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CHENG FAN KWOK v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. No. 638. Argued May 2, 1968. Decided June 10, 1968. Jules E. Coven argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Abraham Lebenkoff. Charles Gordon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Francis X. Beytagh, Jr. William H. Dempsey, Jr., by invitation of the Court, 390 U. S. 918, argued the cause and filed a brief, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. The narrow question presented by this case is whether jurisdiction to review the denial of a stay of deportation, if the pertinent order has not been entered in the course of a proceeding conducted under § 242 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 209, 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (b), is, under § 106 (a) of the Act, 75 Stat. 651, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a (a), vested exclusively in the courts of appeals. The question arises from the following circumstances. Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, evidently entered the United States in 1965 as a seaman. The terms of his entry permitted him to remain in this country for the period during which his vessel was in port, provided that this did not exceed 29 days. See 8 U. S. C. § 1282 (a). He deserted his vessel, and remained unlawfully in the United States. After petitioner’s eventual apprehension, deportation proceedings were conducted by a special inquiry officer under the authority of § 242 (b). Petitioner conceded his deportability, but sought and obtained permission to depart the United States voluntarily. Despite his protestations of good faith, petitioner did not voluntarily depart, and was ultimately ordered to surrender for deportation. He then requested a stay of deportation from a district director of immigration, pending the submission and disposition of an application for adjustment of status under 8 U. S. C. § 1153 (a) (7) (1964 ed., Supp. II). The district director concluded that petitioner is ineligible for such an adjustment of status, and. denied a stay of deportation. Petitioner thereupon commenced these proceedings in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, petitioning for review of the denial of a stay. The Court of Appeals held that the provisions of § 106 (a), under which it would otherwise have exclusive jurisdiction to review the district director’s order, are inapplicable to orders denying ancillary relief unless those orders either are entered in the course of a proceeding conducted under § 242 (b), or are denials of motions to reopen such proceedings. The court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. 381 F. 2d 542. We granted certiorari because the courts of appeals have disagreed as to the proper construction of the pertinent statutory provisions. 390 U. S. 918. For reasons that follow, we affirm. I. It is useful first to summarize the relevant provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and of the regulations promulgated under the Act’s authority. Section 242 (b) provides a detailed administrative procedure for determining whether an alien may be deported. It permits the entry of an order of deportation only upon the basis of a record made in a proceeding before a special inquiry officer, at which the alien is assured rights to counsel, to a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence in his own behalf. By regulation, various forms of discretionary relief may also be sought from the special inquiry officer in the course of the deportation proceeding; an alien may, for example, request that his deportation be temporarily withheld, on the ground that he might, in the country to which he is to be deported, “be subject to persecution . . . See 8 U. S. C. § 1253 (h) (1964 ed., Supp. II); 8 CFR § 242.8 (a). Other forms of discretionary relief may be requested after termination of the deportation proceeding. The regulations thus provide that an alien “under a final administrative order of deportation” may apply to the district director “having jurisdiction over the place where the alien is at the time of filing” for a stay of deportation. 8 CFR § 243.4. The stay may be granted by the district director “in his discretion.” Ibid. If the stay is denied, the denial “is not appealable” to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Ibid. Section 106 (a) provides that the procedures for judicial review prescribed by the Hobbs Act, 64 Stat. 1129, 68 Stat. 961, “shall apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation heretofore or hereafter made against aliens . . . pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 242 (b) of this Act . . . .” These procedures vest in the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders issued by specified federal agencies. In situations to which the provisions of § 106 (a) are inapplicable, the alien’s remedies would, of course, ordinarily lie first in an action brought in an appropriate district court. The positions of the various parties may be summarized as follows. We are urged by both petitioner and the Immigration Service to hold that the provisions of § 106 (a) are applicable to the circumstances presented by this case, and that judicial review thus is available only in the courts of appeals. The Immigration Service contends that § 106 (a) should be understood to embrace all determinations "directly affecting the execution of the basic deportation order,” whether those determinations have been reached prior to, during, or subsequent to the deportation proceeding. In contrast, amicus urges, as the Court of Appeals held, that § 106 (a) encompasses only those orders made in the course of a proceeding conducted under § 242 (b) or issued upon motions to reopen such proceedings. II. This is the third case in which we have had occasion to examine the effect of § 106 (a). In the first, Foti v. Immigration Service, 375 U. S. 217, the petitioner, in the course of a proceeding conducted under § 242 (b), conceded his deportability but requested a suspension of deportation under § 244 (a)(5). The special inquiry officer denied such a suspension, and petitioner’s appeal from the denial was dismissed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Petitioner commenced an action in the district court, but the action was dismissed on the ground that, under § 106 (a), his exclusive remedy lay in the courts of appeals. He then petitioned for review to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but it dismissed for want of jurisdiction. A divided court held en banc that the procedures of § 106 (a) were inapplicable to denials of discretionary relief under § 244 (a)(5). 308 F. 2d 779. On certiorari, we reversed, holding that “all determinations made during and incident to the administrative proceeding conducted by a special inquiry officer, and reviewable together by the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . are . . . included within the ambit of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under § 106 (a).” 375 U. S., at 229. In the second case, Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U. S. 18, petitioner moved before the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen proceedings, previously conducted under § 242 (b), that had terminated in an order for his deportation. The Board denied relief. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Board’s denial was not embraced by § 106 (a), and dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. 308 F. 2d 347. On cer-tiorari, this Court held, in a brief per curiam opinion, that such orders were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. Although Foti strongly suggests the result that we reach today, neither it nor Giova can properly be regarded as controlling in this situation. Unlike the order in Foti, the order in this case was not entered in the course of a proceeding conducted by a special inquiry officer under §242 (b); unlike the order in Giova, the order here did not deny a motion to reopen such a proceeding. We regard the issue of statutory construction involved here as markedly closer than the questions pre-sen ted in those cases; at the least, it is plainly an isssue upon which differing views may readily be entertained. In these circumstances, it is imperative, if we are accurately to implement Congress' purposes, to “seiz[e] every thing from which aid can be derived.” Fisher v. Blight, 2 Cranch 358, 386. It is important, first, to emphasize the character of the statute with which we are concerned. Section 106 (a) is intended exclusively to prescribe and regulate a portion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. As a jurisdictional statute, it must be construed both with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes. Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U. S. 39, 44. Further, as a statute addressed entirely to “specialists,” it must, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, “be read by judges with the minds of . . . specialists.” We cannot, upon close reading, easily reconcile the position urged by the Immigration Service with the terms of § 106 (a). A denial by a district director of a stay of deportation is not literally a “final order of deportation,” nor is it, as was the order in Foti, entered in the course of administrative proceedings conducted under § 242 (b) . Thus, the order in this case was issued more than three months after the entry of the final order of deportation, in proceedings entirely distinct from those conducted under § 242 (b), by an officer other than the special inquiry officer who, as required by § 242 (b), presided over the deportation proceeding. The order here did not involve the denial of a motion to reopen proceedings conducted under § 242 (b), or to reconsider any final order of deportation. Concededly, the application for a stay assumed the prior existence of an order of deportation, but petitioner did not “attack the deportation order itself but instead [sought] relief not inconsistent with it.” Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F. 2d 772, 777. If, as the Immigration Service urges, § 106 (a) embraces all determinations “directly affecting the execution of” a final deportation order, Congress has selected language remarkably inapposite for its purpose. As Judge Friendly observed in a similar case, if “Congress had wanted to go that far, presumably it would have known how to say so.” Ibid. The legislative history of § 106 (a) does not strengthen the position of the Immigration Service. The “basic purpose” of the procedural portions of the 1961 legislation was, as we stated in Foti, evidently “to expedite the deportation of undesirable aliens by preventing successive dilatory appeals to various federal courts . . . .” 375 U. S., at 226. Congress prescribed for this purpose several procedural innovations, among them the device of direct petitions for review to the courts of appeals. Although, as the Immigration Service has emphasized, the broad purposes of the legislation might have been expected to encompass orders denying discretionary relief entered outside § 242 (b) proceedings, there is evidence that Congress deliberately restricted the application of § 106 (a) to orders made in the course of proceedings conducted under § 242 (b). Thus, during a colloquy on the floor of the House of Representatives, to which we referred in Foti, Representative Moore, co-sponsor of the bill then under discussion, suggested that any difficulties resulting from the separate consideration of deportability and of discretionary relief could be overcome by “a change in the present administrative practice of considering the issues . . . piecemeal. There is no reason why the Immigration Service could not change its regulations to permit contemporaneous court consideration of deportability and administrative application for relief.” 105 Cong. Rec. 12728. In the same colloquy, Representative Walter, the chairman of the subcommittee that conducted the pertinent hearings, recognized that certain forms of discretionary relief may be requested in the course of a deportation proceeding, and stated that § 106 (a) would apply to the disposition of such requests, “just as it would apply to any other issue brought up in deportation proceedings.” 105 Cong. Rec. 12728 (emphasis added). Similarly, Representative Walter, in a subsequent debate, responded to a charge that judicial review under § 106 (a) would prove inadequate because of the absence of a suitable record, by inviting “the gentleman’s attention to the law in section 242, in which the procedure for the examiner is set forth in detail.” 107 Cong. Rec. 12179. We believe that, in combination with the terms of § 106 (a) itself, these statements lead to the inference that Congress quite deliberately restricted the application of § 106 (a) to orders entered during proceedings conducted under § 242 (b), or directly challenging deportation orders themselves. This is concededly “a choice between uncertainties,” but we are “content to choose the lesser.” Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 288. We need not speculate as to Congress’ purposes. Quite possibly, as Judge Browning has persuasively suggested, “Congress visualized a single administrative proceeding in which all questions relating to an alien’s deportation would be raised and-resolved, followed by a single petition in a court of appeals for judicial review . . . .” Yamada v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 384 F. 2d 214, 218. It may therefore be that Congress expected the Immigration Service to include within the § 242 (b) proceeding “all issues which might affect deportation.” Ibid. Possibly, as amicus cogently urges, Congress wished to limit petitions to the courts of appeals to situations in which quasi-judicial hearings had been conducted. It is enough to emphasize that neither of these purposes would be in any fashion impeded by the result we reach today. We hold that the judicial review provisions of § 106 (a) embrace only those determinations made during a proceeding conducted under § 242 (b), including those determinations made incident to a motion to reopen such proceedings. This result is entirely consistent with our opinion in Foti. There, it was repeatedly stated in the opinion of The Chief Justice that the order held reviewable under § 106 (a) had, as the regulations required, been entered in the course of a proceeding conducted under § 242 (b). 375 U. S., at 218, 222-223, 224, 226, 228, 229, 232. It. was emphasized that “the administrative discretion to grant a suspension of deportation,” the determination involved in Foti, “has historically been consistently exercised as an integral part of the proceedings which have led to the issuance of a final deportation order.” Id., at 223. A suspension of deportation “must be requested prior to or during the deportation hearing.” Ibid. Moreover, it was explicitly recognized that, although modification of the pertinent regulations might “effectively broaden or narrow the scope of review available in the Courts of Appeals,” this was “nothing anomalous.” Id., at 229-230. An essential premise of Foti was thus that the application of § 106 (a) had been limited to orders “made during the same proceedings in which deportability is determined . . . Id., at 224. The per curiam opinion in Giova did not take a wider view of § 106 (a). The denial of an application to reopen a deportation proceeding is readily distinguishable from a denial of a stay of deportation, in which there is no attack upon the deportation order or upon the proceeding in which it was entered. Petitions to reopen, like motions for rehearing or reconsideration, are, as the Immigration Service urged in Foti, “intimately and immediately associated” with the final orders they seek to challenge. Thus, petitions to reopen deportation proceedings are governed by the regulations applicable to the deportation proceeding itself, and, indeed, are ordinarily presented for disposition to the special inquiry officer who entered the deportation order. The result in Giova was thus a logical concomitant of the construction of § 106 (a) reached in Foti; it did not, explicitly or by implication, broaden that construction in any fashion that encompasses this situation. The result we reach today will doubtless mean that, on occasion, the review of denials of discretionary relief will be conducted separately from the review of an order of deportation involving the same alien. Nonetheless, this does not seem an onerous burden, nor is it one that cannot be avoided, at least in large part, by appropriate action of the Immigration Service itself. More important, although “there is no table of logarithms for statutory construction,” it is the result that we believe most consistent both with Congress’ intentions and with the terms by which it has chosen to express those intentions. Affirmed. We emphasize that no questions are presented as to petitioner’s deportability or as to the propriety in his situation of any discretionary relief. We intimate no views on any such questions. The facts concerning petitioner’s entry into, and subsequent stay in, the United States appear to have been conceded in the proceeding before the special inquiry officer. Section 1282 (a) provides in relevant part that “(a) No alien crewman shall be permitted to land temporarily in the United States except ... for a period of time, in any event, not to exceed— (1) the period of time (not exceeding twenty-nine days) during which the vessel . . . remains in port We note, as we did in Foti v. Immigration Service, 375 U. S. 217, that the “granting of voluntary departure relief does not result in the alien’s not being subject to an outstanding final order of deportation.” Id., at 219, n. 1. Section 1153 (a) (7) (1964 ed., Supp. II) provides in part that “ [c] onditional entries shall next be made available ... to aliens who satisfy an Immigration and Naturalization Service officer . . . that (i) because of persecution or fear of persecution . . . they have fled . . . from any Communist or Communist-dominated country . . . .” Conditional entries are available only to refugees, and, like the parole system, grant “temporary harborage in this country for humane considerations or for reasons rooted in public interest." C. Gordon & R. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 2.54 (1967). See also id., at § 2.27h. Compare the following: Skiftos v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 332 F. 2d 203 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Talavera v. Pederson, 334 F. 2d 52 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Samala v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 336 F. 2d 7 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Mendez v. Major, 340 F. 2d 128 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Melone v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 355 F. 2d 533 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F. 2d 772 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Yamada v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 384 F. 2d 214 (C. A. 9th Cir.); De Lucia v. Attorney General, - U. S. App. D. C. -, - F. 2d -. Section 106 (a), 8 U. S. C. § 1105a (a), was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by § 5 (a) of Public Law 87-301, approved September 26, 1961, 75 Stat. 651. Brief for Respondent 28. Since the Immigration Service had aligned itself with petitioner on this question, the Court invited William H. Dempsey, Jr., Esquire, a member of the Bar of this Court, to appear and present oral argument as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. 390 U. S. 918. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 2 Record of N. Y. C. B. A. 213, 225. We find the emphasis placed in dissent upon the word “pursuant" in § 106 (a) unpersuasive. First, § 106 (a) was evidently limited to those final orders of deportation made “pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 242 fb)” simply because Congress preferred to exclude from it those deportation orders entered without a § 242 (b) proceeding. This would, for example, place orders issued under 8 U. S. C. § 1282 (b), by which the Immigration Service may revoke a seaman’s conditional permit to land and deport him, outside the judicial review procedures of § 106 (a). See generally C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 5.11 (1967). Perhaps this suggests, as amicus urges, that § 106 (a) was intended to be limited to situations in which quasi-judicial proceedings, such as those under §242 (b), have been conducted. It certainly indicates that the reference in § 106 (a) to § 242 (b) proceedings was intended to limit, and not to broaden, the classes of orders to which § 106 (a) may be applied. Second, it must be reiterated that § 106 (a) does not, as the dissenting opinion suggests, encompass “all orders” entered pursuant to §242 (b) proceedings; it is limited to “final orders of deportation.” The textual difficulty, with which the dissenting opinion does not deal, is that the order in question here neither is a final order of deportation, nor is it, as was the order in Foti, “made during the same proceedings” in which a final order of deportation has been issued. 375 U. S., at 224. This cannot be overcome merely by examination of the meaning of the word “pursuant.” The special inquiry officer's decision, which established deport-ability and granted voluntary departure, was issued on March 3, 1966. Petitioner filed his application for a stay on June 20, 1966. The application was evidently denied on the same day. See 375 U. S., at 223-224. The Immigration Service has argued that the limiting language in § 106 (a) may be explained by Congress’ wish to restrict its application to deportation cases, preventing its application to questions arising from exclusion proceedings. We have found nothing in the pertinent legislative history that offers meaningful support to this view. Note, e. g., the apparent exclusion from § 106 (a) of orders entered under 8 U. S. C. § 1282 (b). See generally supra, n. 11. We intimate no views on the possibility that a court of appeals might have “pendent jurisdiction” over denials of discretionary relief, where it already has before it a petition for review from a proceeding conducted under §242 (b). See Foti v. Immigration Service, supra, at 227, n. 14. The opinion of the Court emphasized, in addition, that “[c]learly, changes in administrative procedures may affect the scope and content of various types of agency orders and thus the subject matter embraced in a judicial proceeding to review such orders.” Id., at 230, n. 16. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, supra, at 234. Brief for Respondent, No. 28, October Term 1963, at 53. See 8 CFR § 242.22. If, however, the order of the special inquiry officer is appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, a subsequent motion to reopen or reconsider is presented to the Board for disposition. Ibid. The motion in Giova was presented to the Board and decided by it.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LENG MAY MA v. BARBER, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. No. 105. Argued May 20, 1958. Decided June 16, 1958. Joseph S. Hertogs argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Leonard B. Sand argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Anderson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Julia P. Cooper. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a habeas corpus case involving § 243 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes the Attorney General “to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution. . . Claiming to be an alien "within the United States” by reason of her parole in this country while her admissibility was being determined, petitioner contends that she is eligible to receive the benefactions of § 243 (h). The Attorney General contends that the section is applicable only to aliens who, in contemplation of law, have entered the United States. He argues that petitioner has never enjoyed that status because she eventually was found ineligible for entry and ordered excluded. The District Court denied a writ of habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 241 F. 2d 85. We granted certiorari. 353 U. S. 981 (1957). We conclude that petitioner’s parole did not alter her status as an excluded alien or otherwise bring her “within the United States” in the meaning of § 243 (h). Petitioner is a native of China who arrived in this country in May 1951 claiming United States citizenship on the ground that her father was a United States citizen. Pending determination of her claim, she at first was held in custody, but later, in August 1952, was released on parole. Some three months thereafter, having failed to establish her claim of citizenship, she was ordered excluded, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. She surrendered for deportation in January 1954, and thereafter applied for a stay of deportation under § 243 (h) in which she alleged that her pending deportation to China would subject her to physical persecution and probable death at the hands of the existing government. Her petition for writ of habeas corpus followed administrative notification of her ineligibility for relief under that section. Petitioner does not challenge the validity of her exclusion order or the proceedings culminating therein. She merely contends that by virtue of her physical presence as a parolee she is “within the United States,” and hence covered by § 243 (h). The question, therefore, is wholly one of statutory construction. It is important to note at the outset that our immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission, such as petitioner, and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance the Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are merely “on the threshold of initial entry.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953). See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596 (1953). The distinction was carefully preserved in Title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Chapter 4 subjects those seeking admission to “exclusion proceedings” to determine whether they “shall be allowed to enter or shall be excluded and deported.” 66 Stat. 200, 8 U. S. C. § 1226 (a). On the other hand, Chapter 5 concerns itself with aliens who have already entered the United States and are subject to “expulsion,” as distinguished from “exclusion,” if they fall within certain “general classes of deportable aliens.” 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251. Proceedings for expulsion under Chapter 5 are commonly referred to as “deportation proceedings.” Parenthetically, the word “deportation” appears also in Chapter 4 to refer to the return of excluded aliens from the country, but its use there reflects none of the technical gloss accompanying its use as a word of art in Chapter 5. For over a half century this Court has held that the detention of an alien in custody pending determination of his admissibility does not legally constitute an entry though the alien is physically within the United States. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 215 (1953); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263 (1905); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 661 (1892). It seems quite clear that an alien so confined would not be “within the United States” for purposes of §243 (h). This, in fact, was conceded by respondents in the companion case, Rogers v. Quan, post, p. 193. Our question is whether the granting of temporary parole somehow effects a change in the alien’s legal status. In §212 (d)(5) of the Act, generally a codification of the administrative practice pursuant to which petitioner was paroled, the Congress specifically provided that parole “shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien,” and that after the return to custody the alien’s case “shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioner’s concept of the effect of parole certainly finds no support in this statutory language. This Court previously has had occasion to define the legal status of excluded aliens on parole. In Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U. S. 228 (1925), an excluded alien was paroled to a private Immigrant Aid Society pending deportation. The questions posed were whether the alien was “dwelling in the United States” within the meaning of a naturalization statute, and whether she had “entered or [was] found in the United States” for purpose of limitations. Mr. Justice Holmes disposed of the problem by explicitly equating parole with detention: “The appellant could not lawfully have landed in the United States . . . , and until she legally landed ‘could not have dwelt within the United States.’ Zartarian v. Billings, 204 U. S. 170, 175. Moreover while she was at Ellis Island she was to be regarded as stopped at the boundary line and kept there unless and until her right to enter should be declared. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263. When her prison bounds were enlarged by committing her to the custody of the Hebrew Society, the nature of her stay within the territory was not changed. She was still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United States.” 267 U. S., at 230. We find no evidence that the Congress, in enacting § 243 (h) in 1952, intended to depart from this interpretation. The context in which § 243 (h) appears in the Act persuasively indicates the scope of its provisions. As we have observed, Title II of the Act preserves the distinction between exclusion proceedings and deportation (expulsion) proceedings, Chapter 4 dealing with the former and Chapter 5 with the latter. Within the two chapters are enumerated separate administrative procedures for exclusion and expulsion, separate provisions for removal and transportation, and — most significantly — separate provisions for stays of deportation. Section 243 (h), under which petitioner claims relief, was inserted by the Congress not among Chapter 4’s “Provisions Relating to Entry and Exclusion,” but squarely within Chapter 5 — a strikingly inappropriate place if, as petitioner claims, it was intended to apply to excluded aliens. The parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through which needless confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are conducted. It was never intended to affect an alien’s status, and to hold that petitioner’s parole placed her legally “within the United States” is inconsistent with the congressional mandate, the administrative concept of parole, and the decisions of this Court. Physical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule, and is generally employed only as to security risks or those likely to abscond. See Annual Reports, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1955, pp. 5-6; 1956, pp. 5-6. Certainly this policy reflects the humane qualities of an enlightened civilization. The acceptance of petitioner’s position in this case, however, with its inherent suggestion of an altered parole status, would be quite likely to prompt some curtailment of current parole policy — an intention we are reluctant to impute to the Congress. Affirmed Section 243 (h): “The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.” 66 Stat. 214, 8 U. S. C. § 1253 (h). 66 Stat. 195-204, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1221-1230. 66 Stat. 204-219, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251-1260. See Analysis of S. 716, 82d Cong., General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, pp. 39-42. Section 212 (d) (5): “The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 66 Stat. 188, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (d)(5).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. et al. No. 71-1016. Argued April 19, 1972 Decided June 7, 1972 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all members joined except Stewart, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases, and Powell, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Gordon Gooch argued the cause for petitioner in No. 71-1016. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Samuel Huntington, Leo E. Forguer, J. Richard Tiano, and George W. McHenry. William C. Harvin argued the cause for petitioners in No. 71-1040. With him on the briefs were William R. Choate, Perry O. Barber, Jr., Jeron Stevens, W. DeVier Pierson, and William B. Cassin. Andrew P. Carter argued the cause for respondent Louisiana Power & Light Co. With him on the brief was Thomas W. Leigh. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by J. Lee Rankin, Stanley Buchsbaum, and Francis I. Howley for the City of New York; by Peter H. Schiff for the Public Service Commission for the State of New York; by J. Evans Attwell, Christopher T. Boland, Robert O. Koch, John J. Mullally, and William W. Brackett for the Pipeline Intervenors; by Howard E. Wahrenbrock and John M. Kuykendall, Jr., for Mobile Gas Service Corp. et al.; by Barbara M. Gunther for Brooklyn Union Gas Co.; and by Richard A. Rosan and Daniel L. Bell, Jr., for Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by John J. McKeithen, Governor, Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General, Fred G. Benton, Sr., and Arnold D. Berkeley for the State of Louisiana; by Pat Moran for the Arkansas Public Service Commission; by Martin N. Erck, John R. Rebman, Kirby Ellis, Sherman S. Poland, and Daniel F. Collins for Humble Oil & Refining Co.; by Thomas G. Johnson for Shell Oil Co.; and by J. Donald Annett, Kirk W. Weinert, and John M. Young for Texaco Inc. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Albert G. Norman, Jr., John W. Hinchey, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, John E. Holtzinger, Jr., and Allen E. Lockerman for Atlanta Gas Light Co. et al., and by John T. Miller, Jr., for Monsanto Co. et al. Together with No. 71-1040, United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al., on certiorari to the same court. MR. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. In April 1971 the Federal Power Commission (FPC) promulgated its Order No. 431 requiring every jurisdictional pipeline to report to the FPC whether curtailment of its deliveries to customers would be necessary because of inadequate supply of natural gas. A pipeline anticipating the necessity for curtailment was required to file a revised tariff to control deliveries to all customers— industrial “direct sales” customers, purchasing gas for their own consumption, and “resale” customers, purchasing gas for distribution to ultimate consumers. The principal question here is whether the proviso to § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821,15 U. S. C. § 717, prohibits the FPC from applying its Order No. 431 to curtail direct-sales deliveries in times of natural gas shortage. Section 1 (b) provides: “The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other trans portation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.” (Emphasis supplied.) A subsidiary question presented is whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction obliged the federal courts in this case to defer to the FPC for an initial determination of FPC jurisdiction to certificate a particular pipeline delivery when a certification proceeding to determine that question was pending before the Commission. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the proviso of § 1 (b) prohibited application of FPC curtailment regulations to direct sales deliveries, and held, further, that neither that court nor the District Court was obliged to defer to the FPC’s pending certification proceeding. 456 F. 2d 326 (CA5 1972). We granted certiorari, 405 U. S. 973 (1972). We reverse. I Respondent Louisiana Power & Light Co. (LP&L) generates electricity at Sterlington-Electric Generating Station in Ouachita Parish, Louisiana, and at Nine-Mile Point Generating Station in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The natural gas burned under LP&L’s boilers at both stations is purchased from United Gas Pipe Line Co. (United), a petitioner in No. 71-1040, under direct-sales contracts of long standing. The sales to Sterlington Station are sales of interstate gas, initially certificated by the FPC. Sales to Nine-Mile Point Station had been wholly intrastate gas delivered from United’s intrastate “Green System” when, in 1970, United diverted 2.6%. of the gas from its interstate “Black System” into the intrastate “Green System,” after which United sought FPC certification of the “Green System.” In 1970 also, United, from concern that its gas supply during the 1970-1971 heating season would fall short of demand, sought a declaratory order from the FPC to approve a proposed program of curtailment of natural gas deliveries to both its direct and resale customers. This proceeding culminated in agreement among affected customers under which FPC allowed United to carry out its program for the 1970-1971 winter. When, however, United made a supplemental filing in February 1971, for a proposed curtailment program for the 1971 summer season, LP&L, in March 1971, filed this diversity action in the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, alleging that the program was a breach of its contracts with United and asking injunctive relief against its implementation. LP&L also asked for a judgment declaring that the “Green System” was an intrastate system, deliveries from which did not require FPC certification. The FPC and United sought dismissal of the action on the ground that a prior decision by the District Court would be destructive of the FPC’s primary jurisdiction since the FPC was, in fact, asserting its jurisdiction over both issues at that time and was promulgating its Order No. 431, and United, in response to Order No. 431, was filing its third curtailment plan. In opposition to the motions to dismiss in the District Court, LP&L argued that the FPC was without jurisdiction to authorize or approve curtailment programs affecting direct-sales deliveries and was also without jurisdiction to curtail deliveries to Nine-Mile Point Station because they were local and not interstate deliveries. On June 30, 1971, the District Court dismissed the action, holding that the FPC had jurisdiction of both curtailment and certification proceedings and that LP&L had to exhaust its administrative remedies in both, 332 F. Supp. 692 (1971). The Court of Appeals decision reversed this dismissal. II United is a “jurisdictional” pipeline purchasing gas from producers in Texas and Louisiana and supplying wholesalers, direct-sales customers, and other pipelines. United supplies ultimate consumers throughout the eastern half of the United States from Texas to Massachusetts with a peak-day commitment in the winter heating months totaling about 6,000,000 thousand cubic feet (Mcf). In 1970, as part of a pattern of temporary and chronic natural gas shortages throughout the Nation, United found itself unable to meet all of its contract commitments during peak demand periods. Indeed, on days of greatest use, United expected to fall short by as much as 20% or more. In October 1970 United first promulgated a proposed delivery curtailment plan and sought a declaratory order from the FPC that the plan was consistent with United's obligations under its tariff and direct-sales contracts. Many of United’s contracts with its customers made some provision for curtailment in times of temporary shortage, but these terms were complex and were not identical in all contracts or in United’s tariff filings with the Commission. United’s proposed curtailment plan established a priority system of three groups, curtailed on the basis of end use. These three groups were, in order of the lowest priority and curtailed first, gas used for industrial purposes, including gas to generate electricity for industrial purposes; gas used to generate electricity consumed by domestic consumers; and gas used by domestic consumers. See United Gas Pipe Line Co., F. P. C. Op. No. 606, Oct. 5, 1971. The plan made no distinction between direct-sales customers and resale customers. This plan was opposed by LP&L and others, primarily on the ground that the FPC had no jurisdiction to curtail deliveries under direct-sales contracts. While preserving their objections, all but one of United’s customers agreed to a modified plan to go into effect for the 1970-1971 winter season while the proceedings continued. During this same season, many other pipelines reported serious shortages and applied to the FPC for assistance in effecting curtailment plans. In response, the FPC promulgated several emergency provisions for temporary measures to avoid major disruptions of power supplies. Orders Nos. 402, 35 Fed. Reg. 7511, and 402A, 35 Fed. Reg. 8927, authorized short-term purchases by pipelines facing shortages from other jurisdictional pipelines to ensure that storage fields were filled. Order No. 418, 35 Fed. Reg. 19173, authorized similar emergency purchases from producers without following usual procedures. It was because these measures were found to be insufficient that the FPC promulgated Order No. 431, 36 Fed. Reg. 7505. The Order recommended that in filing the required tariff revisions, “ [consideration should be given to the curtailment of volumes equivalent to all interruptible sales and to the curtailment of large boiler fuel sales where alternate fuels are available.” Finally, Order No. 431 provided: “Jurisdictional pipelines have the responsibility in the first instance to adopt a curtailment program by filing appropriate tariffs. Such tariffs, if approved by the Commission, will control in all respects notwithstanding inconsistent provisions in sales contracts, jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional, entered into prior to the date of the approval of the tariff.” United’s revised tariff program filed in compliance with this order immediately became subject to the pending hearing for a declaratory order. On October 5, 1971, the FPC announced its interim decision, Op. No. 606, finding jurisdiction to effect a curtailment program for all customers, revising United’s latest filing slightly, and remanding other issues in the plan to a hearing examiner. On November 2, 1971, United’s plan, as modified, went into full effect. The appeal of LP&L and others from the FPC decision, Op. No. 606, is pending in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Also, in October 1970, based on the introduction of the interstate gas from its Black System, United sought certification under § 7 (c) for the continued operation of the portion of its pipeline facilities in Louisiana (the Green System) used to supply LP&L’s Nine-Mile Point generating station. LP&L opposed the application, alleging that the pipeline was constructed and operated to be wholly intrastate, and that United’s “illegal” introduction of a very small quantity of interstate gas did not cause the whole system to come under Commission jurisdiction. On February 9, 1972, the Commission found in Op. No. 610 that the Green System was within its jurisdiction and thus required certification; it remanded the proceedings to a trial examiner to determine if the certificate should be granted under the “public convenience and necessity” standard of § 7. The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District Court on the curtailment issue rested on its view that under the Natural Gas Act . . FPC has no form of continuing certificate jurisdiction over direct sales to customers of interstate pipeline companies. It has the initial right to issue or veto a certificate of public convenience and necessity and it must give its approval to the abandonment of the use of the certificated facilities, but between the two functions the express exemption [in the proviso of § 1 (b)] of regulatory power over such consumptive sales bars agency intervention.” 456 F. 2d, at 338. The Court of Appeals’ holding that United’s injection of interstate gas from its Black System into the theretofore intrastate Green System did not establish FPC jurisdiction to certificate the Green System, rested on its finding that the record showed that “the flow of gas from the Black system into the Green system in the case at bar is occasional and irregular, as well as minimal. The Green system, as an entire and separate unit, is physically located and functions entirely in Louisiana. Therefore, the undisputed facts show that the channel of constant flow is an intrastate and not an interstate channel. The regulation of the Green system is substantially and essentially a localized matter committed to Louisiana’s jurisdiction.” 456 F. 2d, at 339-340. III The Natural Gas Act of 1938 granted FPC broad powers “to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies.” FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 610 (1944). See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 19 (1961); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U. S. 137, 147 (1960). To that end, Congress “meant to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme,” Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 332 U. S. 507, 520 (1947), of dual state and federal authority. Although federal jurisdiction was not to be exclusive, FPC regulation was to be broadly complementary to that reserved to the States, so that there would be no “gaps” for private interests to subvert the public welfare. This congressional blueprint has guided judicial interpretation of the broad language defining FPC jurisdiction, and “when a dispute arises over whether a given transaction is within the scope of federal or state regulatory authority, we are not inclined to approach the problem negatively, thus raising the possibility that a ‘no man's land’ will be created. Compare Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U. S. 1. That is to say, in a borderline case where congressional authority is not explicit we must ask whether state authority can practicably regulate a given area and, if we find that it cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority governs.” FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., supra, at 19-20. This litigation poses the question whether FPC has authority to effect orderly curtailment plans involving both direct sales and sales for resale. LP&L insists that the FPC has no power to include direct sales in these plans. Transcontinental counsels inquiry into the necessary consequences of that contention in terms of the scope of federal and state regulatory authority in the premises. Thirty-seven percent of United's total sales in 1970 were direct industrial sales. Under LP&L’s argument, this volume would be wholly exempt from any curtailment plan approved by the FPC and thus United’s resale customers would be forced to accept the entire burden of sharply reduced volumes while direct-sales customers received full contract service. The ultimate consumers thus affected include schools, hospitals, and homes completely dependent on a continued natural gas supply for heating and other domestic uses. These resale consumers could be curtailed by as much as 560,000 Mcf on cold days without dire consequences, but burdening them with the full curtailment volume would deprive them of up to 1,500,000 Mcf. From a practical point of view, LP&L’s position may thus produce a seriously inequitable system of gas distribution. Many direct industrial users of gas require only “interruptible services,” which by the terms of their contracts are recognized to be of such minimal importance to the user that, upon the happening of certain events, the supply can be shut off on little or no notice. Nevertheless, the need for curtailment may not be sufficient to trigger these provisions of the contract and interruptible service customers may be able to demand full contract gas while resale consumers are being drastically curtailed. Many other direct industrial sales customers have alternative means available at little or no additional cost, yet under LP&L’s contention will be able to demand their contract volumes while homes, hospitals, and schools suffer from lack of adequate service. Can state authority practicably regulate in this area to prevent this inequity and hardship? Insofar as state plans purport to curtail deliveries of interstate gas, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923), is authority that such plans, when they operate to withdraw a large volume of gas from an established interstate current whereby it is supplied to customers in other States, would constitute a prohibited interference with interstate commerce. But even to the extent the States may constitutionally promulgate curtailment plans, the inevitable result would be varied regulatory programs of state courts and agencies, interpreting a countless number of different contracts and applying a variety of state agency rules. The conflicting results would necessarily produce allocations determined simply by the ability of each customer to pump its desired volume from a pipeline. Moreover, in some States, Louisiana for example, the state regulatory agency is forbidden to regulate direct-sales contracts. Besides, a state agency empowered to regulate these contracts would be obliged to regulate in the State, not the national interest. Cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra. The unavoidable conflict between producing States and consuming States will create contradictory regulations that cannot possibly be equitably resolved by the courts. With these problems in mind, the desirability of uniform federal regulation is abundantly clear. Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, 456 F. 2d, at 335, a need for federal regulation does not establish FPC jurisdiction that Congress has not granted. We turn then to analysis of the statute to determine whether Congress withheld, as LP&L argues, authority from the FPC to apply its curtailment regulations to direct sales. IV In § 1 (b) of the Act, “[t]hree things and three only Congress drew within its own regulatory power, delegated by the Act to- its agent, the Federal Power Commission. These were: (1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce for resale; and (3) natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale.” Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 332 U. S., at 516. Each of these is an independent grant of jurisdiction and, though the Act's application to “sales” is limited to sales of interstate gas' for resale, the Act applies to interstate • “transportation” regardless of whether the gas transported is ultimately sold retail or wholesale. FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464, 468 (1950). LP&L argues that the proviso in § 1 (b) creates a complete exemption of direct sales from curtailment regulations. The answer is that the prohibition of the proviso of § 1 (b) withheld from FPC only rate-setting authority with respect to direct sales. Curtailment regulations are not rate-setting regulations but regulations of the “transportation” of natural gas and thus within FPC jurisdiction under the opening sentence of § 1 (b) that “[t]he provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce-. . . .” The Court of Appeals rejected that construction on the ground that under it the “transportation” jurisdiction would swallow up the proviso’s exemption for direct sales. We disagree. The major impetus for the congressional grant of sales jurisdiction to the FPC was furnished by a Federal Trade Commission study of the pipeline industry in 1935-1936. The study showed that increasing concentration in the industry was producing vast economic power for the pipelines and a serious threat of unreasonably high prices for consumers. This threat was most acute in the case of sales for resale because wholesale distributors and their customers had little economic clout with which to obtain equitable prices from the pipelines. State power to regulate rates charged for interstate service to a customer in another State for resale was also thought, within this Court’s decisions, constitutionally to be outside the regulatory power of the States. Public Utilities Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927); Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298 (1924). In response to this report and pressures from state regulatory agencies, Congress enacted a federal “sales” jurisdiction in the Natural Gas Act, by which Congress granted rate-setting authority to the Commission over all interstate sales for resale. But as this Court, in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 252 U. S. 23 (1920), had sustained state authority to regulate rates for “direct” sales, and, moreover, the need for federal authority here was not deemed acute, Congress withheld rate-setting jurisdiction over direct sales. That rate setting was the only subject matter covered by “sales” jurisdiction and the “direct sales” exception is clear from the legislative history of the proviso. The original phrasing of the proviso was: “Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Commission to fix rates or charges for the sale of natural gas distributed locally in low-pressure mains or for the sale of natural gas for industrial use only.” Hearing on H. R. 11662 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1936) (emphasis supplied). The phrasing was changed and the words “to fix rates or charges” were subsequently deleted, but the House committee report confirms that the proviso as finally phrased was nevertheless meant to be restricted to rate setting. H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1937), states: “It was urged in connection with earlier bills that there should be inserted at the end of this subsection a proviso as follows: “ ‘Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Commission to fix the rates or charges to the public for the sale of natural gas distributed locally.’ “In order to avoid misunderstanding the committee thought it necessary to omit this proviso from the present bill for the following reasons, even though there is entire agreement with the intended policy which would have prompted its inclusion: First, it would have been surplusage if interpreted as it was intended to be interpreted, and, second, it would have been, in all likelihood, a source of confusion if interpreted in any other way. For example, it was felt that in the effort to find a reason for its inclusion it might have been argued that it exempted sales to a publicly owned distributing company, and such an exemption is not, of course, intended. It is believed that the purposes of this proviso, assuming the need for any such provision, are fully covered in the present provision by the language — ‘but shall not apply to any other . . . sales of natural gas.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) The author of the changed version, the General Solicitor of the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, confirmed this interpretation. Hearing on H. R. 4008, before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 143. Thus, Congress’ grant of sales jurisdiction as to sales for resale and the prohibition as to direct sales were meant to apply exclusively to rate setting, and in no wise limited the broad base of “transportation” jurisdiction granted the FPC. That head of jurisdiction plainly embraces regulation of the quantities of gas that pipelines may transport, for in that respect Congress created “a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme,” Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 332 U. S., at 520, to “afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection . . . .” At lantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 360 U. S. 378, 388 (1959). “Therefore, when we are presented with an attempt by the federal authority to control a problem that is not, by its very nature, one with which state regulatory commissions can be expected to deal, the conclusion is irresistible that Congress desired regulation by federal authority rather than non-regulation.” FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S., at 28. Comprehensive and equitable curtailment plans for gas transported in interstate commerce, as already mentioned, are practically beyond the competence of state regulatory agencies. Congress was also aware that Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923), casts serious doubt upon the constitutionality of state regulation of such plans. That decision was considered in the deliberations on the Natural Gas Act and was cited to the House Committee as a reason for federal regulation. Hearing on H. R. 11662 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1936). Finally, this Court has already stated its view that curtailment plans are aspects of FPC’s “transportation” and not its “sales” jurisdiction. In Panhandle Eastern, 332 U. S., at 523, we said: “[T]he matter of interrupting service is one largely related ... to transportation and thus within the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission to control, in accommodation of any conflicting interests among various states.” y Since curtailment programs fall within the FPC’s responsibilities under the head of its “transportation” jurisdiction, the Commission must possess broad powers to devise effective means to meet these responsibilities. FPC and other agencies created to protect the public interest must be free, “within the ambit of their statutory authority, to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances.” FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 586 (1942). Section 16 of the Act assures the FPC the necessary degree of flexibility in providing that: “The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act. . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 717o. In applying this section, we have held that “the width of administrative authority must be measured in part by the purposes for which it was conferred .... Surely the Commission’s broad responsibilities therefore demand a generous construction of its statutory authority.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 776 (1968); see United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 385 U. S. 83, 89-90 (1966). The substantive standard governing FPC evaluation of curtailment plans is found in § 4 (b) of the Act: “No natural-gas company shall, with respect to any transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service.” 15 U. S. C. § 717c (b). Two procedural mechanisms are available to enforce this antidiscriminatory provision of § 4(b). As to a tariff already on file and in effect, the FPC may proceed under §5 (a). The § 5 (a) procedure has substantial disadvantages, however, rendering it unsuitable for the evaluation of curtailment plans. The FPC must afford interested parties a full hearing on the reasonableness of the tariff before taking any remedial action, and, as we have observed, “the delay incident to determination in § 5 proceedings through which initial certificated rates [as well as “practices” and “contracts”] are reviewable appears nigh interminable.” Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 360 U. S., at 389. In addition a prescribed remedial order can have only prospective application. FPC has therefore chosen to process curtailment plans under §§ 4 (c), (d), and (e). Under these provisions, a pipeline's tariff amendments filed with the FPC go into effect in 30 days unless suspended by the Commission. If a filing is challenged or the FPC of its own motion deems it appropriate, it may suspend the amended tariff for up to five months, at the end of which time the amended tariff becomes effective pending the completion of hearings. In these hearings, the pipeline has the burden of proving that its plan is reasonable and fair. Order No. 431 makes full use of the § 4 procedures. All pipelines facing shortages necessitating curtailment are required to file reasonable allocation schemes as amendments to their existing tariffs, or to state that the existing tariffs are adequate. When emergency or other conditions arise and it appears desirable in the public interest to place a plan into effect, the FPC may accept the filing, implement it immediately or suspend it, and employ the plan as a working guideline while hearings continue. In addition to the flexibility of this arrangement, the requirement that pipelines submit plans enables the FPC to utilize each pipeline’s unique knowledge of its customers’ needs, ability to substitute other fuel sources, and other relevant considerations. The Court of Appeals held that, under our decision in FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S., at 17, FPC authority over direct-sales contracts is limited to a “veto power” to be exercised only in certification proceedings under § 7 (c) and abandonment proceedings under § 7 (b). We reject this argument on two grounds. First, Transcontinental dealt with FPC’s authority to consider direct-sales rates in certification proceedings. We there noted that under § 1 (b) FPC jurisdiction over rates was limited. The litigation here, unlike Transcontinental, does not involve rates and therefore the provision of § 1 (b) is wholly inapplicable. Secondly, Transcontinental dealt only with FPC "veto power” under § 7, and in no way limited FPC authority under § 4 (b) to prevent discrimination among a pipeline’s customers. Since § 4 (b) deals with “service,” the FPC may invoke it to deal with curtailment programs, whether or not it could also invoke § 7 for that purpose. Amici have argued that permitting the pipeline’s tariff amendments to take effect despite contrary terms in existing contracts is inconsistent with our decision in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332 (1956). In that case, however, we dealt with an attempt by a pipeline unilaterally to effect a change in its contract terms by making a filing under § 4. In the present cause, the issue is whether the FPC, acting under the head of its transportation jurisdiction and its broad mandate under § 16, may order pipelines facing shortages to develop and submit rational curtailment arrangements. Our holding in Mobile Gas Service Corp. does not govern the decision of this issue since, as we observed in that case: “[D] enying to natural gas companies the power unilaterally to change their contracts in no way impairs the regulatory powers of the Commission, for the contracts remain fully subject to the paramount power of the Commission to modify them when necessary in the public interest.” 350 U. S., at 344. We conclude therefore that the FPC has the jurisdiction asserted here and that the Natural Gas Act fully authorizes the method chosen by the FPC for its exercise. VI In addition to holding that the proviso to § 1 (b) prohibited curtailment of gas delivered to the Nine-Mile Point Station, the Court of Appeals held that those deliveries were not regulable by the FPC because “the flow of gas from the Black system into the Green system . . . is occasional and irregular, as well as minimal,” and that “[t]he Green system, as an entire and separate unit, is physically located and functions entirely in Louisiana”; the court concluded that, for these reasons, “[t]he regulation of the Green system is substantially and essentially a localized matter committed to Louisiana’s jurisdiction.” 456 F. 2d, at 339-340. The Court of Appeals erred in deciding this question. The FPC had exercised its primary jurisdiction and was conducting proceedings to determine whether the Green System was subject to its jurisdiction. In that circumstance, the District Court and the Court of Appeals were obliged to defer to the FPC for the initial determination of its jurisdiction. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). The need to protect the primary authority of an agency to determine its own jurisdiction “is obviously greatest when the precise issue brought before a court is in the process of litigation through procedures originating in the [agency]. While the [agency’s] decision is not the last word, it must assuredly be the first.” Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Interlake S. S. Co., 370 U. S. 173, 185 (1962). Review of the FPC decision may proceed in due course pursuant to § 19 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717r (b). We see no need to make the same disposition as to the curtailment question since the Court of Appeals had Op. No. 606 before it and acted upon the opinion in reaching its decision. Reversed. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of these cases. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. A "jurisdictional” pipeline transports natural gas in interstate commerce and for that reason is subject to FPC certification jurisdiction. The “jurisdictional” label is also sometimes used to apply to sales, in which case it refers to interstate sales for resale, which are subject to Commission rate regulation. FPC Staff Report No. 2, National Gas Supply and Demand 1971-1990 (1972): “The emergence of a natural gas shortage during the past two years marks a historic turning point — the end of natural gas industry growth uninhibited by supply considerations. Not only has the Nation’s proven gas reserve inventory for the lower 48 states been shrinking for the past three years, but major pipeline companies and distributors in most parts of the country have been forced to refuse requests for additional gas service from large industrial customers and from many new customers. For practical short-term purposes we are confronted with the fact that current proven reserves in the lower 48 states, as reported by the American Gas Association, have dropped from 289.3 trillion cubic feet in 1967 to 259.6 in 1970, a 10.3 percent drop within a three-year period. Furthermore, approximately 95 percent of this proven reserve inventory is already committed to gas sales contracts and is therefore unavailable for sales to new customers or for increased volumes to old customers.” Id., at xi. Demand for natural gas fluctuates sharply from season to season and from day to day. Nationally, peak days occur in winter heating months. For LP&L, however, the need for gas is greatest in the summer months, when air conditioning increases electricity consumption. Many of the facts are taken from the recitals in the petitions for certiorari, which draw upon evidence presented before the FPC in the curtailment proceedings. LP&L has not challenged their accuracy except to argue that no significant gas shortage actually exists. Our decision in this case in no way limits LP&L’s freedom to argue its position as to the facts on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals. The Commission has authority to issue declaratory orders under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 554 (e). The record in these cases does not contain all the contract terms dealing with curtailment of deliveries. United’s two contracts with LP&L under consideration in this litigation, however, indicate that the terms vary from year to year and customer to customer since these two contracts themselves establish slightly different priority systems. Moreover, LP&L informs us that its contracts had terms slightly different from those in most other direct-sales contracts. The objecting party appealed the decision of the FPC and that case is now pending in the District of Columbia. The petitions of the Solicitor General and United for review here of the FPC decision prior to judgment of the Court of Appeals were denied. 406 U. S. 973 (1972). Section 7 (c) provides: “No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations . . . 15 U. S. C. § 717f (c). Argument was heard in the Fifth Circuit in November 1971, one month after the FPC decision in No. 606. The Court of Appeals decision was announced in January 1972, one month before the FPC decision in No. 610. La. Const., Art. 6, § 4. The conflict between producing and consuming States over state or federal regulatory authority is highlighted in the contrast between Louisiana’s amicus brief in this litigation and the statement of the Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission in another case. Louisiana, a producing State, submits: “Historically, gas producing states have certain advantages over states which do not have their own gas supply. Their very proximity to the source of production attracts industries which use gas as the raw material without which their plants could not operate. The lower transportation costs of delivering gas to other industrial and commercial users within the state makes its use particularly attractive for such applications. It is not surprising, therefore, that producing states have a higher proportion of industrial-commercial consumption of total gas consumed and of firm gas than consuming states. Louisiana utilizes 84% of the total quantity of firm gas sold in the state for industrial and power plant generation purposes, in comparison to a national average of only 37%. “Louisiana’s economy is heavily dependent upon the availability of a firm, reliable and uninterrupted supply of natural gas. Statewide investment by industrial category clearly reflects the predominance of petroleum, refineries and chemicals which represented $465,297,370 or 76% of a total industrial investment of $609,578,850 in 1970. Apart from these industries which use natural gas as process gas without which their plants cannot function, the state’s electric utilities are completely dependent upon natural gas as fuel for electric generators. “Thus, the economic welfare of the state hinges upon the continued delivery of the volumes of gas it received and used prior to United’s curtailment and upon the ability to draw upon greater volumes. Otherwise, its economy will be frozen at or below its present level. This is not true of other states in which natural gas plays a subsidiary rather than a dominant role in the overall economy of the state and in which the electrical utilities have alternate power sources such as coal, imported liquefied natural gas and inexpensive hydroelectric power.” Brief of State of Louisiana Amicus Curiae 2-3. As observed in FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S. 1 (1961), consuming States prefer federal regulation. The Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission summed up this position in In re Cabot Gas Corp., 16 P. U. R. (N. S.) 443 (1936): “There can be but one opinion among those who believe in the conservation of natural resources. They should be developed not to benefit a few individuals but in the interests of public welfare present and future. Our natural gas resources ought to be conserved and there is probably no field where the Federal government acting in the interests of the entire country and to protect the welfare of the future could accomplish more than in the natural gas industry. From a conservation viewpoint, I thoroughly agree with Commissioner Burritt, and if I could see how a denial of the present petition would work to this end, I would vote to refuse the application; but will such denial produce the desired results? “The field from which gas is to be taken by the petitioner is in northern Pennsylvania and southern New York. Apparently, far more of the gas will come from Pennsylvania than from New York and over the extraction of gas in the state of Pennsylvania, this Commission has practically no control. It is possible for Pennsylvania companies to take all of the gas from this field unless the New York companies remove the gas before the field is exhausted. “Further, the Public Service Commission has been given no adequate authority to determine how the natural gas resources of this state, to say nothing of the resources of Pennsylvania, shall be developed. We have no powers directly to control the amount of gas that is taken from any field and our indirect powers are so limited that it is doubtful if much could be accomplished. The state of New York receives far more gas from sources located beyond its boundaries than it exports to any adjoining state and the conservation of natural gas resources in the various states cannot be properly brought about except through voluntary action of the states or by the Federal government. Neither one is yet operative and while attention has been given to electric interstate commerce, no effective steps have been taken to conserve or regulate the distribution of natural gas, where it is so urgently needed. “In view of the lack of authority conferred upon this Commission to conserve natural resources, the question becomes primarily what will be gained to consumers in the state of New York if the petition is denied. It is stated that about 80 or 90 per cent of the gas furnished by the petitioner will be used for industrial purposes and that only from 10 to 20 per cent will go to the general public, the inference being that the saving to the companies purchasing the gas will go to enrich a few stockholders. Let us assume such are the facts. Who will gain if those benefited by the petition are deprived of their profits or advantages by a denial of the petition? This Commission does not control the use that will be made of the gas from the field tapped by the petitioner. There are many other companies tapping the supply and we have no means of determining where, when, or to whom the gas will be sold. If restriction is imposed on the use of it in New York, it may go to Pennsylvania; and if the petitioner is not allowed to supply the areas which it is proposed to serve, the gas will go to other areas and there is no assurance that it will be used any more beneficially from a public viewpoint than it will be if the petition is granted. “As stated, I am heartily in favor of the conservation of natural gas as well as other natural resources; but in this specific case, will the granting or the denial of the petition work to the benefit of the people of New York? The benefit to the area to be supplied by the petitioner is definite, it is known, it is sure. But if the petition is denied, who will be benefited? There is no assurance upon this point. The answer is speculative and uncertain. There is nothing to assure us that the denial of the petition would conserve the gas supply. Is it not likely that the benefits would merely be diverted from one group or one locality to another?” East Ohio dealt with the grant of FPC jurisdiction over natural gas companies engaged in interstate transportation or sale. What we said there has relevance to the issue in this case: “Respondents contend, however, that the word 'transportation’ in § 1 (b) must be construed as applying only to companies engaged in the business of transporting gas in interstate commerce for hire or for sales to be followed by resales, whereas East Ohio does neither. The short answer is that the Act’s language did not express any such limitation. Despite the unqualified language of § 1 (b) making the Act apply to ‘transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,’ respondents ask us to qualify that language by applying it only to businesses which both transport and sell natural gas for resale. They rely on a sentence in the declaration of policy, § 1 (a), referring to ‘the business of transporting and selling natural gas.’ But their contention that the word ‘and’ in the policy provision creates an unseverable bond is completely refuted by the clearly disjunctive phrasing of § 1 (b) itself. As we pointed out in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 332 U. S. 507, 516, § 1 (b) made the Natural Gas Act applicable to three separate things: ‘(1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce for resale; and (3) natural gas companies engaged in such transporation or sale.’ And throughout the Act ‘transportation’ and ‘sale’ are viewed as separate subjects of regulation. They have independent and equally important places in the Act. Thus, to adopt respondents’ construction would unduly restrict the Commission’s power to carry out one of the major policies of the Act. Moreover, the initial interest of Congress in regulation of transportation facilities was reemphasized in 1942 by passage of an amendment to § 7 (c) of the Act broadening the Commission’s powers over the construction or extension of pipe lines. 56 Stat. 83. This amendment followed a report of the Commission to Congress pointing out that without amendment the Act vested the Commission with inadequate power to make ‘any serious effort to control the unplanned construction of natural-gas pipe lines with a view to conserving one of the country’s valuable but exhaustible energy resources.’ We hold that the word ‘transportation’ like the phrase ‘interstate commerce’ aptly describes the movements of gas in East Ohio’s high-pressure pipe lines.” 338 U. S. 464, 468-469 (1950) (footnotes omitted). It is well established that the proviso was added to the Act merely for clarification and was not intended to deprive FPC of any jurisdiction otherwise granted by § 1 (b). FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 365 U. S. 1 (1961); FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464 (1950). The House report on the bill described this second sentence of § 1 (b) as follows: “The quoted words are not actually necessary, as the matters specified therein could not be said fairly to be covered by the language affirmatively stating the jurisdiction of the Commission, but similar language was in previous bills, and, rather than invite the contention, however unfounded, that the elimination of the negative language would broaden the scope of the act, the committee has included it in this bill.” H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937). S. Doc. No. 92, pt. 84 — A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., submitted Dec. 31, 1935. In Panhandle, the Court was asked to hold that direct industrial sales customers receiving gas in interstate commerce could not be subjected to state regulatory control consistently with FPC jurisdiction in the area. In support of this position, the customers argued that state control of certain matters affecting the sales could not practically be managed by state regulation. Not surprisingly, the problem of curtailment was used as a prime example of a matter presenting these difficulties. Section 5(a) provides: “Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order: Provided, however, That the Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained in the currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with the Commission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule filed by such natural gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease where existing rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or are not the lowest reasonable rates.” 15 U. S. C. § 717d (a). Of course, even when conducting a § 5 hearing, the Commission would have emergency authority to issue interim orders effecting a curtailment plan. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 316 U. S. 575 (1942). These sections provide, “(c) Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every natural-gas company shall file with the Commission, within such time (not less than sixty days from the date this Act takes effect) and in such form as the Commission may designate, and shall keep open in convenient form and place for public inspection, schedules showing all rates and charges for any transportation or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such rates and charges, together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and services. “(d) Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days’ notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into effect. The Commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect without requiring the thirty days’ notice herein provided for by an order specifying the changes so to be made and the time when they shall take effect and the manner in which they shall be filed and published. “(e) Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority, either upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the natural-gas company, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the natural-gas company affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect.” 15 U. S. C. §§ 717c (c), (d), and (e).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARROWSMITH et al., EXECUTORS, et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 51. Argued October 24, 1952. Decided November 10, 1952. George R. Sherriff argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Joseph C. Woodle. Helen Goodner argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Lyon, Philip Elman, Ellis N. Slack and Harry Baum. Briefs of amici curiae supporting petitioners were filed by Norman D. Keller for Edgar J. Kaufmann; and by John W. Burke. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an income tax controversy growing out of the following facts as shown by findings of the Tax Court. In 1937 two taxpayers, petitioners here, decided to liquidate and divide the proceeds of a corporation in which they had equal stock ownership. Partial distributions made in 1937, 1938, and 1939 were followed by a final one in 1940. Petitioners reported the profits obtained from this transaction, classifying them as capital gains. They thereby' paid less income tax than would have been required had the income been attributed to ordinary business transactions for profit. About the propriety of these 1937-1940 returns, there is no dispute. But in 1944 a judgment was rendered against the old corporation and against Erederick R. Bauer, individually. The two taxpayers were required to and did pay the judgment for the corporation, of whose assets they were transferees. See Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U. S. 233, 235-236. Cf. I. R. C., § 311 (a). Classifying the loss as an ordinary business one, each took a tax deduction for 100% of the amount paid. Treatment of the loss as a capital one would have allowed deduction of a much smaller amount. See I. R. C., § 117 (b), (d) (2) and (e). The Commissioner viewed the 1944 payment as part of the original liquidation transaction requiring classification as a capital loss, just as the taxpayers had treated the original dividends as capital gains. Disagreeing with the Commissioner the Tax Court classified the 1944 payment as an ordinary business loss. 15 T. C. 876. Disagreeing with the Tax Court the Court of Appeals reversed, treating the loss as “capital.” 193 F. 2d 734. This latter holding conflicts with the Third Circuit’s holding in Commissioner v. Switlik, 184 F. 2d 299. Because of this conflict, we granted certiorari. 343 U. S. 976. I. R. C., § 23 (g) treats losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets as “capital losses” and I. R. C., § 115 (c) requires that liquidation distributions be treated as exchanges. The losses here fall squarely within the definition of “capital losses” contained in these sections. Taxpayers were required to pay the judgment because of liability imposed on them as transferees of liquidation distribution assets. And it is plain that their liability as transferees was not based on any ordinary business transaction of theirs apart from the liquidation proceedings. It is not even denied that had this judgment been paid after liquidation, but during the year 1940, the losses would have been properly treated as capital ones. For payment during 1940 would simply have reduced the amount of capital gains taxpayers received during that year. It is contended, however, that this payment which would have been a capital transaction in 1940 was transformed into an ordinary business transaction in 1944 because of the well-established principle that each taxable year is a separate unit for tax accounting purposes. United States v. Lewis, 340 U. S. 590; North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417. But this principle is not breached by considering all the 1937-1944 liquidation transaction events in order properly to classify the nature of the 1944 loss for tax purposes. Such an examination is not an attempt to reopen and readjust the 1937 to 1940 tax returns, an action that would be inconsistent with the annual tax accounting principle. The petitioner Bauer’s executor presents an argument for reversal which applies to Bauer alone. He was liable not only by reason of being a transferee of the corporate assets. He was also held liable jointly with the original corporation, on findings that he had secretly profited because of a breach of his fiduciary relationship to the judgment creditor. Trounstine v. Bauer, Pogue & Co., 44 F. Supp. 767, 773; 144 F. 2d 379, 382. The judgment was against both Bauer and the corporation. For this reason it is contended that the nature of Bauer’s tax deduction should be considered on the basis of his liability as an individual who sustained a loss in an ordinary business transaction for profit. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this contention should not be sustained. While there was a liability against him in both capacities, the individual judgment against him was for the whole amount. His payment of only half the judgment indicates that both he and the other transferee were paying in their capacities as such. We see no reason for giving Bauer a preferred tax position. Affirmed. At dissolution the corporate stock was owned by Frederick P. Bauer and the executor of Davenport Pogue’s estate. The parties here now are Pogue’s widow, Bauer’s widow, and the executor of Bauer’s estate.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KERN-LIMERICK, INC. et al. v. SCURLOCK, COMMISSIONER OF REVENUES FOR ARKANSAS. No. 115. Argued January 4, 1954. Decided February 8, 1954. Assistant Attorney General Holland argued the cause for appellants. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Mr. Holland, Ellis N. Slack and Lee A. Jackson for the United States, and A. F. House and William Nash for Kern-Limerick, Inc., appellants. O. T. Ward argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal brings here the legality of the application of the Arkansas Gross Receipts Tax Law of 1941, Ark. Stat., 1947, § 84^1901 et seq., to a transaction by which certain private contractors engaged in a joint venture, abbreviated WHMS, procured in Arkansas two diesel tractors costing $17,146, for use in the construction there for the United States of a naval ammunition depot estimated to cost over thirty million dollars. The tractors were procured from Kern-Limerick, Inc., a local dealer. The circumstances of the transaction would concededly make Kern-Limerick liable for the tax if the real purchaser were not the United States. The applicable sections of the Gross Receipts Tax Law levy an “excise tax of two [2%] per centum upon the gross proceeds or gross receipts derived from all sales to any person.” § 84-1903. This is a sales tax, not a use tax. It is to be paid to the Tax Commissioner by the seller, § 84H908. He is the taxpayer, § 84-1902 (e), and “shall collect the tax levied hereby from the purchaser.” § 84-1908. Gross receipts derived from sales to the United States Government are exempt. § 84-1904. The construction contract had, so far as pertinent here, the provisions as to “Materials — Purchases” which are set out in the margin. It was entered into by the Department of the Navy “under authority of Sections 2 (c) (10) and 4 (b)” of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. 62 Stat. 21, 41 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 157 et seq. These sections authorized this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract by negotiation without advertising. Kern-Limerick, Inc., the seller, upon demand by the Commissioner paid under protest the amount of the sales tax and brought this action for a refund in accordance with state law. The United States intervened, as under the contract any state taxes the contractor was required to pay were reimbursable to it by the Government. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held WHMS was the purchaser and the claimed tax payable by Kern-Limerick as the “seller.” It denied the contention of the United States that the Government was the purchaser. It held that the Armed Services Procurement Act authorized the Navy Department “to purchase . . . supplies or services for its own use,” but did not authorize the Department “to buy nails, lumber, cement, tractors, etc., which were not to be used by the Navy but by WHMS [in this instance] to construct, as independent contractors, the Ammunition Dump.” The state court further held that, even if the Department had the authority to buy the tractors, it could not, under the Procurement Act of 1947, delegate this power to WHMS. 221 Ark. 439, 254 S. W. 2d 454. Appellants seek reversal of the decision on the grounds that the Procurement Act authorizes this contract and that the Arkansas tax cannot by statute or constitutionally be applied to a purchase by the United States. The state court’s interpretation of the Procurement Act to deny the Navy authority to buy supplies or equipment for the construction of an ammunition dump is, we think, too restrictive. The Act gives broad powers to the Armed Services for obtaining as cheaply and promptly as possible “purchases and contracts for supplies or services ... for the use of any such agency or otherwise,” § 2 (a), and provides: Sec. 9. “(b) The term ‘supplies’ shall mean all property except land, and shall include, by way of description and without limitation, public works, buildings, facilities, ships, floating equipment, and vessels of every character, type and description, aircraft, parts, accessories, equipment, machine tools and alteration or installation thereof.” We hold that the Act allows the purchase of this machinery. It seems to us, also, that under the Procurement Act the Armed Services may use agents, other than its own official personnel, to handle for it the detail of purchase. The contention of Arkansas which was accepted by its Supreme Court is, as we understand it, that the Procurement Act does not permit a delegation to private contractors of any authority to purchase for or pledge the credit of the United States even though these contractors have contracts for construction or supplies on a cost-plus basis. Further, it follows from the Arkansas contention, that without such statutory authority the purchase by the contractor was not for the United States but for itself. This contention is based on the language of the Procurement Act, §§ 7 (a) and (b). Pursuant to § 7 (a), the Secretary of the Navy, somewhat obscurely, appears to have delegated his authority to determine the necessity for a negotiated contract to a Navy Contracting Officer asserted in the contract, without exception, to be the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. See 32 CFR §§ 400.201-5 and 402.101. That official negotiated the contract, as it stated and as is admitted by stipulation, under the authority of § 2 (c)(10) of the Procurement Act — “for supplies or services for which it is impracticable to secure competition.” Arkansas calls attention to the restrictions on delegation in § 7 (b) upon which the state court commented. But the provisions of § 7 (b), as the words show, do not cover actions under § 2(c) (10), and the section’s prohibition of delegation in certain instances is inapplicable. We find nothing in the Procurement Act that bars a contract for purchase for the United States of supplies or services by private persons. The Government asserts that §§ 4 (a) and (b) authorize this contract. Under them, negotiated contracts such as this “may be of any type which . . . will promote the best interests of the Government.” Under such a provision, it seems that the determination to use purchasing agents is permissible. Where there is no prohibition of a particular type of contract and no direction to use a particular type, the contracting officers are free to follow business practices. We conclude that the Navy Department has power to negotiate contracts which provide for private purchasing agents for supplies and materials. With this determination that the provisions of the contract are within the authority of the Procurement Act, we turn to examine the validity of the argument that the naming of the Government as purchaser was only color-able and left the contractor the real purchaser and the transaction subject to the Arkansas tax. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, is relied upon primarily. We consider this argument under the assumption, made by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, that the contract was designed to avoid the necessity in this cost-plus contract of the ultimate payment of a state tax by the United States. We are mindful, too, of the careful attention Congress has given in recent years to a proper adjustment of tax liabilities between the federal and the state sovereignties. Congress has been solicitous to see that states and their subdivisions are not unduly burdened by federal acquisition of property taxable by the states when otherwise held. It understands the burdens on local public agencies from the new federal installations and their accompanying personnel. Provisions deemed suitable have been made. These include recent legislation designed to make independent contractors carrying on activities of the Atomic Energy Commission subject to state sales taxes. But in recommending the legislation the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, while providing for voluntary contributions, did not propose to subject Government property and purchases to state taxes. The enactment left them free. This recognition of the constitutional immunity of the Federal Government from state exactions rests, of course, upon unquestioned authority. From McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, through Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, a host of cases upheld freedom from state taxation not only for Government activities but also for the agencies and salaries of persons that carried on the work. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, reviewed this judicial history, adopted for federal contractors and state taxation the reasoning that subjected a state contractor’s earnings to federal income tax and upheld the state’s gross receipts tax upon a federal contractor’s earnings on the ground that it did not interfere “in any substantial way with the performance of federal functions.” Id., at 161. The question of the immunity of Government in relation to its purchases of commodities was left open. Id., at 153. Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, overruled New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, supra, and Gillespie, supra, fell in Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342, 365. A phase of the question reserved in the Dravo case came up in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1. We declared that federal sovereignty “does not spell immunity from paying the added costs, attributable to the taxation of those who furnish supplies to the Government and who have been granted no tax immunity.” Id., at 9. That case involved the usual type sales tax on the seller, collectible by him from the buyer. There was there, too, a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract with the United States. We held the state tax collectible from the sellers, notwithstanding the Government bore the economic burden. A few excerpts will make clear the purport of the ruling: “As the sale of the lumber by King and Boozer was not for cash, the precise question is whether the Government became obligated to pay for the lumber and so was the purchaser whom the statute taxes, but for the claimed immunity. . . . The contract provided that the title to all materials and supplies for which the contractors were ‘entitled to be reimbursed’ should vest in the Government ‘upon delivery at the site of the work or at an approved storage site and upon inspection and acceptance in writing by the Contracting Officer.’ ” Id., at 10. “. . . we think all the provisions which we have mentioned, read together, plainly contemplate that the contractors were to purchase in their own names and on their own credit all the materials required, unless the Government should elect to furnish them; that the Government was not to be bound by their purchase contracts, but was obligated only to reimburse the contractors when the materials purchased should be delivered, inspected and accepted at the site.” Id., at 11. “But however extensively the Government may have reserved the right to restrict or control the action of the contractors in other respects, neither the reservation nor the exercise of that power gave to the contractors the status of agents of the Government to enter into contracts or to pledge its credit.” Id., at 13. The contract here in issue differs in form but not in economic effect on the United States. The Nation bears the burden of the Arkansas tax as it did that of Alabama. The significant difference lies in this. Both the request for bids and the purchase order, in accordance with the contract arrangements making the contractors purchasing agents for the Government, note 2, supra, contain this identical, specific provision: “3. This purchase is made by the Government. The Government shall be obligated to the Vendor for the purchase price, but the Contractor shall handle all payments hereunder on behalf of the Government. The vendor agrees to make demand or claim for payment of the purchase price from the Government by submitting an invoice to the Contractor. Title to all materials and supplies purchased hereunder shall vest in the Government directly from the Vendor. The Contractor shall not acquire title to any thereof.” The purchase order is headed Navy Department Bureau of Yards and Docks, is signed by the contractor as purchasing agent, and requires the seller to make this certification on the claim for payment: “ ‘I certify that the above bill is correct and just; that payment therefor has not been received; that all statutory requirements as to American production and labor standards, and all conditions of purchase applicable to the transactions have been complied with; and that the State or local sales taxes are not included in the amounts billed.’ “In the event the Contractor is required to pay and does pay State or local sales taxes, the words ‘and that State or local sales taxes are not included in the amounts billed’ should be struck from the certification and the following additional certification added: “ ‘The amount of State or local sales, use, occupational, gross receipts, or other similar taxes or license fees imposed on the Vendor or Vendee by reason of this transaction is $-. The Vendor, or Vendee, as the case may be, agrees upon direction of the United States to make appropriate claim for refund and in the event of any refund, to pay the amount thereof to the United States.’ ” The stipulation of facts shows in detail the course of business under this contract in the purchase of supplies and the form of this purchase. Both conform to the language of the contract in requiring specific Government approval to the purchasing agent for each request for bid and each purchase. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Government is the disclosed purchaser and that no liability of the purchasing agent to the seller arises from the transaction. A comment should be made about another excerpt from King & Boozer. It was referred to in the Arkansas opinion as though it were effective for the determination of this case. The quotation is this: “The soundness of this conclusion turns on the terms of the contract and the rights and obligations of the parties under it. The taxing statute, as the Alabama courts have held, makes the ‘purchaser’ liable for the tax to the seller, who is required ‘to add to the sales price’ the amount of the tax and collect it when the sales price is collected, whether the sale is for cash or on credit. Who, in any particular transaction like the present, is a ‘purchaser’ within the meaning of the statute, is a question of state law on which only the Supreme Court of Alabama can speak with final authority.” Id., at 9-10. Read literally, one might conclude this Court was saying that a state court might interpret its tax statute so as to throw tax liability where it chose, even though it arbitrarily eliminated an exempt sovereign. Such a conclusion as to the meaning of the quoted words would deny the long course of judicial construction which establishes as a principle that the duty rests on this Court to decide for itself facts or constructions upon which federal constitutional issues rest. The quotation refers, we think, only to the power of the state court to determine who is responsible under its law for payment to the state of the exaction. The formulation of the “precise question” at the first of the quotation from King & Boozer, p. 118, supra, indicates this. We find that the purchaser under this contract was the United States. Thus, King & Boozer is not controlling for, though the Government also bore the economic burden of the state tax in that case, the legal incidence of that tax was held to fall on the independent contractor and not upon the United States. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is so embedded in constitutional history and practice that this Court cannot subject the Government or its official agencies to state taxation without a clear congressional mandate. No instance of such submission is shown. Nor do we think that the drafting of the contract by the Navy Department to conserve Government funds, if that was the purpose, changes the character of the transaction. As we have indicated, the intergovernmental submission to taxation is primarily a problem of finance and legislation. But since purchases by independent contractors of supplies for Government construction or other activities do not have federal immunity from taxation, the form of contracts, when governmental immunity is not waived by Congress, may determine the effect of state taxation on federal agencies, for decisions consistently prohibit taxes levied on the property or purchases of the Government itself. Reversed. Cook v. Southeast Arkansas Transportation Co., 211 Ark. 831, 202 S.W. 2d 772. Materials — Purchases. Article 8 — (a) “Except where provision is otherwise made by the Officer-in-Charge, all materials, articles, supplies, and equipment required for the accomplishment of the work under this contract shall be furnished by the Contractor. The Contractor shall act as the purchasing agent of the Government in effecting such procurement and the Government shall be directly liable to the vendors for the purchase price. The exercise of this agency is subject to the obtaining of approval in the instances and in the manner required by subparagraph (c) of this article. The Contractor shall negotiate and administer all such purchases and shall advance all payments therefor unless the Officer-in-Charge shall otherwise direct. “(b) Title to all such materials, articles, supplies and equipment, the cost of which is reimbursable to the Contractor hereunder, shall pass directly from the vendor to the Government without vesting in the Contractor, and such title (except as to property to which the Government has obtained title at an earlier date) shall vest in the Government at the time payment is' made therefor by the Government or by the Contractor or upon delivery thereof to the Government or the Contractor, whichever of said events shall first occur. This provision for passage of title shall not relieve the Contractor of any of its duties or obligations under this contract or constitute any waiver of the Government’s right to absolute fulfillment of all of the terms hereof. “(c) No purchase in excess of $500 shall be made hereunder without the prior written approval of the Officer-in-Charge, except that the Officer-in-Charge may, in his discretion, either reduce the limitation on the amount of any purchase which may be made without such prior approval or authorize the Contractor to make purchases in amounts not in excess of $2500 for any one purchase without obtaining such prior approval.” These provisions were also applicable to subcontractors. Section 2 (c) provides: “All purchases and contracts for supplies and services shall be made by advertising, as provided in section 3, except that such purchases and contracts may be negotiated by the agency head without advertising if— “(10) for supplies or services for which it is impracticable to secure competition; . . . .” Section 4 (b) prohibits use of cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts and prescribes other operative limitations not pertinent here. All provisions required by those sections were included in the contract. S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 21, had this to say of this language: “To make it clear that the bill relates to all procurement by the services, except purchases with non appropriated funds, subsection (b) of this section defines ‘supplies’ to include all property except land, and shall include, but without limitation, public works, buildings, facilities, ships, floating equipment, and vessels of every character, type and description, aircraft, parts, accessories, equipment, machine tools, and alteration or installation thereof. These are really examples and this section is to be construed in the broadest manner possible.” The corresponding House Report, No. 109, p. 23, omitted only the last sentence. “Sec. 7. (a) . . . Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the agency head is authorized to delegate his powers provided by this Act, including the making of such determinations and decisions, in his discretion and subject to his direction, to any other officer or officers or officials of the agency. “(b) The power of the agency head to make the determinations or decisions specified in paragraphs (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16) of section 2 (c) and in section 5 (a) shall not be delegable, and the power to make the determinations or decisions specified in paragraph (11) of section 2 (e) shall be delegable only to a chief officer responsible for procurement and only with respect to contracts which will not require the expenditure of more than $25,000.” Appellee also refers to § 10. As that provides only for interservice procurement, we do not think it pertinent. United, States v. Linn, 15 Pet. 290, 316; Muschany v. United States, 324 U. S. 49, 63. E. g., T. V. A., 16 U. S. C. § 831l; R. F. C., 15 U. S. C. §607. Cf. Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U. S. 322. 67 Stat. 575. See S. Rep. No. 694, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. Section 9 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 765, 42 U. S. C. § 1809 (b), as amended, provides: “In order to render financial assistance to those States and localities in which the activities of the Commission are carried on and in which the Commission has acquired property previously subject to State and local taxation, the Commission is authorized to make payments to State and local governments in lieu of property taxes. Such payments may be in the amounts, at the times, and upon the terms the Commission deems appropriate, but the Commission shall be guided by the policy of not making payments in excess of the taxes which would have been payable for such property in the condition in which it was acquired, except in cases where special burdens have been cast upon the State or local government by activities of the Commission, the Manhattan Engineer District or their agents. In any such case, any benefit accruing to the State or local government by reason of such activities shall be considered in determining the amount of the payment.” See Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch 345, 362; Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 703; Restatement, Agency, §320; Williston, Contracts, § 281. Cf. Merchant Fleet Corp. v. Harwood, 281 U. S. 519, 525. New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, 674; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S. 69, 83; United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 182; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 248 U. S. 67, 69. Cf. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U. S. 22, 29. This principle covers the question of who is the “purchaser.” S. R. A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U. S. 558, 564; Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U. S. 454, 456; Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 483. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342, 365: “True intergovernmental immunity remains for the most part. But, so far as concerns private persons claiming immunity for their ordinary business operations (even though in connection with governmental activities), no implied constitutional immunity can rest on the merely hypothetical interferences with governmental functions here asserted to sustain exemption.” Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1; Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U. S. 232; Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U. S. 495. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174; Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441; Pittman v. Home Owners’ Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 31.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. TURNER et al. No. 83-1097. Argued October 9, 1984 Decided February 27, 1985 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Richard G. Wilkins, William Ranter, and Richard A. Olderman. John K. Van De Ramp, Attorney General of California, and John J. Rlee, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for state respondents, respondents under this Court’s Rule 19.6. Mark N. Aaronson argued the cause for AFDC respondents. With him on the brief was John E. Peer. Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General, and Charles F. Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Washington as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Mexico by Paul Bardacke, Attorney General, Richard J. Rubin, and David Stafford; and for the State of New York by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, R. Scott Greathead, First Assistant Attorney General, Peter H. Schiff, and Judith A. Gordon and Marion R. Buchbinder, Assistant Attorneys General. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This litigation concerns the proper computation of benefits to working recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), provided pursuant to subch. IV, pt. A, of the Social Security Act of 1935 (Act), as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq. Specifically, we must decide whether, in calculating a household’s need, the responsible state agency is to treat mandatory tax withholdings as a work expense encompassed within the flat-sum disregard of § 402(a)(8)(A)(ii) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(8)(A)(ii), or whether the agency is to deduct such sums in determining “income” under § 402(a)(7)(A) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7)(A). The latter interpretation, of course, would accrue to the benefit of the recipient. I Before 1981, § 402(a)(7) of the Act required the state agency responsible for calculating a family’s eligibility for AFDC benefits to “take into consideration any . . . income and resources of any child . . . claiming aid,” as well as any “expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income.” See Pub. L. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 188 (1962). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, however, effected amendments of § 402(a)(7). While preserving the language that instructs the State to consider a family’s income and resources, Congress, in §2302 of OBRA, 95 Stat. 844, eliminated the requirement that the State take into account “expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income.” At the same time, by §2301, 95 Stat. 843, Congress placed in § 402(a)(8)(A)(ii), 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii), a flat $75 “work expense” deduction or “disregard” to be taken from an individual’s “earned income.” In response to these amendments, petitioner Secretary of Health and Human Services advised the responsible state agencies that mandatory payroll deductions were to be included in the new $75 work-expense disregard and that this disregard was to be taken from gross rather than net income. The State of California promptly issued regulations implementing these directions; this had the effect of significantly reducing benefits paid to approximately 45,000 California AFDC families with working members. Respondents, a class of all past, present, and future California AFDC recipients who have been or will be affected by the changes wrought in the AFDC program by OBRA, brought this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to challenge the California regulations implementing the Secretary’s directions. They contended that the regulations misconstrued the term “income” in § 402(a)(7) to mean gross income, and thereby incorrectly relegated mandatory payroll deductions to the work expenses covered by the flat-sum disregard of § 402(a)(8); instead, according to respondents, they were entitled to have these mandatory payroll items disregarded by the State when calculating income and resources under § 402(a)(7). The State of California brought the Secretary into the litigation as a third-party defendant. The District Court agreed with the plaintiff class. It therefore granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment, as well as the State’s motion for summary judgment against the Secretary. The court enjoined the State from implementing its new regulations and the Secretary from terminating federal matching funds due the State. Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603 (1982). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Turner v. Prod, 707 F. 2d 1109 (1983). Finding’ the statutory language unhelpful, it scrutinized the legislative history and the administrative interpretation of the two statutory provisions before relying primarily on “congressional purpose” to conclude that § 402(a)(7) “income” had always been net income after deduction of amounts man-datorily withheld for payment of social security, federal, state, and local taxes. Therefore, it concluded, the substitution of the flat-sum disregard of § 402(a)(8) for the work-expense disregard of § 402(a)(7) had had no effect on the independent deduction of tax withholdings in determining need. The other Courts of Appeals to address the issue have concluded that Congress intended the flat work-expense disregard of § 402(a)(8) to encompass mandatory payroll with-holdings, and that “income” for purposes of § 402(a)(7) was gross income. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 465 U. S. 1064 (1984). On July 19, 1984, after the writ had issued but before this Court heard oral argument, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, became law. This new legislation includes a provision, § 2625(a), 98 Stat. 1135, that directly addresses the issue raised by this case. On the basis of that congressional action, Justice Rehnquist, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit, prospectively stayed the injunction from July 18, 1984. 468 U. S. 1305 (1984) (in chambers). We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. HH H-H “The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism.” King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316 (1968). Established by Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, “to provide financial assistance to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and care for them,” Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974), the federal program reimburses each State which chooses to participate with a percentage of the funds it expends. §403, 42 U. S. C. §603. In return, the State must administer its assistance program pursuant to a state plan that conforms to applicable federal statutes and regulations. §402, 42 U. S. C. §602. Among these provisions are the two relevant here — § 402(a)(7), which requires consideration of “income” for purposes of determining need, and § 402(a)(8), which requires the State to disregard certain sums from a recipient’s income in making that determination. The present controversy has its roots in a series of amendments to these two sections. As originally enacted in 1935, the Act did not expressly require a State to decrease AFDC grants to families with other income sources. Effective July 1, 1941, however, Congress added § 402(a)(7), which mandated that a state agency, in determining need, shall “take into consideration any . . . income and resources of any child claiming aid to dependent children.” Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, § 401(b), 53 Stat. 1379. This amendment, in its turn, created a new problem. Because “families with working members incurred certain employment-related expenses that reduced available income but were not taken into account by the States in determining eligibility for AFDC assistance,” the Social Security Board soon “recognized that a failure to consider work-related expenses could result in a disincentive to seek or retain employment.” Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S., at 259. To avoid defeating the purpose of the Act to encourage employment even where it did not wholly eliminate the need for public assistance, ibid.; see §401, 42 U. S. C. §601, the Board encouraged the State, in determining a family’s need, to take account of the additional incidental expenses encountered by a working person. In 1962, Congress converted this administrative prompting into a statutory requirement. It amended § 402(a)(7) to oblige the State to consider, in addition to “income and resources,” all “expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income.” Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 188. The amendment made “mandatory the widespread but then optional practice of deducting employment expenses from total income in determining eligibility for assistance.” Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S., at 260. The statute again was amended, effective July 1, 1969, to alter fundamentally the statutory treatment of earned income. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. 90-248, § 202(b), 81 Stat. 881. Instead of merely protecting against the possibility of a disincentive, Congress moved to create an affirmative incentive to employment by adding several new deductions, or earned-income disregards. While it left intact the language of § 402(a)(7), requiring the State to take into account both a family’s “income and resources” and “any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income,” the amended version subjected this requirement to a new provision, § 402(a)(8). In part, the new section required the State, in computing income for purposes of determining need, to disregard the first $30 of “earned income” in any month, “plus one-third of the remainder of such income for such month.” 81 Stat. 881. The effect, of course, was to decrease the amount of “earned income” and thereby to increase a family’s benefits. In response to the new section, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which, as successor to the Social Security Board and predecessor of the Department of Health and Human Services, was then administering the AFDC program, issued regulations defining “earned income” for purposes of § 402(a)(8), and incorporating the new disregards into the benefit calculations. “Earned income” was defined as the “total amount” of “commissions, wages, or salary,” and calculated “irrespective of personal expenses, such as income-tax deductions. . . .” 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1970). In 1981, by OBRA, Congress again significantly altered the treatment of work expenses. As noted above, in place of the requirement of § 402(a)(7) that the State consider expenses “reasonably attributable” to the earning of income, Congress substituted in § 402(a)(8) a child-care disregard of up to $160, and a flat $75 disregard, “in lieu of itemized work expenses.” S. Rep. No. 97-139, p. 435 (1981). In addition, Congress restricted the “$30 plus one-third” disregard to the first four months of a recipient’s employment, § 402(a)(8)(B)(ii)(II), 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(8)(B)(ii)(II), and reduced its impact by requiring that the calculation be made after the work-expense and child-care disregards had been subtracted, § 402(a)(8)(A)(iv), 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(8)(A)(iv). In determining how Congress intended these tandem provisions to operate, we look first, as always, to the language of the statute. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U. S. 300, 312 (1983). We do not find this language, as informed by the structure and pattern of amendment of the relevant provisions, as unhelpful as did the Court of Appeals. K The statute makes no explicit provision for the deduction of mandatory payroll-tax withholdings. Nor does it qualify the meaning of “income” for purposes of § 402(a)(7). Instead, that section provides that, “except as may be otherwise provided in” § 402(a)(8), the state agency’s determination of need must take account of “any other income and resources” of an AFDC recipient. Section 402(a)(8), in turn, requires that specified amounts of a recipient’s “earned income” be disregarded “in making the determination” under § 402(a)(7). Successive paragraphs of the statute, then, employ twin usages of the term “income” — the first expressly unqualified, the second limited to that “earned.” Absent contrary indications, it seems to us to make sense to read “earned income” to represent a subset of the broader term “income.” Since those portions of one’s salary or wages withheld to meet tax obligations are nonetheless “earned,” a common-sense meaning of “earned income” would include tax withholdings. Such an interpretation is reflected, in any event, in the Secretary’s longstanding definition of the term as “the total amount [of commissions, wages, or salary], irrespective of personal expenses, such as income-tax deductions.” 45 CFR §233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1984). The OBRA Congress must have had that definition in mind when it re-employed the term in § 402(a)(8). Since earned income includes mandatory tax withholdings, so too does the broader category of “income.” Thus, the calculation of need must include all income, unless the recipient has earned income. In that event, the recipient gets the benefit of the disregards of § 402(a)(8). Any authorization for the deduction from § 402(a)(7) income of a working recipient’s tax liabilities, even if mandatorily withheld from pay, must be found in the earned-income disregards of § 402(a)(8). Among those disregards is the flat sum of $75 monthly. § 402(a)(8)(A)(ii). As the congressional Reports accompanying the 1981 amendments make clear, Congress provided this flat sum “in lieu of itemized work expenses.” S. Rep. No. 97-139, p. 435 (1981); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-208, p. 979 (1981). The substitution is apparent, as well, from the simultaneous elimination from § 402(a)(7) of the language requiring States to consider “expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of . . . income.” Tax liabilities indisputably are so attributable. Indeed, they are the paradigmatic work expense: while transportation, food, clothing, and the like often are susceptible to economies, the proverbial certainty attaches to taxes. Further, the new version of § 402(a)(8) provides a separate disregard, up to $160 monthly, for child-care expenditures, another species of work expense. In contrast, the absence of a special provision conferring independent authorization to disregard mandatory tax with-holdings indicates that they were thought to come within the flat deduction. In sum, there is no support in language or structure for any inference that, notwithstanding the unqualified benchmark of “any other income” in § 402(a)(7) and the specified earned-income disregards of § 402(a)(8), Congress contemplated an additional but unmentioned deduction for tax liabilities. The administrative background against which the OBRA Congress worked also supports the conclusion that mandatory tax withholdings were among the items Congress intended to include within the flat-sum disregard of § 402(a)(8)(A)(ii). Until 1962, there was no statutory or regulatory requirement that the States disregard work-related expenses in assessing a working recipient’s income, although the successive federal agencies responsible for the AFDC program urged the States to do so as a matter of sound administrative practice. It appears that virtually all States acceded to that urging, at least to the extent of deducting mandatory tax withholdings, although practices varied widely as to other types of expenses. See App. 30-36, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Assistance Report No. 43: State Methods for Determining Need in the Aid to Dependent Children Program (March 1961). The practice of deducting with-holdings continued after § 402(a)(7) was amended in 1962 expressly to require a State to take account of work expenses in determining income; of course, during this period the deduction and computation would have been the same whether the withholdings were subtracted from income pursuant to the work-expense disregard or not included in income in the first place. The addition of the work-incentive disregard in 1967, however, made it necessary to detail the steps in the determination of need. In response, HEW promulgated detailed regulations on the application of these disregards to earned income. As noted above, one regulation, which has remained unchanged since its initial promulgation, defined “earned income” to mean “the total amount [of commissions, wages, or salary], irrespective of personal expenses, such as income-tax deductions, lunches, and transportation to and from work, and irrespective of expenses of employment which are not personal, such as the cost of tools, materials, special uniforms, or transportation to call on customers.” 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1970). Another regulation — which has also remained unchanged, though after OBRA it no longer applied to AFDC calculations — set forth the procedure by which the disregards would be applied: “The applicable amounts of earned income to be disregarded will be deducted from the gross amount of ‘earned income,’ and all work expenses, personal and non-personal, will then be deducted. Only the net amount remaining will be applied in determining need and the amount of the assistance payment.” 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(7)(i) (1970). The second regulation, echoing the terminology of the first, clearly treated mandatory tax withholdings as “personal” work expenses. The authority for deducting such expenses, of course, by then was the work-expense disregard of § 402(a)(7). Administrative practice reflected the taxonomy of the regulations. Sometime after 1962, but well before the OBRA Congress acted, many States had come to treat tax withholdings as expenses “reasonably attributable to the earning of . . . income.” A 1972 HEW study reported that virtually every State subjected mandatory payroll with-holdings to the work-expense provision of § 402(a)(7). See App. 47, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Memorandum, Assistance Payments Administration, Social and Rehabilitation Service (Feb. 1, 1972). The Colorado program under consideration in Shea was said to treat mandatory payroll deductions as “expenses reasonably attributable to employment,” 416 U. S., at 254-255, and the Shea Court assumed as much, id., at 255. And, in 1977, the House Committee on Government Operations received a comprehensive report on the AFDC program which appeared to indicate that all of the 43 States that responded to the inquiry treated mandatory tax withholdings as deductible work expenses. Congressional Research Service, Administration of the AFDC Program: A Report to the Committee on Government Operations 98 (Comm. Print 1977). There is no reason to suppose that the Congress that enacted OBRA legislated in ignorance of the then generally accepted categorization of mandatory tax withholdings as work expenses. To the contrary, the Senate Report described Congress’ understanding of existing law: “In determining AFDC benefits, States are required to disregard from the recipient’s total income: (1) the first $30 earned monthly, plus one-third of additional earnings; and (2) any expenses (including child care) reasonably attributable to the earning of such income . . . .” S. Rep. No. 97-139, p. 501 (1981). It is unlikely that Congress would have omitted so important an independent step as the disregard of tax liabilities. Instead, the parenthetical mention of child-care expenditures presages their treatment in the revised § 402(a)(8) as the only type of work expense separately disregarded. The House Conference Report describes the new provisions to the same effect: “States would be required to disregard the following amount of earnings, in the following order: “(a) Eligibility Determination — the first $75 of monthly earnings for full time employment (in lieu of itemized work expenses); and the cost of care for a child or incapacitated adult, up to $160 per child per month. “(b) Benefit Calculation^-the first $75 of monthly earnings for full time employment; child care costs up to $160 per child per month; and $30 plus one-third of earnings not previously disregarded.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-208, pp. 978-979 (1981). Again, we find it implausible that Congress would have provided an otherwise complete description of the proposed calculation, yet neglect to mention that “earnings” or “monthly earnings” did not include mandatory tax withholdings. We acknowledge that the legislative history of the 1962 amendments, which codified the administrative policy that a state agency take account of work expenses in determining need, does not mention mandatory tax withholdings. See S. Rep. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18 (1962); H. R. Rep. No. 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 (1962). It is also true that in amending its guide to the States in response to the 1962 amendment of § 402(a)(7), HEW did not include such withholdings in its list of expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income. See App. 39-41, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, §3140 (Apr. 22, 1964). This silence is at best ambiguous, however. The failure to mention these expenses well may have resulted from Congress’ and HEW’s recognition that the States, acquiescing in the longstanding policy of the federal agencies administering AFDC that state agencies attempt realistically to ascertain recipients’ need, already deducted these expenses in determining eligibility and benefit levels. As the Court of Appeals recognized, the source of the authority to reduce countable income by the amount of various work expenses was unclear at this time. 707 F. 2d, at 1120. In any event, we must identify Congress’ intention in 1981. It is clear that by then the practice of disregarding amounts withheld to satisfy tax liabilities had found a statutory home in the work-expense disregard of § 402(a)(7). It is equally clear that they were among the “itemized work expenses” which the OBRA Congress intended the flat-sum disregard to replace. B The Court of Appeals recognized that “if mandatory payroll deductions enter into income at all, they must be treated as work-related expenses subject to the $75 ceiling enacted by OBRA, because no separate disregard for payroll with-holdings exists.” 707 F. 2d, at 1120. It avoided this conclusion, however, by rejecting its premise. According to the Court of Appeals, mandatory tax withholdings always had been excluded from the calculation of a working recipient’s income by virtue of a long-enshrined principle of “actual availability,” which, independently of any explicit statutory disregards, governed the definition of “income” for purposes of § 402(a)(7). Therefore, the substitution of the flat $75 disregard of § 402(a)(8) for the work-expense disregard of § 402(a)(7) had no effect on the treatment of tax payments, which should continue to be deducted from a working recipient’s earnings as the first step in any determination of need. We disagree. Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the principle of actual availability has not been understood to distinguish the treatment of tax withholdings from that of other work expenses. Rather, it has served primarily to prevent the States from conjuring fictional sources of income and resources by imputing financial support from persons who have no obligation to furnish it or by overvaluing assets in a manner that attributes nonexistent resources to recipients. The availability principle traces its origins to congressional consideration of the 1939 amendments to the Act. At that time, some Members expressed concern, specifically with regard to the old-age assistance program, that state agencies not assume financial assistance from potential sources, such as children, who actually might not contribute. See 3 Hearings Relative to the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 2254 (1939) (statement of A. J. Alt-meyer, Chairman, Social Security Board); 84 Cong. Rec. 6851 (1939) (statement of Rep. Poage). Shortly after passage of the 1939 amendments, the Board adopted a policy statement applicable to various aid programs, including AFDC. See App. 17-20, Social Security Board Memorandum (Dec. 20, 1940). The statement cautioned the States that in effecting the new statutory directive to take into account a recipient’s “income and resources,” they must ensure that any such income or resources “actually exist,” be not “fictitious” or “imputed,” and “be actually on hand or ready for use when it is needed.” A short time later, this policy statement was incorporated in substantially the same form in the Board’s guidelines to the States, see App. 21-23, and successive federal agencies administering the AFDC program have continued to endorse the principle. See, e. g., HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, §3131.7 (1967) (quoted in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U. S. 552, 555, and n. 6 (1970)). At no time, however, have the federal AFDC agencies suggested that it demanded special treatment of mandatory tax withholdings. This Court, too, has viewed the actual availability principle “clearly [to] comport with the statute,” King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 319, n. 16, and has not hesitated to give it effect in that case and others. See Lewis v. Martin, supra; Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 (1975). But the Court’s cases applying the principle clearly reflect that its purpose is to prevent the States from relying on imputed or unrealizable sources of income artificially to depreciate a recipient’s need. For example, in King v. Smitk the Court considered the actual availability regulation in holding that Alabama could not deny assistance to otherwise eligible children solely on the basis of their mother’s cohabitation with a “substitute father,” not their own, without regard to whether the putative substitute actually contributed to the children’s support. 392 U. S., at 319-320, and n. 16. The failure of the federal agencies administering AFDC to apply the availability principle to distinguish mandatory tax withholdings is not surprising. The sums they consume are no less available for living expenses than other sums mandatorily withheld from the worker’s paycheck and other expenses necessarily incurred while employed. In implicit recognition of this analytic difficulty, the Court of Appeals, without helpful explanation, purported to clarify the District Court’s ruling by excluding “non-governmental deductions” from its compass, specifying that only federal, state, and local income taxes, social security taxes, and “state disability and equivalent governmental programs” could properly be denominated “non-income items.” 707 F. 2d, at 1124. The individual respondents make an identical concession, Brief for APDC Respondents 46, but they, also, fail to trace a similarly circumscribed rationale. Yet sums mandatorily withheld for obligations such as union dues, medical insurance, or retirement programs no more pass through the wage earner’s hands than do mandatory tax withholdings. Insofar as the Court of Appeals’ definition pivots on availability to meet family expenses, any distinction between various species of payroll withholdings would be “metaphysical indeed.” James v. O’Bannon, 557 F. Supp. 631, 641 (ED Pa. 1982), aff’d, 715 F. 2d 794 (CA3 1983), cert, pending sub nom. James v. Cohen, No. 83-6168. Likewise, the expenditure of funds on other work-related expenses, such as transportation, meals, and uniforms, just as effectively precludes their use for the needs of the family. That they first pass through the wage earner’s hands is a difference of no apparent import: “the time of payment seems . . . but a superficial distinction; all necessary expenses must be met sometime.” Dickenson v. Petit, 728 F. 2d 23, 25 (CA1 1984), cert, pending, No. 83-6769. There is no reason, then, why the actual availability principle, once applied to exclude mandatory tax withhold-ings from the definition of income, would not similarly apply to other mandatory payroll withholdings and other standard work expenses, both of which also render a portion of a wage earner’s income unavailable to meet the recipient family’s needs. Yet this would negate Congress’ enactment of the flat-sum work-expense disregard in 1981. The failure of the Court of Appeals to outline a principled limit to the applicability of the availability principle to sums deducted from gross income is telling. The Court of Appeals, however, thought it “clear that the agency charged with the administration of this statute has long regarded it as dealing with net income exclusively.” 707 F. 2d, at 1115. To support this conclusion, it cited the then-current regulation embodying the availability principle, which, as republished after OBRA, provided that “ ‘in determining need and the amount of the assistance payment . . . [n]et income . . . and resources available shall be considered . . . Ibid., quoting 45 CFR §233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1983), as amended by 47 Fed. Reg. 5647, 5675 (1982) (emphasis supplied by Court of Appeals). The court, in our view, however, ignored the context in which the term “net income” appeared. The “net income” to which the regulation then referred was that for which the recipient family must account “after all policies governing the reserves and allowances and disregard or setting aside of income and resources . . . have been uniformly applied.” 45 CFR §233.20(a)(3)(ii) (1983); see also 45 CFR §233.20(a)(3)(ii)(a) (1970). Among those “policies governing. . . disregard” was that governing earned income, which provided that “[o]nly the net amount remaining” after application of the work-incentive and work-expense disregards would be applied in determining need. 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(7)(f) (1970). This Court recognized the proper referent of “net income and resources” in Shea v. Vialpando, where we observed with regard to an earlier version of the regulation: “The ‘income and resources’ attributable to an applicant, defined in 45 CFR §§ 233.20(a)(6) (iii-viii), consist generally of ‘only such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis . . . and only currently available resources.’ 45 CFR §233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c). . . . In determining net income, any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income are deducted from gross income. Jp2 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7). If, taking into account these deductions and other deductions not at issue in the instant case, the net amount of ‘earned income’ is less than the predetermined statewide standard of need, the applicant is eligible for participation in the program and the amount of the assistance payments will be based upon that difference. 45 CFR §233.20 (a)(3)(ii)(a) and (c)” (emphasis supplied). 416 U. S., at 253-254. Thus, it is apparent that the net amount to which the regulation refers is that remaining after AFDC disregards, not simply payroll withholdings. Finally, even accepting the view of the Court of Appeals that § 402(a)(7) “income” does not encompass mandatory tax withholdings, one reaches a much more limited result than respondents seek. In the face of the straightforward regulatory definition of “earned income” and Congress’ reemployment of that term in reworking the § 402(a)(8) disregards, it is clear that the flat-sum disregard is to be deducted from total earned income, including mandatory tax withholdings, as provided by § 402(a)(8) and its implementing regulations. The putative rule excluding tax withholdings as “non-income items” under § 402(a)(7) income would also take total earnings as its starting point. Thus, the benefits each provides would be duplicative until deductions exceeded $75. Respondents’ understanding of § 402(a)(7) would simply require the state agency to permit recipients to deduct the greater of either actual payroll deductions or $75. No party urges this construction, of course, because it would have been a senseless and cumbersome way for Congress to achieve such a result. But, for us, it demonstrates the implausibility of respondents’ view of the interplay of § 402(a)(7) and § 402(a)(8). C Notwithstanding its conclusion that the actual availability principle had always governed the treatment of mandatory tax withholdings in calculating an AFDC family’s need, and continued to do so after enactment of OBRA, the Court of Appeals looked “primarily to congressional purpose” for its holding that these withholdings should be deducted independently of the flat-sum disregard. 707 F. 2d, at 1110. As the court noted, the AFDC statute has long sought to “enabl[e] each State to furnish financial assistance ... to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living . . . and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection . . . .” §401, 42 U. S. C. §601. See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S., at 253. While acknowledging the cost-cutting focus of the OBRA amendments, the Court of Appeals reasoned that its construction best accommodated what it saw as the competing purposes of the 76th and 97th Congresses. First, citing the elimination after the first four months of employment of the $30 and one-third, work-incentive disregard, which it regarded as OBRA’s “chief economizing feature,” as well as the imposition of a cap on the child-care and work-expense disregards, the court opined that other changes in the statutory disregards fully accomplished any budgetary savings intended by the OBRA Congress. Next, it reasoned that the unchanged statement of statutory purpose compelled its construction, which still resulted in a disincentive to employment, because it produced a lesser disincentive than that effected by the Secretary’s regulations. Finally, seeing “no reason to believe that AFDC recipients will work in order to pay handsomely for the privilege,” it decided that in the long term the OBRA Congress’ desire to reduce welfare expenditures would best be accomplished by avoiding or minimizing financial penalties on employed recipients. 707 F. 2d, at 1123. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the OBRA Congress neither changed the language of the AFDC statement of purpose nor abandoned the statutory goals. We also agree that the new scheme, as implemented by the Secretary, threatens to dissipate any incentive to employment, in some cases perhaps even forcing recipients who wish to work to apportion a smaller sum to family expenses than if they stayed at home. Unlike the Court of Appeals, however, we hesitate to tell Congress that it might have achieved its budgetary objectives by less than the full range of changes it chose to utilize, particularly when the information provided Congress by its own Budget Office, on which it presumably relied, belies that conclusion. See S. Rep. No. 97-139, at 447, 552. More importantly, it seems plain to us that the risk of creating disincentives to employment that would lead to increased expenditures down the road did not trouble the OBRA Congress. During the House hearings on the OBRA changes to the AFDC statute, Representative Stark voiced concern that the new scheme would put a working mother to the distressing choice of either quitting her job or making do with less money to devote to her family’s needs. See Administration’s Proposed Savings in Unemployment Compensation, Public Assistance, and Social Services Programs: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 97-7, p. 3 (Comm. Print 1981). Representative Rangel feared that “[t]he marginally poor, actually penalized ... for working, would have a great disincentive to continue to work.” Id., at 41. Other Members and numerous private witnesses issued similar warnings. See, e. g., id., at 26 (Rep. Russo); id., at 46 (Rep. Chisholm); id:, at 318 (Kevin M. Aslanian, Welfare Recipients League, Inc.). And the report of the Congressional Budget Office, included in the Senate Report, expressly called Congress’ attention to the possibility that the work-expense cap and temporal limitation on the work incentive disregard would “increase the work disincentives found in the current AFDC program.” S. Rep. No. 97-139, at 552. In the face of these warnings, we must assume that Congress enacted the proposed changes in full awareness of the employment disincentives some Members felt the changes threatened to create. Indeed, the concerns which underlay the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case prompted the House Subcommittee on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation to draft a version of § 402(a)(8) which would have increased substantially the flat work-expense disregard. The Subcommittee proposed to allow a work-expense deduction of the lesser of 20% of earned income or $175. See 127 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1981). But the House rejected this version and, instead, passed a substitute identical to that passed by the Senate. See id., at 14681-14682; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-208, at 978-979. Again, Members sounded warnings of the consequences of the administration substitute. See 127 Cong. Rec. 14104 (1981) (Rep. Rostenkowski); id., at 14663-14664 (Rep. Biaggi). These concerns, however, did not deter the OBRA Congress. Instead, as the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed, the legislative history indicates that, “[hjaving determined that providing financial incentives for work was not achieving the goal of self-sufficiency and that such incentives were leading to ever-increasing public expenditures,. Congress embarked on a new course.” James v. O’Bannon, 715 F. 2d, at 809. In proposing to limit the $30 and one-third disregard to the first four months of employment, for example, the Senate Budget Committee expressed impatience that the program then in effect was not inducing AFDC mothers to achieve self-sufficiency. S. Rep. No. 97-139, at 502-503. As a result, Congress sought other means that, in combination with the now temporally limited work-incentive disregard, might “decrease welfare dependency, and emphasize the principle that AFDC should not be regarded as a permanent income guarantee.” Ibid. It chose to authorize the States to establish programs aimed at promoting employment among AFDC recipients. A State could establish a “community work experience program . . . designed to improve the employability of participants through actual work experience and training,” § 409(a)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 609(a)(1), and it could condition AFDC eligibility on participation in the program. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-208, at 980. A State could establish a “work supplementation program,” under which it would “make jobs available, on a voluntary basis, as an alternative to aid otherwise provided under the State plan.” §414(a), 42 U. S. C. § 614(a). “Under this approach, recipients would be given a choice between taking a job or depending upon a lower AFDC grant . . . .” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-208, at 980. And the State could establish a “work-incentive demonstration program” as an alternative to current work-incentive programs. § 445, 42 U. S. C. §645; see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-208, at 981. Participation in such a program would also be mandatory for persons eligible for AFDC. § 445(b)(1)(B), 42 U. S. C. § 645(b)(1)(B). See also § 402(a)(19), 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(19). In conjunction with the amendments to the earned-income disregards, these provisions suggest a change in strategy on Congress’ part — away from financial incentives and toward programs designed to find employment for recipients and oblige them to take it. Thus, it is clear that the OBRA Congress elected to pursue unchanged goals by new methods. By concluding that Congress could not have intended to include mandatory tax withholdings in the new $75 disregard because such a rule would dilute financial incentives to work, the Court of Appeals ignored the congressional choices manifest in the departure from approaches previously favored. D Were there any doubt remaining as to Congress’ intention in 1981, subsequent congressional action would dispel it. In the immediately succeeding session, certain Members of the House Committee on Ways and Means introduced H. R. 6369, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), by which they attempted to restore the financial work incentives eliminated by OBRA. The attempt failed. The Report accompanying the bill, however, describes the pre-OBRA state of the law. The Committee first noted that the “countable income” which determined eligibility equaled “gross income minus the disregards.” H. R. Rep. No. 97-587, pt. 1, p. 6 (1982). Later, it referred to the potential disincentive posed, prior to the 1962 and 1967 amendments, by “any work-related expenses — such as transportation and child day care costs, and mandatory tax and other wage deductions.” Id., at 12. It also listed the components of an AFDC family’s pre-OBRA “disposable income (wages minus work expenses plus AFDC benefits).” Ibid. Finally, it recounted the pre-OBRA calculation of need: “States were required to reduce the State monthly payment by the amount of the family’s earnings that remained after the following amounts had been excluded or disregarded: (1) the first $30 of earnings; (2) plus one-third of remaining earnings; (3) plus work expenses for the month (any expenses, including child day care, reasonably attributable to the earning of income). ” I bid. E ach of these statements indicates that the OBRA Congress regarded mandatory tax withholdings as standard work expenses; none admits of the possibility that they might have constituted an independent deduction. We take great care, of course, before relying on the understandings of Members of a subsequent Congress as to the actions of an earlier one, but we by no means eschew what guidance they offer. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 117-120, n. 13 (1980); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 686-687, n. 7 (1979). Here, we face the considered statements of a Committee whose Members were in the thick of the fight over earned-income disregards in the preceding session of the same Congress. And those statements clearly reveal the common ground of that fight that the existing scheme did not independently disregard mandatory tax withholdings, but grouped them with other work expenses which the new flat-sum disregard would subsume. The most recent confirmation of Congress’ intentions in this matter came with enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, which, by its § 2625, 98 Stat. 1135, amends § 402(a)(8) to provide that “in implementing [the section], the term ‘earned income’ shall mean gross earned income, prior to any deductions for taxes or for any other purposes.” The legislative history demonstrates that Congress enacted this provision in order to resolve the very dispute presented here. Specifically noting that the Courts of Appeals had come to conflicting conclusions on the matter and that this Court had granted the petition for certiorari in this case, the Conference Report leaves no doubt that Congress intended to endorse the competing construction. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, pp. 1394-1395 (1984). The Senate echoed the House explanation: “The statute would be amended to make clear that the term ‘earned income’ means the gross amount of earnings, prior to- the taking of payroll or other deductions. The provisions in the AFDC statute which require that specified amounts of earned income be disregarded in determining eligibility and benefits have historically been interpreted as requiring that such amounts be deducted from gross, rather than net, earnings. “The Committee agrees with the Department that there was no intention to change this interpretation when it approved the 1981 AFDC amendments. The Committee notes that when the Congressional Budget Office estimated the savings expected to be derived from the changes in 1981, it followed the interpretation shared by the Department and the Committee that the proposed disregards would apply to gross earnings.” 1 Senate Committee on Finance, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 982 (Senate Print 98-169, 1984). Thus, the 98th Congress reiterated its immediate predecessor’s intentions not just by words but by deed — not only did it express in legislative history the “historic] interpretation]” of the relevant income, but it found it sufficient in resolving the disagreement to amend only § 402(a)(8). This 1984 legislation, which, it was said, sought to “[c]larif[y] current law,” Senate Print, at 79, leaves no doubt as to the prospective interpretation of the statute, but it carries in addition considerable retrospective weight. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 166-167, and n. 19 (1982); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380-381 (1969); FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U. S. 84, 90 (1958). In conjunction with contemporaneous evidence and the 1982 House Report, it removes all doubt. > H-I In sum, while it appears that from the early days of the AFDC program the States regularly have excluded mandatory tax withholdings when determining need, it is clear to us that from some time after the addition in 1962 of the work-expense disregard of § 402(a)(7), and certainly by the time of OBRA, they did so pursuant to the directive of that section to disregard expenses “reasonably attributable” to the earning of income. All the available evidence indicates that the Congress that enacted the OBRA changes in the AFDC program also viewed tax liabilities as work expenses subject to the § 402(a)(7) disregard. That congressional understanding compels the conclusion that mandatory tax withholdings were among the items encompassed by the flat-sum disregard of § 402(a)(8). Respondents and their amici have offered various policy reasons why the disincentive to employment effected by the failure fully to account for work expenses is wrong. They point to the value, both pecuniary and inherent, of the search for and maintenance of employment, as well as to the long-term costs to the States in discouraging AFDC families’ efforts toward economic independence. We, however, do not sit to pass on policy or the wisdom of the course Congress has set. Our task is only to determine that the Secretary has identified it correctly. We are satisfied that she did. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. California Department of Social Services, Manual of Policy and Procedure, Eligibility and Assistance Standards § 44-113.21 (Nov. 1981). See Dickenson v. Petit, 728 F. 2d 23 (CA1 1984), cert. pending, No. 83-6769; James v. O’Bannon, 715 F. 2d 794 (CA3 1983), cert. pending sub nom. James v. Cohen, No. 83-6168; Bell v. Massinga, 721 F. 2d 131 (CA4 1983), cert. pending, No. 83-6269. The State, however, is afforded “broad discretion in determining both the standard of need and the level of benefits.” Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974); see King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 318-319 (1968). The state plan first establishes the statewide standard of need, “which is the amount deemed necessary by the State to maintain a hypothetical family at a subsistence level,” Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S., at 253, and then determines “how much assistance will be given, that is, what ‘level of benefits’ will be paid,” Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 408 (1970). Both eligibility and benefit amounts are determined by comparing income with the state standard of need. If a family’s income “is less than the predetermined statewide standard of need, the applicant is eligible for participation in the program and the amount of the assistance payments will be based upon that difference.” Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S., at 254. A State need not pay the entire difference, but instead may establish dollar maxima or provide only a specified percentage of the family’s need. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S., at 408-409. The State of California, a respondent here under this Courts’ Rule 19.6, has filed, with others, a brief in support of the petitioner. See App. 24, 25, Bureau of Public Assistance, Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, State Letter No. 4 (Apr. 30, 1942) (“It should be recognized that when a person is working there may be additional needs which must be met such as additional clothing, transportation, food and the like”); App. 27, 28, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, State Letter No. 291 (Mar. 11, 1957), incorporated as §3140 of pt. IV of Handbook of Public Assistance Administration (1957). See also App. 37, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, § 3140 (1962). The statute at that time thus had come to be worded as follows: “A state plan for aid and services to needy families with children must “(7) except as may be otherwise provided in clause (8), provide that the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children,... as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income; (8) provide that, in making the determination under clause (7), the State agency— “(A) shall wilh respect to any month disregard— “(ii) in the case of earned income of a dependent child [or] a relative receiving such aid ... , the first $30 of the total of such earned income for such month plus one-third of the remainder of such income for such month . . ..” The statute thus provided: “A state plan for aid and services to needy families with children must. . . “(7) except as may be otherwise provided in paragraph (8) . . . , provide that the State agency— “(A) shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children . . . “(8)(A) provide that, with respect to any month, in making the determination under paragraph (7), the State agency— “(ii) shall disregard from the earned income of any child or relative applying for or receiving aid to families with dependent children, or of any other individual (living in the same home as such relative and child) whose needs are taken into account in making such determination, the first $75 of the total of such earned income for such month (or such lesser amount as the Secretary may prescribe in the ease of an individual not engaged in full-time employment or not employed throughout the month); “(iii) shall disregard from the earned income of any child, relative, or other individual specified in clause (ii), an amount equal to expenditures for care in such month for a dependent child . . . receiving aid to families with dependent children and requiring such care for such month, to the extent that such amount (for each such dependent child . . .) does not exceed $160 (or such lesser amount as the Secretary may prescribe in the case of an individual not engaged in full-time employment or not employed throughout the month); “(iv) shall disregard from the earned income of any child or relative receiving aid to families with dependent children ... an amount equal to the first $30 of the total of such earned income not disregarded under any other clause of this subparagraph plus one-third of the remainder thereof. . . ; and “(B) provide that (with respect to any month) the State agency— “(ii) ••• “(II) in the case of the earned income of a person with respect to whom subparagraph (A)(iv) has been applied for four consecutive months, shall not apply the provisions of subparagraph (A)(iv) for so long as he continues to receive aid under the plan and shall not apply such provisions to any month thereafter until the expiration of an additional period of twelve consecutive months during which he is not a recipient of such aid.” The current version of this regulation is identical to that originally promulgated in 1970. See also Connecticut State Dept. of Public Welfare v. HEW, 448 F. 2d 209, 216 (CA2 1971) (treating 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1970) to provide a nonexhaustive list of expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income under § 402(a)(7)). The Court of Appeals suggested that tax withholdings “are easily verified,” 707 F. 2d, at 1124, but so too are any other amounts whose deduction a payroll stub records. In the 1984 version of the regulation, the words “[n]et income” are replaced by “[fincóme after application of disregards.” 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1984). There are also other changes in subparagraph (D). See 49 Fed. Reg. 35586, 35592, 35600 (1984). The text at p. 35592 explains that the changes were in response to the Deficit Reduction Act to correct the “misinterpret[ations]” of the phrase “net income” in the prior version. See Heckler v. Turner, 468 U. S. 1305, 1306-1307 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HARISIADES v. SHAUGHNESSY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION. NO. 43. Argued December 5, 1951. Decided March 10, 1952. Richard F. Watt argued the cause for petitioner in No. 43. With him on the brief was Walter F. Dodd. Jack Wasserman argued the cause for appellant in No. 206. With him on the brief was Filindo B. Masino. David Rein argued the cause for appellant in No. 264. With him on the brief was Joseph Forer. Robert L. Stern argued the cause for respondent in No. 43 and appellees in Nos. 206 and 264. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney, Beatrice Rosenberg, John R. Wilkins and. Charles Gordon. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. The ultimate question in these three cases is whether the United States constitutionally may deport a legally resident alien because of membership in the Communist Party which terminated before enactment of the Alien Registration Act, 1940. Harisiades, a Greek national, accompanied hisTfather to the United States in 1916, when thirteen years of age, and has resided here since. He has taken a wife and sired two children, all citizens. He joined the Communist Party in 1925, when it was known as the Workers Party, and served as an organizer, Branch Executive Committeeman, secretary of its Greek Bureau, and editor of its paper “Empros.” The party discontinued his membership, along with that of other aliens, in 1939, but he has continued association with members. He was familiar with the principles and philosophy of the Communist Party and says he stilf believes in them. He disclaims personal belief in use of force and violence and asserts that the party favored their'use only in defense. A warrant for his deportation because of his membership was issued in 1930 but was not served until 1946. The delay was due to inability to locate him because of his use of a number of aliases. After hearings, he was ordered deported on the grounds that after entry he had been a mémber of an organization which advocates overthrow of the Government by force and violence and distributes printed matter so advocating. He sought release by habeas corpus, which was denied by the District Court. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Mascitti, a citizen of Italy, came to this country in 1920, at the age of sixteen. He married a resident alien and has one American-born child. He was a member of the Young Workers Party, the Workers Party and the Communist Party between 1923 and 1929. His testimony was that he knew the party advocated a proletarian dictatorship, to be established by force and violence if the capitalist class resisted. He heard some speakers advocate violence, in which he says he did not personally believe, and he was not clear as to the party policy. He resigned in 1929, apparently because he lost sympathy with or interest in the party! A warrant for his deportation issued and was served in 1946. After the usual administrative hearings he was ordered deported on the samé grounds as Harisiades. He sought relief by declaratory judgment, which was denied without opinion by a three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia. His case 'comes to this Court by direct appeal. Mrs. Coleman, a native of Russia, was admitted to the United States in 1914, when thirteen years of age. She married an American citizen and has three children, citizens by birth.' She admits, being a member of the Communist Party for about a year, beginning in 1919, and 'again from 1928 to 1930, and again from 1936 to 1937 or 1938. She held no office and her activities were not significant. She disavowed much knowledge of party principles and program, claiming she joined each time because of some injustice the party was then fighting. The reasons she gives for leaving the party are her health and the party’s discontinuance of alien memberships. She has been ordered deported because after entry she becamé a member of an-organization advocating overthrow of the Government by force -and violence. She sought an injunction on constitutional grounds, among others: Relief was denied, without opinion, by a three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia and: her case also bornes here by direct appeal. Validity of the hearing procedures is questioned for noncompliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, which we think is here inapplicable. Admittedly, each of these deportations is authorized and required by the letter, spirit and intention of the statute. But the Act is assailed on three grounds: (1) that it deprives the aliens of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (2) that it abridges their freedoms of speech and assembly in contravention of the First Amendment; and (3) that it is an ex post facto law which Congress is forbidden to pass by Art. I, § 9, cl. 3 of the Constitution. We have in each case a finding, approved by the court below, that the Communist Party during the period of the alien’s membership taught and advocated overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence. Those findings are not questioned here. I. These aliens ask us to forbid their expulsion by a departure from the long-accepted application fo such cases of the Fifth Amendment provision that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Their basic contention is that admission for permanent residence confers a “vested right” on the alien, equal to that of the citizen, to remain within the country, and that the alien is entitled to constitutional protection in that matter to the same extent as the citizen. Their second line of defense is that if any power to deport domiciled aliens exists it is so dispersed that the judiciary must concur .in the grounds for its exercise to the extent of finding them reasonable. The argument goes on to the contention that the grounds prescribed by the Act of 1940 bear no reasonable relation to protection of legitimate interests of the United States and concludes that the Act should be declared invalid. Admittedly these propositions are hot founded in precedents of this Court. For over thirty years each of these aliens has enjoyed such advantages as accrue from residence here without renouncing his foreign allegiance or formally acknowledging adherence to the Constitution he now invokes. Each was admitted to the United States, upon passing formidable exclusionary hurdles, in the hope that, after what may be called a probationary period, he would desire and be found desirable for citizenship. Each has been offered naturalization, with all of the rights and privileges of citizenship, conditioned only upon open and.honest assumption of undivided allegiance to our Government. But acceptance was and is not compulsory. Each has been permitted to prolong his original nationality indefinitely. So long as one thus perpetuates a dual status as.an American inhabitant but foreign citizen, he. may derive advantages from two sources of law — American and international. He may claim protection against our Government unavailable to the citizen. As an alien he retains a claim upon the state of his citizenship to diplomatic intervention on his behalf, a patronage often of considerable valúe. The state of origin of each of these aliens could presently enter diplomatic remonstrance against these deportations if they were inconsistent with international law, the prevailing custom among nations or their own practices. The alien retains immunities from burdens which the citizen • must shoulder. By withholding his allegiance from the United States, he leaves outstanding a foreign call on his loyalties which international law not. only permits our Government to recognize but commands it to respect. In deference to it certain dispensations from conscription for any military service have been granted foreign nationals. They cannot, -consistently with our international commitments, be compelled “to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country.” In addition to such general immunities they may enjoy particular' treaty privileges. Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on . an equal footing with citizens, but in others has never been conceded legal parity with the citizen. Most importantly, to protract this ambiguous status within-^the country is not his right but is a matter of permission and tolerance; The Government’s power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this Court since the question first arose. War, of course, is the most usual occasion for extensive resort to the power. Though the resident alien may be personally loyal to the United States, if his nation becomes our enemy his allegiance prevails over his personal preference and makes him also our enemy, liable to expulsion or internment, and his property becomes subject to seizure and perhaps confiscation. But it does not require war to bring the power of deportation into éxistence or to authorize its exercise. Congressional apprehension of foreign or internal dangers short of war may lead to its use. So long as the alien elects to continue the ambiguity of his allegiance his domicile here is held by a precarious tenure. That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every sovereign state. Such is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien and we leave the law on the subject as we find it. This brings us to the alternative defense under the Due Process Clause — that, granting the power, it is so unreasonably and harshly exercised by this enactment that it should be held unconstitutional. In historical context the Act before us stands out.as an extreme application of the expulsion power. There is no denying that as world convulsions have driven us toward a closed society the expulsion power has been exercised with increasing severity, manifest in multiplication of grounds for deportation, in expanding the subject classes from illegal entrants to legal residents, and in greatly lengthening the period of residence after which one may be expelled. This is said to have reached a point where it is the duty of this Court to call a halt upon the political branches of the Government. It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. These restraints upon the judiciary, occasioned by different events, do not control today’s decision but they are pertinent. It is not necessary and probably, not possible to delineate a fixed and precise line of separation in these matters between political, and judicial power under the Constitution. Certainly, however, nothing in the structure of our Government or the text of our Constitution would- warrant judicial review by standards which would require us to equate our political judgment .with that óf Congress. ' Under the conditions which produced this Act, can we declare that congressional alarm about a coalition of Communist power without and Communist conspiracy within the United States is either a fantasy or a pretense? This Act was approved by President Roosevelt June 28, 1940, when a world war was threatening to involve'us, as soon it did. . Communists in the .United States were exerting évery effort to defeat and delay our preparations. Certainly no-responsible American would say that there were then or are now no possible grounds on which Congress might believe that Communists in our. midst are inimical to our security. - Congress received evidence that the Communist move? ment here has -been heavily laden with • aliens and that Soviet control of the American Communist Party has been largely through alien Communists. It would be easy for. those of us who do not have security responsibility to say that those who do are taking Communism too seriously and overestimating its danger. But we have an Act of one Congress which, for a decade, subsequent Congresses have never repealed but have strengthened and extended. We, in our private opinions, need not concur ' in Congress’ policies to hold its enactments constitutional, judicially we must tolerate what personally we may regard as a legislative mistake. We are urged, because the policy inflicts severe and undoubted hardship on affected individuals, to find a re-. straint in the Due Process Clause. But the Due Process Clause does not shield the citizen from conscription and the consequent calamity of being separated from family, friends, home' and business while he is transported to foreign lands to stem the tide bf Communism. If Communist aggression creates such hardships for loyal citizens, it is hard to find justification for holding that the Constitution requires that its hardships must be spared the Communist alien. When citizens raised the. Constitution as a shield against expulsion from their homes and places of business, the Court refused to find hardship a cause for' judicial intervention. . We think that, in the present state of the world, it would be rash and irresponsible to reinterpret our fundamental law to deny or qualify the Government’s power of deportation. However desirable world-wide amelioration of the lot of aliens, we think it is peculiarly a subject for international diplomacy. It should not be initiated by judicial decision which can only deprive our own Government of a power of defense and reprisal without obtaining for Américañ 'citizens abroad any reciprocal privileges or immunities. Reform in this field must be entrusted to the branches of the Government in control of our international relations and treaty-making powers. We . hold that the Act is not invalid under the Due Process Clause.. These aliens aré not entitled to judicial relief unless some other constitutional limitation has been transgressed, to which inquiry we turn. II. The First Amendment is invoked as a barrier;, against this enactment. The elaim is that in joining an organization advocating ovérthrow of government by force and violence the alien has merely exercised freedoms of speech, press and assembly which that Amendment guarantees to him. The assumption is that the First Amendment allows Congress to make no distinction between advocating change in the existing order by lawful elective processes and advocating change by force and violence, that freedom for the one includes freedom for the other, and that when teaching of violence is denied so is freedom of speech. Our Constitution sought to leave no excuse for violent attack on the status quo by providing a legal alternative— attack by ballot. • To arm all men'for orderly change, the Constitution put in their hands a right to influence' the electorate by press, speech and assembly. This means freedom to advocate or promote Communism by means of the ballot box, but it does not include the practice or incitement of violence. True, it often is difficult to determine whether ambiguous speech is advocacy of political methods or subtly shades into a methodical but prudent incitement to violence. Communist governments avoid the inquiry by suppressing everything distasteful. Some would have us avoid the difficulty by going to the opposite extreme of permitting incitement to violent overthrow at least unless it seems certain to succeed immediately. We apprehend that the Constitution enjoins upon us the duty, however difficult, of distinguishing between the two. Different formulae have been applied in different situations and the test applicable to the Communist Party has been stated too recently to make further discussion at this timé profitable. We think the First Amendment does not prevent the deportation of these aliens. III. The remaining claim is that this Act conflicts with Art. I, § 9, of the Constitution forbidding ex post facto enactments. An impression of retroactivity results from reading as a new and isolated enactment what is actually a continuation of prior legislation. During all the years since 1920 Congress has maintained a standing admonition to aliens, on pain of deportation, riot to become members of any organization that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence, a category repeatedly held to include the Communist Party. These aliens violated that prohibition and incurred liability to deportation. ■ They were not caught unawares by a change of law. There can be no contention that they were not adequately forewarned both that their conduct was prohibited and of its consequences. In 1939, this Court decided Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22, in which it was held that Congress, in the stat. ute as it then stood, had not clearly expressed an intent that Communist Party membership remained cause for deportation after it ceased. The Court concluded that in the absence of such expression only contemporaneous membership would authorize deportation. The reaction of the Communist- Party was to drop aliens from membership, at least in .form, in order to imriiunize them from the consequences of their party membership. The reaction of Congress was that the Court had misunderstood its legislation. In the. Act here before us it supplied unmistakable language that past violators of its prohibitions continued to be deportable in spite of resignation or expulsion from the party. It regarded the fact that an alien defied our laws to join the Communist Party as an indication that he had developed little comprehension of the principles or practice of representative government or else was unwilling to abide by them. However, even if the Act were found to be retroactive, to strike it down would require us to overrule the construction of the ex post facto provision which has been followed by this Court from earliest times. It always has been considered that that which it forbids is penal legislation which imposes or increases criminal punishment for conduct lawful previous to its enactment. Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified-as a civil rather than a criminal procedure. Both of these, doctrines as original proposals might be de~ batable, but both have been considered closed for many years and a body of statute and decisional law has been built upon them. In Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591, Mr. Justice Holmes, for the Court, said: “It is’.thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. The determination by facts that might constitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is the deportátion a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government to harboir persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of the local penal law with the policy of Congress is an accident. . . . The prohibition of ex post facto laws in Article I, § 9, has.no application . . . and with regard to the petitioner it is not. necessary to construe the statute as having any retrospective effect.” Later, the Court said, “It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment. . . . The inhibition against the passage-of an ex post facto law by Congress in § 9 of Article I of the Constitution applies only to. criminal laws . . . and not to a deportation act like this '. . . .” Mahler v. Ehy, 264 U. S. 32, 39. It is urged against the foregoing opinions that in a few cases the ex post facto prohibition had been applied to what appeared to be civil disabilities. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234. The Court has since explained that those cases proceeded from the view that novel disabilities there imposed upon citizens were really criminal penalties for which civil form was a disguise, Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U. S. 381, 385. Those cases were known to the Justices who promulgated the above-quoted opinions but have never been considered to govern deportation. The facts of this case afford no basis for reconsidering or modifying the. long-settled doctrine. It is contended that this poliey allows no escape by reformation. We are urged to apply some doctrine of atonement and redemption. Congress might well have, done so, but it is not for the judiciary, to usurp the function of. granting absolution or pardon. ;We cannot do so fór dépórtable ex-convicts, even though they have .served a term of imprisonment calculated to bring about their .reformation. When the Communist Party as a matter of party strategy formally expelled alien members en masse, it destroyed any significance that discontinued membership might otherwise have as indication of change of heart by the individual. Congress may have believed that the party tactics threw upon the Government an almost impossible burden, if it attempted to. separate those who sincerely: renounced Communist principles of force and violence from those who left the party the better to serve it. Congress, exercising the wide discretion that it alone has in these matters, declined to accept that as the Government’s burden. We find noné of tne constitutional objections to the Act well founded. The judgments accordingly are Affirmed. Mr.. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 54 Stat. 670, 8 U. S. C. § 137. 90 F. Supp. 397. 187 F. 2d 137. Petitioner Harisiades and appellant Coleman contend that the proceedings against them-must be nullified for failure to conform to thé requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. However, § 12 of the Act, 60 Stat. 244, 5 U. S. C. § 1011; provides that “. . . no procedural requirement shall be mandatory as to any agency proceeding initiated prior to -the effective, date of such requirement.” The proceedings against Harisiades and Coleman were instituted before the effective date of the. Act.. Harisiades also contends that, the Administrative Procedure Act aside, he was denied procedural due process in that in his 1946-1947 hearings the same individual acted both as presiding officer and examining' officer. However, it appears that the officer here performed both functions with Harisiades’ consent. He, therefore, has no standing to raise the objection now. 40 Stat. 548, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 732 (a) (13), (16), (17), (18), (19);61 Stat. 122, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 735. But a certificate of naturalization is subject to revocation on the ground of fraud or other illegality in the procurement. 54 Stat. 1158, 8 U. S. C. § 738; Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654. § 2 of the Selective Draft Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 202; § 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 303; § 4 (a) of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a). Cf. Moser v. United States, 341 U. S. 41. Article 23, 1907 Hague Convention, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2301-2302. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 64. This Court has held that the Constitution assures him a large-measure of equal economic opportunity, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; he may invoke the writ of habeas corpus to protect' his personal liberty, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 660; in criminal proceedings against him he must be accorded the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228; and, unless he is an enemy alien, his property cannot be taken without just compensation. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481. He cannot stand for election to many public offices. For instance, Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3, of the Constitution respectively require that candidates for election to the House of Representatives and Senate be citizens. See Borcliard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 63. . The states, to whom is entrusted the authority to set qualifications of voters, for most--purposes require citizenship as a condition precedent to the voting , franchise, The alien’s .right to travel temporarily outside' the United States is subject to restrictions not applicable to citizens. 43 Stat. 158, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 210. If he is arrested on a charge of entering the country illegally, the Burden is his to prove ‘‘his right to enter or remain” — no 'presumptions accrue in his favoT by his presence here. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 155 (a). Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 707, 711-714, 730; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 545-546; Li Sing v. United States, 180 U. S. 486, 494-495; Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296, 302; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 97; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 261; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272, 275; Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549, 556-557; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591. 40 Stat. 531, 50 U. S. C. § 21. 40 Stat. 411, 50 U. S. C. App. § 2 (c); 40 Stat. 415, 50 U. S. C. App. § 6; 62 Stat. 1246, 50 U. S. C. App. § 39; Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U. S. 308. “. . . [I]n strict law, a State can expel even domiciled aliens-without so much as giving the reasons, the refusal of the expelling State to supply the reasons for expulsion to the home State of the expelled alien does not constitute an illegal, but only a very unfriendly act.” 1 Oppenheim, International Law (3d ed., Roxburgh, 1920), 498-502, at 499. But cf. 1 Oppenheim, International Law (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948), 630-634, at 631. See also 4 Moore, International Law Digest, 67-96, citing examples; Wheaton's International Law (6th ed., Keith, 1929), 210-211; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698. An open door to the immigrant was the early federal policy. It began to close in 1884 when Orientals were excluded. 23 Stat. 115. Thereafter, Congress has intermittently added to the excluded classes, and as rejections at the border multiplied illegal entries increased. To combat these, recourse was had-to deportation in the Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1086. However, that Act could be applied to an illegal entrant only within one year after his entry.’ Although that time limitation was subsequently extended, 32 Stat. 1218; 34 Stat. 904-905, until after the turn of the century expulsion was used only as an auxiliary remedy to enforce exclusion. Congress, in 1907, provided for deportation of legally resident aliens, but the statute reached only women found engaging in prostitution, and deportation proceedings were authorized only within three years after entry. From those early steps, the policy has been extended. In 1910; new classes of resident aliens were listed for deportation, including for the. first time political offenders such as anarchists and those believing in or advocating the overthrow of the Government by force and violence. 36 Stat. 264. In 1917, aliens who were found after entry to be advocating anarchist doctrines or the overthrow of the Government by force and violence were made subject to deportation, a-dive-year- time limit being retained. 39 Stat. 889. A year later, deportability because of membership in described subversive organizations was introduced. 40 Stat. 1012; 41 Stat. 1008. When this Court, in 1939, held that that Act reached only aliens who were members when the proceedings against them were instituted, Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22, Congress promptly enacted the statute before us, making deportation mandatory for all aliens who at any time past have been members of the proscribed organizations. In so doing it also eliminated th.e time limit for institution of proceedings thereunder. Alien Registration Act, 1940, 54 Stat. 670, 673. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319-322; Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111; U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 4; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42; Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U. S. 250. In respect to the war power over even citizens, see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 R. S. 81, 92; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 217-218. That English courts also refuse to review grounds for deportation orders appears from Rex v. Home Secretary; Ex parte Bressler, 27 Cox Cr. Ca. 655. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494. Ibid. 40 Stat. 1012. Colder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390; Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, 242. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 730; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591; Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 154.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, et al. v. TAXATION WITH REPRESENTATION OF WASHINGTON No. 81-2338. Argued March 22, 1983 Decided May 23, 1983 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Black-mun, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 551. Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for appellants in No. 81-2338. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Archer, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Stuart A. Smith, Richard Farber, and Robert S. Pomerance. John Cary Sims argued the cause for appellee in No. 81-2338. With him on the brief were Alan B. Morrison and Thomas F. Field. Together with No. 82-134, Taxation With Representation of Washington v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al., also on appeal from the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Sheldon S. Cohen, Julie Noel Gilbert, Dennis B. Drapkin, George H. Gangwere, and Wilmer S. Schantz, Jr., for the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States; by Joseph C. Zengerle and Zachary R. Karol for the Disabled American Veterans et al.; and by Mitchell Rogovin and George T. Frampton, Jr., for the American Legion. Thomas A. Troyer, H. David Rosenbloom, Albert G. Lauber, Jr., and John G. Milliken filed a brief for the American Association of Museums et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellee Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR) is a nonprofit corporation organized to promote what it conceives to be the “public interest” in the area of federal taxation. It proposes to advocate its point of view before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Judiciary. This case began when TWR applied for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3). The Internal Revenue Service denied the application because it appeared that a substantial part of TWR’s activities would consist of attempting to influence legislation, which is not permitted by § 501(c)(3). TWR then brought this suit in District Court against the appellants, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that it qualifies for the exemption granted by § 501(c)(3). It claimed the prohibition against substantial lobbying is unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment for appellants. On appeal, the en banc Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that § 501(c)(3) does not violate the First Amendment but does violate the Fifth Amendment. 219 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 676 F. 2d 715 (1982). Appellants appealed pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1252, and TWR cross-appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal, 459 U. S. 819 (1982). TWR was formed to take over the operations of two other nonprofit corporations. One, Taxation With Representation Fund, was organized to promote TWR’s goals by publishing a journal and engaging in litigation; it had tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). The other, Taxation With Representation, attempted to promote the same goals by influencing legislation; it liad tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4). Neither predecessor organization was required to pay federal income taxes. For purposes of our analysis, there are two principal differences between § 501(c)(3) organizations and § 501(c)(4) organizations. Taxpayers who contribute to § 501(c)(3) organizations are permitted by § 170(c)(2) to deduct the amount of their contributions on their federal income tax returns, while contributions to § 501(c)(4) organizations are not deductible. Section 501(c)(4) organizations, but not § 501(c)(3) organizations, are permitted to engage in substantial lobbying to advance their exempt purposes. In these cases, TWR is attacking the prohibition against substantial lobbying in § 501(c)(3) because it wants to use tax-deductible contributions to support substantial lobbying activities. To evaluate TWR’s claims, it is necessary to understand the effect of the tax-exemption system enacted by Congress. Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual’s contributions. The system Congress has enacted provides this kind of subsidy to nonprofit civic welfare organizations generally, and an additional subsidy to those charitable organizations that do not engage in substantial lobbying. In short, Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that nonprofit organizations undertake to promote the public welfare. It appears that TWR could still qualify for a tax exemption under § 501(c)(4). It also appears that TWR can obtain tax-deductible contributions for its nonlobbying activity by returning to the dual structure it used in the past, with a § 501(c)(3) organization for nonlobbying activities and a § 501(c)(4) organization for lobbying. TWR would, of course, have to ensure that the § 501(c)(3) organization did not subsidize the § 501(c)(4) organization; otherwise, public funds might be spent on an activity Congress chose not to subsidize. TWR contends that Congress’ decision not to subsidize its lobbying violates the First Amendment. It claims, relying on Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), that the prohibition against substantial lobbying by § 501(c)(3) organizations imposes an “unconstitutional condition” on the receipt of tax-deductible contributions. In Speiser, California established a rule requiring anyone who sought to take advantage of a property tax exemption to sign a declaration stating that he did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government of the United States. This Court stated that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.” Id., at 518. TWR is certainly correct when it states that we have held that the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972). But TWR is just as certainly incorrect when it claims that this case fits the Speiser-Perry model. The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible contributions to support its non-lobbying activity, nor does it deny TWR any independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby. Congress has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys. This Court has never held that Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right. This aspect of these cases is controlled by Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498 (1959), in which we upheld a Treasury Regulation that denied business expense deductions for lobbying activities. We held that Congress is not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying. Id., at 513. In these cases, as in Cammarano, Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying. We again reject the “notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.” Id., at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring). TWR also contends that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment renders the prohibition against substantial lobbying invalid. TWR points out that § 170(c)(3) permits taxpayers to deduct contributions to veterans’ organizations that qualify for tax exemption under §501(c)(19). Qualifying veterans’ organizations are permitted to lobby as much as they want in furtherance of their exempt purposes. TWR argues that because Congress has chosen to subsidize the substantial lobbying activities of veterans’ organizations, it must also subsidize the lobbying of § 501(c)(3) organizations. Generally, statutory classifications are valid if they bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. Statutes are subjected to a higher level of scrutiny if they interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or employ a suspect classification, such as race. E. g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 322 (1980). Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes. More than 40 years ago we addressed these comments to an equal protection challenge to tax legislation: “The broad discretion as to classification possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has long been recognized .... [T]he passage of time has only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. Traditionally classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden. It has, because of this, been pointed out that in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom.in classification. Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 87-88 (1940) (footnotes omitted). See also San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 40-41 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359-360 (1973). We have already explained why we conclude that Congress has not violated TWR’s First Amendment rights by declining to subsidize its First Amendment activities. The case would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to “ ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’” Cammarano, supra, at 513, quoting Speiser, 357 U. S., at 519. But the veterans’ organizations that qualify under §501(c)(19) are entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions regardless of the content of any speech they may use, including lobbying. We find no indication that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that it has had that effect. The sections of the Internal Revenue Code here at issue do not employ any suspect classification. The distinction between veterans’ organizations and other charitable organizations is not at all like distinctions based on race or national origin. The Court of Appeals nonetheless held that “strict scrutiny” is required because the statute “affect[s] First Amendment rights on a discriminatory basis.” 219 U. S. App. D. C., at 130, 676 F. 2d, at 728 (emphasis supplied). Its opinion suggests that strict scrutiny applies whenever Congress subsidizes some speech, but not all speech. This is not the law. Congress could, for example, grant funds to an organization dedicated to combating teenage drug abuse, but condition the grant by providing that none of the money received from Congress should be used to lobby state legislatures. Under Cammarano, such a statute would be valid. Congress might also enact a statute providing public money for an organization dedicated to combating teenage alcohol abuse, and impose no condition against using funds obtained from Congress for lobbying. The existence of the second statute would not make the first statute subject to strict scrutiny. Congressional selection of particular entities or persons for entitlement to this sort of largesse “is obviously a matter of policy and discretion not open to judicial review unless in circumstances which here we are not able to find. United States v. Realty Co., [163 U. S. 427,] 444 [(1896)].” Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308, 317 (1937). See also, id., at 313; Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272 (1954). For the purposes of these cases appropriations are comparable to tax exemptions and deductions, which are also “a matter of grace [that] Congress can, of course, disallow . . . as it chooses.” Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U. S. 27, 28 (1958). These are scarcely novel principles. We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), upheld a statute that provides federal funds for candidates for public office who enter primary campaigns, but does not provide funds for candidates who do not run in party primaries. We rejected First Amendment and equal protection challenges to this provision without applying strict scrutiny. Id., at 93-108. Harris v. McRae, supra, and Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977), considered legislative decisions not to subsidize abortions, even though other medical procedures were subsidized. We declined to apply strict scrutiny and rejected equal protection challenges to the statutes. The reasoning of these decisions is simple: “although government may not place obstacles in the path of a [person’s] exercise of. . . freedom of [speech], it need not remove those not of its own creation.” Harris, 448 U. S., at 316. Although TWR does not have as much money as it wants, and thus cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the Constitution “does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.” Id., at 318. As we said in Maher, “[constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law . . . .” 432 U. S., at 476. Where governmental provision of subsidies is not “ ‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,’ ” Cammarano, 358 U. S., at 513, its “power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.” Maher, supra, at 476. We have no doubt but that this statute is within Congress’ broad power in this area. TWR contends that § 501(c)(3) organizations could better advance their charitable purposes if they were permitted to engage in substantial lobbying. This may well be true. But Congress — not TWR or this Court — has the authority to determine whether the advantage the public would receive from additional lobbying by charities is worth the money the public would pay to subsidize that lobbying, and other disadvantages that might accompany that lobbying. It appears that Congress was concerned that exempt organizations might use tax-deductible contributions to lobby to promote the private interests of their members. See 78 Cong. Rec. 5861 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Reed); id., at 5959 (remarks of Sen. La Follette). It is not irrational for Congress to decide that tax-exempt charities such as TWR should not further benefit at the expense of taxpayers at large by obtaining a further subsidy for lobbying. It is also not irrational for Congress to decide that, even though it will not subsidize substantial lobbying by charities generally, it -will subsidize lobbying by veterans’ organizations. Veterans have “been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation,” Boone v. Lightner, 319 U. S. 561, 575 (1943), “‘subjecting themselves to the mental and physical hazards as well as the economic and family detriments which are peculiar to military service and which do not exist in normal civil life.’” Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 380 (1974) (emphasis deleted). Our country has a longstanding policy of compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them with numerous advantages. This policy has “always been deemed to be legitimate.” Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279, n. 25 (1979). The issue in these cases is not whether TWR must be permitted to lobby, but whether Congress is required to provide it with public money with which to lobby. For the reasons stated above, we hold that it is not. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Section § 501(c)(3) grants exemption to: “Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... , or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office” (emphasis supplied). The Due Process Clause imposes on the Federal Government requirements comparable to those that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the States. E. g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 226, n. 6 (1981). Appellants contend that we lack jurisdiction of the cross-appeal because 28 U. S. C. § 1252 refers only to appeals, and this Court’s Rule 12.4 only establishes a procedure for taking a cross-appeal. Section 1252 provides: “Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action ... to which the United States or any of its agencies ... is a party” (emphasis supplied). This language is broad enough to encompass appellee’s cross-appeal. We hold that it does. Therefore, we deny the appellants’ motion to dismiss, and decide the cross-appeal together with the appeal. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to statutes in this opinion refer to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. Section 501(c)(4) grants exemption to: “Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, . . . and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.” In stating that exemptions and deductions, on the one hand, are like cash subsidies, on the other, we of course do not mean to assert that they are in all respects identical. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 674-676 (1970); id., at 690-691 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 699 (opinion of Harlan, J.). TWR and some amici are concerned that the IRS may impose stringent requirements that are unrelated to the congressional purpose of ensuring that no tax-deductible contributions are used to pay for substantial lobbying, and effectively make it impossible for a § 501(c)(3) organization to establish a § 501(e)(4) lobbying affiliate. No such requirement in the Code or regulations has been called to our attention, nor have we been able to discover one. The IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying. This is not unduly burdensome. We also note that TWR did not bring this suit because it was unable to operate with the dual structure and seeks a less stringent set of bookkeeping requirements. Rather, TWR seeks to force Congress to subsidize its lobbying activity. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-39. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290 (1981), upon which TWR relies, is not to the contrary. In that case the challenged ordinance regulated First Amendment activity by limiting individuals’ expenditures of their own money on political speech. TWR contends that Congress has overruled Cammarano by enacting § 162(e), which permits businesses to deduct certain lobbying expenses that are “ordinary and necessary [business] expenses.” See Brief for Ap-pellee 13. It is elementary that Congress’ decision to permit deductions does not affect this Court’s holding that refusing to permit them does not violate the Constitution. The rules governing deductibility of contributions to veterans’ organizations are not the same as the analogous rules for § 501(c)(3) organizations. For example, an individual may generally deduct up to 50% of his adjusted gross income in contributions to § 501(c)(3) organizations, but only 20% in contributions to veterans’ organizations. Compare § 170(b)(1)(A) with § 170(b)(1)(B). Taxpayers are permitted to carry over excess contributions to § 501(c)(3) organizations, but not veterans’ organizations, to the next year. § 170(d). There are other differences. If it were entitled to equal treatment with veterans’ organizations, TWR would, of course, be entitled only to the benefits they receive, not to more. See, e. g., Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979) (veterans’ preference in civil service employment); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974) (educational benefits).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PARKLANE HOSIERY CO., INC., et al. v. SHORE No. 77-1305. Argued October 30, 1978 Decided January 9, 1979 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, White, Marshall, BlackmuN, Powell, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. RehNquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 337. Jack B. Levitt argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Irving Parker, Joseph N. Salomon, and Robert N. Cooperman. Samuel K. Rosen argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. iSolicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, Stephen M. Shapiro, Harvey L. Pitt, Paul Gonson, and Michael K. Wolen- sky filed a brief for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Joel D. Joseph filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a party who has had issues of fact adjudicated adversely to it in an equitable action may be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues before a jury in a subsequent legal action brought against it by a new party. The respondent brought this stockholder’s class action against the petitioners in a Federal District Court. The complaint alleged that the petitioners, Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. (Parklane), and 13 of its officers, directors, and stockholders, had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a merger. The proxy statement, according to the complaint, had violated §§ 14 (a), 10 (b), and 20 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895, 891, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C.. §§ 78n (a), 78j (b), and 78t (a), as well as various rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The complaint sought damages, rescission of the merger, and recovery of costs. Before this action came to trial, the SEC filed suit against the same defendants in the Federal District Court, alleging that the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was materially false and misleading in essentially the same respects as those that had been alleged in the respondent’s complaint. Injunctive relief was requested. After a 4-day trial, the District Court found that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in the respects alleged, and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this judgment. 558 F. 2d 1083. The respondent in the present case then moved for partial summary judgment against the petitioners, asserting that the petitioners were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues that had been resolved against them in the action brought by the SEC. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that such an application of collateral estoppel would deny the petitioners their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a party who has had issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a non jury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a subsequent jury trial of these same issues of fact. 565 F. 2d 815. The appellate court concluded that “the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial only with respect to issues of fact, [and] once those issues have been fully and fairly adjudicated in a prior proceeding, nothing remains for trial, either with or without a jury.” Id., at 8.19. Because of an intercircuit conflict, we granted certiorari. 435 U. S. 1006. I The threshold question to be considered is whether, quite apart from the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, the petitioners can be precluded from relitigating facts resolved adversely to them in a prior equitable proceeding with another party under the general law of collateral estop-pel. Specifically, we must determine whether a litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment may nevertheless use that judgment “offensively” to prevent a defendant from relitigat-ing issues resolved in the earlier proceeding. A Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 328-329. Until relatively recently, however, the scope of collateral estoppel was limited by the doctrine of mutuality of parties. Under this mutuality doctrine, neither party could use a prior judgment as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were bound by the judgment. Based on the premise that it is somehow unfair to allow a party to use a prior judgment when he himself would not be so bound, the mutuality requirement provided a party who had litigated and lost in a previous action an opportunity to relitigate identical issues with new parties. By failing to recognize the obvious difference in position between a party who has never litigated an issue and one who has fully litigated and lost, the mutuality requirement was criticized almost from its inception. Recognizing the validity of this criticism, the Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, supra, abandoned the mutuality requirement, at least in cases where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent after a federal court in a previous lawsuit has already declared it invalid. The “broader question” before the Court, however, was “whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue.” 402 U. S., at 328. The Court strongly suggested a negative answer to that question: “In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources. To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting, without contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the prior suit, the defendant’s time and money are diverted from alternative uses — productive or otherwise — to relitigation of a decided issue. And, still assuming that the issue was resolved correctly in the first suit, there is reason to be concerned about the plaintiff’s allocation of resources. Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or 'a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure.’ Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U. S. 180, 185 (1952). Although neither judges, the parties, nor the adversary system performs perfectly in all cases, the requirement of determining whether the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard.” Id., at 329. B The Blonder-Tongue case involved defensive use of collateral estoppel — a plaintiff was estopped from asserting a claim that the plaintiff had previously litigated and lost against another defendant. The present case, by contrast, involves offensive use of collateral estoppel — a plaintiff is seeking to estop a defendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff. In both the offensive and defensive use situations, the party against whom estoppel is asserted has litigated and lost in an earlier action. Nevertheless, several reasons have been advanced why the two situations should be treated differently. First, offensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy in the same manner as defensive use does. Defensive use of collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from relitigating identical issues by merely “switching adversaries.” Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 19 Cal. 2d, at 813, 122 P. 2d, at 895. Thus defensive collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action if possible. Offensive use of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, creates precisely the opposite incentive. Since a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a “wait and see” attitude, in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment. E. g., Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767-768, 327 P. 2d 111, 116; Reardon v. Allen, 88 N. J. Super. 560, 571-572, 213 A. 2d 26, 32. Thus offensive use of collateral estoppel will likely increase rather than decrease the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action. A second argument against offensive use of collateral estop-pel is that it may be unfair to a defendant. If a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F. 2d 927, 929 (CA2); cf. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F. 2d 532 (CA2) (application of offensive collateral estoppel denied where defendant did not appeal an adverse judgment awarding damages of $35,000 and defendant was later sued for over $7 million). Allowing offensive collateral estoppel may also be unfair to a' defendant if the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant. Still another situation where it might be unfair to apply offensive estoppel is where the second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result. C We have concluded that the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied. The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where, either for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel. In the present case, however, none of the circumstances that might justify reluctance to allow the offensive use of collateral estoppel is present. The application of offensive collateral estoppel will not here reward a private plaintiff who could have joined in the previous action, since the respondent probably could not have joined in the injunctive action brought by the SEC even had he so desired. Similarly, there is no unfairness to the petitioners in applying offensive collateral estoppel in this case. First, in light of the serious allegations made in the SEC’s complaint against the petitioners, as well as the foreseeability of subsequent private suits that typically follow a successful Government judgment, the petitioners had every incentive to litigate the SEC lawsuit fully and vigorously. Second, the judgment in the SEC action was not inconsistent with any previous decision. Finally, there will in the respondent’s action be no procedural opportunities available to the petitioners that were unavailable in the first action of a •kind that might be likely to cause a different result. We conclude, therefore, that none of the considerations that would justify a refusal to allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel is present in this case. Since the petitioners received a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate their claims in the SEC action, the contemporary law of collateral estoppel leads inescapably to the conclusion that the petitioners are collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of whether the proxy statement was materially false and misleading. II The question that remains is whether, notwithstanding the law of collateral estoppel, the use of offensive collateral estoppel in this case would violate the petitioners’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. A “[T]he thrust of the [Seventh] Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791.” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 193. At common law, a litigant was not entitled to have a jury determine issues that had been previously adjudicated by a chancellor in equity. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 217-218; Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148, 158-159; Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 442, 448-458 (1971). Recognition that an equitable determination could have collateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action was the major premise of this Court’s decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500. In that case the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that certain arrangements between it and the defendant were not in violation of the antitrust laws, and asked for an injunction to prevent the defendant from instituting an antitrust action to challenge the arrangements. The defendant denied the allegations .and counterclaimed for treble damages under the antitrust laws, requesting a trial by jury of the issues common to both the legal and equitable claims. The Court of Appeals upheld denial of the request, but this Court reversed, stating: “[T]he effect of the action of the District Court could be, as the Court of Appeals believed, 'to limit the petitioner’s opportunity fully to try to a jury every issue which has a bearing upon its treble damage suit,’ for determination of the issue of clearances by the judge might ‘operate either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage claim.’ ” Id., at 504. It is thus clear that the Court in the Beacon Theatres case thought that if an issue common to both legal and equitable claims was first determined by a judge, relitigation of the issue before a jury might be foreclosed by res judicata or collateral estoppel. To avoid this result, the Court held, that when legal and equitable claims are joined in the same action, the trial judge has only limited discretion in determining the sequence of trial and “that discretion . . . must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial.” Id., at 510. Both the premise of Beacon Theatres, and the fact that it enunciated no more than a general prudential rule were confirmed by this Court’s decision in Katchen v. Landy, 382 U. S. 323. In that case the Court held that a bankruptcy court, sitting as a statutory court of equity, is empowered to adjudicate equitable claims prior to legal claims, even though the factual issues decided in the equity action would have been triable by a jury under the Seventh Amendment if the legal claims had been adjudicated first. The Court stated: “Both Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen recognize that there might be situations in which the Court could proceed to resolve the equitable claim first even though the results might be dispositive of the issues involved in the legal claim.” Id., at 339. Thus the Court in Katchen v. Landy recognized that an equitable determination can have collateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action and that this estoppel does not violate the Seventh Amendment. B Despite the strong support to be found both in history and in the recent decisional law of this Court for the proposition that an equitable determination can have collateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action, the petitioners argue that application of collateral estoppel in this case would nevertheless violate their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The petitioners contend that since the scope of the Amendment must be determined by reference to the common law as it existed in 1791, and since the common law permitted collateral estoppel only where there was mutuality of parties, collateral estoppel cannot constitutionally be applied when such mutuality is absent. The petitioners have advanced no persuasive reason, however, why the meaning of the Seventh Amendment should depend on whether or not mutuality of parties is present. A litigant who has lost because of adverse factual findings in an equity action is equally deprived of a jury trial whether he is estopped from relitigating the factual issues against the same party or a new party. In either case, the party against whom estoppel is asserted has litigated questions of fact, and has had the facts determined against him in an earlier proceeding. In either case there is no further factfinding function for the jury to perform, since the common factual issues have been resolved in the previous action. Cf. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 310 (“No one is entitled in a civil case to trial by jury unless and except so far as there are issues of fact to be determined”). The Seventh Amendment has never been interpreted in the rigid manner advocated by the petitioners. On the contrary, many procedural devices developed since 1791 that have diminished the civil jury’s historic domain have been found not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S. 372, 388-393 (directed verdict does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494, 497-498 (retrial limited to question of damages does not violate the Seventh Amendment even though there was no practice at common law for setting aside a verdict in part); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U. S. 315, 319-321 (summary judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment). The Galloway case is particularly instructive. There the party against whom a directed verdict had been entered argued that the procedure was unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment. In rejecting this claim, the Court said: “The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then prevailing. Nor were 'the rules of the common law’ then prevalent, including those relating to the procedure by which the judge regulated the jury’s role on questions of fact, crystallized in a fixed and immutable system. . . . “The more logical conclusion, we think, and the one which both history and the previous decisions here support, is that the Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then so widely among common-law jurisdictions.” 319 U. S., at 390, 392 (footnote omitted). The law of collateral estoppel, like the law in other procedural areas defining the scope of the jury’s function, has evolved since 1791. Under the rationale of the Galloway case, these developments are not repugnant to the Seventh Amendment simply for the reason that they did not exist in 1791. Thus if, as we have held, the law of collateral estoppel forecloses the petitioners from relitigating the factual issues determined against them in the SEC action, nothing in the Seventh Amendment dictates a different result, even though because of lack of mutuality there would have been no collateral estoppel in 1791. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. The amended complaint alleged that the proxy statement that had been issued to the stockholders was false and misleading because it failed to disclose: (1) that the president of Parklane would financially benefit as a result of the company’s going private; (2) certain ongoing negotiations that could have resulted in financial benefit to Parklane; and (3) that the appraisal of the fair value of Parklane stock was based on insufficient information to be accurate. A private plaintiff in an action under the proxy rules is not entitled to relief simply by demonstrating that the proxy solicitation was materially false and misleading. The plaintiff must also show that he was injured and prove damages. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 376, 386-390. Since the SEC action was limited to a determination of whether the proxy statement contained materially false and misleading information, the respondent conceded that he would still have to prove these other elements of his prima facie case in the private action. The petitioners’ right to a jury trial on those remaining issues is not contested. The position of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is in conflict with that taken by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Rachal v. Hill, 435 F. 2d 59. In this context, offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party. Defensive use occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost against another defendant. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action. IB J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.405 [1], pp. 622-624 (2d ed. 1974); e. g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U. S. 322, 326; Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 597; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352-353. E. g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S, 111, 127 (“It is a principle of general elementary law that estoppel of a judgment must be mutual”); Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 248 U. S. 55, 63; Restatement of Judgments §93 (1942). It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 329; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 40. This criticism was summarized in the Court’s opinion in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, supra, at 332-327. The opinion of Justice Traynor for a unanimous California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P. 2d 892, 895, made the point succinctly: “No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend.” In Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638, the Court had held that a determination of patent invalidity in a prior action did not bar a plaintiff from relitigating the validity of a patent in a subsequent action against a different defendant. This holding of the Triplett case was explicitly overruled in the Blonder-Tongue case. The Court also emphasized that relitigation of issues previously adjudicated is particularly wasteful in patent cases because of their staggering expense and typical length. 402 U. S., at 334, 348. Under the doctrine of mutuality of parties an alleged infringer might find it cheaper to pay royalties than to challenge a patent that had been declared invalid in a prior suit, since the holder of the patent is entitled to a statutory presumption of validity. Id., at 338. Various commentators have expressed reservations regarding the application of offensive collateral estoppel. Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1457 (1968); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1010 (1967). Professor Currie later tempered his reservations. Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 25 (1965). Under the mutuality requirement, a plaintiff could accomplish this result since he would not have been bound by the judgment had the original defendant won. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 88 (3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, Apr. 15, 1975) provides that application of collateral estoppel may be denied if the party asserting it “could have effected joinder in the first action between himself and his present adversary.” In Professor Currie's familiar example, a railroad collision injures 50 passengers all of whom bring separate actions against the railroad. After the railroad wins the first 25 suits, a plaintiff wins in suit 26. Professor Currie argues that offensive use of collateral estoppel should not be applied so as to allow plaintiffs 27 through 50 automatically to recover. Currie, supra, 9 Stan. L. Rev., at 304. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §88 (4), supra. If, for example, the defendant in the first action was forced to defend in an inconvenient forum and therefore was unable to engage in full scale discovery or call witnesses, application of offensive collateral estoppel may be unwarranted. Indeed, differences in available procedures may sometimes justify not allowing a prior judgment to have estoppel effect in a subsequent action even between the same parties, or where defensive estoppel is asserted against a plaintiff who has litigated and lost. The problem of unfairness is particularly acute in eases of offensive estoppel, however, because the defendant against whom estoppel is asserted typically will not have chosen the forum in the first action. See, id., § 88 (2) and Comment d. This is essentially the approach of id., § 88, which recognizes that “the distinct trend if not the clear weight of recent authority is to the effect that there is no intrinsic difference between 'offensive’ as distinct from 'defensive’ issue preclusion, although a stronger showing that the prior opportunity to litigate was adequate may be required in the former situation than the latter.” Id., Reporter’s Note, at 99. SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F. 2d 1236, 1240 (CA2) (“[T]he complicating effect of the additional issues and the additional parties outweighs any advantage of a single disposition of the common issues”). Moreover, consolidation of a private action with one brought by the SEC without its consent is prohibited by statute. 15 U. S. C. § 78u (g). After a 4-day trial in which the petitioners had every opportunity to present evidence and call witnesses, the District Court held for the SEC. The petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the judgment against them. Moreover, the petitioners were already aware of the action brought by the respondent, since it had commenced before the filing of the SEC action. It is true, of course, that the petitioners in the present action would be entitled to a jury trial of the issues bearing on whether the proxy statement was materially false and misleading had the SEC action never been brought — a matter to be discussed in Part II of this opinion. But the presence or absence of a jury as factfinder is basically neutral, quite unlike, for example, the necessity of defending the first lawsuit in an inconvenient forum. The Seventh Amendment provides: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shaE exceed twenty doEars, the right to jury trial shall be preserved. . . The authors of this article conclude that the historical sources “indicates that in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, determinations in equity were thought to have as much force as determinations at law, and that the possible impact on jury trial rights was not viewed with concern. ... If coEateral estoppel is otherwise warranted, the jury trial question should not stand in the way.” 85 Harv. L. Rev., at 455-456. This common-law rule is adopted in the Restatement of Judgments § 68, Comment j (1942). Similarly, in both Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, and Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Cory., 375 U. S. 160, the Court held that legal claims should ordinarily be tried before equitable claims to preserve the right to a jury trial. The petitioners’ reliance on Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, is misplaced. In the Dimick case the Court held that an increase by the trial judge of the amount of money damages awarded by the jury violated the second clause of the Seventh Amendment, which provides that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” Collateral estoppel does not involve the “re-examination” of any fact decided by a jury. On the contrary, the whole premise of collateral estoppel is that once an issue has been resolved in a prior proceeding, there is no further factfinding function to be performed. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals went on to state: “Were there any doubt about the [question whether the petitioners were entitled to a jury redetermination of the issues otherwise subject to collateral estoppel] it should in any event be resolved against the defendants in this case for the reason that, although they were fully aware of the pendency of the present suit throughout the non-jury trial of the SEC case, they made no effort to protect their right to a jury trial of the damage claims asserted by plaintiffs, either by seeking to expedite trial of the present action or by requesting Judge Duffy, in the exercise of his discretion pursuant to Rule 39 (b), (c), F.R.Civ.P., to order that the issues in the SEC case be tried by a jury or before an advisory jury.” 565 F. 2d, at 821-822. (Footnote omitted.) The Court of Appeals was mistaken in these suggestions. The petitioners did not have a. right to a jury trial in the equitable injunctive action brought by the SEC. Moreover, an advisory jury, which might have only delayed and complicated that proceeding, would not in any event have been a Seventh Amendment jury. And the petitioners were not in a position to expedite the private action and stay the SEC action. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for prompt enforcement actions by the SEC unhindered by parallel private actions. 15 U. S. C. § 78u (g).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WYMAN, COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. v. JAMES No. 69. Argued October 20, 1970 — Decided January 12, 1971 BlackmüN, J., delivered the opinion of the’ Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Black, HarlaN, and Stewart, JJ., and White, J. (except for Part IY) joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 326. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrenNan, J., joined, post, p. 338. Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellant Wyman. With her on the brief were Louis J. LefUowitz, Attorney'General, and Samuel A: Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, for appellant Wyman, and J. Lee Rankin for appellant Goldberg, Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York. Jonathan Weiss argued the cause for appellee. With him . on the brief was David Gilman.. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Stephen F. Gordon and Ernest Fleischman for the Social Service Employees Union Local 371, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and by Lois P. Sheinfeld for the Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents the. issue whether a beneficiary of the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) may refuse a home visit by the caseworker without risking the termination, of benefits. The New York State and City social services commissioners appeal from a judgment and decree of a divided three-judge District Court holding invalid and unconstitutional in application § 134 of the New York Social Services Law, § 175 of the New York Policies Governing the Administration of Public Assistance, and §§ 351.10 and 351.21 of Title 18 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations, and granting injunctive relief. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (SDNY 1969). This Court noted probable jurisdiction but, by a divided vote, denied a requested stay. 397 U. S. 904. The District Court majority held that a mother receiving AFDC relief may refuse, without forfeiting her. right to that relief, the periodic home visit which the cited New York statutes and regulations 'prescribe as a condition for the continuance of assistance under the program. The beneficiary’s thesis, and that of the District Court majority, is that home visitation is a search and, when not consented to or when not supported by a warrant based on probable cause, violates the beneficiary’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Judge McLean, in dissent, thought it unrealistic to regard the home visit as a search; felt that the requirement of a search warrant to issue only upon a showing of probable cause would make the AFDC program “in effect another criminal statute” and would “introduce a hostile arm’s length element into the relationship’-’ between worker and mother, “a relationship which can be effective only when it is based upon mutual confidence and trust”; and concluded that the majority’s holding struck “a damaging blow” to an important social welfare program. 303 F. Supp., at 946. I The case comes to us on the pleadings and supporting affidavits and without the benefit of testimony which an extended hearing would have provided. The pertinent facts, however, are not in dispute. Plaintiff Barbara James is the mother of a son, Maurice, who was born in May 1967. They reside in New York City. Mrs. James first applied for AFDC assistance shortly before Maurice’s birth. A caseworker made a visit to her apartment at that time without objection. The assistance was authorized. Two years later, on May 8, 1969, a caseworker wrote Mrs. James that she would visit her home on May 14. Upon receipt of this advice, Mrs. James telephoned the worker that, although she was willing to supply information “reasonable and relevant” to her need for public assistance, any discussion was not to take place at her home. The -worker told Mrs. James that she was required by law to visit in her home and that refusal to permit the visit would result in the termination of assistance. Permission was still denied. On May 13 the City Department of Social Services sent Mrs. James a notice of intent to discontinue assistance because of the visitation refusal. The notice advised the beneficiary of her right to a hearing before a review officer. The hearing was requested and was held on-May 27. Mrs. James appeared with an attorney at that hearing. They continued, to refuse permission for a worker to visit the James home, but again expressed willingness to cooperate and to permit visits elsewhere. The review officer ruled that the refusal was a proper ground for the termination of assistance. His written decision stated: “The home visit which Mrs. James refuses to permit is for the purpose of determining if there are any changes in her situation that might affect her . eligibility to continue to receive Public Assistance, or that might affect the amount of such assistance, and to see if there are any social services which the Department of Social Services can provide to the family.” A notice of termination issued on Juné 2. Thereupon, without seeking a hearing at the state level, Mrs. James, individually and on behalf of Maurice, and purporting to act on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, instituted the present civil rights suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. She alleged the denial of rights guaranteed to her under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and under Subchapters IV and XVI of the Social Security Act and regulations issued thereunder. She further alleged that she and her son have no income, resources, or support other than the benefits received under the AFDC program. She asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. A temporary restraining order was issued on June 13, James v. Goldberg, 302 F. Supp. 478 (SDNY 1969), and the three-judge District Court was convened. II The federal aspects of the AFDC program deserve mention. They are provided for in Subchapter IV, Part A, of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601-610 (1964 ed. and Supp. V). Section 401 of. the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 601 (1964 ed., Supp. V), specifies its purpose, namely, “encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services ... to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life . . . The same section authorizes the federal appropriation for payments to States that qualify. Section 402, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (1964 ed., Supp. V), provides that a state plan, among other things, must “provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for aid to families with dependent children is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness”; must “provide that the State agency will make such reports ... as the Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare] may from time to time require”; must “provide that the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid”; and must “provide that where the State agency has reason to believe’ that the home in which a relative and child receiving aid reside is unsuitable for' the child because of the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of such child it shall bring such condition to the attention of the appropriate court or law enforcement agencies in the State . . . Section 405, 42 U. S. C. § 605, provides that.. “Whenever the State agency has reason to believe that any páyments of aid . . . made with respect to a child are not being or may not be used in the best interests of the child, the State agency may provide for such counseling and guidance services with respect to the use of such payments and the management of other funds by the relative ... in order to assure use of such payments in the best interests, of such child, and may provide for advising such relative that continued failure to so use such payments will result in substitution therefor of protective payments ... or in seeking the appointment of a guardian ... or in. the imposition of criminal or civil penalties . . .. .” III When a case involves a home and some type of official intrusion into that home, as this case appears to do, an immediate and natural reaction is one of concern about Fourth Amendment rights and the protection which that Amendment is intended to afford. Its emphasis indeed is upon one of the most precious aspects of personal security in the home: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ; . . .” This Court has characterized that right as “basic to a free society.” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967). And over the years the Court consistently has been most protective of the privacy of the dwelling. See, for example, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-630 (1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30 (1970). In Camara Mr. Justice White, after noting that the “translation of the abstract prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable guidelines, for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” went on to observe, “Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” 387 U. S., at 528-529. He pointed out, too, that one’s Fourth Amendment protection sübsists apart from his being suspected of criminal behavior. 387 U. S., at 530. IV This natural and quite proper protective attitude, however, is not a factor in this case, for the seemingly obvious and simple reason that we. are not concerned here with any search by the New York social service agency in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that term. It is true that the governing statute and regulations appear to make mandatory the initial home visit and the subsequent periodic “contacts” (which may include home visits) for the inception and continuance of aid. It is also true that the caseworker’s posture in the home visit is perhaps, in a sense, both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we think, is given too broad a character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context. We note, too, that the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and .that the bene-Sciary’s denial of permission is not a criminal act. If iorisent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no search. V If however, we were to assume that a caseworker’s home visit, before or subsequent to the beneficiary’s initial qualification for. benefits, somehow (perhaps because the average beneficiary might feel she is in no position to refuse consent to the visit), and despite its interview nature, does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense, we nevertheless conclude that the visit does not fall within the Fourth Amendment’s proscription. This is because it does not descend to the level of unreasonableness. It is unreasonableness which is the Fourth Amendment’s standard. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). And Mr. Chief Justice Warren observed in Terry that “the specific content and incidents of this, right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted.” 392 U. S., at 9. There are a number of factors that compel us to conclude that the home visit proposed for Mrs. James is not unreasonable: 1. The public’s interest in .this particular segment of the area of assistance to the unfortunate is protection and aid for the dependent child whose family requires such aid for that child.. The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who is dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public’s concern. The dependent . child’s. needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to what the . mother claims as her rights. 2. The agency, with tax funds provided from federal as well as from state sources, is fulfilling a public trust. The State, working through its qualified welfare agency, has appropriate and paramount interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper objects of that tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit; from the aid it dispenses. . Surely it is not unreasonable, in the Fourth Amendment sense or in any other sense of that term, that the State have at its command a gentle means, of limited extent and of practical and. considerate application, of achieving that, assurance. 3. One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the provider, rightly expects the same. It might well expect more, because of the trust aspect of public funds, and the recipient, as well as the caseworker,, has not only an interest but an obligation. 4. The emphasis of the New York statutes and regulations is upon the home, upon “close contact” with the beneficiary, upon restoring the aid recipient “to a condition of self-support,” and upon the relief of his distress. The. federal emphasis is no different. It is upon “assistance and rehabilitation,” upon maintaining and strengthening family life, and upon “maximum self-support and personál independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §601 (1964 ed., Supp. V); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 479 (1970), and id., at 510 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It requires cooperation from the state agency upon specified standards and in specified ways. And it is concerned about any possible exploitation of the child. 5. The home visit, it is true, is not required by federal statute or regulation. But it has been noted that the visit is “the heart of welfare administration”; that it affords “a personal, rehabilitative orientation, unlike that. of most federal programs”; and that the “more pronounced service orientation” effected by Congress with the 1956 amendments to the Social Security Act “gave redoubled importance to the practice of home visiting.” Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Visit, 79 Yale L. J. 746, 748 (1970). The home visit is an established routine in States besides New York. 6. The means employed by the New York agency are significant. Mrs. James received written notice several days in advance of the intended home visit. The date was specified. Section 134-a of the New York Social Services Law, effective April 1, 1967, and set forth, in n. 2, supra, sets the tone. Privacy is emphasized. The applicant-recipient is made the primary source of information as to eligibility. Outside informational sources, other than public records, aré to be consulted only with the beneficiary’s consent. Forcible entry or entry under false pretenses or visitation outside working hours or snooping in the home are forbidden. HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, §§ 2200 (a) and 2300; 18 NYCRR §§351.1, 351.6, and 351.7. All this minimizes any “burden” upon the homeownér’s right against unreasonable intrusion. 7. Mrs. James, in fact, on this record presents no specific complaint of any unreasonable intrusion of her home and nothing that supports an inference that the desired home visit had as its purpose the obtaining of information as to criminal activity. She complains of no proposed visitation at an awkward or retirement hour. She suggests no forcible entry. She refers to no snooping. She describes no impolite or reprehensible conduct of any kind. She alleges only, in general and nonspecific terms, that on previous visits and, on information and belief, on visitation at the home of other aid recipients, “questions concerning personal relationships, beliefs and behavior are raised and pressed which are unnecessary for a determination of continuing eligibility.” Paradoxically, this same complaint could be. made of a conference held elsewhere than in the home, and yet this is what is sought by Mrs. James. The same complaint could be made of the census taker’s questions. See Me. Justice Makshall’s opinion, as United States Circuit Judge, in United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F. 2d 462 (CA2 1962), cert. denied, 371 U. S, 962. What Mrs. James appears to want from the agency that provides her and her infant son with the necessities for life is the right to receive those necessities upon her own informational terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge for imposing those terms, and to avoid questions of any kind. 8. We are not persuaded, as Mrs.- James would have us be, that all information pertinent to the issue of eligibility can be obtained by the agency through an interview at a place other than the home, or, as the District Court majority suggested, by examining a lease or a birth certificate, or . by periodic medical examinations, or by interviews with school personnel. 303 F. Supp., at 943. Although these secondary sources might be helpful, they would not always assure verification of actual residence or-of actual physical presence in the home, which are requisites for AFDC benefits, or of impending medical needs. And, of course, little children, such as Maurice James, are not yet registered in school. 9. The visit is not one by police or uniformed authorrity. It is made by "a caseworker of some training whose primary objective is, or should be, the welfare, not the prosecution, of the aid recipient for whom the worker has profound responsibility. As has already been stressed, the program concerns dependent children and the. needy families of those children. It does not deal with crime or with the actual or suspected perpetrators of crime. The caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a friend to one in need. 10. The home visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and despite the announced fears of Mrs. James and those who would join her, is not in aid of any criminal proceeding. If the visitation serves to discourage misrepresentation or fraud, such a byproduct of that visit does not impress upon the visit itself a dominant criminal investigative aspect. And if the visit should, by chance, lead to the discovery of fraud and a criminal prosecution should follow, then, even assuming that the evidence discovered upon the home visitation is admissible, an issue upon which we express no opinion, that is a routine and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which necessarily ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct. 11. The warrant procedure, which the plaintiff appears to claim to be so precious to her, even if civil in nature, is not without its seriously objectionablé features in the welfare context. If a warrant could be obtained (the plaintiff affords us little help as to how it would be obtained), it presumably could be applied for ex parte, its execution would require no notice, it would justify entry by force, and its hours for execution would not be so limited as those prescribed for home visitation. The warrant necessarily would imply conduct either criminal or out of compliance with an asserted governing standard. Of course, the force behind the warrant argument, welcome to the one asserting it, is the fact that it would have to rest upon probable cause, and probable cause in the welfare context, as Mrs. James concedes, requires more than the mere need of the caseworker to see the child in the home and to have assurance that the child is there and is receiving the benefit of the aid that has been authorized for it. In this setting, the warrant argument is out of place. It seems to us that the situation is akin to that where an Internal Revenue Service agent, in making a routine civil audit of a tapayer’s income tax return, asks that the taxpayer produce for the agent’s review some, proof of a deduction the taxpayer has asserted to his benefit in the computation of his tax. If thé taxpayer refuses, . there is, absent fraud, only a disallowance of the claimed deduction and a consequent additional tax. The taxpayer is fully within his “rights” in refusing to produce the proof, but in maintaining and asserting those rights a tax detriment results and it is a detriment of the taxpayer’s own making. So here Mrs. James has the “right” to refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of aid,' similar to the taxpayer’s resultant additional tax, flows' from that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved. VI Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and its companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), both by a divided. Court, are not inconsistent with our result here. Those cases concerned, respectively, a refusal of entry to city housing inspectors checking for a violation of a building’s occupancy permit, and a refusal of entry to a fire department representative interested in compliance with a city’s fire code. In each case a majority of this Court held that the Fourth Amendment barred prosecution for refusal to permit the desired warrantless inspection. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959), a case that reáched an opposing result and that concerned a request by a health officer for entry in order to check the source of a rat infestation, was pro tanto overruled. Both Frank and Camara involved dwelling quarters. See had to do with a commercial warehouse. But the facts of the three cases are significantly different from those before us. Each concerned a true search, for violations. Frank was a criminal prosecution for the owner’s refusal to permit entry. So, too, was See. Cam-ara had to do with a writ of prohibition sought to prevent an already pending criminal prosecution. The community welfare aspects, of course, were highly important, but each case arose in a criminal context where a genuine search was denied and prosecution followed. In contrast, Mrs. James is not being prosecuted for her refusal to permit the home visit and is not about to be so prosecuted. Her wishes in that respect are fully honored. We. have not been told, and have not found, that her refusal is made a criminal act by any applicable New York or federal statute. The only consequence of her refusal is that the payment of benefits ceases. Important and serious as this is, the situation is no different than if she had exercised a similar negative choice initially and refrained frorp applying for AFDC benefits. If a statute made her refusal a criminal offense, and if this case were one concerning her prosecution under that statute, Camara and See would have conceivable pertinency. VII Our holding today does not mean, of course, that a termination of benefits upon refusal of a home visit is to be upheld against constitutional challenge, under all conceivable circumstances. The early morning maás raid upon homes of welfare recipients is not unknown. See Parrish v. Civil Service Comm’n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P. 2d 223 (1967); Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 Yale L. J. 1347 (1963). But that is not this case. Facts of that kind present another cáse for another day. We therefore conclude that the home visitation as structured by the New York statutes and regulations is a reasonable administrative tool; that it serves a valid and proper administrative purpose for the dispensation of the AFDC program; that, it'is not an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and that it violates no right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal. It is so , ordered. Mr. Justice White concurs in the judgment and joins the opinion of the Court with the exception of Part IV thereof. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 256 n. 1 (1970), the Court observed that AFDC is a categorical assistance program supported by federal grants-in-aid but administered by the States according to regulations of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. See New York Social Services Law §§ 343-362 (1966 and Supp. 1969-1970). Aspects of AFDC have been considered in King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). “§ 134. Supervision. “The public welfare officials responsible . . ..'for investigating any. application for public assistance and care, shall maintain close contact with persons granted public assistance and care. Such persons shall be visited as frequently as is provided by the rules of the board' and/or regulations of the department or required by the circumstances of the case, in order that any treatment-or service tending to restore such persons to a condition of self-support and to relieve their distress may be rendered and in order that assistance or care may be given only in such amount and as long as necessary. The circumstances of a person receiving continued care shall be re-investigated as frequently as the rules of the board or regulations of the department may require.” Section 134-a, as added by Laws 1967, c. 183, effective April 1, 1967, provides: “In accordance with regulations- of the department, any investigation or- reinvestigation of eligibility . . . shall be limited to those factors reasonably necessary to insure that expenditures shall be in accord with applicable provisions of this chapter and the rules of the board and regulations of the department and shall be conducted in siich manner so as not to violate any civil right of the applicant or recipient. In making such investigation or reinvfestigation, sources of information, other than public records, shall be consulted only with the permission of the applicant or recipient. However, if such permission is not granted by the applicant or recipient, the appropriate public welfare official may deny, suspend or discontinue public assistance or care until such time as he may- be satisfied that such applicant or recipient is eligible therefor.” “Mandatory visits must be made in accordance with law that requires that persons be visited at least once .every three months if they are receiving . . . Aid to Dependent Children . . . 4 “Section 351.10. Required, home . visits and contacts. Social investigation as defined and described . . . shall be made of each application or- reapplication for public assistance or-care as the basis for determination of initial eligibility. “a. Determination of initial eligibility, shall include contact with the applicant and at least one home visit which shall be made promptly in accordance with agency policy. . . .” “Section 351.21. Required contacts. Contacts with recipients and collateral sources shall be adequate as to content and frequency and shall include home visits, office interviews, correspondence, reports oh resources and other necessary documentation.” Section 3.69.2 of Title 18 provides in part: “(c) Welfare of child or minor. A child or minor shall be considered to be eligible for ADC if his home situation is one in which his physical, mental and moral well-being will be safeguarded and his religious faith preserved and protected. (1) In determining the ability of a parent or relative to care for the child so that this purpose is achieved, the home shall be judged by the same standards as are applied to self-maintaining families in the community. When, at the time of application, a home does not meet the usual standards of health and decency but the welfare of the child is not endangered, ADC shall be granted and defined services provided in an effort to improve the situation. Where appropriate, consultation or direct service shall be requested from child welfare.” No issue of procedural due process is raised in. this case. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), and Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U. S. 280 (1970). The federal regulations require only periodic redeterminations of eligibility. HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, § 2200 (d). But they also require verification of eligibility by making field- investigations “including home visits” in a selected sample of cases. Pt. II, §6200 (a)(3). See, e. g., Ala., Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. 1-8 (B) (1968 rev.); Ariz., Regulations promulgated pursuant to Rev. Stat. Ann. §46-203 (1956), Reg. 3-203.6 (1968); Ark. Stat. Ann. §83-131 (1960); Cal. State Dept, of Social Welfare. Handbook, C-012.50 (1964); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119-9-1 et seq. (Supp. 1967), as amended, Laws 1969, c. 279; Fla. Public Assistance c. 100; Ga. Division of Social Administration — Public Assistance Manual, pt. III, §V (D)(2), pt. VIII (A) (1) (b) (1969); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 23, §4-7 (1967); Ind. Ann. Stat. §52-1247 (1964), Dept. Pub. Welfare, Rules & Regs., Reg. 2-403 (1965); Mich. Public Assistance Manual, Item 243 (3) (F) (Rqv.) (1967); Miss. Code Ann. § 7177 (1942) (Laws of 1940, c. 294); Mo. Public Assistance Manual, Dept, of Welfare, § III (1969); Nebraska, State Plan and Manual Regulations, pt. IX, §§ 5760, 5771; N. J., Manual of Administration, Division of Public Welfare, pt. II, §§2120, 2122 (1969); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-13 (1953), Health and Social Services Dept. Manual, §§211.5, 272.11; S, C. Dept, of Public Welfare Manual, Vol. IV (D)(2); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §28-7-7 (1967) (formerly S. D. Code §55.3805); Tenn. Code Ann. §14-309 (1955), Public Assistance Manual, Vol. II, p. 212 (1968 rev.); Wis. Stat. § 49.19 (2) (1967). It is true that the record contains 12 affidavits, all essentially identical, of aid recipients (other than Mrs. James) which recite that a caseworker “most often” comes without notice; that when he does, the plans the recipient had for that time cannot be carried out; that the visit is “very embarrassing to me if the caseworker, comes when I have company”; and that the caseworker “sometimes asks very personal questions” in front of children. We have examined Mrs. James’ case record with the New York City Department of Social Services, which, as an exhibit, accompanied defendant Wyman’s answer. It discloses numerous interviews from the time of the initial one on April 27, 1967, until the attempted termination in June 1969. The record is revealing as to Mrs. James’ failure ever really to satisfy the requirements for eligibility; as to constant and repeated demands; as to attitude toward the caseworker; as to reluctance to cooperate; as to evasiveness; and as to occasional belligerency. There are indications that all was not always well with the infant Maurice (skull fracture, a dent in the head, a possible rat bite). The picture is a sad and unhappy one. § 406 (a) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V); § 349B1 of the New York Social Services Law. The amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Social Services Employees Union Local 371, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the bargaining representative for the social service staff" employed in the New York City Department of Social Services,- recites that “caseworkers are either badly trained or untrained” and that “[generally, a case-. worker is not only poorly trained, but also young and inexperienced . . . Despite this astonishing description by the union of the. lack of qualification of its own members for the work they are employed to do, we must assume that the caseworker possesses at least some qualifications and some dedication to duty. See, for example, New York Social Services Law § 145. New York Code Crim. Proc. § 801. See Appendix II to this opinion.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY, dba THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL v. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES No. 93-120. Argued April 18, 1994 Decided June 24, 1994 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Scalia, and Souter, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 518. Ronald N. Sutter argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were James M. Gaynor, Jr., and Amy E. Hancock. Amy L. Wax argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Robert V. Zener, Robert D. Kamenshine, Harriet S. Rabb, Darrel J Grinstead, Henry R. Goldberg, and Thomas W. Coons Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Diane M. Signoracci, Catherine M. Ballard, Richard A Cordray, and Simon B. Karas, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Charles M. Oberly III of Delaware, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, John P. Arnold of New Hampshire, G. Oliver Koppell of New York, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jan Graham of Utah, and James S. Gilmore III of Virginia; and for the American Hospital Association et al. by Ronald N. Sutter, Mary Susan Philp, and Joseph A Keyes, Jr. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Although Medicare reimburses provider hospitals for the costs of certain educational activities, the program is forbidden by regulation from “participating] in increased costs resulting from redistribution of costs from educational institutions ... to patient care institutions.” 42 CFR § 413.85(c) (1993) (emphasis added). In denying reimbursement for the disputed costs in this case, the Secretary of Health and Human Services interpreted this provision to bar reimbursement of educational costs that were borne in prior years not by the requesting hospital, but by the hospital’s affiliated medical school. The dispositive question is whether the Secretary’s interpretation is a reasonable construction of the regulatory language. We conclude that it is. I A Established in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), Medicare is a federally funded health insurance program for the elderly and disabled. Subject to a few exceptions, Congress authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) to issue regulations defining reimbursable costs and otherwise giving content to the broad outlines of the Medicare statute. § 1395x(v)(l)(A). That authority encompasses the discretion to determine both the “reasonable cost” of services and the “items to be included” in the category of reimbursable services. Ibid. Acting under the statute, the Secretary, by regulation, permits reimbursement for the costs of “approved educational activities” conducted by hospitals. 42 CFR § 413.85(a)(1) (1993). The regulations define “approved educational activities” as “formally organized or planned programs of study usually engaged in by providers in order to enhance the quality of patient care.” § 413.85(b). Graduate medical education (GME) programs are one category of approved educational activities. GME programs give interns and residents clinical training in various medical specialties. Because participants learn both by treating patients and by observing other physicians do so, GME programs take place in a patient care unit (most often in a teaching hospital), rather than in a classroom. Hospitals are entitled to recover the “net cost” of GME and other approved educational activities, a figure “determined by deducting, from a provider’s total costs of these activities, revenues it receives from tuition.” § 413.85(g). A hospital may include as a reimbursable GME cost not only the costs of services it furnishes, but also the costs of services furnished by the hospital’s affiliated medical school. § 413.17(a). That brings us to the regulation here in question. Section 413.85(c) sets forth conditions governing the reimbursement of educational activities. In a sentence referred to by the parties as the “anti-redistribution” principle, the regulation provides that “[although the intent of the [Medicare] program is to share in the support of educational activities customarily or traditionally carried on by providers in conjunction with their operations, it is not intended that this program should participate in increased costs resulting from redistribution of costs from educational institutions or units to patient care institutions or units.” Ibid. In a portion of the regulation known as the “community support” principle, § 413.85(c) also states that the costs of educational activities “should be borne by the community,” but that “[u]ntil communities undertake to bear these costs, the [Medicare] program will participate appropriately in the support of these activities.” Ibid. B Thomas Jefferson University Hospital (Hospital) is a 700-bed teaching hospital in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Hospital has been a qualified Medicare provider since the program took effect in 1966. Petitioner Thomas Jefferson University (University) is a private, not-for-profit educational institution that operates the Hospital and other entities, including the Jefferson Medical College (Medical College). As a teaching facility, the Hospital provides Medicare-approved GME programs for postgraduate interns and residents in numerous medical specialties. The programs are conducted at the Hospital by Medical College faculty. Because of their common ownership by the University, the Hospital and the Medical College are considered affiliated or “related” organizations under Medicare regulations. 42 CFR § 413.17(a) (1993). As a result, the Hospital is entitled to reimbursement for all eligible patient-care, educational, and administrative costs carried on the books of the Medical College. Ibid. Nevertheless, for reasons not clear from the record, the Hospital did not seek reimbursement for any GME costs during the first eight years of the Medicare program’s existence. During the next 10 years, however, from 1974 through 1983, the Hospital sought and received reimbursement for three categories of salary-related GME costs: (1) salaries paid by the Hospital to Medical College faculty for services rendered to the Hospital’s Medicare patients; (2) salaries paid by the Hospital to residents and interns; and (3) funds transferred internally from the Hospital to the Medical College as payment for faculty time devoted to the Hospital’s GME program. The Hospital did not seek reimbursement during that period for its other, non-salary-related GME costs (namely, the costs of administering the Hospital’s GME programs), and those costs were borne by the Medical College. In 1983, Congress adopted a more restrictive method of reimbursing hospitals for inpatient medical services, see 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww(d) (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), but it retained the more lenient method of reimbursement for medical education costs. 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww(a)(4) (1988 ed., Supp. IV). In 1984, when the new cost reimbursement regime was implemented, the Hospital reviewed its claim for costs associated with its GME programs to determine whether it was identifying all costs eligible for reimbursement. This review resulted in an increased claim reflecting clerical costs incurred by the Medical College for activities associated with its GME programs. The following year, in an effort to further refine its cost allocation techniques, the Hospital retained an accounting firm to compute the Hospital’s total GME costs for fiscal year 1985, the year here in question. Fiscal year 1985 later became especially significant because, under a new reimbursement scheme enacted in 1986, it is considered the Hospital’s base period, to which all later claims for GME cost reimbursement will be tied. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww(h). After completing the cost study, the accounting firm reported that the Hospital had incurred GME program costs totaling $8.8 million, a figure that included direct and indirect administrative costs not previously claimed by the Hospital. The report was submitted to petitioner’s assigned fiscal intermediary, whose function is to review petitioner’s annual cost reports and to calculate the appropriate level of reimbursement under applicable statutes and regulations. See 42 CFR §405.1803 (1993). Although petitioner sought reimbursement for the full $8.8 million, the fiscal intermediary allowed only those salary-related costs that had been reimbursed earlier (after adjustment for inflation). The fiscal intermediary disallowed reimbursement for all nonsalaryrelated GME costs that the report identified (amounting to approximately $2.9 million). App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a. Petitioner then appealed to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, an intermediate appellate tribunal within the Department, which reversed the decision of the fiscal intermediary in part and allowed reimbursement for all of the GME costs documented in the cost study. The Secretary, acting through the Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration, modified the Board’s decision and reinstated the fiscal intermediary’s ruling. The Secretary concluded that the anti-redistribution clause of § 413.85(c) prohibits the shift of approved educational costs from an educational unit to a patient-care unit, even if the educational activities for which reimbursement is sought are the kind of activities traditionally engaged in by Medicare providers. Id., at 35a. Since the nonsalary GME costs here in issue were borne in prior years by the Medical College, the Secretary ruled that reimbursement of these costs would constitute an impermissible “redistribution of costs” under § 413.85(c). Ibid. The Secretary also relied on the community support language in § 413.85(c) as an independent ground for denying the requested reimbursement. According to the Secretary, this language prohibits Medicare reimbursement for educational activities that “have been historically borne by the community.” Ibid. That the Hospital had failed to seek reimbursement for the disputed costs in previous years was, in the Secretary’s view, “evidence of the communit[y’s] support for these activities.” Ibid. “To allow the community to withdraw that support and pass these costs to the Medicare program” would violate the community support principle and would “encourage the community to abdicate its commitment to education to an insurance program intended to provide care for the elderly.” Ibid. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the District Court seeking reimbursement for the $2,861,247 in GME costs that the Secretary had disallowed. Id., at 10a. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in the Secretary’s favor, accepting her interpretation of the anti-redistribution and community support clauses as a reasonable construction of § 413.85(c). Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Sullivan, CCH Medicare & Medicaid Guide ¶ 40,294, p. 30,959 (ED Pa. 1992). The Third Circuit affirmed without opinion, judgment order reported at 993 F. 2d 879 (1993), thereby creating a conflict with the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary, Dept. of Health and Human Services, 996 F. 2d 122 (1993), cert. pending, No. 93-696, concerning the validity of the Secretary’s interpretation of the anti-redistribution clause. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1039 (1994), and now affirm. II Petitioner challenges the Secretary’s construction of § 413.85(c) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. The APA, which is incorporated by the Social Security Act, see 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(f )(1), commands reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A). We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 150-151 (1991); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). Our task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose. Rather, the agency’s interpretation must be given “‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Ibid, (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945)). In other words, we must defer to the Secretary’s interpretation unless an “alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.” Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U. S. 415, 430 (1988). This broad deference is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation concerns “a complex and highly technical regulatory program,” in which the identification and classification of relevant “criteria necessarily require significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.” Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U. S. 680, 697 (1991). Petitioner challenges the Secretary’s construction of both the anti-redistribution language and the community support language of § 413.85(c). Because we conclude that the Secretary’s interpretation of the anti-redistribution clause is neither “ ‘plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the regulation,’ ” Tollman, supra, at 16-17, and because its application suffices to deny reimbursement of the disputed costs in this case, we need not pass upon the Secretary’s interpretation of the community support language. The anti-redistribution clause is contained in the final sentence of § 413.85(c), which states: “Although the intent of the [Medicare] program is to share in the support of educational activities customarily or traditionally carried on by providers in conjunction with their operations, it is not intended that this program should participate in increased costs resulting from redistribution of costs from educational institutions or units to patient care institutions or units.” (Emphasis added.) The meaning of this sentence is straightforward. Its introductory clause defines the scope of educational activities for which reimbursement may be sought: To be eligible for reimbursement, the activity must be one that is “customarily or traditionally carried on by providers in conjunction with their operations.” It is the language that follows, however, that imposes the relevant restriction on cost redistribution. The second clause provides that, notwithstanding the activity for which reimbursement is sought, the Medicare program will not participate in the “redistribution of costs from educational institutions or units to patient care institutions or units.” The Secretary’s interpretation gives full effect to both clauses of the relevant sentence. The Secretary interprets the regulation to allow reimbursement for costs of educational programs traditionally engaged in by hospitals, but, at the same time, to deny reimbursement for “cost[s] previously incurred and paid by a medical school.” Brief for Respondent 26 (emphasis deleted); see also § 413.85(b) (defining “approved educational activities” that are eligible for reimbursement as “programs of study usually engaged in by providers in order to enhance the quality of patient care”). The Secretary’s reading is not only a plausible interpretation of the regulation; it is the most sensible interpretation the language will bear. The circumstance addressed by the anti-redistribution clause is a hospital’s submission of “increased costs” arising from approved educational activities. The regulation provides, in unambiguous terms, that the “costs” of these educational activities will not be reimbursed when they are the result of a “redistribution,” or shift, of costs from an “educational” facility to a “patient care” facility, even if the activities that generated the costs are the sort “customarily or traditionally carried on by providers in conjunction with their operations.” § 413.85(c). The Secretary’s reliance on a hospital’s own historical cost allocations, along with those of an affiliated medical school, is a simple and effective way of determining whether a prohibited “redistribution of costs” has occurred. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to come up with an alternative method to identify the shifting of costs from one entity to another. Petitioner advances three separate arguments for not deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation of the anti-redistribution clause. None is persuasive. First, petitioner asserts that the “clear meaning” of the anti-redistribution clause is to allow reimbursement for the costs of activities traditionally carried on by hospitals (e. g., clinical training of residents and interns), but to deny reimbursement for costs incurred in activities traditionally carried on by educational institutions (e. g., classroom training). Pet. for Cert. 14. In other words, according to petitioner, the redistribution that is prohibited is the redistribution of activities, not the redistribution of costs. Brief for Petitioner 20. This argument is mistaken, for it ignores the second clause of the critical sentence, which refers, on its face, to the “redistribution of costs,” not the “redistribution of activities.” The term “costs,” moreover, is used without condition. Nothing in the plain language suggests that the prohibition on “redistribution of costs” is limited to the costs of certain activities (such as classroom instruction) carried on by an educational unit. The clear inference from the language is that the shift of any reimbursable costs from an “educational institutio[n] or uni[t]” to a “patient care institutio[n] or uni[t]” is prohibited. The Secretary’s interpretation of the anti-redistribution principle is thus far more consistent with the regulation’s unqualified language than the interpretation advanced by petitioner. But even if this were not so, the Secretary’s construction is, at the very least, a reasonable one, and we are required to afford it “controlling weight.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S., at 414. Second, petitioner argues that the Secretary has been inconsistent in her interpretation of the anti-redistribution provision. While it is true that an agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is “ ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency view,” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 446, n. 30 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 273 (1981)), that maxim does not apply here because petitioner fails to present persuasive evidence that the Secretary has interpreted the anti-redistribution provision in an inconsistent manner. In an attempt to find an inconsistency, petitioner points to a 1978 internal operating memorandum issued by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) that addressed the reimbursement of costs incurred by medical schools affiliated with providers. Intermediary Letter No. 78-7 (Feb. 1978), App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a-66a. The intermediary letter detailed various categories and amounts of educational expenses incurred by affiliated medical schools that might be allowable to providers, but did not mention the anti-redistribution limitation. Petitioner’s attempt to infer from that silence the existence of a contrary policy fails because the intermediary letter did not purport to be a comprehensive review of all conditions that might be placed on reimbursement of educational costs. By its own terms, the intermediary letter attempted to review only a “number of situations” relating to the reimbursement of educational costs — namely, “situations raising] questions about the reasonableness of [medical school faculty] costs as allowable hospital costs and the appropriateness of the bases used in allocating them to the hospital.” Id., at 64a. It is not surprising, then, that the letter did not address the anti-redistribution principle, and the mere failure to address it here hardly establishes an inconsistent policy on the part of the Secretary. Likewise, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 520-522, the mere fact that in 1974 a fiscal intermediary may have allowed reimbursement to petitioner for GME costs that appear to have violated the anti-redistribution clause does not render the Secretary’s interpretation of that clause invalid. For even if petitioner could show that such allowance was approved by — or even brought to the attention of— the Secretary or her designate at the time, “[t]he Secretary is not estopped from changing a view she believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken legal interpretation.” Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 417 (1993). And under the circumstances of this case, “where the agency’s interpretation of [its regulation] is at least as plausible as competing ones, there is little, if any, reason not to defer to its construction.” Id., at 417. Finally, petitioner contends that we should ignore the Secretary’s interpretation of the anti-redistribution clause because the language of the regulation is “precatory” and “aspirational” in nature, and thus lacking in operative force. See Brief for Petitioner 31-32. We do not lightly assume that a regulation setting forth specific limitations on the reimbursement of costs under a federal program is devoid of substantive effect. That is especially so when, as here, the language in question speaks not in vague generalities but in precise terms about the conditions under which reimbursement is, and is not, available. Whatever vagueness may be found in the community support language that precedes it, the anti-redistribution clause lays down a bright line for distinguishing permissible from impermissible reimbursement: Educational costs will not be reimbursed if they are the result of a “redistribution of costs from educational institutions or units to patient care institutions or units.” § 413.85(c). The Secretary was well within her discretion to interpret this language as imposing a substantive limitation on reimbursement. In sum, the Secretary’s construction qf the anti-redistribution principle is faithful to the regulation’s plain language, and the application of this language suffices to bar reimbursement of the costs claimed in this case. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. The Court’s opinion reads as if this were a case of model agency action. As the Court views matters, 42 CFR § 413.85(c) (1993) is “unambiguous,” ante, at 514, and respondent Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) has always been “faithful to the regulation’s plain language,” ante this page. That plain language, according to the Court, required the Secretary to disallow the reimbursement petitioner sought. The Court’s account is hardly an accurate portrayal of this case. When the case is properly viewed, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the Secretary’s construction of § 413.85(c) runs afoul of the plain meaning of the regulation and therefore is contrary to law, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). I therefore respectfully dissent. I The Court holds that § 413.85(c) has substantive content, reasoning that “the language in question speaks not in vague generalities but in precise terms about the conditions under which reimbursement is, and is not, available.” Ante, at. 517. In my view, however, § 413.85(c) is cast in vague aspirational terms, and it strains credulity to read the regulation as imposing any restriction on the reimbursability of the costs of graduate medical education (GME) or other approved educational expenses. On the contrary, subsection (c) appears to be nothing more than a precatory statement of purpose that imposes no substantive restrictions. Subsection (c), in stark contrast to the remainder of §413.85, reads more like a preamble than a law. See ante, at 507-508, n. 1 (quoting § 413.85(c)). In the community support portion of § 413.85(c), the Secretary praises the benefits of approved educational programs and expresses a belief that communities “should” pay for such programs. The subsection then announces the Secretary’s intention to support such activities “appropriately,” limited only by the vague suggestion that at some point in the future a restructuring of fiscal priorities at the “community” level may obviate the need for federal support. The anti-redistribution principle is no less precatory than the community support principle. It states two “intent[ions]”: first, to pay for the “customar[y] and traditional]” educational activities of Medicare providers, and, second, to avoid reimbursing expenses that should be borne by educational institutions affiliated with teaching hospitals. I would not permit the Secretary to transform by “interpretation” what self-evidently are mere generalized expressions of intent into substantive rules of reimbursability. Cf. Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 45 (1993) (an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation cannot be sustained if “ ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’ ”) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945)). See also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965). We rejected a similar attempted transformation of precatory language in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). There, we addressed a claim that the “bill of rights” of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U. S. C. § 6010 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), created substantive rights in favor of the mentally retarded. The bill of rights provided, in part, that such persons “have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habitation” and that state governments “have an obligation to assure that public funds are not provided to any [noncomplying] institutio[n].” §§6010(1), (8). We held that the bill of rights did not have substantive effect: “§ 6010, when read in the context of other more specific provisions of the Act, does no more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment. It is simply a general statement of ‘findings’ and, as such, is too thin a reed to support the rights and obligations read into it by the court below.” 451 U. S., at 19. Even though Pennhurst did not involve an agency regulation, its textual analysis suggests that it is unreasonable to give substantive effect to precatory, aspirational language — as would the Secretary’s construction of 42 CFR § 413.85(c) (1993). Cf. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (explaining that “deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ”). Interestingly enough, for the first two decades of the Medicare program’s operation, the Secretary’s fiscal intermediaries, with her acquiescence (if not approval), gave § 413.85(c) precisely the same substantive effect as I would — none. During that entire period, the Secretary never invoked the subsection to deny reimbursement for previously unreimbursed costs, and providers were actually reimbursed for such costs despite § 413.85(c). Indeed, contrary to the Court’s baffling assertion that “petitioner fails to present persuasive evidence that the Secretary has interpreted the anti-redistribution provision in an inconsistent manner,” ante, at 515, one need look no further than petitioner’s brief, see Brief for Petitioner 21-24, to find evidence of such interpretive inconsistency as to both the anti-redistribution and community support principles. Petitioner received no Medicare reimbursement for any GME costs from 1966 to 1973. Even though the anti-redistribution and community support principles were in effect for that entire period, see ante, at 507-508, n. 1, petitioner was awarded reimbursement for the first time in 1974, for salary-related GME costs. Because those GME costs were not paid for by Thomas Jefferson University Hospital (Hospital) prior to 1974, even the Secretary’s opinion below finds, as a matter of fact, that they were borne, to a large extent, by Jefferson Medical College (Medical School) during that period. Cf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a (identifying public educational grants to the Medical School and Medical School tuition as sources for funding the Hospital’s pre-1974 GME activities). Also, the funding for those costs that came from sources other than the Medical School (namely, hospital fees from charges to non-Medicare beneficiaries, see ibid.) did not come from Medicare and therefore constituted “community support.” See App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a (the Secretary “views community support as any source of funding other than the Medicare program”). Yet under the Secretary’s present interpretation of § 413.85(c), petitioner should never have received any GME cost reimbursement because it had not obtained such reimbursement from the beginning of the Medicare program. To the extent the Hospital’s GME costs were previously borne by the Medical School, providing petitioner reimbursement for those costs violated the anti-redistribution principle, as presently construed. See ante, at 513 (“The Secretary interprets the regulation ... to deny reimbursement for ‘costs previously incurred and paid by a medical school’”) (editorial revisions omitted). Indeed, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) explicitly recognized this fact, finding that, on the fiscal intermediary’s interpretation of “redistribution” (adopted by the Secretary below), “[i]n 1974, the [Hospital] commenced shifting costs ... to the Medicare program” and that “[additional cost shifting occurred in 1984 when certain clerical costs of the Medical School were included in the [Hospital’s] cost report.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a. Similarly, reimbursing petitioner for GME costs violated the community support principle, to the extent funding for such costs had been available previously from non-Medicare sources. See ante, at 511 (where community support has been received, § 413.85(c) “prohibits Medicare reimbursement”). Thus, the Court’s statement that there is no “evidence that the Secretary has interpreted the anti-redistribution provision in an inconsistent manner,” ante, at 515, appears to be wishful thinking: Petitioner has been routinely granted reimbursement which it should have been denied under § 413.85(c), if the Secretary’s current interpretation is correct. I think it reasonable to conclude that in reimbursing petitioner since 1974 for GME costs not reimbursed from the inception of the Medicare program, the Secretary acted on the basis of an interpretation of § 413.85(c) that attached no significance to a Medicare provider’s failure in prior years to be reimbursed for, or to carry on its books, eligible educational costs. This conclusion has significant support in the Secretary’s roughly contemporaneous pronouncements. Cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986); M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 U. S. 614, 622 (1946) (opinion of Murphy, J.). In 1978, for example, the Secretary advised fiscal intermediaries that reasonable GME costs incurred by a related medical school are “allowable hospital costs,” Intermediary Letter No. 78-7 (Feb. 1978), without even mentioning either the community support or the anti-redistribution principle as potential limitations on its construction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a. The letter’s explicit statement that the Secretary therein addressed the “appropriateness” of “allocating [educational costs] to the hospital [in question],” ibid., demonstrates the inaccuracy of the Court’s suggestion that the letter addressed topics entirely unrelated to the anti-redistribution principle, ante, at 515-516; the “appropriateness” of allocating costs from a medical school to its affiliated hospital is precisely what the anti-redistribution principle governs, to the extent it has substantive effect at all. See 42 CFR § 413.85(c) (1993). Moreover, in 1982, the Secretary answered a query from a fiscal intermediary concerning the relationship between the anti-redistribution principle and Intermediary Letter 78-7 with the statement that “allocation of costs to a hospital from a related medical school is governed by Intermediary Letter 78-7.” App. 25. The Court makes much of the fact that the 1982 memorandum did not explicitly mention the anti-redistribution principle. Ante, at 516, n. 4. In so doing, however, the Court overlooks the fact that the fiscal intermediary’s inquiry presented the Secretary with a specific binary choice: Axe approved educational activities previously paid for by an affiliated educational unit either allowable (i. e., reimbursable) hospital costs (as Intermediary Letter No. 78-7 advised) or a prohibited redistribution of costs under § 413.85(c)? By answering the fiscal intermediary’s pointed query with the statement that Intermediary Letter No. 78-7 is controlling on the reimbursability of the costs associated with such activities, see App. 25, the Secretary quite clearly (albeit implicitly) afforded the anti-redistribution principle no substantive effect whatsoever. To be sure, in 1985 the Secretary issued a memorandum stating, without elaboration, that “[t]he fact that [the anti-redistribution principle] is not mentioned in the [1982] memorandum does not change the basic policy as espoused in [§ 413.85(c)].” Id., at 27. The 1985 memorandum’s bare reference to the “policy” of § 413.85(c), however, neither disavowed the Secretary’s past interpretation of the regulation nor set forth any alternative interpretation. The Court thus considerably overstates matters in its suggestion that the 1985 memorandum specifically confirmed the continued vitality of the anti-redistribution principle. Ante, at 516, n. 4. Based on a reading of the undeniably precatory language used in § 413.85(c), confirmed by two decades of consistent agency practice, I would hold that subsection (c) imposes no limit on the reimbursability of approved educational activities. Cf. M. Kraus & Bros., 327 U. S., at 622 (“Not even the Administrator’s interpretations of his own regulations can . . . add certainty and definiteness to otherwise vague language”). Instead, the subsection seems intended merely to explain the remainder of the regulation, which addresses the reimbursability of approved educational costs in clear, unmistakably mandatory terms. Cf. Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 19, n. 14. By giving substantive effect to such a hopelessly vague regulation, the Court disserves the very purpose behind the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies, which is to “resol[ve] . . . ambiguity in a statutory text.” Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U. S. 680, 696 (1991). See generally Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 865-866 (1984). Here, far from resolving ambiguity in the Medicare program statutes, the Secretary has merely replaced statutory ambiguity with regulatory ambiguity. It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process. Nonetheless, agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice concerning the agency’s understanding of the law. Cf. FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F. 2d 96, 103 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J.). Cf. generally 2 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law §11.5, p. 204 (3d ed. 1994) (“An agency whose powers are not limited either by meaningful statutory standards or . . . legislative rules poses a serious potential threat to liberty and to democracy”). The aspirational terms of § 413.85(c) are woefully inadequate to impart such notice. II A In view of its unbelabored conclusion that § 413.85(c) imposes substantive limits on the reimbursability of approved educational costs, the Court’s discussion focuses primarily on what substantive import §413.85(c)’s anti-redistribution principle should be read to have. The Court finds the anti-redistribution principle “straightforward” in its meaning— any costs that, at some previous point in time, were carried on the books of an affiliated educational institution cannot subsequently be reimbursed by Medicare. Ante, at 513. For the reasons previously discussed, I would hold that § 413.85(c) cannot reasonably be construed to impose substantive restrictions on the reimbursability of approved educational costs. Nevertheless, if I had to give the principle substantive effect, I could not agree with the Court’s sweeping construction of the principle. In my view, the Court’s reading is premised on a distortion of the text of the regulation enunciating the anti-redistribution principle, and it is the text, of course, which must be given controlling effect. See Bowles, 325 U. S., at 414 (holding that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation must comport with “the plain words of the regulation”). Under the relevant portion of § 413.85(c), it is the type of educational activity engaged in that determines whether or not reimbursement is proper: “[T]he intent of the [Medicare] program is to share in the support of educational activities customarily or traditionally carried on by providers in conjunction with their [patient care] operations.” 42 CFR § 413.85(c) (1993). The proper question under the anti-redistribution principle, therefore, is not, as the Secretary puts it, whether “[a particular provider] has traditionally claimed and been allowed” reimbursement for a particular category of reimbursable costs. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a. Instead, the relevant question is whether the educational activities for which reimbursement is sought are of a type “customarily or traditionally” engaged in by providers. If, in a particular case, that question is answered in the negative, then it would be a forbidden “redistribution” of costs to award Medicare reimbursement for the costs associated with the activities in question. Conversely, if the costs for which a provider seeks reimbursement result from educational activities that are traditionally engaged in by Medicare providers, no redistribution of costs occurs when those costs are reimbursed. A prohibition against shifting the costs of educational units (for example, medical or nursing schools) to patient care units was necessary because of the Medicare program’s related-organization rule, which provides that “costs applicable to services, facilities, and supplies furnished to the provider by organizations related to the provider by common ownership or control are includable in the allowable cost of the provider.” 42 CFR § 413.17(a) (1993). In light of the related-organization rule, §413.85(a)’s recognition of educational costs as reimbursable costs created the distinct possibility that many, if not most, of the costs arising from educational unit activities could be shifted to affiliated Medicare providers (and therefore to the Medicare program) because, by definition, such units engage in educational activities. Cf. 57 Fed. Reg. 43659, 43668 (1992) (expressing the Secretary’s concern that “Medicare payment for medical education costs should not result in a redistribution of costs from the educational institution to the provider”). Since Medicare is primarily intended to fund health care for the elderly and disabled, not to subsidize the education of health care professionals, cf. 42 U. S. C. § 1395c, the Secretary avoided such an inadvertent “expansion] [in] the range of items and services for which a provider could claim payment” by barring the redistribution of costs from educational to patient care units. 57 Fed. Reg. 43668 (1992). The Court therefore errs in reading the term “redistribution” wholly divorced from the context in which it appears. See ante, at 513 (suggesting the first clause of the anti-redistribution principle is not even “relevant” to an understanding of the second phrase). In my view, “redistribution” can only be properly understood in light of the remainder of the sentence in which it appears and in light of the related-organization rule, because interpreting a statute or regulation “is a holistic endeavor.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988). Viewed in the proper textual context, §413.85(c)’s anti-redistribution principle simultaneously expresses an intent to fund educational activities customarily conducted by teaching hospitals and disallows reimbursement for costs incurred by their affiliated educational units in conducting educational programs not customarily or traditionally engaged in by such hospitals. The Secretary’s contrary interpretation, in my view, is unworthy of deference. Cf., e. g., Bowles, supra, at 414. There can be no question that the GME activities for which petitioner seeks reimbursement are customarily or traditionally engaged in by teaching hospitals. As the District Court cogently explained in Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary, U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 777 F. Supp. 582 (SD Ohio 1991), aff’d, 996 F. 2d 122 (CA6 1993), cert. pending, No. 93-696: “In the case of graduate medical education, it would be customary and traditional for a teaching hospital to employ qualified physicians in various medical specialties to select and supervise the interns and residents enrolled in the educational program. These physicians would need clerical and administrative staff, office space and supplies to carry out their function[s]. Their salaries, the salaries of their clerical and administrative staffs, and the cost of their office space and supplies would all be part of the cost of the educational activity which ultimately contributes to the quality of patient care in the hospital.” 777 F. Supp., at 587. As a result, the anti-redistribution principle provides no basis for denying petitioner Medicare reimbursement for the full level of its GME costs, less tuition revenues. See §§ 413.85(a), (g). I therefore wholeheartedly agree with the PRRB that “[t]he fact that [the Hospital] did not fully identify all of the costs associated with its GME programs in prior years does not prohibit the correction of this [cost accounting] error in the cost reporting period in contention.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a-59a. In ruling to the contrary, the Court arbitrarily subjects similarly situated Medicare providers, with identical levels of reimbursable GME costs, to disparate reimbursement, simply because one provider may have forgone reimbursement to which it was plainly entitled as a consequence of its cost accounting procedure’s failure to identify all of the provider’s reimbursable costs. Although “[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Government,” Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 143 (1920) (Holmes, J.), the manifest injustice of the Court’s result should be apparent. B Because, unlike the Court, I do not believe the anti-redistribution principle may reasonably be read to bar petitioner’s claim for reimbursement for non-salary-related GME costs, I must also address petitioner’s challenge to the Secretary’s construction of the community support principle. Petitioner argues that interpreting the term “community support” to include all non-Medicare sources of funding for GME costs is inconsistent with the text of § 413.85(c). I agree. Not only is the community support principle merely an aspirational statement of policy, see supra, at 519-523, but, in my view, the other provisions of 42 CFR §413.85 (1993) plainly leave no role for the principle in the cost reimbursement calculus for approved educational activities. Section 413.85(a) authorizes a provider to “include its net cost of approved educational activities” in its allowable Medicare costs and provides that the “net cost” of such activities is to be “calculated under paragraph (g) of this section.” Section 413.85(g), in turn, defines “[n]et cost of approved educational activities” as the provider’s “total costs of these activities,” less “revenues it receives from tuition.” Section 413.85(g) therefore clearly establishes the level of reimbursement a provider may expect for approved educational costs, and the only source of funding that is to be offset against such costs is tuition revenues. No other potential sources of funding for GME activities are included in the offset required by § 413.85(g). Thus, the Secretary’s interpretation of the community support principle as requiring, in effect, all non-Medicare sources of funding to be offset against total educational cost is flatly inconsistent with §§ 413.85(a) and (g). The plain implication of § 413.85(g) is confirmed by its regulatory history. Cf. Payne, 476 U. S., at 941. In 1984, the Secretary amended the subsection’s predecessor to eliminate the requirement that “grants” and “specific donations” be offset against educational costs actually incurred. See 49 Fed. Reg. 234, 296, 313 (1984) (amending 42 CFR § 405.421(g) (1983)). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 39752, 39797, 39811 (1983) (withdrawing 42 CFR § 405.423 (1982) relating to offsets for certain grants and gifts). The Secretary’s construction of the community support principle essentially reintroduces grants and specific donations into the reimbursement calculus. The Secretary has thus rendered the 1984 amendment to the regulation entirely superfluous, a disfavored result that should be avoided where possible. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 778 (1988). Cf. also Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). Consequently, the Secretary’s construction of the community support principle to impose a substantive restriction on the reimbursability of approved educational expenses is inconsistent with the regulation. As such, the construction is unworthy of deference. See, e. g., Stinson, 508 U. S., at 45. Ill For the foregoing reasons, the Secretary acted contrary to law, within the meaning of 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), in construing 42 CFR § 413.85(c) (1993) as denying Medicare providers the right to receive reimbursement for otherwise eligible educational costs simply because the costs had not previously been reimbursed by Medicare. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I respectfully dissent. Title 42 CFR § 413.85(c) provides in full: “Educational Activities. Many providers engage in educational activities including training programs for nurses, medical students, interns and residents, and various paramedical specialties. These programs contribute to the quality of patient care within an institution and are necessary to meet the community’s needs for medical and paramedical personnel. It is recognized that the costs of such educational activities should be borne by the community. However, many communities have not assumed responsibility for financing these programs and it is necessary that support be provided by those purchasing health care. Until communities undertake to bear these costs, the [Medicare] program will participate appropriately in the support of these activities. Although the intent of the program is to share in the support of educational activities customarily or traditionally carried on by providers in conjunction with their operations, it is not intended that this program should participate in increased costs resulting from redistribution of costs from educational institutions or units to patient care institutions or units.” The language in § 418.85(c) has been in effect since the beginning of the Medicare program, although it was formerly designated 42 CFR §405.421 (1977) and 20 CFR §405.421 (1967). The fiscal intermediary allowed these clerical costs at first, but later determined that such allowance was in error. The dissent seeks to demonstrate that the Secretary has been inconsistent in her application of the community support principle. See post, at 520-522. We see no need to dispute that proposition; as indicated above, we express no view on the validity of the Secretary’s interpretation of the community support clause. Petitioner further relies on an exchange of memoranda within HCFA in 1982 regarding the University of Oregon’s health training programs. App. 22-26. In response to an internal agency memorandum identifying the antiredistribution clause and requesting additional clarification on the scope of reimbursable educational activities, the Director of HCFA’s Division of Institutional Services responded, in part, that “[t]he allocation of costs to a hospital from a related medical school is governed by Intermediary Letter 78-7,” and failed to discuss the redistribution issue. Id., at 25. This omission likewise fails to manifest a contrary policy. Indeed, a subsequent memorandum issued in 1985 from the Director of HCFA’s Division of Hospital Payment Policy stated that “[t]he fact that [the redistribution issue] is not mentioned in the subject memorandum does not change the basic policy as espoused in 42 CFR [§ 413.85(c),]” which provides “that where costs for items and services were previously borne by a medical school, their allocation to a university hospital represents a redistribution of costs from an educational institution to a patient care institution.” Id., at 27. Like the Court, ante, at 507-508, I refer to the last sentence of 42 CFR § 413.85(c) (1993) as the “anti-redistribution principle,” and to the remainder of the subsection as the “community support principle.” Because the Secretary, through the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), only modified rather than reversed the PRRB’s decision, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a, the PRRB’s opinion remains in force to the extent consistent with the opinion of the HCFA. Cf. 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(f)(l). Even less satisfactory is the Secretary’s suggestion that her failure to apply § 413.85(c) in prior fiscal years is of no relevance. See Brief for Respondent 37. The prior inconsistent conduct of the agency is quite relevant — not because her inconsistency “estop[s]” her from changing her view, ante, at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted) — but rather because agency conduct, no less than express statements, can effect a construction of statutes or regulations. Cf., e. g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 41-42 (1983) (holding that “[a] ‘settled course of behavior embodies the agency’s informed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies [of applicable statutes or regulations]’ ”) (quoting Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U. S. 800, 807-808 (1973)). Two decades of providing reimbursement in contravention of what is now claimed to be the community support and anti-redistribution principles certainly constitutes a “settled course of behavior,” and I find it difficult to believe the Secretary would permit such a persistent — and costly— error in the application of her reimbursement rules. C£ 1991 Medicare Explained ¶ 706, p. 179 (“When Medicare pays for noncovered services or it pays too much for covered services, the program will ordinarily attempt to recover the amount of the overpayment”). A settled interpretation that persists over time is presumptively to be preferred, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn., 463 U. S., at 41-42, and therefore judges are properly suspect of sharp departures from past practice that are as unexplained as the Secretary’s in this case. Id., at 42. See also Wichita Bd. of Trade, supra, at 807-808. As a result of the Court’s ruling today, petitioner and other Medicare providers who, in the past, received reimbursement for GME costs in violation of the Secretary’s present interpretation of § 413.85(c) are suddenly faced with the possibility of being sued for recoupment of the millions of dollars of “overpayments” they received from Medicare. The Social Security Act, we have noted, “permits . . . retroactive action” within three years by the Secretary to make “ ‘corrective adjustments ... where, for a provider of services for any fiscal period, the aggregate reimbursement produced by the methods of determining costs proves to be . . . excessive.’ ” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 209 (1988) (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A)). Thus, although the Secretary permitted petitioner to recover reimbursement for “those medical education costs which it has traditionally claimed and been allowed prior to 1984,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a, that act of administrative grace appears to be subject to revision at the whim of the Secretary. Cf. Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U. S. 51 (1984) (Secretary not estopped from recouping overpayment to Medicare provider whose prior reimbursement claims were made in reliance on erroneous advice of its designated fiscal intermediary).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DOUGLAS, COMMISSIONER, VIRGINIA MARINE RESOURCES COMMISSION v. SEACOAST PRODUCTS, INC., et al. No. 75-1255. Argued January 17, 1977 Decided May 23, 1977 James E. Moore, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, and Anthony F. Troy and James E. Kulp, Deputy Attorneys General. John J. Loflin, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Thomas H. Willcox, Jr., James C. Howell, and Franklin G. Hunt. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Joseph E. Brennan, Attorney General of Maine, Edward F. Bradley, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, David H. Souter, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Donald W. Stever, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Julius C. Michael-son, Attorney General of Rhode Island, for the States of Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island; by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Terence P. O’Malley and Howard Whitehead, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; by Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip Weinberg and John G. Proudfit, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of New York; and by Ammon G. Dunton, Jr., and Philip B. Kurland for the Virginia Seafood Council et al. Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Deputy Solicitor General Randolph, Bruce C. Rashkow, and Ralph J. Gillis filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Richard R. Wier, Jr., Attorney General, and June D. MacArtor and Harrison F. Turner, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of Delaware; and by Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, Henry R. Lord, Deputy Attorney General, and Warren K. Rich, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Maryland. Me. Justice Maeshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is the validity of two Virginia statutes that limit the right of nonresidents and aliens to catch fish in the territorial waters of the Commonwealth. I Persons or corporations wishing to fish commercially in Virginia must obtain licenses. Section 28.1-81.1 of the Virginia Code (§81.1) (Supp. 1976), enacted in 1975, limits the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to United States citizens. Under this law, participants in any licensed partnership, firm, or association must be citizens. A fishing business organized in corporate form may be licensed only if it is chartered in this country; American citizens own and control at least 75% of its stock; and its president, board chairman, and controlling board majority are citizens. Section 28.1-60 of the Virginia Code (§ 60) (Supp. 1976) governs licensing of nonresidents of Virginia to fish for menhaden, an inedible but commercially valuable species of fin fish. Section 60 allows nonresidents who meet the citizenship requirements of § 81.1 to obtain licenses to fish for menhaden in the three-mile-wide belt of Virginia’s territorial sea off the Commonwealth’s eastern coastline. At the same time, however, § 60 prohibits nonresidents from catching menhaden in the Virginia portion of Chesapeake Bay. Appellee Seacoast Products, Inc., is one of three companies that dominate the menhaden industry. The other two firms, unlike Seacoast, have fish-processing plants in Virginia and are owned by American citizens. Hence, they are not affected by either of the restrictions challenged in this case. Seacoast was founded in New Jersey in 1911 and maintains its principal offices in that State; it is incorporated in Delaware and qualified to do business in Virginia. The other appellees are subsidiaries of Seacoast; they are incorporated and maintain plants and offices in States other than Virginia. In 1973, the family of Seacoast’s founder sold the business to Hanson Trust, Ltd., a United Kingdom company almost entirely owned by alien stockholders. Seacoast continued its operations unchanged after the sale. All of its officers, directors, boat captains, and crews are American citizens, as are over 95% of its plant employees. At the time of its sale, Seacoast’s fishing vessels were enrolled and licensed American-flag ships. See infra, at 272-274. Under 46 U. S. C. §§ 808, 835, the transfer of these vessels to a foreign-controlled corporation required the approval of the Department of Commerce. This was granted unconditionally over the opposition of Seacoast’s competitors after a full public hearing that considered the effect of the transfer on fish conservation and management, on American workers and consumers, and on competition and other social and economic concerns. See 38 Fed. Reg. 29239-29240 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 7819, 33812-33813 (1974); App. 29-32. Following this approval, appellees’ fishing vessels were re-enrolled and relicensed pursuant to 46 U. S. C. §§ 251-252, 263. They remain subject to all United States laws governing maritime commerce. In past decades, although not recently, Seacoast had operated processing plants in Virginia and was thereby entitled to fish in Chesapeake Bay as a resident. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29, 34. More recently, Seacoast obtained nonresident menhaden licenses as restricted by § 60 to waters outside Chesapeake Bay. In 1975, however, § 81.1 was passed by the Virginia Legislature, c. 338, 1975 Va. Acts, and appellant James E. Douglas, Jr., the Commissioner of Marine Resources for Virginia, denied appellees’ license applications on the basis of the new law. Seacoast and its subsidiaries were thereby completely excluded from the Virginia menhaden fishery. Appellees accordingly filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to have §§60 and 81.1 declared unconstitutional and their enforcement enjoined. A three-judge court was convened and it struck down both statutes. It held that the citizenship requirement of § 81.1 was pre-empted by the Bartlett Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1081 et seq., and that the residency restriction of § 60 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We noted probable jurisdiction of the Commissioner’s appeal, 425 U. S. 949 (1976), and we affirm. II Seacoast advances a number of theories to support affirmance of the judgment below. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 387 n. 13 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475 n. 6 (1970). Among these is the claim that the Virginia statutes are pre-empted by federal enrollment and licensing laws for fishing vessels. The United States has filed a brief as amicus curiae supporting this contention. Although the claim is basically constitutional in nature, deriving its force from the operation of the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, it is treated as “statutory” for purposes of our practice of deciding statutory claims first to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudications. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 549 (1974). Since we decide the case on this ground, we do not reach the constitutional issues raised by the parties. The well-known principles of pre-emption have been rehearsed only recently in our decisions. See, e. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525-526 (1977); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976). No purpose would be served by repeating them here. It is enough to note that we deal in this case with federal legislation arguably superseding state law in a “field which . . . has been traditionally occupied by the States.” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., supra, at 525. Preemption accordingly will be found only if “ 'that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947).” Ibid. We turn our focus, then, to the congressional intent embodied in the enrollment and licensing laws. A The basic form for the comprehensive federal regulation of trading and fishing vessels was established in the earliest days of the Nation and has changed little since. Ships engaged in trade with foreign lands are “registered,” a documentation procedure set up by the Second Congress in the Act of Dec. 31, 1792, 1 Stat. 287, and now codified in 46 U. S. C., c. 2. “The purpose of a register is to declare the nationality of a vessel . . . and to enable her to assert that nationality wherever found.” The Mohawk, 3 Wall. 566, 571 (1866); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187, 199 (1912). Vessels engaged in domestic or coastwise trade or used for fishing are “enrolled” under procedures established by the Enrollment and Licensing Act of Feb. 18, 1793, 1 Stat. 305, codified in 46 U. S. C., c. 12. “The purpose of an enrollment is to evidence the national character of a vessel . . . and to enable such vessel to procure a . . . license.” The Mohawk, supra; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., supra. A “license,” in turn, regulates the use to which a vessel may be put and- is intended to prevent fraud on the revenue of the United States. See 46 U. S. C. §§ 262, 263, 319, 325; 46 CFR § 67.01-13 (1976). The form of a license is statutorily mandated: “license is hereby granted for the . . . [vessel] to be employed in carrying on the (. . . 'coasting trade,’ 'whale fishery,’ 'mackerel fishery,’ or 'cod fishery,’ as the case may be), for one year from the date hereof, and no longer.” 46 U. S. C. § 263. The law also provides that properly enrolled and licensed vessels “and no others, shall be deemed vessels of the United States entitled to the privileges of vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries.” § 251. Appellees’ vessels were granted licenses for the “mackerel fishery” after their transfer was approved by the Department of Commerce. The requirements for enrollment and registration are the same. 46 U. S. C. §252; The Mohawk, supra, at 571-572. Insofar as pertinent here, enrolled and registered vessels must meet identification, measurement, and safety standards, generally must be built in the United States, and must be owned by citizens. An exception to the latter rule permits a corporation having alien stockholders to register or enroll ships if it is organized and chartered under the laws of the United States or of any State, if its president or chief executive officer and the chairman of its board of directors are American citizens, and if no more of its directors than a minority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum are noncitizens. 46 U. S. C. § 11; 46 CFR § 67.03-5 (a) (1976). The Shipping Act, 1916, further limits foreign ownership of American vessels by requiring the Secretary of Commerce to approve any transfer of an American-owned vessel to noncitizens. 46 U. S. C. § 808. B Deciphering the intent of Congress is often a difficult task, and to do so with a law the vintage of the Enrollment and Licensing Act verges on the impossible. There is virtually no surviving legislative history for the Act. What we do have, however, is the historic decision of Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), rendered only three decades after passage of the Act. Gibbons invalidated a discriminatory state regulation of shipping as applied to vessels federally licensed to engage in the coasting trade. Although its historic importance lies in its general discussion of the commerce power, Gibbons also provides substantial illumination on the narrower question of the intended meaning of the Licensing Act. The case challenged a New York law intended to encourage development of steamboats by granting Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston the exclusive right to operate steam-powered vessels in all of the State’s territorial waters. The right to navigate steamboats between Elizabethtown Point, N. J., and New York City was, by assignment from Fulto'n and Livingston, granted to Aaron Ogden. Thomas Gibbons began operating two passenger ferries in violation of Ogden’s sub-monopoly. Gibbons’ steamboats had been enrolled and granted “license ... to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade” under the Enrollment and Licensing Act. Id., at 203. Ogden nevertheless obtained an injunction from the New York courts enforcing the monopoly by restraining Gibbons from running his ferries in New York waters. Chancellor James Kent rejected Gibbons’ pre-emption claim based upon his federal licenses. Kent found that the sole purpose of the license was to “giv[e] to the vessel an American character,” i. e., to establish its nationality as an American-flag ship. This would have reduced various duties and taxes assessed under federal law, but in Kent’s view, it did not oust the power of the State to regulate the use of chattels within its borders. 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 156-159 (1819). The highest state court affirmed, ruling that “the only effect” of the license was “to determine [the vessel’s] national character, and the rate of duties which she is to pay.” 17 Johns. 488, 509 (1820). On appeal to this Court, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that the rights granted to Gibbons by federal law superseded the conflicting state-created rights asserted by Ogden. Marshall first considered the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. He concluded that “[e]ommerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior,” 9 Wheat., at 194, and that “[t]he power of Congress . . . , whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States.” Id., at 196’. The Court next defined the nature of the commerce power: “the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.” Ibid. Ogden’s claim that the States may exercise concurrent power over commerce, or even exercise their police powers, where that exercise conflicts with express federal law was rejected. Id., at 200-210. The Court then turned to the question whether “the laws of New-York” did “come into collision with an act of Congress” so that “the acts of New-York must yield to the law of Congress.” Id., at 210. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall found the conflict unquestionable: “To the Court it seems very clear, that the whole act on the subject of the coasting trade, according to those principles which govern the construction of statutes, implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on the coasting trade.” Id., at 212. The license granted to Gibbons under the Act “must be understood to be what it purports to be, a legislative authority to [Gibbons’] steamboat ... 'to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, for one year from this date.’ ” Id., at 214. The Court rejected Ogden’s argument — and the holding of the New York courts — that the license “gives no right to trade; and that its sole purpose is to confer the American character.” Ibid. Finally, the Court decided that the statutory phrase “coasting trade” encompassed the carriage of passengers for hire as well as the transport of goods. Id., at 215-219. Although Gibbons is written in broad language which might suggest that the sweep of the Enrollment and Licensing Act ousts all state regulatory power over federally licensed vessels, neither the facts before the Court nor later interpretations extended that far. Gibbons did not involve an absolute ban on steamboats in New York waters. Rather, the monopoly law allowed some steam vessels to ply their trade while excluding others that were federally licensed. The case struck down this discriminatory treatment. Subsequent decisions spelled out the negative implication of Gibbons: that States may impose upon federal licensees reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection measures otherwise within their police power. For example, in Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (1855), the Court upheld a conservation law which limited the fishing implements that could be used by a federally licensed vessel to take oysters from state waters. The Court held that an “enrolment and license confer no immunity from the operation of valid laws of a State,” id., at 74, and that the law was valid because the State “may forbid all such acts as would render the public right [of fishery] less valuable, or destroy it altogether,” id., at 75. At the same time, the Court explicitly reserved the question of the validity of a statute discriminating against nonresidents. Ibid. To the same effect is the holding in Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240 (1891). There, state law prohibited the use by any person of certain types of fishing tackle in specified areas. Though Manchester was a Rhode Island resident basing a claim on his federal fisheries license, the Court held that the statute “was evidently passed for the preservation of the fish, and makes no discrimination in favor of citizens of Massachusetts and against citizens of other States. . . . [T]he statute may well be considered as an impartial and reasonable regulation . . . and the subject is one which a State may well be permitted to regulate within its territory, in the absence of any regulation by the United States. The preservation of fish ... is for the common benefit; and we are of opinion that the statute is not repugnant to the Constitution and the laws of the United States.” Id,., at 265. More recently, the same principle was applied in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960), where we held that the city’s Smoke Abatement Code was properly applicable to licensed vessels. Relying on earlier cases, we noted that “[t]he mere possession of a federal license . . . does not immunize a ship from the operation of the normal incidents of local police power.” Id., at 447. As an “[e]venhanded local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,” id., at 443, the ordinance was valid. Although it is true that the Court’s view in Gibbons of the intent of the Second Congress in passing the Enrollment and Licensing Act is considered incorrect by commentators, its provisions have been repeatedly re-enacted in substantially the same form. We can safely assume that Congress was aware of the holding, as well as the criticism, of a case so renowned as Gibbons. We have no doubt that Congress has ratified the statutory interpretation of Gibbons and its progeny. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 414 n. 8 (1975); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U. S. 332, 339 (1969); Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U. S. 445, 449-450 (1948). We consider, then, its impact on the Virginia statutes challenged in this case. c The federal licenses granted to Seacoast are, as noted above, identical in pertinent part to Gibbons’ licenses except that they cover the “mackerel fishery” rather than the “coasting trade.” Appellant contends that because of the difference this case is distinguishable from Gibbons. He argues that Gibbons upheld only the right of the federal licensee, as an American-flag vessel, to navigate freely in state territorial waters. He urges that Congress could not have intended to grant an additional right to take fish from the waters of an unconsenting State. Appellant points out that the challenged statutes in no way interfere with the navigation of Seacoast’s fishing boats. They are free to cross the State’s waters in search of fish in jurisdictions where they may lawfully catch them, and they may transport fish through the State’s waters with equal impunity. Appellant’s reading of Gibbons is too narrow. Gibbons emphatically rejects the argument that the license merely establishes the nationality of the vessel. That function is performed by the enrollment. 9 Wheat., at 214. Rather, the license “implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on” the activity for which they are licensed. Id., at 212. In Gibbons, the “authority ... to carry on” the licensed activity included not only the right to navigate in, or to travel across, state waters, but also the right to land passengers in New York and thereby provide an economically valuable service. The right to perform that additional act of landing cargo in the State — which gave the license its real value — was part of the grant of the right to engage in the “coasting trade.” See Harman v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 396, 405 (1893). The same analysis applies to a license to engage in the mackerel fishery. Concededly, it implies a grant of the right to navigate in state waters. But, like the trading license, it must give something more. It must grant “authority . . . to carry on” the “mackerel fishery.” And just as Gibbons and its progeny found a grant of the right to trade in a State without discrimination, we conclude that appellees have been granted the right to fish in Virginia waters on the same terms as Virginia residents. Moreover, 46 U. S. C. § 251 states that properly documented vessels “and no others” are “entitled to the privileges of vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries.” Referring to this section, Gibbons held: “[T]hese privileges . . . cannot be enjoyed, unless the trade may be prosecuted. The grant of the privilege . . . convey [s] the right [to carry on the licensed activity] to which the privilege is attached.” 9 Wheat., at 213. Thus, under § 251 federal licensees are “entitled” to the same “privileges” of fishery access as a State affords to its residents or citizens. Finally, our interpretation of the license is reaffirmed by the specific discussion in Gibbons of the section granting the license, now 46 U. S. C. § 263. The Court pointed out that “a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. It certainly transfers to him all the right which the grantor can transfer, to do what is within the terms of the license.” 9 Wheat., at 213-214. Gibbons recognized that the “grantor” was Congress. Id., at 213. Thus Gibbons expressly holds that the words used by Congress in the vessel license transfer to the licensee “all the •right” which Congress has the power to convey. While appellant may be correct in arguing that at earlier times in our history there was some doubt whether Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the taking of fish in state waters, there can be no question today that such power exists where there is some effect on interstate commerce. Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942). The movement of vessels from one State to another in search of fish, and back again to processing plants, is certainly activity which Congress could conclude affects interstate commerce. Cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 403-406 (1948). Accordingly, we hold that, at the least, when Congress re-enacted the license form in 1936, using language which, according to Gibbons, gave licensees “all the right which the grantor can transfer,” it necessarily extended the license to cover the taking of fish in state waters, subject to valid state conservation regulations. D Application of the foregoing principles to the present case is straightforward. Section 60 prohibits federally licensed vessels owned by nonresidents of Virginia from fishing in the Chesapeake Bay. Licensed ships owned by noncitizens are prevented by § 81.1 from catching fish anywhere, in the Commonwealth. On the other hand, Virginia residents are permitted to fish commercially for menhaden subject only to seasonal and other conservation restrictions not at issue here. The challenged statutes thus deny appellees their federally granted right to engage in fishing activities on the same terms as Virginia residents. They violate the “indisputable” precept that “no State may completely exclude federally licensed commerce.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963). They must fall under the Supremacy Clause. Appellant seeks to escape this conclusion by arguing that the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1315, and a number of this Court’s decisions recognize that the States have a title or ownership interest in the fish swimming in their territorial waters. It is argued that because the States “own” the fish, they can exclude federal licensees. The contention is of no avail. The Submerged Lands Act does give the States “title,” “ownership,” and “the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use” the lands beneath the oceans and natural resources in the waters within state territorial jurisdiction. 43 U. S. C. §1311 (a). But when Congress made this grant pursuant to the Property Clause of the Constitution, see Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272 (1954), it expressly retained for the United States “all constitutional powers of regulation and control” over these lands and waters “for purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs.” United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 10 (1960); see 43 U. S. C. § 1314 (a). Since the grant of the fisheries license is made pursuant to the commerce power, see supra, at 281-282; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365, 377 (1883), the Submerged Lands Act did not alter its pre-emptive effect. Certainly Congress did not repeal by implication, in the broad language of the Submerged Lands Act, the Licensing Act requirement of equal treatment for federal licensees. In any event, “[t]o put the claim of the State upon title is,” in Mr. Justice Holmes’ words, “to lean upon a slender reed.” Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 434 (1920). A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of “owning” wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture. Ibid.; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 539-540 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting). The “ownership” language of cases such as those cited by appellant must be understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction expressing “the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.” Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S., at 402; see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 420-421 (1948). Under modern analysis, the question is simply whether the State has exercised its police power in conformity with the federal laws and Constitution. As we have demonstrated above, Virginia has failed to do so here. Ill Our decision is very much in keeping with sound policy considerations of federalism. The business of commercial fishing must be conducted by peripatetic entrepreneurs moving, like their quarry, without regard for state boundary lines. Menhaden that spawn in the open ocean or in coastal waters of a Southern State may swim into Chesapeake Bay and live there for their first summer, migrate south for the following winter, and appear off the shores of New York or Massachusetts in succeeding years. A number of coastal States have discriminatory fisheries laws, and with all natural resources becoming increasingly scarce and more valuable, more such restrictions would be a likely prospect, as both protective and retaliatory measures. Each State’s fishermen eventually might be effectively limited to working in the territorial waters of their residence, or in the federally controlled fishery beyond the three-mile limit. Such proliferation of residency requirements for commercial fishermen would create precisely the sort of Balkanization of interstate commercial activity that the Constitution was intended to prevent. See, e. g., H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 532-539 (1949); cf. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U. S. 20 (1974). We cannot find that Congress intended to allow any such result given the well-known construction of federal vessel licenses in Gibbons. For these reasons, we conclude that §§60 and 81.1 are preempted by the federal Enrollment and Licensing Act. Insofar as these state laws subject federally licensed vessels owned by nonresidents or aliens to restrictions different from those applicable to Virginia residents and American citizens, they must fall under the Supremacy Clause. As we have noted above, however, reasonable and evenhanded conservation measures, so essential to the preservation of our vital marine sources of food supply, stand unaffected by our decision. The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. Section 28.1-81.1 provides: “Licenses for taking of fish restricted to United States citizens.— (a) No commercial.license for the taking of food fish or fish for the manufacture into fish meal, fish oil, fish scrap or other purpose shall be granted to any person not a citizen of the United States, nor to any firm, partnership, or association unless each participant therein shall be a citizen of the United States, nor to any corporation unless the same be a citizen of the United States as hereinafter defined. This requirement shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other requisite to the issuance of a license imposed by this chapter or any other provision of the Code of Virginia as amended from time to time. “ (b) Within the meaning of this section, no corporation shall be deemed a citizen of the United States unless seventy-five per centum of the interest therein shall be owned by citizens of the United States and unless its president or other chief executive officer and the chairman of its board of directors are citizens of the United States and unless no more of its directors than a minority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum are noncitizens and the corporation is organized under the laws of the United States or of a state, territory, district, or possession thereof. “(c) Seventy-five per centum of the interest in a corporation shall not be deemed to be owned by citizens of the United States (i) if the title to seventy-five per centum of its stock is not vested in such citizens free from any trust or fiduciary obligation in favor of any person not a citizen of the United States; or (ii) if seventy-five per centum of the voting power in such corporation is not vested in citizens of the United States; or (iii) if, through any contract or understanding, it is so arranged that more than twenty-five per centum of the voting power in such corporation may be exercised, directly or indirectly, in behalf of any person who is not a citizen of the United States; or (iv) if by any other means whatsoever control of any interest in the corporation in excess of twenty-five per centum is conferred upon or permitted to be exercised by any person who is not a citizen of the United States.” Section 28.1-60 provides in pertinent part: “Nonresidents generally. — (1) Catching fish for oil or guano prohibited. — No nonresident of this State shall take or catch any fish, in the waters of the Commonwealth, or in the waters under its joint jurisdiction, for the purpose of converting the same into oil, fish scrap, fish meal or guano, except as hereinafter provided; nor shall any nonresident be concerned or interested with any resident as partner or otherwise, except as a stockholder in a domestic corporation, in taking or catching fish in any of the waters of this State to be manufactured into oil, fish scrap, fish meal or guano, or in such manufacture, except as hereinafter provided. “(2) Resident not to be interested. — Nor shall any resident of this State be concerned or interested with any nonresident as partner or otherwise, except as stockholder in a domestic corporation, in taking or catching fish in any of the waters of this State to be manufactured into oil, fish scrap, fish meal or guano, or in such manufacture, except as hereinafter provided, or knowingly permit any nonresident to use his name for either purpose. “(3) License for taking menhaden fish. — A nonresident person, firm or corporation may take or catch the fish known as 'menhaden,' within the three-mile limit on the seacoast of Virginia and east of a straight line drawn from Cape Charles Lighthouse to Cape Henry Lighthouse for the purpose of converting the same into oil, fish scrap, fish meal or guano between the third Monday of May and the third Friday of November, inclusive, of each year; provided such person, firm or corporation has applied for and obtained license to take and catch such fish within the above-defined area and in accordance with the following requirements. “(6) Penalty for violation. — Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” The menhaden industry is, in terms of landed tonnage, the largest fishery in the United States, accounting for about 45% of our total commercial fish catch. The 1975 harvest was valued at about $50 million fresh and $80 million after processing. Menhaden are processed and used for industrial purposes including the manufacture of antibiotics, poultry and animal feed, paint, soap, lubricants, and, in Canada and Europe, margarine. The fish spend much of their life cycle in coastal estuaries or shallow water close to the ocean shore. Indeed, over 95% of the 1.8 billion pounds of menhaden taken in 1975 were caught within three miles of the coast. The fish are only found far offshore in deep water during the winter months along the South Atlantic coast. In March, they begin a northward migration traveling up the east coast in enormous schools, with some ultimately reaching north of Cape Cod. Most of the fish reverse this migration path in the fall. It is feasible to fish commercially for menhaden only during the migratory period when they are in large, dense schools close to the surface. Estuaries like the Chesapeake Bay are important nurturing grounds for the species. See U. S. Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the United States, 1975, pp. 18, 37 (1976); App. 24-25, 32-33, 73-89, 92-113. Appellant’s contention that the District Court should have abstained in this case to allow the Virginia courts to decide the validity of the statutes is without merit. Appellant suggests that under recent decisions, e. g., In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), the alienage classification established in § 81.1 might well be ruled unconstitutional by the state courts as applied to individual resident aliens. That result is certainly plausible. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948). It is also irrelevant. Abstention is proper in this context only where it can be "fairly concluded that the underlying state statute is susceptible of an interpretation that might avoid the necessity for constitutional adjudication.” Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 55 (1973). But appellant’s suggestion would not resolve any of the claims raised by appellees. In such circumstances, it is the “solemn responsibility” of “all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor’s choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims.” Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 248 (1967). Appellees argue in addition that federal fisheries law constitutes a comprehensive regulatory scheme not admitting of conflicting state laws. They also urge that the Virginia statutes violate the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses and interfere with federal control of international relations. The claim is, of course, statutory in the sense that it depends on interpretation of an Act of Congress, and like any other statutory decision, the result we reach here is subject to legislative overruling. Vessel documentation actually dates from the first months of the Federal Government. See Act of Sept. 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 55, repealed by the Acts discussed in the text. 8 The quaint categories of the statute have remained unchanged since the “mackerel fishery” was added by the Act of May 24, 1828, c. 119, 4 Stat. 312. They seem to correspond to the only three types of sea creatures sought by organized fishing fleets at that time. See L. Sabine, Report on the Principal Fisheries of the American Seas, H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 23, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., 181 (1853). A license for the “mackerel fishery” entitles the holder to catch “cod or fish of any other description whatever.” Act of Apr. 20, 1836, c. 55, 5 Stat. 16, 46 U. S. C. §325; 46 CFR § 67.07-13 (b) (1976). A vessel of more than 5 but less than 20 tons need not be enrolled in order to obtain a license. See 46 U. S. C. §§ 251, 262, 263; 46 CFR §§ 67.01-1, 67.07-13 (a) (1976). No documentation is required for a vessel of less than five net tons. 46 CFR § 67.01-11 (a) (5) (1976). See n. 8, supra. A corporation is considered to be a citizen for purposes of this requirement only if it meets the same citizenship tests imposed for registration of a vessel and, in addition, if citizens own a controlling interest in it, or for a vessel used in the coastwise trade, if citizens own a 75% interest. 46 U. S. C. § 802. As noted above, appellees received approval from the Secretary of Commerce for the transfer of their vessels to the ultimate ownership of the noncitizen Hanson Trust, Ltd. See 3 Annals of Cong. 671, 728, 738, 748, 750, 752 (1972). This history contains no debates; it merely records the legislative steps in passage of the Act. There are no committee reports available. Criticism began in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, 9 Wheat., at 222, 231-233. He thought the Enrollment and Licensing Act was simply the American formulation of a navigation Act, commonly used by commercial nations to encourage shipping on vessels owned and manned by their citizens to promote the local economy and assure maritime strength in case of war. See generally G. Gilmore & C. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty §§ 11-3, 11-4 (2d ed. 1975). Chancellor Kent soon exercised his prerogative as the country’s foremost legal scholar to take sharp exception to Marshall’s statutory construction: “If congress had intended that a coasting license should confer power and control, and a claim of sovereignty subversive of local laws of the states within their own jurisdictions, it was supposed they would have said so in plain and intelligible language, and not have left their claim of supremacy to be hidden from the observation and knowledge of the state governments, in the unpretending and harmless shape of a coasting license, obviously intended for other purposes. “The only great point on which the Supreme Court of the United States, and the courts of this state, have differed, is in the construction and effect given to a coasting license.... The formidable effect which has been given to a coasting license, was a perfect surprise upon the judicial authorities of this state; and none of the persons concerned in the former decisions in our state courts on this subject, ever entertained the idea, as I apprehend, that congress intended, by a coasting license, a grant of power that was to bear down all state regulations of internal commerce that stood in its way.” 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 408, 411 (1st ed. 1826). Mr. Justice Frankfurter agreed, calling Marshall’s view “esoteric statutory construction.” F. Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause 15, 17, 20 (1937). See also R. Faulkner, The Jurisprudence of John Marshall 85 (1968); M. Baxter, The Steamboat Monopoly 34^35, 52 (1972); Campbell, Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Marshall and the Steamboat Cases, 25 Syracuse L. Rev. 497, 519-532 (1974); Mann, The Marshall Court: Nationalization of Private Rights and Personal Liberty from the Authority of the Commerce Clause, 38 Ind. L. J. 117, 180-181, 209-212, 236-237 (1963). See Act of May 24, 1828, c. 119, 4 Stat. 312 (adding “mackerel fishery” category); Act of Apr. 20, 1836, c. 55, 5 Stat. 16 (permitting capture of all types of fish on mackerel license); Rev. Stat. §§ 4311, 4321 (1878) (codifying license provisions); Act of Apr. 18, 1874, c. 110, 18 Stat. 31 (exempting canal boats); Act of May 20, 1936, c. 434, 49 Stat. 1367 (license form amended and re-enacted). Cf. Act of Feb. 28, 1887, c. 288, 24 Stat. 435 (temporarily applying a fishing season for mackerel to federal licenses). In addition to the contemporary comments of Mr. Justice Johnson and Chancellor Kent, see n. 13, supra, Thomas Jefferson’s well-publicized letters were highly critical of what he saw as undue expansion of federal power, exemplified by Gibbons. See 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 620-621 (1937 ed.). See, e. g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 395 (1877) (“There has been . . . no . . . grant of power over the fisheries [to the United States]. These remain under the exclusive control of the State . . .”); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 258-260 (1891); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896); 17 Cong. Rec. 4734 (1886) (conservation amendment to fisheries license, Act of Feb. 28, 1887, c. 288, 24 Stat. 435, see n. 14, supra, believed not to apply to state territorial waters). Appellant also cites cases describing fishing as a “local activity,” Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199, 203 (1961), and as one that “occurs before the [fish] can be said to have entered the flow of interstate commerce,” Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S., at 395. But these statements were made in upholding the right of States to tax what was argued to be interstate commerce. Pronouncements made in that context are not used interchangeably as statements of law where the issue is the power of Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause. The restrictions imposed by the Commerce Clause standing alone may well be less than the pre-emptive reach of statutes passed by Congress pursuant to the power. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S., at 121-122. No federal statutory claim was raised in Toomer or Arctic Maid, and in both cases the Court noted that the challenged statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Act of May 20, 1936, c. 434, 49 Stat. 1367. We are confident that Congress, in the midst of the New Deal legislative program, broadly construed its powers under the Commerce Clause at this time. See, e. g., Wickard v. Filburn. Indeed, an amendment to the license form made at the time of the 1936 re-enactment specifically authorizes “the taking of fish.” Acting to reverse a Circuit Court of Appeals decision, The Pueblos, 77 F. 2d 618 (CA2 1935), Congress authorized issuance of licenses for the “coasting trade and mackerel fishery.” The amendment explains that vessels so documented “shall be deemed to have sufficient license for engaging in the coasting trade and the taking of fish of every description, including shellfish.” 49 Stat. 1368, 46 U. S. C. § 263. See also S. Rep. No. 83, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836), describing the modification in the Enrollment and Licensing Act, 5 Stat. 16, see nn. 8, 14, supra, as intended “to enable those engaged in the mackerel fishery to take other fish without incurring a penalty.” See cases cited in n. 16, supra. Appellant claims that the challenged statutes have a legitimate conservation purpose. He argues that § 81.1 is a valid response to the grave problem of overfishing of American marine stocks by foreign fleets. Similarly, § 60 is said to be an essential enforcement mechanism for net-size restrictions on menhaden fishermen. The claims are specious. Virginia makes no attempt to restrict the quantity of menhaden caught by her own residents. A statute that leaves a State’s residents free to destroy a natural resource while excluding aliens or nonresidents is not a conservation law at all. It bears repeating that a “state may not use its admitted powers to protect the health and safety of its people as a basis for suppressing competition.” H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 538 (1949). A State cannot escape this principle by cloaking objectionable legislation in the currently fashionable garb of environmental protection. Moreover, despite its foreign ownership, Seacoast is subject to all United States shipping and fisheries laws. And the record does not support the claim based on enforcement of the net-size restriction. Furthermore, the cases upon which appellant relies are factually distinguishable. In McCready v. Virginia and Geer v. Connecticut neither petitioner asserted a claim under a pre-emptive Act of Congress. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (1855), Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240 (1891), and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960), did raise Licensing Act claims, but the statutes there upheld operated equally against residents and nonresidents. Among those States filing briefs as amici curiae in support of Virginia, see, e. g., Md. Nat. Res. Ann. Code §§ 4-703, 4-704 (b) (1974); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 130, § 99 (1974); Act of Feb. 20, 1923, 1923 Mass. Acts c. 35, as amended by Act of Mar. 13, 1962, 1962 Mass. Acts c. 219; Act of Mar. 23, 1936, 1936 Mass. Acts c. 158; N. Y. Envir. Conserv. Law §§ 13-0333 (4), 13-0335 (2), 13-0341 (7) (McKinney 1973). See also Va. Code Ann. §28.1-57 (1973). The Court was aware of this threat in Gibbons. A number of States had enacted steamboat monopoly legislation. See, e. g., Abel, Commerce Regulation before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate Transportation Facilities, 25 N. C. L. Rev. 121, 159-160 (1947); M. Baxter, The Steamboat Monopoly 7, 16 (1972). Connecticut and Ohio retaliated against the Livingston-Fulton monopoly by forbidding its licensees from entering their waters; New Jersey not only did that, but also granted a right of action for treble damages against anyone obtaining an injunction under New York law. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., at 4-5 (argument of Daniel Webster); Abel, supra, at 160; Baxter, supra, at 25-30. As of March 1, 1977, United States jurisdiction for fishery management was extended from 12 to 200 nautical miles from our coasts. 90 Stat. 336, 16 U. S. C. § 1811 (1976 ed.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN BANK & TRUST CO. et al. v. DALLAS COUNTY et al. No. 81-1717. Argued March 29, 1983 — Decided July 5, 1983 Marvin S. Sloman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Brian M. Lidji, Peter S. Chantilis, Cecilia H. Morgan, Roy Coffee, Christopher G. Sharp, and Bruce W. Bowman, Jr. Ernest J. Brown argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Archer, and Michael L. Paup. Carroll R. Graham argued the cause for respondents City of Dallas et al. With him on the brief were Douglas H. Conner III and Jan W. Fletcher. Earl Luna argued the cause for respondents Dallas County et al. With him on the briefs was Randel B. Gibbs. Henry D. Atkin, Jr., filed a brief for respondents Richardson Independent School District et al. Charles M. Hinton, Jr., filed a brief for respondents City of Garland et al. Together with Bank of Texas et al. v. Childs et al., and Wynnewood Bank & Trust et al. v. Childs et al., also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court’s Rule 19.4). Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by William H. Smith and Michael F. Crotty for the American Bankers Association; and by Frank A. Sinon and Sherill T. Moyer for the Dale National Bank. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Robert S. Stubbs II, Executive Assistant Attorney General, H. Perry Michael, First Assistant Attorney General, VerleyJ. Spivey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and James C. Pratt, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Georgia; and by C. Richard Fine for the Texas Association of Appraisal Districts et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Mike Westergren, Alan Gallagher, J. Bruce Ay cock, and Felix Hallum George, Jr., for Nueces County, Texas, et al.; and by Jay D. Howell, Jr., and Daniel Doherty for the City of Houston. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether a Texas property tax on bank shares, computed on the basis of the bank’s net assets without any deduction for tax-exempt United States obligations held by the bank, violates Rev. Stat. § 3701, as amended. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals ruled that it did not. I Until 1959, Rev. Stat. §3701, 31 U. S. C. §742, provided, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority.” This Court consistently held that this language prohibited state taxes imposed on federal obligations, either directly, or indirectly as part of a tax on the taxpayer’s total property or assets. See Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S. 143, 147-148 (1955). The Court also consistently held, however, that § 3701 did not prohibit nondiscriminatory taxes imposed on discrete property interests such as corporate shares or business franchises, even though the value of that discrete interest was measured by the underlying assets, including United States obligations. See Werner Machine Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U. S. 492, 493-494 (1956); Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 147-148; Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103, 112 (1923); Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 518-519 (1907); Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611, 629-632 (1868). Similarly, the Court interpreted Rev. Stat. § 3701 not to prohibit taxes imposed on a discrete transaction, such as an inheritance, even though the value of the inheritance was measured according to the value of the federal obligations transferred. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 133-134 (1900). In 1956, the Court observed that this formal but economically meaningless distinction between taxes on Government obligations and taxes on separate interests was “firmly embedded in the law.” Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148. In 1959, Congress amended § 3701 by adding a second sentence: “This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax,” with exceptions only for nondiscriminatory franchise taxes or other nonproperty taxes, and for estate or inheritance taxes. Act of Sept. 22, 1959, § 105(a), 73 Stat. 622. The issue is whether this amendment extends to a state bank shares tax. HH HH In 1979 and 1980, Texas imposed a property tax on bank shares and a separate tax on the real estate holdings of banks. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 7166 (Vernon I960). It required each bank doing business in the State to report its real estate to the local tax assessor, and to submit a list of its shareholders with the number of shares owned by each. The shareholders were required to report the actual value of their shares to the assessor in the bank’s jurisdiction. To prevent double taxation, each share was to be taxed to the shareholder on the difference between the share’s cash value and the proportionate amount per share of the bank’s real estate assessment. Petitioners are certain state and national banks and their shareholders. Respondents are taxing subdivisions of the State of Texas, and officers and Boards of Equalization of those subdivisions, that levied taxes on petitioners’ bank shares pursuant to Art. 7166. In determining the value of the bank shares subject to the tax, respondents included the value of United States obligations held by the banks. Petitioners sought mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief against respondents in state court, asserting that § 3701 required that the value of their bank shares be reduced by the proportionate value of the United States obligations held by the bank. In its initial opinion concerning petitioner Bank of Texas, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the plain language of §3701, as amended, precludes consideration of United States obligations in the computation of any state or local tax. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a. On motions for rehearing, the court withdrew its original opinion and, instead, upheld the tax. Bank of Texas v. Childs, 615 S. W. 2d 810 (1981). The court stated that, prior to the 1959 amendment to §3701, a different statute, Rev. Stat. § 5219, as amended, 12 U. S. C. §548, had authorized state taxation of shares of national banks without reduction in value for obligations of the United States held by the banks. 615 S. W. 2d, at 817-820. The court concluded that the 1959 amendment to § 3701 had not withdrawn this authorization. 615 S. W. 2d, at 819-820. The court reasoned that if the 1959 amendment had withdrawn the authorization granted by § 5219, in effect it would have repealed a portion of that statute, and that repeals by implication are not favored. 615 S. W. 2d, at 820-822. Similar judgments were entered in companion cases. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a, 41a. The Court of Civil Appeals denied motions for rehearing, 615 S. W. 2d, at 823-826; App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a, 42a. The Supreme Court of Texas denied applications for writs of error. Id., at 4a, 39a, 43a. Because the decisions of the Court of Civil Appeals appeared to be inconsistent with decisions of the Supreme Court of Montana, and because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. 966 (1982). Ill A “Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [the statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). The exemption for federal obligations provided by §3701, as amended in 1959, is sweeping: with specific exceptions, it “extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax” (emphasis supplied). See Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U. S. 392, 395-396 (1983) (the statute “establishes a broad exemption”). The 1959 amendment rejected and set aside this Court’s rather formalistic pre-1959 approach to § 3701. Under that approach, if a tax were imposed on a property interest or transaction separate from the ownership of federal obligations, the method by which the tax was computed was entirely irrelevant. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S., at 129; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 600, 602, 606 (1890). This remained true despite the Court’s recognition that the practical impact of such a tax is indistinguishable from that of a tax imposed directly on corporate assets that include federal obligations. See Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148. Under the plain language of the 1959 amendment, however, the tax is barred regardless of its form if federal obligations must be considered, either directly or indirectly, in computing the tax. Giving the words of amended § 3701 their ordinary meaning, there can be no question that federal obligations were considered in computing the bank shares tax at issue here. In context, the word “considered” means taken into account, or included in the accounting. The tax at issue was computed by use of an “equity capital formula,” which involved determining the amount of the bank’s capital assets, subtracting from that figure the bank’s liabilities and the assessed value of the bank’s real estate, and then dividing the result by the number of shares. 615 S. W. 2d, at 816. Plainly, such a tax takes into account, at least indirectly, the federal obligations that constitute a part of the bank’s assets. Cf. Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 146-147 (tax on total assets of corporation is tax on federal obligations it owns); New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, 672-673 (1950) (same); Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200, 208-209 (1865) (same). The express exceptions to the 1959 amendment — franchise taxes and estate and inheritance taxes — reinforce this conclusion. Just as state tax laws relating to corporate or bank shares generally assess the shares according to the value of the corporation’s assets, see Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148, franchise and estate and inheritance taxes customarily assess the franchise or the demise at the value of the assets of the business or at the value of the property inherited. See, e. g., Werner Machine Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U. S., at 492 (franchise tax measured by “net worth”); Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S., at 134 (inheritance tax measured by “the value of the property passing”); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S., at 599 (franchise tax measured by “capital stock and dividends”). Prior to the 1959 amendment, franchise and estate and inheritance taxes measured by the value of federal obligations, like bank shares taxes, were upheld on the theory that the tax was levied on the franchise or the transfer of property, rather than on the ownership interest in the federal securities themselves. By expressly exempting franchise and estate and inheritance taxes from the amended § 3701, Congress manifested its awareness that the new language would broaden significantly the prohibition as it had been construed by the courts. Congress must have believed that franchise and estate and inheritance taxes required federal obligations to “be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax”; otherwise, the specific exemptions for these taxes would have been superfluous. There is no reason to conclude that shares taxes are any different. The language of § 3701 encompasses “every form of taxation,” and is inconsistent with implied exceptions. Cf. Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 60-62 (1980). From the specific exceptions for franchise and estate and inheritance taxes, and the conspicuous omission of shares taxes from that group, only one inference is possible: Congress meant to bar shares taxes to the extent they consider federal obligations in the computation of the tax. Cf. Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U. S. 608, 616 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 56 (1979). Respondents Dallas County et al. argue, however, that § 3701 does not prohibit the Texas tax because, on its face, the tax statute does not require use of the equity capital formula or any other formula based on the value of federal obligations. Brief for Respondents Dallas County et al. 10-11. In the present litigation, however, the assessors did use the equity capital formula, which is the usual method for assessing the value of bank shares, see Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148, and is “the usual and customary method used in Texas to arrive at such value.” City of Midland v. Midland National Bank, 607 S. W. 2d 303, 304 (1980). Respondents have not cited a single instance where a different formula was employed. Section 3701 prohibits any form of tax that would require consideration of federal obligations in computing the tax; it cannot matter whether such consideration is mandated by the tax assessor in practice or by the state statute in so many words. The taxes at issue therefore violated the plain language of § 3701. B The legislative history of the 1959 amendment to §3701, while not extensive, supports this construction of the amendment’s effect. The catalyst for the amendment was an Idaho tax “upon every individual . . . which shall be according to and measured by his net income.” See Idaho Code § 63-3011 (1948). Despite this Court’s holding that §3701 precluded direct state taxation of the interest on federal obligations, as well as taxation of the underlying obligations, see New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S., at 675-676, Idaho’s position was that its tax need not exempt the interest received on federal obligations, because it was imposed on the individual and was merely measured by his net income, rather than being imposed on the income itself. See Hearings on Public Debt Ceiling and Interest Rate Ceiling on Bonds before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 69-70 (1959) (supplemental statement of Secretary of the Treasury Anderson) (Hearings). In presenting the 1959 amendment to Congress, the Secretary described Idaho’s position as “resting] upon a distinction of words which is without substance.” Id., at 71. Similar accusations had been leveled at this Court’s analogous distinctions between shares taxes and franchise taxes on the one hand, and taxes on corporate assets on the other. Respondents suggest, however, that the 1959 amendment was intended only to make clear that income taxes like Idaho’s, on interest from federal obligations, were unlawful. Congress, according to respondents, did not mean to set aside this Court’s well-established distinction between taxes on assets and taxes on shares. We, however, have found no evidence whatsoever in the legislative history to suggest that Congress considered shares taxes to fall outside the scope of the prohibition. The fact that the 1959 legislative history refers to the Idaho tax, but not specifically to bank shares taxes, does not raise a “negative inference” limiting the amendment to this specific problem. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 679 (1983). The amendment plainly did more than make clear that the interest on federal obligations was tax exempt. Idaho relied on the formal distinction between a tax on an individual, measured by his net income, and a tax on the income itself. See Hearings, at 70. To answer this argument, the amendment abolished the formalistic inquiry whether the tax is on a distinct interest, and replaced it with the inquiry whether “computation of the tax” requires consideration of federal obligations. Nor can the 1959 amendment be read to apply only to income taxes; it reaches “every form of tax ...” (emphasis supplied). Indeed, Congress felt compelled to exempt estate and inheritance and franchise taxes from the scope of its amendment precisely because the amendment was not limited to income taxes. Congress understood the amendment’s effect; both the Senate and House Reports explained that the amendment “makes it clear that both the principal and interest on U. S. obligations are exempt from all State taxes except nondiscriminatory franchise, etc., taxes” (emphasis supplied). Senate Report, at 2; House Report, at 2. Congress intended to sweep away formal distinctions and to invalidate all taxes measured directly or indirectly by the value of federal obligations, except those specified in the amendment. IV In an effort to avoid this result and to resurrect the formalistic approach, respondents embark on a tour of the history of an entirely different statute, Rev. Stat. § 5219, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 548. Section 5219, they argue, authorizes States to tax the full value of bank shares, and the 1959 amendment to § 3701 did not repeal that authorization by implication. Even if the 1959 Congress abolished the distinction between taxes on and taxes measured by the value of federal obligations, respondents conclude, the Texas tax is valid. It is true, of course, that “repeals by implication are not favored.” Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). This doctrine flows from the basic principle that “courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). But, at the time the taxes at issue were assessed, § 5219 was clearly capable of coexistence with the plain language of § 3701 as amended in 1959, and there is no justification for construing § 5219 to create an inconsistency. When the taxes challenged here were assessed, and now, § 5219 provided only that States could not impose discriminatory taxes on national banks: “For the purposes of any tax law enacted under authority of the United States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its principal office is located.” Section 3701’s requirement that shares taxes on all corporations not consider federal obligations in their computation easily coexists with §5219’s simple ban on discriminatory taxation of national banks. Giving each statute its common-sense meaning, the proper result in these cases could not be more clear. Respondents, though, find an unexpressed exception for bank shares taxes in the plain language of § 3701 by reading into the plain language of §5219 an unexpressed congressional authorization to tax bank shares at their full value. Respondents argue that this silent authorization may be found in § 5219 by looking to the pre-1969 language of that section. Even assuming that such an adventure in statutory-revision would be an appropriate exercise of judicial power, respondents’ argument is based on an unnecessary construction of this earlier version of § 5219. From 1926 until 1969, § 5219 provided that the States could tax national banks in only four ways: (1) by taxing bank shares, (2) by including bank share dividends in the taxable income of a shareholder, (3) by taxing national banks on their net income, or (4) by levying a franchise tax on national banks “according to or measured by their net income. ” Act of Mar. 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. 223; see n. 3, supra. Respondents argue that this statute not only permitted these forms of taxation of national banks, but that in so doing it also implicitly authorized the taxation of any federal obligations held by national banks, notwithstanding independent limitations placed on taxation of federal obligations. Although respondents’ reading might be a plausible construction of the prior version of § 5219, the prior version need not be so construed. That version did not mention federal obligations; § 5219 was, and still is, addressed to the concern first considered in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), where this Court declared that any tax on the operation of a national bank unconstitutionally burdened this instrumentality of the Federal Government. The original predecessor of §5219, §41 of the 1864 National Bank Act, 13 Stat. Ill, permitted state taxation of national banks only on their real estate and shares; such taxes, McCulloch indicated, did not violate the Constitution’s protection of national banks. 4 Wheat., at 436-437. But whether a tax imposes an intolerable burden on national banks, and whether it imposes an intolerable burden on federal obligations by threatening to diminish their value, are questions that are historically and analytically distinct. Section 3701 responds to the latter concern, first addressed in Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (1829). Congress might well conclude that a tax not imposing an undue burden on national banks does unduly burden federal obligations, and § 5219 and § 3701 have always been directed to, and have protected, these separate federal interests. A state tax affecting national banks holding federal obligations implicates both federal concerns, and therefore confronts both federal barriers to state taxation. Under the statutory scheme in effect in 1959, the year § 3701 was amended, a tax not satisfying the requirements of § 5219 was invalid whether or not it also satisfied the requirements of § 3701. Compare Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 676, 682-683 (1899) (franchise taxation of national bank violated predecessor to § 5219 prior to 1926 amendment of that statute, which permitted for the first time franchise taxes on national banks), with Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall., at 630-632 (franchise tax on state corporation not unlawful burden on federal obligations). Similarly, there was no reason to believe that a tax that violated § 3701 could be imposed on a bank merely because it did not also violate §5219. Indeed, while §5219 explicitly had permitted the levying of an income tax on national banks since 1923, see Act of Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 267, 42 Stat. 1499, it was never contended that this permitted the inclusion of interest from federal obligations in the national banks’ taxable income. Although it might be inferred from dicta in certain cases that the prior version of § 5219 implicitly authorized a State’s refusal to deduct the value of federal obligations from the assessed value of national bank shares, see, e. g., Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U. S. 111, 115 (1902); Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 584-588 (1866), this implication has not been necessary for any of the Court’s decisions in this area. In the context of bank shares taxes, until the 1959 amendment of §3701 the prohibitions of §3701 and §5219 were coextensive. Because they were permitted expressly by § 5219, such taxes did not violate the proscription of taxes on national banks. And regardless of the manner in which a shares tax was computed, it did not violate § 3701 because it was assessed on an interest separate from the federal obligations held by the bank. See, e. g., Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 147. There was therefore no cause to consider whether § 5219 implicitly granted powers to burden federal obligations held by national banks that otherwise would have been denied by §3701. The prior version of § 5219 thus need not be read as giving implied consent to taxation of federal obligations; on its face it was addressed only to the separate interdiction on taxation of national banks, and it never was necessary to decide whether implicitly it reached further. The plain language of §3701, as amended in 1959, therefore need not be seen as an “implied repeal” of the pre-1969 version of § 5219. The 1959 amendment of § 3701 left § 5219 entirely intact. All taxes on national banks except those enumerated in § 5219 still were unlawful. A shares tax on a national bank still was lawful. The 1959 amendment simply limited the ability of States to consider federal obligations when levying any form of tax, taxes on national banks included. States still could reach the value of federal obligations by imposing the other effective form of taxation permitted by § 5219, a franchise tax, which was expressly excepted from the prohibition contained in the amended language of §3701. The doctrine disfavoring implied repeals thus is irrelevant for these cases. It does not justify the use of an unnecessary construction of the language of an ambiguous statute that no longer is on the books to defeat the plain language of an effective statute. This is particularly true when, as here, the “impairment” of the prior statute is minimal even if the prior statute is construed so as to maximize its conflict with the later one. See Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U. S., at 618-619. Given its current language, which does not mention or even arguably authorize any form of tax, it would be singularly inappropriate for this Court to hold for the first time that § 5219 authorizes the imposition of taxes that otherwise would violate §3701. V Nothing in the legislative history of the 1959 amendment to §3701 contradicts its plain language. Nor is the plain language of the amendment inconsistent with any other federal statute. In these circumstances, the plain language of § 3701 is controlling. The judgments of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals are therefore reversed. It is so ordered. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Section § 3701, as so amended, 31 U. S. C. § 742, read: “[A]ll stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority. This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax, except nondiscriminatory franchise or other nonproperty taxes in lieu thereof imposed on corporations and except estate taxes or inheritance taxes.” Title 31 of the United States Code was not enacted into positive law until 1982, when it was reformulated without substantive change. Rev. Stat. § 3701, 31 U. S. C. § 742, then was replaced by 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a) (1982 ed.). Act of Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 877, 945. Because the state taxes at issue here were levied in 1979 and 1980, the former Rev. Stat. § 3701, as amended, rather than the present 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a) (1982 ed.) technically controls these cases. As of January 1, 1982, Art. 7166 was replaced by substantively similar provisions of the Texas Property Tax Code. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§21.09, 22.06, 23.11, 25.14 (1982). Until 1982, and at all times pertinent to these cases, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 7166 (Vernon 1960), read, in relevant part: “Every banking corporation, State or national, doing business in the State shall, in the city or town in which it is located, render its real estate to the tax assessor at the time and in the manner required of individuals. At the time of making such rendition the president or some other officer of said bank shall file with said assessor a sworn statement showing the number and amount of shares of said bank, the name and residence of each shareholder, and the number and amount of shares owned by him. Every shareholder of said bank shall, in the city or town where said bank is located, render at their actual value to the tax assessor all shares owned by him in such bank; and in case of his failure to do so, the assessor shall assess such unrendered shares as other unrendered property. Each share in such bank shall be taxed only for the difference between its actual cash value and the proportionate amount per share at which its real estate is assessed. . . . Nothing herein shall be so construed as to tax national or State banks, or the shareholders thereof, at a greater rate than is assessed against other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals.” Before its amendment in 1969, Rev. Stat. § 5219, as amended by the Act of Mar. 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. 223, 12 U. S. C. § 548, provided, in relevant part: “The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject to the provisions of this section, the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking associations located within its limits. The several States may (1) tax said shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable income of an owner or holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations on their net income, or (4) according to or measured by their net income. ...” The statute required that any such tax comply with certain conditions, principally designed to prohibit discrimination against national banks. As amended in 1969, § 5219 provides: “For the purposes of any tax law enacted under authority of the United States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its principal office is located.” Pub. L. 91-156, § 2(a), 83 Stat. 434. The court also rejected claims that the tax violated state law and the United States Constitution by placing a tax burden on banks heavier than it placed on other “moneyed capital” in the State. 615 S. W. 2d, at 813-816, 822-823. These holdings are not before us. Montana Bankers Assn. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 177 Mont. 112, 580 P. 2d 909 (1978); First Security Bank of Bozeman v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 177 Mont. 119, 580 P. 2d 913 (1978). The Supreme Court of Georgia has upheld a similar bank shares tax. Bartow County Bank v. Bartow County Board of Tax Assessors, 248 Ga. 703, 285 S. E. 2d 920 (1982), appeal docketed, No. 81-1834. Respondents Dallas County et al. suggest that “considered” may mean “characterized by deliberate thought,” so that a tax would be invalid under the section only if the tax assessor subjectively knew that the bank’s assets included federal obligations. Brief for Respondents Dallas County et al. 8-9. Respondents do not explain why Congress might have believed the subjective knowledge of the tax assessor worthy of federal concern. Moreover, on its face, the statute bars taxes requiring that federal obligations be considered “indirectly” in computing the tax. A Texas Court of Civil Appeals itself has stated that each asset of a bank, apart from real estate holdings, is “included and considered in arriving at the value of the Bank’s shares.” City of Midland v. Midland National Bank, 607 S. W. 2d 303, 304 (1980). The unenacted 31 U. S. C. §742, which codified Rev. Stat. §3701, included the introductory phrase “Except as otherwise provided by law . . . .” Rev. Stat. § 3701 itself did not include that phrase, however, and the Statutes at Large prevail over the Code whenever the two are inconsistent. Stephan v. United States, 319 U. S. 423, 426 (1943). In fact, Congress was aware that Rev. Stat. § 3701 did not contain this phrase. Both the House and Senate Reports, although mentioning the phrase at one point, see S. Rep. No. 909, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1959) (Senate Report); H. R. Rep. No. 1148, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1959) (House Report), properly set forth the statute without the introductory clause. Senate Report, at 22; House Report, at 25. Moreover, the Reports summarized the amendment as making clear that, with specified exceptions, “both the principal and interest on U. S. obligations are exempt from all State taxes except . . . .” Senate Report, at 2; House Report, at 2. There was no suggestion that some category of state taxes apart from those specifically preserved was to be impliedly excepted. At the time the contested taxes were levied, at least six States other than Texas imposed a bank shares tax. Of the six statutes, five explicitly required that the share’s value be determined according to the value of the bank’s assets. See Ga. Code Ann. § 48-6-90 (1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §47:8 (West 1970) and §47:1967(0 (West Cum. Supp. 1982); Nev. Rev. Stat. §367:025 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §5725.04 (1980) (repealed, effective Jan. 1, 1983, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5725.04 (Supp. 1982)); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 72, §7701 (Purdon Supp. 1982). One of the statutes, like Texas’, did not specify the method by which the assessment was to be made. See W. Va. Code § 11-3-14 (1974). Accordingly, we need not decide whether Texas, by the use of some other method of assessing the shares, could avoid the plain prohibition of the statute. See, e. g., Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 598-599 (1866) (Chase, C. J., concurring); 67 Cong. Rec. 6085-6986 (1926) (colloquy of Reps. Wingo and Cooper) (legalizing franchise tax measured by assets including federal obligations is “a use of words to conceal an idea”; “the decision of the Supreme Court which arrived at [that] conclusion gave me a headache, and it took me considerable time to be able to comprehend it”); id., at 6088 (remarks of Rep. Stevenson) (“the Supreme Court of the United States frequently obscures ideas by language as well as statesmen when they are on the stump. . . . When they held that the stock was taxable, although every dollar of it was invested in United States bonds, which were expressly exempt from taxation, they held practically the same thing”). See also Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 628-629 (1929); Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148. The unenacted phrase “Except as otherwise provided by law,” added to the text of Rev. Stat. § 3701 by the codifiers of the United States Code in 1926, see n. 8, supra, almost certainly did not refer to §5219 or its predecessors. The drafters probably inserted the language as a cross-reference to the Act of Aug. 13,1894, ch. 281,28 Stat. 278, which had legislatively overruled Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26 (1869), and modified § 3701 to the extent of removing the exemption from circulating notes and other notes circulating as currency. See W. McClenon & W. Gilbert, Index to the Federal Statutes 1874-1931, p. 1243 (1933) (listing Act of Aug. 13,1894, as an implied amendment of Rev. Stat. § 3701). In the preface to the 1926 edition of the United States Code, at v, it is said: “Acknowledgement of valuable assistance is given to W. H. McClenon. . . .” Inclusion of interest from federal obligations in income for the purposes of state income taxes was prohibited by the pre-1959 version of § 3701, because the tax was imposed on, rather than being measured by, the interest. The States’ inability to include interest from federal obligations in an income tax was the primary reason the predecessor to § 5219 was amended in 1926 to permit the imposition on national banks of nondiscriminatory franchise taxes based on corporate income. See 67 Cong. Rec. 6085 (1926) (remarks of Rep. Wingo); T. Anderson, Federal and State Control of Banking 217-219 (1934). Thus, we do not “disregard]” these cases, as the dissent contends. Post, at 874. We simply observe that like the former § 5219 itself these cases were ambiguous about the relationship of § 5219 to taxation of federal obligations and § 3701, and that their results in no way turned on an exception to § 3701 created by § 5219. In Van Allen v. Assessors, for example, the Court did not state unambiguously, as the dissent implies, post, at 875, that §5219 independently recognized the State’s power to tax federal obligations “irrespective of § 3701,” post, at 876, but rather stated that the statute recognized the State’s power to tax the shares of national banks. See 3 Wall, at 586. The Van Allen Court held that a bank shares tax did not illegally tax the United States obligations that constituted the capital of the bank, because the shares were “a distinct independent interest or property, held by the shareholder like any other property that may belong to him.” Id., at 584. Similarly, in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, the Court recognized that it was well established that Rev. Stat. § 3701 did not bar a tax on the separate individuality of shareholders. 184 U. S., at 115. And in Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103 (1923), relied upon, post, at 876, the Court addressed §3701’s application to a shares tax on national banks and held that “[a]s respects national banks, the rule is the same as with corporations in general”: “[t]he difference [between a lawful and an unlawful tax on United States obligations] turns on the distinction between the corporate assets and the shares, — the one belonging to the corporation as an artificial entity and the other to the stockholders,” 263 U. S., at 112. The Fairweather Court’s reference to Van Allen’s ruling as “settled law,” 263 U. S., at 114, in context appears to refer principally to this distinction, see id., at 113-115. Any oblique suggestions in these cases that § 5219 independently defined the States’ authority to reach the value of federal obligations held by national banks were wholly superfluous. Finally, the “firmly embedded” exception to the general rule of immunity of federal obligations from state taxation noted in Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148, was not an immunity afforded by § 5219. Cf. post, at 876. Section 5219 was not mentioned in Bowers. The Bowers Court referred to an immunity entirely internal to § 3701, one based on “the theory that... a tax on the stockholders’ interests is not a tax on the federal obligations which are included in the corporate property.” 349 U. S., at 147. The 1959 amendment to § 3701 certainly abolished the relevance of this formalistic theory. Moreover, the Court of Civil Appeals’ approach would ascribe to Congress the implausible intention to outlaw consideration of federal obligations in computing all taxes on shareholders, except taxes on shareholders of banks. As discussed above, state taxation of national banks historically has been thought to pose a threat to a federal interest independent of the threat posed by state taxation of federal obligations. Policy and logic suggest that Congress could not have meant to single out national banks for disfavored treatment.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ATKINS, COMMISSIONER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE v. PARKER et al. No. 83-1660. Argued November 27, 1984 Decided June 4, 1985 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Part I of which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 132. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 157. Samuel A. Alito argued the cause for the federal respondent in No. 83-6381 in support of petitioner in No. 83-1660. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Leonard Schaitman, and Bruce G. Forrest. Ellen L. Janos, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 83-1660. With her on the briefs were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and E. Michael Sloman and Carl Volvo, Assistant Attorneys General. Steven A. Hitov argued the cause for Parker et al. in both cases. With him on the briefs was J. Paterson Rae. Together with No. 83-6381, Parker et al. v. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Neil Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Bronson C. LaFollette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and F. Thomas Creeron III, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Illinois et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Cynthia G. Schneider filed a brief for the National Anti-Hunger Coalition as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General, and Charles F. Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Washington as amicus curiae. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In November, and again in December 1981, the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare mailed a written notice to over 16,000 recipients advising them that a recent change in federal law might result in either a reduction or a termination of their food-stamp benefits. The notice did not purport to explain the precise impact of the change on each individual recipient. The question this case presents is whether that notice violated any federal statute or regulation, or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we conclude that there was no violation. In an attempt to “permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade,” Congress created a federally subsidized food-stamp program. The Secretary of Agriculture prescribes the standards for eligibility for food stamps, but state agencies are authorized to make individual eligibility determinations and to distribute the food stamps to eligible households, which may use them to purchase food from approved, retail food stores. The eligibility of an individual household, and the amount of its food-stamp allotment, are based on several factors, including the size of the household and its income. Certifications of eligibility expire periodically and are renewed on the basis of applications submitted by the households. Prior to 1981, federal law provided that 20 percent of the household’s earned income should be deducted, or disregarded, in computing eligibility. The purpose of the earned-income disregard was to maintain the recipients’ incentive to earn and to report income. In 1981 Congress amended the Food Stamp Act to reduce this deduction from 20 percent to 18 percent. That amendment had no effect on households with no income or with extremely low income, but caused a reduction of benefits in varying amounts, or a complete termination of benefits, for families whose income placed them close to the border between eligibility and ineligibility. On September 4, 1981, the Department of Agriculture issued regulations providing for the implementation of the change in the earned-income disregard and directing the States to provide notice to food-stamp recipients. That directive indicated that the form of the notice might comply with the regulations dealing with so-called “mass changes,” rather than with the regulations dealing with individual “adverse actions.” In November, the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (Department) mailed a brief, ambiguously dated notice to all food-stamp recipients with earned income advising them that the earned-income deduction had been lowered from 20 percent to 18 percent and that the change would result in either a reduction or a termination of their benefits. The notice was printed on a card, in English on one side and Spanish on the other. The notice stated that the recipient had a right to request a hearing “if you disagree with this action,” and that benefits would be reinstated if a hearing was requested within 10 days of the notice. On December 10, 1981, petitioners in No. 83-6381 commenced this action on behalf of all Massachusetts households that had received the notice. They alleged that the notice was inadequate as a matter of law and moved for a temporary restraining order. On December 16, 1981, after certifying the action as a class action, and after commenting that the “notice was deficient in that it failed to provide recipients with a date to determine the time in which they could appeal,” the District Court enjoined the Department from reducing or terminating any benefits on the basis of that notice. The Department, in compliance with the District Court’s order, mailed supplemental benefits for the month of December to each of the 16,640 class members. It then sent out a second notice, in English and Spanish versions, dated December 26, which stated in part: “ * * * IMPORTANT NOTICE — READ CAREFULLY * * * “RECENT CHANGES IN THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM HAVE BEEN MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1981 FEDERAL LAW. UNDER THIS LAW, THE EARNED INCOME DEDUCTION FOR FOOD STAMP BENEFITS HAS BEEN LOWERED FROM 20 TO 18 PERCENT. THIS REDUCTION MEANS THAT A HIGHER PORTION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD’S EARNED INCOME WILL BE COUNTED IN DETERMINING YOUR ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNT FOR FOOD STAMPS. AS A RESULT OF THIS FEDERAL CHANGE, YOUR BENEFITS WILL EITHER BE REDUCED IF YOU REMAIN ELIGIBLE OR YOUR BENEFITS WILL BE TERMINATED. (FOOD STAMP MANUAL CITATION: 106 CMR:364.400). “YOUR RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING: “YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REQUEST A FAIR HEARING IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THIS ACTION. IF YOU ARE REQUESTING A HEARING, YOUR FOOD STAMP BENEFITS WILL BE REINSTATED. ... IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR BENEFITS COMPUTATION OR THE FAIR HEARING PROCESS, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL WELFARE OFFICE. YOU MAY FILE AN APPEAL AT ANY TIME IF YOU FEEL THAT YOU ARE NOT RECEIVING THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF FOOD STAMPS.” Petitioners filed a supplemental complaint attacking the adequacy of this notice, and again moved for a preliminary injunction. In October 1982, the District Court consolidated the hearing on that motion with the trial on the merits and again ruled in petitioners’ favor. The District Court found that there was a significant risk of error in the administration of the food-stamp program, particularly with the implementation of the change in the earned-income disregard, and that the failure to provide each recipient with an adequate notice increased the risk of error. In essence, the District Court concluded that the December notice was defective because it did not advise each household of the precise change in its benefits, or with the information necessary to enable the recipient to calculate the correct change; because it did not tell recipients whether their benefits were being reduced or terminated; and because the reading level and format of the notice made it difficult to comprehend. Based on the premise that the statutorily mandated reduction or termination of benefits was a deprivation of property subject to the full protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that the Due Process Clause had been violated. As a remedy, the District Court ordered the Department “to return forthwith to each and every household in the plaintiff class all food stamp benefits lost as a result of the action taken pursuant to the December notice” between January 1, 1981, and the date the household received adequate notice, had its benefits terminated for a reason unrelated to the change in the earned-income disregard, or had its file re-certified. The District Court also ordered that all future food-stamp notices issued by the Department contain various data, including the old and new benefit amounts, and that the Department issue regulations, subject to court approval, governing the form of future food-stamp notices. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the District Court’s constitutional holding, indicated its belief that Congress could not have “intended a constitutionally deficient notice to satisfy the statutory notice requirement,” and thus affirmed the District Court’s holding that “the December notice failed to satisfy the notice requirements of 7 U. S. C. § 2020(e)(10) and 7 CFR §273.12(e)(2) (ii).” Foggs v. Block, 722 F. 2d 933, 939-940 (1983). The Court of Appeals held, however, that the District Court had erred in ordering a reinstatement of benefits and in specifying the form of future notices. Petitioners in No. 83-6381 sought review of the Court of Appeals’ modification of the District Court’s remedy, and the Department, in No. 83-1660, cross-petitioned for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the holding on liability. We granted both the petition and the cross-petition, and invited the Solicitor General to participate in the argument. 467 U. S. 1250 (1984). We conclude that the notice was lawful, and therefore have no occasion to discuss the remedy issue that the petition in No. 83-6381 presents. Because there would be no need to decide the constitutional question if we found a violation of either the statute or the regulations, we first consider the statutory issue. I The only reference in the Food Stamp Act to a notice is contained in § 2020(e), which outlines the requirements of a state plan of operation. Subsection (10) of that section provides that a state plan must grant a fair hearing, and a prompt determination, to any household that is aggrieved by the action of a state agency. A proviso to that subsection states that any household “which timely requests such a fair hearing after receiving individual notice of agency action reducing or terminating its benefits” shall continue to receive the same level of benefits until the hearing is completed. The language of the proviso does not itself command that any notice be given, but it does indicate that Congress assumed that individual notice would be an element of the fair-hearing requirement. Thus, whenever a household is entitled to a fair hearing, it is appropriate to read the statute as imposing a requirement of individual notice that would enable the household to request such a hearing. The hearing requirement, and the incidental reference to “individual notice,” however, are by their terms applicable only to “agency action reducing or terminating” a household's benefits. Therefore, it seems unlikely that Congress contemplated individual hearings for every household affected by a general change in the law. The legislative history of §2020(e)(10) sheds light on its meaning. As originally enacted in 1964, the Food Stamp Act contained no fair-hearing requirement. See 78 Stat. 703-709. In 1971, however, in response to this Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), Congress amended the Act to include a fair-hearing provision, and in the Food Stamp Act of 1977, § 2020(e)(10) was enacted in its present form. The legislative history of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 contains a description of the then-existing regulations, which were promulgated after the 1971 amendment, and which drew a distinction between the requirement of notice in advance of an “adverse action” based on the particular facts of an individual case, on the one hand, and the absence of any requirement of individual notice of a “mass change,” on the other. That history contains no suggestion that Congress intended to eliminate that distinction; to the contrary, Congress expressly recognized during the period leading to the enactment of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 the distinction between the regulatory requirement regarding notice in the case of an adverse action and the lack of such a requirement in the case of a mass change. Read against this background, the relevant statutory language — which does not itself mandate any notice at all but merely assumes that a request for a hearing will be preceded by “individual notice of agency action” — cannot fairly be construed as a command to give notice of a general change in the law. Nor can we find any basis for concluding that the December notice failed to comply with the applicable regulations. Title 7 CFR § 273.12(e)(2)(h) (1984) provides: “(ii) A notice of adverse action is not required when a household’s food stamp benefits are reduced or terminated as a result of a mass change in the public assistance grant. However, State agencies shall send individual notices to households to inform them of the change. If a household requests a fair hearing, benefits shall be continued at the former level only if the issue being appealed is that food stamp eligibility or benefits were improperly computed.” This regulation reflects the familiar distinction between an individual adverse action and a mass change. The statement that a notice of adverse action is not required when a change of benefits results from a mass change surely implies that individual computations are not required in such cases. The two requirements that are imposed when a mass change occurs are: (1) that “individual” notice be sent and (2) that it “inform them of the change.” In this case, a separate individual notice was sent to each individual household and it did “inform them of the change” in the program that Congress had mandated. Since the word “change” in the regulation plainly refers to the “mass change,” the notice complied with the regulation. II Since the notice of the change in the earned-income disregard was sufficient under the statute and under the regulations, we must consider petitioners’ claim that they had a constitutional right to advance notice of the amendment’s specific impact on their entitlement to food stamps before the statutory change could be implemented by reducing or terminating their benefits. They argue that an individualized calculation of the new benefit was necessary in order to avoid the risk of an erroneous reduction or termination. The record in this case indicates that members of petitioners’ class had their benefits reduced or terminated for either or both of two reasons: (1) because Congress reduced the earned-income disregard from 20 percent to 18 percent; or (2) because inadvertent errors were made in calculating benefits. These inadvertent errors, however, did not necessarily result from the statutory change, but rather may have been attributable to a variety of factors that can occur in the administration of any large welfare program. For example, each of the named petitioners, presumably representative of the class, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a), appealed a reduction in benefits. None identified an error resulting from the legislative decision to change the earned-income disregard. But even if it is assumed that the mass change increased the risk of erroneous reductions in benefits, that assumption does not support the claim that the actual notice used in this case was inadequate. For that notice plainly informed each household of the opportunity to request a fair hearing and the right to have its benefit level frozen if a hearing was requested. As the testimony of the class representatives indicates, every class member who contacted the Department had his or her benefit level frozen, and received a fair hearing, before any loss of benefit occurred. Thus, the Department’s procedures provided adequate protection against any deprivation based on an unintended mistake. To determine whether the Constitution required a more detailed notice of the mass change, we therefore put the miscellaneous errors to one side and confine our attention to the reductions attributable to the statutory change. Food-stamp benefits, like the welfare benefits at issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), “are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.” Id., at 262 (footnote omitted). Such entitlements are appropriately treated as a form of “property” protected by the Due Process Clause; accordingly, the procedures that are employed in determining whether an individual may continue to participate in the statutory program must comply with the commands of the Constitution. Id., at 262-263. This case, however, does not concern the procedural fairness of individual eligibility determinations. Rather, it involves a legislatively mandated substantive change in the scope of the entire program. Such a change must, of course, comply with the substantive limitations on the power of Congress, but there is no suggestion in this case that the amendment at issue violated any such constraint. Thus, it must be assumed that Congress had plenary power to define the scope and the duration of the entitlement to food-stamp benefits, and to increase, to decrease, or to terminate those benefits based on its appraisal of the relative importance of the recipients’ needs and the resources available to fund the program. The procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not “impose a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits.” Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971). The congressional decision to lower the earned-income deduction from 20 percent to 18 percent gave many food-stamp households a less valuable entitlement in 1982 than they had received in 1981. But the 1981 entitlement did not include any right to have the program continue indefinitely at the same level, or to phrase it another way, did not include any right to the maintenance of the same level of property entitlement. Before the statutory change became effective, the existing property entitlement did not qualify the legislature’s power to substitute a different, less valuable entitlement at a later date. As we have frequently noted: “[A] welfare recipient is not deprived of due process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels. . . . [T]he legislative determination provides all the process that is due.” The participants in the food-stamp program had no greater right to advance notice of the legislative change — in this case, the decision to change the earned-income disregard level— than did any other voters. They do not claim that there was any defect in the legislative process. Because the substantive reduction in the level of petitioners’ benefits was the direct consequence of the statutory amendment, they have no basis for challenging the procedure that caused them to receive a different, less valuable property interest after the amendment became effective. The claim that petitioners had a constitutional right to better notice of the consequences of the statutory amendment is without merit. All citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of the law, see, e. g., North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925). Arguably that presumption may be overcome in cases in which the statute does not allow a sufficient “grace period” to provide the persons affected by a change in the law with an adequate opportunity to become familiar with their obligations under it. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 532 (1982). In this case, however, not only was there a grace period of over 90 days before the amendment became effective, but in addition, every person affected by the change was given individual notice of the substance of the amendment. As a matter of constitutional law there can be no doubt concerning the sufficiency of the notice describing the effect of the amendment in general terms. Surely Congress can presume that such a notice relative to a matter as important as a change in a household’s food-stamp allotment would prompt an appropriate inquiry if it is not fully understood. The entire structure of our democratic government rests on the premise that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the particular policies that affect his destiny. To contend that this notice was constitutionally insufficient is to reject that premise. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. 7 U. S. C. §2011. §2014. §§ 2013(a), 2020(a). § 2014. §§ 2012(c), 2014(f), 2015(c). § 2014(e) (1976 ed., Supp. II). See 95 Stat. 360, 7 U. S. C. § 2014(e). The Government states that it is “advised that the reductions involved did not exceed $6 per month for a four-member household if the household remained eligible for benefits.” Brief for Federal Respondent 7. It does not indicate where in the record this information is located; nor does it indicate the source of the “advice.” 46 Fed. Reg. 44722 (1981). The regulation provided that the change should begin no later than 90 days from the date of implementation, with October 1,1981, as the last date for state agencies to begin implementation (absent a waiver). Ibid. The portion of 7 CFR § 273.12(e) (1985), which discusses the notice required for mass changes, provides in relevant part: “(e) Mass changes. Certain changes are initiated by the State or Federal government which may affect the entire caseload or significant portions of the caseload. These changes include adjustments to the income eligibility standards, the shelter and dependent care deductions, the Thrifty Food Plan, and the standard deduction; annual and seasonal adjustments to Social Security, SSI, and other Federal benefits, periodic adjustments to AFDC or GA payments; and other changes in the eligibility criteria based on legislative or regulatory actions. “(2) . . . (ii) A notice of adverse action is not required when a household’s food stamp benefits are reduced or terminated as a result of a mass change in the public assistance grant. However, State agencies shall send individual notices to households to inform them of the change. If a household requests a fair hearing, benefits shall be continued at the former level only if the issue being appealed is that food stamp eligibility or benefits were improperly computed.” The section on adverse actions, 7 CFR §273.13 (1985), provides in relevant part: “(a) Use of notice. Prior to any action to reduce or terminate a household’s benefits within the certification period, the State agency shall, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, provide the household timely and adequate advance notice before the adverse action is taken.” “(b) Exemptions from notice. Individual notices of adverse action are not required when: “(1) The State initiates a mass change as described in § 273.12(e).” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, pp. A. 44-A. 45; App. 3. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, pp. A. 45-A. 46. App. 5. Each recipient was provided with a card that he could mail to obtain a hearing; a recipient could also obtain a hearing by placing a telephone call or by asking for a hearing in person. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, p. A. 48. Id,., at A. 100. The District Court wrote: “The risk of erroneous deprivation of benefits is increased in this case by the lack of adequate notice. The December notice did not inform the affected food stamp households of the exact action being taken, that is, whether their food stamp allotment was being reduced or terminated. There was no mention of the amount by which the benefits were being reduced. And finally, the December notice lacked the information necessary to enable the household to determine if an error had been made. Therefore, without the relevant information to determine whether an error had been made, the risk of an erroneous deprivation is increased.” Id., at A. 90-A. 91. The District Court concluded: “It is clear that the entitlement to food stamps benefits is a property interest subject to the full protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). Therefore, given the existence of a constitutionally protected property interest, the question is what process is due.” Id., at A. 86. The District Court also held that the December notice violated the timely notice requirements of 7 U. S. C. §2020(e)(10) and 7 CFR §273.12(e)(2)(ii) (1985), App. Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, p. A. 98; that the notice required to implement the earned-income disregard had to comport with 7 CFR §273.13(a) (1985), App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, p. A. 98, and that the notice violated multilingual notice requirements, id., at A. 104-A. 105. Id., at A. 101. Id., at A. 102-104. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed that the December notice failed to satisfy the notice requirements of 7 CFR §273.13(a) (1985). Foggs v. Block, 722 F. 2d, at 940. Id., at 941. Escambia County, Florida v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam) (“normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case”); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring). Title 7 U. S. C. § 2020(e)(10) provides, in relevant part: “The State plan of operation . . . shall provide . . . “(10) for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation as it affects the participation of such household in the food stamp program or by a claim against the household for an overissuance: Provided, That any household which timely requests such a fair hearing after receiving individual notice of agency action reducing or terminating its benefits within the household’s certification period shall continue to participate and receive benefits on the basis authorized immediately prior to the notice of adverse action until such time as the fair hearing is completed and an adverse decision rendered or until such time as the household’s certification period terminates, whichever occurs earlier . . . 84 Stat. 2051; see H. R. Rep. No. 95-464, pp. 285-286 (1977); 7 U. S. C. § 2019(e)(8) (1976 ed.) (state agency must provide “for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of a State agency”). 91 Stat. 972. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-464, at 285-289 (summarizing the existing rules governing fair hearings). Id., at 289 (“The Committee bill would retain the fair hearings provision of the law intact and would encourage the Department to enforce its excellent regulations and instructions on the subject. . . . The Department should also be certain that, although its regulations do not require individual notice of adverse action when mass changes in program benefits are proposed, they should require the states to send precisely such notices well in advance when the massive changes mandated by this bill are about to be implemented so that the individuals affected are fully aware of precisely why their benefits are being adversely affected. Hearings would, of course, be unnecessary in the absence of claims of factual error in individual benefit computation and calculation. All states should be overseen to be certain that their individual notices in non-mass change adverse action contexts recite the household’s fair hearing request rights”). Prior to the enactment of the Food Stamp Act of 1977, although individual notices of adverse action were not required by the regulations when mass changes in benefits were instituted because of changes in the law affecting, among other items, income standards or other eligibility criteria, see 7 CFR § 271.1 (n)(2)(i) (1975), the States were required to “publicize the possibility of a change in benefits through the various news media or through a general notice mailed out with [food stamp allotment] cards and with notices placed in food stamp and welfare offices.” §271.1(n)(3); see also 39 Fed. Reg. 25996 (1974). It may well be true, as petitioners argue, that the computerized data in the Department’s possession made it feasible for the agency to send an individualized computation to each recipient, and that such a particularized notice would have served the Commonwealth’s interest in minimizing or correcting predictable error. What judges may consider common sense, sound policy, or good administration, however, is not the standard by which we must evaluate the claim that the notice violated the applicable regulations. Moreover, present regulations protect the food-stamp household by providing, upon request, the ongoing right to access to information and materials in its case file. 7 CFR § 272.1(c)(2) (1985). Further, upon request, specific materials are made available for determining whether a hearing should be requested, §273.15(i)(l). If a hearing is requested, access to information and materials concerning the case must be made available prior to the hearing and during the hearing, §273.15(p)(l). See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, pp. A. 50-A. 52 (Cecelia Johnson), A. 53 (Gill Parker), A. 55 (Stephanie Zades), A. 55-A. 56 (Madeline Jones). By hypothesis, an inadvertent error is one that the Department did not anticipate; for that reason, the Department could not give notice of a reduction that was simply the consequence of an unintended mistake. Thus, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332 (1976), this Court wrote: “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary does not contend that procedural due process is inapplicable to terminations of Social Security disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 889, 401-402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960), that the interest of an individual in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created ‘property’ interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 432-433 (1982); see also United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174 (1980); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 575 (1979); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 608-611 (1960). Cf. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 445 (1915) (“Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule”). Thus, even under the position espoused in dissent in Texaco, there would be no merit to the claim in this case. As Justice Brennan wrote: “As a practical matter, a State cannot afford notice to every person who is or may be affected by a change in the law. But an unfair and irrational exercise of state power cannot be transformed into a rational exercise merely by invoking a legal maxim or presumption. If it is to survive the scrutiny that the Constitution requires us to afford laws that deprive persons of substantial interests in property, an enactment that relies on that presumption of knowledge must evidence some rational accommodation between the interests of the State and fairness to those against whom the law is applied.” 454 U. S., at 544. In the case before us, the constitutional claim is particularly weak because the relevant regulations provided that any recipient who claimed that his benefit had been improperly computed as a result of the change in the income deduction was entitled to a reinstatement of the earlier benefit level pending a full individual hearing. 7 CFR §273.12(e)(2)(h) (1985). Petitioners do not contend that there was a failure to comply with this regulation. This, of course, would be a different case if the reductions were based on changes in individual circumstances, or if the reductions were based on individual factual determinations, and notice and an opportunity to be heard had been denied.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD v. STATE AIRLINES, INC. NO. 157. Argued December 12, 1949. Decided February 6, 1950. Emory T. Nunneley, Jr. argued the cause for the Civil Aeronautics Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Bergson, Philip Elman, J. Roger Wollenberg and Warren L. Sharjman. Frederick W. P. Lorenzen argued the cause for State Airlines, Inc. With him on the brief was Philip Schleit. Charles H. Murchison argued the cause for Piedmont Aviation, Inc., petitioner in Ño. 159 and respondent in No. 158. With him on the brief was William A. Carter. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Acting under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board (C. A. B.) consolidated some 45 route applications of 25 airlines into one area proceeding, styled the “Southeastern States Case.” After hearings, it made findings of fact as to what new routes should be established and which of the applicants could best serve these routes. It then entered orders authorizing certificates of convenience and necessity for several new routes in the area. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., was authorized to engage in air transportation of persons, property, and mail along certain of these routes. State Airlines, Inc., was denied authority to act as a carrier on any of them. State filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit asking that court to reverse the orders and remand the case to the Board with directions to grant carrier certificates to State instead of Piedmont. The court reversed insofar as the orders awarded certificates to Piedmont but held that it was without power to direct the Board to certify State. A crucial ground of the court’s reversal was its finding that Piedmont had never filed an application for the particular routes certified, an indispensable prerequisite to certification as the Court of Appeals interpreted the Civil Aeronautics Act. A second ground for reversal was that since Piedmont had filed no application for the particular routes certified, State failed to have sufficient notice that the Board might consider Piedmont as a competing applicant, and thus was deprived of a fair opportunity to discredit Piedmont’s fitness and ability to serve those routes. A third ground was that the Board’s findings that Piedmont was fit and able to serve the routes “were, in the legal sense, arbitrary and capricious and lacked the support of substantial evidence.” Both Piedmont and the Board petitioned for review of the court’s reversal, while State cross-petitioned for review of the court’s refusal to direct certification of State. We granted certiorari because a final determination of the questions involved, particularly those involving interpretation of the Act, is of importance for future guidance of the Board in carrying out its congressionally imposed functions. 338 U. S. 812. First. We hold that Piedmont’s applications were sufficient to permit certification of Piedmont for the routes awarded. The contrary holding of the Court of Appeals rested primarily on its interpretation of § 401 (d) (1) and (2) of the Civil Aeronautics Act. The particular language most relied on by the court was that which empowers the Board to issue certificates “authorizing the whole or any part of the transportation covered by the application, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform such transportation properly . . . .” (Italics used by the Court of Appeals.) The Court of Appeals read this language as showing a congressional purpose to bar the Board from granting any certificates in which the routes awarded deviate more than slightly from the precise routes defined in the application. We think that such a narrow interpretation is not compelled by the language of § 401 (d) and that the Act as a whole refutes any intent to freeze the Board’s procedures in so rigid a mold. The language of § 401 (d) (1) and (2) unqualifiedly gives the Board power, after application and appropriate findings, to issue certificates for the whole or any part of transportation covered in an application. This manifests a purpose generally to gear the award of certificates to an application procedure. But Congress made no attempt in (1) and (2) of §401 (d) to define the full reach or contents of an application. These subsections do not even require an applicant to designate the terminal cities or the intermediate points a proposed route would serve. A different provision, § 401 (b), contains the only requirements directly imposed by Congress — that an application must be in writing and verified. With this one exception, § 401 (b) provides that an application “shall be in such form and contain such information ... as the Board shall by regulation require.” And in § 1001 Congress. granted the Board authority to “conduct its proceedings in such manner as will be conducive to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice.” Thus, except for the statutory requirement of written and verified applications, Congress plainly intended to leave the Board free to work out application procedures reasonably adapted to fair and orderly administration of its complex responsibilities. Here the Board decided that the policies of the Act could best be served by a consolidated area proceeding. In doing so it did not exceed its procedural discretion. Only through such joint hearings could the Board expeditiously decide what new routes should be established, if any, and which of the numerous applicants should be selected as appropriate carriers for different routes. And in such a proceeding, as the Board has found, limiting all applications to the precise routes they describe would destroy necessary flexibility. For the Board’s decision as to what new routes are actually available is not reached until long after the applications are filed. Recognizing this, Piedmont, like other airlines, inserted a so-called “catchall clause” in its applications, broadly requesting authority to transport on “the routes detailed herein, or such modification of such routes as the Board may find public convenience and necessity require.” It also included a general prayer “for such other and further relief, general and specific, under Section 401 of the . . . Act ... as the Board may deem appropriate, and to which the applicant may be entitled in any proceeding in which the application may be heard in part or in its entirety.” We are convinced that the Board, in awarding routes varying from those specifically detailed in Piedmont’s application, has not departed from the congressional policy hinging certification generally on application procedures. While the routes sought by Piedmont did differ markedly from those awarded, they were all in the general area covered by the consolidated hearings. All twenty-five applicants had asked for routes somewhere in the area, and many of these routes overlapped. In such an area proceeding it would exalt imaginary procedural rights above the public interest to hold that the Board is hamstrung by the lack of foresight or skill of a draftsman in describing routes. The flexible requirements set by the Board were reasonable. They accorded with the policies of the Act. The Board in well-considered opinions held that Piedmont’s application met these requirements. That application also met the congressional requirements of writing and verification. So far as § 401 (d) (1) and (2) are concerned, the Board acted within its power in entering the orders. Second. The Court of Appeals recognized that full hearings were held in the area proceedings after due notice to all interested parties. But that court nevertheless held that State was without adequate notice that the Board might consider Piedmont as an applicant for routes encroaching on those sought by State. This contention largely rests on the statutory interpretation we have rejected. State argues, however, that since it never considered Piedmont as a possible applicant for the routes awarded, it failed to produce available evidence and arguments to convince the Board that Piedmont was not fit and able to serve as a carrier on the routes. This challenge is substantial. The Board’s major standard is the public interest in having convenient routes served by fit and able carriers. These questions are to be determined in hearings after notice. The prime purpose of allowing interested persons to offer evidence is to give the Board the advantage of all available information as a basis for its selection of the applicant best qualified to serve the public interest. Cf. Federal Communications Comm’n v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 477. If the Board had neglected this purpose, State could rightly complain. Here, however, we find that the Board fully appreciated its responsibility in this respect. It seems plain to us from the entire record that State did fully recognize that Piedmont was a potential competitive applicant in the consolidated proceedings. Their applications in large part sought certificates in the same general area. Each argued against the other before the Board. Moreover, after issuance of the order, the Board granted State a limited rehearing to show, if it could, that the proceeding should be reopened to enable State to offer new evidence against Piedmont’s fitness and ability. In the rehearing argument, State’s main contention was that the Board lacked jurisdiction because of the limited nature of Piedmont’s application, a contention we have already rejected. But State also contended that had it known Piedmont to be an actual competitor, State would have made diligent efforts by cross-examination and otherwise to prevent the Board’s finding that Piedmont’s qualifications were superior to State’s. The record reveals that the Board gave most careful consideration to all the contentions made by State’s counsel. The Board in an opinion discussed each of those contentions. 8 C. A. B. 716. With particular reference to the general contention that in reopened proceedings State could offer evidence to refute the Board’s findings of Piedmont’s superior qualifications, the Board said: “Although in the course of the subsequent argument State asserted that had it been aware of the situation it might have presented additional or different evidence and would have enlarged upon its inquiries into Piedmont’s case, it did not, in the course of the argument or in its petition for reconsideration, specify what the nature of such additional evidence or inquiries would have been.” Id., at 721. It was in this setting that the Board held State’s showing inadequate to justify new hearings concerning the respective qualifications of State and Piedmont. In reaffirming its previous holding of Piedmont’s superior qualifications, the Board said: “The only practical approach that can be taken in cases of this type is to consider the applications, not with a view as to how an individual proposal would benefit the applicant, or whether a particular proposed route is required precisely as set forth in an application, but rather to consider the entire case with the objective of establishing a sound transportation pattern in the area involved.” 8 C. A. B. at 722. We think the standard adopted by the Board under which the public interest is given a paramount consideration is a correct standard. And since the Board’s conclusion that the proceeding should not be reopened represents its informed judgment after a searching inquiry, we accept its conclusion. Because of the foregoing and other circumstances disclosed by the record we think there is no ground for State’s contention that it failed to have a fair hearing. See Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R. Co. v. United States, 322 U. S. 1, 3. Third. During the rehearing argument, counsel for State was asked by a member of the Board whether State took the position that Piedmont was “not capable of running the route that was awarded.” He replied: “We are taking the position that both State and Piedmont are fit and able, it’s a question of which has demonstrated in this record to be more fit, willing and able.” State nevertheless contends here, and the Court of Appeals held, that, there was no sufficient evidence to support the Board’s finding of Piedmont’s fitness and ability. This contention, like others, rests almost wholly on the argument that Piedmont had not applied for the particular routes awarded and thus could not have evidenced its ability to handle those routes. The Court of Appeals also emphasized the fact that the routes awarded required Piedmont to transport over mountains, whereas the detailed passenger routes for which it had applied would not have crossed the mountains; it contrasted this with State’s applications, which had specifically shown routes crossing the mountains. Precisely what added skills, if any, are required for flights across mountains is a matter of proof. In the extensive hearings held in this area proceeding, each applicant was required to and did offer evidence concerning fitness and ability. Much of this evidence concerned the financial condition and experience in aviation of both Piedmont and State. The Board’s opinions show the painstaking consideration given this evidence. The Board found both airlines fit and able, but found the evidence of qualifications as between the two weighted on Piedmont’s side. We hold that the conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. In view of our conclusion we need not consider the allegations of State’s cross-petition in No. 158 and that case is therefore dismissed. In Nos. 157 and 159 the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 52 Stat. 973, 49 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. The several opinions of the Board are reported. 7 C. A. B. 863 ; 8 C. A. B. 585 and 716. Authority for judicial review is given by § 1006 of the Act, 52 Stat. 1024, 49 U. S. C. § 646. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 374, 174 F. 2d 510. The Board’s petition is our Docket No. 157; Piedmont’s is No. 159; State’s cross-petition is No. 158. There are slight but immaterial variants in the relevant language as it appears in (1) and (2) of § 401 (d). Those sections, as italicized by the Court of Appeals, read: “(1) The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any part of the transportation covered by the application, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform such transportation properly, and to conform to the provisions of this chapter [originally this Act] and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Board hereunder, and that such transportation is required by the public convenience and necessity; otherwise such application shall be denied. “(2) In the case of an application for a certificate to engage in temporary air transportation, the Board may issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any part thereof for such limited periods as may be required by the public convenience and necessity, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able properly to perform such transportation and to conform to the provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Board hereunder.” “Application for a certificate shall be made in writing to the [Board] and shall be so verified, shall be in such form and contain such information, and shall be accompanied by such proof of service upon such interested persons, as the [Board] shall by regulation require.” Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, § 401 (b). The Court of Appeals placed in its opinion two maps charting the passenger routes applied for by Piedmont and State and indicating that the routes awarded Piedmont far more nearly approximated those sought by State. The Board and State take the position that these maps do not show all of the points and routes applied for by either airline, and the Court of Appeals said as much with reference to the maps. But the view we take makes it unnecessary to elaborate the different views as to the precise routes for which Piedmont and State applied. The record does show a statement by State’s counsel, made near the end of the rehearing argument, that “had State known that Piedmont was an applicant for these routes” it could have proven in the original hearings that Piedmont did not have “facilities for all types of overhaul.” It may be that this general suggestion can be considered as a request by State to reopen the proceedings for proof on this particular single point. If so considered, it is sufficient to point out that the Board found that Piedmont had adequate financing to obtain all necessary equipment, which is a major consideration in determining the comparative fitness and ability as between applicants who propose to operate newly established routes. See the case cited in the Board’s opinion, American Export Airlines, Inc., Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C. A. B. 16, 38 (1940). In this Court a suggestion is made that two sentences by one member of the Board during the rehearing argument indicate that the Board acted on a wrong standard of public interest: “Yes, but apart from all these legalisms, isn’t the real issue whether or not we made a mistake and picked a carrier who cannot run this route? If we really get down and try to find what is the public interest, isn’t that the real point?” It is said that this statement departs from the standard of “public interest, convenience, or necessity.” But in the statement itself the Board member pointed out that the proper standard was “the public interest.” Moreover, he went on to say that “the important thing is not whether you win or Piedmont wins but whether the people of North Carolina and Kentucky and Virginia and that area in there get the kind of service that they should.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DIAMOND, COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS v. CHAKRABARTY No. 79-136. Argued March 17, 1980 Decided June 16, 1980 BubgeR, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 318. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Shenefield, Harriet S. Shapiro, Robert B. Nicholson, Frederic Freilicher, and Joseph F. Nakamura. Edward F. McKie, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Leo I. MaLossi, William E. Schuyler, Jr., and Dale H. Hoscheit Leonard S. Bubenstein filed a brief for the Peoples Business Commission as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by George W. Whitney, Bruce M. Collins, and Karl F. Jorda for the American Patent Law Association, Inc.; by Thomas D. Kiley for Genentech, Inc.; by Jerome G. Lee, William F. Dudine, Jr., and Paul H. Heller for the New York Patent Law Association, Inc.; by Peter R. Taft, Joseph A. Keyes, Jr., and Sheldon Ellcñt Steinbach for Dr. Leroy E. Hood et al.; and by Lorance L. Greenlee for Dr. George Pieczenik. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by William I. Althen for the American Society for Microbiology; by Donald R. Dunner for the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association; by Edward S. Irons, Mary Helen Sears, and Donald Reidhaar for the Regents of the University of California; and by Cornell D. Cornish, pro se. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to determine whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35 U. S. C. § 101. I In 1972, respondent Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, filed a patent application, assigned to the General Electric Co. The application asserted 36 claims related to Chakrabarty’s invention of “a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas containing therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of said plasmids providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway.” This human-made, genetically engineered bacterium is capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil. Because of this property, which is possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria, Chakrabarty’s invention is believed to have significant value for the treatment of oil spills. Chakrabarty’s patent claims were of three types: first, process claims for the method of producing the bacteria; second, claims for an inoculum comprised of a carrier material floating on water, such as straw, and the new bacteria; and third, claims to the bacteria themselves. The patent examiner allowed the claims falling into the first two categories, but rejected claims for the bacteria. His decision rested on two grounds: (1) that micro-organisms are “products of nature,” and (2) that as living things they are not patentable subject matter under 35 U. S. C. § 101. Chakrabarty appealed the rejection of these claims to the Patent Office Board of Appeals, and the Board affirmed the examiner on the second ground. Relying on the legislative history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, in which Congress extended patent protection to certain asexually reproduced plants, the Board concluded that § 101 was not intended to cover living things such as these laboratory created micro-organisms. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, by a divided vote, reversed on the authority of its prior decision in In re Bergy, 563 F. 2d 1031, 1038 (1977), which held that “the fact that microorganisms . . . are alive ... [is] without legal significance” for purposes of the patent law. Subsequently, we granted the Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks’ petition for certiorari in Bergy, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case “for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584 (1978).” 438 17. S. 902 (1978). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals then vacated its judgment in Chakrabarty and consolidated the case with Bergy for reconsideration. After re-examining both cases in the light of our holding in Flook, that court, with one dissent, reaffirmed its earlier judgments. 596 F. 2d 952 (1979). The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks again sought certiorari, and we granted the writ as to both Bergy and Chakrabarty. 444 U. S. 924 (1979). Since then, Bergy has been dismissed as moot, 444 U. S. 1028 (1980), leaving only Chakrabarty for decision. II The Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The patent laws promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 480-481 (1974); Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U. S. 471, 484 (1944). The authority of Congress is exercised in the hope that “[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.” Kewanee, supra, at 480. The question before us in this case is a narrow one of statutory interpretation requiring us to construe 35 U. S. C. § 101, which provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Specifically, we must determine whether respondent’s microorganism constitutes a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of the statute. Ill In cases of statutory construction we begin, of course, with the language of the statute. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 405 (1979). And “unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979). We have also cautioned that courts “should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.” United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178, 199 (1933). Guided by these canons of construction, this Court has read the term “manufacture” in § 101 in accordance with its dictionary definition to mean “the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.” American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U. S. 1, 11 (1931). Similarly, “composition of matter” has been construed consistent with its common usage to include “all compositions of two or more substances and ... all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.” Shell Development Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (DC 1957) (citing 1 A. Deller, Walker on Patents § 14, p. 55 (1st ed. 1937)). In choosing such expansive terms as “manufacture” and “composition of matter,” modified by the comprehensive “any,” Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope. The relevant legislative history also supports a broad construction. The Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, defined statutory subject matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof].” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319. The Act embodied Jefferson’s philosophy that “ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.” 5 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871). See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1966). Subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 employed this same broad language. In 1952, when the patent laws were recodified, Congress replaced the word “art” with “process,” but otherwise left Jefferson’s language intact. The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.” S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952). This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-121 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853). Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk, supra, at 130. Judged in this light, respondent’s micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter — a product of human ingenuity “having a distinctive name, character [and] use.” Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 615 (1887). The point is underscored dramatically by comparison of the invention here with that in Funk. There, the patentee had discovered that there existed in nature certain species of root-nodule bacteria which did not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other. He used that discovery to produce a mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous plants. Concluding that the patentee had discovered "only some of the handiwork of nature,” the Court ruled the product nonpatentable: “Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous plants which it always infected. No species acquires a different use. The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each species has the same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their use in combination does not improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.” 333 TJ. S., at 131. Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101. IV Two contrary arguments are advanced, neither of which we find persuasive. (A) The petitioner’s first argument rests on the enactment of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which afforded patent protection to certain asexually reproduced plants, and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, which authorized protection for certain sexually reproduced plants but excluded bacteria from its protection. In the petitioner’s view, the passage of these Acts evidences congressional understanding that the terms “manufacture” or “composition of matter” do not include living things; if they did, the petitioner argues, neither Act would have been necessary. We reject this argument. Prior to 1930, two factors were thought to remove plants from patent protection. The first was the belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of the patent law. This position appears to have derived from the decision of the Patent Office in Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123, in which a patent claim for fiber found in the needle of the Pinus australis was rejected. The Commissioner reasoned that a contrary result would permit “patents [to] be obtained upon the trees of the forest and the plants of the earth, which of course would be unreasonable and impossible.” Id., at 126. The Latimer case, it seems, came to “se[t] forth the general stand taken in these matters” that plants were natural products not subject to patent protection. Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 23, 24 (1923). The second obstacle to patent protection for plants was the fact that plants were thought not amenable to the “written description” requirement of the patent law. See 35 U. S. C. § 112. Because new plants may differ from old only in color or perfume, differentiation by written description was often impossible. See Hearings on H. R. 11372 before the House Committee on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1930) (memorandum of Patent Commissioner Robertson). In enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress addressed both of these concerns. It explained at length its belief that the work of the plant breeder “in aid of nature” was patentable invention. S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 6-8 (1930); H. R. Rep. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 7-9 (1930). And it relaxed the written description requirement in favor of “a description ... as complete as is reasonably possible.” 35 U. S. C. § 162. No Committee or Member of Congress, however, expressed the broader view, now urged by the petitioner, that the terms “manufacture” or “composition of matter” exclude living things. The sole support for that position in the legislative history of the 1930 Act is found in the conclusory statement of Secretary of Agriculture Hyde, in a letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees considering the 1930 Act, that “the patent laws ... at the present time are understood to cover only inventions or discoveries in the field of inanimate nature.” See S. Rep. No. 315, supra, at Appendix A; H. R. Rep. No. 1129, supra, at Appendix A. Secretary Hyde’s opinion, however, is not entitled to controlling weight. His views were solicited on the administration of the new law and not on the scope of patentable subject matter — an area beyond his competence. Moreover, there is language in the House and Senate Committee' Reports suggesting that to the extent Congress considered the matter it found the Secretary’s dichotomy unpersuasive. The Reports observe: “There is a clear and logical distinction between the discovery of a new variety of plant and of certain inanimate things, such, for example, as a new and useful natural mineral. The mineral is created wholly by nature unassisted by man. ... On the other hand, a plant discovery resulting from cultivation is unique, isolated, and is not repeated by nature, nor can it be reproduced by nature unaided by man. . . .” S. Rep. No. 315, supra, at 6; H. R. Rep. No. 1129, supra, at 7 (emphasis added). Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions. Here, respondent’s micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research. Hence, the passage of the Plant Patent Act affords the Government no support. Nor does the passage of the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act support the Government’s position. As the Government acknowledges, sexually reproduced plants were not included under the 1930 Act because new varieties could not be reproduced true-to-type through seedlings.. Brief for Petitioner 27, n. 31. By 1970, however, it was generally recognized that true-to-type reproduction was possible and that plant patent protection was therefore appropriate. The 1970 Act extended that protection. There is nothing in its language or history to suggest that it was enacted because § 101 did not include living things. In particular, we find nothing in the exclusion of bacteria from plant variety protection to support the petitioner’s position. See n. 7, supra. The legislative history gives no reason for this exclusion. As the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals suggested, it may simply reflect congressional agreement with the result reached by that court in deciding In re Arzberger, 27 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1315, 112 F. 2d 834 (1940), which held that bacteria were not plants for the purposes of the 1930 Act. Or it may reflect the fact that prior to 1970 the Patent Office had issued patents for bacteria under § 101. In any event, absent some clear indication that Congress “focused on [the] issues . . . directly related to the one presently before the Court" SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 120-121 (1978), there is no basis for reading into its actions an intent to modify the plain meaning of the words found in § 101. See TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 189-193 (1978) ; United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). (B) The petitioner’s second argument is that micro-organisms cannot qualify as patentable subject matter until Congress expressly authorizes such protection. His position rests on the fact that genetic technology was unforeseen when Congress enacted § 101. From this it is argued that resolution of the patentability of inventions such as respondent’s should be left to Congress. The legislative process, the petitioner argues, is best equipped to weigh the competing economic, social, and scientific considerations involved, and to determine whether living organisms produced by genetic engineering should receive patent protection. In support of this position, the petitioner relies on our recent holding in Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584 (1978), and the statement that the judiciary “must proceed cautiously when . . . asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.” Id., at 596. It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of patentability; but it is equally true that once Congress has spoken it is “the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. In so doing, our obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the legislative history and statutory purpose. Here, we perceive no ambiguity. The subject-matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting “the Progress of Science and the useful Arts” with all that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson. Broad general language is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives require broad terms. Nothing in Flook is to the contrary. That case applied our prior precedents to determine that a “claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.” 437 U. S., at 595, n. 18. The Court carefully scrutinized the claim at issue to determine whether it was precluded from patent protection under “the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for 'ideas’ or phenomena of nature.” Id., at 593. We have done that here. Flook did not announce a new principle that inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se. To read that concept into Flook would frustrate the purposes of the patent law. This Court frequently has observed that a statute is not to be confined to the “particular application [s] . . . contemplated by the legislators.” Barr v. United States, 324 U. S. 83, 90 (1945). Accord, Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339 (1941); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253, 257 (1937). This is especially true in the field of patent law. A rule that unanticipated inventions are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines patentability. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S., at 12-17. Mr. Justice Douglas reminded that the inventions most benefiting mankind are those that “push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like.” Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 154 (1950) (concurring opinion). Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable. To buttress his argument, the petitioner, with the support of amicus, points to grave risks that may be generated by research endeavors such as respondent’s. The briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles. Scientists, among them Nobel laureates, are quoted suggesting that genetic research may pose a serious threat to the human race, or, at the very least, that the dangers are far too substantial to permit such research to proceed apace at this time. We are told that genetic research and related technological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depreciate the value of human life. These arguments are forcefully, even passionately, presented; they remind us that, at times, human ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces it creates— that, with Hamlet, it is sometimes better “to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.” It is argued that this Court should weigh these potential hazards in considering whether respondent’s invention is patentable subject matter under § 101. We disagree. The grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The large amount of research that has already occurred when no researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides. Whether respondent's claims are patentable may determine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all. What is more important is that we are without competence to entertain these arguments — either to brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them. The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts We have emphasized in the recent past that “[o]ur individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular [legislative] course ... is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute.” TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S., at 194. Our task, rather, is the narrow one of determining what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute; once that is done our powers are exhausted. Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced by genetic engineering. Cf. 42 U. S. C. § 2181 (a), exempting from patent protection inventions “useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon.” Or it may choose to craft a statute specifically designed for such living things. But, until Congress takes such action, this Court must construe the language of § 101 as it is. The language of that section fairly embraces respondent’s invention. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is Affirmed. Plasmids are hereditary units physically separate from the chromosomes of the cell. In prior research, Chakrabarty and an associate discovered that plasmids control the oil degradation abilities of certain bacteria. In particular, the two researchers discovered plasmids capable of degrading camphor and octane, two components of crude oil. In the work represented by the patent application at issue here, Chakrabarty discovered a process by which four different plasmids, capable of degrading four different oil components, could be transferred to and maintained stably in a single Pseudomonas bacterum, which itself has no capacity for degrading oil. At present, biological control of oil spills requires the use of a mixture of naturally occurring bacteria, each capable of degrading one component of the oil complex. In this way, oil is decomposed into simpler substances which can serve as food for aquatic life. However, for various reasons, only a portion of any such mixed culture survives to attack the oil spill. By breaking down multiple components of oil, Chakrabarty’s microorganism promises more efficient and rapid oil-spill control. The Board concluded that the new bacteria were not “products of nature,” because Pseudomonas bacteria containing two or more different energy-generating plasmids are not naturally occurring. Bergy involved a patent application for a pure culture of the microorganism Streptomyces vellosus found to be useful in the production of lincomycin, an antibiotic. This case does not involve the other “conditions and requirements” of the patent laws, such as novelty and nonobviousness. 35 U. S. C. §§ 102, 103. This same language was employed by P. J. Federico, a principal draftsman of the 1952 reeodification, in his testimony regarding that legislation: “[U]nder section 101 a person may have invented a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man. . . .” Hearings on H. R. 3760 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1951). The Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U. S. C. § 161, provides in relevant part: “Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propogated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor. . . .” The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, provides in relevant part: “The breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant (other than fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety, or his successor in interest, shall be entitled to plant variety protection therefor. ...” 84 Stat. 1547, 7 U. S. C. § 2402 (a). See generally, 3 A. Deller, Walker on Patents, ch. EX (2d ed. 1964); R. Allyn, The First Plant Patents (1934). Writing three years after the passage of the 1930 Act, R. Cook, Editor of the Journal of Heredity, commented: “It is a little hard for plant men to understand why [Art. I, § 8] of the Constitution should not have been earlier construed to include the promotion of the art of plant breeding. The reason for this is probably to be found in the principle that natural products are not patentable.” Florists Exchange and Horticultural Trade World, July 15, 1933, p. 9. In 1873, the Patent Office granted Louis Pasteur a patent on “yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture.” And in 1967 and 1968, immediately prior to the passage of the Plant Variety Protection Act, that Office granted two patents which, as the petitioner concedes, state claims for living micro-organisms. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 3, and n. 2. Even an abbreviated list of patented inventions underscores the point: telegraph (Morse, No. 1,647); telephone (Bell, No. 174,465); electric lamp (Edison, No. 223,898); airplane (the Wrights, No. 821,393); transistor (Bardeen & Brattain, No. 2,524,035); neutronic reactor (Fermi & Szilard, No.. 2,708,656); laser (Schawlow & Townes, No. 2,929,922). See generally Revolutionary Ideas, Patents & Progress in America, United States Patent and Trademark Office (1976). We are not to be understood as suggesting that the political branches have been laggard in the consideration of the problems related to genetic research and technology. They have already taken action. In 1976, for example, the National Institutes of Health released guidelines for NIH-sponsored genetic research which established conditions under which such research could be performed. 41 Fed. Reg. 27902. In 1978 those guidelines were revised and relaxed. 43 Fed. Reg. 60080, 60108, 60134. And Committees of the Congress have held extensive hearings on these matters. See, e. g., Hearings on Genetic Engineering before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Hearings on H. R. 4759 et al. before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHNEIDER v. SMITH, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD. No. 196. Argued December 12-13, 1967. Decided January 16, 1968. Leonard, W. Schroeter and John Caughlan argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. John S. Martin, Jr., argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Kevin T. Maroney and Lee B. Anderson. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, who has served on board American-flag commercial vessels in various capacities, is now qualified to act as a second assistant engineer on steam vessels. But between 1949 and 1964 he was employed in trades other than that of a merchant seaman. In October 1964 he applied to the Commandant of the Coast Guard for a validation of the permit or license which evidences his ability to act as a second assistant engineer. Under the Magnuson Act, 64 Stat. 427, 50 U. S. C. § 191 (b), the President is authorized, if he finds that “the security of the United States is endangered by . . . subversive activity,” to issue rules and regulations “to safeguard against destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts” all “vessels” in the territories or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. President Truman promulgated Regulations, 33 CFR, pt. 6, which give the Commandant of the Coast Guard authority to grant or withhold validation of any permit or license evidencing the right of a seaman to serve on a merchant vessel of the United States. § 6.10-3. He is directed not to issue such validation unless he. is satisfied that “the character and habits of life of such person are such as to authorize the belief that the presence of the individual on board would not be inimical to the security of the United States.” § 6.10-1. The questionnaire, which appellant in his application was required to submit, contained the following inquiry which he answered: “Item 4. Do you now advocate, or have you ever advocated, the overthrow or alteration of the Government of the United States by force' or violence or by unconstitutional means? “Answer: No.” The questionnaire contained the following inquiries which related to his membership and participation in organizations which were on the special list of the Attorney General as authorized by Executive Order 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489: “Item 5. Have you ever submitted material for publication to any of the organizations listed in Item 6 below? “Answer. No. “Item 6. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of, or affiliated or associated with in any way, any of the organizations set forth below? [There followed a list of more than 250 organizations.] “Answer. Yes. “If your answer is 'yes/ give full details in Item 7. “Item 7. (Use this space to explain Items 1 through 6. . . . Attach a separate sheet if there is not enough space here.) “Answer. I have been a member of many political & social organizations, including several named on this list. “I cannot remember the names of most of them & could not be specific about any. “To the best of my knowledge, I have not been a member or participated in the activities of any of these organizations for ten years.” Upon receiving the questionnaire returned by the appellant, the Commandant advised him that the information was not sufficient and that answers to further interrogatories were necessary. In reply, appellant, speaking through his counsel, admitted to the Commandant that he had been a member of the Communist Party as well as other organizations on the Attorney General’s list and that he had subscribed to People’s World. He said that he had joined the Party because of his personal philosophy and idealistic goals, but later quit it and the other organizations due to fundamental disagreement with Communist methods and techniques. But beyond that he said he would not answer because “it would be obnoxious to a truly free citizen to answer the kinds of questions under compulsion that you require.” The Commandant declined to process the application further, relying upon 33 CFR § 121.05 (d)(2), which authorizes him to hold the application in abeyance if an applicant fails or refuses to furnish the additional information. Appellant thereupon brought this action for declaratory relief that the provisions of the Magnuson Act in question and the Commandant’s actions thereunder were unconstitutional, praying that the Commandant be directed to approve his application and that he be enjoined from interfering with appellant’s employment upon vessels flying the American flag. A three-judge court was convened and the complaint was dismissed. 263 F. Supp. 496. The case is here on appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 1263. We postponed the question of jurisdiction to the merits. 389 U. S. 810. We agree, as does appellee, that the case was one to be heard by a three-judge court and that accordingly we have jurisdiction of this appeal. For appellant did raise the question as to whether the statute was unconstitutional because of vagueness and abridgment of First Amendment rights and also questioned whether the power to install a screening program was validly delegated. A three-judge court was accordingly proper. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1. The Magnuson Act gives the President no express authority to set up a screening program for personnel on merchant vessels of the United States. As respects “any foreign-flag vessels” the power to control those who “go or remain on board” is clear. 50 U. S. C. § 191 (a). As respects personnel of our own merchant ships, the power exists under the Act only if it is found in the power to “safeguard” vessels and waterfront facilities against “sabotage or other subversive acts,” that is, under § 191 (b). The Solicitor General argues that the power to exclude persons from vessels “clearly implies auhority to establish a screening procedure for determining who shall be allowed on board.” But that power to exclude is contained in § 191 (a) which, as noted, applies to “foreign-flag vessels,” while, as we have said, the issue tendered here must find footing in § 191 (b). We agree with the District Court that keeping our merchant marine free of saboteurs is within the purview of this Act. Our question is a much narrower one. The Regulations prescribe the standards by which the Commandant is to judge the “character and habits of life” of the employee to determine whether his “presence ... on board” the vessel would be “inimical to the security of the United States”: “(a) Advocacy of the overthrow or alteration of the Government of the United States by unconstitutional means. “(b) Commission of, or attempts or preparations to commit, an act of espionage, sabotage, sedition or treason, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting another to commit such an act. “(c) Performing, or attempting to perform, duties or otherwise acting so as to serve the interests of another government to the detriment of the United States. “(d) Deliberate unauthorized disclosure of classified defense information. “(e) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, as amended.” 33 CFR § 121.03. If we assume arguendo that the Act authorizes a type of screening program directed at “membership” or “sympathetic association,” the problem raised by it and the Regulations would b'e kin to the one presented in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, where a teacher to be hired by a public school of Arkansas had to submit an affidavit “listing all organizations to which he at the time belongs and to which he has belonged during the past five years.” Id., at 481. We held that an Act touching on First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn so that the precise evil is exposed; that an unlimited and indiscriminate search of the employee’s past which interferes with his associational freedom is unconstitutional. Id., at 487-490. If we gave § 191 (b) the broad construction the Solicitor General urges, we would face here the kind of issue present in Shelton v. Tucker, supra, whether government can probe the reading habits, political philosophy, beliefs, and attitudes on social and economic issues of prospective seamen on our merchant vessels. A saboteur on a merchant vessel may, of course, be dangerous. But no charge that appellant was a saboteur was made. Indeed, no conduct of appellant was at issue before the Commandant. The propositions tendered in the complaint were (1) plaintiff is now and always has been loyal to the United States; (2) he has not been active in any organization on the Attorney General’s list for the past 10 years; (3) he has never committed any act of sabotage or espionage or any act inimical to the security of the United States. Those propositions were neither contested by the Commandant nor conceded. He took the position that admission of evidence on those propositions was “irrelevant and immaterial.” We are loath to conclude that Congress, in its grant of authority to the President to “safeguard” vessels and waterfront facilities from “sabotage or other subversive acts,” undertook to reach into the First Amendment area. The provision of the Act in question, 50 U. S. C. § 191 (b), speaks only in terms of actions, not ideas or beliefs or reading habits or social, educational, or political associations. The purpose of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, unlike more recent models promoting a welfare state, was to take government off the backs of people. The First Amendment’s ban against Congress “abridging” freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and to petition, and the “associational freedom” (Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 490) that goes with those rights create a preserve where the views of the individual are made inviolate. This is the philosophy of Jefferson that “the opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction .... [I]t is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order . ...” No act of sabotage or espionage or any act inimical to the security of the United States is raised or charged in the present case. In United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, the Court construed the statutory word “lobbying” to include only direct representation to Congress, its members, and its committees, not all activities tending to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation. Id., at 47. Such an interpretation of the statute, it was said, was “in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt” (ibid.) — doubts that were serious “in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment.” Id., at 46. The holding in Rumely was not novel. It is part of the stream of authority which admonishes courts to construe statutes narrowly so as to avoid constitutional questions. The Court said in Rumely, “Whenever constitutional limits upon the investigative power of Congress have to be drawn by this Court, it ought only to be done after Congress has demonstrated its full awareness of what is at stake by unequivocally authorizing an inquiry of dubious limits. Experience admonishes us to tread warily in this domain.” 345 U. S., at 46. The present case involves investigation, not by Congress but by the Executive Branch, stemming from congressional delegation. When we read that delegation with an eye to First Amendment problems, we hesitate to conclude that Congress told the Executive to ferret out the ideological strays in the maritime industry. The words it used — “to safeguard . . . from sabotage or other subversive acts” — refer to actions, not to ideas or beliefs. We would have to stretch those words beyond their normal meaning to give them the meaning the Solicitor General urges. Rumely, and its allied cases, teach just the opposite — that statutory words are to be read narrowly so as to avoid questions concerning the “associational freedom” that Shelton v. Tucker protected and concerning other rights within the purview of the First Amendment. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black, while concurring in the Court’s judgment and opinion, also agrees with the statement in Mr. Justice Fortas’ concurring opinion that the statute under consideration, if construed to authorize the interrogatories involved, is offensive to the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 191 provides in part: “Whenever the President finds that the security of the United States is endangered by reason of actual or threatened war, or invasion, or insurrection, or subversive activity, or ’of disturbances or threatened disturbances of the international relations of the United States, the President is authorized to institute such measures and issue such rules and regulations— “(a) to govern the anchorage and movement of any foreign-flag vessels in the territorial waters of the United States, to inspect such vessels at any time, to place guards thereon, and, if necessary in his opinion in order to secure such vessels from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or injury to any harbor or waters of the United States, or to secure the observance of rights and obligations of the United States, may take for such purposes full possession and control of such vessels and remove therefrom the officers and crew thereof, and all other persons not especially authorized by him to go or remain on board thereof; “(b) to safeguard against destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of similar nature, vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities in the United States, the Canal Zone, and all territory and water, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” "1. With respect to your statements above, furnish the following information, fully and honestly to the best of your ability: “(a) List the names of the political and social organizations to which you belonged, and location. “(b) Furnish approximate dates of membership. “(c) Furnish full particulars concerning the extent of your activities and participation in the organization's (number and type of meetings/functions attended; positions or offices held; classes or schools attended; contributions made; etc.). “(d) Your reason for discontinuing the membership. “(e) Your present attitude toward the principles and objectives of the organizations. “If your answer is ‘YES’ to the following Questions, explain jully in the space provided at the end of the Interrogatories: “2. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of or affiliated with, in any way, the Communist Party, its Subdivisions, Subsidiaries, or Affiliates? (Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’) “3. Have you at any time been a subscriber to the ‘People’s World’? “. If your answer is ‘Yes,’ give dates. (Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’) 4. “Have you at any time engaged in any activities in behalf of the ‘People’s World’? . (Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’) “If your answer is ‘Yes,’ furnish details. “5. What is your present attitude toward the Communist Party? “6. What is your present attitude toward the principles and objectives of Communism? “7. What is your attitude toward the form of Government in the United States?” It is true that Senator Magnuson when discussing this measure stated that it “will give the President the authority to invoke th§ same kind of security measures which were invoked in World War I and in World War II.” 96 Cong. Pec. 10795. And from that the Solicitor General argues that the Act authorizes the broad sweeping personnel screening programs which were in force during World War II. But this reference by Senator Magnuson apparently was to § 191 (a) which, as noted, covers “any foreign-flag vessels.” When it came to § 191 (b) Senator Magnuson did not speak in terms of any screening program, but said: “It [the bill] also has this purpose, which I think is a good one: As I have said before, the last stronghold of subversive activity in this country, in my opinion, or at least the last concentrated stronghold, has been around our waterfronts. It would be impossible for destruction to come to any great port of the United States, of which there are many, as the result of a ship coming into port with an atomic bomb or with biological or other destructive agency, without some liaison ashore. This would give authority to the President to instruct the FBI, in cooperation with the Coast Guard, the Navy, or any other appropriate governmental agency, to go.to our water fronts and pick out people who might be subversives or security risks to this country. I think it goes a long way toward taking care of the domestic situation, as related to this subject, particularly in view of the large amount of talk we have had in the Senate within the past few days about Communists. The bill also protects that last loophole which is left, by which there might be some actual destruction along the shores of the United States.” 96 Cong. Rec. 11321. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, Jeffersonian Cyclopedia 976 (1900). United States v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407-408; United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 618, n. 6; International Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749; Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705, 710-711; United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U. S. 29, 32.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARKANSAS et al. v. OKLAHOMA et al. No. 90-1262. Argued December 11, 1991 Decided February 26, 1992 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Edward W. Warren argued the cause for petitioners in No. 90-1262. With him on the briefs were Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Mary B. Stallcup, Angela S. Jegley, David G. Norrell, James N. McCord, Walter R. Niblock, and Nancy L. Hamm. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner in No. 90-1266. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Stewart, Harriet S. Shapiro, Michael A. McCord, Anne S.. Almy, Gary S. Guzy, and E. Donald Elliott. Robert A. Butkin, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief for respondents State of Oklahoma et al. were Susan B. Loving, Attorney General, Brita Haugland Cantrell, Assistant Attorney General, and Julian Fite. Theodore E. Dinsmoor and Susan Hedman filed a brief for respondent Oklahoma Wildlife Federation. Together with No. 90-1266, Environmental Protection Agency v. Oklahoma et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Colorado by Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Martha E. Rudolph, Assistant Attorney General, and Martha Phillips Allbright; for the State of Nevada et al. by Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, John P. Arnold, Attorney General of New Hampshire, and Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota; for the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies et al. by Lee C. White, Benjamin L. Brown, Howard Holme, Don A Zimmerman, Geoff Wilson, Thomas W. Kelty, James M. Kaup, Fred G. Stickel III, Robert E. Johnson, John E. Gother-man, Mark I. Wallach, Roy D. Bates, Ogden Stokes, Thomas S. Smith, Robert J. Alfton, and John Dodge; for Champion International Corp. et al. by J. Jeffrey McNealey, Michael K. Glenn, Theodore L. Garrett, Corinne A Goldstein, Charles R. Nestrud, Richard A Flye, Jerry C. Jones, and Jess Askew III; for the Colorado Water Congress by Mark T. Pifher; and for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. by William Perry Pendley. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Roland W. Burris, Attorney General of Illinois, Rosalyn Kaplan, Solicitor General, and James L. Morgan, Assistant Attorney General, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, John Knox Walkup, Solicitor General, and Michael D. Pearigen, Deputy Attorney General, Jimmy Evans, Attorney General of Alabama, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, and Jon H. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, and T. Travis Med-lock, Attorney General of South Carolina; for the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma by Jim Wilcoxen; for the Natural Resources Defense Council et al. by Jessica C. Landman and Mark Van Putten; for the Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma et al. by Kathy Carter-White, Joel Glenn Richardson, Harvey Chaffin, and Bill J. Ballard; for the Sierra Club by Stephan C. Volker; for the U. S. Senator from Oklahoma, Don Nickles, et al. by James George Jatras; and for Mike Synar, Member of Congress, pro se. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency) issued a discharge permit to a new point source in Arkansas, about 39 miles upstream from the Oklahoma state line. The question presented in this litigation is whether the EPA’s finding that discharges from the new source would not cause a detectable violation of Oklahoma’s water quality standards satisfied the EPA’s duty to protect the interests of the downstream State. Disagreeing with the Court of Appeals, we hold that the Agency’s action was authorized by the statute. I In 1985, the city of Fayetteville, Arkansas, applied to the EPA, seeking a permit for the city’s new sewage treatment plant under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). After the appropriate procedures, the EPA, pursuant to § 402(a)(1) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a)(1), issued a permit authorizing the plant to discharge up to half of its effluent (to a limit of 6.1 million gallons per day) into an unnamed stream in northwestern Arkansas. That flow passes through a series of three creeks for about 17 miles, and then enters the Illinois River at a point 22 miles upstream from the Arkansas-Oklahoma border. The permit imposed specific limitations on the quantity, content, and character of the discharge and also included a number of special conditions, including a provision that if a study then underway indicated that more stringent limitations were necessary to ensure compliance with Oklahoma’s water quality standards, the permit would be modified to incorporate those limits. App. 84. Respondents challenged this permit before the EPA, alleging, inter alia, that the discharge violated the Oklahoma water quality standards. Those standards provide that “no degradation [of water quality] shall be allowed” in the upper Illinois River, including the portion of the river immediately downstream from the state line. Following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Oklahoma standards would not be implicated unless the contested discharge had “something more than a mere de minimis impact” on the State’s waters. He found that the discharge would not have an “undue impact” on Oklahoma’s waters and, accordingly, affirmed the issuance of the permit. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, pp. 101a-103a (emphasis deleted). On a petition for review, the EPA’s Chief Judicial Officer first ruled that § 301(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act “requires an NPDES permit to impose any effluent limitations necessary to comply with applicable state water quality standards.” Id., at 116a-117a. He then held that the Act and EPA regulations offered greater protection for the downstream State than the ALJ’s “undue impact” standard suggested. He explained the proper standard as follows: “[A] mere theoretical impairment of Oklahoma’s water quality standards — i. e., an infinitesimal impairment predicted through modeling but not expected to be actually detectable or measurable — should not by itself block the issuance of the permit. In this case, the permit should be upheld if the record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the authorized discharges would not cause an actual detectable violation of Oklahoma’s water quality standards.” Id., at 117a (emphasis in original). On remand, the ALJ made detailed findings of fact and concluded that the city had satisfied the standard set forth by the Chief Judicial Officer. Specifically, the ALJ found that there would be no detectable violation of any of the components of Oklahoma’s water quality standards. Id., at 127a-143a. The Chief Judicial Officer sustained the issuance of the permit. Id., at 145a-153a. Both the petitioners in No. 90-1262 (collectively Arkansas) and the respondents in this litigation sought judicial review. Arkansas argued that the Clean Water Act did not require an Arkansas point source to comply with Oklahoma’s water quality standards. Oklahoma challenged the EPA’s determination that the Fayetteville discharge would not produce a detectable violation of the Oklahoma standards. The Court of Appeals did not accept either of these arguments. The court agreed with the EPA that the statute required compliance with Oklahoma’s water quality standards, see 908 F. 2d 595, 602-615 (CA10 1990), and did not disagree with the Agency’s determination that the discharges from the Fayetteville plant would not produce a detectable violation of those standards. Id., at 631-633. Nevertheless, relying on a theory that neither party had advanced, the Court of Appeals reversed the Agency’s issuance of the Fayette-ville permit. The court first ruled that the statute requires that “where a proposed source would discharge effluents that would contribute to conditions currently constituting a violation of applicable water quality standards, such [a] proposed source may not be permitted.” Id., at 620. Then the court found that the Illinois River in Oklahoma was “already degraded,” that the Fayetteville effluent would reach the Illinois River in Oklahoma, and that that effluent could “be expected to contribute to the ongoing deterioration of the scenic [Illinois R]iver” in Oklahoma even though it would not detectably affect the river’s water quality. Id., at 621-629. The importance and the novelty of the Court of Appeals’ decision persuaded us to grant certiorari. 499 U. S. 946 (1991). We now reverse. II Interstate waters have been a font of controversy since the founding of the Nation. E. g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). This Court has frequently resolved disputes between States that are separated by a common river, see, e. g., Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U. S. 335 (1980), that border the same body of water, see, e. g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296 (1921), or that are fed by the same river basin, see, e. g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336 (1931). Among these cases are controversies between a State that introduces pollutants to a waterway and a downstream State that objects. See, e. g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496 (1906). In such cases, this Court has applied principles of common law tempered by a respect for the sovereignty of the States. Compare id., at 521, with Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237 (1907). In forging what “may not improperly be called interstate common law,” Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 105-106 (1972) (Milwaukee I), however, we remained aware “that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance.” Id., at 107. In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II), we held that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 did just that. In addressing Illinois’ claim that Milwaukee’s discharges into Lake Michigan constituted a nuisance, we held that the comprehensive regulatory regime created by the 1972 amendments pre-empted Illinois’ federal common law remedy. We observed that Congress had addressed many of the problems we had identified in Milwaukee I by providing a downstream State with an opportunity for a hearing before the source State’s permitting agency, by requiring the latter to explain its failure to accept any recommendations offered by the downstream State, and by authorizing the EPA, in its discretion, to veto a source State’s issuance of any permit if the waters of another State may be affected. Milwaukee II, 451 U. S., at 325-326. In Milwaukee II, the Court did not address whether the 1972 amendments had supplanted state common law remedies as well as the federal common law remedy. See id., at 310, n. 4. On remand, Illinois argued that § 510 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1370, expressly preserved the State’s right to adopt and enforce rules that are more stringent than federal standards. The Court of Appeals accepted Illinois’ reading of § 510, but held that that section did “no more than to save the right and jurisdiction of a state to regulate activity occurring within the confines of its boundary waters.” Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F. 2d 403, 413 (CA7 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1196 (1985). This Court subsequently endorsed that analysis in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481 (1987), in which Vermont property owners claimed that the pollution discharged into Lake Champlain by a paper company located in New York constituted a nuisance under Vermont law. The Court held the Clean Water Act taken “as a whole, its purposes and its history” pre-empted an action based on the law of the affected State and that the only state law applicable to an interstate discharge is “the law of the State in which the point source is located.” Id., at 493, 487. Moreover, in reviewing § 402(b) of the Act, the Court pointed out that when a new permit is being issued by the source State’s permit-granting agency, the downstream State “does not have the authority to block the issuance of the permit if it is dissatisfied with the proposed standards. An affected State’s only recourse is to apply to the EPA Administrator, who then has the discretion to disapprove the permit if he concludes that the discharges will have an undue impact on interstate waters. § 1342(d)(2).... Thus the Act makes it clear that affected States occupy a subordinate position to source States in the federal regulatory program.” Id., at 490-491. Unlike the foregoing cases, this litigation involves not a state-issued permit, but a federally issued permit. To explain the significance of this distinction, we comment further on the statutory scheme before addressing the specific issues raised by the parties. Ill The Clean Water Act anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective: “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a). Toward this end, the Act provides for two sets of water quality measures. “Effluent limitations” are promulgated by the EPA and restrict the quantities, rates, and concentrations of specified substances which are discharged from point sources. See §§1311, 1314. “[W]ater quality standards” are, in general, promulgated by the States and establish the desired condition of a waterway. See §1313. These standards supplement effluent limitations “so that numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels.” EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U. S. 200, 205, n. 12 (1976). The EPA provides States with substantial guidance in the drafting of water quality standards. See generally 40 CFR pt. 131 (1991) (setting forth model water quality standards). Moreover, §303 of the Act requires, inter alia, that state authorities periodically review water quality standards and secure the EPA’s approval of any revisions in the standards. If the EPA recommends changes to the standards and the State fails to comply with that recommendation, the Act authorizes the EPA to promulgate water quality standards for the State. 33 U. S. C. § 1313(c). The primary means for enforcing these limitations and standards is the NPDES, enacted in 1972 as a critical part of Congress’ “complete rewriting” of federal water pollution law. Milwaukee II, 451 U. S., at 317. Section 301(a) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1311(a), generally prohibits the discharge of any effluent into a navigable body of water unless the point source has obtained an NPDES permit. Section 402 establishes the NPDES permitting regime, and describes two types of permitting systems: state permit programs that must satisfy federal requirements and be approved by the EPA, and a federal program administered by the EPA. Section 402(b) authorizes each State to establish “its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). Among the requirements the state program must satisfy are the procedural protections for downstream States discussed in Ouellette and Milwaukee II. See §§ 1342(b)(3), (5). Although these provisions do not authorize the downstream State to veto the issuance of a permit for a new point source in another State, the Administrator retains authority to block the issuance of any state-issued permit that is “outside the guidelines and requirements” of the Act. § 1342(d)(2). In the absence of an approved state program, the EPA may issue an NPDES permit under § 402(a) of the Act. (In these cases, for example, because Arkansas had not been authorized to issue NPDES permits when the Fayetteville plant was completed, the permit was issued by the EPA itself.) The EPA’s permit program is subject to the “same terms, conditions, and requirements” as a state permit program. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a)(3). Notwithstanding this general symmetry, the EPA has construed the Act as requiring that EPA-issued NPDES permits also comply with § 401(a). That section, which predates § 402 and the NPDES, applies to a broad category of federal licenses, and sets forth requirements for “[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities, which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters.” 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a). Section 401(a)(2) appears to prohibit the issuance of any federal license or permit over the objection of an affected State unless compliance with the affected State’s water quality requirements can be ensured. ) — I <! The parties have argued three analytically distinct questions concerning the interpretation of the Clean Water Act. First, does the Act require the EPA, in crafting and issuing a permit to a point source in one State, to apply the water quality standards of downstream States? Second, even if the Act does not require as much, does the Agency have the statutory authority to mandate such compliance? Third, does the Act provide, as the Court of Appeals held, that once a body of water fails to meet water quality standards no discharge that yields effluent that reach the degraded waters will be permitted? In these cases, it is neither necessary nor prudent for us to resolve the first of these questions. In issuing the Fay-etteville permit, the EPA assumed it was obligated by both the Act and its own regulations to ensure that the Fayette-ville discharge would not violate Oklahoma’s standards. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, pp. 116a-117a, and n. 14. As we discuss below, this assumption was permissible and reasonable and therefore there is no need for us to address whether the Act requires as much. Moreover, much of the analysis and argument in the briefs of the parties relies on statutory provisions that govern not only federal permits issued pursuant to §§ 401(a) and 402(a), but also state permits issued under § 402(b). It seems unwise to evaluate those arguments in a case such as these, which only involve a federal permit. Our decision not to determine at this time the scope of the Agency’s statutory obligations does not affect our resolution of the second question, which concerns the Agency’s statutory authority. Even if the Clean Water Act itself does not require the Fayetteville discharge to comply with Oklahoma’s water quality standards, the statute clearly does not limit the EPA’s authority to mandate such compliance. Since 1973, EPA regulations have provided that an NPDES permit shall not be issued “[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States.” 40 CFR § 122.4(d) (1991); see also 38 Fed. Reg. 13533 (1973); 40 CFR § 122.44(d) (1991). Those regulations — relied upon by the EPA in the issuance of the Fayetteville permit— constitute a reasonable exercise of the Agency’s statutory authority. Congress has vested in the Administrator broad discretion to establish conditions for NPDES permits. Section 402(a) (2) provides that for EPA-issued permits “[t]he Administrator shall prescribe conditions ... to assure compliance with the requirements of [§ 402(a)(1)] and such other requirements as he deems appropriate.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a)(2) (emphasis added). Similarly, Congress preserved for the Administrator broad authority to oversee state permit programs: “No permit shall issue ... if the Administrator . . . objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter.” § 1342(d)(2). The regulations relied on by the EPA were a perfectly reasonable exercise of the Agency’s statutory discretion. The application of state water quality standards in the interstate context is wholly consistent with the Act’s broad purpose “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a). Moreover, as noted above, § 301(b)(1)(C) expressly identifies the achievement of state water quality standards as one of the Act’s central objectives. The Agency’s regulations conditioning NPDES permits are a well-tailored means of achieving this goal. Notwithstanding this apparent reasonableness, Arkansas argues that our description in Ouellette of the role of affected States in the permit process and our characterization of the affected States’ position as “subordinate,” see 479 U. S., at 490-491, indicates that the EPA’s application of the Oklahoma standards was error. We disagree. Our statement in Ouellette concerned only an affected State’s input into the permit process; that input is clearly limited by the plain language of § 402(b). Limits on an affected State’s direct participation in permitting decisions, however, do not in any way constrain the EPA’s authority to require a point source to comply with downstream water quality standards. Arkansas also argues that regulations requiring compliance with downstream standards are at odds with the legislative history of the Act and with the statutory scheme established by the Act. Although we agree with Arkansas that the Act’s legislative history indicates that Congress intended to grant the Administrator discretion in his oversight of the issuance of NPDES permits, we find nothing in that history to indicate that Congress intended to preclude the EPA from establishing a general requirement that such permits be conditioned to ensure compliance with downstream water quality standards. Similarly, we agree with Arkansas that in the Clean Water Act Congress struck a careful balance among competing policies and interests, but do not find the EPA regulations concerning the application of downstream water quality standards at all incompatible with that balance. Congress, in crafting the Act, protected certain sovereign interests of the States; for example, §510 allows States to adopt more demanding pollution-control standards than those established under the Act. Arkansas emphasizes that §510 preserves such state authority only as it is applied to the waters of the regulating State. Even assuming Arkansas’ construction of § 510 is correct, cf. id., at 493, that section only concerns state authority and does not constrain the EPA’s authority to promulgate reasonable regulations requiring point sources in one State to comply with water quality standards in downstream States. For these reasons, we find the EPA’s requirement that the Fayetteville discharge comply with Oklahoma’s water quality standards to be a reasonable exercise of the Agency’s substantial statutory discretion. Cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984). V The Court of Appeals construed the Clean Water Act to prohibit any discharge of effluent that would reach waters already in violation of existing water quality standards. We find nothing in the Act to support this reading. The interpretation of the statute adopted by the court had not been advanced by any party during the Agency or court proceedings. Moreover, the Court of Appeals candidly acknowledged that its theory “has apparently never before been addressed by a federal court.” 908 F. 2d, at 620, n. 39. The only statutory provision the court cited to support its legal analysis was § 402(h), see id., at 633, which merely authorizes the EPA (or a state permit program) to prohibit a publicly owned treatment plant that is violating a condition of its NPDES permit from accepting any additional pollutants for treatment until the ongoing violation has been corrected. See 33 U. S. C. § 1342(h). Although the Act contains several provisions directing compliance with state water quality standards, see, e. g., § 1311(b)(1)(C), the parties have pointed to nothing that mandates a complete ban on discharges into a waterway that is in violation of those standards. The statute does, however, contain provisions designed to remedy existing water quality violations and to allocate the burden of reducing undesirable discharges between existing sources and new sources. See, e. g., § 1313(d). Thus, rather than establishing the categorical ban announced by the Court of Appeals — which might frustrate the construction of new plants that would improve existing conditions — the Clean Water Act vests in the EPA and the States broad authority to develop long-range, area-wide programs to alleviate and eliminate existing pollution. See, e. g., § 1288(b)(2). To the extent that the Court of Appeals relied on its interpretation of the Act to reverse the EPA’s permitting decision, that reliance was misplaced. > The Court of Appeals also concluded that the EPAs issuance of the Fayetteville permit was arbitrary and capricious because the Agency misinterpreted Oklahoma’s water quality standards. The primary difference between the court’s and the Agency’s interpretation of the standards derives from the court’s construction of the Act. Contrary to the EPA’s interpretation of the Oklahoma standards, the Court of Appeals read those standards as containing the same categorical ban on new discharges that the court had found in the Clean Water Act itself. Although we do not believe the text of the Oklahoma standards supports the court’s reading (indeed, we note that Oklahoma itself had not advanced that interpretation in its briefs in the Court of Appeals), we reject it for a more fundamental reason — namely, that the Court of Appeals exceeded the legitimate scope of judicial review of an agency adjudication. To emphasize the importance of this point, we shall first briefly assess the soundness of the EPA’s interpretation and application of the Oklahoma standards and then comment more specifically on the Court of Appeals’ approach. As discussed above, an EPA regulation requires an NPDES permit to comply “with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States.” 40 CFR § 122.4(d) (1991). This regulation effectively incorporates into federal law those state-law standards the Agency reasonably determines to be “applicable.” In such a situation, then, state water quality standards — promulgated by the States with substantial guidance from the EPA and approved by the Agency — are part of the federal law of water pollution control. Two features of the body of law governing water pollution support this conclusion. First, as discussed more thoroughly above, we have long recognized that interstate water pollution is controlled by federal law. See supra, at 98-100. Recognizing that the system of federally approved state standards as applied in the interstate context constitutes federal law is wholly consistent with this principle. Second, treating state standards in interstate controversies as federal law accords with the Act’s purpose of authorizing the EPA to create and manage a uniform system of interstate water pollution regulation. Because we recognize that, at least insofar as they affect the issuance of a permit in another State, the Oklahoma standards have a federal character, the EPA’s reasonable, consistently held interpretation of those standards is entitled to substantial deference. Cf. INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U. S. 183, 189-190 (1991); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). In these cases, the Chief Judicial Officer ruled that the Oklahoma standards — which require that there be “no degradation” of the upper Illinois River — would only be violated if the discharge effected an “actually detectable or measurable” change in water quality. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, p. 117a. This interpretation of the Oklahoma standards is certainly reasonable and consistent with the purposes and principles of the Clean Water Act. As the Chief Judicial Officer noted, “unless there is some method for measuring compliance, there is no way to ensure compliance.” Id., at 118a, n. 16 (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted). Moreover, this interpretation of the Oklahoma standards makes eminent sense in the interstate context: If every discharge that had some theoretical impact on a downstream State were interpreted as “degrading” the downstream waters, downstream States might wield an effective veto over upstream discharges. The EPA’s application of those standards in these cases was also sound. On remand, the ALJ scrutinized the record and made explicit factual findings regarding four primary measures of water quality under the Oklahoma standards: eutrophication, esthetics, dissolved oxygen, and metals. In each case, the ALJ found that the Fayetteville discharge would not lead to a detectable change in water quality. He therefore concluded that the Fayetteville discharge would not violate the Oklahoma water quality standards. Because we agree with the Agency’s Chief Judicial Officer that these findings are supported by substantial evidence, we conclude that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed both the EPA’s construction of the regulations and the issuance of the Fayetteville permit. In its review of the EPA’s interpretation and application of the Oklahoma standards, the Court of Appeals committed three mutually compounding errors. First, the court failed to give due regard to the EPA’s interpretation of its own regulations, as those regulations incorporate the Oklahoma standards. Instead the court voiced its own interpretation of the governing law and concluded that “where a proposed source would discharge effluents that would contribute to conditions currently constituting a violation of applicable water quality standards, such [a] proposed source may not be permitted.” 908 F. 2d, at 620. As we have already pointed out, that reading of the law is not supported by the statute or by any EPA regulation. The Court of Appeals sat in review of an agency action and should have afforded the EPA’s interpretation of the governing law an appropriate level of deference. See generally Chevron, supra, at 842-844. Second, the court disregarded well-established standards for reviewing the factual findings of agencies and instead made its own factual findings. The troubling nature of the court’s analysis appears on the face of the opinion itself: At least four times, the court concluded that “there was substantial evidence before the ALJ to support” particular findings which the court thought appropriate, but which were contrary to those actually made by the ALJ. 908 F. 2d, at 620, 625, 627, 629. Although we have long recognized the “substantial evidence” standard in administrative law, the court below turned that analysis on its head. A court reviewing an agency’s adjudicative action should accept the agency’s factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951). The court should not supplant the agency’s findings merely by identifying alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evidence. Third, the court incorrectly concluded that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. This error is derivative of the court’s first two errors. Having substituted its reading of the governing law for the Agency’s, and having made its own factual findings, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPA erred in not considering an important and relevant fact — namely, that the upper Illinois River was (by the court’s assessment) already degraded. As we have often recognized, an agency ruling is “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). However, in these cases, the degraded status of the river is only an “important aspect” because of the Court of Appeals’ novel and erroneous interpretation of the controlling law. Under the EPA’s interpretation of that law, what matters is not the river’s current status, but rather whether the proposed discharge will have a “detectable effect” on that status. If the Court of Appeals had been properly respectful of the Agency’s permissible reading of the Act and the Oklahoma standards, the court would not have adjudged the Agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious for this reason. In sum, the Court of Appeals made a policy choice that it was not authorized to make. Arguably, as that court suggested, it might be wise to prohibit any discharge into the Illinois River, even if that discharge would have no adverse impact on water quality. But it was surely not arbitrary for the EPA to conclude — given the benefits to the river from the increased flow of relatively clean water and the benefits achieved in Arkansas by allowing the new plant to operate as designed — that allowing the discharge would be even wiser. It is not our role, or that of the Court of Appeals, to decide which policy choice is the better one, for it is clear that Congress has entrusted such decisions to the Environmental Protection Agency. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The permit also authorized the plant to discharge the remainder of its effluent into the White River, a river that does not flow into Oklahoma; this aspect of the permit is not at issue in this litigation. Section 5 of the Oklahoma water quality standards provides: “All streams and bodies of water designated as (a) are protected by prohibition of any new point source discharge of wastes or increased load from an existing point source except under conditions described in Section 3. “All streams designated by the State as ‘scenic river areas,’ and such tributaries of those streams as may be appropriate will be so designated. Best management practices for control of nonpoint source discharge should be initiated when feasible.” App. 46-47. Oklahoma has designated the portion of the Illinois River immediately downstream from the state line as a “scenic river.” Okla. Stat., Tit. 82, § 1462(b)(1) (Supp. 1989); see also App. 54. Section 3 of the Oklahoma water quality standards provides, in relevant part: “The intent of the Anti-degradation Policy is to protect all waters of the State from quality degradation. Existing instream water uses shall be maintained and protected. No further water quality degradation which would interfere with or become injurious to existing instream water uses shall be allowed. Oklahoma’s waters constitute a valuable State resource and shall be protected, maintained and improved for the benefit of all the citizens. “No degradation shall be allowed in high quality waters which constitute an outstanding resource or in waters of exceptional recreational or ecological significance. These include water bodies located in national and State parks, Wildlife Refuges, and those designated ‘Scenic Rivers’ in Appendix A.” App. 27-28. Section 301(b)(1)(C) provides, in relevant part, that “there shall be achieved— “(C) not later than July 1,1977, any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards ... established pursuant to any State law or regulations ... or required to implement any applicable water quality standard established pursuant to this chapter.” 33 U. S. C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). The Arkansas petition was filed in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and transferred to the Tenth Circuit where it was consolidated with the petition filed by the respondents. Section 510 provides in relevant part: “Except as expressly provided in this [Act], nothing in this [Act] shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution [with exceptions]; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.” 33 U. S. C. § 1370 (emphasis added). This description of the downstream State’s role in the issuance of a new permit by a source State was apparently consistent with the EPA’s interpretation of the Act at the time. The Government’s amicus curiae brief in Ouelletie stated that “the affected neighboring state [has] only an advisory role in the formulation of applicable effluent standards or limitations. The affected state may try to persuade the federal government or the source state to increase effluent requirements, but ultimately possesses no statutory authority to compel that result, even when its waters are adversely affected by out-of-state pollution. See 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(2), 1342(b)(3) and (5) . . . .” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 1986, No. 85-1233, p. 19 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Section 402(b) requires state permit programs “(3) [t]o insure that . . . any other State the waters of which may be affected . .. receive notice of each application for a permit and to provide an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling on each such application; “(5) [t]o insure that any State (other than the permitting State), whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any permit application and, if any part of such written recommendations are not accepted by the permitting State, that the permitting State will notify such affected State (and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such recommendations together with its reasons for so doing.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). Although § 402(b) focuses on state-issued permits, § 402(a)(3) requires that, in issuing an NPDES permit, the Administrator follow the same procedures required of state permit programs. See 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a)(3); see also § 1341(a)(2). Section 402(d)(2) provides: “(2) No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of his notification under subsection (b)(5) of this section objects in writing to the issuance of such permit, or (B) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of transmittal of the proposed permit by the State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter. Whenever the Administrator objects to the issuance of a permit under this paragraph such written objection shall contain a statement of the reasons for such objection and the effluent limitations and conditions which such permit would include if it were issued by the Administrator.” 33 U. S. C. §'1342(d)(2). Section 401(a)(2) provides, in relevant part: “Whenever such a discharge may affect, as determined by the Administrator, the quality of the waters of any other State, the Administrator . . . shall so notify such other State, the licensing or permitting agency, and the applicant. If, within sixty days after receipt of such notification, such other State determines that such discharge will affect the quality of its waters so as to violate any water quality requirements in such State, and within such sixty-day period notifies the Administrator and the licensing or permitting agency in writing of its objection to the issuance of such license or permit and requests a public hearing on such objection, the licensing or permitting agency shall hold such a hearing. The Administrator shall at such hearing submit his evaluation and recommendations with respect to any such objection to the licensing or permitting agency. Such agency, based upon the recommendations of such State, the Administrator, and upon any additional evidence, if any, presented to the agency at the hearing, shall condition such license or permit in such manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with applicable water quality requirements. If the imposition of conditions cannot insure such compliance such agency shall not issue such license or permit.” 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(2). This restriction applies whether the permit is issued by the EPA or by an approved state program. See 40 CFR § 123.25 (1991). See, e. g., 1 Legislative History of Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, pp. 322, 388-389, 814 (1973); see also 33 U. S. C. § 1342(d)(3). “[W]e hold that the Clean Water Act prohibits granting an NPDES permit under the circumstances of this case (i. e., where applicable water quality standards have already been violated) and reverse EPA’s decision to permit Fayetteville to discharge any part of its effluent to the Illinois River Basin.” 908 F. 2d 595, 616 (CA10 1990). “Congress cannot reasonably be presumed to have intended to exclude from the CWA’s ‘all-encompassing program,’ 451 U. S., at 318, a permitting decision arising in circumstances such as those of this case. It is even more unfathomable that Congress fashioned a ‘comprehensive . . . policy for the elimination of water pollution,’ id., which sanctions continued pollution once minimum water quality standards have been transgressed. More likely, Congress simply never contemplated that EPA or a state would consider it permissible to authorize further pollution under such circumstances. We will not ascribe to the Act either the gaping loophole or the irrational purpose necessary to uphold EPA’s action in this case.” Id., at 632 (footnotes omitted). The court identified three errors in the EPA’s reading of the Oklahoma standards. First, the court correctly observed that the AU and the Chief Judicial Officer misinterpreted § 4.10(c) of the standards as governing only the discharge of phosphorus into lakes, rather than the discharge of phosphorus into lakes and into all “perennial and intermittent streams.” Id., at 617 (emphasis omitted). This error was harmless because the ALJ found that the discharge into Lake Francis would comply with § 4.10(c) and it is undisputed that that discharge produced a greater threat to the slow-moving water of the lake than to the rapid flow in the river. The second flaw identified by the court was the AU’s mistaken reliance on the 1985, rather than the 1982 version, of the Oklahoma standards. We agree with the Chief Judicial Officer, who also noted this error, that the portions of the two versions relevant to this case “do not differ materially.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, p. 150a. Therefore, this error was also harmless. Because these two errors were harmless, we have focused in the text on the major difference between the court’s and the EPA’s readings of the Oklahoma standards: the “no degradation” provision. See supra, at 101. Oklahoma’s water quality standards closely track the EPA’s model standards in effect at that time. Compare §3 of the Oklahoma standards with 40 CFR § 35.1550(e)(1) (1981). Eutrophication is the “normally slow aging process by which a lake evolves into a bog or marsh.... During eutrophication the lake becomes so rich in nutritive compounds (especially nitrogen and phosphorus) that algae and other microscopic plant life become superabundant, thereby ‘choking’ the lake . . . .” App. 57-58. With regard to eutrophication, the ALJ found that the Fayetteville plant would discharge 30 pounds of phosphorus per day, only about 6 pounds of which would reach the Arkansas/Oklahoma border, and that such a small amount would not result in an increase in eutrophication. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, p, 129a. With regard to esthetics, the ALJ concluded that the only discharged compound that would affect esthetics was phosphorus and that, again, the amount of that substance crossing the border would not affect the esthetic quality of Oklahoma’s waters. Id, at 135a-136a. With regard to dissolved oxygen, the AU found that in the 39 miles between discharge and the border the effluent would experience “complete oxygen recovery” and therefore would not affect the dissolved oxygen levels in the river. Id, at 140a. , With regard to metals, the AU concluded that the concentrations of metals would be so low as not to violate the Oklahoma,standards. Id., at 143a. Justice Holmes recognized this potential benefit years ago: “There is no pretence that there is a nuisance of the simple kind that was known to the older common law. There is nothing which can be detected by the unassisted senses — no visible increase of filth, no new smell. On the contrary, it is proved that the great volume of pure water from Lake Michigan which is mixed with the sewage at the start has improved the Illinois River in these respects to a noticeable extent. Formerly it was sluggish and ill smelling. Now it is a comparatively clear stream to which edible fish have returned. Its water is drunk by the fisherman, it is said, without evil results.” Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 522 (1906).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. BANKS No. 03-892. Argued November 1, 2004 Decided January 24, 2005 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Rehnquist, C. J., who took no part in the decision of the cases. David B. Salmons argued the cause pro hoc vice for petitioner in both cases. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Olson, Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General O’Connor, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Richard Farber, and Kenneth W. Rosenberg. James R. Carty argued the cause pro hoc vice for respondent in No. 03-892. With him on the briefs were Robert G. Wilson, Russell R. Young, Roger J. Jones, William J. Wise, and Glenn R Schwartz. Philip N. Jones argued the cause for respondent in No. 03-907. With him on the briefs were Peter J. Duffy, Holly N. Mitchell, and Eric Schnapper. Together with No. 03-907, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banaitis, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases was filed for Gregg D. Polsky et al. by Mr. Polsky, pro se, and Brant J. Hellwig, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White and Todd A. Smith; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Ann Elizabeth Reesman; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Jerome B. Libin, Mary E. Monahan, Barbara R. Amwine, Michael L. Foreman, Sarah C. Crawford, Audrey J. Wiggins, Ira A. Burnim, Vincent A. Eng, Dennis C. Hayes, and Dina R. Lassow; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. by William Perry Pendley and J. Scott Detamore; for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Douglas B. Huron, Victoria W. Ni, Richard A. Marcantonio, Richard A. Rothschild, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, Robert H. Stroup, and Thomas W. Osborne; for the Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund by Charles J. Cooper and Hamish P. M. Hume; and for Kenneth W. Gideon et al. by Mr. Gideon, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both cases for the Oregon Trial Lawyers Association by Richard S. Yugler; for Stephen B. Cohen by Mr. Cohen, pro se; and for Charles Davenport by Mr. Davenport, pro se. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in these consolidated cases is whether the portion of a money judgment or settlement paid to a plaintiff’s attorney under a contingent-fee agreement is income to the plaintiff under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. I). The issue divides the courts of appeals. In one of the instant cases, Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F. 3d 373 (2003), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the contingent-fee portion of a litigation recovery is not included in the plaintiff’s gross income. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also adhere to this view, relying on the holding, over Judge Wisdom’s dissent, in Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F. 2d 119, 125-126 (CA5 1959). Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F. 3d 353, 363-365 (CA5 2000); Foster v. United States, 249 F. 3d 1275, 1279-1280 (CA11 2001). In the other case under review, Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F. 3d 1074 (2003), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee is excluded from the plaintiff’s gross income if state law gives the plaintiff’s attorney a special property interest in the fee, but not otherwise. Six Courts of Appeals have held the entire litigation recovery, including the portion paid to an attorney as a contingent fee, is income to the plaintiff. Some of these Courts of Appeals discuss state law, but little of their analysis appears to turn on this factor. Raymond v. United States, 355 F. 3d 107, 113-116 (CA2 2004); Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F. 3d 881, 883-884 (CA7 2001); Baylin v. United States, 43 F. 3d 1451, 1454-1455 (CA Fed. 1995). Other Courts of Appeals have been explicit that the fee portion of the recovery is always income to the plaintiff regardless of the nuances of state law. O’Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T. C. 707, 712 (1962), aff’d, 319 F. 2d 532 (CA3 1963) (per curiam); Young v. Commissioner, 240 F. 3d 369, 377-379 (CA4 2001); Hukkanen-Campbell v. Commissioner, 274 F. 3d 1312, 1313-1314 (CA10 2001). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 541 U. S. 958 (2004). We hold that, as a general rule, when a litigant’s recovery constitutes income, the litigant’s income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee. We reverse the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. I A. Commissioner v. Banks In 1986, respondent John W. Banks, II, was fired from his job as an educational consultant with the California Department of Education. He retained an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and filed a civil suit against the employer in a United States District Court. The. complaint alleged employment discrimination in violation of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 12965 (West 1986). The original complaint asserted various additional claims under state law, but Banks later abandoned these. After trial commenced in 1990, the parties settled for $464,000. Banks paid $150,000 of this amount to his attorney pursuant to the fee agreement. Banks did not include any of the $464,000 in settlement proceeds as gross income in his 1990 federal income tax return. In 1997 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Banks a notice of deficiency for the 1990 tax year. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, finding that all the settlement proceeds, including the $150,000 Banks had paid to his attorney, must be included in Banks’ gross income. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part. 345 F. 3d 373 (2003). It agreed the net amount received by Banks was included in gross income but not the amount paid to the attorney. Relying on its prior decision in Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F. 3d 854 (2000), the court held the contingent-fee agreement was not an anticipatory assignment of Banks’ income because the litigation recovery was not already earned, vested, or even relatively certain to be paid when the contingent-fee contract was made. A contingent-fee arrangement, the court reasoned, is more like a partial assignment of income-producing property than an assignment of income. The attorney is not the mere beneficiary of the client’s largess, but rather earns his fee through skill and diligence. 345 F. 3d, at 384-385 (quoting Estate of Clarks, supra, at 857-858). This reasoning, the court held, applies whether or not state law grants the attorney any special property interest (e. g., a superior lien) in part of the judgment or settlement proceeds. B. Commissioner v. Banaitis After leaving his job as a vice president and loan officer at the Bank of California in 1987, Sigitas J. Banaitis retained an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and brought suit in Oregon state court against the Bank of California and its successor in ownership, the Mitsubishi Bank. The complaint alleged that Mitsubishi Bank willfully interfered with Banaitis’ employment contract, and that the Bank of California attempted to induce Banaitis to breach his fiduciary duties to customers and discharged him when he refused. The jury awarded Banaitis compensatory and punitive damages. After resolution of all appeals and post-trial motions, the parties settled. The defendants paid $4,864,547 to Banaitis; and, following the formula set forth in the contingent-fee contract, the defendants paid an additional $3,864,012 directly to Banaitis’ attorney. Banaitis did not include the amount paid to his attorney in gross income on his federal income tax return, and the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 340 F. 3d 1074 (2003). In contrast to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Banaitis court viewed state law as pivotal. Where state law confers on the attorney no special property rights in his fee, the court said, the whole amount of the judgment or settlement ordinarily is included in the plaintiff’s gross income. Id., at 1081. Oregon state law, however, like the law of some other States, grants attorneys a superior lien in the contingent-fee portion of any recovery. As a result, the court held, contingent-fee agreements under Oregon law operate not as an anticipatory assignment of the client’s income but as a partial transfer to the attorney of some of the client’s property in the lawsuit. II To clarify why the issue here is of any consequence for tax purposes, two preliminary observations are useful. The first concerns the general issue of deductibility. For the tax years in question the legal expenses in these eases could have been taken as miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the ordinary requirements, 26 U. S. C. §§ 67-68 (2000 ed. and Supp. I), but doing so would have been of no help to respondents because of the operation of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). For noncorporate individual taxpayers, the AMT establishes a tax liability floor equal to 26 percent of the taxpayer’s “alternative minimum taxable income” (minus specified exemptions) up to $175,000, plus 28 percent of alternative minimum taxable income over $175,000. §§ 55(a), (b) (2000 ed.). Alternative minimum taxable income, unlike ordinary gross income, does not allow any miscellaneous itemized deductions. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i). Second, after these cases arose Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 1418. Section 703 of the Act amended the Code by adding § 62(a)(19). Id., at 1546. The amendment allows a taxpayer, in computing adjusted gross income, to deduct “attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer in connection with any action involving a claim of unlawful discrimination.” Ibid. The Act defines “unlawful discrimination” to include a number of specific federal statutes, §§ 62(e)(1) to (16), any federal whistle-blower statute, §62(e)(17), and any federal, state, or local law “providing for the enforcement of civil rights” or “regulating any aspect of the employment relationship ... or prohibiting the discharge of an employee, the discrimination against an employee, or any other form of retaliation or reprisal against an employee for asserting rights or taking other actions permitted by law,” § 62(e)(18). Id., at 1547-1548. These deductions are permissible even when the AMT applies. Had the Act been in force for the transactions now under review, these cases likely would not have arisen. The Act is not retroactive, however, so while it may cover future taxpayers in respondents’ position, it does not pertain here. Ill The Internal Revenue Code defines “gross income” for federal tax purposes as “all income from whatever source derived.” 26 U. S. C. § 61(a). The definition extends broadly to all economic gains not otherwise exempted. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426, 429-430 (1955); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28, 49 (1949). A taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain from gross income by assigning the gain in advance to another party. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 604 (1948); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 116-117 (1940). The rationale for the so-called anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is the principle that gains should be taxed “to those who earned them,” Lucas, supra, at 114, a maxim we have called “the first principle of income taxation,” Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733, 739-740 (1949). The anticipatory assignment doctrine is meant to prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxation through “arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent [income] when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.” Lucas, 281 U. S., at 115. The rule is preventative and motivated by administrative as well as substantive concerns, so we do not inquire whether any particular assignment has a discernible tax avoidance purpose. As Lucas explained, “no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.” Ibid. Respondents argue that the anticipatory assignment doctrine is a judge-made antifraud rule with no relevance to contingent-fee contracts of the sort at issue here. The Commissioner maintains that a contingent-fee agreement should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the attorney of a portion of the client’s income from any litigation recovery. We agree with the Commissioner. In an ordinary case attribution of income is resolved by asking whether a taxpayer exercises complete dominion over the income in question. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra, at 431; see also Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U. S. 203, 209 (1990); Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 405 U. S. 394, 403 (1972). In the context of anticipatory assignments, however, the assignor often does not have dominion over the income at the moment of receipt. In that instance the question becomes whether the assignor retains dominion over the income-generating asset, because the taxpayer “who owns or controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants.” Horst, supra, at 116-117. See also Lucas, supra, at 114-115; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122, 124-125 (1940); Sunnen, supra, at 604. Looking to control over the income-generating asset, then, preserves the principle that income should be taxed to the party who earns the income and enjoys the consequent benefits. In the case of a litigation recovery the income-generating asset is the cause of action that derives from the plaintiff’s legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion over this asset throughout the litigation. We do not understand respondents to argue otherwise. Rather, respondents advance two counterarguments. First, they say that, in contrast to the bond coupons assigned in Horst, the value of a legal claim is speculative at the moment of assignment, and may be worth nothing at all. Second, respondents insist that the claimant’s legal injury is not the only source of the ultimate recovery. The attorney, according to respondents, also contributes income-generating assets — effort and expertise— without which the claimant likely could not prevail. On these premises respondents urge us to treat a contingent-fee agreement as establishing, for tax purposes, something like a joint venture or partnership in which the client and attorney combine their respective assets — the client’s claim and the attorney’s skill — and apportion any resulting profits. We reject respondents’ arguments. Though the value of the plaintiff’s claim may be speculative at the moment the fee agreement is signed, the anticipatory assignment doctrine is not limited to instances when the precise dollar value of the assigned income is known in advance. Lucas, supra; United States v. Basye, 410 U. S. 441, 445, 450-452 (1973). Though Horst involved an anticipatory assignment of a predetermined sum to be paid on a specific date, the holding in that case did not depend on ascertaining a liquidated amount at the time of assignment. In each of the cases before us, as in Horst, the taxpayer retained control over the income-generating asset, diverted some of the income produced to another party, and realized a benefit by doing so. As Judge Wesley correctly concluded in a recent case, the rationale of Horst applies fully to a contingent-fee contract. Raymond v. United States, 355 F. 3d, at 115-116. That the amount of income the asset would produce was uncertain at the moment of assignment is of no consequence. We further reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-client relationship as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes. The relationship between client and attorney, regardless of the variations in particular compensation agreements or the amount of skill and effort the attorney contributes, is a quintessential principal-agent relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1, Comment e (1957) (hereinafter Restatement); ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3, and Comment 1; Rule 1.7, and Comment 1 (2002). The client may rely on the attorney’s expertise and special skills to achieve a result the client could not achieve alone. That, however, is true of most principal-agent relationships, and it does not alter the fact that the client retains ultimate dominion and control over the underlying claim. The control is evident when it is noted that, although the attorney can make tactical decisions without consulting the client, the plaintiff still must determine whether to settle or proceed to judgment and make, as well, other critical decisions. Even where the attorney exercises independent judgment without supervision by, or consultation with, the client, the attorney, as an agent, is obligated to act solely on behalf of, and for the exclusive benefit of, the client-principal, rather than for the benefit of the attorney or any other party. Restatement §§ 13, 39, 387. The attorney is an agent who is dutybound to act only in the interests of the principal, and so it is appropriate to treat the full amount of the recovery as income to the principal. In this respect Judge Posner’s observation is apt: “[T]he contingent-fee lawyer [is not] a joint owner of his client’s claim in the legal sense any more than the commission salesman is a joint owner of his employer’s accounts receivable.” Kenseth, 259 F. 3d, at 883. In both cases a principal relies on an agent to realize an economic gain, and the gain realized by the agent’s efforts is income to the principal. The portion paid to the agent may be deductible, but absent some other provision of law it is not excludable from the principal’s gross income. This rule applies whether or not the attorney-client contract or state law confers any special rights or protections on the attorney, so long as these protections do not alter the fundamental principal-agent character of the relationship. Cf. Restatement § 13, Comment b, and § 14G, Comment a (an agency relationship is created where a principal assigns a chose in action to an assignee for collection and grants the assignee a security interest in the claim against the assign- or’s debtor in order to compensate the assignee for his collection efforts). State laws vary with respect to the strength of an attorney’s security interest in a contingent fee and the remedies available to an attorney should the client discharge or attempt to defraud the attorney. No state laws of which we are aware, however, even those that purport to give attorneys an “ownership” interest in their fees, e. g., 340 F. 3d, at 1082-1083 (discussing Oregon law); Cotnam, 263 F. 2d, at 125 (discussing Alabama law), convert the attorney from an agent to a partner. Respondents and their amici propose other theories to exclude fees from income or permit deductibility. These suggestions include: (1) The contingent-fee agreement establishes a Subchapter K partnership under 26 U. S. C. §§ 702, 704, and 761, Brief for Respondent in No. 03-907, pp. 5-21; (2) litigation recoveries are proceeds from disposition of property, so the attorney’s fee should be subtracted as a capital expense pursuant to §§1001, 1012, and 1016, Brief for Association of Trial Lawyers of America as Amicus Curiae 23-28, Brief for Charles Davenport as Amicus Curiae 3-13; and (3) the fees are deductible reimbursed employee business expenses under § 62(a)(2)(A) (2000 ed. and Supp. I), Brief for Stephen B. Cohen as Amicus Curiae. These arguments, it appears, are being presented for the first time to this Court. We are especially reluctant to entertain novel propositions of law with broad implications for the tax system that were not advanced in earlier stages of the litigation and not examined by the Courts of Appeals. We decline comment on these supplementary theories. In addition, we do not reach the instance where a relator pursues a claim on behalf of the United States. Brief for Taxpayers Against Fraúd Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 10-20. IV The foregoing suffices to dispose of Banaitis’ case. Banks’ case, however, involves a farther consideration. Banks brought his claims under federal statutes that authorize fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs’ attorneys. He contends that application of the anticipatory assignment principle would be inconsistent with the purpose of statutory fee-shifting provisions. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U. S. 82, 86 (1990) (observing that statutory fees enable “plaintiffs to employ reasonably competent lawyers without cost to themselves if they prevail”). In the federal system statutory fees are typically awarded by the court under the lodestar approach, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983), and the plaintiff usually has little control over the amount awarded. Sometimes, as when the plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief, or when the statute caps plaintiffs’ recoveries, or when for other reasons damages are substantially less than attorney’s fees, court-awarded attorney’s fees can exceed a plaintiff’s monetary recovery. See, e. g., Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 561, 564-565 (1986) (compensatory and punitive damages of $33,350; attorney’s fee award of $245,456.25). Treating the fee award as income to the plaintiff in such cases, it is argued, can lead to the perverse result that the plaintiff loses money by winning the suit. Furthermore, it is urged that treating statutory fee awards as income to plaintiffs would undermine the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes in deputizing plaintiffs and their lawyers to act as private attorneys general. We need not address these claims. After Banks settled his case, the fee paid to his attorney was calculated solely on the basis of the private contingent-fee contract. There was no court-ordered fee award, nor was there any indication in Banks’ contract with his attorney, or in the settlement agreement with the defendant, that the contingent fee paid to Banks’ attorney was in lieu of statutory fees Banks might otherwise have been entitled to recover. Also, the amendment added by the American Jobs Creation Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps most, claims governed by fee-shifting statutes. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. . The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of these cases.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, et al., Petitioners v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al. No. 12-10. Supreme Court of the United States Argued April 22, 2013. Decided June 20, 2013. Sri Srinivasan, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. David W. Bowker, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Sri Srinivasan, Counsel of Record, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitors General, Jeffrey B. Wall, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Michael S. Raab, Sharon Swingle, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Mark C. Fleming, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, Jason D. Hirsch, Michael D. Gottesman, Shalev Roisman, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, David W. Bowker, Counsel of Record, Catherine M.A. Carroll, Weili J. Shaw, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, Rebekah Diller, Laura Abel, New York, NY, for Respondents. Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), 117 Stat. 711, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 7601 et seq., outlined a comprehensive strategy to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS around the world. As part of that strategy, Congress authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars to fund efforts by nongovernmental organizations to assist in the fight. The Act imposes two related conditions on that funding: First, no funds made available by the Act "may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking." § 7631(e). And second, no funds may be used by an organization "that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking." § 7631(f). This case concerns the second of these conditions, referred to as the Policy Requirement. The question is whether that funding condition violates a recipient's First Amendment rights. I Congress passed the Leadership Act in 2003 after finding that HIV/AIDS had "assumed pandemic proportions, spreading from the most severely affected regions, sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, to all corners of the world, and leaving an unprecedented path of death and devastation." 22 U.S.C. § 7601(1). According to congressional findings, more than 65 million people had been infected by HIV and more than 25 million had lost their lives, making HIV/AIDS the fourth highest cause of death worldwide. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, AIDS had claimed the lives of more than 19 million individuals and was projected to kill a full quarter of the population of that area over the next decade. The disease not only directly endangered those infected, but also increased the potential for social and political instability and economic devastation, posing a security issue for the entire international community. § 7601(2) - (10). In the Leadership Act, Congress directed the President to establish a "comprehensive, integrated" strategy to combat HIV/AIDS around the world. § 7611(a). The Act sets out 29 different objectives the President's strategy should seek to fulfill, reflecting a multitude of approaches to the problem. The strategy must include, among other things, plans to increase the availability of treatment for infected individuals, prevent new infections, support the care of those affected by the disease, promote training for physicians and other health care workers, and accelerate research on HIV/AIDS prevention methods, all while providing a framework for cooperation with international organizations and partner countries to further the goals of the program. §§ 7611(a)(1)-(29). The Act "make[s] the reduction of HIV/AIDS behavioral risks a priority of all prevention efforts." § 7611(a)(12); see also § 7601(15) ("Successful strategies to stem the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic will require ... measures to address the social and behavioral causes of the problem"). The Act's approach to reducing behavioral risks is multifaceted. The President's strategy for addressing such risks must, for example, promote abstinence, encourage monogamy, increase the availability of condoms, promote voluntary counseling and treatment for drug users, and, as relevant here, "educat[e] men and boys about the risks of procuring sex commercially" as well as "promote alternative livelihoods, safety, and social reintegration strategies for commercial sex workers." § 7611(a)(12). Congress found that the "sex industry, the trafficking of individuals into such industry, and sexual violence" were factors in the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and determined that "it should be the policy of the United States to eradicate" prostitution and "other sexual victimization." § 7601(23). The United States has enlisted the assistance of nongovernmental organizations to help achieve the many goals of the program. Such organizations "with experience in health care and HIV/AIDS counseling," Congress found, "have proven effective in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic and can be a resource in ... provid[ing] treatment and care for individuals infected with HIV/AIDS." § 7601(18). Since 2003, Congress has authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars for funding these organizations' fight against HIV/AIDS around the world. § 2151b-2(c); § 7671. Those funds, however, come with two conditions: First, no funds made available to carry out the Leadership Act "may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking." § 7631(e). Second, no funds made available may "provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking, except ... to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Health Organization, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative or to any United Nations agency." § 7631(f). It is this second condition-the Policy Requirement-that is at issue here. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are the federal agencies primarily responsible for overseeing implementation of the Leadership Act. To enforce the Policy Requirement, the agencies have directed that the recipient of any funding under the Act agree in the award document that it is opposed to "prostitution and sex trafficking because of the psychological and physical risks they pose for women, men, and children." 45 CFR § 89.1(b) (2012) ; USAID, Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 12-04, p. 6 (AAPD 12-04). II Respondents are a group of domestic organizations engaged in combating HIV/AIDS overseas. In addition to substantial private funding, they receive billions annually in financial assistance from the United States, including under the Leadership Act. Their work includes programs aimed at limiting injection drug use in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in Kenya, and promoting safer sex practices in India. Respondents fear that adopting a policy explicitly opposing prostitution may alienate certain host governments, and may diminish the effectiveness of some of their programs by making it more difficult to work with prostitutes in the fight against HIV/AIDS. They are also concerned that the Policy Requirement may require them to censor their privately funded discussions in publications, at conferences, and in other forums about how best to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS among prostitutes. In 2005, respondents Alliance for Open Society International and Pathfinder International commenced this litigation, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Government's implementation of the Policy Requirement violated their First Amendment rights. Respondents sought a preliminary injunction barring the Government from cutting off their funding under the Act for the duration of the litigation, from unilaterally terminating their cooperative agreements with the United States, or from otherwise taking action solely on the basis of respondents' own privately funded speech. The District Court granted such a preliminary injunction, and the Government appealed. While the appeal was pending, HHS and USAID issued guidelines on how recipients of Leadership Act funds could retain funding while working with affiliated organizations not bound by the Policy Requirement. The guidelines permit funding recipients to work with affiliated organizations that "engage [ ] in activities inconsistent with the recipient's opposition to the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking" as long as the recipients retain "objective integrity and independence from any affiliated organization." 45 CFR § 89.3 ; see also AAPD 12-04, at 6-7. Whether sufficient separation exists is determined by the totality of the circumstances, including "but not ... limited to" (1) whether the organizations are legally separate; (2) whether they have separate personnel; (3) whether they keep separate accounting records; (4) the degree of separation in the organizations' facilities; and (5) the extent to which signs and other forms of identification distinguish the organizations. 45 CFR § 89.3(b) (1)-(5) ; see also AAPD 12-04, at 6-7. The Court of Appeals summarily remanded the case to the District Court to consider whether the preliminary injunction was still appropriate in light of the new guidelines. On remand, the District Court issued a new preliminary injunction along the same lines as the first, and the Government renewed its appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that respondents had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment challenge under this Court's "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine. 651 F.3d 218 (C.A.2 2011). Under this doctrine, the court reasoned, "the government may not place a condition on the receipt of a benefit or subsidy that infringes upon the recipient's constitutionally protected rights, even if the government has no obligation to offer the benefit in the first instance." Id., at 231 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) ). And a condition that compels recipients "to espouse the government's position" on a subject of international debate could not be squared with the First Amendment. 651 F.3d, at 234. The court concluded that "the Policy Requirement, as implemented by the Agencies, falls well beyond what the Supreme Court ... ha[s] upheld as permissible funding conditions." Ibid. Judge Straub dissented, expressing his view that the Policy Requirement was an "entirely rational exercise of Congress's powers pursuant to the Spending Clause." Id., at 240. We granted certiorari. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 928, 184 L.Ed.2d 719 (2013). III The Policy Requirement mandates that recipients of Leadership Act funds explicitly agree with the Government's policy to oppose prostitution and sex trafficking. It is, however, a basic First Amendment principle that "freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say." Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ). "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) ; see Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 2288, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012) ("The government may not ... compel the endorsement of ideas that it approves."). Were it enacted as a direct regulation of speech, the Policy Requirement would plainly violate the First Amendment. The question is whether the Government may nonetheless impose that requirement as a condition on the receipt of federal funds. A The Spending Clause of the Federal Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Clause provides Congress broad discretion to tax and spend for the "general Welfare," including by funding particular state or private programs or activities. That power includes the authority to impose limits on the use of such funds to ensure they are used in the manner Congress intends. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195, n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991) ("Congress' power to allocate funds for public purposes includes an ancillary power to ensure that those funds are properly applied to the prescribed use."). As a general matter, if a party objects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the funds. This remains true when the objection is that a condition may affect the recipient's exercise of its First Amendment rights. See, e.g., United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 212, 123 S.Ct. 2297, 156 L.Ed.2d 221 (2003) (plurality opinion) (rejecting a claim by public libraries that conditioning funds for Internet access on the libraries' installing filtering software violated their First Amendment rights, explaining that "[t]o the extent that libraries wish to offer unfiltered access, they are free to do so without federal assistance"); Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (dismissing "the notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State" (internal quotation marks omitted)). At the same time, however, we have held that the Government " 'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.' " Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supra, at 59, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (quoting American Library Assn., supra, at 210, 123 S.Ct. 2297). In some cases, a funding condition can result in an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment rights. See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supra, at 59, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (the First Amendment supplies "a limit on Congress' ability to place conditions on the receipt of funds"). The dissent thinks that can only be true when the condition is not relevant to the objectives of the program (although it has its doubts about that), or when the condition is actually coercive, in the sense of an offer that cannot be refused. See post, at 2325 - 2326 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Our precedents, however, are not so limited. In the present context, the relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases is between conditions that define the limits of the government spending program-those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize-and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself. The line is hardly clear, in part because the definition of a particular program can always be manipulated to subsume the challenged condition. We have held, however, that "Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise." Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547, 121 S.Ct. 1043, 149 L.Ed.2d 63 (2001). A comparison of two cases helps illustrate the distinction: In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, the Court upheld a requirement that nonprofit organizations seeking tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) not engage in substantial efforts to influence legislation. The tax-exempt status, we explained, "ha[d] much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization." 461 U.S., at 544, 103 S.Ct. 1997. And by limiting § 501(c)(3) status to organizations that did not attempt to influence legislation, Congress had merely "chose[n] not to subsidize lobbying." Ibid. In rejecting the nonprofit's First Amendment claim, the Court highlighted-in the text of its opinion, but see post, at 2326 -the fact that the condition did not prohibit that organization from lobbying Congress altogether. By returning to a "dual structure" it had used in the past-separately incorporating as a § 501(c)(3) organization and § 501(c)(4) organization-the nonprofit could continue to claim § 501(c)(3) status for its nonlobbying activities, while attempting to influence legislation in its § 501(c)(4) capacity with separate funds. Ibid. Maintaining such a structure, the Court noted, was not "unduly burdensome." Id., at 545, n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 1997. The condition thus did not deny the organization a government benefit "on account of its intention to lobby." Id., at 545, 103 S.Ct. 1997. In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, by contrast, the Court struck down a condition on federal financial assistance to noncommercial broadcast television and radio stations that prohibited all editorializing, including with private funds. 468 U.S. 364, 399-401, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984). Even a station receiving only one percent of its overall budget from the Federal Government, the Court explained, was "barred absolutely from all editorializing." Id., at 400, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Unlike the situation in Regan, the law provided no way for a station to limit its use of federal funds to noneditorializing activities, while using private funds "to make known its views on matters of public importance." 468 U.S., at 400, 104 S.Ct. 3106. The prohibition thus went beyond ensuring that federal funds not be used to subsidize "public broadcasting station editorials," and instead leveraged the federal funding to regulate the stations' speech outside the scope of the program. Id., at 399, 104 S.Ct. 3106 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our decision in Rust v. Sullivan elaborated on the approach reflected in Regan and League of Women Voters . In Rust, we considered Title X of the Public Health Service Act, a Spending Clause program that issued grants to nonprofit health-care organizations "to assist in the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects [to] offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services." 500 U.S., at 178, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (internal quotation marks omitted). The organizations received funds from a variety of sources other than the Federal Government for a variety of purposes. The Act, however, prohibited the Title X federal funds from being "used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). To enforce this provision, HHS regulations barred Title X projects from advocating abortion as a method of family planning, and required grantees to ensure that their Title X projects were " 'physically and financially separate' " from their other projects that engaged in the prohibited activities. Id., at 180-181, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (quoting 42 CFR § 59.9 (1989) ). A group of Title X funding recipients brought suit, claiming the regulations imposed an unconstitutional condition on their First Amendment rights. We rejected their claim. We explained that Congress can, without offending the Constitution, selectively fund certain programs to address an issue of public concern, without funding alternative ways of addressing the same problem. In Title X, Congress had defined the federal program to encourage only particular family planning methods. The challenged regulations were simply "designed to ensure that the limits of the federal program are observed," and "that public funds [are] spent for the purposes for which they were authorized." Rust, 500 U.S., at 193, 196, 111 S.Ct. 1759. In making this determination, the Court stressed that "Title X expressly distinguishes between a Title X grantee and a Title X project ." Id., at 196, 111 S.Ct. 1759. The regulations governed only the scope of the grantee's Title X projects, leaving it "unfettered in its other activities." Ibid. "The Title X grantee can continue to ... engage in abortion advocacy; it simply is required to conduct those activities through programs that are separate and independent from the project that receives Title X funds." Ibid. Because the regulations did not "prohibit[ ] the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program," they did not run afoul of the First Amendment. Id., at 197, 111 S.Ct. 1759. B As noted, the distinction drawn in these cases-between conditions that define the federal program and those that reach outside it-is not always self-evident. As Justice Cardozo put it in a related context, "Definition more precise must abide the wisdom of the future." Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937). Here, however, we are confident that the Policy Requirement falls on the unconstitutional side of the line. To begin, it is important to recall that the Leadership Act has two conditions relevant here. The first-unchallenged in this litigation-prohibits Leadership Act funds from being used "to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking." 22 U.S.C. § 7631 (e). The Government concedes that § 7631(e) by itself ensures that federal funds will not be used for the prohibited purposes. Brief for Petitioners 26-27. The Policy Requirement therefore must be doing something more-and it is. The dissent views the Requirement as simply a selection criterion by which the Government identifies organizations "who believe in its ideas to carry them to fruition." Post, at 2332. As an initial matter, whatever purpose the Policy Requirement serves in selecting funding recipients, its effects go beyond selection. The Policy Requirement is an ongoing condition on recipients' speech and activities, a ground for terminating a grant after selection is complete. See AAPD 12-04, at 12. In any event, as the Government acknowledges, it is not simply seeking organizations that oppose prostitution. Reply Brief 5. Rather, it explains, "Congress has expressed its purpose 'to eradicate' prostitution and sex trafficking, 22 U.S.C. § 7601(23), and it wants recipients to adopt a similar stance." Brief for Petitioners 32 (emphasis added). This case is not about the Government's ability to enlist the assistance of those with whom it already agrees. It is about compelling a grant recipient to adopt a particular belief as a condition of funding. By demanding that funding recipients adopt-as their own-the Government's view on an issue of public concern, the condition by its very nature affects "protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program." Rust, 500 U.S., at 197, 111 S.Ct. 1759. A recipient cannot avow the belief dictated by the Policy Requirement when spending Leadership Act funds, and then turn around and assert a contrary belief, or claim neutrality, when participating in activities on its own time and dime. By requiring recipients to profess a specific belief, the Policy Requirement goes beyond defining the limits of the federally funded program to defining the recipient. See ibid. ("our 'unconstitutional conditions' cases involve situations in which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program"). The Government contends that the affiliate guidelines, established while this litigation was pending, save the program. Under those guidelines, funding recipients are permitted to work with affiliated organizations that do not abide by the condition, as long as the recipients retain "objective integrity and independence" from the unfettered affiliates. 45 CFR § 89.3. The Government suggests the guidelines alleviate any unconstitutional burden on the respondents' First Amendment rights by allowing them to either: (1) accept Leadership Act funding and comply with Policy Requirement, but establish affiliates to communicate contrary views on prostitution; or (2) decline funding themselves (thus remaining free to express their own views or remain neutral), while creating affiliates whose sole purpose is to receive and administer Leadership Act funds, thereby "cabin[ing] the effects" of the Policy Requirement within the scope of the federal program. Brief for Petitioners 38-39, 44-49. Neither approach is sufficient. When we have noted the importance of affiliates in this context, it has been because they allow an organization bound by a funding condition to exercise its First Amendment rights outside the scope of the federal program. See Rust, supra, at 197-198, 111 S.Ct. 1759. Affiliates cannot serve that purpose when the condition is that a funding recipient espouse a specific belief as its own. If the affiliate is distinct from the recipient, the arrangement does not afford a means for the recipient to express its beliefs. If the affiliate is more clearly identified with the recipient, the recipient can express those beliefs only at the price of evident hypocrisy. The guidelines themselves make that clear. See 45 CFR § 89.3 (allowing funding recipients to work with affiliates whose conduct is "inconsistent with the recipient's opposition to the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking" (emphasis added)). The Government suggests that the Policy Requirement is necessary because, without it, the grant of federal funds could free a recipient's private funds "to be used to promote prostitution or sex trafficking." Brief for Petitioners 27 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, ---- - ----, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2725-2726, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010)). That argument assumes that federal funding will simply supplant private funding, rather than pay for new programs or expand existing ones. The Government offers no support for that assumption as a general matter, or any reason to believe it is true here. And if the Government's argument were correct, League of Women Voters would have come out differently, and much of the reasoning of Regan and Rust would have been beside the point. The Government cites but one case to support that argument, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project . That case concerned the quite different context of a ban on providing material support to terrorist organizations, where the record indicated that support for those organizations' nonviolent operations was funneled to support their violent activities. 561 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2725-2726. Pressing its argument further, the Government contends that "if organizations awarded federal funds to implement Leadership Act programs could at the same time promote or affirmatively condone prostitution or sex trafficking, whether using public or private funds, it would undermine the government's program and confuse its message opposing prostitution and sex trafficking." Brief for Petitioners 37 (emphasis added). But the Policy Requirement goes beyond preventing recipients from using private funds in a way that would undermine the federal program. It requires them to pledge allegiance to the Government's policy of eradicating prostitution. As to that, we cannot improve upon what Justice Jackson wrote for the Court 70 years ago: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Barnette, 319 U.S., at 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178. * * * The Policy Requirement compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program. In so doing, it violates the First Amendment and cannot be sustained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. KAGAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, dissenting. The Leadership Act provides that "any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking" may not receive funds appropriated under the Act. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f). This Policy Requirement is nothing more than a means of selecting suitable agents to implement the Government's chosen strategy to eradicate HIV/AIDS. That is perfectly permissible under the Constitution. The First Amendment does not mandate a viewpoint-neutral government. Government must choose between rival ideas and adopt some as its own: competition over cartels, solar energy over coal, weapon development over disarmament, and so forth. Moreover, the government may enlist the assistance of those who believe in its ideas to carry them to fruition; and it need not enlist for that purpose those who oppose or do not support the ideas. That seems to me a matter of the most common common sense. For example: One of the purposes of America's foreign-aid programs is the fostering of good will towards this country. If the organization Hamas-reputed to have an efficient system for delivering welfare-were excluded from a program for the distribution of U.S. food assistance, no one could reasonably object. And that would remain true if Hamas were an organization of United States citizens entitled to the protection of the Constitution. So long as the unfunded organization remains free to engage in its activities (including anti-American propaganda) "without federal assistance," United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 212, 123 S.Ct. 2297, 156 L.Ed.2d 221 (2003) (plurality), refusing to make use of its assistance for an enterprise to which it is opposed does not abridge its speech. And the same is true when the rejected organization is not affirmatively opposed to, but merely unsupportive of, the object of the federal program, which appears to be the case here. (Respondents do not promote prostitution, but neither do they wish to oppose it.) A federal program to encourage healthy eating habits need not be administered by the American Gourmet Society, which has nothing against healthy food but does not insist upon it. The argument is that this commonsense principle will enable the government to discriminate against, and injure, points of view to which it is opposed. Of course the Constitution does not prohibit government spending that discriminates against, and injures, points of view to which the government is opposed; every government program which takes a position on a controversial issue does that. Anti-smoking programs injure cigar aficionados, programs encouraging sexual abstinence injure free-love advocates, etc. The constitutional prohibition at issue here is not a prohibition against discriminating against or injuring opposing points of view, but the First Amendment's prohibition against the coercing of speech. I am frankly dubious that a condition for eligibility to participate in a minor federal program such as this one runs afoul of that prohibition even when the condition is irrelevant to the goals of the program. Not every disadvantage is a coercion. But that is not the issue before us here. Here the views that the Government demands an applicant forswear-or that the Government insists an applicant favor-are relevant to the program in question. The program is valid only if the Government is entitled to disfavor the opposing view (here, advocacy of or toleration of prostitution). And if the program can disfavor it, so can the selection of those who are to administer the program. There is no risk that this principle will enable the Government to discriminate arbitrarily against positions it disfavors. It would not, for example, permit the Government to exclude from bidding on defense contracts anyone who refuses to abjure prostitution. But here a central part of the Government's HIV/AIDS strategy is the suppression of prostitution, by which HIV is transmitted. It is entirely reasonable to admit to participation in the program only those who believe in that goal. According to the Court, however, this transgresses a constitutional line between conditions that operate inside a spending program and those that control speech outside of it. I am at a loss to explain what this central pillar of the Court's opinion-this distinction that the Court itself admits is "hardly clear" and "not always self-evident," ante, at 2328, 2330 -has to do with the First Amendment. The distinction was alluded to, to be sure, in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991), but not as (what the Court now makes it) an invariable requirement for First Amendment validity. That the pro-abortion speech prohibition was limited to "inside the program" speech was relevant in Rust because the program itself was not an anti-abortion program. The Government remained neutral on that controversial issue, but did not wish abortion to be promoted within its family-planning-services program. The statutory objective could not be impaired, in other words, by "outside the program" pro-abortion speech. The purpose of the limitation was to prevent Government funding from providing the means of pro-abortion propaganda, which the Government did not wish (and had no constitutional obligation) to provide. The situation here is vastly different. Elimination of prostitution is an objective of the HIV/AIDS program, and any promotion of prostitution-whether made inside or outside the program-does harm the program. Of course the most obvious manner in which the admission to a program of an ideological opponent can frustrate the purpose of the program is by freeing up the opponent's funds for use in its ideological opposition. To use the Hamas example again: Subsidizing that organization's provision of social services enables the money that it would otherwise use for that purpose to be used, instead, for anti-American propaganda. Perhaps that problem does not exist in this case since the respondents do not affirmatively promote prostitution. But the Court's analysis categorically rejects that justification for ideological requirements in all cases, demanding "record indica[tion]" that "federal funding will simply supplant private funding, rather than pay for new programs." Ante, at 2331. This seems to me quite naive. Money is fungible. The economic reality is that when NGOs can conduct their AIDS work on the Government's dime, they can expend greater resources on policies that undercut the Leadership Act. The Government need not establish by record evidence that this will happen. To make it a valid consideration in determining participation in federal programs, it suffices that this is a real and obvious risk. None of the cases the Court cites for its holding provide support. I have already discussed Rust . As for Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983), that case upheld rather than invalidated a prohibition against lobbying as a condition of receiving 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. The Court's holding rested on the conclusion that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right." 461 U.S., at 549, 103 S.Ct. 1997. Today's opinion, ante, at 2329, stresses the fact that these nonprofits were permitted to use a separate § 501(c)(4) affiliate for their lobbying-but that fact, alluded to in a footnote, Regan, 461 U.S., at 545, n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 1997, was entirely nonessential to the Court's holding. Indeed, that rationale prompted a separate concurrence precisely because the majority of the Court did not rely upon it. See id., at 551-554, 103 S.Ct. 1997 (Blackmun, J., concurring). As for FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984), the ban on editorializing at issue there was disallowed precisely because it did not further a relevant, permissible policy of the Federal Communications Act-and indeed was simply incompatible with the Act's "affirmativ[e] encourage[ment]" of the "vigorous expression of controversial opinions" by licensed broadcasters. Id., at 397, 104 S.Ct. 3106. The Court makes a head-fake at the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, ante, at 2330, but that doctrine is of no help. There is no case of ours in which a condition that is relevant to a statute's valid purpose and that is not in itself unconstitutional (e.g., a religious-affiliation condition that violates the Establishment Clause) has been held to violate the doctrine. Moreover, as I suggested earlier, the contention that the condition here "coerces" respondents' speech is on its face implausible. Those organizations that wish to take a different tack with respect to prostitution "are as unconstrained now as they were before the enactment of [the Leadership Act]." National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). As the Court acknowledges, "[a]s a general matter, if a party objects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the funds," ante, at 2328, and to draw on its own coffers. The majority cannot credibly say that this speech condition is coercive, so it does not. It pussyfoots around the lack of coercion by invalidating the Leadership Act for "requiring recipients to profess a specific belief" and "demanding that funding recipients adopt-as their own-the Government's view on an issue of public concern." Ante, at 2329 (emphasis mine). But like King Cnut's commanding of the tides, here the Government's "requiring" and "demanding" have no coercive effect. In the end, and in the circumstances of this case, "compell[ing] as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief," ante, at 2332 (emphasis mine), is no compulsion at all. It is the reasonable price of admission to a limited government-spending program that each organization remains free to accept or reject. Section 7631(f)"defin [es] the recipient" only to the extent he decides that it is in his interest to be so defined. Ante, at 2330. * * * Ideological-commitment requirements such as the one here are quite rare; but making the choice between competing applicants on relevant ideological grounds is undoubtedly quite common. See, e.g., Finley, supra . As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is quite impossible to distinguish between the two. If the government cannot demand a relevant ideological commitment as a condition of application, neither can it distinguish between applicants on a relevant ideological ground. And that is the real evil of today's opinion. One can expect, in the future, frequent challenges to the denial of government funding for relevant ideological reasons. The Court's opinion contains stirring quotations from cases like West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). They serve only to distract attention from the elephant in the room: that the Government is not forcing anyone to say anything . What Congress has done here-requiring an ideological commitment relevant to the Government task at hand-is approved by the Constitution itself. Americans need not support the Constitution; they may be Communists or anarchists. But "[t]he Senators and Representatives ..., and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support [the] Constitution." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3. The Framers saw the wisdom of imposing affirmative ideological commitments prerequisite to assisting in the government's work. And so should we. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. In Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 121 S.Ct. 1043, 149 L.Ed.2d 63 (2001), upon which the Court relies, the opinion specified that "in the context of this statute there is no programmatic message of the kind recognized in Rust and which sufficed there to allow the Government to specify the advice deemed necessary for its legitimate objectives," id., at 548, 121 S.Ct. 1043.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GOLDFARB et ux. v. VIRGINIA STATE BAR et al. No. 74-70. Argued March 25, 1975 Decided June 16, 1975 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Powell, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Alan B. Morrison argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent Virginia State Bar. With him on the brief were Anthony F. Troy, Deputy Attorney General, and Stuart H. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General. Lewis T. Booker argued the cause for respondent Fairfax County Bar Assn. With him on the brief was John H. Shenefield. Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Gerald P. Norton, and Howard E. Shapiro. Eleanor M. Fox filed a brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by James D. Fellers and H. Blair White for the American Bar Assn.; by Richard C. McFarlain for the National Organization of Bar Counsel; by Leroy Jeffers for the State Bar of Texas; by Warren H. Resh for the State Bar of Wisconsin; by E. Robert Wallach and Walter J. Robinson for the Bar Association of San Francisco; and by Owen Roll and Peter M. Sfikas for the American Dental Assn. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of. the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether a minimum-fee schedule for lawyers published by the Fairfax County Bar Association and enforced by the Virginia State Bar violates § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1. The Court of Appeals held that, although the fee schedule and enforcement mechanism substantially restrained competition among lawyers, publication of the schedule by the County Bar was outside the scope of the Act because the practice of law is not “trade or commerce,” and enforcement of the schedule by the State Bar was exempt from the Sherman Act as state action as defined in Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). I In 1971 petitioners, husband and wife, contracted to buy a home in Fairfax County, Va. The financing agency required them to secure title insurance; this required a title examination, and only a member of the Virginia State Bar could legally perform that service. Petitioners therefore contacted a lawyer who quoted them the precise fee suggested in a minimum-fee schedule published by respondent Fairfax County Bar Association; the lawyer told them that it was his policy to keep his charges in line with the minimum-fee schedule which provided for a fee of 1% of the value of the property involved. Petitioners then tried to find a lawyer who would examine the title for less than the fee fixed by the schedule. They sent letters to 36 other Fairfax County lawyers requesting their fees. Nineteen replied, and none indicated that he would charge less than the rate fixed by the schedule; several stated that they knew of no attorney who would do so. The fee schedule the lawyers referred to is a list of recommended minimum prices for common legal services. Respondent Fairfax County Bar Association published the fee schedule although, as a purely voluntary association of attorneys, the County Bar has no formal power to enforce it. Enforcement has been provided by respondent Virginia State Bar which is the administrative agency through which the Virginia Supreme Court regulates the practice of law in that State; membership in the State Bar is required in order to practice in Virginia. Although the State Bar has never taken formal disciplinary action to compel adherence to any fee schedule, it has published reports condoning fee schedules, and has issued two ethical opinions indicating that fee schedules cannot be ignored. The most recent opinion states that “evidence that an attorney habitually charges less than the suggested minimum fee schedule adopted by his local bar Association, raises a presumption that such lawyer is guilty of misconduct. Because petitioners could not find a lawyer willing to charge a fee lower than the schedule dictated, they had their title examined by the lawyer they had first contacted. They then brought this class action against the State Bar and the County Bar alleging that the operation of the minimum-fee schedule, as applied to fees for legal services relating to residential real estate transactions, constitutes price fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Petitioners sought both injunctive relief and damages. After a trial solely on the issue of liability the District Court held that the minimum-fee schedule violated the Sherman Act. 355 F. Supp. 491 (ED Va. 1973). The court viewed the fee-schedule system as a significant reason for petitioners’ failure to obtain legal services for less than the minimum fee,, and it rejected the County Bar’s contention that as a “learned profession” the practice of law is exempt from the Sherman Act. Both respondents argued that their actions were also exempt from the Sherman Act as state action. Parker v. Brown, supra. The District Court agreed that the Virginia State Bar was exempt under that doctrine because it is an administrative agency of the Virginia Supreme Court, and more important, because its “minor role in this matter . . . derived from the judicial and ‘legislative command of the State and was not intended to operate or become effective without that command.’ ” The County Bar, on the other hand, is a private organization and was under no compulsion to adopt the fee schedule recommended by the State Bar. Since the County Bar chose its own course of conduct the District Court held that the antitrust laws “remain in full force and effect as to it.” The court enjoined the fee schedule, 15 TJ. S. C. i 26, and set the case down for trial to ascertain damages. 15 U. S. C. § 15. The Court of Appeals reversed as to liability. 497 F. 2d 1 (CA4 1974). Despite its conclusion that it “is abundantly clear from the record before us that the fee schedule and the enforcement mechanism supporting it act as a substantial restraint upon competition among attorneys practicing in Fairfax County,” id., at 13, the Court of Appeals held the State Bar immune under Parker v. Brown, supra, and held the County Bar immune because the practice of law is not “trade or commerce” under the Sherman Act. There has long been judicial recognition of a limited exclusion of “learned professions” from the scope of the antitrust laws, the court said; that exclusion is based upon the special form of regulation imposed upon the professions by the States, and the incompatibility of certain competitive practices with such professional regulation. It concluded that the promulgation of a minimum-fee schedule is one of “those matters with respect to which an accord must be reached between the necessities of professional regulation and the dictates of the antitrust laws.” The accord reached by that court was to hold the practice of law exempt from the antitrust laws. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals held that respondents’ activities did not have sufficient effect on interstate commerce to support Sherman Act jurisdiction. Petitioners had argued that the fee schedule restrained the business of financing and insuring home mortgages by inflating a component part of the total cost of housing, but the court concluded that a title examination is generally a local service, and even where it is part of a transaction which crosses state lines its effect on commerce is only “incidental,” and does not justify federal regulation. We granted certiorari, 419 U. S. 963 (1974), and are thus confronted for the first time with the question of whether the Sherman Act applies to services performed by attorneys in examining titles in connection with financing the purchase of real estate. II Our inquiry can be divided into four steps: did respondents engage in price fixing? If so, are their activities in interstate commerce or do they affect interstate commerce? If so, are the activities exempt from the Sherman Act because they involve a “learned profession?” If not, are the activities “state action” within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), and therefore exempt from the Sherman Act? A The County Bar argues that because the fee schedule is merely advisory, the schedule and its enforcement mechanism do not constitute price fixing. Its purpose, the argument continues, is only to provide legitimate information to aid member lawyers in complying with Virginia professional regulations. Moreover, the County Bar contends that in practice the schedule has not had the effect of producing fixed fees. The facts found by the trier belie these contentions, and nothing in the record suggests these findings lack support. A purely advisory fee schedule issued to provide guidelines, or an exchange of price information without a showing of an actual restraint on trade, would present us with a different question, e. g., American Column Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921); Maple Flooring Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 580 (1925). But see United States v. National Assn. of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485, 488-489, 495 (1950). The record here, however, reveals a situation quite different from what would occur under a purely advisory fee schedule. Here a fixed, rigid price floor arose from respondents’ activities: every lawyer who responded to petitioners’ inquiries adhered to the fee schedule, and no lawyer asked for additional information in order to set an individualized fee. The price information disseminated did not concern past standards, cf. Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925), but rather minimum fees to be . charged in future transactions, and those minimum rates were increased over time. The fee schedule was enforced through the prospect of professional discipline from the State Bar, and the desire of attorneys to comply with announced professional norms, see generally American Column Co., supra, at 411; the motivation to conform was reinforced by the assurance that other lawyers would not compete by underbidding. This is not merely a case of an agreement that may be inferred from an exchange of price information, United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S. 333, 337 (1969), for here a naked agreement was clearly shown, and the effect on prices is plain. Id., at 339 (Fortas, J., concurring). Moreover, in terms of restraining competition and harming consumers, like petitioners the price-fixing activities found here are unusually damaging. A title examination is indispensable in the process of financing a real estate purchase, and since only an attorney licensed to practice in Virginia may legally examine a title, see n. 1, supra, consumers could not turn to alternative sources for the necessary service. All attorneys, of course, were practicing under the constraint of the fee schedule. See generally United States v. Container Corp., supra, at 337. The County Bar makes much of the fact that it is a voluntary organization; however, the ethical opinions issued by the State Bar provide that any lawyer, whether or not a member of his county bar association, may be disciplined for “habitually charging] less than the suggested minimum fee schedule adopted by his local bar Association . . . See supra, at 777-778, and n. 4. These factors coalesced to create a pricing system that consumers could not realistically escape. On this record respondents’ activities constitute a classic illustration of price fixing. B The County Bar argues, as the Court of Appeals held, that any effect on interstate commerce caused by the fee schedule’s restraint on legal services was incidental and remote. In its view the legal services, which are performed wholly intrastate, are essentially local in náture and therefore a restraint with respect to them can never substantially affect interstate commerce. Further, the County Bar maintains, there was no showing here that the fee schedule and its enforcement mechanism increased fees, and that even if they did there was no showing that such an increase deterred any prospective homeowner from buying in Fairfax County. These arguments misconceive the nature of the transactions at issue and the place legal services play in those transactions. As the District Court found, “a significant portion of funds furnished for the purchasing of homes in Fairfax County comes from without the State of Virginia,” and “significant amounts of loans on Fairfax County real estate are guaranteed by the United States Veterans Administration and Department of Housing and Urban Development, both headquartered in the District of Columbia.” Thus in this class action the transactions which create the need for the particular legal services in question frequently are interstate transactions. The necessary connection between the interstate transactions and the restraint of trade provided by the minimum-fee schedule is present because, in a practical sense, title examinations are necessary in real estate transactions to assure a lien on a valid title of the borrower. In financing realty purchases lenders require, “as a condition of making the loan, that the title to the property involved be examined . . . Thus a title examination is an integral part of an interstate transaction and this Court has long held that “there is an obvious distinction to be drawn between a course of conduct wholly within a state and conduct which is an inseparable element of a larger program dependent for its success upon activity which affects commerce between the states.” United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293, 297 (1945). See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218, 228-229 (1947). Given the substantial volume of commerce involved, and the inseparability of this particular legal service from the interstate aspects of real estate transactions, we conclude that interstate commerce has been sufficiently affected. See Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 45-46 (1904); United States v. Women’s Sportswear Assn., 336 U. S. 460, 464-465 (1949). The fact that there was no showing that home buyers were discouraged by the challenged activities does not mean that interstate commerce was not affected. Otherwise, the magnitude of the effect would control, and our cases have shown that, once an effect is shown, no specific magnitude need be proved. E. g., United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U. S. 305, 310 (1956). Nor was it necessary for petitioners to prove that the fee schedule raised fees. Petitioners clearly proved that the fee schedule fixed fees and thus “deprive [d] purchasers or consumers of the advantages which they derive from free competition.” Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 501 (1940). See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940). Where, as a matter of law or practical necessity, legal services are an integral part of an interstate transaction, a restraint on those services may substantially affect commerce for Sherman Act purposes. Of course, there may be legal services that involve interstate commerce in other fashions, just as there may be legal services that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. C The County Bar argues that Congress never intended to include the learned professions within the terms “trade or commerce” in § 1 of the Sherman Act, and therefore the sale of professional services is exempt from the Act. No explicit exemption or legislative.history is provided to support this contention; rather, the existence of state regulation seems to be its primary basis. Also, the County Bar maintains that competition is inconsistent with the practice of a profession because enhancing profit is not the goal of professional activities; the goal is to provide services necessary to the community. That, indeed, is the classic basis traditionally advanced to distinguish professions from trades, businesses, and other occupations, but it loses some of its force when used to support the fee control activities involved here. In arguing that learned professions are not “trade or commerce” the County Bar seeks a total exclusion from antitrust regulation. Whether state regulation is active or dormant, real or theoretical, lawyers would be able to adopt anticompetitive practices with impunity. We cannot find support for the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion. The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 7 (1945), nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice controlling in determining whether § 1 includes professions. United States v. National Assn, of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S., at 489. Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could in § 1 of the Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an exemption as that urged on us would be at odds with that purpose. The language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, of course, contains no exception. “Language more comprehensive is difficult to conceive.” United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). And our cases have repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U. S. 482, 485 (1962). Indeed, our cases have specifically included the sale of services within § 1. E. g., American Medical Assn. v. United States, 317 U. S. 519 (1943); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445 (1957). Whatever else it may be, the examination of a land title is a service; the exchange of such a service for money is “commerce” in the most common usage of that word. It is no disparagement of the practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has this business aspect, and § 1 of the Sherman Act “[o]n its face . . . shows a carefully studied attempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among the states.” United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, at 553. In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce. D In Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), the Court held that an anticompetitive marketing program which “derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state” was not a violation of the Sherman Act because the Act was intended to regulate private practices and not to prohibit a State from imposing a restraint as an act of government. Id., at 350-352; Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 332, 344-345 (1904): Respondent State Bar and respondent County Bar both seek to avail themselves of this so-called state-action exemption. Through its legislature Virginia has authorized its highest court to regulate the practice of law. That court has adopted ethical codes which deal in part with fees, and far from exercising state power to authorize binding price fixing, explicitly directed lawyers not “to be controlled” by fee schedules. The State Bar, a state agency by law, argues that in issuing fee schedule reports and ethical opinions dealing with fee schedules it was merely implementing the fee provisions of the ethical codes. The County Bar, although it is a voluntary association and not a state agency, claims that the ethical codes and the activities of the State Bar “prompted” it to issue fee schedules and thus its actions, too, are state action for Sherman Act purposes. The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S., at 350-352; Continental Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U. S. 690, 706-707 (1962). Here we need not inquire further into the state-action question because it cannot fairly be said that the State- of Virginia through its Supreme Court Rules required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent. Respondents have pointed to no Virginia statute requiring their activities; state law simply does not refer to fees, leaving regulation of the profession to the Virginia Supreme Court; although the Supreme Court’s ethical codes mention advisory fee schedules they do not direct either respondent to supply them, or require the type of price floor which arose from respondents’ activities. Although the State Bar apparently has been granted the power to issue ethical opinions, there is no indication in this record that the Virginia Supreme Court approves the opinions. Respondents’ arguments, at most, constitute the contention that their activities complemented the objective of the ethical codes. In our view that is not state action for Sherman Act purposes. It is not enough that, as the County Bar puts it, anticompetitive conduct is “prompted” by state action; rather, anti-competitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign. The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 578-579 (1973). The State Bar, by providing that deviation from County Bar minimum fees may lead to disciplinary action, has voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity, and in that posture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. Parker v. Brown, supra, at 351-352. Its activities resulted in a rigid price floor from which petitioners, as consumers, could not escape if they wished to borrow money to buy a home. Ill We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions. We also recognize that in some instances the State may decide that “forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession.” United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326, 336 (1952). See also Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 611-613 (1935). The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been “officers of the courts.” See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U. S. 379, 383 (1963); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117, 123-124 (1961); Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 157 (1971). In holding that certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its professions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with orders to remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Unauthorized Practice of Law, Opinion No. 17, Aug. 5, 1942, Virginia State Bar — Opinions 239 (1965). Virginia Code Ann. § 54-49 (1972) provides: “The Supreme Court of Appeals may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations organizing and governing the association known as the Virginia State Bar, composed of the attorneys at law of this State, to act as an administrative agency of the Court for the purpose of investigating and reporting the violation of such rules and regulations as are adopted by the Court under this article to a court of competent jurisdiction for such proceedings as may be necessary, and requiring all persons practicing law in this State to be members thereof in good standing.” Ibid. In 1962 the State Bar published a minimum-fee-schedule report that listed a series of fees and stated that they “represent the considered judgment of the Committee [on Economics of Law Practice] as to [a] fair minimum fee in each instance.” The report stated, however, that the fees were not mandatory, and it recommended only that the State Bar consider adopting such a schedule. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter the County Bar adopted its own minimum-fee schedule that purported to be “a conscientious effort to show lawyers in their true perspective of dignity, training and integrity.” The suggested fees for title examination were virtually identical to those in the State Bar report. In accord with Opinion 98 of the State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics the schedule stated that, although there is an ethical duty to charge a lower fee in a deserving case, if a lawyer “ ‘purely for his own advancement, intentionally and regularly bills less than the customary charges of the bar for similar services . . . [in order to] increase his business with resulting personal gain, it becomes a form of solicitation contrary to Canon 27 and also a violation of Canon 7, which forbids the efforts of one lawyer to encroach upon the employment of another.’ ” App. 30. In 1969 the State Bar published a second fee-schedule report that, as it candidly stated, “reflect[ed] a general scaling up of fees for legal services.” The report again stated that no local bar association was bound by its recommendations; however, respondent County Bar again quickly moved to publish an updated minimum-fee schedule, and generally to raise fees. The new schedule stated that the fees were not mandatory, but tempered that by referring again to Opinion 98. This time the schedule also stated that lawyers should feel free to charge more than the recommended fees; and to avoid condemnation of higher fees charged by some lawyers, it cautioned County Bar members that “to . . . publicly criticize lawyers who charge more than the suggested fees herein might in itself be evidence of solicitation . . . .” Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 98, June 1, 1960; Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 170, May 28,1971. Ibid. The parties stipulated that these opinions are a substantial influencing factor in lawyers’ adherence to the fee schedules. One reason for this may be because the State Bar is required by statute to “investigat [e] and report . . . the violation of . . . rules and regulations as are adopted by the [Virginia Supreme Court] to a court of competent jurisdiction for such proceedings as may be necessary . . . .” Va. Code Ann. §54-49 (1972). Therefore any lawyer who contemplated ignoring the fee schedule must have been aware that professional sanctions were possible, and that an enforcement mechanism existed to administer them. Two additional county bar associations were originally named as defendants but they agreed to a consent judgment under which they were directed to cancel their existing fee schedules, and were enjoined from adopting, publishing, or distributing any future schedules of minimum or suggested fees. Damage claims against these associations were then dismissed with prejudice. The court was satisfied that interstate commerce was sufficiently affected to sustain jurisdiction under the Sherman Act because a significant portion of the funds and insurance involved in the purchase of homes in Fairfax County comes from outside the State of Virginia. 355 F. Supp 491, 497 (ED Va. 1973). The Court of Appeals accurately depicted the situation: “[I]t is clear from the record that ah or nearly all of the [County Bar] members charged fees equal to or exceeding the fees set forth in the schedule for title examinations and other services involving real estate.” 497 F. 2d 1,12 (CA4 1974). “ ‘A significant reason for the inability of [petitioners] to obtain legal services ... for less than the fee set forth in the Minimum Fee Schedule . . . was the operation of the minimum fee schedule system.’ ” Id., at 4. “It is abundantly clear from the record before us that the fee schedule and the enforcement mechanism supporting it act as a substantial restraint upon competition among attorneys practicing in Fairfax County.” Id., at 13. The Court of Appeals did not disturb the District Court’s findings of fact. It simply disagreed on the conclusions of law drawn therefrom. It is in a practical sense that we must view an effect on interstate commerce, Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 376, 398 (1905); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 233 (1948). 355 F. Supp., at 494. The County Bar relies on United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218 (1947), to support its argument that the “essentially local” legal services at issue here are beyond the Sherman Act. There we held, inter alia, that intrastate taxi trips that occurred at the start and finish of interstate rail travel were “too unrelated to interstate commerce to constitute a part thereof within the mean-' ing of the Sherman Act.” Id., at 230. The ride to the railway station, we said, “[f]rom the standpoints of time and continuity . . . may be quite distinct and separate from the interstate journey.” Id., at 232. Here, on the contrary, the legal services are coincidental with interstate real estate transactions in terms of time, and, more important, in terms of continuity they are essential. Indeed, it would be more apt to compare the legal services here with a taxi trip between stations to change trains in the midst of an interstate journey. In Yellow Cab we held that such a trip was a part of the stream of commerce. Id., at 228-229. 355 F. Supp., at 497. The County Bar cites phrases in several cases that implied the practice of a learned profession is not “trade or commerce” under the antitrust laws. E. g., Federal Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 200, 209 (1922) (“a firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a case . . . does not engage in . . . commerce because the lawyer . . . goes to another State”); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 653 (1931) (“medical practitioners . . . follow a profession and not a trade . . .”); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 436 (1932); United States v. National Assn. of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485, 490 (1950). These citations are to passing references in cases concerned with other issues; and, more important, until the present case it is clear that we have not attempted to decide whether the practice of a learned profession falls within § 1 of the Sherman Act. In National Assn. of Real Estate Boards, we specifically stated that the question was still open, 339 U. S., at 492, as we had done earlier in American Medical Assn. v. United States, 317 U. S. 519, 528 (1943). The reason for adopting the fee schedule does not appear to have been wholly altruistic. The first sentence in Tospondent State Bar’s 1962 Minimum Fee Schedule Report states: “ ‘The lawyers have slowly, but surely, been committing economic suicide as a profession.’ ” Virginia State Bar, Minimum Fee Schedule Report 1962, p. 3, App. 20. The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today. Virginia Code Ann. § 54-48 (1972) provides: “Rules and regulations defining practice of law and prescribing codes of ethics and disciplinary procedure. — The Supreme Court of Appeals may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations: “(a) Defining the practice of law. “(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys at law and a code of judicial ethics. “(c) Prescribing procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys at law.” In addition, the Supreme Court of Virginia, has inherent power to regulate the practice of law in that State. Button v. Day, 204 Va. 547, 132 S. E. 2d 292 (1963). See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820 (1961). In 1938 the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted Rules for the Integration of the Virginia State Bar, and Rule II, § 12, dealt with the procedure for setting fees. Among six factors that court directed to be considered in setting a fee were “the customary charges of the Bar for similar services.” The court also directed that "[i]n determining the customary charges of the Bar for similar services, it is proper for a law}-er to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar Association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby or to follow it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.” Rules for Integration of the Virginia State Bar, 171 Va. xvii, xxiii. (Emphasis supplied.) In 1970 the Virginia Supreme Court amended the 1938 rules in part, and adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility, effective January 1, 1971. 211 Va. 295 (1970). Certain of its provisions also dealt with the fee-setting procedure. In EC 2-18 lawyers were told again that fees vary according to many factors, but that “[s]uggested fee schedules and economic reports of state and local bar associations provide some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees.” 211 Va., at 302. In DR 2-106 (B), which detailed eight factors that should be considered in avoiding an excessive fee, one of the factors was “[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” DR 2-106 (B)(3). 211 Va., at 313. See supra, at 776 n. 2. The District Court stated that the State Bar acted in only a “minor role” as far as the price fixing was concerned, 355 F. Supp., at 496, and one member of the Court of Appeals panel was prepared to exonerate the State Bar because its participation was so minimal as to be insufficient to impose Sherman Act liability. 497 F. 2d, at 21 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting). Of course, an alleged participant in a restraint of trade may have so insubstantial a connection with the restraint that liability under the Sherman Act would not be found, see United States v. National Assn. of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S., at 495; however, that is not the case here. The State Bar’s fee schedule reports provided the impetus for the County Bar, on two occasions, to adopt minimum-fee schedules. More important, the State Bar’s ethical opinions provided substantial reason for lawyers to comply with the minimum-fee schedules. Those opinions threatened professional discipline for habitual disregard of fee schedules, and thus attorneys knew their livelihood was in jeopardy if they did so. Even without that threat the opinions would have constituted substantial reason to adhere to the schedules because attorneys could be expected to comply in order to assure that they did not discredit themselves by departing from professional norms, and perhaps betraying their professional oaths. The State Bar also contends that it is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). Petitioners dispute this contention, and the District Court had no occasion to reach it in view of its holding. Given the record before us we intimate no view on the issue, leaving it for the District Court on remand.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. FOSTER LUMBER CO., INC. No. 74-799. Argued November 12, 1975- — -Reargued October 5, 1976— Decided November 2, 1976 Stuart A. Smith reargued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Crampton, Jonathan S. Cohen, and Ernest J. Brown. Russell W. Baker reargued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Paul R. Lamoree. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Hilbert P. Zarky for Data Products Corp.; and by Edward J. Schmuck, Jerome B. Libin, and George B. Abramowitz for North River Insurance Co. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, provides that a “net operating loss” experienced by a corporate taxpayer in one year may be carried as a deduction to the preceding three years and the succeeding five years to offset taxable income of those years. The entire loss must be carried to the earliest possible year; any of the loss that is not “absorbed” by that first year may then be carried in turn to succeeding years. The respondent, Foster Lumber Co., sustained a net operating loss of some $42,000 in 1968, which it carried back to 1966. In 1966 the respondent had had ordinary income of about $7,000 and a capital gain of about $167,000. The question presented is whether a loss carryover is “absorbed” by capital gain as well as ordinary income or is instead limited to offsetting only ordinary income. The taxpayer filed a refund suit in Federal District Court challenging the Commissioner’s disallowance of its claim that the $35,000 of the 1968 loss not used to offset its 1966 ordinary income survived to reduce its 1967 tax liability. The trial court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the taxpayer. We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict on a recurring question of statutory interpretation. I The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of “taxable income” as used in § 172 (b) (2) to govern the amount of carrybacks and carryovers that can be successively transferred from one taxable year to another. In relevant part, § 172 (b) (2) requires the net operating loss to be carried in full to the earliest taxable year possible, and provides: “The portion of such loss which shall be carried to each of the other taxable years shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of such loss over the sum of the taxable income for each of the prior taxable years to which such loss may be carried.” Thus when the loss has been carried back to the first year to which it is applicable, the loss “survives” for carryover to a succeeding taxable year only to the extent that it exceeds the taxable income of the earlier year. “Taxable income” is defined in § 63 (a) of the Code to mean “gross income, minus the deductions allowed by this chapter.” Gross income is in turn defined by § 61 (a) of the Code as “all income from whatever source derived,” and specifically includes “[g]ains derived from dealings in property.” On its face the concept of “taxable income” thus includes capital gains as well as ordinary income. In the absence of a specific provision excluding capital gains, it thus appears that both capital gain and ordinary income must be included in the taxable income that § 172 directs must be offset by the loss deduction before any loss excess can be found to be available for transfer forward to the succeeding taxable year. The respondent argues that the Code’s prescribed method for calculating the taxes due on its taxable income conflicts with this natural reading of § 172. The Code provides two methods for computing taxes due on corporate income, and a corporation is under a statutory duty to employ the method that results in the lower tax. 26 U. S. C. § 1201 (a). Under § 11, the “regular method,” ordinary income and capital gains income are added together to produce taxable income; during the period at issue a 22% tax rate was then imposed on the first $25,000 of taxable income and the remainder was taxed at a 48% rate. Section 1201 (a) of the Code prescribes the “alternative tax,” calculated in two steps and applied when resulting in a lower tax liability for the corporation. The first step computes a partial tax on the taxable income reduced by the net long-term capital gain at the regular corporate rates imposed by §11. This step effectively subjects only ordinary income to the partial tax. The second step imposes a 25% tax on the net long-term capital gain. The alternative tax is the sum of the partial tax and the tax on capital gain. In practical terms, the alternative tax does not redefine taxable income, but it does result in a much lower effective tax rate for corporations whose income is in whole or substantial part composed of capital gain. It thus extends to corporations the longstanding statutory policy of taxing income from capital gain at a lower rate than that applicable to ordinary income. The problem from the respondent’s point of view is that the mechanics of the alternative tax work in such a way that the potential benefit of the loss deduction may not be fully reflected in reduced tax liability for the taxable year to which the loss is carried. The problem arises when, as in 1966 for the respondent, the “alternative method” governs the calculation of tax liability, and the ordinary income effectively subject to the partial tax under the first step is less than the loss deduction subtracted from it. The Code does not permit the excess loss to be subtracted from the capital gain income before the second step- is carried out. Under the alternative method, therefore, the tax benefit of the loss deduction is effectively lost for the carryover year to the extent that it exceeds the ordinary income in that year. This can be seen simply by considering the taxpayer’s circumstances in this case. Subtracting the loss deduction of $42,203.12 from the 1966 ordinary income of $7,236.05 under Step 1 resulted in a negative balance of $34,967.07; no partial tax was imposed and the 25% rate on the $166,634.81 of capital gains under Step 2 produced a tax of $41,658.70. If the loss deduction had been merely $7,236.05, and thus exactly offset the $7,236.05 of ordinary income, however, the tax due would still have been $41,658.70. The taxpayer therefore asserts that only $7,236.05 of the loss deduction was actually “used” in 1966 and that $34,-967.07 remained to be carried forward to reduce its tax liability in 1967. There can be no doubt that if the “regular method” had been applicable to the respondent’s taxes in 1966, the loss deduction ($42,203.12) would have been fully “used” to offset capital gains ($166,634.81) as well as ordinary income ($7,236.05), leaving $131,667.74 to be taxed, and a tax bill of $58,200.52. It is clear that the alternative tax produced the lower tax liability despite the inability to fully “use” the loss deduction; the lower tax resulted directly from the favorable rate of taxation of capital gain income prescribed by the alternative method. The question is whether the two “tax benefit” provisions relied on by the respondent— low capital gain taxation under the alternative method and the loss carryback provision — must each be maximized independently of the other or whether Congress instead anticipated that the benefit provided by the loss deduction might on occasion be subsumed in the greater benefit provided by the alternative tax computation method. Section 172 does not explicitly address the question of fit between these two tax benefits, providing simply that “[t]he portion of such loss which shall be carried to each of the other taxable years shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of such loss over the sum of the taxable income for each of the prior taxable years to which such loss may be carried.” The respondent contends, and the Tax Court in Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T. C. 346, aff’d per curiam, 428 F. 2d 474 (CA1), held, that the phrase “to which such loss may be carried” modifies “taxable income” as well as “each of the prior taxable years.” The Tax Court in the Chartier case further held that “ 'taxable income’ in this context (as modified by the above phrase) means that taxable income to which the loss is actually applied in computing actual tax liability.” 52 T. C., at 357-358. In other wnrds, it was held, taxable income refers only to that ordinary income offset by a loss deduction that produces an additional reduction in tax liability under the alternative tax computation method. It is, of course, not unusual in statutory construction to find that a defined term’s meaning is substantially modified by an attached clause. But reading “taxable income to which . . . such loss may be carried” as equivalent to “taxable income to which such loss may be carried and deducted, resulting in a reduction of tax liability” gives these phrases a synergistic effect that goes well beyond their natural import. Such a construction subtly redefines “taxable income” in terms of the tax impact of a particular method of tax calculation. It thus implicitly departs from the “term of art” definition of taxable income given in § 63 (a), while discovering a significance in the word “carry” that goes well beyond its usual connotation of a transfer of a loss from the year in which it occurred. Standing alone, this strained reading of the statute’s terms falls considerably short of the explicit statutory support the Court has previously required of taxpayers seeking a tax benefit from losses suffered in other years. See, e. g., Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U. S. 319, 326. If Congress had intended to allow a loss deduction to offset only ordinary income when the alternative tax calculation method is used, it could easily have said so. II The respondent further asserts that the legislative history and the broad policy behind the loss deduction section of the Code support its interpretation of “taxable income” under § 172 (b). Although, for the reasons stated above, it can hardly be said that the benefit claimed by the respondent is fairly within the statutory language, it is not inappropriate to consider this contention — to consider, in short, whether “the construction sought is in harmony with the statute as an organic whole.” See Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U. S. 237, 240. The respondent relies on the Court’s opinion in Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U. S. 382, 386, for a description of the legislative purpose in allowing loss carryovers. In that case the Court said that the net operating loss carryover and carryback provisions “were enacted to ameliorate the unduly drastic consequences of taxing income strictly on an annual basis. They were designed to permit a taxpayer to set off its lean years against its lush years, and to strike something like an average taxable income computed over a period longer than one year.” There were, in fact, several policy considerations behind the decision to allow averaging of income over a number of years. Ameliorating the timing consequences of the annual accounting period makes it possible for shareholders in companies with fluctuating as opposed to stable incomes to receive more nearly equal tax treatment. Without loss offsets, a firm experiencing losses in some periods would not be able to deduct all the expenses of earning income. The consequence would be a tax on capital, borne by shareholders who would pay higher taxes on net income than owners of businesses with stable income. Congress also sought through allowance of loss carryovers to stimulate enterprise and investment, particularly in new businesses or risky ventures where early losses can be carried forward to future more prosperous years. The respondent focuses on the equalizing purposes of § 172 to argue that the Commissioner’s insistence on the absorption of the loss deduction by capital gain income is inconsistent with § 172’s primary purpose of avoiding the subjection of similarly situated taxpayers to significantly different treatment solely on the basis of arbitrary timing. This argument is based on the observation that, unless it is accepted, the taxpayer’s ability to fully benefit from the loss carryover deduction will turn on whether ordinary income in the first year to which the loss may be carried exceeds or is less than the loss deduction. If the ordinary income exceeds the loss, the taxpayer will get the full benefit of the deduction; if the ordinary income is less than the loss, the shortfall will be absorbed by capital gain income without providing an incremental tax reduction. Congress may, of course, be lavish or miserly in remedying perceived inequities in the tax structure. While there is no doubt that Congress through the loss carryover provisions did intend to reduce the arbitrariness inherent in a taxing system based on annual accounting, the history of the loss offset provision does not support the respondent’s vision of a Congress seeking perfection in the realization of its objective. Over the years, Congress has shifted the definition of both the kinds of losses and the kinds of income that may be used in calculating the loss offset, indicating its ability in this area of the Internal Revenue Code as in others to make precise definitions and later to modify them in pursuing its broad policy goals. For example, Congress in 1924 specifically provided that a noncorporate taxpayer could use the excess of a loss deduction over ordinary income to reduce the amount of capital gain subject to tax, thus permitting full “use” of the loss deduction by the taxpayer. The inference can be drawn that Congress was aware of the potential “waste” of the deduction otherwise and acted to prevent it. That provision was in turn left out of the 1939 Code, leading to the contrary inference that Congress was aware of the “waste” of the deduction but decided not to remedy it. The 1939 revision of the Code, in fact, tolerated even further “waste” of the loss deduction, providing not only that the loss must be offset against net income (ordinary income and capital gains), but that tax-exempt interest income must also be included in income that the loss was required to offset. This provision had the same arbitrary policy consequences that the respondent decries under the alternative tax computation method applicable here. It required the loss deduction to be “used up” in offsetting tax-exempt income, thus “wasting” a portion of the loss deduction's capacity to reduce overall tax liability. And it made the utility of the loss deduction turn on the accidents of timing. The loss deduction would be “wasted” in offsetting tax-exempt income realized in an early year, while if the tax-exempt income were not realized until a later year the full tax benefit of the loss deduction could have been garnered. Such results cut against any assertion that the loss-deduction provisions have consistently been used completely to minimize arbitrary timing consequences, and indicate that Congress has not hesitated in this area to limit taxpayers to the enjoyment of one tax benefit even though it could have made them eligible for two. The 1954 Internal Revenue Code continued the 1939 Code’s definition of ordinary and capital gain income as subject to set-off by the § 172 loss deduction. Although several substantive changes in the loss-deduction section were made and commented on in the legislative reports accompanying the 1954 Code, there was no indication that the addition to § 172 (b) of the phrase “to which such loss may be carried” was meant to signal a willingness to condition the loss deduction’s life on its ability to produce full tax benefits for the taxpayer. In view of the predecessor statutes’ tolerance of a taxpayer’s inability to maximize the tax benefit of a loss deduction, and the complete failure of the Committee Reports in any way to indicate the shift in policy the respondent claims to discern in the 1954 Code revision, the legislative history simply does not support the respondent’s contention that the addition in 1954 of. the phrase “to which such loss may be carried” was intended to eliminate the requirement that the loss deduction be used to offset capital gain under the alternative tax computation method. We turn finally'to an examination of § 172 (b) in the context of the statute as it exists today. If the statute could be viewed as consistently minimizing the arbitrariness of timing consequences, a construction of § 172 (b) inconsistent with that approach might be suspect. Section 172 as a whole has not, however, been drafted with the singleminded devotion to reducing arbitrary timing consequences that the respondent urges should control the decision in this case. The most telling example of Congress’ failure to remedy all timing accidents that “rob” a taxpayer of the full benefit of the loss deduction can be found in § 172 (c). That provision defines a “net operating loss” as “the excess of the deductions allowed by this chapter over the gross income.” A taxpayer does not have a loss for a particular year unless its deductions exceed its ordinary income and its capital gains. When an ordinary income loss is experienced in a year of negligible capital gains it gives rise to a net operating loss that can be carried over to other years. If that same ordinary income loss comes in a year when the net capital gains exceed that loss, there is no net operating loss under the statute to carry to another year. Because the statute also forbids setting off that ordinary loss against the capital gains before the capital gain tax is computed under the alternative method, the loss’ potential tax benefit is arbitrarily “lost” to the taxpayer solely as a result of accidents of timing. Congress, of course, can and occasionally has in the past treated loss years differently from carryover years. But if Congress were intent on substantially eliminating accidents of timing from the calculation of income on an average basis, it would hardly have tolerated such a departure from that purpose at the very inception of the tax benefit provided by § 172. The respondent’s argument is further undercut by the holding in Chartier Real Estate Co., not challenged here, that the statute forbids using a loss deduction to offset capital gain income in a loss carryover year. If such an offset were permitted, the taxpayer would benefit by a further reduction in its capital gain tax liability already calculated at a preferential rate. The respondent in effect asks this Court to infer from that deliberate denial of the limited tax benefit that would accrue from using the loss to offset preferentially taxed capital gains, that Congress implicitly meant to confer the even greater tax benefit of using the loss to offset ordinary income taxed at the higher regular rates. In a statutory section that part by part manages explicitly to detail loss calculations on one hand and deductions on the other, such a leap in statutory construction must be much more firmly grounded in a consistently articulated and achieved congressional purpose than can be discerned here. The respondent’s broad argument, in short, boils down to a contention that “harmony with the statute as an organic whole” can be achieved in this area only by reading the Code provision so as to give the greatest possible benefits to all taxpayers. For the reasons we have discussed, that is a contention that cannot be accepted. The judgment is 'Reversed. Title 26 U. S. C. § 172 (1964 ed.): “Net operating loss deduction. “(a) Deduction allowed. “There shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year an amount equal to the aggregate of (1) the net operating loss carryovers to such year, plus (2) the net operating loss carrybacks to such year. For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'net operating loss deduction’ means the deduction allowed by this subsection. “(b) [as amended by §317 (b), Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-794, 76 Stat. 889, and §§ 210 (a) and 210 (b), Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-272, 78 Stat. 47, 48] Net operating loss carrybacks and carryovers. “(1) Years to which loss may be carried. “(A)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii) and in subparagraph (D), a net operating loss for any taxable year ending after December 31, 1957, shall be a net operating loss carryback to each of the 3 taxable years preceding the taxable year of such loss. “(ii) In the case of a taxpayer with respect to a taxable year ending on or after December 31, 1962, for which a certification has been issued under section 317 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a net operating loss for such taxable year shall be a net operating loss carryback to each of the 5 taxable years preceding the taxable year of such loss. “(B) Except as provided in subparagraphs (C) and (D), a net operating loss for any taxable year ending after December 31, 1955, shall be a net operating loss carryover to each of the 5 taxable years following the taxable year of such loss. “(2) Amount of carrybacks and carryovers. “Except as provided in subsections (i) and (j), the entire amount of the net operating loss for any taxable year (hereinafter in this section referred to as the ‘loss year’) shall be carried to the earliest of the taxable years to which (by reason of paragraph (1)) such loss may be carried. The portion of such loss which shall be carried to each of the other taxable years shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of such loss over the sum of the taxable income for > each of the prior taxable years to which such loss may be carried. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the taxable income for any such prior taxable year shall be computed— “(A) with the modifications specified in subsection (d) other than paragraphs (1), (4), and (6) thereof; and “(B) by determining the amount of the net operating loss deduction— “(i) without regard to the net operating loss for the loss year or for any taxable year thereafter, and “(ii) without regard to that portion, if any, of a net operating loss for a taxable year attributable to a foreign expropriation loss, if such portion may not, under paragraph (1)(D), be carried back to such prior taxable year, “and the taxable income so computed shall not be considered to be less than zero. For purposes of this paragraph, if a portion of the net operating loss for the loss year is attributable to a foreign expropriation loss to which paragraph (1) (D) applies, such portion shall be considered to be a separate net operating loss for such year to be applied after the other portion of such net operating loss. “(c) Net operating loss defined. “For purposes of this section, the term 'net operating loss’ means (for any taxable year ending after December 31, 1953) the excess of the deductions allowed by this chapter over the gross income. Such excess shall be computed with the modifications specified in subsection (d). “(d) Modifications. “The modifications referred to in this section are as follows: “(1) Net operating loss deduction. “No net operating loss deduction shall be allowed. “(2) Capital gains and losses oj taxpayers other than corporations. “In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation— “(B) the deduction for long-term capital gains provided by section 1202 shall not be allowed.” 420 U. S. 1003. In the present case the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed the seminal Tax Court decision in Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T. C. 346, aff’d per curiam, 428 F. 2d 474 (CA1). See 500 F. 2d 1230. The Ninth Circuit is in agreement with the First and the Eighth Circuits. See Olympic Foundry Co. v. United States, 493 F. 2d 1247, and Data Products Corp. v. United States, No. 74-3341 (Dec. 27, 1974), cert. pending, No. 74-996. The Fourth Circuit refused to follow the reasoning of those Circuits in Mutual Assurance Soc. v. Commissioner, 505 F. 2d 128. The Sixth Circuit appears to agree in principle with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning. See Axelrod v. Commissioner, 507 F. 2d 884. Congress has specifically tailored definitions of taxable income in other sections of the Code when the § 63 (a) definition is inadequate for its purposes. See, e. g., 26 U. S. C. § 593 (b) (2) (E) (mutual savings banks); § 832 (a) (insurance companies); § 852 (b) (2) (regulated investment companies). Congress in fact did state certain modifications of the term “taxable income” in the third sentence of § 172 (b) (2), but none of these modifications suggests any instances in which taxable income does not include capital gains. For purposes of simplicity we use the term “net long-term capital gain” or simply “capital gain” rather than the statutory phrase “excess of net long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss.” Similarly, we sometimes in this opinion use the term “loss deduction” rather than the statutory phrase “net operating loss deduction.” See 26 U. S. C. § 1201 (a) (2) and Chartier Real Estate Co., 52 T. C., at 350-356; Weil v. Commissioner, 23 T. C. 424, aff’d, 229 F. 2d 593 (CA6). The description in the text of the alternative tax computation method is truncated; the mechanics are here set out in full: “Alternative Method” (Section 1801 (a)) Taxable Income (excluding net operating loss deduction): Ordinary Income........................ $7,236.05 Capital Gain Income.................... 166,634.81 $173,870.86 LESS: Net Operating Loss Deduction Resulting From Carryback of 1968 Net Operating Loss............... (42,203.12) Taxable Income (Section 63(a))....................... $131,667.74 (Step 1 — Partial Tax) LESS: Excess of Net Long-Term Capital Gain Over Net ShorLTerm Capital Loss............................. $166,634.81 Balance .............................................. ($ 34,967.07) Partial Tax at Section 11 Rates on Balance (Section 1201(a)(1)) ........................................ -0- (Step 8 — Capital Gain Tax) PLUS: Capital Gain Tax at Flat 25 Percent Rate on Excess of Net Long-Term Capital Gain Over Net Short-Term Capital Loss (Section 1201 (a)(2)).............. $ 41,658.70 Alternative Tax (Sum of Partial Tax and Capital Gain Tax) (1966 rates)................................... $ 41,658.70 The steps taken by the Internal Revenue Service to reach that result are as follows: “Regular Method” (Section 11) Taxable Income (excluding net operating loss deduction) : Ordinary Income........................ $7,236.05 Capital Gain Income.................... 166,634.81 $173,870.86 LESS: Net Operating Loss Deduction Resulting From Carryback of 1968 Net Operating Loss................. (42,203.12) Taxable Income (Section 63 (a))........................ $131,667.74 Regular Tax (1966 rates).............................. $ 58,200.52 (The regular tax reflects a $1,500 tax on multiple surtax exemption not at issue in this case.) The construction urged by the respondent also finds no support in the Treasury Regulations on Income Tax that implement § 172. See 26 CFR §§ 1.172-4, 1.172-5 (1976). See generally United States Treasury Department and Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Business Loss Offsets (1947), excerpted in B. Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income Estate and Gift Taxation 859-863 (1972). See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1939): “New enterprises and the capital-goods industries are especially subject to wide fluctuations in earnings. It is, therefore, believed that the allowance of a net operating business loss carry-over will greatly aid business and stimulate new enterprises.” See also H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 27 (1954): “The longer period for averaging will improve the equity of the tax system as between businesses with fluctuating income and those with comparatively stable incomes, and will be particularly helpful to the riskier types of enterprises which encounter marked variations in profitability.” Since 1918, the carryover period has gradually been lengthened to provide more potential years of positive income against which experienced losses can be offset; a perfect system from a taxpayer’s point of view, however, would eschew any time limitations altogether. Section 204 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 was the first provision to permit the excess of expensas over income in one tax year to be deducted in another tax year. A one-year carryover and carryback was allowed. See Act of Feb. 24, 1919, § 204, 40 Stat. 1060. In 1933, the National Industrial Recovery Act abolished all net operating loss carryovers and carrybacks. See Act of June 16, 1933, §218 (a), 48 Stat. 209. In 1939, a net operating loss carryover provision was reintroduced and provided for a two-year carryover. See Act of June 29, 1939, § 122, 53 Stat. 867. The three-year carryback and five-year carryover permitted since 1958, has recently been amended to allow seven years for carryover and to permit the taxpayer to elect to forgo carrybacks and to instead carry the net operating loss forward seven years. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 806 (a), 90 Stat. 1598. Act of June 2,1924, c. 234, § 208 (a) (5), 43 Stat. 262. Counsel for the respondent relied in oral argument on Merrill v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 566, 105 F. Supp. 379, which excluded capital gain from the term “net income” in interpreting the 1939 Code’s § 12 (g) limitation on tax liability, to demonstrate that “net income” under the 1939 Code could for policy reasons be construed to avoid the unnecessary “wasting” of a loss. Such a construction would be in direct conflict with the statute’s general definition of “net income”; under § 122 of the 1939 Code governing loss deductions, there was no phrase like “to which such loss may be carried” to give even a colorable statutory-construction basis to its argument that net income does not include capital gain. The Merrill case obviously does not control construction of the “net income” term as used in § 122 of the 1939 Code. And it would be anomalous in ■ any case to conclude that Congress meant to exclude capital gain income from offsetting a loss deduction with the purpose of avoiding “wasting” a loss deduction, when Congress simultaneously required “waste” of the loss deduction by providing that it must offset tax-exempt interest and depletion income as well as net income. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §§122 (d)(1), (2). See H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 27 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 31-33 (1954); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1954). See Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T. C. 346. The Chartier holding relied on Weil v. Commissioner, 23 T. C. 424, a case in which the Tax Court had concluded that the express language of the 1939 Code provided for a flat rate of tax on taxable capital gain, unreduced by a loss deduction, as an alternative to the tax imposed upon such gain when it is included in gross income and taxed in the regular manner. An amicus curiae brief filed in the present case urges that this holding be reconsidered on policy grounds should the respondent’s argument be rejected, but concedes that the language of § 1201 (a) (2) supports the result reached in Weil and applied in Chartier. Section 172 (d) (2) (B) provides a further indication that capital gains are properly included in the taxable income that a loss deduction must offset before being carried to a succeeding carryover year. For a non-corporate taxpayer who normally computes his tax liability by deducting 50% of net long-term capital gains under § 1202 of the Code, § 172 (d) (2) (B) requires that the full amount of ordinary income plus capital gains be offset against the net operating loss. That “taxable income” encompasses capital gain income for individual taxpayers under § 172 strongly suggests that the “taxable income” of corporate taxpayers should be given similar scope.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 25. Argued April 3, 1950. Decided June 5, 1950. Belford V. Lawson, Jr. and Jawn Sandifer argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief were Marjorie M. McKenzie, Sidney A. Jones, Jr., Earl B. Dickerson, Josiah F. Henry, Jr., Theodore M. Berry and George H. Windsor. Attorney General McGrath and Solicitor General Perl-man argued the cause for the United States, appellee, urging reversal. With Mr. Perlman on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Bergson, Charles H. Weston and Philip Elman. Allen Crenshaw argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellee, urging affirmance. With him on the brief was Daniel W. Knowlton. Charles Clark argued the cause for the Southern Railway Co., appellee. With him on the brief were Sidney S. Alderman and Arthur J. Dixon. By special leave of Court, The Honorable Sam Hobbs, a member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, argued the cause and filed a brief, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae, supporting appellant, were filed by Robert J. Silberstein, Mozart G. Ratner and Ruth Weyand for the National Lawyers Guild; Phineas Indritz for the American Veterans Committee, Inc.; Arthur J. Goldberg for the Congress of Industrial Organizations; Will Maslow, Shad Polier and Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress; Robert L. Carter and Thurgood Marshall for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; and Joseph R. Booker, Richard E. Westbrooks, Lucia T. Thomas, William A. Booker, Georgia Jones Ellis, Earl B. Dickerson and Joseph E. Clayton, Jr. for the Civil Rights Committee of the National Bar Association. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is whether the rules and practices of the Southern Railway Company, which divide each dining car so as to allot ten tables exclusively to white passengers and one table exclusively to Negro passengers, and which call for a curtain or partition between that table and the others, violate § 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. That section makes it unlawful for a railroad in interstate commerce “to subject any particular person, ... to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever: . . . .” 54 Stat. 902, 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1). We hold that those rules and practices do violate the Act. This issue grows out of an incident which occurred May 17, 1942. On that date the appellant, Elmer W. Henderson, a Negro passenger, was traveling on a first-class ticket on the Southern Railway from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, en route to Birmingham, Alabama, in the course of his duties as an employee of the United States. The train left Washington at 2 p. m. At about 5:30 p. m., while the train was in Virginia, the first call to dinner was announced and he went promptly to the dining car. In accordance with the practice then in effect, the two end tables nearest the kitchen were conditionally reserved for Negroes. At each meal those tables were to be reserved initially for Negroes and, when occupied by Negroes, curtains were to be drawn between them and the rest of the car. If the other tables were occupied before any Negro passengers presented themselves at the diner then those two tables also were to be available for white passengers, and Negroes were not to be seated at them while in use by white passengers. When the appellant reached the diner, the end tables in question were partly occupied by white passengers but at least one seat at them was unoccupied. The dining-car steward declined to seat the appellant in the dining car but offered to serve him, without additional charge, at his Pullman seat. The appellant declined that offer and the steward agreed to send him word when space was available. No word was sent and the appellant was not served, although he twice returned to the diner before it was detached at 9 p. m. In October, 1942, the appellant filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission alleging especially that the foregoing conduct violated § 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Division 2 of the Commission found that he had been subjected to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage, but that the occurrence was a casual incident brought about by the bad judgment of an employee. The Commission declined to enter an order as to future practices. 258 I. C. C. 413. A three-judge United States District Court for the District of Maryland, however, held that the railroad’s general practice, as evidenced by its instructions of August 6, 1942, was in violation of § 3 (1). Accordingly, on February 18, 1946, it remanded the case for further proceedings. 63 F. Supp. 906. Effective March 1, 1946, the company announced its modified rules which are now in effect. They provide for the reservation of ten tables, of four seats each, exclusively and unconditionally for white passengers and one table, of four seats, exclusively and unconditionally for Negro passengers. Between this table and the others a curtain is drawn during each meal. On remand, the full Commission, with two members dissenting and one not participating, found that the modified rules do not violate the Interstate Commerce Act and that no order for the future was necessary. 269 I. C. C. 73. The appellant promptly instituted the present proceeding before the District Court, constituted of the same three members as before, seeking to have the Commission’s order set aside and a cease and desist order issued. 28 U. S. C. §§ 41 (28), 43-48; 49 U. S. C. § 17 (9); see also, 28 U. S. C. (Supp. III) §§ 1336, 1398, 2284, 2321, 2325. With one member dissenting, the court sustained the modified rules on the ground that the accommodations are adequate to serve the average number of Negro passengers and are “proportionately fair.” 80 F. Supp. 32, 39. The case is here on direct appeal. 28 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) §§ 1253, 2101 (b). In this Court, the United States filed a brief and argued orally in support of the appellant. It is clear that appellant has standing to bring these proceedings. He is an aggrieved party, free to travel again on the Southern Railway. Having been subjected to practices of the railroad which the Commission and the court below found to violate the Interstate Commerce Act, he may challenge the railroad's current regulations on the ground that they permit the recurrence of comparable violations. Mitchell v. United, States, 313 U. S. 80, 92-93. The material language in § 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act has been in that statute since its adoption in 1887. 24 Stat. 380. From the beginning, the Interstate Commerce Commission has recognized the application of that language to discriminations between white and Negro passengers. Councill v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 1 I. C. C. 339; Heard v. Georgia R. Co., 1 I. C. C. 428; Heard v. Georgia R. Co., 3 I. C. C. 111; Edwards v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co., 121. C. C. 247; Cozart v. Southern R. Co., 161. C. C. 226; Gaines v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 471; Crosby v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 112 I. C. C. 239. That section recently was so applied in Mitchell v. United States, supra. The decision of this case is largely controlled by that in the Mitchell case. There a Negro passenger holding a first-class ticket was denied a Pullman seat, although such a seat was unoccupied and would have been available to him if he had been white. The railroad rules had allotted a limited amount of Pullman space, consisting of compartments and drawing rooms, to Negro passengers and, because that space was occupied, the complainant was excluded from the Pullman car and required to ride in a second-class coach. This Court held that the passenger thereby had been subjected to an unreasonable disadvantage in violation of § 3 (l). The similarity between that case and this is inescapable. The appellant here was denied a seat in the dining car although at least one seat was vacant and would have been available to him, under the existing rules, if he had been white. The issue before us, as in the Mitchell case, is whether the railroad’s current rules and practices cause passengers to be subjected to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in violation of § 3 (1). We find that they do. The right to be free from unreasonable discriminations belongs, under § 3 (1), to each particular person. Where a dining car is available to passengers holding tickets entitling them to use it, each such passenger is equally entitled to its facilities in accordance with reasonable regulations. The denial of dining service to any such passenger by the rules before us subjects him to a prohibited disadvantage. Under the rules, only four Negro passengers may be served at one time and then only at the table reserved for Negroes. Other Negroes who present themselves are compelled to await a vacancy at that table, although there may be many vacancies elsewhere in the diner. The railroad thus refuses to extend to those passengers the use of its existing and unoccupied facilities. The rules impose a like deprivation upon white passengers whenever more than 40 of them seek to be served at the same time and the table reserved for Negroes is vacant. We need not multiply instances in which these rules sanction unreasonable discriminations. The curtains, partitions and signs emphasize the artificiality of a difference in treatment which serves only to call attention to a racial classification of passengers holding identical tickets and using the same public dining facility. Cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, ante, p. 637, decided today. They violate § 3 (1). Our attention has been directed to nothing which removes these racial allocations from the statutory condemnation of “undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage . . . .” It is argued that the limited demand for dining-car facilities by Negro passengers justifies the regulations. But it is no answer to the particular passenger who is denied service at an unoccupied place in a dining car that, on the average, persons like him are served. As was pointed out in Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80, 97, “the comparative volume of traffic cannot justify the denial of a fundamental right of equality of treatment, a right specifically safeguarded by the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.” Cf. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337. That the regulations may impose on white passengers, in proportion to their numbers, disadvantages similar to those imposed on Negro passengers is not an answer to the requirements of §3(1). Discriminations that operate to the disadvantage of two groups are not the less to be condemned because their impact is broader than if only one were affected. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22. Since § 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act invalidates the rules and practices before us, we do not reach the constitutional or other issues suggested. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to set aside the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which dismissed the original complaint and to remand the case to that Commission for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. No reliance is placed in this case upon any action by any state. Rule of the Southern Railway Company issued July 3, 1941, and in effect May 17, 1942: “dining car regulations “Meals should be served to passengers of different races at separate times. If passengers of one race desire meals while passengers of a different race are being served in the dining car, such meals will be served in the room or seat occupied by the passenger without extra charge. If the dining ear is equipped with curtains so that it can be divided into separate compartments, meals may be served to passengers of different races at the same time in the compartments set aside for them.” 258 I. C. C. 413, 415, 63 F. Supp. 906, 910. Joint Circular of the Southern Railway System issued August 6, 1942: “Effective at once please be governed by the following with respect to the race separation curtains in dining cars: “Before starting each meal pull the curtains to service position and place a ‘Reserved’ card on each of the two tables behind the curtains. “These tables are not to be used by white passengers until all other seats in the car have been taken. Then if no colored passengers present themselves for meals, the curtain should be pushed back, cards removed and white passengers served at those tables. “After the tables are occupied by white passengers, then should colored passengers present themselves they should be advised that they will be served just as soon as those compartments are vacated. “ ‘Reserved’ cards are being supplied you.” 258 I. C. C. at p. 415, 63 F. Supp. at p. 910. “(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this part to make, give, or came any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever: . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 54 Stat. 902, 49 U. S. C. §3 (1). The appellant sought an order directing the railroad not only to cease and desist from the specific violations alleged but also to establish in the future, for the complainant and other Negro interstate passengers, equal and just dining-car facilities and such other service and facilities as the Commission might consider reasonable and just, and requiring the railroad to discontinue using curtains around tables reserved for Negroes. The appellant sought damages, but the Commission found no pecuniary damages and that issue has not been pressed further. “TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 142. CANCELLING INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT DATED JULY 3, 1941, AND AUGUST 6, 1942. “SUBJECT: SEGREGATION OF WHITE AND COLORED PASSENGERS IN DINING CARS. “To: Passenger Conductors and Dining Car Stewards. “Consistent with experience in respect to the ratio between the number of white and colored passengers who ordinarily apply for service in available diner space, equal but separate accommodations shall be provided for white and colored passengers by partitioning diners and the allotment of space, in accordance with the rules, as follows: “(1) That one of the two tables at Station No. 1 located to the left side of the aisle facing the buffet, seating four persons, shall be reserved exclusively for colored passengers, and the other tables in the diner shall be reserved exclusively for white passengers. “(2) Before starting each meal, draw the partition curtain separating the table in Station No. 1, described above, from the table on that side of the aisle in Station No. 2, the curtain to remain so drawn for the duration of the meal. “(3) A ‘Reserved’ card shall be kept in place on the left-hand table in Station No. 1, described above, at all times during the meal except when such table is occupied as provided in these rules. “ (4) These rules become effective March 1, 1946. “R. K. McClain, “Assistant Vice-President.” 2691. C. C. 73, 75,80 F. Supp. 32,35. Counsel for the railway company, at a subsequent hearing, corrected the above rules “to the extent of using the word ‘negroes’ in the place of ‘colored persons.’ ” Also, the evidence shows, and the Commission has stated, that “White and Negro soldiers are served together, without distinction.” 258 I. C. C. 413, 415, 63 F. Supp. 906, 910. The rules, accordingly, are treated as applicable only to civilian passengers. The company further showed that it is now substituting a five-foot high wooden partition in place of the curtain. The steward’s office is being placed in the table space opposite that reserved for Negro passengers and a similar wooden partition is being erected between that office and the rest of the car. The company was permitted to introduce two tabulations, covering about ten days each, showing the comparative numbers of meals served to white and Negro passengers on trips comparable to the one which the appellant had taken. These show that only about 4% of the total meals served were served to Negro passengers whereas four reserved seats exceed 9% of a total seating capacity of 44. On the other hand, the tabulations also show that at one meal 17 Negro passengers, and at each of 20 meals more than eight Negro passengers, were served. Similarly, the brief filed by the Commission states that, out of the 639 serving periods reported, on 15 occasions more than four times as many white passengers were served as there were seats reserved for them, and, on 541 occasions, there were two or more rounds of servings. “The Western and Atlantic Railroad Company will be notified to cease and desist from subjecting colored persons to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage in violation of section 3 of the Act to regulate commerce, and from furnishing to colored persons purchasing first-class tickets on its road accommodations which are not equally safe and comfortable with those furnished other first-class passengers.” 11. C. C. at p. 347. The rules also denied access by Negroes to the dining car and observation car. The principles there announced applied equally to those facilities. That specific denial of service was condemned by the Commission and the District Court as a violation of §3 (1). Review of that condemnation is not sought here.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. GARRET F., a minor, by his mother and next friend, CHARLENE F. No. 96-1793. Argued November 4, 1998 Decided March 3, 1999 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 79. Sue Luettjohann Seitz argued the cause fpr petitioners. With her on the briefs was Edward M. Mansfield. R. Oelschlaeger argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Diane Kutzko. Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, David K. Flynn, and Seth M. Galanter. Gwendolyn H. Gregory and Julie Underwood filed a brief for the National School Boards Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Academy of Pediatrics et al. by Paul M. Smith and Nory Miller; and for the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems et al. by Leslie Seid Margolis. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, was enacted, in part, “to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.” 20 U. S. C. § 1400(c). Consistent with this purpose, the IDEA authorizes federal financial assistance to States that agree to provide disabled children with special education and “related services.” See §§ 1401(a)(18), 1412(1). The question presented in this case is whether the definition of “related services” in § 1401(a)(17) requires a public school district in a participating State to provide a ventilator-dependent student with certain nursing services during school hours. I Respondent Garret E is a friendly, creative, and intelligent young man. When Garret was four years old, his spinal column was severed in a motorcycle accident. Though paralyzed from the neck down, his mental capacities were unaffected. He is able to speak, to control his motorized wheelchair through use of a puff and suck straw, and to operate a computer with a device that responds to head movements. Garret is currently a student in the Cedar Rapids Community School District (District), he attends regular classes in a typical school program, and his academic performance has been a success. Garret is, however, ventilator dependent, and therefore requires a responsible individual nearby to attend to certain physical needs while he is in school. During Garret’s early years at school his family provided for his physical care during the schoolday. When he was in kindergarten, his 18-year-old aunt attended him; in the next four years, his family used settlement proceeds they received after the accident, their insurance, and other resources to employ a licensed practical nurse. In 1993, Garret’s mother requested the District to accept financial responsibility for the health care services that Garret requires during the schoolday. The District denied the request, believing that it was not legally obligated to provide continuous one-on-one nursing services. Relying on both the requested a hearing before the Iowa Department of Education. An Administrative Law Judge (AU) received extensive evidence concerning Garret’s special needs, the District’s treatment of other disabled students, and the assistance provided to other ventilator-dependent children in other parts of the country. In his 47-page report, the AU found that the District has about 17,500 students, of whom approximately 2,200 need some form of special education or special services. Although Garret is the only ventilator-dependent student in the District, most of the health care services that he needs are already provided for some other students. “The primary difference between Garret’s situation and that of other students is his dependency on his ventilator for life support.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. The AU noted that the parties disagreed over the training or licensure required for the care and supervision of such students, and that those providing such care in other parts of the country ranged from nonlieensed personnel to registered nurses. However, the District did not contend that only a licensed physician could provide the services in question. The AU explained that federal law requires that children with a variety of health impairments be provided with “special education and related services” when their disabilities adversely affect their academic performance, and that such children should be educated to the maximum extent appropriate with children who are not disabled. In addition, the ALJ explained that applicable federal regulations distinguish between “school health services,” which are provided by a “qualified school nurse or other qualified person,” and “medical services,” which are provided by a licensed physician. See 34 CFR §§ 300.16(a), (b)(4), (b)(11) (1998). The District must provide the former, but need not provide the latter (except, of course, those “medical services” that are for diagnostic or evaluation purposes, 20 U. S. C. § 1401(a)(17)). According to the AU, the distinction in the regulations does not just depend on “the title of the person providing the service”; instead, the “medical services” exclusion is limited to services that are “in the special training, knowledge, and judgment of a physician to carry out.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. The AU thus concluded that the IDEA required the District to bear financial responsibility for all of the services in dispute, including continuous nursing services. The District challenged the AU’s decision in Federal District Court, but that court approved the ALJ’s IDEA ruling and granted summary judgment against the District. Id., at 9a, 15a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 106 F. 3d 822 (CA8 1997). It noted that, as a recipient of federal funds under the IDEA, Iowa has a statutory duty to provide all disabled children a “free appropriate public education,” which includes “related services.” See id., at 824. The Court of Appeals read our opinion in Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U. S. 883 (1984), to provide a two-step analysis of the “related services” definition in §1401(a)(17) — asking first, whether the requested services are included within the phrase “supportive services”; and second, whether the services are excluded as “medical services.” 106 F. 3d, at 824-825. The Court of Appeals succinctly answered both questions in Garret’s favor. The court found the first step plainly satisfied, since Garret cannot attend school unless the requested services are available during the sehoolday. Id., at 825. As to the second step, the court reasoned that Tatro “established a bright-line test: the services of a physician (other than for diagnostic and evaluation purposes) are subject to the medical services exclusion, but services that can be provided in the school setting by a nurse or qualified layperson are not.” 106 F. 3d, at 825. In its petition for certiorari, the District challenged only the second step of the Court of Appeals’ analysis. The District pointed out that some federal courts have not asked whether the requested health services must be delivered by a physician, but instead have applied a multifaetor test that considers, generally speaking, the nature and extent of the services at issue. See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County School, 68 F. 3d 965, 972-973 (CA6 1995), cert. denied, 517 U. S. 1134 (1996); Detsel v. Board of Ed. of Auburn Enlarged City School Dist., 820 F. 2d 587, 588 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 981 (1987). We granted the District’s petition to resolve this conflict. 523 U. S. 1117 (1998). b-i H — t The District contends that § 1401(a)(17) does not require it to provide Garret with “continuous one-on-one nursing services” during the schoolday, even though Garret cannot remain in school without such care. Brief for Petitioner 10. However, the IDEA’S definition of “related services,” our decision in Irving Independent School Dist v. Tatro, 468 U. S. 883 (1984), and the overall statutory scheme all support the decision of the Court of Appeals. The text of the “related services” definition, see n. 1, supra, broadly encompasses those supportive services that “may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.” As we have already noted, the District does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the in-sehool services at issue are within the covered category of “supportive services.” As a general matter, services that enable a disabled child to remain in school during the day provide the student with “the meaningful access to education that Congress envisioned.” Tatro, 468 U. S., at 891 (“ 'Congress sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped children’ and ‘to make such access meaningful’ ” (quoting Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist, Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 192 (1982))). This general definition of “related services” is illuminated by a parenthetical phrase listing examples of particular services that are included within the statute’s coverage. § 1401(a)(17). “[M]edieal services” are enumerated in this list, but such services are limited to those that are “for diagnostic and evaluation purposes.” Ibid. The statute does not contain a more specific definition of the “medical services” that are excepted from the coverage of § 1401(a)(17). The scope of the “medical services” exclusion is not a matter of first impression in this Court. In Tatro we concluded that the Secretary of Education had reasonably determined that the term “medical services” referred only to services that must be performed by a physician, and not to school health services. 468 U. S., at 892-894. Accordingly, we held that a specific form of health care (clean intermittent catheterization) that is often, though not always, performed by a nurse is not an excluded medical service. We referenced the likely cost of the services and the competence of school staff as justifications for drawing a line between physician and other services, ibid., but our endorsement of that line was unmistakable. It is thus settled that the phrase “medical services” in § 1401(a)(17) does not embrace all forms of care that might loosely be described as “medical” in other contexts, such as a claim for an income tax deduction. See 26 U. S. C. § 213(d)(1) (1994 ed. and Supp. II) (defining “medical care”). The District does not ask us to define the term so broadly. Indeed, the District does not argue that any of the items of care that Garret needs, considered individually, could be excluded from the scope of 20 U. S. C. § 1401(a)(17). It could not make such an argument, considering that one of the services Garret needs (catheterization) was at issue in Tatro, and the others may be provided competently by a school nurse or other trained personnel. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a, 52a. As the ALJ concluded, most of the requested services are already provided by the District to other students, and the in-school care necessitated by Garret’s ventilator dependency does not demand the training, knowledge, and judgment of a licensed physician. Id., at 51a-52a. While more extensive, the in-sehool services Garret needs are no more “medical” than was the care sought in Tatro. Instead, the District points to the combined and continuous character of the required care, and proposes a test under which the outcome in any particular ease would “depend upon a series of factors, such as [1] whether the care is continuous or intermittent, [2] whether existing school health personnel can provide the service, [3] the cost of the service, and [4] the potential consequences if the service is not properly performed.” Brief for Petitioner 11; see also id., at 34-35. The District’s multifaetor test is not supported by any recognized source of legal authority. The prqposed factors can be found in neither the text of the statute nor the regulations that we upheld in Tatro. Moreover, the District offers no explanation why these characteristics make one service any more “medical” than another. The continuous character of certain services associated with Garret’s ventilator dependency has no apparent relationship to “medical” services, much less a relationship of equivalence. Continuous services may be more costly and may require additional school personnel, but they are not thereby more “medical.” Whatever its imperfections, a rule that limits the medical services exemption to physician services is unquestionably a reasonable and generally workable interpretation of the statute. Absent an elaboration of the statutory terms plainly more convincing than that which we reviewed in Tatro, there is no good reason to depart from settled law. Finally, the District raises broader concerns nancial burden that it must bear to provide the services that Garret needs to stay in school. The problem for the District in providing these services is not that its staff cannot be trained to deliver them; the problem, the District contends, is that the existing school health staff cannot meet all of their responsibilities and provide for Garret at the same time. Through its multifaetor test, the District seeks to establish a kind of undue-burden exemption primarily based on the cost of the requested services. The first two factors can be seen as examples of cost-based distinctions: Intermittent care is often less expensive than continuous care, and the use of existing personnel is cheaper than hiring additional employees. The third factor — -the cost of the service— would then encompass the first two. The relevance of the fourth factor is likewise related to cost because extra care may be necessary if potential consequences are especially serious. The District may have legitimate financial concerns, but our role in this dispute is to interpret existing law. Defining “related services” in a manner that accommodates the cost concerns Congress may have had, cf. Tatro, 468 U. S., at 892, is altogether different from using cost itself as the definition. Given that § 1401(a)(17) does not employ cost in its definition of “related services” or excluded “medical services,” accepting the District’s cost-based standard as the sole test for determining the scope of the provision would require us to engage in judicial lawmaking without any guidance from Congress. It would also create some tension with the purposes of the IDEA. The statute may not require public schools to maximize the potential of disabled students com-mensúrate with the opportunities provided to other children, see Rowley, 458 U. S., at 200; and the potential financial burdens imposed on participating States may be relevant to arriving at a sensible construction of the IDEA, see Tatro, 468 U. S., at 892. But Congress intended “to open the door of public education” to all qualified children and “require[d] participating States to educate handicapped children with nonhandicapped children whenever possible.” Rowley, 458 U. S., at 192, 202; see id., at 179-181; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 310-311, 324 (1988); §§1412(1), (2)(C), (5)(B). This case is about whether meaningful access to the public schools will be assured, not the level of education that a school must finance once access is attained. It is undisputed that the services at issue must be provided if Garret is to remain in school. Under the statute, our precedent, and the purposes of the IDEA, the District must fund such “related services” in order to help guarantee that students like Garret are integrated into the public schools. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed. “The term ‘related services’ means transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children.” 20 U. S. C. § 1401(a)(17). Originally, the statute was enacted without a definition of “related services.” See Education of the Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175. In 1975, Congress added the definition at issue in this case. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, § 4(a)(4), 89 Stat. 775. Aside from non-substantive changes and added examples of included services, see, e. g„ Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, § 101, 111 Stat. 45; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991, §25(a)(1)(B), 105 Stat. 605; Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, § 101(c), 104 Stat. 1103, the relevant language in §1401(a)(17) has not been amended since 1975. All references to the IDEA herein are to the 1994 version as codified in Title 20 of the United States Code — the version of the statute in effect when this dispute arose. In his report in this case, the Administrative Law Judge explained: “Being ventilator dependent means that [Garret] breathes only with external aids, usually an electric ventilator, and occasionally by someone else’s manual pumping of an air bag attached to his tracheotomy tube when the ventilator is being maintained. This later procedure is called ambu bagging.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. “He needs assistance with urinary bladder catheterization once a day, the suctioning of his tracheotomy tube as needed, but at least once every six hours, with food and drink at lunchtime, in getting into a reclining position for five minutes of each hour, and ambu bagging occasionally as needed when the ventilator is checked for proper functioning. He also needs assistance from someone familiar with his ventilator in the event there is a malfunction or electrical problem, and someone who can perform emergency procedures in the event he experiences autonomic hyper-reflexia. Autonomic hyperreflexia is an uncontrolled visceral reaction to anxiety or a full bladder. Blood pressure increases, heart rate increases, and flushing and sweating may occur. Garret has not experienced autonomic hyperreflexia frequently in recent years, and it has usually been alleviated by catheterization. He has not ever experienced autonomic hyperreflexia at school. Garret is capable of communicating his needs orally or in another fashion so long as he has not been rendered unable to do so by an extended lack of oxygen.” Id., at 20a. “Included are such services as care for • eterization, food and drink, oxygen supplement positioning, and suetion-ing.” Id., at 28a; see also id., at 53a. In addition, the ALJ’s opinion contains a thorough discussion of “other tests and criteria” pressed by the District, id, at 52a, including the burden on the District and the cost of providing assistance to Garret. Although the ALJ found no legal authority for establishing a cost-based test for determining what related services are required by the statute, he went on to reject the District’s arguments on the merits. See id, at 42a-53a. We do not reach the issue here, but the AU also found that Garret’s in-sehool needs must be met by the District under an Iowa statute as well as the IDEA. Id., at 54a-55a. “The regulations define ‘related services’ for handicapped children to include ‘school health services,’ 34 CFR § 300.13(a) (1983), which are defined in turn as ‘services provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person,’ §300.13(b)(10). ‘Medical services’ are defined as ‘services provided by a licensed physician.’ § 300.13(b)(4). Thus, the Secretary has [reasonably] determined that the services of a school nurse otherwise qualifying as a ‘related service’ are not subject to exclusion as a ‘medical service,’ but that the services of a physician are excludable as such. “. .. By limiting the ‘medical services’ exclusion to the services of a •physician or hospital, both far more expensive, the Secretary has given a permissible construction to the provision.” 468 U. S., at 892-893 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also id., at 894 (“[T]he regulations state that school nursing services must be provided only if they can be performed by a nurse or other qualified person, not if they must be performed by a physician”). Based on it seems that the Secretary’s post-ihiro view of the statute has not been entirely clear. E. g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a. We may assume that the Secretary has authority under the IDEA to adopt regulations that define the “medical services” exclusion by more explicitly taking into account the nature and extent of the requested services; and the Secretary surely has the authority to enumerate the services that are, and are not, fairly included within the scope of § 1407(a)(17). But the Secretary has done neither; and, in this Court, he advocates affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7-8, 30; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 462 (1997) (an agency’s views as amicus curiae may be entitled to deference). We obviously have no authority to rewrite the regulations, and we see no sufficient reason to revise Tairo, either. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5,12. At oral argument, the District suggested that we first consider the nature of the requested service (either “medical” or not); then, if the service is “medical,” apply the multifactor test to determine whether the service is an excluded physician service or an included sehool nursing service under the Secretary of Education’s regulations. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 13-14. Not only does this approach provide no additional guidance for identifying “medical” services, it is also disconnected from both the statutory text and the regulations we upheld in Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U. S. 883 (1984). “Medical” services are generally excluded from the statute, and the regulations elaborate on that statutory term. No authority cited by the District requires an additional inquiry if the requested service is both “related” and non-“medieaI.” Even if § 1401(a)(17) demanded an additional step, the factors proposed by the District are hardly more useful in identifying “nursing” services than they are in identifying “medical” services; and the District cannot limit educational access simply by pointing to the limitations of existing staff! As we noted in Tatro, the IDEA requires schools to hire specially trained personnel to meet disabled student needs. Id., at 893. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5, 13; Brief for Petitioner 6-7, 9. The District, however, will not necessarily need to hire an additional employee to meet Garret’s needs. The District already employs a one-on-one teacher associate (TA) who assists Garret during the schoolday. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a-27a. At one time, Garret’s TA was a licensed practical nurse (LPN). In light of the state Board of Nursing’s recent ruling that the District’s registered nurses may decide to delegate Garret’s care to an LPN, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9-10 (filed Apr. 22, 1998), the dissent’s future-cost estimate is speculative. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a, 58a-60a (if the District could assign Garret’s care to a TA who is also an LPN, there would be "a minimum of additional expense”). The dissent’s approach, which seems to be even broader than the District’s, is unconvincing. The dissent’s rejection of our unanimous decision in Tatro comes 15 years too late, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172-178 (1989) (stare decisis has “special force” in statutory interpretation), and it offers nothing constructive in its place. Aside from rejecting a “provider-specific approach,” the dissent cites unrelated statutes and offers a circular definition of “medical services.” Post, at 81 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (“ ‘services’ that are ‘medical’ in ‘nature’ ”). Moreover, the dissent’s approach apparently would exclude most ordinary school nursing services of the kind routinely provided to npndisabled children; that anomalous result is not easily attributable to congressional intent. See Tatro, 468 U. S., at 893. In a later discussion the dissent does offer a specific proposal: that we now interpret (or rewrite) the Secretary’s regulations so that school districts need only provide disabled children with “health-related services that school nurses can perform as part of their normal duties.” Post, at 85. The District does not dispute that its nurses “can perform” the requested services, so the dissent’s objection is that District nurses would not be performing their “normal duties” if they met Garret’s needs. That is, the District would need an “additional employee.” Ibid. This proposal is functionally similar to a proposed regulation — ultimately withdrawn — that would have replaced the “school health services” provision. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33838, 33854 (1982) (the statute and regulations may not be read to affect legal obligations to make available to handicapped, children services, including school health services, made available to nonhand-ieapped children). The dissent’s suggestion is unacceptable for several reasons. Most important, such revisions of the regulations are better left to the Secretary, and an additional staffing need is generally not a sufficient objection to the requirements of § 1401(a)(17). See n. 8, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ASARCO INC. v. IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION No. 80-2015. Argued April 19, 1982 Decided June 29, 1982 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 331. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 331. George W. Beatty argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were C. Rudolf Peterson, William L. Goldman, James A. Riedy, Philip E. Peterson, and Alexander J. Gillespie, Jr. Theodore V. Spangler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was David H. Leroy, Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Illinois by Tyrone Fahner, Attorney General, Fred H. Montgomery, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Lloyd B. Foster; and for the Multistate Tax Commission et al. by William D. Dexter; Wilson L. Condon, Attorney General of Alaska; J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado; Carl R. Ajello, Attorney General of Connecticut; Richards. Gebelein, Attorney General of Delaware; David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, and Theodore V. Spangler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana; Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas; Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland; Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts; Frank K. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan; Warren R. Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota; John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri; Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska; Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General of New Hampshire; Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General of New Mexico; Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, and M. C. Banks, Deputy Attorney General; Robert O. Welfald, Attorney General of North Dakota, and Albert R. Hausauer, Assistant Attorney General; Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon; and David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah. John J. Easton, Attorney General of Vermont, and Paul P. Hanlon filed a brief for the State of Vermont as amicus curiae. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether the State of Idaho constitutionally may include within the taxable income of a nondomiciliary parent corporation doing some business in Idaho a portion of intangible income — such as dividend and interest payments, as well as capital gains from the sale of stock — that the parent receives from subsidiary corporations having no other connection with' the State. I This case involves corporate income taxes that appellee Idaho State Tax Commission sought to levy on appellant ASARCO Inc. for the years 1968,1969, and 1970. ASARCO is a corporation that mines, smelts, and refines in various States nonferrous metals such as copper, gold, silver, lead, and zinc. It is incorporated in New Jersey and maintains its headquarters and commercial domicile in New York. ASARCO’s primary Idaho business is the operation of a silver mine. It also mines and sells other metals and operates the administrative office of its northwest mining division in Idaho. According to the appellee’s tax calculations, approximately 2.5% of ASARCO’s total business activities take place in Idaho. App. 59a, 67a, and 75a. During the years in question, ASARCO received three types of intangible income of relevance to this suit. First, it collected dividends from five corporations in which it owned major interests: M. I. M. Holdings, Ltd.; General Cable Corp.; Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.; ASARCO Mexicana, S. A.; and Southern Peru Copper Corp. Second, ASARCO received interest income from three sources: from Revere’s convertible debentures; from a note received in connection with a prior sale of Mexicana stock; and from a note received in connection with a sale of General Cable Stock. Third, ASARCO realized capital gains from the sale of General Cable and M. I. M. stock. In 1965, Idaho adopted its version of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). See Idaho Code §63-3027 (1976 and Supp. 1981); 7A U. L. A. 91 (1978). Under this statute, Idaho classifies corporate income from intangible property as either “business” or “nonbusiness” income. “Business” income is defined to include income from intangible property when “acquisition, management, or disposition [of the property] constitute^] integral or necessary parts of the taxpayers’ trade or business operations.” Idaho apportions such “business” income according to a three-factor formula and includes this apportioned share of “business” income in the taxpayer’s taxable Idaho income. “Nonbusiness” income, on the other hand, is defined as “all income other than business income.” Idaho Code § 63— 3027(a)(4) (Supp. 1981). Idaho allocates intangible “nonbusiness” income entirely to the State of the corporation’s commercial domicile instead of apportioning it among the States in which a corporate taxpayer owns property or carries on business. Idaho is a member of the Multistate Tax Compact, an interstate taxation agreement concerning state taxation of multistate businesses. The Compact established the Multistate Tax Commission, which is composed of the tax administrators from the member States. Article VIII of the Compact provides that any member State may request that the Commission perform an audit on its behalf. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U. S. 452, 457 (1978) (upholding the Compact against a facial attack on Compact and Commerce Clauses and Fourteenth Amendment grounds). In 1971, the Multistate Tax Commission audited ASARCO’s tax returns for the years in question on behalf of six States, including Idaho. The auditor recommended adjusting ASARCO’s tax computations in several respects. As accepted by the Idaho State Tax Commission and as relevant to the present dispute, the auditor first “unitized” — or treated as one single corporation — ASARCO and six of its wholly owned subsidiaries. As a consequence of unitization, the auditor combined ASARCO’s income with that of these six subsidiaries and disregarded (as intracompany accounting transfers) the subsidiaries’ dividend payments to ASARCO. Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, supra, at 473, n. 25. The auditor listed five factors thought to justify unitizing treatment. First, ASARCO owned a majority (in fact, all) of the stock of each subsidiary. Second, “ASARCO, with its subsidiaries, conducts a vertically integrated non-ferrous metals operation. This is evidenced by the flow from the mines to the smelters to the refineries and ultimately to the sales made by the New York office.” App. 88a. Third, “ASARCO and its subsidiaries have interlocking officers and directors, which enables ASARCO to control the major management decisions of each subsidiary.” Ibid. Fourth, sales between the companies were numerous, making it “apparent. . . that the companies supplied markets to each other . . . .” Id., at 89a. And finally, various services were provided to the ASARCO group either by ASARCO or by subsidiaries specifically set up for such a purpose. The propriety of this treatment of the six wholly owned subsidiaries is not an issue before us. The auditor found the situation to differ with respect to ASARCO’s interest in M. I. M., General Cable, Revere, Mexicana, and Southern Peru. This judgment planted the seed of the current dispute. As to these five companies, the auditor determined that the links with ASARCO were not sufficient to justify unitary treatment. Nonetheless, he found that ASARCO’s receipt of dividends from each of these did constitute “business” income to ASARCO. See n. 4, supra. The auditor similarly classified the interest and capital gains income at issue in this case. These categories of income also were added in ASARCO’s total income to be apportioned among the various States in which ASARCO was subjected to an income tax. The Idaho State Tax Commission adopted the auditor’s adjustments in an unreported decision. App. to Juris. Statement 46a. In rejecting ASARCO’s challenge to the auditor’s unitized treatment of the six wholly owned corporations, see n. 8, supra, the Commission stated that it was “quite clear from the evidence produced at the hearing that [ASARCO’s] business activities are so inter-related as to defy measurement by separate accounting . . . .” App. to Juris. Statement 49a-50a. The Commission likewise upheld the auditor’s conclusion that the dividends presently at issue were properly treated as apportionable “business” income. It consequently assessed tax deficiencies against ASARCO of $92,471.88 for 1968, $111,292.44 for 1969, and $121,750.76 for 1970, plus interest. On ASARCO’s petition for review, the State District Court upheld the Commission's unitized treatment of the six subsidiaries in an unpublished opinion. The court, however, overruled the Commission’s determination that the disputed dividends, interest, and capital gains constituted “business” income, on the reasoning that this income did not come from property or activities that were “an integral part of [ASARCO’s] trade or business.” Idaho Code § 63-3027(a)(l) (Supp. 1981). In the court’s view, “if the dividend income from other corporations is an integral part of the business of [ASARCO] . . . they should be unitized and all matters considered and[,] if they are not[,] . . . the income is not business income but is [nonapportionable] non business income.” App. to Juris. Statement 37a. The Commission, but not ASARCO, appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. That court held that the trial court had erred by excluding from “business” income ASARCO’s receipt of dividends, interest, and capital gains as a result of its owning stock in the five corporations. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 99 Idaho 924, 935-937, 592 P. 2d 39, 50-52 (1979). In response to ASARCO’s constitutional arguments, the court decided that this tax treatment withstood attack under the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. We vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of our decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U. S. 425 (1980). ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 445 U. S. 939 (1980). The Idaho Supreme Court reinstated its previous opinion in a brief per curiam order on March 4, 1981. 102 Idaho 38, 624 P. 2d 946. We noted probable jurisdiction, 454 U. S. 812 (1981), and we now reverse. II As a general principle, a State may not tax value earned outside its borders. See, e. g., Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77, 80-81 (1938). The broad inquiry in a case such as this, therefore, is “whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.” Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940). Our application of this general principle in this case is guided by two of our recent decisions. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, supra, the taxpayer conducted “an integrated petroleum business,” 445 U. S., at 428, that included international petroleum exploration, production, refining, transportation, distribution, and sale of petroleum, as well as related chemical and mining enterprises. Much of its business abroad was conducted through wholly or partly owned subsidiaries. The State of Vermont imposed a corporate income tax on that portion of Mobil’s total income that the State attributed to Mobil’s Vermont activity, which was confined to the wholesale and retail marketing of petroleum. The State sought to include within Mobil’s apportion-able Vermont income its receipt of dividends from its subsidiaries and affiliates that operated abroad. Mobil protested that the State could not properly apportion and tax this “foreign source” dividend income. For present purposes, our analysis in Mobil began with the observation that Mobil’s principal dividend payors were part of Mobil’s integrated petroleum business. Although Mobil was “unwilling to concede the legal conclusion” that activities by these dividend payors formed part of Mobil’s “‘unitary business,’ ” it “offered no evidence that would undermine the conclusion that most, if not all, of its subsidiaries and affiliates contribute^] to [Mobil’s] worldwide petroleum enterprise.” Id., at 435. The Court next stated that due process limitations on Vermont’s attempted tax would be satisfied if there were “a ‘minimal connection’ between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise.” Id., at 436-437, citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 272-273 (1978); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 386 U. S. 753, 756 (1967); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Missouri Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 325 (1968). And we said that these limitations would not be contravened by state apportionment and taxation of income that were determined by geographic accounting to have arisen from a different State “so long as the intrastate and extrastate activities formed part of a single unitary business.” 445 U. S., at 438 (emphasis added). The Mobil Court explicated the limiting “unitary business” principle by observing, that geographic accounting, in purporting to isolate income received in various States, “may fail to account for contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.” Ibid. The fact that “these factors of profitability arise from the operation of the business as a whole,” ibid., therefore could justify a State’s otherwise impermissible inclusion of corporate income derived from corporate activities beyond the State’s borders. The Court thus stated: “[T]he linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary-business principle. In accord with this principle, what appellant must show, in order to establish that its dividend income is not subject to an apportioned tax in Vermont, is that the income was earned in the course of activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products in that State. [Mobil] has made no effort to demonstrate that the foreign operations of its subsidiaries and affiliates are distinct in any business or economic sense from its petroleum sales activities in Vermont. Indeed, all indications in the record are to the contrary, since it appears that these foreign activities are part of [Mobil’s] integrated petroleum enterprise. In the absence of any proof of discrete business enterprise, Vermont was entitled to conclude that the dividend income’s foreign source did not destroy the requisite nexus with in-state activities.” Id., at 439-440 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). We consequently rejected Mobil’s constitutional challenge to Vermont’s tax. In so doing, however, we cautioned that we did “not mean to suggest that all dividend income received by corporations operating in interstate commerce is necessarily taxable in each State where that corporation does business. Where the business activities of the dividend payor have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing State, due process considerations might well preclude apportionability, because there would be no underlying unitary business.” Id., at 441-442 (emphasis added). We soon had occasion to reiterate these principles. Three months after Mobil, we decided Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207 (1980). In Exxon, “a vertically integrated petroleum company,” id., at 210, explored for, produced, refined, and marketed petroleum and related products. Although Exxon’s activities in Wisconsin were confined to marketing, the State sought to apportion and tax Exxon’s income from nonmarketing activities in the United States. Exxon disputed the propriety of this treatment. The Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission agreed with the objection on the basis of its conclusion that Exxon’s “three main functional operating departments — Exploration and Production, Refining, and Marketing — were separate unitary businesses.” Id., at 215 (emphasis added). The Commission found that the tax as applied “ ‘had the effect of imposing a tax on [Exxon’s] exploration and on its refining net income, all of which was derived solely from operations outside the State of Wisconsin and which had no integral relationship to [Exxon’s] marketing operations within Wisconsin.’” Ibid. On appeal, however, the Circuit Court for Dane County held that Exxon’s three main functional operating departments were all part of a single unitary business. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed. In reviewing the case, this Court unanimously agreed with the State Commission and the two state courts that the decisive concept in the case was that of a unitary business. Significantly, we repeated Mobil’s teaching that “[t]he ‘linchpin of apportionability’ for state income taxation of an interstate enterprise is the ‘unitary-business principle.’” Id., at 223, quoting Mobil, 445 U. S., at 439. We also repeated: “In order to exclude certain income from the apportionment formula, the company must prove that ‘the income was earned in the course of activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products in that State.’. . . The court looks to the ‘underlying economic realities of a unitary business,’ and the income must derive from ‘unrelated business activity’ which constitutes a ‘discrete business enterprise,’ 445 U. S., at 441, 442, 439.” 447 U. S., at 223-224. Examining the facts, the Court found that Exxon was “a highly integrated business which benefits from an umbrella of centralized management and controlled interaction.” Id., at 224. We rejected the company’s protest because “[w]e agree[d] with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that Exxon [was] such a unitary business and that Exxon has not carried its burden of showing that its functional departments are ‘discrete business enterprises’. . . .” Ibid,. Ill In this case, ASARCO claims that it has succeeded, where the taxpayers in Mobil and Exxon failed, in proving that the dividend payors at issue are not part of its unitary business, but rather are “discrete business enterprises.” 447 U. S., at 224. We must test this contention on the record before us. A The closest question is posed by ASARCO’s receipt of dividends from Southern Peru. ASARCO is one of Southern Peru’s four shareholders, holding 51.5% of its stock. Southern Peru produces smelted but unrefined “blister copper” in Peru, and sells 20-30% of its output to the Southern Peru Copper Sales Corp. The remainder of Southern Peru’s output is sold under contracts to its shareholders in proportion to their ownership interests. Southern Peru sold about 35% of its output to ASARCO, App. 89a, at prices determined by reference to average representative trade prices quoted in a trade publication and over which the parties had no control. Id., at 125a-126a; 99 Idaho, at 928, 592 P. 2d, at 43. ASARCO’s majority interest, if asserted, could enable it to control the management of Southern Peru. The Idaho State Tax Commission, however, found that Southern Peru’s “remaining three shareholders, owning the remainder of the stock, refuse[d] to participate in [Southern Peru] unless assured that they would have a way to assure that management would not be completely dominated by ASARCO.” App. to Juris. Statement 55. Consequently ASARCO entered a management agreement giving it the right to appoint 6 of Southern Peru’s 13 directors. The other three shareholders also appointed six directors. Ibid. The thirteenth and final director is appointed by the joint action of either the shareholders or the first 12 directors. Ibid.; App. 121a. Southern Peru’s bylaws provide that eight votes are required to pass any resolution, ibid, and its articles and bylaws can be changed only by unanimous consent of the four stockholders. In its unreported opinion, the state trial court concluded that this management contract “insures that [ASARCO] will not be able to control [Southern Peru].” App. to Juris. Statement 43a. It likewise found that Southern Peru “operates independently of [ASARCO].” Id., at 42a. The court reached this conclusion after hearing testimony that ASARCO did not “control Southern Peru in any sense of that term,” App. 121a, and that Southern Peru did not “seek direction or approval from ASARCO on major decisions.” Id., at 124a. Idaho does not dispute any of these facts. In view of the findings and the undisputed facts, we conclude that ASARCO’s Idaho silver mining and Southern Peru’s autonomous business are insufficiently connected to permit the two companies to be classified as a unitary business. B Under the principles of our decisions, the relationship of each of the other four subsidiaries to ASARCO falls far short of bringing any of them within its unitary business. M. I. M. Holdings engages in the mining, milling, smelting, and refining of copper, lead, zinc, and silver in Australia. The company also operates a lead and zinc refinery in England. During the years in question M. I. M. sold only about 1% of its output to ASARCO, for sums in the range of $0.2 to $2.2 million. Id., at 43a-47a. It appears that these sales were on the open market at prevailing market rates. ASARCO owns 52.7% of M. I. M.’s stock, and the rest is widely held. Although ASARCO has the control potential to manage M. I. M., no claim is made that it has done so. As an ASARCO executive explained, it never even elected a member of M. I. M.’s board: “This company has been very successful in staffing the corporation with Australian people and [they have] been able to run this company by themselves and, therefore, in consequence of the nationalistic feeling which develops in most of such developing countries we have not exercised any right we might have to elect a director to the board of the company.” Id., at 132a. In addition to forgoing its right to elect directors, ASARCO similarly has taken no part in the selection of M. I. M.’s officers — a function of the board of directors. Nor do the two companies have any common directors or officers. Id., at 34a, 40a. The state trial court found that M. I. M. “operates entirely independently of and has minimal contact with” ASARCO. App. to Juris. Statement 43a. As the business relation also is nominal, it is clear that M. I. M. is merely an investment. See, e. g., Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 Hastings L. J. 42, 52-53 (1960). General Cable and Revere Copper, large publicly owned companies, fabricate metal products. Both are ASARCO customers. But ASARCO held only minority interests, owning approximately 34% of the outstanding common shares of each. The remaining shares — listed on the New York Stock Exchange — are widely held. App. 135a. The two companies occupy parallel positions with respect to ASARCO as a result of a 1961 Department of Justice antitrust suit against ASARCO. The suit was based on ASARCO’s interests in each. In 1967, ASARCO consented to a decree that prohibited it from maintaining common officers in these companies, voting its stock in them, selling the companies copper at prices below those quoted to their competition, and from acquiring stock in any other copper fabricator. Id., at 96a. Neither Revere’s nor General Cable’s management seeks direction or approval from ASARCO on operational or other management decisions. Id., at 137a. Mexicana mines and smelts lead and copper in Mexico. Originally it was a wholly owned subsidiary of ASARCO, but a change in Mexican law required ASARCO to divest itself of 51% of Mexicana’s stock in 1965. This stock is now publicly held by Mexican nationals. The record does not reveal whether ASARCO and Mexicana have any common directors. The state trial court found, however, that Mexicana “operates independently of [ASARCO],” App. to Juris. Statement 43a, and the Idaho Supreme Court stated that “Mexicana does not seek approval from ASARCO concerning major policy decisions . . . .” 99 Idaho, at 929, 592 P. 2d, at 44. c Idaho does not dispute the foregoing facts. Neither does it question that a unitary business relationship between ASARCO and these subsidiaries is a necessary prerequisite to its taxation of the dividends at issue. E. g., Brief for Appellee 10 (“When income is earned from activities which are part of a unitary business conducted in several states, then the requirement that the income bear relation to the benefits and privileges conferred by the several states has been met”). See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 (“[W]hen intangible assets such as, for example, shares of stock, are found to be a part of a taxpayer’s own unitary business,. . . there is no logical or constitutional reason why the income from those same intangibles should be treated any differently than any other business income that that taxpayer might earn”). Rather the State urges that we expand the concept of a “unitary business” to cover the facts of this case. Idaho’s proposal is that corporate purpose should define unitary business. It argues that intangible income should be considered a part of a unitary business if the intangible property (the shares of stock) is “acquired, managed or disposed of for purposes relating or contributing to the taxpayer’s business.” Brief for Appellee 4. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 (urging that income from intangible property be considered part of a unitary business when the intangibles “contribute to or relate to or are some way in furtherance of the taxpayer’s own trade or business”). Idaho asserts that “[i]t is this integration — i. e., between the business use of the intangible asset (the shares of stock) and ASARCO’s mining, smelting, and refining business — which makes the income part of the unitary business.” Brief for Appellee 4. This definition of unitary business would destroy the concept. The business of a corporation requires that it earn money to continue operations and to provide a return on its invested capital. Consequently all of its operations, including any investment made, in some sense can be said to be “for purposes related to or contributing to the [corporation’s] business.” When pressed to its logical limit, this conception of the “unitary business” limitation becomes no limitation at all. When less ambitious interpretations are employed, the result is simply arbitrary. We cannot accept, consistently with recognized due process standards, a definition of “unitary business” that would permit nondomiciliary States to apportion and tax dividends “[w]here the business activities of the dividend payor have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing State . . . .” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U. S., at 442. In such a situation, it is not true that “the state has given anything for which it can ask return.” Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S., at 444. Justice Holmes stated long ago that “the possession of bonds secured by mortgages of lands in other States, or of a land-grant in another State or of other property that adds to the riches of the corporation but does not affect the [taxing State’s] part of the [business] is no sufficient ground for the increase of the tax — whatever it may be . . . .” Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 69-70 (1920). In this case, it is plain that the five dividend-paying subsidiaries “add to the riches” of ASARCO. But it is also true that they are “discrete business enterprise[s]” that — in “any business or economic sense” — have “nothing to do with the activities” of ASARCO in Idaho. Mobil, supra, at 439-442. Therefore there is no “rational relationship between the [ASARCO dividend] income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 272-273 (1978).” Mobil, supra, at 437. Idaho’s attempt to tax a portion of these dividends can be viewed as “a mere effort to reach profits earned elsewhere under the guise of legitimate taxation.” Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271, 283 (1924). The Due Process Clause bars such an effort to levy upon income that is not properly “within the reach of [Idaho’s] taxing power.” Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S., at 80. IV In addition to the disputed dividend income, Idaho also has sought to tax certain ASARCO interest and capital gains income. The interest income arose from a note ASARCO received from its sale of Mexicana stock and from a Revere convertible debenture, as well as in connection with ASARCO’s 1970 disposition of its General Cable stock. See n. 21, supra. The General Cable stock sale also generated capital gains for ASARCO, as did ASARCO’s sale of a portion of its stock in M. I. M. Idaho and ASARCO agree that interest and capital gains income derived from these companies should be treated in the same manner as the dividend income. Brief for Appellant 27; Brief for Appellee 21. Cf. 99 Idaho, at 937, 592 P. 2d, at 52 (“In our view the same standard applies to the question whether gains from the sale of stock are business income as applies to the question whether dividends from the stock are business income”). We also agree. “One must look principally at the underlying activity, not at the form of investment, to determine the propriety of apportionability.” Mobil, 445 U. S., at 440. Changing the form of the income “works no change in the underlying economic realities of [whether] a unitary business [exists], and accordingly it ought not to affect the apportionability of income the parent receives.” Id., at 441. We therefore hold that Idaho’s attempt to tax this income also violated the Due Process Clause. V For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho is Reversed. ASARCO also received other intangible income, but the proper tax treatment of that income is not at issue in this case. M. I. M. Holdings, Ltd., is a publicly owned corporation engaged in the mining, milling, smelting, and refining of nonferrous metals in Australia and England. ASARCO owned about 53% of M. I. M.’s stock during the period in question. General Cable Corp. and Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., are publicly owned companies that respectively fabricate cables and manufacture copper wares. ASARCO owned about 34% of the stock of each. ASARCO Mexicana, S. A., engages in Mexico in the same general line of business as does ASARCO in the United States. ASARCO owned 49% of Mexicana. Southern Peru Copper Corp. mines and smelts copper in Peru. ASARCO owned about 51.5% of Southern Peru during the time at issue. The UDITPA is a tax allocation system approved in 1957 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the American Bar Association. See 7A U. L. A. 91 (1978). At least 23 States have adopted substantially all of the UDITPA to date. See id., at 10 (Supp. 1982); Brief for State of Illinois as Amicus Curiae 1-2. The UDITPA has been adopted as Article IV of the Multistate Tax Compact. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U. S. 452, 457-458, n. 6 (1978). Idaho Code § 63-3027(a)(l) (Supp. 1981). The complete definition provides that “ ‘[b]usiness income’ means income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayers’ trade or business and includes income from the acquisition, management, or disposition of tangible and intangible property when such acquisition, management, or disposition constitute[s] integral or necessary parts of the taxpayers’ trade or business operations. Gains or losses and dividend and interest income from stock and securities of any foreign or domestic corporation shall be presumed to be income from intangible property, the acquisition, management, or disposition of which constitute an integral part of the taxpayers’ trade or business; such presumption may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Ibid, (emphasis added). See UDITPA, § 1(a), 7A U. L. A. 93 (1978). “All business income shall be apportioned to this state by multiplying the income by a fraction, the numerator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three (3).” Idaho Code § 63-3027(i) (Supp. 1981). “The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the average value of the taxpayer’s real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used in this state during the tax period and the denominator of which is the average value of all the taxpayer’s real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used during the tax period.” § 63 — 3027(j). “The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total amount paid in this state during the tax period by the taxpayer for compensation, and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid everywhere during the tax period.” § 63-3027(m). “The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and the denominator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period.” § 63-3027(o). “Capital gains and losses from sales of intangible personal property are allocable to this state if the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is in this state, unless such gains and losses constitute business income as defined in this section.” Idaho Code § 63 — 3027(f)(3) (Supp. 1981). “Interest and dividends are allocable to this state if the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is in this state unless such interest or dividends constitute business income as defined in this section.” § 63-3027(g). Idaho defines “commercial domicile” as “the principal place from which the trade or business of the taxpayer is directed or managed.” § 63-3027(a) (2). Presently 19 States and the District of Columbia have joined the Compact as full members. Eleven States have joined as associate members. Brief for Multistate Tax Commission and Participating States as Amici Curiae 2. Idaho law provides that “two ... or more corporations the voting stock of which is more than fifty percent. . . owned directly or indirectly by a common owner or owners may, when necessary to accurately reflect income, be considered a single corporation.” Idaho Code §63-3027(s) (Supp. 1981). The six unitized subsidiaries are Federated Metals of Canada; ASARCO Mercantile Co.; Enthone, Inc.; International Mining Co.; Lone Star Lead Construction Corp.; and Northern Peru Mining Corp. The auditor also stated that Southern Peru Copper Corp. and Southern Peru Copper Sales Corp. “were deemed unitary and were combined only for those states in which ownership of less than 80% presents no problem.” App. 88a. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U. S. 425, 435, n. 12 (1980). These two corporations were not “deemed unitary” in Idaho. The auditor noted that ASARCO Mercantile bought and sold equipment for the subsidiaries and that International Metals acted as ASARCO’s foreign sales agent. He further observed that exploration, research and development, insurance procurement, and tax preparation were performed jointly for most or all of these companies. Finally, he stated that ASARCO’s audit staff examined the operations of these subsidiaries to enable “ASARCO to know whether the subsidiaries are operating along the lines set down by its management.” App. 90. The Idaho Supreme Court also ruled that ASARCO’s receipt of certain rents and royalties, as well as its receipt of dividends from Compañía American Smelting, S. A., constituted apportionable “business” income. It further upheld the trial court’s “nonbusiness” income classification with respect to dividends received by ASARCO from Lake Asbestos of Quebec, ASARCO International Corp., Hecla Mining Co., Kennecott Copper Co., Phelps-Dodge, and United Park City Mines. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 99 Idaho 924, 935-937, 592 P. 2d 39, 50-52 (1979). These rulings are not disputed here. See Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 Tax L. Rev. 171, 181 (1970). That court examined Exxon’s organizational structure and business operations. It found that Exxon’s full utilization of its production and refining functions were dependent on its marketing system, which encompassed Exxon’s Wisconsin activities. The court therefore agreed with the Circuit Court for Dane County that Exxon’s marketing in Wisconsin was an integral part of one unitary business and, consequently, that its total corporate income derived from the United States was subject to Wisconsin’s apportioned taxation. See 447 U. S., at 217-219. It was noted that Exxon’s Coordination and Services Management office “provided many essential corporate services for the entire company, including the coordination of the refining and other operational functions ‘to obtain an optimum short range operating program.’ . . . Many of the items sold by appellant in Wisconsin were obtained through a centralized purchasing office in Houston whose obvious purpose was to increase overall corporate profits through bulk purchases and efficient allocation of supplies among retailers. . . . Even the gasoline sold in Wisconsin was available only because of an exchange agreement with another company arranged by the Supply Department, part of Coordination and Services Management, and the Refining Department. Similarly, sales were facilitated through the use of a uniform credit card system, uniform packaging, brand names, and promotional displays, all run from the national headquarters.” Id., at 224. The unitary-business principle applied in Mobil and Exxon is not new. It has been a familiar concept in our tax cases for over 60 years. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U. S., at 473, n. 25, 474, n. 26; General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436, 439 (1964); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 460 (1959); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 508 (1942); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331, 336 (1939); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U. S. 682, 684 (1936); Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U. S. 123, 132-133 (1931); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271, 282 (1924). Cf. Burnet v. Aluminum Goods Mfg. Co., 287 U. S. 544, 550 (1933); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 120-121 (1920); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 69 (1920); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 499-500 (1904); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 221-222 (1897); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185, 219, 222, 223-224 (1897). A review of our cases before Mobil made plain that “[f]ormulary apportionment, which takes into account the entire business income of a multistate business in determining the income taxable by a particular state, is constitutionally permissible only in the case of a unitary business.” Rudolph, supra n. 11, at 183-184. The other shareholders are Phelps Dodge, 16%; Newmont Mining, 10.25%; and Cerro Corp., 22.25%. App. 86a. Either these large companies or their parents were traded on the New York Stock Exchange at the time in question. Southern Peru Copper Sales Corp. in turn sells the copper to European customers. These European sales are handled in this manner to preserve Southern Peru’s favorable federal tax status as a Western Hemisphere Trading Corporation. Southern Peru Copper Sales Corp.’s stock is owned in the same manner as is Southern Peru’s. Unlike Southern Peru, however, Southern Peru Copper Sales Corp. has no employees of its own. Sales are generally transacted by ASARCO’s New York office, for which that office earns a sales commission. Ibid. These sales ranged between $44 and $65 million for the years in question. Id., at 89a. There was evidence that ASARCO could replace this output contract “[wlithin a short time” if it were lost, and that loss of ASARCO’s ownership in Southern Peru would not cause the loss of the output contract. Id., at 128a. Southern Peru has a “staff that you’d expect a major corporation to have.” Id., at 122a. ASARCO provided Southern Peru with purchasing service outside of Peru, traffic service for its exports and imports outside of Peru, and preparation service for its United States tax return. Id., at 123a-124a. The contract for ASARCO’s purchasing services provided for payment of this service on the basis of a fixed fee plus a commission based on the dollar volume of purchases. Id., at 124a. ASARCO received separate “negotiated fair fee[s]” for its tax and traffic services. Ibid. Southern Peru has its own purchasing, traffic, and tax departments in Peru. Id., at 123a. M. I. M. did use an ASARCO melting furnace patent for which it pays a price “the same that would be paid by any other company using it.” Id., at 133a. For the years in question, Revere’s purchases averaged 3-4% of ASARCO’s sales and totalled from $17 to $29 million. Id., at 27a. Revere in turn sold ASARCO from 1 to 2% of its total output, which totalled $4-$6 million. Id., at 43a-47a. General Cable’s purchases accounted for approximately 6% of ASARCO’s sales and ranged from $31 to $47 million. Id., at 27a. ASARCO’s purchases from General Cable averaged 0.1% of General Cable’s total sales and ranged between $0.3 and $0.5 million. Id., at 43a-47a. Both Revere and General Cable utilized ASARCO’s stock transfer department on a contract basis, and Revere licensed one patent from ASARCO for a “fair price.” Id., at 136a. In 1970, ASARCO was compelled, apparently by the Department of Justice, to divest itself of all its General Cable stock. Id., at 95a. ASARCO sold Mexicana none of its output in 1968 and insignificant amounts (totalling $24,169 and $14,902) in 1969 and 1970. Id., at 27a. Mexicana apparently did not sell ASARCO any of its output during the time in question. Id., at 43a-47a. For a commission, ASARCO does act as a contract sales agent for Mexicana in the United States. Id., at 131a. This contract would continue if ASARCO lost its investment interest in Mexicana. Ibid. ASARCO also provides technical services to Mexicana for a fee. Id., at 130a; 99 Idaho, at 929, 592 P. 2d, at 44. The dissent’s perception of some of the facts differs substantially from the record. It speculates that ASARCO’s unitary-business experience “must” have aided ASARCO’s stock investments, post, at 336, despite the undisputed trial court finding that ASARCO’s stock investments were “not integral to nor a necessary part of [ASARCO’s] business operation . . . .” App. to Juris. Statement 44a. See also id., at 43a. It maintains that— “[f]or all we know” — ASARCO’s stock investments were interim uses of idle funds “accumulated for the future operation of [ASARCO’s] own primary business.” Post, at 337. The trial court, however, found that ASARCO “has never been required to utilize its stock as security for borrowing of working capital, acquiring stock or securities in other companies or to support any bond issues.” App. to Juris. Statement 41a. Moreover, ASARCO was found to have “sufficient cash flow from mining to provide operating capital for all mining operations without reliance upon cash flow from . . . income from intangibles.” Ibid. The dissent also describes the five companies as “captive suppliers and customers. . . .” Post, at 342. This description is at odds with the undisputed facts. See supra, at 320-324. Cf. Keesling & Warren, California’s Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, Part I, 15 UCLA L. Rev. 156, 172 (1967). Such arbitrariness is evident in this case. As previously noted, see n. 10, supra, ASARCO received dividend income from Lake Asbestos of Quebec. Lake Asbestos is a wholly owned subsidiary of ASARCO that is engaged in extracting and processing asbestos fibers in Canada. App. 86a. Its selling agent is ASARCO International, another wholly owned ASARCO subsidiary. Ibid. The Idaho Supreme Court found that “Lake Asbestos has its own staff, but ASARCO provides important management services. Lake Asbestos seeks ASARCO’s direction and approval on major policy decisions.” 99 Idaho, at 929, 592 P. 2d, at 44. Lake Asbestos consequently appears in many respects to be more likely to qualify as part of ASARCO’s unitary business than does any of the five corporations involved in this case. Yet Idaho now agrees, as the courts below held, that on this record Lake Asbestos is not part of such a business. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. ASARCO also received approximately $250,000 a year in dividends from Kennecott Copper Corp., and approximately $300,000 a year in dividends from Phelps Dodge. App. 52a. The record describes the business of these two corporations as the mining, smelting, refining, and sale of copper. Id., at 50a. ASARCO made sales in the range of $3-$5 million a year to Kennecott, and $24,000-$800,000 a year to Phelps Dodge. Id., at 27a. Each in turn made some (albeit “minimal”) sales to ASARCO. Id., at 43a-47a. In light of this information, we have no basis for concluding that ASARCO did not “acquire” stock in Kennecott and Phelps Dodge “for purposes relating or contributing to the taxpayer’s business.” Brief for Appellee 4. ASARCO’s management scarcely would make such an admission. Yet Idaho makes no claim that Kennecott and Phelps Dodge are part of ASARCO’s unitary business. Justice O’Connor’s dissent views the Court’s decision as “prohibiting apportioned taxation of investment income by nondomiciliary states.” Post, at 345 et seq. This reflects a serious misunderstanding of our decision today and the eases on which we rely. The case we follow primarily is Mobil. It sustained the taxation of investment income after applying enunciated principles carefully to the facts of the case. In this case we have applied the same principles but have reached a different result because the facts differ in critical respects. As we have said elsewhere, the application of the unitary-business principle requires in each case a careful examination both of the way in which the corporate enterprise is structured and operates, and of the relationship with the taxing State. The dissent, argues that our reliance on the Due Process Clause is inappropriate. It also says that our holding that Idaho has exceeded its jurisdiction to tax somehow “strip[s] Congress of the authority” to authorize or regulate state taxation. Post, at 331. See also post, at 349-350, 353. In analyzing the validity of Idaho’s tax, we follow long-established precedent in relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Exxon, 447 U. S., at 219, 221-225, 226, 227; Mobil, 445 U. S., at 436-442; Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S., at 507, 508; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S., at 120-121. In view of our decision on due process, it is unnecessary to address appellant’s Commerce Clause argument. In any event, it is elementary that the “States . . . are subject to limitations on their taxation powers that do not apply to the Federal Government.” F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dept., post, at 363. Cf. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guiñee, 456 U. S. 694, 713 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). The question of federal authority to legislate in this area— whether to lay taxes or to delegate such power — is not presented in this case, and we imply no view as to it. The dissenting opinion reflects profound — though unexpressed — dissatisfaction with the unitary-business principle, even though it was firmly established by more than a half a dozen decisions of this Court prior to Mobil and Exxon. See n. 14, supra. The dissent purports to rely on these recent cases, and yet its basic arguments — in practical effect — would seriously undermine their force as precedents. It relies primarily on considerations quite different from those identified as controlling in Mobil and Exxon. The dissent does not deny that ASARCO’s subsidiaries were discrete business enterprises; rather it submits that they were engaged “in the same general line of business.” Post, at 335. It notes — though the relevance is not obvious — that the management of ASARCO had special knowledge of the types of business engaged in by these subsidiaries. Post, at 336-337. The dissent also perceives a relationship between Idaho and the investment income simply because ASARCO has the use in its business of income from whatever source it may be derived. Post, at 337-339. Finally, it emphasizes the limited amount of open market buying and selling of products between ASARCO and the companies in which it has invested funds. See Parts III-A and III-B, supra. In Mobil, in applying the unitary-business principle, the Court stated that the question is whether “the [investment] income was earned in the course of activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products” in the State seeking to tax the income. Our decision went against Mobil Oil Corp. because we found that its “foreign activities [were] part of appellant’s integrated petroleum enterprise,” and because the subsidiaries in question were not shown to operate as “discrete business enterprise[s].” 445 U. S., at 439. In this ease, in sharp contrast, the record establishes that each of the three partial subsidiaries in question operated a “discrete business enterprise” having “nothing to do with the activities of [ASARCO] in the taxing State.” Id., at 442. As we recognize in this opinion, these cases are decided on their facts in light of established general principles. The most comprehensive discussion of the factors that are relevant is contained in our recent decisions in Mobil and Exxon. In both of those cases, that we follow today, the States prevailed because it was clear that the corporations operated unitary businesses with a continuous flow and interchange of common products. ASARCO has proved that these essential factors are wholly absent in this case. It is late in the day to confuse this important area of state tax law by rewriting the standards of Mobil and Exxon. ASARCO has not challenged Idaho’s taxation of interest and capital gains income other than that attributable to the five corporations discussed in the text. Brief for Appellant 26. We do not intimate views on such matters.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BORDEN RANCH PARTNERSHIP et al. v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS et al. No. 01-1243. Argued December 10, 2002 Decided December 16, 2002 Timothy S. Bishop argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Arthur F. Coon, Kyriakos Tsakopoulos, and Edmund L. Regalia. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, David C. Shilton, and Sylvia Quast Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by William H. Pryor, Jr., Attorney General of Alabama, Nathan A. Forrester, Solicitor General, and Alyce S. Robertson, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard, P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, John Cornyn of Texas, and Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia; for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by John J. Rademacher; for the American Forest & Paper Association by Steven P. Quarles, J. Michael Klise, Ellen B. Steen, and William R. Murray; for the California Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Robin L. Rivett and M. Reed Hopper; for the National Association of Home Builders by Virginia S. Albrecht, Andrew J. Turner, Duane J. Desiderio, and Thomas Jon Ward; for the National Stone, Sand and Gravel Association et al. by Lawrence R. Liebesman; and for Save Our Shoreline by Nancie G. Marzulla, Roger J. Marzulla, Brenda D. Colella, and David L. Powers. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Jersey et al. by David Samson, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Patrick DeAlmeida and Rachel J. Horowitz, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii and Darrell V McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the Association of State Wetlands Managers by Patrick A. Parenteau; for the National Wildlife Federation et al. by Howard I. Fox; and for Dr. Joy Zedler et al. by John D. Echeverría. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KAVANAGH, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. NOBLE. No. 70. Argued November 18, 1947. Decided December 22, 1947. Lee A. Jackson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assist ant Attorney General Caudle, Arnold Raum and Helen R. Carloss. E. M. Baynes and W. H. Harris argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Reginald S. Laughlin filed a brief as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is a companion to Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., ante, p. 524. The stipulated facts show that on March 16, 1936, the respondent taxpayer filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue a joint individual income tax return for himself and his wife for the calendar year 1935. This disclosed a tax liability of $8,017.01, which was duly paid. In the return the losses and gains from sales of capital assets by the taxpayer and his wife were reported together, the losses of the wife being deducted from the gains of the husband, resulting in a net loss in excess of $2,000. This amount (the allowable limit of loss) was deducted on the return. On June 7, 1937, the taxpayer was advised at a conference with revenue agents that there was additional income tax due for the year 1935, aggregating $421.80. The taxpayer’s check, which was tendered for that amount, was later returned to him. Then by a letter dated June 11, 1937, a revenue agent notified the taxpayer that instead of a deficiency of $421.80 on the 1935 income tax return there was a deficiency of $19,973.93 and the taxpayer was furnished a computation showing the basis for such determination. The agent relied upon Article 117-5, Treasury Regulations 86, later declared void by this Court in Helvering v. Janney, 311 U. S. 189. After protest and further conference, the taxpayer gave the agent a check for $21,527.70, covering the then proposed deficiency assessment of $19,973.93, plus interest of $1,553.77. This check was remitted to the United States Treasury, after having been received by the Collector on July 21, 1937. On July 14, 1937, the taxpayer and his wife executed an agreement waiving certain statutory restrictions in their favor and consenting to the immediate assessment and collection against them of 1935 income tax in the principal sum of $19,973.93, plus deficiency interest of $1,553.77, which the Commissioner thereafter assessed. The agreement specified in a footnote that it was not a final closing agreement under § 606 of the Revenue Act of 1928 and that it did not therefore preclude the assertion of a further deficiency if one should be determined, nor did it extend the statutory period of limitation for refund, assessment or collection of the tax. On January 28, 1941, the taxpayer and his wife filed a claim for refund of $21,105.90, plus interest, on the ground that there had been an illegal assessment and collection since the revenue agents had “refused to allow the losses of one spouse against the gains of the other spouse in the joint return of husband and wife.” Reference was made to § 3313 of the Internal Revenue Code, specifying a four-year period of limitations. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected this claim in reliance upon § 322 (b) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1934 (the same as § 322 (b) (1) of the Code), establishing a two-year period of limitations; it was pointed out that § 3313 specifically excludes income taxes from those for which a claim may be filed within four years after payment. On July 12, 1941, the taxpayer filed his individual claim for refund of $21,527.70 paid with respect to the year 1935. The claim was on the same grounds as the claim previously filed by the taxpayer and his wife. This claim was returned with the request that the wife join in the execution of the claim; this request was refused and the claim was returned to the Collector; once again the claim was returned to the taxpayer. The taxpayer then brought this suit against the Collector to recover the amount alleged to be due in the refund claim. The District Court held that the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Lederer Terminal W. Co., 139 F. 2d 679, controlled the case and made it clear that the four-year period of § 3313 was applicable. Summary judgment was therefore entered for the taxpayer. 66 F. Supp. 258. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam, 160 F. 2d 104, citing its previous decision in the Lederer Terminal case. For reasons which we have set forth in Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., ante, p. 524, the decision below cannot stand. The two-year period provided by § 322 (b) (1), rather than the four-year period of § 3313, governs income tax refund claims. The overpayment which brings § 322 (b) (1) into operation occurs whenever the taxpayer has paid an amount over and above his true liability. Hence, if we assume that the deficiency assessment and collection in this case were without legal authority, the taxpayer’s payment of that illegal assessment was an overpayment within the meaning of § 322 (b) (1). And he had two years from the date of that payment within which to file a claim for refund. Since he did not file his claim until three and a half years after payment, the claim was out of time. It may well be that the taxpayer’s refund claim was prompted by this Court’s decision in Helvering v. Janney, supra, which set aside the Treasury regulation upon which the deficiency assessment was based. That decision was rendered on December 9, 1940, and the taxpayer filed his first refund claim on January 28, 1941. But assuming that the Janney decision makes clear that the taxpayer here made an overpayment, the loss which he now suffers from an application of § 322 (b) (1) is a loss which is inherent in the application of any period of limitations. Such periods are established to cut off rights, justifiable or not, that might otherwise be asserted and they must be strictly adhered to by the judiciary. Rosenman v. United States, 323 U. S. 658, 661. Remedies for resulting inequities are to be provided by Congress, not the courts. Moreover, it is not our province to speculate as to why Congress established a shorter period of limitations relative to the income tax than is the case of those taxes governed by § 3313. It is enough that § 322 (b) (1) creates a two-year period applicable to all income tax refund claims and that the claim in this case is of that type. Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

STINSON v. UNITED STATES No. 91-8685. Argued March 24, 1993 — Decided May 3, 1993 William Mallory Kent argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and John F. DePue. Robert Augustus Harper filed a brief for the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we review a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holding that the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines is not binding on the federal courts. We decide that commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline. Petitioner Terry Lynn Stinson entered a plea of guilty to a five-count indictment resulting from his robbery of a Florida bank. The presentence report recommended that petitioner be sentenced as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §4B1.1 (Nov. 1989). Section 4B1.1 provided that a defendant is a career offender if: “(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” All concede that petitioner was at least 18 years old when the events leading to the indictment occurred and that he then had at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence, thereby satisfying the first and third elements in the definition of career offender. It is the second element in this definition, the requirement that the predicate offense be a crime of violence, that gave rise to the ultimate problem in this case. At the time of his sentencing, the Guidelines defined “crime of violence” as, among other things, “any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that... involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” §4B1.2(1). The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida found that petitioner’s conviction for the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g), was a crime of violence, satisfying the second element of the career offender definition. Although the indictment contained other counts, the District Court relied only upon the felon-in-possession offense in applying the career offender provision of the Guidelines. In accord with its conclusions, the District Court sentenced petitioner as a career offender. On appeal, petitioner maintained his position that the offense relied upon by the District Court was not a crime of violence under USSG §§4B1.1 and 4B1.2(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that possession of a firearm by a felon was, as a categorical matter, a crime of violence. 943 F. 2d 1268, 1271-1273 (CA11 1991). After its decision, however, Amendment 433 to the Guidelines Manual, which added a sentence to the commentary to §4B1.2, became effective. The new sentence stated that “[t]he term ‘crime of violence’ does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.” USSG App. C, p. 253 (Nov. 1992). See §4B1.2, comment., n. 2. Petitioner sought rehearing, arguing that Amendment 433 should be given retroactive effect, but the Court of Appeals adhered to its earlier interpretation of “crime of violence” and denied the petition for rehearing in an opinion. 957 F. 2d 813 (CA11 1992) (per curiam). Rather than considering whether the amendment should be given retroactive application, the Court of Appeals held that commentary to the Guidelines, though “persuasive,” is of only “limited authority” and not “binding” on the federal courts. Id., at 815. It rested this conclusion on the fact that Congress does not review amendments to the commentary under 28 U. S. C. § 994(p). The Court of Appeals “decline[d] to be bound by the change in section 4B1.2’s commentary until Congress amends section 4B1.2,s language to exclude specifically the possession of a firearm by a felon as a ‘crime of violence.”’ 957 F. 2d, at 815. The various Courts of Appeals have taken conflicting positions on the authoritative weight to be accorded to the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, so we granted certiorari. 506 U. S. 972 (1992). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Sentencing Reform Act), as amended, 18 U. S. C. §3551 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. Ill), 28 U.S.C. §§991-998 (1988 ed. and Supp. Ill), created the Sentencing Commission, 28 U. S. C. § 991(a), and charged it with the task of “establish[ingj sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system,” § 991(b)(1). See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 367-370 (1989). The Commission executed this function by promulgating the Guidelines Manual. The Manual contains text of three varieties. First is a guideline provision itself. The Sentencing Reform Act establishes that the Guidelines are “for use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal ease.” 28 U. S. C. § 994(a)(1). The Guidelines provide direction as to the appropriate type of punishment — probation, fine, or term of imprisonment — and the extent of the punishment imposed. §§ 994(a)(1)(A) and (B). Amendments to the Guidelines must be submitted to Congress for a 6-month period of review, during which Congress can modify or disapprove them. § 994(p). The second variety of text in the Manual is a policy statement: The Sentencing Reform Act authorizes the promulgation of “general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines” or other aspects of sentencing that would further the purposes of the Act. § 994(a)(2). The third variant of text is commentary, at issue in this case. In the Guidelines Manual, both guidelines and policy statements are accompanied by extensive commentary. Although the Sentencing Reform Act does not in express terms authorize the issuance of commentary, the Act does refer to it. See 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b) (in determining whether to depart from a guidelines range, “the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission”). The Sentencing Commission has provided in a Guideline that commentary may serve these functions: commentary may “interpret [a] guideline or explain how it is to be applied,” “suggest circumstances which ... may warrant departure from the guidelines,” or “provide background information, including factors considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the guideline.” USSG § 1B1.7. As we have observed, “the Guidelines bind judges and courts in the exercise of their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases.” Mistretta v. United States, supra, at 391. See also Burns v. United States, 501 U. S. 129, 133 (1991). The most obvious operation of this principle is with respect to the Guidelines themselves. The Sentencing Reform Act provides that, unless the sentencing court finds an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, not given adequate consideration by the Commission, a circumstance not applicable in this ease, “[t]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,” established by the applicable guidelines. 18 U. S. C. §§ 3553(a)(4), (b). The principle that the Guidelines Manual is binding on federal courts applies as well to policy statements. In Williams v. United States, 503 U. S. 193, 201 (1992), we said that “[w]here ... a policy statement prohibits a district court from taking a specified action, the statement is an authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable Guideline.” There, the District Court had departed upward from the Guidelines’ sentencing range based on prior arrests that did not result in criminal convictions. A policy statement, however, prohibited a court from basing a départure on a prior arrest record alone. USSG §4A1.3, p. s. We held that failure to follow the policy statement resulted in a sentence “imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines” under 18 U. S. C. § 3742(f)(1) that should be set aside on appeal unless the error was harmless. 503 U. S., at 201, 203. In the case before us, the Court of Appeals determined that these principles do not apply to commentary. 957 F. 2d, at 814-815. Its conclusion that the commentary now being considered is not binding on the courts was error. The commentary added by Amendment 433 was interpretive and explanatory of the Guideline defining “crime of violence.” Commentary which functions to “interpret [a] guideline or explain how it is to be applied,” USSG § 1B1.7, controls, and if failure to follow, or a misreading of, such commentary results in a sentence “seleet[ed]. . . from the wrong guideline range,” Williams v. United States, supra, at 203, that sentence would constitute “an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines” under 18 U. S. C. § 3742(f)(1). A Guideline itself makes this proposition clear. See USSG § 1B1.7 (“Failure to follow such commentary could constitute an incorrect application of the guidelines, subjecting the sentence to possible reversal on appeal”). Our holding in Williams dealing with policy statements applies with equal force to the commentary before us here. Cf. USSG § 1B1.7 (commentary regarding departures from the Guidelines should be “treated as the legal equivalent of a policy statement”); § 1B1.7, comment. (“Portions of [the Guidelines Manual] not labeled as guidelines or commentary ... aré to be construed as commentary and thus have the force of policy statements”). It does not follow that commentary is binding in all instances. If, for example, commentary and the guideline it interprets are inconsistent in that following one will result in violating the dictates of the other, the Sentencing Reform Act itself commands compliance with the guideline. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 3553(a)(4), (b). Some courts have refused to follow commentary in situations falling short of such flat inconsistency. Thus, we articulate the standard that governs the decision whether particular interpretive or explanatory commentary is binding. Different analogies have been suggested as helpful characterizations of the legal force of commentary. Some we reject. We do not think it helpful to treat commentary as a contemporaneous statement of intent by the drafters or issuers of the guideline, having a status similar to that of, for example, legislative committee reports or the advisory committee notes to the various federal rules of procedure and evidence. Quite apart from the usual difficulties of attributing meaning to a statutory or regulatory command by reference to what other documents say about its proposers’ initial intent, here, as is often true, the commentary was issued well after the guideline it interprets had been promulgated. The guidelines of the Sentencing Commission, moreover, cannot become effective until after the 6-month review period for congressional modification or disapproval. It seems inconsistent with this process for the Commission to announce some statement of initial intent well after the review process has expired. To be sure, much commentary has been issued at the same time as the guideline it interprets. But neither the Guidelines Manual nor the Sentencing Reform Act indicates that the weight accorded to, or the function of, commentary differs depending on whether it represents a contemporaneous or ex post interpretation. We also find inapposite an analogy to an agency’s construction of a federal statute that it administers. Under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), if a statute is unambiguous the statute governs; if, however, Congress’ silence or ambiguity has “left a gap for the agency to fill,” courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation so long as it is “a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., at 842-843. Commentary, however, has a function different from an agency’s legislative rule. Commentary, unlike a legislative rule, is not the product of delegated authority for rulemaking, which of course must yield to the clear meaning of a statute. Id., at 843, n. 9. Rather, commentary explains the guidelines and provides concrete guidance as to how even unambiguous guidelines are to be applied in practice. Although the analogy is not precise because Congress has a role in promulgating the guidelines, we think the Government is correct in suggesting that the commentary be treated as an agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rule. Brief for United States 13-16. The Sentencing Commission promulgates the guidelines by virtue of an express congressional delegation of authority for rulemaking, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S., at 371-379, and through the informal rulemaking procedures in 5 U. S. C. §553, see 28 U. S. C. § 994(x). Thus, the guidelines are the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies. The functional purpose of commentary (of the kind at issue here) is to assist in the interpretation and application of those rules, which are within the Commission’s particular area of concern and expertise and which the Commission itself has the first responsibility to formulate and announce. In these respects this type of commentary is akin to an agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rules. As we have often stated, provided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945). See, e. g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 359 (1989); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U. S. 864, 872-873 (1977); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965). See also 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7:22, pp. 105-107 (2d ed. 1979). According this measure of controlling authority to the commentary is consistent with the role the Sentencing Reform Act contemplates for the Sentencing Commission. The Commission, after all, drafts the guidelines as well as the commentary interpreting them, so we can presume that the interpretations of the guidelines contained in the commentary represent the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems that the guidelines should be applied to be consistent with the Guidelines Manual as a whole as well as the authorizing statute. The Commission has the statutory obligation “periodically [to] review and revise” the guidelines in light of its consultation with authorities on and representatives of the federal criminal justice system. See 28 U. S. C. § 994(b). The Commission also must “revie[w] the presentence report, the guideline worksheets, the tribunal’s sentencing statement, and any written plea agreement,” Mistretta v. United States, supra, at 369-370, with respect to every federal criminal sentence. See 28 U. S. C. § 994(w). In assigning these functions to the Commission, “Congress necessarily contemplated that the Commission would periodically review the work of the courts, and would make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions might suggest.” Braxton v. United States, 500 U. S. 344, 348 (1991). Although amendments to guidelines provisions are one method of incorporating revisions, another method open to the Commission is amendment of the commentary, if the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear the construction. Amended commentary is binding on the federal courts even though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior judicial constructions of a particular guideline cannot prevent the Commission from adopting a conflicting interpretation that satisfies the standard we set forth today. It is perhaps ironic that the Sentencing Commission’s own commentary fails to recognize the full significance of interpretive and explanatory commentary. The commentary to the Guideline on commentary provides: “[I]n seeking to understand the meaning of the guidelines courts likely will look to the commentary for guidance as an indication of the intent of those who wrote them. In such instances, the courts will treat the commentary mueh like legislative history or other legal material that helps determine the intent of a drafter.” USSG § 1B1.7, comment. We note that this discussion is phrased in predictive terms. To the extent that this commentary has prescriptive content, we think its exposition of the role of interpretive and explanatory commentary is inconsistent with the uses to which the Commission in practice has put such commentary and the command in.§lB1.7 that failure to follow interpretive and explanatory commentary could result in reversible error. We now apply these principles to Amendment 433. We recognize that the exclusion of the felon-in-possession offense from the definition of “crime of violence” may not be compelled by the guideline text. Nonetheless, Amendment 433 does not run afoul of the Constitution or a federal statute, and it is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent” with §4B1.2, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., supra, at 414. As a result, the commentary is a binding interpretation of the phrase “crime of violence.” Federal courts may not use the felon-in-possession offense as the predicate crime of violence for purposes of imposing the career offender provision of USSG §4B1.1 as to those defendants to whom Amendment 433 applies. The Government agrees that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that commentary is not binding on the federal courts and in ruling that Amendment 433 is not of controlling weight. See Brief for United States 11-19. It suggests, however, that we should affirm the judgment on an alternative ground. It argues that petitioner’s sentence conformed with the Guidelines Manual in effect when he was sentenced, id., at 22-29, and that the sentence may not be reversed on appeal based upon a postsentence amendment to the provisions in the Manual, id., at 19-22. The Government claims that petitioner’s only recourse is to file a motion in District Court for resentencing, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3582(e)(2). Brief for United States 33-35. It notes that after the Court of Appeals denied rehearing in this case, the Sentencing Commission amended USSG § 1B1.10(d), p. s., to indicate that Amendment 433 may be given retroactive effect under § 3582(c)(2). See Amendment 469, USSG App. C, p. 296 (Nov. 1992). We decline to address this argument. In refusing to upset petitioner’s sentence, the Court of Appeals did not consider the nonretroactivity theory here advanced by the Government; its refusal to vacate the sentence was based only on its view that commentary did not bind it. This issue, moreover, is not “fairly included” in the question we formulated in the grant of certiorari, see 506 U. S. 972 (1992). Cf. this Court’s Rule 14.1(a). We leave the contentions of the parties on this aspect of the case to be addressed by the Court of Appeals on remand. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Amendment 433 was contrary to a substantial body of Circuit precedent holding that the felon-in-possession offense constituted a crime of violence in at least some circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 892 F. 2d 296, 304 (CA3 1989), cert. denied, 496 U. S. 939 (1990); United States v. Goodman, 914 F. 2d 696, 698-699 (CA5 1990); United States v. Alvarez, 914 F. 2d 915, 917-919 (CA7 1990), cert. denied, 500 U. S. 934 (1991); United States v. Cornelius, 931 F. 2d 490, 492-493 (CA8 1991); United States v. O’Neal, 937 F. 2d 1369, 1374-1375 (CA9 1990); United States v. Walker, 930 F. 2d 789, 793-795 (CA10 1991); 943 F. 2d 1268, 1271-1273 (CA11 1991) (case below). With the decision below compare, e. g., United States v. Weston, 960 F. 2d 212, 219 (CA1 1992) (when the language of a guideline is not “fully self-illuminating,” courts should look to commentary for guidance; while commentary “do[es] not possess the force of law,” it is an “important interpretive ai[d], entitled to considerable respect”); United States v. Joshua, 976 F. 2d 844, 855 (CA3 1992) (commentary is analogous to an administrative agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute; courts should defer to commentary if it is a “reasonable reading” of the guideline); United States v. Wimbish, 980 F 2d 312, 314-315 (CA5 1992) (commentary has the force of policy statements; while courts “must consider” commentary, “they are not bound by [it] as they are by the guidelines”), cert. pending, No. 92-7993; United States v. White, 888 F 2d 490, 497 (CA7 1989) (commentary constitutes a “contemporaneous explanatio[n] of the Guidelines by their authors, entitled to substantial weight”); United States v. Smeathers, 884 F. 2d 363, 364 (CA8 1989) (commentary “reflects the intent” of the Sentencing Commission); United States v. Anderson, 942 F. 2d 606, 611-613 (CA9 1991) (en banc) (commentary is analogous to advisory committee notes that accompany the federal rules of procedure and evidence; commentary should be applied unless it cannot be construed as consistent with the Guidelines); United States v. Saucedo, 950 F. 2d 1508, 1515 (CA10 1991) (refuses to follow amendment to commentary that is inconsistent with Circuit precedent; “our interpretation of a guideline has the force of law until such time as the Sentencing Commission or Congress changes the actual text of the guideline”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORFOLK REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY v. CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY OF VIRGINIA et al. No. 81-2332. Argued October 3, 1983 Decided November 1, 1983 Francis N. Crenshaw argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Howard W. Martin, Jr., and Ann K. Sullivan. Joshua I. Schwartz argued the cause for the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development as respondent under this Court’s Rule 19.6 in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, and Geoffrey I. Stewart. Joseph L. Kelly argued the cause for respondent Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia. With him on the brief was Jack E. Greer. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Boston Redevelopment Authority by William A. Zucker; for the Community Redevelopment Agencies of the City of Los Angeles et al. by James Dexter Clark and Richard E. Brandt; for the United States Conference of Mayors et al. by Stephen Chappie, John J. Gunther, Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Richard B. Geltman; for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers by J. Lamar Shelley, John W. Witt, Henry W. Underhill, Jr., Benjamin L. Brown, Roy D. Bates, George Agnost, James B. Brennan, Roger F. Cutler, Walter M. Powell, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., William H. Taube, William I. Thornton, Jr., Max P. Zall, and Charles S. Rhyne; for the City of New York by Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., and Leonard Koemer; and for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, by Philip R. Trapani and Lydia Calvert Taylor. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Gas Association by Kevin B. Belford; for Brooklyn Union Gas Co. by Dana Contratto; and for Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. et al. by Dale G. Higer. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia (C&P) was required to relocate some of its telephone transmission facilities by reason of a street realignment. It sought compensation from petitioner Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA), the local government agency responsible for the urban renewal plan which caused the street realignment. C&P claimed that it was a “displaced person” as that term is defined in the Uniform Relocation Act, passed by Congress in 1970. We hold that C&P is not a “displaced person” within the meaning of the Act. The Relocation Act provides that any person “displaced” from his home or place of business by a federal or federally funded project is entitled to relocation benefits, including reimbursement for the “actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, business, farm operation, or other personal property.” 42 U. S. C. § 4622(a)(1). The Act by its terms binds only federal agencies; but a federal agency may not provide funds for state projects involving condemnation without first receiving “satisfactory assurances” that displaced persons will be given such relocation payments and assistance “as are required to be provided by a Federal agency” under the Act. 42 U. S. C. § 4630. In order to qualify for federal funds, therefore, many States, such as Virginia, see Va. Code §25-235 et seq. (1980 and Supp. 1983), have adopted legislation modeled on the Relocation Act. NRHA is a political subdivision of the State of Virginia, located in the city of Norfolk. During the 1960’s, NRHA began four redevelopment projects in Norfolk for which federal funds were provided under the urban renewal program contained in Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 414, 42 U. S. C. § 1450 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The development plans approved by the city and carried out by NRHA required the reshaping of certain land parcels, which in turn required a realignment of street patterns. After acquiring the land on both sides of the streets in question, NRHA successfully petitioned the city to close off those streets or parts thereof. Stipulations of Fact Nos. 5, 6, App. 39-41. New streets were constructed in accordance with the development plans. C&P is a privately owned utility company engaged in the business of selling telephone and other telecommunication services in the city of Norfolk and throughout Virginia. To serve its customers, C&P had placed telephone transmission facilities, including manholes, conduits, cables, and accessory fittings, within the public rights-of-way of certain streets throughout Norfolk, including streets within the urban renewal project areas. When the streets were realigned, C&P was forced to relocate some of its facilities. The manholes and conduits, too massive to move, were simply abandoned in place. The telephone cables were withdrawn and, for the most part, sold for their scrap value, though some cable was stored for possible reuse. App. 100-101 (testimony of Mr. Tucker). Substitute facilities were installed beneath the new streets to prevent any interruption in service. C&P sought reimbursement from NRHA for the expenses it incurred in this relocation, claiming that it was a “displaced person” within the meaning of the Relocation Act. After a series of administrative rejections, C&P sued NRHA in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court denied relief to C&P, but on appeal its decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Landrieu, 674 F. 2d 298 (1982). That court held that the definitional provisions of the Relocation Act compelled the conclusion that a utility was not excluded from the definition of “displaced person” under the Act, and that C&P was entitled to compensation as a “displaced person” for the sort of expenses incurred here. We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 459 U. S. 1145 (1983). We now reverse. Our analysis of the statute and its legislative history convinces us that in passing the Relocation Act Congress addressed the needs of residential and business tenants and owners, and did not deal with the separate problem posed by the relocation of utility service lines. We hold, therefore, that the Relocation Act did not change the long-established common-law principle that a utility forced to relocate from a public right-of-way must do so at its own expense; it is not a “displaced person” as that term is defined in the Act. There is no doubt that a utility company could, under certain circumstances, be a “displaced person” within the meaning of the Relocation Act. Businesses as well as natural persons are eligible for relocation benefits. Thus, for example, if a branch office of C&P were located in a building condemned by the NRHA, C&P might well be entitled to recover the cost of moving its office equipment and furnishings. C&P, just like any other legitimate business, would be “displaced” by the federally funded project. But whether C&P can be said to be “displaced” within the meaning of the Act when it relocates telephone lines because an urban renewal project calls for realignment of existing street patterns is a different question which requires more detailed analysis. When streets containing utility conduits are realigned, C&P is not “just like any other legitimate business”; it faces a problem unique to utilities. Under the traditional common-law rule, utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local authorities. 12 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations § 34.74a (3d ed. 1970); 4A J. Sackman, Nichols’ Law of Eminent Domain § 15.22 (rev. 3d ed. 1981). This rule was recognized and approved by this Court as long ago as New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm’n of New Orleans, 197 U. S. 453, 462 (1905) (holding that the injury sustained by the utility is damnum absque injuria). It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that “[t]he common law . . . ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose.” Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 7 Cranch 603, 623 (1813). Since the elements of the federal law of eminent domain are largely derived from the common law, see, e. g., United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369 (1943), this canon of construction has a force in this case that it might not have in other contexts of federal statutory construction. We must, therefore, be satisfied that Congress addressed the problem of utility relocation costs in the Relocation Act before we can conclude that C&P is entitled to the benefits it seeks. “As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of th[e] statut[e] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.” Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600, 608 (1979). The passage of the Relocation Act in 1970 ended a decade of close consideration of the problems faced by persons displaced by federal and federally funded projects. See Alexander v. United States Dept. of HUD, 441 U. S. 39, 49 (1979). The principal sponsor of the bill, Senator Muskie, noted that over 50 federal programs resulted in condemnation proceedings and that the victims of such proceedings received widely varying treatment. “Nearly all federally assisted programs have differing, if not conflicting, provisions for helping those displaced. They range from no assistance in some cases to liberal benefits and protection in others.” 115 Cong. Rec. 31533 (1969). In part, the Uniform Relocation Act was passed, as its name suggests, simply to ensure uniform treatment of persons displaced by condemnation. Another, equally important, purpose of the Act was to ensure that persons displaced by federal and federally funded programs would “not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole.” 42 U. S. C. §4621. Under traditional concepts of eminent domain, a homeowner would receive only the market value of his condemned house. H. R. Rep. No. 91-1656, p. 8 (1970). A tenant at will, residing or doing business at condemned premises, received nothing. Id., at 12. Yet both would incur significant, perhaps devastating, expenses in moving personal property. S. Rep. No. 91-488, pp. 6-7 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1656, supra, at 2-3. The Relocation Act was intended to alleviate the “disproportionate injuries” suffered by such persons. In pursuit of both equity and uniformity, Congress relied heavily on prior legislation governing specific federal programs. For the relocation provisions at issue here, Congress adopted as its principal model the relocation provisions in §501 through §511 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 (1968 Highway Act), Pub. L. 90-495, 82 Stat. 830-835. The legislative history is explicit that the Relocation Act was designed to extend the coverage of that pre-existing program to all federal agencies, with modifications “only as necessary to achieve a system of requirements and aids that can be applied uniformly in all Federal and federally assisted programs.” S. Rep. No. 91-488, supra, at 2. See also H. R. Rep. No. 91-1656, supra, at 2; 115 Cong. Rec. 31534 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Mundt). Much of the language of the Relocation Act, including the declaration of policy, the definitions of “person,” “business,” and “displaced person,” as well as the formula for calculating relocation benefits, is taken directly from the 1968 Highway Act. In divining congressional intent, therefore, it is instructive to note that the claims made by C&P in this case would not have been countenanced under the 1968 Highway Act. Utility relocation costs necessitated by federally funded highway projects were already specifically governed by a separate provision, 23 U. S. C. § 123, which predated and was left intact by the 1968 Act. Careful consideration of this provision demonstrates that Congress considered utility relocation as a problem separate and distinct from the plight of “displaced” persons dealt with in the 1968 Highway Act and later, more generally, in the Relocation Act. Title 23 U. S. C. § 123 had its origins in S. Rep. No. 1093, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1954). In 1954, the Senate Committee on Public Works “heard considerable testimony from owners and operators of various public utilities concerning the heavy financial burden placed upon them when reconstruction or modernization of highways requires that their facilities be moved from their prior locations on the highway right-of-way.” Id., at 12. But the Committee tentatively concluded that, since the question was governed by long-established state law, it was “neither feasible nor desirable for the Federal Government to give direction to those local relationships by force of application of Federal funds.” Id., at 13. The Committee did, however, authorize a study of the problem, and this study led to the adoption of §111 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 (1956 Highway Act), Pub. L. 84-627, 70 Stat. 383. Some States had, by statute or practice, altered the common law in order to reimburse utilities for the costs of relocation. Congress felt that such reimbursement should be considered a legitimate project expense for which the Federal Government would contribute its pro rata share. Thus, § 111 provided that when a State, in accordance with state law, pays the costs of relocation of a utility necessitated by a federally funded highway project, “Federal funds may be used to reimburse the State for such cost in the same proportion as Federal funds are expended on the project.” 23 U. S. C. § 123(a). The question of utility reimbursement was, thus, left to the laws of the individual States, with no congressional displacement of those laws. The House Report accompanying the 1956 Highway Act specifically stressed: “There is no requirement in this section, either expressed or implied, that a State must pay all or any part of utility relocation costs.” H. R. Rep. No. 2022, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1956). In response to the 1956 Highway Act, a number of States passed legislation providing for reimbursement of the cost of relocating utility facilities for federal-aid highway projects. The Senate Committee on Public Works expressed concern over “this drastic change in existing practices,” noting that “the use of Federal funds for reimbursement to the States for this purpose will increase substantially, thereby reducing the amount of Federal funds available for construction of highways.” S. Rep. No. 1407, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1958). In response, the Committee proposed to put a 70% cap on federal contributions to States for reimbursement of utilities. Ibid. This limitation was rejected in the final bill, however, and the only amendment to 23 U. S. C. § 123 was a proviso that reimbursement be made “only after evidence satisfactory to the Secretary shall have been presented to him substantiating the fact that the State has paid such cost from its own funds . . . .” Pub. L. 85-381, § 11(a), 72 Stat. 94-95. Thus, after careful consideration of the alternatives, the relations between utilities and the States were left, once again, to state law. No federal right to reimbursement was ever granted to utilities, although pro rata federal reimbursement remained available to the States if state law required reimbursement of utilities. As noted, the 1968 Highway Act did nothing to change this situation. Title 23 U. S. C. § 123 was left untouched. The relocation provisions in § 501 through § 511 of the 1968 Act were directed at a separate problem: the plight of those displaced from their homes or places of business. H. R. Rep. No. 1584, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 20 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1340, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1968). Utility relocation costs were never mentioned and, given 23 U. S. C. § 123, were clearly not intended to be covered by §501 through §511. The history of the Federal-Aid Highway Act from 1954 to 1968 shows, therefore, that Congress considered utility relocation costs and the expenses incurred by “displaced persons” to be separate and distinct problems calling for separate and distinct solutions. Congress showed that it was aware of the common-law rule that utilities must bear their own relocation expenses, and it proved unwilling, after extensive consideration and debate, to federalize the relations between utilities and state and local governments. In the Relocation Act, Congress chose to deal with only one of these two problems. In modifying and extending §501 through §511 of the 1968 Highway Act, Congress was addressing the needs of residential and business tenants and owners, living and working in buildings that would be bulldozed by federal and federally funded programs. 115 Cong. Rec. 31533 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (expressing his concern at “the bulldozing of hundreds of thousands of people from their homes and businesses annually”). Section 220 of the Relocation Act repealed those sections of prior law that had been superseded or rendered superfluous by the Relocation Act, including §501 through §511 of the 1968 Highway Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-1656, pp. 21, 32-38 (1970). Yet 23 U. S. C. § 123, governing utility relocation costs occasioned by federally funded highway projects, was left intact. It was neither contradicted nor rendered superfluous because it addressed a problem outside the scope of the Relocation Act. At no point in the extensive hearings, congressional debates, or Committee Reports was it ever suggested that the Relocation Act would alter the state rules governing utility relocation expenses. Given that Congress had hitherto expressly declined to alter those rules, after extensive consideration and debate, the conclusion seems inescapable that Congress did not do so in a fit of absentmindedness when it modified and extended the provisions of the 1968 Highway Act, provisions directed at a different problem. Virginia has continuously recognized the common-law rule that a utility forced to relocate from a public right-of-way must do so at its own expense. In Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Fugate, 211 Va. 745, 747-748, 180 S. E. 2d 657, 658-659 (1971), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a franchise agreement, such as that between Norfolk and C&P, which allows a utility to place its facilities in public streets is revocable at will and confers no property right on the utility. Established practice under the franchise agreement between Norfolk and C&P was to the same effect. C&P has always in the past borne all costs of relocation and has included those expenses as part of its operating expenses within the rate structure approved by the State Corporation Commission. Stipulations of Fact Nos. 10, 11, App. 43-44. We hold that the Relocation Act did not grant utilities such as C&P a new, federal right to reimbursement for expenses of the sort incurred here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The full title of the Act is the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1894, 42 U. S. C. § 4601 et seq. Agreements were worked out between the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and NRHA for each of the four projects, providing that HUD would furnish two-thirds of the net project cost in cash, while the city of Norfolk would contribute the remaining one-third “in kind,” by means of public improvements such as streets, schools, and parks. See Stipulation of Fact No. 9, App. 42-43; App. 187-188, 194 (testimony of Mr. Rice). The facilities were placed under the streets pursuant to an 1898 franchise agreement between the city and C&P’s predecessor, Southern Bell Telephone Co. See Exhibit No. 1, App. 228-243. Under the terms of that agreement, the city could require C&P to move its facilities at any time, with all expenses of the move to be borne by C&P. Stipulations of Fact Nos. 10, 11, App. 43-44. Section 101(6) of the Relocation Act, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 4601(6), provides as follows: “The term ‘displaced person’ means any person who, on or after January 2, 1971, moves from real property, or moves his personal property from real property, as a result of the acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, or as the result of the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency, or with Federal financial assistance; and solely for the purposes of sections 4622(a) and (b) and 4625 of this title, as a result of the acquisition of or as the result of the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate other real property, on which such person conducts a business or farm operation, for such program or project.” After C&P was turned down by NRHA, it appealed to the Richmond office of HUD. That agency also rejected the claim and was joined as a defendant in this suit. The basis for C&P’s appeal from the local agency to the federal agency is contained in a regulation issued by HUD, 24 CFR § 42.707 (1983). The statutory authorization for such appeal is unclear, but neither party questions the validity of the regulation in question, and we proceed on the assumption that such review by HUD was authorized by the Act, and that the present litigation involves only the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Relocation Act. “Person” is defined in the Act to include “any individual, partnership, corporation, or association.” 42 U. S. C. § 4601(5). The term “business” includes “any lawful activity, excepting a farm operation, conducted primarily ...(B) for the sale of services to the public . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §4601(7). See also, Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U. S. 297, 304-305 (1959); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 437 (1907); Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 557, 565 (1880). See 42 U. S. C. §4621 (statement of purpose); S. Rep. No. 91-488, pp. 1-8 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1656, pp. 1-3 (1970). See S. Rep. No. 91-488, supra, at 4, 6-7, 9; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1656, supra, at 3 The same sources also indicate reliance on § 114 of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 526. Section 114 made no mention of utility relocation costs, and HUD regulations promulgated under the Act specifically state that utilities have no right to reimbursement for expenses incurred when relocating to accommodate an urban renewal project. If, however, state law requires that such compensation be paid to the utility by the state or local agency involved in the project, then the amount paid is considered a legitimate project expenditure to which HUD will contribute its pro rata share. See HUD Urban Renewal Handbook, RHA 7209.1, ch. 2, pp. 4-5 (1969). Section 114 was repealed by § 220(a)(5) of the Relocation Act, and HUD regulations have been extensively revised to reflect the new law. The regulation governing utility relocation costs, however, remains unchanged. Compare § 501 of the 1968 Highway Act (“to insure that a few individuals do not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole”) with § 201 of the Relocation Act, 42 U. S. C. § 4621 (“to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a result of Federal and federally assisted programs in order that such persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole”). Compare § 511(1) of the 1968 Highway Act (“The term ‘person’ means . . . any individual, partnership, corporation, or association which is the owner of a business . . .”) with § 101(5) of the Relocation Act, 42 U. S. C. § 4601(5), set out in n. 6, supra. Compare § 511(4) of the 1968 Highway Act (“The term ‘business’ means any lawful activity conducted primarily . . . (B) for the sale of services to the public . . .”) with § 101(7) of the Relocation Act, 42 U. S. C. § 4601(7), set out in n. 6, supra. Compare § 511(3) of the 1968 Highway Act (“any person who moves from real property ... as a result of the acquisition or reasonable expectation of acquisition of such real property, which is subsequently acquired, in whole or in part, for a Federal-aid highway . . .”) with § 101(6) of the Relocation Act, 42 U. S. C. § 4601(6), set out in n. 4, supra. Compare §505(a) of the 1968 Highway Act (“actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, his business, or his farm operation, including personal property”) with § 202(a)(1) of the Relocation Act, 42 U. S. C. § 4622(a)(1) (“actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, business, farm operation, or other personal property”). Public Utility Relocation Incident to Highway Improvement, H. R. Doc. No. 127, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). “During 1956 and 1957, legislation which would provide for payment by the State of the cost of relocating public-utility facilities was considered by the legislative assemblies in 40 States. Such legislation was passed in 22 States, but was vetoed in 6 States, so it became law in 16 States. Under these 16 State laws only 1 State will pay the cost of relocating utility facilities on all State-maintained highways, 5 relate to all Federal-aid projects, and 10 relate to the projects on the Interstate System only, where the Federal share of the cost is at least 90 percent.” S. Rep. No. 1407, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1958). See also S. Rep. No. 91-488, pp. 4, 6, 9 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1656, pp. 2-3 (1970); 115 Cong. Rec. 31534 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Mundt); id,., at 31534-31535 (remarks of Sen. Tydings); 116 Cong. Rec. 40167 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Edmondson); id., at 40168 (remarks of Rep. Kluczynski); id., at 40170 (remarks of Rep. Mink). See Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies Act of 1969: Hearings on S. 1 before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies-1970: Hearings on H. R. 14898, H. R. 14899, S. 1, and related bills before the House Committee on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1969-1970). See, e.g., 115 Cong. Rec. 31533-31535 (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 40163-40172, 42132-42140 (1970). S. Rep. No. 91-488 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1656 (1970).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROHR AIRCRAFT CORP. v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO et al. No. 295. Argued March 30, 1960. Decided May 23, 1960. Leroy A. Wright argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Manuel L. Kugler and Henry A. Dietz argued the cause for appellees. With them on the brief were Carroll H. Smith and Duame J. Carnes. Myron C. Baum argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and John J. McCarthy. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. The question to be decided is whether real property declared to be surplus under the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 765, but the record title to which is in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, continues to be subject to local taxation under the exemption of § 8 of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 47 Stat. 5. The Supreme Court of California and the Supreme Court of Michigan have held that it does. The Court of Claims has reached the opposite conclusion. In view of this conflict we agreed to hear this case, but postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 361 U. S. 859. On the question of jurisdiction, we believe that appellant did not make the required “explicit and timely insistence in the state courts that a state statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Constitution, treaties or laws. . . . And it has long been settled that an attack upon a tax assessment or levy, such as [appellant] here made, on the ground that it infringes a taxpayer’s federal rights, privileges, or immunities, will not sustain an appeal . . . Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185 (1945). The appeal is therefore dismissed. While the case is not properly here by appeal, we treat the same as a petition for certiorari under 28 U. S. C. § 2103. The petition is granted. On the merits, we conclude that the property involved is not within the waiver provision of the federal Act. The language of § 8 of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act was borrowed from earlier federal legislation dealing with federal financial institutions. The congressional policy appears to have been to waive tax exemption on real property owned by government corporations whose functions were primarily financial in nature. Originally conceived for the purpose of making loans to distressed business concerns, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was in this category. Apparently Congress was concerned that property obtained by the Corporation through its financial operations in aid of economic recovery policies would lose its taxable status. Through § 8, therefore, Congress preserved the right of state and local governmental bodies to tax property even though it came into the hands of the Corporation. Success crowned the economic efforts of the Corporation, and, as the country approached the critical period immediately preceding its entry into World War II, Congress in 1940 extended the Corporation's functions to include the stockpiling of critical supplies and the operation of plants engaged in the manufacture of war material. 54 Stat. 573. It was soon apparent that large tracts of land would be necessary in this operation, and the waiver was extended to the real estate holdings of the Defense Plant Corporation, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 55 Stat. 248. The termination of the war quickly threw substantial portions of such property into disuse, there being no further need for the mass production of war material. The President created the War Assets Administration for the purpose of disposing of all government surplus property. After March 25, 1946, government agencies possessing property surplus to official needs were required so to declare it and to transfer it to the Administration for disposal. By declaration of May 29, 1946, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation declared the subject property to be surplus to its needs and responsibilities. Under the Surplus Property Act, this declaration transferred to the War Assets Administration the functions of: caring for and handling the property pending disposal (§3 (g) and § 6); making disposition of the property on such terms as it saw fit (§ 9 (b) and § 15 (a)), including donation under certain conditions (§13 (b)); and the power of execution and delivery of all necessary papers incident to transfer of title (§15 (b)). It further provided that all funds derived from such disposition would be covered into the United States Treasury as miscellaneous receipts (§ 30 (a)). Pursuant to this declaration by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the War Assets Administration took possession of this property on May 29, 1946, and its successor, the General Services Administration, retained possession until September 1, 1949, during which period the property was used as a storage depot and a sales center for surplus property held by the Administration. On the latter date, the property was leased to appellant's predecessor. The lease described the lessor as the “Reconstruction Finance Corporation . . . and the United States of America, both acting by and through the General Services Administrator under . . . the Surplus Property Act of 1944.” Appellees assessed ad valorem real property taxes on the realty against the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, as owner, for the fiscal tax years 1951 to 1955, inclusive. Appellant paid the taxes and filed this suit after claims for refund had been denied. The trial court entered judgment against appellant. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and denied the claim for refund. 51 Cal. 2d 759, 336 P. 2d 521. There would be no question as to the exemption of the real property involved had the record title been in the name of the United States. Since March 17, 1955, in fact, it has been so recorded; on that date the Reconstruction Finance Corporation executed and recorded a quitclaim deed to the United States. The Supreme Court of California correctly posed as the underlying question, "whether the land ceased to be ‘real property of the’ Reconstruction Finance Corporation” after it was declared surplus and became subject to the provisions of the Surplus Property Act of 1944. That court found that, since no deed was executed transferring title out of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation until 1955, it remained “property of the Corporation” and hence subject to taxation until that time. We believe the court placed too much reliance on the fact that the bare record title to the property remained in the name of the Corporation. It appears to us that the purpose of the waiver provision was to permit taxation of real property being used by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the performance of its functions. Such use was terminated when the property was declared surplus in 1946. At that time another agency of the Government took both the occupancy and complete control of the property for the purpose of management and disposition. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, under the specific provisions of the Surplus Property Act, thereby lost all power and control over the property, which came into the hands of the Administrator for the account of the United States, any proceeds therefrom being ordered paid into the United States Treasury. Thereafter, the Administrator elected, as he had the statutory power to do, to lease the property to appellant’s predecessor. The real property, however, remained in the account of the United States, not the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. As the Supreme Court of California recognized, the general rule is “that lands owned by the United States of America or its in-strumentalities are immune from state and local taxation.” We think that the land here was “owned” by the United States. We believe that California overlooks the fact that, while the 1949 lease was formally made in the name of both the United States and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, as lessors, it recited on its face that the property was “surplus property of the Government of the United States” and subject to the Surplus Property Act of 1944. Furthermore, this lease noted that the property had “been assigned to War Assets Administration for disposal,” and that “the Department of Air Force has determined that the use of the leased premises by the Lessee herein is necessary for the production of military equipment for the National Defense.” Moreover, the property had been occupied by the War Assets Administration during the two years immediately preceding its lease. The appellees’ contention seems to be that, since the lease was in the name of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as well as the United States, the land was “property of the Corporation.” We hardly think such a conclusion inevitable. We believe that the appropriate test would turn on practical ownership of the property rather than the naked legal title. This is the more necessary with respect to public property where the record title may often be in a government agency or department — or, for that matter, in an official of the Government — rather than in the name of the United States. Here the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had no proprietary interest in the property, no possession or control thereof, was performing none of its functions with regard thereto, and could receive none of the income or future benefits therefrom. Even though it held the record title, such holding, under the circumstances here, could be only for the benefit of the United States. All of the incidents of beneficial ownership ended by the express mandate of the statute when the property was declared surplus and transferred to another agency for disposition. When confronted with the same issue as presented by the instant case, the Court of Claims reached a conclusion directly contrary to that of the Supreme Court of California. Board of County Comm’rs of Sedgwick County v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 304, 105 F. Supp. 995. The Court of Claims there noted that, after the declaration of surplus, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had no “physical possession, control, or custody of the property. It had neither the use nor the right to use the property.” The court went on to conclude that “[t]here is no indication that Congress intended to waive immunity from taxation under these circumstances.” 123 Ct. Cl., at 324, 105 F. Supp., at 1001. We agree with the Court of Claims “that the cloak of immunity descended upon the property [when it was declared surplus] and no tax liability for the property could arise thereafter.” 123 Ct. Cl., at 324, 105 F. Supp., at 1002. Since the crucial element is the intent of Congress, it is important to note the enactment of a 1955 statute providing the States relief from the effects of federal immunity. 40 U. S. C. §§ 521-524. The congressional declaration of purpose in that statute “recognizes that the transfer of real property having a taxable status from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation ... to another Government department has often operated to remove such property from the tax rolls . . . .” “Transfer” was defined to include “a transfer of custody and control of, or accountability for the care and handling of,” the property, as well as “transfer of legal title.” The statute goes on to provide for certain payments in lieu of taxes where such a transfer occurs. The relevance of this statute lies in a congressional sanction of the rule of the Sedgwick County case, construing the waiver provision. Wé'cannot say that Congress in 1932 intended to waive the tax exemption on “real property of the Corporation” after the Corporation found the property surplus to its needs and responsibilities and transferred it to another agency, for management and disposition as United States property. To say that the Government’s land remained taxable merely because no formal deed was executed transferring title, either to itself or any of its designated agencies, would but make a local tollgate of a technicality. Nor can we agree that the short administrative practice claimed here continued the waiver in effect. Even if the responsible agency had permitted the paper title to the Government’s property to remain in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the sole purpose of allowing it to be taxed, the congressional mandate in the Surplus Property Act of 1944 could not be overridden. As to such matters, any adjustments between the federal and the local governments are strictly legislative ones for the Congress, United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466, 474 (1958), and not within the discretion of the executive agencies. The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. . Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent. Section 8 (as amended): “. . . any real property of the Corporation shall be subject to . . . State, Territorial, county, municipal, or local taxation to the same extent according to its value as other real property is taxed.” 61 Stat. 205; 15 U. S. C. § 607. Continental Motors Corp. v. Township of Muskegon, 346 Mich. 141, 77 N. W. 2d 370. Board of County Comm’rs of Sedgwick County v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 304, 105 F. Supp. 995. In a case involving property in a similar posture, the Ninth Circuit reached a result in accord with Sedgwick County, and contrary to the California and Michigan courts. United States v. Shofner Iron & Steel Works, 168 F. 2d 286. In Shofner, the ultimate issue was not tax immunity, but ejectment of a defendant from government property. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 provides: “Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: “ (2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity. “(3) By writ of certiorari, . . . where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of . . . the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2103: “If an appeal to the Supreme Court is improvidently taken from the decision of the highest court of a State in a case where the proper mode of a review is by petition for certiorari, this alone shall not be ground for dismissal; but the papers whereon'the appeal was taken shall be regarded and acted on as a petition for writ of certiorari and as if duly presented to the Supreme Court at the time the appeal was taken. . . .” See 13 Stat. 99, 111, 12 U. S. C. § 548 (national banking associations) ; 38 Stat. 251, 258, 12 U. S. C. § 531 (Federal Reserve Banks); 39 Stat. 380, 12 U. S. C. §§ 931, 933 (Federal Land Banks); 42 Stat. 1469, 12 U. S. C. § 1261 (National Agricultural Credit Corporation). See Exec. Order No. 9689, dated Jan. 31, 1946, 11 Fed. Reg. 1265. See Surplus Property Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 765. The Act did not require the execution of a deed to the Administration. As of July 1, 1949, Congress transferred all of the functions of the War Assets Administration to the General Services Administration. See Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, c. 288, 63 Stat. 377. By the terms of the lease, the lessee undertook to pay all taxes legally assessed against the property.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROGERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. QUAN et al. No. 396. Argued May 20, 1958. Decided June 16, 1958. Leonard B. Sand argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Anderson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Julia P. Cooper. David Carliner argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jack Wasserman and Andrew Reiner. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a companion case to Leng May Ma v. Barber, decided today, ante, p. 185. The five respondents are natives of China who came to the United States seeking admission between 1949 and 1954, four of them arriving before the effective date of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Like petitioner in Leng May Ma, all were paroled into the United States, and all have been ordered excluded. They applied for stays of deportation under § 243 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and upon refusal, filed complaints in the District Court seeking judgments declaring their nondeportability to China, directing consideration of their claims under § 243 (h), and restraining the Attorney General from deporting them. The complaints were dismissed by the District Court, but the Court of Appeals held that excluded aliens on parole are “within the United States” for purposes of § 243 (h). 101 U. S. App. D. C. 229, 248 F. 2d 89. Because of the conflict with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Leng May Ma, we granted certiorari. 355 U. S. 861 (1957). We have concluded that respondents, like petitioner in Leng May Ma, are ineligible for stays of deportation under § 243 (h). However, because of the importance of this problem in the administration of the immigration laws, we deem it appropriate to deal specifically with a contention not directly asserted by petitioner in Leng May Ma. The deportation of excluded aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act is authorized in § 237 (a) of Chapter 4, wherein it is provided that an alien excluded under the Act “shall be immediately deported to the country whence he came . . . .” 66 Stat. 201, 8 U. S. C. § 1227 (a). A similar provision existed in the immediate predecessor to § 237 (a), which was § 18 of the Immigration Act of 1917. Deportation in expulsion proceedings is separately provided for under the present Act in § 243 of Chapter 5, subsection (h) of which, of course, contains the authority which respondents seek to invoke in this case. 66 Stat. 212, 8 U. S. C. § 1253. Like authority existed in the immediate predecessor of § 243, which was § 20 of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 890, as amended by § 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1010. Respondents assert, however, that neither § 237 (a) nor its predecessor, § 18 of the 1917 Act, is the basis for their deportation since they were not “immediately” deported as required in the sections. Hence, they argue that deportation must rest upon § 243 of the present Act, as to the respondent who arrived after the Immigration and Nationality Act, and its predecessor, § 20 of the 1917 Act, as to the four who arrived prior to the present Act. We will assume, for purpose of analysis, that four of the five respondents are, as they claim, deportable only under prior Acts by virtue of their early arrival. However, under neither of the exclusion sections, i. e., § 237 (a) of the present Act or § 18 of the 1917 Act, is the deportation authority confined, as respondents contend, to those situations where deportation is immediate. Neither section, when read in its entirety and in context, fairly suggests any such limitation. Nor are there reasons of policy to compel such a result. As the desire to remain increases,, those knocking on our doors quite naturally become more litigious, and contested departures often involve long delays. We doubt that the Congress intended the mere fact of delay to improve an alien’s status from that of one seeking admission to that of one legally considered within the* United States. We conclude that there is ample basis under § 237 (a) and § 18 of the 1917 Act to deport respondents; we need not draw upon the provisions in § 243 of the present Act or § 20 of the 1917 Act. Regardless of which of the two exclusion sections, § 237 (a) of the 1952 Act or § 18 of the 1917 Act, provides the basis for respondents’ deportation, the applications for stays were all filed subsequent to the 1952 Act and hence must be determined by that Act. For reasons explained in Leng May Ma, § 243 (h) is unavailable to excluded aliens, and the fact of parole creates no variance from this principle. Reversed. The Chief Justice, MR. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan dissent for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion in Leng May Ma v. Barber, ante, p. 190. Section 243 (h): “The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.” 66 Stat. 214, 8 U. S. C. § 1253 (h). Section 18: “[A] 11 aliens brought to this country in violation of law shall be immediately sent back . . . .” 39 Stat. 887.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES No. 85. Argued December 9, 1970 — Decided March 8, 1971 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and HarlaN, BreNNAN, Stewart, White, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Black, J., concurred in the judgment and in Part I of the Court’s opinion. Douglas, J., filed dissenting opinions, post, p. 463 and p. 470. Conrad J. Lynn argued the cause for petitioner in No. 85. With him on the brief were Leon Friedman, Marvin M. Karpatkin, and Melvin L. Wulf. Richard Harrington argued the cause for petitioner in No. 325. With him on the briefs were Leigh Athearn, Stuart J. Land, and John T. Noonan, Jr. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States and for the other respondents in both cases. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Wilson and Beatrice Rosenberg. George T. Altman, pro se, filed a brief as amicus curiae in both cases. Leo Rosen filed a brief for the American Ethical Union as amicus curiae in No. 85. Briefs of amici curiae in No. 325 were filed by Charles H. Tuttle and Thomas A. Shaw, Jr., for the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U. S. A. et al.; by Peter J. Donnici for the Executive Board of the National Federation of Priests’ Councils; by Joseph B. Robison, Ephraim Margolin, Stanley J. Friedman, Seymour Farber, and Edwin J. Lukas for the American Jewish Congress; by Michael N. Pollet and Elsbeth Levy Bothe for Louis P. Font; and by the American Friends Service Committee. Together with No. 325, Negre v. Larsen et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases present the question whether conscientious objection to a particular war, rather than objection to war as such, relieves the objector from responsibilities of military training and service. Specifically, we are called upon to decide whether conscientious scruples relating to a particular conflict are within the purview of established provisions relieving conscientious objectors to war from military service. Both petitioners also invoke constitutional principles barring government interference with the exercise of religion and requiring governmental neutrality in matters of religion. In No. 85, petitioner Gillette was convicted of wilful failure to report for induction into the armed forces. Gillette defended on the ground that he should have been ruled exempt from induction as a conscientious objector to war. In support of his unsuccessful request for classification as a conscientious objector, this petitioner had stated his willingness to participate in a war of national defense or a war sponsored by the United Nations as a peace-keeping measure, but declared his opposition to American military operations in Vietnam, which he characterized as “unjust.” Petitioner concluded that he could not in conscience enter and serve in the armed forces during the period of the Vietnam conflict. Gillette’s view of his duty to abstain from any involvement in a war seen as unjust is, in his words, “based on a humanist approach to religion,” and his personal decision concerning military service was guided by fundamental principles of conscience and deeply held views about the purpose and obligation of human existence. The District Court determined that there was a basis in fact to support administrative denial of exemption in Gillette’s case. The denial of exemption was upheld, and Gillette’s defense to the criminal charge rejected, not because of doubt about the sincerity or the religious character of petitioner’s objection to military service, but because his objection ran to a particular war. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals concluded that Gillette’s conscientious beliefs “were specifically directed against the war in Vietnam,” while the relevant exemption provision of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. V), “requires opposition 'to participation in war in any form.’ ” 420 F. 2d 298, 299-300 (CA2 1970). In No. 325, petitioner Negre, after induction into the Army, completion of basic training, and receipt of orders for Vietnam duty, commenced proceedings looking to his discharge as a conscientious objector to war. Application for discharge was denied, and Negre sought judicial relief by habeas corpus. The District Court found a basis in fact for the Army’s rejection of petitioner’s application for discharge. Habeas relief was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal, because, in the language of the Court of Appeals, Negre “objects to the war in Vietnam, not to all wars,” and therefore does “not qualify for separation [from the Army], as a conscientious objector.” 418 F. 2d 908, 909-910 (CA9 1969). Again, no question is raised as to the sincerity or the religious quality of this petitioner’s views. In line with religious counseling and numerous religious texts, Negre, a devout Catholic, believes that it is his duty as a faithful Catholic to discriminate between “just” and “unjust” wars, and to forswear participation in the latter. His assessment of the Vietnam conflict as an unjust war became clear in his mind after completion of infantry training, and Negre is now firmly of the view that any personal involvement in that war would contravene his conscience and “all that I had been taught in my religious training.” We granted certiorari in these cases, 399 U. S. 925 (1970), in order to resolve vital issues concerning the exercise of congressional power to raise and support armies, as affected by the religious guarantees of the First Amendment. We affirm the judgments below in both cases. I Each petitioner claims a nonconstitutional right to be relieved of the duty of military service in virtue of his conscientious scruples. Both claims turn on the proper construction of § 6 (j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. V), which provides: “Nothing contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.” This language controls Gillette’s claim to exemption, which was asserted administratively prior to the point of induction. Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (May 10, 1968), prescribes that post-induction claims to conscientious objector status shall be honored, if valid, by the various branches of the armed forces. Section 6 (j) of the Act, as construed by the courts, is incorporated by the various service regulations issued pursuant to the Directive, and thus the standards for measuring claims of in-service objectors, such as Negre, are the same as the statutory tests applicable in a pre-induction situation. For purposes of determining the statutory status of conscientious objection to a particular war, the focal language of § 6 (j) is the phrase, “conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.” This language, on a straightforward reading, can bear but one meaning; that conscientious scruples relating to war and military service must amount to conscientious opposition to participating personally in any war and all war. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 340, 342 (1970); id., at 347, 357 (concurring in result). See also United States v. Kauten, 133 F. 2d 703, 707 (CA2 1943). It matters little for present purposes whether the words, “in any form,” are read to modify “war” or “participation.” On the first reading, conscientious scruples must implicate “war in any form,” and an objection involving a particular war rather than all war would plainly not be covered by § 6 (j). On the other reading, an objector must oppose “participation in war.” It would strain good sense to read this phrase otherwise than to mean “participation in all war.” For the word “war” would still be used in an unqualified, generic sense, meaning war as such. Thus, however the statutory clause be parsed, it remains that conscientious objection must run to war in any form. A different result cannot be supported by reliance on the materials of legislative history. Petitioners and amici point to no episode or pronouncement in the legislative history of § 6 (j), or of predecessor provisions, that tends to overthrow the obvious interpretation of the words themselves. It is true that the legislative materials reveal a deep concern for the situation of conscientious objectors to war, who absent special status would be put to a hard choice between .contravening imperatives of religion and conscience or suffering penalties. Moreover, there are clear indications that congressional reluctance to impose such a choice stems from a recognition of the value of conscientious action to the democratic community at large, and from respect for the general proposition that fundamental principles of conscience and religious duty may sometimes override the demands of the secular state. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163, 170-172 (1965); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 631-634 (1931) (dissenting opinion). See generally Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection (1950). But there are countervailing considerations, which are also the concern of Congress, and the legislative materials simply do not support the view that Congress intended to recognize any conscientious claim whatever as a basis for relieving the claimant from the general responsibility or the various incidents of military service. The claim that is recognized by § 6 (j) is a claim of conscience running against war as such. This claim, not one involving opposition to a particular war only, was plainly the focus of congressional concern. Finding little comfort in the wording or the legislative history of § 6 (j), petitioners rely heavily on dicta in the decisional law dealing with objectors whose conscientious scruples ran against war as such, but who indicated certain reservations of an abstract nature. It is instructive that none of the cases relied upon embraces an interpretation of § 6 (j) at variance with the construction we adopt today. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U. S. 385 (1955), presented the only previous occasion for this Court to focus on the “participation in war in any form” language of § 6 (j). In Sicurella a Jehovah’s Witness who opposed participation in secular wars was held to possess the requisite conscientious scruples concerning war, although he was not opposed to participation in a “theocratic war” commanded by Jehovah. The Court noted that the “theocratic war” reservation was highly abstract — no such war had occurred since biblical times, and none was contemplated. Congress, on the other hand, had in mind “real shooting wars,” id., at 391, and Sicurella’s abstract reservations did not undercut his conscientious opposition to participating in such wars. Plainly, Sicurella cannot be read to support the claims of those, like petitioners, who for a variety of reasons consider one particular “real shooting war” to be unjust, and therefore oppose participation in that war. It should be emphasized that our cases explicating the “religious training and belief” clause of § 6 (j), or cognate clauses of predecessor provisions, are not relevant to the present issue. The question here is not whether these petitioners' beliefs concerning war are “religious” in nature. Thus, petitioners’ reliance on United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163, and Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, is misplaced. Nor do we decide that conscientious objection to a particular war necessarily falls within § 6 (j)’s expressly excluded class of “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.” Rather, we hold that Congress intended to exempt persons who oppose participating in all war — -“participation in war in any form”— and that persons who object solely to participation in a particular war are not within the purview of the exempting section, even though the latter objection may have such roots in a claimant’s conscience and personality that it is “religious” in character. A further word may be said to clarify our statutory holding. Apart from abstract theological reservations, two other sorts of reservations concerning use of force have been thought by lower courts not to defeat a conscientious objector claim. Willingness to use force in self-defense, in defense of home and family, or in defense against immediate acts of aggressive violence toward other persons in the community, has not been regarded as inconsistent with a claim of conscientious objection to war as such. See, e. g., United States v. Haughton, 413 F. 2d 736, 740-742 (CA9 1969); United States v. Carroll, 398 F. 2d 651, 655 (CA3 1968). But surely willingness to use force defensively in the personal situations mentioned is quite different from willingness to fight in some wars but not in others. Cf. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U. S., at 389. Somewhat more apposite to the instant situation are cases dealing with persons who oppose participating in all wars, but cannot say with complete certainty that their present convictions and existing state of mind are unalterable. See, e. g., United States v. Owen, 415 F. 2d 383, 390 (CA8 1969). Unwillingness to deny the possibility of a change of mind, in some hypothetical future circumstances, may be no more than humble good sense, casting no doubt on the claimant’s present sincerity of belief. At any rate there is an obvious difference between present sincere objection to all war, and present opposition to participation in a particular conflict only. II Both petitioners argue that § 6 (j), construed to cover only objectors to all war, violates the religious clauses of the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. . .” Petitioners contend that Congress interferes with free exercise of religion by failing to relieve objectors to a particular war from military service, when the objection is religious or conscientious in nature. While the two religious clauses — pertaining to “free exercise” and “establishment” of religion — overlap and interact in many ways, see Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 222-223 (1963); Freund, Public Aid To Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1684 (1969), it is best to focus first on petitioners’ other contention, that §6 (j) is a law respecting the establishment of religion. For despite free exercise overtones, the gist of the constitutional complaint is that §6 (j) impermissibly discriminates among types of religious belief and affiliation. On the assumption that these petitioners’ beliefs concerning war have roots that are “religious” in nature, within the meaning of the Amendment as well as this Court’s decisions construing § 6 (j), petitioners ask how their claims to relief from military service can be permitted to fail, while other “religious” claims are upheld by the Act. It is a fact that § 6 (j), properly construed, has this effect. Yet we cannot conclude in mechanical fashion, or at all, that the section works an establishment of religion. An attack founded on disparate treatment of “religious” claims invokes what is perhaps the central purpose of the Establishment Clause — the purpose of ensuring governmental neutrality in matters of religion. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 103-104 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1947). Here there is no claim that exempting conscientious objectors to war amounts to an overreaching of secular purposes and an.undue involvement of government in affairs of religion. Cf. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 675 (1970); id., at 695 (opinion of Harlan, J.). To the contrary, petitioners ask for greater “entanglement” by judicial expansion of the exemption to cover objectors to particular wars. Necessarily the constitutional value at issue is “neutrality.” And as a general matter it is surely true that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430-431 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 495 (1961). The metaphor of a “wall” or impassable barrier between Church and State, taken too literally, may mislead constitutional analysis, see Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, at 668-669; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 312-313 (1952), but the Establishment Clause stands at least for the proposition that when government activities touch on the religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary impact. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 222; id., at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring) ; id., at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring). A The critical weakness of petitioners' establishment claim arises from the fact that § 6 (j), on its face, simply does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or religious belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning war. The section says that anyone who is conscientiously opposed to all war shall be relieved of military service. The specified objection must have a grounding in “religious training and belief,” but no particular sectarian affiliation or theological position is required. The Draft Act of 1917, § 4, 40 Stat. 78, extended relief only to those conscientious objectors affiliated with some “well-recognized religious sect or organization” whose principles forbade members’ participation in war, but the attempt to focus on particular sects apparently broke down in administrative practice, Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S., at 367 n. 19 (concurring in result), and the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act, § 5 (g), 54 Stat. 889, discarded all sectarian restriction. Thereafter Congress has framed the conscientious objector exemption in broad terms compatible with “its long-established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs.” United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S., at 175. Thus, there is no occasion to consider the claim that when Congress grants a benefit expressly to adherents of one religion, courts must either nullify the grant or somehow extend the benefit to cover all religions. For § 6 (j) does not single out any religious organization or religious creed for special treatment. Rather petitioners’ contention is that since Congress has recognized one sort of conscientious objection concerning war, whatever its religious basis, the Establishment Clause commands that another, different objection be carved out and protected by the courts. Properly phrased, petitioners’ contention is that the special statutory status accorded conscientious objection to all war, but not objection to a particular war, works a de facto discrimination among religions. This happens, say petitioners, because some religious faiths themselves distinguish between personal participation in “just” and in “unjust” wars, commending the former and forbidding the latter, and therefore adherents of some religious faiths — and individuals whose personal beliefs of a religious nature include the distinction — cannot object to all wars consistently with what is regarded as the true imperative of conscience. Of course, this contention of de facto religious discrimination, rendering § 6 (j) fatally underinclusive, cannot simply be brushed aside. The question of governmental neutrality is not concluded by the observation that § 6 (j) on its face makes no discrimination between religions, for the Establishment Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality, “religious gerrymanders,” as well as obvious abuses. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S., at 696 (opinion of Harlan, J.). See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 607 (1961) (opinion of Warren, C. J.); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 213, 232 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Still a claimant alleging “gerrymander” must be able to show the absence of a neutral, secular basis for the lines government has drawn. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 107-109; Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 248 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442-444 (1961); id., at 468 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.). For the reasons that follow, we believe that petitioners have failed to make the requisite showing with respect to § 6 (j). Section 6 (j) serves a number of valid purposes having nothing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, religion, or cluster of religions. There are considerations of a pragmatic nature, such as the hopelessness of converting a sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting man, Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S., at 369 (White, J., dissenting), but no doubt the section reflects as well the view that “in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the State has always been maintained.” United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting). See United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S., at 170-172. We have noted that the legislative materials show congressional concern for the hard choice that conscription would impose on conscientious objectors to war, as well as respect for the value of conscientious action and for the principle of supremacy of conscience. Naturally the considerations just mentioned are affirmative in character, going to support the existence of an exemption rather than its restriction specifically to persons who object to all war. The point is that these affirmative purposes are neutral in the sense of the Establishment Clause. Quite apart from the question whether the Free Exercise Clause might require some sort of exemption, it is hardly impermissible for Congress to attempt to accommodate free exercise values, in line with “our happy tradition” of “avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of conscience.” United States v. Macintosh, supra, at 634 (Hughes, C. J., dissenting). See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 294-299 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id., at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S., at 370-373 (White, J., dissenting). “Neutrality” in matters of religion is not inconsistent with “benevolence” by way of exemptions from onerous duties, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S., at 669, so long as an exemption is tailored broadly enough that it reflects valid secular purposes. In the draft area for 30 years the exempting provision has focused on individual conscientious belief, not on sectarian affiliation. The relevant individual belief is simply objection to all war, not adherence to any extraneous theological viewpoint. And while the objection must have roots in conscience and personality that are “religious” in nature, this requirement has never been construed to elevate conventional piety or religiosity of any kind above the imperatives of a personal faith. In this state of affairs it is impossible to say that § 6 (j) intrudes upon “voluntarism” in religious life, see id., at 69A-696 (opinion of Harlan, J.), or that the congressional purpose in enacting § 6 (j) is to promote or foster those religious organizations that traditionally have taught the duty to abstain from participation in any war. A claimant, seeking judicial protection for his own conscientious beliefs, would be hard put to argue that §6 (j) encourages membership in putatively “favored” religious organizations, for the painful dilemma of the sincere conscientious objector arises precisely because he feels himself bound in conscience not to compromise his beliefs or affiliations. B We conclude not only that the affirmative purposes underlying § 6 (j) are neutral and secular, but also that valid neutral reasons exist for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war, and that the section therefore cannot be said to reflect a religious preference. Apart from the Government’s need for manpower, perhaps the central interest involved in the administration of conscription laws is the interest in maintaining a fair system for determining “who serves when not all serve.” When the Government exacts so much, the importance of fair, evenhanded, and uniform decisionmaking is obviously intensified. The Government argues that the interest in fairness would be jeopardized by expansion of § 6 (j) to include conscientious objection to a particular war. The contention is that the claim to relief on account of such objection is intrinsically a claim of uncertain dimensions, and that granting the claim in theory would involve a real danger of erratic or even discriminatory decisionmaking in administrative practice. A virtually limitless variety of beliefs are subsumable under the rubric, “objection to a particular war.” All the factors that might go into nonconscientious dissent from policy, also might appear as the concrete basis of an objection that has roots as well in conscience and religion. Indeed, over the realm of possible situations, opposition to a particular war may more likely be political and nonconscientious, than otherwise. See United States v. Kauten, 133 F. 2d, at 708. The difficulties of sorting the two, with a sure hand, are considerable. Moreover, the belief that a particular war at a particular time is unjust is by its nature changeable and subject to nullification by changing events. Since objection may fasten on any of an enormous number of variables, the claim is ultimately subjective, depending on the claimant’s view of the facts in relation to his judgment that a given factor or congeries of factors colors the character of the war as a whole. In short, it is not at all obvious in theory what sorts of objections should be deemed sufficient to excuse an objector, and there is considerable force in the Government’s contention that a program of excusing objectors to particular wars may be “impossible to conduct with any hope of reaching fair and consistent results . . . .” Brief 28. For their part, petitioners make no attempt to provide a careful definition of the claim to exemption that they ask the courts to carve out and protect. They do not explain why objection to a particular conflict — much less an objection that focuses on a particular facet of a conflict — should excuse the objector from all military service whatever, even from military operations that are connected with the conflict at hand in remote or tenuous ways. They suggest no solution to the problems arising from the fact that altered circumstances may quickly render the objection to military service moot. To view the problem of fairness and evenhanded de-cisionmaking, in the present context, as merely a commonplace chore of weeding out “spurious claims,” is to minimize substantial difficulties of real concern to a responsible legislative body. For example, under the petitioners’ unarticulated scheme for exemption, an objector’s claim to exemption might be based on some feature of a current conflict that most would regard as incidental, or might be predicated on a view of the facts that most would regard as mistaken. The particular complaint about the war may itself be “sincere,” but it is difficult to know how to judge the “sincerity” of the objector’s conclusion that the war in toto is unjust and that any personal involvement would contravene conscience and religion. To be sure we have ruled, in connection with § 6 (j), that “the 'truth’ of a belief is not open to question”; rather, the question is whether the objector’s beliefs are “truly held.” United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S., at 185. See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 (1944). But we must also recognize that “sincerity” is a concept that can bear only so much adjudicative weight. Ours is a Nation of enormous heterogeneity in respect of political views, moral codes, and religious persuasions. It does not bespeak an establishing of religion for Congress to forgo the enterprise of distinguishing those whose dissent has some conscientious basis from those who simply dissent. There is a danger that as between two would-be objectors, both having the same complaint against a war, that objector would succeed who is more articulate, better educated, or better counseled. There is even a danger of unintended religious discrimination— a danger that a claim’s chances of success would be greater the more familiar or salient the claim’s connection with conventional religiosity could be made to appear. At any rate, it is true that “the more discriminating and complicated the basis of classification for an exemption — even a neutral one — the greatei* the potential for state involvement” in determining the character of persons’ beliefs and affiliations, thus “entangl[ing] government in difficult classifications of what is or is not religious,” or what is or is not conscientious. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S., at 698-699 (opinion of Harlan, J.). Cf. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Church, 393 U. S. 440 (1969). While the danger of erratic decisionmaking unfortunately exists in any system of conscription that takes individual differences into account, no doubt the dangers would be enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate scope were honored in theory. In addition to the interest in fairness, the Government contends that neutral, secular reasons for the line drawn by § 6 (j) — between objection to all war and objection to a particular war — may be found in the nature of the conscientious claim that these petitioners assert. Opposition to a particular war, states the Government’s brief, necessarily involves a judgment “that is political and particular,” one “based on the same political, sociological and economic factors that the government necessarily considered” in deciding to engage in a particular conflict. Brief 24-26. Taken in a narrow sense, these considerations do not justify the distinction at issue, for however “political and particular” the judgment underlying objection to a particular war, the objection still might be rooted in religion and conscience, and although the factors underlying that objection were considered and rejected in the process of democratic decision-making, likewise the viewpoint of an objector to all war was no doubt considered and “necessarily” rejected as well. Nonetheless, it can be seen on a closer view that this line of analysis, conjoined with concern for fairness, does support the statutory distinction. Tacit at least in the Government’s view of the instant cases is the contention that the limits of § 6 (j) serve an overriding interest in protecting the integrity of democratic decisionmaking against claims to individual noncompliance. Despite emphasis on claims that have a “political and particular” component, the logic of the contention is sweeping. Thus the “interest” invoked is highly problematical, for it would seem to justify governmental refusal to accord any breathing space whatever to noncompliant conduct inspired by imperatives of religion and conscience. On the other hand, some have perceived a danger that exempting persons who dissent from a particular war, albeit on grounds of conscience and religion in part, would “open the doors to a general theory of selective disobedience to law” and jeopardize the binding quality of democratic decisions. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? 50 (1967). See also Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 268 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring). Other fields of legal obligation aside, it is undoubted that the nature of conscription, much less war itself, requires the personal desires and perhaps the dissenting views of those who must serve to be subordinated in some degree to the pursuit of public purposes. It is also true that opposition to a particular war does depend inter alia upon particularistic factual beliefs and policy assessments, beliefs and assessments that presumably were overridden by the government that decides to commit lives and resources to a trial of arms. Further, it is not unreasonable to suppose that some persons who are not prepared to assert a conscientious objection, and instead accept the hardships and risks of military service, may well agree at all points with the objector, yet conclude, as a matter of conscience, that they are personally bound by the decision of the democratic process. The fear of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, apparently, is that exemption of objectors to particular wars would weaken the resolve of those who otherwise would feel themselves bound to serve despite personal cost, uneasiness at the prospect of violence, or even serious moral reservations or policy objections concerning the particular conflict. We need not and do not adopt the view that a categorical, global “interest” in stifling individualistic claims to noncompliance, in respect of duties generally exacted, is the neutral and secular basis of § 6 (j). As is shown by the long history of the very provision under discussion, it is not inconsistent with orderly democratic government for individuals to be exempted by law, on account of special characteristics, from general duties of a burdensome nature. But real dangers — dangers of the kind feared by the Commission — might arise if an exemption were made available that in its nature could not be administered fairly and uniformly over the run of relevant fact situations. Should it be thought that those who go to war are chosen unfairly or capriciously, then a mood of bitterness and cynicism might corrode the spirit of public service and the values of willing performance of a citizen’s duties that are the very heart of free government. In short, the considerations mentioned in the previous paragraph, when seen in conjunction with the central problem of fairness, are without question properly cognizable by Congress. In light of these valid concerns, we conclude that it is supportable for Congress to have decided that the objector to all war — to all killing in war — has a claim that is distinct enough and intense enough to justify special status, while the objector to a particular war does not. Of course, we do not suggest that Congress would have acted irrationally or unreasonably had it decided to exempt those who object to particular wars. Our analysis of the policies of § 6 (j) is undertaken in order to determine the existence vel non of a neutral, secular justification for the lines Congress has drawn. We find that justifying reasons exist and therefore hold that the Establishment Clause is not violated. h-1 H-1 J — I Petitioners’ remaining contention is that Congress interferes with the free exercise of religion by conscripting persons who oppose a particular war on grounds of conscience and religion. Strictly viewed, this complaint does not implicate problems of comparative treatment of different sorts of objectors, but rather may be examined in some isolation from the circumstance that Congress has chosen to exempt those who conscientiously object to all war. And our holding that § 6 (j) comports with the Establishment Clause does not automatically settle the present issue. For despite a general harmony of purpose between the two religious clauses of the First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause no doubt has a reach of its own. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 222-223. Nonetheless, our analysis of § 6 (j) for Establishment Clause purposes has revealed governmental interests of a kind and weight sufficient to justify under the Free Exercise Clause the impact of the conscription laws on those who object to particular wars. Our cases do not at their farthest'reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303-304 (1940); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 29 (1905); cf. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 20 (1946). To be sure, the Free Exercise Clause bars “governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such,” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 402 (1963), or interference with the dissemination of religious ideas. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943). It prohibits misuse of secular governmental programs “to impede the observance of one or all religions or ... to discriminate invidiously between religions, . . . even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.” Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S., at 607 (opinion of Warren, C. J.). And even as to neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims, the Free Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government’s valid aims. See id.; Sherbert v. Verner, supra. See generally Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 327 (1969). However, the impact of conscription on objectors to particular wars is far from unjustified. The conscription laws, applied to such persons as to others, are not designed to interfere with any religious ritual or practice, and do not work a penalty against any theological position. The incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners’ position are strictly justified by substantial governmental interests that relate directly to the very impacts questioned. And more broadly, of course, there is the Government’s interest in procuring the manpower necessary for military purposes, pursuant to the constitutional grant of power to Congress to raise and support armies. Art. I, § 8. IV Since petitioners’ statutory and constitutional claims to relief from military service are without merit, it follows that in Gillette’s case (No. 85) there was a basis in fact to support administrative denial of exemption, and that in Negre’s case (No. 325) there was a basis in fact to support the Army’s denial of a discharge. Accordingly, the judgments below are Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the Court’s judgment and in Part I of the opinion of the Court. The relevant provisions are set down infra, at nn. 4, 5, and 6, and at accompanying text. Since petitioner Negre is no longer on active duty in the Army, the dispute in No. 325 lacks the same intensity that was present at the time that Negre commenced his habeas action. However, some possibility of Vietnam duty apparently remains, and the Government seems to concede that the case has not been mooted. We therefore pursue the matter no further. Both petitioners asked to be spared all military responsibilities because of their objections to the Vietnam conflict — Gillette sought exemption from the draft; Negre sought discharge from the Army. Section 6 (j) provides further: “As used in this subsection, the term 'religious training and belief’ does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code. Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the armed forces ... , be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction, be ordered ... to perform . . . civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest . . . .” The Directive states: “IV. A. National Policy. [T]he Congress . . . has deemed it more essential to respect a man’s religious beliefs than to force him to serve in the Armed Forces and accordingly has provided that a person having bona fide religious objection to participation in war in any form . . . shall not be inducted into the Armed Forces . . . . “IV. B. DoD Policy. Consistent with this national policy, bona fide conscientious objection ... by persons who are members of the Armed Forces will be recognized to the extent practicable and equitable. Objection to a particular war will not be recognized.” DOD Directive No. 1300.6 itself states: “Since it is in the national interest to judge all claims of conscientious objection by the same standards, whether made before or after entering military service, Selective Service System standards used in determining [conscientious objector status] of draft registrants prior to induction shall apply to servicemen who claim conscientious objection after entering military service.” See also, e. g., Army Regulations AR 635-20 (July 31, 1970), and AR 135-25 (Sept. 2, 1970). Moreover, a reading that attaches the words “in any form” to “participation,” rather than to “war,” would render § 6 (j) somewhat incoherent. For that section itself allows a person having the specified conscientious scruples to be assigned to noneombatant service in the armed forces, if he is not “found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service.” See n. 4, supra. In short, Congress had in mind that conscientious scruples should be honored if they implicate opposition to “war in any form,” even though the objector may not be averse to a noncombatant form of “participation.” The roots of §6 (j) may be found in the earliest period of American history. See generally Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 29-38 (1950). In 1775 the Continental Congress announced its resolve to respect the beliefs of “people who from Religious Principles cannot bear Arms in any case . . . Id., at 33-34. Against a background of state constitutional and statutory law exempting conscientious objectors from militia service, see United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163, 170-171 (1965), Congress in 1864 explicitly exempted from the federal draft persons who “are conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith [of their] religious denominations.” 13 Stat. 9. The Draft Act of 1917 relieved from military service any person who belonged to “any well-recognized religious sect or organization . . . whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein . . . 40 Stat. 78. The Senate rejected an amendment to the 1917 legislation that would have granted exemptions “[o]n the ground of a conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant service in the present war.” 55 Cong. Rec. 1478. Subsequent exemption clauses have eliminated any restriction in terms of sectarian affiliation, and have made the exemption broadly available to any conscientious objector whose scruples concerning participation in war are grounded in “religious training and belief.” Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 5 (g), 54 Stat. 889. But the phrase “participation in war in any form,” used in the 1917 enactment, has, of course, survived the various revisions of the exempting provision. Petitioners’ sole argument having specific reference to the legislative materials is utterly flawed. It runs as follows: the 1948 revision of the exempting provision was inspired in part by the dissent of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931); Macintosh involved a claimant whose conscientious scruples implicated only “unjust” wars, and the dissent remarked that “eminent statesmen here and abroad” have held such views, id., at 635; thus Congress cannot fairly be deemed to have excluded objectors to particular wars from the 1948 exempting provision, predecessor to the present §6 (j). However, the very most that can be said about congressional reliance on the Macintosh dissent is that Congress used it in fashioning a definition of the words “religious training and belief.” See United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S., at 172-179. The language of the exempting provision that is relevant to the present dispute — “participation in war in any form” — was not altered in 1948 or thereafter. Moreover, the Macintosh dissent does not itself suggest that conscientious objection to a particular war is or has ever been a basis for relief from military service. The claimant in Macintosh did not seek relief from military service— his contention, and that of the dissent, was that conscientious unwillingness to bear arms is not a disqualifying factor, under the language of the applicable loyalty oath, in a naturalization proceeding. (The argument of the dissent was later adopted by the Court in Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 64 (1946).) See infra, at 454-460. See generally Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? 50-51 (1967). Perhaps more significant is the fact that even lower courts that have granted relief to claimants who object to particular wars, have done so on constitutional, not statutory, grounds, and have found § 6 (j) defective because it does not admit of such relief. See, e. g., United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502 (ND Cal. 1970), app. docketed, No. 422, O. T. 1970; United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 399 U. S. 267 (1970). Since we conclude that § 6 (j), interpreted in the obvious way, suffers no constitutional infirmity, there is no temptation to expand its intended scope by constructional fiat in order to “save” it. After noting that Sicurella’s faith involved willingness to engage in theocratic conflict, though “without carnal weapons,” the Court stated: “The test is not whether the registrant is opposed to all war, but whether he is opposed ... to participation in war.” 348 U. S., at 390. The plain purport of this statement is that opposition to theocratic war is' not exacted, since Congress quite reasonably-considered participation in “real shooting wars” to be the only sort of participation at stake. See also Taffs v. United States, 208 F. 2d 329, 331 (CA8 1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 928 (1954). See n. 4, supra. Petitioners also assert that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, because the distinction embodied in § 6 (j) — between objectors to all war and objectors to particular wars- — is arbitrary and capricious and works an invidious discrimination in contravention of the “equal protection” principles encompassed by the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). This is not an independent argument in the context of these cases. Cf. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 696 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.). We hold that the section survives the Establishment Clause because there are neutral, secular reasons to justify the line that Congress has drawn, and it follows as a more general matter that the line is neither arbitrary nor invidious. See n. 8, supra. Since we hold that the “participation in war in any form” clause of § 6 (j) does not violate the First Amendment, there is little point in dealing with the problems that would be involved in deciding whether invalidity of the restrictive clause should lead to judicial nullification of the exemption in toto or judicial expansion to cure “underinclusiveness.” The exemption provision of the Draft Act of 1917, § 4, 40 Stat. 78, was upheld in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 389-390 (1918), at an early stage in the development of First Amendment doctrine, against a constitutional attack apparently founded on both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. A single sentence was devoted to the complainants’ First Amendment argument, “because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more.” Id., at 390. See supra, at 445-446. See n. 23, infra. The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service (1967) is aptly entitled In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? Matters relevant to such an objection, as the papers in these cases show, are whether the purposes of the war are thought ultimately defensive and pacific, or otherwise; whether the conflict is legal, or its prosecution decided upon by legal means; whether the implements of war are used humanely, or whether certain weapons should be used at all. A war may be thought “just” or not depending on one’s assessment of these factors and many more: the character of the foe, or of allies; the place the war is fought; the likelihood that a military clash will issue in benefits, of various kinds, enough to override the inevitable costs of the conflict. And so on. See n. 3, supra. We are not faced with the question whether the Free Exercise Clause itself would require exemption of any class other than objectors to particular wars. A free exercise claim on behalf of such objectors collides with the distinct governmental interests already discussed, and, at any rate, no other claim is presented. We note that the Court has previously suggested that relief for conscientious objectors is not mandated by the Constitution. See Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 264 (1934); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S., at 623-624; cf. In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 572-573 (1945).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

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IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. DOHERTY No. 90-925. Argued October 16, 1991 Decided January 15, 1992 Rehnquist, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part I, in which White, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part II, in which White, Blackmun, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Kennedy, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens and Souter, JJ., joined, post, p. 329. Thomas, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Edwin S. Kneedler, Barbara L. Herwig, and John C. Hoyle. Mary Boresz Pike argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Arthur C. Helton. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by David W. Rivkin, Michael W. Galligan, Lucas Guttentag, Steven R. Shapiro, and Carolyn Patty Blum; for Amnesty International et al. by Paul L. Hoffman; for the International Human Rights Law Group by Irwin Goldbloom; for Members of the United States Senate et al. by Carolyn Patty Blum, Kevin R. Johnson, and Joseph K. Brenner; and for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr., Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Julian Fleet, and Ralph G. Steinhardt. Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part I, an opinion with respect to Part II, in which Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice O’Con-nor join, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Kennedy joins. Respondent, Joseph Patrick Doherty, entered this country illegally in 1982. After more than eight years of proceedings concerning Doherty’s status in the United States, the question presented here is whether the Attorney General abused his discretion in refusing to reopen the deportation proceedings against respondent to allow consideration of respondent’s claims for asylum and withholding of deportation which he had earlier withdrawn. We conclude that the Attorney General did not abuse the broad discretion vested in him by the applicable regulations. Respondent is a native of Northern Ireland and a citizen of both Ireland and the United Kingdom. In May 1980, he and fellow members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army ambushed a car containing members of the British Army and killed British Army Captain Herbert Richard Westmacott. He was tried for the murder of Westmacott in Northern Ireland. Before the court returned a verdict, he escaped from the maximum security prison where he was held; the court found him guilty in absentia of murder and related charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In 1982, respondent surreptitiously entered the United States under an alias. In June 1983, he was located by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which thereupon began deportation proceedings against him. Respondent applied for asylum under §208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by the Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 105, 8 U. S. C. § 1158. The immigration proceedings were suspended to allow completion of extradition proceedings, which were initiated by the United States at the request of the United Kingdom. In December 1984, United States District Judge Sprizzo, acting as an Extradition Magistrate under 18 U. S. C. § 3184, held that respondent was not extraditable because his crimes fell into the political offenses exception to the extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. In re Requested Extradition of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (SDNY 1984). The attempts of the United States to attack this conclusion collaterally were rebuffed. United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755 (SDNY 1985), aff’d, 786 F. 2d 491 (CA2 1986). When the extradition proceedings concluded, the deportation proceedings against respondent resumed. On September 12, 1986, at a hearing before the Immigration Judge, respondent conceded deportability and designated Ireland as the country to which he be deported pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1253(a). In conjunction with this designation, respondent withdrew his application for asylum and withholding of deportation. The INS unsuccessfully challenged respondent’s designation on the basis that Doherty’s deportation to Ireland would, in the language of § 1253(a), “be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” The Immigration Judge found that the INS had produced no evidence to support its objection to the designation and ordered that respondent be deported to Ireland. App. to Pet. for Cert. 158a. On March 11, 1987, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the deportation order, concluding that the INS had never before rejected a deportee’s designation and that rejection of a deportee’s country of designation is improper “in the absence of clear evidence to support that conclusion.” Id., at 155a. The INS appealed the BIA’s determination to the Attorney General pursuant to 8 CFR §3.1(h)(iii) (1987). While the order to deport respondent to Ireland was being reviewed by the Attorney General, respondent filed a motion to reopen his deportation proceedings on the basis that the Irish Extradition Act, implemented by Ireland in December 1987, constituted new evidence requiring that his claims for withholding of deportation and asylum now be reopened. In June 1988, Attorney General Meese reversed the BIA and ordered respondent deported to the United Kingdom. Respondent’s designation was rejected by the Attorney General on the basis that respondent committed a serious crime in the United Kingdom and therefore to deport respondent to any country other than the United Kingdom to serve his sentence would harm the interests of the United States. The Attorney General remanded respondent’s motion to reopen for consideration by the BIA. The BIA granted respondent’s motion to reopen, concluding that the 1987 Irish Extradition Act was a circumstance that respondent could not have been expected to anticipate, and that the result of his designation would now leave him to be extradited from Ireland to the United Kingdom, where he feared persecution. The BIA’s decision to reopen was appealed by the INS and was reversed by Attorney General Thornburgh who found three independent grounds for denying Doherty’s motion to reopen. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed both the order of Attorney General Meese which denied respondent’s designation of Ireland as the country of deportation and Attorney General Thorn-burgh’s order denying respondent’s motion to reopen his deportation proceedings. It affirmed the Meese order, but by a divided vote reversed the Thornburgh order. Doherty v. United States Dept. of Justice, INS, 908 F. 2d 1108 (1990). Attorney General Thornburgh had abused his discretion in denying the motion to reopen, according to the Court of Appeals, because he had overturned the BIA’s finding that respondent had produced new material evidence under an incorrect legal standard. The passing of the 1987 Irish Extradition Act in conjunction with Attorney General Meese’s denial of Ireland as Doherty’s country of deportation was new evidence, which, according to the Court of Appeals, entitled Doherty to have his deportation proceedings reopened. The Court of Appeals also held that Attorney General Thornburgh had erred in determining, on a motion for reopening, that respondent was not entitled to the ultimate relief requested. Citing this Court’s decision in INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S. 94 (1988), the Court of Appeals held that such a determination could not be made for the mandatory relief of withholding of deportation, and that once an alien establishes a prima facie case for withholding of deportation and brings new evidence, the Attorney General is without discretion to deny the motion to reopen. In addition, the Court of Appeals held that the Attorney General had abused his discretion by relying on foreign policy concerns in denying respondent’s motion to reopen his claim for asylum. After examining the legislative history of § 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Court of Appeals concluded that Congress intended foreign policy interests to play no role in asylum determinations. The Attorney General had abused his discretion “in denying Doherty’s application for reasons that congress sought to eliminate from asylum cases . . ..” 908 F. 2d, at 1121. We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 1081 (1991), and now decide that the Court of Appeals placed a much too narrow limit on the authority of the Attorney General to deny a motion to reopen deportation proceedings. The Attorney General based his decision to deny respondent’s motion to reopen on three independent grounds. First, he concluded that respondent had not presented new evidence warranting reopening; second, he found that respondent had waived his claims to asylum and withholding of deportation by withdrawing them at his deportation hearing in September 1986; and, third, he concluded that the motion to reopen was properly denied because Doherty’s involvement in serious nonpolitical crimes in Northern Ireland made him statutorily ineligible for withholding of deportation, as well as undeserving of the discretionary relief of asylum. Because we conclude that the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to reopen either on the first or second of these grounds, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision, and need not reach the third ground for denial of reopening relied upon by the Attorney General. I This is the fifth case in the last decade in which we have dealt with the authority of the Attorney General and the BIA to deny a motion to reopen deportation proceedings. These cases establish several propositions. There is no statutory provision for reopening of a deportation proceeding, and the authority for such motions derives solely from regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U. S. 444, 446 (1985). The regulation with which we deal here, 8 CFR § 3.2 (1987), is couched solely in negative terms; it requires that under certain circumstances a motion to reopen be denied, but does not specify the conditions under which it shall be granted: “Reopening or reconsideration. “(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States . .. .” “. . . Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . .. The granting of a motion to reopen is thus discretionary, INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U. S. 183, 188, n. 6 (1984), and the Attorney General has “broad discretion” to grant or deny such motions, Rios-Pineda, supra, at 449. Motions for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S., at 107-108. This is especially true in a deportation proceeding, where, as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States. See INS v. Rios-Pineda, supra, at 450. In Abudu, supra, we stated that there were “at least” three independent grounds on which the BIA might deny a motion to reopen — failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought, failure to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence, and a determination that even if these requirements were satisfied, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief which he sought. Abudu, supra, at 104-105. When denial of a motion to reopen is based on the last two of these three grounds, abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review. 485 U. S., at 105. We also noted in Abudu that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to motions to reopen “regardless of the underlying basis of the alien’s request [for relief].” Id., at 99, n. 3. In Abudu itself, the alien’s claim for asylum was made after an order of deportation was issued, and therefore by operation of the regulations, the alien had brought a claim for withholding of deportation as well. Ibid. The discretion which we discussed in Abudu, therefore, applies equally to motions to reopen claims for asylum and claims for withholding of deportation. We think that the proper application of these principles leads inexorably to the conclusion that the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening either on the basis that respondent failed to adduce new material evidence or on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims. II The Attorney General determined that neither the denial of respondent's designation of Ireland as the country of deportation, nor the change in Irish extradition law, qualified as new material evidence to support reopening of respondent's deportation proceedings. He explained that since the very same statute which allows the alien to designate a country for deportation also authorizes the Attorney General to oppose that designation, the eventual denial of respondent's designation could not be a "new fact" which would support reopening. He stated that "it is inconceivable that anyone represented by counsel could not know that there always existed a risk that the Attorney General would deny respondent's deportation to Ireland to protect the interests of the United States." App. to Pet, for Cert. 66a. This conclusion was based on 8 U. S. C. § 1253(a), which provides that the Attorney General shall direct the alien be deported to the country designated by the alien “if that country is willing to accept him into its territory, unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, concludes that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” In addition, in this case, the INS had objected to respondent’s designation at the very hearing at which his selection of Ireland as the country of deportation was made. The Attorney General also concluded that his rejection of the designated country was not a “fact,” reasoning that “[t]he ultimate decision in an administrative process cannot itself constitute ‘new’ evidence to justify reopening. If an adverse decision were sufficient, there could never be finality in the process.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 67a. He therefore concluded that the Government’s successful opposition to respondent’s designation was neither “new” nor “evidence.” The Attorney General also decided that Ireland’s implementation of its 1987 Extradition Act was neither relevant nor new. By the time he issued his denial of the motion to reopen, the question was whether respondent should be deported to the United Kingdom. And the treaty upon which the Irish Extradition Act was based had been signed six months before respondent withdrew his asylum and withholding of deportation claims in 1986. He also noted that a change in law ordinarily does not support a motion to reopen unless the change pertains to the rules of the proceeding at which deportation was ordered. The Court of Appeals took the view that the Attorney General’s insistence that the grounds adduced for reopening have been “unforeseeable” was supported by “[njeither the regulations nor the applicable decisional law.” 908 F. 2d, at 1115. But the regulation here in question, 8 CFR §3.2 (1987), provides in part that motions to reopen in deportation proceedings “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” The Court of Appeals seized upon a sentence in our opinion in Abudu stating that the issue in such a proceeding is whether the alien has “reasonably explained his failure to apply for asylum initially” and has indeed offered “previously unavailable, material evidence,” Abudu, 485 U. S., at 104-105, as negating a requirement of unforeseeability. But this sentence, we think, cannot bear that construction, particularly when the same opinion sets out verbatim the applicable regulation quoted above. It is not at all uncommon to require that motions to reopen proceedings be based on matter which could not reasonably have been previously adduced; see, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(2) (“newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) . . .”). We hold, for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Attorney General, that it was well within his broad discretion in considering motions to reopen to decide that the material adduced by respondent could have been foreseen or anticipated at the time of the earlier proceeding. The alien, as we discuss more fully in Part III, infra, is allowed to plead inconsistently in the alternative in the original proceeding and thereby raise any claims that are foreseeable at that time. The Court of Appeals also took the view that since the BIA had granted the motion to reopen, the Attorney General was in some way limited in his authority to overturn that decision. But the BIA is simply a regulatory creature of the Attorney General, to which he has delegated much of his authority under the applicable statutes. He is the final administrative authority in construing the regulations, and in deciding questions under them. See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139, 140 (1981) (per curiam). The mere fact that he disagrees with a conclusion of the BIA in construing or applying a regulation cannot support a conclusion that he abused his discretion. III The Attorney General found, as an independent basis for denying reopening, that respondent had waived his claims for relief by withdrawing them at the first hearing to obtain a tactical advantage. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ rejection of this reason to deny reopening. 908 F. 2d, at 1122. The Attorney General’s reasoning as to respondent’s waiver of his claims is the functional equivalent of a conclusion under 8 CFR §208.11 (1987) that respondent has not reasonably explained his failure to pursue his asylum claim at the first hearing. In other words, the Attorney General found that withdrawing a claim for a tactical advantage is not a reasonable explanation for failing to pursue the claim at an earlier hearing. Precisely because an alien may qualify for one form of relief from deportation, but not another, the INS allows aliens to plead in the alternative in immigration proceedings. There was nothing which prevented respondent from bringing evidence in support of his asylum and withholding of deportation claims at his first deportation proceeding, in case the Attorney General did contest his designation of Ireland as the country to which he be deported. Respondent chose, however, to withdraw those claims, even when expressly questioned by the Immigration Judge. The Court of Appeals rejected this ground for the Attorney General’s denial of reopening on the ground that his reasoning was “incompatible with any motion to reopen . . . .” 908 F. 2d, at 1122. It may be that the Attorney General has adopted a narrow, rather than a broad, construction of the regulations governing reopening, but nothing in the regulations forbids such a course. The Attorney General here held that respondent’s decision to withdraw certain -daims in the initial proceedings was a “deliberate tactical decision,” and that under applicable regulations those claims could have been submitted at that time even though inconsistent with other claims made by respondent. We hold that this basis for the Attorney General’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 208 of the Immigration Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1158(a) provides, in pertinent part: “The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States ... to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee . . . .” The term “refugee” is defined by 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) as “any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to ... that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .” Respondent, who has been confined since his arrest by the INS, has also twice unsuccessfully filed for habeas corpus relief. Doherty v. Meese, 808 F. 2d 938 (CA2 1986); Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F. 2d 204 (CA2 1991). Title 8 U. S. C. § 1253(a) provides, in part: “The deportation of an alien in the United States . . . shall be directed by the Attorney General to a country promptly designated by the alien if that country is willing to accept him into its territory, unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, concludes that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” Initially, the INS moved for reconsideration of the BIA’s March 1987 decision based on new evidence in the form of an affidavit by the Associate Attorney General. The BIA reopened the appeal but refused to remand to the Immigration Judge, instead finding that the affidavit offered by the INS was not new evidence and, in any event, did not change the BIA’s conclusion. App. to Pet. for Cert. 134a-142a. Title 8 U. S. C. § 1253(h) provides in pertinent part: “Withholding of deportation or return “(1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. “(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines that— “(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; [or] This is so, in part, because every request for asylum made after institution of deportation proceedings is also considered as a request for withholding of deportation under 8 U. S. C. § 1263(h) (1988 ed. and Supp. II). 8 CFR § 208.3(b) (1983). We concluded that the BIA was within its discretion to deny respondent's motion to reopen both claims for relief because "respondent had not reasonably explained his failure to apply for asylum prior to the completion of the initial deportation proceeding," INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S., at 111, not because the alien was not entitled on the merits to the relief sought. Cf. post, at 333-334 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment in part and din-senting in part). At the deportation hearing, counsel for the INS stated that the INS “opposefd] the designation of the Republic of Ireland on the ground that the respondent’s deportation to the Republic of Ireland would be prejudicial to the interest of the United States” and designated the United Kingdom as “an alternate country of deportation.” App. 34. The Court of Appeals, 908 F. 2d 1108, 1115-1116 (CA2 1990), and Justice Scalia, post, at 338-339, suggest that the Attorney General’s denial of respondent’s designation of Ireland was not even foreseeable at the time of the deportation hearing. Given the statutory language of 8 U. S. C. § 1253(a) and the position taken by the INS at the deportation hearing, we find it unrealistic to assume that respondent was unaware of the possibility that his designation of Ireland might prove ineffective notwithstanding the fact that Ireland was willing to receive him. The Attorney General certainly does not abuse his discretion in failing to take such a view of the events in this case. Although 8 CFR §§208.11 and 3.2 (1987) are nominally directed respectively at motions to reopen asylum claims and withholding of deportation claims, they are often duplicative in that an offer of material evidence which was not available at the time of the hearing would, in most cases, also be an adequate explanation for failure to pursue a claim at an earlier proceeding. As we explained in INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S. 94, 99, n. 3 (1988), the “application of 8 CFR §208.11 (1987), which on its face applies only to asylum requests on reopening, will also usually be dispositive of its decision whether to reopen to permit a withholding of deportation request.” See supra, at 324. The opportunity for the alien to plead in the alternative is an ample basis for the Attorney General to find, without abusing his discretion in a situation such as the present one, that the failure of the alien to so plead has not been reasonably explained. Indeed, in Abudu, supra, the alien had moved to reopen his deportation proceedings to pursue claims for asylum and withholding of deportation based on persecution he feared in his home country of Ghana in the event that his designation of England as the country of deportation proved ineffective. 485 U. S., at 97. The Immigration Judge did prevent the INS from presenting evidence of additional grounds on which respondent could be deported once respondent had conceded deportability, but there is no indication that had respondent not withdrawn his claims at the September 12, 1986, proceeding, the Immigration Judge would not have allowed respondent to bring evidence in support of his application for asylum and withholding of deportation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a. At the September 12, 1986, hearing, the Immigration Judge asked respondent’s counsel: “I just want to be sure ... there won’t be any application for political asylum and/or withholding of deportation, correct?” to which respondent’s counsel replied: “That is correct.” The Immigration Judge asked again: “In other words, there is no application for relief from deportation that you will be making?” to which the response from counsel was again in the affirmative. App. 32.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

E. I. DU PONT de NEMOURS & CO. et al. v. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al. No. 75-978. Argued December 8, 1976 Decided February 23, 1977 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined, except Powell, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Robert C. Barnard argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 75-978 and 75-1473 and for respondents in No. 75-1705. With him on the briefs was Charles F. Lettow. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for respondents in Nos. 75-978 and 75-1473 and for petitioner in No. 75-1705. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Howard E. Shapiro, Edmund B. Clark, Kathryn A. Oberly, and Alan W. Eckert. Together with No. 75-1473, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al. v. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, and No. 75-1705, Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Frederick M. Rowe, Edward W. Warren, and Stark Ritchie filed a brief for the American Petroleum Institute as amicus curiae in Nos. 75-1473 and 75-1705 urging reversal. George C. Freeman, Jr., and Henry V. Nickel filed a brief for the Appalachian Power Co. et al. as amici curiae in Nos. 75-1473 and 75-1705 urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae in No. 75-978 were filed by Thomas H. Truitt for the American Paper Institute, and by Edward L. Strohbehn, Jr., for the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Inorganic chemical manufacturing plants operated by the eight petitioners in Nos. 75-978 and 75-1473 discharge various pollutants into the Nation’s waters and therefore are “point sources” within the meaning of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Act), as added and amended by § 2 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V). The Environmental Protection Agency has promulgated industrywide regulations imposing three sets of precise limitations on petitioners’ discharges. The first two impose progressively higher levels of pollution control on existing point sources after July 1, 1977, and after July 1, 1983, respectively. The third set imposes limits on “new sources” that may be constructed in the future. These cases present three important questions of statutory construction: (1) whether EPA has the authority under § 301 of the Act to issue industrywide regulations limiting discharges by existing plants; (2) whether the Court of Appeals, which admittedly is authorized to review the standards for new sources, also has jurisdiction under § 509 to review the regulations concerning existing plants; and (3) whether the new-source standards issued under § 306 must allow variances for individual plants. As a preface to our discussion of these three questions, we summarize relevant portions of the statute and then describe the procedure which EPA followed in promulgating the challenged regulations. The Statute The statute, enacted on October 18, 1972, authorized a series of steps to be taken to achieve the goal of eliminating all discharges of pollutants into the Nation’s waters by 1985, § 101 (a)(1). The first steps required by the Act are described in § 304, which directs the Administrator to develop and publish various kinds of technical data to provide guidance in carrying out responsibilities imposed by other sections of the Act. Thus, within 60 days, 120 days, and 180 days after the date of enactment, the Administrator was to promulgate a series of guidelines to assist the States in developing and carrying out permit programs pursuant to § 402. §§ 304 (h), (f), (g). Within 270 days, he was to develop the information to be used in formulating standards for new plants pursuant to § 306. § 304 (c). And within one year he was to publish regulations providing guidance for effluent limitations on existing point sources. Section 304 (b) goes into great detail concerning the contents of these regulations. They must identify the degree of effluent reduction attainable through use of the best practicable or best available technology for a class of plants. The guidelines must also “specify factors to be taken into account” in determining the control measures applicable to point sources within these classes. A list of factors to be considered then follows. The Administrator was also directed to develop and publish, within one year, elaborate criteria for water quality accurately reflecting the most current scientific knowledge, and also technical information on factors necessary to restore and maintain water quality. § 304 (a). The title of § 304 describes it as the “information and guidelines" portion of the statute. Section 301 is captioned “effluent limitations.” Section 301 (a) makes the discharge of any pollutant unlawful unless the discharge is in compliance with certain enumerated sections of the Act. The enumerated sections which are relevant to this case are § 301 itself, § 306, and § 402. A brief word about each of these sections is necessary. Section 402 authorizes the Administrator to issue permits for individual point sources, and also authorizes him to review and approve the plan of any State desiring to administer its own permit program. These permits serve “to transform generally applicable effluent limitations . . . into the obligations (including a timetable for compliance) of the individual discharger[s] . . . ." EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 205. Petitioner chemical companies’ position in this litigation is that § 402 provides the only statutory authority for the issuance of enforceable limitations on the discharge of pollutants by existing plants. It is noteworthy, however, that although this section authorizes the imposition of limitations in individual permits, the section itself does not mandate either the Administrator or the States to use permits as the method of prescribing effluent limitations. Section 306 directs the Administrator to publish within 90 days a list of categories of sources discharging pollutants and, within one year thereafter, to publish regulations establishing national standards of performance for new sources within each category. Section 306 contains no provision for exceptions from the standards for individual plants; on the contrary, subsection (e) expressly makes it unlawful to operate a new source in violation of the applicable standard of performance after its effective date. The statute provides that the new-source standards shall reflect the greatest degree of effluent reduction achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology. Section 301 (b) defines the effluent limitations that shall be achieved by existing point sources in two stages. By July 1, 1977, the effluent limitations shall require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available; by July 1, 1983, the limitations shall require application of the best available technology economically achievable. The statute expressly provides that the limitations which are to become effective in 1983 are applicable to “categories and classes of point sources”; this phrase is omitted from the description of the 1977 limitations. While § 301 states that these limitations “shall be achieved,” it fails to state who will establish the limitations. Section 301 (c) authorizes the Administrator to grant variances from the 1983 limitations. Section 301 (e) states that effluent limitations established pursuant to § 301 shall be applied to all point sources. To summarize, § 301 (b) requires the achievement of effluent limitations requiring use of the “best practicable” or “best available” technology. It refers to § 304 for a definition of these terms. Section 304 requires the publication of “regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations.” Finally, permits issued under § 402 must require compliance with § 301 effluent limitations. Nowhere are we told who sets the § 301 effluent limitations, or precisely how they relate to § 304 guidelines and § 402 permits. The Regulations The various deadlines imposed on the Administrator were too ambitious for him to meet. For that reason, the procedure which he followed in adopting the regulations applicable to the inorganic chemical industry and to other classes of point sources is somewhat different from that apparently contemplated by the statute. Specifically, as will appear, he did not adopt guidelines pursuant to § 304 before defining the effluent limitations for existing sources described in § 301 (b) or the national standards for new sources described in § 306. This case illustrates the approach the Administrator followed in implementing the Act. EPA began by engaging a private contractor to prepare a Development Document. This document provided a detailed technical study of pollution control in the industry. The study first divided the industry into categories. For each category, present levels of pollution were measured and plants with exemplary pollution control were investigated. Based on this information, other technical data, and economic studies, a determination was made of the degree of pollution control which could be achieved by the various levels of technology mandated by the statute. The study was made available to the public and circulated to interested persons. It formed the basis of “effluent limitation guideline” regulations issued by EPA after receiving public comment on proposed regulations. These regulations divide the industry into 22 subcategories. Within each subcategory, precise numerical limits are set for various pollutants. The regulations for each subcategory contain a variance clause, applicable only to the 1977 limitations. Eight chemical companies filed petitions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of these regulations. The Court of Appeals rejected their challenge to EPA’s authority to issue precise, single-number limitations for discharges of pollutants from existing sources. It held, however, that these limitations and the new plant standards were only “presumptively applicable” to individual plants. We granted the chemical companies’ petitions for certiorari in order to consider the scope of EPA’s authority to issue existing-source regulations. 425 U. S. 933; 426 U. S. 947. We also granted the Government’s cross-petition for review of the ruling that new-source standards are only presumptively applicable. Ibid. For convenience, we will refer to the chemical companies as the “petitioners.” The Issues The broad outlines of the parties’ respective theories may be stated briefly. EPA contends that § 301 (b) authorizes it to issue regulations establishing effluent limitations for classes of plants. The permits granted under § 402, in EPA’s view, simply incorporate these across-the-board limitations, except for the limited variances allowed by the regulations themselves and by § 301 (c). The § 304 (b) guidelines, according to EPA, were intended to guide it in later establishing § 301 effluent-limitation regulations. Because the process proved more time consuming than Congress assumed when it established this two-stage process, EPA condensed the two stages into a single regulation. In contrast, petitioners contend that § 301 is not an independent source of authority for setting effluent limitations by regulation. Instead, § 301 is seen as merely a description of the effluent limitations which are set for each plant on an individual basis during the permit-issuance process. Under the industry view, the § 304 guidelines serve the function of guiding the permit issuer in setting the effluent limitations. The jurisdictional issue is subsidiary to the critical question whether EPA has the power to issue effluent limitations by regulation. Section 509 (b)(1), 86 Stat. 892, 33 U. S. C. 1369 (b)(1), provides that “[r]eview of the Administrator’s action . . . (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation . . . under section 301” may be had in the courts of appeals. On the other hand, the Act does not provide for judicial review of § 304 guidelines. If EPA is correct that its regulations are “effluent limitation[s] under section 301,” the regulations are directly reviewable in the Court of Appeals. If industry is correct that the regulations can only be considered § 304 guidelines, suit to review the regulations could probably be brought only in the District Court, if anywhere. Thus, the issue of jurisdiction to review the regulations is intertwined with the issue of EPA’s power to issue the regulations. I We think § 301 itself is the key to the problem. The statutory language concerning the 1983 limitations, in particular, leaves no doubt that these limitations are to be set by regulation. Subsection (b)(2)(A) of § 301 states that by 1983 “effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources” are to be achieved which will require “application of the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class.” (Emphasis added.) These effluent limitations are to require elimination of all discharges if “such elimination is technologically and economically achievable for a category or class of point sources.” (Emphasis added.) This is “language difficult to reconcile with the view that individual effluent limitations are to be set when each permit is issued.” American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d 442, 450 (CA7 1975). The statute thus focuses expressly on the characteristics of the “category or class” rather than the characteristics of individual point sources. Normally, such classwide determinations would be made by regulation, not in the course of issuing a permit to one member of the class. Thus, we find that § 301 unambiguously provides for the use of regulations to establish the 1983 effluent limitations. Different language is used in § 301 with respect to the 1977 limitations. Here, the statute speaks of “effluent limitations for point sources,” rather than “effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources.” Nothing elsewhere in the Act, however, suggests any radical difference in the mechanism used to impose limitations for the 1977 and 1983 deadlines. See American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d 1027, 1042 n. 32 (CA3 1975). For instance, there is no indication in either § 301 or § 304 that the § 304 guidelines play a different role in setting 1977 limitations. Moreover, it would be highly anomalous if the 1983 regulations and the new-source standards were directly reviewable in the Court of Appeals, while the 1977 regulations based on the same administrative record were reviewable only in the District Court. The magnitude and highly technical character of the administrative record involved with these regulations makes it almost inconceivable that Congress would have required duplicate review in the first instance by different courts. We conclude that the statute authorizes the 1977 limitations as well as the 1983 limitations to be set by regulation, so long as some allowance is made for variations in individual plants, as EPA has done by including a variance clause in its 1977 limitations. The question of the form of § 301 limitations is tied to the question whether the Act requires the Administrator or the permit issuer to establish the limitations. Section 301 does not itself answer this question, for it speaks only in the passive voice of the achievement and establishment of the limitations. But other parts of the statute leave little doubt on this score. Section 304 (b) states that “[f]or the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations . . . the Administrator shall” issue guideline regulations; while the judicial-review section, § 509 (b)(1), speaks of “the Administrator’s action . . . in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 301 . . . .” See infra, at 136-137. And § 101 (d) requires us to resolve any ambiguity on this score in favor of the Administrator. It provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency . . . shall administer this Act.” (Emphasis added.) In sum, the language of the statute supports the view that § 301 limitations are to be adopted by the Administrator, that they are to be based primarily on classes and categories, and that they are to take the form of regulations. The legislative history supports this reading of § 301. The Senate Report states that “pursuant to subsection 301 (b)(1)(A), and Section 304 (b)” the Administrator is to set a base level for all plants in a given category, and “[i]n no case . . . should any plant be allowed to discharge more pollutants per unit of production than is defined by that base level.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 50 (1971), Leg. Hist. 1468. The Conference Report on § 301 states that “the determination of the economic impact of an effluent limitation [will be made] on the basis of classes and categories of point sources, as distinguished from a plant by plant determination.” Sen. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 121 (1972), Leg. Hist. 304. In presenting the Conference Report to the Senate, Senator Muskie, perhaps the Act’s primary author, emphasized the importance of uniformity in setting § 301 limitations. He explained that this goal of uniformity required that EPA focus on classes or categories of sources in formulating effluent limitations. Regarding the requirement contained in § 301 that plants use the “best practicable control technology” by 1977, he stated: “The modification of subsection 304 (b)(1) is intended to clarify what is meant by the term ‘practicable.’ The balancing test between total cost and effluent reduction benefits is intended to limit the application of technology only where the additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal level of reduction for any class or category of sources. “The Conferees agreed upon this limited cost-benefit analysis in order to maintain uniformity within a class and category of point sources subject to effluent limitations, and to avoid imposing on the Administrator any requirement to consider the location of sources within a category or to ascertain water quality impact of effluent controls, or to determine the economic impact of controls on any individual plant in a single community.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33696 (1972), Leg. Hist. 170 (emphasis added). He added that: “The Conferees intend that the factors described in section 304 (b) be considered only within classes or categories of point sources and that such factors not be considered at the time of the application of an effluent limitation to an individual point source within such a category or class.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33697 (1972), Leg. Hist. 172. This legislative history supports our reading of § 301 and makes it clear that the § 304 guidelines are not merely aimed at guiding the discretion of permit issuers in setting limitations for individual plants. What, then, is the function of the § 304 (b) guidelines? As we noted earlier, § 304 (b) requires EPA to identify the amount of effluent reduction attainable through use of the best practicable or available technology and to “specify factors to be taken into account” in determining the pollution control methods “to be applicable to point sources . . . within such categories or classes.” These guidelines are to be issued “[f]or the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under this Act.” As we read it, § 304 requires that the guidelines survey the practicable or available pollution-control technology for an industry and assess its effectiveness. The guidelines are then to describe the methodology EPA intends to use in the § 301 regulations to determine the effluent limitations for particular plants. If the technical complexity of the task had not prevented EPA from issuing the guidelines within the statutory deadline, they could have provided valuable guidance to permit issuers, industry, and the public, prior to the issuance of the § 301 regulations. Our construction of the Act is supported by § 501 (a), which gives EPA the power to make “such regulations as are necessary to carry out” its functions, and by § 101 (d), which charges the agency with the duty of administering the Act. In construing this grant of authority, as Mr. Justice Harlan wrote in connection with a somewhat similar problem: “ ‘[C]onsiderations of feasibility and practicality are certainly germane’ to the issues before us. Bowles v. Willingham, [321 U. S. 503,] 517. We cannot, in these circumstances, conclude that Congress has given authority inadequate to achieve with reasonable effectiveness the purposes for which it has acted.” Permian Basin Area Bate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 777. The petitioners’ view of the Act would place an impossible burden on EPA. It would require EPA to give individual consideration to the circumstances of each of the more than 42,000 dischargers who have applied for permits, Brief for Respondents in No. 75-978, p. 30 n. 22, and to issue or approve all these permits well in advance of the 1977 deadline in order to give industry time to install the necessary pollution-control equipment. We do not believe that Congress would have failed so conspicuously to provide EPA with the authority needed to achieve the statutory goals. Both EPA and petitioners refer to numerous other provisions of the Act and fragments of legislative history in support of their positions. We do not find these conclusive, and little point would be served by discussing them in detail. We are satisfied that our reading of § 301 is consistent with the rest of the legislative scheme. Language we recently employed in another case involving the validity of EPA regulations applies equally to this case: “We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation . . . was 'correct,' to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the 'correct' one. Given this conclusion, as well as the facts that the Agency is charged with administration of the Act, and that there has undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States and other parties affected by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.” Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421 U. S. 60, 87. When, as in this litigation, the Agency’s interpretation is also supported by thorough, scholarly opinions written by some of our finest judges, and has received the overwhelming support of the Courts of Appeals, we would be reluctant indeed to upset the Agency’s judgment. Here, on the contrary, our independent examination confirms the correctness of the Agency’s construction of the statute. Consequently, we hold that EPA has the authority to issue regulations setting forth uniform effluent limitations for categories of plants. II Our holding that § 301 does authorize the Administrator to promulgate effluent limitations for classes and categories of existing point sources necessarily resolves the jurisdictional issue as well. For, as we have already pointed out, § 509 (b)(1) provides that “[r]eview of the Administrator’s action . . . in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 301, 302, or 306, . . . may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial district in which such person resides or transacts such business . . . .” Petitioners have argued that the reference to § 301 was intended only to provide for review of the grant or denial of an individual variance pursuant to § 301 (c). We find this argument unpersuasive for two reasons in addition to those discussed in Part I of this opinion. First, in other portions of § 509, Congress referred to specific subsections of the Act and presumably would have specifically mentioned § 301 (c) if only action pursuant to that subsection were intended to be reviewable in the court of appeals. More importantly, petitioners’ construction would produce the truly perverse situation in which the court of appeals would review numerous individual actions issuing or denying permits pursuant to § 402 but would have no power of direct review of the basic regulations governing those individual actions. See American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d, at 452. We regard §509 (b)(1)(E) as unambiguously authorizing court of appeals review of EPA action promulgating an effluent limitation for existing point sources under § 301. Since those limitations are typically promulgated in the same proceeding as the new-source standards under § 306, we have no doubt that Congress intended review of the two sets of regulations to be had in the same forum. III The remaining issue in this case concerns new plants. Under § 306, EPA is to promulgate “regulations establishing Federal standards of performance for new sources . . ." § 306 (b)(1)(B). A “standard of performance” is a “standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants which reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology, . . . including, where practicable, a standard permitting no discharge of pollutants.” § 306 (a)(1). In setting the standard, “[t]he Administrator may distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories of new sources . . . and shall consider the type of process employed (including whether batch or continuous).” § 306 (b)(2). As the House Report states, the standard must reflect the best technology for “that category of sources, and for class, types, and sizes within categories.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 111 (1972), Leg. Hist. 798. The Court of Appeals held: “Neither the Act nor the regulations contain any variance provision for new sources. The rule of presumptive applicability applies to new sources as well as existing sources. On remand EPA should come forward with some limited escape mechanism for new sources.” Du Pont II, 541 F. 2d, at 1028. The court’s rationale was that “[p]rovisions for variances, modifications, and exceptions are appropriate to the regulatory process.” Ibid. The question, however, is not what a court thinks is generally appropriate to the regulatory process; it is what Congress intended for these regulations. It is clear that Congress intended these regulations to be absolute prohibitions. The use of the word “standards” implies as much. So does the description of the preferred standard as one “permitting no discharge of pollutants.” (Emphasis added.) It is “unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.” § 306 (e) (emphasis added). In striking contrast to § 301 (c), there is no statutory provision for variances, and a variance provision would be inappropriate in a standard that was intended to insure national uniformity and “maximum feasible control of new sources.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 58 (1971), Leg. Hist. 1476. That portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 541 F.2d 1018 requiring EPA to provide a variance procedure for new sources is reversed. In all other aspects, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. A “point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” § 502 (14), 33 U. S. C. § 1362 (14) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Throughout this opinion we will refer interchangeably to the Administrator of the EPA and to the Agency itself. The reasons for the statutory scheme have been described as follows: “Such direct restrictions on discharges facilitate enforcement by marking it unnecessary to work backward from an overpolluted body of water to determine which point sources are responsible and which must be abated. In addition, a discharger’s performance is now measured against strict technology-based effluent limitations—specified levels of treatment—to which it must conform, rather than against limitations derived from water quality standards to which it and other polluters must collectively conform.” EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 204-205 (footnotes omitted). Section 304 (b) provides: “(b) For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under this Act the Administrator shall, after consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies and other interested persons, publish within one year of enactment of this title, regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations, and, at least annually thereafter, revise, if appropriate, such regulations. Such regulations shall— “(1)(A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best practicable control technology currently available for classes and categories of point sources (other than publicly owned treatment works); and “(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determining the control measures and practices to be applicable to point sources (other than publicly owned treatment works) within such categories or classes. Factors relating to the assessment of best practicable control technology currently available to comply with subsection (b)(1) of section 301 of this Act shall include consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application, and shall also take into account the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate; “(2) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best control measures and practices achievable including treatment techniques, process and procedure innovations, operating methods, and other alternatives for classes and categories of point sources (other than publicly owned treatment works); and “(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determining the best measures and practices available to comply with subsection (b)(2) of section 301 of this Act to be applicable to any point source (other than publicly owned treatment works) within such categories or classes. Factors relating to the assessment of best available technology shall take into account the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate; and “(3) identify control measures and practices available to eliminate the discharge of pollutants from categories and classes of point sources, taking into account the cost of achieving such elimination of the discharge of pollutants.” 86 Stat. 851, 33 U. S. C. § 1314 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Section 301 provides in pertinent part: “Sec. 301. (a) Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful. “(b) In order to carry out the objective of this Act there shall be achieved— “(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations for point sources, other than publicly owned treatment works, (i) which shall require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available as defined by the Administrator pursuant to section 304 (b) of this Act . . . . “(2)(A) not later than July 1, 1983, effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources, other than publicly owned treatment works, which (i) shall require application of the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class, which will result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants, as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 304 (b) (2) of this Act, which such effluent limitations shall require the elimination of discharges of all pollutants if the Administrator finds, on the basis of information available to him (including information developed pursuant to section 315), that such elimination is technologically and economically achievable for a category or class of point sources as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 304 (b)(2) of this Act . . . . “(c) The Administrator may modify the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to any point source for which a permit application is filed after July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner or operator of such point source satisfactory to the Administrator that such modified requirements (1) will represent the maximum use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2) will result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants. “(d) Any effluent limitation required by paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section shall be reviewed at least every five years and, if appropriate, revised pursuant to the procedure established under such paragraph. “(e) Effluent limitations established pursuant to this section or section 302 of this Act shall be applied to all point sources of discharge of pollutants in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 86 Stat. 844, 33 U. S. C. § 1311 (1970 ed., Supp. V). There is no provision for compliance with § 304, the guideline section. Section 402 (a) (1) provides: “Except as provided in sections 318 and 404 of this Act, the Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 301 (a), upon condition that such discharge will meet either all applicable requirements under sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, and 403 of this Act, or prior to the talking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.” 86 Stat. 880, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (a) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Under § 402 (b), the Administrator may delegate this authority to the States, but retains the power to withdraw approval of the state program, §402 (c)(3), and to veto individual state permits, §402 (d). Finally, under § 402 (k), compliance with the permit is generally deemed compliance with § 301. Twenty-seven States now administer their own permit programs. The pertinent provisions of § 306, 86 Stat. 854, 33 U. S. C. § 1316 (1970 ed., Supp. V), are as follows: “(a) For purposes of this section: “(1) The term 'standard of performance' means a standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants which reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives, including, where practicable, a standard permitting no discharge of pollutants. “(b)(1) . . . “(B) As soon as practicable, but in no case more than one year, after a category of sources is included in a list under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the Administrator shall propose and publish regulations establishing Federal standards of performance for new sources within such category. . . . “(2) The Administrator may distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories of new sources for the purpose of establishing such standards and shall consider the type of process employed (including whether batch or continuous). “(3) The provisions of this section shall apply to any new source owned or operated by the United States. “(e) After the effective date of standards of performance promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.” Some subcategories are required to eliminate all discharges by 1977. E. g., 40 CFR §§ 415.70-415.76 (1976). Other subcategories are subject to less stringent restrictions. For instance, by 1977 plants producing titanium dioxide by the chloride process must reduce average daily discharges of dissolved iron to 0.72 pounds per thousand pounds of product. This limit is cut in half for existing plants in 1983 and for all new plants. 40 CFR §§415.220-415.225 (1976). These limitations may be made “either more or less stringent” to the extent that “factors relating to the equipment or facilities involved, the process applied, or other such factors related to such discharger are fundamentally different from the factors considered” in establishing the limitations. See, e. g., for the two subcategories discussed in n. 9, supra, 40 CFR §§ 415.72 and 415.222 (1976), respectively. Because EPA’s authority to issue the regulations is closely tied to the question whether the regulations are directly reviewable in the Court of Appeals, see infra, at 124-125, some of the companies also filed suit in District Court challenging the regulations. The District Court held that EPA had the authority to issue the regulations and that exclusive jurisdiction was therefore in the Court of Appeals. 383 F. Supp. 1244 (WD Va. 1974), aff’d, 528 F. 2d 1136 (CA4 1975) (Du Pont I). The Court of Appeals issued two separate opinions. In Du Pont I, supra, the court held that it had exclusive jurisdiction to consider the validity of the regulations. It therefore affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of a suit to set aside the regulations. See n. 11, supra. In Du Pont II, 541 F. 2d 1018 (1976), the court held that EPA was authorized to issue “presumptively applicable” effluent limitations and new-source standards. No. 75-978 is the companies’ petition for certiorari in Du Pont I, which we granted last Term, 425 U. S. 933. No. 75-1473 is their petition in Du Pont II. We granted that petition, consolidated it with EPA’s cross-petition, No. 75-1705, and ordered that they be argued in tandem with the companies’ petition in Du Pont I. 426 U. S. 947. Section 304 (b) calls for publication of guideline regulations within one year of the Act’s passage. EPA failed to meet this deadline and was ordered to issue the regulations on a judicially imposed timetable. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 166 U. S. App. D. C. 312, 510 F. 2d 692 (1975). Although the Act itself does not provide for review of guidelines, the Eighth Circuit has held that they are reviewable in the district court, apparently under the Administrative Procedure Act. CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F. 2d 1032, 1038 (1975) (CPC I). It has been suggested, however, that even if the EPA regulations are considered to be only § 304 guidelines, the Court of Appeals might still have ancillary jurisdiction to review them because of their close relationship with the § 301 effluent limitations, and because they were developed on the same record as the § 306 standards of performance for new plants, which are directly reviewable in the Court of Appeals. The Courts of Appeals have resolved these issues in various ways. Only the Eighth Circuit, the first to consider the issues, has accepted the industry position. In CPC I, supra, it held that EPA lacked the authority to issue effluent-limitation regulations and that jurisdiction to review the regulations as § 304 guidelines was in the District Court. The Fourth Circuit, in Du Pont II, supra, and the Tenth Circuit, in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540 F. 2d 1023 (1976), held that EPA has the authority to issue effluent-limitation regulations, but that these regulations are only presumptively applicable to individual sources. The majority position, adopted by the Third Circuit, American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d 1027 (1975); the Seventh Circuit, American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d 442 (1975); the District of Columbia Circuit, American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 176 U. S. App. D. C. 105, 539 F. 2d 107 (1976); and the Second Circuit, Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F. 2d 620 (1976), is that EPA has the authority to issue regulations setting forth effluent limitations which individual plants may not exceed. Even these courts are not in complete agreement about the form the regulations should take. The commentators have also divided on these problems. See Parenteau & Tauman, The Effluent Limitations Controversy, 6 Ecology L. Q. 1 (1976); Note, Judicial Maelstrom in Federal Waters, 45 Ford. L. Rev. 625 (1976); Comment, The Application of Effluent Limitations and Effluent Guidelines to Industrial Polluters, 13 Houst. L. Rev. 348 (1976); Note, Effective National Regulation of Point Sources Under the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 10 Ga. L. Rev. 983 (1976). The difference in opinion among the Circuits may be less significant than might appear. The Eighth Circuit has concluded: “Under our ruling, the limitations written into individual permits for existing point sources should be substantially similar to those written into permits if the EPA’s theory of the Act were to be adopted. “The only practical difference resulting from this Court's interpretation of the statute is that the § 304 (b) guidelines for existing sources must be reviewed first in the District Court, while the § 306 (b) standards of performance for new plants—often based on the same scientific research and conclusions—must be reviewed first in the Court of Appeals.” CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F. 2d 1329, 1331-1332, n. 1 (1976) (CPC II). See also American Meat Institute, supra, at 449 n. 14. While this Court has not had occasion to rule directly on this question, our discussion of the Act in a case decided last Term is suggestive of the answer. We then described § 402 permits as “serv[ing] to transform generally applicable effluent limitations . . . into the obligations (including a timetable for compliance) of the individual discharger . . . .” EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S., at 205 (emphasis added). This description clearly implied that effluent limitations of general application are to be established before individual permits are issued. The Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he 1983 and new source requirements are on the basis of categories.” Du Pont II, 541 F. 2d, at 1029. Furthermore, § 301 (c) provides that the 1983 limitations may be modified if the owner of a plant shows that “such modified requirements (1) will represent the maximum use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2) will result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants.” This provision shows that the § 301 (b) limitations for 1983 are to be established prior to consideration of the characteristics of the individual plant. American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, supra, at 1037 n. 15. Moreover, it shows that the term “best technology economically achievable” does not refer to any individual plant. Otherwise, it would be impossible for this “economically achievable” technology to be beyond the individual owner’s “economic capability.” Section 509 (b)(1)(A) makes new-source standards directly reviewable in the court of appeals. The Court of Appeals in this litigation did not believe that Congress “intended for review to be bifurcated,” with the new-source standards reviewable in a different forum than regulations governing existing sources. 528 F. 2d, at 1141. The Eighth Circuit has acknowledged the practical problems and potential for inconsistent rulings created by bifurcated review. CPC II, supra, at 1332 n. 1. We consider it unlikely that Congress intended such bifurcated review, and even less likely that Congress intended regulations governing existing sources to be reviewable in two different forums, depending on whether the regulations require compliance in 1977 or 1983. We agree with the Court of Appeals, 541 F. 2d, at 1028, that consideration of whether EPA’s variance provision has the proper scope would be premature. All citations to the legislative history are to Senate Committee on Public Works, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, prepared by the Environmental Policy Division of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress (Comm. Print 1973). Petitioners rely heavily on selected portions of the following passage from the Senate Report to support their view of § 301 : “It is the Committee’s intention that pursuant to subsection 301 (b)(1)(A), and Section 304 (b) the Administrator will interpret the term ‘best practicable’ when applied to various categories of industries as a basis for specifying clear and precise effluent limitations to be implemented by January 1, 1976 [now July 1, 1977]. In defining best practicable for any given industrial category, the Committee expects the Administrator to take a number of factors into account. These factors should include the age of the plants, their size and the unit processes involved and the cost of applying such controls. In effect, for any industrial category, the Committee expects the Administrator to define a range of discharge levels, above a certain base level applicable to all plants within that category. In applying effluent limitations to any individual plant, the factors cited above should be applied to that specific plant. In no case, however, should any plant be allowed to discharge more pollutants per unit of production than is defined by that base level. “The Administrator should establish the range of best practicable levels based upon the average of the best existing performance by plants of various sizes, ages, and unit processes within each industrial category.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 50 (1971), Leg. Hist. 1468. If construed to be consistent with the legislative history we have already discussed, and with what we have found to be the clear statutory language, this language can be fairly read to allow the use of subcategories based on factors such as size, age, and unit processes, with effluent limitations for each subcategory normally based on the performance of the best plants in that subcategory. As the Court of Appeals held, 541 F. 2d, at 1027, EPA’s response to this problem was within its discretion. Accord, American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 176 U. S. App. D. C., at 128-129, 539 F. 2d, at 130-131. Even if we considered this course to constitute a procedural error, it would not invalidate the § 301 regulations themselves since the purposes for issuing the guidelines were substantially achieved, see n. 23, infra, and no prejudice has been shown. The guidelines could have served at least three functions. First, they would have provided guidance to permit issuers prior to promulgation of the § 301 effluent limitation regulations. Second, they would have given industry more time to prepare to meet the § 301 regulations. Third, they would have afforded a greater opportunity for public input into the final § 301 regulations, by giving notice of the general outlines of those regulations. These functions were substantially served by EPA’s practice of obtaining public comment on the development document and proposed regulations. In addition, the guidelines could furnish technical guidance to companies lacking expertise in pollution control by informing them of appropriate control methods. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 45 (1971), Leg. Hist. 1463. This function is served by the Development Document and supporting materials. See American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d, at 1037-1041; American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F. 2d, at 450-452; American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 176 U. S. App. D. C., at 114-129, 539 F. 2d, at 116—131. As these courts have noted, a number of provisions of the Act seem to assume that § 301 effluent limitations have some existence apart from § 402 permits. Section 301 (a) makes any discharge unlawful “[e]xcept as in compliance with this section and sectio[n] . . . 402 . . . of this Act.” Similarly, § 509 (b), the judicial-review provision, refers separately to the Administrator’s action “(E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 301 . . . and (F) in issuing or denying any permit under section 402.” Likewise, § 505 (f) defines “effluent standard or limitation” for purposes of the citizen-enforcement provision of the Act, to include “(2) an effluent limitation or other limitation under section 301 or 302 of this Act,” and “(6) a permit or condition thereof issued under section 402 of this Act.” The legislative history also recognizes a distinction between permit conditions and § 301 limitations. For instance: “The [House] Committee further recognizes that the requirements under sectio[n] 301 . . . will not all be promulgated immediately upon enactment of this bill. Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to delay issuing of permits until all the implementing steps are necessary.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 126 (1972), Leg. Hist. 813. These Court of Appeals decisions have also thoroughly considered the arguments the Eighth Circuit found to be persuasive. The most important contrary arguments are these: (1) The Eighth Circuit was impressed by the differences between § 301 and sections explicitly authorizing EPA to issue regulations. These differences are less than the Eighth Circuit believed. For instance, the Eighth Circuit stressed that the explicitly authorized regulations were referred to as “standards,” and that this term is not used in § 301. CPC 1, 515 F. 2d, at 1038. But § 316 (b) refers to “[a]ny standard established pursuant to section 301.” Other differences between § 301 and sections providing explicitly for enforceable regulations, such as the lack of any statutory timetable for § 301 limitations, can be explained on the basis of the greater difficulty of drafting § 301 regulations. (2) There was heated debate in Congress concerning whether EPA should be able to veto individual state permits, as the Act now provides. The Eighth Circuit believed that “creation of the veto power would make no sense if the EPA was already empowered to promulgate regulations under §301.” CPC I, supra, at 1040-1041. We disagree. “[A] veto power could have been considered just as necessary to ensure compliance by the permit grantors with section 301 limitations as with section 304 guidelines.” American Iron & Steel Institute, supra, at 1041. The veto power would be especially important because large numbers of permits could be issued before the § 301 regulations were promulgated. During this interim period, inconsistency with the § 304 (b) guidelines could be a ground for vetoing a permit. (Moreover, we disagree with the Eighth Circuit’s contention that EPA’s power to object to “the issuance of such permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of this Act,” § 402 (d)(2), can only refer to § 304 (b) guidelines. CPC I, supra, at 1038-1039. Section 304 (h) provides for guidelines governing the procedure for issuance of permits; EPA can veto a permit if “the issuance of such permit” violated these guidelines.) We are also unconvinced by the argument that our view of the Act violates the congressional intent to leave the States a major role in controlling water pollution. See American Meat Institute, supra, at 452. Petitioners contend that the administrative construction should not receive deference because it was not contemporaneous with the passage of the Act. They base this argument primarily on the fact that EPA’s initial notices of its proposed rulemaking refer to § 304 (b), rather than § 301, as the source of authority. But this is merely evidence that the Administrator originally intended to issue guidelines prior to issuing effluent limitation regulations. American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, supra, at 128 n. 6, 539 F. 2d, at 130 n. 6. In fact, in a letter urging the President to sign the Act, the Administrator stated that “[t]he Conference bill fully incorporates as its central regulatory point the Administration’s proposal concerning effluent limitations in terms of industrial categories and groups ultimately applicable to individual dischargers through a permit system.” 118 Cong. Rec. 36777 (1972), Leg. Hist. 149 (emphasis added). Finally, the EPA interpretation would be entitled to some deference even if it was not contemporaneous, “having in mind the complexity and technical nature of the statutes and the subjects they regulate, the obscurity of the statutory language, and EPA’s unique experience and expertise in dealing with the problems created by these conditions.” American Meat Institute v. EPA, supra, at 450 n. 16. This litigation exemplifies the wisdom of allowing difficult issues to mature through full consideration by the courts of appeals. By eliminating the many subsidiary, but still troubling, arguments raised by industry, these courts have vastly simplified our task, as well as having underscored the reasonableness of the agency view. It should be noted that petitioners’ principal arguments are directed to the proposition that § 301 did not mandate the promulgation of industrywide regulations for existing point sources. But that ultimate proposition is not necessarily inconsistent with EPA’s position that it was authorized to proceed by regulation if the aggregate effect of thousands of individual permit proceedings would not achieve the required effluent limitations by the 1977 and 1983 deadlines. Even with respect to the permit programs authorized by § 402, it is clear that EPA can delegate responsibilities to the States without surrendering its ultimate authority over such programs as well as over individual permit actions. Petitioners attach some significance to the fact that compliance with a § 402 permit is “deemed compliance, for purposes of sections 309 [the federal enforcement section] and 505 [the citizen suit section], with sectio[n] . . . 306 . . . .” § 402 (k). This provision plainly cannot allow deviations from § 306 standards in issuing the permit. For, after standards of performance are promulgated, the permit can only be issued “upon condition that such discharge will meet . . . all applicable requirements under sectio[n] . . . 306 . . .” § 402 (a)(1); and one of the requirements of § 306 is that no new source may operate in violation of any standard of performance. § 306 (e). The purpose of § 402(k) seems to be to insulate permit holders from changes in various regulations during the period of a permit and to relieve them of having to litigate in an enforcement action the question whether their permits are sufficiently strict. In short, § 402 (k) serves the purpose of giving permits finality.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al. No. 02-658. Argued October 8, 2003 Decided January 21, 2004 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas., JJ., joined, post, p. 502. Jonathan S. Franklin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John G. Roberts, Jr., Lorane F. Hebert, Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General of Alaska, and Cameron M. Leonard, Assistant Attorney General. Robert J Mahoney, Robert T. Connery, and Marcy G. Glenn filed briefs in support of petitioner for Teck Comineo Alaska Inc., respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.6. Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Johnson, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, James A. Feldman, Andrew J. Doyle, Robert E. Fabricant, Carol S. Holmes, and Juliane R. B. Matthews. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of North Dakota et al. by Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General of North Dakota, Lyle Witham, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General of Wyoming, and Theodore C. Preston, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Larry Long of South Dakota, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Jerry W Kilgore of Virginia; for NANA Regional Corp., Inc., by James E. Torgerson and Matthew Cohen; for the National Environmental Development Association et al. by Janet Pitterle Holt; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by M. Reed Hopper and Robin L. Rivett. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Vermont et al. by William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, and Kevin O. Leske and Erick Titrud, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Lockyer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Michael A Cox of Michigan, Peter W. Heed of New Hampshire, Peter C. Harvey of New Jersey, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Patrick C. Lynch of Rhode Island, and Peggy A Lautenschlager of Wisconsin; for Environmental Defense et al. by Sean H. Donahue; and for the Native Village of Kivalina, Alaska, by Michael J Frank and Peter Van Tuyn. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Center for Energy and Economic Development by Paul M. Seby; and for the Northwest Environmental Defense Center by Donald B. Potter. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency) to enforce the provisions of the Clean Air Act’s (CAA or Act) Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program. Under that program, no major air pollutant emitting facility may be constructed unless the facility is equipped with “the best available control technology” (BACT). As added by § 165, 91 Stat. 735, and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 7475(a)(4). BACT, as defined in the CAA, means, for any major air pollutant emitting facility, “an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of [pollutant] reduction . .. which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for [the] facility....” § 7479(3). Regarding oversight, the a struction and one geared specifically to the PSD program. The general prescription, § 113(a)(5) of the Act, authorizes EPA, when it finds that a State is not complying with a CAA requirement governing construction of a pollutant source, to issue an order prohibiting construction, to prescribe an administrative penalty, or to commence a civil action for in-junctive relief. 42 U. S. C. § 7413(a). Directed specifically to the PSD program, CAA §167 instructs EPA to “take such measures, including issuance of an order, or seeking ih-junctive relief, as necessary to prevent the construction” of a major pollutant emitting facility that does not conform to the PSD requirements of the Act. 42 U. S. C. § 7477. In the case before us, “the permitting authority” under §7479(3) is the State of Alaska, acting through Alaska’s Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC). The question presented is what role EPA has with respect to ADEC’s BACT determinations. Specifically, may EPA act to block construction of a new major pollutant emitting facility permitted by ADEC when EPA finds ADEC’s BACT determination unreasonable in light of the guides §7479(3) prescribes? We hold that the Act confers that checking authority on EPA. I A Congress enacted the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq., in response to “dissatisfaction with the progress of existing air pollution programs.” Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U. S. 246, 249 (1976). The amendments aimed “to guarantee the prompt attainment and maintenance of specified air quality standards.” Ibid,.; D. Currie, Air Pollution §1.13, p. 1-16 (1981) (summary of 1970 amendments). Added by the 1970 amendments, §§ 108(a) and 109(a) of the Act require EPA to publish lists of emissions that “cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” and to promulgate primary and secondary national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for such pollutants. 42 U. S. C. §§ 7408(a) and 7409(a); Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 462-463 (2001). NAAQS “define [the] levels of air quality that must be achieved to protect public health and welfare.” R. Belden, Clean Air Act 6 (2001). The Agency published initial NAAQS in 1971, Union Elec., 427 U. S., at 251 (citing 40 CFR pt. 50 (1975)), and in 1985, NAAQS for the pollutant at issue in this case, nitrogen dioxide. 40 CFR §50.11 (2002). Under § 110 of the Act, also added in 1970, each State must submit for EPA approval “a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of [NAAQS].” 42 U. S. C. § 7410(a)(1); cf. § 7410(c)(1) (EPA shall promulgate an implementation plan if the State’s plan is inadequate). Relevant to this case, EPA has approved Alaska’s implementation plan. 48 Fed. Reg. 30626 (1983), as amended, 56 Fed. Reg. 19288 (1991); 40 CFR § 52.96(a) (2002). To gain EPA approval, a “state implementation plan” (SIP) must “include enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, means, or techniques ... as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable [CAA] requirements.” 42 U. S. C. § 7410(a)(2)(A). While States have “wide discretion” in formulating their plans, Union Elec., 427 U. S., at 250, SIPs must include certain measures Congress specified “to assure that national ambient air quality standards are achieved,” 42 U. S. C. § 7410(a)(2)(C). Among those measures are permit provisions, § 7475, basic to the administration of the program involved in this case, CAA’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality” (PSD) program. The PSD requirements, as part ments to the Act, Title I, §160 et seq., 91 Stat. 731, “are designed to ensure that the air quality in attainment areas or areas that are already 'clean’ will not degrade,” Belden, supra, at 43. See 42 U. S. C. § 7470(1) (purpose of PSD program is to “protect public health and welfare from any. actual or potential adverse effect which in [EPA’s] judgment may reasonably be anticipate^] to occur from air pollution . . . notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of all national ambient air quality standards”). Before 1977, no CAA provision specifically addressed potential air quality deterioration in areas where pollutant levels were lower than the NAAQS. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F. 2d 323, 346-347 (CADC 1979). Responding to litigation initiated by an environmental group, however, EPA issued regulations in 1974 requiring that SIPs include a PSD program. Id., at 347, and n. 18 (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 42510 (1974)). Three years later, Congress adopted the current PSD program. See S. Rep. No. 95-127, p. 11 (1977) (Congress itself has “a responsibility to delineate a policy for protecting clean air”). The PSD program imposes on States a regime governing areas “designated pursuant to [42 U. S. C. § 7407] as attainment or unclassifiable.” § 7471. An attainment area is one in which the air “meets the national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard for [a regulated pollutant].” §7407(d)(l)(A)(ii). Air in an unclassifiable area “cannot be classified on the basis of available information as meeting or not meeting the national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard for the pollutant.” §7407(d)(l)(A)(iii). Northwest Alaska, the region this ease concerns, is classified as an attainment or unclassifiable area for nitrogen dioxide, 40 CFR § 81.302 (2002); therefore, the PSD program applies to emissions of that pollutant in the region. In 2002, the Agency reported that “[a]ll areas of the country that once violated the NAAQS for [nitrogen dioxide] now meet that standard.” EPA, Latest Findings on National Air Quality 7 (Aug. 2003). Section 165 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §7475, installs a permitting requirement for any “major emitting facility,” defined to include any source emitting more than 250 tons of nitrogen oxides per year, §7479(1). No such facility may be constructed or modified unless a permit prescribing emission limitations has been issued for the facility. § 7475(a)(1); see §7479(2)(C) (defining “construction” to include “modification”). Alaska’s SIP imposes an analogous requirement. 18 Alaska Admin. Code § 50.300(c)(1) (2003). Modifications to major emitting facilities that increase nitrogen oxide emissions in excess of 40 tons per year require a PSD permit. 40 CFR § 51.166(b)(23)(i) (2002); 18 Alaska Admin. Code § 50.300(h)(3)(B)(ii) (2003). The Act sets out preconditions for the issuance of PSD permits. Inter alia, no PSD permit may issue unless “the proposed facility is subject to the best available control technology for each pollutant subject to [CAA] regulation . . . emitted from ... [the] facility.” 42 U. S. C. § 7475(a)(4). As described in the Act’s definitional provisions, “best available control technology” (BACT) means: “an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques .... In no event shall application of ‘best available control technology’ result in emissions of any pollutants which will exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable standard established pursuant to section 7411 or 7412 of this title [emission standards for new and existing stationary sources].” §7479(3). 40 CFR §51.166(b)(12) (2002) (repeating statutory definition). Alaska’s SIP contains provisions that track the statutory BACT requirement and definition. 18 Alaska Admin. Code §§ 50.310(d)(3) and 50.990(13) (2003). The State, with slightly variant terminology, defines BACT as “the emission limitation that represents the maximum reduction achievable for each regulated air contaminant, taking into account energy, environmental and economic impacts, and other costs.” §50.990(13). Under the federal Act, a limited class of sources must gain advance EPA approval for the BACT prescribed in the permit. 42 U. S. C. § 7475(a)(8). CAA also provides that a PSD permit may issue only if a source “will not cause, or contribute to, air pollution in excess of any . . . maximum allowable increase or maximum allowable concentration for any pollutant” or any NAAQS. § 7475(a)(3). Congress left to the Agency the determination of most maximum allowable increases, or “increments,” in pollutants. EPA regulations have defined increments for nitrogen oxides. 40 CFR § 51.166(c) (2002). Typically, to demonstrate that increments will not be exceeded, applicants use mathematical models of pollutant plumes, their behavior, and their dispersion. Westbrook, Air Dispersion Models: Tools to Assess Impacts from Pollution Sources, 13 Natural Resources & Env. 546, 547-548 (1999). Among measures EPA may take to ensure compliance with the PSD program, two have special relevance here. The first prescription, § 113(a)(5) of the Act, provides that “[w]henever, on the basis of any available information, [EPA] finds that a State is not acting in compliance with any requirement or prohibition of the chapter relating to the construction of new sources or the modification of existing sources,” 42 U. S. C. § 7413(a)(5), EPA may “issue an order prohibiting the construction or modification of any major stationary source in any area to which such requirement applies,” § 7413(a)(5)(A). The second measure, §167 of the Act, trains on enforcement of the PSD program; it requires EPA to “take such measures, including issuance of an order, or seeking injunctive relief, as necessary to prevent the construction or modification of a major emitting facility which does not conform to the [PSD] requirements.” §7477. B Teck Comineo Alaska Inc. (Comineo) operates a zinc concentrate mine, the Red Dog Mine, in northwest Alaska approximately 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle and close to the native Alaskan villages of Kivalina and Noatak. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a; Brief for Petitioner 8; Brief for Respondents 4. The mine is the region’s largest private employer. Brief for Petitioner 9. It supplies a quarter of the area’s wage base. Ibid. Comineo leases the land from the NANA Regional Corporation, an Alaskan corporation formed pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 85 Stat. 688, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq. Brief for NANA Regional Corporation, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 1-2, 4. In 1988, Comineo obtained authorization to operate the mine, a “major emitting facility” under the Act and Alaska’s SIP. App. 106. The mine’s PSD permit authorized five 5,000 kilowatt Wartsila diesel electric generators, MG-1 through MG-5, subject to operating restrictions; two of the five generators were permitted to operate only in standby status. Ibid. Petitioner Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) issued a second PSD permit in 1994 allowing addition of a sixth full-time generator (MG-6), removing standby status from MG-2, and imposing a new operational cap that allowed all but one generator to run full time. Ibid. In 1996, Comineo initiated a project, with funding from the State, to expand zinc production by 40%. Brief for Petitioner 10; Reply Brief for Petitioner 11, n. 9. Anticipating that the project would increase nitrogen oxide emissions by more than 40 tons per year, see supra, at 472, Comineo applied to ADEC for a PSD permit to allow, inter alia, increased electricity generation by its standby generator, MG-5. App. 107-108; App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a. On March 3, 1999, ADEC preliminarily proposed as BACT for MG-5 the emission control technology known as selective catalytic reduction (SCR), which reduces nitrogen oxide emissions by 90%. App. 72, 108. In response, Comineo amended its application to add a seventh generator, MG-17, and to propose as BACT an alternative control technology — Low NOx— that achieves a 30% reduction in nitrogen oxide pollutants. Brief for Respondents 5, and n. 1; App. 84. On May 4,1999, ADEC, in conjunction with Cominco’s representative, issued a first draft PSD permit and preliminary technical analysis report that concluded Low NOx was BACT for MG-5 and MG-17. Id., at 55-95. To determine BACT, ADEC employed EPA’s recommended top-down methodology, id., at 61: “In briefj the top-down process provides that all available control technologies be ranked in descending order of control effectiveness. The PSD applicant first examines the most stringent — or ‘top’ — alternative. That alternative is established as BACT unless the applicant demonstrates, and the permitting authority in its informed judgment agrees, that technical considerations, or energy, environmental, or economic impacts justify a conclusion that the most stringent technology is not ‘achievable’ in that case. If the most stringent technology is eliminated in this fashion, then the next most stringent alternative is considered, and so on.” EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual B.2 (Draft Oct. 1990) (hereinafter New Source Review Manual); App. 61-62. Applying top-down methodology, ADEC first homed in on SCR as BACT for MG-5, and the new generator, MG-17. “[W]ith an estimated reduction of 90%,” ADEC stated, SCR “is the most stringent” technology. Id., at 79. Finding SCR “technically and economically feasible,” id., at 65, ADEC characterized as “overstated” Cominco’s cost estimate of $5,643 per ton of nitrogen oxide removed by SCR, id., at 113. Using Cominco's data, ADEC reached a cost estimate running between $1,586 and $2,279 per ton. Id., at 83. Costs in that range, ADEC observed, “are well within what ADEC and EPA conside[r] economically feasible.” Id., at 84. Responding to Cominco’s comments on the preliminary permit, engineering staff in ADEC’s Air Permits Program pointed out that, according to information Comineo provided to ADEC, “SCR has been installed on similar diesel-fired engines throughout the world.” Id., at 102. Despite its staff’s clear view “that SCR (the most effective individual technology) [was] technologically, environmentally, and economically feasible for the Red Dog power plant engines,” id., at 103-104, ADEC endorsed the alternative proffered by Comineo. To achieve nitrogen oxide emission reductions commensurate with SCR’s 90% impact, Comineo proposed fitting the new generator MG-17 and the six existing generators with Low NOx. Ibid. , Comineo asserted that it could lower net emissions by 396 tons per year if it fitted all seven generators with Low NOx rather than fitting two (MG-5 and MG-17) with SCR and choosing one of them as the standby unit. Id., at 87. Cominco’s proposal hinged on the “assumption . . . that under typical operating conditions one or more engines will not be running due to maintenance of standby-generation capacity.” Ibid. If all seven generators ran continuously, however, Cominco’s alternative would increase emissions by 79 tons per year. Ibid. Accepting Cominco’s submission, ADEC stated that Cominco’s Low NOx solution “achieve[d] a similar maximum NOx reduction as the most stringent controls; [could] potentially result in a greater NOx reduction; and is logistically and economically less onerous to Comineo.” Id., at 87-88. On the final day of the public comment period, June 2, 1999, the United States Department of the Interior, National Parks Service (NPS), submitted comments to ADEC. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a; App. 97, 108. NPS objected to the projected offset of new emissions from MG-5 and MG-17 against emissions from other existing generators that were not subject to BACT. Letter from John Notar, NPS Air Resources Division, to Jim Baumgartner, ADEC (June 2, 1999). Such an offset, NPS commented, “is neither allowed by BACT, nor achieves the degree of reduction that would result if all the generators that are subject to BACT were equipped with SCR.” Id., at 3. NPS further observed that the proposed production-increase project would remove operating restrictions that the 1994 PSD permit had placed on four of the existing generators — MG-1, MG-3, MG-4, and MG-5. App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. Due to that alteration, NPS urged, those generators, too, became part of the production-expansion project and would be subject to the BACT requirement. Ibid. Following NPS’ lead, EPA wrote to ADEC on July 29, 1999, commenting: “Although ADEC states in its analysis that [SCR], the most stringent level of control, is economically and technologically feasible, ADEC did not propose to require SCR. . . . [0]nce it is determined that an emission unit is subject to BACT, the PSD program does not allow the imposition of a limit that is less stringent than BACT.” App. 96-97. A permitting authority, EPA agreed with NPS, could not offset new emissions “by imposing new controls on other emission units” that were not subject to BACT, Id., at 97. New emissions could be offset only against reduced emissions from sources covered by the same BACT authorization. Id., at 285-286. EPA further agreed with NPS that, based on the existing information, BACT would be required for MG-1, MG-3, MG-4, and MG-5. Id., at 97. After receiving EPA comments, ADEC issued a second draft PSD permit and technical analysis report on September 1,1999, again finding Low NOx to be BACT for MG-17. Id., at 105-117. Abandoning the emissions-offsetting justification advanced in the May 4 draft permit, ADEC agreed with NPS and EPA that “emission reductions from sources that were not part of the permit action,” here MG-1, MG-2, MG-3, MG-4, MG-5, and MG-6, could not be considered in determining BACT for MG-17. Id., at 111; id., at 199 (same). ADEC conceded that, lacking data from Comineo, it had made “no judgment... as to the impact of ... [SCR] on the operation, profitability, and competitiveness of the Red Dog Mine.” Id., at 116. Contradicting its May 1999 conclusion that SCR was “technically and economically feasible,” see supra, at 476, ADEC found in September 1999 that SCR imposed “a disproportionate cost” on the mine. App. 116. ADEC concluded, on a “cursory review,” that requiring SCR for a rural Alaska utility would lead to a 20% price increase, and that in comparison with other BACT technologies, SCR came at a “significantly higher” cost. Ibid. No economic basis for a comparison between the mine and a rural utility appeared in ADEC’s technical analysis. EPA protested the revised permit. In a September 15, 1999, letter, the Agency stated: “Comineo has not adequately demonstrated any site-specific factors to support their claim that the installation of [SCR] is economically infeasible at the Red Dog Mine. Therefore, elimination of SCR as BACT based on cost-effectiveness grounds is not supported by the record and is clearly erroneous.” Id., at 127; see id., at 138 (ADEC’s record does not support the departure from ADEC’s initial view that the costs for SCR were economically feasible). To justify the September 1, 1999, permit, EPA suggested, ADEC could “include an analysis of whether requiring Com-ineo to install and operate [SCR] would have any adverse economic impacts upon Comineo specifically.” Id., at 127. Stating that such an inquiry was unnecessary and expressing “concerns related to confidentiality,” Comineo declined to submit financial data. Id., at 134. In this regard, Comineo simply asserted, without detail, that the company’s “overall debt remains quite high” despite continuing profits. Id., at 134-135. Comineo also invoked the need for “[¡Industrial development in rural Alaska.” Id., at 135. On December 10, 1999, ADEC issued the final permit and technical analysis report. Once again, ADEC approved Low NOx as BACT for MG-17 “[t]o support Cominco’s Red Dog Mine Production Rate Increase Project, and its contributions to the region.” Id., at 208. ADEC did not include the economic analysis EPA had suggested. Id., at 152-246. Indeed, ADEC conceded again that it had made “no judgment ... as to the impact of... [SCR’s] cost on the operation, profitability, and competitiveness of the Red Dog Mine.” Id., at 207. Nonetheless, ADEC advanced, as cause for its decision, SCR’s adverse, effect on the mine’s “unique and continuing impact on the economic diversity of th[e] region” and on the venture’s “world competitiveness.” Id., at 208. ADEC did not explain how its inferences of adverse effects on the region’s economy or the mine’s “world competitiveness” could be made without financial information showing SCR’s impact on the “operation, profitability, and competitiveness” of the mine. Id., at 207, 299. Instead, ADEC reiterated its rural Alaska utility analogy, and again compared SCR’s cost to the costs of other, less stringent, control technologies. Id., at 205-207. The same day, December 10, 1999, EPA issued an order to ADEC, under §§ 113(a)(5) and 167 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7413(a)(5) and 7477, prohibiting ADEC from issuing a PSD permit to Comineo “unless ADEC satisfactorily documents why SCR is not BACT for the Wartsila diesel generator [MG-17].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. In the letter accompanying the order, the Agency stated that “ADEC’s own analysis supports the determination that BACT is [SCR], and that ADEC’s decision in the proposed permit therefore is both arbitrary and erroneous.” App. 149. On February 8, 2000, EPA, again invoking its authority under §§ 113(a)(5) and 167 of the Act, issued a second order, this time prohibiting Comineo from beginning “construction or modification activities at the Red Dog mine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. A third order, issued on March 7, 2000, superseding and vacating the February 8 order, generally prohibited Comineo from acting on ADEC’s December 10 PSD permit but allowed limited summer construction. Id., at 62a-64a. On April 25, 2000, EPA withdrew its December 10 order. App. 300; App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a. Once ADEC issued the permit, EPA explained, that order lacked utility. On July 16, 2003, ADEC granted Comineo a PSD permit to construct MG-17 with SCR as BACT. Letter from Theodore B. Olson, Solicitor General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the Court (Aug. 21, 2003). Under the July 16, 2003, permit, SCR ceases to be BACT “if and when the case currently pending before the Supreme Court of the United States of America is decided in favor of the State of Alaska.” ADEC, Air Quality Control Construction Permit, Final Technical Analysis Report, Permit No. 9932-AC005, Revision 2, p. 7. The day EPA issued its first order against Comineo, February 8, 2000, ADEC and Comineo petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of EPA’s orders. App. 11. The Agency initially moved to dismiss, urging that the Court of Appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In an order released March 27, 2001, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it had adjudicatory authority pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b)(1), which lodges jurisdiction over challenges to “any . . . final [EPA] action” in the Courts of Appeals. Alaska v. United States EPA, 244 F. 3d 748, 750-751. The Court of Appeals resolved the merits in a judgment released July 30, 2002. 298 F. 3d 814 (CA9). It held that EPA had authority under §§ 113(a)(5) and 167 to issue the contested orders, and that the Agency had properly exercised its discretion in doing so. Id., at 820-823. Concerning EPA’s authority under §§ 113(a)(5) and 167, the Court of Appeals observed first that “the question presented is what requirements the state must meet” under the Act to issue a PSD permit, not what the correct BACT might be. Id., at 821 (emphasis in original). Concluding that EPA had “authority to determine the reasonableness or adequacy of the state's justification for its decision,” the Court of Appeals emphasized that the “provision of a reasoned justification” by a permitting authority is undeniably a “requirement” of the Act. Ibid. EPA had properly exercised its discretion in issuing the three orders, the Ninth Circuit ultimately determined, because (1) Comineo failed to “demonstrate] that SCR was economically infeasible,” and (2) “ADEC failed to provide a reasoned justification for its elimination of SCR as a control option.” Id., at 823. We granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 1186 (2003), to resolve an important question of federal . law, i. e., the scope of EPA’s authority under §§ 113(a)(5) and 167, and now affirm the Ninth Circuit's judgment. II ADEC contested EPA’s orders under 42 U. S. C. § 7607 (b)(1), which renders reviewable in the appropriate federal court of appeals any EPA “final action." Before the Ninth Circuit, EPA unsuccessfully urged that its orders were “interlocutory,” and therefore unreviewable in court unless and until EPA chose to commence an enforcement action. A preenforcement contest could be maintained in the Court of Appeals under § 7607(b)(1), the Ninth Circuit held, for in the circumstances presented, EPA’s actions had the requisite finality. It was undisputed, the Court of Appeals observed, that EPA had spoken its “‘last word”’ on whether ADEC had adequately justified its conclusion that Low NOx was the best available control technology for the MG-17 generator. 244 F. 3d, at 750. Further, EPA’s orders effectively halted construction of the MG-17 generator, for Comineo would risk civil and criminal penalties if it defied a valid EPA directive. In this Court, EPA agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s finality determination. See Brief for Respondents 16-20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 43-44. We are satisfied that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the guides we set out in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 177-178 (1997) (to be “final,” agency action must “mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” and must either determine “rights or obligations” or occasion “legal consequences” (some internal quotation marks omitted)). As the Court of Appeals stated, EPA had “asserted its final position on the factual circumstances” underpinning the Agency’s orders, 244 F. 3d, at 750, and if EPA’s orders survived judicial review, Cominco could not escape the practical and legal consequences (lost costs and vulnerability to penalties) of any ADEC-permitted construction Cominco endeavored, ibid. No question has been raised here, we note, about the adequacy of EPA’s preorder procedures under the Due Process Clause or the Administrative Procedure Act. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 544 (1978) (agencies have authority to “fashion their own rules of procedure,” even when a statute does not specify what process to use). Furthermore, in response to ADEC’s initial contention that the record was incomplete, the Ninth Circuit gave EPA an opportunity to supplement the record, and thereafter obtained from all parties agreement “that the record as it stood was adequate to resolve [ADEC’s review petition].” 298 F. 3d, at 818. III A Centrally at issue in this case is the question whether EPA’s oversight role, described by Congress in CAA §§ 113(a)(5) and 167, see supra, at 473-474, extends to ensuring that a state permitting authority’s BACT determination is reasonable in light of the statutory guides. Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 lodge in the'Agency encompassing supervisory responsibility over the construction and modification of pollutant emitting facilities in areas covered by the PSD program. 42 U. S. C. §§ 7413(a)(5) and 7477. In notably capacious terms, Congress armed EPA with authority to issue orders stopping construction when “a State is not acting in compliance with any [CAA] requirement or prohibition . . . relating to the construction of new sources or the modification of existing sources,” § 7413(a)(5), or when “construction or modification of a major emitting facility . . . does not conform to the requirements of [the PSD program],” § 7477. The federal Act enumerates several “^reconstruction requirements” for the PSD program. §7475. Absent these, “[n]o major emitting facility .. . may be constructed.” Ibid. One express preconstruction requirement is inclusion of a BACT determination in a facility’s PSD permit. §§ 7475(a) (1) and (4). As earlier set out, see supra, at 472, the Act defines BACT as “an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of [a] pollutant . . . which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for [a] facility.” §7479(3). Under this formulation, the permitting authority, ADEC here, exercises primary or initial responsibility for identifying BACT in line with the Act’s definition of that term. All parties agree that one of the “many requirements in the PSD provisions that the EPA may enforce” is “that a [PSD] permit contain a BACT limitation.” Brief for Petitioner 34; see id., at 22, 25 (same). See also Brief for Respondents 23. It is therefore undisputed that the Agency may issue an order to stop a facility’s construction if a PSD permit contains no BACT designation. EPA reads the Act’s definition of BACT, together with CAA’s explicit listing of BACT as a “^reconstruction re-quiremen[t],” to mandate not simply a BACT designation, but a determination of BACT faithful to the statute’s definition. In keeping with the broad oversight role §§ 113(a)(5) and 167 vest in EPA, the Agency maintains, it may review permits to ensure that a State’s BACT determination is reasonably moored to the Act’s provisions. See id., at 24. We hold, as elaborated below, that the Agency has rationally construed the Act’s text and that EPA’s construction warrants our respect and approbation. BACT’s statutory definition requires selection of an emission control technology that results in the “maximum” reduction of a pollutant “achievable for [a] facility” in view of “energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.” 42 U. S. C. § 7479(3). This instruction, EPA submits, cabins state permitting authorities’ discretion by granting only “authority to make reasonable BACT determinations,” Brief for Respondents 27 (emphasis in original), i. e., decisions made with fidelity to the Act’s purpose “to insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air resources,” 42 U. S. C. § 7470(3). Noting that state permitting authorities’ statutory discretion is constrained by CÁA’s strong, normative terms “maximum” and “achievable,” §7479(3), EPA reads §§ 113(a)(5) and 167 to empower the federal Agency to check a state agency's unreasonably lax BACT designation. See Brief for Respondents 27. EPA stresses Congress' reason for enacting the PSD program — to prevent significant deterioration of air quality in clean-air areas within a State and in neighboring States. §§ 7470(3), (4); see id., at 33. That aim, EPA urges, is unlikely to be realized absent an EPA surveillance role that extends to BACT determinations. The Agency notes in this regard a House Report observation: “Without national guidelines for the prevention of significant deterioration a State deciding to protect its clean air resources will face a double threat. The prospect is very real that such a State would lose existing industrial plants to more permissive States. But additionally the State will likely become the target of 'economic-environmental blackmail’ from new industrial plants that will play one State off against another with threats to locate in whichever State adopts the most permissive pollution controls.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, p. 134 (1977). The House Report further observed that “a community that sets and enforces strict standards may still find its air polluted from sources in another community or another State.” Id., at 135 (quoting 116 Cong. Rec. 32909 (1970)). Federal Agency surveillance of a State’s BACT designation is needed, EPA asserts, to restrain the interjurisdictional pressures to which Congress was alert. See Brief for Respondents 33-34, 43; Brief for Vermont et al. as Amici Curiae 12 (“If EPA has authority to ensure a reasonable level of consistency among BACT determinations nationwide, then every State can feel more confident about maintaining stringent standards without fear of losing its current industry or alienating prospective industry.”). The CAA construction EPA advances in this litigation is reflected in interpretive guides the Agency has several times published. See App. 268-269 (1983 EPA PSD guidance memorandum noting the Agency’s “oversight function”); id., at 274 (1988 EPA guidance memorandum stating EPA may find a BACT determination deficient if it is “not based on a reasoned analysis”); id., at 281-282 (1993 guidance memorandum stating that “EPA acts to ensure that the state exercises its discretion within the bounds of the law” (internal quotation marks omitted); as to BACT, EPA will not intervene if the state agency has given “a reasoned justification for the basis of its decision” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Commonwealth of Virginia- — Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 13797 (1998) (EPA will “review whether any determination by the permitting authority was made on reasonable grounds properly supported on the record, described in enforceable terms, and consistent with all applicable requirements”). We “normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration,” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212, 220 (2002) (quoting North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512, 522, n. 12 (1982)), recognizing that “well-reasoned views” of an expert administrator rest on “ ‘a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,’ ” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 642 (1998) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140 (1944)). We have previously accorded dispositive effect to EPA’s interpretation of an ambiguous CAA provision. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 865-866 (1984); Union Elec., 427 U. S., at 256. The Agency’s interpretation in this case, presented in internal guidance memoranda, however, does not qualify for the dispositive force described in Chevron. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such as those in .. . policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law— do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”); accord United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 234 (2001). Cogent “administrative interpretations .. . not [the] products of formal rulemaking ... nevertheless warrant respect.” Washington State Dept, of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 371, 385 (2003). We accord EPA’s reading of the relevant statutory provisions, §§ 7413(a)(5), 7470(3), 7470(4), 7475(a)(4), 7477, and 7479(3), that measure of respect. B ' ADEC assails the Agency’s construction of the Act on several grounds. Its arguments do not persuade us to reject as impermissible EPA’s longstanding, consistently maintained interpretation. ADEC argues that the statutory § 7479(3), unambiguously assigns to “the permitting authority” alone determination of the control technology qualifying as “best available.” Brief for Petitioner 21-26. Because the Act places responsibility for determining BACT with “the permitting authority,” ADEC urges, CAA excludes federal Agency surveillance reaching the substance of the BACT decision. Id., at 22-25. EPA’s enforcement role, ADEC maintains, is restricted to the requirement “that the permit contain a BACT limitation.” Id., at 34. Understandably, Congress authorities with initial responsibility to make BACT determinations “case-by-case.” §7479(3). A state agency, no doubt, is best positioned to adjust for local differences in raw materials or plant configurations, differences that might make a technology “unavailable” in a particular area. But the fact that the relevant statutory guides — “maximum” pollution reduction, considerations of energy, environmental, and economic impacts — may not yield a “single, objectively ‘correct’ BACT determination,” id., at 23, surely does not signify that there can be no unreasonable determinations. Nor does Congress’ sensitivity to site-specific factors necessarily imply a design to preclude in this context meaningful EPA oversight under §§ 113(a)(5) and 167. EPA claims no prerogative to designate the correct BACT; the Agency asserts only the authority to guard against unreasonable designations. See 298 F. 3d, at 821 (“the question presented is what requirements the state must meet,” not what final substantive decision the State must make (emphasis in original)). Under ADEC’s interpretation, EPA properly inquires whether a BACT determination appears in a PSD permit, Brief for Petitioner 34, but not whether that BACT determination “was made on reasonable grounds properly supported on the record,” 63 Fed. Reg., at 13797. Congress, however, vested EPA with explicit and sweeping authority to enforce CAA “requirements” relating to the construction and modification of sources under the PSD program, including BACT. We fail to see why Congress, having expressly endorsed an expansive surveillance role for EPA in two independent CAA provisions, would then implicitly preclude the Agency from verifying substantive compliance with the BACT provisions and, instead, limit EPA’s superintendence to the insubstantial question whether the state permitting authority had uttered the key words “BACT.” We emphasize, however, that EPA’s rendition of the Act’s less than crystalline text leaves the “permitting authority” considerable leeway. The Agency acknowledges “the need to accord appropriate deference” to States’ BACT designations,. Brief for Respondents 43, and disclaims any intention to “‘second guess’ state decisions,” 63 Fed. Reg., at 13797. Only when a state agency’s BACT determination is “not based on a reasoned analysis,” App. 274, may EPA step in to ensure that the statutory requirements are honored. EPA adhered to that limited role here, explaining why ADEC’s BACT determination was “arbitrary” and contrary to ADEC’s own findings. Id., at 149-150. EPA’s limited but vital role in enforcing BACT is consistent with a scheme that “places primary responsibilities and authority with the States, backed by the Federal Government.” S. Rep. No. 95-127, p. 29. ADEC also points to 42 U. S. C. § 7475(a)(8), a provision of the Act expressly requiring, in a limited category of cases, EPA approval of a state permitting authority’s BACT determination before a facility may be constructed. See Brief for Petitioner 25; Reply Brief for Petitioner 6. Had Congress intended EPA superintendence of BACT determinations, ADEC urges, Congress would have said so expressly by mandating Agency approval of all, not merely some, BACT determinations. Brief for Petitioner 25-26. ADEC’s argument overlooks the obvious difference between a statutory requirement, e. g., § 7475(a)(8), and a statutory authorization. Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 sensibly do not require EPA approval of all state BACT determinations, they simply authorize EPA to act in the unusual case in which a state permitting authority has determined BACT arbitrarily. EPA recognizes that its authorization to issue a stop order may be exercised only when a state permitting authority’s decision is unreasonable; in contrast, a required approval may be withheld if EPA would come to a different determination on the merits. See, e. g., 57 Fed. Reg. 28095 (1992) (“EPA acknowledges that states have the primary role in administering and enforcing the various components of the PSD program. States have been largely successful in this effort, and EPA’s involvement in interpretative and enforcement issues is limited to only a small number of cases.”). Even if the Act imposes a requirement of reasoned justification for a BACT determination, ADEC ultimately argues, such a requirement may be enforced only through state administrative and judicial processes. Brief for Petitioner 34-38. State review of BACT decisions, according to ADEC, allows development of an adequate factual record, properly imposes the burden of persuasion on EPA when it challenges a State’s BACT determination, and promotes certainty. Id., at 36-37. Unless EPA review of BACT determinations is channeled into state administrative and judicial forums, ADEC suggests, “there is nothing to prevent the EPA from invalidating a BACT determination at any time — months, even years, after a permit has been issued.” Id., at 35. It would be unusual, to say the least, for Congress to remit a federal agency enforcing federal law solely to state court. We decline to read such an uncommon regime into the Act’s silence. EPA, the expert federal agency charged with enforcing the Act, has interpreted the BACT provisions and its own §§ 113(a)(5) and 167 enforcement powers not to require recourse to state processes before stopping a facility’s construction. See supra, at 485-488. That rational interpretation, we agree, is surely permissible. Nor are we persuaded by ADEC’s practical concerns. We see no reason to conclude that an appropriate record generally cannot be developed to allow informed federal-court review when EPA disputes a BACT decision’s reasonableness. ADEC contends that, in this very case, “the State’s BACT determination was reviewed by the Ninth Circuit on an incomplete record.” Brief for Petitioner 37. ADEC, however, offers no particulars to back up its assertion that the Court of Appeals proceeded on. an inadequate evidentiary record. We note again that the Ninth Circuit ordered EPA to submit a complete administrative record. 298 F. 3d, at 818. After the Agency declared that the record was complete, “all the parties effectively agreed that the record as it stood was adequate to resolve the issues on appeal.” Ibid. As to the burdens of production and persuasion, nothing in the Act suggests that EPA gains a proof-related tactical advantage by issuing a stop-construction order instead of seeking relief through a civil action. But cf. post, at 510 (EPA authority to issue stop-construction orders creates “the anomaly of shifting the burden of pleading and of initiating litigation from EPA to the State”). Correspondingly, nothing in our decision today invites or permits EPA to achieve an unfair advantage through its choice of litigation forum. In granting EPA a choice between initiating a civil action and exercising its stop-construction-order authority, see supra, at 473-474, 492, n. 15, Congress nowhere suggested that the allocation of proof burdens would differ depending upon which enforcement route EPA selected. The point ought not to be left in doubt. Accordingly, we hold that in either an EPA-initiated civil action or a challenge to an EPA stop-construction order filed in state or federal court, the production and persuasion burdens remain with EPA and the underlying question a reviewing court resolves remains the same: Whether the state agency’s BACT determination was reasonable, in light of the statutory guides and the state administrative record. See supra, at 485-486, 491. The Ninth Circuit’s review of EPA’s order is in keeping with our holding that EPA may not reduce the burden it must carry by electing to invoke its 'stop-construction-order authority. Specifically, the Court of Appeals rested its judgment on what EPA showed from ADEC’s own report: “(1) Comineo failed to meet its burden of demonstrating [to ADEC] that SCR was economically infeasible; and (2) ADEC failed to provide a reasoned justification for its elimination of SCR as a control option.” 298 F. 3d, at 823. EPA’s conclusions, and the basis for them, support the Court of Appeals’ determination that the federal Agency’s grounds for issuing the orders under review were not “arbitrary] and capriciou[s].” Ibid. Our own analysis, infra, at 497-502, similarly hinges on the question whether ADEC’s BACT determination was a reasonable one. Our analysis would have taken the same path had EPA initiated a civil action pursuant to § 113(a)(5)(C), or if the suit under consideration had been filed initially in state court. Nor do we find compelling ADEC’s suggestion, reiterated by the dissent, that, if state courts are not the exclusive judicial arbiters, EPA would be free to invalidate a BACT determination “months, even years, after a permit has been issued.” Brief for Petitioner 35; post, at 512-514. This case threatens no such development. It involves preconstruction-orders issued by EPA, see supra, at 481, not postconstruction federal Agency directives. EPA itself regards it as “imperative” to act on a timely basis, recognizing that courts are “less likely to require new sources to accept more stringent permit conditions the farther planning and construction have progressed.” App. 273 (July 15, 1988, EPA guidance memorandum). In the one instance of untimely EPA action ADEC identifies, the federal courts declined to permit enforcement to proceed. See United States v. AM General Corp., 34 F. 3d 472, 475.(CA7 1994) (affirming District Court’s dismissal of an EPA-initiated enforcement action where EPA did not act until well after the facility received a PSD permit and completed plant modifications). EPA, we are confident, could not indulge in the inequitable conduct ADEC and the dissent hypothesize while the federal courts sit to review EPA’s actions, Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 678-679 (1970); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1941). In sum, EPA interprets the Act to allow substantive federal Agency surveillance of state permitting authorities’ BACT determinations subject to federal-court review. We credit EPA’s longstanding construction of the Act and confirm EPA’s authority, pursuant to §§ 113(a)(5) and 167, to rule on the reasonableness of BACT decisions by state permitting authorities. IV A We turn finally, and more particularly, to the reasons why we conclude that EPA properly exercised its statutory authority in this case. ADEC urges that, even if the Act allows the Agency to issue stop-construction orders when a state permitting authority unreasonably determines BACT, EPA acted impermissibly in this instance. See Brief for Petitioner 39-48. We note, first, EPA’s threshold objection. ADEC’s petition to this Court questioned whether the Act accorded EPA oversight authority with respect to a State’s BACT determination. Pet. for Cert. 13-22. ADEC did not present, as a discrete issue, the question whether EPA, assuming it had authority to review the substance of a state BACT determination, nevertheless abused its authority by countermanding ADEC’s permit for the Red Dog Mine expansion. See Brief for Respondents 44-45; cf. Reply Brief for Petitioner 15-16, n. 12 (“EPA asserts authority to overturn only ‘arbitrary or unreasoned’ state BACT determinations. . . . Thus, whether the State issued a reasoned justification is ‘fairly included’ within the question presented[J”). Treating the case-specific issue as embraced within the sole question presented, we are satisfied that EPA did not act arbitrarily in finding that ADEC furnished no tenable accounting for its determination that Low NOx was BACT for MG-17. Because the Act itself does not specify a standard for judicial review in this instance, we apply the familiar default standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), and ask whether the Agency’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Even when an agency explains its decision with “less than ideal clarity,” a reviewing court will not upset the decision on that account “if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 286 (1974). EPA’s three skeletal orders to ADEC and Comineo surely are not composed with ideal clarity. These orders, however, are properly read together with accompanying explanatory correspondence from EPA; so read, the Agency’s comments and orders adequately ground the determination that ADEC’s acceptance of Low NOx for MG-17 was unreasonable given the facts ADEC found. In the two draft permits and the final permit, ADEC formally followed the EPA-recommended top-down methodology to determine BACT, as Cominco had done in its application. App. 61, 109, 175; see supra, at 475-476. Employing that methodology in the May 1999 draft permit, ADEC first concluded that SCR was the most stringent emission-control technology that was both “technically and economically feasible.” App. 65; see supra, at 476. That technology should have been designated BACT absent “technical considerations, or energy, environmental, or economic impacts justifying] a conclusion that [SCR was] not ‘achievable’ in [this] case.” New Source Review Manual, p. B.2; App. 61-62. ADEC nevertheless selected Low NOx as BACT; ADEC did so in May 1999 based on Cominco’s suggestion that fitting all Red Dog Mine generators with Low NOx would reduce aggregate emissions. Id., at 87, 111-112; see supra, at 476-477. In September and December 1999, ADEC again rejected SCR as BACT but no longer relied on Cominco’s suggestion that it could reduce aggregate emissions by equipping all generators with Low NOx. See supra, at 478-480. ADEC candidly stated that it aimed “[t]o support Cominco’s Red Dog Mine Production Rate Increase Project, and its contributions to the region.” App. 208. In these second and third rounds, ADEC rested its selection of Low NOx squarely and solely on SCR’s “disproportionate cost.” Id., at 116; id., at 112-117, 203-208; supra, at 478-480. EPA concluded that ADEC’s switch from finding SCR economically feasible in May 1999 to finding SCR economically infeasible in September 1999 had no factual basis in the record. See App: 138. In the September and December 1999 technical analyses, ADEC acknowledged that “no judgment [could then] be made as to the impact of [SCR’s] cost on the operation, profitability, and competitiveness of the Red Dog Mine.” Id., at 116, 207. ADEC nevertheless concluded that SCR would threaten both the Red Dog Mine’s “unique and continuing impact on the economic diversity” of northwest Alaska and the mine’s “world competitiveness.” Id., at 208. ADEC also stressed the mine’s role as employer in an area with “historical high unemployment and limited permanent year-round job opportunities.” Id., at 207. We do not see how ADEC, having acknowledged that no determination “[could], be made as to the impact of [SCR’s] cost on the operation . . . and competitiveness of the [mine],” ibid., could simultaneously proffer threats to the mine’s operation or competitiveness as reasons for declaring SCR economically infeasible. ADEC, indeed, forthrightly explained why it was disarmed from reaching any judgment on whether, or to what extent, implementation of SCR would adversely affect the mine’s operation or profitability: Com-ineo had declined to provide the relevant financial data, disputing the need for such information and citing “confidentiality” concerns, id., at 134; see supra, at 479-480; 298 F. 3d, at 823 (“Comineo failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that SCR was economically infeasible.”). No record evidence suggests that the mine, were it to use SCR for its new generator, would be obliged to cut personnel or raise zinc prices. Absent evidence of that order, ADEC lacked cause for selecting Low NOx as BACT based on the more stringent control’s impact on the mine’s operation or competitiveness. Nor has ADEC otherwise justified its choice of Low NOx. To bolster its assertion that SCR was too expensive, ADEC invoked four BACT determinations made in regard to diesel generators used for primary power production; BACT’s cost, in those instances, ranged from $0 to $936 per ton of nitrogen oxide removed. App. 205-206; supra, at 480. ADEC itself, however, had previously found SCR’s per-ton cost, then estimated as $2,279, to be “well within what ADEC and EPA considers economically feasible.” App. 84; cf. id., at 204 (estimating SCR’s per ton cost to be $2,100). No reasoned explanation for ADEC’s retreat from this position appears in the final permit. See id., at 138 (“[SCR’s cost falls] well within the range of costs EPA has seen permitting authorities nationwide accept as economically feasible for NOx control except where there are compelling site specific factors that indicate otherwise.”). Tellingly, as to examples of low-cost BACT urged by Comineo, ADEC acknowledged: “The cited examples of engines permitted in Alaska without requiring SCR are not valid examples as they either took place over 18 months ago or were not used for similar purposes.” Id., at 233-234 (footnote omitted). ADEC added that it has indeed “permitted [Alaska] projects requiring SCR.” Id., at 234. Further, EPA rejected ADEC’s comparison between the miné and a nina] utility, séé supra, at 479, because "no facts exist to suggest that the ‘economic impact’ of the incrementally higher cost of SCR on the world’s largest producer of zinc concentrates would be anything like its impact on a rural, non-profit utility that must pass costs on to a small base of individual consumers,” Brief for Respondents 49; App. 138-139 (similar observation in Nov. 10, 1999, EPA letter). ADEC’s basis for selecting Low NOx thus reduces to a readiness “[t]o support Cominco’s Red Dog Mine Production Rate Increase Project, and its contributions to the region.” Id., at 208. This justification, however, hardly meets ADEC’s own standard of a "source-specific ... economic impact] which demonstrate^] [SCR] to be inappropriate as BACT.” Id., at 177. In short, as the Ninth Circuit determined, EPA validly issued stop orders because ADEC’s BACT designation simply did not qualify as reasonable in light of the statutory guides. In its briefs to this Court, ADEC nonetheless justifies its selection of Low NOx as BACT for MG-17 on the ground that lower aggregate emissions would result from Cominco’s “agree[ment] to install Low NOx on all its generators.” Brief for Petitioner 42, and n. 12 (emphasis added); id., at 29; Reply Brief for Petitioner 19, n. 16. We need not dwell on ADEC’s attempt to resurrect Cominco’s emissions-offsetting suggestion, see supra, at 477, adopted in the initial May 1999 draft permit, but thereafter dropped. As ADEC acknowledges, the final PSD permit did not offset MG-17’s emissions against those of the mine’s six existing generators, installations that were not subject to BACT. Brief for Petitioner 42, n. 12; App. 149. ADEC recognized in September and December 1999 that a State may treat emissions from several pollutant sources as falling under one “bubble” for PSD permit purposes only if every pollutant source so aggregated is “part of the permit action.” Id., at 111, 199. Offsetting new emissions against those from any of the mine’s other generators, ADEC agreed, “[was] not a consideration of the BACT review provided for by the applicable law or guidelines,” for those generators remained outside the permit’s compass. Id., at 112,199. ADEC plainly did not, and could not, base its December 10, 1999, permit and technical analysis on an emissions-offsetting rationale drawing in generators not subject to BACT. Id., at 111-112. By that time, only MG-17 was “part of the permit action.” Id., at 111, 199. B We emphasize that today’s disposition does not impede ADEC from revisiting the BACT determination in question. In letters and orders throughout the permitting process, EPA repeatedly commented that it was open to ADEC to prepare “an appropriate record” supporting its selection of Low NOx as BACT. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35; see App. 127 (attachment to Sept. 28,1999, EPA letter to ADEC, stating “an analysis of whether requiring Comineo to install and operate [SCR] would have any adverse economic impacts upon Com-ineo specifically” might demonstrate SCR’s economic infeasibility); id., at 150 (letter accompanying EPA’s Dec. 10, 1999, finding of noncompliance and order reiterating the Agency’s willingness to “review, and consider any additional information or analyses provided by ADEC or Comineo” on Low NOx as BACT); App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a (EPA Dec. 10, 1999, order inviting ADEC to justify its choice of Low NOx by “documenting] why SCR is not BACT [for MG-17]”); id., at 49a (similar statement in Feb. 8, 2000, order). At oral argument, counsel for EPA reaffirmed that, “absolutely,” ADEC could reconsider the matter and, on an “appropriate record,” endeavor to support Low NOx as BACT. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. We see no reason not to take EPA at its word. * * * In sum, we conclude that EPA has supervisory authority over the reasonableness of state permitting authorities’ BACT determinations and may issue a stop-construction order, under §§ 113(a)(5) and 167, if a BACT selection is not reasonable. We further conclude that, in exercising that authority, the Agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that ADEC’s BACT decision in this instance lacked evidentiary support. EPA’s orders, therefore, were neither arbitrary nor capricious. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed. Emissions levels for nitrogen dioxide, a regulated pollutant under the Act, are defined in terms of quantities of all oxides of nitrogen. R. Bel-den, Clean Air Act 47, n. 11 (2001). “The term nitrogen oxides refers to a family of compounds of nitrogen and oxygen. The principal nitrogen oxides component present in the atmosphere at any time is nitrogen dioxides. Combustion sources emit mostly nitric oxide, with some nitrogen dioxide. Upon entering the atmosphere, the nitric oxide changes rapidly, mostly to nitrogen dioxide.” EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration for Nitrogen Oxides, 53 Fed. Reg. 40656 (1988). Nitrogen oxides are also termed “NOx.” Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (DC 1972), aff’d per curiam, 4 E. R. C. 1815, 2 Env. L. Rep. 20656 (CADC 1972), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U. S. 541 (1973) (per curiam). The PSD program also requires visibility control measures, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7491-7492, not at issue in this case. As enacted in 1977, § 113(a)(5) extended only to solid waste combustion and sources in nonattainment areas. See Title I, § 111(a), 91 Stat. 685. Congress extended § 113(a)(5) in 1990 amendments to the Act to cover attainment areas, and thus to encompass enforcement of PSD permitting requirements. Title VII, 104 Stat. 2672. SCR requires injections of “ammonia or urea into the exhaust before the exhaust enters a catalyst bed made with vanadium, titanium, or platinum. The reduction reaction occurs when the flue gas passes over the catalyst bed where the NOx and ammonia combine to become nitrogen, oxygen, and water .. ..” App. 71. In Low NOx, changes are made to a generator to improve fuel atomization and modify the combustion space to enhance the mixing of air and fuel. Id.., at 75. Nothing in the Act or its implementing regulations mandates top-down analysis. See 42 U. S. C. § 7479(3); 40 CFR § 52.21(j) (2002). EPA represents that permitting authorities “commonly” use top-down methodology. Brief for Respondents 3. Two generators already were fitted with a technology called Fuel Injection Timing Retard that results in a 20% to 30% reduction in nitrogen oxide emissions. App. 75-76, 86. Rather than subject MG-1, MG-3, MG-4, and MG-5 to BACT, ADEC and Comineo “agreed to permit conditions that would require low NOx controls on MG-1, MG-3, MG-4, and MG-5, and emission limits that reflect the previous 'bubbled' limits. Under this approach, the permit would result in no increase in actual or allowable emissions from any of these engines and the installation of BACT would not be necessary for these four units.” Id., at 149. EPA found no cause to question this ADEC-Cominco agreement. Ibid. At oral argument, counsel for EPA confirmed that the Agency no longer questions the Court of Appeals’ adjudicatory authority, satisfied that the finality requirement was met because the stop-construction order imposed “new legal obligations on Cominco.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 43-44 (punctuation omitted). Such an action would lie in district court, under 42 U. S. C. § 7413(b). Formulations similar to the BACT definition’s “maximum degree of [pollutant] reduction . . . achievable” appear in the Act’s standards for new sources in nonattainment areas, 42 U. S. C. §§7501(3) and 7503(a)(2) (“lowest achievable emission rate” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and its technology-based standard for hazardous emissions, § 7412(d)(2) (“maximum degree of reduction ... achievable”). The dissent admonishes that “a statute is to be read as a whole.” Post, at 504 (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991)). We give that unexceptional principle effect by attending both to the unequivocal grant of supervisory authority to EPA in §§ 113(a)(5) and 167, and to the statutory control on permitting authorities’ discretion contained in the BACT definition, 42 U. S. C. §7479(3). It is, moreover, “a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001)). The Act instructs permitting authorities to identify the “best,” “maximum” emission reduction technique, taking account of costs. 42 U. S. C. § 7479(3). The dissent does not explain how that instruction can be construed as something other than a constraint on permitting authorities’ discretion. Ultimately, the dissent recognizes the essential statutory requirement: selection of “the technology that can best reduce pollution within practical constraints.” Post, at 505 (emphasis added). Nor do we find enlightening Congress’ inclusion of the word “determines” in the BACT definition. Post, at 503-504. Even under the dissent’s view of the Act, state permitting authorities’ BACT determinations are not “conclusiv[eJ and authoritativ[e].” Post, at 504 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the dissent develops at length, review of such BACT determinations may be sought in state court. Post, at 509-512; Alaska Stat. § 44.62.560 (2002). And EPA actions, of course, are subject to “the process of judicial review,” post, at 503, Congress empowered federal courts to provide, here in 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b)(1). See supra, at 482-483. According to the Agency, “[i]t has proven to be relatively rare that a state agency has put EPA in the position of having to exercise [its] authority,” noting that only two other reported judicial decisions concern EPA orders occasioned by States’ faulty BACT determinations. Brief for Respondents 30, and n. 9 (citing Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F. 3d 312 (CA6 1994), and Solar Turbines Inc. v. Seif, 879 F. 2d 1073 (CA3 1989)). EPA’s restrained and moderate use of its authority hardly supports the dissent’s speculation that the federal Agency will “displac[e]” or “degrad[e]” state agencies or relegate them to the performance of “ministerial” functions. Post, at 516, 518. Nor has EPA ever asserted authority to override a state-court judgment. Cf. post, at 511. Preclusion principles, we note in this regard, unquestionably do apply against the United States, its agencies and officers. See, e. g., Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147 (1979). From the availability of state-court judicial review, the dissent concludes, it necessarily “follows that EPA ... must take the same procedural steps,” of filing suit in state court, as any other person or entity seeking to challenge the issuance of a PSD permit. Post, at 509. Interpreted otherwise, the dissent asserts, the Act contains a “loophole” that allows an EPA “end run around the State’s process.” Post, at 511. In designing the Act, however, Congress often gave EPA a choice of enforcement measures. For example, EPA has three options to address a failure to comply with new source requirements. Compare' 42 U. S. C. § 7413(a)(5)(A) (EPA may “issue an order prohibiting the construction or modification of any major stationary source”) with § 7413(a)(5)(B) (EPA may “issue an administrative penalty order”) and § 7413(a)(5)(C) (EPA may “bring a civil action”). Other sections of the Act provide EPA with similar options. See, e.g., §§7413(a)(lM3). Following the dissent’s logic, EPA’s authority to bring a civil action would rule out, as a “loophole,” its authority to issue a stop-construction order. Moreover, the existence of concurrent authority is hardly at odds with the Act. As ADEC itself concedes, EPA can issue a checking order if a PSD permit lacks a BACT determination, Brief for Petitioner 34, even if state-court jurisdiction could be invoked instead. Experience, we have already noted, see supra, at 490, n. 14, affords no grounding for the dissent’s predictions that EPA oversight, which is undeniably subject to federal-court review, will “rewor[k]. . . the balance between State and Federal Governments” and threaten state courts’ independence. Post, at 511-512. “[Ljooking for the burden of pleading is not a foolproof guide to the allocation of the burdens of proof. The latter burdens do not invariably follow the pleadings.” 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §337, pp. 411-412 (5th ed. 1999). No “single principle or rule . . . solve[s] all cases and afford[s] a general test for ascertaining the incidence” of proof burdens. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2486, p. 288 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981) (emphasis deleted). “[I]n a case of first impression,” which we address today, “reference to which party has pleaded a fact is no help at all.” 2 McCormick, supra, §337, at 412. Among other considerations, allocations of burdens of production and persuasion may depend on which party — plaintiff or defendant, petitioner or respondent — has made the “affirmative allegation” or “presumably has peculiar means of knowledge.” 9 Wigmore, supra, § 2486, at 288, 290 (emphases deleted); accord Campbell v. United States, 365 U. S. 85, 96 (1961). The Court of Appeals referred to 42 U. S. C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) when it considered whether EPA’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 298 F. 3d 814, 822 (CA9 2002). Section 7607(d)(9), however, applies only to the “subsection” concerning rulemaking in which it is embedded. Cf. Chevron V. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 853-859 (1984) (upholding EPA regulations allowing States to treat all pollutant-emitting devices within the same stationary source in a nonattainment area as though encased in a single “bubble”). The May 4, 1999, draft permit considered whether adding Low NOx to seven generators would result in lower emissions than adding SCR to only two and choosing one of the latter as a standby unit. App. 86-87. Before December 10, 1999, however, Comineo agreed to install Low NOx controls on four of the mine’s six existing generators — MG-1, MG-3, MG-4, and MG-5 — in order to increase use of those generators without exceeding the 1994 PSD permit’s operating restriction. Id., at 149. Having agreed to use Low NOx on four generators, Comineo could propose in the December 10, 1999, permit only the addition of Low NOx to two generators — MG-2 and MG-6 — to offset increases in emissions from MG-17. No facts in the record support any suggestion that addition of Low NOx to three generators, MG-2, MG-6, and MG-17, would result in lower aggregate emissions than the addition of SCR to MG-17 alone. The dissent is daunted by the hypothesis that “[bjecause there can always be an additional procedure to ensure that the preceding process was followed,” the State “may never reach” the goal of issuing a permit. Post, at 515 (“The majority creates a sort of Zeno’s paradox for state agencies.”). Again, the dissent can point to no instance in which EPA has indulged in any piling of process upon process. See supra, at 493, n. 16.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Adrian MONCRIEFFE, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General. No. 11-702. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Oct. 10, 2012. Decided April 23, 2013. Thomas C. Goldstein, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Pratik A. Shah, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Pamela S. Karlan, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford Law School, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Stanford, CA, Angel L. Arias, Arias Law Group, P.A., Hollywood, FL, Thomas C. Goldstein, Counsel of Record, Kevin K. Russell, Amy Howe, Tejinder Singh, Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Pratik A. Shah, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Donald E. Keener, W. Manning Evans, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., provides that a noncitizen who has been convicted of an " aggravated felony" may be deported from this country. The INA also prohibits the Attorney General from granting discretionary relief from removal to an aggravated felon, no matter how compelling his case. Among the crimes that are classified as aggravated felonies, and thus lead to these harsh consequences, are illicit drug trafficking offenses. We must decide whether this category includes a state criminal statute that extends to the social sharing of a small amount of marijuana. We hold it does not. I A The INA allows the Government to deport various classes of noncitizens, such as those who overstay their visas, and those who are convicted of certain crimes while in the United States, including drug offenses. § 1227. Ordinarily, when a noncitizen is found to be deportable on one of these grounds, he may ask the Attorney General for certain forms of discretionary relief from removal, like asylum (if he has a well-founded fear of persecution in his home country) and cancellation of removal (if, among other things, he has been lawfully present in the United States for a number of years). §§ 1158, 1229b. But if a noncitizen has been convicted of one of a narrower set of crimes classified as "aggravated felonies," then he is not only deportable, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), but also ineligible for these discretionary forms of relief. See §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i); §§ 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C). The INA defines "aggravated felony" to include a host of offenses. § 1101(a)(43). Among them is "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance." § 1101(a)(43)(B). This general term is not defined, but the INA states that it "includ[es] a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18 )." Ibid. In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) defines "drug trafficking crime" to mean "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act," or two other statutes not relevant here. The chain of definitions ends with § 3559(a)(5), which provides that a "felony" is an offense for which the "maximum term of imprisonment authorized" is "more than one year." The upshot is that a noncitizen's conviction of an offense that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment will be counted as an "aggravated felony" for immigration purposes. A conviction under either state or federal law may qualify, but a "state offense constitutes a 'felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act' only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law." Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006). B Petitioner Adrian Moncrieffe is a Jamaican citizen who came to the United States legally in 1984, when he was three. During a 2007 traffic stop, police found 1.3 grams of marijuana in his car. This is the equivalent of about two or three marijuana cigarettes. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of Ga.Code Ann. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2007). Under a Georgia statute providing more lenient treatment to first-time offenders, § 42-8-60(a) (1997), the trial court withheld entering a judgment of conviction or imposing any term of imprisonment, and instead required that Moncrieffe complete five years of probation, after which his charge will be expunged altogether. App. to Brief for Petitioner 11-15. Alleging that this Georgia conviction constituted an aggravated felony, the Federal Government sought to deport Moncrieffe. The Government reasoned that possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is an offense under the CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), punishable by up to five years' imprisonment, § 841(b)(1)(D), and thus an aggravated felony. An Immigration Judge agreed and ordered Moncrieffe removed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a-18a. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed that conclusion on appeal. Id., at 10a-13a. The Court of Appeals denied Moncrieffe's petition for review. The court rejected Moncrieffe's reliance upon § 841(b)(4), a provision that, in effect, makes marijuana distribution punishable only as a misdemeanor if the offense involves a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration. It held that in a federal criminal prosecution, "the default sentencing range for a marijuana distribution offense is the CSA's felony provision, § 841(b)(1)(D), rather than the misdemeanor provision." 662 F.3d 387, 392 (C.A.5 2011). Because Moncrieffe's Georgia offense penalized possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the court concluded that it was "equivalent to a federal felony." Ibid. We granted certiorari, 566 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1857, 182 L.Ed.2d 642 (2012), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals with respect to whether a conviction under a statute that criminalizes conduct described by both § 841's felony provision and its misdemeanor provision, such as a statute that punishes all marijuana distribution without regard to the amount or remuneration, is a conviction for an offense that "proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under" the CSA. Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625. We now reverse. II A When the Government alleges that a state conviction qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under the INA, we generally employ a "categorical approach" to determine whether the state offense is comparable to an offense listed in the INA. See, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33-38, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009) ; Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185-187, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). Under this approach we look "not to the facts of the particular prior case," but instead to whether "the state statute defining the crime of conviction" categorically fits within the "generic" federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony. Id., at 186, 127 S.Ct. 815 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) ). By "generic," we mean the offenses must be viewed in the abstract, to see whether the state statute shares the nature of the federal offense that serves as a point of comparison. Accordingly, a state offense is a categorical match with a generic federal offense only if a conviction of the state offense " 'necessarily' involved ... facts equating to [the] generic [federal offense]." Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) (plurality opinion). Whether the noncitizen's actual conduct involved such facts "is quite irrelevant." United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (C.A.2 1939) (L. Hand, J.). Because we examine what the state conviction necessarily involved, not the facts underlying the case, we must presume that the conviction " rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts" criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) ; see Guarino, 107 F.2d, at 400. But this rule is not without qualification. First, our cases have addressed state statutes that contain several different crimes, each described separately, and we have held that a court may determine which particular offense the noncitizen was convicted of by examining the charging document and jury instructions, or in the case of a guilty plea, the plea agreement, plea colloquy, or " 'some comparable judicial record' of the factual basis for the plea." Nijhawan, 557 U.S., at 35, 129 S.Ct. 2294 (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S., at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254). Second, our focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute is not an invitation to apply "legal imagination" to the state offense; there must be "a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime." Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S., at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. This categorical approach has a long pedigree in our Nation's immigration law. See Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1669, 1688-1702, 1749-1752 (2011) (tracing judicial decisions back to 1913). The reason is that the INA asks what offense the noncitizen was "convicted" of, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), not what acts he committed. "[C]onviction" is "the relevant statutory hook." Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. ----, ----, 130 S.Ct. 2577, 2588, 177 L.Ed.2d 68 (2010); see United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 862 (C.A.2 1914). B The aggravated felony at issue here, "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance," is a "generic crim[e]." Nijhawan, 557 U.S., at 37, 129 S.Ct. 2294. So the categorical approach applies. Ibid. As we have explained, supra, at 1682 - 1683, this aggravated felony encompasses all state offenses that "proscrib[e] conduct punishable as a felony under [the CSA]." Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625. In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct. Moncrieffe was convicted under a Georgia statute that makes it a crime to "possess, have under [one's] control, manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, administer, purchase, sell, or possess with intent to distribute marijuana." Ga.Code Ann. § 16-13-30(j)(1). We know from his plea agreement that Moncrieffe was convicted of the last of these offenses. App. to Brief for Petitioner 11; Shepard, 544 U.S., at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254. We therefore must determine whether possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is "necessarily" conduct punishable as a felony under the CSA. We begin with the relevant conduct criminalized by the CSA. There is no question that it is a federal crime to "possess with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled substance," 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one of which is marijuana, § 812(c). So far, the state and federal provisions correspond. But this is not enough, because the generically defined federal crime is "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act," 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), not just any "offense under the CSA." Thus we must look to what punishment the CSA imposes for this offense. Section 841 is divided into two subsections that are relevant here: (a), titled "Unlawful acts," which includes the offense just described, and (b), titled "Penalties." Subsection (b) tells us how "any person who violates subsection (a)" shall be punished, depending on the circumstances of his crime (e.g., the type and quantity of controlled substance involved, whether it is a repeat offense). Subsection (b)(1)(D) provides that if a person commits a violation of subsection (a) involving "less than 50 kilograms of marihuana," then "such person shall, except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years," i.e., as a felon. But one of the exceptions is important here. Paragraph (4) provides, "Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D) of this subsection, any person who violates subsection (a) of this section by distributing a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration shall be treated as" a simple drug possessor, 21 U.S.C. § 844, which for our purposes means as a misdemeanant. These dovetailing provisions create two mutually exclusive categories of punishment for CSA marijuana distribution offenses: one a felony, and one not. The only way to know whether a marijuana distribution offense is "punishable as a felony" under the CSA, Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, is to know whether the conditions described in paragraph (4) are present or absent. A conviction under the same Georgia statute for "sell[ing]" marijuana, for example, would seem to establish remuneration. The presence of remuneration would mean that paragraph (4) is not implicated, and thus that the conviction is necessarily for conduct punishable as a felony under the CSA (under paragraph (1)(D)). In contrast, the fact of a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, standing alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana was involved. It is possible neither was; we know that Georgia prosecutes this offense when a defendant possesses only a small amount of marijuana, see, e.g., Taylor v. State, 260 Ga.App. 890, 581 S.E.2d 386, 388 (2003) (6.6 grams), and that "distribution" does not require remuneration, see, e.g., Hadden v. State, 181 Ga.App. 628, 628-629, 353 S.E.2d 532, 533-534 (1987). So Moncrieffe's conviction could correspond to either the CSA felony or the CSA misdemeanor. Ambiguity on this point means that the conviction did not "necessarily" involve facts that correspond to an offense punishable as a felony under the CSA. Under the categorical approach, then, Moncrieffe was not convicted of an aggravated felony. III A The Government advances a different approach that leads to a different result. In its view, § 841(b)(4)'s misdemeanor provision is irrelevant to the categorical analysis because paragraph (4) is merely a "mitigating exception," to the CSA offense, not one of the "elements" of the offense. Brief for Respondent 12. And because possession with intent to distribute marijuana is "presumptive[ly]" a felony under the CSA, the Government asserts, any state offense with the same elements is presumptively an aggravated felony. Id., at 37. These two contentions are related, and we reject both of them. First, the Government reads our cases to hold that the categorical approach is concerned only with the "elements" of an offense, so § 841(b)(4)"is not relevant" to the categorical analysis. Id., at 20. It is enough to satisfy the categorical inquiry, the Government suggests, that the "elements" of Moncrieffe's Georgia offense are the same as those of the CSA offense: (1) possession (2) of marijuana (a controlled substance), (3) with intent to distribute it. But that understanding is inconsistent with Carachuri-Rosendo, our only decision to address both "elements" and "sentencing factors." There we recognized that when Congress has chosen to define the generic federal offense by reference to punishment, it may be necessary to take account of federal sentencing factors too. See 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2581-2582. In that case the relevant CSA offense was simple possession, which "becomes a 'felony punishable under the [CSA]' only because the sentencing factor of recidivism authorizes additional punishment beyond one year, the criterion for a felony." Id., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2590 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). We therefore called the generic federal offense "recidivist simple possession," even though such a crime is not actually "a separate offense" under the CSA, but rather an " 'amalgam' " of offense elements and sentencing factors. Id., at ----, and n. 3, ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2581-2582, and n. 3, 2583-2584 (majority opinion). In other words, not only must the state offense of conviction meet the "elements" of the generic federal offense defined by the INA, but the CSA must punish that offense as a felony. Here, the facts giving rise to the CSA offense establish a crime that may be either a felony or a misdemeanor, depending upon the presence or absence of certain factors that are not themselves elements of the crime. And so to qualify as an aggravated felony, a conviction for the predicate offense must necessarily establish those factors as well. The Government attempts to distinguish Carachuri-Rosendo on the ground that the sentencing factor there was a "narrow" aggravating exception that turned a misdemeanor into a felony, whereas here § 841(b)(4) is a narrow mitigation exception that turns a felony into a misdemeanor. Brief for Respondent 40-43. This argument hinges upon the Government's second assertion: that any marijuana distribution conviction is "presumptively" a felony. But that is simply incorrect, and the Government's argument collapses as a result. Marijuana distribution is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor until we know whether the conditions in paragraph (4) attach: Section 841(b)(1)(D) makes the crime punishable by five years' imprisonment "except as provided" in paragraph (4), and § 841(b)(4) makes it punishable as a misdemeanor "[n]otwithstanding paragraph (1)(D)" when only "a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration" is involved. (Emphasis added.) The CSA's text makes neither provision the default. Rather, each is drafted to be exclusive of the other. Like the BIA and the Fifth Circuit, the Government believes the felony provision to be the default because, in practice, that is how federal criminal prosecutions for marijuana distribution operate. See 662 F.3d, at 391-392; Matter of Aruna, 24 I. & N. Dec. 452, 456-457 (2008) ; Brief for Respondent 18-23. It is true that every Court of Appeals to have considered the question has held that a defendant is eligible for a 5-year sentence under § 841(b)(1)(D) if the Government proves he possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute it, and that the Government need not negate the § 841(b)(4) factors in each case. See, e.g., United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 636-639 (C.A.2 2002) (describing § 841(b)(4) as a "mitigating exception"); United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 670-671 (C.A.4 2003) (collecting cases). Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show that he qualifies for the lesser sentence under § 841(b) (4). Cf. id., at 671. We cannot discount § 841's text, however, which creates no default punishment, in favor of the procedural overlay or burdens of proof that would apply in a hypothetical federal criminal prosecution. In Carachuri-Rosendo, we rejected the Fifth Circuit's " 'hypothetical approach,' " which examined whether conduct " 'could have been punished as a felony' 'had [it] been prosecuted in federal court.' " 560 U.S., at ----, ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2584, 2585-2586. The outcome in a hypothetical prosecution is not the relevant inquiry. Rather, our "more focused, categorical inquiry" is whether the record of conviction of the predicate offense necessarily establishes conduct that the CSA, on its own terms, makes punishable as a felony. Id., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2588-2589. The analogy to a federal prosecution is misplaced for another reason. The Court of Appeals cases the Government cites distinguished between elements and sentencing factors to determine which facts must be proved to a jury, in light of the Sixth Amendment concerns addressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The courts considered which "provision ... states a complete crime upon the fewest facts, " Outen, 286 F.3d, at 638, which was significant after Apprendi to identify what a jury had to find before a defendant could receive § 841(b)(1)(D)'s maximum 5-year sentence. But those concerns do not apply in this context. Here we consider a "generic" federal offense in the abstract, not an actual federal offense being prosecuted before a jury. Our concern is only which facts the CSA relies upon to distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors, not which facts must be found by a jury as opposed to a judge, nor who has the burden of proving which facts in a federal prosecution. Because of these differences, we made clear in Carachuri-Rosendo that, for purposes of the INA, a generic federal offense may be defined by reference to both " 'elements' in the traditional sense" and sentencing factors. 560 U.S., at ----, n. 3, ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2581-2582, and n. 3, 2583-2584; see also id., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2581-2582 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (describing the generic federal offense there as "the Controlled Substances Act felony of possession-plus-recidivism"). Indeed, the distinction between "elements" and "sentencing factors" did not exist when Congress added illicit drug trafficking to the list of aggravated felonies, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4469-4470, and most courts at the time understood both § 841(b)(1)(D) and § 841(b)(4) to contain sentencing factors that draw the line between a felony and a misdemeanor. See, e.g., United States v. Campuzano, 905 F.2d 677, 679 (C.A.2 1990). Carachuri-Rosendo controls here. Finally, there is a more fundamental flaw in the Government's approach: It would render even an undisputed misdemeanor an aggravated felony. This is "just what the English language tells us not to expect," and that leaves us "very wary of the Government's position." Lopez, 549 U.S., at 54, 127 S.Ct. 625. Consider a conviction under a New York statute that provides, "A person is guilty of criminal sale of marihuana in the fifth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully sells, without consideration, [marihuana] of an aggregate weight of two grams or less ; or one cigarette containing marihuana." N.Y. Penal Law Ann. § 221.35 (West 2008) (emphasis added). This statute criminalizes only the distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, and so all convictions under the statute would fit within the CSA misdemeanor provision, § 841(b)(4). But the Government would categorically deem a conviction under this statute to be an aggravated felony, because the statute contains the corresponding "elements" of (1) distributing (2) marijuana, and the Government believes all marijuana distribution offenses are punishable as felonies. The same anomaly would result in the case of a noncitizen convicted of a misdemeanor in federal court under § 841(a) and (b)(4) directly. Even in that case, under the Government's logic, we would need to treat the federal misdemeanor conviction as an aggravated felony, because the conviction establishes elements of an offense that is presumptively a felony. This cannot be. "We cannot imagine that Congress took the trouble to incorporate its own statutory scheme of felonies and misdemeanors," only to have courts presume felony treatment and ignore the very factors that distinguish felonies from misdemeanors. Lopez, 549 U.S., at 58, 127 S.Ct. 625. B Recognizing that its approach leads to consequences Congress could not have intended, the Government hedges its argument by proposing a remedy: Noncitizens should be given an opportunity during immigration proceedings to demonstrate that their predicate marijuana distribution convictions involved only a small amount of marijuana and no remuneration, just as a federal criminal defendant could do at sentencing. Brief for Respondent 35-39. This is the procedure adopted by the BIA in Matter of Castro Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 698, 702 (2012), and endorsed by Justice ALITO's dissent, post, at 1701 - 1702. This solution is entirely inconsistent with both the INA's text and the categorical approach. As noted, the relevant INA provisions ask what the noncitizen was "convicted of," not what he did, and the inquiry in immigration proceedings is limited accordingly. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a)(3) ; see Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2585-2586. The Government cites no statutory authority for such case-specific factfinding in immigration court, and none is apparent in the INA. Indeed, the Government's main categorical argument would seem to preclude this inquiry: If the Government were correct that "the fact of a marijuana-distribution conviction alone constitutes a CSA felony," Brief for Respondent 37, then all marijuana distribution convictions would categorically be convictions of the drug trafficking aggravated felony, mandatory deportation would follow under the statute, and there would be no room for the Government's follow-on factfinding procedure. The Government cannot have it both ways. Moreover, the procedure the Government envisions would require precisely the sort of post hoc investigation into the facts of predicate offenses that we have long deemed undesirable. The categorical approach serves "practical" purposes: It promotes judicial and administrative efficiency by precluding the relitigation of past convictions in minitrials conducted long after the fact. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 125, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) ; see also Mylius, 210 F., at 862-863. Yet the Government's approach would have our Nation's overburdened immigration courts entertain and weigh testimony from, for example, the friend of a noncitizen who may have shared a marijuana cigarette with him at a party, or the local police officer who recalls to the contrary that cash traded hands. And, as a result, two noncitizens, each "convicted of" the same offense, might obtain different aggravated felony determinations depending on what evidence remains available or how it is perceived by an individual immigration judge. The categorical approach was designed to avoid this "potential unfairness." Taylor, 495 U.S., at 601, 110 S.Ct. 2143; see also Mylius, 210 F., at 863. Furthermore, the minitrials the Government proposes would be possible only if the noncitizen could locate witnesses years after the fact, notwithstanding that during removal proceedings noncitizens are not guaranteed legal representation and are often subject to mandatory detention, § 1226(c)(1)(B), where they have little ability to collect evidence. See Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 3, 5-10 (2008) ; Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 5-18; Brief for Immigration Law Professors as Amici Curiae 27-32. A noncitizen in removal proceedings is not at all similarly situated to a defendant in a federal criminal prosecution. The Government's suggestion that the CSA's procedures could readily be replicated in immigration proceedings is therefore misplaced. Cf. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2587-2588 (rejecting the Government's argument that procedures governing determination of the recidivism sentencing factor could "be satisfied during the immigration proceeding"). The Government defends its proposed immigration court proceedings as "a subsequent step outside the categorical approach in light of Section 841(b)(4)'s 'circumstance-specific' nature." Brief for Respondent 37. This argument rests upon Nijhawan, in which we considered another aggravated felony, "an offense that ... involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (i). We held that the $10,000 threshold was not to be applied categorically as a required component of a generic offense, but instead called for a " circumstance-specific approach" that allows for an examination, in immigration court, of the "particular circumstances in which an offender committed the crime on a particular occasion." Nijhawan, 557 U.S., at 38-40, 129 S.Ct. 2294. The Government suggests the § 841(b)(4) factors are like the monetary threshold, and thus similarly amenable to a circumstance-specific inquiry. We explained in Nijhawan, however, that unlike the provision there, "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance" is a "generic crim[e]" to which the categorical approach applies, not a circumstance-specific provision. Id., at 37, 129 S.Ct. 2294; see also Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, n. 11, 130 S.Ct., at 2586-2587 n. 11. That distinction is evident in the structure of the INA. The monetary threshold is a limitation, written into the INA itself, on the scope of the aggravated felony for fraud. And the monetary threshold is set off by the words "in which," which calls for a circumstance-specific examination of "the conduct involved 'in ' the commission of the offense of conviction." Nijhawan, 557 U.S., at 39, 129 S.Ct. 2294. Locating this exception in the INA proper suggests an intent to have the relevant facts found in immigration proceedings. But where, as here, the INA incorporates other criminal statutes wholesale, we have held it "must refer to generic crimes," to which the categorical approach applies. Id., at 37, 129 S.Ct. 2294. Finally, the Government suggests that the immigration court's task would not be so daunting in some cases, such as those in which a noncitizen was convicted under the New York statute previously discussed or convicted directly under § 841(b)(4). True, in those cases, the record of conviction might reveal on its face that the predicate offense was punishable only as a misdemeanor. But most States do not have stand-alone offenses for the social sharing of marijuana, so minitrials concerning convictions from the other States, such as Georgia, would be inevitable. The Government suggests that even in these other States, the record of conviction may often address the § 841(b)(4) factors, because noncitizens "will be advised of the immigration consequences of a conviction," as defense counsel is required to do under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), and as a result counsel can build an appropriate record when the facts are fresh. Brief for Respondent 38. Even assuming defense counsel "will" do something simply because it is required of effective counsel (an assumption experience does not always bear out), this argument is unavailing because there is no reason to believe that state courts will regularly or uniformly admit evidence going to facts, such as remuneration, that are irrelevant to the offense charged. In short, to avoid the absurd consequences that would flow from the Government's narrow understanding of the categorical approach, the Government proposes a solution that largely undermines the categorical approach. That the only cure is worse than the disease suggests the Government is simply wrong. C The Government fears the consequences of our decision, but its concerns are exaggerated. The Government observes that, like Georgia, about half the States criminalize marijuana distribution through statutes that do not require remuneration or any minimum quantity of marijuana. Id., at 26-28. As a result, the Government contends, noncitizens convicted of marijuana distribution offenses in those States will avoid "aggravated felony" determinations, purely because their convictions do not resolve whether their offenses involved federal felony conduct or misdemeanor conduct, even though many (if not most) prosecutions involve either remuneration or larger amounts of marijuana (or both). Escaping aggravated felony treatment does not mean escaping deportation, though. It means only avoiding mandatory removal. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2589. Any marijuana distribution offense, even a misdemeanor, will still render a noncitizen deportable as a controlled substances offender. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). At that point, having been found not to be an aggravated felon, the noncitizen may seek relief from removal such as asylum or cancellation of removal, assuming he satisfies the other eligibility criteria. §§ 1158(b), 1229b(a)(1)-(2). But those forms of relief are discretionary. The Attorney General may, in his discretion, deny relief if he finds that the noncitizen is actually a member of one "of the world's most dangerous drug cartels," post, at 1696 (opinion of ALITO, J.), just as he may deny relief if he concludes the negative equities outweigh the positive equities of the noncitizen's case for other reasons. As a result, "to the extent that our rejection of the Government's broad understanding of the scope of 'aggravated felony' may have any practical effect on policing our Nation's borders, it is a limited one." Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2589. In any event, serious drug traffickers may be adjudicated aggravated felons regardless, because they will likely be convicted under greater "trafficking" offenses that necessarily establish that more than a small amount of marijuana was involved. See, e.g., Ga.Code Ann. § 16-13-31(c)(1) (Supp.2012) (separate provision for trafficking in more than 10 pounds of marijuana). Of course, some offenders' conduct will fall between § 841(b)(4) conduct and the more serious conduct required to trigger a "trafficking" statute. Brief for Respondent 30. Those offenders may avoid aggravated felony status by operation of the categorical approach. But the Government's objection to that underinclusive result is little more than an attack on the categorical approach itself. We prefer this degree of imperfection to the heavy burden of relitigating old prosecutions. See supra, at 1690 - 1691. And we err on the side of underinclusiveness because ambiguity in criminal statutes referenced by the INA must be construed in the noncitizen's favor. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2589 ; Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11, n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004). Finally, the Government suggests that our holding will frustrate the enforcement of other aggravated felony provisions, like § 1101(a)(43)(C), which refers to a federal firearms statute that contains an exception for "antique firearm[s]," 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). The Government fears that a conviction under any state firearms law that lacks such an exception will be deemed to fail the categorical inquiry. But Duenas-Alvarez requires that there be "a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime." 549 U.S., at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. To defeat the categorical comparison in this manner, a noncitizen would have to demonstrate that the State actually prosecutes the relevant offense in cases involving antique firearms. Further, the Government points to § 1101 (a)(43)(P), which makes passport fraud an aggravated felony, except when the noncitizen shows he committed the offense to assist an immediate family member. But that exception is provided in the INA itself. As we held in Nijhawan, a circumstance-specific inquiry would apply to that provision, so it is not comparable. 557 U.S., at 37-38, 129 S.Ct. 2294. * * * This is the third time in seven years that we have considered whether the Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance," and thus an "aggravated felony." Once again we hold that the Government's approach defies "the 'commonsense conception' " of these terms. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2584-2585 (quoting Lopez, 549 U.S., at 53, 127 S.Ct. 625). Sharing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, let alone possession with intent to do so, "does not fit easily into the 'everyday understanding' " of "trafficking," which " 'ordinarily ... means some sort of commercial dealing.' " Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2584-2585 (quoting Lopez, 549 U.S., at 53-54, 127 S.Ct. 625). Nor is it sensible that a state statute that criminalizes conduct that the CSA treats as a misdemeanor should be designated an "aggravated felony." We hold that it may not be. If a noncitizen's conviction for a marijuana distribution offense fails to establish that the offense involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, the conviction is not for an aggravated felony under the INA. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. In addition to asylum, a noncitizen who fears persecution may seek withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, p. 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; 8 CFR § 1208.17(a) (2012). These forms of relief require the noncitizen to show a greater likelihood of persecution or torture at home than is necessary for asylum, but the Attorney General has no discretion to deny relief to a noncitizen who establishes his eligibility. A conviction of an aggravated felony has no effect on CAT eligibility, but will render a noncitizen ineligible for withholding of removal if he "has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years" for any aggravated felonies. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). The parties agree that this resolution of Moncrieffe's Georgia case is nevertheless a "conviction" as the INA defines that term, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). See Brief for Petitioner 6, n. 2; Brief for Respondent 5, n. 2. Compare 662 F.3d 387 (C.A.5 2011) (case below), Garcia v. Holder, 638 F.3d 511 (C.A.6 2011) (is an aggravated felony), and Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30 (C.A.1 2008) (same), with Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113 (C.A.2 2008) (is not an aggravated felony), and Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377 (C.A.3 2003) (same). Carachuri-Rosendo construed a different provision of the INA that concerns cancellation of removal, which also requires determining whether the noncitizen has been "convicted of any aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (emphasis added). Our analysis is the same in both contexts. In full, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) provides, "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally- "(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance...." In pertinent part, § 841(b)(1)(D) and (b)(4) (2006 ed. and Supp. V) provide, "Except as otherwise provided in section 849, 859, 860, or 861 of this title, any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows: . . . . . "[ (1) ](D) In the case of less than 50 kilograms of marihuana, except in the case of 50 or more marihuana plants regardless of weight, 10 kilograms of hashish, or one kilogram of hashish oil, such person shall, except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years, a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with the provisions of title 18 or $250,000 if the defendant is an individual or $1,000,000 if the defendant is other than an individual, or both.... . . . . . "(4) Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D) of this subsection, any person who violates subsection (a) of this section by distributing a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration shall be treated as provided in section 844 of this title and section 3607 of title 18." Although paragraph (4) speaks only of "distributing" marijuana, the parties agree that it also applies to "the more inchoate offense of possession with intent to distribute that drug." Matter of Castro Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 698, 699, n. 2 (BIA 2012) ; see Brief for Petitioner 6, n. 2; Brief for Respondent 8, n. 5. The CSA does not define "small amount." The BIA has suggested that 30 grams "serve[s] as a useful guidepost," Castro Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec., at 703, noting that the INA exempts from deportable controlled substances offenses "a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana," 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The meaning of "small amount" is not at issue in this case, so we need not, and do not, define the term. Justice ALITO states that the statute "obviously" requires examination of whether "conduct associated with the state offense ... would have supported a qualifying conviction under the federal CSA." Post, at 1697 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added); see also post, at 1699. But this echoes the Fifth Circuit's approach in Carachuri-Rosendo . As noted in the text, our opinion explicitly rejected such reasoning based on conditional perfect formulations. See also, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2588-2589 (criticizing approach that "focuses on facts known to the immigration court that could have but did not serve as the basis for the state conviction and punishment" (emphasis altered)). Instead, as we have explained, supra, at 1687 - 1688, our holding depended upon the fact that Carachuri-Rosendo's conviction did not establish the fact necessary to distinguish between misdemeanor and felony punishment under the CSA. The same is true here. The Government also cites 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1), which provides that the Government need not "negative any exemption or exception set forth" in the CSA, and instead "the burden of going forward with the evidence with respect to any such exemption or exception shall be upon the person claiming its benefit." Brief for Respondent 21. Even assuming § 841(b)(4) is such an "exception," § 885(a)(1) applies, by its own terms, only to "any trial, hearing, or other proceeding under" the CSA itself, not to the rather different proceedings under the INA. In addition to New York, it appears that 13 other States have separate offenses for § 841(b)(4) conduct. See Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11360(b) (West Supp.2013); Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18-18-406(5) (2012) ; Fla. Stat. § 893.13(2)(b)(3) (2010) ; Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, §§ 550/3, 550/4, 550/6 (West 2010); Iowa Code § 124.410 (2009); Minn.Stat. § 152.027(4)(a) (2010) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-22(E) (Supp.2011); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2925.03(C)(3)(h) ( Lexis 2012 Cum.Supp.); Ore.Rev.Stat. § 475.860(3) (2011); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 780-113(a)(31) (Purdon Supp.2012); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-42-7 (Supp.2012); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.120(b)(1) (West 2010); W. Va.Code Ann. § 60A-4-402(c) (Lexis 2010). Similarly, Justice ALITO's dissent suggests that he disagrees with the first premises of the categorical approach. He says it is a "strange and disruptive resul[t]" that "defendants convicted in different States for committing the same criminal conduct" might suffer different collateral consequences depending upon how those States define their statutes of conviction. Post, at 9. Yet that is the longstanding, natural result of the categorical approach, which focuses not on the criminal conduct a defendant "commit[s]," but rather what facts are necessarily established by a conviction for the state offense. Different state offenses will necessarily establish different facts. Some will track the "uniform" federal definition of the generic offense, and some will not. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). Whatever disparity this may create as between defendants whose real-world conduct was the same, it ensures that all defendants whose convictions establish the same facts will be treated consistently, and thus predictably, under federal law. This was Taylor 's chief concern in adopting the categorical approach. See id., at 599-602, 110 S.Ct. 2143.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORTH AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al. No. 410. Argued March 6-7, 1956. Decided April 23, 1956. Howard, C. Westwood argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was J. Randolph Wilson. Walter J. Derenberg argued the cause for North American Airlines, Inc., respondent. With him on the brief was Hardy K. Maclay. Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Barnes, Daniel M. Friedman, Franklin M. Stone, O. D. Ozment and Gerald F. Krassa filed a brief for the Civil Aeronautics Board, respondent. Mr. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Court. Twentieth Century Airlines, Inc., was issued a letter of registration as a large irregular air carrier by the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1947. For some reason, beginning in 1951 it conducted its business under the name of North American Airlines. On March 3, 1952, it amended its articles of incorporation so as legally to change its name to North American Airlines, Inc. By letter dated March 11, 1952, it requested the C. A. B. to reissue its letter of registration in the new corporate name. The Board took no action on that request, but rather, in August 1952, adopted an Economic Regulation requiring every irregular carrier after November 15, 1952, to do business in the name in which its letter of registration was issued. 14 CFR § 291.28. The Board explained that under the Regulation it would allow continued use of a different name to which good will had become attached, except where use of such name constitutes a violation of § 411 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 1003, as amended, 66 Stat. 628, 49 U. S. C. § 491, which prohibits unfair or deceptive commercial practices and unfair methods of competition. 17 Fed. Reg. 7809. On October 6, 1952, respondent applied for permission to continue use of its name, “North American Airlines.” Petitioner, American Airlines, on October 17, 1952, filed a memorandum with the Board requesting denial of North American’s application for the reasons, among others, that use of the name “North American” infringed upon its long-established trade name, “American,” and constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of § 411 of the Act. The Board, as authorized by § 411, on its own motion instituted an investigation and hearing into whether there was a violation of § 411 by North American. It consolidated with that proceeding an investigation and hearing into the matter of North American’s application for change of name in its letter of registration. American was granted leave to intervene in the consolidated proceeding. After extensive hearings, the Board found that respondent’s use of the name “North American” in the air transportation industry, in which it competed with American, had caused “substantial public confusion,” which was “likely to continue” and which constituted “an unfair or deceptive practice and an unfair method of competition within the meaning of Section 411.” Docket Nos. 5774 and 5928 (Nov. 4, 1953), 14-15 (mimeo). It found that the public interest required elimination of the use of the name, and accordingly it denied the application of North American and ordered it to “cease and desist from engaging in air transportation under the name ‘North American Airlines, Inc.,’ ‘North American Airlines,’ ‘North American,’ or any combination of the word ‘American.’ ” Id., at 15-16. On petition for review by North American, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside the Board’s order. 97 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 228 F. 2d 432. American, having been admitted as a party below by intervention, sought, and we granted, certiorari. 350 U. S. 894. As we understand its opinion, the Court of Appeals set aside the order because the public interest in this proceeding was inadequate to justify exercise of the Board’s jurisdiction under § 411. Although the court was critical of the finding of “substantial public confusion,” it did not, on its disposition of the. case, expressly disturb that or any other of the Board’s findings. For the purposes of review here, we will accept the findings, and there is no cause for this Court to review the evidence. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, has no application in the present posture of the case before us. The questions then presented are whether confusion between the parties’ trade names justified a proceeding by the Board to protect the public and whether the kind of confusion found by the Board could support a conclusion of a violation of the statute by respondent. This is a case of first impression under § 411. That section provides that “The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint ... if it considers that such action by it would be in the interest of the public, investigate and determine whether any air carrier . . . has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation or the sale thereof.” If the Board finds that the carrier is so engaged, “it shall order such air carrier ... to cease and desist from such practices or methods of competition.” Section 411 was modeled closely after § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which similarly prohibits “unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and provides for issuance of a complaint “if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it . . . would be to the interest of the public.” 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45. We may profitably look to judicial interpretation of § 5 as an aid in the resolution of the questions raised here under § 411. It should be noted at the outset that a finding as to the “interest of the public” under both § 411 and § 5 is not a prerequisite to the issuance of a cease and desist order as such. Rather, consideration of the public interest is made a condition upon the assumption of jurisdiction by the agency to investigate trade practices and methods of competition and determine whether or not they are unfair. Thus, this Court has held that, under § 5, the Federal Trade Commission may not employ its powers to vindicate private rights and that whether or not the facts, on complaint or as developed, show the public interest to be sufficiently “specific and substantial” to authorize a proceeding by the Commission is a question subject to judicial review. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19. See also Federal Trade Comm’n v. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U. S. 304; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U. S. 212. In the Klesner case, two District of Columbia retailers, with a long history of acrimonious personal and business relations, were both operating stores called the “Shade Shop.” This Court held that the public interest merely in resolving their private unfair competition dispute would not justify the Commission in issuing a complaint. The courts of law are open to competitors for the settlement of their private legal rights, one against the other. The Board, under a mandate from Congress, is charged with the protection of the public interest as affected by practices of carriers in the field of air transportation. In exercising our function of review of the Board’s jurisdiction to protect the public interest by a proceeding which may be generated from facts also giving rise to a private dispute, we must take account of the significant differences between § 5 and § 411. Section 5 is concerned with purely private business enterprises which cover the full spectrum of economic activity. On the other hand, the air carriers here conduct their business under a regulated system of limited competition. The business so conducted is of especial and essential concern to the public, as is true of all common carriers and public utilities. Finally, Congress has committed the regulation of this industry to an administrative agency of special competence that deals only with the problems of the industry. The practices of the competitors here clashed in a field where Congress was specifically concerned to protect the public interest. Demonstrated confusion of the public as to the origin of major air transportation services may be of obvious national public concern. The criteria which the Board employed to determine whether the confusion here created a problem of concern to the public are contained in the following quotation from its report: “. . . the record is convincing that the public interest requires this action in order to prevent further public confusion between respondent and intervenor due to similarity of names. The maintenance of high standards in dealing with the public is expected of common carriers, and the public has a right to be free of the inconveniences which flow from confusion between carriers engaging in the transportation of persons by air. The speed of air travel may well be diminished when passengers check in for flights with the wrong carrier, or attempt to retrieve baggage from the wrong carrier, or attempt to purchase transportation from the wrong carrier, or direct their inquiries to the wrong carrier. Friends, relatives or business associates planning to meet passengers or seeking information on delayed arrivals are subject to annoyance or worse when confused as to the carrier involved. The proper handling of complaints from members of the public is impeded by confusion as to the carrier to whom the complaint should be presented. The transportation itself may differ from what the confused purchaser had anticipated (e. g., in terms of equipment), even though the time and place of arrival may be about the same. It is obvious that public confusion between air carriers operating between the same cities is adverse to the public interest . . . Docket Nos. 5774 and 5928 (Nov. 4, 1953), 12-13 (mimeo). Under § 411 it is the Board that speaks in the public interest. We do not sit to determine independently what is the public interest in matters of this kind, committed as they are to the judgment of the Board. We decide only whether, in determining what is the public interest, the Board has stayed within its jurisdiction and applied criteria appropriate to that determination. The Board has done that in the instant case. Considerations of the high standards required of common carriers in dealing with the public, convenience of the traveling public, speed and efficiency in air transport, and protection of reliance on a carrier’s equipment are all criteria which the Board in its judgment may properly employ to determine whether the public interest justifies use of its powers under § 411. It is argued that respondent’s use of the name “North American” cannot amount to an unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition authorizing the Board’s order within § 411. “Unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition,” as used in § 411, are broader concepts than the common-law idea of unfair competition. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Keppel & Bro., Inc., supra; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 648. The section is concerned not with punishment of wrongdoing or protection of injured competitors, but rather with protection of the public interest. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Klesner, supra, at 27-28. The courts have held, in construing § 5 of the Trade Commission Act, that the use of a trade name that is similar to that of a competitor, which has the capacity to confuse or deceive the public, may be prohibited by the Commission. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67; Juvenile Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 289 F. 57. And see Pep Boys — Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 122 F. 2d 158, where the confusing name was not that of any competitor. The Board found that respondent knowingly adopted a trade name that might well cause confusion. But it made no findings that the use of the name was intentionally deceptive or fraudulent or that the competitor, American Airlines, was injured thereby. Such findings are not required of the Trade Commission under § 5, and there is no reason to require them of the Civil Aeronautics Board under § 411. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Algoma Lumber Co., supra, at 81; Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 142 F. 2d 321, 327; D. D. D. Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 125 F. 2d 679, 682; Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 116 F. 2d 578, 579; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Balme, 23 F. 2d 615, 621. See also S. Rep. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2. The Board had jurisdiction to inquire into the methods of competition presented here, and its evidentiary findings concerned confusion of the type which can support a finding of violation of § 411. The judgment of the Court of Appeals must therefore be reversed. However, since we do not understand the court to have decided whether the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in the light of this opinion. Reversed and remanded. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3659, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5; 83 Cong. Rec. 6726; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2 and S. 1760, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, 74.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

David KING, et al., Petitioners v. Sylvia BURWELL, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. No. 14-114. Supreme Court of the United States Argued March 4, 2015. Decided June 25, 2015. Michael A. Carvin, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Donald B. Verrilli, Solicitor General, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Michael A. Carvin, Counsel of Record, Yaakov M. Roth, Jonathan Berry, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Christopher J. Meade, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Department of Labor, William B. Schultz, General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitors General, Beth S. Brinkmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Brian H. Fletcher, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Mark B. Stern, Alisa B. Klein, Attorneys, Department of Justice, for Respondents. Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act adopts a series of interlocking reforms designed to expand coverage in the individual health insurance market. First, the Act bars insurers from taking a person's health into account when deciding whether to sell health insurance or how much to charge. Second, the Act generally requires each person to maintain insurance coverage or make a payment to the Internal Revenue Service. And third, the Act gives tax credits to certain people to make insurance more affordable. In addition to those reforms, the Act requires the creation of an "Exchange" in each State-basically, a marketplace that allows people to compare and purchase insurance plans. The Act gives each State the opportunity to establish its own Exchange, but provides that the Federal Government will establish the Exchange if the State does not. This case is about whether the Act's interlocking reforms apply equally in each State no matter who establishes the State's Exchange. Specifically, the question presented is whether the Act's tax credits are available in States that have a Federal Exchange. I A The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, grew out of a long history of failed health insurance reform. In the 1990s, several States began experimenting with ways to expand people's access to coverage. One common approach was to impose a pair of insurance market regulations -a "guaranteed issue" requirement, which barred insurers from denying coverage to any person because of his health, and a "community rating" requirement, which barred insurers from charging a person higher premiums for the same reason. Together, those requirements were designed to ensure that anyone who wanted to buy health insurance could do so. The guaranteed issue and community rating requirements achieved that goal, but they had an unintended consequence: They encouraged people to wait until they got sick to buy insurance. Why buy insurance coverage when you are healthy, if you can buy the same coverage for the same price when you become ill? This consequence-known as "adverse selection"-led to a second: Insurers were forced to increase premiums to account for the fact that, more and more, it was the sick rather than the healthy who were buying insurance. And that consequence fed back into the first: As the cost of insurance rose, even more people waited until they became ill to buy it. This led to an economic "death spiral." As premiums rose higher and higher, and the number of people buying insurance sank lower and lower, insurers began to leave the market entirely. As a result, the number of people without insurance increased dramatically. This cycle happened repeatedly during the 1990s. For example, in 1993, the State of Washington reformed its individual insurance market by adopting the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements. Over the next three years, premiums rose by 78 percent and the number of people enrolled fell by 25 percent. By 1999, 17 of the State's 19 private insurers had left the market, and the remaining two had announced their intention to do so. Brief for America's Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae 10-11. For another example, also in 1993, New York adopted the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements. Over the next few years, some major insurers in the individual market raised premiums by roughly 40 percent. By 1996, these reforms had "effectively eliminated the commercial individual indemnity market in New York with the largest individual health insurer exiting the market." L. Wachenheim & H. Leida, The Impact of Guaranteed Issue and Community Rating Reforms on States' Individual Insurance Markets 38 (2012). In 1996, Massachusetts adopted the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements and experienced similar results. But in 2006, Massachusetts added two more reforms: The Commonwealth required individuals to buy insurance or pay a penalty, and it gave tax credits to certain individuals to ensure that they could afford the insurance they were required to buy. Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae 24-25. The combination of these three reforms-insurance market regulations, a coverage mandate, and tax credits-reduced the uninsured rate in Massachusetts to 2.6 percent, by far the lowest in the Nation. Hearing on Examining Individual State Experiences with Health Care Reform Coverage Initiatives in the Context of National Reform before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (2009). B The Affordable Care Act adopts a version of the three key reforms that made the Massachusetts system successful. First, the Act adopts the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements. The Act provides that "each health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual ... market in a State must accept every ... individual in the State that applies for such coverage." 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a). The Act also bars insurers from charging higher premiums on the basis of a person's health. § 300gg. Second, the Act generally requires individuals to maintain health insurance coverage or make a payment to the IRS. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. Congress recognized that, without an incentive, "many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care." 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I). So Congress adopted a coverage requirement to "minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums." Ibid. In Congress's view, that coverage requirement was "essential to creating effective health insurance markets." Ibid. Congress also provided an exemption from the coverage requirement for anyone who has to spend more than eight percent of his income on health insurance. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii). Third, the Act seeks to make insurance more affordable by giving refundable tax credits to individuals with household incomes between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. § 36B. Individuals who meet the Act's requirements may purchase insurance with the tax credits, which are provided in advance directly to the individual's insurer. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081, 18082. These three reforms are closely intertwined. As noted, Congress found that the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements would not work without the coverage requirement. § 18091(2)(I). And the coverage requirement would not work without the tax credits. The reason is that, without the tax credits, the cost of buying insurance would exceed eight percent of income for a large number of individuals, which would exempt them from the coverage requirement. Given the relationship between these three reforms, the Act provided that they should take effect on the same day-January 1, 2014. See Affordable Care Act, § 1253, redesignated § 1255, 124 Stat. 162, 895; §§ 1401(e), 1501(d), id., at 220, 249. C In addition to those three reforms, the Act requires the creation of an "Exchange" in each State where people can shop for insurance, usually online. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1). An Exchange may be created in one of two ways. First, the Act provides that "[e]ach State shall ... establish an American Health Benefit Exchange ... for the State." Ibid. Second, if a State nonetheless chooses not to establish its own Exchange, the Act provides that the Secretary of Health and Human Services "shall ... establish and operate such Exchange within the State." § 18041(c)(1). The issue in this case is whether the Act's tax credits are available in States that have a Federal Exchange rather than a State Exchange. The Act initially provides that tax credits "shall be allowed" for any "applicable taxpayer." 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a). The Act then provides that the amount of the tax credit depends in part on whether the taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through "an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [hereinafter 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]." 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b) - (c) (emphasis added). The IRS addressed the availability of tax credits by promulgating a rule that made them available on both State and Federal Exchanges. 77 Fed.Reg. 30378 (2012). As relevant here, the IRS Rule provides that a taxpayer is eligible for a tax credit if he enrolled in an insurance plan through "an Exchange," 26 CFR § 1.36B-2 (2013), which is defined as "an Exchange serving the individual market ... regardless of whether the Exchange is established and operated by a State ... or by HHS," 45 CFR § 155.20 (2014). At this point, 16 States and the District of Columbia have established their own Exchanges; the other 34 States have elected to have HHS do so. D Petitioners are four individuals who live in Virginia, which has a Federal Exchange. They do not wish to purchase health insurance. In their view, Virginia's Exchange does not qualify as "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]," so they should not receive any tax credits. That would make the cost of buying insurance more than eight percent of their income, which would exempt them from the Act's coverage requirement. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1). Under the IRS Rule, however, Virginia's Exchange would qualify as "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]," so petitioners would receive tax credits. That would make the cost of buying insurance less than eight percent of petitioners' income, which would subject them to the Act's coverage requirement. The IRS Rule therefore requires petitioners to either buy health insurance they do not want, or make a payment to the IRS. Petitioners challenged the IRS Rule in Federal District Court. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the Act unambiguously made tax credits available to individuals enrolled through a Federal Exchange. King v. Sebelius, 997 F.Supp.2d 415 (E.D.Va.2014). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 759 F.3d 358 (2014). The Fourth Circuit viewed the Act as "ambiguous and subject to at least two different interpretations." Id., at 372. The court therefore deferred to the IRS's interpretation under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 759 F.3d, at 376. The same day that the Fourth Circuit issued its decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the IRS Rule in a different case, holding that the Act "unambiguously restricts" the tax credits to State Exchanges. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 394 (2014). We granted certiorari in the present case. 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 475, 190 L.Ed.2d 355 (2014). II The Affordable Care Act addresses tax credits in what is now Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code. That section provides: "In the case of an applicable taxpayer, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this subtitle ... an amount equal to the premium assistance credit amount." 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a). Section 36B then defines the term "premium assistance credit amount" as "the sum of the premium assistance amounts determined under paragraph (2) with respect to all coverage months of the taxpayer occurring during the taxable year." § 36B(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 36B goes on to define the two italicized terms-"premium assistance amount" and "coverage month"-in part by referring to an insurance plan that is enrolled in through "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]." 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B (b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i). The parties dispute whether Section 36B authorizes tax credits for individuals who enroll in an insurance plan through a Federal Exchange. Petitioners argue that a Federal Exchange is not "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]," and that the IRS Rule therefore contradicts Section 36B. Brief for Petitioners 18-20. The Government responds that the IRS Rule is lawful because the phrase "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]" should be read to include Federal Exchanges. Brief for Respondents 20-25. When analyzing an agency's interpretation of a statute, we often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Id., at 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. This approach "is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000). "In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation." Ibid. This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act's key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep "economic and political significance" that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2444, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014) (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S., at 160, 120 S.Ct. 1291 ). It is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266-267, 126 S.Ct. 904, 163 L.Ed.2d 748 (2006). This is not a case for the IRS. It is instead our task to determine the correct reading of Section 36B. If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 176 L.Ed.2d 998 (2010). But oftentimes the "meaning-or ambiguity-of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context." Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S., at 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291. So when deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words "in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." Id., at 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our duty, after all, is "to construe statutes, not isolated provisions." Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290, 130 S.Ct. 1396, 176 L.Ed.2d 225 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A We begin with the text of Section 36B. As relevant here, Section 36B allows an individual to receive tax credits only if the individual enrolls in an insurance plan through "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]." In other words, three things must be true: First, the individual must enroll in an insurance plan through "an Exchange." Second, that Exchange must be "established by the State." And third, that Exchange must be established "under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]." We address each requirement in turn. First, all parties agree that a Federal Exchange qualifies as "an Exchange" for purposes of Section 36B. See Brief for Petitioners 22; Brief for Respondents 22. Section 18031 provides that "[e]ach State shall ... establish an American Health Benefit Exchange ... for the State." § 18031(b)(1). Although phrased as a requirement, the Act gives the States "flexibility" by allowing them to "elect" whether they want to establish an Exchange. § 18041(b). If the State chooses not to do so, Section 18041 provides that the Secretary "shall ... establish and operate such Exchange within the State." § 18041(c)(1) (emphasis added). By using the phrase "such Exchange," Section 18041 instructs the Secretary to establish and operate the same Exchange that the State was directed to establish under Section 18031. See Black's Law Dictionary 1661 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "such" as "That or those; having just been mentioned"). In other words, State Exchanges and Federal Exchanges are equivalent-they must meet the same requirements, perform the same functions, and serve the same purposes. Although State and Federal Exchanges are established by different sovereigns, Sections 18031 and 18041 do not suggest that they differ in any meaningful way. A Federal Exchange therefore counts as "an Exchange" under Section 36B. Second, we must determine whether a Federal Exchange is "established by the State" for purposes of Section 36B. At the outset, it might seem that a Federal Exchange cannot fulfill this requirement. After all, the Act defines "State" to mean "each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia"-a definition that does not include the Federal Government. 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d). But when read in context, "with a view to [its] place in the overall statutory scheme," the meaning of the phrase "established by the State" is not so clear. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S., at 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291 (internal quotation marks omitted). After telling each State to establish an Exchange, Section 18031 provides that all Exchanges "shall make available qualified health plans to qualified individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(A). Section 18032 then defines the term "qualified individual" in part as an individual who "resides in the State that established the Exchange." § 18032(f)(1)(A). And that's a problem: If we give the phrase "the State that established the Exchange" its most natural meaning, there would be no "qualified individuals" on Federal Exchanges. But the Act clearly contemplates that there will be qualified individuals on every Exchange. As we just mentioned, the Act requires all Exchanges to "make available qualified health plans to qualified individuals"-something an Exchange could not do if there were no such individuals. § 18031(d)(2)(A). And the Act tells the Exchange, in deciding which health plans to offer, to consider "the interests of qualified individuals ... in the State or States in which such Exchange operates"-again, something the Exchange could not do if qualified individuals did not exist. § 18031(e)(1)(B). This problem arises repeatedly throughout the Act. See, e.g., § 18031(b)(2) (allowing a State to create "one Exchange ... for providing ... services to both qualified individuals and qualified small employers," rather than creating separate Exchanges for those two groups). These provisions suggest that the Act may not always use the phrase "established by the State" in its most natural sense. Thus, the meaning of that phrase may not be as clear as it appears when read out of context. Third, we must determine whether a Federal Exchange is established "under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]." This too might seem a requirement that a Federal Exchange cannot fulfill, because it is Section 18041 that tells the Secretary when to "establish and operate such Exchange." But here again, the way different provisions in the statute interact suggests otherwise. The Act defines the term "Exchange" to mean "an American Health Benefit Exchange established under section 18031." § 300gg-91(d)(21). If we import that definition into Section 18041, the Act tells the Secretary to "establish and operate such 'American Health Benefit Exchange established under section 18031.' " That suggests that Section 18041 authorizes the Secretary to establish an Exchange under Section 18031, not (or not only) under Section 18041. Otherwise, the Federal Exchange, by definition, would not be an "Exchange" at all. See Halbig, 758 F.3d, at 399-400 (acknowledging that the Secretary establishes Federal Exchanges under Section 18031 ). This interpretation of "under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]" fits best with the statutory context. All of the requirements that an Exchange must meet are in Section 18031, so it is sensible to regard all Exchanges as established under that provision. In addition, every time the Act uses the word "Exchange," the definitional provision requires that we substitute the phrase "Exchange established under section 18031." If Federal Exchanges were not established under Section 18031, therefore, literally none of the Act's requirements would apply to them. Finally, the Act repeatedly uses the phrase "established under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]" in situations where it would make no sense to distinguish between State and Federal Exchanges. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 125(f)(3)(A) (2012 ed., Supp. I) ("The term 'qualified benefit' shall not include any qualified health plan ... offered through an Exchange established under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]"); 26 U.S.C. § 6055(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (2012 ed.) (requiring insurers to report whether each insurance plan they provided "is a qualified health plan offered through an Exchange established under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]"). A Federal Exchange may therefore be considered one established "under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]." The upshot of all this is that the phrase "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]" is properly viewed as ambiguous. The phrase may be limited in its reach to State Exchanges. But it is also possible that the phrase refers to all Exchanges-both State and Federal-at least for purposes of the tax credits. If a State chooses not to follow the directive in Section 18031 that it establish an Exchange, the Act tells the Secretary to establish "such Exchange." § 18041. And by using the words "such Exchange," the Act indicates that State and Federal Exchanges should be the same. But State and Federal Exchanges would differ in a fundamental way if tax credits were available only on State Exchanges-one type of Exchange would help make insurance more affordable by providing billions of dollars to the States' citizens; the other type of Exchange would not. The conclusion that Section 36B is ambiguous is further supported by several provisions that assume tax credits will be available on both State and Federal Exchanges. For example, the Act requires all Exchanges to create outreach programs that must "distribute fair and impartial information concerning ... the availability of premium tax credits under section 36B." § 18031(i)(3)(B). The Act also requires all Exchanges to "establish and make available by electronic means a calculator to determine the actual cost of coverage after the application of any premium tax credit under section 36B." § 18031(d)(4)(G). And the Act requires all Exchanges to report to the Treasury Secretary information about each health plan they sell, including the "aggregate amount of any advance payment of such credit," "[a]ny information ... necessary to determine eligibility for, and the amount of, such credit," and any "[i]nformation necessary to determine whether a taxpayer has received excess advance payments." 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3). If tax credits were not available on Federal Exchanges, these provisions would make little sense. Petitioners and the dissent respond that the words "established by the State" would be unnecessary if Congress meant to extend tax credits to both State and Federal Exchanges. Brief for Petitioners 20; post, at 2497 - 2498. But "our preference for avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute." Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) ; see also Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 1177, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013) ("The canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule"). And specifically with respect to this Act, rigorous application of the canon does not seem a particularly useful guide to a fair construction of the statute. The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few examples of inartful drafting. (To cite just one, the Act creates three separate Section 1563s. See 124 Stat. 270, 911, 912.) Several features of the Act's passage contributed to that unfortunate reality. Congress wrote key parts of the Act behind closed doors, rather than through "the traditional legislative process." Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 L. Lib. J. 131, 163 (2013). And Congress passed much of the Act using a complicated budgetary procedure known as "reconciliation," which limited opportunities for debate and amendment, and bypassed the Senate's normal 60-vote filibuster requirement. Id., at 159-167. As a result, the Act does not reflect the type of care and deliberation that one might expect of such significant legislation. Cf. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 545 (1947) (describing a cartoon "in which a senator tells his colleagues 'I admit this new bill is too complicated to understand. We'll just have to pass it to find out what it means.' "). Anyway, we "must do our best, bearing in mind the fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." Utility Air Regulatory Group, 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2441 (internal quotation marks omitted). After reading Section 36B along with other related provisions in the Act, we cannot conclude that the phrase "an Exchange established by the State under [ Section 18031 ]" is unambiguous. B Given that the text is ambiguous, we must turn to the broader structure of the Act to determine the meaning of Section 36B. "A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme ... because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law." United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988). Here, the statutory scheme compels us to reject petitioners' interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very "death spirals" that Congress designed the Act to avoid. See New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-420, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 37 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973) ("We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes."). As discussed above, Congress based the Affordable Care Act on three major reforms: first, the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements; second, a requirement that individuals maintain health insurance coverage or make a payment to the IRS; and third, the tax credits for individuals with household incomes between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. In a State that establishes its own Exchange, these three reforms work together to expand insurance coverage. The guaranteed issue and community rating requirements ensure that anyone can buy insurance; the coverage requirement creates an incentive for people to do so before they get sick; and the tax credits-it is hoped-make insurance more affordable. Together, those reforms "minimize ... adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums." 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I). Under petitioners' reading, however, the Act would operate quite differently in a State with a Federal Exchange. As they see it, one of the Act's three major reforms-the tax credits-would not apply. And a second major reform-the coverage requirement-would not apply in a meaningful way. As explained earlier, the coverage requirement applies only when the cost of buying health insurance (minus the amount of the tax credits) is less than eight percent of an individual's income. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii). So without the tax credits, the coverage requirement would apply to fewer individuals. And it would be a lot fewer. In 2014, approximately 87 percent of people who bought insurance on a Federal Exchange did so with tax credits, and virtually all of those people would become exempt. HHS, A. Burke, A. Misra, & S. Sheingold, Premium Affordability, Competition, and Choice in the Health Insurance Marketplace 5 (2014); Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae 19-20. If petitioners are right, therefore, only one of the Act's three major reforms would apply in States with a Federal Exchange. The combination of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage requirement could well push a State's individual insurance market into a death spiral. One study predicts that premiums would increase by 47 percent and enrollment would decrease by 70 percent. E. Saltzman & C. Eibner, The Effect of Eliminating the Affordable Care Act's Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces (2015). Another study predicts that premiums would increase by 35 percent and enrollment would decrease by 69 percent. L. Blumberg, M. Buettgens, & J. Holahan, The Implications of a Supreme Court Finding for the Plaintiff in King vs. Burwell: 8.2 Million More Uninsured and 35% Higher Premiums (2015). And those effects would not be limited to individuals who purchase insurance on the Exchanges. Because the Act requires insurers to treat the entire individual market as a single risk pool, 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c)(1), premiums outside the Exchange would rise along with those inside the Exchange. Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae 11-12. It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2674, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) (SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., dissenting) ("Without the federal subsidies ... the exchanges would not operate as Congress intended and may not operate at all."). Congress made the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements applicable in every State in the Nation. But those requirements only work when combined with the coverage requirement and the tax credits. So it stands to reason that Congress meant for those provisions to apply in every State as well. Petitioners respond that Congress was not worried about the effects of withholding tax credits from States with Federal Exchanges because "Congress evidently believed it was offering states a deal they would not refuse." Brief for Petitioners 36. Congress may have been wrong about the States' willingness to establish their own Exchanges, petitioners continue, but that does not allow this Court to rewrite the Act to fix that problem. That is particularly true, petitioners conclude, because the States likely would have created their own Exchanges in the absence of the IRS Rule, which eliminated any incentive that the States had to do so. Id., at 36-38. Section 18041 refutes the argument that Congress believed it was offering the States a deal they would not refuse. That section provides that, if a State elects not to establish an Exchange, the Secretary "shall ... establish and operate such Exchange within the State." 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (c)(1)(A). The whole point of that provision is to create a federal fallback in case a State chooses not to establish its own Exchange. Contrary to petitioners' argument, Congress did not believe it was offering States a deal they would not refuse-it expressly addressed what would happen if a State did refuse the deal. C Finally, the structure of Section 36B itself suggests that tax credits are not limited to State Exchanges. Section 36B(a) initially provides that tax credits "shall be allowed" for any "applicable taxpayer." Section 36B(c)(1) then defines an "applicable taxpayer" as someone who (among other things) has a household income between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. Together, these two provisions appear to make anyone in the specified income range eligible to receive a tax credit. According to petitioners, however, those provisions are an empty promise in States with a Federal Exchange. In their view, an applicable taxpayer in such a State would be eligible for a tax credit-but the amount of that tax credit would always be zero. And that is because-diving several layers down into the Tax Code- Section 36B says that the amount of the tax credits shall be "an amount equal to the premium assistance credit amount," § 36B(a) ; and then says that the term "premium assistance credit amount" means "the sum of the premium assistance amounts determined under paragraph (2) with respect to all coverage months of the taxpayer occurring during the taxable year," § 36B(b)(1) ; and then says that the term "premium assistance amount" is tied to the amount of the monthly premium for insurance purchased on "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]," § 36B(b)(2) ; and then says that the term "coverage month" means any month in which the taxpayer has insurance through "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]," § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i). We have held that Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions." Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001). But in petitioners' view, Congress made the viability of the entire Affordable Care Act turn on the ultimate ancillary provision: a sub-sub-sub section of the Tax Code. We doubt that is what Congress meant to do. Had Congress meant to limit tax credits to State Exchanges, it likely would have done so in the definition of "applicable taxpayer" or in some other prominent manner. It would not have used such a winding path of connect-the-dots provisions about the amount of the credit. D Petitioners' arguments about the plain meaning of Section 36B are strong. But while the meaning of the phrase "an Exchange established by the State under [ 42 U.S.C. § 18031 ]" may seem plain "when viewed in isolation," such a reading turns out to be "untenable in light of [the statute] as a whole." Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 343, 114 S.Ct. 843, 127 L.Ed.2d 165 (1994). In this instance, the context and structure of the Act compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase. Reliance on context and structure in statutory interpretation is a "subtle business, calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes legislation itself." Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83, 60 S.Ct. 34, 84 L.Ed. 93 (1939). For the reasons we have given, however, such reliance is appropriate in this case, and leads us to conclude that Section 36B allows tax credits for insurance purchased on any Exchange created under the Act. Those credits are necessary for the Federal Exchanges to function like their State Exchange counterparts, and to avoid the type of calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid. * * * In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those chosen by the people. Our role is more confined-"to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). That is easier in some cases than in others. But in every case we must respect the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done. A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan. Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent with what we see as Congress's plan, and that is the reading we adopt. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is Affirmed. Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice ALITO join, dissenting. The Court holds that when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act says "Exchange established by the State" it means "Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government." That is of course quite absurd, and the Court's 21 pages of explanation make it no less so. I The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act makes major reforms to the American health-insurance market. It provides, among other things, that every State "shall ... establish an American Health Benefit Exchange"-a marketplace where people can shop for health-insurance plans. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1). And it provides that if a State does not comply with this instruction, the Secretary of Health and Human Services must "establish and operate such Exchange within the State." § 18041(c)(1). A separate part of the Act-housed in § 36B of the Internal Revenue Code -grants "premium tax credits" to subsidize certain purchases of health insurance made on Exchanges. The tax credit consists of "premium assistance amounts" for "coverage months." 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(1). An individual has a coverage month only when he is covered by an insurance plan "that was enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under [ § 18031 ]." § 36B(c)(2)(A). And the law ties the size of the premium assistance amount to the premiums for health plans which cover the individual "and which were enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under [ § 18031 ]." § 36B(b)(2)(A). The premium assistance amount further depends on the cost of certain other insurance plans "offered through the same Exchange." § 36B(b)(3)(B)(i). This case requires us to decide whether someone who buys insurance on an Exchange established by the Secretary gets tax credits. You would think the answer would be obvious-so obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme Court to hear a case about it. In order to receive any money under § 36B, an individual must enroll in an insurance plan through an "Exchange established by the State." The Secretary of Health and Human Services is not a State. So an Exchange established by the Secretary is not an Exchange established by the State-which means people who buy health insurance through such an Exchange get no money under § 36B. Words no longer have meaning if an Exchange that is not established by a State is "established by the State." It is hard to come up with a clearer way to limit tax credits to state Exchanges than to use the words "established by the State." And it is hard to come up with a reason to include the words "by the State" other than the purpose of limiting credits to state Exchanges. "[T]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover." Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370, 45 S.Ct. 274, 69 L.Ed. 660 (1925) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under all the usual rules of interpretation, in short, the Government should lose this case. But normal rules of interpretation seem always to yield to the overriding principle of the present Court: The Affordable Care Act must be saved. II The Court interprets § 36B to award tax credits on both federal and state Exchanges. It accepts that the "most natural sense" of the phrase "Exchange established by the State" is an Exchange established by a State. Ante, at 2502. (Understatement, thy name is an opinion on the Affordable Care Act!) Yet the opinion continues, with no semblance of shame, that "it is also possible that the phrase refers to all Exchanges-both State and Federal." Ante, at 2491. (Impossible possibility, thy name is an opinion on the Affordable Care Act!) The Court claims that "the context and structure of the Act compel [it] to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase." Ante, at 2495. I wholeheartedly agree with the Court that sound interpretation requires paying attention to the whole law, not homing in on isolated words or even isolated sections. Context always matters. Let us not forget, however, why context matters: It is a tool for understanding the terms of the law, not an excuse for rewriting them. Any effort to understand rather than to rewrite a law must accept and apply the presumption that lawmakers use words in "their natural and ordinary signification." Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1, 12, 24 L.Ed. 708 (1878). Ordinary connotation does not always prevail, but the more unnatural the proposed interpretation of a law, the more compelling the contextual evidence must be to show that it is correct. Today's interpretation is not merely unnatural; it is unheard of. Who would ever have dreamt that "Exchange established by the State" means "Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government "? Little short of an express statutory definition could justify adopting this singular reading. Yet the only pertinent definition here provides that "State" means "each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia." 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d). Because the Secretary is neither one of the 50 States nor the District of Columbia, that definition positively contradicts the eccentric theory that an Exchange established by the Secretary has been established by the State. Far from offering the overwhelming evidence of meaning needed to justify the Court's interpretation, other contextual clues undermine it at every turn. To begin with, other parts of the Act sharply distinguish between the establishment of an Exchange by a State and the establishment of an Exchange by the Federal Government. The States' authority to set up Exchanges comes from one provision, § 18031(b) ; the Secretary's authority comes from an entirely different provision, § 18041(c). Funding for States to establish Exchanges comes from one part of the law, § 18031(a) ; funding for the Secretary to establish Exchanges comes from an entirely different part of the law, § 18121. States generally run state-created Exchanges; the Secretary generally runs federally created Exchanges. § 18041(b) - (c). And the Secretary's authority to set up an Exchange in a State depends upon the State's "[f]ailure to establish [an] Exchange." § 18041(c) (emphasis added). Provisions such as these destroy any pretense that a federal Exchange is in some sense also established by a State. Reading the rest of the Act also confirms that, as relevant here, there are only two ways to set up an Exchange in a State: establishment by a State and establishment by the Secretary. §§ 18031(b), 18041(c). So saying that an Exchange established by the Federal Government is "established by the State" goes beyond giving words bizarre meanings; it leaves the limiting phrase "by the State" with no operative effect at all. That is a stark violation of the elementary principle that requires an interpreter "to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152, 2 S.Ct. 391, 27 L.Ed. 431 (1883). In weighing this argument, it is well to remember the difference between giving a term a meaning that duplicates another part of the law, and giving a term no meaning at all. Lawmakers sometimes repeat themselves-whether out of a desire to add emphasis, a sense of belt-and-suspenders caution, or a lawyerly penchant for doublets (aid and abet, cease and desist, null and void). Lawmakers do not, however, tend to use terms that "have no operation at all." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). So while the rule against treating a term as a redundancy is far from categorical, the rule against treating it as a nullity is as close to absolute as interpretive principles get. The Court's reading does not merely give "by the State" a duplicative effect; it causes the phrase to have no effect whatever. Making matters worse, the reader of the whole Act will come across a number of provisions beyond § 36B that refer to the establishment of Exchanges by States. Adopting the Court's interpretation means nullifying the term "by the State" not just once, but again and again throughout the Act. Consider for the moment only those parts of the Act that mention an "Exchange established by the State" in connection with tax credits: • The formula for calculating the amount of the tax credit, as already explained, twice mentions "an Exchange established by the State." 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i). • The Act directs States to screen children for eligibility for "[tax credits] under section 36B" and for "any other assistance or subsidies available for coverage obtained through" an "Exchange established by the State." 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3(b)(1)(B)-(C). • The Act requires "an Exchange established by the State" to use a "secure electronic interface" to determine eligibility for (among other things) tax credits. § 1396w-3(b)(1)(D). • The Act authorizes "an Exchange established by the State" to make arrangements under which other state agencies "determine whether a State resident is eligible for [tax credits] under section 36B." § 1396w-3(b)(2). • The Act directs States to operate Web sites that allow anyone "who is eligible to receive [tax credits] under section 36B" to compare insurance plans offered through "an Exchange established by the State." § 1396w-3(b)(4). • One of the Act's provisions addresses the enrollment of certain children in health plans "offered through an Exchange established by the State" and then discusses the eligibility of these children for tax credits. § 1397ee(d)(3)(B). It is bad enough for a court to cross out "by the State" once. But seven times? Congress did not, by the way, repeat "Exchange established by the State under [ § 18031 ]" by rote throughout the Act. Quite the contrary, clause after clause of the law uses a more general term such as "Exchange" or "Exchange established under [ § 18031 ]." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031 (k), 18033 ; 26 U.S.C. § 6055. It is common sense that any speaker who says "Exchange" some of the time, but "Exchange established by the State" the rest of the time, probably means something by the contrast. Equating establishment "by the State" with establishment by the Federal Government makes nonsense of other parts of the Act. The Act requires States to ensure (on pain of losing Medicaid funding) that any "Exchange established by the State" uses a "secure electronic interface" to determine an individual's eligibility for various benefits (including tax credits). 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3(b)(1)(D). How could a State control the type of electronic interface used by a federal Exchange? The Act allows a State to control contracting decisions made by "an Exchange established by the State." § 18031(f)(3). Why would a State get to control the contracting decisions of a federal Exchange? The Act also provides "Assistance to States to establish American Health Benefit Exchanges" and directs the Secretary to renew this funding "if the State ... is making progress ... toward ... establishing an Exchange." § 18031(a). Does a State that refuses to set up an Exchange still receive this funding, on the premise that Exchanges established by the Federal Government are really established by States? It is presumably in order to avoid these questions that the Court concludes that federal Exchanges count as state Exchanges only "for purposes of the tax credits." Ante, at 2491. (Contrivance, thy name is an opinion on the Affordable Care Act!) It is probably piling on to add that the Congress that wrote the Affordable Care Act knew how to equate two different types of Exchanges when it wanted to do so. The Act includes a clause providing that "[a] territory that ... establishes ... an Exchange ... shall be treated as a State" for certain purposes. § 18043(a) (emphasis added). Tellingly, it does not include a comparable clause providing that the Secretary shall be treated as a State for purposes of § 36B when she establishes an Exchange. Faced with overwhelming confirmation that "Exchange established by the State" means what it looks like it means, the Court comes up with argument after feeble argument to support its contrary interpretation. None of its tries comes close to establishing the implausible conclusion that Congress used "by the State" to mean "by the State or not by the State." The Court emphasizes that if a State does not set up an Exchange, the Secretary must establish "such Exchange." § 18041(c). It claims that the word "such" implies that federal and state Exchanges are "the same." Ante, at 2491. To see the error in this reasoning, one need only consider a parallel provision from our Constitution: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations ." Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Just as the Affordable Care Act directs States to establish Exchanges while allowing the Secretary to establish "such Exchange" as a fallback, the Elections Clause directs state legislatures to prescribe election regulations while allowing Congress to make "such Regulations" as a fallback. Would anybody refer to an election regulation made by Congress as a "regulation prescribed by the state legislature"? Would anybody say that a federal election law and a state election law are in all respects equivalent? Of course not. The word "such" does not help the Court one whit. The Court's argument also overlooks the rudimentary principle that a specific provision governs a general one. Even if it were true that the term "such Exchange" in § 18041(c) implies that federal and state Exchanges are the same in general, the term "established by the State" in § 36B makes plain that they differ when it comes to tax credits in particular. The Court's next bit of interpretive jiggery-pokery involves other parts of the Act that purportedly presuppose the availability of tax credits on both federal and state Exchanges. Ante, at 2491 - 2492. It is curious that the Court is willing to subordinate the express words of the section that grants tax credits to the mere implications of other provisions with only tangential connections to tax credits. One would think that interpretation would work the other way around. In any event, each of the provisions mentioned by the Court is perfectly consistent with limiting tax credits to state Exchanges. One of them says that the minimum functions of an Exchange include (alongside several tasks that have nothing to do with tax credits) setting up an electronic calculator that shows "the actual cost of coverage after the application of any premium tax credit." 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4) (G). What stops a federal Exchange's electronic calculator from telling a customer that his tax credit is zero? Another provision requires an Exchange's outreach program to educate the public about health plans, to facilitate enrollment, and to "distribute fair and impartial information" about enrollment and "the availability of premium tax credits." § 18031(i)(3)(B). What stops a federal Exchange's outreach program from fairly and impartially telling customers that no tax credits are available? A third provision requires an Exchange to report information about each insurance plan sold-including level of coverage, premium, name of the insured, and "amount of any advance payment" of the tax credit. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3). What stops a federal Exchange's report from confirming that no tax credits have been paid out? The Court persists that these provisions "would make little sense" if no tax credits were available on federal Exchanges. Ante, at 2492. Even if that observation were true, it would show only oddity, not ambiguity. Laws often include unusual or mismatched provisions. The Affordable Care Act spans 900 pages; it would be amazing if its provisions all lined up perfectly with each other. This Court "does not revise legislation ... just because the text as written creates an apparent anomaly." Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2033, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). At any rate, the provisions cited by the Court are not particularly unusual. Each requires an Exchange to perform a standardized series of tasks, some aspects of which relate in some way to tax credits. It is entirely natural for slight mismatches to occur when, as here, lawmakers draft "a single statutory provision" to cover "different kinds" of situations. Robers v. United States, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1854, 1858, 188 L.Ed.2d 885 (2014). Lawmakers need not, and often do not, " write extra language specifically exempting, phrase by phrase, applications in respect to which a portion of a phrase is not needed." Ibid. Roaming even farther afield from § 36B, the Court turns to the Act's provisions about "qualified individuals." Ante, at 2489 - 2490. Qualified individuals receive favored treatment on Exchanges, although customers who are not qualified individuals may also shop there. See Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 404-405 (C.A.D.C.2014). The Court claims that the Act must equate federal and state establishment of Exchanges when it defines a qualified individual as someone who (among other things) lives in the "State that established the Exchange," 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A). Otherwise, the Court says, there would be no qualified individuals on federal Exchanges, contradicting (for example) the provision requiring every Exchange to take the " 'interests of qualified individuals' " into account when selecting health plans. Ante, at 2490 (quoting § 18031(e)(1)(b) ). Pure applesauce. Imagine that a university sends around a bulletin reminding every professor to take the "interests of graduate students" into account when setting office hours, but that some professors teach only undergraduates. Would anybody reason that the bulletin implicitly presupposes that every professor has "graduate students," so that "graduate students" must really mean "graduate or undergraduate students"? Surely not. Just as one naturally reads instructions about graduate students to be inapplicable to the extent a particular professor has no such students, so too would one naturally read instructions about qualified individuals to be inapplicable to the extent a particular Exchange has no such individuals. There is no need to rewrite the term "State that established the Exchange" in the definition of "qualified individual," much less a need to rewrite the separate term "Exchange established by the State" in a separate part of the Act. Least convincing of all, however, is the Court's attempt to uncover support for its interpretation in "the structure of Section 36B itself." Ante, at 2494. The Court finds it strange that Congress limited the tax credit to state Exchanges in the formula for calculating the amount of the credit, rather than in the provision defining the range of taxpayers eligible for the credit. Had the Court bothered to look at the rest of the Tax Code, it would have seen that the structure it finds strange is in fact quite common. Consider, for example, the many provisions that initially make taxpayers of all incomes eligible for a tax credit, only to provide later that the amount of the credit is zero if the taxpayer's income exceeds a specified threshold. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 24 (child tax credit); § 32 (earned-income tax credit); § 36 (first-time-homebuyer tax credit). Or consider, for an even closer parallel, a neighboring provision that initially makes taxpayers of all States eligible for a credit, only to provide later that the amount of the credit may be zero if the taxpayer's State does not satisfy certain requirements. See § 35 (health-insurance-costs tax credit). One begins to get the sense that the Court's insistence on reading things in context applies to "established by the State," but to nothing else. For what it is worth, lawmakers usually draft tax-credit provisions the way they do-i.e., the way they drafted § 36B -because the mechanics of the credit require it. Many Americans move to new States in the middle of the year. Mentioning state Exchanges in the definition of "coverage month"-rather than (as the Court proposes) in the provisions concerning taxpayers' eligibility for the credit-accounts for taxpayers who live in a State with a state Exchange for a part of the year, but a State with a federal Exchange for the rest of the year. In addition, § 36B awards a credit with respect to insurance plans "which cover the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or any dependent ... of the taxpayer and which were enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State." § 36B(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). If Congress had mentioned state Exchanges in the provisions discussing taxpayers' eligibility for the credit, a taxpayer who buys insurance from a federal Exchange would get no money, even if he has a spouse or dependent who buys insurance from a state Exchange-say a child attending college in a different State. It thus makes perfect sense for "Exchange established by the State" to appear where it does, rather than where the Court suggests. Even if that were not so, of course, its location would not make it any less clear. The Court has not come close to presenting the compelling contextual case necessary to justify departing from the ordinary meaning of the terms of the law. Quite the contrary, context only underscores the outlandishness of the Court's interpretation. Reading the Act as a whole leaves no doubt about the matter: "Exchange established by the State" means what it looks like it means. III For its next defense of the indefensible, the Court turns to the Affordable Care Act's design and purposes. As relevant here, the Act makes three major reforms. The guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements prohibit insurers from considering a customer's health when deciding whether to sell insurance and how much to charge, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1 ; its famous individual mandate requires everyone to maintain insurance coverage or to pay what the Act calls a "penalty," 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1), and what we have nonetheless called a tax, see National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2597-2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ; and its tax credits help make insurance more affordable. The Court reasons that Congress intended these three reforms to " work together to expand insurance coverage"; and because the first two apply in every State, so must the third. Ante, at 2493. This reasoning suffers from no shortage of flaws. To begin with, "even the most formidable argument concerning the statute's purposes could not overcome the clarity [of] the statute's text." Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. ----, ----, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 596, 607, n. 4, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012). Statutory design and purpose matter only to the extent they help clarify an otherwise ambiguous provision. Could anyone maintain with a straight face that § 36B is unclear? To mention just the highlights, the Court's interpretation clashes with a statutory definition, renders words inoperative in at least seven separate provisions of the Act, overlooks the contrast between provisions that say "Exchange" and those that say "Exchange established by the State," gives the same phrase one meaning for purposes of tax credits but an entirely different meaning for other purposes, and (let us not forget) contradicts the ordinary meaning of the words Congress used. On the other side of the ledger, the Court has come up with nothing more than a general provision that turns out to be controlled by a specific one, a handful of clauses that are consistent with either understanding of establishment by the State, and a resemblance between the tax-credit provision and the rest of the Tax Code. If that is all it takes to make something ambiguous, everything is ambiguous. Having gone wrong in consulting statutory purpose at all, the Court goes wrong again in analyzing it. The purposes of a law must be "collected chiefly from its words," not "from extrinsic circumstances." Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202, 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.). Only by concentrating on the law's terms can a judge hope to uncover the scheme of the statute, rather than some other scheme that the judge thinks desirable. Like it or not, the express terms of the Affordable Care Act make only two of the three reforms mentioned by the Court applicable in States that do not establish Exchanges. It is perfectly possible for them to operate independently of tax credits. The guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements continue to ensure that insurance companies treat all customers the same no matter their health, and the individual mandate continues to encourage people to maintain coverage, lest they be "taxed." The Court protests that without the tax credits, the number of people covered by the individual mandate shrinks, and without a broadly applicable individual mandate the guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements "would destabilize the individual insurance market." Ante, at 2493. If true, these projections would show only that the statutory scheme contains a flaw; they would not show that the statute means the opposite of what it says. Moreover, it is a flaw that appeared as well in other parts of the Act. A different title established a long-term-care insurance program with guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements, but without an individual mandate or subsidies. §§ 8001-8002, 124 Stat. 828-847 (2010). This program never came into effect "only because Congress, in response to actuarial analyses predicting that the [program] would be fiscally unsustainable, repealed the provision in 2013." Halbig, 758 F.3d, at 410. How could the Court say that Congress would never dream of combining guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements with a narrow individual mandate, when it combined those requirements with no individual mandate in the context of long-term-care insurance? Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Services originally interpreted the Act to impose guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements in the Federal Territories, even though the Act plainly does not make the individual mandate applicable there. Ibid. ; see 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(4) ; 42 U.S.C. § 201(f). "This combination, predictably, [threw] individual insurance markets in the territories into turmoil." Halbig, supra, at 410. Responding to complaints from the Territories, the Department at first insisted that it had "no statutory authority" to address the problem and suggested that the Territories "seek legislative relief from Congress" instead. Letter from G. Cohen, Director of the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, to S. Igisomar, Secretary of Commerce of the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (July 12, 2013). The Department changed its mind a year later, after what it described as "a careful review of [the] situation and the relevant statutory language." Letter from M. Tavenner, Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to G. Francis, Insurance Commissioner of the Virgin Islands (July 16, 2014). How could the Court pronounce it "implausible" for Congress to have tolerated instability in insurance markets in States with federal Exchanges, ante, at 2494, when even the Government maintained until recently that Congress did exactly that in American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands? Compounding its errors, the Court forgets that it is no more appropriate to consider one of a statute's purposes in isolation than it is to consider one of its words that way. No law pursues just one purpose at all costs, and no statutory scheme encompasses just one element. Most relevant here, the Affordable Care Act displays a congressional preference for state participation in the establishment of Exchanges: Each State gets the first opportunity to set up its Exchange, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) ; States that take up the opportunity receive federal funding for "activities ... related to establishing" an Exchange, § 18031(a)(3); and the Secretary may establish an Exchange in a State only as a fallback, § 18041(c). But setting up and running an Exchange involve significant burdens-meeting strict deadlines, § 18041(b), implementing requirements related to the offering of insurance plans, § 18031(d)(4), setting up outreach programs, § 18031(i), and ensuring that the Exchange is self-sustaining by 2015, § 18031(d)(5) (A). A State would have much less reason to take on these burdens if its citizens could receive tax credits no matter who establishes its Exchange. (Now that the Internal Revenue Service has interpreted § 36B to authorize tax credits everywhere, by the way, 34 States have failed to set up their own Exchanges. Ante, at 2487.) So even if making credits available on all Exchanges advances the goal of improving healthcare markets, it frustrates the goal of encouraging state involvement in the implementation of the Act. This is what justifies going out of our way to read "established by the State" to mean "established by the State or not established by the State"? Worst of all for the repute of today's decision, the Court's reasoning is largely self-defeating. The Court predicts that making tax credits unavailable in States that do not set up their own Exchanges would cause disastrous economic consequences there. If that is so, however, wouldn't one expect States to react by setting up their own Exchanges? And wouldn't that outcome satisfy two of the Act's goals rather than just one: enabling the Act's reforms to work and promoting state involvement in the Act's implementation? The Court protests that the very existence of a federal fallback shows that Congress expected that some States might fail to set up their own Exchanges. Ante, at 2495. So it does. It does not show, however, that Congress expected the number of recalcitrant States to be particularly large. The more accurate the Court's dire economic predictions, the smaller that number is likely to be. That reality destroys the Court's pretense that applying the law as written would imperil "the viability of the entire Affordable Care Act." Ante, at 2495. All in all, the Court's arguments about the law's purpose and design are no more convincing than its arguments about context. IV Perhaps sensing the dismal failure of its efforts to show that "established by the State" means "established by the State or the Federal Government," the Court tries to palm off the pertinent statutory phrase as "inartful drafting." Ante, at 2495. This Court, however, has no free-floating power "to rescue Congress from its drafting errors." Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only when it is patently obvious to a reasonable reader that a drafting mistake has occurred may a court correct the mistake. The occurrence of a misprint may be apparent from the face of the law, as it is where the Affordable Care Act "creates three separate Section 1563s." Ante, at 2492. But the Court does not pretend that there is any such indication of a drafting error on the face of § 36B. The occurrence of a misprint may also be apparent because a provision decrees an absurd result-a consequence "so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application." Sturges, 4 Wheat., at 203. But § 36B does not come remotely close to satisfying that demanding standard. It is entirely plausible that tax credits were restricted to state Exchanges deliberately-for example, in order to encourage States to establish their own Exchanges. We therefore have no authority to dismiss the terms of the law as a drafting fumble. Let us not forget that the term "Exchange established by the State" appears twice in § 36B and five more times in other parts of the Act that mention tax credits. What are the odds, do you think, that the same slip of the pen occurred in seven separate places? No provision of the Act-none at all-contradicts the limitation of tax credits to state Exchanges. And as I have already explained, uses of the term "Exchange established by the State" beyond the context of tax credits look anything but accidental. Supra, at 2487. If there was a mistake here, context suggests it was a substantive mistake in designing this part of the law, not a technical mistake in transcribing it. V The Court's decision reflects the philosophy that judges should endure whatever interpretive distortions it takes in order to correct a supposed flaw in the statutory machinery. That philosophy ignores the American people's decision to give Congress "[a]ll legislative Powers" enumerated in the Constitution. Art. I, § 1. They made Congress, not this Court, responsible for both making laws and mending them. This Court holds only the judicial power-the power to pronounce the law as Congress has enacted it. We lack the prerogative to repair laws that do not work out in practice, just as the people lack the ability to throw us out of office if they dislike the solutions we concoct. We must always remember, therefore, that "[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it." Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U.S. 120, 126, 110 S.Ct. 456, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989). Trying to make its judge-empowering approach seem respectful of congressional authority, the Court asserts that its decision merely ensures that the Affordable Care Act operates the way Congress "meant [it] to operate." Ante, at 2494. First of all, what makes the Court so sure that Congress "meant" tax credits to be available everywhere? Our only evidence of what Congress meant comes from the terms of the law, and those terms show beyond all question that tax credits are available only on state Exchanges. More importantly, the Court forgets that ours is a government of laws and not of men. That means we are governed by the terms of our laws, not by the unenacted will of our lawmakers. "If Congress enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform to its intent." Lamie, supra, at 542, 124 S.Ct. 1023. In the meantime, this Court "has no roving license ... to disregard clear language simply on the view that ... Congress 'must have intended' something broader." Bay Mills, 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2034. Even less defensible, if possible, is the Court's claim that its interpretive approach is justified because this Act "does not reflect the type of care and deliberation that one might expect of such significant legislation." Ante, at 2492 - 2493. It is not our place to judge the quality of the care and deliberation that went into this or any other law. A law enacted by voice vote with no deliberation whatever is fully as binding upon us as one enacted after years of study, months of committee hearings, and weeks of debate. Much less is it our place to make everything come out right when Congress does not do its job properly. It is up to Congress to design its laws with care, and it is up to the people to hold them to account if they fail to carry out that responsibility. Rather than rewriting the law under the pretense of interpreting it, the Court should have left it to Congress to decide what to do about the Act's limitation of tax credits to state Exchanges. If Congress values above everything else the Act's applicability across the country, it could make tax credits available in every Exchange. If it prizes state involvement in the Act's implementation, it could continue to limit tax credits to state Exchanges while taking other steps to mitigate the economic consequences predicted by the Court. If Congress wants to accommodate both goals, it could make tax credits available everywhere while offering new incentives for States to set up their own Exchanges. And if Congress thinks that the present design of the Act works well enough, it could do nothing. Congress could also do something else altogether, entirely abandoning the structure of the Affordable Care Act. The Court's insistence on making a choice that should be made by Congress both aggrandizes judicial power and encourages congressional lassitude. Just ponder the significance of the Court's decision to take matters into its own hands. The Court's revision of the law authorizes the Internal Revenue Service to spend tens of billions of dollars every year in tax credits on federal Exchanges. It affects the price of insurance for millions of Americans. It diminishes the participation of the States in the implementation of the Act. It vastly expands the reach of the Act's individual mandate, whose scope depends in part on the availability of credits. What a parody today's decision makes of Hamilton's assurances to the people of New York: "The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over ... the purse; no direction ... of the wealth of society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment." The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). * * * Today's opinion changes the usual rules of statutory interpretation for the sake of the Affordable Care Act. That, alas, is not a novelty. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 this Court revised major components of the statute in order to save them from unconstitutionality. The Act that Congress passed provides that every individual "shall" maintain insurance or else pay a "penalty." 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. This Court, however, saw that the Commerce Clause does not authorize a federal mandate to buy health insurance. So it rewrote the mandate-cum-penalty as a tax. 567 U.S., at ---- - ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2583-2601 (principal opinion). The Act that Congress passed also requires every State to accept an expansion of its Medicaid program, or else risk losing all Medicaid funding. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. This Court, however, saw that the Spending Clause does not authorize this coercive condition. So it rewrote the law to withhold only the incremental funds associated with the Medicaid expansion. 567 U.S., at ---- - ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2601-2608 (principal opinion). Having transformed two major parts of the law, the Court today has turned its attention to a third. The Act that Congress passed makes tax credits available only on an "Exchange established by the State." This Court, however, concludes that this limitation would prevent the rest of the Act from working as well as hoped. So it rewrites the law to make tax credits available everywhere. We should start calling this law SCOTUScare. Perhaps the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will attain the enduring status of the Social Security Act or the Taft-Hartley Act; perhaps not. But this Court's two decisions on the Act will surely be remembered through the years. The somersaults of statutory interpretation they have performed ("penalty" means tax, "further [Medicaid] payments to the State" means only incremental Medicaid payments to the State, "established by the State" means not established by the State) will be cited by litigants endlessly, to the confusion of honest jurisprudence. And the cases will publish forever the discouraging truth that the Supreme Court of the United States favors some laws over others, and is prepared to do whatever it takes to uphold and assist its favorites. I dissent. The dissent argues that one would "naturally read instructions about qualified individuals to be inapplicable to the extent a particular Exchange has no such individuals." Post, at 2501 - 2502 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). But the fact that the dissent's interpretation would make so many parts of the Act "inapplicable" to Federal Exchanges is precisely what creates the problem. It would be odd indeed for Congress to write such detailed instructions about customers on a State Exchange, while having nothing to say about those on a Federal Exchange. The dissent argues that the phrase "such Exchange" does not suggest that State and Federal Exchanges "are in all respects equivalent." Post, at 2500. In support, it quotes the Constitution's Elections Clause, which makes the state legislature primarily responsible for prescribing election regulations, but allows Congress to "make or alter such Regulations." Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. No one would say that state and federal election regulations are in all respects equivalent, the dissent contends, so we should not say that State and Federal Exchanges are. But the Elections Clause does not precisely define what an election regulation must look like, so Congress can prescribe regulations that differ from what the State would prescribe. The Affordable Care Act does precisely define what an Exchange must look like, however, so a Federal Exchange cannot differ from a State Exchange. The dissent notes that several other provisions in the Act use the phrase "established by the State," and argues that our holding applies to each of those provisions. Post, at 2498 - 2499. But "the presumption of consistent usage readily yields to context," and a statutory term may mean different things in different places. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2441-2442, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is particularly true when, as here, "the Act is far from a chef d'oeuvre of legislative draftsmanship." Ibid. Because the other provisions cited by the dissent are not at issue here, we do not address them. The dissent argues that our analysis "show[s] only that the statutory scheme contains a flaw," one "that appeared as well in other parts of the Act." Post, at 2503. For support, the dissent notes that the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements might apply in the federal territories, even though the coverage requirement does not. Id., at 2503 - 2504. The confusion arises from the fact that the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements were added as amendments to the Public Health Service Act, which contains a definition of the word "State" that includes the territories, 42 U.S.C. § 201(f), while the later-enacted Affordable Care Act contains a definition of the word "State" that excludes the territories, § 18024(d). The predicate for the dissent's point is therefore uncertain at best. The dissent also notes that a different part of the Act "established a long-term-care insurance program with guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements, but without an individual mandate or subsidies." Post, at 2503. True enough. But the fact that Congress was willing to accept the risk of adverse selection in a comparatively minor program does not show that Congress was willing to do so in the general health insurance program-the very heart of the Act. Moreover, Congress said expressly that it wanted to avoid adverse selection in the health insurance markets. § 18091(2)(I). The dissent cites several provisions that "make[ ] taxpayers of all States eligible for a credit, only to provide later that the amount of the credit may be zero." Post, at 2501 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 24, 32, 35, 36 ). None of those provisions, however, is crucial to the viability of a comprehensive program like the Affordable Care Act. No one suggests, for example, that the first-time-homebuyer tax credit, § 36, is essential to the viability of federal housing regulation.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ECCLES et al. v. PEOPLES BANK OF LAKEWOOD VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA. No. 101. Argued December 9, 1947. Decided March 15, 1948. /. Leonard Townsend argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Robert L. Stern and George B. Vest. Samuel B. Stewart, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Luther E. Birdzell. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955, 28 U. S. C. § 400. Its aim is to have declared invalid a condition under which the respondent became a member of the Federal Reserve System. The California State Banking Commission authorized the establishment of the respondent provided it obtained federal deposit insurance. This requirement could be met either by direct application to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or through membership in the Federal Reserve System. § 12 B (e) and (f) of the Federal Reserve Act, 48 Stat. 162, 170, 49 Stat. 684, 687, 12 U. S. C. § 264 (e) and (f). Respondent sought such membership but its application was rejected. The promoters of the Bank, having requested the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to reconsider the application for membership, were advised that favorable action depended on a showing that the Transamerica Corporation, a powerful bank holding company, did not have, nor was intended to have, any interest in this Bank. Having been satisfied on this point, the Board of Governors granted membership to respondent subject to conditions of which the fourth is the bone of contention in this litigation. This condition reads as follows: “4. If, without prior written approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Trans-america Corporation or any unit of the Transamerica group, including Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, or any holding company affiliate or any subsidiary thereof, acquires, directly or indirectly, through the mechanism of extension of loans for the purpose of acquiring bank stock, or in any other manner, any interest in such bank, other than such as may arise out of usual correspondent bank relationships, such bank, within 60 days after written notice from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, shall withdraw from membership in the Federal Reserve System.” The Board of Governors gave the respondent this explanation for the condition: “The application for membership has been approved upon representations that the bank is a bona fide local independent institution and that no holding company group has any interest in the bank at the time of its admission to membership, and that the directors and stockholders of the bank have no plans, commitments or understandings looking toward a change in the status of the bank as a local independent institution. Condition of membership numbered 4 is designed to maintain that status.” Some time later, in 1944, Transamerica, without prior knowledge of the respondent, acquired 540 of the 5,000 shares of its outstanding stock. The Bank duly advised the Board of Governors of this fact, but requested that it be relieved of Condition No. 4. This, the Board of Governors declined to do. Then followed this action, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, against the Board of Governors for a declaration that Condition No. 4 was invalid and for an injunction against its enforcement. A motion by the defendants to dismiss the complaint, in that it failed to set forth a justiciable controversy, was denied. 64 F. Supp. 811. The defendants answered, claiming that the Bank’s acceptance of membership barred it from questioning the validity of Condition No. 4, and that in any case the condition was valid, and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Bank, having filed a number of affidavits, moved for summary judgment. The District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that the Bank was bound by the condition on which it had accepted membership in the Federal Reserve System, and gave judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, one judge dissenting, reversed. It rejected the defense of estoppel and sustained the validity of the condition “only as a statement that, if the Board of Governors should determine, after hearing, that Trans-america’s ownership of the bank’s shares has resulted in a change for the worse in the character of the bank’s personnel, in its banking policies, in the safety of its deposits or in any other substantial way, it may require the bank to withdraw from the Federal Reserve System.” 161 F. 2d 636, 643-44. Accordingly, it remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a judgment construing Condition No. 4 to such effect. Since this ruling involves a matter of importance to the administration of the Federal Reserve Act, we brought the case here. 332 U. S. 755. Condition No. 4 provides for withdrawal from membership in the Federal Reserve System, for violation of its provisions, “within 60 days after written notice from the Board of Governors . . . .” Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Board of Governors to revoke the membership status of a bank “after hearing.” If the case contained no more than the foregoing elements, three questions would emerge: (1) Was this action premature, brought as it was before the Board of Governors commenced revocation proceedings? (2) If not, could the respondent attack the validity of a condition on the basis of which it had been accepted, and had enjoyed, membership? Compare Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 255. (3) If so, did the Board of Governors have power to impose the condition as a means of guarding against acquisition by Transamerica of an interest in respondent? However, with due regard for the considerations that should guide us in rendering a declaratory judgment, the record as a whole requires us to dispose of the case without reaching any of these questions. Extended correspondence between Marriner S. Eccles, the then Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and A. P. Giannini, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Transamerica, together with the testimony of Eccles before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, set forth the reason for the Board’s insistence on the fourth condition. The Board sought to block “acquisition by Transamerica of stock in independent unit banks, especially when it constitutes a means of evading the requirements of the Federal agencies who will not permit its banks to establish additional branches.” Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, on H. R. 2634, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 15. The Board was concerned not that Transamerica might purchase some shares of independent banks for the ordinary purposes of investment, but that it would buy into banks in order to acquire control, and thereby turn banks, though outwardly independent, into parts of its own banking network. The Board of Governors was therefore carrying out the policy underlying Condition No. 4 when it formally disavowed any intention to invoke that condition against respondent merely because of acquisition by Transamerica of an interest in the Bank, with no indication of subversion of its independence. This action by the Board was taken after it had satisfied itself that Transamerica’s holding did not affect the Bank’s control. The Bank had vigorously insisted on its continued independence, in urging upon the Board the harmlessness of Transamerica’s ownership of some of the Bank’s stock, and the Board, upon independent investigation found such to be the fact. Accordingly, the Board concluded that “the public interest” called for no action. A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest. Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U. S. 491; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297-98; H. R. Rep. No. 1264, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) pp. 312-14. It is always the duty of a court of equity to strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the consequences of giving the desired relief. Especially where governmental action is involved, courts should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or speculative. The actuality of the plaintiff’s need for a declaration of his rights is therefore of decisive importance. And so we turn to the facts of the case at bar. The Bank has always insisted that it is independent of Transamerica; the Board of Governors has sustained the claim. The Bank stands on its right to remain in the Federal Reserve System; the Board acknowledges that right. The Bank disclaims any intention to give up its independence; the Board of Governors, having imposed the condition to safeguard this independence, disavows any action to terminate the Bank’s membership, so long as the Bank maintains the independence on which it insists. What the Bank really fears, and for which it now seeks relief, is that under changed conditions, at some future time, it may be required to withdraw from membership, and if this happens, so the argument runs, the Comptroller of the Currency, one of the Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, has agreed with the Federal Reserve Board to refuse any application by the Bank for deposit insurance as a non-member. Thus the Bank seeks a declaration of its rights if it should lose its independence, or if the Board of Governors should reverse its policy and seek to invoke the condition even though the Bank remains independent and if then the Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation should not change their policy not to grant deposit insurance to the Bank as a non-member of the Federal Reserve System. The concurrence of these contingent events, necessary for injury to be realized, is too speculative to warrant anticipatory judicial determinations. Courts should avoid passing on questions of public law even short of constitutionality that are not immediately pressing. Many of the same reasons are present which impel them to abstain from adjudicating constitutional claims against a statute before it effectively and presently impinges on such claims. It appears that the respondent could, if it wished, protect itself from the loss of its independence through adoption of by-laws forbidding any further sale or pledge of its shares to Transamerica or its affiliates. See California Corporations Code, L. 1947, c. 1038, § 501 (g). To this the Bank replies that even if its independence is maintained, the Board of Governors may change its policy, and seek enforcement of Condition No. 4, whether or not such enforcement is required by “the public interest” in having independent banks, which the condition now serves. Such an argument reveals the hypothetical character of the injury on the existence of which a jurisdiction rooted in discretion is to be exercised. In the light of all this, the difficulties deduced from the present uncertainty regarding the future enforcement of the condition, possibly leading to uninsured deposits, are too tenuous to call for adjudication of important issues of public law. We are asked to contemplate as a serious danger that a body entrusted with some of the most delicate and grave responsibilities in our Government will change a deliberately formulated policy after urging it on this Court against the Bank’s standing to ask for relief. A determination of administrative authority may of course be made at the behest of one so immediately and truly injured by a regulation claimed to be invalid, that his need is sufficiently compelling to justify judicial intervention even before the completion of the administrative process. But, as we have seen, the Bank's grievance here is too remote and insubstantial, too speculative in nature, to justify an injunction against the Board of Governors, and therefore equally inappropriate for a declaration of rights. This is especially true in view of the type of proof offered by the Bank. Its claims of injury were supported entirely by affidavits. Judgment on issues of public moment based on such evidence, not subject to probing by judge and opposing counsel, is apt to be treacherous. Caution is appropriate against the subtle tendency to decide public issues free from the safeguards of critical scrutiny of the facts, through use of a declaratory summary judgment. Modern equity practice has tended away from a procedure based on affidavits and interrogatories, because of its proven insufficiencies. Equity Rule 46 forbade such practice save in exceptional cases. See Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U. S. 701; cf. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 (a). Again, not the least of the evils that led to the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the frequent practice of issuing labor injunctions upon the basis of affidavits rather than after oral proof presented in open court. See Amidon, J., in Great Northern R. Co. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 416; Swan, J., in Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 29 F. 2d 679, 681-82. Where administrative intention is expressed but has not yet come to fruition (Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 324), or where that intention is unknown (Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 429-30), we have held that the controversy is not yet ripe for equitable intervention. Surely, when a body such as the Federal Reserve Board has not only not asserted a challenged power but has expressly disclaimed its intention to go beyond the legitimate “public interest” confided to it, a court should stay its hand. Judgment reversed. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “If at any time it shall appear to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System that a member bank has failed to comply with the provisions of this section or the regulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System made pursuant thereto, or has ceased to exercise banking functions without a receiver or liquidating agent having been appointed therefor, it shall be within the power of the board after hearing to require such bank to surrender its stock in the Federal reserve bank and to forfeit all rights and privileges of membership. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may restore membership upon due proof of compliance with the conditions imposed by this section.” 38 Stat. 251, 260, as amended, 46 Stat. 250, 251, 49 Stat. 684, 704, 12 U. S. C. § 327. See also § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 239, 5 U. S. C. § 1004. The following is an extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Board on January 28,1946: “Upon consideration of the latest report of examination of the Peoples Bank, Lakewood Village, California, from which the Board concluded that there had been no substantial change in the control, management or policy of the bank resulting from the acquisition by Transamerica Corporation of certain shares of the bank’s stock, the Board, by unanimous vote, decided that there was no present need in the public interest for any action by the Board with respect to the condition of membership of the bank relating to acquisition of its stock by Transamerica Corporation.” “501. The by-laws of a corporation may make provisions not in conflict with law or its articles for: “(g) Special qualifications of persons who may be shareholders, and reasonable restrictions upon the right to transfer or hypothecate shares.” Likewise, the shareholders, or such of them as chose to, could presumably bind themselves not to sell or pledge to Transamerica, and by noting this agreement on their certificates could bind their transferees. Cf. Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706. The bank asserted, in its affidavits, not that lack of confidence had deterred depositors, but that deposits had been so heavy that capital expansion was in order, but might be disadvantaged by fear of prospective investors to risk personal assessment if deposits were uninsured.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. WALTON MANUFACTURING CO. et al. No. 77. Argued March 19, 1962. Decided April 9, 1962. Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner in both cases. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Stuart Rothman, Dominick L. Manoli, Frederick U. Reel, Russell Specter and Allan I. Mendelsohn. Robert T. Thompson argued the cause for respondents in No. 77. With him on the briefs was Alexander E. Wilson, Jr. O. R. T. Bowden argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent in No. 94. Together with No. 94, National Labor Relations Board v. Florida Citrus Canners Cooperative, also on certiorari to the same Court, argued March 19-20, 1962. Per Curiam. These cases are here on petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which refused enforcement of orders of the Board. We granted certiorari (368 U. S. 810, 812) because there was a seeming noncompliance by that court with our admonitions in Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474. We there said that while the “reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board’s view,” it may not “displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Id., at 488. Each of these cases involves alleged discriminatory discharges of employees in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (3); and in each the Board ordered, inter alia, reinstatement of the workers in question with back pay. See 124 N. L. R. B. 1331, 124 N. L. R. B. 1182. In that type of case the Fifth Circuit has fashioned a special rule that was announced in Labor Board v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., 122 F. 2d 433, a decision rendered in 1941. In case of a cease-and-desist order, the court said that it generally “costs no money and only warns to observe a right which already existed; evidence short of demonstration may easily justify such an order.” Id., at 438. But the court established a more onerous rule for reinstatement cases: “Orders for reinstatement of employees with back pay are somewhat different. They may impoverish or break an employer, and while they are not in law penal orders, they are in the nature of penalties for the infraction of law. The evidence to justify them ought therefore to be substantial, and surmise or suspicion, even though reasonable, is not enough. The duty to weigh and test the evidence is of course on the Board. This court may not overrule a fact conclusion supported by substantial evidence, even though we deem it incorrect under all the evidence. ... In the matters now concerning us, the controlling and ultimate fact question is the true reason which governed the very person who discharged or refused to reemploy in each instance. There is no doubt that each employee here making complaint was discharged, or if laid off was not reemployed, and that he was at the time a member of the union. In each case such membership may have been the cause, for the union was not welcomed by the persons having authority to discharge and employ. If no other reason is apparent, union membership may logically be inferred. Even though the discharger disavows it under oath, if he can assign no other credible motive or cause, he need not be believed. But it remains true that the discharger knows the real cause of discharge, it is a fact to which he may swear. If he says it was not union membership or activity, but something else which in fact existed as a ground, his oath cannot be disregarded because of suspicion that he may be lying. There must be impeachment of him, or substantial contradiction, or if circumstances raise doubts, they must be inconsistent with the positive sworn evidence on the exact point.” Id., at 438-439. This special rule concerning the weight of the evidence necessary to sustain the Board’s orders for reinstatement with back pay has been repeatedly followed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in decisions refusing enforcement of that particular type of order. See Labor Board v. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 130 F. 2d 260; Labor Board v. Alco Feed Mills, 133 F. 2d 419; Labor Board v. Ingram, 273 F. 2d 670; Labor Board v. Allure Shoe Corp., 277 F. 2d 231; Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., v. Labor Board, 296 F. 2d 617. The Court of Appeals in No. 77, Labor Board v. Walton Mfg. Co., 286 F. 2d 16, 25, in resolving the issue of credibility between witnesses for the employer and witnesses for the union, as to the reasons for the discharge of the employees in question, relied on the test stated in Labor Board v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., supra. In No. 94, Labor Board v. Florida Citrus Canners Cooperative, 288 F. 2d 630, decided less than three months later, the Tex-O-Kan opinion was not mentioned. But its test of credibility of witnesses seemingly was applied. 288 F. 2d, at 636-638. There is no place in the statutory scheme for one test of the substantiality of evidence in reinstatement cases and another test in other cases. Labor Board v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 340 U. S. 498, and the Universal Camera Corp. case, both decided the same day, were cases involving reinstatement. They state a rule for review by Courts of Appeals in all Labor Board cases. The test in the Tex-O-Kan opinion for reinstatement cases is that the employer’s statement under oath must be believed unless there is “impeachment of him” or “substantial contradiction,” or if there are “circumstances” that “raise doubts” they must be “inconsistent with the positive sworn evidence on the exact point.” But the Examiner — the one whose appraisal of the testimony was discredited by the Court of Appeals in the Florida Citrus Canners Cooperative case — sees the witnesses and hears them testify, while the Board and the reviewing court look only at cold records. As we said in the Universal Camera case: “. . . The findings of the examiner are to be considered along with the consistency and inherent probability of testimony. The significance of his report, of course, depends largely on the importance of credibility in the particular case.” 340 U. S., at 496. For the demeanor of a witness “. . . may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the witness’ testimony is not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story; for the denial of one, who has a motive to deny, may be uttered with such hesitation, discomfort, arrogance or defiance, as to give assurance that he is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies.” Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F. 2d 265, 269. We are in doubt as to how the Court of Appeals would have decided these two cases were it rid of the yardstick for reinstatement proceedings fashioned in its Tex-O-Kan decision. The reviewing function has been deposited, not here, but in the Court of Appeals, as the Universal Camera case makes clear. We “will intervene only . . . when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.” 340 U. S., at 491. Since the special rule for reinstatement cases announced in the Tex-O-Kan opinion apparently colored the review given by the Court of Appeals of these two orders, we remand the cases to it for reconsideration. Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AIR COURIER CONFERENCE OF AMERICA v. AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, et al. No. 89-1416. Argued November 28, 1990 Decided February 26, 1991 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O’ConnoR, Sc alia, Kennedy, and SouteR, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 531. L. Peter Farkas argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was James I. Campbell, Jr. Paul J. Lar-kin, Jr., argued the cause for the United States Postal Service, respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.4, in support of petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Roberts, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Michael Jay Singer, and Jeffrica Jenkins Lee. Keith E. Secular argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Anton G. Hajjar and Laurence Gold. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to decide whether postal employees are within the “zone of interests” of the group of statutes known as the Private Express Statutes (PES), so that they may challenge the action of the United States Postal Service in suspending the operation of the PES with respect to a practice of private courier services called “international remailing.” We hold that they are not. Since its establishment, the United States Postal Service has exercised a monopoly over the carriage of letters in and from the United States. The postal monopoly is codified in the PES, 18 U. S. C. §§1693-1699 and 39 U. S. C. §§601-606. The monopoly was created by Congress as a revenue protection measure for the Postal Service to enable it to fulfill its mission. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U. S. 589, 598 (1988). It prevents private competitors from offering service on low-cost routes at prices below those of the Postal Service, while leaving the Service with high-cost routes and insufficient means to fulfill its mandate of providing uniform rates and service to patrons in all areas, including those that are remote or less populated. See J. Haldi, Postal Monopoly: An Assessment of the Private Express Statutes 9 (1974); Craig & Alvis, The Postal Monopoly: Two Hundred Years of Covering Commercial as Well as Personal Messages, 12 U. S. F. L. Rev. 57, 60, and n. 8 (1977). A provision of the PES allows the Postal Service to “suspend [the PES restrictions] upon any mail route where the public interest requires the suspension.” 39 U. S. C. § 601(b). In 1979, the Postal Service suspended the PES restrictions for “extremely urgent letters,” thereby allowing overnight delivery of letters by private courier services. 39 CFR § 320.6 (1990); 44 Fed. Reg. 61178 (1979). Private courier services, including members of petitioner-intervenor Air Courier Conference of America, relied on that suspension to engage in a practice called “international remailing.” This entails bypassing the Postal Service and using private courier systems to deposit with foreign postal systems letters destined for foreign addresses. Believing this international remailing was a misuse of the urgent-letter suspension, the Postal Service issued a proposed modification and clarification of its regulation in order to make clear that the suspension for extremely urgent letters did not cover this practice. 50 Fed. Reg. 41462 (1985). The comments received in response to the proposed rule were overwhelmingly negative and focused on the perceived benefits of international remailing: Lower cost, faster delivery, greater reliability, and enhanced ability of United States companies to remain competitive in the international market. Because of the vigorous opposition to the proposed rule, the Postal Service agreed to reconsider its position and instituted a rulemaking “to remove the cloud” over the validity of the international remailing services. 51 Fed. Reg. 9852, 9853 (1986). After receiving additional comments and holding a public meeting on the subject, on June 17, 1986, the Postal Service issued a proposal to suspend operation of the PES for international remailing. Id., at 21929-21932. Additional comments were received, and after consideration of the record it had compiled, the Postal Service issued a final rule suspending the operation of the PES with respect to international remailing. Id., at 29637. Respondents, the American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, and the National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (Unions), sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the international remailing regulation pursuant to the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 702. They claimed that the rulemaking record was inadequate to support a finding that the suspension of the PES for international remailing was in the public interest. Petitioner Air Courier Conference of America (ACCA) intervened. On December 20, 1988, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Postal Service and ACCA. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 701 F. Supp. 880 (1988). The Unions appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and that court vacated the grant of summary judgment. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 282 U. S. App. D. C. 5, 891 F. 2d 304 (1989). It held that the Unions satisfied the zone-of-interests requirement for APA review under Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987), and that the Postal Service’s regulation was arbitrary and capricious because it relied on too narrow an interpretation of “the public interest.” In determining that the Unions’ interest in employment opportunities was protected by the PES, the Court of Appeals noted that the PES were reenacted as part of the Postal Reorganization Act (PRA), Pub. L. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719, codified at 39 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. The Court of Appeals found that a “key impetus” and “principal purpose” of the PRA was “to implement various labor reforms that would improve pay, working conditions and labor-management relations for postal employees.” 282 U. S. App. D. C., at 10-11, 891 F. 2d, at 309-310. Reasoning that “[t]he Unions’ asserted interest is embraced directly by the labor reform provisions of the PRA,” id., at 11, 891 F. 2d, at 310, and that “[t]he PES constitute the linchpin in a statutory scheme concerned with maintaining an effective, financially viable Postal Service,” ibid., the court concluded that “[t]he interplay between the PES and the entire PRA persuades us that there is an ‘arguable’ or ‘plausible’ relationship between the purposes of the PES and the interests of the Union[s].” Ibid. The Court of Appeals also held that “the revenue protective purposes of the PES, standing alone, plausibly relate to the Unions’ interest in preventing the reduction of employment opportunities,” since “postal workers benefit from the PES’s function in ensuring a sufficient revenue base” for the Postal Service’s activities. Ibid. Addressing the merits of the Unions’ challenge to the suspension order, the Court of Appeals held that it was arbitrary and capricious because the Postal Service had applied §601(b)’s public interest test too narrowly by considering only the benefits of the international remail rule to the small segment of the Postal Service’s consumer base that engages in international commerce. We granted certiorari, 496 U. S. 904 (1990), and we now reverse. The United States Postal Service, nominally a respondent, argues along with ACCA that the Unions do not have standing to challenge the Postal Service’s suspension of the PES for international remailing. The Postal Service argues now that Congress precluded judicial review of Postal Service action under the APA by enacting 39 U. S. C. § 410(a), which the Postal Service contends provides that Chapters 5 and 7 of Title 5 do not apply to the Postal Service. Chapters 5 and 7 of Title 5 are the provisions of the APA dealing with “Administrative Procedure” (Chapter 5) and “Judicial Review” (Chapter 7). The Postal Service raised this argument for the first time in its brief in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari. It was not argued to either of the lower courts, and was not considered by either court below in deciding this case. This issue was not raised by ACCA in its petition for writ of certiorari, nor is it encompassed by the questions presented upon which we based our grant of certiorari. Consequently, we decline to decide whether § 410(a) exempts the Postal Service from judicial review under the APA. To establish standing to sue under the APA, respondents must establish that they have suffered a legal wrong because of the challenged agency action, or are adversely affected or “aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” 5U. S. C. §702. Once they have shown that they are adversely affected, i. e., have suffered an “injury in fact,” see Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984), the Unions must show that they are within the zone of interests sought to be protected through the PES. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871 (1990); Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). Specifically, “the plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.” Lujan, supra, at 883 (citing Clarke, supra, at 396-397). The District Court found that the Unions had satisfied the injury-in-fact test because increased competition through international remailing services might have an adverse effect on employment opportunities of postal workers. This finding of injury in fact was not appealed. The question before us, then, is whether the adverse effect on the employment opportunities of postal workers resulting from the suspension is within the zone of interests encompassed by the PES — the statutes which the Unions assert the Postal Service has violated in promulgating the international remailing rule. The Court of Appeals found that the Unions had standing because “the revenue protective purposes of the PES, standing alone, plausibly relate to the Unions’ interest in preventing the reduction of employment opportunities.” 282 U. S. App. D. C., at 11, 891 F. 2d, at 310. This view is mistaken, for it conflates the zone-of-interests test with injury in fact. In Lujan, this Court gave the following example illustrating how injury in fact does not necessarily mean one is within the zone of interests to be protected by a given statute: “[T]he failure of an agency to comply with a statutory provision requiring ‘on the record’ hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the company that has the contract to record and transcribe the agency’s proceedings; but since the provision was obviously enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the proceedings and not those of the reporters, that company would not be ‘adversely affected within the meaning’ of the statute.” 497 U. S., at 883. We must inquire, then, as to Congress’ intent in enacting the PES in order to determine whether postal workers were meant to be within the zone of interests protected by those statutes. The particular language of the statutes provides no support for respondents’ assertion that Congress intended to protect jobs with the Postal Service. In fact, the provisions of 18 U. S. C. § 1696(c), allowing private conveyance of letters if done on a one-time basis or without compensation, and 39 U. S. C. § 601(a), allowing letters to be carried out of the mails if certain procedures are followed, indicate that the congressional concern was not with opportunities for postal workers but with the receipt of necessary revenues for the Postal Service. Nor does the history of this legislation — such as it is — indicate that the PES were intended for the benefit of postal workers. When the first statutes limiting private carriage of letters on post roads were enacted in 1792, the Post Office offered no pickup or delivery services. See C. Scheele, A Short History of the Mail Service 66, 91 (1970). Statutory authority to employ letter carriers was not enacted until two years later and was largely ignored until the late 1820’s. Id., at 66. The 1792 restrictions on private carriage protected the Government’s capital investment in the post roads, not the jobs of as yet virtually nonexistent postal employees. In 1825 and 1827, Acts were passed prohibiting the private carriage of letters through the use of stages or other vehicles, packet boats, or other vessels, § 19, ch. 64 of Act of March 3, 1825, 4 Stat. 107, and foot and horse posts, § 3, ch. 61 of Act of March 2, 1827, 4 Stat. 238. Postal employees cannot have been within the zone of interests of either the 1824 or 1827 Acts; those Acts targeted transportation of mail which even then was contracted out to private carriers. See W. Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of the Common Life 150 (1972). Congress’ consideration of the 1845 Act was the only occasion on which the postal monopoly was the subject of substantial debate. The 1845 statute, entitled “An Act to reduce the rates of postage, to limit the use and correct the abuse of the franking privilege, and for the prevention of frauds on the revenues of the Post Office Department,” 5 Stat. 732, was the result of three circumstances, none of which involved the interests of postal employees. First, the Post Office Department continued to run substantial deficits in spite of high postage rates. H. R. Rep. No. 477, 28th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3, 5 (1844). Second, high postal rates enabled private expresses to make substantial inroads into the domestic market for delivery of letters and the 1825 and 1827 Acts proved unsuccessful in prosecuting them. Priest, The History of the Postal Monopoly in the United States, 18 J. Law & Econ. 33, 60 (1975) (citing United States v. Gray, 26 F. Cas. 18 (No. 15,253) (Mass. 1840), and United States v. Adams, 24 F. Cas. 761 (No. 14,421) (SDNY 1843)). Third, inauguration of the “penny post” in England quadrupled use of the mails, and it was thought that a substantial reduction in American postal rates would have the dual virtues of driving private expresses out of business and increasing mail volume of the Post Office. This, in turn, would help reduce the Post Office’s deficit. Cong. Globe, 28th Cong., 2d Sess., 213 (1845) (remarks of Sens. Simmons and Breese). See also H. R. Rep. No. 477, supra, at 5. The legislative history of the sections of the Act limiting private carriage of letters shows a two-fold purpose. First, the Postmaster General and the States most distant from the commercial centers of the Northeast believed that the postal monopoly was necessary to prevent users of faster private expresses from taking advantage of early market intelligence and news of international affairs that had not yet reached the general populace through the slower mails. S. Doc. No. 66, 28th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1845). Second, it was thought to be the duty of the Government to serve outlying, frontier areas, even if it meant doing so below cost. H. R. Rep. No. 477, supra, at 2-3. Thus, the revenue protection provisions were not seen as an end in themselves, nor in any sense as a means of ensuring certain levels of public employment, but rather were seen as the means to achieve national integration and to ensure that all areas of the Nation were equally served by the Postal Service. The PES enable the Postal Service to fulfill its responsibility to provide service to all communities at a unifprm rate by preventing private courier services from competing selectively with the Postal Service on its most profitable routes. If competitors could serve the lower cost segment of the market, leaving the Postal Service to handle the high-cost services, the Service would lose lucrative portions of its business, thereby increasing its average unit cost and requiring higher prices to all users. See Report of the President’s Commission on Postal Organization, Towards Postal Excellence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 (Comm. Print 1968). The postal monopoly, therefore, exists to ensure that postal services will be provided to the citizenry at large, and not to secure employment for postal workers. The Unions’ claim on the merits is that the Postal Service has failed to comply with the mandate of 39 U. S. C. § 601(b) that the PES be suspended only if the public interest requires. The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the PES were not designed to protect postal employment or further postal job opportunities, but the Unions argue that the courts should look beyond the PES to the entire 1970 PR A in applying the zone-of-interests test. The Unions argue that because one of the purposes of the labor-management provisions of the PRA was to stablize labor-management relations within the Postal Service, and because the PES is the “linchpin” of the Postal Service, employment opportunities of postal workers are arguably within the zone of interests covered by the PES. The Unions rely upon our opinion in Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987), to support this contention. Clarke is the most recent in a series of cases in which we have held that competitors of regulated entities have standing to challenge regulations. Clarke, supra; Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617 (1971); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). In Clarke, we said that “we are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the National Bank Act.” 479 U. S., at 401. This statement, like all others in our opinions, must be taken in the context in which it was made. In the next paragraph of the opinion, the Court pointed out that 12 U. S. C. §36, which the plaintiffs in that case claimed had been misinterpreted by the Comptroller, was itself “a limited exception to the otherwise applicable requirement of [12 U. S. C.] §81,” limiting the places at which a national bank could transact business to its headquarters and any “branches” permitted by §36. Thus the zone-of-interests test was to be applied not merely in the light of § 36, which was the basis of the plaintiffs’ claim on the merits, but also in the light of § 81, to which § 36 was an exception. The situation in the present case is quite different. The only relationship between the PES, upon which the Unions rely for their claim on the merits, and the labor-management provisions of the PRA, upon which the Unions rely for their standing, is that both were included in the general codification of postal statutes embraced in the PRA. The statutory provisions enacted and reenacted in the PRA are spread over some 65 pages in the United States Code and take up an entire title of that volume. We said in Lujan that “the relevant statute [under the APA] of course, is the statute whose violation is the gravamen of the complaint.” 497 U. S., at 886. To adopt the unions’ contention would require us to hold that the “relevant statute” in this case is the PRA, with all of its various provisions united only by the fact that they deal with the Postal Service. But to accept this level of generality in defining the “relevant statute” could deprive the zone-of-interests test of virtually all meaning. Unlike the two sections of the National Bank Act discussed in Clarke, supra, none of the provisions of the PES have any integral relationship with the labor-management provisions of the PRA. When it enacted the PRA, Congress made no substantive changes to those portions of the PES codified in the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1693-1699; Congress readopted without change those portions of the PES codified in the Postal Service Code, 39 U. S. C. §§601-606; and Congress required the Postal Service to conduct a 2-year study and reevaluation of the PES before deciding whether those laws should be modified or repealed. PRA, Pub. L. 91-375, §7, 84 Stat. 783; S. Rep. No. 91-912, p. 22 (1970); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1104, p. 48 (1970). None of the documents constituting the PRA legislative history suggest that those concerned with postal reforms saw any connection between the PES and the provisions of the PRA dealing with labor-management relations. The Senate and House Reports simply note that the proposed bills continue existing law without change and require the Postal Service to conduct a study of the PES. The Court of Appeals referred to the PES as the “linchpin” of the Postal Service, which it may well be; but it stretches the zone-of-interests test too far to say that because of that fact those who a different part of the PRA was designed to benefit may challenge a violation of the PES. It would be a substantial extension of our holdings in Clarke, supra, Data Processing, supra, and Investment Co. Institute, supra, to allow the Unions in this case to leapfrog from their asserted protection under the labor-management provisions of the PRA to their claim on the merits under the PES. We decline to make that extension, and hold that the Unions do not have standing to challenge the Postal Service’s suspension of the PES to permit private couriers to engage in international remailing. We therefore do not reach the merits of the Unions’ claim that the suspension was not in the public interest. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Title 39 U. S. C. § 410 provides in pertinent part: “[N]o Federal law dealing with public or Federal contracts, property, works, officers, employees, budgets, or funds, including the provisions of chapters 5 and 7 of title 5, shall apply to the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service.” The questions presented in this case are as follows: “1. Are postal employees within the ‘zone of interest’ of the Private Express Statutes that establish and allow the United States Postal Service to suspend restrictions on the private carriage of letters when ‘the public interest requires?’ “2. Did the Postal Service act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously in promulgating its international remail regulation under the ‘public interest’ standard for suspending the Private Express Statutes where it found no adverse effects on revenues and found general benefits to the public, competition, and users of remail services?” Brief for Petitioner i. The Postal Service argues that since “congressional preclusion of judicial review is in effect jurisdictional,” Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 353, n. 4 (1984), the issue cannot be waived by the parties. We do not agree. Section 410, at most, exempts the Postal Service from the APA. The judicial review provisions of the APA are not jurisdictional, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977), so a defense based on exemption from the APA can be waived by the Government. Whether § 410(a) exempts the Postal Service from APA review is in essence a question whether Congress intended to allow a certain cause of action against the Postal Service. Whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction, and may be assumed without being decided. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 476, n. 5 (1979). Title 18 U. S. C. § 1696 provides: “Private express for letters and packets “(a) Whoever establishes any private express for the conveyance of letters or packets, or in any manner causes or provides for the conveyance of the same by regular trips or at stated periods over any post route which is or may be established by law, or from any city, town, or place to any other city, town, or place, between which the mail is regularly carried, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. “(b) Whoever transmits by private express or other unlawful means, or delivers to any agent thereof, or deposits at any appointed place, for the purpose of being so transmitted any letter or packet, shall be fined not more than $50. “(c) This chapter shall not prohibit the conveyance or transmission of letters or packets by private hands without compensation, or by special messenger employed for the particular occasion only. Whenever more than twenty-five such letters or packets are conveyed or transmitted by such special messenger, the requirements of section 601 of title 39, shall be observed as to each piece.” Title 39 U. S. C. § 601 provides: “Letters carried out of the mail “(a) A letter may be carried out of the mails when— “(1) it is enclosed in an envelope; “(2) the amount of postage which would have been charged on the letter if it had been sent by mail is paid by stamps, or postage meter stamps, on the envelope; “(3) the envelope is properly addressed; “(4) the envelope is so sealed that the letter cannot be taken from it without defacing the envelope; “(5) any stamps on the envelope are canceled in ink by the sender; and “(6) the date of the letter, of its transmission or receipt by the carrier is endorsed on the envelope in ink. “(b) The Postal Service may suspend the operation of any part of this section upon any mail route where the public interest requires the suspension.” The PES are competition statutes that regulate the conduct of competitors of the Postal Service. The postal employees for whose benefit the Unions have brought suit here are not competitors of either the Postal Service or remailers. Employees have generally been denied standing to enforce competition laws because they lack competitive and direct injury. See, e. g., Adams v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 264 U. S. App. D. C. 174, 828 F. 2d 24 (1987) (former airline employees denied standing to assert antitrust claim against airline that allegedly drove their former employer out of business), cert, denied sub nom. Union de Transports Aeriens v. Beckman, 485 U. S. 934 (1988); Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 687 F. 2d 336 (CA10) (employees of corporation injured by anti-competitive conduct denied standing under antitrust laws), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1090 (1982).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LERNER v. CASEY et al., CONSTITUTING THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY. No. 165. Argued March 4, 1958. Decided June 30, 1958. Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Victor Rabinowitz. Daniel T. Scannell argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Helen R. Cassidy and Edward L. Cox, Jr. Ruth Kessler Toch, Assistant Attorney General, argued • the cause for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. . With her on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Paxton Blair, Solicitor General. David I. Shapiro and Stephen C. Vladeck filed a brief for the New York Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. MR. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises questions under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States concerning the validity of appellant’s dismissal from his position as a subway conductor in the New York City Transit System. The dismissal was pursuant to the Security Risk Law of the State of New York, N. Y. Laws 1951, c. 233, as amended, N. Y. Laws 1954, c. 105. The Security Risk Law, enacted by New York in 1951, provides in pertinent part as follows: The State Civil Service Commission is authorized to classify any bureau or agency within the State as a “security agency” (§3), defined as any unit of government “. . . wherein functions are performed which are necessary to the security or defense of the nation and the state . . . .” (§2.) The appointing authority in each such agency is given powers of suspension and dismissal as to any employee if, after investigation, it is found that, . . upon all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that, because of doubtful trust and reliability, the employment of such person . . . [in a security agency] would endanger the security or defense of the nation and the state” (§5). Such evidence is not to be restricted by normal rules prevailing in the courts, and the required finding may be based upon an employee’s past conduct “. . . which may include, . . . but shall not be limited to evidence of . . . (d) membership in any organization or group found by the state civil service commission to be subversive” (§ 7). A discharged employee has a right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, which may take further evidence (§6). In November 1953 the Commission determined the New York City Transit Authority, which the appellees in this case constitute, to be a “security agency,” and in March 1954 it listed the Communist Party of the United States as a “subversive group,” adopting, as contemplated by the Security Risk Law, the similar listing of the State Board of Regents made under the provisions of the Feinberg Law, N. Y. Laws 1949, c. 360, after hearings at which the Party appeared by counsel. In September 1954 appellant was summoned to the office of the Commissioner of Investigation of the City of New York in the course of an investigation being conducted under the Security Risk Law. Appellant, who had been sworn, was asked whether he was then a member of the Communist Party, but he refused to answer and claimed his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. After he had been advised of the provisions of the Security Risk Law and given time to reconsider his refusal and to engage counsel, appellant, accompanied by counsel, made two further appearances in September and October before the Department of Investigation, on each of which he adhered to his initial position. Appellees, informed of these events, thereupon adopted a resolution suspending appellant without pay and sent him a copy of the resolution with a covering letter. This letter notified appellant that his suspension followed a finding under § 5 of the Security Risk Law . . that upon all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that, because of doubtful trust and reliability . . . ,” appellant’s continued employment would endanger national and state security. This finding was based on appellant’s refusal “. . . to answer questions as to whether or not he was a member of the Communist Party and [invocation of] the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States . . . .” Appellant was also advised, pursuant to § 5 of the Security Risk Law, that he had thirty days within which to submit statements or affidavits showing why he should be reinstated. At the expiration of this period appellees, having heard nothing further from appellant, dismissed him from his position by a resolution which confirmed the previous “suspension” findings. Appellant did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission, as was his statutory right, but brought this proceeding in the state courts for reinstatement. He attacked appellees’ actions on various grounds, including the constitutional grounds asserted here. The State Supreme Court, assuming jurisdiction despite appellant’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, upheld the Security Risk Law and its application to appellant as constitutional, ruled adversely to appellant’s state law contentions, and dismissed the proceeding. 138 N. Y. S. 2d 777. The Appellate Division, 2 App. Div. 2d 1, 154 N. Y. S. 2d 461 (2d Dept.), and the Court of Appeals, 2 N. Y. 2d 355, 141 N. E. 2d 533, both affirmed, each by a divided court. An appeal to this Court was brought under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), and we postponed to the hearing on the merits the question of our jurisdiction. 355 U. S. 803. As will appear from this opinion, we consider that the constitutional questions before us relate primarily, and more substantially, to the propriety of the findings made by appellees rather than to the validity of the provisions of the Security Risk Law. Accordingly, we think it the better course to dismiss the appeal, and to treat the papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, which is hereby granted. 28 U. S. C. § 2103. Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 236. We address ourselves initially to appellant’s constitutional challenges to the Security Risk Law in its entirety or to certain of its provisions. It is said that New York’s statute deprives him of procedural due process, in that it provides for dismissal of employees in the first instance without a statutory right to a hearing, opportunity for cross-examination, or disclosure of the evidence on which dismissal is based. However, appellant is in no position to complain of procedural defects in the statute. His own refusal to answer blocked proceedings at his appearances before the Department of Investigation, and more important he failed to pursue his administrative remedy by appealing to and obtaining a hearing before the State Civil Service Commission. Appellant further argues that the Security Risk Law could not be applied to him in 1954 since at that time no public emergency existed which could justify the law. But New York's right to enact legislation to protect its public service against the employment of persons fairly deemed untrustworthy and unreliable, and therefore security risks, can hardly be regarded as constitutionally dependent upon the existence of a public emergency, and we do not think it open to us to inquire into the motives which led the State Legislature to extend the Security Risk Law beyond its original effective period. Nor can we say that it was so irrational as to make it constitutionally impermissible for New York to apply this statute to one employed in the major artery of New York’s transportation system, even though appellant’s daily task was simply to open and shut subway doors. We are not here concerned with the wisdom, but solely with the constitutional validity, of the application of this statute to appellant. Finally, the claim that the statute offends due process because dismissal of an employee may be based on mere present membership in the Communist Party, without regard to the character of such membership, cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, must also fail. Apart from the fact that the statute simply makes membership in an organization found to be subversive one of the elements which may enter into the ultimate determination as to “doubtful trust and reliability,” appellant, as the Court of Appeals viewed the administrative proceedings and as we accordingly treat them here, was not discharged on grounds that he was a party member. We come then to what we consider appellant’s major constitutional claim, which goes to the manner in which the Security Risk Law was applied to him. It is contended that the administrative finding of reasonable grounds for belief that he was “of doubtful trust and reliability,” and therefore a security risk, offends due process. The contention is (1) that the finding rests on an inference, that appellant was a member of the Communist Party, which was drawn from appellant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, and that this inference lacked any rational connection with appellant’s refusal to answer based on the exercise of this constitutional privilege; and (2) that the drawing of such an inference was in any event in derogation of the policy behind the Fifth Amendment privilege and contrary to the teaching of this Court’s decision in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. 551. We think this contention both misconceives the basis on which the Court of Appeals sustained appellant’s dismissal and assumes incorrectly the availability of the Fifth Amendment to appellant in these proceedings. Consequently it must be rejected in both its aspects. As we read its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that appellant had been discharged neither because of any inference of Communist Party membership which was drawn from the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege nor because of the assertion of that constitutional protection, but rather because of the doubt created as to his “reliability” by his refusal to answer a relevant question put by his employer, a doubt which the court held justifiable quite independently of appellant’s reasons for his silence. In effect, the administrative action was interpreted to rest solely on the refusal to respond. The Court of Appeals said: “[N]o inference of membership in [the Communist] party was drawn from [appellant’s] refusal to reply to the question asked .... [Appellant] was not discharged for invoking the Fifth Amendment; he was discharged for creating a doubt as to his trustworthiness and reliability by refusing to answer the question as to Communist party membership.” 2 N. Y. 2d, at 372, 141 N. E. 2d, at 542. In other words, we read the court’s opinion as meaning that a finding of doubtful trust and reliability could justifiably be based on appellant’s lack of frankness, cf. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716; Beilan v. Board of Public Education, ante, p. 399, decided today, just as if he had refused to give any other information about himself which might be relevant to his employment. It was this lack of candor which provided the evidence of appellant’s doubtful trust and reliability which under the New York statutory scheme constituted him a security risk. The Court of Appeals went on to reason that had appellant refused, without more, to answer the question, the finding of “doubtful trust and reliability” would have undoubtedly been permissible, and that the basis for such a finding, in appellant’s refusal to answer, was not destroyed by the claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege because the Commissioner was not required to accept that claim as an adequate explanation of the refusal. Accepting, as we do, these premises of the state court’s opinion, we find no constitutional block to its decision sustaining appellant’s dismissal from employment. Postponing for the moment the question whether appellant was entitled to rely in this local investigation on the federal privilege, it seems clear that the discharge here in any event was unlike that in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, supra, in that, as definitively interpreted by the Court of Appeals, it was not based on the fact that the employee had asserted Fifth Amendment rights. Further, in Slochower such a claim had been asserted in a federal inquiry having nothing to do with the qualifications of persons for state employment, and the Court in its opinion carefully distinguished that situation from one where, as here, a State is conducting an inquiry into fitness of its employees. Nor, as the Court of Appeals stressed, was the claim of possible self-incrimination made the basis for an inference that appellant was a Communist and therefore unreliable. Hence we are not faced here with the question whether party membership may rationally be inferred from a refusal to answer a question directed to present membership where the refusal rests on the belief that an answer might incriminate, cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, or with the question whether membership in the Communist Party which might be “innocent” can be relied upon as a ground for denial of state employment. Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, supra; Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232. We think it scarcely debatable that had there been no claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, New York would have been constitutionally entitled to conclude from appellant’s refusal to answer what must be conceded to have been a question relevant to the purposes of the statute and his employment, cf. Garner v. Board of Public Works, supra, that he was of doubtful trust and reliability. Such a conclusion is not “so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them.” Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 468. This Court pointed out in Garner that a government employee can be required upon pain- of dismissal to respond to inquiry probing into matters relevant to his employment, and that present membership in the Communist Party is such a matter. See also Beilan v. Board of Public Education, supra. Certainly it is not a controlling constitutional distinction that New York, rather than impose on employees, as in Garner and Beilan, an absolute duty to respond to permissible inquiry upon threat of dismissal for refusal, has in these proceedings held that an employee lacking in candor to his governmental employer evidences doubt as to his trust and reliability. Finally, unlike the situation involved in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra, there is here no problem of inadequate notice as to the consequences of refusal to answer, for appellant was specifically notified that continued refusal might lead to his dismissal. The fact that New York has chosen to base its dismissal of employees whom it finds to be of doubtful trust and reliability on the ground that they are in effect “security risks” hardly requires a different determination. The classification is not so arbitrary that we would be justified in saying that it is constitutionally impermissible in its application to one in appellant's position. Neither the New York statute nor courts purported to equate this ground for dismissal with “disloyalty.” That term, which carries a distinct connotation, was never relied upon by New York as justification for appellant’s dismissal. The issue then reduces to the narrow question whether the conclusion which could otherwise be reached from appellant’s refusal to answer is constitutionally barred because his refusal was accompanied by the assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege. We think it does not. The federal privilege against self-incrimination was not available to appellant through the Fourteenth Amendment in this state investigation. Knapp v. Schweitzer, ante, p. 371, decided today; Adamson v. California, supra. And we see no merit in appellant’s suggestion that, despite the teachings of these cases, the plea was available to him in this instance because the State was acting as agent for, or in collaboration with, the Federal Government. This contention finds no support in the record. Hence we are not here concerned with the protection, as a matter of policy or constitutional requirement, to be accorded persons who under similar circumstances, in a federal inquiry, validly invoke the federal privilege. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 3481; Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60; Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, supra; Grunewald v. United States, 363 U.S. 391. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that appellant’s explanation for his silence precluded New York from con- . eluding that his failure to respond to relevant inquiry engendered reasonable doubt as to his trustworthiness and reliability. We hold that appellant’s discharge was not in violation of rights assured him by the Federal Constitution. Affirmed. [For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, see ante, p. 409.] [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, see ante, p. 411.] [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black, see ante, p. 412.] [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, see ante, p. 417.] The state statute was originally passed as an emergency measure and thereafter extended from year to year. The present terminal date is June 30, 1958. A subversive organization is defined in § 8 as one which is found “. . . to advocate, advise, teach or embrace the doctrine that the government of the United States or of any state or of any political subdivision thereof shall be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means, or to advocate, advise, teach or embrace the duty, necessity or propriety of adopting any such doctrine . . . .” The New York Court of Appeals held that the Transit Authority was a state body corporate subject to classification under the Security Risk Law and sustained the Commission’s determination that it was a “security agency.” 2 N. Y. 2d 355, 365-367, 141 N. E. 2d 533, 538-539. We consider ourselves bound by these holdings. The Court of Appeals held that the Commissioner of Investigation, although a city official, was authorized to act with respect to these matters arising under the Security Risk Law and to conduct these investigations. Appellant did not specifically state that his refusal to answer was based on his belief that an answer might incriminate him but simply explained his silence by reference to the “Fifth Amendment.” We consider this reference, without regard to the availability of the Fifth Amendment to appellant in this state investigation (see p. 477, infra), to be equivalent to an assertion of a claim of possible self-incrimination. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 162-163; Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190, 194. For convenience, we shall continue to refer to the parties as appellant and appellees. We must also reject the contention that appellant was denied due process in that the resolution made the basis for his dismissal noted not only his refusal to answer but also "... that further investigation has revealed activities on the part of [appellant] which give reasonable ground for belief that he is not a good security risk. . . .” These other activities were not revealed to appellant. But this issue is not before us, since the state court sustained the dismissal solely on the basis of appellant’s refusal to answer. In any event had appellant pursued his administrative remedy, he could have sought disclosure and review of such evidence before the Civil Service Commission.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

THOMPSON, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al. v. WESTERN STATES MEDICAL CENTER et al. No. 01-344. Argued February 26, 2002 — Decided April 29, 2002 Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Matthew D. Roberts, Douglas N. Letter, Alex M. Azar II, Daniel E. Troy, and Patricia J. Kaeding. Howard M. Hoffmann argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the International Academy of Compounding Pharmacists by Alan E. Untereiner and Amon D. Siegel; for the National Community Pharmacists Association by Kenneth S. Geller and John M. Rector; and for Julian M. Whitaker, M.D., et al. by Jonathan W. Emord and Claudia A. Lewis-Eng. Michael H. McConihe filed a brief for the American Pharmaceutical Association as amicus curiae. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 127(a) of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA or Act), 111 Stat. 2328, 21 U. S. C. § 353a, exempts “compounded drugs” from the Food and Drug Administration’s standard drug approval requirements as long as the providers of those drugs abide by several restrictions, including that they refrain from advertising or promoting particular compounded drugs. Respondents, a group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs, sought to enjoin enforcement of the subsections of the Act dealing with advertising and solicitation, arguing that those provisions violate the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee. The District Court agreed with respondents and granted their motion for summary judgment, holding that the provisions do not meet the test for acceptable government regulation of commercial speech set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). The court invalidated the relevant provisions, severing them from the rest of § 127(a). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing that the provisions regarding advertisement and promotion are unconstitutional but finding them not to be severable from the rest of § 127(a). Petitioners challenged only the Court of Appeals’ constitutional holding in their petition for certiorari, and respondents did not file a cross-petition. We therefore address only the constitutional question, having no occasion to review the Court of Appeals’ severability determination. We conclude, as did the courts below, that §127(a)’s provisions regarding advertisement and promotion amount to unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech, and we therefore affirm. I Drug compounding is a process by which a pharmacist or doctor combines, mixes, or alters ingredients to create a medication tailored to the needs of an individual patient. Compounding is typically used to prepare medications that are not commercially available, such as medication for a patient who is allergic to an ingredient in a mass-produced product. It is a traditional component of the practice of pharmacy, see J. Thompson, A Practical Guide to Contemporary Pharmacy Practice 11.3 (1998), and is taught as part of the standard curriculum at most pharmacy schools, see American Council on Pharmaceutical Education, Accreditation Standards and Guidelines for the Professional Program in Pharmacy Leading to the Doctor of Pharmacy Degree, Standard 10(a) (adopted June 14, 1997). Many States specifically regulate compounding practices as part of their regulation of pharmacies. See, e. g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §§ 1716.2, 1751 (2002); Ind. Admin. Code, tit. 856, §§ 1-30-8, 1-30-18, 1-28-8 (2001); N. H. Code Admin. Rules Ann. Pharmacy, pts. PH 404, PH 702.01 (2002); 22 Tex. Admin. Code §291.36 (2002). Some require all licensed pharmacies to offer compounding services. See, e. g., 49 Pa. Code §27.18(p)(2) (2002); W. Va. Code St. Rules, tit. 15, §19.4 (2002). Pharmacists may provide compounded drugs to patients only upon receipt of a valid prescription from a doctor or other medical practitioner licensed to prescribe medication. See, e.g., Okla. Admin. Code §§535:15-10-3, 535:15-10-9(d) (2001); Colo. State Board of Pharmacy Rule 3.02.10 (2001). The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), 21 U. S. C. §§ 301-397, regulates drug manufacturing, marketing, and distribution. Section 505(a) of the FDCA, 52 Stat. 1052, as amended, 76 Stat. 784, provides that “[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed [with the Food and Drug Administration] is effective with respect to such drug.” 21 U. S. C. § 355(a). “[N]ew drug” is defined by §201(p)(l) of the FDCA, 52 Stat. 1041, as amended, 76 Stat. 781, as “[a]ny drug . . . not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.” 21 U. S. C. §321(p). The FDCA invests the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the power to enforce its requirements. § 371(a). For approximately the first 50 years after the enactment of the FDCA, the FDA generally left regulation of compounding to the States. Pharmacists continued to provide patients with compounded drugs without applying for FDA approval of those drugs. The FDA eventually became concerned, however, that some pharmacists were manufacturing and selling drugs under the guise of compounding, thereby avoiding the FDCA’s new drug requirements. In 1992, in response to this concern, the FDA issued a Compliance Policy Guide, which announced that the “FDA may, in the exercise of its enforcement discretion, initiate federal enforcement actions ... when the scope and nature of a pharmacy’s activities raises the kinds of concerns normally associated with a manufacturer and . . . results in significant violations of the new drug, adulteration, or misbranding provisions of the Act.” Compliance Policy Guide 7132.16 (hereinafter Guide), App. to Pet. for Cert. 76a. The Guide explained that the “FDA recognizes that pharmacists traditionally have extemporaneously compounded and manipulated reasonable quantities of drugs upon receipt of a valid prescription for an individually identified patient from a licensed practitioner,” and that such activity was not the subject of the Guide. Id., at 71a. The Guide said, however, “that while retail pharmacies ... are exempted from certain requirements of the [FDCA], they are not the subject of any general exemption from the new drug, adulteration, or mis-branding provisions” of the FDCA. Id., at 72a. It stated that the “FDA believes that an increasing number of establishments with retail pharmacy licenses are engaged in manufacturing, distributing, and promoting unapproved new drugs for human use in a manner that is clearly outside the bounds of traditional pharmacy practice and that constitute violations of the [FDCA].” Ibid. The Guide expressed concern that drug products “manufactured and distributed in commercial amounts without [the] FDA’s prior approval” could harm the public health. Id., at 73a. In light of these considerations, the Guide announced that it was FDA policy to permit pharmacists to compound drugs after receipt of a valid prescription for an individual patient or to compound drugs in “very limited quantities” before receipt of a valid prescription if they could document a history of receiving valid prescriptions “generated solely within an established professional practitioner-patient-pharmaey relationship” and if they maintained the prescription on file as required by state law. Id., at 73a-75a. Compounding in such circumstances was permitted as long as the pharmacy’s activities did not raise “the kinds of concerns normally associated with a manufacturer.” Id., at 76a. The Guide listed nine examples of activities that the FDA believed raised such concerns and that would therefore be considered by the agency in determining whether to bring an enforcement action. These activities included: “[s]oliciting business (e. g., promoting, advertising, or using salespersons) to compound specific drug products, product classes, or therapeutic classes of drug products”; “[c]ompounding, regularly, or in inordinate amounts, drug products that are commercially available ... and that are essentially generic copies of commercially available, FDA-approved drug products”; using commercial scale manufacturing or testing equipment to compound drugs; offering compounded drugs at wholesale; and “[distributing inordinate amounts of compounded products out of state.” Id., at 76a-77a. The Guide further warned that pharmacies could not dispense drugs to third parties for resale to individual patients without losing their status as retail entities. Id., at 75a. Congress turned portions of this policy into law when it enacted the FDAMA in 1997. The FDAMA, which amends the FDCA, exempts compounded drugs from the FDCA’s “new drug” requirements and other requirements provided the drugs satisfy a number of restrictions. First, they must be compounded by a licensed pharmacist or physician in response to a valid prescription for an identified individual patient, or, if prepared before the receipt of such a prescription, they must be made only in “limited quantities” and in response to a history of the licensed pharmacist’s or physician’s receipt of valid prescription orders for that drug product within an established relationship between the pharmacist, the patient, and the prescribes 21 U. S. C. § 353a(a). Second, the compounded drug must be made from approved ingredients that meet certain manufacturing and safety standards, §§ 353a(b)(l)(A)-(B), and the compounded drug may not appear on an FDA list of drug products that have been withdrawn or removed from the market because they were found to be unsafe or ineffective, §353a(b)(l)(C). Third, the pharmacist or physician compounding the drug may not “compound regularly or in inordinate amounts (as defined by the Secretary) any drug products that are essentially copies of a commercially available drug product.” § 353a(b)(l)(B). Fourth, the drug product must not be identified by the FDA as a drug product that presents demonstrable difficulties for compounding in terms of safety or effectiveness. § 353a(b)(3)(A). Fifth, in States that have not entered into a “memorandum of understanding” with the FDA addressing the distribution of “inordinate amounts” of compounded drugs in interstate commerce, the pharmacy, pharmacist, or physician compounding the drug may not distribute compounded drugs out of state in quantities exceeding five percent of that entity’s total prescription orders. § 353a(b)(3)(B). Finally, and most relevant for this litigation, the prescription must be “unsolicited,” §353a(a), and the pharmacy, licensed pharmacist, or licensed physician compounding the drug may “not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug,” §353a(c). The pharmacy, licensed pharmacist, or licensed physician may, however, “advertise and promote the compounding service.” Ibid. Respondents are a group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in drug compounding. They have prepared promotional materials that they distribute by mail and at medical conferences to inform patients and physicians of the use and effectiveness of specific compounded drugs. Fearing that they would be prosecuted under the FDAMA if they continued to distribute those materials, respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing that the Act’s requirement that they refrain from advertising and promoting their products if they wish to continue compounding violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Specifically, they challenged the requirement that prescriptions for compounded drugs be “unsolicited,” 21 U. S. C. § 353a(a), and the requirement that pharmacists “not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug,” § 353a(c). The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents, finding that the FDAMA’s speech-related provisions constitute unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech under Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566, and that their enforcement should therefore be enjoined. Western States Medical Center v. Shalala, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (Nev. 1999). The District Court, however, found those provisions to be severable from the rest of § 127(a) of the FDAMA, 21 U. S. C. §353a, and so left the Act’s other compounding requirements intact. The Government appealed both the holding that the speech-related provisions were unconstitutional and the holding that those provisions were severable from the rest of § 127(a). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Western States Med ical Center v. Shalala, 238 F. 3d 1090 (2001). The Court of Appeals agreed that the FDAMA’s advertisement and solicitation restrictions fail Central Hudson’s test for permissible regulation of commercial speech, finding that the Government had not demonstrated that the speech restrictions would directly advance its interests or that alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable. The Court of Appeals disagreed, however, that the speech-related restrictions were severable from the rest of § 127(a), 21U. S. C. § 353a, explaining that the FDAMA’s legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended to exempt compounding from the FDCA’s requirements only in return for a prohibition on promotion of specific compounded drugs. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals invalidated § 127(a) in its entirety. We granted certiorari, 534 U. S. 992 (2001), to consider whether the FDAMA’s prohibitions on soliciting prescriptions for, and advertising, compounded drugs violate the First Amendment. Because neither party petitioned for certiorari on the severability issue, we have no occasion to review that portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision. Likewise, the provisions of the FDAMA outside § 127(a), which are unrelated to drug compounding, are not an issue here and so remain unaffected. II The parties agree that the advertising and soliciting prohibited by the FDAMA constitute commercial speech. In Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976), the first case in which we explicitly held that commercial speech receives First Amendment protection, we explained the reasons for this protection: “It is a matter of public interest that [economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well-informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.” Id., at 765. Indeed, we recognized that a “particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.” Id., at 763. We have further emphasized: “The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented. Thus, even a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 767 (1993). Although commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, not all regulation of such speech is unconstitutional. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, supra, at 770. In Central Hudson, supra, we articulated a test for determining whether a particular commercial speech regulation is constitutionally permissible. Under that test we ask as a threshold matter whether the commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. If so, then the speech is not protected by the First Amendment. If the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, however, we next ask “whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.” Id., at 566. If it is, _then we “determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,” and, finally, “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Ibid. Each of these latter three inquiries must be answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found constitutional. Neither party has challenged the appropriateness of applying the Central Hudson framework to the speech-related provisions at issue here. Although several Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in particular cases, see, e. g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U. S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Uh Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484, 501, 510-514 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.); id., at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), there is no need in this case to break new ground. “ ‘Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision.’ ” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 554-555 (2001) (quoting Greater New Orleans, supra, at 184). Ill The Government does not attempt to defend the FDAMA’s speech-related provisions under the first prong of the Central Hudson test; i. e., it does not argue that the prohibited advertisements would be about unlawful activity or would be misleading. Instead, the Government argues that the FDAMA satisfies the remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson test. The Government asserts that three substantial interests underlie the FDAMA. The first is an interest in “preserving] the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval process and the protection of the public health that it provides.” Brief for Petitioners 19. The second is an interest in “preserving] the availability of compounded drugs for those individual patients who, for particularized medical reasons, cannot use commercially available products that have been approved by the FDA.” Id., at 19-20. Finally, the Government argues that “[achieving the proper balance between those two independently compelling but competing interests is itself a substantial governmental interest.” Id., at 20. Explaining these interests, the Government argues that the FDCA’s new drug approval requirements are critical to the public health and safety. It claims that the FDA’s experience with drug regulation demonstrates that proof of the safety and effectiveness of a new drug needs to be established by rigorous, scientifically valid clinical studies because impressions of individual doctors, who cannot themselves compile sufficient safety data, cannot be relied upon. The Government also argues that a premarket approval process, under which manufacturers are required to put their proposed drugs through tests of safety and effectiveness in order to obtain FDA approval to market the drugs, is the best way to guarantee drug safety and effectiveness. While it praises the FDCA’s new drug approval process, the Government also acknowledges that “because obtaining FDA approval for a new drug is a costly process, requiring FDA approval of all drug products compounded by pharmacies for the particular needs of an individual patient would, as a practical matter, eliminate the practice of compounding, and thereby eliminate availability of compounded drugs for those patients who have no alternative treatment.” Id., at 26. The Government argues that eliminating the practice of compounding, drugs for individual patients would be undesirable because compounding is sometimes critical to the care of patients with drug allergies, patients who cannot tolerate particular drug delivery systems, and patients requiring special drug dosages. Preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval process is clearly an important governmental interest, and the Government has every reason to want as many drugs as possible to be subject to that approval process. The Government also has an important interest, however, in permitting the continuation of the practice of compounding so that patients with particular needs may obtain medications suited to those needs. And it would not make sense to require compounded drugs created to meet the unique needs of individual patients to undergo the testing required for the new drug approval process. Pharmacists do not make enough money from small-scale compounding to make safety and efficacy testing of their compounded drugs economically feasible, so requiring such testing would force pharmacists to stop providing compounded drugs. Given this, the Government needs to be able to draw a line between small-scale compounding and large-scale drug manufacturing. That line must distinguish compounded drugs produced on such a small scale that they could not undergo safety and efficacy testing from drugs produced and sold on a large enough scale that they could undergo such testing and therefore must do so. The Government argues that the FDAMA’s speech-related provisions provide just such a line, i. e., that, in the terms of Central Hudson, they “directly advanc[e] the governmental interest[s] asserted.” 447 U. S., at 566. Those provisions use advertising as the trigger for requiring FDA approval — essentially, as long as pharmacists do not advertise particular compounded drugs, they may sell compounded drugs without first undergoing safety and efficacy testing and obtaining FDA approval. If they advertise their compounded drugs, however, FDA approval is required. The Government explains that traditional (or, in its view, desirable) compounding responds to a physician’s prescription and an individual patient’s particular medical situation, and that “[advertising the particular products created in the provision of [such] service (as opposed to advertising the compounding service itself) is not necessary to . . . this type of responsive and customized service.” Brief for Petitioners 34. The Government argues that advertising particular products is useful in a broad market but is not useful when particular products are designed in response to an individual’s “often unique need[s].” Ibid. The Government contends that, because of this, advertising is not typically associated with compounding for particular individuals. In contrast it is typically associated, the Government claims, with large-scale production of a drug for a substantial market. The Government argues that advertís-ing, therefore, is “a fair proxy for actual or intended large-scale manufacturing,” and that Congress’ decision to limit the FDAMA’s compounding exemption to pharmacies that do not engage in promotional activity was “rationally calculated” to avoid creating “‘a loophole that would allow unregulated drug manufacturing to occur under the guise of pharmacy compounding.’” Id., at 35 (quoting 143 Cong. Rec. S9839 (Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)). The Government seems to believe that without advertising it would not be possible to market a drug on a large enough scale to make safety and efficacy testing economically feasible. The Government thus believes that conditioning an exemption from the FDA approval process bn refraining from advertising is an ideal way to permit compounding and yet also guarantee that compounding is not conducted on such a scale as to undermine the FDA approval process. Assuming it is true that drugs cannot be marketed on a large scale without advertising, the FDAMA’s prohibition on advertising compounded drugs might indeed “directly advanc[e]” the Government’s interests. Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566. Even assuming that it does, however, the Government has failed to demonstrate that the speech restrictions are “not more extensive than is necessary to serve [those] interests]. ” Ibid. In previous cases addressing this final prong of the Central Hudson test, we have made clear that if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. 476 (1995), for example, we found a law prohibiting beer labels from displaying alcohol content to be unconstitutional in part because of the availability of alternatives “such as directly limiting the alcohol content of beers, prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol strength ... , or limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors.” Id., at 490-491. The fact that “all of [these alternatives] could advance the Government’s asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to . . . First Amendment rights” indicated that the law was “more extensive than necessary.” Id., at 491. See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S., at 507 (plurality opinion) (striking down a prohibition on advertising the price of alcoholic beverages in part because “alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State’s goal of promoting temperance”). Several non-speech-related means of drawing a line between compounding and large-scale manufacturing might be possible here. First, it seems that the Government could use the very factors the FDA relied on to distinguish compounding from manufacturing in its 1992 Guide. For example, the Government could ban the use of “commercial scale manufacturing or testing equipment for compounding drug products.” Guide, App. to Pet. for Cert. 76a. It could prohibit pharmacists from compounding more drugs in anticipation of receiving prescriptions than in response to prescriptions already received. See ibid. It could prohibit pharmacists from “[o]ffering compounded drug products at wholesale to other state licensed persons or commercial entities for resale.” Id., at 77a. Alternately, it could limit the amount of compounded drugs, either by volume or by numbers of prescriptions, that a given pharmacist or pharmacy sells out of state. See ibid. Another possibility not suggested by the Guide would be capping the amount of any particular compounded drug, either by drug volume, number of prescriptions, gross revenue, or profit that a pharmacist or pharmacy may make or sell in a given period of time. It might even be sufficient to rely solely on the non-speech-related provisions of the FDAMA, such as the requirement that compounding only be conducted in response to a prescription or a history of receiving a prescription, 21 U. S. C. § 353a(a), and the limitation on the percentage of a pharmacy’s total sales that out-of-state sales of compounded drugs may represent, § 353a(b)(3)(B). The Government has not offered any reason why these possibilities, alone or in combination, would be insufficient to prevent compounding from occurring on such a scale as to undermine the new drug approval process. Indeed, there is no hint that the Government even considered these or any other alternatives. Nowhere in the legislative history of the FDAMA or petitioners’ briefs is there any explanation of why the Government believed forbidding advertising was a necessary as opposed to merely convenient means of achieving its interests. Yet “[i]t is well established that ‘the party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it.’ ” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S., at 770 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 71, n. 20 (1983)). The Government simply has not provided sufficient justification here. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last — not first — resort. Yet here it seems to have been the first strategy the Government thought to try. The dissent describes another governmental interest — an interest in prohibiting the sale of compounded drugs to “patients who may not clearly need them,” post, at 379 (opinion of Breyer, J.) — and argues that “Congress could . . . conclude that the advertising restrictions ‘directly advance’ ” that interest, post, at 384. Nowhere in its briefs, however, does the Government argue that this interest motivated the advertising ban. Although, for the reasons given by the dissent, Congress conceivably could have enacted the advertising ban to advance this interest, we have generally only sustained statutes on the basis of hypothesized justifications when reviewing statutes merely to determine whether they are rational. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1444-1446 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the “rational basis” or “conceivable basis” test); see also, e. g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 466 (1981) (sustaining a milk packaging regulation under the “rational basis” test because “the Minnesota Legislature could rationally have decided that [the regulation] might foster greater use of environmentally desirable alternatives” (emphasis deleted)). The Central Hudson test is significantly stricter than the rational basis test, however, requiring the Government not only to identify specifically “a substantial interest to be achieved by [the] restrictio[n] on commercial speech,” 447 U. S., at 564, but also to prove that the regulation “directly advances” that interest and is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest,” id., at 566. The Government has not met any of these requirements with regard to the interest the dissent describes. Even if the Government had argued that the FDAMA’s speech-related restrictions were motivated by a fear that advertising compounded drugs would put people who do not need such drugs at risk by causing them to convince their doctors to prescribe the drugs anyway, that fear would fail to justify the restrictions. Aside from the fact that this concern rests on the questionable assumption that doctors would prescribe unnecessary medications (an assumption the dissent is willing to make based on one magazine article and one survey, post, at 383-384, neither of which was relied upon by the Government), this concern amounts to a fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful information about compounded drugs. See supra, at 368 (explaining that the Government does not claim the advertisements forbidden by the FDAMA would be false or misleading). We have previously rejected the notion that the Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with the information. In Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, the State feared that if people received price advertising from pharmacists, they would “choose the low-cost, low-quality service and drive the ‘professional’ pharmacist out of business” and would “destroy the pharmacist-customer relationship” by going from one pharmacist to another. We found these fears insufficient to justify a ban on such advertising. 425 U. S., at 769. We explained: “There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them. . . . But the choice among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly’s. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us. Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in other ways.... But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering.” Id., at 770 (citation omitted). See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S., at 503 (“[B]ans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech . . . usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth. . . . The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good” (citation omitted)). Even if the Government had asserted an interest in preventing people who do not need compounded drugs from obtaining those drugs, the statute does not directly advance that interest. The dissent claims that the Government “must exclude from the area of permitted drug sales ... those compounded drugs sought by patients who may not clearly need them.” Post, at 379. Yet the statute does not directly forbid such sales. It instead restricts advertising, of course not just to those who do not need compounded drugs, but also to individuals who do need compounded drugs and their doctors. Although the advertising ban may reduce the demand for compounded drugs from those who do not need the drugs, it does nothing to prevent such individuals from obtaining compounded drugs other than requiring prescriptions. But if it is appropriate for the statute to rely on doctors to refrain from prescribing compounded drugs to patients who do not need them, it is not clear why it would not also be appropriate to rely on doctors to refrain from prescribing compounded drugs to patients who do not need them in a world where advertising was permitted. The dissent may also be suggesting that the Government has an interest in banning the advertising of compounded drugs because patients who see such advertisements will be confused about the drugs’ risks. See post, at 387 (“[The Government] fears the systematic effect ... of advertisements that will not fully explain the complicated risks at issue”). This argument is precluded, however, by the fact that the Government does not argue that the advertisements are misleading. Even if the Government did argue that it had an interest in preventing misleading advertisements, this interest could be satisfied by the far less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be labeled with a warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing and that its risks were unknown. If the Government’s failure to justify its decision to regulate speech were not enough to convince us that the FDAMA’s advertising provisions were unconstitutional, the amount of beneficial speech prohibited by the FDAMA would be. Forbidding the advertisement of compounded drugs would affect pharmacists other than those interested in producing drugs on a large scale. It would prevent pharmacists with no interest in mass-producing medications, but who serve clienteles with special medical needs, from telling the doctors treating those clients about the alternative drugs available through compounding. For example, a pharmacist serving a children’s hospital where many patients are unable to swallow pills would be prevented from telling the children’s doctors about a new development in compounding that allowed a drug that was previously available only in pill form to be administered another way. Forbidding advertising of particular compounded drugs would also prohibit a pharmacist from posting a notice informing customers that if their children refuse to take medications because of the taste, the pharmacist could change the flavor, and giving examples of medications where flavoring is possible. The fact that the FDAMA would prohibit such seemingly useful speech even though doing so does not appear to directly further any asserted governmental objective confirms our belief that the prohibition is unconstitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment that the speech-related provisions of FDAMA § 127(a) are unconstitutional. So ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LOCAL 74, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS OF AMERICA, A. F. OF L., et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 85. Argued February 26, 1951. Decided June 4, 1951. Charles H. Tuttle argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Frank X. Ward. Mozart O. Ratner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, David P. Findling and Dominick L. Manoli. Clif Langsdale filed a brief for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, A. F. of L., et al., as amici curiae, supporting petitioners. Me. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a companion case to No. 393, Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council (the Denver case), ante, p. 675, and No. 108, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Labor Board (the Greenwich case), ante, p. 694. The principal question is whether, under the following circumstances, a union engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 : On the day before the effective date of that amendment, the union ordered its members, who were working on a dwelling renovation project, to engage in a strike, where an object thereof was to force the owner of the dwelling to cancel a contract for the installation of wall and floor coverings; and then for several days, on and after the effective date of the amendment, the strike was continued under the same conditions which created it and for the same objective. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that an unfair labor practice was engaged in on and after the effective date of the amendment. For some years before March, 1947, Ira A. Watson Company, a Rhode Island corporation (here called Watson's), operated a general retail store in Chattanooga, Tennessee, including a department for the sale and installation of wall and floor coverings. Since that time Watson’s has operated a specialty store devoted to those activities. At about the same time, Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F. of L. (here called the union), and its business agent, Jack Henderson (respectively the petitioners in the instant case), asked Watson’s to enter into a closed-shop agreement with the union recognizing it as the bargaining agent of Watson’s installation employees. None of its employees were members of the union and Watson’s declined to enter the agreement. Thereupon, from the latter part of March until about August 28, 1947, petitioners maintained a picket in front of Watson’s store carrying a placard. This announced, over the name of the union, that Watson’s was “unfair to organized labor” or later “This store employs non-union labor.” Watson’s sometimes sold wall or floor coverings without installing them and, at other times, it insisted upon installing such coverings as a condition of their sale. When the installations were made by Watson’s, the work was done by nonunion men. August 7,1947, George D. Stanley, who owned a dwelling near Chattanooga, contracted with D. F. Parker to improve and renovate it. Parker was to furnish and supervise the workmen and select the materials. Stanley was to pay the wages of the workmen, the cost of the materials, and a ten per cent commission to Parker on both. Parker was a member of the union and he hired union members to do the carpentry work. If the wall and floor coverings desired by Stanley had been available in Chattanooga elsewhere than at Watson’s, Parker would have purchased them from such source and would have employed union men to install them. However, neither Parker nor Stanley could find such coverings in Chattanooga except at Watson’s and Watson’s insisted on installing them as a condition of their sale. Although knowing that Watson’s would use nonunion men to make the installations, Stanley, with Parker’s implied consent, contracted with Watson’s for the purchase and installation of the coverings. Watson’s began its installation Sunday, August 17, when there were no other workmen present. Monday and Tuesday, apparently with Parker’s approval, the installation continued during regular working hours. Wednesday, two of the union carpenters stopped work for half an hour because of the presence on the job of the nonunion installation workers. Parker, however, induced the carpenters to resume work. This situation came to the attention of the union and, on Thursday, August 21, Henderson came to the project and told the four union carpenters who were working there that they could not continue to work with nonunion men or where nonunion men were employed. At that hour, none of Watson’s men were present but the installation of coverings contracted for by Stanley with Watson’s had not been completed. The union men finished their day’s work but, in compliance with the instructions thus issued by petitioners, did not return on the following days. Watson’s men returned and completed their work by August 28, and the entire renovation was finished by the end of August. The unfinished carpentry work was done by two of the four union men who had been on the job and who returned without the knowledge or consent of petitioners. On August 22, 1947, § 8 .(b) (4) (A) took effect. Watson’s promptly filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board based upon the continuance of the above strike by petitioners on and after August 22. The Regional Director issued a complaint charging the union and Henderson with engaging in an unfair labor practice as defined in § 8 (b) (4) (A). Pursuant to § 10 (l), the Regional Director petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee for injunctive relief. This relief was denied on the ground that the conduct complained of took place before August 22 and was at that time lawful. 74 F. Supp. 499. After hearings before an examiner, the Board, with one member dissenting, affirmed the rulings of its examiner, attached his intermediate report to its decision, 80 N. L. R. B. 533, 540, and adopted his findings, conclusions and recommendations with additions and modifications. It ordered the union and Henderson to— “Cease and desist from engaging in or inducing the members of Local 74 to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform services for any employer, where an object thereof is to require any employer or other person to cease doing business with Ira A. Watson, doing business as Watson’s Specialty Store.” Id., at 539. The dissent was on the ground that the effect of the actions complained of upon interstate commerce was so remote and insubstantial and the controversy was so local in character that it was undesirable for the Board to exercise federal power in relation to it. Id., at 540. On a review under § 10 (e), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered enforcement of the order. 181 F. 2d 126. We granted certiorari. 340 U. S. 902. See Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council, ante, at p. 681. 1. Petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the Board on the ground of the insufficiency of the effect of the actions complained of upon interstate commerce. We conclude that the findings in the intermediate report, adopted by the Board and accepted by the court below, are sufficient to sustain the Board’s jurisdiction. Denver case, ante, at pp. 683-685. From March to September, 1947, Watson’s purchased about $93,000 worth of goods. Thirty-three percent was shipped to it in interstate business. Thirty percent more had been manufactured outside of Tennessee. Watson’s sales and installation jobs came to about $100,000 of which eight percent represented sales and installations outside of the State. The Board also referred to the fact that Watson’s operated a system of 26 or 27 retail stores in seven different states, of which the Chattanooga store apparently was an integral part. 2. The complaint was not against the picketing at Watson’s store from March to August 28, 1947. See Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., ante, p. 665. The complaint was directed against petitioners’ extension of their activities to the Stanley project by there ordering a strike, or concerted cessation of work, on the part of Stanley’s union carpenters with an object of forcing Stanley to cancel his installation contract with Watson’s. Section 8 (c) is not applicable. This strike was ordered by Henderson in person. The union and he both engaged in and ordered the strike. The carpenters, as individual employees are not charged with an unfair labor practice. The charge is confined to the actions of the labor organization and its agent in engaging in, ordering and continuing a strike for a proscribed object after Congress had made such conduct an unfair labor practice. 3. As determined in the Denver case, it is enough that one of the objects of the action complained of was to force Stanley to cancel Watson’s contract. It does not immunize such action from § 8 (b) (4) (A) to show that it also had as an object the enforcement of a rule of the union that its members should not work on a project on which nonunion men were employed. The statute did not require, the individual carpenters to remain on this job. It did, however, make it an unfair labor practice for the union or its agent to engage in a strike, as they did here, when an object of doing so was to force the project owner to cancel his installation contract with Watson’s. 4. Even assuming that, if petitioners had engaged in such a strike or had induced the union carpenters to take part in it on and after August 22, 1947, it would have been an unfair labor practice under the new amendment, petitioners contend that their actions all took place before August 22, and that they did nothing on or after that date which is proscribed by § 8 (b) (4) (A). The answer turns on what actually took place on and after August 22. As to that the Board concluded: “Nor is it material . . . that the labor dispute had its origin before the effective date of the amended Act, for we are convinced that it was continued and prolonged after the effective date by the very same factors which originally created it and for the same original objective which, as found above, Section 8 (b) (4) (A) declares unlawful. Thus, at material times both before and after the effective date of the amendments ... (2) the Respondents’ [here petitioners] strike order, which admittedly was never rescinded, was outstanding and effectively prevented the carpenters from officially working on the job as long as Watson’s men were also working; . . . .” 80 N. L. R. B. at 537-538. We agree with the court below in sustaining that conclusion. 5. We have considered the remaining questions raised by petitioners, based on constitutional or other grounds, and have resolved them in favor of sustaining the Board and the court below. This case has not been rendered moot by the completion of the renovation project. The complaint was against petitioners’ use of secondary pressure upon Watson’s in a manner proscribed by the statute. The use of such pressure on this renovation project was merely a sample of what might be repeated elsewhere if not prohibited. The underlying dispute between petitioners and Watson’s has not been shown to have been resolved. The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Jackson are of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed. 61 Stat. 140-141, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 158 (b) (4) (A). For text see Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council, ante, p. 677, note 1. The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, was enacted into law June 23, 1947, but Title I, containing § 8 (b) (4) (A), took effect 60 days later. 61 Stat. 152, 162, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill), note following §151. The complaint originally also charged violations of § 8 (b) (1) (A) but the Board dismissed those allegations and they are not before us. 61 Stat. 149-150, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 160 (Z). For text see Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council, ante, p. 682, note 10. 61 Stat. 147-148, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 160 (e). The examiner expressed doubt as to whether the carpenters were employees of Parker or of Stanley but decided to assume that they . were employees of Stanley. 80 N. L. R. B. at 544, n. 12. 61 Stat. 142, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 158 (c). For text see the Denver case, ante, p. 690, note 20. The examiner found that Henderson testified credibly that this rule applied whether or not the nonunion men were physically present at the moment. It was enough that nonunion men were employed on the project. Henderson, therefore, applied the rule here because, although Watson’s men were absent from the project on August 21, 1947, Watson’s installation contract was not yet complete, and it was clear that its completion would mean the return of nonunion men to the project. Henderson testified also that the rule applied even to the employment of nonunion labor which did not come under the jurisdiction of Local 74. 80 N. L. R. B. at 546, 553, n. 33. In the proceedings for an injunction under § 10 (1) the District Court so held. Its decision, however, was based upon the affidavits before it rather than upon the record before the Board, and its conclusion did not bind the Board in the proceeding on the merits. 74 F. Supp. 499, and see Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council, ante, pp. 681-683. Petitioners gain nothing from § 102: “No provision of this title [which includes § 8 (b) (4) (A)] shall be deemed to make an unfair labor practice any act which was performed prior to the date of the enactment of this Act [June 23, 1947] which did not constitute an unfair labor practice prior thereto . . . .” 61 Stat. 152, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill), note following § 158. For a comparable result relating to a labor dispute which commenced before the taking effect of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, see Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. Labor Board, 91 F. 2d 134.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FRONTIERO et vir v. RICHARDSON, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. No. 71-1694. Argued January 17, 1973 Decided May 14, 1973 Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall, concluded that 37 U. S. C. §§ 401, 403 and 10 U. S. C. §§ 1072, 1076, as inherently suspect statutory classifications based on sex, are so unjustifiably discriminatory as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 682-691. Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that the challenged statutes work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71. P. 691. Mr. Justice Powell, joined by The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun, while agreeing that the statutes deprive servicewomen of due process, concluded that in the light of Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, and the fact that the Equal Rights Amendment has been submitted to the States for ratification, it is inappropriate to decide at this time whether sex is a suspect classification. Pp. 691-692. Brennan, J., announced the Court’s judgment and delivered an opinion, in which Douglas, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment, post, p. 691. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 691. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 691. Joseph J. Levin, Jr., argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Morris S. Dees, Jr. Samuel Huntington argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wood, and Mark L. Evans. Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued the cause for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief was Melvin L. Wulf. Mr. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall join. The question before us concerns the right of a female member of the uniformed services to claim her spouse as a “dependent” for the purposes of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits under 37 U. S. C. §§ 401, 403, and 10 U. S. C. §§ 1072, 1076, on an equal footing with male members. Under these statutes, a serviceman may claim his wife as a “dependent” without regard to whether she is in fact dependent upon him for any part of her support. 37 U. S. C. § 401 (1); 10 U. S. C. § 1072 (2) (A). A servicewoman, on the other hand, may not claim her husband as a “dependent” under these programs unless he is in fact dependent upon her for over one-half of his support. 37 TJ. S. C. §401; 10 U. S. C. § 1072 (2) (C). Thus, the question for decision is whether this difference in treatment constitutes an unconstitutional discrimination against servicewomen in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A three-judge District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, one judge dissenting, rejected this contention and sustained the constitutionality of the provisions of the statutes making this distinction. 341 F. Supp. 201 (1972). We noted probable jurisdiction. 409 U. S. 840 (1972). We reverse. I In an effort to attract career personnel through reenlistment, Congress established, in 37 U. S. C. § 401 et seq., and 10 U. S. C. § 1071 et seq., a scheme for the provision of fringe benefits to members of the uniformed services on a competitive basis with business and industry. Thus, under 37 U. S. C. §403, a member of the uniformed services with dependents is entitled to an increased “basic allowance for quarters” and, under 10 U. S. C. § 1076, a member’s dependents are provided comprehensive medical and dental care. Appellant Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought increased quarters allowances, and housing and medical benefits for her husband, appellant Joseph Frontiero, on the ground that he was her “dependent.” Although such benefits would automatically have been granted with respect to the wife of a male member of the uniformed services, appellant’s application was denied because she failed to demonstrate that her husband was dependent on her for more than one-half of his support. Appellants then commenced this suit, contending that, by making this distinction, the statutes unreasonably discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In essence, appellants asserted that the discriminatory impact of the statutes is twofold: first, as a procedural matter, a female member is required to demonstrate her spouse’s dependency, while no such burden is imposed upon male members; and, second, as a substantive matter, a male member who does not provide more than one-half of his wife’s support receives benefits, while a similarly situated female member is denied such benefits. Appellants therefore sought a permanent injunction against the continued enforcement of these statutes and an order directing the appellees to provide Lieutenant Frontiero with the same housing and medical benefits that a similarly situated male member would receive. Although the legislative history of these statutes sheds virtually no light on the purposes underlying the differential treatment accorded male and female members, a majority of the three-judge District Court surmised that Congress might reasonably have concluded that, since the husband in our society is generally the “breadwinner” in the family — and the wife typically the “dependent” partner — “it would be more economical to require married female members claiming husbands to prove actual dependency than to extend the presumption of dependency to such members.” 341 F. Supp., at 207. Indeed, given the fact that_ approximately 99% of all members of the uniformed services are male, the District Court speculated that such differential treatment might conceivably lead to a “considerable saving of administrative expense and manpower.” Ibid. II At the outset, appellants contend that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. We agree and, indeed, find at least implicit support for such an approach in our unanimous decision only last Term in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Court considered the constitutionality of an Idaho statute providing that, when two individuals are otherwise equally entitled to appointment as administrator of an estate, the male applicant must be preferred to the female. Appellant, the mother of the deceased, and appellee, the father, filed competing petitions for appointment as administrator of their son’s estate. Since the parties, as parents of the deceased, were members of the same entitlement class, the statutory preference was invoked and the father’s petition was therefore granted. Appellant claimed that this statute, by giving a mandatory preference to males over females without regard to their individual qualifications, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the Idaho statute “provides that different treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” 404 U. S., at 75. Under “traditional” equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained unless it is “patently arbitrary” and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426 (1961); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970). In an effort to meet this standard, appellee contended that the statutory scheme was a reasonable measure designed to reduce the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests. Moreover, appellee argued that the mandatory preference for male applicants was in itself reasonable since “men [are] as a rule more conversant with business affairs than . . . women.” Indeed, appellee maintained that “it is a matter of common knowledge, that women still are not engaged in politics, the professions, business or industry to the extent that men are.” And the Idaho Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of this statute, suggested that the Idaho Legislature might reasonably have “concluded that in general men are better qualified to act as an administrator than are women.” Despite these contentions, however, the Court held the statutory preference for male applicants unconstitutional. In reaching this result, the Court implicitly rejected appellee’s apparently rational explanation of the statutory scheme, and concluded that, by ignoring the individual qualifications of particular applicants, the challenged statute provided “dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated.” 404 U. S., at 77. The Court therefore held that, even though the State’s interest in achieving administrative efficiency “is not without some legitimacy,” “[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution] . . . .” Id., at 76. This departure from “traditional” rational-basis analysis with respect to sex-based classifications is clearly justified. There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of “romantic paternalism” which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage. Indeed, this paternalistic attitude became so firmly rooted in our national consciousness that, 100 years ago, a distinguished Member of this Court was able to proclaim: “Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. . . . “. . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.” Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children. See generally L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution 5-6 (1969); G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma 1073 (20th anniversary ed. 1962). And although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right — which is itself “preservative of other basic civil and political rights” — until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later. It is true, of course, that the position of women in America has improved markedly in recent decades. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena. See generally K. Amundsen, The Silenced Majority: Women and American Democracy (1971); The President’s Task Force on Women’s Rights and Responsibilities, A Matter of Simple Justice (1970). Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .” Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972). And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously-relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members. We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. In Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, Congress expressly declared that no employer, labor union, or other organization subject to the provisions of the Act shall discriminate against any individual on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Similarly, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides that no employer covered by the Act “shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex.” And § 1 of the Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and submitted to the legislatures of the States for ratification, declares that “[e] quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under consideration.' Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 240, 248-249 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 648-649 (1966). With these considerations in mind, we can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Applying the analysis mandated by that stricter standard of review, it is clear that the statutory scheme now before us is constitutionally invalid. III The sole basis of the classification established in the challenged statutes is the sex of the individuals involved. Thus, under 37 U. S. C. §§ 401, 403, and 10 U. S. C. §§ 1072, 1076, a female member of the uniformed services seeking to obtain housing and medical benefits for her spouse must prove his dependency in fact, whereas no such burden is imposed upon male members. In addition, the statutes operate so as to deny benefits to a female member, such as appellant Sharron Frontiero, who provides less than one-half of her spouse’s support, while at the same time granting such benefits to a male member who likewise provides less than one-half of his spouse’s support. Thus, to this extent at least, it may fairly be said that these statutes command “dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated.” Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S., at 77. Moreover, the Government concedes that the differential treatment accorded men and women under these statutes serves no purpose other than mere “administrative convenience.” In essence, the Government maintains that, as an empirical matter, wives in our society frequently are dependent upon their husbands, while husbands rarely are dependent upon their wives. Thus, the Government argues that Congress might reasonably have concluded that it would be both cheaper and easier simply conclusively to presume that wives of male members are financially dependent upon their husbands, while burdening female members with the task of establishing dependency in fact. The Government offers no concrete evidence, however, tending to support its view that such differential treatment in fact saves the Government any money. In order to satisfy the demands of strict judicial scrutiny, the Government must demonstrate, for example, that it is actually cheaper to grant increased benefits with respect to all male members, than it is to determine which male members are in fact entitled to such benefits and to grant increased benefits only to those members whose wives actually meet the dependency requirement. Here, however, there is substantial evidence that, if put to the test, many of the wives of male members would fail to qualify for benefits. And in light of the fact that the dependency determination with respect to the husbands of female members is presently made solely on the basis of affidavits, rather than through the more costly hearing process, the Government’s explanation of the statutory scheme is, to say the least, questionable. In any case, our prior decisions make clear that, although efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some importance, “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 656 (1972). And when we enter the realm of “strict judicial scrutiny,” there can be no doubt that “administrative convenience” is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Carrington v. Bash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965). On the contrary, any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands “dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated,” and therefore involves the “very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution] . . . .” Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S., at 77, 76. We therefore conclude that, by according differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as they require a female member to prove the dependency of her husband. Reversed. Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71. Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissents for the reasons stated by Judge Rives in his opinion for the District Court, Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (1972). The “uniformed services” include the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Environmental Science Services Administration, and Public Health Service. 37 U. S. C. § 101 (3) ; 10 U. S. C. §1072 (1). Title 37 U. S. C. § 401 provides in pertinent part: “In this chapter, 'dependent/ with respect to a member of a uniformed service, means— “(1) his spouse; “However, a person is not a dependent of a female member unless he is in fact dependent on her for over one-half of his support. . . .” Title 10 U. S. C. § 1072 (2) provides in pertinent part: “ 'Dependent/ with respect to a member ... of a uniformed service, means— “(A) the wife; “(C) the husband, if he is in fact dependent on the member . . . for over one-half of his support. . .’’ See 102 Cong. Rec. 3849-3850 (Cong. Kilday), 8043 (Sen. Saltonstall); 95 Cong. Rec. 7662 (Cong. Kilday), 7664 (Cong. Short), 7666 (Cong. Havenner), 7667 (Cong. Bates), 7671 (Cong. Price). See also 10 U. S. C. § 1071. Appellant Joseph Frontiero is a full-time student at Huntingdon College in Montgomery, Alabama. According to the agreed stipulation of facts, his living expenses, including his share of the household expenses, total approximately $354 per month. Since he receives $205 per month in veterans’ benefits, it is clear that he is not dependent upon appellant Sharron Frontiero for more than one-half of his support. “[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.’ ” Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964); see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 641-642 (1969); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). The housing provisions, set forth in 37 U. S. C. § 401 et seq., were enacted as part of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, which established a uniform pattern of military pay and allowances, consolidating and revising the piecemeal legislation that had been developed over the previous 40 years. See H. R. Rep. No. 779, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 733, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. The Act apparently retained in substance the dependency definitions of §4 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 361), as amended by § 6 of the Act of September 7, 1944 (58 Stat. 730), which required a female member of the service to demonstrate her spouse’s dependency. It appears that this provision was itself derived from unspecified earlier enactments. See S. Rep. No. 917, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 4. The medical benefits legislation, 10 U. S. C. § 1071 et seq., was enacted as the Dependents’ Medical Care Act of 1956. As such, it was designed to revise and make uniform the existing law relating to medical services for military personnel. It, too, appears to have carried forward, without explanation, the dependency provisions found in other military pay and allowance legislation. See H. R. Rep. No. 1805, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1878, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 191-192 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, at 499. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971). See Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 644-646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Brief for Appellee in No. 70-4, O. T. 1971, Reed v. Reed, p. 12. Id., at 12-13. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P. 2d 635, 638 (1970). Indeed, the position of women in this country at its inception is reflected in the view expressed by Thomas Jefferson that women should be neither seen nor heard in society’s decisionmaking councils. See M. Gruberg, Women in American Politics 4 (1968). See also 2 A. de Toequeville, Democracy in America (Reeves trans. 1948). Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964); see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 626 (1969); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370 (1886). See generally The President’s Task Force on Women’s Rights and Responsibilities, A Matter of Simple Justice (1970); L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution (1969) ; A. Montagu, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth (4th ed. 1964); The President’s Commission on the Status of Women, American Women (1963). See, e. g., Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1499, 1507 (1971). It is true, of course, that when viewed in the abstract, women do not constitute a small and powerless minority. Nevertheless, in part because of past discrimination, women are vastly underrepresented in this Nation’s decisionmaking councils. There has never been a female President, nor a female member of this Court. Not a single woman presently sits in the United States Senate, and only 14 women hold seats in the House of Representatives. And, as appellants point out, this underrepresentation is present throughout all levels of our State and Federal Government. See Joint Reply Brief of Appellants and American Civil Liberties Union (Amicus Curiae) 9. See, e. g., Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1173-1174 (1969). 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-2 (a), (b), (c) (emphasis added). See generally, Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 824 (1972); Developments in the Law — Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (1971). 29 U. S. C. § 206 (d) (emphasis added). See generally Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay Act 1963— 1970, 39 U. Cin. L. Rev. 615 (1970). H. R. J. Res. No. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). In conformity with these principles, Congress in recent years has amended various statutory schemes similar to those presently under consideration so as to eliminate the differential treatment of men and women. See 5 U. S. C. §2108, as amended, 85 Stat. 644; 5 U. S. C. § 7152, as amended, 85 Stat. 644; 5 U. S. C. § 8341, as amended, 84 Stat. 1961; 38 U. S. C. § 102 (b), as amended, 86 Stat. 1092. It should be noted that these statutes are not in any sense designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against women. See Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F. 2d 591 (CA2), cert, denied, 393 U. S. 982 (1968); cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966). On the contrary, these statutes seize upon a group — women—who have historically suffered discrimination in employment, and rely on the effects of this past discrimination as a justification for heaping on additional economic disadvantages. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S. 285, 296-297 (1969). In 1971, 43% of all women over the age of 16 were in the labor force, and 18% of all women worked full time 12 months per year. See U. S. Women’s Bureau, Dept, of Labor, Highlights of Women’s Employment & Education 1 (W. B. Pub. No. 72-191, Mar. 1972). Moreover, 41.5% of all married women are employed. See U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dept, of Labor, Work Experience of the Population in 1971, p. 4 (Summary Special Labor Force Report, Aug. 1972). It is also noteworthy that, while the median income of a male member of the armed forces is approximately $3,686, see The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force 51, 181 (1970), the median income for all women over the age of 14, including those who are not employed, is approximately $2,237. See Statistical Abstract of the United States Table No. 535 (1972), Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 80. Applying the statutory definition of “dependency” to these statistics, it appears that, in the “median” family, the wife of a male member must have personal expenses of approximately $4,474, or about 75% of the total family income, in order to qualify as a “dependent.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-28. As noted earlier, the basic purpose of these statutes was to provide fringe benefits to members of the uniformed services in order to establish a compensation pattern which would attract career personnel through re-enlistment. See n. 3, supra, and accompanying text. Our conclusion in no wise invalidates the statutory schemes except insofar as they require a female member to prove the dependency of her spouse. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968); Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 469 F. 2d 466 (CA10 1972). See also 1 U. S. C. § 1.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MANUAL ENTERPRISES, INC., et al. v. DAY, POSTMASTER GENERAL. No. 123. Argued February 26-27, 1962. Decided June 25, 1962. Stanley M. Dietz argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Edioard J. Lynch. J. William Doolittle argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, John G. Laughlin, Jr. and David L. Rose. Mr. Justice Harlan announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice Stewart joins. This case draws in question a ruling of the Post Office Department, sustained both by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, 110 U. S. App. D. C. 78, 289 F. 2d 455, barring from the mails a shipment of petitioners’ magazines. That ruling was based on alternative determinations that the magazines (1) were themselves “obscene,’’ and (2) gave information as to where obscene matter could be obtained, thus rendering them nonmailable under two separate provisions of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, known as the Comstock Act. Certiorari was granted (368 U. S. 809) to consider the claim that this ruling was inconsistent with the proper interpretation and application of § 1461, and with principles established in two of this Court’s prior decisions. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476; Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147. Petitioners are three corporations respectively engaged in publishing magazines titled MANual, Trim, and Grecian Guild Pictorial. They have offices at the same address in Washington, D. C., and a common president, one Herman L. Womack. The magazines consist largely of photographs of nude, or near-nude, male models and give the names of each model and the photographer, together with the address of the latter. They also contain a number of advertisements by independent photographers offering nudist photographs for sale. On March 25, 1960, six parcels containing an aggregate of 405 copies of the three magazines, destined from Alexandria, Virginia, to Chicago, Illinois, were detained by the Alexandria postmaster, pending a ruling by his superiors at Washington as to whether the magazines were “non-mailable.” After an evidentiary hearing before the Judicial Officer of the Post Office Department there ensued the administrative and court decisions now under review. I. On the issue of obscenity, as distinguished from unlawful advertising, the case comes to us with the following administrative findings, which are supported by substantial evidence and which we, and indeed the parties, for the most part, themselves, accept: (1) the magazines are not, as asserted by petitioners, physical culture or “bodybuilding” publications, but are composed primarily, if not exclusively, for homosexuals, and have no literary, scientific or other merit; (2) they would appeal to the “prurient interest” of such sexual deviates, but would not have any interest for sexually normal individuals; and (3) the magazines are read almost entirely by homosexuals, and possibly a few adolescent males; the ordinary male adult would not normally buy them. On these premises, the question whether these magazines are “obscene,” as it was decided below and argued before us, was thought to depend solely on a determination as to the relevant “audience” in terms of which their “prurient interest” appeal should be judged. This view of the obscenity issue evidently stemmed from the belief that in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 489, this Court established the following single test for determining whether challenged material is obscene: “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” (Footnote omitted.) On this basis the Court of Appeals, rejecting the petitioners’ contention that the “prurient interest” appeal of the magazines should be judged in terms of their likely impact on the “average person,” even though not a likely recipient of the magazines, held that the administrative finding respecting their impact on the “average homosexual” sufficed to establish the Government’s case as to their obscenity. We do not reach the question thus thought below to be dispositive on this aspect of the case. For we find lacking in these magazines an element which, no less than “prurient interest,” is essential to a valid determination of obscenity under § 1461, and to which neither the Post Office Department nor the Court of Appeals addressed itself at all: These magazines cannot be deemed so offensive on their face as to affront current community standards of decency — a quality that we shall hereafter refer to as “patent offensiveness” or “indecency.” Lacking that quality, the magazines cannot be deemed legally “obscene,” and we need not consider the question of the proper “audience” by which their “prurient interest” appeal should be judged. The words of § 1461, “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile,” connote something that is portrayed in a manner so offensive as to make it unacceptable under current community mores. While in common usage the words have different shades of meaning, the statute since its inception has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex. Although the statute condemns such material irrespective of the effect it may have upon those into whose hands it falls, the early case of United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 14571), put a limiting gloss upon the statutory language: the statute reaches only indecent material which, as now expressed in Roth v. United States, supra, at 489, “taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” This “effect” element, originally cast in somewhat different language from that of Roth (see 354 U. S., at 487, 489), was taken into federal obscenity law from the leading English case of Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, of which a distinguished Australian judge has given the following illuminating analysis: “As soon as one reflects that the word ‘obscene/ as an ordinary English word, has nothing to do with corrupting or depraving susceptible people, and that it is used to describe things which are offensive to current standards of decency and not things which may induce to sinful thoughts, it becomes plain, I think, that Cockburn, C. J., in ... R. v. Hicklin . . . was not propounding a logical definition of the word ‘obscene,’ but was merely explaining that particular characteristic which was necessary to bring an obscene publication within the law relating to obscene libel. [] The tendency to deprave is not the characteristic which makes a publication obscene but is the characteristic which makes an obscene publication criminal. It is at once an essential element in the crime and the justification for the intervention of the common law. But it is not the whole and sole test of what constitutes an obscene libel. There is no obscene libel unless what is published is both offensive according to current standards of decency and calculated or likely to have the effect described in R. v. Hicklin . . . .” Regina v. Close, [1948] Vict. L. R. 445, 463, Judgment of Fullagar, J. (Emphasis in original.) The thoughtful studies of the American Law Institute reflect the same twofold concept of obscenity. Its earlier draft of a Model Penal Code contains the following definition of “obscene”: “A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest . . . and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.” A. L. I., Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 6 (1957), § 207.10 (2). (Emphasis added.) The same organization’s currently proposed definition reads: “Material is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest . . . and if in addition it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters.” A. L. I., Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (May 4, 1962), § 251.4 (1). (Emphasis added.) Obscenity under the federal statute thus requires proof of two distinct elements: (1) patent offensiveness; and (2) “prurient interest” appeal. Both must conjoin before- challenged material can be found “obscene” under § 1461. In most obscenity cases, to be sure, the two elements tend to coalesce, for that which is patently offensive will also usually carry the requisite “prurient interest” appeal. It is only in the unusual instance where, as here, the “prurient interest” appeal of the material is found limited to a particular class of persons that occasion arises for a truly independent inquiry into the question whether or not the material is patently offensive. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in considering that Roth made “prurient interest” appeal the sole test of obscenity. Reading that case as dispensing with the requisite of patently offensive portrayal would be not only inconsistent with § 1461 and its common-law background, but out of keeping with Roth’s evident purpose to tighten obscenity standards. The Court there both rejected the “isolated excerpt” and “particularly susceptible persons” tests of the Hicklin case, 354 U. S., at 488-489, and was at pains to point out that not all portrayals of sex could be reached by obscenity laws but only those treating that subject “in a manner appealing to prurient interest.” 354 U. S., at 487. That, of course, was but a compendious way of embracing in the obscenity standard both the concept of patent offensiveness, manifested by the terms of § 1461 itself, and the element of the likely corruptive effect of the challenged material, brought into federal law via Regina v. Hicklin. To consider that the “obscenity” exception in “the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,” Roth, at 485, does not require any determination as to the patent offensiveness vel non of the material itself might well put the American public in jeopardy of being denied access to many worthwhile works in literature, science, or art. For one would not have to travel far even among the acknowledged masterpieces in any of these fields to find works whose “dominant theme” might, not beyond reason, be claimed to appeal to the “prurient interest” of the reader or observer. We decline to attribute to Congress any such quixotic and deadening purpose as would bar from the mails all material, not patently offensive, which stimulates impure desires relating to sex. Indeed such a construction of § 1461 would doubtless encounter constitutional barriers. Roth, at 487-489. Consequently we consider the power exercised by Congress in enacting § 1461 as no more embracing than the interdiction of “obscenity” as it had theretofore been understood. It is only material whose indecency is self-demonstrating and which, from the standpoint of its effect, may be said predominantly to appeal to the prurient interest that Congress has chosen to bar from the mails by the force of § 1461. We come then to what we consider the dispositive question on this phase of the case. Are these magazines offensive on their face? Whether this question be deemed one of fact or of mixed fact and law, see Lock-hart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 114r-115 (1960), we see no need of remanding the case for initial consideration by the Post Office Department or the Court of Appeals of this missing factor in their determinations. That issue, involving factual matters entangled in a constitutional claim, see Grove Press, Inc., v. Christenberry, 276 F. 2d 433, 436, is ultimately one for this Court. The relevant materials being before us, we determine the issue for ourselves. There must first be decided the relevant “community” in terms of whose standards of decency the issue must be judged. We think that the proper test under this federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United States whose population reflects many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of decency. We need not decide whether Congress could constitutionally prescribe a lesser geographical framework for judging this issue which would not have the intolerable consequence of denying some sections of the country access to material, there deemed acceptable, which in others might be considered offensive to prevailing community standards of decency. Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. '380. As regards the standard for judging the element of “indecency,” the Roth case gives little guidance beyond indicating that the standard is a constitutional one which, as with “prurient interest,” requires taking the challenged material “as a whole.” Roth, at 489. Being ultimately concerned only with the question whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect material that is admittedly obscene, the Court there had no occasion to explore the application of a particular obscenity standard. At least one important state court and some authoritative commentators have considered Roth and subsequent cases to indicate that only “hard-core” pornography can constitutionally be reached under this or similar state obscenity statutes. See People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N. Y. 2d 578, 175 N. E. 2d 681; Lockhart and McClure, supra, at 58-60. Whether “hard-core” pornography, or something less, be the proper test, we need go no further in the present case than to hold that the magazines in question, taken as a whole, cannot, under any permissible constitutional standard, be deemed to be beyond the pale of contemporary notions of rudimentary decency. We cannot accept in full the Government’s description of these magazines which, contrary to Roth (354 U. S., at 488-489), tends to emphasize and in some respects overdraw certain features in several of the photographs, at the expense of what the magazines fairly taken as a whole depict. Our own independent examination of the magazines leads us to conclude that the most that can be said of them is that they are dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry. But this is not enough to make them “obscene.” Divorced from their “prurient interest” appeal to the unfortunate persons whose patronage they were aimed at capturing (a separate issue), these portrayals of the male nude cannot fairly be regarded as more objectionable than many portrayals of the female nude that society tolerates. Of course not every portrayal of male or female nudity is obscene. See Parmelee v. United States, 72 App. D. C. 203, 206-208, 113 F. 2d 729, 732-734; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U. S. 372; Mounce v. United States, 355 U. S. 180. Were we to hold that these magazines, although they do not transcend the prevailing bounds of decency, may be denied access to the mails by such undifferentiated legislation as that before us, we would be ignoring the admonition that “the door . . . into this area [the First Amendment] cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests” (footnote omitted). Roth, at 488. We conclude that the administrative ruling respecting nonmailability is improvident insofar as it depends on a determination that these magazines are obscene. I — < There remains the question of the advertising. It is not contended that the petitioners held themselves o.ut as purveyors of obscene material, or that the advertisements, as distinguished from the other contents of the magazines, were obscene on their own account. The advertisements were all by independent third-party photographers. And, neither with respect to the advertisements nor the magazines themselves, do we understand the Government to suggest that the “advertising” provisions of § 1461 are violated if the mailed material merely “gives the leer that promises the customer some obscene pictures.” United States v. Hornick, 229 F. 2d 120, 121. Such an approach to the statute could not withstand the underlying precepts of Roth. See Poss v. Christenberry, 179 F. Supp. 411, 415; cf. United States v. Schillaci, 166 F. Supp. 303, 306. The claim on this branch of the case rests, then, on the fact that some of the third-party advertisers were found in possession of what undoubtedly may be regarded as “hard-core” photographs, and that postal officials, although not obtaining the names of the advertisers from the lists in petitioners’ magazines, received somewhat less offensive material through the mails from certain studios which were advertising in petitioners’ magazines. A question of law must first be dealt with. Should the "obscene-advertising” proscription of § 1461 be construed as not requiring proof that the publisher knew that at least some of his advertisers were offering to sell obscene material? In other words, although the criminal provisions of § 1461 do require scienter (note 1, supra), can the Post Office Department in civil proceedings under that section escape with a lesser burden of proof? We are constrained to a negative answer. First, Congress has required scienter in respect of one indicted for mailing material proscribed by the statute. In the constitutional climate in which this statute finds itself, we should hesitate to attribute to Congress a purpose to render a publisher civilly responsible for the innocuous advertisements of the materials of others, in the absence of any showing that he knew that the character of such materials was offensive. And with no express grant of authority to the Post Office Department to keep obscene matter from the mails (see note 2, supra), we should be slow to accept the suggestion that an element of proof expressly required in a criminal proceeding may be omitted in an altogether parallel civil proceeding. Second, this Court’s ground of decision in Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, indicates that a substantial constitutional question would arise were we to construe § 1461 as not requiring proof of scienter in civil proceedings. For the power of the Post Office to bar a magazine from the mails, if exercised without proof of the publisher’s knowledge of the character of the advertisements included in the magazine, would as effectively “impose a severe limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally protected matter,” 361 U. S., at 153, as would a state obscenity statute which makes criminal the possession of obscene material without proof of scienter. Since publishers cannot practicably be expected to investigate each of their advertisers, and since the economic consequences of an order barring even a single issue of a periodical from the mails might entail heavy financial sacrifice, a magazine publisher might refrain from accepting advertisements from those whose own materials could conceivably be deemed objectionable by the Post Office Department. This would deprive such materials, which might otherwise be entitled to constitutional protection, of a legitimate and recognized avenue of access to the public. To be sure, the Court found it unnecessary in Smith to delineate the scope of scienter which would satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet it may safely be said that a federal statute which, as we construe it, requires the presence of that element is not satisfied, as the Government suggests it might be, merely by showing that a defendant did not make a “good faith effort” to ascertain the character of his advertiser’s materials. On these premises we turn to the record in this case. Although postal officials had informed petitioners’ president, Womack, that their Department was prosecuting several of his advertisers for sending obscene matter through the mails, there is no evidence that any of this material was shown to him. He thus was afforded no opportunity to judge for himself as to its alleged obscenity. Contrariwise, one of the government witnesses at the administrative hearing admitted that the petitioners had deleted the advertisements of several photographic studios after being informed by the Post Office that the proprietors had been convicted of mailing obscene material. The record reveals that none of the postal officials who received allegedly obscene matter from some of the advertisers obtained their names from petitioners’ magazines; this material was received as a result of independent test checks. Nor on the record before us can petitioners be linked with the material seized by the police. Note 15, supra. The only such asserted connection — that “hard core” matter was seized at the studio of one of petitioners’ advertisers — falls short of an adequate showing that petitioners knew that the advertiser was offering for sale obscene matter. Womack’s own conviction for sending obscene material through the mails, Womack v. United States, 111 U. S. App. D. C. 8, 294 F. 2d 204, is remote from proof of like conduct on the part of the advertisers. At that time he was acting as president of another studio; the vendee of the material, while an advertiser in petitioners’ magazines, had closed his own studio before the present issues were published. Finally, the general testimony by one postal inspector to the effect that in his experience advertisers of this character, after first leading their customers on with borderline material, usually followed up with “hard-core” matter, can hardly be deemed of probative significance on the issue at hand. At best the Government’s proof showed no more than that petitioners were chargeable with knowledge that these advertisers were offering photographs of the same character, and with the same purposes, as those reflected in their own magazines. This is not enough to satisfy the Government’s burden of proof on this score. In conclusion, nothing in this opinion of course remotely implies approval of the type of magazines published by these petitioners, still less of the sordid motives which prompted their publication. All we decide is that on this record these particular magazines are not subject to repression under § 1461. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 1461 of 18 U. S. C. provides in part: “Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance; and— “Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained or made .... “Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be convej’ed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier. “Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of anything declared by this section to be non-mailable, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, or knowingly takes any such thing from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years . . . .” Because of our view of the case, we need not reach petitioners’ third contention that, as applied in this instance, these Post Office procedures amounted to an unconstitutional “prior restraint” on the publication of these magazines. The petitioner in this case has not questioned the Post Office Department’s general authority under § 1461 to withhold these magazines from the mails if they are obscene. If that question, discussed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, post, p. 495, may still be deemed open in this Court, see Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 421-422 (Brandéis, J., dissenting); cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146, we do not think it should be decided except upon full-dress argument and briefing, which have not been afforded us here. The Judicial Officer found that “the publisher has admitted that the magazines are knowingly published to appeal to the male homosexual group,” and that “The publisher of the issues here involved has deliberately planned these publications so that they would appeal to the male homosexual audience . . . .” The words of the statute are defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (unabridged, 2d ed., 1956) as follows: obscene “1. Offensive to taste; foul; loathsome; disgusting. “2. a Offensive to chastity of mind or to modesty; expressing or presenting to the mind or view something that delicacy, purity, and decency forbid to be exposed; lewd; indecent; as, obscene language, dances, images.” lewd “4. Lustful; libidinous; lascivious; unchaste .... “Syn. — Licentious, lecherous, dissolute, sensual; debauched, impure; obscene, salacious, pornographic.” lascivious “1. Wanton; lewd; lustful. “Syn. — Licentious, lecherous, libidinous, salacious.” indecent “Not decent; specif.: a Unbecoming or unseemly; indecorous . . . . “Syn. — Immodest, impure; gross, obscene.” filthy “1. Defiled with filth, whether material or moral; nasty; disgustingly dirty; polluting; foul; impure; obscene. “Syn. — Squalid, unclean, gross, licentious.” vile “2. Morally contaminated; befouled by or as if by sin; morally base or impure; wicked; evil; sinful .... “3. . . . unclean; filthy; repulsive; odious .... “Syn. — Cheap (despicable), debased; depraved; corrupt, sordid, vicious; disgusting, loathsome, foul.” To the same effect see Webster’s New International Dictionary (unabridged, 3d ed. 1961). The first federal statute bearing on obscenity was the Tariff Act of 1842 which forbade the importation of “indecent and obscene” pictorial matter and authorized confiscation. 5 Stat. 566-567. In 1865 the Congress passed the first Postal Act touching on the mailing of obscene matter, making it a crime to deposit an “obscene book . . . or other publication of a vulgar and indecent character” in the mails. 13 Stat. 507. The reenactment of the 1865 Act in the codification of the postal laws in 1872 did not change the several adjectives describing the objectionable matter. 17 Stat. 302. The Comstock Act, 17 Stat. 598, added the descriptive terms “lewd” and “lascivious” so that the proscription then included any “obscene, lewd, or lascivious book . . . or other publication of an indecent character,” but this Court in Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446, 450, held that the words “obscene, lewd or lascivious” described a single offense. In 1909 the phrase “and every filthy” as well as the word “vile” were included in the provisions of the Comstock Act, 35 Stat. 1129. In 1955 the words were arranged in their present order. 69 Stat. 183. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that the words “indecent, filthy or vile” are limited in their meaning by the preceding words “obscene, lewd, lascivious,” and that all have reference to matters of sex. Flying Eagle Publications, Inc. v. United States, 273 F. 2d 799, 803. “Obscene libel” in English usage simply means obscene material, being derived from libellus, “little book.” See St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law, 24. The passage referred to in Regina v. Hicklin was the following: “I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. Now, with regard to this work, it is quite certain that it would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character.” [1868] L. It. 3 Q. B., at 371. The quotations from Regina v. Close and the Hicklin case are not intended to signify our approval of either the “tendency to deprave” or “sexual thoughts” test, but only to emphasize the two elements in the legal definition of “obscene.” This definition was approved by the Institute, as part of the “Proposed Official Draft,” at its annual meeting in Washington, D. C., in May 1962. It is also evident that the Judicial Officer of the Post Office Department and its counsel entertained the same mistaken view of Roth. The Report of the Judicial Officer did not address itself directly to the inherent indecency aspect of the magazines, except to the extent that such factor was tangentially involved in the findings already summarized (supra, p. 481). The same is true of the expert testimony adduced by government counsel at the administrative hearing. The 1958 amendments to 18 U. S. C. § 1461, 72 Stat. 962, authorizing criminal prosecution at the place of delivery evince no purpose to make the .standard less than national. No issue was presented in Roth as to the obscenity of any of the materials involved. 354 U. S., at 481, n. 8. See cases cited, infra, p. 490. ‘'The magazines contained little textual material, with pictures of male models dominating almost every page .... The typical page consisted of a photograph, with the name of the model and the photographer and occasional references to the model’s age (usually under 26), color of eyes, physical dimensions and occupation. The magazines contained little, either in text or pictures, that could be considered as relating in any way to weight lifting, muscle building or physical culture .... "Many of the photographs were of nude male models, usually posed with some object in front of their genitals . . . ; a number were of nude or partially nude males with emphasis on their bare buttocks .... Although none of the pictures directly exposed the model’s genitals, some showed his pubic hair and others suggested what appeared to be a semi-erect penis . . . ; others showed male models reclining with their legs (and sometimes their arms as well) spread wide apart .... Many of the pictures showed models wearing only loin cloths, ‘V gowns,’ or posing straps . . . ; some showed the model apparently removing his clothing .... Two of the magazines had pictures of pairs of models posed together suggestively "Each of the magazines contained photographs of models with swords or other long pointed objects .... The magazines also contained photographs of virtually nude models wearing only shoes, boots, helmets or leather jackets .... There were also pictures of models posed with chains or of one model beating another while a third held his face in his hands as if weeping . . . .” Since Congress has sought to bar from the mails only material that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile,” and it is within this statutory framework that we must judge the materials before us, we need not consider whether these magazines could constitutionally be reached under “a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311. A number of such photographs were seized by the police, possessing search or arrest warrants, but knowledge that these advertisers were selling, or would sell, such photographs -was never brought home to any of these petitioners. Grecian Guild Pictorial carried a notice that it “does not knowingly use the work of any studio which takes or sells nude, undraped front or side view photographs. The photographers listed above do not offer such photographs.” To be sure this magazine, as did the others, also carried a notation that the publisher was familiar with the work of the advertisers and urged the reader to support them'; but this cannot well be taken as an admission of knowledge that the advertisers’ works were obscene. We do not think it would be appropriate at this late stage to remand the case for further proceedings on the issue of scienter. Although suggesting that “[it] is arguable” that scienter is not a necessary element under this part of the statute, the Government undertakes to defend this aspect of the judgment primarily on the premise that it was. The record shows that at the administrative hearing government counsel sought to fasten the petitioners with knowledge that the third-party advertisers were selling “obscene” material. The Judicial Officer indeed rejected the petitioners’ proposed findings that “the publishers of each of the magazines in evidence . . . had no personal knowledge of the material sold by the advertisers ....’’ To be sure, the record does not disclose whether this was because “knowledge” was deemed proved rather than that such element was not considered relevant. But on the cross motions for summary judgment, based upon the administrative record, the Government did not undertake to controvert petitioners’ allegations that scienter was a necessary element under this part of the statute.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. LARIONOFF et al. No. 76-413. Argued April 27, 1977 Decided June 13, 1977 Deputy Solicitor General Jones argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, former Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Babcock, and Robert E. Kopp. Stephen Daniel Keefje argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Seven enlisted members of the United States Navy brought this class action in the District Court for the District of Columbia under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a)(2), alleging that their agreements to extend their enlistments, made at various times from 1968 to 1970, entitled each of them to payment of a re-enlistment bonus. The District Court ordered that the bonuses be paid, 365 F. Supp. 140 (1973), and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 175 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 533 F. 2d 1167 (1976). We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 997 (1976). We affirm. I From early in our history, Congress has provided by statute for payment of a re-enlistment bonus to members of the Armed Services who re-enlisted upon expiration of their term of service, or who agreed to extend their period of service before its expiration. Prior to the enactment of Pub. L. No. 89-132, 79 Stat. 547 (1965), this bonus was determined for an enlistee’s first re-enlistment or extension of enlistment by multiplying his monthly pay at the time of expiration of the initial period of service by the number of years specified in the re-enlistment agreement. See former 37 U. S. C. §§ 308 (a), (b). The perceived defect of this system was that “it failed to vary the monetary incentive for reenlistment according to the needs of the armed services for personnel with particular skills.” 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 38, 533 F. 2d, at 1173. Consequently, Congress enacted former 37 U. S. C. § 308 (g), which authorized the services to provide, in addition to the Regular Re-enlistment Bonus (RRB) just described, a Variable Re-enlistment Bonus (VRB) to members of the Armed Services whose particular skills were in short supply. The VRB was to be a multiple, no greater than four, of the RRB. This program was in effect when respondent Nicholas J. Larionoff enlisted in the Navy for four years on June 23, 1969. Shortly after his enlistment, Larionoff chose to participate in a Navy training program, completion of which would qualify him for the service rating “Communications Technician — Maintenance” (CTM). At that time, as Larionoff was aware the CTM rating was classified by Navy regulations as a “critical military skill,” whose holders were eligible upon re-enlistment or extension of enlistment for payment of a VRB in the amount of four times the RRB, the highest allowable rate. Before entering the training program, which entailed a six-year service obligation, Larionoff entered a written agreement to extend his enlistment “in consideration of the pay, allowances, and benefits which will accrue to me during -the continuance of my service.” Larionoff successfully completed the program and was advanced to the CTM rating, expecting to receive a VRB upon entering the period of his extended enlistment on June 23, 1973. On March 24, 1972, however, the Navy announced that effective July 1, 1972, the CTM rating would no longer be considered a “critical military skill” eligible for a VRB. When Larionoff, through his congressional representatives, inquired into his continued eligibility for a VRB, he was informed that since the CTM rating was no longer listed, he would not receive the expected bonus. Accordingly, in March 1973, respondents filed this lawsuit, and in September of that year the District Court certified a class and granted summary judgment for respondents, ordering payment of the disputed VRB’s. While the Government’s appeal of this order was pending in the Court of Appeals, Congress repealed the statutes authorizing both the RRB and the VRB, and substituted a new Selective Re-enlistment Bonus (SRB), effective June 1, 1974. Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 119, 37 U. S. C. § 308 (1970 ed., Supp. V). The Government concedes that this action had no effect on six of the named respondents; like Larionoff, they were scheduled to begin serving their extended enlistments prior to the effective date of the Act, and therefore should have received their VRB’s, if at all, while the program was still in effect. Respondent Johnnie S. Johnson, however, first enlisted in the Navy in August 1970, and did not begin serving his extended enlistment until August 1974. The Court of Appeals was thus confronted with two questions: (1) whether Larionoff and those in his position were entitled to receive VRB’s despite the Navy’s elimination of their rating from the eligible list in the period after their agreement to extend their enlistments but before they began serving those extensions; and (2) whether Johnson and others in his situation were entitled to receive VRB’s despite the repeal of the VRB program in the same period. The Court of Appeals held that both were entitled to receive VRB’s. II A Both the Government and respondents recognize that “[a] soldier’s entitlement to pay is dependent upon statutory right,” Bell v. United States, 366 U. S. 393, 401 (1961), and that accordingly the rights of the affected service members must be determined by reference to the statutes and regulations governing the VRB, rather than to ordinary contract principles. In this case, the relevant statute, former 37 U. S. C. § 308 (g), provided: “Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, ... a member who is designated as having a critical military skill and who is entitled to [an RRB] upon his first reenlistment may be paid an additional amount not more than four times the amount of [the RRB].” The regulations governing individual eligibility were set forth in Department of Defense Instruction 1304.15, ¶ IV.B.1 (Sept. 3, 1970). The Government contends that these eligibility criteria are to be applied as of the time the enlisted member completes service of his original enlistment and enters into the extended enlistment. This is a reasonable construction, since the statute requires that the VRB not be paid until that time. See n. 5, supra. At that time, it is argued, respondents did not satisfy two related criteria prescribed by ¶ V.B.l, although it is conceded they met the others. First, they were not then “serving ... in a military specialty designated” as a critical military skill, ¶ V.B.l.a, since the CTM rating was by that time no longer so designated; second, they had not “[at-tainted] eligibility prior to the effective date of termination of awards” for the CTM rating. ][V.B.l.f. The Government also relies upon the regulations governing the amount of the award to be received. Under Department of Defense Directive 1304.14, ¶ IV.F (Sept. 3, 1970): “When a military skill is designated for reduction or termination of award an effective date for reduction or termination of awards shall be established and announced to the field at least 90 days in advance. All awards on or after that effective date in military skills designated for reduction of award level will be at the level effective that date and no new awards will be made on or after the effective date in military skills designated for termination of awards.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Department of Defense Instruction 1304.15, supra, [[VI.A, stated: “Members serving in a military specialty designated for reduction or termination of award under the provisions of subsection IV.F. of [Directive 1304.14, supra] will receive the award level effective on the date of- their reenlistment or extension of enlistment, except as provided in paragraph V.B.l.f. above.” The Government argues that these regulations, read together, establish that respondents were entitled to receive only the VRB in effect for their service rating at the time the period of their original enlistment ended, and the extended enlistment began. These regulations, as the Court of Appeals pointed out and the Government freely concedes, contain a number of ambiguities. See 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 40-42, 533 F. 2d, at 1175-1177. We need not tarry, however, over the various ambiguous terms and complex interrelations of the regulations. In construing administrative regulations, "the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945). See also INS v. Stanisic, 395 U. S. 62 (1969). The Government represents, and respondents do not seriously dispute, that throughout the period in which the VRB program was in effect, the Navy interpreted the Department of Defense regulations as entitling an enlisted member who .extends his enlistment to the VRB level, if any, in effect at the time he began to serve the extended enlistment. Since this interpretation is not plainly inconsistent with the wording of the regulations, we accept the Government’s reading of those regulations as correct. B This, however, does not end our inquiry. For regulations, in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated. We are persuaded that insofar as they required that the amount of the VRB to be awarded to a service member who extended his enlistment was to be determined by reference to the award level in effect at the time he began to serve the extension, rather than at the time he agreed to it, the relevant regulations were contrary to the manifest purposes of Congress in enacting the VRB program, and hence invalid. The legislative history of the VRB statute makes those congressional purposes crystal clear. As noted above, the re-enlistment bonus scheme in effect before 1965, which relied entirely on the RRB, was criticized for providing the same re-enlistment incentive to all members of the Armed Services, regardless of the need for their skills. The Defense Department desired greater flexibility in calibrating re-enlistment incentives to its manpower needs. The additional expenditures for the VRB were expected to save money in the long run, since payment of the higher re-enlistment bonus would enable the Armed Forces to retain highly skilled individuals whose training had required a considerable investment. Members of Congress in the floor debates clearly recognized the wisdom of offering such incentives. The VRB was thus intended to induce selected service members to extend their period of service beyond their original enlistment. Of course, the general pay raise for the military included in the same Act was also intended to have a similar effect, by making a military career generally more attractive. But the VRB was expected to be a very specific sort of incentive, not only because it was aimed at a selected group of particularly desirable service members, but also because it offered an incentive “at just the time that it will be most effective, when an individual decides whether or not to reenlist.” Remarks of Rep. Nedzi, 111 Cong. Rec. 17201 (1965). The then Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, made the same point to the House Armed Services Committee, in contrasting the VRB to “proficiency pay,” which provides increased pay to service members with critical skills: “We believe a more efficient way to provide additional reenlistment incentives to selected first termers in especially high demand is by using a variable reenlistment bonus. Monetary rewards are thereby concentrated at the first reenlistment decision point, obtaining the greatest return per dollar spent on the retention of personnel.” Hearings on Military Pay Bills before the House Committee on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2545 (June 7, 1965) (House Hearings). (Emphasis added.) The then Assistant Secretary of Defense, Norman S. Paul, also distinguished the VRB from ordinary pay, stating that with the VRB the military hoped “to cure a separate specific problem by specific means, rather than overall pay.” Hearings on Military Pay Increase before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (July 29, 1965) (Senate Hearings). The timing of the VRB was crucial to this intention: “At the end of his first term of reenlistment [sic] he is trying to make up his mind whether to stay in the military. And we think that the added bonus may push him over the line into staying with us, which is what we want to see happening.” Id., at 40. It is true that in discussing the VRB, Congress focused on the service member who reaches the end of his enlistment, and is faced with the decision “whether or not to reenlist.” (Emphasis added.) Remarks of Rep. Nedzi, supra. But, as Congress has recognized in providing that “[a] member of the [Armed Forces] who extends his enlistment ... is entitled to the same pay and allowances as though he had reenlisted,” 37 U. S. C. § 906, precisely the same reasoning applies to the decision to extend enlistment as to the decision to re-enlist. In either case, the VRB could only be effective as a selective incentive to extension of service if at the time he made his decision the service member could count on receiving it if he elected to remain in the service. This is very apparent when the VRB program is examined from the perspective of an individual who is at the point of deciding whether or not to extend an enlistment due to expire at some future date. At the time he makes this decision, he is aware that his rating or expected rating is classified as a critical military skill eligible for a VRB at a particular level. Under the plan as envisioned by Congress, and as applied by the- Navy in the case of re-enlistments, the incentive operates “at just the time it will be most effective,” because the service member knows that if he remains in the service, he will receive a VRB at the prescribed level. But under the contested regulations, the service member has no such reassurance. Whether or not his rating is eligible for a VRB now, it may not be at the future date on which his first enlistment expires. His “incentive” to extend his enlistment is the purely hypothetical possibility that he might receive a VRB if there is a personnel shortage in his skill on that date. On the other hand, if he nevertheless extends his enlistment, and if the VRB level for his rating is increased in the interval before his original term expires, he will receive a higher award than that which sufficed to induce his decision to remain in the service — from the standpoint of Congress' purposes, a totally gratuitous award. The clear intention of Congress to enact a program that “concentrates monetary incentives at the first reenlistment decision point where the greatest returns per retention dollar can be expected,” Senate Hearings 26 (statement of Asst. Secy. Paul), could only be effectuated if the enlisted member at the decision point had some certainty about the incentive being offered. Instead, the challenged regulations provided for a virtual lottery. We therefore hold that insofar as the Defense Department regulations required that the amount of the VRB to be paid to a service member who was otherwise eligible to receive one be determined by the award level as of the time he began to serve his extended enlistment, they are in clear conflict with the congressional intention in enacting the VRB program, and hence invalid. Because Congress intended to provide at the re-enlistment decision point a promise of a reasonably certain and specific bonus for extending service in the Armed Forces, Larionoff and the members of his class are entitled, as the Court of Appeals held, to payment of VRB’s determined according to the award levels in effect at the time they agreed to extend their enlistments. Ill This brings us to the further question of respondent Johnson's entitlement to a VRB. At the time he agreed to extend his enlistment, the VRB program was in effect, and his CTM rating was classified as a critical military skill. Before he began serving the extended enlistment period, however, Congress repealed the RRB and VRB system, and substituted the new SRB. 88 Stat. 119, 37 U. S. C. § 308 (1970 ed., Supp. V). The Government contends that since the VRB had been abolished before Johnson became eligible to receive one, he is not entitled to receive a bonus. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. What we have said above as to Larionoff goes far toward answering this question. The intention of Congress in enacting the VRB was specifically to promise to those who extended their enlistments that a VRB award would be paid to them at the expiration of their original enlistment in return for their commitment to lengthen their period of service. When Johnson made that commitment, by entering an agreement to extend his enlistment, he, like Larionoff, became entitled to receive at some future date a VRB at the award level then in effect (provided that he met the other eligibility criteria). Thus, unless Congress intended, in repealing the VRB program in 1974, to divest Johnson of the rights he had already earned, and constitutionally could do so, the prospective repeal of the program could not affect his right to receive a VRB, even though the date on which the bonus was to be paid had not yet arrived. Of course, if Congress had such an intent, serious constitutional questions would be presented. No one disputes that Congress may prospectively reduce the pay of members of the Armed Forces, even if that reduction deprived members of benefits they had expected to be able to earn. Cf. Bell v. United States, 366 U. S. 393 (1961); United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554 (1940). It is quite a different matter, however, for Congress to deprive a service member of pay due for services already performed, but still owing. In that case, the congressional action would appear in a different constitutional light. Cf. Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934); Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935). In view of these problems, we would not lightly conclude, in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent, that in amending 37 U. S. C. § 308 and establishing a new bonus system, Congress intended to affect the rights of those service members who had extended their enlistments and become entitled to receive VRB’s. Nothing in the language of the 1974 Act or its legislative history expresses such aii intention. The Act makes no reference whatever to service members who have become entitled to payment of a VRB by extending their enlistments. There is no prohibition of further payments of VRB’s to those already entitled to them; the Act simply replaces the old § 308 with a new one that authorizes SRB’s rather than RRB’s and VRB’s. Nor does the legislative history express any intention to effect such a prohibition. No paramount power of the Congress or important national interest justifying interference with contractual entitlements is invoked. The Courts of Appeals that have upheld the Government’s position have relied on two indications of a congressional intent to affect the rights of Johnson and his class. First, the 1974 Act expressly preserves the right of all service members on active duty as of the effective date of the Act to receive upon re-enlistment the RRB’s they would have been entitled to before passage of the Act. Pub. L. No. 93-277, § 3, 88 Stat. 121. The failure to include a similar saving clause as to VRB’s, it is argued, indicates that Congress intended to abolish them entirely. But the saving clause for RRB’s does not merely preserve them for those who had already extended their enlistments, but assures RRB’s upon re-enlistment to any service member then on active duty. The failure to enact a similar provision as to VRB’s indicates only that Congress did not intend that VRB’s be paid to those service members who re-enlisted after the effective date of the Act, and has no bearing on those who had already extended their enlistments and become entitled to VRB’s. Second, reference is made to a portion of the Conference Report on the Act, indicating a congressional “understanding” that service members, like Johnson, who had already entered two-year extensions of enlistment could become eligible for an SRB by canceling the extension and replacing it with a four-year extension. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-985, pp. 4-5 (1974). This, it is argued, indicates that Congress had considered the possible unfairness that eliminating the VRB could work on members such as Johnson, and felt that it had made sufficient provision for them by making them eligible, upon a further extension of their commitment, for an SRB. But the Report does not refer to the possible unfairness of eliminating the VRB payable to those service members with whom it deals; rather, it refers to the Navy’s concern that language in the legislative history might cast doubt on a commitment the Navy had made “to a man with a four-year enlistment and a two-year extension that he can cancel the two-year extension and reenlist for four years and receive a reenlistment bonus for the four-year reenlistment.” Id., at 4. The Report removes any doubts about the validity of that commitment. The only relevance of the Report to the problem before us is that it demonstrates that Congress was responsive to the “concern that the language of the bill might be interpreted to require it to abrogate an understanding” between the Armed Forces and enlistees, ibid., making it less rather than more likely that Congress intended the 1974 Act to abrogate Johnson’s entitlement to a VRB by implication. Affirmed. The Court of Appeals opinion traces the history of this policy from 1795 to the present. 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 37-38, and n. 16, 533 F. 2d, at 1172-1173, and n. 16. Former 37 U. S. C. § 308 (g), 79 Stat. 547, provided as follows: “(g) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, a member who is designated as having a critical military skill and who is entitled to a bonus computed under subsection (a) of this section upon his first reenlistment may be paid an additional amount not more than four times the amount of that bonus. The additional amount shall be paid in equal yearly installments in each year of the reenlistment period. However, in meritorious cases the additional amount may be paid in fewer installments if the Secretary concerned determines it to be in the best interest of the members. An amount paid under this subsection does not count against the limitation prescribed by subsection (c) of this section on the total amount that may be paid under this section.” Under the Department of Defense regulations implementing the VRB program, multiples of one to four times the RRB were assigned depending on the relative urgency of the services’ need for particular skills, as measured by personnel shortages and the cost of training replacement personnel. Department of Defense Directive 1304.14, ¶¶ IV.D.1.a, b (Sept. 3, 1970); Department of Defense Instruction 1304.15, ¶¶ IV.D, V.A.1, 2 (Sept. 3, 1970). Under 37 U. S. C. § 906, “[a] member of the [Armed Forces] who extends his enlistment ... is entitled to the same pay and allowances as though he had reenlisted.” Except as noted below with specific reference to respondent Johnnie S. Johnson, the facts relating to Larionoff are typical of those concerning the other named respondents. Larionoff was informed of the existence of the VRB program, and its applicability to the CTM program, by a Navy “classifier” who interviewed him to determine what field within the service he should enter. Several of the other named respondents were also told of the existence of the VRB program, and in sóme instances the amount of the VRB they could expect to receive was calculated for them by Navy personnel, without any indication that the amount might be reduced. 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 35, 36, and nn. 6, 11, 533 F. 2d, at 1170, 1171, and nn. 6, 11. These facts, contained in affidavits filed by respondents, are undisputed; while an affidavit introduced by the Government states that “it is not the policy of the Department of the Navy to promise specific eligibility for Variable Reenlistment Bonus, nor is any official authorized to make such a promise in counselling with a prospective enlistee,” there is no dispute that in particular cases individual service members might, inadvertently or otherwise, be left with the impression that a VRB had been promised. Under former 37 U. S. C. §308 (g), the VRB was paid “in equal yearly installments in each year of the reenlistment period.” But see n. 23, infra. Indeed, this is implicitly recognized in the contracts executed by the named respondents, which state that they agree to extend their enlistments “in consideration of the pay, allowances, and benefits which will accrue to me during the continuance of my service,” rather than stating any fixed compensation. This regulation provided: “B. Individual Eligibility for Receipt of Awards “1. Variable Reenlistment Bonus. An enlisted member is eligible to receive, a Variable Reenlistment Bonus if he meets all the following conditions: “a. Is qualified and serving on active duty in a military specialty designated under provisions of paragraph V.A.2. above for award of the Variable Reenlistment Bonus. Members paid a Variable Reenlistment Bonus shall continue to serve in the military specialty which qualified them for the bonus unless the Secretary of a Military Department determines that a waiver of this restriction is necessary in the interest of the Military Service concerned. “b. Has completed at least 21 months of continuous active service other than active duty for training immediately prior to discharge, release from active duty, or extension of enlistment. “e. Is serving in pay grade E-3 or higher. “d. Reenlists in a regular component of the Military Service concerned within three (3) months (or within a lesser period if so prescribed by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned) after the date of his discharge or release from compulsory or voluntary active duty (other than for training), or extends his enlistment, so that the reenlistment or enlistment as extended provides a total period of continuous active service of not less than sixty-nine (69) months. “(1) The reenlistment or extension of enlistment must be a first reenlistment or extension for which a reenlistment bonus is payable. “(2) No reenlistment or extension accomplished for any purpose other than continued active service in the designated military specialty shall qualify a member for receipt of the Variable Reenlistment Bonus. “(3) Continued active service in a designated military specialty shall include normal skill progression as defined in the respective Military Service classification manuals. “e. Has not more than eight years of total active service at the time of reenlistment or extension of enlistment. “f.‘ Attains eligibility prior to the effective date of termination of awards in any military specialty designated for termination of the award. Member must attain eligibility prior to the effective date of a reduction of award level to be eligible for the higher award level. Eligibility attained through any modification of an existing service obligation, including any early discharge granted pursuant to 10 U. S. C. 1171, must have been attained prior to the date the authority approving the modification was notified of the prospective termination or reduction of award in the military specialty. “g. Meets such additional eligibility criteria as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned.” Instruction 1304.15 has been canceled by Department of Defense Instruction 1304.22 (June 1975). Directive 1304.14 has been canceled by Department of Defense Directive 1304.21 (June 1975). The reference is apparently to the last sentence of ¶ V.B.l.f, supra, n. 8, which provided: “Eligibility attained through any modification of an existing service obligation . . . must have been attained prior to the date the authority approving the modification was notified of the prospective termination or reduction of award ...” The Court of Appeals interpreted this provision as intended to prevent service members from qualifying for a soon-to-be-reduced benefit level by agreeing to extend their enlistments in the interval between the announcement of the reduction in award level and the effective date of the change, and hence an implicit recognition that in the absence of such a provision service members in that position would be entitled to the higher benefit level. 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 41-42, 533 F. 2d, at 1176-1177. The Government argues, however,, that the purpose of ¶ V.B.l.f was to reach the much smaller group of service members who would be in a position both to agree to extend their enlistment and to begin serving the extension within the relevant period. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16. This has apparently been the practice regardless of whether that level was higher or lower than that in effect when the service member agreed to extend his enlistment. Id., at 45. “The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is . . . [only] the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which' does not do this, but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.” Manhattan General Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U. S. 129, 134 (1936). See, e. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 213-214 (1976); Dixon v. United States, 381 U. S. 68, 74 (1965). This argument was clearly raised in the briefs in the Court of Appeals, Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees (Cross-Appellants) 13, Larionoff v. United States, Nos. 74-1211 and 74-212, and in this Court, Brief for Respondents 15-18. We therefore do not regard the somewhat inconclusive colloquy at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-33, as abandoning it. H. R. Rep. No. 549, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1965); S. Rep. No. 544, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1965). See, e. g., remarks of Rep. Morton, 111 Cong. Rec. 17206 (1965); remarks of Rep. Bennett, ibid.; remarks of Rep. Dole, id., at 17209; remarks of Sen. Russell, id., at 20034. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 549, supra, at 5-6; S. Rep. No. 544, supra, at 1-4. The argument that the VRB would be particularly effective as an inducement to re-enlist because it would be provided at the “decision point” is a constant theme through the hearings, the committee reports, and the floor debates. See House Hearings 2545-2584 (statements of Secy. McNamara), 2671 (colloquy of Rep. Stratton and Gen. Greene); Senate Hearings 19 (statement of Secy. McNamara), 26, 40, 44 (statements of Asst. Secy. Paul); H. R. Rep. No. 549, supra, at 47; S. Rep. No. 544, supra, at 14; 111 Cong. Rec. 17201 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Nedzi). Indeed, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 43-44, n. 32, 533 F. 2d, at 1178-1179, n. 32, because the regulations governing the VRB program required the various services to undertake an annual review of the military specialties in which personnel shortages existed for the purpose of adjusting VRB award levels, Department of Defense Directive 1304.14, ¶ IV.F.1, the service member, by his very decision to extend his enlistment, would contribute to the likelihood that by the time his initial enlistment expired, his skill would no longer be in short supply and the VRB he had expected would therefore have been reduced or eliminated. The effects of the challenged regulations would, of course, be less than clear to the service member deciding whether or not to extend his enlistment, and, given the complexity and ambiguity of the regulations, and the resulting possibility that they could be misconstrued by Navy recruiters as well as by the enlistees themselves, it would not be surprising if many service members, like some of the respondents here, see n. 4, supra, came to believe that by extending their enlistments they had acquired a vested right to a VRB. To the extent that such beliefs had been fostered, upholding the regulations would perpetrate a considerable injustice. Of course, the enlisted service member agreeing to extend his enlistment could not have been entirely certain of the amount of his future VRB. First, the VRB was calculated according to a formula based on the amount of the RRB, which in turn depended on the re-enlistee’s basic pay upon entering the re-enlistment period. At the time he agreed to extend his enlistment, the service member could not have been sure what that amount would be; Congress could alter military pay scales, or the member might be promoted or demoted, and hence his pay might change, in the interval. Second, the VRB, by both statute and regulation, was not actually paid until the service member began serving his extended enlistment, and even then was ordinarily paid in yearly installments. If for some reason the enlistee did not complete service of his extension, remaining installments were not paid, and overpayments were recouped. Department of Defense Directive 1304.14, ¶ IV.G. Finally, receipt of any VRB at all depended on the service member’s completing the requirements for eligibility before expiration of the original enlistment. See Department of Defense Instruction 1304.15, ¶ IV.B.1, n. 8. Thus, the VRB as applied to service members extending their enlistments, as opposed to those re-enlisting, was always somewhat contingent. But there is a significant difference between this sort of contingency, which was inherent in the nature of the program and in any event involved marginal effects on the amount of the award or the occurrence of rather speculative events, and the sort of uncertainty the contested regulations inject into the program, which rendered the primary determinant of the VRB entirely unpredictable at the time the decision to extend enlistment was made. The decision of the Court of Appeals on this point is in conflict with the decisions in Collins v. Rumsfeld, 542 F. 2d 1109 (CA9 1976), cert. pending sub nom. Saylors v. United States, No. 76-677; and Carini v. United States, 528 F. 2d 738 (CA4 1975), cert. pending, No. 75-1695. As noted, n. 20, supra, the precise amount of the award remained somewhat uncertain, and the award was contingent on the enlisted member’s meeting certain eligibility conditions. The Government’s concession that the 1974 Act does not affect respondents other than Johnson implicitly admits that the Act permits such payments. Three other named respondents entered their two-year extension periods after June 1, 1973. Since the VRB was paid in yearly installments, n. 5, supra, these three would presumably still have installments due on their VRB after the Act became effective on June 1, 1974. This section provides: “Notwithstanding section 308 of title 37, United States Code, as amended by this Act, a member of a uniformed service on active duty on the effective date of this Act, who would have been eligible, at the end of his current or subsequent enlistment, for the reenhstment bonus prescribed in section 308 (a) or (d) of that title, as it existed on the day before the effective date of this Act, shall continue to be eligible for the reenhstment bonus under that section as it existed on the day before the effective date of this Act. If a member is also eligible for the reenhstment bonus prescribed in that section as amended by this Act, he may elect to receive either one of those reenhstment bonuses. However, a member’s eligibility under section 308 (a) or (d) of that title, as it existed on the day before the effective date of this Act, terminates when he has received a total of $2,000 in reenhstment bonus payments, received under either section 308 (a) or (d) of that title as it existed on the day before the effective date of this Act, or under section 308 of that title, as amended by this Act, or from a combination of both.” The relevant portion of the Conference Report referred to in the text states: “Clarification of interpretation of bill language “The House committee in reporting the bill indicated its intention that bonuses not be authorized for personnel for existing obligated service. There was brought to the attention of the conferees a problem that would exist, particularly in the Navy nuclear-power field, under the House interpretation of the language of the bill. In cases where commitment has been made to a man with a four-year enlistment and a two-year extension he can cancel the two-year extension and reenlist for four years and receive a reenlistment bonus for the four-year reenlistment. The Navy expressed great concern that the language of the bill might be interpreted to require it to abrogate an understanding it had with enlistees and would operate in such a way as to cause serious retention problems in its most critical career field. The conferees, therefore, want it understood that while it normally does not expect bonuses to be paid for services for which there was an existing obligation, it is consistent with the conferees’ understanding that full entitlement to SRB will be authorized for personnel who have already agreed to an extension period prior to the enactment of the legislation if they subsequently cancel this extension prior to its becoming operative and reenlist for a period of at least two years beyond the period of the canceled extension. Nothing in the bill should operate to deny the Chief of Naval Operations the authority to extend SRB entitlement to nuclear-power operators, if they subsequently can cancel any outstanding extension period prior to its becoming operative and reenlist for a period of at least two years beyond the period of the canceled extension.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WOODWARD et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 412. Argued February 26, 1970 Decided April 20, 1970 Donald P. Cooney argued the cause for petitioners. On the brief was Martin M. Cooney. Assistant Attorney General Walters argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Matthew J. Zinn, Gilbert E. Andrews, and Stuart A. Smith. Mb. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case and United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., post, p. 580, involve the tax treatment of expenses incurred in certain appraisal litigation. Taxpayers owned or controlled a majority of the common stock of the Telegraph-Herald, an Iowa-publishing corporation. The Telegraph-Herald was incorporated in 1901, and its charter was extended for 20-year periods in 1921 and 1941. On June 9, 1960, taxpayers voted their controlling share of the stock of the corporation in favor of a perpetual extension of the charter. A minority stockholder voted against the extension. Iowa law requires “those stockholders voting for such renewal . . . [to] purchase at its real value the stock voted against such renewal.” Iowa Code §491.25 (1966). Taxpayers attempted to negotiate purchase of the dissenting stockholder’s shares, but no agreement could be reached on the “real value” of those shares. Consequently, in 1962 taxpayers brought an action in state court to appraise the value of the minority stock interest. The trial court fixed a value, which was slightly reduced on appeal by the Iowa Supreme Court, Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 133 N. W. 2d 38, on rehearing, 257 Iowa 1104, 136 N. W. 2d 280 (1965). In July 1965, taxpayers purchased the minority stock interest at the price fixed by the court. During 1963, taxpayers paid attorneys’, accountants’, and appraisers’ fees of over $25,000, for services rendered in connection with the appraisal litigation. On their 1963 federal income tax returns, taxpayers claimed deductions for these expenses, asserting that they were “ordinary and necessary expenses paid ... for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income” deductible under § 212 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 212. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deduction “because the fees represent capital expenditures incurred in connection with the acquisition of capital stock of a corporation.” The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s determination, with two dissenting opinions, 49 T. C. 377 (1968), and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 410 F. 2d 313 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1969). We granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 875 (1969), to resolve the conflict over the deductibility of the costs of appraisal proceedings between this decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., supra. We affirm. Since the inception of the present federal income tax in 1913, capital expenditures have not been deductible. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 263. Such expenditures are added to the basis of the capital asset with respect to which they are incurred, and are taken into account for tax purposes either through depreciation or by reducing the capital gain (or increasing the loss) when the asset is sold. If an expense is capital, it cannot be deducted as “ordinary and necessary,” either as a business expense under § 162 of the Code or as an expense of “management, conservation, or maintenance” under § 212. It has long been recognized, as a general matter, that costs incurred in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset are to be treated as capital expenditures. The most familiar example of such treatment is the capitalization of brokerage fees for the sale or purchase of securities, as explicitly provided by a longstanding Treasury regulation, Treas. Reg. on Income Tax § 1.263 (a)-2 (e), and as approved by this Court in Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79 (1938), and Spreckels v. Commissioner, 315 U. S. 626 (1942). The Court recognized that brokers’ commissions are “part of the acquisition cost of the securities,” Helvering v. Winmill, supra, at 84, and relied on the Treasury regulation, which had been approved by statutory re-enactment, to deny deductions for such commissions even to a taxpayer for whom they were a regular and recurring expense in his business of buying and selling securities. The regulations do not specify other sorts of acquisition costs, but rather provide generally that “[t]he cost of acquisition . . . of . . . property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year” is a capital expenditure. Treas. Reg. on Income Tax § 1.263 (a)-2 (a). Under this general provision, the courts have held that legal, brokerage, accounting, and similar costs incurred in the acquisition or disposition of such property are capital expenditures. See, e. g., Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F. 2d 913, 921 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1963); United States v. St. Joe Paper Co., 284 F. 2d 430, 432 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1960). See generally 4A J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation §§ 25.25, 25.26, 25.40, 25A.15 (1966 rev.). The law could hardly be otherwise, for such ancillary expenses incurred in acquiring or disposing of an asset are as much part of the cost of that asset as is the price paid for it. More difficult questions arise with respect to another class of capital expenditures, those incurred in “defending or perfecting title to property.” Treas. Reg. on Income Tax § 1.263 (a)-2 (c). In one sense, any lawsuit brought against a taxpayer may affect his title to property — money or other assets subject to lien. The courts, not believing that Congress meant all litigation expenses to be capitalized, have created the rule that such expenses are capital in nature only where the taxpayer’s “primary purpose” in incurring them is to defend or perfect title. See, e. g., Rassenfoss v. Commissioner, 158 F. 2d 764 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1946); Industrial Aggregate Co. v. United States, 284 F. 2d 639, 645 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1960). This test hardly draws a bright line, and has produced a melange of decisions, which, as the Tax Court has noted, “[i]t would be idle to suggest . . . can be reconciled.” Ruoff v. Commissioner, 30 T. C. 204, 208 (1958). Taxpayers urge that this “primary purpose” test, developed in the context of cases involving the costs of defending property, should be applied to costs incurred in acquiring or disposing of property as well. And if it is so applied, they argue, the costs here in question were properly deducted, since the legal proceedings in which they were incurred did not directly involve the question of title to the minority stock, which all agreed was to pass to taxpayers, but rather was concerned solely with the value of that stock. We agree with the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals that the “primary purpose” test has no application here. That uncertain and difficult test may be the best that can be devised to determine the tax treatment of costs incurred in litigation that may affect a taxpayer’s title to property more or less indirectly, and that thus calls for a judgment whether the taxpayer can fairly be said to be “defending or perfecting title.” Such uncertainty is not called for in applying the regulation that makes the “cost of acquisition” of a capital asset a capital expense. In our view application of the latter regulation to litigation expenses involves the simpler inquiry whether the origin of the claim litigated is in the process of acquisition itself. A test based upon the taxpayer’s “purpose” in undertaking or defending a particular piece of litigation would encourage resort to formalisms and artificial distinctions. For instance, in this case there can be no doubt that legal, accounting, and appraisal costs incurred by taxpayers in negotiating a purchase of the minority stock would have been capital expenditures. See Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T. C. 173 (1961). Under whatever test might be applied, such expenses would have clearly been “part of the acquisition cost” of the stock. Helvering v. Winmill, supra. Yet the appraisal proceeding was no more than the substitute that state law provided for the process of negotiation as a means of fixing the price at which the stock was to be purchased. Allowing deduction of expenses incurred in such a proceeding, merely on the ground that title was not directly put in question in the particular litigation, would be anomalous. Further, a standard based on the origin of the claim litigated comports with this Court's recent ruling on the characterization of litigation expenses for tax purposes in United States v. Gilmore, 372 U. S. 39 (1963). This Court there held that the expense of defending a divorce suit was a nondeductible personal expense, even though the outcome of the divorce case would affect the taxpayer’s property holdings, and might affect his business reputation. The Court rejected a test that looked to the consequences of the litigation, and did not even consider the taxpayer’s motives or purposes in undertaking defense of the litigation, but rather examined the origin and character of the claim against the taxpayer, and found that the claim arose out of the personal relationship of marriage. The standard here pronounced may, like any standard, present borderline cases, in which it is difficult to determine whether the origin of particular litigation lies in the process of acquisition. This is not such a borderline case. Here state law required taxpayers to “purchase” the stock owned by the dissenter. In the absence of agreement on the price at which the purchase was to be made, litigation was required to fix the price. Where property is acquired by purchase, nothing is more clearly part of the process of acquisition than the establishment of a purchase price. Thus the expenses incurred in that litigation were properly treated as part of the cost of the stock that the taxpayers acquired. Affirmed. Other federal court decisions on the point are in conflict. Compare Boulder Building Corp. v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 512 (D. C. W. D. Okla. 1954) (holding appraisal proceeding costs capital expenditures), with Smith Hotel Enterprises, Inc. v. Nelson, 236 F. Supp. 303 (D. C. E. D. Wis. 1964) (holding such costs deductible as ordinary and necessary business expense). And see Heller v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 371 (1943), aff’d, 147 F. 2d 376 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1945) (holding dissenting stockholder’s appraisal costs deductible under predecessor to § 212). See also Naylor v. Commissioner, 203 F. 2d 346 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1953), in which expenses of litigation to fix the purchase price of stock sold pursuant to an option to purchase it at its net asset value on a certain date were held deductible under the predecessor of § 212. See § IIB of the Income Tax Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 167. The two sections are in pari materia with respect to the capital-ordinary distinction, differing only in, that § 212 allows deductions for the ordinary and necessary expenses of nonbusiness profitmaking activities. See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U. S. 39, 44-45 (1963). Heller v. Commissioner, n. 1, supra, may have been based in part on the premise that the predecessor of § 212 permitted the deduction of some expenses that would have been capitalized if incurred in the conduct of a trade or business. See Hochschild v. Commissioner, 161 F. 2d 817, 820 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1947) (Frank, J., dissenting). A large number of these decisions are collected in 4A Mertens, supra, §§ 25.24, 25A.16. Taxpayers argue at length that under Iowa law title to the stock passed before the appraisal proceeding. The Court of Appeals viewed Iowa law differently, and it seems to us that it was correct in so doing. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., post, at 583-584, n. 2. But resolution of this question of state law makes no difference and is not necessary for decision of the case, since, as we hold in Hilton Hotels, the sequence in which title passes and price is determined is irrelevant for purposes of the tax question involved here. See, e. g., Petschek v. United States, 335 F. 2d 734 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1964), for a borderline case of whether legal expenses were incurred in the disposition of property. Taxpayers argue that “purchase” analysis cannot properly be applied to the appraisal situation, because the transaction is an involuntary one from their point of view — an argument relied upon by the District Court in the Smith Hotel Enterprises case, supra, n. 1. In the first place, the transaction is in a sense voluntary, since the majority holders know that under state law they will have to buy out any dissenters. More fundamentally, however, wherever a capital asset is transferred to a new owner in exchange for value either agreed upon or determined by law to be a fair quid pro quo, the payment itself is a capital expenditure, and there is no reason why the costs of determining the amount of that payment should be considered capital in the case of the negotiated price and yet considered deductible in the case of the price fixed by law. See Isaac G. Johnson & Co. v. United States, 149 F. 2d 851 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1945) (expenses of litigating amount of fair compensation in condemnation proceeding held capital expenditures).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EDELMAN, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID OF ILLINOIS v. JORDAN No. 72-1410. Argued December 12, 1973 Decided March 25, 1974 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, and Powell, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., post, p. 678, and Brennan, J., post, p. 687, filed dissenting opinions. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blacicmun, J., joined, post, p. 688. Robert J. O’Rourke, Deputy Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were William J. Scott, Attorney General, and Donald S. Car-now, Special Assistant Attorney General. Sheldon Roodman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Jack Greenberg, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Eric Schnapper for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and by Nancy Duff Levy and Henry A. Freedman for the NLSP Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Inc. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent John Jordan filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, individually and as a representative of a class, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against two former directors of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, the director of the Cook County Department of Public Aid, and the comptroller of Cook County. Respondent alleged that these state officials were administering the federal-state programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD) in a manner inconsistent with various federal regulations and with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. AABD is one of the categorical aid programs administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid pursuant to the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 23, §§ 3-1 through 3-12 (1973). Under the Social Security Act, the program is funded by the State and the Federal Governments. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1381-1385. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which administers these payments for the Federal Government, issued regulations prescribing maximum permissible time standards within which States participating in the program had to process AABD applications. Those regulations, originally issued in 1968, required, at the time of the institution of this suit, that eligibility determinations must be made by the States within 30 days of receipt of applications for aid to the aged and blind, and within 45. days of receipt of applications for aid to the disabled. For those persons found eligible, the assistance check was required to be received by them within the applicable time period. 45 CFR §206.10 (a)(3). During the period in which the federal regulations went into effect, Illinois public aid officials were administering the benefits pursuant to their own regulations as provided in the Categorical Assistance Manual of the Illinois Department of Public Aid. Respondent’s complaint charged that the Illinois defendants, operating under those regulations, were improperly authorizing grants to commence only with the month in which an application was approved and not including prior eligibility months for which an applicant was entitled to aid under federal law. The complaint also alleged that the Illinois defendants were not processing the applications within the applicable time requirements of the federal regulations; specifically, respondent alleged that his own application for disability benefits was not acted on by the Illlinois Department of Public Aid for almost four months. Such actions of the Illinois officials were alleged to violate federal law and deny the equal protection of the laws. Respondent's prayer requested declaratory and injunctive relief, and specifically requested “a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants to award to the entire class of plaintiffs all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld.” In its judgment of March 15, 1972, the District Court declared § 4004 of the Illinois Manual to be invalid insofar as it was inconsistent with the federal regulations found in 45 CFR § 206.10 (a) (3), and granted a permanent injunction requiring compliance with the federal time limits for processing and paying AABD applicants. The District Court, in paragraph 5 of its judgment, also ordered the state officials to “release and remit AABD benefits wrongfully withheld to all applicants for AABD in the State of Illinois who applied between July 1, 1968 [the date of the federal regulations] and April 16, 197 [1] [the date of the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court] and were determined eligible . ...” On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Illinois officials contended, inter alia, that the Eleventh Amendment barred the award of retroactive benefits, that the judgment of inconsistency between the federal regulations and the provisions of the Illinois Categorical Assistance Manual could be given prospective effect only, and that the federal regulations in question were inconsistent with the Social Security Act itself. The Court of Appeals rejected these contentions and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F. 2d 985 (1973). Because of an apparent conflict on the Eleventh Amendment issue with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 921 (1973), we granted the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Joel Edelman, who is the present Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, and successor to the former directors sued below. 412 U. S. 937 (1973). The petition for certiorari raised the same contentions urged by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals. Because we believe the Court of Appeals erred in its disposition of the Eleventh Amendment claim, we reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the District Court’s order that retroactive benefits be paid by the Illinois state officials. The historical basis of the Eleventh Amendment has been oft stated, and it represents one of the more dramatic examples of this Court’s effort to derive meaning from the document given to the Nation by the Framers nearly 200 years ago. A leading historian of the Court tells us: “The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and to adjudicate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension and of active debate at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the existence of any such right had been disclaimed by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal Government, and it was largely owing to their successful dissipation of the fear of the existence of such Federal power that the Constitution was finally adopted.” 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 91 (rev. ed. 1937). Despite such disclaimers, the very first suit entered in this Court at its February Term in 1791 was brought against the State of Maryland by a firm of Dutch bankers as creditors. Vanstophorst v. Maryland, see 2 Dall. 401 and Warren, supra, at 91 n. 1. The subsequent year brought the institution of additional suits against other States, and caused considerable alarm and consternation in the country. The issue was squarely presented to the Court in a suit brought at the August 1792 Term by two citizens of South Carolina, executors of a British creditor, against the State of Georgia. After a year's postponement for preparation on the part of the State of Georgia, the Court, after argument, rendered in February 1793, its short-lived decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419. The decision in that case, that a State was liable to suit by a citizen of another State or of a foreign country, literally shocked the Nation. Sentiment for passage of a constitutional amendment to override the decision rapidly gained momentum, and five years after Chisholm the Eleventh Amendment was officially announced by President John Adams. Unchanged since then, the Amendment provides: “The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own citizens, this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U. S. 311 (1920); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944); Barden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964); Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279 (1973). It is also well established that even though a State is not named a party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945), the Court said: “[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.” Id., at 464. Thus the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, supra; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946). The Court of Appeals in this case, while recognizing that the Hans line of cases permitted the State to raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to suit by its own citizens, nevertheless concluded that the Amendment did not bar the award of retroactive payments of the statutory benefits found to have been wrongfully withheld. The Court of Appeals held that the above-cited cases, when read in light of this Court's landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), do not preclude the grant of such a monetary award in the nature of equitable restitution. Petitioner concedes that Ex parte Young, supra, is no bar to that part of the District Court’s judgment that prospectively enjoined petitioner’s predecessors from failing to process applications within the time limits established by the federal regulations. Petitioner argues, however, that Ex parte Young does not extend so far as to permit a suit which seeks the award of an accrued monetary liability which must be met from the general revenues of a State, absent consent or waiver by the State of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that therefore the award of retroactive benefits by the District Court was improper. Ex parte Young was a watershed case in which this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an action in the federal courts seeking to enjoin the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a statute claimed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This holding has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect. But the relief awarded in Ex parte Young was prospective only; the Attorney General of Minnesota was enjoined to conform his future conduct of that office to the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such relief is analogous to that awarded by the District Court in the prospective portion of its order under review in this case. But the retroactive portion of the District Court’s order here, which requires the payment of a very substantial amount of money which that court held should have been paid, but was not, stands on quite a different footing. These funds will obviously not be paid out of the pocket of petitioner Edelman. Addressing himself to a similar situation in Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 921 (1973), Judge McGowan observed for the court: “It is not pretended that these payments are to come from the personal resources of these appellants. Appellees expressly contemplate that they will, rather, involve substantial expenditures from the public funds of the state.... “It is one thing to tell the Commissioner of Social Services that he must comply with the federal standards for the future if the state is to have the benefit of federal funds in the programs he administers. It is quite another thing to order the Commissioner to use state funds to make reparation for the past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.” 467 F. 2d, at 236-237 (footnotes omitted). We agree with Judge McGowan’s observations. The funds to satisfy the award in this case must inevitably come from the general revenues of the State of Illinois, and thus the award resembles far more closely the monetary award against the State itself, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra, than it does the prospective injunctive relief awarded in Ex parte Young. The Court of Appeals, in upholding the award in this case, held that it was permissible because it was in the form of “equitable restitution” instead of damages, and therefore capable of being tailored in such a way as to minimize disruptions of the state program of categorical assistance. But we must judge the award actually made in this case, and not one which might have been differently tailored in a different case, and we must judge it in the context of the important constitutional principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. We do not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings of this Court to indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state officer, no matter how closely it may in practice resemble a money judgment payable out of the state treasury, so long as the relief may be labeled “equitable” in nature. The Court’s opinion in Ex parte Young hewed to no such line. Its citation of Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52 (1886), and In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887), which were both actions against state officers for specific performance of a contract to which the State was a party, demonstrate that equitable relief may be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As in most areas of the law, the difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between day and night. The injunction issued in Ex parte Young was not totally without effect on the State's revenues, since the state law which the Attorney General was enjoined from enforcing provided substantial monetary penalties against railroads which did not conform to its provisions. Later cases from this Court have authorized equitable relief which has probably had greater impact on state treasuries than did that awarded in Ex parte Young. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), Arizona and Pennsylvania welfare officials were prohibited from denying welfare benefits to otherwise qualified recipients who were aliens. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), New York City welfare officials were enjoined from following New York State procedures which authorized the termination of benefits paid to welfare recipients without prior hearing. But the fiscal consequences to state treasuries in these cases were the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature. State officials, in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate of the Court’s decrees, would more likely have to spend money from the state treasury than if they had been left free to pursue their previous course of conduct. Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young, supra. But that portion of the District Court’s decree which petitioner challenges on Eleventh Amendment grounds goes much further than any of the cases cited. It requires payment of state funds, not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question determination, but as a form of compensation to those whose applications were processed on the slower time schedule at a time when petitioner was under no court-imposed obligation to conform to a different standard. While the Court of Appeals described this retroactive award of monetary relief as a form of “equitable restitution,” it is in practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an award of damages against the State. It will to a virtual certainty be paid from state funds, and not from the pockets of the individual state officials who were the defendants in the action. It is measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials. Were we to uphold this portion of the District Court’s decree, we would be obligated to overrule the Court’s holding in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra. There a taxpayer, who had, under protest, paid taxes to the State of Indiana, sought a refund of those taxes from the Indiana state officials who were charged with their collection. The taxpayer claimed that the tax had been imposed in violation of the United States Constitution. The term “equitable restitution” would seem even more applicable to the relief sought in that case, since the taxpayer had at one time had the money, and paid it over to the State pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional tax exaction. Yet this Court had no hesitation in holding that the taxpayer’s action was a suit against the State, and barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the retroactive portion of the relief awarded by the District Court in this case. The Court of Appeals expressed the view that its conclusion on the Eleventh Amendment issue was supported by this Court’s holding in Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355 (1966). There the United States was held entitled to sue the Colorado Department of Employment in the United States District Court for refund of unemployment compensation taxes paid under protest by the American National Red Cross, an instrumentality of the United States. The discussion of the State’s Eleventh Amendment claim is confined to the following sentence in the opinion: “With respect to appellants’ contention that the State of Colorado has not consented to suit in a federal forum even where the plaintiff is the United States, see Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934), and Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).” Id., at 358. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934), reaffirmed the principle that the Eleventh Amendment was no bar to a suit by the United States against a State. Id., at 329. In view of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes’ vigorous reaffirmation in Monaco of the principles of the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, we think it unlikely that the Court in Department of Employment v. United States, in citing Ex parte Young as well as Monaco, intended to foreshadow a departure from the rule to which we adhere today. Three fairly recent District Court judgments requiring state directors of public aid to make the type of retroactive payment involved here have been summarily affirmed by this Court notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment contentions made by state officers who were appealing from the District Court judgment. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), is the only instance in which the Eleventh Amendment objection to such retroactive relief was actually presented to this Court in a case which was orally argued. The three-judge District Court in that case had ordered the retroactive payment of welfare benefits found by that court to have been unlawfully withheld because of residence requirements held viola-tive of equal protection. 270 F. Supp. 331, 338 n. 5 (Conn. 1967). This Court, while affirming the judgment, did not in its opinion refer to or substantively treat the Eleventh Amendment argument. Nor, of course, did the summary dispositions of the three District Court cases contain any substantive discussion of this or any other issues raised by the parties. This case, therefore, is the first opportunity the Court has taken to fully explore and treat the Eleventh Amendment aspects of such relief in a written opinion. Shapiro v. Thompson and these three summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value in support of the contention that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the relief awarded by the District Court in this case. Equally obviously, they are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits. Since we deal with a constitutional question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas of the law. Having now had an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings of those cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our holding today. The Court of Appeals held in the alternative that even if the Eleventh Amendment be deemed a bar to the retroactive relief awarded respondent in this case, the State of Illinois had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consented to the bringing of such a suit by participating in the federal AABD program. The Court of Appeals relied upon our holdings in Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964), and Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U. S. 275 (1959), and on the dissenting opinion of Judge Bright in Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 452 F. 2d 820, 827 (CA8 1971). While the holding in the latter case was ultimately affirmed by this Court in 411 U. S. 279 (1973), we do not think that the answer to the waiver question turns on the distinction between Parden, supra, and Employees, supra. Both Parden and Employees involved a congressional enactment which by its terms authorized suit by designated plaintiffs against a general class of defendants which literally included States or state instrumentalities. Similarly, Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, supra, involved congressional approval, pursuant to the Compact Clause, of a compact between Tennessee and Missouri, which provided that each compacting State would have the power “to contract, to sue, and be sued in its own name." The question of waiver or consent under the Eleventh Amendment was found in those cases to turn on whether Congress had intended to abrogate the immunity in question, and whether the State by its participation in the program authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abrogation of that immunity. But in this case the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally includes States is wholly absent. Thus respondent is not only precluded from relying on this Court’s holding in Employees, but on this Court’s holdings in Parden and Petty as well. The Court of Appeals held that as a matter of federal law Illinois had “constructively consented” to this suit by participating in the federal AABD program and agreeing to administer federal and state funds in compliance with federal law. Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here. In deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated “by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909). We see no reason to retreat from the Court's statement in Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S., at 54 (footnote omitted): “[W]hen we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial interference in the vital field of financial administration a clear declaration of the state’s intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found.” The mere fact that a State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts. And while this Court has, in cases such as J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964), authorized suits by one private party against another in order to effectuate a statutory purpose, it has never done so in the context of the Eleventh Amendment and a state defendant. Since Employees, supra, where Congress had expressly authorized suits against a general class of defendants and the only thing left to implication was whether the described class of defendants included States, was decided adversely to the putative plaintiffs on the waiver question, surely this respondent must also fail on that issue. The only language in the Social Security Act which purported to provide a federal sanction against a State which did not comply with federal requirements for the distribution of federal monies was found in former 42 U. S. C. § 1384 (now replaced by substantially similar provisions in 42 U. S. C. § 804), which provided for termination of future allocations of federal funds when a participating State failed to conform with federal law. This provision by its terms did not authorize suit against anyone, and standing alone, fell far short of a waiver by a participating State of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Our Brother Marshall argues in dissent, and the Court of Appeals held, that although the Social Security Act itself does not create a private cause of action, the cause of action created by 42 U. S. C. § 1983, coupled with the enactment of the AABD program, and the issuance by HEW of regulations which require the States to make corrective payments after successful “fair hearings” and provide for federal matching funds to satisfy federal court orders of retroactive payments, indicate that Congress intended a cause of action for public aid recipients such as respondent. It is, of course, true that Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970), held that suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States. But it has not heretofore been suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be brought under that section against state officers, rather than against the State itself. Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients such as respondent, a federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunc-tive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra. Respondent urges that since the various Illinois officials sued in the District Court failed to raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to the relief sought by respondent, petitioner is therefore barred from raising the Eleventh Amendment defense in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. The Court of Appeals apparently felt the defense was properly presented, and dealt with it on the merits. We approve of this resolution, since it has been well settled since the decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra, that the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court: “[The Attorney General of Indiana] appeared in the federal District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals and defended the suit on the merits. The objection to petitioner’s suit as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued by Indiana in this Court. This was in time, however. The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even though urged for the first time in this Court.” 323 U. S., at 466-467. For the foregoing reasons we decide that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not constitute a bar to that portion of the District Court decree which ordered retroactive payment of benefits found to have been wrongfully withheld. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. In his complaint in the District Court, respondent claimed that the Illinois Department of Public Aid was not complying with federal regulations in its processing of public aid applications, and also that its refusal to process and allow respondent’s claim for a period of four months, while processing and allowing the claims of those similarly situated, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent asserted that the District Court could exercise jurisdiction over the cause by virtue of 28 U. S. C. §§1331 and 1343 (3) and (4). Though not briefed by the parties before this Court, we think that under our decision in Hagans v. Lavine, ante, p. 528, the equal protection claim cannot be said to be “wholly insubstantial,” and that therefore the District Court was correct in exercising pendent jurisdiction over the statutory claim. Effective January 1, 1974, this AABD program was replaced by a similar program. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 801-805 (1970 ed., Supp. II). Title 45 CFR § 206.10 (a) (3) (1973) provides in pertinent part: “(a) State plan requirements. A State plan . . . shall provide that: “(3) A decision shall be made promptly on applications, pursuant to reasonable State-established time standards not in excess of: “ (i) 45 days [for aid to aged and blind] .. . ; and “ (ü) 60 days . . . [for aid to disabled]. Under this requirement, the applicant is informed of the agency’s time standard in acting on applications, which covers the time from date of application under the State plan to the date that the assistance check, or notification of denial of assistance or change of award, or the eligibility decision with respect to medical assistance, is mailed to the applicant or recipient. . . .” When originally issued in 1968 the regulations provided that the applications for aid to the aged and blind be processed within 30 days and that aid to the disabled be processed within 45 days of receipt. They also provided that the person determined to be eligible must receive his assistance check within the applicable time period. The amendment to 60 days for aid to the disabled occurred in 1971, as did the change to require mailing instead of receipt of the assistance check within the applicable time period; effective Oct. 15, 1973, the time for processing aged and blind applications became 45 days. In addition, at the time of institution of the suit, 45 CFR § 206.10 (a)(6) (1972) provided in pertinent part: “(6) Entitlement will begin as specified in the State plan, which (i) for financial assistance must be no later than the date of authorization of payment . .. The Illinois regulations, found in the Illinois Categorical Assistance Manual of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, provide in pertinent part: “4004.1 “Except for [disability] cases which have a time standard of 45 days, the time standard for disposition of applications is 30 days from the date of application to the date the applicants are determined eligible and the effective date of their first assistance or are determined ineligible and receive a notice of denial of assistance. . . . “8255. Initial Awards “Initial awards may be new grants, reinstatements, or certain types of resumptions. They can be effective for the month in which Form FO-550 is signed but for no prior period except [under conditions not relevant to this case]. “8255.1 New Grants “A new grant is the first grant authorized after an application has been accepted in a case which has not previously received assistance under the same assistance program. It may be authorized for the month in which Form FO-550 is signed but not for any prior period unless it meets [exceptions not relevant to this case].” Paragraph 5 of the District Court’s judgment provided: “That the defendant EDWARD T. WEAVER, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, his agents, including all of the County Departments of Public Aid in the State of Illinois, and employees, and all persons in active concert and participation with them, are hereby enjoined to release and remit AABD benefits wrongfully withheld to all applicants for AABD in the State of Illlinois who applied between July 1, 1968 and April 16, 1972 [sic] [should read “1971”], and were determined eligible, as follows: “(a) For those aged and blind applicants whose first full AABD check was not mailed within thirty days from the date of application, AABD assistance for the period beginning with the thirtieth day from the date of application to the date the applicant’s entitlement to AABD became effective; “(b) (i) For those disabled applicants who applied between July 1, 1968 and December 31, 1970, whose first full AABD check was not mailed within forty-five days from the date of application, AABD assistance for the period beginning with the forty-fifth day from the date of application to the date the applicant’s entitlement became effective; “(ii) For those disabled applicants who applied between January 1, 1971 and April 16, 1971, whose first full AABD cheek was not mailed within sixty days from the date of application, AABD assistance for the period beginning with the sixtieth day from the date of application to the date the applicant’s entitlement became effective. “These AABD benefits shall be mailed to those persons currently receiving AABD within eight months with an explanatory letter, said letter having been first approved by plaintiffs’ attorney. Any AABD benefits received pursuant to this paragraph shall not be deemed income or resources under Article III of the Illinois Public Aid Code. “For those persons not presently receiving AABD: “(a) A certified letter (return receipt requested), said letter having been first approved by plaintiffs’ attorney, shall be sent to the last known address of the person, informing him in concise and easily understandable terms that he is entitled to a specified amount of AABD benefits wrongfully withheld, and that he may claim such amount by contacting the County Department of Public Aid at a specified address, within 45 days from the receipt of said letter. “(b) If the County Department of Public Aid does not receive a claim for the AABD benefits within 45 days from the date of actual notice to the person, the right to said AABD benefits shall be forfeited and the file shall be closed. Persons who do not receive actual notice do not forfeit their rights to AABD benefits wrongfully withheld under this provision.” Paragraph 6 of the District Court’s judgment provided: “Within 15 days from the date of this decree, defendant EDWARD T. WEAVER, Director, Illlinois Department of Public Aid, shall submit to the court and the plaintiffs’ attorney a detailed statement as to the method for effectuating the relief required by paragraph 5, supra, of this Decree. Any disputes between the parties as to whether the procedures and steps outlined by the defendant WEAVER will fulfill the requirements of this Decree will be resolved by the Court.” On July 19, 1973, the author of this opinion stayed until further order of this Court these two paragraphs of the District Court's judgment. 414 U. S. 1301. Respondent appealed from the District Court’s judgment insofar as it held him not entitled to receive benefits from the date of his applications (as opposed to the date of authorization of benefits as provided by the federal regulations) and insofar as it failed to award punitive damages. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s decision against respondent on those points and they are not at issue here. 472 F. 2d 985, 997-999. 7 Citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971), petitioner also contends in this Court that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to give the District Court’s judgment prospective effect only. Brief for Petitioner 37, incorporating arguments made in Pet. for Cert. 18-22. The Court of Appeals concluded that this ground was “not presented to the district judge before the entry of judgment, so that it comes too late.” 472 F. 2d, at 995. The Court of Appeals went on, however, to conclude that “[e]ven if the ground had been timely presented, defendants’ contention would be meritless.” Ibid. Noting that one of three tests established by our decision in Hrnon for determining the retroactivity of court decisions was that “the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or [have decided] an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed . . . ,” Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, supra, at 106, the Court of Appeals found that the petitioner had not satisfied this test, since the “federal time requirements for processing applications and paying eligible AABD applicants were made effective July 1, 1968, and defendants were well aware of these mandatory maximum permissible time standards.” 472 F. 2d, at 996. In light of our disposition of this case on the Eleventh Amendment issue we see no reason to address this contention. Former Title 42 U. S. C. § 1382 (a) (8) provided in pertinent part: “(a) Contents. “A State plan for aid to the aged, blind, or disabled, or for aid to the aged, blind, or disabled and medical assistance for the aged, must— “(8) provide that all individuals wishing to make application for aid or assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such aid or assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.” HEW, pursuant to authority granted to it by 42 U. S. C. § 1302, has promulgated regulations, see n. 3, supra, which require that decisions be made promptly on applications within 45 days for the aged and blind and within 60 days for the disabled, and that initiation of payments to the eligible be made within the same periods. Petitioner renews in this Court the contention made in the Court of Appeals that these time limitations in the regulations are inconsistent with the statute and therefore an unlawful abuse of the rule-making authority. Brief for Petitioner 37, incorporating arguments made in Pet. for Cert. 22-28. Specifically, petitioner argues that the “establishment of arbitrary [forty-five] and sixty day máxi-mums in the HEW regulations for determination of eligibility and initiation of payments without talcing into consideration the efficient administration of the Act by the State agencies is inconsistent with the ‘reasonable promptness’ requirement and must therefore be declared unlawful . . . .” Pet. for Cert. 23. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, holding that “these time requirements, binding on state welfare officials, are an appropriate interpretation of the Congressional mandate of ‘reasonable promptness.’ ” 472 F. 2d, at 996. We agree with the Court of Appeals. While the debates of the Constitutional Convention themselves do not disclose a discussion of the question, the prevailing view at the time of the ratification of the Constitution was stated by various of the Framers in the writings and debates of the period. Examples of these views have been assembled by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes: “. . . Madison, in the Virginia Convention, answering objections to the ratification of the Constitution, clearly stated his view as to the purpose and effect of the provision conferring jurisdiction over controversies between States of the Union and foreign States. That purpose was suitably to provide for adjudication in such cases if consent should be given but not otherwise. Madison said: ‘The next case provides for disputes between a foreign state and one of our states, should such a case ever arise; and between a citizen and a foreign citizen or subject. I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be decided, in these courts, between an American state and a foreign state, without the consent of the parties. If they consent, provision is here made.’ 3 Elliot’s Debates, 533. “Marshall, in the same Convention, expressed a similar view. Replying to an objection as to the admissibility of a suit by a foreign state, Marshall said: ‘He objects, in the next place, to its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and a foreign state. Suppose, says he, in such a suit, a foreign state is cast; will she be bound by the decision? If a foreign state brought a suit against the commonwealth of Virginia, would she not be barred from the claim if the federal judiciary thought it unjust? The previous consent of the parties is necessary; and, as the federal judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce.’ 3 Elliot’s Debates, 557. “Hamilton, in The Federalist, No. 81, made the following emphatic statement of the general principle of immunity: ‘It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of State sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us that there is no color to pretend that the State governments would by the adoption of that plan be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident it could not be done without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the federal courts by mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting right of the State governments, a power which would involve such a consequence would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.’ ” Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 323-325 (1934) (footnotes omitted). Of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting by designation on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. It may be true, as stated by our Brother Douglas in dissent, that “[m]ost welfare decisions by federal courts have a financial impact on the States.” Post, at 680-681. But we cannot agree that such a financial impact is the same where a federal court applies Ex parte Young to grant prospective declaratory and in-junctive relief, as opposed to an order of retroactive payments as was made in the instant case. It is not necessarily true that '‘[w]hether the decree is prospective only or requires payments for the weeks or months wrongfully skipped over by the state officials, the nature of the impact on the state treasury is precisely the same.” Post, at 682. This argument neglects the fact that where the State has a definable allocation to be used in the payment of public aid benefits, and pursues a certain course of action such as the processing of applications within certain time periods as did Illinois here, the subsequent ordering by a federal court of retroactive payments to correct delays in such processing will invariably mean there is less money available for payments for the continuing obligations of the public aid system. As stated by Judge McGowan in Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 235 (CA2 1972): “The second federal policy which might arguably be furthered by retroactive payments is the fundamental goal of congressional welfare legislation — the satisfaction of the ascertained needs of impoverished persons. Federal standards are designed to ensure that those needs are equitably met; and there may perhaps be cases in which the prompt payment of funds wrongfully withheld will serve that end. As time goes by, however, retroactive payments become compensatory rather than remedial; the coincidence between previously ascertained and existing needs becomes less clear.” The Court of Appeals considered the Court’s decision in Griffin v. School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964), to be of like import. But as may be seen from Griffin’s citation of Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529 (1890), a counts^ does not occupy the same position as a State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See also Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693 (1973). The fact that the county policies executed by the county officials in Griffin were subject to the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the county was not able to invoke the protection of the Eleventh Amendment, is no more than a recognition of the long-established rule that while county action is generally state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a county defendant is not necessarily a state defendant for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Brief for Respondent 15-18. Decisions of this Court in which we summarily affirmed a decision of a lower federal court which ordered the payment of retroactive awards and in which the jurisdictional statement filed in this Court raised the Eleventh Amendment defense include: State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Zarate, 407 U. S. 918 (1972), aff’g 347 F. Supp. 1004 (SD Fla. 1971); Sterrett v. Mothers’ and Children’s Rights Organization, 409 U. S. 809 (1972), aff’g unreported order and judgment of District Court (ND Ind. 1972) on remand from Carpenter v. Sterrett, 405 U. S. 971 (1972); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (SDNY 1969) (order at CCH Poverty Law Rep. ¶ 10,506 [1968-1971 Transfer Binder]), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U. S. 49 (1970). In the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis: “Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406-408 (1932) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted). Respondent urges that the traditionally broad power of a federal court sitting as a court of equity to fashion appropriate remedies as are necessary to effect congressional purposes requires that the District Court’s award of retroactive benefits be upheld. Respondent places principal reliance on our prior decisions in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395 (1946), and Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U. S. 288 (1960). Both cases dealt with the power of a federal court to grant equitable relief for violations of federal law; the decision in Mitchell indicated that a federal court could provide equitable relief “complete ... in light of the statutory purposes.” Id., at 292. Since neither of these cases involved a suit against a State or a state official, it did not purport to decide the availability of equitable relief consistent with the Eleventh Amendment. HEW sought passage of a bill in the 91st Congress, H. R. 16311, §407 (a), which would have given it authority to require retroactive payments to eligible persons denied such benefits. The bill failed to pass the House of Representatives. See H. R. 16311, The Family Assistance Act of 1970, Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., C169-170 (Comm. Print Nov. 5, 1970). Title 45 CFR §§ 205.10 (b) (2) and (3) provide: “(b) Federal financial participation. Federal financial participation is available for the following items: “(2) Payments of assistance made to carry out hearing decisions, or to take corrective action after an appeal but prior to hearing, or to extend the benefit of a hearing decision or court order to others in the same situation as those directly affected by the decision or order. Such payments may be retroactive in accordance with applicable Federal policies on corrective payments. “(3) Payments of assistance within the scope of Federally aided public assistance programs made in accordance with a court order.” The Court of Appeals felt that § 1983, the enactment of the AABD program, and the issuance by HEW of the above regulation, indicated that Congress intended to include within the Social Security Act the remedy of “effective judicial review” and “the remedy of restoration of benefits withheld in violation of federal law.” 472 F. 2d, at 994-995 and n. 15. But the adoption of regulations by HEW to permit the use of federal funds in the satisfaction of judicial awards is not determinative of the constitutional issues here presented. Mr. Justice Marshall, and both the Court of Appeals and the respondent herein, refer to language in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S., at 420, to the effect that Congress in legislating the Social Security Act has not “closed the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals most directly affected by the administration of its program.” The Court in Rosado was concerned with the compatibility of a provision of New York law which decreased benefits to some eligible public aid recipients and amendments to the federal act which required cost-of-living increases. The case did not purport to decide the Eleventh Amendment issue we resolve today. In finding the New York law inconsistent with the federal law, Mr. Justice Harlan stated: “New York is, of course, in no way prohibited from using only state funds according to whatever plan it chooses, providing it violates no provision of the Constitution. It follows, however, from our conclusion that New York’s program is incompatible with §402 (a) (23), that petitioners are entitled to declaratory relief and an appropriate injunction by the District Court against the payment of federal monies according to the new schedules, should the State not develop a conforming plan within a reasonable period of time. “We have considered and rejected the argument that a federal court is without power to review state welfare provisions or prohibit the use of federal funds by the States in view of the fact that Congress has lodged in the Department of HEW the power to cut off federal funds for noncompliance with statutory requirements. We are most reluctant to assume Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals most directly affected by the administration of its program. . . . We adhere to King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968), which implicitly rejected the argument that the statutory provisions for HEW review of plans should be read to curtail judicial relief and held Alabama’s ‘substitute father’ regulation to be inconsistent with the federal statute. While King did not advert specifically to the remedial problem, the unarticulated premise was that the State had alternative choices of assuming the additional cost of paying benefits to families with substitute fathers or not using federal funds to pay welfare benefits according to a plan that was inconsistent with federal requirements.” Id., at 420-421. Respondent urges that this language is “tantamount to a finding that Congress conditioned the participation of a state in the categorical assistance program on the forfeiture of immunity from suit in a federal forum . . . irrespective of the relief sought, [since] the intent of Congress remains constant.” Brief for Respondent 42-43. Petitioner contends that this language, coupled with the fact that the Court in Rosado remanded the case to the District Court to “afford New York an opportunity to revise its program . . . or, should New York choose [not to revise its program], issue its order restraining the further use of federal monies pursuant to the present statute,” 397 U. S., at 421-422, indicates that the Court felt that retroactive relief was not a permissible remedy. Brief for Petitioner 17-20. We do not regard Rosado as controlling either way since the Court was not faced with a district court judgment ordering retroactive payments or with a challenge based on the Eleventh Amendment. Respondent urges that the State of Illinois has abolished its common-law sovereign immunity in its state courts, and appears to argue that suit in a federal court against the State may thus be maintained. Brief for Respondent 23. Petitioner contends that sovereign immunity has not been abolished in Illinois as to this type of case. Brief for Petitioner 31-36. Whether Illinois permits such a suit to be brought against the State in its own courts is not determinative of whether Illinois has relinquished its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts. Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 591-592 (1904). The lower court’s opinion is found in 270 F. Supp. 331.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. STUART et al. No. 87-1064. Argued December 5, 1988 Decided February 28, 1989 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II-C of which O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 370. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 371. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Rose, Alan I. Horowitz, Charles E. Brookhart, and John A. Dudeck, Jr. Charles E. Peery argued the cause for respondents. On the brief was Brian L. McEachron. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Articles XIX and XXI of the Convention between the United States and Canada Respecting Double Taxation, Mar. 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1405-1406, T. S. No. 983, oblige the United States, upon request and consistent with United States revenue laws, to obtain and convey information to Canadian authorities to assist them in determining a Canadian taxpayer’s income tax liability. The question presented is whether the United States Internal Revenue Service may issue an administrative summons pursuant to a request by Canadian authorities only if it first determines that the Canadian tax investigation has not reached a stage analogous to a domestic tax investigation’s referral to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. We hold that neither the 1942 Convention nor domestic legislation imposes this precondition to issuance of an administrative summons. So long as the summons meets statutory requirements and is issued in good faith, as we defined that term in United States v. Powell, 879 U. S. 48, 57-58 (1964), compliance is required, whether or not the Canadian tax investigation is directed toward criminal prosecution under Canadian law. I Respondents are Canadian citizens and residents who maintained bank accounts with the Northwestern Commercial Bank in Bellingham, Washington. In attempting to ascertain their Canadian income tax liability for 1980, 1981, and 1982, the Canadian Department of National Revenue (Revenue Canada) asked the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in January 1984 to secure and provide pertinent bank records. Revenue Canada made its requests pursuant to Articles XIX and XXI of the 1942 Convention. The IRS Director of Foreign Operations — the “competent authority” under Article XIX — concluded that Revenue Canada’s requests fell within the scope of the Convention and that it would be appropriate for the United States to honor them. App. 27-28. Specifically, he found that “the requested information is not within the possession of the Internal Revenue Service or the Canadian tax authorities; that the requested information may be relevant to a determination of the correct tax liability of [respondents] under Canadian law; and that the same type of information can be obtained by tax authorities under Canadian law.” Id., at 28. Thus, on April 2, 1984, the IRS served on Northwestern Commercial Bank administrative summonses for the requested information. At respondents’ behest, the bank refused to comply. In accordance with 26 U. S. C. § 7609(b)(2), respondents petitioned the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington to quash the summonses. Only one of their claims is before us. Respondents contended that because the IRS may not issue a summons to further its investigation of a United States taxpayer when a Justice Department referral is in effect, 26 U. S. C. § 7602(c), and because Revenue Canada’s investigation of each of them was, in the words of the IRS Director of Foreign Operations, “a criminal investigation, preliminary stage,” App. 28, United States law proscribed the use of a summons to obtain information for Canadian authorities regarding respondents’ American bank accounts. The Magistrate who held a consolidated hearing on respondents’ claims rejected this argument. Without addressing their contention that the IRS may not issue a summons pursuant to a request by Revenue Canada once a Canadian tax investigation has reached a stage equivalent to a Justice Department referral for criminal prosecution, the Magistrate found that, even if respondents’ legal claims were assumed to have merit, they had failed to carry their burden of showing that the Canadian authorities’ investigation had advanced that far. App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. Upon considering the Magistrate’s report and respondents’ objections to it, the District Court ordered the bank to comply with the summonses. Id., at 25a-26a, 34a-35a. After the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the enforcement orders pending appeal, a divided panel of the court reversed. 813 F. 2d 243 (1987). The Ninth Circuit held that a summons issued pursuant to a request under the 1942 Convention, like one issued as part of a domestic tax investigation, will be enforced only if it was issued in good faith. The Court of Appeals further stated that the elements of good faith we described in United States v. Powell, supra, at 57-58, are not exhaustive; rather, in light of our subsequent decision in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298 (1978), and Congress’ enactment of what is now 26 U. S. C. § 7602(c), good faith in domestic tax investigations also requires that the IRS not have referred the case to the Justice Department for possible criminal prosecution. Finally, and most significantly for purposes of this litigation, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the IRS acts in good faith in complying with a request for information under the 1942 Convention only when Canadian authorities act in good faith in seeking IRS assistance, and that the good faith of Canadian authorities should be judged by the same standard applicable to the IRS when it conducts a domestic investigation. Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded, before the IRS may honor a request for information it must determine that Revenue Canada’s investigation has not reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department referral by the IRS. In addition, the Court of Appeals said, “in order to establish its prima facie case by affidavit, the IRS must make an affirmative statement” that Canadian authorities are acting in good faith and that their investigation has not yet reached that stage; the burden of proof on this point rests initially with the IRS rather than the taxpayer attempting to quash a summons, the court held, because the IRS “can consult with Canada’s competent authority and can be expected to have greater familiarity with Canadian administrative procedures.” 813 F. 2d, at 250. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision because the affidavits submitted by the IRS failed to state that Revenue Canada’s investigation of respondents had not yet reached a point analogous to an IRS referral to the Justice Department. We granted certiorari, 485 U. S. 1033 (1988), to resolve a conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case and the Second Circuit’s holding in United States v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 703 F. 2d 47 (1983). We now reverse. II A In United States v. Powell, supra, we rejected the claim that the IRS must show probable cause to obtain enforcement of an administrative summons issued in connection with a domestic tax investigation. See id., at 52-57. We held instead that the IRS need only demonstrate good faith in issuing the summons, which we defined as follows: “[The IRS Commissioner] must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed — in particular, that the ‘Secretary or his delegate,’ after investigation, has determined the further examination to be necessary and has notified the taxpayer in writing to that effect.” Id., at 57-58. Once the IRS has made such a showing, we stated, it is entitled to an enforcement order unless the taxpayer can show that the IRS is attempting to abuse the court’s process. “Such an abuse would take place,” we said, “if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.” Id., at 58. See also United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141, 146 (1975). The taxpayer carries the burden of proving an abuse of the court’s process. 379 U. S., at 58. Leaving aside the question whether the 1942 Convention, in conjunction with 26 U. S. C. § 7602(c), narrows the class of legitimate purposes for which the IRS may issue an administrative summons, the affidavits the IRS submitted in respondents’ cases plainly satisfied the requirements of good faith we set forth in Powell and have repeatedly reaffirmed. See, e. g., Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U. S. 310, 321 (1985); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U. S. 805, 813, n. 10 (1984). The IRS Director of Foreign Operations stated under oath that the information sought was not within the possession of American or Canadian tax authorities, that it might be relevant to the computation of respondents’ Canadian tax liabilities, and that the same type of information could be obtained by Canadian authorities under Canadian law. App. 28. He further noted that the “[ejxchanged information may only be disclosed as required in the normal administrative or judicial process operative in the administration of the tax system of the requesting country,” and that improper use of exchanged information would be protested. Ibid. In addition, the IRS issued its summonses in conformity with applicable statutes and duly informed respondents of their issuance. In their petitions to quash, respondents nowhere alleged that the IRS was trying to use the District Court’s process for some improper purpose, such as harassment or the acquisition of bargaining power in connection with some collateral dispute. See id., at 18-20. Nor does it appear that they later sought to prove abuse of process. Unless 26 U. S. C. § 7602(c) or the 1942 Convention imposes more stringent requirements on the enforcement of the administrative summonses issued in this case, the IRS was entitled to enforcement orders under the rule laid down in Powell. B Section 7602(c) does impose an additional constraint on the issuance of summonses to further domestic tax investigations. By its terms, however, it does not apply to the sum monses challenged by respondents, for it speaks only to investigations into possible violations of United States revenue laws. Section 7602(c) forbids the issuance of a summons “if a Justice Department referral is in effect” with respect to a person about whom information is sought by means of the summons. At the time of the District Court’s decision, no Justice Department referral was in effect with regard to respondents; indeed, the IRS agent seeking the bank records to fulfill Revenue Canada’s request said in her affidavit that no domestic tax investigation of any kind was pending. See App. 30. Section 7602(c) therefore does not itself appear to bar enforcement of the summonses at issue here. The legislative history of § 7602(c) supports this conclusion. Prior to its enactment, we held in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298 (1978), that the IRS may not issue a summons once it has recommended prosecution to the Justice Department, nor may it circumvent this requirement by delaying such a recommendation in order to gather additional information. We based our holding in large part on our finding that “[n]othing in §7602 or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended the summons authority to broaden the Justice Department’s right of criminal litigation discovery or to infringe on the role of the grand jury as a principal tool of criminal accusation.” Id., at 312 (citations omitted). When Congress codified the essence of our holding in § 7602(c), it apparently shared our concern about permitting the IRS to encroach upon the rights of potential criminal defendants. The Report of the Senate Finance Committee noted that “the provision is in no way intended to broaden the Justice Department’s right of criminal discovery or to infringe on the role of the grand jury as a principal tool of criminal prosecution.” S. Rep. No. 97-494, Vol. 1, p. 286 (1982). This explanation for the restriction embodied in § 7602(c) suggests that Congress did not intend to make the enforcement of a treaty summons contingent upon the foreign tax investigation’s not having reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department referral. None of the civil-law countries with whom the United States has tax treaties providing for exchanges of information employ grand juries, and Canada has ceased to use them. Moreover, criminal discovery procedures differ considerably among countries with whom we have such treaties. The concerns that prompted Congress to pass § 7602(c) are therefore not present when the IRS issues summonses at the request of most foreign governments conducting investigations into possible violations of their own tax laws. If Congress had intended § 7602(c) to impose a restriction on the issuance of summonses pursuant to treaty requests parallel to the restriction it expressly imposes on summonses issued by the IRS in connection with domestic tax investigations, it would presumably have offered some reason for extending the sweep of the section beyond its plain language. In addition, Congress would likely have discussed the appropriateness of extending the protections afforded by United States law to citizens of other countries who are not subject to criminal prosecution here, and would doubtless have considered the problems posed by the application of § 7602(c) to requests by treaty partners, in particular the difficulty of determining when a foreign investigation has progressed to a point analogous to a Justice Department referral. Respondents have not directed us, however, to anything in the legislative history of § 7602(c) suggesting that Congress intended it to apply to summonses issued pursuant to treaty requests, or to any reference to the problems its application would have occasioned. We therefore see no reason to think that § 7602(c) means more than it says. C The only conceivable foundation for the Ninth Circuit’s rule that an IRS summons issued at the request of Canadian authorities may not be enforced unless the IRS provides assurance that the Canadian investigation has not proceeded to a stage analogous to a Justice Department referral is therefore the language of the 1942 Convention itself. Article XIX obliges the competent authority for the United States to furnish, upon request, relevant information that it is “in a position to obtain under its revenue laws.” Article XXI repeats this clause almost verbatim, permitting the IRS Commissioner to supply Canadian authorities with relevant information he “is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the United States of America.” Respondents contend that because the IRS would not be able, under American law, to issue an administrative summons to gather information for use by the Government once a Justice Department referral was in effect, the IRS is not in a position to obtain such information once Canadian authorities have reached a corresponding stage in their investigation. (1) We are not persuaded by this argument. “The clear import of treaty language controls unless ‘application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.’” Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U. S. 176, 180 (1982), quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U. S. 49, 54 (1963). Articles XIX and XXI both refer to information that the IRS may obtain under American law. American law, however, does not contain the restriction respondents claim to find there. Section 7602(c) only limits the issuance of summonses when a Justice Department referral is in effect; it says nothing about decisions by foreign tax officials to investigate possible violations of their countries’ tax laws with a view to criminal prosecution outside the United States. The elements of good faith we outlined in United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964), do not contain such a restriction. Nor does our reasoning in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298 (1978), favor the result respondents urge, because the provision of information to Canadian authorities could not curtail the rights of potential criminal defendants in this country by undermining American discovery rules or diminishing the role of the grand jury. And respondents have not suggested that some other segment of American law, such as the law of privilege, prevents the IRS from issuing an administrative summons pursuant to a treaty request once a treaty partner has embarked on a tax investigation leading to a foreign criminal prosecution. Articles XIX and XXI of the 1942 Convention on their face therefore lend no support to respondents’ position. (2) Nontextual sources that often assist us in “giving effect to the intent of the Treaty parties,” Sumitomo, supra, at 185, such as a treaty’s ratification history and its subsequent operation, further fail to sustain respondents’ claim. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations did not hold hearings on the Convention prior to its ratification in 1942, and the Committee Report did not even mention the provisions for exchange of information. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 3, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), 1 Legislative History of United States Tax Conventions (Committee Print compiled by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation) 455 (1962) (Leg. Hist.). The sole reference to these provisions during the brief floor debate in the Senate contained no hint that the 1942 Convention was intended to incorporate domestic restrictions on the issuance of summonses by the IRS in connection with American tax investigations, such as the limitation later codified in § 7602(c). The President’s message accompanying transmittal of the proposed treaty to the Senate, see S. Exec. Doc. B, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted in Leg. Hist. 445, and the President’s Proclamation at the time the Convention was signed, see Leg. Hist. 475, 56 Stat. 1399, similarly contain no language supporting respondents’ argument. Indeed, given that a treaty should generally be “construe[d] . . . liberally to give effect to the purpose which animates it” and that “[e]ven where a provision of a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting, the other enlarging, rights which may be claimed under it, the more liberal interpretation is to be preferred,” Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U. S. 150, 163 (1940) (citations omitted), the evident purpose behind Articles XIX and XXI — the reduction of tax evasion by allowing signatories to demand information from each other — counsels against interpreting those provisions to limit inquiry in the manner respondents desire. In any event, nothing in the history of the Convention’s ratification buttresses respondents’ claim. (3) Nor do other aids to interpretation strengthen their case. The practice of treaty signatories counts as evidence of the treaty’s proper interpretation, since their conduct generally evinces their understanding of the agreement they signed. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U. S. 243, 259 (1984); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U. S. 276, 294-295 (1933). The Government’s regular compliance with requests for information by Canadian authorities without inquiring whether they intend to use the information for criminal prosecution therefore weighs in favor of its reading of Articles XIX and XXI. Similarly, “[although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.” Sumitomo, 457 U. S., at 184-185. See also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 187, 194 (1961). The IRS’ construction of the 1942 Convention repudiates rather than confirms the interpretation respondents ask us to adopt. Finally, the result urged by respondents would contravene Congress’ main reason for laying down an easily administrable test in § 7602(c): “[S]um-mons enforcement proceedings should be summary in nature and discovery should be limited.” S. Rep. No. 97-494, Vol. 1, p. 285 (1982). If respondents had their way, disputes would inevitably arise over whether a Canadian tax investigation had progressed to a point analogous to a Justice Department referral when Revenue Canada made its request for information, thereby “spawning] protracted litigation without any meaningful results for the taxpayer.” Ibid. It seems unlikely that Congress would have welcomed this re-suit when it ratified the 1942 Convention, or that Congress intended it when it approved the bill containing what is presently § 7602(c). Ill We conclude that the IRS need not attest that a Canadian tax investigation has not yet reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department referral by the IRS in order to obtain enforcement of a summons issued pursuant to a request by Canadian authorities under the 1942 Convention. So long as the IRS itself acts in good faith, as that term was explicated in United States v. Powell, 379 U. S., at 57-58, and complies with applicable statutes, it is entitled to enforcement of its summons. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Articles XIX and XXI of the Convention between the United States and Canada Respecting Double Taxation, Mar. 4,1942, 56 Stat. 1405-1406, T. S. No. 983, provide in part: “ARTICLE XIX “With a view to the prevention of fiscal evasion, each of the contracting States undertakes to furnish to the other contracting State, as provided in the succeeding Articles of this Convention, the information which its competent authorities have at their disposal or are in a position to obtain under its revenue laws in so far as such information may be of use to the authorities of the other contracting State in the assessment of the taxes to which this Convention relates. “The information to be furnished under the first paragraph of this Article, whether in the ordinary course or on request, may be exchanged directly between the competent authorities of the two contracting States.” “ARTICLE XXI “1. If the Minister in the determination of the income tax liability of any person under any of the revenue laws of Canada deems it necessary to secure the cooperation of the Commissioner, the Commissioner may, upon request, furnish the Minister such information bearing upon the matter as the Commissioner is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the United States of America.” Section 7602(c) of Title 26 reads: “(c) No administrative summons when there is Justice Department referral “(1) Limitation of authority “No summons may be issued under this title, and the Secretary may not begin any action under section 7604 to enforce any summons, with respect to any person if a Justice Department referral is in effect with respect to such person. “(2) Justice Department referral in effect “For purposes of this subsection— “(A) In general “A Justice Department referral is in effect with respect to any person if— “(i) the Secretary has recommended to the Attorney General a grand jury investigation of, or the criminal prosecution of, such person for any offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws, or “(ii) any request is made under section 6103(h)(3)(B) for the disclosure of any return or return information (within the meaning of section 6103(b)) relating to such person. “(B) Termination “A Justice Department referral shall cease to be in effect with respect to a person when— “(i) the Attorney General notifies the Secretary, in writing, that — “(I) he will not prosecute such person for any offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws, “(II) he will not authorize a grand jury investigation of such person with respect to such an offense, or “(III) he will discontinue such a grand jury investigation. “(ii) a final disposition has been made of any criminal proceeding pertaining to the enforcement of the internal revenue laws which was instituted by the Attorney General against such person, or “(iii) the Attorney General notifies the Secretary, in writing, that he will not prosecute such person for any offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws relating to the request described in subparagraph (A)(ii). “(3) Taxable years, etc., treated separately “For purposes of this subsection, each taxable period (or, if there is no taxable period, each taxable event) and each tax imposed by a separate chapter of this title shall be treated separately.” We need not, and do not, decide whether the IRS could issue a summons to honor a treaty request if the individual under investigation by the requesting foreign government were also under investigation by American authorities and a Justice Department referral were in effect with respect to him. Nor do we address the question whether the IRS could use in a criminal prosecution evidence it obtained from Canadian authorities pursuant to a treaty request made while a Justice Department referral was in effect. See the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, ch. 19, §§113-115, reprinted in Revised Statutes of Canada, ch. 27, §§ 113-115 (Supp. I 1985). See also McKibbon v. Queen, [1984] 1 S. C. R. 131, 137-157, 6 D. L. R. 4th 1, 20-35 (1984) (recounting the history of grand juries in Canada). Other common-law countries have eliminated the grand jury as well. See, e. g., Saywell v. Attorney-General, [1982] 2 N. Z. L. R. 97, 100-105 (H. C.) (discussing consequences for presentation of indictment of abolition of grand juries in New Zealand, England, and Australia). As of September 30, 1988, the United States had in force income tax conventions containing exchange of information provisions with over 30 countries, ranging from France to Poland to Japan. Fogarasi, Gordon, Venuti, & Renfroe, Current Status of U. S. Tax Treaties, 17 Tax Mgmt. Int’I J. 507, 509 (1988). Not all of those countries distinguish between civil and criminal prosecutions for tax offenses as does the United States. In some Swiss Cantons, for example, tax fraud — the most severe offense — is prosecuted in the administrative rather than in the criminal courts, and a single administrative agency investigates and prosecutes all tax offenses. See Meier, Banking Secrecy in Swiss and International Taxation, 7 Int’I Law. 16, 26 (1973). The difficulty of finding the equivalent of a Justice Department referral is particularly acute in Canadian tax investigations. Although criminal prosecution is centered in Canadian attorneys-general, just as criminal prosecution in the United States falls within the province of the Justice Department, “[t]he similarity appears to stop there.” Scheim & Cantillon Ross, Stuart v. United States: Standards for Section 7602 Summons in Treaty Matters, 17 Tax Mgmt. Int’I J. 479, 482 (1988). Revenue Canada routinely gathers virtually all of the information necessary for criminal prosecution before turning a case over to the Canadian Justice Department, see id,., at 482-484, and available Canadian agency manuals suggest “that a case is referred to Justice only when it is already in a stage amenable to Court presentation, and that some degree of cooperation continues after that point.” Id., at 482. Scheim and Cantillon Ross conclude: “It appears therefore that [Revenue Canada] adopts an institutional posture tilted towards prosecution well before referral.” Ibid. If this conclusion is correct, then it might be difficult in at least some eases to determine whether a Canadian tax investigation has reached a point analogous to a Justice Department referral by the IRS. Contrary to Justice Scalia’s suggestion, see post, at 377, the Government relied on the preratification Senate debate in its brief, see Brief for United States 29, and n. 11, pointing out that the only reference to intergovernmental exchanges of information came in the following colloquy: “Mr. TAFT . . . “In other words, if an American citizen were using a Canadian bank deposit to evade income taxation, I think the convention would permit the United States Government to ask the Canadian Government to obtain information from its own bank and furnish it to this Government in connection with the enforcement of our internal-revenue laws. “Mr. GEORGE. It does provide for exchange of information, as the Senator from Ohio points out.” 88 Cong. Ree. 4714 (1942). Nor is reliance on the Senate’s preratification debates and reports improper. As Justice Scalia acknowledges, the American Law Institute’s most recent Restatement counsels consideration of such materials. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 314, Comment d (1987) (“indication that . . . the Senate ascribed a particular meaning to the treaty is relevant”); id., §325, Reporters’ Note 5 (“A court ... is required to take into account . . . (i) Committee reports, debates, and other indications of meaning that the legislative branch has attached to an agreement. . . ”). Consultation of these materials is eminently reasonable. Pace Justice Scalia, reviewing preratification Senate debates and reports is not akin to “determining the meaning of a bilateral contract between two corporations on the basis of what the board of directors of one of them thought it meant when authorizing the chief executive officer to conclude it.” Post, at 374. Senate debates do not occur behind closed doors, out of earshot of proposed treaty partners, nor are preratification Senate reports kept under seal. Both are public statements. They therefore bear no resemblance to the private deliberations of a board of directors prior to the board’s decision whether to authorize the chief executive officer to sign an agreement. Insofar as the contract analogy is apt, the better comparison is to a meeting of the board whose minutes and position papers the other corporation’s board and chief executive officer are invited to peruse. It is hornbook contract law that the proper construction of an agreement is that given by one of the parties when “that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(2)(b) (1981). See also E. Farnsworth, Contracts 487-488 (1982). A treaty’s negotiating history, which Justice Scalia suggests would be a better interpretive guide than preratification Senate materials, see post, at 374, would in fact be a worse indicator of a treaty’s meaning, for that history is rarely a matter of public record available to the Senate when it decides to grant or withhold its consent. A new United States-Canada Income Tax Convention became effective August 16, 1984, after the summonses involved in this case were issued. 1986-2 Cum. Bull. 258. Article XXVII of the new Convention closely resembles Articles XIX and XXI of the 1942 Convention. Yet neither the new Convention nor its supplementary protocols suggest any limitation on United States compliance with a treaty request dependent upon the status of a Canadian tax investigation. The hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Hearing on Tax Treaties before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-115 (1981), the technical explanation of the new Convention, see 1986-2 Cum. Bull. 275, 294, and the perfunctory ratification debate in the Senate, see 130 Cong. Ree. 19504-19509, 19512-19513 (1984), are similarly silent on this point. Thus, the Senate apparently did not believe that in ratifying the new Convention it was giving respondents’ claim the force of law, just as it did not appear to think, from the legislative history it left behind, that § 7602(e) accomplished that end on its own.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Marvin D. HORNE, et al., Petitioners v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. No. 12-123. Supreme Court of the United States Argued March 20, 2013. Decided June 10, 2013. Michael W. McConnell, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Joseph R. Palmore, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Brian C. Leighton, Attorney at Law, Clovis, CA, Michael W. McConnell, Aditya Bamzai, Joseph Cascio, Aaron L. Nielson, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Ramona E. Romero, General Counsel, Carrie F. Ricci, Assistant General Counsel, Leslie K. Lagomarcino, Senior Counsel, Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Joseph R. Palmore, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Michael S. Raab, Joshua Waldman, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) and the California Raisin Marketing Order (Marketing Order or Order) promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, raisin growers are frequently required to turn over a percentage of their crop to the Federal Government. The AMAA and the Marketing Order were adopted to stabilize prices by limiting the supply of raisins on the market. Petitioners are California raisin growers who believe that this regulatory scheme violates the Fifth Amendment. After petitioners refused to surrender the requisite portion of their raisins, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) began administrative proceedings against petitioners that led to the imposition of more than $650,000 in fines and civil penalties. Petitioners sought judicial review, claiming that the monetary sanctions were an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation. The Ninth Circuit held that petitioners were required to bring their takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to review petitioners' claim. We disagree. Petitioners' takings claim, raised as an affirmative defense to the agency's enforcement action, was properly before the court because the AMAA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over takings claims brought by raisin handlers. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Ninth Circuit. I A Congress enacted the AMAA during the Great Depression in an effort to insulate farmers from competitive market forces that it believed caused "unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices." Ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 602(4). To achieve this goal, Congress declared a national policy of stabilizing prices for agricultural commodities. Ibid. The AMAA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders that regulate the sale and delivery of agricultural goods. § 608c(1) ; see also Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 346, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) ("The Act contemplates a cooperative venture among the Secretary, handlers, and producers the principal purposes of which are to raise the price of agricultural products and to establish an orderly system for marketing them"). The Secretary may delegate to industry committees the authority to administer marketing orders. § 608c(7)(C). The AMAA does not directly regulate the "producer[s]" who grow agricultural commodities, § 608c(13)(B) ; it only regulates "handlers," which the AMAA defines as "processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling" of covered agricultural commodities. § 608c(1). Handlers who violate the Secretary's marketing orders may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. §§ 608a(5), 608a(6), and 608c(14). The Secretary promulgated a marketing order for California raisins in 1949. See 14 Fed. Reg. 5136 (codified, as amended, at 7 CFR pt. 989 (2013)). In particular, "[t]he Raisin Marketing Order, like other fruit and vegetable orders adopted under the AMAA, [sought] to stabilize producer returns by limiting the quantity of raisins sold by handlers in the domestic competitive market." Lion Raisins, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.3d 1356, 1359 (C.A.Fed.2005). The Marketing Order defines a raisin "handler" as "(a) [a]ny processor or packer; (b) [a]ny person who places ... raisins in the current of commerce from within [California] to any point outside thereof; (c) [a]ny person who delivers off-grade raisins ... into any eligible non-normal outlet; or (d) [a]ny person who blends raisins [subject to certain exceptions]." 7 CFR § 989.15. The Marketing Order also established the Raisin Administrative Committee (RAC), which consists of 47 members, with 35 representing producers, ten representing handlers, one representing the cooperative bargaining associations, and one member of the public. See § 989.26. The Marketing Order authorizes the RAC to recommend setting up annual reserve pools of raisins that are not to be sold on the open domestic market. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(E) ; 7 CFR §§ 989.54(d) and 989.65. Each year, the RAC reviews crop yield, inventories, and shipments and makes recommendations to the Secretary whether or not there should be a reserve pool. § 989.54. If the RAC recommends a reserve pool, it also recommends what portion of that year's production should be included in the pool ("reserve-tonnage"). The rest of that year's production remains available for sale on the open market ("free-tonnage"). § 989.54(d), (a). The Secretary approves the recommendation if he determines that the recommendation would "effectuate the declared policy of the Act." § 989.55. The reserve-tonnage, calculated as a percentage of a producer's crop, varies from year to year. Under the Marketing Order's reserve requirements, a producer is only paid for the free-tonnage raisins. § 989.65. The reserve-tonnage raisins, on the other hand, must be held by the handler in segregated bins "for the account" of the RAC. § 989.66(f). The RAC may then sell the reserve-tonnage raisins to handlers for resale in overseas markets, or may alternatively direct that they be sold or given at no cost to secondary, noncompetitive domestic markets, such as school lunch programs. § 989.67(b). The reserve pool sales proceeds are used to finance the RAC's administrative costs. § 989.53(a). In the event that there are any remaining funds, the producers receive a pro rata share. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(E) ; 7 CFR § 989.66(h). As a result, even though producers do not receive payment for reserve-tonnage raisins at the time of delivery to a handler, they retain a limited interest in the net proceeds of the RAC's disposition of the reserve pool. Handlers have other duties beyond managing the RAC's reserve pool. The Marketing Order requires them to file certain reports with the RAC, such as reports concerning the quantity of raisins that they hold or acquire. § 989.73. They are also required to allow the RAC access to their premises, raisins, and business records to verify the accuracy of the handlers' reports, § 989.77, to obtain inspections of raisins acquired, § 989.58(d), and to pay certain assessments, § 989.80, which help cover the RAC's administrative costs. A handler who violates any provision of the Order or its implementing regulations is subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,100 per day. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(14)(B) ; 7 CFR § 3.91(b)(1)(vii). A handler who does not comply with the reserve requirement must "compensate the [RAC] for the amount of the loss resulting from his failure to ... deliver" the requisite raisins. § 989.166(c). B Petitioners Marvin and Laura Horne have been producing raisins in two California counties (Fresno and Madera) since 1969. The Hornes do business as Raisin Valley Farms, a general partnership. For more than 30 years, the Hornes operated only as raisin producers. But, after becoming disillusioned with the AMAA regulatory scheme, they began looking for ways to avoid the mandatory reserve program. Since the AMAA applies only to handlers, the Hornes devised a plan to bring their raisins to market without going through a traditional handler. To this end, the Hornes entered into a partnership with Mrs. Horne's parents called Lassen Vineyards. In addition to its grape-growing activities, Lassen Vineyards purchased equipment to clean, stem, sort, and package the raisins from Raisin Valley Farms and Lassen Vineyards. It also contracted with more than 60 other raisin growers to clean, stem, sort, and, in some cases, box and stack their raisins for a fee. The Hornes' facilities processed more than 3 million pounds of raisins in toto during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 crop years. During these two crop years, the Hornes produced 27.4% and 12.3% of the raisins they processed, respectively. Although the USDA informed the Hornes in 2001 that their proposed operations made them "handlers" under the AMAA, the Hornes paid no assessments to the RAC during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 crop years. Nor did they set aside reserve-tonnage raisins from those produced and owned by the more than 60 other farmers who contracted with Lassen Vineyards for packing services. They also declined to arrange for RAC inspection of the raisins they received for processing, denied the RAC access to their records, and held none of their own raisins in reserve. On April 1, 2004, the Administrator of the Agriculture Marketing Service (Administrator) initiated an enforcement action against the Hornes, Raisin Valley Farms, and Lassen Vineyards (petitioners). The complaint alleged that petitioners were "handlers" of California raisins during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 crop years. It also alleged that petitioners violated the AMAA and the Marketing Order by submitting inaccurate forms to the RAC and failing to hold inspections of incoming raisins, retain raisins in reserve, pay assessments, and allow access to their records. Petitioners denied the allegations, countering that they were not "handlers" and asserting that they did not acquire physical possession of the other producers' raisins within the meaning of the regulations . Petitioners also raised several affirmative defenses, including a claim that the Marketing Order violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking property without just compensation. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded in 2006 that petitioners were handlers of raisins and thus subject to the Marketing Order. The ALJ also concluded that petitioners violated the AMAA and the Marketing Order and rejected petitioners' takings defense based on its view that "handlers no longer have a property right that permits them to market their crop free of regulatory control." App. 39 (citing Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 244, 246-247 (1994) ). Petitioners appealed to a judicial officer who, like the ALJ, also found that petitioners were handlers and that they had violated the Marketing Order. The judicial officer imposed $202,600 in civil penalties under 7 U.S.C. § 608c(14)(B) ; $8,783.39 in assessments for the two crop years under 7 CFR § 989.80(a) ; and $483,843.53 for the value of the California raisins that petitioners failed to hold in reserve for the two crop years under § 989.166(c). The judicial officer believed that he lacked "authority to judge the constitutionality of the various statutes administered by the [USDA]," App. 73, and declined to adjudicate petitioners' takings claim. Petitioners filed a complaint in Federal District Court seeking judicial review of the USDA's decision. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(14)(B). The District Court granted summary judgment to the USDA. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency's determination that petitioners were "handlers" subject to the Marketing Order, and rejected petitioners' argument that they were exempt from the Marketing Order due to their status as "producers" under § 608c(13)(B). No. CV-F-08-1549LJOSMS, 2009 WL 4895362, at *15 (E.D.Cal., Dec. 11, 2009). Petitioners renewed their Fifth Amendment argument, asserting that the reserve-tonnage requirement constituted a physical taking. Though the District Court found that the RAC takes title to a significant portion of a California raisin producer's crop through the reserve requirement, the court held that the transfer of title to the RAC did not constitute a physical taking. See id., at *26 (" '[I]n essence, [petitioners] are paying an admissions fee or toll-admittedly a steep one-for marketing raisins. The Government does not force plaintiffs to grow raisins or to market the raisins; rather, it directs that if they grow and market raisins, then passing title to their "reserve tonnage" raisins to the RAC is the admissions ticket' " (quoting Evans v. United States, 74 Fed.Cl. 554, 563-564 (2006) )). The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed that petitioners were "handlers" subject to the Marketing Order's provisions, and rejected petitioners' argument that they were producers, and, thus exempt from regulation. 673 F.3d 1071, 1078 (2012). The court did not resolve petitioners' takings claim, however, because it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. The court explained that "a takings claim against the federal government must be brought [in the Court of Federal Claims] in the first instance, 'unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction in the relevant statute.' " Id., at 1079 (quoting Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 520, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998) (plurality opinion)). The court recognized that 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15) provides an administrative remedy to handlers wishing to challenge marketing orders under the AMAA, and it agreed that "when a handler, or a producer-handler in its capacity as a handler, challenges a marketing order on takings grounds, Court of Federal Claims Tucker Act jurisdiction gives way to section [60]8c(15)'s comprehensive procedural scheme and administrative exhaustion requirements." 673 F.3d, at 1079. But, the Ninth Circuit determined, petitioners brought the takings claim in their capacity as producers, not handlers. Id., at 1080. Consequently, the court was of the view that "[n]othing in the AMAA precludes the Hornes from alleging in the Court of Federal Claims that the reserve program injures them in their capacity as producers by subjecting them to a taking requiring compensation." Ibid. This availability of a Federal Claims Court action thus rendered petitioners' takings claim unripe for adjudication. Ibid. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to review petitioners' takings claim. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 638, 184 L.Ed.2d 452 (2012). II A The Ninth Circuit's jurisdictional ruling flowed from its determination that petitioners brought their takings claim as producers rather than handlers. This determination is not correct. Although petitioners argued that they were producers-and thus not subject to the AMAA or Marketing Order at all-both the USDA and the District Court concluded that petitioners were "handlers." Accordingly, the civil penalty, assessment, and reimbursement for failure to reserve raisins were all levied on petitioners in their capacity as "handlers." If petitioners' argument that they were producers had prevailed, they would not have been subject to any of the monetary sanctions imposed on them. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(13)(B) ("No order issued under this chapter shall be applicable to any producer in his capacity as a producer"). It is undisputed that the Marketing Order imposes duties on petitioners only in their capacity as handlers. As a result, any defense raised against those duties is necessarily raised in that same capacity. Petitioners argue that it would be unconstitutional for the Government to come on their land and confiscate raisins, or to confiscate the proceeds of raisin sales, without paying just compensation; and, that it is therefore unconstitutional to fine petitioners for not complying with the unconstitutional requirement. SEE BRIEF FOR PETItioNers 54. given that fines Can only be levied on handlers, petitioners' takings claim makes sense only as a defense to penalties imposed upon them in their capacity as handlers . The Ninth Circuit confused petitioners' statutory argument (i.e., "we are producers, not handlers") with their constitutional argument (i.e., "assuming we are handlers, fining us for refusing to turn over reserve-tonnage raisins violates the Fifth Amendment"). The relevant question, then, is whether a federal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a takings defense raised by a handler seeking review of a final agency order. B The Government argues that petitioners' takings-based defense was rightly dismissed on ripeness grounds. Brief for Respondent 21-22. According to the Government, because a takings claim can be pursued later in the Court of Federal Claims, the Ninth Circuit correctly refused to adjudicate petitioners' takings defense. In support of its position, the Government relies largely on Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v . hamilTon bank Of johnsOn city, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.CT. 3108, 87 l.ed.2d 126 (1985). Brief for Respondent 21-22 ("Just compensation need not 'be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a 'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation' exist at the time of the taking' " (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S., at 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108) ). In that case, the plaintiff filed suit against the Regional Planning Commission, claiming that a zoning decision by the Commission effected a taking of property without just compensation. Id ., at 182, 105 S.Ct. 3108. We found that the plaintiff's claim was not "ripe" for two reasons, neither of which supports the Government's position. First, we explained that the plaintiff's takings claim in Williamson County failed because the plaintiff could not show that it had been injured by the Government's action. Specifically, the plaintiff "ha[d] not yet obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property." Id., at 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108. Here, by contrast, petitioners were subject to a final agency order imposing concrete fines and penalties at the time they sought judicial review under § 608c(14)(B). This was clearly sufficient "injury" for federal jurisdiction. Second, the Williamson County plaintiff's takings claim was not yet ripe because the plaintiff had not sought "compensation through the procedures the State ha[d] provided for doing so." Id., at 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108. We explained that "[i]f the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process yields just compensation, then the property owner has no claim against the Government for a taking." Id., at 194-195, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Stated differently, a Fifth Amendment claim is premature until it is clear that the Government has both taken property and denied just compensation. Although we often refer to this consideration as "prudential 'ripeness,' " Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1013, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992), we have recognized that it is not, strictly speaking, jurisdictional. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, ----, and n. 10, 130 S.Ct. 2592, 2610, and n. 10, 177 L.Ed.2d 184 (2010). Here, the Government argues that petitioners' takings claim is premature because the Tucker Act affords "the requisite reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining just compensation that a property owner must pursue." Brief for Respondent 22. In the Government's view, "[p]etitioners should have complied with the order, and, after a portion of their raisins were placed in reserve to be disposed of as directed by the RAC, ... sought compensation as producers in the Court of Federal Claims for the alleged taking." Id., at 24-25. We disagree with the Government's argument, however, because the AMAA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over a handler's takings claim. As a result, there is no alternative "reasonable, certain, and adequate" remedial scheme through which petitioners (as handlers) must proceed before obtaining review of their claim under the AMAA. The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). " [A] claim for just compensation under the Takings Clause must be brought to the Court of Federal Claims in the first instance, unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction in the relevant statute." Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S., at 520, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (plurality opinion); see also United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 12, 17, 184 L.Ed.2d 317 (2012) (where "a statute contains its own self-executing remedial scheme," a court "look[s] only to that statute"). To determine whether a statutory scheme displaces Tucker Act jurisdiction, a court must "examin[e] the purpose of the [statute], the entirety of its text, and the structure of review that it establishes." United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988). Under the AMAA's comprehensive remedial scheme, handlers may challenge the content, applicability, and enforcement of marketing orders. Pursuant to § 608c(15)(A)-(B), a handler may file with the Secretary a direct challenge to a marketing order and its applicability to him. We have held that "any handler" subject to a marketing order must raise any challenges to the order, including constitutional challenges, in administrative proceedings. See United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 294, 67 S.Ct. 207, 91 L.Ed. 290 (1946). Once the Secretary issues a ruling, the federal district court where the "handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business" is "vested with jurisdiction ... to review [the] ruling." § 608c(15)(B). These statutory provisions afford handlers a ready avenue to bring takings claim against the USDA. We thus conclude that the AMAA withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over petitioners' takings claim. Petitioners (as handlers) have no alternative remedy, and their takings claim was not "premature" when presented to the Ninth Circuit. C Although petitioners' claim was not "premature" for Tucker Act purposes, the question remains whether a takings-based defense may be raised by a handler in the context of an enforcement proceeding initiated by the USDA under § 608c(14). We hold that it may. The AMAA provides that the handler may not be subjected to an adverse order until he has been given "notice and an opportunity for an agency hearing on the record." § 608c(14)(B). The text of § 608c(14)(B) does not bar handlers from raising constitutional defenses to the USDA's enforcement action. Allowing handlers to raise constitutional challenges in the course of enforcement proceedings would not diminish the incentive to file direct challenges to marketing orders under § 608c(15)(A) because a handler who refuses to comply with a marketing order and waits for an enforcement action will be liable for significant monetary penalties if his constitutional challenge fails. In the case of an administrative enforcement proceeding, when a party raises a constitutional defense to an assessed fine, it would make little sense to require the party to pay the fine in one proceeding and then turn around and sue for recovery of that same money in another proceeding. See Eastern Enterprises, supra, at 520, 118 S.Ct. 2131. We see no indication that Congress intended this result for handlers subject to enforcement proceedings under the AMAA. Petitioners were therefore free to raise their takings-based defense before the USDA. And, because § 608c(14)(B) allows a handler to seek judicial review of an adverse order, the district court and Ninth Circuit were not precluded from reviewing petitioners' constitutional challenge. The grant of jurisdiction necessarily includes the power to review any constitutional challenges properly presented to and rejected by the agency. We are therefore satisfied that the petitioners raised a cognizable takings defense and that the Ninth Circuit erred in declining to adjudicate it. III The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide whether the USDA's imposition of fines and civil penalties on petitioners, in their capacity as handlers, violated the Fifth Amendment. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The AMAA also applies to a vast array of other agricultural products, including "[m]ilk, fruits (including filberts, almonds, pecans and walnuts ..., pears, olives, grapefruit, cherries, caneberries (including raspberries, blackberries, and loganberries), cranberries, ... tobacco, vegetables, ... hops, [and] honeybees." § 608c(2). In 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, the crop years at issue here, the reserve percentages were set at 47 percent and 30 percent of a producer's crop, respectively. See RAC, Marketing Policy & Industry Statistics 2012, p. 28 (Table 12). The Hornes wrote the Secretary and to the RAC in 2002 setting out their grievances: "[W]e are growers that will pack and market our raisins. We reserve our rights under the Constitution of the United States ... [T]he Marketing Order Regulating Raisins has become a tool for grower bankruptcy, poverty, and involuntary servitude. The Marketing Order Regulating Raisins is a complete failure for growers, handlers, and the USDA ... [W]e will not relinquish ownership of our crop. We put forth the money and effort to grow it, not the Raisin Administrative Committee. This is America, not a communist state." App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a. The Ninth Circuit construed the takings argument quite differently, stating that petitioners believe the regulatory scheme "takes reserve-tonnage raisins belonging to producers." 673 F.3d 1071, 1080 (2012). When the agency brought its enforcement action against petitioners, however, it did not seek to recover reserve-tonnage raisins from the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 crop years. Rather, it sought monetary penalties and reimbursement. Petitioners could not argue in the face of such agency action that the Secretary was attempting to take raisins that had already been harvested and sold. Instead, petitioners argued that they could not be compelled to pay fines for refusing to accede to an unconstitutional taking. The Government notes that petitioners did not own most of the raisins that they failed to reserve and argues that petitioners would have no takings claim based on those raisins. See Brief for Respondent 19. We take no position on the merits of petitioners' takings claim. We simply recognize that insofar as the petitioners challenged the imposition of monetary sanctions under the Marketing Order, they raised their takings-based defense in their capacity as handlers. On remand, the Ninth Circuit can decide in the first instance whether petitioners may raise the takings defense with respect to raisins they never owned. A "Case" or "Controversy" exists once the government has taken private property without paying for it. Accordingly, whether an alternative remedy exists does not affect the jurisdiction of the federal court. That is not to say that a producer who turns over her reserve-tonnage raisins could not bring suit for just compensation in the Court of Claims. Whether a producer could bring such a claim, and what impact the availability of such a claim would have on petitioners' takings-based defense, are questions going to the merits of petitioners' defense, not to a court's jurisdiction to entertain it. We therefore do not address those issues here. Petitioners filed an administrative petition before the Secretary in March 2007 pursuant to § 608c(15)(A) challenging the Marketing Order and its application to them. The USDA argued that they had no standing to file the petition because they had not admitted that they were handlers. The judicial officer granted the USDA's motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a complaint in District Court, but the court dismissed it as untimely. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. See Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture, 395 Fed.Appx. 486 (2010).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. POOL MANUFACTURING CO. No. 435. Argued April 18, 1950. Decided May 15, 1950. A. Norman Somers argued the cause for petitioner. Solicitor General Perlman, Robert N. Denham, David P. Findling and Mozart G. Ratner filed a brief for petitioner. John M. Scott argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is a companion to Labor Board v. Mexia Textile Mills, ante, p. 563, decided this day. Respondent is a manufacturer of clothing in Texas, and is engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the labor relations acts. In December 1943, the National Labor Relations Board designated Local Union No. 251 of the United Garment Workers of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, the exclusive bargaining-representative of certain of respondent’s employees. In December 1945, the Union charged the respondent with violations of §§8(1) and 8 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act in connection with a strike going on at that time. The Board’s complaint was issued pursuant to these charges in April 1946; a hearing was held; the Trial Examiner’s intermediate report was issued; and, since no exceptions to the report were entered by the respondent, the Board, on August 26, 1946, adopted the Trial Examiner’s findings, conclusions and recommendations, and ordered the respondent to cease and desist from its refusal to bargain with the Union. With certain limitations, the company was also ordered to offer reinstatement and back pay to employees who had gone on strike. 70 N. L. R. B. 540 (1946). Two and one-half years later, on February 17, 1949, the Board petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for the enforcement of its order. Respondent moved for leave to adduce additional evidence. It stated that it had bargained with the Union since the date of the order, but that no agreement had been reached; that the Union had made no effort to bargain since early in 1948; that respondent questioned whether the Union retained the majority of employees in the bargaining unit, since certain employees had informed respondent that they had left the Union, and the Union’s organizer had stated, according to respondent, that a rival union had a “substantial group” within its membership; that these facts had come to respondent’s attention since the “record in the instant case was closed and completed”; and finally that the passage of the statute imposing a duty upon the Union to bargain with the respondent might affect the disposition of the case before the Board. On May 13, 1949, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered an order identical in pertinent part with that quoted in Labor Board v. Mexia Textile Mills, ante, p. 563. We granted certiorari, 338 U. S. 909 (1950). Although respondent concedes that the decision in the Mexia case governs the case at bar, a single issue may deserve separate treatment. In the instant case the Board waited two and one-half years before it sought enforcement of its order. There is a suggestion that the length of the delay may have influenced the Court of Appeals in ordering the Board to take evidence on the question of compliance. We regard this as doubtful, in view of its identical action in the Mexia case, when the petition for enforcement was filed only nine months after the Board’s order. But in any event we view the delay as without consequence in this case. The Board is of course charged with primary responsibility in effectuating the policies of the Act. It has determined that those policies are advanced in some cases by resorting to the processes of negotiation with the employer rather than the compulsion, as well as the trouble and expense, of an enforcement decree. See § 202.13 of the Board’s earlier regulations regarding the Labor Management Relations Act, 12 Fed. Reg. 5651, 5653 (1947). In some cases delay in enforcement may be helpful in reaching an immediate solution of the problem; in others, exhaustion of negotiation techniques before a decree is requested may consume many months after the Board’s order and before such techniques fail. We are of the opinion that a strict judicial time limitation of the duration presented in the instant case would frustrate the deliberate purpose of Congress in permitting, but not requiring, resort to an enforcement decree. Cf. § 10 (b), which states a definite period of limitation regarding charges filed with the Board. Compare Labor Board v. American Creosoting Co., 139 F. 2d 193 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1943); Labor Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U. S. 685, 697-698 (1942). We must not forget that the “question whether the settlement [with the employer] shall be accepted as definitive is for the Board to decide . . . Labor Board v. General Motors Corp., 179 F. 2d 221, 222 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1950). The employer, who could have obtained review of the Board order when it was entered, § 10 (f), is hardly in a position to object. Labor Board v. Todd Co., 173 F. 2d 705 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1949); Labor Board v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F. 2d 130, 134 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1949). The contrary argument was made in more explicit terms in Labor Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U. S. 217 (1949), a case also coming to us from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Board’s petition for enforcement had been filed more than a year and three months after its order. In its brief in this Court as well as in response to the petition for enforcement in the Court of Appeals, the employer alleged that it had bargained collectively with the Union for nearly two years prior to the petition for enforcement, and that the Board’s order requiring collective bargaining should not be enforced. Noting the delay, respondent asked that it be afforded “an opportunity to prove the pertinent facts.” The Court of Appeals denied the Board’s “belated” petition for enforcement for a reason not pertinent here, coupled with “the earnest assertions by the respondent that it has complied with the Board’s previous order .. . .” 167 F. 2d 662, 663 (1948). This Court reversed, holding “that the Board’s order to cease and desist is justified, under the circumstances of this case . . . .” The Court stated that “Even though the employer, since January 1, 1946, may have carried on collective bargaining in good faith as to rates of pay and other matters, a decree enforcing the original order against making a general increase without consulting the collective bargaining representatives is justifiable. '. . . an order of the character made by the Board, lawful when made, does not become moot because it is obeyed or because changing circumstances indicate that the need for it may be less than when made.’ Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, 271. See also, Federal Trade Comm’n v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 304 U. S. 257.” 337 U. S. at 225, n. 7. We think the rationale of the Crompton-Highland case is persuasive here. Otherwise those intent upon violating the Act have a ready means of escape through the use of delaying tactics in negotiation, culminating in the filing of motions for leave to adduce evidence when enforcement is sought, thus effectively frustrating the Board’s order. We need not now face the question whether a Court of Appeals may under § 10 (e) refer a matter back to the Board for appropriate action on a showing by the employer that subsequent to the Board’s order, but before the petition for enforcement several years later, a rival union has filed before the Board a petition for recognition, not yet acted upon, which claims that the bargaining representative no longer has a majority of the employees. Nor need we decide whether a period of delay through its length alone may mature into a denial of an enforcement decree or make necessary the adduction of additional evidence. Cf. Labor Board v. Eanet, 85 U. S. App. D. C. 371, 179 F. 2d 15 (C. A. D. C. Cir. 1949). We decide only that in this case the Board’s delay in filing its petition was not fatal, and cannot save the order entered below. Like its companion, this order of the Court of Appeals must be vacated and the enforcement of the Board order decreed pursuant to § 10 (e), unless “extraordinary circumstances” are pleaded which justify the respondent’s failure to urge its objections before the Board. It is so ordered. [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Jackson, see ante, p. 570.] 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.; 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 141 et seq. Including the Trial Examiner’s rejection of the employer’s allegation that the Union no longer represented the majority in the bargaining unit. “The Senate amendment followed the present language of the act, which permits the Board to petition for enforcement, but does not require it to do so. The conference agreement adopts the language of the Senate amendment.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, on H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 55.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED DOMINION INDUSTRIES, INC. v. UNITED STATES No. 00-157. Argued March 26, 2001 Decided June 4, 2001 Eric R. Fox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Alan J. J. Swirski Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Fallon, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Richard Farber, and Edward T. Perelmuter. Richard E. Zuckerman and Raymond M. Kethledge filed a brief for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Under § 172(b)(l)(I) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a taxpayer may carry bach its “product liability loss” up to 10 years in order to offset prior years’ income. The issue here is the method for calculating the product liability loss of an affiliated group of corporations electing to file a consolidated federal income tax return. We hold that the group’s product liability loss must be figured on a consolidated basis in the first instance, and not by aggregating product liability losses separately determined company by company. I A “net operating loss” results from deductions in excess of gross income for a given year. 26 U. S. C. § 172(e). Under § 172(b)(1)(A), a taxpayer may carry its net operating loss either backward to past tax years or forward to Mure tax years in order to “set off its lean years against its lush years, and to strike something like an average taxable income computed over a period longer than one year,” Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 386 (1957). Although the normal carryback period was at the time three years, in 1978, Congress authorized a special 10-year carryback for “product liability loss[es],” 26 U. S. C. § 172(b)(l)(I), since, it understood, losses of this sort tend to be particularly “large and sporadic.” Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1978,95th Cong., 232 (Comm. Print 1979). The Code defines “product liability loss,” for a given tax year, as the lesser of (1) the taxpayer’s “net operating loss for such year” and (2) its allowable deductions attributable to product liability “expenses.” 26 U. S. C. § 172(j)(l). In other words, a taxpayer’s product liability loss (PLL) is the total of its product liability expenses (PLEs), limited to the amount of its net operating loss (NOL). By definition, then, a taxpayer with positive annual income, and thus no NOL, may have PLEs but can have no PLL. Instead of requiring each member company of “[a]n affiliated group of corporations” to file a separate tax return, the Code permits the group to file a single consolidated return, 26 U. S. C. § 1501, and leaves it to the Secretary of the Treasury to work out the details by promulgating regulations governing such returns, § 1502. Under Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1502-ll(a) and 1.1502 — 21(f), an affiliated group’s “consolidated taxable income” (CTI), or, alternatively, its “consolidated net operating loss” (CNOL), is determined by “taking into account” several items. The first is the “separate taxable income” (STI) of each group member. A member’s STI (whether positive or negative) is computed as though the member were a separate corporation (i e., by netting income and expenses), but subject to several important “modifications.” Treas. Reg. §1.1502-12. These modifications require a group member calculating its STI to disregard, among other items, its capital gains and losses, charitable-contribution deductions, and dividends-reeeived deductions. Ibid. These excluded items are accounted for on a consolidated basis, that is, they are combined at the level of the group filing the single return, where deductions otherwise attributable to one member (say, for a charitable contribution) can offset income received by another (from a capital gain, for example). Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1502-ll(a)(3) to (8); 1.1502-21(f)(2) to (6). A consolidated group’s CTI or CNOL, therefore, is the sum of each member’s STI, plus or minus a handful of items considered on a consolidated basis. II Petitioner United Dominion’s predecessor in interest, AMGA International Corporation, was the parent of an affiliated group of corporations that properly elected to file consolidated tax returns for the years 1983 through 1986. In each of these years, AMCA reported CNOL (the lowest being $85 million and the highest, $140 million) that exceeded the aggregate of its 26 individual members’ PLEs ($3.5 million to $6.5 million). This case focuses on the PLEs of five of AMCA’s member companies, which, together, generated roughly $205,000 in PLEs in 1983, $1.6 million in 1984, $1.3 million in 1985, and $250,000 in 1986. No one disputes these amounts or their characterization as PLEs. See 208 F. 3d 452,453 (CA4 2000) (“The parties agree” with respect to the amount of “the product liability expenses incurred by the five group members in the relevant years”). Rather, the sole question here is whether the AMCA affiliated group may include these amounts on its consolidated return, in determining its PLL for 10-year carryback. The question arises because of the further undisputed fact that in each of the relevant tax years, each of the five companies in question (with minor exceptions not relevant here), reported a positive STI. AMCA answered this question by following what commentators have called a “single-entity” approach to calculating its “consolidated” PLL. For each tax year, AMCA (1) calculated its CNOL pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11(a), and (2) aggregated its individual members’ PLEs. Because, as noted above, for each tax year AMCA’s CNOL was greater than the sum of its members’ PLEs, AMCA treated the full amount of the PLEs as consolidated PLL eligible for 10-year carryback. In AMCA’s view, the fact that several member companies throwing off large PLEs also, when considered separately, generated positive taxable income was of no significance. From the Government’s perspective, however, the fact that the several affiliated members with PLEs also generated positive separate taxable income is of critical significance. According to the Government’s methodology, which we will call the “separate-member” approach, PLEs incurred by an affiliate with positive separate taxable income cannot contribute to a PLL eligible for 10-year carryback. Whereas AMCA compares the group’s total income (or loss) and total PLEs in an effort to determine the group’s total PLL, the Government compares each affiliate’s STI and PLEs in order to determine whether each affiliate suffers a PLL, and only then combines any PLLs of the individual affiliates to determine a consolidated PLL amount. In 1986 and 1987, AMCA petitioned the Internal Revenue Service for refunds of taxes based on its PLL calculations. The IRS first ruled in AMCA’s favor but was reversed by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation of the United States Congress, which controls refunds exceeding a certain threshold, 26 U. S. C. § 6405(a). AMCA then filed this refund action in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The District Court agreed with AMCA that an affiliated group’s PLL is determined on a single-entity basis, and held that, so long as the group’s consolidated return reflects CNOL in excess of the group’s aggregate PLEs, the total of those expenses (including those incurred by members with positive separate taxable income) is a PLL that “may be carried back the full ten years.” No. 8:9S-CV-341-MU (June 19, 1998), App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, and held that “determining ‘product liability loss’ separately for each group member is correct and consistent with [Treasury] regulations.” 208 F. 3d, at 458. Because the Fourth Circuit’s separate-member approach to calculating PLL conflicted with the Sixth Circuit’s adoption of the single-entity approach in Intermet Corf. v. Com missioner, 209 F. 3d 901 (2000), we granted certiorari, 531 U. S. 1009 (2000). We now reverse. III The ease for the single-entity approach to calculating an affiliated group’s PLL is straightforward. Section 172(j)(l) defines a taxpayer’s “product liability loss” for a given tax year as the lesser of its “net operating loss for such year” and its product liability “expenses.” In order to apply this definition, the taxpayer first determines whether it has taxable income or NOL, and in making that calculation it subtracts PLEs. If the result is NOL, the taxpayer then makes a simple comparison between the NOL figure and the total PLEs. The PLE total becomes the PLL to the extent it does not exceed NOL. That is, until NOL has been determined, there is no PLL. The first step in applying the definition and methodology of PLL to a taxpayer filing a consolidated return thus requires the calculation of NOL. As United Dominion correctly points out, the Code and regulations governing affiliated groups of corporations filing consolidated returns provide only one definition of NOL: “consolidated” NOL, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(f). There is no definition of separate NOL for a member of an affiliated group. Indeed, the fact that Treasury Regulations do provide a measure of separate NOL in a different context, for an affiliated corporation as to any year in which it filed a separate return, infra, at 832-834, underscores the absence of such a measure for an affiliated corporation filing as a group member. Given this apparently exclusive definition of NOL as CNOL in the instance of affiliated entities with a consolidated return (and for reasons developed below, infra, at 884-838) we think it is fair to say, as United Dominion says, that the concept of separate NOL “simply does not exist.” Brief for Petitioner 15. The exclusiveness of NOL at the consolidated level as CNOL is important here for the following reasons. The Code’s authorization of consolidated group treatment contains no indication that for a consolidated group the essential relationship between NOL and PLL will differ from their relationship for a conventional corporate taxpayer. Nor does any Treasury Regulation purport to change the relationship in the cpnsolidated context. If, then, the relationship is to remain essentially the same, the key to understanding it lies in the regulations’ definition of net operating loss exclusively at the consolidated level. Working back from that, PLEs should be considered first in calculating CNOL, and they are: because any PLE of an affiliate affects the calculation of its STI, that same PLE necessarily affects the CTI or CNOL in exactly the same way, dollar for dollar. And because, by definition, there is no NOL measure for a consolidated return group or any affiliate except CNOL, PLEs cannot be compared with any NOL to produce PLL until CNOL has been calculated. Then, and only then in the case of the consolidated filer, can total PLEs be compared •with a net operating loss. In sum, comparable treatment of PLL in the instances of the usual corporate taxpayer and group filing a consolidated return can be achieved only if the comparison of PLEs with a limiting loss amount occurs at the consolidated level after CNOL has been determined. This approach resting on comparable treatment has a further virtue entitled to some weight in case of doubt: it is (relatively) easy to understand and to apply. The case for the separate-member approach, advanced (in one variant) by the Government and adopted (on a different rationale) by the Court of Appeals, is not so easily made. In the analysis of comparable treatment just set out, of course, there is no NOL below the consolidated level and hence nothing for comparison with PLEs to produce PLL at any stage before the CNOL calculation. At the least, then, a proponent of the separate-member approach must identify some figure in the consolidated return scheme that could have a plausible analogy to NOL at the level of the affiliated corporations. See A. Dubroff, J. Blanchard, J. Broadbent, & K Duvall, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations Filing Consolidated Returns §41.04[06], p. 41-75 (2d ed. 2000) (hereinafter Dubroff) (“Even if separate entity treatment was appropriate, it is unclear how a member with [PLEs] would compute its separate NOL”). The Government and the Court of Appeals have suggested different substitute measures. Neither one works. The Government has argued that an individual group member’s STI, as determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12, is analogous to a “separate” NOL, so that an affiliate’s STI may be compared with its PLEs in order to determine any separate PLL. An individual member’s PLL would be the amount of its separate PLEs up to the amount of its negative STI; a member having positive STI could have no PLL. The Government claims that an STI-based comparison places the group member closest to the position it would have occupied if it had filed a separate return. But that is simply not so. We have seen already that the calculation of a group member's STI by definition excludes several items that an individual taxpayer would normally account for in computing income or loss, but which an affiliated group may tally only at the consolidated level, such as capital gains and losses, charitable-contribution deductions, and dividends-received deductions. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1502-12(j) to (n). Owing to these exclusions, an affiliate’s STI will tend to be inflated by eliminating deductions it would have taken if it had filed separately, or deflated by eliminating an income item like capital gain. When pushed, the Government concedes that STI is “not necessarily equivalent to the income or [NOL] figure that the corporation would have computed if it had filed a separate return.” Brief for United States 21, n. 14. But, the Government claims, “[t]here has never been a taxpayer with [PLEs] who had a positive [STI] but a negative separate [NOL].” Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. In other words, the Government says that the deductions excluded from STI have never once made a difference and, therefore, that STI is, in fact, a decent enough proxy for a group member’s “separate” NOL. But whether or not the excluded items have made a difference in the past, or make a difference here, they certainly could make a difference and, given the potential importance of some of the deductions involved (a large charitable contribution, for example), it is not hard to see how the difference could favor the Government. The Court of Appeals was therefore right to reject the Government’s reliance on STI as a functional surrogate for an affiliate’s “separate” NOL. 208 F. 3d, at 459-460. But what the Court of Appeals used in place of STI fares no better. The court relied on Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-79, which contains a definition of “separate net operating loss” that the court believed to be “analogous to an individual’s ‘net operating loss’ on a separate return.” 208 F. 3d, at 460. Section 1.1502-79(a)(3) provides that, “[f]or purposes of this subparagraph,” the “separate net operating loss of a member of the group shall be determined under §1.1502-12 . . . , adjusted for the . . . items taken into account in the computation of” the CNOL. As the Court of Appeals said, the directive of § 1.1502-79(a)(3) (unlike the definition of STI) “takes into account, for example, [a] member’s charitable contributions” and other consolidated deductions. 208 P. 3d, at 460-461. But this sounds too good. It is true that, insofar as § 1.1502-79(a)(3) accounts for gains and losses that STI does not, it gets closer to a commonsense notion of a group member’s “separate” NOL than STI does. But the fact that § 1.1502-79(a)(3) improves on STI simply by undoing what §1.1502-12 requires in defining STI is suspicious, and the suspicion turns out to be justified. Section 1.1502-79(a)(3) unbakes the cake for only one reason, and that reason has no application here. The definition on which the Court of Appeals relied applies, by its terms, only “for purposes of” § 1.1502-79(a)(3), and context makes clear that the purpose is to provide a way to allocate CNOL to an affiliate member that seeks to carry back a loss to a “separate return year,” that is, to a year in which the member was not part of the consolidated group. See Treas. Reg. §1.1502-79 (titled “Separate return years”); § 1.1502-79(a) (titled “Carryover and carryback of [CNOL] to separate return years”); § 1.1502-79(a)(l) (“[i]f a [CNOL] can be carried... to a separate return year . . .”). No separate return years are at issue before us; all NOL carrybacks relevant here apply to years in which the five corporations were affiliated in the group. The Court of Appeals thus applied concepts addressing separate return years to a determination for a consolidated return year, without any statutory or regulatory basis for doing so. Cf. 49 Fed. Reg.. 30530 (1984) (“[AJlthough the consolidated net operating loss is apportioned to individual members for purposes of carry backs to separate return years [under § 1.1502-79(a)], the apportioned amounts are not separate NOLs of each member”). Hence, while § 1.1502-79 might not distort an affiliate’s separate NOL in the same way that STI does, the facial inapplicability of that regulation only underscores the exclusive concern of § 1.1502-ll(a) with consolidated NOL. In sum, neither method for computing PLL on a separate-member basis squares with the notion of comparability as applied to consolidated return regulations. On the contrary, by expressly and exclusively defining NOL as CNOL, the regulations support the position that group members’ PLEs should be aggregated and the affiliated group’s PLL determined on a consolidated, single-entity basis. IV Several objections have been raised to a single-entity approach to calculating PLL that we have not considered yet. First, the Government insists that a single-entity rule allows affiliated groups a “double deduction.” . The Government argues that because PLEs are not included among the specific items (charitable-contribution deductions, etc.) for which consolidated, single-entity treatment is required under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12, PLEs are “consumed” or “used up” in computing members’ STIs, which, pursuant to Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1502-ll(a) and 1.15Q2-21(f), are then used to calculate the group’s CTI or CNOL. According to the Government, to permit the use of PLEs first to reduce an individual member’s STI and then to contribute to an aggregate PLL for carryback purposes would be tantamount to a double deduction. The double-deduction argument may have superficial appeal, but any appeal it has rests on a fundamental misconception of the function of STI in computing an affiliated group’s tax liability. Calculation of a group member’s STI is not in and of itself the basis for any tax event, and there is no separate tax saving when STI is calculated; that occurs only when deductions on the consolidated return equal income and (if they exceed income and produce a CNOL) are carried back against prior income. STI is merely an accounting construct devised as an interim step in computing a group’s CTI or CNOL; it “has no other purpose.” Inter-met, 209 F. 3d, at 906 (“A member’s STI is simply a step along the way to calculating the group’s taxable income or CNOL”). The fact that a group member’s PLEs reduce its STI, which in turn either reduces the group’s CTI or contributes to its CNOL “dollar for dollar,” ibid., is of no other moment. If there were anything wrong in what United Dominion proposes to do, it would be wrong in relation to CNOL and its use for any carryback. Yet, as noted above, no one here disputes that the group members had PLEs in the total amount claimed or that the AMCA group is entitled to carry back the full amount of its CNOL to offset income in prior years. The only question is what portion, if any, of AMCA’s CNOL is PLL and, as such, eligible for 10-year, as opposed to 3-year, carryback treatment. There is no more of a double deduction with a 10-year carryback than one for three years. A second objection was the reason that the Court of Appeals rejected the single-entity approach. That court attached dispositive significance to the fact that, while the Treasury Regulation we have discussed, § 1.1502-12, specifically provides that several items (capital gains and losses, charitable-contribution deductions, etc.) shall be accounted for on a consolidated basis, it does not similarly provide for accounting for PLEs on a consolidated basis: “The regulations provide for blending the group members’ [NOLs], and they explicitly define [CNOL] without an accompanying reference to consolidated [PLEs]. This omission ... makes clear that blending those expenses is not permitted . . . 208 P. 3d, at 458. We think the omission of PLEs from the series of items that §1.1502-12 requires to be tallied at the consolidated level has no such elear lesson, however. The logic that invests the omission with significance is familiar: the mention of some implies the exclusion of others not mentioned. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 168, 168 (1993) (“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”). But here, as always, the soundness of that premise is a function of timing: if there was a good reason to consider the treatment of consolidated PLL at the time the regulation was drawn, then omitting PLL from the list of items for consolidated treatment may well have meant something. But if there was no reason to consider PLL then, its omission would mean nothing at all. And in fact there was no reason. When the consolidated return regulations were first promulgated in 1966, there was no carryback provision pegged to PLEs or PLLs; those notions did not become separate carryback items until 1978, when the 10-year rule was devised. See Revenue Act of 1978, §371, 92 Stat. 2859; see also Leatherman, Current Developments 393, n. 5. Omission of PLEs or PLLs from the series set out for consolidated treatment in the 1966 regulation therefore meant absolutely nothing in 1966. The issue, then, is the significance, not of omission, but of failure to include later: has the significance of the earlier regulation changed solely because the Treasury has never amended it, even though PLL is now a separate carryback? We think that is unlikely. The Treasury’s relaxed approach to amending its regulations to track Code changes is well documented. See e. g., Dubroff 41-72, n. 193; Axelrod & Blank 1391; Leath-erman, Separate Liability Losses 708-709. The absence of any amendment to § 1.1502-12 that might have added PLEs or PLLs to the list of items for mandatory single-entity treatment therefore is more likely a reflection of the Treasury’s inattention than any affirmative intention on its part to say anything at all. Last, the Government warns that “[t]he rule that petitioner advocates would permit significant tax avoidance abuses.” Brief for United States 40. Specifically: "Under petitioner’s approach, a corporation that is currently unprofitable but that had substantial income in prior years could (i) acquire a profitable corporation with product liability expense deductions in the year of acquisition, (ii) file a consolidated return and (iii) thereby create an otherwise nonexistent 'product liability loss’ for the new affiliated group that would allow the acquiring corporation to claim refunds of the tax it paid in prior years.” Ibid. The Government suggests, for example, that “a manufacturing company (with prior profits and current losses) that has no product liability exposure could purchase a tobacco company (with both prior and current profits) that has significant product liability expenses” and that “[t]he combined entity could... assert a ten-year carryback of 'product liability losses’ even though the tobacco company has always made a profit and never incurred a 'loss’ of any type.” Id., at 40-41, n. 27. There are several answers. First, on the score of tax avoidance, the separate-member approach is no better (and is perhaps worse) than the single-entity treatment; both entail some risk of tax-motivated behavior. See Leatherman, Separate Liability Losses 681 (Under the separate-member approach, "[djespite sound non-tax business reasons, a group may be disinclined to form a new member or transfer assets between members, because it may worry that it would lose the benefit of a ten-year carryback,” and "may be encouraged to transfer assets between members to increase its consolidated [PLL], even when those transfers would otherwise he ill-advised”)- Second, the Government may, as always, address tax-motivated behavior under Internal Revenue Code §269, which gives the Secretary ample authority to ‘‘disallow [any] deduction, credit, or other allowance” that results from a transaction “the principal purpose [of] which... is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax.” 26 U. S. C. § 269(a). And finally, if the Government were to conclude that §269 provided too little protection and that it simply could not live with the single-entity approach, the Treasury could exercise the authority provided by the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1502, and amend the consolidated return regulations. * * * Thus, it is true, as the Government has argued, that “[t]he Internal Revenue Code vests ample authority in the Treasury to adopt consolidated return regulations to effect a binding resolution of the question presented in this case.” Brief for United States 19-20. To the extent that the Government has exercised that authority, its actions point to the single-entity approach as the better answer. To the extent the Government disagrees, it may amend its regulations to provide for a different one. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,26 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), as in effect between 1983 and 1986, the tax years here in question. If, for example, a company had $100 in taxable income, $50 in deductible PLEs, and $75 in additional deductions, its NOL would be $25 (i e., $100 — $50—$75= —$25); it could count only $25 of its $50 in PLEs as PLL. If the company had $100 in income] $50 in PLEs, and $125 in additional deductions, its NOL would he $75, and it could count its entire $50 in PLEs as PLL. And, finally, if the company had $100 in income, $50 in PLEs, and $40 in additional deductions, it would have positive income and, thus, no NOL and no PLL. ¡. Unless otherwise noted, Treasury Regulation references are to the regulations in effect between 1983 and 1986, 26 CFR § 1.1502-11 et seq. (1982-1986). Axelrod & Blank, The Supreme Court, Consolidated Returns, and 10-Year Carrybacks, 90 Tax Notes, No. 10, p. 1383 (Mar. 5,2001) (hereinafter Axelrod & Blank). Ibid. Intermet involved “specified liability losses” (SLLs), not PLLs. The difference, however, does not matter. The PLL was a statutory predecessor to the SLL, and PLLs were folded into the SLL provision in § 11811(b)(1) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 1388-532. Thus, “[i]n all relevant respects, the provisions on [PLLs] and SLLs are the same.” Leatherman, Current Developments for Consolidated Groups, 486 PLI/Tax 389,393, n. 5 (2000) (hereinafter Leatherman, Current Developments). In addition to Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-79(a)(3), discussed infra, at 832-834, two other provisions, 26 U. S.C. § 1508(f)(2) and the current version (though not the version applicable between 1983 and 1986) of Treas. Reg. § 1502-21(b) (2000), refer to separate group members’ NOLs. The parties here have not emphasized those provisions, and with good reason. Not only are they inapplicable to the question before us (either substantively, temporally, or both), but, as one commentator has observed, their references to separate NOLs “ste[m] more from careless drafting than meaningful design.” Leatherman, Are Separate Liability Losses Separate for Consolidated Groups?, 52 Tax. Law. 663, 705 (1999) (hereinafter Leather-man, Separate Liability Losses). It makes no difference whatsoever whether the affiliate’s PLEs are (1) first netted against each member's income and then aggregated or (2) first aggregated and then netted against the group’s combined income: under either method, AMCA’s CNOL is the same. See Axelrod & Blank 1394 (noting that this conclusion follows from "the associative principle of arithmetic (which holds that the groupings of items in the case of addition and subtraction have no effect on the result)”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. SLATER, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, et al. No. 99-295. Decided January 12, 2000 Per Curiam. I Congress has adopted a policy that favors contracting with small businesses owned and controlled by the socially and economically disadvantaged. See § 8(d)(1) of the Small Business Act, as added by §7 of Pub. L. 87-305,75 Stat. 667, and as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 637(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. IV). To effectuate that policy, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), Pub. L. 102-240, § 1003(b), 105 Stat. 1919, which is an appropriations measure for the Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to direct 10 percent of the contracting funds expended on projects funded in whole or in part by the appropriated funds to transportation projects employing so-called disadvantaged business enterprises. ISTEA § 1003(b)(1). To qualify for that status, the small business must be certified as owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. DOT does not itself conduct certifications, but relies on certifications from two main sources: the Small Business Administration, which certifies businesses for all types of federal procurement programs, and state highway agencies, which certify them for purposes of federally assisted highway projects. The federal regulations governing these certification programs, see 13 CFR pt. 124 (1999) (Small Business Administration); 64 Fed. Reg. 5096-5148 (1999) (to be codified in 49 CFR pt. 26) (DOT for state highway agencies), require that the certifying entity presume to be socially disadvantaged persons who are black, Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, Native Americans, or members of other groups designated from time to time by the Small Business Administration. See 13 CFR § 124.103(b); 64 Fed. Reg. 5136 (§26.67). State highway agencies must in addition presume that women are socially disadvantaged. Ibid. Small businesses owned and controlled by persons who are not members of the preferred groups may also be certified, but only if they can demonstrate social disadvantage. See 13 CFR § 124.103(c); 64 Fed. Reg. 5136-5137 (§ 26.67(d)); id., at 5147-5148 (pt. 26, subpt. D, App. E). Third parties, as well as DOT, may challenge findings of social disadvantage. See 13 CFR § 124.1017(a); 64 Fed. Reg. 5142 (§26.87). II In 1989, DOT awarded the prime contract for a federal highway project in Colorado to Mountain Gravel & Construction Company. The contract included a Subcontractor Compensation Clause — which the Small Business Act requires all federal agencies to include in their prime contracts, see 15 U. S. C. § 637(d) — rewarding the prime contractor for subcontracting with disadvantaged business enterprises, see § 637(d)(4)(E). Petitioner, whose principal is a white man, submitted the low bid on a portion of the project, but Mountain Gravel awarded the subcontract to a company that had previously been certified by the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) as a disadvantaged business enterprise. Petitioner brought suit against various federal officials, alleging that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause, and in particular the race-based presumption that forms its foundation, violated petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to equal protection. The Tenth Circuit, applying the so-called intermediate scrutiny approved in some of our cases involving classifications on a basis other than race, see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976), upheld the use of the clause and the presumption. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 16 F. 3d 1537 (1994). Because DOT’S use of race-based measures should have been subjected to strict scrutiny, we reversed and remanded for the application of that standard. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 237-239 (1995) (Adarand I). On remand, the District Court for the District of Colorado held that the clause and the presumption failed strict scrutiny because they were not narrowly tailored. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (1997) (Adarand II). Specifically, the court held the presumption that members of the enumerated racial groups are socially disadvantaged to be both overinelusive and underinclusive, because it includes members of those groups who are not disadvantaged and excludes members of other groups who are. Id., at 1580. The District Court enjoined DOT from using the elause and its presumption. Id., at 1584. Respondents appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Shortly thereafter, and while respondents’ appeal was still pending, petitioner filed a second suit in the District Court, this time naming as defendants certain Colorado officials, and challenging (on the same grounds) the State’s use of the federal guidelines in certifying disadvantaged business enterprises for federally assisted projects. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Romer, Civ. No. 97-K-1351 (June 26, 1997). Shortly after this suit was filed, however, Colorado altered its certification program in response to the District Court's decision in Adarand II. Specifically, the State did away with the presumption of social disadvantage for certain minorities and women, App. to Pet. for Cert. 109-111, and in its place substituted a requirement that all applicants certify on their own account that each of the firm’s majority owners “has experienced social disadvantage based upon the effects of racial, ethnic or gender discrimination,” id., at 110. Colorado requires no further showing of social disadvantage by any applicant. A few days after Colorado amended its certification procedure, the District Court held a hearing on petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction in Romer. The District Court took judicial notice of its holding in Adarand II that the Federal Government had discriminated against petitioner’s owner “by the application of unconstitutional rules and regulations.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 136. As a result of that race-based discrimination, the District Court reasoned, petitioner likely was eligible for disadvantaged business status under Colorado’s system for certifying businesses for federally assisted projects — the system at issue in Romer. App. to Pet. for Cert. 137. The District Court therefore denied petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction. Id., at 138. Petitioner then requested and received disadvantaged business status from CDOT. Meanwhile, respondents’ appeal from the District Court’s decision in Adamnd II was pending before the Tenth Circuit. Upon learning that CDOT had given petitioner disadvantaged business status, the Tenth Circuit held that the cause of action was moot, and vacated the District Court’s judgment favorable to petitioner in Adarand II. 169 F. 3d 1292, 1296-1297, 1299 (CA10 1999). Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. Ill In dismissing the ease as moot, the Tenth Circuit relied on the language of the Subcontractor Compensation Clause, which provides that “[a] small business concern will be considered a [disadvantaged business enterprise] after it has been certified as such by . . . any State’s Department of Highways/Transportation.” Id., at 1296. Because CDOT had certified petitioner as a disadvantaged business enterprise, the court reasoned, the language of the clause indicated that the Federal Government also had accepted petitioner’s certification for purposes of federal projects. As a result, petitioner could no longer demonstrate “ ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is sufficiently ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent’” to establish standing. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 64 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992)). Because, the court continued, petitioner could not demonstrate such an invasion, its cause of action was moot. 169 F. 3d, at 1296-1297. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit “confused mootness with standing,” Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., ante, at 189, and as a result placed the burden of proof on the wrong party. If this case is moot, it is because the Federal Government has accepted CDOT’s certification of petitioner as a disadvantaged business enterprise, and has thereby eeased its offending conduct. Voluntary cessation of challenged conduct moots a ease, however, only if it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc., 393 U. S. 199, 203 (1968) (emphasis added). And the “ ‘heavy burden of persua[ding]’ the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting mootness.” Friends of Earth, ante, at 189 (emphasis added) (quoting Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., supra, at 203). Because respondents cannot satisfy this burden, the Tenth Circuit’s error was a crucial one. As common sense would suggest, and as the Tenth Circuit itself recognized, DOT accepts only “valid certification[s]” from state agencies. 169 F. 3d, at 1298. As respondents concede, however, see Brief in Opposition 13-14, n. 6, DOT has yet to approve — as it must—CDOT’s procedure for certifying disadvantaged business enterprises, see 64 Fed. Reg. 5129 (1999) (49 CFR § 26.21(b)(1)) (“[The State] must submit a [disadvantaged business enterprise] program conforming to this part by August 31, 1999 to the concerned operating administration”). DOT has promulgated regulations outlining the procedure state highway agencies must follow in certifying firms as disadvantaged business enterprises. See 64 Fed. Reg. 5096-5148 (pt. 26). As described earlier, those regulations require the agency to presume that “women, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, Subcontinent Asian Americans, or other minorities found to be disadvantaged by the [Small Business Administration]” are socially disadvantaged. Id., at 5136 (§ 26.67(a)(1)). Before individuals not members of those groups may be certified, the state agency must make individual determinations as to disadvantage. See id., at 5136-5137 (§ 26.67(d)) (“In such a proceeding, the applicant firm has the burden of demonstrating to [the state highway-agency], by a preponderance of the evidence, that the individuals who own and control it are socially and economically disadvantaged”); id., at 5147-5148 (pt. 26, subpt. D, App. E) (providing list of “elements” that highway agencies must consider in making individualized determinations of social disadvantage). CDOT’s new procedure under which petitioner was certified applies no presumption in favor of minority groups, and accepts without investigation a firm’s self-certification of entitlement to disadvantaged business status. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 109-111. Given the material differences (not to say incompatibility) between that procedure and the requirements of the DOT regulations, it is not at all clear that CDOT’s certification is a “valid certification,” and hence not at all clear that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause requires its acceptance. Before the Tenth Circuit, respondents took pains to “ex-presé] no opinion regarding the correctness of Colorado’s determination that [petitioner] is entitled to [disadvantaged business] status.” Motion by the Federal Appellants to Dismiss Appeal as Moot and to Vacate the District Court Judgment in No. 97-1304, p. 3, n. 2. Instead, they stated flatly that “in the event there is a third-party challenge to [petitioner’s] certification as a [disadvantaged business enterprise] and the decision on the challenge is appealed to DOT, DOT may review the decision to determine whether the certification was proper.” Id., at 3-4, n. 2. In addition, DOT itself has the power to require States to initiate proceedings to withdraw a firm’s disadvantaged status if there is “reasonable cause to believe” that the firm “does not meet the eligibility criteria” set forth in the federal regulations. 64 Fed. Reg. 5142 (§ 26.87(e)(1)). Given the patent incompatibility of the certification with the federal regulations, it is far from clear that these possibilities will not become reality. Indeed, challenges to petitioner’s disadvantaged business status seem quite probable now that the Tenth Circuit, by vacating Adarand II, has eliminated the sole basis for petitioner’s certification in the first place. The Tenth Circuit dismissed these possibilities as insufficiently particular and concrete to grant standing and therefore “too conjectural and speculative to avoid a finding of mootness.” 169 F. 3d, at 1298 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we recently noted in Friends of the Earth, however, “[t]he plain lesson of [our precedents] is that there are circumstances in which the prospect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.” Ante, at 190. Because, under the circumstances of this case, it is impossible to conclude that respondents have borne their burden of establishing that it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,” ante, at 189, petitioner’s cause of action remains alive. * * * It is no small matter to deprive a litigant of the rewards of its efforts, particularly in a case that has been litigated up to this Court and back down again. Such action on grounds of mootness would be justified only if it were absolutely clear that the litigant no longer had any need of the judicial protection that it sought. Because that is not the case here, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Congress recently enacted the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. 105-178, Tit. I, § 1101(b), 112 Stat. 113, the successor appropriations measure to ISTEA. Although the new Act contains similar provisions, it is technically the provisions of ISTEA that apply to funding obligated in prior fiscal years but not yet expended. Before the Tenth Circuit, the parties disagreed as to whether the scope of the District Court’s remedial order was appropriate. In characterizing that order as we do here, we do not intend to take a position in that dispute.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TALK AMERICA, INC. v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE CO., dba AT&T MICHIGAN No. 10-313. Argued March 30, 2011 Decided June 9, 2011 John J. Bursch, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs in No. 10-329 were Bill Schuette, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, Steven D. Hughey, and Anne M. Uitvlugt, Assistant Attorney General. On the briefs in No. 10-313 was Susan C. Gentz. Eric D. Miller argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Katyal, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Austin C. Schlick, Richard K. Welch, and Maureen K. Flood. Scott H. Angstreich argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Brendan J. Crim-mins, Scott K. Attaway, Gary L. Phillips, Christopher M. Hermann, John T. Lenahan, Mark R, Ortlieb, and Cynthia F. Malone. Together with No. 10-329, Isiogu et al. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., dba AT&T Michigan, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the California Public Utilities Commission by Frank R. Lindh, Helen M. Michiewicz, and Laura E. Gasser; for COMPTEL by Mary C. Albert; and for Sprint Nextel Corp. by Kannon K. Shanmugam and George W. Hicks, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for Administrative Law Professors by G. Frederick Beckner III; for Century-Link, Inc., et al. by John M. Devaney, Robert B. McKenna, and John E. Benedict; for United States Telecom Association et al. by Megan L. Brown, Bennett L. Ross, and Jonathan B. Banks; and for Verizon by Heather M. Zachary and Michael E. Glover. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In these cases, we consider whether an incumbent provider of local telephone service must make certain transmission facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission), as amicus curiae contends that its regulations require the incumbent provider to do so if the facilities are to be used for interconnection: to link the incumbent provider’s telephone network with the competitor’s network for the mutual exchange of traffic. We defer to the Commission’s views and reverse the judgment below. I The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), 110 Stat. 56, imposed a number of duties on incumbent providers of local telephone service in order to facilitate market entry by competitors. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 371 (1999). The incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) owned the local exchange networks: the physical equipment necessary to receive, properly route, and deliver phone calls among customers. Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 490 (2002). Before the 1996 Act, a new, competitive LEC could not compete with an incumbent carrier without basically replicating the incumbent’s entire existing network. Ibid. The 1996 Act addressed that barrier to market entry by requiring incumbent LECs to share their networks with competitive LECs in several ways, two of which are relevant here. First, 47 U. S. C. § 251(c)(3) requires incumbent LECs to lease “on an unbundled basis” — i. e., a la carte — network elements specified by the Commission. This makes it easier for a competitor to create its own network without having to build every element from scratch. In identifying which network elements must be available for unbundled lease under § 251(c)(3), the Commission is required to consider whether access is “necessary” and whether failing to provide access would “impair” a competitor’s provision of service. § 251(d)(2). Second, § 251(c)(2) mandates that incumbent LECs “provide ... interconnection” between their networks and competitive LECs’ facilities. This ensures that customers on a competitor’s network can call customers on the incumbent’s network, and vice versa. The interconnection duty is independent of the unbundling rules and not subject to impairment analysis. It is undisputed that both unbundled network elements and interconnection must be provided at cost-based rates. See § 252(d)(1); Brief for Petitioner in No. 10-313, p. 28; Brief for Petitioners in No. 10-329, p. 7; Brief for Respondent 4. These cases concern incumbent LECs’ obligation to share existing “entrance facilities” with competitive LECs. Entrance facilities are the transmission facilities (typically wires or cables) that connect competitive LECs’ networks with incumbent LECs’ networks. The FCC recently adopted a regulation specifying that entrance facilities are not among the network elements that § 251(c)(3) requires incumbents to lease to competitors on an unbundled basis at cost-based rates. See 47 CFR §51.319(e)(2)(i) (2005). The Commission noted, however, that it “d[id] not alter the right of competitive LECs to obtain interconnection facilities pursuant to section 251(e)(2).” In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 20 FCC Red. 2533, 2611, ¶ 140 (2005) (Triennial Review Remand Order). The specific issue here is whether respondent, Michigan Bell Telephone Company, d/b/a AT&T Michigan (AT&T), must lease existing entrance facilities to competitive LECs at cost-based rates. The FCC interprets its regulations to require AT&T to do so for the purpose of interconnection. We begin by reviewing the Commission’s recent actions regarding entrance facilities and then explain the particular dispute that is before us today. A In 2003, the FCC decided, contrary to its previous orders, that incumbent LECs were not obligated to provide cost-based unbundled access to entrance facilities under § 251(c)(3). In re Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 18 FCC Red. 16978, 17202-17205, ¶¶ 365-367 (2003) (Triennial Review Order). Explaining that its previous approach had been “misguided” and “overly broad,” id., ¶¶ 366, 365, the Commission concluded that entrance facilities were not subject to the unbundling requirement because they are not network elements at all. See id., ¶ 366 (entrance facilities “exist outside the incumbent LEC’s local network”). The Commission therefore did not conduct an impairment analysis. The FCC emphasized, however, the limits of this ruling. Entrance facilities are used for two purposes: interconnection and baekhauling. It expressly “d[id] not alter” an incumbent LEC’s obligation under § 251(c)(2) to provide “facilities in order to ‘interconnect with the incumbent LEC’s network.’” Id., ¶366 (brackets omitted). Thus, although the Commission specified that § 251(c)(3) did not require any unbundled leasing of entrance facilities, it determined in practical effect only that “incumbent LECs [were not obligated] to unbundle [entrance facilities] for the purpose of baekhauling traffic.” Id., ¶ 365. On direct review, the D. C. Circuit questioned the Commission’s determination that entrance facilities are not network elements under § 251(c)(3), but found the agency rulemaking record insufficient and remanded to the Commission for further consideration. See United States Telecom Assn. v. FCC, 359 F. 3d 554, 586, cert, denied, 543 U. S. 925 (2004). The court noted that if entrance facilities were in fact “ ‘network elements,’ ” then “an analysis of impairment would presumably follow.” 359 F. 3d, at 586. In 2005, the Commission responded. See Triennial Review Remand Order ¶ ¶ 136-141. The Commission retreated from its view that entrance facilities are not network elements but adhered to its previous position that cost-based unbundled access to them need not be provided under § 251(c)(3). Id., ¶¶ 137-138. Treating entrance facilities as network elements, the Commission concluded that competitive LECs are not impaired without access to them. Ibid. The Commission again emphasized that it “d[id] not alter the right of competitive LECs to obtain interconnection facilities pursuant to section 251(c)(2).” Id., ¶ 140. B In the wake of the Triennial Review Remand Order, AT&T notified competitive LECs that it would no longer provide entrance facilities at cost-based rates for either back-hauling or interconnection, but would instead charge higher rates. Competitive LECs complained to the Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) that AT&T was unlawfully abrogating their right to cost-based interconnection under § 251(c)(2). The Michigan PSC agreed with the competitive LECs and ordered AT&T to continue providing entrance facilities for interconnection at cost-based rates. AT&T challenged the Michigan PSC’s ruling in the District Court, which, relying on the Triennial Review Remand Order, ruled in AT&T’s favor. The Michigan PSC and several competitive LECs, including petitioner Talk America, Inc., appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed over a dissent. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Covad Communications Co., 597 F. 3d 370 (2010). At the court’s invitation, the FCC filed a brief as amicus curiae, arguing that the Triennial Review Remand Order did not change incumbent LECs’ interconnection obligations, including the obligation to lease entrance facilities for interconnection. The Sixth Circuit declined to defer to the FCC’s views, 597 F. 3d, at 375, n. 6, and also expressly disagreed with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, id., at 384-386 (discussing Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Box, 526 F. 3d 1069 (2008), and Southwestern Bell Tel., L. P. v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 530 F. 3d 676 (2008)). We granted certiorari, 562 U. S. 1104 (2010), and now reverse. II Petitioners contend that AT&T must lease its existing entrance facilities for interconnection at cost-based rates. We agree. A No statute or regulation squarely addresses whether an incumbent LEC must provide access to entrance facilities at cost-based rates as part of its interconnection duty under § 251(e)(2). According to the statute, each incumbent LEC has: “The duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier’s network— “(A) for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access; “(B) at any technically feasible point within the carrier’s network; “(C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other party to which the carrier provides interconnection; and “(D) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252 of this title.” Nothing in that language expressly addresses entrance facilities. Nor does any regulation do so. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22, n. 6. AT&T contends that the statute makes clear that an incumbent LEC need not provide access to any facilities— much less entrance facilities — to provide interconnection. The company points out that § 251(c)(2) does not mention incumbent LECs’ facilities, but rather mandates only that incumbent LECs provide interconnection “for the facilities and equipment of any [competing] carrier.” In contrast, AT&T notes, § 251(e)(3) requires that incumbent LECs provide unbundled “access to [their] network elements.” We do not find the statute so clear. Although § 251(c)(2) does not expressly require that incumbent LECs lease facilities to provide interconnection, it also does not expressly excuse them from doing so. The statute says nothing about what an incumbent LEC must do to “provide . . . interconnection.” § 251(c)(2). “[T]he facilities and equipment of any [competing] carrier” identifies the equipment that an incumbent LEC must allow to interconnect, but it does not specify what the incumbent LEC must do to make the interconnection possible. Ibid. B In the absence of any unambiguous statute or regulation, we turn to the FCC’s interpretation of its regulations in its amicus brief. See, e. g., Chase Bank USA, N. A. v. McCoy, 562 U. S. 195, 207 (2011). As we reaffirmed earlier this Term, we defer to an agency's interpretation of its regulations, even in a legal brief, unless the interpretation is “ ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[]’ ” or there is any other “ ‘reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.’” Id., at 208, 209 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461, 462 (1997)). The Commission contends that its regulations require AT&T to provide access at cost-based rates to its existing entrance facilities for the purpose of interconnection. The Commission’s interpretation proceeds in three steps. First, an incumbent LEC must lease “technically feasible” facilities for interconnection. Second, entrance facilities are among the facilities that an incumbent must make available for interconnection, if technically feasible. Third, it is technically feasible to provide access to the particular entrance facilities at issue in these cases. 1 The Commission first contends that an incumbent LEC must lease, at cost-based rates, any requested facilities for obtaining interconnection with the incumbent LEC’s network, unless it is technically infeasible to do so. Section 251(c)(2) mandates that an incumbent LEC provide interconnection, at cost-based rates, “at any technically feasible point within the carrier’s network.” The FCC has long construed § 251(c)(2) to require incumbent LECs to provide, at cost-based rates, “any technically feasible method of obtaining interconnection ... at a particular point.” 47 CFR § 51.321(a) (2010). The requirement in § 51.321(a) to provide a “method of obtaining interconnection,” the Commission argues, encompasses a duty to lease an existing facility to a competing LEC. When the Commission originally promulgated § 51.321(a), it explained that incumbent LECs would be required to “adapt their facilities to interconnection” and to “accept the novel use of, and modification to, [their] network facilities.” In re Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Red. 15499, 15605, ¶ 202 (1996) (Local Competition Order). Since then, as AT&T and its amici concede, incumbent LECs have commonly leased certain facilities at cost-based prices to accommodate interconnection. See Brief for Respondent 28-29; Brief for United States Telecom Association et al. as Amici Curiae 33-35. As additional support for its assertion that incumbent LECs are obligated to lease facilities, the FCC highlights the examples in § 51.321(b) of “[t]echnically feasible methods of obtaining interconnection,” which include “[m]eet point interconnection arrangements.” In a meet-point arrangement, an incumbent LEC “accommodat[es]” interconnection by building a transmission facility from its network to a designated point, where it connects with the competitor's corresponding transmission facility. Local Competition Order ¶ 553. Compared to that requirement, the Commission argues, the obligation to lease existing facilities for interconnection is quite modest. 2 Next, the Commission contends that existing entrance facilities are among the facilities that an incumbent LEC must lease for interconnection. According to the FCC, the Triennial Review Remand Order adopted a regulatory definition that reestablished that entrance facilities are part of an incumbent LEC’s network. See ¶ 137; see also 47 CFR § 51.319(e). The end of every entrance facility is therefore a “point within [an incumbent] carrier’s network” at which a competing LEC could request interconnection, 47 U. S. C. § 251(c)(2), and each entrance, facility potentially provides a “technically feasible method of obtaining interconnection,” 47 CFR § 51.321(a). 3 Finally, the FCC contends that providing access to the entrance facilities here for interconnection purposes is technically feasible. Under the Commission’s regulations, an incumbent LEC bears the burden of showing that a requested method or point of interconnection is technically infeasible. See 47 CFR §§ 51.305(e), 51.321(d); see also §§ 51.305(d), 51.321(e) (previously successful interconnection is “substantial evidence” of technical feasibility). AT&T does not dispute technical feasibility here. C The FCC’s interpretation is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s].” Auer, supra, at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted). First, we disagree with AT&T’s argument that entrance facilities are not a part of incumbent LECs’ networks. Indeed, the Commission’s view on this question is more than reasonable; it is certainly not plainly erroneous. The Triennial Review Remand Order responded to the D. C. Circuit’s decision questioning the Commission’s earlier finding that entrance facilities are not network elements. It revised the definition of dedicated transport — a type of network element — to include entrance facilities. Triennial Review Remand Order ¶¶ 136-137; see 47 CFR § 51.319(e)(1) (defining dedicated transport to include “incumbent LEC transmission facilities . . . between wire centers or switches owned by incumbent LECs and switches owned by [competing] carriers”). Given that revised definition, it is perfectly sensible to conclude that entrance facilities are a part of incumbent LECs’ networks. Second, we are not persuaded by AT&T’s argument that the Commission’s views conflict with the definition of interconnection in §51.5. That regulation provides: “Interconnection is the linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic. This term does not include the transport and termination of traffic.” AT&T focuses on the definition’s exclusion of “transport and termination of traffic.” An entrance facility is a transport facility, AT&T argues, and it makes no sense to require an incumbent LEC to furnish a transport facility for interconnection when the definition of interconnection expressly excludes transport. We think AT&T reads too much into the exclusion of “transport.” The regulation cannot possibly mean that no transport can occur across an interconnection facility, as that would directly conflict with the statutory language. See § 251(c)(2) (requiring “interconnection ... for the transmission and routing of [local] telephone exchange service”). The very reason for interconnection is the “mutual exchange of traffic.” 47 CFR § 51.5; see also Competitive Telecommunications Assn. v. FCC, 117 F. 3d 1068, 1071-1072 (CA8 1997) (“[T]he transmission and routing of telephone exchange service” is “what the interconnection, the physical link, would be used for” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The better reading of the regulation is that it merely reflects that the “transport and termination of traffic” is subject to different regulatory treatment than interconnection. Compensation for transport and termination — that is, for delivering local telephone calls placed by another carrier’s customer — is governed by separate statutory provisions and regulations. See 47 U. S. C. §§ 251(b)(5), 252(d)(2); 47 CFR § 51.701. The Commission explains that a competitive LEC typically pays one fee for interconnection — “just for having the link” — and then an additional fee for the transport and termination of telephone calls. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3, n. 1. Entrance facilities, at least when used for the mutual exchange of traffic, seem to us to fall comfortably within the definition of interconnection. See 597 F. 3d, at 388 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (noting that entrance facilities are “designed for the very purpose of linking two carriers’ networks” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In sum, the Commission’s interpretation of its regulations is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulatory text. Contrary to AT&T’s assertion, there is no danger that deferring to the Commission would effectively “permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create defacto a new regulation.” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 588 (2000). D Nor is there any other “reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.” Auer, 519 U. S., at 462. We are not faced with a post-hoc rationalization by Commission counsel of agency action that is under judicial review. See ibid.; see also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962) (“The courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action; [SEC v.] Chenery [Corp., 332 U. S. 194 (1947),] requires that an agency’s discretionary order be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself”). And although the FCC concedes that it is advancing a novel interpretation of its longstanding interconnection regulations, novelty alone is not a reason to refuse deference. The Commission explains that the issue in these eases did not arise until recently — when it initially eliminated unbundled access to entrance facilities in the Triennial Review Order. Until then, the Commission says, a competitive LEC typically would elect to lease a cost-priced entrance facility under § 251(c)(3) since entrance facilities leased under § 251(c)(3) could be used for any purpose — i. e., both interconnection and backhauling — but entrance facilities leased under § 251(c)(2) can be used only for interconnection. We see no reason to doubt this explanation. AT&T suggests that the Commission is attempting to require under § 251(c)(2) what courts have prevented it from requiring under § 251(c)(3) and what the Commission itself said was not required in the Triennial Review Remand Order. Tr. of Oral Arg. 50 (“[T]his is a rear guard effort to preserve [cost-based] pricing for things that the [Commission has said should no longer be available ... at [such] pricing”). We do not think that AT&T is correct. 1 To begin with, AT&T’s accusation does not square with the regulatory history. The Commission was not compelled to eliminate the obligation to lease unbundled entrance facilities at cost-based rates. It is true that, prior to the Triennial Review orders, the Commission twice unsuccessfully attempted to impose sweeping unbundling requirements on incumbent LECs. See Local Competition Order ¶ 278; In re Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Red. 3696, 8771-3904, ¶¶ 162-464 (1999); see also 47 CFR § 51.319 (1997); § 51.319 (2000). Each time, the Commission’s efforts were rejected for taking an unreasonably broad view of “impair[ment]” under § 251(d)(2). See Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S., at 392; United States Telecom Assn. v. FCC, 290 F. 3d 415, 421-428 (CADC 2002), cert, denied, 538 U. S. 940 (2003). In the Triennial Review Order, the Commission once again reinterpreted the “impair” standard and revised the list of network elements that incumbents must provide unbundled to competitors. The Commission’s initial decision to eliminate the obligation to unbundle entrance facilities, however, was not a result of the narrower view of impairment mandated by this Court and the D. C. Circuit. Instead, the Commission determined that entrance facilities need not be provided on an unbundled basis under § 251(c)(3) on the novel ground that they are not network elements at all — something no court had ever suggested. Moreover, since its initial decision to eliminate the un-bundling obligation for entrance facilities, the Commission has been committed to that position. When the D. C. Circuit questioned the Commission’s finding that entrance facilities are not network elements, the Commission responded by observing that the court “did not reject our conclusion that incumbent LECs need not unbundle entrance facilities, only the analysis through which we reached that conclusion.” Triennial Review Remand Order ¶ 137. The Commission then found another way to support that same conclusion. 2 More importantly, AT&T’s characterization of what the Commission has done, and is doing, is inaccurate. The Tri ennial Review orders eliminated incumbent LECs’ obligation under § 251(c)(3) to provide unbundled access to entrance facilities. But the FCC emphasized in both orders that it “d[id] not alter” the obligation on incumbent LECs under § 251(c)(2) to provide facilities for interconnection purposes. Triennial Review Order ¶366; Triennial Review Remand Order ¶ 140. Because entrance facilities are used for backhauling and interconnection purposes, the FCC effectively eliminated only unbundled access to entrance facilities for backhauling purposes — a nuance it expressly noted in the first Triennial Review order. Triennial Review Order ¶ 365. That distinction is neither unusual nor ambiguous. In these cases, the Commission is simply explaining the interconnection obligation that it left undisturbed in the Triennial Review orders. We see no conflict between the Triennial Review orders and the Commission’s views expressed here. We are not concerned that the Triennial Review Remand Order did not expressly distinguish between backhauling and interconnection, though AT&T makes much of that fact. AT&T argues that the Commission’s holding in the Triennial Review Remand Order is broader than that in the Triennial Review Order. In AT&T’s view, the Commission concluded in the Triennial Review Remand Order that competitors are not impaired if they lack cost-based access to entrance facilities for backhauling or interconnection. There are two flaws with AT&T’s reasoning. First, as we have discussed, the Triennial Review Remand Order reinstated the ultimate conclusion of the Triennial Review Order and changed only “the analysis through which [it] reached that conclusion.” Triennial Review Remand Order ¶ 137. Second, unlike §251(c)(3)’s unbundling obligation, § 251(c)(2)’s interconnection obligation does not require the Commission to consider impairment. As the dissent below observed, it would be surprising indeed if the FCC had taken the novel step of incorporating impairment into interconnection without comment. 597 F. 3d, at 389 (opinion of Sutton, J.). * * * The FCC as amicus curiae has advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, and we defer to its views. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. The Solicitor General, joined by counsel for the FCC, represents that the amicus brief for the United States filed in this Court reflects the Commission’s considered interpretation of its own rules and orders. Brief for United States 31. We thus refer to the Government’s arguments in these cases as those of the agency. See, e. g., Chase Bank USA, N. A. v. McCoy, 562 U. S. 195, 203 (2011). Although the parties and their amici disagree over the precise definition of baekhauling, they all appear to agree that baekhauling is important to competitive LECs and occurs when a competitive LEC uses an entrance facility to transport traffic from a leased portion of an incumbent network to the competitor’s own facilities. Baekhauling does not involve the exchange of traffic between incumbent and competitive networks. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioners in No. 10-329, p. 25; Brief for United States Telecom Association et al. as Amici Curiae 82. It thus differs from interconnection — “the linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic.” 47 CFR §51.5 (2010). The Ninth Circuit has since joined the Seventh and Eighth Circuits. Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. California Pub. Util. Comm’n, 621F. 3d 836 (2010). These eases concern only existing entrance facilities, and the Commission expressly declines to address whether it reads its regulations to require incumbent LECs to build new entrance facilities for interconnection. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25, n. 7. The Commission suggests here, as it has before, that additional considerations of cost or reasonableness might be appropriate if a competitive LEC were to request that an incumbent LEC build new entrance facilities for interconnection. Ibid, (noting that the Commission’s Wireline Competition Bureau has declined to require an incumbent LEC to bear the entire cost of building new entrance facilities); see also Local Competition Order ¶ 553 (explaining with respect to meet-point arrangements that “the parties and state commissions are in a better position than the Commission to determine the appropriate distance that would constitute the required reasonable accommodation of interconnection”). We express no view on the matter. There is no merit to AT&T’s assertion that the FCC is improperly amending the list of “[t]echnically feasible methods of obtaining interconnection” set forth in 47 CFR § 51.321(b). By its own terms, that list is nonexhaustive. See § 51.321(b) (“[technically feasible methods of obtaining interconnection . . . include, but are not limited to,” the listed examples); see also § 51.321(a) (“[A]n incumbent LEC shall provide . . . any technically feasible method of obtaining interconnection” (emphasis added)). The Commission has long recognized that a single facility can be used for different functions and that its regulatory treatment can vary depending on its use. Unbundled network elements, for example, may not be used for the exclusive provision of mobile wireless or long-distance services. 47 CFR § 51.309(b) (2010). Similarly, interconnection arrangements may be used for local telephone service but not for long-distance services. § 51.305(b). The parties and their amici dispute whether an incumbent LEC has any way of knowing how a competitive LEC is using an entrance facility. This technical factual dispute simply underscores the appropriateness of deferring to the FCC. So long as the Commission is acting within the scope of its delegated authority and in accordance with prescribed procedures, it has greater expertise and stands in a better position than this Court to make the technical and policy judgments necessary to administer the complex regulatory program at issue here.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HOUSTON INSULATION CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 206. Argued January 19, 1967. Decided April 17, 1967. W. D. Deakins, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 206 and for respondent in No. 413. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent in No. 206 and for petitioner in No. 413. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Arnold Ordman and Dominick L. Manoli. Together with No. 413, National Labor Relations Board v. Houston Insulation Contractors Association, also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of- the Court. These are companion cases to Nos. 110 and 111, National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, and NLRB v. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn., ante, p. 612. A provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the Houston Insulation Contractors Association and Local 22, International. Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, AFL-CIO, provides, in pertinent part, that the employer will not contract out work relating to “the preparation, distribution and application of pipe and boiler coverings.” In No. 206, the Contractors Association seeks review of the dismissal by the National Labor Relations Board, 148 N. L. R. B. 866, affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 357 F. 2d 182, 189, of §8 (b)(4)(B) charges brought against Local 22 because of its activities designed to enforce the agreement. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat. 543. In No. 413, the Board challenges the holding of the Court of Appeals, reversing the Board, that similar conduct by a sister Local 113, designed to protect the work guaranteed to Local 22 by the agreement, violated §8 (b)(4)(B). We granted both petitions and set them for argument with Nos. 110 and 111. We affirm in No. 206 and reverse in No. 413. No. 206: Johns-Manville Company, a member of the Contractors Association, engaged in a construction project in Texas City, Texas, purchased from Techalloy Corporation, a manufacturer of insulation materials, stainless steel bands used to fasten asbestos material around pipes to be insulated. The bands had been pre-cut to specification by Tech alloy’s employees. Customarily, Johns-Manville had ordered rolls of wire which were then cut to size by members of Local 22. The cutting work was reserved for Johns-Manville employee members of Local 22 by the quoted provision of .the collective bargaining agreement between the Association an d the Local. Agents of Local 22 instructed its members on the jobsite not to install the precut bands. After the hearing on the complaint issued on the Contractors Association’s charge that this conduct violated § 8 (b)(4)(B), the Board held that “[t]he conduct complained of herein was taken to protest ... a deprivation of work, its object being to protect or preserve for employees'certain work customarily performed by them. This conduct constituted primary activity and is protected by the Act . . . .” 148 N. L. R. B., at 869. The Court of Appeals found that there was substantial evidence to support this fíñding and sustained it. The Association here attacks the substantiality of the evidence supporting the Board’s finding, but we agree with the Court of Appeals. See Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474. In that circumstance our holding today in National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, supra, requires an affirmance in No. 206. No. 418: Armstrong Company, a member of thé Contractors Association, was engaged in a construction project in Victoria, Texas, within the jurisdiction of Local 113 of the Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers. The cutting and mitering of asbestos fittings for such jobs was customarily performed at Armstrong’s Houston shop, which was within Local 22’s jurisdiction. Armstrong purchased from Thorpe Company, a manufacturer of insulation materials, asbestos 'fittings upon which the cutting and mitering work had already been performed. Agents of Local 113 informed Armstrong that fittings would not be installed unless the cutting and mitering had been performed by its sister Local 22 as provided by Local 22’s bargaining agreement. The Board found, as it had in No. 206, that the object of this refusal was primary — the preservation of work customarily performed by Armstrong’s own employees. 148 N. L. R. B., at 869. - The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground tha,t Local 113 “had no economic interest in Local 22’s claim of breach of contract,” and that therefore “it was coercing Armstrong not for its own benefit but for the benefit of another local at the expense of a neutral employer.” 357 F. 2d, at 189. We disagree. . National Woodwork 'Mfrs., supra, holds that collective activity by employees of the primary employer, the object of which is to affect the labor policies of that primary employer, and not engaged in for its effect elsewhere, is protected primary activity. “Congress was not concerned to protect primary employers against pressures by disinterested unions, but rather to protect disinterested employers against direct pressures by any union.” The finding of the Board, supported by substantial evidence, was that Local 113’s object was to influence Armstrong in a dispute with Armstrong employees, and not for its effect elsewhere. Primary employees have traditionally been assured the right to take concerted action against their employer to gain the “mutual aid or protection” guaranteed by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, whether or not the resolution of the particular dispute directly affects all of them. As Judge Learned Hand stated in Labor Board v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F. 2d 503, 505-506: “When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike .in his support, they engage in a ‘concerted activity’ for ‘mutual aid or protection/ although the aggrieved workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest know that by their action each one of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the One whom they are all.then helping; and the solidarity so established is ‘mutual aid’ in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.” . A boycott cannot become secondary because engaged in by primary employees not directly affected by the dispute, or because only engaged in by some of the primary employees, and not the entire group. Since that situation does not involve'the employer in a. dispute not his own, his employees’ conduct in support of their fellow employees is not secondary and, therefore, not a violation ■of §8 (b)(4)(B). The judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 206 is affirmed and in No. 413 is reversed. Tt. is so ordered. Mb. Justice Black, Mb. Justice Douglas, Mb. Justice Clark, and Mb. Justice Stewart dissent for the reasons expressed in Mb. Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion in National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn, v, NLRB, ante, p. 650. The Association did not charge the Union with violation of §8(e) (73 Stat. 543), and the .validity of the work-preservation clause was not an issue in the hearing before the Board. But the Board appears to have assumed that the clause was valid in holding that the object of the Union’s conduct pursuant thereto was a primary one of work preservation. The Court of Appeals expressly held, as an aspect’of its finding that § 8(b)(4)(B) was not violated by Local 22’s ’ activities, that the clause was valid. 357 F. 2d, at 188-189. A mitered fitting is described by the president of Thorpe Company as “an insulation item that is used to cover something other than a straight piece of pipe in a pipe line, and this is made by taking standard insulation pipe covering and cutting it on a bias or miter and then gluing it together or sticking it together so that it will conform to the fitting that you are trying to shape it to.” United Association of Journeymen, Local 106 (Columbia-Southern Chemical Corporation), 110 N. L. R. B. 206, 209.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SNOW et ux. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 73-641. Argued April 16, 1974 Decided May 13, 1974 Douglas, J., delivered the opinioh of the Court, in which all Members joined except Stewart, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Burgess L. Doan argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, ■Assistant Attorney General Crampton, Bennet N. Hollander, and Jane M. Edmisten. Charles H. Phillips and Ronald L. Blanc, pro se, filed a brief as amici curiae. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 174(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 174 (a)(1), allows a taxpayer to take as a deduction “experimental expenditures which are paid •or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account.” Petitioner Edwin A. Snow (hereafter petitioner) was disallowed as a deduction his distributive share of the net operating loss of a partnership, Burns Investment Company, for the taxable year 1966. The United States Tax Court sustained the Commissioner, 58 T. C. 585. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 482 F. 2d 1029 (1973). The case is here on a writ of certiorari because of an apparent conflict between that court and the Fourth Circuit in Cleveland v. Commissioner, 297 F. 2d 169 (1961). Petitioner was a limited partner in Burns, having contributed $10,000 for a four-percent interest in Burns. The general partner was one Trott who had previously formed two other limited partnerships, one called Echo, to develop a telephone answering device and the other Courier, to develop an electronic tape recorder. Petitioner had become a-limited partner in each of these other partnerships. Burns .wa^ formed to develop “a special purpose incinerator for the consumer and industrial markets.” Trott was the inventor and had conceived of this idea in 1964 and between then and 1966 had made a number of prototypes. His patent counsel had told him in 1965 that several features of the burner were in his view patentable but in 1966 advised him that the incinerator as a whole had not been sufficiently “reduced to practice” in order to develop it into a marketable product. At that point Trott formed Burris, petitioner putting up part of the capital. Thereafter various models of the burner were built and tested. During 1966 Burns reported no sales of the incinerator or any other product but expectations were high; and Trott was giving about one-third of his time to the project, an outside engineering firm doing the shopwork. Trott obtained a patent on the incinerator in 1970, and it is currently being produced and marketed under the name Trash-Away. Section 174 was enacted in 1954 to dilute some of the conception of “ordinary and necessary” business expenses under § 162 (a) (then § 23 (a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939) adumbrated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion in Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U. S. 488, 499 (1940), where he said that the section in question (old § 23 (a)) “involves holding one’s self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services.” The words “trade or business” appear, however, in about .60 different sections of the 1954 Act. Those other sections are not helpful here because Congress wrote into.§ 174 (a)(1) “in connection with,” and § 162 (a) is more narrowly written than is § 174, allowing “a deduction” of “ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred ... in carrying on any trade or business.” That and other sections are not helpful here. The legislative history makes fairly clear the reasons. Established firms with ongoing business had continuous programs of research quite unlike small or pioneering business enterprises. Mr. Reed of New York, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, made the point even more explicit when he addressed the House on the bill: “Present law contains no statutory provision dealing expressly with the deduction of these expenses. The result has been confusion and uncertainty. Very often, under present law'small businesses which are developing new products and do not have est¿blished research departments are not allowed to deduct these expenses' despite the fact that them large and well-established competitors can obtain the deduction. . . . This, provision will greatly stimulate the' search for new products' and new inventions, upon which the fiiture economic and military strength of our Nation depends.' It will be particularly valuable to small and growing businesses.” (Emphasis added.) Congress may at times in its wisdom discriminate tax-wise between various kinds of business, between old and oncoming businéss and the like. But we would defeat the congressional purpose somewhat to equalize the tax benefits of the ongoing companies and those that are upcoming and about to reach the market by perpetuating the discrimination created below and urged upon us here. We read § 174 as did the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Cleveland “to encourage expenditure for research and experimentation.” 297 F. 2d, at 173. -That incentive is embedded in § 174 because of “in connection with,” making irrelevant whether petitioners-were rich or poor. - We aré invited to explore the treatment of “hobby-losses” under §183. But that is far afield of the present inquiry for it is clear that in this case under § 174 the profit motive was the sole drive of the venture. Reversed. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Both Echo and Courier claimed research and development expenses in 1965 and 1966; and they were not. challenged by the Commissioner, apparently because their products were in a more advanced stage of development and were available for sale or licensing. Treasury Regulation § 1.174-2 (a) (2) provides: “The provisions of this .section apply not only to costs paid or incurred by the taxpayer for research or- experimentation undertaken directly by him but also to expenditures paid or incurred for research or experimentation carried on in his behalf by another person or organization (such as . . . [an] engineering company, or similar contractor). . . .” Prior to 1970 Burns was incorporated and it produces and markets Trasli-Away, petitioner being its Chairman of the Board. Saunders, “Trade or Business,” Its Meaning Under the Internal Revenue Code, U. So. Cal. 12th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 693 (1960). Hearings on H. R. 8300 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 105. 100 Cong. Rec. 3425 (1954).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HARRIS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. ROSARIO et al. No. 79-1294. Decided May 27, 1980 Per Curiam. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., provides federal financial assistance to States and Territories to aid families with needy dependent children. Puerto Rico receives less assistance than do the States, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1308 (a)(1), 1396d (b) (1976 ed. and Supp. II). Appellees, AFDC recipients residing in Puerto Rico, filed this class action against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Secretary of Health and Human Services) in March 1977 in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico; they challenged the constitutionality of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1308 and 1396d (b), claiming successfully that the lower level of AFDC reimbursement provided to Puerto Rico violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. We disagree. Congress, which is empowered under the Territory Clause of the Constitution, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the United States,” may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1 (1978) (per curiam) , we concluded that a similar statutory-classification was rationally grounded on three factors: Puerto Rican residents do not contribute to the federal treasury; the cost of treating Puerto Rico as a State under the statute would be high; and greater benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican economy. These same considerations are forwarded here in support of §§ 1308 and 1396d (b), Juris. Statement 12-14, and we see no reason to depart from our conclusion in Torres that they suffice to form a rational basis for the challenged statutory classification. We reverse. So ordered. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Blackmun, not now being persuaded that the Court’s summary disposition in Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1 (1978), so clearly controls this case, would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument. For example, the Secretary estimates that the additional cost of treating Puerto Rico as a State for AFDC purposes alone would be approximately $30 million per year, and, if the decision below were to apply equally to various other reimbursement programs under the Social Security Act, the total annual cost could exceed $240 million. Juris. Statement 12, n. 13.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

THOMAS v. WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT CO. et al. No. 79-116. Argued March 19, 1980 Decided June 27, 1980 Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, J., joined, post, p. 286. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 290. James F. Green argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Martin E. Gerel, James A. Mannino, and Mark L. Schaffer. Kevin J. Baldwin argued the cause for respondent Washington Gas Light Co. With him on the brief were Lewis Carroll, Carl W. Belcher, Henry F. Krautwurst, and Douglas V. Pope. Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause pro hac vice for the federal respondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Laurie M. Streeter, and Joshua T. Gillelan II. Mr. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined. Petitioner received an award of disability benefits under the Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act. The question presented is whether the obligation of the District of Columbia to give full faith and credit to that award bars a supplemental award under the District’s Workmen’s Compensation Act. Petitioner is a resident of the District of Columbia and was hired in the District of Columbia. During the year that he was employed by respondent, he worked primarily in the District but also worked in Virginia and Maryland. He sustained a back injury while at work in Arlington, Va., on January 22, 1971. Two weeks later he entered into an “Industrial Commission of Virginia Memorandum of Agreement as to Payment of Compensation” providing for benefits of $62 per week. Several weeks later the Virginia Industrial Commission approved the agreement and issued its award directing that payments continue “during incapacity,” subject to various contingencies and changes set forth in the Virginia statute. App. 49. In 1974, petitioner notified the Department of Labor of his intention to seek compensation under the District of Columbia Act. Respondent opposed the claim primarily on the ground that since, as a matter of Virginia law, the Virginia award excluded any other recovery “at common law or otherwise” on account of the injury in Virginia, the District of Columbia’s obligation to give that award full faith and credit precluded a second, supplemental award in the District. The Administrative Law Judge agreed with respondent that the Virginia award must be given res judicata effect in the District to the extent that it was res judicata in Virginia. He held, however, that the Virginia award, by its terms, did not preclude a further award of compensation in Virginia. Moreover, he construed the statutory prohibition against additional recovery “at common law or otherwise” as merely covering “common law and other remedies under Virginia law.” After the taking of medical evidence, petitioner was awarded permanent total disability benefits payable from the date of his injury with a credit for the amounts previously paid under the Virginia award. Id., at 31. The Benefits Review Board upheld the award. 9 BRBS 760 (1978). Its order, however, was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, judgment order reported at 598 F. 2d 617, which squarely held that a “second and separate proceeding in another jurisdiction upon the same injury after a prior recovery in another State [is] precluded by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 962, and now reverse. I Respondent contends that the District of Columbia was without power to award petitioner additional compensation because of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution or, more precisely, because of the federal statute implementing that Clause. An analysis of this contention must begin with two decisions from the 1940’s that are almost directly on point: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, and Industrial Comm’n of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U. S. 622. In Magnolia, a case relied on heavily both by respondent and the Court of Appeals, the employer hired a Louisiana worker in Louisiana. The employee was later injured during the course of his employment in Texas. A tenuous majority held that Louisiana was not permitted to award the injured worker supplementary compensation under the Louisiana Act after he had already obtained a recovery from the Texas Industrial Accident Board: “Respondent was free to pursue his remedy in either state but, having chosen to seek it in Texas, where the award was res judicata, the full faith and credit clause precludes him from again seeking a remedy in Louisiana upon the same grounds.” 320 U. S., at 444. Little more than three years later, the Court severely curtailed the impact of Magnolia,. In McCartin, the employer and the worker both resided in Illinois and entered into an employment contract there for work to be performed in Wisconsin. The employee was injured in the course of that employment. He initially filed a claim with the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin. Prior to this Court’s decision in Magnolia, the Wisconsin Commission informed him that under Wisconsin law, he could proceed under the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act, and then claim compensation under the Wisconsin Act, with credit to be given for any payments made under the Illinois Act. Thereafter, the employer and the employee executed a contract for payment of a specific sum in full settlement of the employee’s right under Illinois law. The contract expressly provided, however, that it would “ 'not affect any rights that applicant may have under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Wisconsin.’ ” 330 U. S., at 624. The employee then obtained a supplemental award from the Wisconsin Industrial Commission; but the Wisconsin state courts vacated it under felt compulsion of the intervening decision in Magnolia. This Court reversed, holding without dissent that Magnolia was not controlling. Although the Court could have relied exclusively on the contract provision reserving the employee’s rights under Wisconsin law to distinguish the case from Magnolia, Mr. Justice Murphy’s opinion provided a significantly different ground for the Court’s holding when it said: “[T]he reservation spells out what we believe to be implicit in [the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation] Act— namely, that an . . . award of the type here involved does not foreclose an additional award under the laws of another state. And in the setting of this case, that fact is of decisive significance.” 330 TJ. S., at 630. Earlier in the opinion, the Court had stated that “[o]nly some unmistakable language by a state legislature or judiciary would warrant our accepting ... a construction” that a workmen’s compensation statute “is designed to preclude any recovery by proceedings brought in another state.” Id., at 627-628. The Illinois statute, which the Court held not to contain the “unmistakable language” required to preclude a supplemental award in Wisconsin, broadly provided: “ ‘No common law or statutory right to recover damages for injury or death sustained by any employe while engaged in the line of his duty as such employe, other than the compensation herein provided, shall be available to any employe who is covered by the provisions of this act, . . Id., at 627. The Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act’s exclusive-remedy provision, see n. 4, supra, is not exactly the same as Illinois’; but it contains no “unmistakable language” directed at precluding a supplemental compensation award in another State that was not also in the Illinois Act. Consequently, McCartin by its terms, rather than the earlier Magnolia decision, is controlling as between the two precedents. Nevertheless, the fact that we find ourselves comparing the language of two state statutes, neither of which has been construed by the highest court of either State, in an attempt to resolve an issue arising under the Full Faith and Credit Clause makes us pause to inquire whether there is a fundamental flaw in our analysis of this federal question. II We cannot fail to observe that, in the Court’s haste to retreat from Magnolia, it fashioned a rule that clashes with normally accepted full faith and credit principles. It has long been the law that “the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced.” Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234, 235 (Marshall, C. J.,). See also Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481, 484 (Story, J.). This rule, if not compelled by the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself, see n. 18, infra, is surely required by 28 U. S. C. § 1738, which provides that the “Acts, records and judicial proceedings ... [of any State] shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of [the] State . . . from which they are taken.” See n. 1, supra. Thus, in effect, by virtue of the full faith and credit obligations of the several States, a State is permitted to determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments; but it may only do so indirectly, by prescribing the effect of its judgments within the State. The McCartin rule, however, focusing as it does on the extraterritorial intent of the rendering State, is fundamentally different. It authorizes a State, by drafting or construing its legislation in “unmistakable language,” directly to determine the extraterritorial effect of its workmen’s compensation awards. An authorization to a state legislature of this character is inconsistent with the rule established in Pacific Em ployers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U. S. 493, 502: “This Court must determine for itself how far the full faith and credit clause compels the qualification or denial of rights asserted under the laws of one state, that of the forum, by the statute of another state.” It follows inescapably that the McCartin “unmistakable language” rule represents an unwarranted delegation to the States of this Court’s responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith and credit questions. The Tull Faith and Credit Clause “is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of, transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation.” Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 355. To vest the power of determining the extraterritorial effect of a State’s own laws and judgments in the State itself risks the very kind of parochial entrenchment on the interests of other States that it was the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and other provisions of Art. IV of the Constitution to prevent. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 424-425. Thus, a re-examination of McCartin’s, “unmistakable language” test reinforces our tentative conclusion that it does not provide an acceptable basis on which to distinguish Magnolia. But if we reject that test, we must decide whether to overrule either Magnolia or McCartin. In making this kind of decision, we must take into account both the practical values served by the doctrine of stare decisis and the principles that inform the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Ill The doctrine of stare decisis imposes a severe burden on the litigant who asks us to disavow one of our precedents. For that doctrine not only plays an important role in orderly adjudication; it also serves the broader societal interests in evenhanded, consistent, and predictable application of legal rules. When rights have been created or modified in reliance on established rules of law, the arguments against their change have special force. It is therefore appropriate to begin the inquiry by considering whether a rule that permits, or a rule that forecloses, successive workmen’s compensation awards is more consistent with settled practice. The answer to this question is pel-lucidly clear. It should first be noted that Magnoliaby only the slimmest majority, see n. 11, supra, effected a dramatic change in the law that had previously prevailed throughout the United States. See Mr. Justice Black’s dissent in Magnolia, 320 U. S., at 457-459, 462. Of greater importance is the fact that as a practical matter the “unmistakable language” rule of construction announced in McCartin left only the narrowest area in which Magnolia could have any further precedential value. For the exclusivity language in the Illinois Act construed in McCartin was typical of most state workmen’s compensation laws. Consequently, it was immediately recognized that Magnolia no longer had any significant practical impact. Moreover, since a state legislature seldom focuses on the extraterritorial effect of its enactments, and since a state court has even less occasion to consider whether an award under its State’s law is intended to preclude a supplemental award under another State’s Workmen’s Compensation Act, the probability that any State would thereafter announce a new rule against supplemental awards in other States was extremely remote. As a matter of fact, subsequent cases in the state courts have overwhelmingly followed McCartin and permitted successive state workmen’s compensation awards. Thus, all that really remained of Magnolia after McCartin was a largely theoretical difference between what the Court described as “unmistakable language” and the broad language of the exclusive-remedy provision in the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act involved in McCartin. This history indicates that the principal values underlying the doctrine of stare decisis would not be served either by attempting to revive Magnolia or by attempting to preserve the uneasy coexistence of Magnolia and McCartin. The latter attempt could only breed uncertainty and unpredictability, since the application of the “unmistakable language” rule of McCartin necessarily depends on a determination by one state tribunal of the effect to be given to statutory language enacted by the legislature of a different State. And the former would represent a rather dramatic change that surely would not promote stability in the law. Moreover, since Magnolia has been so rarely followed, there appears to be little danger that there has been any significant reliance on its rule. We conclude that a fresh examination of the full faith and credit issue is therefore entirely appropriate. IV Three different state interests are affected by the potential conflict between Virginia and the District of Columbia. Virginia has a valid interest in placing a limit on the potential liability of companies that transact business within its borders. Both jurisdictions have a valid interest in the welfare of the injured employee — Virginia because the injury occurred within that State, and the District because the injured party was employed and resided there. And finally, Virginia has an interest in having the integrity of its formal determinations of contested issues respected by other sovereigns. The conflict between the first two interests was resolved in Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 294 U. S. 532, and a series of later cases. In Alaska Packers, California, the State where the employment contract was made, was allowed to apply its own workmen’s compensation statute despite the statute of Alaska, the place where the injury occurred, which was said to afford the exclusive remedy for injuries occurring there. Id., at 539. The Court held that the conflict between the statutes of two States ought not to be resolved “by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to their weight.” Id., at 547. The converse situation was presented in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U. S. 493. In that case the injury occurred in California, and the objection to California’s jurisdiction was based on a statute of Massachusetts, the State where the employee resided and where the employment contract had been made. The Massachusetts statute provided that the remedy afforded was exclusive of the worker’s “ ‘right of action at common law or under the law of any other jurisdiction.’” Id., at 498. Again, however, California was permitted to provide the employee with an award under the California statute. The principle that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to subordinate its own compensation policies to those of another State has been consistently applied in more recent cases. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408; Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U. S. 39; Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 421-424. Indeed, in the Nevada case the Court not only rejected the contention that California was required to respect a statutory limitation on the defendant’s liability, but did so in a case in which the defendant was the sovereign State itself asserting, alternatively, an immunity from any liability in the courts of California. It is thus perfectly clear that petitioner could have sought a compensation award in the first instance either in Virginia, the State in which the injury occurred, Carroll v. Lanza, supra; Pacific Employers, supra, or in the District of Columbia, where petitioner resided, his employer was principally located, and the employment relation was formed, Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, supra. And as those cases underscore, compensation could have been sought under either compensation scheme even if one statute or the other purported to confer an exclusive remedy on petitioner. Thus, for all practical purposes, respondent and its insurer would have had to measure their potential liability exposure by the more generous of the two workmen’s compensation schemes in any event. It follows that a State’s interest in limiting the potential liability of businesses within the State is not of controlling importance. It is also manifest that the interest in providing adequate compensation to the injured worker would be fully served by the allowance of successive awards. In this respect the two jurisdictions share a common interest and there is no danger of significant conflict. The ultimate issue, therefore, is whether Virginia’s interest in the integrity of its tribunal’s determinations forecloses a second proceeding to obtain a supplemental award in the District of Columbia. We return to the Court’s prior resolution of this question in Magnolia. The majority opinion in Magnolia took the position that the case called for a straightforward application of full faith and credit law: the worker’s injury gave rise to a cause of action; relief was granted by the Texas Industrial Accident Board; that award precluded any further relief in Texas; and further relief was therefore precluded elsewhere as well. The majority relied heavily on Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, for the propositions that a workmen’s compensation award stands on the same footing as a court judgment, and that a compensation award under one State’s law is a bar to a second award under another State’s law. See 320 U. S., at 441, 446. But Schendel did not compel the result in Magnolia. See 320 U. S., at 448 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id., at 457 (Black, J., dissenting). In Schendel, the Court held that an Iowa state compensation award, which was grounded in a contested factual finding that the deceased railroad employee was engaged in intrastate commerce, precluded a subsequent claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) brought in the Minnesota state courts, which would have required a finding that the employee was engaged in interstate commerce. Schendel therefore involved the unexceptionable full faith and credit principle that resolutions of factual matters underlying a judgment must be given the same res judicata effect in the forum State as they have in the rendering State. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S., at 351-352. The Minnesota courts could not have granted relief under the FELA and also respected the factual finding made in Iowa. In contrast, neither Magnolia nor this case concerns a second State’s contrary resolution of a factual matter determined in the first State’s proceedings. Unlike the situation in Schendel, which involved two mutually exclusive remedies, compensation could be obtained under either Virginia’s or the District’s workmen’s compensation statutes on the basis of the same set of facts. A supplemental award gives full effect to the facts determined by the first award and also allows full credit for payments pursuant to the earlier award. There is neither inconsistency nor double recovery. We are also persuaded that Magnolia’s reliance on Schendel for the proposition that workmen’s compensation awards stand on the same footing as court judgments was unwarranted. To be sure, as was held in Schendel, the factfindings of state administrative tribunals are entitled to the same res judicata effect in the second State as findings by a court. But the critical differences between a court of general jurisdiction and an administrative agency with limited statutory authority forecloses the conclusion that constitutional rules applicable to court judgments are necessarily applicable to workmen’s compensation awards. A final judgment entered by a court of general jurisdiction normally establishes not only the measure of the plaintiff’s rights but also the limits of the defendant’s liability. A traditional application of res judicata principles enables either party to claim the benefit of the judgment insofar as it resolved issues the court had jurisdiction to decide. Although a Virginia court is free to recognize the perhaps paramount interests of another State by choosing to apply that State’s law in a particular case, the Industrial Commission of Virginia does not have that power. Its jurisdiction is limited to questions arising under the Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act. See Va. Code §65:1-92 (1980). Typically, a workmen’s compensation tribunal may only apply its own State’s law. In this case, the Virginia Commission could and did establish the full measure of petitioner’s rights under Virginia law, but it neither could nor purported to determine his rights under the law of the District of Columbia. Full faith and credit must be given to the determination that the Virginia Commission had the authority to make; but by a parity of reasoning, full faith and credit need not be given to determinations that it had no power to make. Since it was not requested, and had no authority, to pass on petitioner’s rights under District of Columbia law, there can be no constitutional objection to a fresh adjudication of those rights. It is true, of course, that after Virginia entered its award, that State had an interest in preserving the integrity of what it had done. And it is squarely within the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as explained in Pacific Employers, 306 U. S., at 501, “to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts” of Virginia by requiring other States to recognize their validity. See n. 23, supra. Thus, Virginia had an interest in having respondent pay petitioner the amounts specified in its award. Allowing a supplementary recovery in the District does not conflict with that interest. As we have already noted, Virginia also has a separate interest in placing a ceiling on the potential liability of companies that transact business within the State. But past cases have established that that interest is not strong enough to prevent other States with overlapping jurisdiction over particular injuries from giving effect to their more generous compensation policies when the employee selects the most favorable forum in the first instance. Thus, the only situations in which the Magnolia rule would tend to serve that interest are those in which an injured workman has either been constrained by circumstances to seek relief in the less generous forum or has simply made an ill-advised choice of his first forum. But in neither of those cases is there any reason to give extra weight to the first State’s interest in placing'a ceiling on the employer’s liability than it otherwise would have had. For neither the first nor the second State has any overriding interest in requiring an injured employee to proceed with special caution when first asserting his claim. Compensation proceedings are often initiated' informally, without the advice of counsel, and without special attention to the choice of the most appropriate forum. Often the worker is still hospitalized when benefits are sought as was true in this case. And indeed, it is not always the injured worker who institutes the claim. See Schendel, 270 U. S., at 614. This informality is consistent with the interests of both States. A rule forbidding supplemental recoveries under more favorable workmen’s compensation schemes would require a far more formal and careful choice on the part of the injured worker than may be possible or desirable when immediate commencement of benefits may be essential. Thus, whether or not the worker has sought an award from the less generous jurisdiction in the first instance, the vindication of that State’s interest in placing a ceiling on employers’ liability would inevitably impinge upon the substantial interests of the second jurisdiction in thé welfare and subsistence of disabled workers — interests that a court of general jurisdiction might consider, but which must be ignored by the Virginia Industrial Commission. The.reasons why the statutory policy of exclusivity of the other jurisdictions involved in Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers, could not defeat California’s implementation of its own compensation policies therefore continue to apply even after the entry of a workmen’s compensation award. Of course, it is for each State to formulate its own policy whether to grant supplemental awards according to its perception of its own interests. We simply conclude that the substantial interests of the second State in these circumstances should not be overridden by another State through an unnecessarily aggressive application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as was implicitly recognized at the time of McCartin. We therefore would hold that a State has no legitimate interest within the context of our federal system in preventing another State from granting a supplemental compensation award when that second State would have had the power to apply its workmen’s compensation law in the first instance. The Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be construed to preclude successive workmen’s compensation awards. Accordingly, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt should be overruled. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded. bo ordered. United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 1: “Full Faitb and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” Title 28 U. S. C. § 1738 provides, in part: “The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto. “Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory, or Possession from which they are taken.” The District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act, D. C. Code §§501-502 (1968), adopts the terms of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U. S. C. §901 et seq. The program is administered by the United States Department of Labor. Respondent also contended' that the claim was barred by limitations. The Administrative Law Judge ruled, however, that respondent’s failure to file the report of injury required by the District of Columbia Act had tolled the statute and made respondent automatically liable for a 10% penalty. Respondent also argues in this Court that the LHWCA forbade the granting of an award where compensation could have been obtained under a state workmen’s compensation program. Since the Court of Appeals passed on neither of these statutory arguments, they remain open ón remand. Virginia- Code § 65.1-40 (1980) provides: “Employee’s rights under Act exclude all others. — ’The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee. when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Act respectively to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.” “Accordingly, it is concluded that, in the instant matter, Claimant’s award under the Virginia compensation law must be given such faith and credit in the District as it is given in Virginia; that, to the extent that the Virginia award is res judicata in Virginia, it is res judicata in the District.” App. 42. “The award did not effect a final settlement of the rights and liabilities of the parties. Rather, by its terms, it contemplated further awards. “In view of the foregoing, it is determined that, because the Virginia award was not a bar to further recovery of compensation in Virginia, it was not, under the full faith and credit concept, res judicata as a bar to further recovery of compensation under District law.” Id., at 46-47. Id., at 48. He added that the exclusive-remedy provisions “were not designed for extraterritorial extension to other sovereign jurisdictions. They do not preclude jurisdiction under District law.” Ibid. See 33 IT. S. C. §921 (c), which provides for review of decisions of the Benefits Review Board “in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred. . . .” The quoted language is from the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in the similar case of Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc., 587 F. 2d 627, 630 (1978), cert, denied, 444 U. S. 883. In this case the Court of Appeals merely issued a brief unpublished order citing Pettus. App. 2a. The statute places on courts in the District of Columbia the same obligation to respect state judgments as is imposed on the courts of the several States. See n. 1, supra. Four Members of the Court — Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge — dissented, expressing the opinion that the holding was not supported by precedent and did not accord proper respect to the States’ interests in implementing their policies of compensating injured workmen. Mr. Justice Jackson concurred in Mr. Chief Justice Stone’s opinion for the Court, but only because he felt bound by Williams v. North Carolina, 317 TJ. S. 287, a decision from which he vigorously dissented. Id., at 311. In that case, the Court held that North Carolina had to respect an ex parte divorce decree obtained in Nevada in a bigamy prosecution of a North Carolina resident. (It was assumed for purposes of decision that the petitioner was a bona fide domiciliary of Nevada at the time of the divorce, id., at 302.) In his concurring opinion in Magnolia, Mr. Justice Jackson explained that he was “unable to see how Louisiana can be constitutionally free to apply its own workmen’s compensation law to its citizens despite a previous adjudication in another state if North Carolina was not free to apply its own matrimonial policy to its own citizens after judgment on the subject in Nevada.” 320 U. S., at 446. Mr. Justice Douglas, author of the opinion for the Court in Williams. pointed out, in one of the two dissents filed in the Magnolia case, that as compared with the dual workmen’s compensation award problem then before the Court, “questions of status, i. e., marital capacity, involve conflicts between the policies of two States which are quite irreconcilable.” 320 TJ. S., at 447. Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred only in the result. Magnolia had not been well received. See Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 330, 344-346 (1944) (hereinafter Cheatham); Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv, L. Rev. 1210, 1227-1230 (1946) (hereinafter Freund); Wolkin, Workmen’s Compensation Award — Commonplace or Anomaly in Full Faith and Credit Pattern?, 92 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401, 405-411 (1944) (hereinafter Wolkin); Note, 23 Ind. L. J. 214 (1948); Note, 18 Tulane L. Rev. 509 (1944); Recent Cases, 12 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 487 (1944). That statute, insofar as it is relevant here, reads exactly as it did when the first Congress passed it in 1790. See 1 Stat. 122. See Magnolia, 320 U. S., at 438; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S., at 302; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 294 U. S. 532, 547; Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 153, 161-162 (1949) (hereinafter Reese & Johnson): “Full faith and credit is a national policy, not a state policy. Its purpose is not merely to demand respect from one state for another, but rather to give us .the benefits of a unified nation by altering the status of otherwise ‘independent, sovereign states.’ Hence it is for federal law, not state law, to prescribe the measure of credit which one state shall give to another’s judgment. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in dealing with full faith and credit to statutes the Supreme Court in recent years has accorded no weight to language which purported to give a particular statute extraterritorial effect.49 There is every reason why a similar attitude should be taken with respect to judgments. “49 Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U. S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532 (1935); Tennessee Coal Iron & R. R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354 (1914); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55 (1909). . . .” (Some footnotes omitted.) In Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George, cited in the authors’ footnote, the Court held that a Georgia court, consistent with its full faith and credit obligations, could ignore a provision in the Alabama statute creating the cause of action there sued upon, which required that any suit to enforce the right of action “must be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Alabama and not elsewhere.” 233 U S., at 358. The Sowers case is much like the George case. Pacific Employers and Alaska Packers are discussed in Part IV, infra. Cf. Note, Unconstitutional Discrimination in Choice of Law, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 272 (1977) (Privileges and Immunities Clause). “[limitation of the past, until we have a clear reason for a change, no more needs justification than appetite. It is a form of the inevitable to be accepted until we have a clear vision of what different things we want.” 0. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 290 (1920). The doctrine of stare decisis has a more limited application when the precedent rests on constitutional grounds, because “correction through legislative action is practically impossible.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 407-408 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 627 (Powell, J., concurring). The full faith and credit area presents special problems, because the Constitution expressly delegates to Congress the authority “by general Laws [to] prescribe the Manner in which [the States’] Acts. Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” (Emphasis added.) See n. 1, supra. Yet it is quite clear that Congress’ power in this area is not exclusive, for this Court has given effect to the Clause beyond that, required by implementing legislation. See Bradford Electric Co v Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, in which the Court required the New Hampshire courts to respect a Vermont statute which precluded a worker from bringing a common-law action against his employer for job-related injuries where the employment relation was formed in Vermont, even though the injury occurred in New Hampshire. At the time the Clapper case was decided, the predecessor of 28 U. S. C. § 1738 included no reference to “Acts” in the sentence that required the forum State to accord the same full faith and credit to records and judicial proceedings as they have in the State from which they are taken. The reference to Acts was added for the first time in 1948. See Carroll v. Lanza. 349 U. S. 408. 422, n 4 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Thus, the Clapper case rested on the constitutional Clause alone. Carroll, which for all intents and purposes buned whatever was left of Clapper after Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U. S. 493; see 349 U. S., at 412; n. 23, infra, cast no doubt on Clapper’s reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself Thus, while Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to the law's or judgments of another State, there is at least some question whether Congress may cut back on the measure of faith and credit required by a decision of this Court. See Freund 1229-1230. Professor Larson has pointed out that prior to Magnolia and McCar-tin, “state courts, with virtual unanimity, had held or assumed that a prior award under the laws of another state was no bar to an award under local law made in accordance with the local law’s own standards of applicability, always of course, with the understanding that the claimant could not have a complete double recovery but must deduct from its present recovery the amount of the prior award.” 4 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 85.10, pp. 16-15 — 16-16 (1980) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter A. Larson). See also Wolkin 403, n. 6. As the majority opinion in Magnolia recognized, 320 U. S., at 441, n. 5, the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 403 (1934) was flatly contrary to the Magnolia result: “Award already had under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of another state will not bar a proceeding under an applicable Act, but the amount paid on a prior award in another state will be credited on the second award.” As we note below, see n. 21, infra, Texas’ rule was otherwise. Virtually every commentator agrees that McCartin all but overruled Magnolia. See R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 162, p. 334 (3d ed. 1977); G. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 221 (3d ed. 1963); 4 A. Larson §§85.10, 85.20, at 15-16, 16-17; Reese & Johnson 159 (“The dissenters in Magnolia saw their day of triumph in . . . McCartin. . . . [T]he facts were essentially identical with those of the Magnolia case; similarly, the workmén’s compensation statutes involved in the two cases were not in any significant manner distinguishable”). See also Recent Cases, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 993, 993-994 (1947) (“By this decision the practical effect of the Magnolia case in preventing more than one state applying its workmen’s compensation law to the same injury is almost completely nullified . . . , and may foreshadow a modification of ‘full faith and credit’ as to workmen’s compensation judgments similar to that which occurred in regard to legislation”); Comment, 33 Cornell L. Q. 310, 315 (1947). Apparently only Nevada’s Workmen’s Compensation Act contains the unmistakable language required under the McCartin rule. Nevada Rev. Stat. § 616.525 (1979) provides in part: “[I]f an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment outside this state, and he . . . accepts any compensation or benefits under the provisions of this chapter, the acceptance of such compensation shall constitute a waiver by such employee ... of all rights and remedies against the employer at common law or given under the laws of any other state, and shall further constitute a full and complete release of such employer from any and all liability arising from such injury. . . .” (Emphasis added.) In Magnolia, the Court noted the existence of a Texas statute precluding a supplemental award in Texas when an injured worker had obtained an award under the workmen’s compensation law of another State. 320 U. S., at 435. But that provision, of course, was directed not at the effect Texas desired a Texas award to be given in a second State, but rather at the converse situation. That is, it governed the effect that the Texas Industrial Accident Board had to give to an award previously rendered in another State. See id., at 454 (Black, J., dissenting). While the Texas statute so understood may be obliquely probative of the Texas Legislature’s intent as regards the effect to be given a Texas award in another State, that intent is surely not indicated with the unmistakable language required by McCartin. It is worth noting that the Virginia statute involved in this case expressly allows a second recovery in Virginia in certain cases in which a prior recovery has been obtained in another State. Va. Code §65.1-61 (1980). See, e. g., City Products Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 19 Ariz. App. 286, 506 P. 2d 1071 (1973) (prior California award); Jordan v. Industrial Comm’n, 117 Ariz. 215, 571 P. 2d 712 (App. 1977) (prior Texas award); McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S. W. 2d 608 (1961) (prior Mississippi award); Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Bd., 65 Cal. 2d 429, 421 P. 2d 96 (1966) (prior Nevada award); Industrial Track Builders of America v. Lemaster, 429 S. W. 2d 403 (Ky. 1968) (prior Indiana award); Ryder v. Insurance Co. of North America, 282 So. 2d 771 (La. App. 1973) (prior Georgia award); Griffin v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 283 So. 2d 748 (La. 1973) (prior Texas award under statute involved in Magnolia held not to preclude second award in Louisiana in light of McCartin), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 904; Lavoie’s Case, 334 Mass. 403, 135 N. E. 2d 750 (1956) (prior Rhode Island award), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 927; Stanley v. Hinchliffe & Kenner, 395 Mich. 645, 652-653, 238 N. W. 2d 13, 16 (1976) (prior California award) (“It is now widely accepted that McCar-tin severely limited, if not overruled, Magnolia . . .”); Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Construction Co., 231 Minn. 433, 43 N. W. 2d 792 (1950) (prior North Dakota award); Hubbard v. Midland Constructors, Inc., 269 Minn. 425, 426, n. 1, 131 N. W. 2d 209, 211, n. 1 (1964) (prior South Dakota award); Harrison Co. v. Norton, 244 Miss. 752, 146 So. 2d 327 (1962) (prior Georgia award); Bowers v. American Bridge Co., 43 N. J. Super. 48, 127 A. 2d 580 (1956), aff’d, 24 N. J. 390, 132 A. 2d 28 (1957) (prior Pennsylvania award); Hudson v. Kingston Contracting Co., 58 N. J. Super. 455, 156 A. 2d 491 (1959) (prior Maryland award); Cramer v. State Concrete Corp., 39 N. J. 507, 189 A. 2d 213 (1963) (prior New York award); Bekkedahl v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 222 N. W. 2d 841 (N. D. 1974) (prior Montana award); Spietz v. Industrial Comm’n, 251 Wis. 168, 28 N. W. 2d 354 (1947) (prior Montana award). But see Gasch v. Britton, 92 U. S. App. D. C. 64, 202 F. 2d 356 (1953) (2-to-1 decision, Fahy, J., dissenting) (prior Maryland award held pre-clusive of supplemental award in District of Columbia as construction of Maryland law, which construction was specifically rejected by Hudson, supra, and, significantly, by the Maryland Court of Appeals in a declaratory judgment action, see Wood v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 260 Md. 651, 273 A. 2d 125 (1971)); Cofer v. Industrial Comm’n, 24 Ariz. App. 357, 359, n. 2, 538 P. 2d 1158, 1160, n 2 (1975) (refusing to permit second award in Arizona after claimant obtained first award in Texas, under compulsion of Magnolia, but questioning that case’s interpretation of the Texas statute, see n. 21, supra; specifically repudiated by Jordan, supra; and see Griffin, supra). The Court reasoned: “The Supreme Court of California has recognized the conflict and resolved it by holding that the full faith and credit clause does not deny to the courts of California the right to apply its own statute awarding compensation for an injury suffered by an employee within the state. “To the extent that California is required to give full faith and credit to the conflicting Massachusetts statute it must be denied the right to apply in its own courts its own statute, constitutionally enacted in pursuance of its policy to provide compensation for employees injured in their employment within the state. It must withhold the remedy given by its own statute to its residents by way of compensation for medical, hospital and nursing services rendered to the injured employee, and it must remit him to Massachusetts to secure the administrative remedy which that state has provided. We cannot say that the full faith and credit clause goes so far. “While the purpose of that provision was to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity in other states, the very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.” 306 U. S., at 501. In Carroll, the Court observed that “Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Commission, 306 U. S. 493, departed . . . from the [Bradford Electric Co. v.] Clapper decision.” 349 U. S., at 412. See n. 18, supra. The Court’s retreat from the rigid Clapper rule, which at the time appeared constitutionally to require application of the workmen’s compensation law of the State in which the employment relation was centered, to the more flexible balancing of the respective States’ interests in Pacific Employers parallels the Court’s movement from Magnolia to McCartín. Whether the latter was true as a matter of Texas law is open to question. See nn. 21, 22, supra. See also Wolkin 410. “The Iowa proceeding was brought and determined upon the theory that Hope [the deceased worker] was engaged in intrastate commerce; the Minnesota action was brought and determined upon the opposite theory that he was engaged in interstate commerce. The point at issue was the same.” 270 U. S., at 616. See 4 A. Larson §86.40, at 16-44; Cheatham 344. The reason for this is the special nature of a workmen’s compensation remedy. It is not merely a grant of a lump-sum award at the end of an extended adversary proceeding. See 4 A. Larson § 84.20, at 16-9: “[A] highly developed compensation system does far more than that. It stays with the claimant from the moment of the accident to the time he is fully restored to normal earning capacity. This may involve supervising an ongoing rehabilitation program, perhaps changing or extending it, perhaps providing, repairing, and replacing prosthetic devices, and supplying vocational rehabilitation. Apart from rehabilitation, optimum compensation administration may require reopening of the award from time to time for change of condition or for other reasons. . . .” Thus, a workmen’s compensation remedy is potentially quite different from the application of a particular State’s law to a transitory cause of action based on fault. See generally New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61.2 (c) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978): “(1) When any of the following circumstances exists, the general rule of § 61 [under which a valid judgment extinguishes a claim by its merger in the judgment] does not apply to extinguish a claim, and part or all of the claim subsists as a possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff against the defendant: "(c) The plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the ease or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their authority to entertain multiple theories or demands for multiple remedies or forms of relief in a single action, and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on that theory or to seek that remedy or form of relief. . . .” While Professor Larson points out that there are some isolated examples of workmen’s compensation tribunals technically having the power to go beyond the confines of their own States’ statutes, see 4 A. Larson §84.30, at 16-13, he also notes that there is "no decisional law . . . showing how this can be done if the filing of a claim with a specified tribunal in the other State is a condition precedent to recovery. Indeed, Vermont [whose statute grants its commission the authority to permit the assertion of rights created under the Acts of other States] refused to use this express statutory power when asked to apply the compensation law of Massachusetts, saying that ‘the remedy is an integral part of the right given and the latter has no existence separate and apart from the former.’” Ibid, See Grenier v. Alta Crest Farms, Inc., 115 Vt. 324, 330, 58 A. 2d 884, 888 (1948). Accordingly, it would seem to follow that unless the tribunal actually passes on the injured worker’s rights under another State’s law, the worker would not be precluded from seeking a second award in that other State. See also Cheatham 345, and Wolkin 410, pointing out the potential for overreaching by an employer more knowledgeable than the injured employee about the relative benefits available under the applicable workmen’s compensation schemes. See Magnolia, 320 U. S., at 450 (Black, J, dissenting): “Confined to a hospital [the injured worker] was told that he could not recover compensation unless he signed two forms presented to him. As found by the Louisiana trial judge there was printed on each. of the forms 'in small type’ the designation ‘Industrial Accident Board, Austin, Texas.’” . Cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 227 (Stone, J., dissenting).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCRIPTO, INC., v. CARSON, SHERIFF, et al. No. 80. Argued February 24, 1960. -Decided March 21, 1960. George B. Haley, Jr. argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Ernest P. Rogers. Joseph C. Jacobs, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, and Sam Spector, Special Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. Florida, by statute, requires appellant, a Georgia corporation, to be responsible for the collection of a use tax on certain mechanical writing instruments which appellant sells and ships from its place of business in Atlanta to residents of Florida for use and enjoyment there. Upon Scripto’s failure to collect the tax, the appellee Comptroller levied a use tax liability of $5,150.66 against it. Appellant then brought this suit to test the validity of the imposition, contending that the requirement of Florida’s statute places a burden on interstate commerce and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. It claimed, in effect, that the nature of its operations in Florida does not form a sufficient nexus to subject it to the statute’s exactions. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Florida held that appellant does have sufficient jurisdictional contacts in Florida and, (therefore, must register as a dealer under the statute and collect and remit to the State the use tax imposed on its aforesaid sales. 105 So. 2d 775. We noted probable jurisdiction. 361 U. S. 806. We agree with the result reached by Florida’s courts. “212.06 Same; collectible from dealers; dealers defined; dealers to collect from purchasers; legislative intent as to scope of tax.— “(1) The aforesaid tax at the rate of three per cent of the retail sales price, as of the moment of sale, or three per cent of the cost price, as of the moment of purchase, as the case may be, shall be collectible from all dealers as herein defined on the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution and the storage for use or consumption in this state, of tangible personal property. Appellant operates in Atlanta an advertising specialty division trading under the name of Adgif Company. Through it, appellant is engaged in the business of selling mechanical writing instruments which are adapted to advertising purposes by the placing of printed material thereon. In its Adgif operation, appellant does not (1) own, lease, or maintain any office, distributing house, warehouse or other place of business in Florida, or (2) have any regular employee or agent there. Nor does it own or maintain any bank account or stock of merchandise in the State. Orders for its products are solicited by advertising specialty brokers or, as the Supreme Court of Florida called them, wholesalers or jobbers, who are residents of Florida. At the time of suit, there were 10 such brokers — each having a written contract and a specific territory. The somewhat detailed contract provides, inter alia, that all compensation is to be on a commission basis on the sales made, provided they are accepted by appellant; repeat orders, even if not solicited, also carry a commission if the salesman has not become inactive through failure to secure acceptable orders during the previous 60 days. The contract specifically provides that it is the intention of the parties “to create the relationship ... of independent contractor.” Each order is to be signed by the solicitor as a “salesman”; however, he has no authority to make collections or incur debts involving appellant. Each salesman is furnished catalogs, samples, and advertising material, and is actively engaged in Florida as a representative “of Scripto for the purpose of attracting, soliciting and obtaining Florida customers” for its mechanical advertising specialties. Orders for such products are sent by these salesmen directly to the Atlanta office for acceptance or refusal. If accepted, the sale is consummated there and the salesman is paid his commission directly. No money passes between the purchaser and the salesman — although the latter does occasionally accept a check payable to the appellant, in which event he is required to forward it to appellant with the order. “(2) ... (g) 'Dealer' also means and includes every person who solicits business either by representatives or by the distribution of catalogs or other advertising matter and by reason thereof receives and accepts orders from consumers in the state, and such dealer shall collect the tax imposed by this chapter from the purchaser and no action either in law or in equity on a sale or transaction as provided by the terms of this chapter may be had in this state by any such dealer unless it be affirmatively shown that the provisions of this chapter have been fully complied with.” As construed by Florida’s highest court, the impost levied by the statute is a tax “on the privilege of using personal property . . . which has come to rest . . . and has become a part of the mass of property” within the State. 105 So. 2d, at 781. It is not a sales tax, but “was developed as a device to complement [such a tax] in order to prevent evasion ... by the completion of purchases in a non-taxing state and shipment by interstate commerce into a taxing forum.” Id,., at 779. The tax is collectible from “dealers” and is to be added to the purchase price of the merchandise “as far as practicable.” In the event that a dealer fails to collect the tax, he himself is liable for its payment. The statute has the customary use tax provisions “against duplication of the tax, an allowance to the dealer for making the collection, and a reciprocal credit arrangement which credits against the Florida tax any amount up to the amount of the Florida tax which might have been paid to another state.” Id., at 782. Florida held appellant to be a dealer under its statute. “The application by that Court of its local laws and the facts on which it founded its judgment are of course controlling here.” General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U. S. 335, 337 (1944). The question remaining is whether Florida, in the light of appellant’s operations there, may collect the State’s use tax from it on the basis of property bought from appellant and shipped from its home office to purchasers in Florida for use there. Florida has well stated the course of this Court’s decisions governing such levies, and we need but drive home its clear understanding. There must be, as our Brother Jackson stated in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344-345 (1954), “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” We believe that such a nexus is present here. First, the tax is a nondiscriminatory exaction levied for the use and enjoyment of property which has been purchased by Florida residents and which has actually entered into and become a part of the mass of property in that State. The burden of the tax is placed on the ultimate purchaser in Florida and it is he who enjoys the use of the property, regardless of its source. We note that the appellant is charged with no tax — save when, as here, he fails or refuses to collect it from the Florida customer. Next, as Florida points out, appellant has 10 wholesalers, jobbers, or “salesmen” conducting continuous local solicitation in Florida and forwarding the resulting orders from that State to Atlanta for shipment of the ordered goods. The only incidence of this sales transaction that is nonlocal is the acceptance of the order. True, the “salesmen” are not regular employees of appellant devoting full time to its service, but we conclude that such a fine distinction is without constitutional significance. The formal shift in the contractual tagging of the salesman as “independent” neither results in changing his local function of solicitation nor bears upon its effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida. This is evidenced by the amount assessed against appellant on the statute’s 3% basis over a period of but four years. To permit such formal “contractual shifts” to make a constitutional difference would open the gates to a stampede of tax avoidance. See Thomas Reed Powell, Sales and Use Taxes: Collection from Absentee Vendors, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1086, 1090. Moreover, we cannot see, from a constitutional standpoint, “that it was important that the agent worked for several principals.” Chief Judge Learned Hand, in Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, 165 F. 2d 33, 36. The test is simply the nature and extent of the activities of the appellant in Florida. In short, we conclude that this case is controlled by General Trading Co., supra. As was said there, “All these differentiations are without constitutional significance. Of course, no State can tax the privilege of doing interstate business. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau, 303 U. S. 250. That is within the protection of the Commerce Clause and subject to the power of Congress. On the other hand, the mere fact that property is used for interstate commerce or has come into an owner’s possession as a result of interstate commerce does not diminish the protection which he may draw from a State to the upkeep of which he may be asked to bear his fair share.” 322 U. S., at 338. Nór do we believe that Florida’s requirement that appellant be its tax collector on such orders from its residents changes the situation. As was pointed out in General Trading Co., this is “a familiar and sanctioned device.” Ibid. Moreover, we note that Florida reimburses appellant for its service in this regard. Appellant earnestly contends that Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, supra, is to the contrary. We think not. Miller had no solicitors in Maryland; there was no “exploitation of the consumer market”; no regular, systematic displaying of its products by catalogs, samples or the like. But, on the contrary, the goods on which Maryland sought to force Miller to collect its tax were sold to residents of Maryland when personally present at Miller’s store in Delaware. True, there was an “occasional” delivery of such purchases by Miller into Maryland, and it did occasionally mail notices of special sales to former customers; but Marylanders went to Delaware to make purchases — Miller did not go to Maryland for sales. Moreover, it was impossible for Miller to determine that goods sold for cash to a customer over the counter at its store in Delaware were to be used and enjoyed in Maryland. This led the Court to conclude that Miller would be made “more vulnerable to liability for another’s tax than to a tax on' itself.” 347 U. S., at 346. In view of these considerations, we conclude that the “minimum connections” not present in Miller are more than sufficient here. The judgment is therefore Affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, deeming this case to be nearer to General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U. S. 335, than it is to Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, concurs in the result. Mr . Justice Whittaker, believing that Florida’s action denies to appellant due process of law and also directly burdens interstate commerce as held in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, and in McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, and adhering to his views expressed in Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 477, would reverse the judgment. The pertinent provisions of this statute are: Appellant Scripto does employ one salesman but he handles its regular line of products and has no connection with Adgif. The Florida courts found that his presence was not relevant to the determination of whether appellant was included within the terms of the statute.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROSE v. ARKANSAS STATE POLICE et al. No. 85-1388. Decided November 3, 1986 Per Curiam. In December 1982, Arkansas State Trooper William Rose was killed in the line of duty. His widow, petitioner in this action, received a $50,000 benefit from the Federal Government pursuant to the Public Safety Officers’ Death Benefits Act, 93 Stat. 1219, 42 U. S. C. § 3796 et seq. The Benefits Act provides for a $50,000 payment to the survivors of a state law enforcement officer who dies as a result of job-related injuries. The federal statute also provides that “[t]he benefit payable under this subchapter shall be in addition to any other benefit that may be due from any other source,” with two exceptions not relevant here. § 3796(e). Petitioner also applied for death benefits under the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 12-3601 et seq. (1979). Respondent Public Employee Claims Division of the Arkansas Insurance Department acknowledged that the claim was compensable, but insisted on reducing the amount owed to Rose by the amount she had received under the federal Benefits Act. In support of its position, respondent relied on a state statute that provides: “In the event that any public employee who is entitled to receive workers’ compensation ... as a result of injury, disability or death, and such injuries, disabilities, or death gives rise to an entitlement of benefits under . . . an Act of Congress providing benefits for public safety officers . . . the state workers’ compensation fun[d] shall be entitled to a credit against its liability ... to the extent of the [federal] benefits received . . . .” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 12-3605(G) (Supp. 1985). Rose filed a complaint with the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission, claiming that her state benefits should not be offset by the federal payment. An Administrative Law Judge ordered respondent to compensate petitioner in full, noting that the Benefits Act plainly states that the federal money is intended to supplement all other benefits. The ALJ ruled that the state statute was in direct conflict with the Benefits Act, and that under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the Arkansas provision must give way. The full Commission reversed the ALJ and allowed the offset, finding no inconsistency between the state and federal laws. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision. 16 Ark. App. 96, 697 S. W. 2d 927 (1985). The court first cited Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971), for the proposition that there is nothing inherently unconstitutional about offsetting state and federal benefits. The state court then concluded that the offset in this case was proper, because the Benefits Act does not show a congressional intent to intrude on the States’ right to set workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, said the court, “[w]e fail to see a supremacy clause argument.” 16 Ark. App., at 99, 697 S. W. 2d, at 928. The Arkansas Supreme Court denied petitioner’s request for review. There can be no dispute that the Supremacy Clause invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere with an Act of Congress. Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 467 U. S. 622, 627, and n. 4 (1984) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824)). In this case, the conflict between the Arkansas law and the Benefits Act is clear from the language of the statutes. The Benefits Act unambiguously provides that the $50,000 payment “shall be in addition to any other benefit that may be due from any other source.” 42 U. S. C. § 3796(e) (emphasis added). Congress plainly intended to give supplemental benefits to the survivors, not to assist the States by subsidizing their benefit programs. The Arkansas statute, however, passed three years after the Benefits Act was enacted, provides that the state award shall be reduced by the full amount of the federal payment. The state statute authorizes the precise conduct that Congress sought to prohibit and consequently is repugnant to the Supremacy Clause. The state court nevertheless failed to perceive a tension between the two statutes, concluding that the federal law did not alter the States’ traditional right to set the level of workers’ compensation benefits. This reasoning misses the point. The Benefits Act does not require a State to set a particular benefit level for its citizens; it simply prohibits a State from reducing the compensation it otherwise would provide to account for the federal payment. This reading of the Benefits Act is consistent with the legislative history, that shows that Congress was concerned about the inadequacy of death benefits paid to police officers by some States. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1032, p. 3 (1976); see also 122 Cong. Rec. 12005 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi). Congress intended that the $50,000 would be a “gratuity,” and would provide payment “over and above all other benefits.” See S. Rep. No. 96-142, p. 58 (1979) (“gratuity”); 122 Cong. Rec. 12002 (remarks of Rep. Eilberg). The Arkansas court’s reliance on Richardson v. Belcher, supra, is misplaced. In that case the Court upheld a law allowing the reduction of federal benefits to account for state awards of workers’ compensation. See id., at 78-79, and n. 1. Belcher did not present a Supremacy Clause issue. Because the Benefits Act prohibits States from offsetting their death benefits against the federal payment, § 12-3605(G) of the Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1985) is invalid. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari, reverse the decision of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. HECTOR No. 86-21. Decided November 17, 1986 Per Curiam. Virginia Hector, a native and citizen of Dominica, West Indies, entered the United States in April 1975 as a nonimmi-grant visitor for pleasure. She has remained in this country illegally since April 30, 1975, when her authorization to stay expired. The youngest of her four children, a 10-year-old boy, resides with her here; the other three children live with their grandparents in Dominica. In 1983, two of Hector’s nieces, United States citizens aged 10 and 11, came to live with her in order to attend school in what their parents perceived to be a superior educational system. The nieces’ parents continue to reside in Dominica. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) instituted deportation proceedings against Hector in July 1983. She conceded deportability, but applied for suspension of deportation pursuant to § 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 66 Stat. 214, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(a)(1). That section authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation of an illegal alien, and to adjust the alien’s status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if the deportable alien “has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of . . . application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) found that Hector satisfied the first two statutory elements — continuous physical residence and good moral character — but that she could not demonstrate extreme hardship to herself, or to her “spouse, parent, or child.” With respect to her nieces, the Board determined that, as a factual matter, Hector’s separation from them would not constitute extreme hardship to herself; as a legal matter, the Board concluded that a niece is not a “child” within the meaning of § 244(a)(1). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted Hector’s petition for review and remanded the case to the Board. 782 F. 2d 1028 (1986). The court held that the Board had erred in not giving sufficient consideration to whether Hector’s relationship with her nieces was the functional equivalent of a parent-child relationship. The court thus instructed the Board to ascertain whether there was a parental-type relationship, and, if so, to determine whether Hector’s nieces would experience extreme hardship as a result of her deportation. In so holding, the court relied on its earlier decision in Tovar v. INS, 612 F. 2d 794 (1980), which held that the term “child” as used in § 244(a)(1) includes individuals who do not fit within the statutory definition of “child” set out in § 101(b)(1), 8 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(1), if their relationship with the deportable alien closely resembles that of a parent and child. Because we find the plain language of the statute so compelling, we reverse, and hold that the Board is not required under § 244(a)(1) to consider the hardship to a third party other than a spouse, parent, or child, as defined by the Act. Congress has specifically identified the relatives whose hardship is to be considered, and then set forth unusually detailed and unyielding provisions defining each class of included relatives. The statutory definition of the term “child” is particularly exhaustive. Hector has never claimed, and the Court of Appeals did not hold, that the two nieces qualify under that statutory definition. As we have explained with reference to the technical definition of “child” contained within this statute: “With respect to each of these legislative policy distinctions, it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a different point and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status to [some] who share strong family ties. . . . But it is clear from our cases . . . that these are policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 798 (1977). Thus, even if Hector’s relationship with her nieces closely resembles a parent-child relationship, we are constrained to hold that Congress, through the plain language of the statute, precluded this functional approach to defining the term “child.” Cf. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U. S. 183, 194 (1984) (refusing to ignore “the clear congressional mandate and the plain meaning of the statute” where it was clear that “Congress considered the harsh consequences of its actions”). Congress has shown its willingness to 'redefine the term “child” on a number of occasions, but it has not included nieces in that definition or authorized us to adopt a functional definition. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Brennan would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument. The Board found that “[t]he emotional hardship to the respondent due to difficulties encountered by her nieces as a result of her deportation also does not constitute extreme hardship even when combined with the other factors in her case.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. Cf. Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F. 2d 401, 403 (CA9 1983); Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS, 703 F. 2d 19, 22 (CA1 1983). Both the Immigration Judge and the Board had also held, in the alternative, that Hector’s relationship with her nieces was not akin to a mother and daughter relationship, and that, in any event, the nieces would not experience extreme hardship as a result of Hector’s deportation. The Court of Appeals held, however, that the Board had foreclosed presentation of evidence on these issues, and had not meaningfully addressed each relevant factor. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. Judge Garth dissented, concluding that the Board has adequately considered Hector’s relationship with her nieces and the hardship issue. Id., at 5a, n. 1. The Courts of Appeals have reached varying conclusions on whether hardship to an alien’s relative or loved one who does not qualify under the statute’s technical definitions as a spouse, parent, or child must be independently considered in assessing extreme hardship under § 244(a)(1). As indicated, the Third Circuit has held that the Board must look at the hardship that some third parties would experience, even if they do not qualify under the definitional section of the Act. See Tovar v. INS, 612 F. 2d 794, 797-798 (1980). A number of other Circuits have rejected this flexible approach. See, e. g., Zamora-Garcia v. United States Dept. of Justice INS, 737 F. 2d 488 (CA5 1984); Contreras-Buenfil, supra, at 403. The term “parent” is defined in 8 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2); the term “spouse” is defined in § 1101(a)(35). The definitional section provides: “(b) As used in in subchapters I and II of this chapter— “(1) The term “child” means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is — “(A) a legitimate child; “(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred; “(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, or under the law of the father’s residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation; “(D) an illegitimate child by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother; “(E) a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years: Provided, That no natural parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter; or “(F) a child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in his behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under section 1151(b) of this title, who is an orphan because of the death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss from, both parents, or for whom the the sole or surviving parent is incapable of providing the proper care and has in writing irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption; who has been adopted abroad by a United States citizen and spouse jointly, or by an unmarried United States citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who personally saw and observed the child prior to or during the adoption proceedings; or who is coming to the United States for adoption by a United States citizen and spouse jointly, or by an unmarried United States citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who have or has complied with the preadoption requirements, if any, of the child’s proposed residence: Provided, That the Attorney General is satisfied that proper care will be furnished the child if admitted to the United States: Provided further, That no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter.” § 1101(b)(1). The suspension of deportation provision, § 1254(a), is part of subehapter II; this definition of “child” therefore applies. The limiting nature of the plain language is corroborated by the legislative history of both the suspension of deportation provision and the definitional section of the Act. With respect to suspension of deportation, the Senate rejected a draft of the bill that focused on the hardship to the “immediate family.” See S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). In a prepared analysis of S. 716, the INS expressed concern about this undefined term that the INS considered “obscure, uncertain, and difficult, if not impossible, to administer” since the language could “conceivably be claimed to include any relative of the alien, by blood or marriage, who might be living with him in his household.” 4 INS, Analysis of S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 244-2 and 244-3 (1951) (emphasis in original). Instead, the INS asked Congress to list the “particular relatives who are intended to be described.” Id., at 244-3. The bill that was eventually passed contained the “parent, spouse, or child” language that is now in effect. The history of the definitional section similarly demonstrates that Congress has been actively engaged in delineating just how broad it wishes the definition of “child” to be. As originally enacted, the statute defined a “child” as an unmarried legitimate or legitimated child or stepchild under 21 years of age. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S., at 797. Congress has since repeatedly fine-tuned the definition of “child.” There have been no less than four separate amendments, each adding to or refining the definition. See Act of Sept. 11,1957, Pub L. 85-316, §2, 71 Stat. 639; Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. 87-301, §§ 1-4, 75 Stat. 650-651; Act of Oct. 3,1965, Pub. L. 89-236, § 8(e), 79 Stat. 917; Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611. In light of this history of close congressional attention to this specific issue, we are especially bound to pay heed to the plain mandate of the words Congress has chosen. See n. 6, supra. Similarly, Congress has shown that it is willing to correct inequities that might result in our applying the plain language of the suspension of deportation provision. In the recently enacted Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, Congress explicitly amended the Act to “overrule INS v. Phinpathya, [464 U. S. 183] (1984), which held that any absence, however brief, breaks the continuity of physical presence.” H. R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, p. 124 (1986). Our decision, of course, does not affect the possibility that Hector may be entitled to relief under the amnesty provisions of the newly enacted Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOYCE MOTOR LINES, INC. v. UNITED STATES. No. 167. Argued December 4, 1951. Decided January 28, 1952. Archie O. Dawson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief -were.Joseph C. Glavin and A. Harry Moore. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States.' With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney and Beatrice Rosenberg. Leander I. Shelley and Russell F. Watson filed a brief for the Port of New York Authority, as amicus curiae, supporting the United States. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioner is charged with the violation of a regulation promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission under 18 U. S. C. § 835. The. Regulation provides: “Drivers of motor vehicles transporting any explosive, inflammable liquid, inflammable compressed gas, or poisonous gas shall avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings.” The statute directs that “[w]hoever knowingly violates” the Regulation shall be subject to fine or imprisonment or both. The indictment, in counts 1, 3, and 5, charges that petitioner on three separate occasions sent one of its trucks carrying carbon bisulphide, a dangerous and inflammable liquid, through the Holland Tunnel; a congested thoroughfare. In each instance, the truck was en route from Cascade Mills, New York, to Brooklyn, New York. On the third of these trips the load of carbon bisulphide éxploded in the tunnel and about sixty persons were injured. The indictment further states that “there were other available and more practicable routes for the transportation of said shipment, and . . . the [petitioner] well knew that tlm transportation of the shipment of carbon bisulphide . . . into the . . . Holland Tunnel was in violation of the regulations promulgated ... by the Interstate Commerce Commission . . ." There is no allegation as to the feasibility of prearrangement of routes, and petitioner is not charged with any omission in that respect. The District Court dismissed those counts of the indictment which were based upon the Regulation in question, holding it to be invalid on the ground that the words “so far as practicable, and, where feasible” are “so vague and indefinite as to make the standard of guilt conjectural.” 90 F. Supp. 996, 998. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Regulation, interpreted in conjunction with the statute, establishes a reasonably certain standard of conduct. 188 F. 2d 889. We granted certiorari. 342 U. S. 846. A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged with its violation. But few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with-which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line. In Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 (1932), these principles were applied in upholding words in a criminal statute similar to those now before us. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous court, there said: “ ‘Shortest practicable route’ is not an expression too vague to be understood. The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary, terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding. . . . The use of common experience as a glossary is necessary to meet the practical demands of legislation.” The Regulation challenged here is the product of a long history of regulation of the transportation of explosives and inflammables.. Congress recognized the need for protecting the public against the hazards involved in transporting explosives as early as 1866. The inadequacy of the legislation then enacted led to the .passage, in 1908, of the Transportation of Explosives Act, which was later extended to cover inflammables. In accordance with that Act, the Commission in the same year issued regulations applicable to railroads. In 1934 the Commission exercised its authority under the Act to promulgate regulations governing motor trucks, including the Regulation here in question. In 1940 this Regulation was amended to substantially its present terminology. That terminology was adopted only after more than three years of study and a number of drafts. The trucking industry participated extensively in this process, making suggestions relating to drafts submitted to carriers and their organizations, and taking part in several hearings. The Regulation’s history indicates the careful consideration which was given to the difficulties involved in framing a regulation which would deal practically with this aspect of the problem presented by the necessary transportation of dangerous explosives on the highways. The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation. This requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense does miich to destroy any force in the argument that application of the Regulation, would be so unfair- that it must be held invalid. That is evident from a consideration of the effect of the requirement in this case. To sustain a conviction, the Government not only must prove that petitioner could have taken another route which was both commercially practicable and appreciably safer (in its avoidance of crowded thoroughfares, etc.) than the one it did follow. It must also be shown that petitioner knew that there was such a practicable, safer route and yet deliberately took the more dangerous route through the tunnel, or that petitioner willfully neglected to exercise its duty under the Regulation to .inquire into the availability of such an alternative route. In an effort to give point to its argument, petitioner asserts that there was no practicable route its trucks might have followed which did not pass through places they were required to avoid. If it is true that in the congestion surrounding the lower Hudson there was no practicable way of crossing the River which would have avoided such points of danger to a substantially greater extent than the route taken, then petitioner has not violated the Regulation. But that is plainly a matter for proof at the trial. We are not so conversant with all the routes in that area that we may, with no. facts in the record before us, assume the allegations of the indictment to be false. We will not thus distort the judicial notice concept to strike down a regulation adopted only after much consultation with those affected and penalizing only those who knowingly violate its prohibition. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the cause to the District Court with directions to reinstate counts 1, 3, and 5 of the indictment. Affirmed. 18 U.S.C. § 835: '“The Interstate Commerce Commission shall formulate regulations for the safe transportation within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States of explosives and other dangerous articles, including flammable liquids, flammable' solids, oxidizing materials, corrosive liquids, compressed gases, and poisonous substances, which shall be binding upon all common carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce which transport' explosives or other dangerous articles by land, and upon all shippers making shipments of explosives or other dangerous articles via any common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by land or water. “Such regulations Shall be in accord with the best-known practicable .means for securing safety in transit, covering the packing, marking, •loading, handling while in transit, and the precautions necessary to determine whether the material when offered is in proper condition to transport.”. 49 CFR § 197.1 (b). “Whoever knowingly violates any such regulation shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and, if the death or bodily injury of any person results from such violation, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 18 U. S. C. § 835 (sixth paragraph). R. 2. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939). Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377 (1913); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 502-503 (1925); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947). Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 393 (1932). The provision which was there challenged and upheld was concerned basically with a requirement as to distance, a requirement applying within necessary limits of practicability, just as the Regulation here challenged is concerned basically with avoidance of designated points of. danger, within like limits of practicability. 14 Stat. 81. 35 Stat. 554, as amended, 35 Stat. 1134. 41 Stat. 1444. 49 CFR, 1938, § 85.34 (b); see Regulations for Transportation of Explosives, 2111. C. C. 351, 354 (1935). 49 CFR, 1940 Supp., § 197-7.3082: “Drivers of motor vehicles transporting inflammable liquids shall-avoid, so far as practicable, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts and dangerous crossings. So far as practicable, this shall be accomplished by prearrangement of routes.” The section was amended to its present form in 1942. 7 Fed. Reg. 2869. Compare United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7 (1947); Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, 434 (1915); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. (Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 221 U. S. 612, 620 (1911). Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 101-103 (1945); United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 524 (1942); Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19, 27-28 (1941); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348 (1918). The officers, agents, and employees of every motor carrier concerned with the transportation Of explosives and other dangerous articles are required to “become conversant” with this and other regulations applying to such transportation. 49 CFR § 197.02. This case is here to review the granting of a motion to dismiss the indictment. It should not be necessary to mention the familiar rule that, at this stage of the case, the allegations of the, indictment must be taken as true.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DIAMOND, COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS v. DIEHR et al. No. 79-1112. Argued October 14, 1980 Decided March 3, 1981 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, and Powell, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 193. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Mc-Gree, Assistant Attorney General Litvack, Harriet S. Shapiro, Robert B. Nicholson, Frederic Freilicher, Joseph F. Naka-mura, and Thomas E. Lynch. Robert E. Wichersham argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Robert F. Hess, Jay M. Cantor, and Thomas M. Freiburger. Edward S. Irons, Mary Helen Sears, and Robert P. Beshar filed a brief for National Semiconductor Corp. as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Donald R. Dunner, Kenneth E. Kuffner, and Travis Gordon White for the American Patent Law Association, Inc.; by Morton C. Jacobs for Applied Data Research, Inc.; by William L. Mathis and Harold D. Messner for Chevron Research Co.; and by Reed C. Lawlor and James W. Geriak for the Los Angeles Patent Law Association. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to determine whether a process for curing synthetic rubber which includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer is patentable subject matter under 35 IT. S. C. § 101. I The patent application at issue was filed by the respondents on August 6, 1975. The claimed invention is a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products. The process uses a mold for precisely shaping the uncured material under heat and pressure and then curing the synthetic rubber in the mold so that the product will retain its shape and be functionally operative after the molding is completed. Respondents claim that their process ensures the production of molded articles which are properly cured. Achieving the perfect cure depends upon several factors including the thickness of the article to be molded, the temperature of the molding process, and the amount of time that the article is allowed to remain in the press. It is possible using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships to calculate by means of the Arrhenius equation when to open the press and remove the cured product. Nonetheless, according to the respondents, the industry has not been able to obtain uniformly accurate cures because the temperature of the molding press could not be precisely measured, thus making it difficult to do the necessary computations to determine cure time. Because the temperature inside the press has heretofore been viewed as an uncontrollable variable, the conventional industry practice has been to calculate the cure time as the shortest time in which all parts of the product will definitely be cured, assuming a reasonable amount of mold-opening time during loading and unloading. But the shortcoming of this practice is that operating with an uncontrollable variable inevitably led in some instances to overestimating the mold-opening time and overcuring the rubber, and in other instances to underestimating that time and undercuring the product. Respondents characterize their contribution to the art to reside in the process of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold. These temperature measurements are then automatically fed into a computer which repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the Arrhenius equation. When the recalculated time equals the actual time that has elapsed since the press was closed, the computer signals a device to open the press. According to the respondents, the continuous measuring of the temperature inside the mold cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure time, and the signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new in the art. The patent examiner rejected the respondents’ claims on the sole ground that they were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U. S. C. § 101. He determined that those steps in respondents’ claims that are carried out by a computer under control of a stored program constituted nonstatutory subject matter under this Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972). The remaining steps — installing rubber in the press and the subsequent closing of the press — were “conventional and necessary to the process and cannot be the basis of patentability.” The examiner concluded that respondents’ claims defined and sought protection of a computer program for operating a rubber-molding press. The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals agreed with the examiner, but the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed. In re Diehr, 602 F. 2d 892 (1979). The court noted that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory because a computer is involved. The respondents’ claims were not directed to a mathematical algorithm or an improved method of calculation but rather recited an improved process for molding rubber articles by solving a practical problem which had arisen in the molding of rubber products. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks sought cer-tiorari arguing that the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court. Because of the importance of the question presented, we granted the writ. 445 U. S. 926 (1980). II Last Term in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303 (1980), this Court discussed the historical purposes of the patent laws and in particular 35 U. S. C. § 101. As in Chakrabarty, we must here construe 35 U. S. C. § 101 which provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” In cases of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute. Unless otherwise defined, “words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,” Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979), and, in dealing with the patent laws, we have more than once cautioned that “courts ‘should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.’ ” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, supra, at 308, quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178, 199 (1933). The Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory subject matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof].” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. Not until the patent laws were recodified in 1952 did Congress replace the word “art” with the word “process.” It is that latter word which we confront today, and in order to determine its meaning we may not be unmindful of the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act which inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.” S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952). Although the term “process” was not added to 35 U. S. C. § 101 until 1952, a process has historically enjoyed patent protection because it was considered a form of “art” as that term was used in the 1793 Act. In defining the nature of a patentable process, the Court stated: “That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. ... A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable; whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new result. The process requires that certain things should be done with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may be of secondary consequence.” Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780, 787-788 (1877). Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a “process” did not change with the addition of that term to § 101. Recently, in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972), we repeated the above definition recited in Cochrane v. Deener, adding: “Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patent-ability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.” 409 U. S., at 70. Analyzing respondents’ claims according to the above statements from our cases, we think that a physical and chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. That respondents’ claims involve the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing cannot be disputed. The respondents’ claims describe in detail a step-by-step method for accomplishing such, beginning with the loading of a mold with raw, uncured rubber and ending with the eventual opening of the press at the conclusion of the cure. Industrial processes such as this are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws. III Our conclusion regarding respondents’ claims is not altered by the fact that in several steps of the process a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used. This Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, at 67; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 (1948). “An idea of itself is not patentable,” Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507 (1874). “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853). Only last Term, we explained: “[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are ‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’ ” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S., at 309, quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., supra, at 130. Our recent holdings in Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, and Parker v. Flook, supra, both of which are computer-related, stand for no more than these long-established principles. In Benson, we held unpatentable claims for an algorithm used to convert binary code decimal numbers to equivalent pure binary numbers. The sole practical application of the algorithm was in connection with the programming of a general purpose digital computer. We defined “algorithm” as a “procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem,” and we concluded that such an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a patent. Parker v. Flook, supra, presented a similar situation. The claims were drawn to a method for computing an “alarm limit.” An “alarm limit” is simply a number and the Court concluded that the application sought to protect a formula for computing this number. Using this formula, the updated alarm limit could be calculated if several other variables were known. The application, however, did not purport to explain how these other variables were to be determined, nor did it purport “to contain any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system. All that it provides is a formula for computing an updated alarm limit.” 437 U. S., at 586. In contrast, the respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. These include installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the proper time. Obviously, one does not need a “computer” to cure natural or synthetic rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the process patent significantly lessens the possibility of “over-curing” or “undercuring,” the process as a whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject matter. Our earlier opinions lend support to our present conclusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. In Gottschalk v. Benson we noted: “It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold.” 409 U. S., at 71. Similarly, in Parker v. Flook we stated that “a process is not un-patentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.” 437 U. S., at 590. It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection. See, e. g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127 (1948); Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota Ontario Paper Co., 261 U. S. 45 (1923); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780 (1877); O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62 (1854); and Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156 (1853). As Justice Stone explained four decades ago: “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.” Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U. S. 86, 94 (1939). We think this statement in Mackay takes us a long way toward the correct answer in this case. Arrhenius’ equation is not patentable in isolation, but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the very least not barred at the threshold by § 101. In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made. The “novelty” of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate consideration under § 101. Presumably, this argument results from the language in § 101 referring to any “new and useful” process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection “subject to .the conditions and requirements of this title.” Specific conditions for patentability follow and i 102 covers in detail the conditions relating to novelty. The question therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is “wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.” In re Bergy, 596 F. 2d 952, 961 (CCPA 1979) (emphasis deleted). See also Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F. 2d 898 (CA6 1978). The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act is in accord with this reasoning. The Senate Report stated: “Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be patented, ‘subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.’ The conditions under which a patent may be obtained follow, and Section 102 covers the conditions relating to novelty.” S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952) (emphasis supplied). It is later stated in the same Report: “Section 102, in general, may be said to describe the statutory novelty required for patentability, and in-eludes, in effect, an amplification and definition of 'new’ in section 101.” Id., at 6. Finally, it is stated in the “Revision Notes”: “The corresponding section of [the] existing statute is split into two sections, section 101 relating to the subject matter for which patents may be obtained, and section 102 defining statutory novelty and stating other conditions for patentability.” Id., at 17. See also H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6, 7, and 17 (1952). In this case, it may later be determined that the respondents’ process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under § 103. A rejection on either of these grounds does not affect the determination that respondents’ claims recited subject matter which was eligible for patent protection under § 101. IV We have before us today only the question of whether respondents’ claims fall within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula. We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract. A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972), and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment. Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584 (1978). Similarly, insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. Ibid. To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent protection. On the other hand, when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101. Because we do not view respondents’ claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber products, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. It is so ordered. A “cure” is obtained by mixing curing agents into the uncured polymer in advance of molding, and then applying heat over a period of time. If the synthetic rubber is cured for the right length of time at the right temperature, it becomes a usable product. The equation is named after its discoverer Svante Arrhenius and has long been used to calculate the cure time in rubber-molding presses. The equation can be expressed as follows: In v=CZ+x wherein In v is the natural logarithm of v, the total required cure time; C is the activation constant, a unique figure for each batch of each compound being molded, determined in accordance with rheometer measurements of each batch; Z is the temperature in the mold; and x is a constant dependent on the geometry of the particular mold in the press. A rheometer is an instrument to measure flow of viscous substances. During the time a press is open for loading, it will cool. The longer it is open, the cooler it becomes and the longer it takes to reheat the press to the desired temperature range. Thus, the time necessary to raise the mold temperature to curing temperature is an unpredictable variable. The respondents claim to have overcome this problem by continuously measuring the actual temperature in the closed press through the use of a thermocouple. We note that the petitioner does not seriously contest the respondents' assertions regarding the inability of the industry to obtain accurate cures on a uniform basis. See Brief for Petitioner 3. Respondents’ application contained 11 different claims. Three examples are claims 1, 2, and 11 which provide: “1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising: “providing said computer with a data base for said press including at least, “natural logarithm conversion data (In), “the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being molded, and “a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press, “initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure, “constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding, “constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z), "repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, which is “In v=CZ+x “where v is the total required cure time, “repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and “opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates equivalence. “2. The method of claim 1 including measuring the activation energy constant for the compound being molded in the press with a rheometer and automatically updating said data base within the computer in the event of changes in the compound being molded in said press as measured by said rheometer. "11. A method of manufacturing precision molded articles from selected synthetic rubber compounds in an openable rubber molding press having at least one heated precision mold, comprising: "(a) heating said mold to a temperature range approximating a predetermined rubber curing temperature, "(b) installing prepared unmolded synthetic rubber of a known compound in a molding cavity of predetermined geometry as defined by said mold, “(c) closing said press to mold said rubber to occupy said cavity in conformance with the contour of said mold and to cure said rubber by transfer of heat thereto from said mold, “(d) initiating an interval timer upon the closure of said press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure, “(e) heating said mold during said closure to maintain the temperature thereof within said range approximating said rubber curing temperature, “(f) constantly determining the temperature of said mold at a location closely adjacent said cavity thereof throughout closure of said press, “(g) repetitively calculating at frequent periodic intervals throughout closure of said press the Arrhenius equation for reaction time of said rubber to determine total required cure time v as follows: “In v=cz+x “wherein c is an activation energy constant determined for said rubber being molded and cured in said press, z is the temperature of said mold at the time of each calculation of said Arrhenius equation, and x is a constant which is a function of said predetermined geometry of said mold, “(h) for each repetition of calculation of said Arrhenius equation herein, comparing the resultant calculated total required cure time with the monitored elapsed time measured by said interval timer, “(i) opening said press when a said comparison of calculated total required cure time and monitored elapsed time indicates equivalence, and “(j) removing from said mold the resultant precision molded and cured rubber article.” The word “process” is defined in 35 U. S. C. § 100 (b): “The term 'process’ means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” In Coming v. Burden, 15 How. 252, 267-268 (1854), this Court explained: “A process, eo nomine, is not made the subject of a patent in our act of congress. It is included under the general term ‘useful art.’ An art may require one or more processes or machines in order to produce a certain result or manufacture. The term machine includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain eifect or result. But where the result or effect is produced by chemical action, by the operation or application of some element or power of nature, or of one substance to another, such modes, methods, or operations, are called processes. A new process is usually the result of discovery; a machine, of invention. The arts of tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores, and numerous others, are usually carried on by processes as distinguished from machines. One may discover a new and useful improvement in the process of tanning, dyeing, &c., irrespective of any particular form of machinery or mechanical device. And another may invent a labor-saving machine by which this operation or process may be performed, and each may be entitled to his patent. As, for instance, A has discovered that by exposing India rubber to a certain degree of heat, in mixture or connection with certain metalie salts, he can produce a valuable product, or manufacture; he is entitled to a patent for his discovery, as a process or improvement in the art, irrespective of any machine or mechanical device. B, on the contrary, may invent a new furnace or stove, or steam apparatus, by which this process may be carried on with much saving of labor, and expense of fuel; and he will be entitled to a patent for his machine, as an improvement in the art. Yet A could not have a patent for a machine, or B for a process; but each would have a patent for the means or method of producing a certain result, or effect, and not for the result or effect produced. It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the result or effect itself. It is when the term process is used to represent the means or method of producing a result that it is patentable, and it will include all methods or means which are not effected by mechanism or mechanical combinations.” We note that as early as 1854 this Court approvingly referred to patent eligibility of processes for curing rubber. See id., at 267; n. 7, supra. In Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707 (1881), we referred to the original patent Charles Goodyear received on his process for “vulcanizing” or curing rubber. We stated: • “That a patent can be granted for a process, there can be no doubt. The patent law is not confined to new machines and new compositions of matter, but extends to any new and useful art or manufacture. A manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law. Goodyear’s patent was for a process, namely, the process of vulcanizing india-rubber by subjecting it to a high degree of heat when mixed with sulphur and a mineral salt. The apparatus for performing the process was not patented, and was not material. The patent pointed out how the process could be effected, and that was deemed sufficient.” Id., at 722. The term “algorithm” is subject to a variety of definitions. The petitioner defines the term to mean: “ '1. A fixed step-by-step procedure for accomplishing a given result; usually a simplified procedure for solving a complex problem, also a full statement of a finite number of steps. 2. A defined process or set of rules that leads [sic] and assures development of a desired output from a given input. A sequence of formulas and/or algebraic/logical steps to calculate or determine a given task; processing rules.’ ” Brief for Petitioner in Diamond v. Bradley, O. T. 1980, No. 79-855, p. 6, n. 12, quoting C. Sippl & R. Sippl, Computer Dictionary and Handbook 23 (2d ed. 1972). This definition is significantly broader than the definition this Court employed in Benson and Flook. Our previous decisions regarding the pat-entability of “algorithms” are necessarily limited to the more narrow definition employed by the Court, and we do not pass judgment on whether processes falling outside the definition previously used by this Court, but within the definition offered by the petitioner, would be patentable subject matter. As we explained in Flook, in order for an operator using the formula to calculate an updated alarm limit the operator would need to know the original alarm base, the appropriate margin of safety, the time interval that should elapse between each updating, the current temperature (or other process variable), and the appropriate weighing factor to be used to average the alarm base and the current temperature. 437 U. S., at 586. The patent application did not “explain how to select the approximate margin of safety, the weighing factor, or any of the other variables.” Ibid. We noted in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 (1948): “He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.” Although we were dealing with a “product” claim in Funk Bros., the same principle applies to a process claim. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 68 (1972). It is argued that the procedure of dissecting a claim into old and new elements is mandated by our decision in Flook which noted that a mathematical algorithm must be assumed to be within the “prior art.” It is from this language that the petitioner premises his argument that if everything other than the algorithm is determined to be old in the art, then the claim cannot recite statutory subject matter. The fallacy in this argument is that we did not hold in Flook that the mathematical algorithm could not be considered at all when making the § 101 determination. To accept the analysis proffered by the petitioner would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their implementation obvious. The analysis suggested by the petitioner would also undermine our earlier decisions regarding the criteria to consider in determining the eligibility of a process for patent protection. See, e. g., Gottschalk v. Benson, supra; and Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780 (1877). Section 102 is titled “Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent,” and provides: “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— “(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or “(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or “(c) he has abandoned the invention, or “(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an inventor’s certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an application for patent or inventor’s certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the United States, or “(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or on an international application by another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371 (c) of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or “(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or “ (g) before the applicant’s invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.” Arguably, the claims in Flook did mare than present a mathematical formula. The claims also solved the calculation in order to produce a new number or “alarm limit” and then replaced the old number with the number newly produced. The claims covered all uses of the formula in processes “comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” There are numerous such processes in the petrochemical and oil refinery industries and the claims therefore covered a broad range of potential uses. 437 U. S., at 586. The claims, however, did not cover every conceivable application of the formula. We rejected in Flook the argument that because all possible uses of the mathematical formula were not pre-empted, the claim should be eligible for patent protection. Our reasoning in Flook is in no way inconsistent with our reasoning here. A mathematical formula does not suddenly become patentable subject matter simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use. A mathematical formula in the abstract is nonstatutory subject matter regardless of whether the patent is intended to cover all uses of the formula or only limited uses. Similarly, a mathematical formula does not become patentable subject matter merely by including in the claim for the formula token postsolution activity such as the type claimed in Flook. We were careful to note in Flook that the patent application did not purport to explain how the variables used in the formula were to be selected, nor did the application contain any disclosure relating to chemical processes at work or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting the alarm limit. Ibid. All the application provided was a “formula for computing an updated alarm limit.” Ibid. The dissent’s analysis rises and falls on its characterization of respondents’ claims as presenting nothing more than “an improved method of calculating the time that the mold should remain closed during the curing process.” Post, at 206-207. The dissent states that respondents claim only to have developed “a new method of programming a digital computer in order to calculate — promptly and repeatedly — the correct curing time in a familiar process.” Post, at 213. Respondents’ claims, however, are not limited to the isolated step of “programming a digital computer.” Rather, respondents’ claims describe a process of curing rubber beginning with the loading of the mold and ending with the opening of the press and the production of a synthetic rubber product that has been perfectly cured — a result heretofore unknown in the art. See n. 5, supra. The fact that one or more of the steps in respondents’ process may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for patent protection is irrelevant to the question of whether the claims as a whole recite subject matter eligible for patent protection under § 101. As we explained when discussing machine patents in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518 (1972): “The patents were warranted not by the novelty of their elements but by the novelty of the combination they represented. Invention was recognized because Laitram’s assignors combined ordinary elements in an extraordinary way — a novel union of old means was designed to achieve new ends. Thus, for both inventions ‘the whole in some way exceed[ed] the sum of its parts.’ Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 152 (1950).” Id., at 521-522 (footnote omitted). In order for the dissent to reach its conclusion it is necessary for it to read out of respondents’ patent application all the steps in the claimed process which it determined were not novel or “inventive.” That is not the purpose of the § 101 inquiry and conflicts with the proposition recited above that a claimed invention may be entitled to patent protection even though some or all of its elements are not “novel.” The subject received some scholarly attention prior to 1964. See, e. g., Seidel, Antitrust, Patent and Copyright Law Implications of Computer Technology, 44 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 116 (1962); Comment, The Patentability of Computer Programs, 38 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 891 (1963). In 1964, the Copyright Office began registering computer programs. See 11 Copyright Soc. Bull. 361 (1964); Davis, Computer Programs and Subject Matter Patentability, 6 Rutgers J. Computers, Tech. & L. 1, 5 (1977). Also in 1964, the Patent Office Board of Appeals issued what appears to be the first published opinion concerning the patentability of a computer-related invention. See Ex parte King, 146 USPQ 590.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. BROWN SHOE CO., INC. No. 118. Argued April 25, 1966. Decided June 6, 1966. Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert S. Rifkind, Howard E. Shapiro, Milton J. Grossman, James Mcl. Henderson, Thomas F. Howder and Gerald J. Thain. Robert H. McRoberts argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Gaylord C. Burke and Edwin S. Taylor. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 5 (a) (6) of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers and directs the Commission “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.” Proceeding under the authority of § 5, the Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against the Brown Shoe Co., Inc., one of the world’s largest manufacturers of shoes with total sales of $236,946,078 for the year ending October 31, 1957. The unfair practices charged against Brown revolve around the “Brown Franchise Stores’ Program” through which Brown sells its shoes to some 650 retail stores. The complaint alleged that under this plan Brown, a corporation engaged in interstate commerce, had “entered into contracts or franchises with a substantial number of its independent retail shoe store operator customers which require said customers to restrict their purchases of shoes for resale to the Brown lines and which prohibit them from purchasing, stocking or reselling shoes manufactured by competitors of Brown.” Brown’s customers who entered into these restrictive franchise agreements, so the complaint charged, were given in return special treatment and valuable benefits which were not granted to Brown’s customers who did not enter into the agreements. In its answer to the Commission’s complaint Brown admitted that approximately 259 of its retail customers had executed written franchise agreements and that over 400 others had entered into its franchise program without execution of the franchise agreement. Also in its answer Brown attached as an exhibit an unexecuted copy of the “Franchise Agreement” which, when exec.uted by Brown’s representative and a retail shoe dealer, obligates Brown to give to the dealer but not to other customers certain valuable services, including among others architectural plans, costly merchandising records, services of a Brown field representative, and a right to participate in group insurance at lower rates than the dealer could obtain individually. In return, according to the franchise agreement set out in Brown’s answer, the retailer must make this promise: “In return I will: “1. Concentrate my business within the grades and price lines of shoes representing Brown Shoe Company Franchises of the Brown Division and will have no lines conflicting with Brown Division Brands of the Brown Shoe Company.” Brown’s answer further admitted that the operators of “such Brown Franchise Stores in individually varying degrees accept the benefits and perform the obligations contained in such franchise agreements or implicit in such Program,” and that Brown refuses to grant these benefits “to dealers who are dropped or voluntarily withdraw from the Brown Franchise Program The foregoing admissions of Brown as to the existence and operation of the franchise program were buttressed by many separate detailed fact findings of a trial examiner, one of which findings was that the franchise program effectively foreclosed Brown’s competitors from selling to a substantial number of retail shoe dealers. Based on these findings and on Brown’s admissions the Commission concluded that the restrictive contract program was an unfair method of competition within the meaning of § 5 and ordered Brown to cease and desist from its use. On review the Court of Appeals set aside the Commission’s order. In doing so the court said: “By passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act, particularly § 5 thereof, we do not believe that Congress meant to prohibit or limit sales programs such as Brown Shoe engaged in in this case. . . . The custom of giving free service to those who will buy their shoes is widespread, and we cannot agree with the Commission that it is an unfair method of competition in commerce.” 339 F. 2d 45, 56. In addition the Court of Appeals held that there was a “complete failure to prove an exclusive dealing agreement which might be held violative of § 5 of the Act.” We are asked to treat this general conclusion as though the court intended it to be a rejection of the Commission’s findings of fact. We cannot do this. Neither this statement of the court nor any other statement in the opinion indicates a purpose to hold that the evidence failed to show an agreement between Brown and more than 650 franchised dealers which restrained the dealers from buying competing lines of shoes from Brown’s competitors. Indeed, in view of the crucial admissions in Brown’s formal answer to the complaint we cannot attribute to the Court of Appeals a purpose to set aside the Commission’s findings that these restrictive agreements existed and that Brown and most of the franchised dealers in varying degrees lived up to their obligations. Thus the question we have for decision is whether the Federal Trade Commission can declare it to be an unfair practice for Brown, the second largest manufacturer of shoes in the Nation, to pay a valuable consideration to hundreds of retail shoe purchasers in order to secure a contractual promise from them that they will deal primarily with Brown and will not purchase conflicting lines of shoes from Brown’s competitors. We hold that the Commission has power to find, on the record here, such an anticompetitive practice unfair, subject of course to judicial review. See Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. FTC, 381 U. S. 357, 367. In holding that the Federal Trade Commission lacked the power to declare Brown’s program to be unfair the Court of Appeals was much influenced by and quoted at length from this Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421. That case, decided shortly after the Federal Trade Commission Act was passed, construed the Act over a strong dissent by Mr. Justice Brandéis as giving the Commission very little power to declare any trade practice unfair. Later cases of this Court, however, have rejected the Gratz view and it is now recognized in line with the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandéis in Gratz that the Commission has broad powers to declare trade practices unfair. This broad power of the Commission is particularly well established with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate these laws. The record in this case shows beyond doubt that Brown, the country’s second largest manufacturer of shoes, has a program, which requires shoe retailers, unless faithless to their contractual obligations with Brown, substantially to limit their trade with Brown’s competitors. This program obviously conflicts with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market. Brown nevertheless contends that the Commission had no power to declare the franchise program unfair without proof that its effect “may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly” which of course would have, to be proved if the Government were proceeding against Brown under § 3 of the Clayton Act rather than § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. We reject the argument that proof of this § 3 element must be made for as we pointed out above our cases hold that the Commission has power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amqunt to an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws. This power of the Commission was emphatically stated in F. T. C. v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U. S. 392, at pp. 394-395: “It is . . . clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act ... to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts ... as well as to condemn as ‘unfair methods of competition’ existing violations of them.” We hold that the Commission acted well within its authority in declaring the Brown franchise program unfair whether it was completely full blown or not. Reversed. 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §45 (a)(6) (1964 ed.). Section 5 (a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides that “Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.” In its opinion the Commission found that the services provided by Brown in its franchise program were the “prime motivation” for dealers to join and remain in the program; that the program resulted in franchised stores purchasing 75% of their total shoe requirements from Brown — the remainder being for the most part shoes which were not “conflicting” lines, as provided by the agreement; that the effect of the plan was to foreclose retail outlets to Brown’s competitors, particularly small manufacturers; and that enforcement of the plan was effected by teams of field men who called upon the shoe stores, urged the elimination of other manufacturers’ conflicting lines and reported deviations to Brown who then cancelled under a provision of the agreement. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294. See, e. g., Federal Trade Comm’n v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U. S. 304, 310; Trade Comm’n, v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 693; Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. FTC, 381 U. S. 357, 367. See, e. g., Fashion Guild v. Trade Comm’n, 312 U. S. 457, 463; Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. FTC, 381 U. S. 357, 369. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1964 ed.), declares illegal “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations . . . .” Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1964 ed.), provides in relevant part: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to . . . make a . . . contract for sale of goods . . . for . . . resale within the United States ... on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the . . . purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where the effect of such . . . condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tepd to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.” See cases cited in note 4, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SPRIETSMA, administrator of the ESTATE OF SPRIETSMA, DECEASED v. MERCURY MARINE, A DIVISION OF BRUNSWICK CORP. No. 01-706. Argued October 15, 2002 Decided December 3, 2002 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Leslie A. Brueckner argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Arthur H. Bryant, Joseph A. Power, Jr., and Todd A. Smith. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curias urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, Michael E. Robinson, Kirk K. Van Tine, Paul M. Geier, Dale C. Andrews, Peter J. Plocki, Robert F. Duncan, and G. Alex Weller. Stephen M. Shapiro argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Steffen N. Johnson, Michael W. McConnell, Kenneth S. Geller, Timothy S. Bishop, and Daniel J. Connolly Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Missouri et al. by Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, James R. Layton, State Solicitor, and Charles W. Hatfield, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Bill Loekyer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Steve Carter of Indiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike McGrath of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Patricia Madrid of New Mexico, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; and for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Ross Diamond III and Jeffrey Robert White. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by John G. Roberts, Jr., Catherine E. Stetson, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Maritime Law Association of the United States by Joshua S. Force, Raymond P. Hayden, William R. Dorsey III, and James Patrick Cooney; for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. by Kenneth W. Starr, Robert R. Gasaway, Richard A. Cordray, Ashley C. Parrish, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; and for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Alan Untereiner. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether a state common-law tort action seeking damages from the manufacturer of an outboard motor is pre-empted either by the enactment of the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U. S. C. §§4301-4311 (FBSA, 1971 Act, or Act), or by the decision of the Coast Guard in 1990 not to promulgate a regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats. I On July 10, 1995, petitioner’s wife, Jeanne Sprietsma, died as a result of a boating accident on an inland lake that spans the Kentucky-Tennessee border. She was riding in an 18-foot ski boat equipped with a 115-horsepower outboard motor manufactured by respondent, Mercury Marine, which is a division of the Brunswick Corporation (Brunswick). Apparently when the boat turned, she fell overboard and was struck by the propeller, suffering fatal injuries. Petitioner filed a nine-count complaint in an Illinois court seeking damages from Brunswick on state-law theories. Each count alleged that Brunswick had manufactured an unreasonably dangerous product because, among other things, the motor was not protected by a propeller guard. The trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed on the ground that the action was expressly pre-empted by the FBSA. 312 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 729 N. E. 2d 45 (2000). Relying on our intervening decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000), the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s express pre-emption rationale, but affirmed on implied pre-emption grounds. 197 Ill. 2d 112, 757 N. E. 2d 75 (2001). The court’s decision added to a split of authority on this precise issue arising from lawsuits against, among a few others, this particular respondent and its corporate subsidiaries. We granted certiorari, 534 U. S. 1112 (2002), to decide whether the FBSA pre-empts state common-law claims of this character. Because the pre-emption defense raises a threshold issue, we have no occasion to consider the merits of petitioner’s claims, or even whether the claims are viable as a matter of Illinois law. We must, however, evaluate three distinct theories that may support the pre-emption defense: (1) that the 1971 Act expressly pre-empts common-law claims; (2) that the Coast Guard’s decision not to regulate propeller guards pre-empts the claims; and (3) that the potential conflict between diverse state rules and the federal interest in a uniform system of regulation impliedly preempts such claims. Before considering each of these theories, we review the history of federal regulation in this area. II The 1971 Act is the most recent and most comprehensive of the several statutes that Congress has enacted to improve the safe operation of recreational boats. A 1910 enactment required three classes of motorboats to carry certain lights, sound signals, life preservers, and fire extinguishers. Act of June 9, 1910, 36 Stat. 462. In 1918, Congress passed a law that required the numbering of motorboats over 16 feet long, Act of June 7, 1918, ch. 93, 40 Stat. 602, and in 1940, it reenacted the above requirements, provided a system of federal inspection, and authorized penalties for the reckless operation of motorboats, Act of Apr. 25, 1940, ch. 155, 54 Stat. 163. In 1958, Congress enacted additional numbering requirements to be administered by the States and directed the States to compile and transmit boating accident statistics to the Secretary of the Treasury. Federal Boating Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1754. Section 9 of the 1958 Act expressed a policy of encouraging uniformity of boating laws insofar as practicable. The accident statistics compiled by the States presumably were instrumental in persuading the 1971 Congress that additional federal legislation was necessary. In its statement of purposes, the FBSA recites that it was enacted “to improve boating safety,” to authorize “the establishment of national construction and performance standards for boats and associated equipment,” and to encourage greater “uniformity of boating laws and regulations as among the several States and the Federal Government.” Pub. L. 92-75, §2, 85 Stat. 213-214. Three of the provisions implementing these goals are particularly relevant to this case. Section 5 of the FBSA, as amended and codified in 46 U. S. C. § 4302, authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations establishing “minimum safety standards for recreational vessels and associated equipment,” and requiring the installation or use of such equipment. The Secretary has delegated this authority to the Coast Guard. See 49 CFR § 1.46(n)(1) (1997). Before exercising that authority, the Coast Guard must consider certain factors, such as the extent to which the proposed regulation will contribute to boating safety, and must consult with a special National Boating Safety Advisory Council appointed pursuant to § 33 of the Act, 46 U. S. C. §13110. The Advisory Council consists of 21 members, 7 representatives from each of three different groups: (1) “State officials responsible for State boating safety programs,” (2) boat and equipment manufacturers, and (3) “national recreational boating organizations and . . . the general public.” § 13110(b). The Coast Guard may also issue exemptions from its regulations if it determines that boating safety “will not be adversely affected.” §4305. Section 10 of the Act, as codified in 46 U. S. C. § 4306, sets forth the Act’s pre-emption clause and thus provides the basis for respondent’s express pre-emption argument. It states in full: “Unless permitted by the Secretary under section 4305 of this title, a State or political subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for associated equipment (except insofar as the State or political subdivision may, in the absence of the Secretary’s disapproval, regulate the carrying or use of marine safety articles to meet uniquely hazardous conditions or circumstances within the State) that is not identical to a regulation prescribed under section 4B02 of this title.” Section 40, 46 U. S. C. §4311, sets forth the penalties that may be assessed against persons who violate the Act. At the end of that section, Congress included the following saving clause: “Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law. ” § 4311(g). Federal Regulation Under the FBSA The day after the President signed the FBSA into law, the Secretary of Transportation took action that was based on the assumption that § 10 would pre-empt existing state regulation that “is not identical to a regulation prescribed” under § 5 of the Act, even if no such federal regulation had been promulgated. On August 11, 1971, the Secretary issued a statement exempting all then-existing state laws from preemption under the Act. 36 Fed. Reg. 15764-15765. He explained that boating safety would “not be adversely affected by continuing in effect those existing laws and regulations of the various States and political subdivisions” until new federal regulations could be issued. Id., at 15765. One year later, on August 4,1972, the Coast Guard issued its first regulations under § 5 of the Act. See 37 Fed. Reg. 15777-15785. Those regulations included boat performance and safety standards such as requirements for hull identification numbers, maximum capacity and warnings of such capacity, and minimum boat flotation. They did not include any propeller guard requirement. After those federal regulations became effective, the Secretary limited the scope of his original blanket exemption to pre-empt those “State statutes and regulations” that concerned requirements covered by the 1972 regulations. See 38 Fed. Reg. 6914-6915 (1973). Existing state laws that regulated matters not covered by the federal regulations continued to be exempted from preemption. Ibid. In the years since, the Coast Guard has promulgated a host of detailed regulations. Some prescribe the use of specified equipment, such as personal flotation devices and visual distress signals, 33 CFR pts. 175(B), (C) (2001), and certain procedures, such as compliance labeling by manufacturers and prompt accident reporting by operators, pts. 181(B), 173(C). See generally pts. 173-181.. Other regulations impose precise standards governing the design and manufacture of boats themselves and of associated equipment, such as electrical and fuel systems, ventilation, and “start-in-gear protection” devices. Pt. 183; cf. Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U. S. 235, 242 (2002) (“Congress has assigned a broad and important mission to the Coast Guard. . . . [T]he Coast Guard possesses authority to promulgate and enforce regulations promoting the safety of vessels ...”). Coast Guard Consideration of Propeller Guard Regulation In May 1988, the Coast Guard decided that the number of recreational boating accidents in which persons in the water were struck by propellers merited a special study. Acting at the request of the Coast Guard, the National Boating Safety Advisory Council appointed a special Propeller Guard Subcommittee. The subcommittee was directed to review “the available data on the prevention of propeller-strike accidents” and to study the “various methods of shrouding propellers to prevent contact with [a] person in the water.” App. 43. After 18 months of study, the subcommittee recommended that the Coast Guard “should take no regulatory action to require propeller guards.” Id., at 40. Its recommendation rested upon findings that, given current technology, feasible propeller guards might prevent penetrating injuries but increase the potential for blunt trauma caused by collision with the guard, which enlarges the boat’s underwater profile; feasible models would cause power and speed loss at higher speeds; and it would be “prohibitive[ly]” expensive to retrofit all existing boats with propeller guards because “[n]o simple universal design suitable for all boats and motors in existence” had been proved feasible. Id., at 36-38. The Advisory Council endorsed the subcommittee’s recommendation, as did the Coast Guard. In a 1990 letter to the Council, the Chief of the Coast Guard’s Office of Navigation Safety and Waterway Services agreed that the available accident data did not support the adoption of a regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats, but stated that the Coast Guard would continue to review information “regarding development and testing of new propeller guarding devices or other information on the state of the art.” Id., at 81. In 1995, 1996, and 1997, the Coast Guard invited public comment on various proposals to reduce the number of injuries involving propeller strikes. In April 2001, the Advisory Council recommended that the Coast Guard develop four specific regulations. See 66 Fed. Reg. 63645, 63647. In response, in December 2001, the Coast Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking addressing one of the recommendations. The proposed rule, if adopted, would require an owner of a nonplaning houseboat for rent to equip her vessel with either a propeller guard or “a combination of three propeller injury avoidance measures.” Ibid. The Advisory Council also recommended that the Coast Guard require “manufacturers and importers of new planing vessels 12 feet to 26 feet in length with propellers aft of the transom to select and install one of several factory installed propeller injury avoidance methods.” Ibid. Although the Coast Guard has indicated that this recommendation, along with the Advisory Council’s other recommendations, will be addressed in “subsequent regulatory projects,” ibid., it has not yet issued any regulation either requiring or prohibiting propeller guards on recreational planing vessels such as the boat involved in this case. III Because the FBSA contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658, 664 (1993). Here, the express pre-emption clause in § 10 applies to “a [state or local] law or regulation.” 46 U. S. C. §4306. We think that this language is most naturally read as not encompassing common-law claims for two reasons. First, the article “a” before “law or regulation” implies a discreteness — which is embodied in statutes and regulations — that is not present in the common law. Second, because “a word is known by the company it keeps,” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995), the terms “law” and “regulation” used together in the pre-emption clause indicate that Congress pre-empted only positive enactments. If “law” were read broadly so as to include the common law, it might also be interpreted to include regulations, which would render the express reference to “regulation” in the pre-emption clause superfluous. The Act’s saving clause buttresses this conclusion. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S., at 867-868. It states that “[compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law.” § 4311(g). As we held in Geier, the “saving clause assumes that there are some significant number of common-law liability cases to save [and t]he language of the preemption provision permits a narrow reading that excludes common-law actions.” Id., at 868. The saving clause is also relevant for an independent reason. The contrast between its general reference to “liability at common law” and the more specific and detailed description of what is pre-empted by § 10 — including the exception for state regulations addressing “uniquely hazardous conditions” — indicates that § 10 was drafted to pre-empt performance standards and equipment requirements imposed by statute or regulation. Our interpretation of the statute’s language does not produce anomalous results. It would have been perfectly rational for Congress not to pre-empt common-law claims, which — unlike most administrative and legislative regulations — necessarily perform an important remedial role in compensating accident victims. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 251 (1984). Indeed, compensation is the manifest object of the saving clause, which focuses not on state authority to regulate, but on preserving “liability at common law or under State law.” In context, this phrase surely refers to private damages remedies. We thus agree with the Illinois Supreme Court’s conclusion that petitioner’s common-law tort claims are not expressly preempted by the FBSA. IV Even if §10 of the FBSA does not expressly pre-empt state common-law claims, respondent contends that such claims are implicitly pre-empted by the entire statute, and more specifically by the Coast Guard’s decision not to regulate propeller guards. Both are viable pre-emption theories: “We have recognized that a federal statute implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively, English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 78-79 (1990), or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law. We have found implied conflict preemption where it is ‘impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements,’ id., at 79, or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).” Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S. 280, 287 (1995). Moreover, Congress’ inclusion of an express pre-emption clause “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles,” Geier, 529 U. S., at 869 (emphasis in original), that find implied pre-emption “where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Freightliner Corp., 514 U. S., at 287 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We are not persuaded, however, that the FBSA has any such pre-emptive effect. We first consider, and reject, respondent’s reliance on the Coast Guard’s decision not to adopt a regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats. It is quite wrong to view that decision as the functional equivalent of a regulation prohibiting all States and their political subdivisions from adopting such a regulation. The decision in 1990 to accept the subcommittee’s recommendation to “take no regulatory action,” App. 80, left the law applicable to propeller guards exactly the same as it had been before the subcommittee began its investigation. Of course, if a state common-law claim directly conflicted with a federal regulation promulgated under the Act, or if it were impossible to comply with any such regulation without incurring liability under state common law, pre-emption would occur. This, however, is not such a case. Indeed, history teaches us that a Coast Guard decision not to regulate a particular aspect of boating safety is fully consistent with an intent to preserve state regulatory authority pending the adoption of specific federal standards. That was the course the Coast Guard followed in 1971 immediately after the Act was passed, and again when it imposed its first regulations in 1972 and 1973. The Coast Guard has never taken the position that the litigation of state common-law claims relating to an area not yet subject to federal regulation would conflict with “the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). The Illinois Supreme Court concluded “that the Coast Guard’s failure to promulgate a propeller guard requirement here equates to a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate pursuant to the policy of the FBSA.” 197 Ill. 2d, at 128, 757 N. E. 2d, at 85. With regard to policies defined by Congress, we have recognized that “a federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left ^regulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate.” Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U. S. 375, 384 (1983); see also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U. S. 767, 774 (1947) (state law is pre-empted “where failure of the federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the statute”). In this instance, however, the Illinois Supreme Court’s conclusion does not accurately reflect the Coast Guard’s entire explanation for its decision: “The regulatory process is very structured and stringent regarding justification. Available propeller guard accident data do not support imposition of a regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats. Regulatory action is also limited by the many questions about whether a universally acceptable propeller guard is available or technically feasible in all modes of boat operation. Additionally, the question of retrofitting millions of boats would certainly be a major economic consideration.” App. 80. This statement reveals only a judgment that the available data did not meet the FBSA’s “stringent” criteria for federal regulation. The Coast Guard did not take the further step of deciding that, as a matter of policy, the States and their political subdivisions should not impose some version of propeller guard regulation, and it most definitely did not reject propeller guards as unsafe. The Coast Guard’s apparent focus was on the lack of any “universally acceptable” propeller guard for “all modes of boat operation.” But nothing in its official explanation would be inconsistent with a tort verdict premised on a jury’s finding that some type of propeller guard should have been installed on this particular kind of boat equipped with respondent’s particular type of motor. Thus, although the Coast Guard’s decision not to require propeller guards was undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, it does not convey an “authoritative” message of a federal policy against propeller guards. And nothing in the Coast Guard’s recent regulatory activities alters this conclusion. The Coast Guard’s decision not to impose a propeller guard requirement presents a sharp contrast to the decision of the Secretary of Transportation that was given pre-emptive effect in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000). As the Solicitor General had argued in that ease, the promulgation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 embodied an affirmative “policy judgment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car.” Id., at 881. In finding pre-emption, we expressly placed “weight upon the DOT’S interpretation of FMVSS 208’s objectives and its conclusion, as set forth in the Government’s brief, that a tort suit such as this one would ‘ “ ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the aceomplishment and execution”” of those objectives .... Congress has delegated to DOT authority to implement the statute; the subject matter is technical; and the relevant history and background are complex and extensive. The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impaet of state requirements.” Id., at 883. In the case before us today, the Solicitor General, joined by counsel for the Coast Guard, has informed us that the agency does not view the 1990 refusal to regulate or any subsequent regulatory actions by the Coast Guard as having any preemptive effect. Our reasoning in Geier therefore provides strong support for petitioner’s submission. V Even though the refusal to regulate propeller guards in 1990 had no pre-emptive effect, it is possible that the statutory scheme as a whole implicitly pre-empted common-law claims such as petitioner’s when it was enacted in 1971. If that were so, the exemption carried forward by the Secretary in 1973 after the first federal regulations were adopted might have saved existing state common-law rules “in effect on the effective date” of the 1971 Act, so far as those rules relate to propeller guards. 38 Fed. Reg., at 6915. But even if that is not the case, we think it clear that the FBSA did not so completely occupy the field of safety regulation of recreational boats as to foreclose state common-law remedies. In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978), we considered a federal statute that directed the Secretary of Transportation to determine “which oil tankers are sufficiently safe to be allowed to proceed in the navigable waters of the United States,” and after inspection to certify “each vessel as sufficiently safe to protect the marine environment.” Id., at 163, 165. We held that this scheme of mandatory federal regulation implicitly pre-empted the power of the State of Washington “to exclude from Puget Sound vessels certified by the Secretary as having acceptable design characteristics, unless they satisfy the different and higher design requirements imposed by state law.” Id., at 165. As we explained in United States v. Locke, 529 U. S. 89 (2000), the analysis in Ray was governed by field-preemption rules because the rules at issue were in a “field reserved for federal regulation” and “Congress ha[d] left no room for state regulation of these matters.” 529 U. S., at 111. In particular, Title II of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) required the Secretary to issue “such rules and regulations as may be necessary with respect to the design, construction, and operation of the covered vessels.” 435 U. S., at 161. The Illinois Supreme Court relied on both Ray and Locke to find petitioner’s claims impliedly pre-empted. But the FBSA, unlike Title II of the PWSA, does not require the Coast Guard to promulgate comprehensive regulations covering every aspect of recreational boat safety and design; nor must the Coast Guard certify the acceptability of every recreational boat subject to its jurisdiction. Moreover, neither Title II of the PWSA nor the holding in either Ray or Locke purported to pre-empt possible common-law claims, whereas the FBSA expressly preserves such claims. The FBSA might be interpreted as expressly occupying the field with respect to state positive laws and regulations but its structure and framework do not convey a “clear and manifest” intent, English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), to go even further and implicitly pre-empt all state common law relating to boat manufacture. Rather, our conclusion that the Act’s express pre-emption clause does not cover common-law claims suggests the opposite intent. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 517 (1992); id., at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Nor is a clear and manifest intent to sweep away state common law established by an unembellished statement in a House Report that the 1971 Act “preempts the field on boating standards or regulations.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-324, p. 11 (1971). The statement was made prior to the amendment containing the saving clause, and nothing in the entire report suggests that it meant the occupied “field” to include judge-made common law. Respondent ultimately relies upon one of the FBSA’s main goals: fostering uniformity in manufacturing regulations. Uniformity is undoubtedly important to the industry, and the statute’s pre-emption clause was meant to “assur[e] that manufacture for the domestic trade will not involve compliance with widely varying local requirements.” S. Rep. 20. Yet this interest is not unyielding, as is demonstrated both by the Coast Guard’s early grants of broad exemptions for state regulations and by the position it has taken in this litigation. Absent a contrary decision by the Coast Guard, the concern with uniformity does not justify the displacement of state common-law remedies that compensate accident victims and their families and that serve the Act’s more prominent objective, emphasized by its title, of promoting boating safety. The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The complaint alleges that the Sprietsmas and the owners of the boat were residents of Illinois and that the boat had been purchased in Illinois. App. 101. Id., at 100-122. Compare Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F. 3d 1494 (CA11) (finding implied pre-emption under the FBSA), cert. granted, 522 U. S. 978 (1997), cert. dismissed, 523 U. S. 1113 (1998); Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F. 3d 430 (CA8) (finding express pre-emption under the FBSA), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 866 (1995); and Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 454 Mich. 20, 557 N. W. 2d 541 (1997) (finding express pre-emption under the FBSA), with Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S. W. 2d 246 (Tex.) (holding that federal law did not pre-empt state law in this context), cert. denied sub nom. Vivian Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. Moore, 513 U. S. 1057 (1994). See also Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F. 3d 598 (CA5 2000) (holding that common-law claims based on the manufacturer’s failure to provide a propeller guard were impliedly pre-empted by the FBSA; Outboard Marine, the successor to Neal Glaser Marine, declared bankruptcy shortly after the petition for certiorari was filed), cert. denied sub nom. Lady v. Outboard Marine Corp., 532 U. S. 941 (2001). Brunswick has asserted that federal maritime law governs this case. Because this argument was not raised below, it is waived. The Senate Report on the 1971 Act observed that approximately 40 million Americans engaged in recreational boating activities every year, and that nearly 7,000 persons had died in boating accidents during the preceding 5-year period. S. Rep. No. 92-248, pp. 6-7 (1971) (hereinafter S. Rep.). The Report added: “It seems apparent that the annual loss of life is of sufficiently alarming proportion that the Federal Government should require products , involved to be built to standards of safety commensurate with the risks associated with their use. Similar federal legislation exists with regard to other products, including aircraft and motor vehicles. Also, safety standards and requirements for certain categories of larger commercial vessels have existed for many years.” Id., at 13. Title 46 U. S. C. §4302 provides: “(a) The Secretary may prescribe regulations— “(1) establishing minimum safety standards for recreational vessels and associated equipment, and establishing procedures and tests required to measure conformance with those standards, with each standard— “(A) meeting the need for recreational vessel safety; and “(B) being stated, insofar as practicable, in terms of performance; “(2) requiring the installation, carrying, or use of associated equipment ... on recreational vessels and classes of recreational vessels subject to this chapter, and prohibiting the installation, carrying, or use of associated equipment that does not conform with safety standards established under this section ....” “In prescribing regulations under this section, the Secretary shall, among other things— “(1) consider the need for and the extent to which the regulations will contribute to recreational vessel safety; “(2) consider relevant available recreational vessel safety standards, statistics, and data, including public and private research, development, testing, and evaluation; “(3) not compel substantial alteration of a recreational vessel or item of associated equipment that is in existence, or the construction or manufacture of which is begun before the effective date of the regulation, but subject to that limitation may require compliance or performance, to avoid a substantial risk of personal injury to the public, that the Secretary considers appropriate in relation to the degree of hazard that the compliance will correct; and “(4) consult with the National Boating Safety Advisory Council established under section 13110 of this title about the considerations referred to in clauses (1M3) of this subsection.” Between 1976 and 1990, the Coast Guard officially reported about 100 propeller-strike injuries in the United States per year. App. in Lewis v. Brunswick, O. T. 1997, No. 97-288, p. 170. A 1992 study by members of the Johns Hopkins University Injury Prevention Center and the Institute for Injury Reduction concluded that, when adjusted for underreporting, “the true number of propeller injuries and fatalities may be closer to . .. 2,000-3,000 per year.” Id., at 199. “After discussing the alternatives and their cost, the Council recommended that the Coast Guard ... develop four specific regulations: “(1) Require owners of all propeller driven vessels 12 feet in length and longer with propellers aft of the transom to display propeller warning labels and to employ an emergency cut-off switch, where installed; “(2) Require manufacturers and importers of new planing vessels 12 feet to 26 feet in length with propellers aft of the transom to select and install one of several factory installed propeller injury avoidance methods; “(3) Require manufacturers and importers of new non-planing vessels 12 feet in length and longer with propellers aft of the transom to select and install one of several factory installed propeller injury avoidance methods; and “(4) Require owners of all non-planing rental boats with propellers aft of the transom to install either a jet propulsion system or a propeller guard or all of several propeller injury avoidance measures.” 66 Fed. Reg., at 63647. The FBSA itself imposes civil money penalties payable to the United States, as well as imprisonment for willful violations, 46 U. S. C. §4311, but does not authorize any private damages remedies for persons injured by noncomplying operators, boats, or equipment. Indeed, in response to the Propeller Guard Subcommittee’s recommendation in favor of “educational and awareness campaigns,” the Coast Guard indicated that it would publish a series of articles “aimed at avoiding boat/propeller strike accidents,” which could include the topic of “available propeller guards.” App. 82-83.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, et al. v. WALD et al. No. 83-436. Argued April 24, 1984 Decided June 28, 1984 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 244. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 262. Deputy Solicitor General Bator argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Carolyn F. Corwin, Michael F. Hertz, and Davis R. Robinson. Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Eric Lieberman, Charles S. Sims, Burt Neubome, Michael Ratner, Jules Lobel, and Harold A. Mayerson. Michael E. Deutsch filed a brief for the Chicago Council of Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Herbert Semmel filed a brief for the United National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States et al. as amici curiae. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents are American citizens who want to travel to Cuba. They are inhibited from doing so by a Treasury Department regulation, first promulgated in 1963, which prohibits any transaction involving property in which Cuba, or any national thereof, has “any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.” 31 CPR § 515.201(b) (1983) (Regulation 201(b)). For a period of about five years, “transactions ordinarily incident to” travel to and from as well as within Cuba were, with some limitations, exempted from the broad prohibition of Regulation 201(b) by a general license. See 31 CFR §515.560 (1983). But this general license was amended in 1982, and the scope of permissible economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba was significantly narrowed. 47 Fed. Reg. 17030 (1982). Respondents challenged the amendment to the general license on constitutional and statutory grounds and sought a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. The District Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that respondents had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and refused to issue the injunction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. On appeal taken by respondents, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, concluding that the challenged amendment lacked statutory authority, vacated the District Court’s order and remanded with instructions to issue the preliminary injunction. 708 F. 2d 794 (1983). We granted the Government’s application for a stay of the mandate, 463 U. S. 1223 (1983), as well as the petition for certiorari, 464 U. S. 990 (1983), and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. H Regulation 201(b) was promulgated in 1963 as part of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR pt. 515 (1963), implemented under the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), 40 Stat. 411, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §1 et seq. See 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1963). At that time, §5(b) of TWEA gave the President broad authority to impose comprehensive embargoes on foreign countries as one means of dealing with both peacetime emergencies and times of war. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations constitute such an embargo. They were originally adopted to deal with the peacetime emergency created by Cuban attempts to destabilize governments throughout Latin America. See Presidential Proclamation No. 3447, 3 CFR 157 (1959-1963 Comp.). “[E]xcept as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury,” Regulation 201(b) prohibits all “transactions in-volv[ing] property in which [Cuba], or any national thereof, has . . . any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect_” 31 CFR § 515.201(b) (1983). In 1977, Regulation 560 was added to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. See 31 CFR §515.560 (1977). Regulation 560 embodied a general license permitting “persons who visit Cuba to pay for their transportation and maintenance expenditures (meals, hotel bills, taxis, etc.) while in Cuba.” 42 Fed. Reg. 16621 (1977). Thus, travel-related economic transactions with Cuba were, for the most part, exempted from the complete embargo of Regulation 201(b). All persons engaging in travel-related transactions, however, were required to make “a full and accurate record of' each such transaction” and to keep those records available for inspection for at least two years. §515.601. And the general license contained in Regulation 560 was subject to revocation or modification “at any time.” § 515.805. Later in 1977, § 5(b) of TWEA was amended to limit the President’s power to act pursuant to that statute solely to times of war. In the same bill, a new law was enacted to cover the President’s exercise of emergency economic powers in response to peacetime crises. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Title II, Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 et seq., codified at 50 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. The authorities granted to the President by § 203 of IEEPA are essentially the same as those in § 5(b) of TWEA, but the conditions and procedures for their exercise are different. Section 202(a) of IEEPA provides that the authorities granted the President by §203 “may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” 50 U. S. C. § 1701(a). The President is also required, “in every possible instance,” to consult with Congress prior to exercising his IEEPA authorities and, once such authorities have been exercised, to report to Congress every six months on the actions taken and any changes in the underlying circumstances. § 1703. However, rather than requiring the President to declare a new national emergency in order to continue existing economic embargoes, such as that against Cuba, Congress decided to grandfather existing exercises of the President’s “national emergency” authorities. Section 101(b) of Public Law 95-223 provides: “Notwithstanding the amendment made by subsection (a), the authorities conferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, which were being exercised with respect to a country on July 1, 1977, as a result of a national emergency declared by the President before such date, may continue to be exercised with respect to such country . . . 91 Stat. 1625, note following 50 U. S. C. App. § 5. This grandfather provision also provided that “[t]he President may extend the exercise of such authorities for one-year periods upon a determination for each such extension that the exercise of such authorities with respect to such country for another year is in the national interest of the United States.” Ibid. Presidents Carter and Reagan, in each of the years since TWE A was amended, have determined that the continued exercise of § 5(b) authorities with respect to Cuba is in the national interest. In 1982, in order to “reduce Cuba’s hard currency earnings from travel by U. S. persons to and within Cuba,” Regulation 560 was amended to curtail the general license permitting travel-related economic transactions. 47 Fed. Reg. 17030 (1982). As amended, Regulation 560 only licenses travel-related economic transactions in connection with certain types of travel, such as official visits, news gathering, professional research, and visits to close relatives. 31 CFR § 515.560(a)(1) (1983). “[FJully sponsored or hosted travel,” which does not involve any economic benefit to Cuba, is also permitted. §515.560(j). General tourist and business travel, however, is specifically excluded from the authorization contained in the general license. § 515.560(a)(3). As noted, respondents challenged the amendment to Regulation 560 on a number of statutory and constitutional grounds. Most important of these contentions, and the only one passed on by the court below, is the claim that the amendment is invalid because it was not promulgated in accordance with the procedures mandated by IEEPA. The Government agrees that it did not follow the procedures set out in IEEPA when it amended Regulation 560, but relies for statutory authority for the amendment on the grandfather clause of Public Law 95-223, which preserved those “authorities . . . being exercised” pursuant to § 5(b) of TWEA on July 1, 1977. The Government argues that the “authority” to regulate travel-related transactions with Cuba was being exercised on July 1, 1977, as part of the general regulation of property transactions contained in Regulation 201(b). Thus, even though most such transactions were not actually prohibited on July 1 because of the general license, the Government contends that the President’s authority to prohibit them was preserved. The Court of Appeals gave three reasons for rejecting the Government’s argument based, in turn, on the plain language, the legislative history, and the underlying purpose of the 1977 amendment to TWEA. First, “as a matter of common sense and common English,” the court stated, restricting commodity purchases and restricting travel purchases would seem to be very different “exercises” of authority— “different enough at least not to count as the exercise of the same authority.” 708 F. 2d, at 796. Thus, since “the government was not restricting travel to Cuba” on July 1, 1977, its authority to do so was not grandfathered. Ibid. Second, the court thought that the legislative history showed that Congress intended the grandfather clause to be narrowly interpreted to allow the President to continue in effect only those specific “restrictions” actually in place on July 1, 1977. “It did not want the existence of one sort of TWEA restriction in 1977 to serve as a justification for imposing a new one.” Id., at 798. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that the purpose behind the grandfather clause was solely to preserve current restrictions as bargaining chips in negotiations with the affected countries. To require the President to announce publicly a new declaration of emergency in order to preserve existing restrictions on transactions with those countries might have undesirable ramifications. On the other hand, simply to abandon the restrictions without any quid pro quo could be equally undesirable. Thus, the grandfather clause allowed current restrictions to remain in place. But, the court concluded, it would go beyond the purposes of the clause to permit the President to augment his bargaining powers by adding new restrictions. Id., at. 799-800. II We find the reasoning of the Court of Appeals ultimately unconvincing on all three counts. The language of the grandfather clause, read in conjunction with § 5(b) of TWEA, supports the Government’s contention that, in the relevant sense, the “authority” to regulate all property transactions with Cuba, including travel-related transactions, was being “exercised” on July 1, 1977 and was, therefore, preserved. And neither the legislative history nor the apparent purpose of the 1977 Act sufficiently supports the contrary contention that what Congress actually intended, despite the statutory language, was to freeze existing restrictions, so that any adjustment of pending embargoes would require the declaration of a new “national emergency” under the procedures of IEEPA. The grandfather clause in Public Law 95-223 refers to the “authorities conferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. ” Among those authorities is the authority to “regulate . . . any . . . transactions involving . . . any property in which any foreign country or any national thereof has had any interest.” 50 U. S. C. App. § 5(b). Section 5(b) draws no distinction between the President’s authority over travel-related transactions and his authority over other property transactions. For purposes of TWEA, it is clear that the authority to regulate travel-related transactions is merely part of the President’s general authority to regulate property transactions. Thus, there is no basis for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, drawn without reference to the actual language of TWEA, that the regulation of travel-related purchases must be based on a separate authority from that governing the regulation of other transactions involving property. In fact, they are based on the same authority. It is also clear that the President’s authority to regulate property transactions with Cuba and Cubans was being exercised on July 1, 1977. Regulation 201(b), which was in force on July 1, 1977, and continues in full force and effect today, explicitly prohibits, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, all transactions involving property in which Cuba or Cuban nationals have “any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.” 31 CFR § 515.201(b) (1983). Thus, absent an explicit license, all transactions involving Cuban property are and, at all relevant times, have been prohibited. On July 1, 1977, most travel-related transactions with Cuba and Cuban nationals were permitted by a general license. But that does not change the fact that the President was exercising his §5(b) authorities with respect to those transactions. Section 5(b) specifically states that the authorities granted therein may be exercised “by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise.” On July 1, 1977, the President was exercising his authority over travel-related transactions with Cuba and Cubans by means of a general license which exempted them from the categorical prohibition of Regulation 201(b). At that time, travel-related transactions involving Cuban property were still subject to the recordkeeping requirements of 31 CFR §515.601 (1977). Other restrictions were also imposed. See n. 6, supra. And the general license was expressly subject to revocation, amendment, or modification “at any time.” § 515.805. Thus, travel-related transactions “were specifically made subordinate to further actions which the President might take . . . .” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 673 (1981). And when the general license was amended in 1982, so that most travel-related transactions were no longer specifically authorized, such transactions automatically became subject, once again, to the prohibition of Regulation 201(b). Since the authority to regulate travel-related transactions was among those “authorities conferred upon the President” by § 5(b) of TWEA “which were being exercised” with respect to Cuba on July 1, 1977, it seems to us to follow from a natural reading of the grandfather clause that the authority to regulate such transactions “may continue to be exercised” with respect to Cuba after that date. Pub. L. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625. And since the President’s authority under § 5(b) to regulate by means of licenses includes the authority to “prevent or prohibit” as well as the authority to “direct and compel,” 50 U. S. C. App. § 5(b)(1)(B), it also follows that the grandfather clause constitutes adequate statutory authority for the 1982 amendment to the general license, the practical effect of which was to prevent travel to Cuba. A contrary, more constricted reading of the grandfather clause does undue violence to the words chosen by Congress. The clause refers to “authorities” being exercised on July 1, 1977, not to “prohibitions” actually in place on that date. And it provides that those authorities “may continue to be exercised.” If Congress had wished to freeze existing restrictions, it could easily have done so explicitly. The fact that it did not do so, but instead used the generic term “authorities,” indicates that Congress intended the President to retain some flexibility to adjust existing embargoes. The Court of Appeals felt that its more constricted reading of the grandfather clause comported with the legislative history surrounding the enactment of Public Law 95-223. We would certainly agree that the following colloquy between Representative Cavanaugh and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Bergsten, the administration’s spokesman for the bill, supports a narrow reading of the grandfather clause: “MR. CAVANAUGH. ... First of all, Mr. Bergsten, would it be your understanding that [the grandfather clause] would strictly limit and restrict the grandfathering of powers currently being exercised under 5(b) [of TWEA] to those specific uses of the authorities granted in 5(b) being employed as of June 1, 1977. “MR. BERGSTEN. Yes, sir. “MR. CAVANAUGH. And it would preclude the expansion by the President of the authorities that might be included in 5(b) but are not being employed as of June 1, 1977. “MR. BERGSTEN. That is right.” We also agree that a narrow construction at least appears to be supported by Representative Bingham’s objections to, and the subsequent elimination of, language in a Subcommittee staff draft which would have expressly grandfathered presently unused authorities of the President under §5(b) of TWEA so long as they were used to deal with a “set of circumstances” already being dealt with under some other authority. But even if these were the only available indications of congressional intent apart from the language which Congress enacted, we would have grave doubts that they were sufficient to overcome what seems to us to be the clear, generic meaning of the word “authorities.” Oral testimony of witnesses and individual Congressmen, unless very precisely directed to the intended meaning of particular words in a statute, can seldom be expected to be as precise as the enacted language itself. To permit what we regard as clear statutory language to be materially altered by such colloquies, which often take place before the bill has achieved its final form, would open the door to the inadvertent, or perhaps even planned, undermining of the language actually voted on by Congress and signed into law by the President. In our opinion, a full examination of the legislative history — the Subcommittee hearings, markup sessions, floor debates, and House and Senate Reports — does not support the view that only those restrictions actually in place on July 1, 1977, were to be grandfathered. The crucial point is that the discussion, even in the Cavanaugh and Bingham excerpts, is consistently carried on in terms of existing “powers” and “authorities,” not in terms of existing “restrictions” or “prohibitions.” The legislative history simply does not countenance the suggestion that Congress really meant “restrictions” even though it wrote “authorities.” Finally, we reject the Court of Appeals’ view that the purpose of the grandfather clause was merely to preserve existing bargaining chips in negotiations with affected countries. There are some statements in the Subcommittee hearings to the effect that existing embargoes should not be abandoned without exacting some sort of negotiated quid pro quo. But it is clear that the prime reason that existing embargoes were grandfathered was to keep the bill, H. R. 7738 — which included IEEPA as well as the amendments to TWEA — from becoming too controversial. Members of the Subcommittee feared that if current embargoes were implicated the bill would bog down in partisan disputes, thereby delaying implementation of the new procedures of IEEPA. The House Report is explicit on this point. “Certain current uses of the authorities affected by H. R. 7738 are controversial — particularly the total U. S. trade embargoes of Cuba and Vietnam. The committee considered carefully whether to revise, or encourage the President to revise, such existing uses of international economic transaction controls, and thereby the policies they reflect, in this legislation. The committee decided that to revise current uses, and to improve policies and procedures that wall govern future uses, in a single bill would be difficult and divisive. Committee members concluded that improved procedures for future use of emergency international economic powers should take precedence over changing existing uses. By ‘grandfathering’ existing uses of these powers, without either endorsing or disclaiming them, H. R. 7738 adheres to the committee’s decision to try to assure improved future uses rather than remedy possible past abuses.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-459, pp. 9-10 (1977). Hewing to this noncontroversial approach, Representative Bingham, the Chairman of the responsible House Subcommittee, assured the Members of the House that “this legislation specifically grandfathers the embargoes against Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Cuba, and other existing embargoes, so that they are not affected in any way by this legislation.” 123 Cong. Rec. 38166 (1977) (emphasis added). Our reading of the grandfather clause is consistent with these clear statements of its purpose and effect. Eliminating the President’s authority to modify existing licenses in response to heightened tensions with Cuba would have sparked just the sort of controversy the grandfather clause was designed to avoid. See Emergency Controls Hearings, at 207 (summary of staff draft); id., at 210 (remarks of Rep. Bingham). Ill Respondents finally urge that if we do find that the President is authorized by Congress to enforce the regulations here in question, their enforcement violates respondents’ right to travel guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents rely on a number of our prior decisions which recognized such a right, beginning in 1958 with Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116. Respondents’ counsel undoubtedly speaks with some authority as to these cases, since he represented the would-be travelers in most of them. In Kent, the Court held that Congress had not authorized the Secretary of State to inquire of passport applicants as to affiliation with the Communist Party. The Court noted that the right to travel “is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law,” id., at 125, and stated that it would “construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute” that right. Id., at 129. Subsequently, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 514 (1964), the Court held that a provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993, forbidding the issuance of a passport to a member of the Communist Party, “sweeps too widely and too indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.” Both Kent and Aptheker, however, were qualified the following Term in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965). In that case, the Court sustained against constitutional attack a refusal by the Secretary of State to validate the passports of United States citizens for travel to Cuba. The Secretary of State in Zemel, as here, made no effort selectively to deny passports on the basis of political belief or affiliation, but simply imposed a general ban on travel to Cuba following the break in diplomatic and consular relations with that country in 1961. The Court in Zemel distinguished Kent on grounds equally applicable to Aptheker. “It must be remembered . . . that the issue involved in Kent was whether a citizen could be denied a passport because of his political beliefs or associations. ... In this case, however, the Secretary has refused to validate appellant’s passport not because of any characteristic peculiar to appellant, but rather because of foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens.” 381 U. S., at 13. The Court went on to note that, although the ban in question effectively prevented travel to Cuba, and thus diminished the right to gather information about foreign countries, no First Amendment rights of the sort that controlled in Kent and Aptheker were implicated by the across-the-board restriction in Zemel. And the Court found the Fifth Amendment right to travel, standing alone, insufficient to overcome the foreign policy justifications supporting the restriction. “That the restriction which is challenged in this case is supported by the weightiest considerations of national security is perhaps best pointed up by recalling that the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 preceded the filing of appellant’s complaint by less than two months.” 381 U. S., at 16. We see no reason to differentiate between the travel restrictions imposed by the President in the present case and the passport restrictions imposed by the Secretary of State in Zemel. Both have the practical effect of preventing travel to Cuba by most American citizens, and both are justified by weighty concerns of foreign policy. Respondents apparently feel that only a Cuban missile crisis in the offing will make area restrictions on international travel constitutional. They argue that there is no “emergency” at the present time and that the relations between Cuba and the United States are subject to “only the ‘normal’ tensions inherent in contemporary international affairs.” Brief for Respondents 55. The holding in Zemel, however, was not tied to the Court’s independent foreign policy analysis. Matters relating “to the conduct of foreign relations ... . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 589 (1952). Our holding in Zemel was merely an example of this classical deference to the political branches in matters of foreign policy. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations were first promulgated during the administration of President Kennedy. They have been retained, though alternately loosened and tightened in response to specific circumstances, ever since. In every year since the enactment of IEEPA in 1977, first President Carter and then President Reagan have determined that the continued exercise of the authorities of § 5(b) of TWE A against Cuba is in the national interest. See n. 10, supra. Since both were acting under the grandfather clause of Public Law 95-223, there was no legal requirement that either of them proclaim a new national emergency under the procedures of IEEPA. But the absence of such a proclamation does not detract from the evidence presented to both the District Court and the Court of Appeals to the effect that relations between Cuba and the United States have not been “normal” for the last quarter of a century, and that those relations have deteriorated further in recent years due to increased Cuban efforts to destabilize governments throughout the Western Hemisphere. See Enders Declaration ¶ 5, App. 172. In the opinion of the State Department, Cuba, with the political, economic, and military backing of the Soviet Union, has provided widespread support for armed violence and terrorism in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba also maintains close to 40,000 troops in various countries in Africa and the Middle East in support of objectives inimical to United States foreign policy interests. See Frechette Declaration ¶4, App. 107. Given the traditional deference to executive judgment “[i]n this vast external realm,” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319 (1936), we think there is an adequate basis under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to sustain the President’s decision to curtail the flow of hard currency to Cuba — currency that could then be used in support of Cuban adventurism — by restricting travel. Zemel v. Rusk, supra, at 14-15; Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 306-307 (1981). IV In sum, we conclude, based on an analysis of the language of the grandfather clause as well as its purpose and legislative history, that the grandfathered authorities of § 5(b) of TWEA provide an adequate statutory basis for the 1982 amendment restricting the scope of permissible travel-related transactions with Cuba and Cuban nationals. We also conclude that such restrictions do not violate the freedom to travel protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Alternative statutory authority for the Cuban Assets Control Regulations was found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424. See 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1963). Section 620(a) of that Act, which is still in force, provides: “No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to the present government of Cuba. As an additional means of implementing and carrying into effect the policy of the preceding sentence, the President is authorized to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.” 22 U. S. C. § 2370(a). The Government has chosen not to rely on § 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act as statutory authority for the 1982 limitations on permissible travel-related economic transactions, apparently for two reasons. See Brief for Petitioners 4, n. 8. First, the scope of § 5(b) of TWEA, see n. 2, infra, appears to be broader than that of § 620(a) insofar as it reaches financial transactions unrelated to trade. Second, the Foreign Assistance Act does not provide criminal penalties for violations of the regulations promulgated under it. TWEA does so provide. See 50 U. S. C. App. §16. In 1963, § 5(b) of TWEA provided in relevant part: “(1) During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise— “(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and “(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest_” 50 U. S. C. App. § 5(b) (1958 ed.). TWEA was first passed in 1917, six months after the United States entered World War I. See Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411. As originally enacted, TWEA dealt only with the President’s use of economic powers in times of war. The Act was expanded to deal with peacetime national emergencies in 1933. Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1. The President has delegated his authority under TWEA to the Secretary of the Treasury, Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 CFR 1174,1175 (1942), who in turn has delegated that authority to the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury Department Order No. 128 (Rev. 1, Oct. 15, 1962). Similar embargoes are in place against North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. See 31 CFR pt. 500 (1983). The Cuban Assets Control Regulations incorporated and expanded upon prior economic sanctions imposed on Cuba. See, e. g., 27 Fed. Reg. 1116 (1962) (complete embargo on imports from Cuba); 43 Dept. State Bull. 715 (1960) (denial of export licenses for most industrial exports to Cuba). For a more complete statement of the policies behind these restrictions and the circumstances that precipitated their imposition, see Report of the Special Committee to Study Resolutions II. 1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OEA/Ser. G/IV, pp. 14-16 (1963); Cuba, Dept. of State Pub. No. 7171, pp. 25-36 (1961). See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1965). Regulation 560 was first passed on March 29, 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 16621. It was amended on May 18, 1977, to further relax existing restrictions on travel-related transactions with Cuba. 42 Fed. Reg. 25499. Some restrictions remained. For example, travelers were not allowed to purchase merchandise in Cuba with a foreign market value in excess of $100. Moreover, such merchandise could be purchased for personal use only and could not be resold. 31 CFR § 515.560(a)(3) (1977). Also, scheduled air and sea travel to Cuba was still prohibited, § 515.560(a)(5), as were any contracts between domestic credit card issuers and any Cuban enterprises “for the extension of credit to any traveler for any purpose,” § 515.560(a)(7). Title I, §101, of Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625, amended §5(b) of TWEA “by striking out ‘or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President’ in the text preceding subparagraph (A).” For the text of § 5(b) prior to this amendment, see n. 2, supra. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 671 (1981). There are some differences, however. The grant of authorities in IEEPA does not include the power to vest (i. e., to take title to) foreign assets, to regulate purely domestic transactions, to regulate gold or bullion, or to seize records. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-459, pp. 14-15 (1977). Congress has reserved to itself the authority to terminate any declared national emergency by concurrent resolution. 50 U. S. C. § 1622. See48 Fed. Reg. 40695 (1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 39797 (1982); 46 Fed. Reg. 45321 (1981); 45 Fed. Reg. 59549 (1980); 44 Fed. Reg. 53153 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 40449 (1978). Regulation 560 was amended again in July of that year to further clarify the scope of permissible travel-related transactions with Cuba. 47 Fed. Reg. 32060 (1982). For a statement of the policies behind the amendments, see Declaration of Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, ¶¶ 5-14, App. 172-177; Declaration of James H. Michel, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs ¶¶3-7, App. 178-181; Declaration of Myles R. R. Frechette, Director, Office of Cuban Affairs, Department of State ¶¶ 4-10, App. 107-108. See also infra, at 243. As amended, Regulation 560 provides that special licenses may be issued in appropriate cases for travel-related transactions by “persons desiring to travel to Cuba for humanitarian reasons, or for purposes of public performances, public exhibitions, or similar activities.” 31 CFR § 515.560(b) (1983). Respondents also claimed that the 1982 travel restrictions violated the 1978 Passport Act, 22 U. S. C. § 211a, which prohibits area restrictions on passports except in certain circumstances; that they exceeded the authority conferred by TWEA and by IEEPA; and that they violated respondents’ First and Fifth Amendment rights, including the right to travel, due process, and equal protection. See Complaint ¶ 14, App. 9. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit accepted the second and third of these reasons in striking down another regulation passed under the grandfather clause to the 1977 amendmends to TWEA. United States v. Frade, 709 F. 2d 1387, 1397-1402 (1983). The Court of Appeals bolstered its conclusion with two additional considerations. First, the court noted that our cases required it to “construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute” the right to travel, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 129 (1958), and that “[t]hat principle of narrow interpretation applies here.” 708 F. 2d, at 800. Second, the court noted that in 1978 Congress amended the Passport Act, 22 U. S. C. § 211a, to prohibit the Executive Branch from imposing peacetime passport travel restrictions without the authorization of Congress, except for health and safety considerations. Pub. L. 95-426, § 124, 92 Stat. 971. “To interpret the ‘savings clause’ as the government suggests, would make the Passport Act amendment meaningless in terms of Cuba, for the Executive Branch could unilaterally impose Cuban travel restrictions by imposing currency restrictions as it did here.” 708 F. 2d, at 801. Respondents argue that § 5(b) of TWEA never encompassed the power to regulate travel-related transactions. Brief for Respondents 21-31. In light of the sweeping statutory language, however, this argument borders on the frivolous. The President is authorized to regulate “any” transaction involving “any” property in which a foreign country or national thereof has “any” interest. Payments for meals, lodging, and transportation in Cuba are all transactions with respect to property in which Cuba or Cubans have an interest. Such transactions, therefore, fall naturally within the statutory language, and there is no indication that Congress intended to limit the President’s power to control them in response to a national emergency. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S., at 672 (“both the legislative history and cases interpreting the TWEA fully sustain the broad authority of the Executive when acting under this congressional grant of power”); Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U. S. 308, 319 (1952). In the alternative, see Brief for Respondents 10-20, respondents argue that a 1978 amendment to the Passport Act, 22 U. S. C. § 211a, eliminated whatever authority the President once had to regulate travel-related transactions under TWEA. See Pub. L. 95-426, § 124, 92 Stat. 971. But the 1978 amendment to the Passport Act is directed solely to the authority of the Secretary of State to impose area restrictions on the use of United States passports. The amendment has nothing to do with, and makes no mention of, the President’s authority to regulate transactions under TWEA. Since repeals by implication are not favored, TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 189-190 (1978); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 549 (1974), respondents’ argument must be rejected. The Court of Appeals’ reliance on the Passport Act in its construction of the grandfather clause, see n. 15, supra, is similarly unpersuasive. Further proof that Congress did not distinguish between travel-related transactions involving foreign property and other property transactions, either when TWEA was first passed or when it was amended in 1977, is provided by § 203(a) of IEEPA. Section 203(a), which delineates the authorities of the President following a declaration of national emergency under the new procedures of IEEPA, merely tracks the language of § 5(b) of TWEA. See n. 8, supra. We think that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit may have been confused as to some aspects of the Cuban embargo. The court states that respondents are prevented from traveling to Cuba by “a Treasury Department regulation that prohibits them . . . from paying for ‘transportation-related’ expenses ‘ordinarily incident to travel to and from Cuba’ and for any other expenses ‘ordinarily incident to travel within Cuba, including payment of living expenses and the acquisition in Cuba of goods for personal consumption there.’ 31 CFR § 515.560 (1982).” 708 F. 2d, at 795. But, of course, 31 CFR § 515.560 (1983) does not prevent respondents from doing anything. As amended, it merely fails to include them in the license that it grants to some persons. Regulation 201(b)’s general prohibition on transactions involving property in which Cuba or Cubans have an interest is what, as a practical matter, prevents respondents from traveling to Cuba. On the next page of its opinion, the court states that “[a]lthough the Treasury Department regulated travel to Cuba by means of regulations of the sort here at issue from 1963 to early 1977, on March 29, 1977, the Department repealed those travel restrictions . ...” Id., at 796. Again, there were no separate “travel restrictions,” either to be repealed in 1977 or reimposed in 1982. The source of all restrictions on property transactions is Regulation 201(b), which has been in effect continuously since 1963. Properly understood, the structure of the Cuban embargo undercuts the argument that restrictions on travel purchases and restrictions on commodities purchases are “very different” exercises of authority. Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup before the House Committee on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Markup). Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 167 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Emergency Controls Hearings). Understood in context, however, the fact that such language was deleted from the Subcommittee draft is at best ambiguous. In response to a request by Representative Bingham for the administration’s reaction to the draft language, Mr. Santos from the Department of the Treasury testified on June 9, 1977, over two months after Regulation 560 was promulgated, that the language was unnecessary because the President was in fact exercising all of the authorities provided by § 5(b) of TWEA: “We have reviewed the powers conferred under this draft. Frankly we believe that all the powers conferred are exercised and that there are no additional powers that could be exercised that are not already exercised.” Id., at 188. Representative Bingham then stated: “You have said, as I understand it, that there is no need for subparagraph 2 [grandfathering presently unused powers], that you would not be disturbed by the elimination of paragraph 2.” Ibid. Thus, the challenged language may simply have been deleted as surplus-age. If so, the deletion supports the view that the phrase “authorities being exercised” embraces much more than simply those restrictions actually in place on July 1, 1977. The Court of Appeals read that history in light of its erroneous conclusion that the regulation of travel purchases is wholly different from the regulation of other transactions involving Cuban property. See supra, at 232-233, and n. 18. The Court of Appeals also freely substituted the word “restrictions” for “authorities” in drawing its conclusions from the legislative history. See 708 F. 2d, at 798. Thus, the court fastened onto isolated statements to the effect that only existing “uses” of authority were to be grandfathered, and concluded that since travel restrictions were not currently being used, such restrictions could not now be imposed. Ibid. We have already discussed the flaws in this argument. When the language of the grandfather clause is read in light of § 5 of TWEA and the structure of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations in effect on July 1, 1977, it becomes clear that the President’s authority to regulate all property transactions with Cuba and Cuban nationals, including travel-related transactions, was being “used” on the relevant date. One might argue that the phrase “uses of authorities” is somehow narrower than the phrase “authorities . . . being exercised” and that the former refers only to specific restrictions. But even if such an argument does not parse concepts too finely, the fact remains that the latter phrase, not the former, was enacted into law. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 95-459, pp. 1, 7, 10, 12-13 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-466, pp. 1, 4 (1977); Emergency Controls Hearings, at 207 (remarks of Rep. Bingham); id., at 147-148 (remarks of Mr. Majak), id., at 168 (remarks of Rep. Cavanaugh); Markup, at 7 (prepared statement of Rep. Bingham); id., at 21 (remarks of Rep. Cavanaugh); 123 Cong.1 Rec. 22476 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Bingham). There are even explicit statements in the legislative history that the regulation of travel-related transactions was among the “authorities being exercised with regard to Cuba . . . Emergency Controls Hearings, at 215 (remarks of Mr. Santos); id., at 197 (remarks of Mr. Majak, Staff Director of Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade) (“[T]he news media, in the case of Cuba objected to the fact that they are subjected to a licensing process in order to travel to certain embargoed countries. That was certainly a part of the exercise of the authorities”). See id., at 103 (statement of Mr. Bergsten); id. at 12 (statement of Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld). See Markup, at 7-8 (prepared statement of Rep. Bingham); Emergency Controls Hearings, at 207 (summary of staff draft); id. at 198 (remarks of Rep. Whalen); id., at 190-191 (remarks of Mr. Santos); id., at 168 (remarks of Rep. Bingham). In Kent, 357 U. S., at 126-127, the constitutional right to travel within the United States and the right to travel abroad were treated indiscriminately. That position has been rejected in subsequent cases. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 306 (1981) (“the freedom to travel outside the United States must be distinguished from the right to travel within the United States”); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170, 176-177 (1978). United States v. Laub, 385 U. S. 475 (1967), upon which respondents also rely, involved only a statutory question of whether an indictment properly charged a crime under the laws of the United States. In our view, the case sheds no light on the issues presented here.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE v. SHEEHAN No. 80-1437. Argued February 23, 1982 Decided June 1, 1982 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., concurred in the judgment. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, and William Kanter. Ira E. Tobolowsky argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue presented by this case is whether the federal courts have jurisdiction over a civil action for monetary damages brought by a former military exchange employee who contests the validity of his discharge. The employee claims that federal jurisdiction exists under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I A In 1962, respondent, Arthur Edward Sheehan, was selected for a data processing position with petitioner Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES or Service). Five years later, respondent was designated by the AAFES commander for participation in the Service’s Executive Management Program (EMP); this program is “intended to fulfill the continuing requirement of AAFES for highly qualified and dedicated executive employees who will be readily available to meet the worldwide executive personnel requirements of AAFES.” Army Regulation (AR) 60-21/Air Force Regulation (AFR) 147-15, ch. 5, § II, ¶ 5-6 (1 Aug. 1979). Employees in the program enjoy special retention, insurance, and retirement benefits. On the other hand, those employees are subject to certain obligations, a principal one being that EMP personnel must accept transfer to any AAFES facility in this country or abroad. ¶ 5—9(a)(2). EMP status may be withdrawn for, among other things, “conduct off the job reflecting discredit upon AAFES.” ¶ 5-9(c). Pursuant to the regulations governing the EMP, respondent was required to “acknowledge] in writing that he understood] and accepted] the conditions of the EMP as prescribed by the Commander, AAFES.” ¶ 5-7(b). In 1975, while respondent was serving as a shopping center manager at Fort Jackson, S. C., he was arrested off the base for possession of controlled substances. Pursuant to a plea bargain, respondent pleaded guilty to four misdemeanor counts of violating state drug laws. He was sentenced to 18 months’ probation and a $1,000 fine was imposed. On March 16, 1976, respondent received advance written notice of separation from the Service for cause. Referring specifically to respondent’s conviction, the notice stated that the reason for the separation was “conduct off the job which reflects discredit on the AAFES and which is of such a nature that your retention in any capacity is incompatible with the best interests of AAFES.” App. 11. James J. Stapleton, the AAFES General Manager for the Piedmont Area Exchange, signed the notice, but, because of respondent’s participation in the EMP, prior approval had been obtained from Major General C. W. Hospelhorn, Commander, AAFES. Following an investigation, Stapleton issued a final notice of separation for cause, effective April 19, 1976. Id., at 17. This notice advised respondent that he was to be dismissed “in view of the entire weight of evidence which resulted in your plea of guilty.” Ibid. Respondent, in accord with authorized AAFES procedures, filed an administrative appeal. The hearing examiner determined that the Service had acted in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, but concluded that respondent’s conduct off the job did not reflect discredit on the AAFES and that his retention in some capacity was not incompatible with the interests of the Service. The examiner therefore recommended that respondent’s appeal be granted and that he be reinstated with backpay to his former grade but transferred to an assignment in another region. General Hospelhorn, however, acting as the appellate authority, disagreed, and denied respondent’s appeal. In 1978, respondent, by a letter from counsel addressed to the new AAFES Commander, Major General Bobby W. Presley, requested reconsideration. Id., at 40. Respondent asserted that his separation was contrary to AAFES rules and regulations and that he had been denied due process of law. General Presley reopened the case and referred it to Lieutenant General Charles E. Buckingham, Chairman of the Board of Directors of AAFES. At General Buckingham’s request, the administrative record was reviewed by the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force. He concluded that the record evidence supported the charge that respondent’s conduct reflected discredit upon the AAFES and that his retention was inconsistent with the Service’s best interests. The Judge Advocate General, however, agreed with respondent that General Hospelhorn was disqualified from acting as the appellate authority; he felt that it was appropriate for General Buckingham to act in that capacity, and he recommended that respondent’s appeal be denied. General Buckingham followed that advice and denied respondent’s appeal. B While the matter was pending before the Judge Advocate General, respondent filed suit against the AAFES in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The first count of respondent’s complaint alleged that his rights to due process and to a free and impartial appeal pursuant to AAFES regulations were infringed when General Hospelhorn acted as both the separation authority and the appellate authority. In the second count, respondent claimed that the denial of his appeal was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence and unwarranted by the facts, and in violation of statutory and constitutional provisions. Respondent sought reinstatement and damages, including backpay. The District Court, without opinion, dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It concluded that the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2), which gives the federal courts jurisdiction over certain suits against the United States founded upon express or implied contracts, provided a basis for jurisdiction over respondent’s claims for monetary relief. 619 F. 2d 1132 (1980). Whether respondent’s employment was initiated by appointment or by contract, the court held, the AAFES regulations providing for separation for cause only under certain conditions and guaranteeing an administrative appeal “manifest[ed] the understanding of the parties concerning discharge procedures while Sheehan continued in AAFES employment.” Id., at 1138 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the court considered those regulations to be “part of a collateral implied-in-fact contract between Sheehan and the AAFES that the AAFES would adhere to the regulations in its dealings with him.” Ibid. In the court’s view, the understanding of the parties was reinforced by the well-established legal principle that a federal agency must comply with its own regulations. The court concluded that respondent’s allegation that his dismissal violated applicable regulations was “equivalent to an allegation of breach of an implied-in-fact contract,” ibid., and that the District Court therefore had erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to award respondent monetary relief. Because this ruling appeared to be in conflict with our precedents, we granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 813 (1981). I — I l-H The AAFES, like other military exchanges, is an “ ‘ar[m] of the government deemed by it essential for the performance of governmental functions . . . and partake[s] of whatever immunities it may have under the constitution and federal statutes/” United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm’n, 421 U. S. 599, 606 (1975), quoting, with approval, language of the District Court in the same case, 378 F. Supp. 558, 562-563 (SD Miss. 1974). As a result, the federal courts may entertain actions against the Service only if Congress has consented to suit; “a waiver of the traditional sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399 (1976), quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969). The Tucker Act effects one such explicit waiver when it provides in pertinent part: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of: “. . . Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. . . . For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service . . . shall be considered an express or implied contract with the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Respondent does not assert Tucker Act jurisdiction on the basis of the Constitution or a specific statute or regulation. He claims only that the Tucker Act affords him a remedy because of an “express or implied contract with the United States” agreed to by the parties. Specifically, respondent urges that he became an AAFES employee, or at least entered the EMP, by virtue of an employment contract, not by appointment, and that the AAFES regulations governing dismissal of employees created an implied contract. We must reject both contentions. A In determining whether respondent’s employment was the result of appointment or contract, we look to United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S. 123 (1976), a wrongful-discharge action brought by an AAFES employee who alleged that his separation from the Service constituted a breach of an employment contract. The Court in its per curiam opinion in Hopkins noted that Tucker Act jurisdiction may be premised on an employment contract, as well as on one for goods or other services, id., at 126, and that the AAFES regulations authorize the Service to enter into service contracts. Id., at 127-128. But the Court also observed that many AAFES employees are appointed to their positions, and it remanded the case for consideration of the question whether the plaintiff had been employed by contract or by appointment, a determination dependent upon “an analysis of the statutes and regulations previously described in light of whatever evidence is adduced on remand as to plaintiff’s particular status in this case.” Id., at 130. Although respondent alleges that he was employed, both initially and upon entering the EMP, by express employment contracts, he points to nothing in the record or in the relevant AAFES regulations that substantiates that claim. In fact, his complaint supports the contrary view. The complaint observes that respondent was first “employed” by the AAFES in 1962, App. 3; the regulations pertaining to “employees” refer to Service personnel as “Federal employees of an instrumentality of the United States” who are appointed to their positions. AR 60-21/AFR 147-15, ch. 1, § I, ¶ 1—6(a); ch. 2, § I, ¶¶ 2-2, 2-3 (1 Aug. 1979). Moreover, if, as respondent alleges, he was “employed” in a data processing position, AAFES regulations prohibit the Service from negotiating a contract with him. See AR 60-20/AFR 147-14, ch. 3, § III, ¶ 3-26(d) (15 Nov. 1978). Respondent’s selection to the EMP plainly was pursuant to appointment. The regulations governing the EMP appear in the provision entitled “Exchange Service Personnel Policies,” AR 60-21/AFR 147-15, ch. 5, § II, rather than in the regulation providing for service contracts, AR 60-20/AFR 147-14, ch. 3, §§ II, III. And, in language that connotes appointment rather than contract, the EMP regulations refer to one’s “nomination, selection, and designation to EMP status,” AR 60-21/AFR 147-15, ch. 5, § II, ¶ 5-8. Furthermore, respondent complains that he was separated from the EMP in violation of discharge procedures described in the regulation applicable to appointed employees, not to those who have contracted with the AAFES to provide services. App. 4-5, 7; see AR 60-21/AFR 147-15, ch. 3. Despite these clear indications that respondent was appointed to his position, he maintains, citing United States v. Hopkins, supra, that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing aimed at ascertaining the nature of his employment status. In Hopkins, however, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he had been employed pursuant to contract. The Court of Claims did not examine this allegation because it erroneously assumed that AAFES employees could never be appointed. This Court held that the plaintiff’s allegation was sufficient to withstand the Government’s motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and remanded the case because “the question of whether plaintiff was employed by virtue of a contract or by appointment is not susceptible of determination at this time.” 427 U. S., at 130. Resolution of the question, the Court noted, depended upon an analysis of the applicable statutes and regulations “in light of whatever evidence is adduced on remand as to plaintiff’s particular status in this case.” Ibid. Respondent’s complaint, in contrast, does not claim that he was employed pursuant to a contract. In fact, it supports the Government’s view that he was appointed. Even after the AAFES moved in the District Court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on the ground that respondent had been “an appointed (non-contract) employee,” Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment 8, respondent did not seek to amend his complaint and did not allege any facts indicating the existence of an employment contract. See Memorandum of Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ (sic) Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment 5-6; see also id., at 1-3 (referring to respondent’s status as an “employee” and to violations of regulations governing AAFES employees). Moreover, as discussed above, all the evidence in the record is to the effect that respondent was appointed to his positions with the AAFES. Under these circumstances, we conclude that a remand on this question would serve no purpose and that respondent will not now be able to adduce evidence, which he has heretofore declined to present, that he was employed — either initially or upon entering the EMP — pursuant to an express employment contract. B The Court of Appeals’ decision rests on a different theory — that, whether or not respondent was initially employed by virtue of a contract or by appointment, the AAFES regulations governing separation procedures created an implied-in-fact contract that the Service would adhere to those regulations while respondent continued in AAFES employment. This approach, however, is foreclosed by our prior decisions. In United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392 (1976), the Court concluded, without dissent, that the Tucker Act did not confer jurisdiction over a complaint filed by civil service employees who claimed that they were entitled to reclassification at a higher grade. The Act, the Court observed, “is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.” Id., at 398. Rather, a plaintiff’s “asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’” Id., at 400, quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (1967). The Court explicitly rejected the argument that “the violation of any statute or regulation relating to federal employment automatically creates a cause of action against the United States for money damages.” 424 U. S., at 401; see also United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S., at 130. As Testan makes clear, jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint cannot be premised on the asserted violation of regulations that do not specifically authorize awards of money damages. Respondent cannot escape the force of Testan by relying on the Court’s observation that the plaintiffs in that case did not “rest their claims upon a contract,” 424 U. S., at 400, and distinguishing this case on the ground that the regulations effected an implied contract. To accept this reasoning would be to undermine the Court’s ruling in Testan that the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages claims against the United States have been authorized explicitly. Admittedly, the Testan plaintiffs did not assert the existence of an employment contract, but neither did respondent until very late in the litigation. And if employment statutes and regulations create an implied-in-fact contract, surely the Court would have so noted in Testan instead of directing that the complaint be dismissed. See id., at 408. Moreover, the plaintiff in Hopkins did claim that he had been employed pursuant to a contract; the Court’s remand for consideration of the plaintiff’s status as an appointed or contract employee, despite a claim that his discharge contravened applicable regulations, clearly suggests that employment regulations do not automatically give rise to an implied-in-fact contract. In addition to mandating different results in Testan and Hopkins, the Court of Appeals’ approach would “rende[r] superfluous” “many of the federal statutes — such as the Back Pay Act — that expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances.” United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at 404. The Back Pay Act, which permits an employee to recover lost wages due to “an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action which has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or part” of the compensation to which he was otherwise entitled, 5 U. S. C. § 5596(b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), expressly denies that cause of action to AAFES personnel. See 5 U. S. C. § 2105(c)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Congress’ intent to prohibit a backpay claim by a Service employee would obviously be subverted if the employee could sue under the Tucker Act whenever he asserted a violation of the Service’s regulations governing termination. And the impact of the Court of Appeals’ decision would not be limited to such circumstances: as counsel for respondent appeared to concede at oral argument, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning would extend Tucker Act jurisdiction to reach any complaint filed by a federal employee alleging the violation of a personnel statute or regulation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. We therefore conclude that Testan is controlling, and we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in implying a contract based solely on the existence of AAFES personnel regulations and in premising Tucker Act jurisdiction on those regulations, which do not explicitly authorize damages awards. Because the court’s judgment may not be sustained on the ground that respondent was hired pursuant to an express employment contract, we find that the Tucker Act did not confer jurisdiction over respondent’s claims for monetary relief. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice concurs in the judgment. AAFES is a nonappropriated fund instrumentality of the United States, that is, one that does not receive funds by congressional appropriation. See 10 U. S. C. §§ 4779(c) and 9779(c). AAFES is under the control of the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and, like other military post exchanges, is intended “to provide convenient and reliable sources where soldiers can obtain their ordinary needs at the lowest possible prices.” Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 484-485 (1942). The regulations cited are those currently in effect. They differ in no material respect from the regulations that were outstanding and applicable while respondent was employed by the AAFES. Reasoning that § 1346(a)(2) does not confer federal jurisdiction to award nonmonetary relief, the Court of Appeals looked to the general federal-question jurisdictional provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1331(a), to support its finding of jurisdiction over respondent’s request for reinstatement. Although the court concluded that § 1331(a) does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, it interpreted the 1976 amendment to § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702, as effecting a waiver for actions against federal agencies, where the agency conduct is otherwise subject to judicial review. 619 F. 2d, at 1138-1140. Given its determination that the District Court could provide respondent both monetary and nonmonetary relief under alternative statutes, the Court of Appeals held, finally, that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint pursuant to the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1361. 619 F. 2d, at 1140-1141. Neither side seeks review of those rulings here. The last sentence of § 1346(a)(2) was added in 1970 by Pub. L. 91-350, 84 Stat. 449, following this Court’s decision some years before in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481 (1942). Relying on the Court’s observation in that case that the “Government assumes none of the financial obligations” of military post exchanges, id., at 485, the Court of Claims, in a series of decisions, had held that it could not entertain contract claims against nonappropriated fund instrumentalities. See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S. 123, 125 (1976). In 1970, Congress sought to close this “loophole” by expressly affording contractors a Tucker Act remedy against such instrumentalities. See id., at 126; S. Rep. No. 91-268, p. 2 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-933, p. 2 (1970). Section 1346(a)(2) gives the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims over all civil actions or claims seeking damages of $10,000 or less. The Court of Claims has sole jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, however, for claims greater than $10,000. See 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Both jurisdictional provisions are otherwise identical. See Richardson v. Morris, 409 U. S. 464, 466 (1973); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 590-591 (1941). The AAFES regulations define “service contract” as follows: “A contract whereby a contractor performs a service for AAFES off a military installation, such as laundry, drycleaning, photo processing, and repair service. This type contract may also include procurement of direct services such as janitorial and window cleaning service.” AR 60-20/AFR 147-14, App. A, ¶ A-8(e) (15 Nov. 1978). Respondent points to the portion of the EMP regulations providing that an EMP employee must have “acknowledged in writing that he understands and accepts the conditions of the EMP as prescribed by the Commander, AAFES.” AR 60-21/AFR 147-15, ch. 5, § II, ¶ 5-7(b). An employee’s acknowledgment and acceptance of the conditions of his employment, however, hardly demonstrate that he is employed pursuant to a contract; surely, an employer could require a nominee to acknowledge and accept the conditions of his appointment. We are advised that Hopkins’ suit was settled on the remand, and that no further inquiry was made into his employment status. See Brief for Petitioner 16, n. 9; Brief for Respondent 14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Respondent did seek to amend his complaint, however, following the Court of Appeals’ decision that the AAFES discharge regulations created an implied-in-fact contract between the parties. The amended complaint alleges that a contract was executed when respondent signed an acknowledgment of the conditions of the EMP, includes a breach-of-contract count, and refers repeatedly to the “employment agreement.” First Amended Complaint 2, 6-7. Claims grounded on implied-in-fact contracts may be brought under the Tucker Act, but the Act does not confer jurisdiction with respect to contracts implied in law. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 465, n. 5 (1980). Like Testan, this case does not involve a suit “for money improperly exacted or retained” or a claim based on a regulation that promises money. 424 U. S., at 401, 402. This case is therefore distinguishable from those cited by respondent where contracts were inferred from regulations promising payment. See Griffin v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 710, 714-715 (1978); New York Airways, Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 800, 816-817, 369 F. 2d 743, 751-752 (1966); Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States, 139 Ct. Cl. 144, 147-148, 153 F. Supp. 403, 405-406 (1957); Aycock-Lindsey Corp. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 518, 521 (CA5 1948); Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 785, 786-787 (SD Ga. 1980), rev’d, 671 F. 2d 445 (CA11 1982). Because respondent has not demonstrated that the parties entered into an express contract, this case is also different from those where regulations were considered an implied part of an express contract. See Bodek v. Department of Treasury, Bureau of Public Debt, 532 F. 2d 277, 279, n. 7 (CA2), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 849 (1976); Wolak v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (Conn. 1973); Spicer v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 44, 50 (Kan. 1963), aff’d, 332 F. 2d 750 (CA10 1964). The Court’s observation in Testan that the case was “not one concerning a wrongful discharge or a wrongful suspension,” 424 U. S., at 402, does not indicate, as respondent urges, that any termination or suspension suit may be brought under the Tucker Act. In Hopkins, the Court relied on Testan in disposing, summarily and adversely, of the contention that “plaintiff’s discharge in violation of executive regulations constituted a claim enforceable under the Tucker Act.” 427 U. S., at 130.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROBERTSON, CHIEF, UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, et al. v. SEATTLE AUDUBON SOCIETY et al. No. 90-1596. Argued December 2, 1991 Decided March 25, 1992 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Acting Assistant Attorney General Hartman, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Clifford M. Sloan, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Martin W. Matzen, and Anne S. Almy. Todd T True argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Seattle Audubon Society et al. were John Bonine, Michael Axline, and Victor M. Sher. Phillip D. Chadsey filed a brief for respondents Association of 0 & C Counties et al. Mark C. Rutzick filed briefs for respondents Northwest Forest Resource Council et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Florida et al. by Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Jonathan Glogau, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Robert J. Del Tufo of New Jersey, Nicholas J. Spaeth of North Dakota, Lee Fisher of Ohio, and Dan Morales of Texas; and for Public Citizen by Patti A Goldman, Alan B. Morrison, and David C. Vladeck. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we must determine the operation of §318 of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990. I This case arises out of two challenges to the Federal Government’s continuing efforts to allow the harvesting and sale of timber from old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest. These forests are home to the northern spotted owl, a bird listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II), since June 1990. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26114. Harvesting the forests, say environmentalists, would kill the owls. Restrictions on harvesting, respond local timber industries, would devastate the region’s economy. Petitioner Robertson is Chief of the United States Forest Service, which manages 13 national forests in Oregon and Washington known to contain the northern spotted owl. In 1988, the Service amended its regional guide to prohibit timber harvesting on certain designated areas within those forests. Respondent Seattle Audubon Society (joined by various other environmental groups) and the Washington Contract Loggers Association (joined by various other industry groups) filed separate lawsuits in the District Court for the Western District of Washington, complaining respectively that the amendment afforded the owl either too little protection, or too much. Seattle Audubon alleged violations of three federal statutes: the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 40 Stat. 755, ch. 128, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §703 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II); the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seq.; and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 90 Stat. 2949, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §1600 et seq. The District Court consolidated the actions and preliminarily enjoined 163 proposed timber sales. Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Robertson, No. 89-160 (WD Wash., Mar. 24, 1989). Petitioner Lujan is Secretary of the Department of the Interior. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an agency within the Department, manages several old-growth forests in western Oregon. Between 1979 and 1983, the BLM developed timber management plans that permitted harvesting on some areas within these forests and prohibited it on others. In 1987, the BLM and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife executed an agreement that expanded the areas on which harvesting was prohibited. Also in 1987, respondent Portland Audubon Society (among others) filed suit in the District Court for the District of Oregon, challenging certain proposed harvesting under- four federal statutes: MBTA; NEPA; the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq.; and the Oregon-California Railroad Land Grant Act (OCLA), 50 Stat. 874, 43 U.S.C. § 1181a. Twice, the District Court dismissed the action. Twice before reversing (on grounds not relevant here), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enjoined some of the challenged harvesting pending appeal. See Portland Audubon Soc. v. Lujan, 884 F. 2d 1233, 1234 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1026 (1990); Portland Audubon Soc. v. Hodel, 866 F. 2d 302, 304, cert. denied sub nom. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Portland Audubon Soc., 492 U. S. 911 (1989). In response to this ongoing litigation, Congress enacted § 318 of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, 103 Stat. 745, popularly known as the Northwest Timber Compromise. The Compromise established a comprehensive set of rules to govern harvesting within a geographically and temporally limited domain. By its terms, it applied only to “the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and [BLM] districts in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls.” §318(i). It expired automatically on September 30, 1990, the last day of fiscal year 1990, except that timber sales offered under § 318 were to remain subject to its terms for the duration of the applicable sales contracts. § 318(k). The Compromise both required harvesting and expanded harvesting restrictions. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) required the Forest Service and the BLM respectively to offer for sale specified quantities of timber from the affected lands before the end of fiscal year 1990. On the other hand, subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) prohibited harvesting altogether from various designated areas within those lands, expanding the applicable administrative prohibitions and then codifying them for the remainder of the fiscal year. In addition, subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(4) specified general environmental criteria to govern the selection of harvesting sites by the Forest Service. Subsection (g)(1) provided for limited, expedited judicial review of individual timber sales offered under § 318. This controversy centers around the first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A), which stated in part: “[T]he Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR.” Subsection (b)(6)(A) also declined to pass upon “the legal and factual adequacy” of the administrative documents produced by the 1988 Forest Service amendment and the 1987 BLM agreement. After §318 was enacted, both the Seattle Audubon and Portland Audubon defendants sought dismissal, arguing that the provision had temporarily superseded all statutes on which the plaintiffs’ challenges had been based. The plaintiffs resisted on the ground that the first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A), because it purported to direct the results in two pending cases, violated Article III of the Constitution. In Seattle Audubon, the District Court held that subsection (b)(6)(A) “can and must be read as a temporary modification of the environmental laws.” Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Robertson, No. 89-160 (WD Wash., Nov. 14, 1989). Under that construction, the court upheld the provision as constitutional and therefore vacated its preliminary injunction. Nonetheless, the court retained jurisdiction to determine whether the challenged harvesting would violate § 318 (if done in fiscal year 1990) or other provisions (if done later). In Portland Audubon, the District Court likewise upheld subsection (b)(6)(A), but dismissed the action entirely (without prejudice to future challenges arising after fiscal year 1990). Portland Audubon Soc. v. Lujan, No. 87-1160 (Ore., Dec. 21, 1989). The Ninth Circuit consolidated the ensuing appeals and reversed. 914 F. 2d 1311 (1990). The court held that the first sentence of § 318(b)(6)(A) “does not, by its plain language, repeal or amend the environmental laws underlying this litigation,” but rather “directs the court to reach a specific result and make certain factual findings under existing law in connection with two [pending] cases.” Id., at 1316. Given that interpretation, the court held the provision unconstitutional under United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), which it construed as prohibiting Congress from “directing] ... a particular decision in a case, without repealing or amending the law underlying the litigation.” 914 F. 2d, at 1315. The Ninth Circuit distinguished this Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (1856), which it construed as permitting Congress to “amend or repeal any law, even for the purpose of ending pending litigation.” 914 F. 2d, at 1315 (emphasis in original). On remand, the plaintiffs renewed their original claims. In Seattle Audubon, the District Court enjoined under NFMA 16 timber sales offered by the Forest Service during fiscal year 1990 in order to meet its harvesting quota under § 318(a)(1). See Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Robertson, No. 89-160 (WD Wash., Dec. 18,1990, and May 24,1991). While the District Court proceedings were ongoing, the agencies jointly sought review of the Ninth Circuit’s judgment that the first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A) was unconstitutional. We granted certiorari, 501 U. S. 1249 (1991), and now reverse. II The first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A) provided that “management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5)... is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for [Seattle Audubon] and [Portland Audubon].” The Ninth Circuit held that this language did not “amend” any previously existing “laws,” but rather “directed]” certain “factual findings” and “specific result[s]” under those laws. 914 F. 2d, at 1316. Petitioners interpret the provision differently. They argue that subsection (b)(6)(A) replaced the legal standards underlying the two original challenges with those set forth in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5), without directing particular applications under either the old or the new standards. We agree. We describe the operation of subsection (b)(6)(A) by example. The plaintiffs in both cases alleged violations of MBTA § 2, 16 U. S. C. § 703, which makes it unlawful to “kill” or “take” any “migratory bird.” ■ Before the Compromise was enacted, the courts adjudicating these MBTA claims were obliged to determine whether the challenged harvesting would “kill” or “take” any northern spotted owl, within the meaning of §2. Subsection (b)(6)(A), however, raised the question whether the harvesting would violate different prohibitions — those described in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). If not, then the harvesting would constitute “management . . . according to” subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5), and would therefore be deemed to “mee[t]” MBTA §2 regardless of whether or not it would cause an otherwise prohibited killing or taking. Thus under subsection (b)(6)(A), the agencies could satisfy their MBTA obligations in either of two ways: by managing their lands so as neither to “kill” nor “take” any northern spotted owl within the meaning of §2, or by managing their lands so as not to violate the prohibitions of subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). Subsection (b)(6)(A) operated identically as well upon all provisions of NEPA, NFMA, FLPMA, and OCLA that formed “the basis for” the original lawsuits. We conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law. Before subsection (b)(6)(A) was enacted, the original claims would fail only if the challenged harvesting violated none of five old provisions. Under subsection (b)(6)(A), by contrast, those same claims would fail if the harvesting violated neither of two new provisions. Its operation, we think, modified the old provisions. Moreover, we find nothing in subsection (b)(6)(A) that purported to direct any particular findings of fact or applications of law, old or new, to fact. For challenges to sales offered before or after fiscal year 1990, subsection (b)(6)(A) expressly reserved judgment upon “the legal and factual adequacy” of the administrative documents authorizing the sales. For challenges to sales offered during fiscal year 1990, subsection (g)(1) expressly provided for judicial determination of the lawfulness of those sales. Section 318 did not instruct the courts whether any particular timber sales would violate subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5), just as the MBTA, for example, does not instruct the courts whether particular sales would “kill” or “take” any northern spotted owl. Indeed, § 318 could not instruct that any particular BLM timber sales were lawful under the new standards, because subsection (b)(5) incorporated by reference the harvesting prohibitions imposed by a BLM agreement not yet in existence when the Compromise was enacted. See n. 1, supra. Respondents cite three textual features of subsection (b)(6)(A) in support of their conclusion that the provision failed to supply new law, but directed results under old law. First, they emphasize the imperative tone of the provision, by which Congress “determine^] and directed]” that compliance with two new provisions would constitute compliance with five old ones. Respondents argue that “Congress was directing the subsection [only] at the courts.” Brief for Respondents Seattle Audubon Society et al. 34. Petitioners, for their part, construe the subsection as “a directive [only] to the Forest Service and BLM.” Brief for Petitioners 30. We think that neither characterization is entirely correct. A statutory directive binds both the executive officials who administer the statute and the judges who apply it in particular cases — even if (as is usually the case) Congress fails to preface its directive with an empty phrase like “Congress . . . directs that.” Here, we fail to see how inclusion of the “Congress . . . directs that” preface undermines our conclusion that what Congress directed — to agencies and courts alike — was a change in law, not specific results under old law. Second, respondents argue that subsection (b)(6)(A) did not modify old requirements because it deemed compliance with new requirements to “mee[t]” the old requirements. We fail to appreciate the significance of this observation. Congress might have modified MBTA directly, for example, in order to impose a new obligation of complying either with the current §2 or with subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). Instead, Congress enacted an entirely separate statute deeming compliance with subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) to constitute compliance with § 2 — a “modification” of the MBTA, we conclude, through operation of the canon that specific provisions qualify general ones, see, e. g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 15 (1978). As explained above, each formulation would have produced an identical task for a court adjudicating the MBTA claims — determining either that the challenged harvesting did not violate § 2 as currently written or that it did not violate subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). Finally, respondents emphasize that subsection (b)(6)(A) explicitly made reference to pending cases identified by name and caption number. The reference to Seattle Audubon and Portland Audubon, however, served only to identify the five “statutory requirements that are the basis for” those cases— namely, pertinent provisions of MBTA, NEPA, NFMA, FLPMA, and OCLA. Subsection (b)(6)(A) named two pending cases in order to identify five statutory provisions. To the extent that subsection (b)(6)(A) affected the adjudication of the cases, it did so by effectively modifiying the provisions at issue in those cases. In the alternative, the Ninth Circuit held that subsection (b)(6)(A) “could not” effect an implied modification of substantive law because it was embedded in an appropriations measure. See 914 F. 2d, at 1317. This reasoning contains several errors. First, although repeals by implication are especially disfavored in the appropriations context, see, e. g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 190 (1978), Congress nonetheless may amend substantive law in an appropriations statute, as long as it does so clearly. See, e. g., United States v. Will, 449 U. S. 200, 222 (1980). Second, because subsection (b)(6)(A) provided by its terms that compliance with certain new law constituted compliance with certain old law, the intent to modify was not only clear, but express. Third, having determined that subsection (b)(6)(A) would be unconstitutional unless it modified previously existing law, the court then became obliged to impose that “saving interpretation,” 914 F. 2d, at 1317, as long as it was a “possible” one. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 30 (1937) (“[A]s between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act”). We have no occasion to address any broad question of Article III jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(6)(A) was unconstitutional under Klein because it directed decisions in pending cases without amending any law. Because we conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) did amend applicable law, we need not consider whether this reading of Klein is correct. The Court of Appeals stated additionally that a statute would be constitutional under Wheeling Bridge if it did amend law. Respondents’ amicus Public Citizen challenges this proposition. It contends that even a change in law, prospectively applied, would be unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of applications at issue in the pending cases. This alternative theory was neither raised below nor squarely considered by the Court of Appeals; nor was it advanced by respondents in this Court. Accordingly, we decline to address it here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Subsection (b)(3) provided: “No timber sales offered pursuant to this section from the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington known to contain northern spotted owls may occur within [spotted owl habitat areas (SOHA’s)'] identified pursuant to the Final Supplement to the Environmental Impact Statement for an Amendment to the Pacific Northwest Regional Guide — Spotted Owl and the accompanying Record of Decision issued by the Forest Service on December 8,1988 as adjusted by this subsection: “(A) For the Olympic Peninsula Province, which includes the Olympic National Forest, SOHA size is to be 3,200 acres; “(B) For the Washington Cascades Province, which includes the Mt. Baker-Snoqualmie, Okanogan, Wenatchee, and Gifford-Pinchot National Forests, SOHA size is to be 2,600 acres; “(C) For the Oregon Cascades Province, which includes the Mt. Hood, Willamette, Rogue River, Deschutes, Winema, and Umpqua National Forests, SOHA size is to be 1,875 acres; “(D) For the Oregon Coast Range Province, which includes the Siuslaw National Forest, SOHA size is to be 2,500 acres; and “(E) For the Klamath Mountain Province, which includes the Siskiyou National Forest, SOHA size is to be 1,250 acres. “(F) All other standards and guidelines contained in the Chief’s Record of Decision are adopted.” Subsection (b)(5) provided: “No timber sales offered pursuant to this section on Bureau of Land Mangagement lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls shall occur within the 110 areas identified in the December 22, 1987 agreement, except sales identified in said agreement, between the Bureau of Land Management and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife. Not later than thirty days after enactment of this Act, the Bureau of Land Management, after consulting with the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to identify high priority spotted owl area sites, shall select an additional twelve spotted owl habitat areas. No timber sales may be offered in the areas identified pursuant to this subsection during fiscal year 1990.” In its entirety, subsection (b)(6)(A) provided: “Without passing on the legal and factual adequacy of the Pinal Supplement to the Environmental Impact Statement for an Amendment to the Pacific Northwest Regional Guide — Spotted Owl Guidelines and the accompanying Record of Decision issued by the Forest Service on December 8,1988 or the December 22,1987 agreement between the Bureau of Land Management and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife for management of the Spotted Owl, the Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR. The guidelines adopted by subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section shall not be subject to judicial review by any court of the United States.” Because no timber sales offered by the BLM during fiscal year 1990 were ever enjoined, the §318 controversy between Portland Audubon and the BLM appears moot. We decide the case, however, because there remains a live controversy between Seattle Audubon and the Forest Service over the 16 sales offered during fiscal year 1990 and still enjoined under the NFMA. The northern spotted owl is a “migratory bird” within the meaning of MBTA. See 50 CFR § 10.13 (1991).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM v. MCORP FINANCIAL, INC., et al. No. 90-913. Argued October 7, 1991 Decided December 3, 1991 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Thomas, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for petitioner in No. 90-913 and respondent in No. 90-914. On the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Ger-son, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Michael R. Lazerwitz, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and James V. Mattingly, Jr. Alan B. Miller argued the cause for respondents in No. 90-913 and petitioners in No. 90-914. With him on the briefs were Harvey R. Miller, Steven Alan Reiss, John D. Hawke, Jr., Jerome I. Chapman, Howard N. Cayne, and David F. Freeman, Jr. Together with No. 90-914, MCorp et al. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, also on certiorari to the same court. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. MCorp, a bank holding company, filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions in March 1989. It then initiated an adversary proceeding against the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) seeking to enjoin the prosecution of two administrative proceedings, one charging MCorp with a violation of the Board’s “source of strength” regulation and the other alleging a violation of § 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, as added, 48 Stat. 183, and amended. The District Court enjoined both proceedings, and the Board appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the §23A proceeding, but that, under the doctrine set forth in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958), the District Court had jurisdiction to review the validity of the “source of strength” regulation. The Court of Appeals then ruled that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating that regulation. 900 F. 2d 852 (CA5 1990). We granted certiorari, 499 U. S. 904 (1991), to review the entire action but, because we conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin either regulatory proceeding, we do not reach the merits of MCorp’s challenge to the regulation. H-t In 1984, the Board promulgated a regulation requiring every bank holding company to “serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks.” In October 1988, the Board commenced an administrative proceeding against MCorp, alleging that MCorp violated the source of strength regulation and engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices that jeopardized the financial condition of its subsidiary banks. The Board also issued three temporary cease-and-desist orders. The first forbids MCorp to declare or pay any dividends without the prior approval of the Board. ' App. 65-67. The second forbids MCorp to dissipate any of its nonbank assets without the prior approval of the Board. Id., at 68-70. The third directs MCorp to use “all of its assets to provide capital support to its Subsidiary Banks in need of additional capital.” Id., at 85. By agreement, enforcement of the third order was suspended while MCorp sought financial assistance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In March 1989, the FDIC denied MCorp’s request for assistance. Thereafter, creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against MCorp in the Southern District of New York, and the Comptroller of the Currency determined that 20 of MCorp’s subsidiary banks were insolvent and, accordingly, appointed the FDIC as receiver of those banks. MCorp then filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions in the Southern District of Texas and all bankruptcy proceedings were later consolidated in that forum. At the end of March, the Board commenced a second administrative proceeding against MCorp alleging that it had violated §23A of the Federal Reserve Act by causing two of its subsidiary banks to extend unsecured credit of approximately $63.7 million to an affiliate. For convenience, we shall refer to that proceeding as the “§ 23A proceeding” and to the earlier proceeding as the “source of strength proceeding.” In May 1989, MCorp initiated this litigation by filing a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court against the Board seeking a declaration that both administrative proceedings had been automatically stayed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code; in the alternative, MCorp prayed for an injunction against the further prosecution of those proceedings without the prior approval of the Bankruptcy Court. On the Board’s motion, the District Court transferred that adversary proceeding to its own docket. In June 1989, the District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to enjoin the Board from prosecuting both administrative proceedings against MCorp and entered a preliminary injunction halting those proceedings. The injunction restrained the Board from exercising “its authority over bank holding companies ... to attempt to effect, directly or indirectly, a reorganization of the MCorp group [of companies] except through participation in the bankruptcy proceedings.” In re MCorp, 101 B. R. 483, 491. The Board appealed. Although the District Court did not differentiate between the two Board proceedings, the Court of Appeals held that the § 23A proceeding could go forward but that the source of strength proceeding should be enjoined. The court reasoned that the plain language of the judicial review provisions of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA), 80 Stat. 1046, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1818 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II), particularly § 1818(i)(1), deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to enjoin either proceeding, but that our decision in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958), nevertheless authorized an injunction against an administrative proceeding conducted without statutory authorization. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Board's promulgation and enforcement of its source of strength regulation exceeded its statutory authority. Accordingly, the court vacated the District Court injunction barring the § 23A proceeding, but remanded the case with instructions to enjoin the Board from enforcing its source of strength regulation. Both parties petitioned for certiorari. The Board's petition challenges the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Leedom v. Kyne, as well as its invalidation of the source of strength regulation. MCorp's petition challenges the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the relationship between the provisions governing judicial review of Board proceedings and those governing bankruptcy proceedings. We first address the latter challenge. II A series of federal statutes gives the Board substantial regulatory power over bank holding companies and establishes a comprehensive scheme of judicial review of Board actions. See FISA; the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA), 12 U. S. C. § 1841 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II); and the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U. S. C. § 3901 et seq. In this litigation, the most relevant of these is FISA. FISA authorizes the Board to institute administrative proceedings culminating in cease-and-desist orders, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1818(a) — (b) (1988 ed., Supp. II), and to issue temporary-cease-and-desist orders that are effective upon service on a bank holding company. § 1818(c). In addition, FISA establishes a tripartite regime of judicial review. First, § 1818(c)(2) provides that, within 10 days after service of a temporary order, a bank holding company may seek an injunction in district court restraining enforcement of the order pending completion of the related administrative proceeding. Second, § 1818(h) authorizes court of appeals review of final Board orders on the application of an aggrieved party. Finally, §1818(i)(l) provides that the Board may apply to district court for enforcement of any effective and outstanding notice or order. None of these provisions controls this litigation: The action before us is not a challenge to a temporary Board order, nor a petition for review of a final Board order, nor an enforcement action initiated by the Board. Instead, FISA’s preclusion provision appears to speak directly to the jurisdictional question at issue in this litigation: “[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order.” Ibid. Notwithstanding this plain, preclusive language, MCorp argues that the District Court’s injunction against the prosecution of the Board proceedings was authorized either by the automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. §362, or by the provision of the Judicial Code authorizing district courts in bankruptcy proceedings to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over certain civil proceedings, 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b). We find no merit in either argument. The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay of several categories of judicial and administrative proceedings. The Board’s planned actions against MCorp constitute the “continuation . . . [of] administrative . . . proceeding^]” and would appear to be stayed by 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(1). However, the Board’s actions also fall squarely within § 362(b)(4), which expressly provides that the automatic stay will not reach proceedings to enforce a “governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.” MCorp contends that in order for § 362(b)(4) to obtain, a court must first determine whether the proposed exercise of police or regulatory power is legitimate and that, therefore, in this litigation the lower courts did have the authority to examine the legitimacy of the Board’s actions and to enjoin those actions. We disagree. MCorp’s broad reading of the stay provisions would require bankruptcy courts to scrutinize the validity of every administrative or enforcement action brought against a bankrupt entity. Such a reading is problematic, both because it conflicts with the broad discretion Congress has expressly granted many administrative entities and because it is inconsistent with the limited authority Congress has vested in bankruptcy courts. We therefore reject MCorp’s reading of § 362(b)(4). MCorp also argues that it is protected by §§ 362(a)(3) and 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Those provisions stay “any act” to obtain possession of, or to exercise control over, property of the estate, or to recover claims against the debtor that arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. MCorp contends that the ultimate objective of the source of strength proceeding is to exercise control of corporate assets and that the § 23A proceeding seeks enforcement of a prepetition claim. We reject these characterizations of the ongoing administrative proceedings. At this point, the Board has only issued “Notices of Charges and of Hearing” and has expressed its intent to determine whether MCorp has violated specified statutory and regulatory provisions. It is possible, of course, that the Board proceedings, like many other enforcement actions, may conclude with the entry of an order that will affect the Bankruptcy Court’s control over the property of the estate, but that possibility cannot be sufficient to justify the operation of the stay against an enforcement proceeding that is expressly exempted by § 362(b)(4). To adopt such a characterization of enforcement proceedings would be to render subsection (b)(4)’s exception almost meaningless. If and when the Board’s proceedings culminate in a final order, and if and when judicial proceedings are commenced to enforce such an order, then it may well be proper for the Bankruptcy Court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b). We are not persuaded, however, that the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code have any application to ongoing, nonfinal administrative proceedings. MCorp’s final argument rests on 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b). That section authorizes a district court to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over certain bankruptcy-related civil proceedings that would otherwise be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of another court. MCorp’s reliance is misplaced. Section 1334(b) concerns the allocation of jurisdiction between bankruptcy courts and other “courts,” and, of course, an administrative agency such as the Board is not a "court." Moreover, contrary to MCorp's contention, the prosecution of the Board proceedings, prior to the entry of a final order and prior to the commencement of any enforcement action, seems unlikely to impair the Bankruptcy Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the estate protected by 28 U. S. C. § 1334(d). In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the specific preclusive language in 12 U. S. C. § 1818(i)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. II) is not qualified or superseded by the general provisions governing bankruptcy proceedings on which MCorp relies. III Although the Court of Appeals found that § 1818(i)(1) precluded judicial review of many Board actions, it exercised jurisdiction in this litigation based on its reading of Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958). Kyne involved an action in District Court challenging a determination by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that a unit including both professional and nonprofessional employees was appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes-a determination in direct conflict with a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. The Act, however, did not expressly authorize any judicial review of such a determination. Relying on Switchmen v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U. S. 297 (1943), the NLRB argued that the statutory provisions establishing review of final Board orders in the courts of appeals indicated a congressional intent to bar review of any NLRB action in the District Court. The Court rejected that argument, emphasizing the presumption that Congress normally intends the federal courts to enforce and protect the rights that Congress has created. Concluding that the Act did not bar the District Court’s jurisdiction, we stated: “This Court cannot lightly infer that Congress does not intend judicial protection of rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of delegated powers.” 358 U. S., at 190. In this litigation, the Court of Appeals interpreted our opinion in Kyne as authorizing judicial review of any agency action that is alleged to have exceeded the agency’s statutory authority. Kyne, however, differs from this litigation in two critical ways. First, central to our decision in Kyne was the fact that the Board’s interpretation of the Act would wholly deprive the union of a meaningful and adequate means of vindicating its statutory rights. “Here, differently from the Switchmen’s case, ‘absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts’ would mean ‘a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress’ has given professional employees, for there is no other means, within their control ... to protect and enforce that right.” Ibid. The cases before us today are entirely different from Kyne because FISA expressly provides MCorp with a meaningful and adequate opportunity for judicial review of the validity of the source of strength regulation. If and when the Board finds that MCorp has violated that regulation, MCorp will have, in the Court of Appeals, an unquestioned right to review of both the regulation and its application. The second, and related, factor distinguishing this litigation from Kyne is the clarity of the congressional preclusion of review in FISA. In Kyne, the NLRB contended that a statutory provision that provided for judicial review implied, by its silence, a preclusion of review of the contested determination. By contrast, in FISA Congress has spoken clearly and directly: “[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any [Board] notice or order under this section.” 12 U. S. C. § 1818(i)(l) (1988 ed., Supp. II) (emphasis added). In this way as well, this litigation differs from Kyne. Viewed in this way, Kyne stands for the familiar proposition that “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967). As we have explained, however, in this case the statute provides us with clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to deny the District Court jurisdiction to review and enjoin the Board’s ongoing administrative proceedings. IV The Court- of Appeals therefore erred when it held that it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of MCorp’s challenge to the source of strength regulation. In No. 90-913, the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case with instructions to enjoin the source of strength proceedings is therefore reversed. In No. 90-914, the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating the District Court’s injunction against prosecution of the § 23A proceeding is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. The “source of strength” regulation provides in relevant part: “A bank holding company shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and shall not eon[d]uct its operations in an unsafe or unsound maimer.” 12 CFR § 225.4(a)(1) (1991). Section 23A sets forth restrictions on bank holding companies’ corporate practices, including restrictions on transactions between subsidiary banks and nonbank affiliates. See 12 U. S. C. § 371c. See n. 1, supra. In 1987, the Board clarified its policy and stated that a “bank holding company’s failure to assist a troubled or failing subsidiary bank . . . would generally be viewed as an unsafe and unsound banking practice or a violation of [12 CFR § 225.4(a)(1)] or both.” 52 Fed. Reg. 15707-15708. The term “MCorp” refers to the corporation and to two of its wholly owned subsidiaries, MCorp Financial, Inc., and MCorp Management. MCorp timely challenged these orders in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas, pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1818(c)(2). The District Court stayed MCorp’s challenge pending resolution of this proceeding. Brief for MCorp et al. 3. The current status of this order is unclear. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-25, 41-42. We address only MCorp’s effort to enjoin the Board’s administrative proceedings and express no opinion on the continuing vitality or validity of any of the temporary cease-and-desist orders. Although the several "Notices of Charges and of Hearing" issued by the Board against MCorp relied on FISA and the BHCA, e. g., App. 57, 72, the parties have focused only on the former. We note, however, that the BHCA includes a preclusion provision that is similar to § 1818(i)(1) in F ISA. See 12 U. S. C. § 1844(e)(2). The statute characterizes such review of final Board orders as “exclusive” and provides: “(2) Any party to any proceeding under paragraph (1) may obtain a review ... by the filing in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the home office of the depository institution is located, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, within thirty days after the date of service of such order, a written petition praying that the order of the agency be modified, terminated, or set aside. . . . Upon the filing of such petition, such court shall have jurisdiction, which upon the filing of the record shall except as provided in the last sentence of said paragraph (1) be exclusive, to affirm, modify, terminate, or set aside, in whole or in part, the order of the agency.” 12 U. S. C. § 1818(h)(2) (1988 ed., Supp. II). The referenced exception concerns actions taken by the agency with permission of the court. The automatic stay provision provides in relevant part: “(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of— “(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; “(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; “(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title . . . 11 U. S. C. § 362(a). Title 11 U. S. C. § 362(b)(4) provides: “(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay— “(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power .. . .” The Board suggests that the automatic stay provisions of § 362 do not themselves confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court, and thus that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay only where the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction has not already been precluded by a statute like § 1818(i)(l). We need not address this question in light of our determination that the automatic stay does not apply to the Board’s ongoing administrative proceedings. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b) provides: “(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” That subsection provides: "(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate." See 29 U. S. C. § 159(b)(l). In Switchmen v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U. S., at 306, the Court had reasoned: “When Congress in § 3 and in § 9 provided for judicial review of two types of orders or awards and in § 2 of the same Act omitted any such provision as respects a third type, it drew a plain line of distinction. And the inference is strong from the history of the Act that that distinction was not inadvertent. The language of the Act read in light of that history supports the view that Congress gave administrative action under § 2, Ninth a finality which it denied administrative action under the other sections of the Act.” The other cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals — Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986); Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U. S. 460 (1970); and Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U. S. 233 (1968) — are distinguishable from this litigation for the same reasons. In each of those cases, the Court recognized that an unduly narrow construction of the governing statute would severely prejudice the party seeking review, and construed the statute to allow judicial review not expressly provided.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CENTRAL BANK v. UNITED STATES. No. 521. Argued April 29, 1953. Decided June 1, 1953. George H. Roster argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Llewellyn A. Luce. Lester S. Jayson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Burger and Samuel D. Slade. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. This grant of certiorari requires us to construe the provision of the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1029, 31 U. S. C. § 203, which provides: “Any contract entered into by the War Department or the Navy Department may provide that payments to an assignee of any claim arising under such contract shall not be subject to reduction or set-off, and if it is so provided in such contract, such payments shall not be subject to reduction or set-off for any indebtedness of the assignor to the United States arising independently of such contract.” The facts of the case are not in dispute. The Graham Ship Repair Company, a California partnership, entered into a contract for ship repair work with the Navy Department on December 30, 1944. As permitted by the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, the contract authorized the Graham Company to assign the proceeds of the contract to a bank and payments to the assignee bank were not to be “subject to reduction or set-off for any indebtedness of the Contractor to the Government arising independently of this contract.” After the contract had been made, the Graham Company arranged with petitioner, a California banking corporation, for the financing of the ship repair work. As security for the funds to be advanced, Graham assigned the proceeds payable under the contract to petitioner. This assignment was made on January 31, 1945. The Contracting Officer, Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, the Disbursing Officer and the General Accounting Office were duly notified of the assignment as required by the Act. Pursuant to the assignment, the Graham Company-received substantial sums of money from petitioner for use in performing the contract. During the course of performance Graham failed to remit to the Collector of Internal Revenue $453,469.55 in withholding taxes, and $11,462.91 in federal unemployment taxes, which it had withheld, pursuant to §§ 1401 and 1622 of the Internal Revenue Code, from the salaries and wages of its employees who were engaged in work called for by the Navy contract. Instead of remitting these sums to the Collector, Graham had converted them to its own use. Because of this dereliction the contract was terminated by the Navy on March 31, 1946, and the individuals of the Graham partnership pleaded guilty to an indictment for willful attempt to evade the payment of the withheld taxes. At the time the contract was terminated, Graham’s obligation to the Government for the unpaid withholding taxes, with interest and penalties, aggregated $616,750.95. At that time the sum of $110,966.08 was due Graham from the Government for work performed under the contract. Also at that time Graham was indebted to petitioner in an amount in excess of $110,966.08 for advances made by petitioner pursuant to the assignment. Petitioner, as assignee, filed a claim for the balance due from the Government under the contract. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue also claimed that amount. The Comptroller General ruled that the $110,966.08 was a proper set-off against Graham’s tax indebtedness and accordingly reduced such indebtedness to $415,018.17. Thereafter petitioner brought this suit in the Court of Claims. That court held that the set-off made by the Comptroller General was proper because the tax deductions withheld were “not entirely independent of such contract,” Central Bank v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 237, 105 F. Supp. 992, 994, and that petitioner was therefore not entitled to recover under the assignment. Prior to 1940, an assignment such as Graham made to petitioner would have been of no effect as against the United States. Under the Anti-Assignment Statutes (R. S. §§ 3477 and 3737), while the assignment might in some circumstances have been good as between the assignor and assignee (Martin v. National Surety Co., 300 U. S. 588), it could not operate to the détriment of rights of the United States. Any set-off which the United States had against an assignor would have been effective against the assignee. The Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, amending the Anti-Assignment Statutes, validated the assignment of moneys due or to become due under any government contract if the assignment were made to a financing institution. The Act authorized the War and Navy Departments to limit the Government’s previous rights of set-off. See R. S. §§ 3477, 3737, as amended. It provided, see 31 U. S. C. § 203, p. 640, supra, “that payments to an assignee of any claim arising under such contract shall not be subject to reduction or set-off.” The Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 was evidently designed to assist in the national defense program through facilitating the financing of defense contracts by limiting the Government’s power to reduce properly assigned payments. Borrowers were not to be penalized in security because one contracting party was the Government. Contractors might well have obligations to the United States not imposed by the contract from which the payments flowed, as for example the contractor’s income tax for prior earnings under the contract. The taxes here involved are another good illustration of the dangers to lenders. The clause in question which prohibits set-offs for “any indebtedness of the assignor to the United States arising independently of such contract,” was embodied in an amendment introduced by Senator Barkley during debate on the Act. In proposing the amendment, the Senator stated: “Mr. President, the amendment merely provides that when a contractor, in order to obtain money so that he may perform his contract with the Government under the defense program, assigns his contract to a bank or trust company in order to get money with which to proceed with the work, it shall not be permissible to offset against the claim or contract later an indebtedness which the contractor may owe the Government on account of some other contract or some other situation. . . Otherwise, “. . . the Government could come in and assert a claim against the contractor on account of something else which had no relationship whatever to the contract and the defense program.” In the decision below the court said: “The assignee knew that the contractor would be required to withhold and pay taxes to the defendant. The obligation of the contractor for the taxes in question arose before the partners converted such taxes to their own use and such obligation was therefore directly associated with the contract. “In order to be independent, as we think that term was used and intended by the Assignment of Claims Act, the indebtedness must arise irrespective of, exclusive of, and separate from the contract, and must have no direct relation with such contract.” To support its position, the words of United States v. Munsey Trust Co. were relied upon: “[One] is not compelled to lessen his own chance of recovering what is due him by setting up a fund undiminished by his claim, so that others may share it with him.” 332 U. S. 234, 240. The Munsey case is inapplicable. It turns on the ability of the Government to reimburse itself ahead of a surety for sums expended to pay laborers out of funds withheld by the United States from the surety’s principal. No problem of assignment was involved and we held the Government could set off its independent claim against the surety. The requirement that Graham withhold taxes from the “payment of wages” to its employees and pay the same over to the United States did not arise from the contract. The requirement is squarely imposed by §§ 1401 and 1622 of the Internal Revenue Code. Without a government contract Graham would owe the statutory duty to pay over the taxes due, just as it would to pay its income tax on profits earned. Graham’s embezzlement lay neither in execution nor in breach of the contract. It arose from the conversion of the withheld taxes which Graham held as trustee for the United States pursuant to § 3661 of the Code. Assignor Graham’s indebtedness to the United States arose, we think, “independently” of the contract. Finally it is urged that the Act should be construed so as to protect the United States. The short answer to this is that the Act should be construed so as to carry out the purpose of Congress to encourage the private financing of government contracts. To grant the Government its sought-for rights of set-off under the circumstances of this case, would be to defeat the purpose of Congress. It would require the assignee to police the assignor’s accounting and payment system. It would increase the risk to the assignee, the difficulty of the assignor in financing the performance, and the ultimate cost to the Government. Reversed. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Clark dissent. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Amended so as to include the Department of the Air Force by the Act of July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 501, 508, 31 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 203. The issue before us has been prospectively settled for others by the 1951 Assignment of Claims Act (65 Stat. 41, 31 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 203). That Act amended the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 by rephrasing subsection 4 so as to bar by specific words the United States from setting off “any liability of the assignor on account of (1) renegotiation ... (2) fines, (3) penalties . . ., or (4) taxes, social security contributions, or the withholding or non-withholding of taxes or social security contributions, whether arising from or independently of such contract. “Except as herein otherwise provided, nothing in this Act, as amended, shall be deemed to affect or impair rights or obligations heretofore accrued.” 65 Stat. 41, 42. This amendment was caused by uneasiness among lenders because of rulings of the Comptroller General: “In an opinion dated May 17, 1949, the Comptroller General held that, in the event of a price revision under a Government contract, any amount in excess of the contract price as so revised may either be withheld from payment to the assignee ‘or recovered directly from the assignee if already paid.’ Generally, when any payment is received by an assignee bank, it is immediately applied to the contractor’s loan, and the excess is released to the borrower. In several instances, long after full payment of a bank’s loan to a contractor, the Comptroller General has made claims for recovery of payments previously made to the bank assignee. "It had also been the understanding of banks that the statute protected them against set-off by the Government on account of any claims by the Government against the contractor arising outside of the terms of the assigned contract. However, in an opinion dated May 15, 1950, the Comptroller General ruled that claims by the Government against a contractor on account of unpaid social-security contributions and withheld income taxes were claims which did not arise independently of the assigned contract.” S. Rep. No. 217, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 4340, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 2 et seq.; 86 Cong. Rec. 12803; H. R. Rep. No. 2925, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 2; S. Rep. No. 2136, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 2. 86 Cong. Rec. 12803. Central Bank v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 237, 244, 245, 105 F. Supp. 992, 994. “§ 1400. Rate of tax. “In addition to other taxes, there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon the income of every individual a tax equal to the following percentages of the wages .... “§ 1401. Deduction of tax from wages — (a) Requirement. “The tax imposed by section 1400 shall be collected by the employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when paid. “(b) Indemnification of employer. “Every employer required so to deduct the tax shall be liable for the payment of such tax, and shall be indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any such payment made by such employer. “§ 1622. Income tax collected at source — (a) Requirement of withholding. “Every employer making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax equal to the sum of the following: . . . “§ 3661. Enforcement of liability for taxes collected. “Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any internal-revenue tax from any other person and to pay such tax over to the United States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States. The amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such fund arose.” United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U. S. 478, 483. In the Guaranty Trust case the United States sought priority under R. S. § 3466 for its debts from embarrassed railroads. Transportation Act of 1920, Tit. II, §§ 207, 209, 210, 41 Stat. 456, 457-469. Although there was no specific waiver of § 3466, similar to the waiver of the right of set-off or reduction here claimed, this Court held: “To have given priority to debts due the United States pursuant to Title II, would have defeated the purpose of Congress. It not only would have prevented the reestablishment of railroad credit among bankers and investors, but it would even have seriously impaired the market value of outstanding railroad securities. It would have deprived the carriers of the credit commonly enjoyed from supplymen and others; would have seriously embarrassed the carriers in their daily operations; and would have made necessary a great enlargement of their working capital. The provision for loans under § 210 would have been frustrated. For, carriers could ill afford voluntarily to contract new debts thereunder which would displace, pro tanto, their existing bonded indebtedness. The entire spirit of the Act makes clear the purpose that the rule leading to such consequences should not be applied.” 280 U. S., at 485.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SERVICE v. DULLES et al. No. 407. Argued April 2-3, 1957. Decided June 17, 1957. C. Edward Rhetts argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Warner W. Gardner and Alfred L. Scanlan. Donald B. MacGuineas argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub and Paul A-Sweeney. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. On December 14, 1951, petitioner, John S. Service, was discharged by the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, from his employment as a Foreign Service Officer in the Foreign Service of the United States. This case brings before us the validity of that discharge. At the time of his discharge in 1951, Service had been a Foreign Service Officer for some sixteen years, during ten of which, 1935-1945, he had served in various capacities in China. In April 1945, shortly after his return to this country, Service became involved in the so-called Amerasia investigation through having furnished to one Jaffe, the editor of the Amerasia magazine, copies of certain of his Foreign Service reports. Two months later, Service, Jaffe and others were arrested and charged with violating the Espionage Act, but the grand jury, in August 1945, refused to indict Service. He was thereupon restored to active duty in the Foreign Service, from which he had been on leave of absence since his arrest, and returned to duty in the Far East. From then on Service’s loyalty and standing as a security risk were under recurrent investigation and review by a number of governmental agencies under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9835, establishing the President’s Loyalty Program, and otherwise. He was accorded successive “clearances” by the State Department in each of the years 1945, 1946 and 1947, and a fourth clearance in 1949 by that Department’s Loyalty Security Board, which, however, was directed by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission, when the case was examined by it on “post-audit,” to prefer charges against Service and conduct a hearing thereon. This was done, and on October 6, 1950, after extensive hearings, the Department Board concluded that “reasonable grounds do not exist for belief that . . . Service is disloyal to the Government of the United States . . . ,” and that “. . . he does not constitute a security risk to the Department of State.” These findings were approved by the Deputy Under Secretary of State, acting pursuant to authority delegated to him by the Secretary. Again, however, the Loyalty Review Board, on post-audit, remanded the case to the Department Board for further consideration. Such consideration was had, this time under the more stringent loyalty standard established by Executive Order No. 10241, amending the earlier Executive Order No. 9835, and again the Department Board,, on July 31, 1951, decided favorably to Service. This determination was likewise approved by the Deputy Under Secretary. However, on a further post-audit, the Loyalty Review Board decided to conduct a new hearing itself, which resulted this time in the Board’s finding that there was a reasonable doubt as to Service’s loyalty, and in its advising the Secretary of State, on December 13, 1951, that in the Board’s opinion Service “should be forthwith removed from the rolls of the Department of State” and that “the Secretary should approve and adopt the proceedings” had before the Board. On the same day the Department notified Service of his discharge, effective at the close of business on the following day. The authority and basis upon which the Secretary acted in discharging petitioner are set forth in an affidavit later filed by Mr. Acheson in the present litigation, in which he states: “2. On December 13, 1951,1 received a letter from the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission submitting to me that Board's opinion, dated December 12,1951, in the case of John S. Service, a Foreign Service officer of the Department of State and the plaintiff in this action. “3. On that same day I considered what action should be taken in the light of the opinion of the Loyalty Review Board, recognizing that whatever action taken would be of utmost importance to the administration of the Government Employees Loyalty Program. I understood that the responsibility was vested in me to make the necessary determination under both Executive Order No. 9835, as amended, and under Section 103 of Public Law 188, 82d Congress, as to what action to take. “4. Acting in the exercise of the authority vested in me as Secretary of State by Executive Order 9835, as amended by Executive Order 10241, and also by Section 103 of Public Law 188, 82d Congress (65 Stat. 575, 581), I made a determination to terminate the services of Mr. Service as a Foreign Service Officer in the Foreign Service of the United States. “5. I made that determination solely as the result of the finding of the Loyalty Review Board and as a result of my review of the opinion of that Board. In making this determination, I did not read the testimony taken in the proceedings in Mr. Service’s case before the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission. I did not make any independent determination of my own as to whether on the evidence submitted before those boards there was reasonable doubt as to Mr. Service’s loyalty. I made no independent judgment on the record in this case. There was nothing in the opinion of the Loyalty Review Board which would make it incompatible with the exercise of my responsibilities as Secretary of State to act on it. I deemed it appropriate and advisable to act on the basis of the finding and opinion of the Loyalty Review Board. In determining to terminate the employment of Mr. Service, I did not consider that I was legally bound or required by the opinion of the Loyalty Review Board to take such action. On the contrary, I considered that the opinion of the Loyalty Review Board was merely an advisory recommendation to me and that I was legally free to exercise my own judgment as to whether Mr. Service’s employment should be terminated and I did so exercise that judgment.” Section 103 of Public Law 188, 82d Congress, upon which the Secretary thus relied, was the so-called McCarran Rider, first enacted as a rider to the Appropriation Act for 1947, which provided: “Notwithstanding the provisions of . . . any other law, the Secretary of State may, in his absolute discretion, . . . terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Department of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States . . . Similar provisions were re-enacted in each subsequent appropriation act until 1953. After an attempt to secure further administrative review of his discharge proved unsuccessful, petitioner brought this action, in which he sought a declaratory judgment that his discharge was invalid; an order directing the respondents to expunge from their records all written statements reflecting that his employment had been terminated because there was a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty; and an order directing the Secretary to reinstate him to his employment and former grade in the Foreign Service, with full restoration of property rights and payment of accumulated salary. While cross-motions for summary judgment were pending before the District Court, this Court rendered its decision in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, holding that under Executive Order No. 9835, the Loyalty Review Board had no authority to review, on post-audit, determinations favorable to employees made by department or agency authorities, or to adjudicate individual cases on its own motion. On the authority of that decision, the District Court declared the finding and opinion of the Loyalty Review Board respecting Service to be a nullity, and directed the Civil Service Commission to expunge from its records the Board’s finding that there was reasonable doubt as to his loyalty. But since petitioner’s removal rested not only upon Executive Order No. 9835, as amended, but also upon the McCarran Rider, the District Court sustained petitioner’s discharge as a valid exercise of the “absolute discretion” conferred upon the Secretary by the latter provision, and granted summary judgment in favor of respondents in all other respects. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 98 U. S. App. D. C. 268, 235 F. 2d 215, and this Court granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 905, because of the importance of the questions involved to federal administrators and employees alike. Petitioner here attacks the validity of the termination of his employment on two separate grounds: First, he contends that the Secretary’s exercise of discretion was invalid since the findings and opinion of the Loyalty Review Board, upon which alone the Secretary acted, were void, because they were rendered without jurisdiction and were based upon procedures assertedly contrary to due process of law. Even conceding that the Secretary’s powers under the McCarran Rider were such that he was not required to state the grounds for his decision, petitioner urges, his decision cannot stand because he did in fact rely upon grounds that are invalid. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80; Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325. Second, petitioner contends that the Secretary’s action is subject to attack under the principles established by this Court’s decision in Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260, namely, that regulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are binding upon him as well as the citizen, and that this principle holds even when the administrative action under review is discretionary in nature. Regulations relating to “loyalty and security of employees” which had been promulgated by the Secretary, petitioner asserts, were intended to govern discharges effected under the McCarran Rider as well as those effected under Executive Order No. 9835, as amended, and because those regulations were violated by the Secretary in this case, so petitioner claims, his dismissal by the Secretary cannot stand. Since, for reasons discussed hereafter, we have concluded that petitioner’s second contention must be sustained, we do not reach the first. The questions to which we address ourselves therefore are as follows: (1) Were the departmental Regulations here involved applicable to discharges effected under the McCarran Rider? and (2) Were those Regulations violated in this instance? We do not understand the respondents to dispute that the principle of Accardi v. Shaughnessy, supra, is controlling, if we find that the Regulations were indeed applicable and were violated. We might also add that we are not here concerned in any wise with the merits of the Secretary’s action in terminating the petitioner’s employment. I. We think it is not open to serious question that the departmental Regulations upon which petitioner relies were applicable to McCarran Rider discharges as well as to those effected pursuant to the Loyalty-Security program. The terms of the Regulations, the fact that the Department itself proceeded in this very case under those Regulations down to the point of petitioner’s discharge, representations made by the State Department to Congress relating to its practices under the McCarran Rider, and the announced wish of the President to the effect that McCarran Rider authority should be exercised subject to procedural safeguards designed to protect “the personal liberties of employees,” all combine to lead to that conclusion. We also think it clear that these Regulations were valid, so far as their validity is put in issue by the respondents in this case. A. The Regulations. When the Department’s proceedings against the petitioner, which resulted in the “clearances” of October 6, 1950, and July 31, 1951, were begun, the Regulations in effect were those of March 11, 1949, entitled “Regulations and Procedures relating to Loyalty and Security of Employees, U. S. Department of State.” Section 391 stated the “Authority and General Policy” of the Regulations in three subsections. Subsection 391.1 stated that it was “highly important to the interests of the United States that no person be employed in the Department who is disloyal or who constitutes a security risk.” Subsection 391.2 stated that so far as the Regulations related to the handling of loyalty cases, they were promulgated in accordance with Executive Order No. 9835, which had recognized the “necessity for removing disloyal employees from the Federal service and for refusing employment therein to disloyal persons,” and the “obligation to protect employees and applicants from unfounded accusations of disloyalty.” Subsection 391.3 referred to the language of the McCarran Rider, noting that the Secretary of State had been granted by Congress the right, in his absolute discretion, “to terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Department of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.” “In the exercise of this right,” the subsection concluded, “the Department will, so far as possible, afford its employees the same protection as those provided under the Loyalty Program.” And, as we shall see hereafter, the Regulations made no provision for action by the Secretary himself, under the McCarran Rider or otherwise, except following unfavorable action in the employee's case by the Department Loyalty Security Board, after full hearing before that Board on the charges against him, and approval of the Board's action by the Deputy Under Secretary. In May and September 1951, prior to the time of petitioner’s discharge, the Regulations were revised, and the amended § 391 provided even more explicitly than the original that the procedures and standards established were intended to govern exercise of the authority granted by the McCarran Rider. After stating in the first subsection that the Regulations were adopted to implement the Department’s policy that “no person be employed in the Department who is disloyal or who constitutes a security risk,” the section continues in the next two subsections to state in effect that the Regulations relating to the handling of loyalty cases were promulgated in accordance with Executive Order No. 9835, and that those relating to security cases were promulgated under the authority of the Act of August 26, 1950 and the McCarran Rider. The phrase “so far as possible,” in reference to McCarran Rider authority, was deleted. The Regulations thus drew upon all the sources of authority available to the Secretary with reference to such cases, and purported to set forth definitively the procedures and standards to be followed in their handling. B. The Administrative Proceedings in this Case. The administrative proceedings held in petitioner’s case were unquestionably conducted on the premise that the Regulations were applicable in this instance. The charges were based on the Regulations, and a copy of the Regulations was sent to Service along with the letter of charges. The hearing was scheduled under § 395 of the 1949 Regulations. In its opinion exonerating Service, the Department Board noted, following the Regulations, that “the issues here are (1) loyalty, and (2) security risk.” The Board’s favorable recommendations came twice before the Deputy Under Secretary for review under §§ 395.6 and 396.7 of these Regulations, and were approved by him. Later, before the Civil Service Commission’s Loyalty Review Board, an additional charge was added to the Department’s original charges by stipulation of the parties, and the stipulation expressly referred to §§ 392.2 and 393.1a of the Regulations. Indeed, at no time during any of the administrative proceedings in this case was there any suggestion that the Regulations were not applicable to the entire proceedings and binding upon all parties to the case. C. The Department’s Representations to Congress. In the spring of 1950, the Department of State submitted to an investigating subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a comprehensive report on the procedures and standards used by the Department in dealing with employee loyalty and security problems. After describing the procedures utilized by the Department in the early post-war period, the report continued as follows: . . The policy of the Department prior to the passage of the McCarran rider was that if there was reasonable doubt as to an employee’s loyalty, his employment was required to be terminated. The McCarran rider freed the hands of the Department in making this policy effective. Basically any reasonable doubt of an employee’s loyalty if based on substantial evidence was to be resolved in favor of the Government. After enactment of the McCarran rider the Department did not contemplate that the legislation required or that the people of this country would countenance the use of ‘Gestapo’ methods or harassment or persecution of loyal employees who were American citizens on flimsy evidence or hearsay and innuendo. The Department proceeded to develop appropriate procedures designed to implement fully and properly the authority granted the Department under the McCarran rider. “The McCarran rider . . . was the first of a series of provisions included in each subsequent appropriation act which authorized the Secretary of State in his absolute discretion to ‘terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Department of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.’ Accordingly, effective during the 1947 fiscal year, and each fiscal year thereafter, the Department considered the McCarran rider as an additional standard for dealing with security problems in the Department. ... In [its] considered view the McCarran rider was subject to procedural limitations. The McCarran rider was not interpreted as permitting reckless discharge or the exercise of arbitrary whims. “The President’s loyalty order of March 21, 1947, prescribed a comprehensive set of standards governing the executive branch as a whole. It was deemed applicable to the Department of State, as well as to other agencies. The unique powers conferred on the Department as a result of continuous reenactment of the McCarran rider led the Department to promulgate regulations which would encompass its duties and powers both under the Executive order and under the McCarran rider.” D. The President’s Letter. That the policy of the Secretary to subject his plenary powers under the McCarran Rider to procedural limitations was deliberately adopted, and rested on decisions taken at the highest level, is evidenced by a letter dated September 6, 1950, from President Truman to the Secretary of State, which was made a part of the record below. In that letter, the President advised the Secretary that he had just approved H. R. 7786, the General Appropriation Act, 1951, 64 Stat. 595, 768, § 1213 of which re-enacted the McCarran Rider for the current fiscal year. The President continued: “I am sure you will agree that in exercising the discretion conferred upon you by Section 1213, every effort should be made to protect the national security without unduly jeopardizing the personal liberties of the employees within your jurisdiction. Procedures designed to accomplish these two objectives are set forth in Public Law 733,81st Congress, which authorizes the summary suspension of civilian officers and employees of various departments and agencies of the Government, including the Department of State. “In order that officers and employees of the Department of State may be afforded the same protection as that afforded by Public Law 733, it is my desire that you follow the procedures set forth in that law in carrying out the provisions of section 1213 of the General Appropriations Act.” In view of the terms of the Regulations, the course of procedure followed by the Department, and the background materials we have noted, we think that there is no room for doubt that the departmental Regulations for the handling of loyalty and security cases were both intended and considered by the Department to apply in this instance. We cannot accept either of the respondents’ present arguments to the contrary. The first argument, as put by the District Court, whose language was adopted by the Court of Appeals, is: “. . . It was not the intent of Congress that the Secretary of State bind himself to follow the provisions of Executive Order 9835 in dismissing employees under Public Law 188. This power of summary dismissal would not have been granted the Secretary of State by the Congress if the Congress was satisfied that the interests of this country were adequately protected by Executive Order 9835.” We gather from this that the lower courts thought that the Secretary was powerless to bind himself by these Regulations as to McCarran Rider discharges based on loyalty or security grounds. We do not think this is so. Although Congress was advised in unmistakable terms that the Secretary had seen fit to limit by regulations the discretion conferred upon him, see pp. 377-378, supra, it continued to re-enact the McCarran Rider without change for several succeeding years. Cf. Labor Board v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U. S. 361, 366; Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111, 116. Nor do we see any inconsistency between this statute and the effect of the Regulations upon the Secretary under Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260, already discussed, pp. 372-373, supra. Accardi, indeed, involved statutory authority as broad as that involved here. The respondents’ second argument is that the Regulations refer explicitly to discharges based on loyalty and security grounds, but make no reference to discharges deemed “necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States” — the sole McCarran Rider standard — and hence were not applicable to such discharges. But, as has already been demonstrated, both the Regulations and their historical context show that the Regulations were applicable to McCarran Rider discharges, at least to the extent that they were based on loyalty or security grounds, and we do not see how it could seriously be considered, as the respondents now seem to urge, that Service was not discharged on such grounds. The Secretary’s affidavit, and also the Department’s formal notice to Service of his discharge, both of which, among other things, refer to Executive Order No. 9835 as well as to the McCarran Rider as authority for the Secretary’s action, unmistakably show that the discharge was based on such grounds. We now turn to the question whether the manner of petitioner’s discharge was consistent with the Department’s Regulations. II. Preliminarily, it must be noted that the parties are in dispute as to which of the two sets of Regulations — those of 1949 or those of 1951 — is applicable to petitioner’s case, assuming, as we have held, that one or the other must govern. The departmental proceedings against petitioner were begun and were conducted under the 1949 Regulations. However, prior to petitioner’s discharge in December 1951, the revised Regulations of May and September 1951 had become effective, and it is under those Regulations, the respondents say, that Service’s discharge must be judged. On the other hand, the petitioner contends that the 1949 Regulations remained applicable to his case, since he was not advised of the existence of the 1951 Regulations until after his discharge had been accomplished and the present court proceedings had been commenced. However, it is unnecessary for us to make a choice between the two sets of Regulations, for we find the manner in which petitioner was discharged to have been inconsistent with both. A. The 1949 Regulations. In terms of the 1949 Regulations, the vice we find in petitioner’s discharge is that the Secretary had no right to dismiss the petitioner for loyalty or security reasons unless and until the Deputy Under Secretary, acting upon the findings of the Department’s Loyalty Security Board, had recommended such dismissal. In other words, the Deputy Under Secretary in this instance having approved the findings of the Loyalty Security Board favorable to petitioner, the Secretary, consistently with these Regulations, could not, without more, dismiss the petitioner. The basis for this conclusion will appear from a consideration of the procedural scheme established by the 1949 Regulations relating to loyalty and security cases. In outline that scheme involved the following procedural steps: (1). The filing of charges, upon notice to the employee involved, accompanied by adequate factual details as to their basis, and a statement as to the employee’s work and pay status pending further action. (2) A hearing on such charges, if requested by the employee, before the Department’s Loyalty Security Board, whose determination, together with the record of the hearings, were then to be forwarded to the Deputy Under Secretary for review. (3) Upon such review the Deputy Under Secretary was empowered (i) to return the case to the Board for further investigation or action; (ii) to decide in favor of the employee, and to so notify him in writing; or (iii) to decide against the employee, and to notify him of his right to appeal to the Secretary within 10 days thereafter. (4) In the event of such an appeal, the Secretary was empowered (i) to decide favorably to the employee, and to so notify him in writing; or (ii) to decide against the employee, and to notify him of such decision, and further, in a loyalty case, of his right to appeal to the Loyalty Review Board within 20 days thereafter. (5) If, upon such an appeal, the Loyalty Review Board decided adversely to the employee and made an “advisory” recommendation to the Secretary that the employee should be removed from employment under the applicable loyalty standards, the Department was to take prompt administrative action to that end. On the other hand if the Board decided favorably to the employee the Secretary was empowered (i) to restore the employee to duty and “close the case”; (ii) to permit the employee to resign; or (iii) to terminate his employment under the authority conferred by the McCarran Rider “or other appropriate authority.” From this survey, three things appear as to the'handling of loyalty and security cases under the 1949 Regulations which are of significance in this case. First, following the decision of the Deputy Under Secretary upon a determination of the Department Loyalty Security Board, there was to be an appeal to the Secretary only if the Deputy’s action had been adverse to the employee. In other words, under these Regulations the action of the Deputy Under Secretary, if favorable to the employee, was to be final, the Secretary reserving to himself power to act further only if his Deputy’s action was unfavorable to the employee. Second, there was likewise an appeal to the Loyalty Review Board from the Secretary’s decision only if his action was adverse to the employee. Again, in other words, a decision of the Secretary favorable to the employee was to be final, and immune from further action by the Loyalty Review Board on post-audit, a rule since confirmed by our decision in Peters v. Hobby, supra. Third, the Secretary reserved the right to deal with such a case under his McCarran Rider authority, outside the Regulations, only in instances where, upon an employee’s appeal to the Loyalty Review Board from an unfavorable decision by the Secretary, the decision of that body was favorable to the employee. Granted, as the respondents argue, that these Regulations gave the petitioner (a) no right of appeal to the Secretary from the Deputy Under Secretary’s favorable decision, and (b) no right of appeal at all from the action of the Loyalty Review Board, it does not follow, as the respondents then argue, that the Secretary was free to dismiss the petitioner. For, as has already been observed, the Regulations left the Secretary functus officio with respect to such cases once the Deputy Under Secretary had made a determination favorable to the employee. So here when the Deputy Under Secretary approved the Loyalty Security Board’s action of July 31, 1951, clearing the petitioner, under these Regulations the case against Service was closed. Hence Service’s subsequent discharge by the Secretary must be deemed to have been in contravention of these 1949 Regulations. The situation under the 1949 Regulations was thus closely analogous to that which obtained in Accardi v. Shaughnessy, supra. There, the Attorney General bound himself not to exercise his discretion until he had received an impartial recommendation from a subordinate board. Here, the Secretary bound himself not to act at all in cases such as this, except upon appeal by employees from determinations unfavorable to them. We see no relevant ground for distinction. B. The 1951 Regulations. A similar conclusion must be reached if the 1951 Regulations are deemed applicable to petitioner’s case. Section 393.1 of those Regulations provides: “The standard for removal from employment in the Department of State under the authority referred to in section 391.3 shall be that on all the evidence reasonable grounds exist for belief that the removal of the officer or employee involved is necessary or advisable in the interest of national security. The decision shall be reached after consideration of the complete file, arguments, briefs, and testimony presented.” (Emphasis added.) The “authority referred to in section 391.3,” as we have already noted, included the McCarran Rider. In light of the former Secretary’s affidavit there is no room for dispute that no attempt was made to comply with this section of the Regulations, as indeed the respondents’ brief virtually concedes. The respondents argue that this provision was not violated in petitioner’s case because “the only decision to which Section 393.1 relates is that the removal of the officer or employee involved is ‘necessary or advisable in the interest of national security,’ ” the standard laid down in the Act of August 26, 1950, and that “[njothing in this section purports to prescribe the procedure to be followed in determining that removal is ‘necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States,’ ” the standard contained in the McCarran Rider. But since § 391.3, which is incorporated by reference into § 393.1, specifically subjected the exercise of the Secretary’s McCarran Rider authority, in such cases as this, to the operation of the 1951 Regulations, it seems clear that the necessary effect of § 393.1 was to subject the exercise of that authority to the substantive standards prescribed by that section, namely, those established by the Act of August 26, 1950, and also to the procedural requirements that such cases must be decided “on all the evidence” and “after consideration of the complete file, arguments, briefs, and testimony presented.” The essential meaning of the section, in other words, was that the Secretary’s decision was required to be on the merits. While it is of course true that under the McCarran Rider the Secretary was not obligated to impose upon himself these more rigorous substantive and procedural standards, neither was he prohibited from doing so, as we have already held, and having done so he could not, so long as the Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without regard to them. It being clear that § 393.1 was not complied with by the Secretary in this instance, it follows that under the Accardi doctrine petitioner’s dismissal cannot stand, regardless of whether the 1951, rather than the 1949, Regulations are deemed applicable in his case. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed, and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, 40 Stat. 217, as amended. 12 Fed. Reg. 1935. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on the Department of State Appropriation Bill for 1950, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 298. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U, S. 331, 339-348, for a discussion of the then-existing “post-audit” procedure. See pp. 382-386 and note 16, infra. This action was based on “supplementary information ... received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation,” the nature of which does not appear in the record. 16 Fed. Reg. 3690. The essence of the Loyalty Review Board's action, and its relation to the prior departmental proceedings with respect to Service, are summarized in the State Department’s press release of December 13, 1951, as follows: “The Department of State announced today that the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission has advised the Department that this Board has found a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of John Stewart Service, Foreign Service Officer. “Today’s decision of the Loyalty Review Board is based on the evidence which was considered by the Department’s Board and found to be insufficient on which to base a finding of ‘reasonable doubt’ as to Mr. Service’s loyalty or security. Copies of the Opinions of both Boards are attached. “The Department of State’s Loyalty Security Board, on July 31, 1951, had reaffirmed its earlier findings that Service was neither disloyal nor a security risk, and the case had been referred to the Loyalty Review Board for post-audit on September 4, 1951. The Loyalty Review Board assumed jurisdiction of Mr. Service’s case on October 9, 1951. “The Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board in today’s letter to the Secretary (full text attached) noted: “ ‘The Loyalty Review Board found no evidence of membership in the Communist Party or in any organization on the Attorney General’s list on the part of John Stewart Service. The Loyalty Review Board did find that there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the employee, John Stewart Service, to the Government of the United States, based on the intentional and unauthorized disclosure of documents and information of a confidential and non-public character within the meaning of subparagraph d of paragraph 2 of Part V, “Standards,” of Executive Order No. 9835, as amended.’ “The Opinion of the Loyalty Review Board stressed the points made above by the Chairman — that is, it stated that the Board was not required to find and did not find Mr. Service guilty of disloyalty, but it did find that his intentional and unauthorized disclosure of confidential documents raised reasonable doubt as to his loyalty. The State Department Board while censoring [sic] Mr. Service for indiscretions, believed that the experience Mr. Service had been through as a result of his indiscretions in 1945 had served to make him far more than normally security conscious. It found also that no reasonable doubt existed as to his loyalty to the Government of the United States. On this point the State Department Board was reversed. “The Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board has requested the Secretary of State to advise the Board of the effective date of the separation of Mr. Service. This request stems from the provisions of Executive Orders 9835 and 10241 — which established the President’s Loyalty Program — and the Regulations promulgated thereon. These Regulations are binding on the Department of State. “The Department has advised the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board that Mr. Service’s employment has been terminated.” 65 Stat. 581. 60 Stat. 458. See 61 Stat. 288, 62 Stat. 315, 63 Stat. 456, 64 Stat. 768, 65 Stat. 581, 66 Stat. 555. All of these provisions are referred to in this opinion as “the McCarran Rider.” The District Court’s opinion is unreported. Actually, the Secretary could be considered to have power to discharge petitioner as he did only by virtue of the McCarran Rider. Petitioner was an officer in the Foreign Service of the United States, and as such was entitled to the protection of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended. 22 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. That statute authorizes the Secretary of State to separate officers from the Foreign Service “for unsatisfactory performance of duty,” id,., § 1007, or for “misconduct or malfeasance,” id., § 1008. However, under both sections, an officer may not be separated without a hearing before the Board of the Foreign Service established by § 211 of the Act, 22 U. S. C. § 826, and his unsatisfactory performance of duty or misconduct must be established at that hearing. No such hearing was ever afforded petitioner. Executive Order No. 9835 did not vest any additional authority in the heads of administrative agencies to discharge employees. It merely established new standards and procedures for effecting discharges under whatever independent legal authority existed for those discharges. Cf. Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536, 543-544. The only statutory provision which could be deemed to authorize the Secretary to dismiss petitioner without observance of the provisions of the Foreign Service Act was therefore the Mc-Carran Rider. The latter provision thus was an indispensable supplement to the Department’s authority if it was to proceed against petitioner under the Loyalty-Security Regulations as it did. See p. 376, infra. See Peters v. Hobby, supra, 349 U. S., at 342-343. U. S. Department of State, Manual of Regulations and Procedures (1949), § 390 et seq. This qualification is without significance here in view of the fact that the petitioner’s case before the Department was handled, down to the time of his discharge by the Secretary, under these Regulations. See p. 376, infra. Moreover, this phrase was deleted in the 1951 revision of the Regulations, as we note hereafter, p. 376, infra, and the respondents have insisted here that the 1951 revision is controlling, see p. 382, infra. We follow the parties in this case in using interchangeably the terms “Deputy Under Secretary” and “Assistant Secretary — Administration.” When the Department’s 1949 Regulations were promulgated, the official charged with duties under them was the “Assistant Secretary — Administration.” At some time thereafter, however, that official’s functions were apparently transferred to a Deputy Under Secretary. Cf. Act of May 26, 1949, §§ 3, 4, 63 Stat. 111. To avoid confusion, we have used exclusively the latter title in the text of this opinion, regardless of its technical correctness in the particular instance. “391.1 Policy.’’ For the Department’s 1951 Regulations see U. S. Department of State, Manual of Regulations and Procedures (1951), Vol. I, §390 et seq. “Department” is defined as including “the Foreign Service of the United States.” § 391.3. “391.2 Loyalty Authority,” and “391.3 Security Authority.” This statute is referred to in the subsection as "Public Law 733, 81st Congress,” being the Act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476, 5 U. S. C. §§ 22-1, 22-3, which gave to the State Department, among other departments and agencies of the Government, suspension and dismissal powers over their civilian employees when deemed necessary "in the interest of the national security of the United States.” Cf. Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536. Referred to in the subsection as “General Appropriations Act, 1951, Section 1213, Public Law 759, 81st Congress.” S. Rep. No. 2108, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (emphasis supplied). 98 U. S. App. D. C., at 271, 235 F. 2d, at 218. See note 11, supra. I. e., § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended: “In the case of any alien (other than one to whom subsection (d) is applicable) who is deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years, the Attorney General may . . . suspend deportation of such alien if he is not ineligible for naturalization or if ineligible, such ineligibility is solely by reason of his race, if he finds (a) that such deportation would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien; or (b) that such alien has resided continuously in the United States for seven years or more and is residing in the United States upon the effective date of this Act.” 62 Stat. 1206, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V) § 155 (c). See pp. 368-369, supra. This notice read: “My dear Mr. Service: “The Secretary of State was advised today by the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board of the U. S. Civil Service Commission that the Loyalty Review Board has found that there is a reasonable doubt as to your loyalty to the Government of the United States. This finding was based on the intentional and unauthorized disclosure of documents and information of a confidential and non-public character within the meaning of subparagraph d of Paragraph 2 of Part V of Executive Order 9835, as amended. The Loyalty Review Board further advised that it found no evidence of membership on your part in the Communist Party or in any organizations on the Attorney General's list. “Pursuant to the foregoing, the Secretary of State, under the authority of Executive Order 9835, as amended, and Section 103 of Public Law 188, 82nd Congress, has directed me to terminate your employment in the Foreign Service of the United States as of the close of business December 14, 1951. “In view thereof, you are advised that your employment in the Foreign Service of the United States is hereby terminated effective [at the] close of business December 14, 1951.” The respondents argue that the proper rule to be applied is that of Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S. 538, holding that a change in the applicable law after a case has been decided by a nisi prius court, but before decision on appeal, requires the appellate court to apply the changed law. And see Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U. S. 73. Petitioner argues that the decisions cited in note 28, supra, are not in point here because, inter alia, the changed regulations were invalid as to him under the Federal Register Act, 49 Stat. 502, 44 U. S. C. § 307, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 238, 5 U. S. C". § 1002, because not published in the Federal Register. §§ 394.13, 394.15, 395.1. §§ 395.1, 395.53. §§ 395.6, 396.11. §§ 396.2, 396.3. §§ 396.4, 396.5. That this was understood to be the effect of the Regulations is indicated by Department of State Press Release No. 247, March 13, 1950, which is reprinted in S. Rep. No. 2108, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 254. Deputy Under Secretary of State John E. Peurifoy is there quoted as stating, in reply to charges made on the floor of the Senate: “. . . I am in full charge of loyalty matters and ... am fully prepared to deal with these charges. “Gen. George C. Marshall, as Secretary of State, vested in me full responsibility and authority for carrying out the loyalty and security program of the Department of State, and I have continued to exercise the same responsibility and authority under Secretary Dean Acheson. “My decisions on matters of loyalty and security within the Department are final, subject, however, under the law, in certain instances to appeal to the Secretary and the President’s Loyalty Review Board. Since the loyalty and security program was launched in the Department, however, there has not been a single instance in which a decision made by me has been reversed or overruled in any way by Secretary Acheson.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 396.7 of the Regulations provided: “If the Assistant Secretary — Administration or the Secretary of State shall, during his consideration of any case, decide affirmatively that an officer or employee is not disloyal and does not constitute a security risk and that his case should be closed, such officer or employee shall be restored to duty, if suspended, and the record shall show such decision.” In holding as we do we by no means imply that under these Regulations the action of the Deputy Under Secretary had the effect of “closing” petitioner’s case irrevocably and beyond hope of recall. No doubt proper steps could have been taken to reopen it in the Department. But, consistent with his Regulations, we think that the Secretary could in no event have discharged the petitioner, as he did here, without the required action first having been taken by the Department’s Loyalty Security Board and the Deputy Under Secretary. In view of this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to consider the other respects in which petitioner claims that his discharge contravened the 1949 Regulations. See pp. 375-376, supra. See pp. 368-369, supra. We do not, of course, imply that the Kegulations precluded the Secretary from discharging any individual without personally reading the “complete file” and considering “all the evidence.” No doubt the Secretary could delegate that duty. But nothing of the kind appears to have been done here. See note 20, supra. Sections 393.2 and 393.3 further refined the standard by defining five classes of persons constituting security risks, and listing five factors which were to be taken into account, together with possible mitigating circumstances. Because of this conclusion it is unnecessary to deal with the other respects in which petitioner claims his discharge violated the 1951 Regulations.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD., et al. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S et al. No. 10-844. Argued December 5, 2011 Decided April 17, 2012 Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayok, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 426. James F. Hurst argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Charles B. Klein, Steffen N. Johnson, Andrew C. Nichols, William P. Ferranti, and David S. Bloch. Benjamin J. Harwich argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brinkmann, Douglas N. Letter, and Daniel Tenny. Mark A. Perry argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Scott P. Martin, Michael A. Sitzman, and Josh A. Krevitt. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for AARP et al. by David A Balto, Stacy Canon, and Michael Schuster; for the Generic Pharmaceutical Association by Roy T. Englert, Jr., and Mark T. Standi; for Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., by Dan L. Bagatell and David J. Harth; and for Representative Henry A. Waxman by Carlos T. Angulo. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Allergan, Inc., et al. by Jonathan E. Singer, Terry G. Mahn, and Ellen A. Scordino; for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America by Robert A. Long, Jr., and Natalie M. Derzko; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. When the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) evaluates an application to market a generic drug, it considers whether the proposed drug would infringe a patent held by the manufacturer of the brand-name version. To assess that matter, the FDA requires brand manufacturers to submit descriptions of the scope of their patents, known as use codes. The FDA does not attempt to determine if that information is accurate. Rather, the FDA assumes that it is so and decides whether to approve a generic drug on that basis. As a result, the breadth of the use code may make the difference between approval and denial of a generic company’s application. In this case, we consider whether Congress has authorized a generic company to challenge a use code’s accuracy by bringing a counterclaim against the brand manufacturer in a patent infringement suit. The relevant statute provides that a generic company “may assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the [brand manufacturer] to correct or delete the patent information [it] submitted . . . under [two statutory subsections] on the ground that the patent does not claim ... an approved method of using the drug.” 117 Stat. 2452, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I). We hold that a generic manufacturer may employ this provision to force correction of a use code that inaccurately describes the brand’s patent as covering a particular method of using the drug in question. I A The FDA regulates the manufacture, sale, and labeling of prescription drugs under a complex statutory scheme. To begin at the beginning: When a brand manufacturer wishes to market a novel drug, it must submit a new drug application (NDA) to the FDA for approval. The NDA must include, among other things, a statement of the drug’s components, scientific data showing that the drug is safe and effective, and proposed labeling describing the uses for which the drug may be marketed. See §§ 355(b)(1), (d). The FDA may approve a brand-name drug for multiple methods of use — either to treat different conditions or to treat the same condition in different ways. Once the FDA has approved a brand manufacturer’s drug, another company may seek permission to market a generic version pursuant to legislation known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1585. Those amendments allow a generic competitor to file an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) piggy-backing on the brand’s NDA. Rather than providing independent evidence of safety and efficacy, the typical ANDA shows that the generic drug has the same active ingredients as, and is biologically equivalent to, the brand-name drug. See §§ 355( j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv). As we have previously recognized, this process is designed to speed the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U. S. 661, 676 (1990). Because the FDA cannot authorize a generic drug that would infringe a patent, the timing of an ANDA’s approval depends on the scope and duration of the patents covering the brand-name drug. Those patents come in. different varieties. One type protects the drug compound itself. Another kind — the one at issue here — gives the .brand manufacturer exclusive rights over a particular method of using the drug. In some circumstances, a brand manufacturer may hold such a method-of-use patent even after its patent on the drug compound has expired. To facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and FDA regulations direct brand manufacturers to file information about their patents. The statute mandates that a brand submit in its NDA “the patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the [brand] submitted the [NDA] or which claims a method of using such drug.” § 355(b)(1). And the regulations issued under that statute require that, once an NDA is approved, the brand provide a description of any method-of-use patent it holds. See 21 CFR §§ 314.53(c)(2)(ii)(P)(3), (e) (2011). That description is known as a use code, and the brand submits it on FDA Form 3542. As later discussed, the FDA does not attempt to verify the accuracy of the use codes that brand manufacturers supply. It simply publishes the codes, along with the corresponding patent numbers and expiration dates, in a fat, brightly hued volume called the Orange Book (less colorfully but more officially denominated Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations). After consulting the Orange Book, a company filing an ANDA must assure the FDA that its proposed generic drug will not infringe the brand’s patents. When no patents are listed in the Orange Book or all listed patents have expired (or will expire prior to the ANDA’s approval), the generic manufacturer simply certifies to that effect. See 21 U. S. C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(III). Otherwise, the applicant has two possible ways to obtain approval. One option is to submit a so-called section viii statement, which asserts that the generic manufacturer will market the drug for one or more methods of use not covered by the brand’s patents. See §355(j)(2)(A)(viii). A section viii statement is typically used when the brand’s patent on the drug compound has expired and the brand holds patents on only some approved methods of using the drug. If the ANDA applicant follows this route, it will propose labeling for the generic drug that “carves out” from the brand’s approved label the still-patented methods of use. See 21 CFR § 314.94(a)(8)(iv). The FDA may approve such a modified label, see § 314.127(a)(7), as an exception to the usual rule that a generic drug must bear the same label as the brand-name product, see 21 U. S. C. §§355(j)(2)(A)(v), (j)(4)(G). FDA acceptance of the carve-out label allows the generic company to place its drug on the market (assuming the ANDA meets other requirements), but only for a subset of approved uses — i. e., those not covered by the brand’s patents. Of particular relevance here, the FDA will not approve such an ANDA if the generic’s proposed carve-out label overlaps at all with the brand’s use code. See 68 Fed. Reg. 36682-36683 (2003). The FDA takes that code as a given: It does not independently assess the patent’s scope or otherwise look behind the description authored by the brand. According to the agency, it lacks “both [the] expertise and [the] authority” to review patent claims; although it will forward questions about the accuracy of a use code to the brand, its own “role with respect to patent listing is ministerial.” Id., at 36683; see ibid. (“A fundamental assumption of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments is that the courts are the appropriate mechanism for the resolution of disputes about the scope and validity of patents”). Thus, whether section viii is available to a generic manufacturer depends on how the brand describes its patent. Only if the use code provides sufficient space for the generic’s proposed label will the FDA approve an ANDA with a section viii statement. The generic manufacturer’s second option is .to file a so-called paragraph IV certification, which states that a listed patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the [generic] drug.” 21 U. S. C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). A generic manufacturer will typically take this path in either of two situations: if it wants to market the drug for all uses, rather than carving out those still allegedly under patent; or if it discovers, as described above, that any carve-out label it is willing to adopt cannot avoid the brand’s use code. Filing a paragraph IV certification means provoking litigation. The patent statute treats such a filing as itself an act of infringement, which gives the brand an immediate right to sue. See 35 U. S. C. § 271(e)(2)(A). Assuming the brand does so, the FDA generally may not approve the ANDA until 30 months pass or the court finds the patent invalid or not infringed. See 21 U. S. C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Accordingly, the paragraph IV process is likely to keep the generic drug off the market for a lengthy period, but may eventually enable the generic company to market its drug for all approved uses. In the late 1990⅛, evidence mounted that some brands were exploiting this statutory scheme to prevent or delay the marketing of generic drugs, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) soon issued a study detailing these anticom-petitive practices. See FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, pp. iii-vi (July 2002) (hereinafter FTC Study). That report focused attention on brands' submission of inaccurate patent information to the FDA. In one case cited by the FTC, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F. 3d 1323 (CA Fed. 2001), a brand whose original patent on a drug was set to expire listed a new patent ostensibly extending its rights over the drug, but in fact covering neither the compound nor any method of using it. The FDA, as was (and is) its wont, accepted the listing at its word and accordingly declined to approve a generic product. The generic manufacturer sued to delete the improper listing from the Orange Book, but the Federal Circuit held that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments did not allow such a right of action. See id., at 1330-1333. As the FTC noted, that ruling meant that the only option for generic manufacturers in Mylan's situation was to file a paragraph IV certification (triggering an infringement suit) and then wait out the usual 30-month period before the FDA could approve an ANDA. See FTC Study 40-45. Congress responded to these abuses by creating a mechanism, in the form of a legal counterclaim, for generic manufacturers to challenge patent information a brand' has submitted to the FDA. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,117 Stat. 2452. The provision authorizes an ANDA applicant sued for patent infringement to “assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the [brand] to correct or delete the patent information submitted by the [brand] under subsection (b) or (c) [of §355] on the ground that the patent does not claim either— “(aa) the drug for which the [brand’s NDA] was approved; or “(bb) an approved method of using the drug.” 21 U.S. C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I). The counterclaim thus enables a generic competitor to obtain a judgment directing a brand to “correct or delete” certain patent information that is blocking the FDA’s approval of a generic product. This case raises the question whether the counterclaim is available to fix a brand’s use code. B The parties to this case sell or seek to sell the diabetes drug repaglinide. Respondents (collectively Novo) manufacture Prandin, the brand-name version of the drug. The FDA has approved three uses of Prandin to treat diabetes: repaglinide by itself; repaglinide in combination with metfor-min; and repaglinide in combination with thiazolidinediones (TZDs). Petitioners (collectively Caraco) wish to market a generic version of the drug for two of those uses. Novo originally owned a patent for the repaglinide compound, known as the ’035 patent, but it expired in 2009. • In 2004, Novo also acquired a method-of-use patent for the drug, called the ’358 patent, which does not expire until 2018. That patent — the one at issue here — claims a “method for treating [diabetes by] administering... repaglinide in combination with metformin.” 601 F. 3d 1359, 1362 (CA Fed. 2010). Thus, Novo currently holds a patent for one of the three FDA-approved uses of repaglinide — its use with met-formin. But Novo holds no patent for the use of repaglinide with TZDs or its use alone. In 2005, Caraco filed an ANDA seeking to market a generic version of repaglinide. At that time, the Orange Book entry for Prandin listed both the ’035 patent (the drug compound) and the ’358 patent (the use of the drug with metformin). Caraco assured the FDA that it would not market its generic drug until the ’035 patent expired, thus making that patent irrelevant to the FDA’s review of the ANDA. Caraco filed a paragraph IV certification for the remaining, ’358 patent, stating that it was “invalid or [would] not be infringed.” § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); see supra, at 407-408. In accord with the patent statute, Novo treated this filing as an act of infringement and brought suit. When Caraco filed its ANDA, Novo’s use code for the ’358 patent represented that the patent covered “‘[u]se of re-paglinide in combination with metformin to lower blood glucose.’ ” 601 F. 3d, at 1362-1363. The FDA therefore advised Caraco that if it did not seek to market repaglinide for use with metformin, it could submit a section viii statement. That would allow Caraco, assuming its ANDA was otherwise in order, to market its generic drug for the other two uses. Caraco took the FDA’s cue and in 2008 submitted a section viii statement, with proposed labeling carving out Novo’s patented metformin therapy. See App. 166-176. Before the FDA took further action, however, Novo changed its use code for the ’358 patent. The new use code describes “‘[a] method for improving glycemic control in adults with type 2 diabetes.’” 601 F. 3d, at 1363. Because that code indicates that the ’358 patent protects all three approved methods of using repaglinide to treat diabetes, Caraco’s proposed carve-out of metformin therapy was no longer sufficient; even with that exclusion, Caraco’s label now overlapped with Novo’s use code on the other two uses. And Caraeo could not carve out those uses as well, because at that point nothing would be left for it to market. The FDA has approved repaglinide for only three uses, and Novo’s use code encompassed them all. The FDA accordingly informed Caraeo that it could no longer employ section viii to bring its drug to market. Caraeo responded to Novo’s new, preclusive use code by filing a statutory counterclaim in the ongoing infringement suit. The counterclaim sought an order requiring Novo to “correct” its use code “on the ground that [the ’358] patent does not claim” two approved methods of using repaglinide— alone and in combination with TZDs. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I); see supra, at 408-409. That order would permit the FDA to accept Caraco’s proposed carve-out label and approve the company’s ANDA. The District Court granted summary judgment to Caraeo, enjoining Novo to “correct... its inaccurate description of the ’358 patent” by submitting a new Form 3542 to the FDA that would “reinstate] its former” use code. App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a-66a. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Caraeo lacked “a statutory basis to assert a counterclaim.” 601 F. 3d, at 1360. The court first read the statutory phrase “the patent does not claim ... an approved method of using the drug” to require Caraeo to demonstrate that the ’358 patent does not claim any approved method of use. See id., at 1365 (“‘[A]n approved method’ means ‘any approved method’”). Because the patent covers one approved method of use— repaglinide in combination with metformin — the counterclaim was unavailable. The court further ruled that the counterclaim provision does not reach use codes because they are not “patent information submitted by the [brand] under subsection (b) or (c).” On the Federal Circuit’s view, that information consists only of the patent number and expiration date. See id., at 1366-1367. Judge Dyk dissented. He would have read the phrase “the patent does not claim ... an approved method of using the drug” to include situations where, as here, the use code wrongly indicates that the patent covers one or more particular approved methods of use. See id., at 1376-1378. And he would have construed “patent information submitted . . . under subsection (b) or (c)” to include use codes. See id., at 1370-1376. We granted certiorari, 564 U. S. 1035 (2011), and now reverse. II We begin “where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989). This case requires us to construe two statutory phrases. First, we must decide when a “patent does not claim ... an approved method of using” a drug. Second, we must determine the content of “patent information submitted . . . under subsection (b) or (c)” of §355. We consider both of those questions against the backdrop of yet a third statutory phrase, providing that the remedy for a prevailing counterclaimant is an order requiring the brand “to correct or delete” that patent information. And we consider each question in the context of the entire statute. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997) (Statutory interpretation focuses on “the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole”). We cannot say that the counterclaim clause is altogether free of ambiguity. But when we consider statutory text and context together, we conclude that a generic manufacturer in Caraco’s position can use the counterclaim. A An ANDA applicant sued for patent infringement may bring a counterclaim “on the ground that the patent does not claim ... an approved method of using the drug.” 21 U. S. C. § 355( j)(5)(C)(ii)(I). The parties debate the meaning of this language. Novo (like the Federal Circuit) reads “not an” to mean “not any,” contending that “the counterclaim is available only if the listed patent does not claim any (or, equivalently, claims no) approved method of using the drug.” Brief for Respondents 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). By that measure, Caraco may not bring a counterclaim because Novo’s ’358 patent claims the use of repaglinide with metformin. In contrast, Caraco reads “not an” to mean “not a particular one,” so that the statute permits a counterclaim whenever the patent does not claim a method of use for which the ANDA applicant seeks to market the drug. On that view, the counterclaim is available here — indeed, is available twice over — because the ’358 patent does not claim the use of repaglinide with TZDs or its use alone. Truth be told, the answer to the general question “What does ‘not an’ mean?” is “It depends”: The meaning of the phrase turns on its context; See Johnson v. United States, 559 U, S. 133, 139 (2010) (“Ultimately, context determines meaning”). “Not an” sometimes means “not any,” in the way Novo claims. If your spouse tells you he is late because he “did not take a cab,” you will infer that he took no cab at all (but took the bus instead). If your child admits that she “did not read a book all summer,” you will surmise that she did not read any book (but went to the movies a lot). And if a sports-fan friend bemoans that “the New York Mets do not have a chance of winning the World Series,” you will gather that the team has no chance whatsoever (because they have no hitting). But now stop a moment. Suppose your spouse tells you that he got lost because he “did not make a turn.” You would understand that he failed to make a particular turn, not that he drove from the outset in a straight line. ' Suppose your child explains her mediocre grade on a college exam by saying that she “did not read an assigned text.” You would infer that she failed to read a specific book, not that she read nothing at all on the syllabus. And suppose a lawyer friend laments that in her last trial, she “did not prove an element of the offense.” You would grasp that she is speaking not of all the elements, but of a particular one. The examples could go on and on, but the point is simple enough: When it comes to the meaning of “not an,” context matters. And the statutory context here supports Caraco’s position. As described earlier (and as Congress understood), a single drug may have multiple methods of use, only one or some of which a patent covers. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 355(b)(1) (requiring that an NDA applicant file information about “any patent which claims the drug ... or which claims a method of using such drug” (emphasis added)). The Hatch-Waxman Amendments authorize the FDA to approve the marketing of a generic drug for particular unpatented uses;, and section viii provides the mechanism for a generic company to identify those uses, so that a product with a label matching them can quickly come to market. The statutory scheme, in other words, contemplates that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones. Within that framework, the counterclaim naturally functions to challenge the brand’s'' assertion of rights over whichever discrete use (or uses) the generic company wishes to pursue. That assertion, after all, is the thing blocking the generic drug’s entry on the market. The availability of the counterclaim thus matches the availability of FDA approval under the statute: A company may bring a counterclaim to show that a method of use is unpatented because establishing that fact allows the FDA to authorize a generic drug via section viii. Consider the point as applied to this ease. Caraco wishes to market a generic version of repaglinide for two (and only two) uses. Under the statute, the FDA could approve Car-aco’s application so long as no patent covers those uses, regardless whether a patent protects yet a third method of using the drug. Novo agrees that Caraco could bring a counterclaim if Novo’s assertion of patent protection for repaglinide lacked any basis — for example, if Novo held no patent, yet claimed rights to the pair of uses for which Car-aco seeks to market its drug. But because Novo has a valid patent on a different use, Novo argues that Caraco’s counterclaim evaporates. And that is so even though, once again, Caraco has no wish to market its product for that patented use and the FDA stands ready, pursuant to the statute, to approve Caraco’s product for the other two. To put the matter simply, Novo thinks the counterclaim disappears because it has a patent for a method of use in which neither Caraco nor the FDA is interested at all. “It would take strong evidence to persuade us that this is what Congress wrought.” Eli Lilly, 496 U. S., at 673. That “not an” sometimes (but sometimes not) means “not any” is not enough. Novo argues that our reading must be wrong because Congress could have expressly “impose[d] additional. .. qualifications” on the term “an approved method of us[e]” — and indeed did so in another place in the statute. Brief for Respondents 31; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I). Novo points here to section viii itself, which applies when the brand’s patent “does not claim a use for which the [ANDA] applicant is seeking approval.” § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (emphasis added). But the mere possibility of clearer phrasing cannot defeat the most natural reading of a statute; if it could (with all due respect to Congress), we would interpret a great many statutes differently than we do. Nor does Congress’s use of more detailed language in another provision, enacted years earlier, persuade us to put the counterclaim clause at odds with its statutory context. That is especially so because we can turn this form of argument back around on Novo. Congress, after all, could have more clearly expressed Novo’s proposed meaning in the easiest of ways — by adding a single letter to make clear that “not an” really means “not any.” And indeed, Congress used a “not any” construction in the very next subclause, enacted at the very same time.' See § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(II) (“Subclause (I) does not authorize the assertion of a claim ... in any [other] civil action”). So if we needed any proof that Congress knew how to say “not any” when it meant “not any,” here we find it. We think that sees, raises, and bests Novo’s argument. Our more essential point, though, has less gamesmanship about it: We think that the “not any” construction does not appear in the relevant counterclaim provision because Congress did not mean what Novo wishes it had. And we think that is so because Congress meant (as it usually does) for the provision it enacted to fit within the statutory scheme — here, by facilitating the approval of non-infringing generic drugs under section viii. B Novo contends that Caraco’s counterclaim must fail for another, independent reason: On its view (as on the Federal Circuit’s), the counterclaim does not provide a way to correct use codes because they are not “patent information submitted by the [brand] under subsection (b) or (c)” of § 355. Once again, we disagree. The statute does not define “patent information,” but a use code must qualify. It describes the method of use claimed in a patent. See 21 CFR §§314.53(e)(2)(ii)(P)(3), (e). That fits under any ordinary understanding of the language. . The more difficult question arises from the “submitted under” phrase. The subsections mentioned there — (b) and (c) of §355 — require an NDA applicant to submit specified information: “the patent number and the expiration date of any patent” claiming the drug or a method of its use. 21 U. S. C. §§ 355(b)(1), (c)(2). According to Novo, only that information comes within the counterclaim provision. But subsections (b) and (c) as well govern the regulatory process by which brands provide additional patent information to the FDA, both before and after an NDA is approved. In particular, those subsections provide the basis for the regulation requiring brands to submit use codes, see 21 CFR § 314.53; in issuing that regulation, the FDA noted that “[o]ur principal legal authority ... is section 505 of the act [codified at §355], in conjunction with our general rulemaking authority,” 68 Fed. Reg. 36697-36698 (specifically referring to subsections (b) and (c)). And the form (Form 3542) on which brands submit their use codes states that the information appearing there is “provided in accordance with Section [355](b) and (c);” App. 97. So use codes fall within the counterclaim’s, ambit if the phrase “submitted under” reaches filings that not only subsections (b) and (c) themselves but also their implementing regulations require. Several of our cases support giving “under” this broad meaning. For example, in Eli Lilly, 496 U. S., at 665-668, we examined a similar statutory reference to the “submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs,” 35 U. S. C. § 271(e)(1). We noted there that submitting information “under a Federal law” suggests doing so “in furtherance of or compliance with a comprehensive scheme of regulation.” 496 U. S., at 667. Likewise, in Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135 (1991), we held that a regulatory proceeding “under section 554,” 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i), meant any proceeding “subject to,” “governed by,” or conducted “by reason of the authority of” that statutory provision. So too here. “Patent information submitted . . . under subsection (b) or (c)” most naturally refers to patent information provided as part of the “comprehensive scheme of regulation” premised on those subsections. Eli Lilly, 496 U. S., at 667. It includes everything (about patents) that the FDA requires brands to furnish in the proceedings “subject to,” “governed by,” or conducted “by reason of the authority of” §§ 355(b) and (c). Ardestani, 502 U. S., at 135. The breadth of the term “under” becomes particularly clear when compared with other phrases — “described in” and “prescribed by” — appearing in neighboring provisions. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 355(c)(2) (“patent information described in subsection (b)”); § 355(d)(6) (“patent information prescribed by subsection (b)”). Those phrases denote a patent number and expiration date and nothing more. In contrast, the word “under” naturally reaches beyond that most barebones information to other patent materials the FDA demands in the regulatory process. Once again, that congressional choice fits the broader statutory context. Use codes are pivotal to the FDA’s implementation of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments — and no less so because a regulation, rather than the statute itself, requires their submission. Recall that those Amendments instruct the FDA (assuming other requirements are met) to approve an ANDA filed with a section viii statement when it proposes to market a drug for only unpatented methods of use. To fulfill that charge, the FDA must determine whether any patent covers a particular method of use; and to do that, the agency (which views itself as lacking expertise in patent matters, see supra, at 406-407, and n. 2) relies on the use codes submitted in the regulatory process. See 68 Fed. Reg. 36682-36683. An overbroad use code therefore throws a wrench into the FDA’s ability to approve generic drugs as the statute contemplates. So it is not surprising that the language Congress used in the counterclaim provision sweeps widely enough to embrace that filing. C Another aspect of the counterclaim provision — its description of available remedies — dispatches whatever remains of Novo’s arguments. According to the statute, a successful claimant may obtain an order requiring the brand to “correct or delete” its patent information. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I). Our interpretation of the statute gives content to both those remedies: It deletes a listing from the Orange Book when the brand holds no relevant patent and corrects the listing when the brand has misdescribed the patent’s scope. By contrast, Novo’s two arguments would all but read the term “correct” out of the statute. Consider first how Novo’s an-means-any contention would accomplish that result. Recall that on Novo’s view, a counterclaim can succeed only if the patent challenged does not claim either the drug or any approved method of using it. See supra, at 413. But when a generic manufacturer makes that showing, the remedy must be to “delete” the listing; no correction would be enough. Novo agrees with that proposition; “[a]t bottom,” Novo avers, “the counterclaim is a delisting provision.” Brief for Respondents 20. But that raises the obvious question: Why did Congress also include the term “correct” in the statute? Novo can come up with just one answer: The counterclaim, it proposes, can correct erroneous patent numbers. Imagine, for example, that Novo mistakenly entered the number ’359, instead, of ’358, when submitting information about its repaglinide patent for publication in the Orange Book. Then, Novo suggests, Caraco could bring a counterclaim to challenge the inaccurate listing (on the ground that ’359 does not claim any method of use), and the remedy would be “correction]” (substituting an 8 for a 9). But we think Novo’s admission that this scenario would be “unusual,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, considerably understates the matter. As Novo concedes, brands have every incentive to provide the right patent number in the first place, and to immediately rectify any error brought to their attention. See id., at 40-41. By doing so, they place both generic companies and the FDA on notice of their patents and thereby prevent infringement. And conversely, generics have little or no incentive to bring a counterclaim that will merely replace one digit in the Orange Book with another. So we doubt Congress created a legal action to “correct” patent information just to fix such scrivener’s errors. See, e. g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (refusing to adopt an interpretation of a statute that would render a piece of it “insignificant, if-not wholly superfluous” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That would have been, in the most literal sense, to make a federal case out of nothing. The same problem afflicts Novo’s alternative contention— that “patent information submitted . . . under subsection (b) or (c)” includes only numbers and expiration dates (and not use codes). Once again, we cannot think Congress included the remedy of “correction]” so that courts could expunge typos in patent numbers. And not even Novo has proffered a way for the counterclaim to “correct” an erroneous expiration date. Suppose, for example, that a brand incorrectly lists the expiration date of a valid patent as 2018 rather than 20Í5. The counterclaim would be useless: It authorizes a remedy only “on the ground' that” the listed patent does not claim the drug or an approved method of using it — and notwithstanding the wrong expiration date, this patent does so. Alternatively, suppose the brand lists a patent as having a 2018 expiration date when in fact the patent has already lapsed. Then, a generic manufacturer could bring a counterclaim alleging that the patent no longer claims the drug or a method of using it — but the appropriate remedy would be deletion, not correction, of the brand’s listing. Novo’s reading of “patent information,” like its reading of “not an,” effectively deletes the term “correct” from the statute. Ill Novo finally advances two arguments relating to the counterclaim’s drafting history. Neither contention,, however, overcomes the statutory text and context. Indeed, consideration of the provision’s background only strengthens our view of its meaning. A Novo first contends that our interpretation of the statute "effectively resurrect[s] the scheme rejected by Congress.” Brief for Respondents 44 (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197, 203, n. 4 (1993)). In 2002, Novo notes, Congress failed to pass a bill that would have required brands to file specified “patent information,” including, for method-of-use patents, a description of “the approved use covered by the [patent] claim.” S. 812, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., § 103(a)(1), p. 7 (engrossed bill). That bill would have allowed a generic company to bring its own civil action — not merely a counterclaim in ongoing litigation — to “delete” or “correct” the information filed. Id., at 8. The Sénate approved the bill, but the House of Representatives took no action on it. Novo argues that because this failed legislation would have allowed a generic company to challenge over-broad descriptions of a patent, we cannot read the statute Congress eventually enacted as doing so. We disagree. We see no reason to assume, as Novo does, that Congress rejected S. 812 because it required brands to submit patent information beyond a number and expiration date. Indeed, Novo’s argument highlights the perils of relying on the fate of prior bills to divine the meaning of enacted legislation. “A bill can be proposed for any number of reasons, and it can be rejected for just as many others.” Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 170 (2001). S. 812 contained numerous items, including a title on importing prescription drugs (no controversy there!), that may have caused its failure. See S. 812, Tit. II. Moreover, what criticism there was of the bill’s mechanism for challenging brands’ patent claims focused not on the specification of “patent information,” but instead on the creation of an independent cause of action— stronger medicine than the counterclaim Congress ultimately adopted. And finally, Novo ignores a likely cause for the redrafting of the provision on submitting information. Between S. 812⅛ demise and the counterclaim’s enactment, the FDA issued a rule requiring brands to supply material concerning method-of-use patents, including use codes. The drafters of the counterclaim provision knew about that rule, and had no need to duplicate its list of mandated filings. So the drafting history does not support Novo’s conclusion. If anything, the statute’s evolution indicates that Congress determined to enforce the FDA’s new listing provisions, including its use-code requirement, through the new counterclaim. B Novo next argues that Congress established the counterclaim only to solve the problem raised by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Mylan, 268 F. 3d 1323 — the impossibility of deleting an improperly listed patent from the Orange Book. In Mylan, as earlier described, a generic company alleged that a brand had listed a patent that covered neither the approved drug nor any method of using, it, and brought an action seeking delisting. See supra, at 408. The Federal Circuit held that no such action was available, even assuming the allegation was true. Because several legislators saw Mylan as “exemplifying]” brands’ “perceived abuse” of the FDA’s patent listing practices, Brief for Respondents 35, Novo contends that we should construe the counterclaim provision to aid only a generic company that “finds itself in the same position as Mylan was in Mylan,” Supp. Brief in Opposition 5-6. Once again, we think not. Maybe Mylan triggered the legislative effort to enact a counterclaim, or maybe it didn’t: By the time Congress acted, it also had at hand an FTC study broadly criticizing brands’ patent listings and an FDA rule designed to address the very same issue. See supra, at 408, 423. But even assuming Mylan “prompted the proposal” of the counterclaim, “whether that alone accounted for its enactment is quite a different question.” Eli Lilly, 496 U. S., at 670, n. 3 (emphasis deleted). Here, we think Mylan alerted Congress to a broader problem — that generic companies generally had no avenue to challenge the accuracy of brands’ patent listings, and that the FDA therefore could not approve proper applications to bring inexpensive drugs to market. The proof of that lies in the statute itself (where the best proof of what Congress means to address almost always resides). As we have described, the statute’s text and context demonstrate that the counterclaim is available not only (as in Mylan) when the patent listing is baseless, but also (as here) when it is overbroad. See supra, at 412-421. In particular, Congress’s decision to allow a coun-terclaimant to seek “correct[ion]” of patent information explodes Novo’s theory, because the remedy for a Mylan-type impropriety is complete delisting. And to make matters still easier, Congress’s equation of the two situations — the one in Mylan and the one here— makes perfect sense. Whether a brand lists a patent that covers no use or describes a patent on one use as extending to others, the brand submits misleading patent information to the FDA. In doing so, the brand equally exploits the FDA’s determination that it cannot police patent claims. And the brand’s action may in either case delay or block approval of a generic drug that infringes no patent — and that under the statute should go to market. See supra, at 406-407. That is the danger Caraeo faces here, as much as it was the threat in Mylan: Novo seeks to preclude Caraco from selling repaglinide for unpatented uses until 2018, when Novo’s patent on a different use expires. Indeed, the need for the counterclaim is greater here than in Mylan. When a brand, lists a patent that covers no use, a generic company has a pathway aside from the counterclaim to challenge the listing. As described earlier, the company may make a paragraph IV certification stating that the listed patent “is invalid or will not be infringed” by the generic drug. 21 U. S. C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); see supra, at 407-408. If the brand sues, the generic company can argue that its product would not infringe the patent. Using the counterclaim may enable a generic manufacturer to obtain delisting more quickly, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 54; but even without it, the company can eventually get a judgment of non-infringement enabling the FDA to approve its ANDA. In contrast, where (as here) a brand files an overbroad use code, a generic company cannot use paragraph IV litigation to that end. A paragraph IV certification (unlike a section viii statement) requires the generic company to propose labeling identical to the brand’s; it cannot carve out any uses. See supra, at 406. And that proposed label will necessarily infringe because it will include the use(s) on which the brand does have a patent. So here, a paragraph IV suit cannot lead to a judgment enabling FDA approval; the counterclaim offers the only route to bring the generic drug to market for non-infringing uses. Novo’s view eliminates the counterclaim where it has the greatest value. IV The statutory counterclaim we have considered enables courts to resolve patent disputes so that the FDA can fulfill its statutory duty to approve generic drugs that do not infringe patent rights. The text and context of the provision demonstrate that a generic company can employ the counterclaim to challenge a brand’s overbroad use code. We accordingly hold that Caraco may bring a counterclaim seeking to “correct” Novo’s use code “on the ground that” the ’358 patent “does not claim ... an approved method of using the drug” — indeed, does not claim two. . The judgment, of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Under the FDA’s regulations, any person may dispute the accuracy of patent information listed in the Orange Book by notifying the agency in writing. See 21 CFR § 314.53(f). The FDA will then request that the brand verify the information, but will make no changes “[u]nless the [brand] withdraws or amends” the listing. Ibid. Several courts have affirmed the FDA’s view of its ministerial role. See, e. g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F. 3d 1335, 1349 (CA Fed. 2003); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F. 3d 227, 242-243 (CA4 2002). That question is not before us, and we express no view on it. Novo asserts that it made the change so that its use code would mirror its label, which the FDA had just asked it to alter. See Brief for Respondents 14. But the FDA, in calling for new labeling, neither requested nor required Novo to amend its use code.' And indeed, Novo’s counsel conceded before the Federal Circuit that Novo modified its use code in part as “⅛ response to the [FDA’s] section viii’” suggestion. 601 F. 3d, at 1380-1381 (Dyk, J., dissenting). On remand from the Federal Circuit’s decision, the District Court determined that the ’358 patent was invalid and unenforceable. See 775 F. Supp. 2d 985 (ED Mich. 2011). The Federal Circuit stayed Novo’s appeal from that judgment pending the decision here. Before proceeding to the merits, we dispose of a recently raised jurisdictional argument. Novo now contends that the federal courts lost subject-matter jurisdiction over this infringement action (including the counterclaim) at the moment Caraco filed its section viii statement. On Novo’s theory, such a statement (unlike a paragraph IV certification) does not count as an act of infringement under the patent statute, see 35 U. S. C. § 271(e)(2)(A), and so cannot provide a jurisdictional basis for the suit. But that argument is wrong even assuming (as Novo contends) that Caraco’s section viii filing terminated its paragraph IV certification and that a section viii filing is not an act of infringement. The want of an infringing act is a merits problem, not a jurisdictional one. Nothing in the section of the statute defining certain filings as acts of infringement suggests anything to the contrary. And “we are not inclined to interpret statutes as creating a jurisdictional bar when they are not framed as such.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 480 (2011). In the absence of such a bar, the federal courts have jurisdiction over this suit for a single, simple reason: It “ar[ose] under a[n] Act of Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). For this reason, we find Novo’s reliance on the occasional dictionary definition of “a[n]” unconvincing. Although “an” sometimes means “any” when used in negative structures, see, e.g., Microsoft Encarta College Dictionary 1 (2001) (fifth definition), it sometimes does not. Cf. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 402-407 (2011) (rejecting a proposed definition of “personal” because it did not always hold in ordinary usage and the statutory context suggested it did not apply). Novo’s only counter is to redefine a use code. Novo argues that a use code need not be tied to the patent at all — that “[t]he relevant regulation requires [NDA] applicants to provide [only] ⅛ description of each approved method of use or indication.’” Brief for Kespondents 48 (quoting 21 CFR § 314.53(e)(2)(ii)(P)(l)). Because an “indication” refers generally to what a drug does (here, treat diabetes), see § 201.57(c)(2), Novo claims that a use code may sweep more broadly than the patent. But that is incorrect. First, Novo does not cite the regulations that specify the information required for publication — i. e., use codes. See §314.53(c)(2)(ii)(P)(3) (requiring a “description of the patented method of use as required for publication”); § 314.53(e) (“[F]or each use patent,” the FDA will publish “the approved indications or other conditions of use covered by a patent”). Those provisions (whether referring to methods of use, conditions of use, or indications) all demand a description of the patent. And second, even the provision Novo cites — which mandates the submission of additional material, not listed in the Orange Book — ties information about indications to patent coverage; that regulation requires (when quoted in full) that the brand provide “a description of each approved method of use or indication and related patent claim of the patent being submitted.” § 314.53(c)(2)(ii)(P)(l). See, e. g., 148 Cong. Rec. 15424 (2002) (remarks of Sen. Gregg) (“Probably the most significant issue is the fact that it creates a new cause of action”);' id., at 15431-15432 (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (similar); id., at 14434 (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (similar). See, e. g., Hearings on Barriers to Entry in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-8 (2003) (statement of Daniel Troy, Chief Counsel to the FDA); id., at 19 (statement of Sen. Schumer) (“The bill provides a critical complement to the work FDA has done in clarifying its regulations on patent listing, but it goes much further”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. FINK et al. No. 86-511. Argued April 27, 1987 Decided June 22, 1987 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 100. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 100. Blackmun, J., concurred in the result. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 101. Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Olsen, Deputy Solicitor General Lauber, and Jonathan S. Cohen. Matthew J. Zinn argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Susan H. Serling, J. Walker Johnson, W. Merritt Jones, Jr., and Mark K. Wilson. Patrick J. Carr filed a brief for Leroy Frantz, Jr., as amicus curiae. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether a dominant shareholder who voluntarily surrenders a portion of his shares to the corporation, but retains control, may immediately deduct from taxable income his basis in the surrendered shares. I Respondents Peter and Karla Fink were the principal shareholders of Travco Corporation, a Michigan manufacturer of motor homes. Travco had one class of common stock outstanding and no preferred stock. Mr. Fink owned 52.2 percent, and Mrs. Fink 20.3 percent, of the outstanding shares. Travco urgently needed new capital as a result of financial difficulties it encountered in the mid-1970’s. The Finks voluntarily surrendered some of their shares to Travco in an effort to “increase the attractiveness of the corporation to outside investors.” Brief for Respondents 3. Mr. Fink surrendered 116,146 shares in December 1976; Mrs. Fink surrendered 80,000 shares in January 1977. As a result, the Finks’ combined percentage ownership of Travco was reduced from 72.5 percent to 68.5 percent. The Finks received no consideration for the surrendered shares, and no other shareholder surrendered any stock. The effort to attract new investors was unsuccessful, and the corporation eventually was liquidated. On their 1976 and 1977 joint federal income tax returns, the Finks claimed ordinary loss deductions totaling $389,040, the full amount of their adjusted basis in the surrendered shares. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions. He concluded that the stock surrendered was a contribution to the corporation’s capital. Accordingly, the Commissioner determined that the surrender resulted in no immediate tax consequences, and that the Finks’ basis in the surrendered shares should be added to the basis of their remaining shares of Travco stock. In an unpublished opinion, the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s determination for the reasons stated in Frantz v. Commissioner, 83 T. C. 162, 174-182 (1984), aff’d, 784 F. 2d 119 (CA2 1986), cert. pending, No. 86-11. In Frantz the Tax Court held that a stockholder’s non pro rata surrender of shares to the corporation does not produce an immediate loss. The court reasoned that “[t]his conclusion . . . necessarily follows from a recognition of the purpose of the transfer, that is, to bolster the financial position of [the corporation] and, hence, to protect and make more valuable [the stockholder’s] retained shares.” 83 T. C., at 181. Because the purpose of the shareholder’s surrender is “to decrease or avoid a loss on his overall investment,” the Tax Court in Frantz was “unable to conclude that [he] sustained a loss at the time of the transaction.” Ibid. “Whether [the shareholder] would sustain a loss, and if so, the amount thereof, could only be determined when he subsequently disposed of the stock that the surrender was intended to protect and make more valuable.” Ibid. The Tax Court recognized that it had sustained the taxpayer’s position in a series of prior cases. Id., at 174-175. But it concluded that these decisions were incorrect, in part because they “encourage[d] a conversion of eventual capital losses into immediate ordinary losses.” Id., at 182. In this case, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court. 789 F. 2d 427 (1986). The court concluded that the proper tax treatment of this type of stock surrender turns on the choice between “unitary” and “fragmented” views of stock ownership. Under the “fragmented view,” “each share of stock is considered a separate investment,” and gain or loss is computed separately on the sale or other disposition of each share. Id., at 429. According to the “unitary view,” “the ‘stockholder’s entire investment is viewed as a single indivisible property unit,’” ibid, (citation omitted), and a sale or disposition of some of the stockholder’s shares only produces “an ascertainable gain or loss when the stockholder has disposed of his remaining shares.” Id., at 432. The court observed that both it and the Tax Court generally had adhered to the fragmented view, and concluded that “the facts of the instant case [do not] present sufficient justification for abandoning” it. Id., at 431. It therefore held that the Finks were entitled to deduct their basis in the surrendered shares immediately as an ordinary loss, except to the extent that the surrender had increased the value of their remaining shares. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Tax Court for a determination of the increase, if any, in the value of the Finks’ remaining shares that was attributable to the surrender. Judge Joiner dissented. Because the taxpayers’ “sole motivation in disposing of certain shares is to benefit the other shares they hold[,]. . . [vjiewing the surrender of each share as the termination of an individual investment ignores the very reason for the surrender.” Id., at 435. He concluded: “Particularly in cases such as this, where the diminution in the shareholder’s corporate control and equity interest is so minute as to be illusory, the stock surrender should be regarded as a contribution to capital.” Ibid. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits, 479 U. S. 960 (1986), and now reverse. II A It is settled that a shareholder’s voluntary contribution to the capital of the corporation has no immediate tax consequences. 26 U. S. C. §263; 26 CFR § 1.263(a)-2(f) (1986). Instead, the shareholder is entitled to increase the basis of his shares- by the amount of his basis in the property transferred to the corporation. See 26 U. S. C. § 1016(a)(1). When the shareholder later disposes of his shares, his contribution is reflected as a smaller taxable gain or a larger deductible loss. This rule applies not only to transfers of cash or tangible property, but also to a shareholder’s forgiveness of a debt owed to him by the corporation. 26 CFR § 1.61-12(a) (1986). Such transfers are treated as contributions to capital even if the other shareholders make proportionately smaller contributions, or no contribution at all. See, e. g., Sackstein v. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 566, 569 (1950). The rules governing contributions to capital reflect the general principle that a shareholder may not claim an immediate loss for outlays made to benefit the corporation. Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U. S. 488 (1940); Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T. C. 669, 676 (1945), aff’d, 153 F. 2d 301 (CA3 1946). We must decide whether this principle also applies to a controlling shareholder’s non pro rata surrender of a portion of his shares. B The Finks contend that they sustained an immediate loss upon surrendering some of their shares to the corporation. By parting with the shares, they gave up an ownership interest entitling them to future dividends, future capital appreciation, assets in the event of liquidation, and voting rights. Therefore, the Finks contend, they are entitled to an immediate deduction. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 165(a) and (c)(2). In addition, the Finks argue that any non pro rata stock transaction “give[s] rise to immediate tax results.” Brief for Respondents 13. For example, a non pro rata stock dividend produces income because it increases the recipient’s proportionate ownership of the corporation. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441, 445 (1936). By analogy, the Finks argue that a non pro rata surrender of shares should be recognized as an immediate loss because it reduces the surrendering shareholder’s proportionate ownership. Finally, the Finks contend that their stock surrenders were not contributions to the corporation’s capital. They note that a typical contribution to capital, unlike a non pro rata stock surrender, has no effect on the contributing shareholder’s proportionate interest in the corporation. Moreover, the Finks argue, a contribution of cash or other property increases the net worth of the corporation. For example, a shareholder’s forgiveness of a debt owed to him by the corporation decreases the corporation’s liabilities. In contrast, when a shareholder surrenders shares of the corporation’s own stock, the corporation’s net worth is unchanged. This is because the corporation cannot itself exercise the right to vote, receive dividends, or receive a share of assets in the event of liquidation. G. Johnson & J. Gentry, Finney and Miller’s Principles of Accounting 538 (7th ed. 1974). III A shareholder who surrenders a portion of his shares to the corporation has parted with an asset, but that alone does not entitle him to an immediate deduction. Indeed, if the shareholder owns less than 100 percent of the corporation’s shares, any non pro rata contribution to the corporation’s capital will reduce the net worth of the contributing shareholder. A shareholder who surrenders stock thus is similar to one who forgives or surrenders a debt owed to him by the corporation; the latter gives up interest, principal, and also potential voting power in the event of insolvency or bankruptcy. But, as stated above, such forgiveness of corporate debt is treated as a contribution to capital rather than a current deduction. Supra, at 94. The Finks’ voluntary surrender of shares, like a shareholder’s voluntary forgiveness of debt owed by the corporation, closely resembles an investment or contribution to capital. See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders § 3.14, p. 3-59 (4th ed. 1979) (“If the contribution is voluntary, it does not produce gain or loss to the shareholder”). We find the similarity convincing in this case. The fact that a stock surrender is not recorded as a contribution to capital on the corporation’s balance sheet does not compel a different result. Shareholders who forgive a debt owed by the corporation or pay a corporate expense also are denied an immediate deduction, even though neither of these transactions is a contribution to capital in the accounting sense. Nor are we persuaded by the fact that a stock surrender, unlike a typical contribution to capital, reduces the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the corporation. This Court has never held that every change in a shareholder’s percentage ownership has immediate tax consequences. Of course, a shareholder’s receipt of property from the corporation generally is a taxable event. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 301, 316. In contrast, a shareholder’s transfer of property to the corporation usually has no immediate tax consequences. § 263. The Finks concede that the purpose of their stock surrender was to protect or increase the value of their investment in the corporation. Brief for Respondents 3. They hoped to encourage new investors to provide needed capital and in the long run recover the value of the surrendered shares through increased dividends or appreciation in the value of their remaining shares. If the surrender had achieved its purpose, the Finks would not have suffered an economic loss. See Johnson, Tax Models for Nonprorata Shareholder Contributions, 3 Va. Tax. Rev. 81, 104-108 (1983). In this case, as in many cases involving closely held corporations whose shares are not traded on an open market, there is no reliable method of determining whether the surrender will result in a loss until the shareholder disposes of his remaining shares. Thus, the Finks’ stock surrender does not meet the requirement that an immediately deductible loss must be “actually sustained during the taxable year.” 26 CFR §1.165-1(b) (1986). Finally, treating stock surrenders as ordinary losses might encourage shareholders in failing corporations to convert potential capital losses to ordinary losses by voluntarily surrendering their shares before the corporation fails. In this way shareholders might avoid the consequences of 26 U. S. C. § 165(g)(1), which provides for capital-loss treatment of stock that becomes worthless. Similarly, shareholders may be encouraged to transfer corporate stock rather than other property to the corporation in order to realize a current loss. We therefore hold that a dominant shareholder who voluntarily surrenders a portion of his shares to the corporation, but retains control, does not sustain an immediate loss deductible from taxable income. Rather, the surrendering shareholder must reallocate his basis in the surrendered shares to the shares he retains. The shareholder’s loss, if any, will be recognized when he disposes of his remaining shares. A reallocation of basis is consistent with the general principle that “[p]ayments made by a stockholder of a corporation for the purpose of protecting his interest therein must be regarded as [an] additional cost of his stock,” and so cannot be deducted immediately. Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T. C., at 676. Our holding today is not inconsistent with the settled rule that the gain or loss on the sale or disposition of shares of stock equals the difference between the amount realized in the sale or disposition and the shareholder’s basis in the particular shares sold or exchanged. See 26 U. S. C. § 1001(a); 26 CFR § 1.1012-1(c)(1) (1986). We conclude only that a controlling shareholder’s voluntary surrender of shares, like contributions of other forms of property to the corporation, is not an appropriate occasion for the recognition of gain or loss. IV For the reasons we have stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Blackmun concurs in the result. In addition, Mr. Fink’s sister owned 10 percent of the stock, his brother-in-law owned 4.1 percent, and his mother owned 2.2 percent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a. The unadjusted basis of shares is their cost. 26 U. S. C. § 1012. Adjustments to basis are made for, among other things, “expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly chargeable to capital account.” § 1016(a)(1). E. g., Tilford v. Commissioner, 75 T. C. 134 (1980), rev’d, 705 F. 2d 828 (CA6), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 992 (1983); Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T. C. 622, 648 (1976), rev’d sub nom. Schleppy v. Commissioner, 601 F. 2d 196 (CA5 1979); Downer v. Commissioner, 48 T. C. 86, 91 (1967); Estate of Foster v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 930, 934 (1947); Miller v. Commissioner, 45 B. T. A. 292, 299 (1941); Budd International Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 B. T. A. 737, 755-756 (1941). The Commissioner acquiesced in Miller and Budd, but later withdrew his acquiescence. See 1941-2 Cum. Bull. 9; 1942-2 Cum. Bull. 3; 1977-1 Cum. Bull. 2. The dissent overstates the extent to which the Commissioner’s disallowance of ordinary loss deductions is contrary to the “settled construction of law.” Post, at 105. In fact, the Commissioner’s position was uncertain when the Finks surrendered their shares in 1976 and 1977. Although the Commissioner had acquiesced in the Tax Court’s holdings that non pro rata surrenders give rise to ordinary losses, “it often took a contrary position in litigation.” Note, Frantz or Fink: Unitary or Fractional View for Non-Prorata Stock Surrenders, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 905, 908 (1987). See, e. g., Smith v. Commissioner, supra, at 647-650; Duett v. Commissioner, 19 TCM 1381 (1960). In 1969, moreover, the Commissioner clearly took the position that a non pro rata surrender by a majority shareholder is a contribution to capital that does not result in an immediate loss. Rev. Rul. 69-368, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 27. Thus, the Finks, unlike the taxpayer in Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U. S. 330 (1984), knew or should have known that their ordinary loss deductions might not be allowed. For this reason, the Commissioner’s disallowance of the Finks’ deductions was not an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding and agreed with its reasoning. Frantz v. Commissioner, 784 F. 2d 119, 123-126 (1986), cert. pending, No. 86-11. The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits have held that a dominant shareholder’s non pro rata stock surrender does not give rise to an ordinary loss. Frantz v. Commissioner, supra; Schleppy v. Commissioner, supra. The Finks concede that a pro rata stock surrender, which by definition does not change the percentage ownership of any shareholder, is not a taxable event. Cf. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920) (pro rata stock dividend does not produce taxable income). As a practical matter, however, the Finks did not give up a great deal. Their percentage interest in the corporation declined by only 4 percent. Because the Finks retained a majority interest, this reduction in their voting power was inconsequential. Moreover, Travco, like many corporations in financial difficulties, was not paying dividends. In most eases, however, stock dividends are not recognized as income until the shares are sold. See 26 U. S. C. § 305. Treasury stock — that is, stock that has been issued, reacquired by the corporation, and not canceled — generally is shown as an offset to the shareholder’s equity on the liability side of the balance sheet. G. Johnson & J. Gentry, Finney and Miller’s Principles of Accounting 538 (7th ed. 1974). For example, assume that a shareholder holding an 80 percent interest in a corporation with a total liquidation value of $100,000 makes a non pro rata contribution to the corporation’s capital of $20,000 in cash. Assume further that the shareholder has no other assets. Prior to the contribution, the shareholder’s net worth was $100,000 ($20,000 plus 80 percent of $100,000). If the corporation were immediately liquidated following the contribution, the shareholder would receive only $96,000 (80 percent of $120,000). Of course such a non pro rata contribution is rare in practice. Typically a shareholder will simply purchase additional shares. It is true that a corporation’s stock is not considered an asset of the corporation. A corporation’s own shares nevertheless may be as valuable to the corporation as other property contributed by shareholders, as treasury shares may be resold. This is evidenced by the fact that corporations often purchase their own shares on the open market. Indeed, if the Finks did not make this concession their surrender probably would be treated as a nondeductible gift. See 26 CFR § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (1986). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, §§ 301, 311, 100 Stat. 2216, 2219, eliminated the differential tax rates for capital gains and ordinary income. The difference between a capital loss and an ordinary loss remains important, however, because individuals are permitted to deduct only $3,000 of capital losses against ordinary income each year, and corporations may not deduct any capital losses from ordinary income. 26 U. S. C. § 1211. In contrast, ordinary losses generally are deductible from ordinary income without limitation. §§ 165(a) and (c)(2). The Court of Appeals in this case did not discuss the possibility of allowing a capital loss rather than an ordinary loss, and the parties raise it only in passing. We note, however that a capital loss is realized only upon the “sal[e] or exchang[e]” of a capital asset. 26 U. S. C. § 1211(b)(3). A voluntary surrender, for no consideration, would not seem to qualify as a sale or exchange. Frantz v. Commissioner, 784 P. 2d, at 124. Our holding today also draws support from two other sections of the Code. First, § 83 provides that, if a shareholder makes a “bargain sale” of stock to a corporate officer or employee as compensation, the “bargain” element of the sale must be treated as a contribution to the corporation’s capital. S. Rep. No. 91-552, pp. 123-124 (1969); 26 CFR § 1.83-6(d) (1986). Section 83 reversed the result in Downer v. Commissioner, 48 T. C. 86 (1967), a decision predicated on the fragmented view of stock ownership adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case. To be sure, Congress was concerned in § 83 with transfers of restricted stock to employees as compensation rather than surrenders of stock to improve the corporation’s financial condition. In both cases, however, the shareholder’s underlying purpose is to increase the value of his investment. Second, if a shareholder’s stock is redeemed — that is, surrendered to the corporation in return for cash or other property — the shareholder is not entitled to an immediate deduction unless the redemption results in a substantial reduction in the shareholder’s ownership percentage. §§ 302 (a), (b), (d); 26 CFR § 1.302-2(c) (1986). Because the Finks’ surrenders resulted in only a slight reduction in their ownership percentage, they would not have been entitled to an immediate loss if they had received consideration for the surrendered shares. 26 U. S. C. § 302(b). Although the Finks did not receive a direct payment of cash or other property, they hoped to be compensated by an increase in the value of their remaining shares. The Finks remained the controlling shareholders after their surrender. We therefore have no occasion to decide in this case whether a surrender that causes the shareholder to lose control of the corporation is immediately deductible. In related contexts, the Code distinguishes between minimal reductions in a shareholder’s ownership percentage and loss of corporate control. See § 302(b)(2) (providing “exchange” rather than dividend treatment for a “substantially disproportionate redemption of stock” that brings the shareholder’s ownership percentage below 50 percent); § 302(b)(3) (providing similar treatment when the redemption terminates the shareholder’s interest in the corporation). In this case we use the term “control” to mean ownership of more than half of a corporation’s voting shares. We recognize, of course, that in larger corporations — especially those whose shares are listed on a national exchange — a person or entity may exercise control in fact while owning less than a majority of the voting shares. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 48 Stat. 894, 15 U. S. C. §78m(d) (requiring persons to report acquisition of more than 5 percent of a registered equity security).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROWAN COS., INC. v. UNITED STATES No. 80-780. Argued April 21, 1981 Decided June 8, 1981 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 263. K. Martin Worthy argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael C. Durney and Elmer H. Theis. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Murray, Leonard J. Henzke, Jr., and Stanley S. Shaw, Jr Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Roger J. Marzulla and Maxwell A. Miller for Kim Aspatore et al.; by Thomas W. Power and Robert D. McDonald for the Foodservice and Lodging Institute; and by Lawrence Gerber for the Young Men’s Christian Association of Metropolitan Hartford, Inc. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the federal taxes imposed upon employers by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), 26 U. S. C. § 3101 et seq., and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U. S. C. § 3301 et seq. The question is whether petitioner should have included in the computation of “wages,” which is the base for taxation under FICA and FUTA, the value of meals and lodging provided for its own convenience to employees working on offshore oil rigs. I During the tax years in question, 1967-1969, petitioner Rowan Companies, Inc., owned and operated rigs for drilling oil and gas wells, both on land and offshore. Some of petitioner’s offshore rigs were located as many as 60 miles from land. It cost petitioner less and was more convenient to provide meals and lodging to employees at these rigs than to transport the employees to and from the rigs for each work shift. Employees worked at these rigs for 10-day tours of duty, and petitioner then transported them back to land for 5-day periods of leave. All employees at a rig received the same meals and lodging facilities, regardless of employment status or pay. Employees did not receive any cash allowance if they chose not to eat a meal. Petitioner did not provide meals or lodging to employees during their leave; nor did it provide meals or lodging to employees working on land-based rigs. Petitioner did not include the value of the meals and lodging in computing its employees’ “wages” for the purpose of paying taxes under FICA or FUTA. Nor did petitioner include this value in computing “wages” for the purpose of withholding its employees’ federal income tax under 26 U. S. C. § 3402 (a) , Its uniform practice appeared to be consistent with the statutory language, as Congress defined “wages” in substantially identical language for each of these three obligations upon employers. Upon audit, however, the Internal Revenue Service included the fair value of the meals and lodging in the employees’ “wages” for the purpose of FICA and FUTA, but not for the purpose of income-tax withholding under §3402 (a). The Service acted consistently with the present Treasury Regulations that interpret the definition of “wages” in FICA and FUTA to include the value of these meals and lodging, whereas the substantially identical definition of “wages” in § 3401 (a) is interpreted by Treasury Regulations to exclude this value. Compare Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121 (a)-l (e), (f) (FICA), 26 CFR §§ 31.3121 (a)-1(e), (f) (1980); Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3306 (b)-l (e), (f) (FUTA), 26 CFR §§ 31.3306 (b)-l (e), (f) (1980); with Treas. Reg. §§31.3401 (a)-l (b)(9), (10) (income-tax withholding), 26 CFR §§31.3401 (a)-l (b)(9), (10) (1980). Petitioner paid the additional assessment and brought this suit for a refund under 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a)(1). The District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, expressing the view that the different interpretations of the definition of “wages” are justified by the different purposes of FICA and FUTA, on the one hand, and income-tax withholding, on the other. 624 F. 2d 701, 707 (1980). We granted a writ of certiorari, 449 U. S. 1109 (1981), because the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals. We now reverse. II The Government acknowledges that petitioner properly excluded the value of the meals and lodging in computing the “wages” from which it withheld employees’ income tax under § 3402 (a). Under the Treasury Regulation interpreting the definition of “wages” for income-tax withholding, the employer excludes the value of meals or lodging from “wages” if the employee excludes the value from his gross income. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401 (a) — 1 (b)(9), 26 CFR § 31.3401 (a)-1 (b)(9) (1980). Under the convenience-of-the-employer rule, an employee may exclude from gross income the value of meals and lodging furnished to him by his employer if the employer furnished both the meals and lodging for its own convenience, furnished the meals on its business premises, and required the employee to accept the lodging on the business premises as a condition of employment. 26 U. S. C. § 119 (1976 ed., Supp. III). Petitioner’s provision of meals and lodging to employees on its offshore rigs satisfied each of these § 119 requirements. The value of the meals and lodging therefore was excludable by the employer from “wages” under Treas. Reg. § 31.3401 (a)-l (b)(9), 26 CFR § 31.3401 (a)-l (b) (9) (1980). See generally Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U. S. 77 (1977). Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, the Government contends that petitioner should have included the value of the meals and lodging in “wages” for purposes of FICA and FUTA. It relies on Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121 (a)-l (f) (FICA) and 31.3306 (b)-l (f) (FUTA), 26 CFR §§31.3121 (a)-l (f) and 31.3306 (b)-l (f) (1980), that provide: “Ordinarily, facilities or privileges (such as entertainment, medical services, or so-called ‘courtesy’ discounts on purchases), furnished or offered by an employer to his employees generally, are not considered as remuneration for employment if such facilities or privileges are of relatively small value and are offered or furnished by the employer merely as a means of promoting the health, good will, contentment, or efficiency of his employees. The term ‘facilities or privileges,’ however, does not ordinarily include the value of meals or lodging furnished, for example, to restaurant or hotel employees, or to seamen or other employees aboard vessels, since generally these items constitute an appreciable part of the total remuneration of such employees.” If valid, these regulations dictate that the value of the meals and lodging provided by petitioner to its employees on offshore rigs was includable in “wages” as defined in FICA and FUTA, even though excludable from “wages” under the substantially identical definition in § 3401 (a) for income-tax withholding. We consider Treasury Regulations valid if they “implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.” United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 307 (1967); accord, Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, 450 U. S. 156, 169 (1981). In National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 U. S. 472, 477 (1979), we stated: “In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose.” Harmony between statutory language and regulation is particularly significant in this case. Congress itself defined the word at issue — “wages”—and the Commissioner interpreted Congress’ definition only under his general authority to “prescribe all needful rules.” 26 U. S. C. § 7805 (a). Because we therefore can measure the Commissioner’s interpretation against a specific provision in the Code, we owe the interpretation less deference than a regulation issued under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision. Compare Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, supra, at 165; Fulman v. United States, 434 U. S. 528, 533 (1978); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424-425, and nn. 8-9 (1977). Where the Commissioner acts under specific authority, our primary inquiry is whether the interpretation or method is within the delegation of authority. Among other considerations relevant to the validity of Treasury Regulations, we inquire whether the regulation “is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional intent,” National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 U. S., at 477; and “[i]f the regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry.” Ibid. We also consider, if pertinent, “the consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.” Ibid. In this case, we hold that Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121 (a)-l (f) and 31.3306 (b)-l (f) are invalid, for they fail to implement the congressional mandate in a consistent and reasonable manner. A Congress chose “wages” as the base for measuring employers’ obligations under FICA, FUTA, and income-tax withholding. In Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435 U. S. 21 (1978), we considered Congress’ use of the concepts of “income” and “wages” for the purpose of income-tax withholding. The question was whether an employer should have included in “wages” for income-tax withholding the reimbursements it had given employees for lunch expenses on company travel that had. not required overnight stays. We held that the employer was not required to include the reimbursements in “wages,” even though the reimbursements constituted “income” to the employees. This holding relied on the recognition that “[t]he two concepts — income and wages — obviously are not necessarily the same. Wages usually are income, but many items qualify as income and yet clearly are not wages.” Id., at 25 (footnote omitted). In short, “wages” is a narrower concept than “income,” see ibid., and the fact that the reimbursements were “income” to the employees did not necessarily mean that the employer had to include them in “wages” for income-tax withholding. Petitioner contends that its position in this case follows from our reasoning in Central Illinois. Because “wages” is a narrower concept than “income” for the purposes of income-tax withholding, it is argued that the value of the meals and lodging in this case — which the Government acknowledges is not “income” — therefore cannot be “wages” under FICA and FUTA. Petitioner’s argument rests on the assumption that Congress intended the term “wages” to have the same meaning for purposes of FICA, FUTA, and income-tax withholding. We now consider whether petitioner’s assumption is correct. B Congress enacted the predecessor provisions of FICA and FUTA as Titles VIII and IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 636, 639. It chose “wages” as the base for taxation of employers, § 804, 49 Stat. 637; § 901, 49 Stat. 639, and it defined “wages.” §811 (a), 49 Stat. 639; §907 (b), 49 Stat. 642. Congress originated the present income-tax withholding system in § 172 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 884. See Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, supra, at 26-27. It again chose “wages” as the base, 56 Stat. 888, and defined “wages” in substantially the same language that it used in FICA and FUTA, id., at 887. When Congress revised the withholding system by replacing § 172 with the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 126, it retained the definition of “wages.” Ibid. In view of this sequence of consistency, the plain language of the statutes is strong evidence that Congress intended “wages” to mean the same thing under FICA, FUTA, and income-tax withholding. The legislative histories of the Acts establishing income-tax withholding support the conclusion to be drawn from the plain language. These histories reveal a congressional concern for “the interest of simplicity and ease of administration.” S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 165 (1942) (Revenue Act of 1942). See Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, supra, at 31. They also reveal that one of the means Congress chose in order to promote simplicity was to base withholding upon the same measure— “wages” — as taxation under FICA and FUTA. Thus, whereas the withholding system proposed by the House provided for withholding upon dividends and bond interest in addition to wages, H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 (1942), the system proposed by the Senate and enacted in § 172 limited withholding to wages. S. Rep. No. 1631, supra, at 165. “This was a standard that was intentionally narrow and precise.” Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, supra, at 31. Section 172 also specified that remuneration for certain services was excepted from “wages.” According to the Senate Report, “[t]hese exceptions [for income-tax withholding] are identical with the exceptions extended to such services for Social Security tax purposes and are intended to receive the same construction and have the same scope.” S. Rep. No. 1631, supra, at 166. When Congress replaced § 172, the House devoted much attention to the specified exceptions from “wages,” H. R. Rep. No. 268, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 14 (1943); H. R. Rep. No. 401, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 22-23 (1943), but it left the essential definition of “wages” unchanged. H. R. Rep. No. 268, supra, at 14. The Senate modified the bill proposed by the House, and reported: “[T]he methods of collection, payment, and administration of the withholding tax have been coordinated generally with those applicable to the Social Security tax imposed on employees under section 1400 of the code. This proposal has been made in order to facilitate the work of both the Government and the employer in administering the withholding system.” S. Rep. No. 221, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1943); see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1943). In sum, Congress intended in both the Revenue Act of 1942 and the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 to coordinate the income-tax withholding system with FICA and FUTA. In both instances, Congress did so to promote simplicity and ease of administration. Contradictory interpretations of substantially identical definitions do not serve that interest. It would be extraordinary for a Congress pursuing this interest to intend, without ever saying so, for identical definitions to be interpreted differently. Despite the plain language of Congress’ definition of “wages” and this legislative history, the Government contends that FICA and FUTA compose a distinct system of taxation to which the rules of income taxation, such as the exclusion of the value of meals and lodging from “income” under the convenience-of-the-employer rule in § 119, do not apply. In support, the Government recites congressional Committee Reports indicating that Congress enacted the Social Security Act to “relieve the existing distress and ... to reduce destitution and dependency in the future,” H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935). See also S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1935). These Reports also state that “[w]ages include not only the cash payments made to the employee for work done, but also compensation for services in any other form, such as room, board, etc.” H. R. Rep. No. 615, supra, at 32 (Title VIII (FICA)); accord, id., at 36 (Title IX (FUTA)); S. Rep. No. 628, supra, at 44 (FICA), 49 (FUTA). The Government concludes that Congress intended to impose the taxes under FICA and FUTA upon a broad range of remuneration in order to accomplish the Act’s purposes. We are not persuaded by this contention. The reference by Congress to “room, board, etc.” as examples of “wages” under Titles VIII and IX is ambiguous. It does not n'eces-sarily mean that Congress intended to tax remuneration in kind without regard to principles developed under income taxation, such as the convenience-of-the-employer rule. This rule first appeared in 1919, O. D. 265, 1 Cum. Bull. 71, and was well established by 1935. See Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U. S., at 8A-87. There is no evidence in the Committee Reports cited by the Government that Congress intended to exclude this established rule from determinations under Titles VIII and IX or to create a different rule to govern “room, board, etc.” We therefore think that the reference in the Committee Reports to “room, board, etc.” lends no support to the validity of the Treasury Regulations on which the Government relies. The Government further contends, however, that a line of Treasury Regulations and rulings unbroken since 1940 refutes petitioner’s view that Congress intended a consistent interpretation of the term “wages.” It also contends that we may infer congressional endorsement of these Treasury Regulations and rulings from Congress’ re-enactment of FICA, FUTA, and the income-tax withholding provisions in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. We now address these contentions. C The history of the Treasury Regulations and rulings interpreting Congress’ definition of “wages” in FICA and FUTA is far from consistent. The Commissioner’s contemporaneous construction of Titles VIII (FICA) and IX (FUTA) of the Social Security Act of 1935 was that the convenience-of-the-employer rule applied to the computation of “wages.” Treas. Regs. 90, Art. 207 (1936) (Title IX); Treas. Regs. 91, Art. 14 (1936) (Title VIII)/ Pursuant to Treas. Regs. 90, Art. 207, the Service ruled in 1937 that “supper money” paid to employees working overtime for the convenience of the employer was excludable from “wages” under both Titles. S. S. T. 110, 1937-1 Cum. Bull. 441. Again in 1938, the Service ruled in S. S. T. 302, 1938-1 Cum. Bull. 457, that free lunches provided by an employer for its own convenience were excludable from “wages” under Title IX. See also S. S. T. 383, 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 210-211. The position taken in the Treasury Regulations and rulings subsequently changed, but without explanation. In 1939, Congress passed the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360, that amended some of the specified exclusions from “wages” under FICA and FUTA but left unchanged the definition of “wages.” Compare §§ 603, 614, 53 Stat. 1382, 1392, with §§ 1426 (a), 1607 (b), Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U. S. C. §§ 1426 (a), 1607 (b) (1952 ed.). In 1940, however, the Commissioner issued Treas. Regs. 106, §402.227 (FICA), and Treas. Regs. 107, § 403.227 (FUTA). These Regulations, which were virtually identical to the present Treasury Regulations at issue in this case, excluded the convenience-of-the-employer rule from the computation of “wages” under FICA and FUTA. No reasons were stated for this change. Pursuant to the new Regulations, the Service ruled in 1940 that the value of meals and lodging furnished to the crew operating a steamship was includable in “wages” under FICA and FUTA. S. S. T. 386, 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 211-212. In 1944, the Commissioner stated in Mim. 5657, 1944 Cum. Bull. 551, that the value of meals and lodging furnished by an employer was includable in “wages,” and the Commissioner added without explanation that “ [i]t is immaterial, for the purposes of such taxes, whether the quarters or meals are furnished for the convenience of the employer.” The Government contends that the 1940 Regulations and the rulings issued pursuant to them acquired “the effect of law” when Congress re-enacted FICA and FUTA without substantial change in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. United States v. Correll, 389 U. S., at 305; Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498, 510-511 (1959). In its view, the 1936 Treasury Regulations and the rulings under them were short-lived and therefore are inconsequential. See National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 U. S., at 485-486. We are unconvinced. Despite Treas. Regs. 106 and 107 and the rulings issued under them, the rule of S. S. T. 302 issued in 1938 — that the value of meals provided for the convenience of the employer is excludable from “wages” — remained in effect until after 1954. In 1957, the Service ruled that S. S. T. 302 did not apply to the provision of meals to restaurant employees, but it also stated that S. S. T. 302 was otherwise “still in full force and effect.” Rev. Rui. 57-471, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 632. The Service did not explain why it took this position as to S. S. T. 302. It is thus clear that as late as 1957 — 17 years after Treas. Regs. 106 and 107 were adopted — the Service itself was inconsistent in construing the term “wages.” Indeed, it was not until 1962 that the Commissioner finally disavowed S. S. T. 302 in Rev. Rui. 62-150, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 213. It therefore assumes a great deal to argue that in 1954, when FICA and FUTA were re-enacted, Congress implicitly approved these Treasury Regulations. The Commissioner himself had offered no explanation by 1954 as to why the contemporaneous regulations of 1936 were changed in 1940 or why inconsistent rulings still were being issued. Indeed, the Government in this case has not yet offered an explanation. The history of the Treasury Regulations and rulings interpreting Congress’ definition of “wages” in FICA and FUTA therefore lends only the most ambiguous support to the view that Congress intended to approve different interpretations of “wages” when it re-enacted the Internal Revenue Code in 1954. The differing interpretations were not substantially contemporaneous constructions of the statutes, and nothing in the manner in which the interpretations changed is probative of congressional endorsement. Nor is there evidence of any particular consideration of these regulations by Congress during re-enactment. III We conclude that Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121 (a)-l (f) and 31.3306 (b)-l (f) fail to implement the statutory definition of “wages” in a consistent or reasonable manner. The plain language and legislative histories of the relevant Acts indicate that Congress intended its definition to be interpreted in the same manner for FICA and FUTA as for income-tax withholding. The Treasury Regulations on which the Government relies fail to do so, and their inconsistent and unexplained application undermine the contention that Congress nonetheless endorsed them. As Congress did intend a consistent interpretation of its definition, these Treasury Regulations also are inconsistent with the Court’s reasoning in Central Illinois. We therefore hold that the Regulations are invalid, and that the Service erred in relying upon them to include in the computation of “wages” the value of the meals and lodging that petitioner provided for its own convenience to its employees on offshore oil rigs. The judgment of the Court of' Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. It cost petitioner about $6 per day, per man to engage a caterer who provided meals and maintained living quarters on a vessel moored alongside the drilling rig. It would have cost petitioner about $25 per man to have transported the crews to and from land for each work shift. FICA imposes “on every employer an excise tax, with respect to having individuals in his employ, equal to [specified] percentages of the wages . . . paid by him with respect to employment.” 26 U. S. C. § 3111. FICA also imposes a tax upon employees, based upon “wages.” § 3101 (a). These taxes fund the Social Security programs. FUTA imposes upon certain employers “an excise tax, with respect to having individuals in [their] employ, equal to [specified percentages] of the total wages . . . paid by [them] during the calendar year with respect to employment.” §3301 (1970 ed.). This tax funds the federal component of a cooperative federal-state program of unemployment insurance. Section 3402 (a) provides that “every employer making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax determined in accordance with tables prescribed by the Secretary.” Congress defined “wages” identically in FICA and FUTA, as “all remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash.” §§ 3121 (a) (FICA), 3306 (b) (FUTA). For the purpose of income-tax withholding, Congress defined “wages” as “all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash.” §3401 (a). See n. 9, infra. The additional assessment totaled $35,198.46, plus interest. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 623 F. 2d 1223 (CA7 1980); Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 20, 597 F. 2d 1348 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1032 (1980). Section 119 reads, in pertinent part: “(a) Meals and lodging furnished to employee, his spouse, and his dependents, pursuant to employment. “There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished to him, his spouse, or any of his dependents by or on behalf of his employer for the convenience of the employer, but only if— “(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer, or “(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such lodging on the business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.” The Court of Appeals assumed, without explicitly holding, that the meals and lodging provided by petitioner fall within Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121 (a)-l (f) and 31.3306 (b)-l (f), 26 CFR §§31.3121 (a)-l (f) and 31.3306 (b)-l (f) (1980), if those regulations are valid. Petitioner did not question this assumption in its petition for writ of certiorari, although its reply brief on the merits disputed the Government’s assertion that these regulations govern this case if valid. Reply Brief for Petitioner 3, n. 6. We accept the Government’s assertion for the purposes of this opinion. The convenience-of-the-employer rule was not implicated in determining whether these reimbursements constituted “income” because the requirements of that rule were not present. See n. 8, supra. The treatment of the reimbursements for income taxation was governed by § 162 (a)(2), 26 U. S. C. §162 (a)(2), which allows a deduction for certain traveling expenses. The Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 moved the income-tax withholding provisions into the same chapter of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 as contained FICA and FUTA. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat. 1360, had incorporated Titles VIII and IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, into Chapter 9 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 as FICA and FUTA. The old-age and disability tax provisions of Title VIII became FICA in Subchapter A of Chapter 9, and the unemployment compensation tax provision of Title IX became FUTA in Subehapter C. Section 172 of the Revenue Act of 1942 had added the income-tax withholding system to Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code as §§ 450-476. The Current Tax Payment Act moved this system into Chapter 9 of the Code as §§ 1621-1632. The inclusion of “room, board, etc.” in “wages” under FICA and FUTA is not inconsistent with the application of the convenience-of-the-employer rule in determining “wages.” Under the rule, room and board constitute “wages” unless they are provided for the employer’s convenience. It is true that Congress codified the convenience-of-the-employer rule in § 119 of the income-tax provisions of the Code in 1954. But that does not mean that Congress implicitly foreclosed the applicability of the rule to other provisions of the Code. To the contrary, Congress in 1954 retained — and since has left unchanged — the substantially identical definitions of “wages” for all three obligations upon employers; and the rule expressly applies to “wages” under the income-tax withholding provisions. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401 (a)-l (b) (9), 26 CFR § 31.3401 (a)-l (b) (9) (1980). Treasury Regulations 90, Art. 207, provided that “facilities or privileges (such as entertainment, cafeterias, restaurants, medical services, or so-called ‘courtesy’ discounts on purchases), furnished or offered by an employer to his employees generally, are not considered as remuneration for services if such facilities or privileges are offered or furnished by the employer merely as a convenience to the employer or as a means of promoting the health, good will, contentment, or efficiency of his employees.” Treasury Regulations 91, Art-. 14, differed slightly, in that it did not contain the phrase “as a convenience to the employer,” but the Service interpreted it in the same way that it interpreted Treas. Regs. 90, Art. 207. See S. S. T. 302, 1938-1 Cum. Bull. 457. The Government also relies on Pacific American Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 138 F. 2d 464 (CA9 1943), in contending that we should infer congressional endorsement of the 1940 Treasury Regulations. The court in that case held that “what might not be taxable income for income tax purposes might constitute wages under the provisions of the Social Security Act.” Id., at 465. But the Government cites nothing to suggest that this Court of Appeals’ decision was brought to Congress’ attention when it re-enacted the Code in 1954. Revenue Ruling 62-150 noted that S. S. T. 302 had been issued under Treasury Regulations 90, Art. 207, which incorporated the convenience-of-the-employer rule for determining “wages,” and that the regulations had omitted that rule since 1940. But it did not explain why the Commissioner had changed the regulations in the first place, or why S. S. T. 302 remained in effect for years after the regulations were changed. A series of private rulings from 1954 to 1965 further reveals that S. S. T. 302 remained a source of inquiry and confusion for the Service and employers well after the re-enactment of the Internal Revenue Code in 1954. Although these rulings have no precedential force, see 26 U. S. C. § 6110 (j) (3); Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-7 (b), 26 CFR § 301.6110-7 (b) (1980), they are evidence that S. S. T. 302 did not merely lie dormant on the books after the Commissioner issued Treas. Regs. 106, § 402.227 (FICA), and 107, §403.227 (FUTA), in 1940. In the first of this series, a school inquired whether it had to include the value of meals served to teachers for the school’s convenience in the teachers’ “wages” under FICA. The Service replied in January 1954 that the school need not, for “S. S. T. 302 is applicable to the instant case.” Private Ruling 5401062910A. In the second ruling, an employer inquired whether to include in “wages” under FICA the value of meals and lodging provided pursuant to an employment contract. The Service replied in March 1954 that the employer should include this value because of the employment contract. It stated that S. S. T. 302 was “based on the premises that the lunches were of relatively small value and were furnished merely as a means of promoting the health, good will, contentment, or efficiency of the employees.” Private Ruling 5403042970A. In the third, a restaurant inquired whether to include in “wages” for FICA and FUTA the value of meals provided to employees. The Service replied in January 1955 that the restaurant need not include this value, for “S. S. T. 302 is equally applicable in the instant case.” Private Ruling 5501244180A. This ruling was flatly inconsistent with the Treasury Regulations that included in “wages” the value of meals provided to employees by restaurants. Treas. Regs. 106, §402.227 (FICA); Treas. Regs. 107, §403.227 (FUTA). The Service had changed its view of S. S. T. 302 by the time it issued the fourth in this series. In 1957, another restaurant inquired whether the value of meals provided to employees was includable in “wages” for FICA and FUTA. Relying on S. S. T. 302, the restaurant contended that the value was excludable. The Service answered that S. S. T. 302 “cannot be regarded as controlling the treatment of meals furnished to employees in the restaurant industry.” Private Ruling 5710044200A. Nonetheless, like Rev. Rui. 57-471, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 630, this private ruling repudiated S. S. T. 302 only as to the restaurant industry, thus leaving the convenience-of-the-employer rule apparently applicable to determinations by other employers. Finally, in 1965, an employer inquired whether the revocation of S. S. T. 302 by Rev. Rui. 62-150, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 213, applied retroactively. The Service ruled that the limitation of S. S. T. 302 in Rev. Rui. 57-471 applied retroactively only as to employers operating restaurants. Private Ruling 6507023460A.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

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McNARY, COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, et al. v. HAITIAN REFUGEE CENTER, INC., et al. No. 89-1332. Argued October 29, 1990 Decided February 20, 1991 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, Blackmun, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, III, and IV of which White, J., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 499. Michael R. Dreeben argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assist ant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, and David V. Bernal. Ira J. Kurzban argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Bruce J. Winick, Irwin P. Stotzky, and Edward Copeland. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Joseph R. Austin, John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Fredric D. Woocher, Robert A. Ginsburg, Niels Frenzen, Jorge L. Fernandez, and Richard K. Mason; for the American Bar Association by John J. Curtin, Jr., Robert E. Juceam, Sandra M. Lipsman, Craig H. Baab, and Carol L. Wolchok; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Michael Rubin, Marsha S. Ber-zon, and Laurence Gold; and for the Farm Labor Alliance et al. by Peter A. Schey, Wayne H. Matelski, Monte B. Lake, Ralph Santiago Abascal, and Robert Gibbs. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Reform Act) constituted a major statutory response to the vast tide of illegal immigration that had produced a “shadow population” of literally millions of undocumented aliens in the United States. On the one hand, Congress sought to stem the tide by making the plight of the undocumented alien even more onerous in the future than it had been in the past; thus, the Reform Act imposed criminal sanctions on employers who hired undocumented workers and made a number of federally funded welfare benefits unavailable to these aliens. On the other hand, in recognition that a large segment of the shadow population played a useful and constructive role in the American economy, but continued to reside in perpetual fear, the Reform Act established two broad amnesty programs to allow existing undocumented aliens to emerge from the shadows. The first amnesty program permitted any alien who had resided in the United States continuously and unlawfully since January 1, 1982, to qualify for an adjustment of his or her status to that of a lawful permanent resident. See 100 Stat. 3394, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1255a. The second program required the Attorney General to adjust the status of any alien farmworker who could establish that he or she had resided in the United States and performed at least 90 days of qualifying agricultural work during the 12-month period prior to May 1, 1986, provided that the alien could also establish his or her admissibility in the United States as an immigrant. The Reform Act required the Attorney General first to adjust the status of these aliens to “[sjpecial agricultural workers” (SAW’s) lawfully admitted for temporary residence, see 100 Stat. 3417, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1160(a) (1), and then eventually to aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, see § 1160(a)(2). This case relates only to the SAW amnesty program. Although additional issues were resolved by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the only question presented to us is whether § 210(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was added by § 302(a) of the Reform Act and sets forth the administrative and judicial review provisions of the SAW program, see 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e), precludes a federal district court from exercising general federal-question jurisdiction over an action alleging a pattern or practice of procedural due process violations by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in its administration of the SAW program. We hold that given the absence of clear congressional language mandating preclusion of federal jurisdiction and the nature of respondents’ requested relief, the District Court had jurisdiction to hear respondents’ constitutional and statutory challenges to INS procedures. Were we to hold otherwise and instead require respondents to avail themselves of the limited judicial review procedures set forth in § 210(e) of the INA, meaningful judicial review of their statutory and constitutional claims would be foreclosed. I The Reform Act provided three important benefits to an applicant for SAW status. First, the mere filing of a “non-frivolous application” entitled the alien to a work authorization that would remain valid during the entire period that the application was being processed. See 8 U. S. C. § 1160(d)(2)(B). Second, regardless of the disposition of the application, the Reform Act expressly prohibited the Government from using any information in the application for enforcement purposes. Thus, the application process could not be used as a means of identifying deportable aliens; rather, the initiation of a deportation proceeding had to be based on evidence obtained from an independent source. See § 1160(b)(6). Third, if SAW status was granted, the alien became a lawful temporary resident, see § 1160(a)(1), and, in due course, could obtain the status of a permanent resident, see § 1160(a)(2). In recognition that the fear of prosecution or deportation would cause many undocumented aliens to be reluctant to come forward and disclose their illegal status, the Reform Act directed the Attorney General to enlist the assistance of a variety of nonfederal organizations to encourage aliens to apply and to provide them with counsel and assistance during the application process. These “qualified . . . designated entities” (QDE’s), which included private entities such as farm labor organizations and associations of agricultural employers as well as qualified state, local, and community groups, were not allowed to forward applications for SAW status to the Attorney General unless the applicant consented. See §§ 1160(b)(2), (b)(4). The Reform Act provided that SAW status applications could be filed with a specially created legalization office (LO), or with a QDE, which would forward applications to the appropriate LO, during an 18-month period commencing on June 1, 1987. See § 1160(b)(1)(A). Regulations adopted by the INS to administer the program provided for' a personal interview of each applicant at an LO. See 8 CFR § 210.2(c) (2)(iv) (1990). In the application, the alien had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she worked the requisite 90 days of qualifying seasonal agricultural services. See §§ 210.3(a), (b)(1). To meet the burden of proof, the applicant was required to present evidence of eligibility independent of his or her own testimony. See § 210.3(b)(2). The applicant could meet this burden through production of his or her employer’s payroll records, see 8 U. S. C. § 1160(b) (3)(B)(ii), or through submission of affidavits “by agricultural producers, foremen, farm labor contractors, union officials, fellow employees, or other persons with specific knowledge of the applicant’s employment,” see 8 CFR §210.3(c)(3) (1990). At the conclusion of the interview and of the review of the application materials, the LO could deny the application or make a recommendation to a regional processing facility that the application be either granted or denied. See §210.1(q). A denial, whether at the regional or local level, could be appealed to the legalization appeals unit, which was authorized to make the final administrative decision in each individual case. See § 103.3(a)(2)(iii). The Reform Act expressly prohibited judicial review of such a final administrative determination of SAW status except as authorized by § 210(e)(3)(A) of the amended INA. That subsection permitted “judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation.” In view of the fact that the courts of appeals constitute the only fora for judicial review of deportation orders, see 75 Stat. 651, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a, the statute plainly foreclosed any review in the district courts of individual denials of SAW status applications. Moreover, absent initiation of a deportation proceeding against an unsuccessful applicant, judicial review of such individual determinations was completely foreclosed. r-H I — I This action was filed in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida by the Haitian Refugee Center, the Migration and Refugee Services of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Palm Beach, and 17 unsuccessful individual SAW applicants. The plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of a class of alien farmworkers who either had been or would be injured by unlawful practices and policies adopted by the INS in its administration of the SAW program. The complaint alleged that the interview process was conducted in an arbitrary fashion that deprived applicants of the due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Among other charges, the plaintiffs alleged that INS procedures did not allow SAW applicants to be apprised of or to be given opportunity to challenge adverse evidence on which denials were predicated, that applicants were denied the opportunity to present witnesses on their own behalf, that non-English speaking Haitian applicants were unable to communicate effectively with LO’s because competent interpreters were not provided, and that no verbatim recording of the interview was made, thus inhibiting even any meaningful administrative review of application denials by LO’s or regional processing facilities. See App. 44-45; Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 694 F. Supp. 864, 867 (SD Fla. 1988). After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction, that the case should proceed as a class action, and that a preliminary injunction should issue. The court recognized that individual aliens could not contest the denial of their SAW applications “unless and until the INS in-stitut[ed] deportation proceedings against them,” but accepted jurisdiction because the complaint “does not challenge any individual determination of any application for SAW status but rather attacks the manner in which the entire program is being implemented, allegations beyond the scope of administrative review.” On the merits, the District Court found that a number of INS practices violated the Reform Act and were unconstitutional, and entered an injunction requiring the INS to vacate large categories of denials, and to modify its practices in certain respects. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On the merits, it upheld all of the findings and conclusions of the District Court, and it also rejected each of the Government’s jurisdictional arguments. Relying on earlier Circuit precedent, it held that the statutory bar to judicial review of individual determinations was inapplicable: “In Jean v. Nelson, 727 F. 2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (in banc), aff’d, 472 U. S. 846 . . . (1985), we reaffirmed that section 106 of the INA (Codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1105a) does not deprive district courts of jurisdiction to review allegations of systematic abuses by INS officials. Jean, 727 F. 2d at 980. We explained that to postpone ‘judicial resolution of a disputed issue that affects an entire class of aliens until an individual petitioner has an opportunity to litigate it on habeas corpus would foster the very delay and procedural redundancy that Congress sought to eliminate in passing § 1105a.’ Id. In this action, appellees do not challenge the merits of any individual status determination; rather . . . they contend that defendants’ policies and practices in processing SAW applications deprive them of their statutory and constitutional rights.” Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F. 2d 1555, 1560 (CA11 1989). In their certiorari petition, petitioners did not seek review of the District Court’s rulings on the merits or the form of its injunctive relief. Our grant of certiorari is therefore limited to the jurisdictional question. h — I I — I We preface our analysis of petitioners position with an identification of matters that are not in issue. First, it is undisputed that SAW status is an important benefit for a previously undocumented alien. This status not only protects the alien from deportation; it also creates job opportunities that are not available to an alien whose application is denied. Indeed, the denial of SAW status places the alien in an even worse position than he or she was in before the Reform Act was passed because lawful employment opportunities are no longer available to such persons. Thus, the successful applicant for SAW status acquires a measure of freedom to work and to live openly without fear of deportation or arrest that is markedly different from that of the unsuccessful applicant. Even disregarding the risk of deportation, the impact of a denial on the opportunity to obtain gainful employment is plainly sufficient to mandate constitutionally fair procedures in the application process. At no time in this litigation have petitioners asserted a right to employ arbitrary procedures, or questioned their obligation to afford SAW status applicants due process of law. Nor, at this stage of the litigation, is there any dispute that the INS routinely and persistently violated the Constitution and statutes in processing SAW applications. Petitioners do not deny that those violations caused injury in fact to the two organizational plaintiffs as well as to the individual members of the plaintiff class. Although it does not do so explicitly, petitioners’ argument assumes that the District Court would have federal-question jurisdiction over the entire case if Congress had not, through the Reform Act, added § 210(e) to the INA. The narrow issue, therefore, is whether § 210(e), which bars judicial review of individual determinations except in deportation proceedings, also forecloses this general challenge to the INS’ unconstitutional practices. IV Petitioners’ entire jurisdictional argument rests on their view that respondents’ constitutional challenge is an action seeking “judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status” and that district court jurisdiction over the action is therefore barred by the plain language of § 210(e)(1) of the amended INA. See 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e)(1). The critical words in § 210(e)(1), however, describe the provision as referring only to review “of a determination respecting an application” for SAW status (emphasis added). Significantly, the reference to “a determination” describes a single act rather than a group of decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making decisions. Moreover, when § 210(e)(3), see 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e)(3), further clarifies that the only judicial review permitted is in the context of a deportation proceeding, it refers to “judicial review of such a denial” — again referring to a single act, and again making clear that the earlier reference to “a determination respecting an application” describes the denial of an individual application. We therefore agree with the District Court’s and the Court of Appeals’ reading of this language as describing the process of direct review of individual denials of SAW status, rather than as referring to general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing applications. This reading of the Reform Act’s review provision is supported by the language in § 210(e)(3)(B) of the INA, which provides that judicial review “shall be based solely upon the administrative record established at the time of the review by the appellate authority and the findings of fact and determinations contained in such record shall be conclusive unless the applicant can establish abuse of discretion or that the findings are directly contrary to clear and convincing facts contained in the record considered as a whole.” 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e)(3)(B). This provision incorporates an assumption that the limited review provisions of § 210(e) apply only to claims that have been subjected to administrative consideration and that have resulted in the creation of an adequate administrative record. However, the record created during the SAW administrative review process consists solely of a completed application form, a report of medical examination, any documents or affidavits that evidence an applicant’s agricultural employment and residence, and notes, if any, from an LO interview — all relating to a single SAW applicant. Because the administrative appeals process does not address the kind of procedural and constitutional claims respondents bring in this action, limiting judicial review of these claims to the procedures set forth in § 210(e) is not contemplated by the language of that provision. Moreover, the “abuse-of-discretion” standard of judicial review under § 210(e)(3)(B) would make no sense if we were to read the Reform Act as requiring constitutional and statutory challenges to INS procedures to be subject to its specialized review provision. Although the abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate for judicial review of an administrative adjudication of the facts of an individual application for SAW status, such a standard does not apply to constitutional or statutory claims, which are reviewed de novo by the courts.' The language of § 210(e)(3)(B) thus lends substantial credence to the conclusion that the Reform Act’s review provision does not apply to challenges to INS' practices and procedures in administering the SAW program. Finally, we note that had Congress intended the limited review provisions of § 210(e) of the INA to encompass challenges to INS procedures and practices, it could easily have used broader statutory language. Congréss could, for example, have modeled § 210(e) on the more expansive language in the general grant of district court jurisdiction under Title II of the INA by channeling into the Reform Act’s special review procedures “all causes . . . arising under any of the provisions” of the legalization program. 66 Stat. 230, 8 U. S. C. § 1329. It moreover could have modeled § 210(e) on 38 U. S. C. § 211(a), which governs review of veterans’ benefits claims, by referring to review “on all questions of law and fact” under the SAW legalization program. Given Congress’ choice of statutory language, we conclude that challenges to the procedures used by INS do not fall within the scope of § 210(e). Rather, we hold that § 210(e) applies only to review of denials of individual SAW applications. Because respondents’ action does not seek review on the merits of a denial of a particular application, the District Court’s general federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1331 to hear this action remains unimpaired by § 210(e). V Petitioners place their principal reliance on our decision in Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602 (1984). The four respondents in Ringer wanted to establish a right to reimbursement under the Medicare Act for a particular form of surgery that three of them had undergone and the fourth allegedly needed. They sought review of the Secretary’s policy of refusing reimbursement for that surgery in an original action filed in the District Court, without exhausting the procedures specified in the statute for processing reimbursement claims. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the essence of the complaint was a claim of entitlement to payment for the surgical procedure. With respect to the three respondents who had had the surgery, we concluded that “it makes no sense” to construe their claims “as anything more than, at bottom, a claim that they should be paid for their BCBR [bilateral carotid body resection] surgery,” id., at 614, since success in their challenge of the Secretary’s policy denying reimbursement would have the practical effect of also deciding their claims for benefits on the merits. “Indeed,” we noted, “the relief that respondents seek to redress their supposed ‘procedural’ objections is the invalidation of the Secretary’s current policy and a ‘substantive.’ declaration from her that the expenses of BCBR surgery are reimbursable under the Medicare Act.” Ibid. Concluding that respondents’ judicial action was not “collateral” to their claims for benefits, we thus required respondents first to pursue their administrative remedies. In so doing, we found it significant that respondents, even if unsuccessful before the agency, “clearly have an adequate remedy in § 405(g) for challenging [in the courts] all aspects of the Secretary’s denial of their claims for payment for the BCBR surgery.” Id., at 617. Unlike the situation in Heckler, the individual respondents in this action do not seek a substantive declaration that they are entitled to SAW status. Nor would the fact that they prevail on the merits of their purportedly procedural objections have the effect of establishing their entitlement to SAW status. Rather, if allowed to prevail in this action, respondents would only be entitled to have their case files reopened and their applications reconsidered in light of the newly prescribed INS procedures. Moreover, unlike in Heckler, if not allowed to pursue their claims in the District Court, respondents would not as a practical matter be able to obtain meaningful judicial review of their application denials or of their objections to INS procedures notwithstanding the review provisions of § 210(e) of the amended IN A. It is presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory construction, and given our well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action, see Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986), coupled with the limited review provisions of § 210(e), it is most unlikely that Congress intended to foreclose all forms of meaningful judicial review. Several aspects of this statutory scheme would preclude review of respondents’ application denials if we were to hold that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this challenge. Initially, administrative or judicial review of an agency decision is almost always confined to the record made in the proceeding at the initial decisionmaking level, and one of the central attacks on INS procedures in this litigation is based on the claim that such procedures do not allow applicants to assemble adequate records. As the District Court found, because of the lack of recordings or transcripts of LO interviews and the inadequate opportunity for SAW applicants to call witnesses or present other evidence on their behalf, the administrative appeals unit of the INS, in reviewing the decisions of LO's and regional processing facilities, and the courts of appeals, in reviewing SAW denials in the context of deportation proceedings, have no complete or meaningful basis upon which to review application determinations. Additionally, because there is no provision for direct judicial review of the denial of SAW status unless the alien is later apprehended and deportation proceedings are initiated, most aliens denied SAW status can ensure themselves review in courts of appeals only if they voluntarily surrender themselves for deportation. Quite obviously, that price is tantamount to a complete denial of judicial review for most undocumented aliens. Finally, even in the context of a deportation proceeding, it is unlikely that a court of appeals would be in a position to provide meaningful review of the type of claims raised in this litigation. To establish the unfairness of the INS practices, respondents in this case adduced a substantial amount of evidence, most of which would have been irrelevant in the processing of a particular individual application. Not only would a court of appeals reviewing an individual SAW determination therefore most likely not have an adequate record as to the pattern of INS’ allegedly unconstitutional practices, but it also would lack the factfinding and record-developing capabilities of a federal district court. As the American Bar Association as amicus points out, statutes that provide for only a single level of judicial review in the courts of appeals “are traditionally viewed as warranted only in circumstances where district court factfinding would unnecessarily duplicate an adequate administrative record — circumstances that are not present in ‘pattern and practice’ cases where district court factfinding is essential [given the inadequate administrative record].” Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 7. It therefore seems plain to us, as it did to the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that restricting judicial review to the courts of appeals as a component of the review of an individual deportation order is the practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review of generic constitutional and statutory claims. Decision in this case is therefore supported by our unanimous holding in Bowen, supra. In that case we rejected the Government’s contention that two sections of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §301 et seq. (1982 ed.), barred judicial review of the validity of a regulation governing the payment of Medicare benefits. We recognized that review of individual determinations of the amount due on particular claims was foreclosed, but upheld the collateral attack on the regulation itself, emphasizing the critical difference between an individual “amount determination” and a challenge to the procedures for making such determinations: “The reticulated statutory scheme, which carefully details the forum and limits of review of ‘any determination . . . of . . . the amount of benefits under part A,’ 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff(b)(l)(C) (1982 ed., Supp. II), and of the ‘amount of . . . payment’ of benefits under Part B, 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C), simply does not speak to challenges mounted against the method by which such amounts are to be determined rather than the determinations themselves. As the Secretary has made clear, ‘the legality, constitutional or otherwise, of any provision of the Act or regulations relevant to the Medicare Program’ is not considered in a ‘fair hearing’ held by a carrier to resolve a grievance related to a determination of the amount of a Part B award. As a result, an attack on the validity of a regulation is not the kind of administrative action that we described in Erika as an ‘amount determination’ which decides ‘the amount of the Medicare payment to be made on a particular claim’ and with respect to which the Act impliedly denies judicial review. 456 U. S., at 208.” 476 U. S., at 675-676 (emphasis in original). Inherent in our analysis was the concern that absent such a construction of the judicial review provisions of the Medicare statute, there would be “no review at all of substantial statutory and constitutional challenges to the Secretary’s administration of Part B of the Medicare program.” Id., at 680. As we read the Reform Act and the findings of the District Court, therefore, this case is controlled by Bowen rather than by Heckler. The strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action is not overcome either by the language or the purpose of the relevant provisions of the Reform Act. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia joins, dissenting. Congress has carefully limited the judicial review available under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Reform Act) in language which “he who runs may read.” The Court, with considerable and obvious effort, finds a way to avoid this limitation, because to apply the statute as written could bar judicial review of respondents’ constitutional claims. The statute as written is, in my view, constitutional, and there is therefore no need to rewrite it. I — I The relevant provisions of the Reform Act dealing with administrative and judicial review are found in 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e): “(1) Administrative and judicial review “There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in accordance with this subsection. “(2) Administrative review “(A) Single level of administrative appellate review “The Attorney General shall establish an appellate authority to provide for a single level of administrative appellate review of such a determination “(3) Judicial review “(A) Limitation to review of exclusion or deportation “There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation under section 1105a of this title.” The first of the quoted sentences states, as clearly as any language can, that judicial review of a “determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section” may not be had except in accordance with the provisions of the subsection. The plain language of subsection (3)(A) provides that judicial review of a denial may be had only in connection with review of an order of exclusion or deportation. The Court chooses to read this language as dealing only with “direct review of individual denials of SAW status, rather than as referring to general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing applications.” Ante, at 492. But the accepted view of judicial review of administrative action generally— even when there is no express preclusion provision as there is in the present statute — is that only “final actions” are reviewable in court. The Administrative Procedure Act provides: “[Fjinal agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly re viewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.” 5 U. S. C. §704. The Court’s reasoning is thus a classic non sequitur. It reasons that because Congress limited judicial review only of what were in effect final administrative decisions, it must not have intended to preclude separate challenges to procedures used by the agency before it issued any final decision. But the type of judicial review of agency action which the Court finds that Congress failed to preclude is a type not generally available even without preclusion. In the light of this settled rule, the natural reading of “determination respecting an application” in § 1160(e) encompasses both final decisions and procedures used to reach those decisions. Each of respondents’ claims attacks the process used by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to make a determination respecting an application. We have on several occasions rejected the argument advanced by respondents that individual plaintiffs can bypass restrictions on judicial review by purporting to attack general policies rather than individual results. For instance, in United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201 (1982), we found that in the context of the “precisely drawn provisions” of the Medicare statute, the provision of judicial review for awards made under Part A of the statute, coupled with the omission of judicial review for awards under Part B, “provides persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose further review of such claims.” Id., at 208 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602 (1984), we addressed a challenge to a ruling issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services that precluded payment under Medicare for a particular medical procedure. The Medicare Act permits judicial review of “any claim arising under” the Act, 42 U. S. C. §§405(g), (h), only after a claimant seeks payment and exhausts administrative remedies. The plaintiffs contended that their lawsuits challenging the Secretary’s refusal to reimburse the procedure at issue were permissible without exhausting administrative remedies because they challenged only the Secretary’s “ ‘procedure’ for reaching her decision,” not the underlying decision on their particular claims. 466 U. S., at 614. We rejected this distinction, finding that “it makes no sense to construe the claims ... as anything more than, at bottom, a claim that they should be paid for their . . . surgery.” Ibid. This holding was based on the recognition that a contrary result would allow claimants “to bypass the exhaustion requirements of the Medicare Act by simply bringing declaratory judgment actions in federal court before they undergo the medical procedure in question.” Id., at 621. We expressly rejected the contention — also urged by the respondents here — that “simply because a claim somehow can be construed as ‘procedural,’ it is cognizable in federal district court by way of federal-question jurisdiction.” Id., at 614. It is well settled that when Congress has established a particular review mechanism, courts are not free to fashion alternatives to the specified scheme. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 448-449 (1988); Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U. S. 411, 419-422 (1965). In creating the Reform Act and the SAW program, Congress balanced the goals of the unprecedented amnesty programs with the need “to insure reasonably prompt determinations” in light of the incentives and opportunity for ineligible applicants to delay the disposition of their cases and derail the program. The Court’s ponderously reasoned gloss on the statute’s plain language sanctions an unwarranted intrusion into a carefully drafted congressional program, a program which placed great emphasis on a minimal amount of paperwork and procedure in an effort to speed the process of adjusting the status of those aliens who demonstrated their entitlement to adjustment. “If the balance is to be struck anew, the decision must come from Congress and not from this Court. ” Ringer, supra, at 627. II The Court bases its conclusion that district courts have jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ pattern and practice allegations in part out of respect for the “strong presumption” that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action. Ante, at 498. This presumption, however, comes into play only where there is a genuine ambiguity as to whether Congress intended to preclude judicial review of administrative action. In this case two things are evident: First, in drafting the Reform Act, Congress did not preclude all judicial review of administrative action; as detailed earlier, Congress provided for judicial review of INS action in the courts of appeals in deportation proceedings, and in the district courts in orders of exclusion. Second, by enacting such a scheme, Congress intended to foreclose all other avenues of relief. Therefore, since the statute is not ambiguous, the presumption has no force here. The Court indicates that this presumption of judicial review is particularly applicable in cases raising constitutional challenges to agency action. Ante, at 496-499. I believe that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of such claims in this instance, and that in this context it is permissible for it to do so. In the Reform Act, Congress enacted a one-time amnesty program to process claims of illegal aliens allowing them to obtain status as lawful residents. Congress intended aliens to come forward during the limited, 12-month eligibility period because “[t]his is the first call and the last call, a one-shot deal.” 132 Cong. Rec. 33217 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Simpson). If an alien failed to file a legalization application within the 12-month period, the opportunity was lost forever. To further expedite this unique and unprecedented amnesty program and to minimize the burden on the federal courts, Congress provided for limited judicial review. Given the structure of the Act, and the status of these alien respondents, it is extremely doubtful that the operation of the administrative process in their cases would give rise to any colorable constitutional claims. ‘“An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare.’” INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875, 884 (1988) (quoting United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472, 474 (1917)). Respondents are undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of those procedures which Congress has accorded them in the Reform Act. But there is no reason to believe that administrative appeals as provided in the Act — which simply have not been resorted to by these respondents before suing in the District Court — would not have assured them compliance with statutory procedures. The Court never mentions what colorable constitutional claims these aliens, illegally present in the United States, could have had that demand judicial review. The most that can be said for respondents’ case in this regard is that it is conceivable, though not likely, that the administrative processing of their claims could be handled in such a way as to deny them some constitutional right, and that the remedy of requesting deportation in order to obtain judicial review is a burdensome one. We have never held, however, that Congress may not, by explicit language, preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, and here, where that body was obviously interested in expeditiously processing an avalanche of claims from noncitizens upon whom it was conferring a substantial benefit, I think it may do so. JusTiCE White joins only Parts I, II, III, and IV of this opinion. Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. Prior to November 6, 1986, the enactment date of the Reform Act, the employment of undocumented aliens did not violate federal law. See 66 Stat. 228, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1324(a) (1982 ed.) (providing that “for the purposes of this section [criminalizing the bringing in and harboring of aliens not lawfully entitled to enter and reside in the United States], employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring”). Section 101 of the Reform Act, however, authorized both civil and criminal penalties against employers who hire unauthorized aliens either knowingly or without complying with specified verification requirements. See 8 U. S. C. § 1324a. Section 121 of the Reform Act amended several federal programs to deny benefits to aliens who could not verify their lawful status. See Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3384-3394. The House Committee noted the purpose behind the legalization programs in the Reform Act: “The United States has a large undocumented alien population living and working within its borders. Many of these people have been here for a number of years and have become a part of their communities. Many have strong family ties here which include U. S. citizens and lawful residents. They have built social networks in this country. They have contributed to the United States in myriad ways, including providing their talents, labor and tax dollars. However, because of their undocumented status, these people live in fear, afraid to seek help when their rights are violated, when they are victimized by criminals, employers or landlords or when they become ill. “Continuing to ignore this situation is harmful to both the United States and the aliens themselves. However, the alternative of intensifying interior enforcement or attempting mass deportations would be both costly, ineffective, and inconsistent with our immigrant heritage. “The Committee believes that the solution lies in legalizing the statuts [sic] of aliens who have been present in the United States for several years, recognizing that past failures to enforces [sic] the immigration laws have allowed them to enter and to settle here. “This step would enable INS to target its enforcement efforts on new flows of undocumented aliens and, in conjunction with the proposed employer sanctions programs, help stem the flow of undocumented people to the United States. It would allow qualified aliens to contribute openly to society and it would help to prevent the exploitation of this vulnerable population in the work place.” H. R. Rep. No. 99 — 682, pt. 1, p. 49 (1986). Senator Simpson, one of the sponsors of the Reform Act, described the vulnerability of this “subculture of human beings who are afraid to go to the cops, afraid to go to a hospital, afraid to go to their employer who says ‘One peep out of you, buster, and you are down the road.’” 132 Cong. Rec. 33222 (1986). The full text of § 210(e) of the INA, as set forth in 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e), reads as follows: “(e) Administrative and judicial review “(1) Administrative and judicial review “There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in accordance with this subsection. “(2) Administrative review “(A) Single level of administrative appellate review “The Attorney General shall establish an appellate authority to provide for a single level of administrative appellate review of such a determination. “(B) Standard for review “Such administrative appellate review shall be based solely upon the administrative record established at the time of the determination on the application and upon such additional or newly discovered evidence as may not have been available at the time of the determination. “(3) Judicial review “(A) Limitation to review of exclusion or deportation “There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation under section 1106a of this title. “(B) Standard for judicial review “Such judicial review shall be based solely upon the administrative record established at the time of the review by the appellate authority and the findings of fact and determinations contained in such record shall be conclusive unless the applicant can establish abuse of discretion or that the findings are directly contrary to clear and convincing facts contained in the record considered as a whole.” The complaint alleges that this respondent has the following interest in the litigation: “Plaintiff MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICES OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PALM BEACH (“RCDPB”) is a component of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Palm Beach. Its principle [sic] place of business is West Palm Beach, Florida. Many members of parishes within the diocese of Palm Beach are foreign agricultural workers who worked at least 90 man-days in the 1985 and 1986 season, and are therefore potentially eligible for the SAW program. In addition, Plaintiff MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICES OF THE RCDPB has been designated by Defendant INS as a “Qualified Designated Entity” (QDE) under IRCA. QDE’s are authorized to provide counseling to aliens about the legalization program, to assist them in filling out applications and obtain documentation, and receive applications for adjustment to temporary resident status. Under IRCA, applications filed with a QDE are deemed to have been filed as of the same date with INS, to whom the QDE’s forward the applications for processing. QDE’s are authorized to receive fees from applicants and reimbursement from INS for counseling and filing services. The actions of Defendants complained of in this case discourages otherwise eligible SAW applicants from seeking counseling and filing of their applications by Plaintiffs MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICES OF THE RCDPB and prevents them from fulfilling its basic mission of assisting aliens to qualify under IRCA.” App. 24. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 694 F. Supp. 864, 873 (SD Fla. 1988). The District Court also found that both of the organizational plaintiffs had standing. It explained: “HRC has alleged that the ‘[defendants’ refusal to recognize that such persons [HRC’s members] are eligible under IRCA both directly and indirectly injures HRC. It directly injures the organization because it makes HRC’s work of assisting the Haitian refugee community more difficult and results in the diversion of HRC’s limited resources away from members and clients having other urgent needs.’ Complaint at ¶ 17. HRC also alleges an indirect injury through the adverse effect upon its members. Id. The plaintiff MRS is a QDE under IRCA authorized to provide counseling to aliens about the legalization process and to assist them in obtaining documentation. It also receives applications and fees from aliens and is reimbursed by the INS for counseling and filing services. MRS alleges that the defendants’ behavior has discouraged otherwise eligible SAW applicants from seeking counseling and/or filing their claims and MRS is prevented from fulfilling its basic mission of assisting aliens to qualify under IRCA.” Id., at 874-876. Although many employers did not maintain payroll records for seasonal workers, some LO’s routinely denied applications that were not supported by such records. The District Court found that the INS maintained a secret list of employers whose supporting affidavits were routinely discredited without giving applicants an opportunity to corroborate the af-fiants’ statements. See id., at 871-872. The District Court moreover found that interpreters were not provided at LO interviews, even though many Haitian applicants spoke only Creole and no personnel in a particular LO understood that language, and that no recordings or transcripts of LO interviews were made, despite the fact that the interview “is the only face to face encounter between the applicant and the INS allowing the INS to assess the applicant’s credibility.” See id., at 869. The preliminary injunction provides in part: “(3) In those cases which the INS denied based in whole or in part on the fact that the applicant failed to submit payroll records or piecework receipts, the INS shall vacate the denials and reconsider the cases in light of the proper standard of proof which will require the government to present evidence to negate the just and reasonable inference created by the affidavits and other documents submitted by the applicant; “(4) The INS shall vacate those denials issued by the Legalization Offices during the period June 1, 1987, to March 29, 1988, unless the government can show that the applications were clearly frivolous based upon the documentation submitted by the applicant or that the applicant admitted fraud or misrepresentation in the application process.” Id., at 881. The preliminary injunction entered by the District Court ordered the INS to institute the following procedures: “(6) The Legalization Offices shall maintain competent translators, at a minimum, in Spanish and Haitian Creole, and translators in other languages shall be made available if necessary; “(7) The INS shall afford the applicants the opportunity to present witnesses at the interview including but not limited to growers, farm labor contractors, co-workers, and any other individuals who may offer testimony in support of the applicant; “(8) The interviewers shall be directed to particularize the evidence offered, testimony taken, credibility determinations, and any other relevant information on the form 1-696.” Ibid. As petitioners state in their brief: “The Act declares in all-encompassing terms: ‘There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in accordance with this subsection.’ 8 U. S. C. 1160(e)(1). In the following paragraphs, the subsection spells out the precise procedures intended to provide the exclusive method of review. The subsection requires the establishment of ‘a single level of administrative appellate review of such a determination,’ and unequivocally states that ‘[tjhere shall be judicial review of such a denial [of a SAW application] only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation under section 1105a of this title.’ 8 U. S. C. 1160(e)(2)(A) and (e)(3)(A). Section 1105a(a), in turn, provides that a petition for review in the court of appeals ‘shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for[ ] the judicial review of all final orders of deportation,’ while exclusion orders are reviewable exclusively in habeas corpus proceedings. 8U. S. C. 1105a(b). Congress could hardly have chosen clearer or more forceful language to express its intention to preclude any judicial review of a ‘determination respecting an application’ for SAW status, other than in the specified review proceedings applicable to individual deportation or exclusion orders. “In light of IRCA’s clear directions, district courts are not free to draw on their federal question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 1331, or on their jurisdiction granted under the immigration laws, 8 U. S. C. 1329, to entertain collateral attacks on procedures used to adjudicate SAW applications. The exercise of either source of general power is barred by the precise and specific language of IRC A.” Brief for Petitioners 11-13 (footnotes omitted). The Court in Heckler also concluded that the fourth respondent’s claim was “essentially one requesting the payment of benefits for BCBR surgery, a claim cognizable only under § 405(g),” 466 U. S., at 620, and held that the “claim for future benefits must be construed as a ‘claim arising under’ the Medicare Act because any other construction would allow claimants substantially to undercut Congress’ carefully crafted scheme for administering the Medicare Act.” Id,., at 621. Then-JuSTiCE Rehnquist did not participate in the case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHEVRON U. S. A. INC. v. ECHAZABAL No. 00-1406. Argued February 27, 2002 Decided June 10, 2002 SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stephen M. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were James D. Holzhauer, Robert P. Davis, and Evan M. Tager. Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Marleigh D. Dover, Matthew Collette, Phillip B. Sklover, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Robert J. Gregory. Samuel R. Bagenstos argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Larry Minsky and Chai R. Feldblum. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine et al. by Craig E. Stewart; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. by Roy T Englert, Jr., Kathryn S. Zecca, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Employers Group by Fred W. Alvarez and Christine A. Kendrick; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Ann Elizabeth Rees-man, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Anne M. Hayes and M. Reed Hopper; and for the Society for Human Resource Management by Peter J. Petesch and John E. Duvall. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of People with Disabilities et al. by John Townsend Rich, Arlene Mayerson, Daniel B. Kohrman, Ira A. Burnim, and Jennifer Mathis; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Matthew A. Coles, James D. Esseks, Steven R. Shapiro, and Lenora M. Lapidus; for the American Public Health Association et al. by Catherine A. Hanssens and Jon W. Davidson; for the National Council on Disability by Peter Blanck, Diane Kutzko, Mark L. Zaiger, Douglas R. Oelschlaeger, and Sarah J. Gayer; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Gary Phelan. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. A regulation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authorizes refusal to hire an individual because his performance on the job would endanger his own health, owing to a disability. The question in this case is whether the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), permits the regulation. We hold that it does. I Beginning in 1972, respondent Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by petitioner Chevron U. S. A. Inc. Twice he applied for a job directly with Chevron, which offered to hire him if he could pass the company’s physical examination. See 42 U. S. C. § 12112(d)(3) (1994 ed.). Each time, the exam showed liver abnormality or damage, the cause eventually being identified as Hepatitis C, which Chevron’s doctors said would be aggravated by continued exposure to toxins at Chevron’s refinery. In each instance, the company withdrew the offer, and the second time it asked the contractor employing Echazabal either to reassign him to a job without exposure to harmful chemicals or to remove him from the refinery altogether. The contractor laid him off in early 1996. Echazabal filed suit, ultimately removed to federal court, claiming, among other things, that Chevron violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or Act) in refusing to hire him, or even to let him continue working in the plant, because of a disability, his liver condition. Chevron defended under a regulation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) permitting the defense that a worker’s disability on the job would pose a “direct threat” to his health, see 29 CFR § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001). Although two medical witnesses disputed Chevron’s judgment that Echaza-bal’s liver function was impaired and subject to further damage under the job conditions in the refinery, the District Court granted summary judgment for Chevron. It held that Echazabal raised no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the company acted reasonably in relying on its own doctors’ medical advice, regardless of its accuracy. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit asked for briefs on a threshold question not raised before, whether the EEOC’s regulation recognizing a threat-to-self defense, ibid., exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA. 226 F. 3d 1063, 1066, n. 3 (2000). The Circuit held that it did and reversed the summary judgment. The court rested its position on the text of the ADA itself in explicitly recognizing an employer’s right to adopt an employment qualification barring anyone whose disability would place others in the workplace at risk, while saying nothing about threats to the disabled employee himself. The majority opinion reasoned that “by specifying only threats to ‘other individuals in the workplace,’ the statute makes it clear that threats to other persons — including the disabled individual himself — are not included within the scope of the [direct threat] defense,” id., at 1066-1067, and it indicated that any such regulation would unreasonably conflict with congressional policy against paternalism in the workplace, id., at 1067-1070. The court went on to reject Chevron’s further argument that Echaza-bal was not “ ‘otherwise qualified’ ” to perform the job, holding that the ability to perform a job without risk to one’s health or safety is not an “ ‘essential function’ ” of the job. Id., at 1070. The decision conflicted with one from the Eleventh Circuit, Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F. 3d 446, 447 (1996), and raised tension with the Seventh Circuit case of Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F. 3d 599, 603 (1999). We granted certiorari, 534 U. S. 991 (2001), and now reverse. II Section 102 of the ADA, 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq., prohibits “discrimination] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability ... in regard to” a number of actions by an employer, including “hiring.” 42 U. S. C. § 12112(a). The statutory definition of “discrimination]” covers a number of things an employer might do to block a disabled person from advancing in the workplace, such as “using qualification standards . . . that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability.” § 12112(b)(6). By that same definition, ibid., as well as by separate provision, § 12113(a), the Act creates an affirmative defense for action under a qualification standard “shown to be job-related for the position in question and ... consistent with business necessity.” Such a standard may include “a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace,” § 12113(b), if the individual cannot perform the job safely with reasonable accommodation, § 12113(a). By regulation, the EEOC carries the defense one step further, in allowing an employer to screen out a potential worker with a disability not only for risks that he would pose to others in the workplace but for risks on the job to his own health or safety as well: “The term ‘qualification standard’ may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace.” 29 CFR § 1680.15(b)(2) (2001). Chevron relies on the regulation here, since it says a job in the refinery would pose a “direct threat” to Echazabal’s health. In seeking deference to the agency, it argues that nothing in the statute unambiguously precludes such a defense, while the regulation was adopted under authority explicitly delegated by Congress, 42 U. S. C. § 12116, and after notice-and-comment rulemaking. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 227 (2001); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-844 (1984). Echazabal, on the contrary, argues that as a matter of law the statute precludes the regulation, which he claims would be an unreasonable interpretation even if the agency had leeway to go beyond the literal text. A As for the textual bar to any agency action as a matter of law, Echazabal says that Chevron loses on the threshold question whether the statute leaves a gap for the EEOC to fill. See id., at 843-844. Echazabal recognizes the generality of the language providing for a defense when a plaintiff is screened out by “qualification standards” that are “job-related and consistent with business necessity” (and reasonable accommodation would not cure the difficulty posed by employment). 42 U. S. C. § 12113(a). Without more, those provisions would allow an employer to turn away someone whose work would pose a serious risk to himself. That possibility is said to be eliminated, however, by the further specification that “‘qualification standards’ may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.” § 12113(b); see also §12111(3) (defining “direct threat” in terms of risk to others). Echazabal contrasts this provision with an EEOC regulation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 357, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 701 et seq., antedating the ADA, which recognized an employer’s right to consider threats both to other workers and to the threatening employee himself. Because the ADA defense provision recognizes threats only if they extend to another, Echazabal reads the statute to imply as a matter of law that threats to the worker himself cannot count. The argument follows the reliance of the Ninth Circuit majority on the interpretive canon, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “expressing one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned.” United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 65 (2002). The rule is fine when it applies, but this case joins some others in showing when it does not. See, e. g., ibid.; United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U. S. 822, 836 (2001); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U. S. 680, 703 (1991). The first strike against the expression-exclusion rule here is right in the text that Echazabal quotes. Congress included the harm-to-others provision as an example of legitimate qualifications that are “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” These are spacious defensive categories, which seem to give an agency (or in the absence of agency action, a court) a good deal of discretion in setting the limits of permissible qualification standards. That discretion is confirmed, if not magnified, by the provision that “qualification standards” falling within the limits of job relation and business necessity “may include” a veto on those who would directly threaten others in the workplace. Far from supporting Echazabal’s position, the expansive phrasing of “may include” points directly away from the sort of exclusive specification he claims. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 169 (1977); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95, 100 (1941). Just as statutory language suggesting exclusiveness is missing, so is that essential extrastatutory ingredient of an expression-exclusion demonstration, the series of terms from which an omission bespeaks a negative implication. The canon depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which is abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded. E. Crawford, Construction of Statutes 337 (1940) (expressio unius “ ‘properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference’” (quoting State ex rel. Curtis v. De Corps, 134 Ohio St. 295, 299, 16 N. E. 2d 459, 462 (1938))); United States v. Vonn, supra. Strike two in this case is the failure to identify any such established series, including both threats to others and threats to self, from which Congress appears to have made a deliberate choice to omit the latter item as a signal of the affirmative defense’s scope. The closest Echazabal comes is the EEOC’s rule interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 357, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 701 et seq., a precursor of the ADA. That statute excepts from the definition of a protected “qualified individual with a handicap” anyone who would pose a “direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals,” but, like the later ADA, the Rehabilitation Act says nothing about threats to self that particular employment might pose. 42 U. S. C. § 12113(b). The EEOC nonetheless extended the exception to cover threat-to-self employment, 29 CFR § 1613.702(f) (1990), and Echazabal argues that Congress’s adoption only of the threat-to-others exception in the ADA must have been a deliberate omission of the Rehabilitation Act regulation’s tandem term of threat-to-self, with intent to exclude it. But two reasons stand in the way of treating the omission as an unequivocal implication of congressional intent. The first is that the EEOC was not the only agency interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, with the consequence that its regulation did not establish a clear, standard pairing of threats to self and others. While the EEOC did amplify upon the text of the Rehabilitation Act exclusion by recognizing threats to self along with threats to others, three other agencies adopting regulations under the Rehabilitation Act did not. See 28 CFR §42.540(0(1) (1990) (Department of Justice), 29 CFR § 32.3 (1990) (Department of Labor), and 45 CFR § 84.3(k)(l) (1990) (Department of Health and Human Services). It would be a stretch, then, to say that there was a standard usage, with its source in agency practice or elsewhere, that connected threats to others so closely to threats to self that leaving out one was like ignoring a twin. Even if we put aside this variety of administrative expérience, however, and look no further than the EEOC’s Rehabilitation Act regulation pairing self and others, the congressional choice to speak only of threats to others would still be equivocal. Consider what the ADA reference to threats to others might have meant on somewhat different facts. If the Rehabilitation Act had spoken only of “threats to health” and the EEOC regulation had read that to mean threats to self or others, a congressional choice to be more specific in the ADA by listing threats to others but not threats to self would have carried a message. The most probable reading would have been that Congress understood what a failure to specify could lead to and had made a choice to limit the possibilities. The statutory basis for any agency rule-making under the ADA would have been different from its basis under the Rehabilitation Act and would have indicated a difference in the agency’s rulemaking discretion. But these are not the circumstances hére. Instead of making the ADA different from the Rehabilitation Act on the point at issue, Congress used identical language, knowing full well what the EEOC had made of that language under the earlier statute. Did Congress mean to imply that the agency had been wrong in reading the earlier language to allow it to recognize threats to self, or did Congress just assume that the agency was free to do under the ADA what it had already done under the earlier Act’s identical language? There is no way to tell. Omitting the EEOC’s reference to self-harm while using the very language that the EEOC had read as consistent with recognizing self-harm is equivocal at best. No negative inference is possible. There is even a third strike against applying the expression-exclusion rule here. It is simply that there is no apparent stopping point to the argument that by specifying a threat-to-others defense Congress intended a negative implication about those whose safety could be considered. When Congress specified threats to others in the workplace, for example, could it possibly have meant that an employer could not defend a refiisal to hire when a worker’s disability would threaten others outside the workplace? If Typhoid Mary had come under the ADA, would a meat packer have been defenseless if Mary had sued after being turned away? See 42 U. S. C. § 12113(d). Expressio unius just fails to work here. B Since Congress has not spoken exhaustively on threats to a worker’s own health, the agency regulation can claim adherence under the rule in Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, so long as it makes sense of the statutory defense for qualification standards that are “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U. S. C. § 12113(a). Chevron’s reasons for calling the regulation reasonable are unsurprising: moral concerns aside, it wishes to avoid time lost to sickness, excessive turnover from medical retirement or death, litigation under state tort law, and the risk of violating the national Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §651 et seq. Although Eehazabal claims that none of these reasons is legitimate, focusing on the concern with OSHA will be enough to show that the regulation is entitled to survive. Eehazabal points out that there is no known instance of OSHA enforcement, or even threatened enforcement, against an employer who relied on the ADA to hire a worker willing to accept a risk to himself from his disability on the job. In Echazabal’s mind, this shows that invoking OSHA policy and possible OSHA liability is just a red herring to excuse covert discrimination. But there is another side to this. The text of OSHA itself says its point is “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions,” § 651(b), and Congress specifically obligated an employer to “furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards, that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees,” § 654(a)(1). Although there may be an open question whether an employer would actually be liable under OSHA for hiring an individual who knowingly consented to the particular dangers the job would pose to him, see Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 19, n. 7, there is no denying that the employer would be asking for trouble: his decision to hire would put Congress’s policy in the ADA, a disabled individual’s right to operate on equal terms within the workplace, at loggerheads with the competing policy of OSHA, to ensure the safety of “each” and “every” worker. Courts would, of course, resolve the tension if there were no agency action, but the EEOC’s resolution exemplifies the substantive choices that agencies are expected to make when Congress leaves the intersection of competing objectives both imprecisely marked but subject to the administrative leeway found in 42 U. S. C. § 12113(a). Nor can the EEOC’s resolution be fairly called unreasonable as allowing the kind of workplace paternalism the ADA was meant to outlaw. It is true that Congress had paternalism in its sights when it passed the ADA, see § 12101(a)(5) (recognizing “overproteetive rules and policies” as a form of discrimination). But the EEOC has taken this to mean that Congress was not aiming at an employer’s refusal to place disabled workers at a specifically demonstrated risk, but was trying to get at refusals to give an even break to classes of disabled people, while claiming to act for their own good in reliance on untested and pretextual stereotypes. Its regulation disallows just this sort of sham protection, through demands for a particularized enquiry into the harms the employee would probably face. The direct threat defense must be “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,” and upon an expressly “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job,” reached after considering, among other things, the imminence of the risk and the severity of the harm portended. 29 CFR § 1630.2(r) (2001). The EEOC was certainly acting within the reasonable zone when it saw a difference between rejecting workplace paternalism and ignoring specific and documented risks to the employee himself, even if the employee would take his chances for the sake of getting a job. Finally, our conclusions that some regulation is permissible and this one is reasonable are not open to Echazabal’s objection that they reduce the direct threat provision to “surplusage,” see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 698 (1995). The mere fact that a threat-to-self defense reasonably falls within the general “job related” and “business necessity” standard does not mean that Congress accomplished nothing with its explicit provision for a defense based on threats to others. The provision made a conclusion clear that might otherwise have been fought over in litigation or administrative rule-making. It did not lack a job to do merely because the EEOC might have adopted the same rule later in applying the general defense provisions, nor was its job any less responsible simply because the agency was left with the option to go a step further. A provision can be useful even without congressional attention being indispensable. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. We do not consider the farther issue passed upon by the Ninth Circuit, which held that the respondent is a “ ‘qualified individual’ ” who “can perform the essential functions of the employment position,” 42 U. S. C. §12111(8) (1994 ed.). 226 F. 3d 1063, 1072 (2000). That issue will only resurface if the Circuit concludes that the decision of respondent’s employer to exclude him was not based on the sort of individualized medical enquiry required by the regulation, an issue on which the District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner and which we leave to the Ninth Circuit for initial appellate consideration if warranted. Chevron did not dispute for purposes of its summary-judgment motion that Echazabal is “disabled” under the ADA, and Echazabal did not argue that Chevron could have made a ‘“reasonable accommodation.’” App. 184, n. 6. In saying that the expansive textual phrases point in the direction of agency leeway we do not mean that the defense provisions place no limit on agency rulemaking. Without deciding whether all safety-related qualification standards must satisfy the ADA's direct-threat standard, see Al- bertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U. S. 555, 569-570, n. 15 (1999), we assume that some such regulations are implicitly precluded by the Act’s specification of a direct-threat defense, such as those allowing “indirect” threats of “insignificant” harm. This is so because the definitional and defense provisions describing the defense in terms of “direct” threats of “significant” harm, 42 Uj S. C. §§ 12113(b), 12111(3), are obviously intended to forbid qualifications that screen out by reference to general categories pretextually applied. See infra, at 85-86, and n. 5. Recognizing the “indirect” and “insignificant” would simply reopen the door to pretext by way of defense. In fact, we have said that the regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, which had previously been the regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, are of “particular significance” in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act because “HEW was the agency responsible for coordinating the implementation and enforcement of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794,” prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities by recipients of federal funds. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U. S. 184, 195 (2002). Unfortunately for Echazabal’s argument, the congruence of the ADA with the HEW regulations does not produce an unequivocal statement of congressional intent. Echazabal’s contention that the Act’s legislative history is to the contrary is unpersuasive. Although some of the comments within the legislative history decry paternalism in general terms, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, p. 72 (1990) (“It is critical that paternalistic concerns for the disabled person’s own safety not be used to disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant”); ADA Conf. Rep., 136 Cong. Rec. 17377 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“[A]n employer could not use as an excuse for not hiring a person with HIV disease the claim that the employer was simply ‘protecting the individual’ from opportunistic diseases to which the individual might be exposed”), those comments that elaborate actually express the more pointed concern that such justifications are usually pretextual, rooted in generalities and misperceptions about disabilities. See, e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 74 (“Generalized fear about risks from the employment environment, such as exacerbation of the disability caused by stress, cannot be used by an employer to disqualify a person with a disability”); S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 28 (1989) (“It would also be a violation to deny employment to an applicant based on generalized fears about the safety of the applicant.... By definition, such fears are based on averages and group-based predictions. This legislation requires individualized assessments”). Similarly, Echazabal points to several of our decisions expressing concern under Title VII, which like the ADA allows employers to defend otherwise discriminatory practices that are “consistent with business necessity,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(k), with employers adopting rules that exclude women from jobs that are seen as too risky. See, e. g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 335 (1977); Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 202 (1991). Those cases, however, are beside the point, as they, like Title VII generally, were concerned with paternalistic judgments based on the broad category of gender, while the EEOC has required that judgments based on the direct threat provision be made on the basis of individualized risk assessments. Respect for this distinction does not entail the requirement, as Echaza-bal claims, that qualification standards be “neutral,” stating what the job requires, as distinct from a worker’s disqualifying characteristics. Brief for Respondent 26. It is just as much business necessity for skyscraper contractors to have steelworkers without vertigo as to have well-balanced ones. See 226 F. 3d, at 1074 (Trott, J., dissenting). Reasonableness does not turn on formalism. We have no occasion, however, to try to describe how acutely an employee must exhibit a disqualifying condition before an employer may exclude him from the class of the generally qualified. See Brief for Respondent 31. This is a job for the trial courts in the first instance.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SHAPERO v. KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION No. 87-16. Argued March 1, 1988 Decided June 13, 1988 Brennan, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respects to Parts I and II, in which White, Marshall, Bláckmun, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 480. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 480. Donald, L. Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Mary Janice Lintner. Frank P. Doheny, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Joseph L. Lenihan Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers by C. Rufus Pennington III; for the American Bar Association by Robert MacCrate, Michael Franck, and George Kuhlman; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; and for the Florida Bar by Barry Richard and Ray Ferrero, Jr. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I and II and an opinion as to Part III in which Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Kennedy join. This case presents the issue whether a State may, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems. hH In 1985, petitioner, a member of Kentucky’s integrated Bar Association, see Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.030 (1988), applied to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval of a letter that he proposed to send “to potential clients who have had a foreclosure suit filed against them.” The proposed letter read as follows: “It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep your home by ORDERING your creditor [sic] to STOP and give you more time to pay them. “You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a. m. to 5:00 p. m. for FREE information on how you can keep your home. “Call NOW, don’t wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling.” The Commission did not find the letter false or misleading. Nevertheless, it declined to approve petitioner’s proposal on the ground that a then-existing Kentucky Supreme Court Rule prohibited the mailing or delivery of written advertisements “precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public.” Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i). The Commission registered its view that Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i)’s ban on targeted, direct-mail advertising violated the First Amendment — specifically the principles enunciated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626 (1985) — and recommended that the Kentucky Supreme Court amend its Rules. See App. to Pet. for Cert. lla-15a. Pursuing the Commission’s suggestion, petitioner petitioned the Committee on Legal Ethics (Ethics Committee) of the Kentucky Bar Association for an advisory opinion as to the Rule’s validity. See Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.530; n. 1, supra. Like the Commission, the Ethics Committee, in an opinion formally adopted by the Board of Governors of the Bar Association, did not find the proposed letter false or misleading, but nonetheless upheld Rule 3.135(5)(b) (i) on the ground that it was consistent with Rule 7.3 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1984). App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. On review of the Ethics Committée’s advisory opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court felt “compelled by the decision in Zauderer to order [Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i)] deleted,” 726 S. W. 2d 299, 300 (1987), and replaced it with the ABA’s Rule 7.3, which provides in its entirety: ‘“A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain. The term ‘solicit’ includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.’” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301 (quoting ABA, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3 (1984)). The court did not specify either the precise infirmity in Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) or how Rule 7.3 cured it. Rule 7.3, like its predecessor, prohibits targeted, direct-mail solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain, without a particularized finding that the solicitation is false or misleading. We granted cer-tiorari to resolve whether such a blanket prohibition is consistent with the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 484 U. S. 814 (1987), and now reverse. II Lawyer advertising is in the category of constitutionally protected commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977). The First Amendment principles governing state regulation of lawyer solicitations for pecuniary gain are by now familiar: “Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful activities . . . may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest.” Zauderer, supra, at 638 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980)). Since state regulation of commercial speech “may extend only as far as the interest it serves,” Central Hudson, supra, at 565, state rules that are designed to prevent the “potential for deception and confusion . . . may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the” perceived evil. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191, 203 (1982). In Zauderer, application of these principles required that we strike an Ohio rule that categorically prohibited solicitation of legal employment for pecuniary gain through advertisements containing information or advice, even if truthful and nondeceptive, regarding a specific legal problem. We distinguished written advertisements containing such information or advice from in-person solicitation by lawyers for profit, which we held in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978), a State may categorically ban. The “unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers [that] justified a prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in such solicitation for pecuniary gain,” we observed, are “not present” in the context of written advertisements. Zauderer, supra, at 641-642. Our lawyer advertising cases have never distinguished among various modes of written advertising to the general public. See, e. g., Bates, supra (newspaper advertising); id., at 372, n. 26 (equating advertising in telephone directory with newspaper advertising); In re R. M. J., supra (mailed announcement cards treated same as newspaper and telephone directory advertisements). Thus, Ohio could no more prevent Zauderer from mass-mailing to a general population his offer to represent women injured by the Daikon Shield than it could prohibit his publication of the advertisement in local newspapers. Similarly, if petitioner’s letter is neither false nor deceptive, Kentucky could not constitutionally prohibit him from sending at large an identical letter opening with the query, “Is your home being foreclosed on?,” rather than his observation to the targeted individuals that “It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on.” The drafters of Rule 7.3 apparently appreciated as much, for the Rule exempts from the ban “letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons . . . who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.” The court below disapproved petitioner’s proposed letter solely because it targeted only persons who were “known to need [the] legal services” offered in his letter, 726 S. W. 2d, at 301, rather than the broader group of persons “so situated that they might in general find such services useful.” Generally, unless the advertiser is inept, the latter group would include members of the former. The only reason to disseminate an advertisement of particular legal services among those persons who are “so situated that they might in general find such services useful” is to reach individuals who actually “need legal services of the kind provided [and advertised] by the lawyer.” But the First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not constitutionally ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those whom it would most interest is somehow inherently objectionable. The court below did not rely on any such theory. See also Brief for Respondent 37 (conceding that “targeted direct mail advertising” — as distinguished from “solicitation” — “is constitutionally protected”) (emphasis in original). Rather, it concluded that the State’s blanket ban on all targeted, direct-mail solicitation was permissible because of the “serious potential for abuse inherent in direct solicitation by lawyers of potential clients known to need specific legal services.” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301. By analogy to Ohralik, the court observed: “Such solicitation subjects the prospective client to pressure from a trained lawyer in a direct personal way. It is entirely possible that the potential client may feel overwhelmed by the basic situation which caused the need for the specific legal services and may have seriously impaired capacity for good judgment, sound reason and a natural protective self-interest. Such a condition is full of the possibility of undue influence, overreaching and intimidation.” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301. Of course, a particular potential client will feel equally “overwhelmed” by his legal troubles and will have the same “impaired capacity for good judgment” regardless of whether a lawyer mails him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a newspaper advertisement — concededly constitutionally protected activities — or instead mails a targeted letter. The relevant inquiry is not whether there exist potential clients whose “condition” makes them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility. Cf. Ohralik, supra, at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“What is objectionable about Ohralik’s behavior here is not so much that he solicited business for himself, but rather the circumstances in which he performed that solicitation and the means by which he accomplished it”). Thus, respondent’s facile suggestion that this case is merely “Ohralik in writing” misses the mark. Brief for Respondent 10. In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue influence, the mode of communication makes all the difference. Our decision in Ohralik that a State could categorically ban all in-person solicitation turned on two factors. First was our characterization of face-to-face solicitation as “a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud.” Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 641. See Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 457-458, 464-465. Second, “unique . . . difficulties,” Zau-derer, supra, at 641, would frustrate any attempt at state regulation of in-person solicitation short of an absolute ban because such solicitation is “not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny.” Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 466. See also ibid. (“[I]n-person solicitation would be virtually immune to effective oversight and regulation by the State or by the legal profession”) (footnote omitted). Targeted, direct-mail solicitation is distinguishable from the in-person solicitation in each respect. Like print advertising, petitioner’s letter — and targeted, direct-mail solicitation generally — “poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence” than does in-person solicitation, Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 642. Neither mode of written communication involves “the coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate” or the “pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.” Ibid. Unlike the potential client with a badgering advocate breathing down his neck, the recipient of a letter and the “reader of an advertisement. . . can ‘effectively avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes,’” Ohralik, supra, at 465, n. 25 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21 (1971)). A letter, like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded. In short, both types of written solicitation “con-ve[y] information about legal services [by means] that [are] more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the part of the consumer than is personal solicitation by an attorney.” Zauderer, supra, at 642. Nor does a targeted letter invade the recipient’s privacy any more than does a substantively identical letter mailed at large. The invasion, if any, occurs when the lawyer discovers the recipient’s legal affairs, not when he confronts the recipient with the discovery. Admittedly, a letter that is personalized (not merely targeted) to the recipient presents an increased risk of deception, intentional or inadvertent. It could, in certain circumstances, lead the recipient to overestimate the lawyer’s familiarity with the case or could implicitly suggest that the recipient’s legal problem is more dire than it really is. See Brief for ABA as Amicus Curiae 9. Similarly, an inaccurately targeted letter could lead the recipient to believe she has a legal problem that she does not actually have or, worse yet, could offer erroneous legal advice. See, e. g., Leoni v. State Bar of California, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 619-620, 704 P. 2d 183, 189 (1985), summarily dism’d, 475 U. S. 1001 (1986). But merely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that mode of protected commercial speech. See In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203. The State can regulate such abuses and minimize mistakes through far less restrictive and more precise means, the most obvious of which is to require the lawyer to file any solicitation letter with a state agency, id., at 206, giving the State ample opportunity to supervise mailings and penalize actual abuses. The “regulatory difficulties” that are “unique” to in-person lawyer solicitation, Zauderer, supra, at 641 — solicitation that is “not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny” and for which it is “difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually took place,” Ohralik, supra, at 466-do not apply to written solicitations. The court below offered no basis for its “belie[f] [that] submission of a blank form letter to the Advertising Commission [does not] pro-vid[e] a suitable protection to the public from overreaching, intimidation or misleading private targeted mail solicitation.” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301. Its concerns were presumably those expressed by the ABA House of Delegates in its comment to Rule 7.3: “State lawyer discipline agencies struggle for resources to investigate specific complaints, much less for those necessary to screen lawyers’ mail solicitation material. Even if they could examine such materials, agency staff members are unlikely to know anything about the lawyer or about the prospective client’s underlying problem. Without such knowledge they cannot determine whether the lawyer’s representations are misleading.” ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, pp. 93-94 (1984). The record before us furnishes no evidence that scrutiny of targeted solicitation letters will be appreciably more burdensome or less reliable than scrutiny of advertisements. See Bates, 433 U. S., at 379; id:, at 387 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (objecting to “enormous new regulatory burdens called for by” Bates). As a general matter, evaluating a targeted advertisement does not require specific information about the recipient’s identity and legal problems any more than evaluating a newspaper advertisement requires like information about all readers. If the targeted letter specifies facts that relate to particular recipients (e. g., “It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on”), the reviewing agency has innumerable options to minimize mistakes. It might, for example, require the lawyer to prove the truth of the fact stated (by supplying copies of the court documents or material that led the lawyer to the fact); it could require the lawyer to explain briefly how he or she discovered the fact and verified its accuracy; or it could require the letter to bear a label identifying it as an advertisement, see id., at 384 (dictum); In re R. M. J., supra, at 206, n. 20, or directing the recipient how to report inaccurate or misleading letters. To be sure, a state agency or bar association that reviews solicitation letters might have more work than one that does not. But “[o]ur recent decisions involving commercial speech have been grounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.” Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 646. Ill The validity of Rule 7.3 does not turn on whether petitioner’s letter itself exhibited any of the evils at which Rule 7.3 was directed. See Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 463-464, 466. Since, however, the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine does not apply to professional advertising, see Bates, 433 U. S., at 379-381, we address respondent’s contentions that petitioner’s letter is particularly overreaching, and therefore unworthy of First Amendment protection. Id., at 381. In that regard, respondent identifies two features of the letter before us that, in its view, coalesce to convert the proposed letter into “high pressure solicitation, overbearing solicitation,” Brief for Respondent 20, which is not protected. First, respondent asserts that the letter’s liberal use of underscored, uppercase letters (e. g., “Call NOW, don’t wait”; “it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling”) “fairly shouts at the recipient . . . that he should employ Shapero.” Id., at 19. See also Brief in Opposition 11 (“Letters of solicitation which shout commands to the individual, targeted recipient in words in underscored capitals are of a different order from advertising and are subject to proscription”). Second, respondent objects that the letter contains assertions (e. g., “It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you”) that “statte] no affirmative or objective fact,” but constitute “pure salesman puffery, enticement for the unsophisticated, which commits Shapero to nothing.” Brief for Respondent 20. The pitch or style of a letter’s type and its inclusion of subjective predictions of client satisfaction might catch the recipient’s attention more than would a bland statement of purely objective facts in small type. But a truthful and non-deceptive letter, no matter how big its type and how much it speculates can never “shou[t] at the recipient” or “gras[p] him by the lapels,” id., at 19, as can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation. The letter simply presents no comparable risk of overreaching. And so long as the First Amendment protects the right to solicit legal business, the State may claim no substantial interest in restricting truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicitations to those least likely to be read by the recipient. Moreover, the First Amendment limits the State’s authority to dictate what information an attorney may convey in soliciting legal business. “[T]he States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information ... if the information may also be presented in a way that is not deceptive,” unless the State “assert[s] a substantial interest” that such a restriction would directly advance. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203. Nor may a State impose a more particularized restriction without a similar showing. Aside from the interests that we have already rejected, respondent offers none. To be sure, a letter may be misleading if it unduly emphasizes trivial or “relatively uninformative fact[s],” In re R. M. J., supra, at 205 (lawyer’s statement, “in large capital letters, that he was a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States”), or offers overblown assurances of client satisfaction, cf. In re Von Wiegen, 63 N. Y. 2d 163, 179, 470 N. E. 2d 838, 847 (1984) (solicitation letter to victims of massive disaster informs them that “it is [the lawyer’s] opinion that the liability of the defendants is clear”), cert. denied, 472 U. S. 1007 (1985); Bates, supra, at 383-384 (“[Advertising claims as to the quality of legal services . . . may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction”). Respondent does not argue before us that petitioner’s letter was misleading in those respects. Nor does respondent contend that the letter is false or misleading in any other respect. Of course, respondent is free to raise, and the Kentucky courts are free to consider, any such argument on remand. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Attorneys Advertising Commission is charged with the responsibility of “regulating attorney advertising as prescribed” in the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(3) (1988). The Commission’s decisions are appealable to the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association, Rule 3.135(8)(a), and are ultimately reviewable by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Rule 3.135(8)(b). “Any attorney who is in doubt as to the propriety of any professional act contemplated by him” also has the option of seeking an advisory opinion from a committee of the Kentucky Bar Association, which, if formally adopted by the Board of Governors, is reviewable by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Rule 3.530. Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) provided in full: “A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee only if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to whómi R is also sent or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it is not prompted or precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating'to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public.” We reject respondent’s request that we dismiss or affirm this case because “the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted Shapero precisely the relief which he requested.” Brief for Respondent 11. The court below did, as petitioner prayed, “declare . . . rule [3.135(5)(b)(i)] void,” Motion for Review of Advisory Opinion E-310, No. 86-SC-335 (Sup. Ct. Ky.). The court’s ultimate disposition, however, was to adopt a new Rule with the same defect that petitioner identified in the old ope and to “affirm the decision of the Ethics Committee to deny [petitioner’s] request” for approval of his letter. 726 S. W. 2d 299, 301 (1987). Petitioner surely cannot be said to have prevailed below. Nor does the fact that petitioner never leveled his constitutional challenge specifically against Rule 7.3 mean that this case presents “federal constitutional issues [that were] raised here for the first time on review of [a] state court decisio[n],” Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969). The parties briefed and argued the constitutionality of a categorical ban on targeted, direct-mail advertising, and the court below plainly considered and rejected those arguments as it adopted Model Rule 7.3. See 726 S. W. 2d, at 300. We also decline respondent’s invitation to dismiss this case in order to avoid interference with ongoing state judicial proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). Once the court below rendered its final judgment in this case, there was no longer any pending state judicial proceeding.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HAYFIELD NORTHERN RAILROAD CO., INC., et al. v. CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION CO. No. 82-1579. Argued February 21, 1984 Decided June 12, 1984 Robert S. Abdalian argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Gilbert S. Buffington, Special Assistant Attorney General. Mark I. Levy argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee and Deputy Solicitor General Bator. Anne E. Keating argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was Thomas E. Glennon. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Arkansas et al. by Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, Ckarles D. Hoomstra, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Clark of Arkansas, Charles M. Oberly III of Delaware, Jim Jones of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Erwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, Robert 0. Wefald of North Dakota, Dave Frohnmayer of Oregon, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, John Eaton, Jr., of Vermont, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry of Washington, and A. G. McClintock of Wyoming. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which amended the Interstate Commerce Act, regulates the process by which rail carriers may abandon unprofitable lines and provides a mechanism for shippers to obtain continued service by purchasing lines or subsidizing their operation. This case poses the question whether the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, pre-empts a Minnesota eminent domain statute used to condemn rail property after it has been abandoned pursuant to the amendments. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the Act, as amended, pre-empted the state statute. 693 F. 2d 819 (1982). We disagree. I — I On January 30, 1981, appellee filed an application with the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) seeking permission to abandon a 44-mile rail line between Oelwein, Iowa, and Randolph, Minn. Appellee maintained that operation of the line imposed a serious financial strain on its resources. Several shippers in Minnesota (Shippers Group) opposed the abandonment of a 19.2-mile segment of the line that passed through Hayfield, Minn. (Hayfield segment). After an Administrative Law Judge ruled that appellee was entitled to abandon the entire 44-mile line, the Shippers Group, pursuant to the Staggers Rail Act amendments, offered to subsidize operation of the Hayfield segment. See 49 U. S. C. § 10905(c). When the parties could not agree on mutually acceptable terms, the Commission, at the request of the Shippers Group, determined the appropriate price for subsidizing continued operation of the line. See 49 U. S. C. § 10905(e). Dissatisfied with the Commission’s determination, the Shippers Group withdrew its offer. See 49 U. S. C. § 10905(f)(2). Soon thereafter, the Commission granted a certificate of abandonment to appellee, ibid., thereby relieving appellee of its federal obligation to supply rail service. During the period that the Shippers Group was attempting to prevent the issuance of a certificate of abandonment, appellee entered into contracts with the State of Iowa and various Iowa shippers. These contracts involved improvements of certain trackage in Iowa. Appellee intended to fulfill these contracts by using the track from the abandoned line. On March 31, 1982, members of the Shippers Group formed appellant Hayfield Northern Railroad Co., Inc. (hereafter appellant). Appellant planned to use the eminent domain authority vested in it by Minn. Stat. §227.27 (1982) to condemn the Hayfield segment that appellee had abandoned. Appellant filed suit in state court and obtained a temporary restraining order preventing appellee from removing track from the Hayfield segment. Appellee immediately removed the suit to Federal District Court and moved to dissolve the restraining order on the ground that the Act, as amended, pre-empted the Minnesota condemnation statute. At this point, the State of Minnesota intervened in order to defend appellant’s application of its condemnation law. The District Court awarded summary judgment to appel-lee and dissolved the restraining order. After granting a stay pending appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 693 F. 2d 819 (1982). The Court of Appeals held that the Minnesota condemnation statute was pre-empted because it constituted an obstacle to the accomplishment of the congressional purpose behind the federal abandonment procedure. The Court of Appeals also dissolved its stay and remanded the case to the District Court for calculation of the damages incurred by appellee because of the delay. Following denial of rehearing by the Court of Appeals, we denied appellant’s motion to stay the issuance of the Court of Appeals’ mandate, 460 U. S. 1018 (1983), and subsequently noted probable jurisdiction, 464 U. S. 812 (1983). II Pre-emption doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and invalidates any state law that contradicts or interferes with an Act of Congress. Pre-emption arises in a wide array of contexts, from circumstances in which federal and state laws are plainly contradictory to those in which the incompatibility between state and federal laws is discernible only through inference. This case presents no issue of express pre-emption; nothing on the face of the Staggers Rail Act amendments explictly indicates whether Congress intended to pre-empt state authority over rail property after the Commission has authorized its abandonment. Therefore, in order to determine whether preemption is otherwise indicated, we must inquire more deeply into the intention of Congress and the scope of the pertinent state legislation. We turn, then, to the laws in dispute to ascertain their structure and purpose. Initially, the Interstate Commerce Act did not subject railroad abandonments to the jurisdiction of the Commission. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. Congress ceded authority over abandonments to the Commission in the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 402(18) — (22), 41 Stat. 477-478. See Chicago & N. W. Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311, 319-320 (1981). The Transportation Act prohibited a carrier from abandoning any portion of a line without first obtaining from the Commission a certificate of abandonment verifying that the future public convenience and necessity permitted the cessation of the carrier’s rail service. The abandonment procedure proved inadequate, however, because it lacked a specific timetable for the issuance of an abandonment certificate. Railroads consequently found themselves enmeshed in lengthy proceedings before the Commission, unable to unburden themselves promptly of unprofitable lines. See Chicago & N. W. Transportation Co. v. United States, 582 F. 2d 1043, 1045-1046 (CA7), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1039 (1978); S. Rep. No. 94-499, p. 3 (1975). Congress enacted new legislation to provide railroads with a more expeditious abandonment process that would also be attentive to the interests of shippers and others who might be dependent upon the continuation of rail service on a particular line. See the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act), Pub. L. 94-210, § 802, 90 Stat. 127, originally codified at 49 U. S. C. § la (1976 ed.) (subsequently recodified without substantive change at 49 U. S. C. § 10903 et seq.). To alleviate the costly delays imposed upon railroads by protracted proceedings before the Commission, the 4-R Act provided a schedule to govern the abandonment process. See 49 U. S. C. §§ la(3), (4) (1976 ed.). At the same time, to afford opponents of an abandonment an opportunity to maintain rail service, the 4-R Act allowed abandonment to be delayed for up to six months if a financially responsible person offered to subsidize or purchase the line. § la(6)(a). It soon became clear, however, that further reforms would be required in order adequately to address both the need of railroads for an even more abbreviated method of abandonment and the need of shippers and communities to avoid the dislocations caused by abandonment. As a consequence, Congress further amended the Interstate Commerce Act by enacting the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-448, § 402, 94 Stat. 1941-1945, codified at 49 U. S. C. §§ 10903-10906. The Staggers Rail Act amendment most pertinent to this case was the revision of § 10905. Entitled “Offers of financial assistance to avoid abandonment and discontinuance,” § 10905 governs the procedures to be followed when a person seeks to prevent an abandonment by purchasing the carrier’s lines or by subsidizing the carrier’s service. Section 10905 provides that the Commission shall publish in the Federal Register its findings that the public convenience and necessity require or permit abandonment or discontinuance of a particular railroad line and that “[wjithin 10 days following the publication, any person may offer to pay the carrier a subsidy or offer to purchase the line.” 49 U. S. C. § 10905(c). If the Commission finds within 15 days that the offeror is “a financially responsible person (including a government authority)” and that the offer of assistance meets prescribed standards, it “shall postpone the issuance of a certificate authorizing abandonment or discontinuance.” § 10905(d). If the offeror and the carrier “fail to agree on the amount or terms of the subsidy or purchase, either party may, within 30 days after the offer is made, request that the Commission establish the conditions and amount of compensation . . . within 60 days,” § 10905(e), and this decision “shall be binding on both parties, except that the person who has offered to subsidize or purchase the line may withdraw his offer within 10 days of the Commission’s decision.” § 10905(f)(2). If the offer is withdrawn, “the Commission shall immediately issue a certificate authorizing the abandonment or discontinuance.” Ibid. The underlying rationale of § 10905 represents a continuation of Congress’ efforts to accommodate the conflicting interests of railroads that desire to unburden themselves quickly of unprofitable lines and shippers that are dependent upon continued rail service. Under the 4-R Act, carriers could negotiate with offerors in bad faith while simply waiting for the 6-month negotiating period to elapse. By pursuing this course, carriers could either extract excessive prices from desperate shippers or abandon their lines without reaching an agreement on purchase or subsidy. See Chicago & N. W. Transportation Co. v. United States, 678 F. 2d 665, 667 (CA7 1982). To counteract bad-faith negotiating on the part of carriers, § 10905(f)(2) binds a carrier to the purchase or subsidy price determined by the Commission in the event that the offeror and the carrier cannot themselves come to terms. On the other hand, to reduce the costly delays associated with shipper opposition to proposed abandonments, § 10905 further abbreviates the period required for resolving negotiations over offers. Under the 4-R Act, the period for resolving such offers was six months; under § 402(c) of the Staggers Rail Act amendments, Congress reduced the period to 110 days. In contrast to the complicated structure of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Minnesota statute at issue is a straightforward application of a State’s familiar power of eminent domain. The statute, originally enacted in 1879, provides: “Every foreign and domestic railroad corporation shall have power to acquire, by purchase or condemnation, all necessary roadways, spur and side tracks, rights of way, depot grounds, yards, grounds for gravel pits, machine shops, warehouses, elevators, depots, station houses, and all other structures necessary or convenient for the use, operation, or enjoyment of the road, and may make with any other railroad company, such arrangements for the use of any portion of its tracks and roadbeds as it may deem necessary.” Minn. Stat. §222.27 (1982). Ill The argument that the Staggers Rail Act amendments pre-empt the State’s power of eminent domain over the abandoned Hayfield segment rests upon two contentions: first, that the federal regulation of railroad abandonments is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for state action on this subject; and, second, that application of the Minnesota statute in the circumstances of this case would pose an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of § 10905. A The first contention attempts to bring this case within the narrow ambit of decisions in which this Court has indicated that congressional legislation so occupied the field of a particular subject area that state regulation within that field would be improper no matter how well state law comported with the federal policies involved. Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U. S. 190, 203-204 (1983). This Court has repeatedly affirmed, however, that “federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons— either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963). In this case, Congress has not “unmistakably ordained” that the States may not exercise their traditional power of eminent domain over railroad property that has been abandoned; nothing in the Act expressly refers to federal pre-emption with respect to the disposition of abandoned railroad property. Nor is there any indication that the subject matter at issue here— abandoned railroad property — is of the sort that “permits no other conclusion” but that it is governed by federal and not state regulation. After all, state law normally governs the condemnation of ordinary real property. Appellee insists that the line it abandoned cannot properly be viewed as ordinary real property because, even after abandonment has occurred, the line remains under the jurisdiction of the Commission. According to appellee, the elaborate procedural detail of the Act indicates that in addition to granting the Commission exclusive and plenary authority to regulate abandonment, the Act also “granted the Commission exclusive and plenary authority to provide for continuation of rail service via forced sale or subsidy following its authorization of abandonment.” Brief for Appellee 21-22. This claim reflects a misunderstanding of the Act. With exceptions irrelevant to this case, the provisions of the Act relate to requirements that must be met before the Commission will authorize an abandonment. Therefore, unless the Commission attaches postabandonment conditions to a certificate of abandonment, the Commission’s authorization of an abandonment brings its regulatory mission to an end. The proposition that, as a general matter, issuing a certificate of abandonment terminates the Commission’s jurisdiction is strongly buttressed by the Commission’s own interpretation of its regulatory authority. According to the Commission, “the disposition of rail property after an effective certificate of abandonment has been exercised is a matter beyond the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction, and within a State’s reserved jurisdiction. Questions of title to, and disposition of, the property are the matters subject to State law.” Abandonment of Railroad Lines and Discontinuance of Service, 365 I. C. C. 249, 261 (1981); see also Chicago & N. W. Transportation Co. — Abandonment—in Waukesha, Jefferson and Dane Counties, WI, I. C. C. Docket No. AB-1 (Sub-No. 144) (May 5, 1983) (set forth in App. to Joint Supplemental Memorandum of Appellant and Appellant-Intervenor A-l, A-5); Common Carrier Status of States, State Agencies and Instrumentalities, and Political Subdivisions, 363 I. C. C. 132, 135 (1980) (“When a rail line has been fully abandoned, it is no longer [a] rail line and the transfer of the line is not subject to our jurisdiction” (footnote omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Simmons v. ICC, 225 U. S. App. D. C. 84, 697 F. 2d 326 (1982); Modern Handcraft, Inc.— Abandonment in Jackson County, Mo., 363 I. C. C. 969, 972 (1981). The Commission’s position, of course, is entitled to considerable deference since it represents the construction of a regulatory statute by the agency charged with the statute’s enforcement. See, e. g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 U. S. 89, 97 (1983). B The second contention in support of a finding of preemption is that the Minnesota condemnation statute, applied in the manner which appellant proposes, would obstruct the accomplishment of the objectives for which Congress enacted §10905. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941) (pre-emption arises when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”). More specifically, appellee maintains that if shippers are allowed to institute potentially lengthy condemnation proceedings against abandoned rail lines, the benefits of the 110-day time limit established by § 10905 will be lost. We are unpersuaded. The expedited process provided by § 10905 was intended to abbreviate the period during which a carrier is obligated to furnish financially burdensome service it seeks to escape through abandonment. State condemnation proceedings do not interfere with that purpose insofar as such proceedings follow abandonment. After the Commission has authorized a carrier to abandon its lines, that carrier is relieved of its obligation to furnish rail service. Nothing in §10905 indicates a federal interest in affording special protection to a carrier after the point at which the carrier’s federal obligation ends. Appellee also maintains that allowing appellant to bring condemnation proceedings after abandonment would contravene the overall purpose of the Act: to make the railroad industry more efficient and productive. It is true that the exercise of state condemnation authority would prevent appellee from removing property subject to that authority from the Hayfield segment and shifting such property to higher-value uses elsewhere. It is also true that the existence of opportunity costs has been recognized by the Commission as one factor to be taken into account in deciding whether to authorize an abandonment. See, e. g., State of Maine Dept. of Transportation v. ICC, 587 F. 2d 541, 543-544 (CA1 1978). It does not follow however, that state condemnation authority thereby frustrates the federal abandonment scheme. What appellee overlooks is that § 10905 is expressly designed to allow an offeror to force a carrier to forgo abandonment in favor of continued operation through subsidization or purchase, regardless of the opportunity costs entailed by the inability to shift its assets to higher-value uses. See § 10905(f)(2). Offerors must be willing, of course, to subsidize or purchase the line so that the costs of continued operation are lifted from the carrier. § 10905(d). But alleviating the carrier’s burden does not alter the economic reality that opportunity costs continue to be incurred; it merely shifts the incidence of those costs. In light of Congress’ imposition of solutions that subordinate opportunity costs to other considerations, state condemnation authority is not pre-empted merely because it may frustrate the economically optimal use of rail assets. Finally, appellee maintains that appellant’s proposed application of Minnesota law would interfere with the valuation procedure established by §10905 by allowing appellant to relitigate the price the Commission established for the purchase or subsidizing of appellee’s lines. Although it may seem unfair to allow a shipper a “second bite at the apple” in state condemnation proceedings after it has participated in, and then withdrawn from, negotiations under § 10905, that second opportunity does not frustrate the purpose of the federal valuation scheme. That purpose was to prevent carriers from frustrating bona fide offers of subsidy or purchase through bad-faith negotiations, see supra, at 630-631, not to impose a blanket prohibition covering all postabandonment efforts to obtain abandoned property. H <1 We hold that appellant s proposed application of Minnesota condemnation law is not pre-empted by the Staggers Act amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Pub. L. 96-448, §402, 94 Stat. 1941-1945, 49 U. S. C. §§ 10903-10906. Minn. Stat. §222.27 (1982); infra, at 631 (quoting the text of the law). Many States have enacted similar statutes. See Brief for Appellants 5, n. 2 (citing statutes in 33 States). At the same time that the Shippers Group offered to subsidize continued rail service, it also appealed the decision authorizing abandonment. The Commission denied the appeal whereupon the Shippers Group filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals. After unsuccessfully seeking a stay of the order permitting abandonment, the Shippers Group withdrew its petition for review. See 693 F. 2d. 819, 820 (1982). See U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance therof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . , any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824). Compare McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 (1913) (invalidating state law directly conflicting with federal regulations), with Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274 (1971) (holding wrongful discharge action brought in state court precluded by pervasiveness of federal regulation in the area). See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 376-391 (1978). See generally Railroad Transportation Policy Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1946 before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Railroad Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearings on H. R. 4570 before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess (1979); Railroad Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 796 before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1, 3 (1979). To enable potential offerors to determine the feasibility of subsidizing or purchasing a line, the Act mandates that a rail carrier applying for an abandonment certificate must provide current financial data, including an estimate of the annual subsidy and minimum purchase price needed to keep the line in operation. 49 U. S. C. § 10905(b). See S. Rep. No. 96-470, pp. 39-41 (1979) (“The abandonment provisions of this bill are designed to accomplish two major objectives: significantly reducing the time spent processing [abandonment] cases at the Commission and improving the process by which abandoned lines can be subsidized”); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1430, p. 125 (1980) (§ 10905 as amended will “assist shippers who are sincerely interested in improving rail service, while at the same time protecting carriers from protracted legal proceedings which are calculated merely to tediously extend the abandonment process”). Compare 49 U. S. C. § la(6)(a) (1976 ed.) with 49 TT §§ 10905(c)-(f). See, e. g., 49 U. S. C. §10906: “If the Commission finds that the rail properties proposed to be abandoned are suitable for public purposes, the properties may be sold, leased, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of only under conditions provided in the order of the Commission. The conditions may include a prohibition on any such disposal for a period of not more than 180 days after the effective date of the order, unless the properties have first been offered, on reasonable terms, for sale for public purposes.” See also 49 U. S. C. § 10905(f)(4) (no purchaser of an abandoned line “may transfer or discontinue service on such line prior to the end of the second year after consummation of the sale, nor may such purchaser transfer such line, except to the carrier from whom it was purchased, prior to the end of the fifth year after consummation of the sale”). This does not mean that in the postabandonment period, States are free to undo the very purposes for which the Commission authorized an abandonment. For example, if the Commission authorized an abandonment on the ground that relocation of the track was essential to enable the carrier to provide adequate service elsewhere, pre-emption would almost certainly invalidate a subsequent order by a state court barring such a transfer. Cf. In re Boston & Maine Corp., 596 F. 2d 2, 5-7 (CA1 1979); Texas & Pac. R. Co. Abandonment between San Martine and Rock House in Culberson, Texas, 363 I. C. C. 666, 678-679 (1980). This problem is absent from the case at bar. According to the Court of Appeals “the benefits of the 110 day time schedule would be lost, since the state proceedings, once commenced, could take years.” 693 F. 2d, at 822-823 (citation omitted). As the Conference Report on the Staggers Rail Act explained, one of the central aims of § 10905 was to “protec[t] carriers from protracted legal proceedings which are calculated merely to tediously extend the abandonment process.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1430, p. 125 (1980) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals accepted this argument and concluded that allowing appellant to use Minnesota law to condemn the Hayfield segment “would circumvent the Commission’s determination of value.” 693 F. 2d, at 823. The question whether appellant should be allowed to litigate the value of appellee’s abandoned rail property is an issue more appropriately analyzed in terms of res judicata rather than pre-emption. If an offeror participates in a § 10905 proceeding and obtains an unfavorable valuation, the Commission’s administrative determination may well have preclusive effect in state condemnation proceedings. See, e. g., United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U. S. 394, 422 (1966) (administrative determinations usually have res judicata effect “[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate”). On the other hand, the 60-day limit within which the Commission must fix a price for purchase or subsidy, see 49 U. S. C. § 10905(f)(1)(A), may deprive the parties of the “adequate opportunity to litigate” required for the imposition of res judicata. We intimate no position on the issue inasmuch as it is not now before us. Similarly, we leave open the issue whether state condemnation proceedings could, consistent with the purposes of the federal abandonment scheme, fix a lower valuation upon abandoned property than the valuation arrived at in prior § 10905 proceedings.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GREENE v. McELROY et al. No. 180. Argued April 1, 1959. Decided June 29, 1959. Carl W: Berueffy argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Assistant Attorney General Doub argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Samuel D. Slade and Bernard Cedarbaum. ' David I. Shapiro, filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court: This case involves the validity of the Government’s revocation of security clearance granted to petitioner, an aeronautical engineer employed by a private manufacturer which, produced goods for the armed services. Petitioner was discharged from his employment solely as a consequence of the revocation because his access to classified information was required by the nature of his job. After his discharge, petitioner was unable to secure employment as an aeronautical engineer and for all practical. purposes that field of endeavor is now closed to him. Petitioner was vice president and general manager of Engineering and Research Corporation (ERCO), a business devoted primarily to developing and manufacturing various mechanical and electronic products. He began this employment in 1937 soon after his graduation from the Guggenheim School of Aeronautics and, except for a brief leave of absence, he stayed with the firm until his discharge in 1953. He was first employed as a junior engineer and draftsman. Because of the excellence of his work he eventually became a chief executive officer of the firm. During his career with ERCO, he was credited with the expedited development of a complicated electronic flight simulator and with the design of a rocket launcher, both of which were produced by ERCO and long used- by the Navy. During the post-World War II period, petitioner was given security clearances on three occasions. These were required by the nature of the projects undertaken by ERCO for the various armed services. On November 21, 1951, however, the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board (PSB) advised ERCO that the company’s clearances fpr access to classified information were in jeopardy because of a tentative decision to deny petitioner access to classified Department of Defense information and to revoke his clearance for security reasons. ERCO was invited to respond to this notification. The corporation, through its president, informed PSB that petitioner had taken an extended furlough due to the Board’s action. The ERCO executive also stated that in his opinion petitioner was a loyal and discreet United States citizen and that his absence denied to the firm the- services of an outstanding engineer and administrative executive. On December 11, 1951, petitioner was informed by the Board that it had “decided that , access by you to contract work and information [at ERCO] ... would be inimical to the best interests of the United States.” Accordingly, the PSB revoked ■ petitioner’s clearances. He was informed that he could seek a héaring before the Industrial Employment Review Board (IERB), and he took this course. Prior to the hearing, petitioner received a letter informing him that the PSB action was based on information indicating that between 1943 and 1947 he had associated with Communists, visited officials of the Russian Embassy, and attended a dinner given by an allegedly Communist Front organization. On January 23,1952, petitioner, with counsel, appeared before the IERB. He was questioned in detail concerning his background and the information disclosed in the IERB letter. In response to numerous, and searching questions he explained in substance that specific “suspect” persons with whom he was said to have associated were actually friends of his ex-wife. He explained in some detail that during his first marriage, which lasted from 1942 through 1947, his then wife held views with which he did not concur and was friendly with associates and other persons with whom he had little in common. He stated that these basic disagreements were the prime reasons that the marriage ended in failure; He attributed to his then wife his attendance at the dinner, his membership in a bookshop association which purportedly was a “front” organization, and the presence in his home of “Communist” publications. He denied categorically that he had ever been a “Communist” and he spoke at length about his dislike for “a theory of Government which has for its object the common ownership of property.” Lastly, petitioner explained that his visits to persons in various foreign embassies (including the Russian Embassy) were made in connection with his attempts to sell ERCO’s products to their Governments. Petitioner’s witnesses, who included top-level- executives of ERCO and a number of military officers who had worked with petitioner in the past, corroborated many of petitioner’s statements and testified in substance that he was a loyal and discreet citizen. These top-level executives of ERCO, whose right to clearance was never challenged, corroborated petitioner’s testimony concerning his reasons for visiting the Russian Embassy. The Government presented no witnesses. It was obvious, however, from the questions posed to petitioner and to his witnesses, that the Board relied on confidential reports which were never made available to petitioner. These reports apparently were compilations of statements taken from various persons contacted by an investigatory agency. Petitioner had no opportunity to confront and question persons whose statements reflected adversely on him or to confront the government investigators who took their statements. Moreover, it seemed- evident that the Board itself had never questioned the investigators and had never seen those persons whose statements were the subject of their reports. On January 29, 1952, the IERB, on the basis of the testimony given at the hearing and the confidential reports, reversed the action of the PSB' and informed petitioner and ERGO that petitioner was authorized to work on Secret contract work. On March 27, 1953, the Sécretary of Defense abolished the PSB and IERB and directed the Secretaries of the three armed services to establish regional Industrial Personnel Security Boards to coordinate the industrial security program. The Secretaries were also instructed to establish uniform standards, criteria, and procedures. Cases pending before the PSB and IERB were referred to these new Boards. During the interim period between the abolishment of the old program and the implementation of the new one, the Secretaries considered themselves charged with administering clearance activities under previously stated criteria. On April 17, 1953, respondent Anderson, the Secretary of the Navy, wrote ERCO that he had reviewed petitioner’s case and had concluded that petitioner’s “continued access to Navy classified security information [was] inconsistent with the best interests of National Security.” No hearing preceded this notification. He requested ERCO to exclude petitioner “from any part of your plants, factories or sites at which classified Navy projects are being carried out and to bar him access to all Navy classified information.” He also advised the corporation that petitioner’s case was being referred to the Secretary of Defense with the'recommendation that the IERB’s decision of January 29, 1952, be overruled. ERCO had no choice but to comply with the request. This led to petitioner’s discharge. . ERCO informed the. Navy of what had occurred and requested an opportunity to discuss the matter in view of pétitioner’s importance to the firm. The Navy replied that “ [a] s far as the Navy, Department is concerned, any further discussion on this problem at this time will serve no useful purpose.” Petitioner asked for reconsideration of the decision. On October 13, 1953, the Navy wrote to him stating that it had requested the Eastern Industrial Personnel Security Board (EIPSB) to accept jurisdiction and to arrive at a final determination concerning petitioner’s status. Various letters were subsequently exchanged between petitioner’s counsel and the EIPSB. These resulted finally in generalized charges, quoted in the margin, incorporating the information previously discussed with petitioner at his 1952 hearing before the IERB. On April 28, 1954, more than one year after the Secretary took action, and for the two days thereafter, petitioner presented his case to the EIPSB and was cross-examined in detail. The hearing began with a statement by the Chairman, which included the following passage: “The transcript to be made of this hearing will not include all material in the file of the case, in that, it will not include reports of investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other investigative agencies which ¿re confidential. Neither will it contain information concerning the identity of confidential informants or information which will reveal the source of confidential evidence. The transcript will contain only the Statement of Reasons, your answer thereto and the testimony actually taken at this hearing.” Petitioner was again advised that the revocation of his security clearance was based on incidents occurring between 1942 and 1947, including his associations with alleged Communists, his visits with officials of the Russian Embassy, and the presence in his house of Communist literature. Petitioner, in response to a question, stated at the outset of the hearing that he was then employed at a salary of $4,700 per year as an architectural draftsman and that he h¿d' been receiving $18,000 per year as Vice President and General Manager of ERCO. He later explained that after his discharge from ERCO he had unsuccessfully tried to' obtain employment in the aeronautics field but had been barricaded from it because of lack of clearance. Petitioner was subjected to an intense examination sim- ' ilar to that which he experienced before the IERB in 1952. .During the course of the examination, the Board injected new subjects of inquiry and made it evident that it was relying on various investigatory reports and statements of confidential informants which were not made available to petitioner. Petitioner reiterated in great detail the explanations' previously given before the IERB. He was subjected to intense cross-examination, however, concerning reports that he had agreed with the views held by his ex-wife. Petitioner again presented a number of witnesses who testified that he was loyal, that he had spoken approvingly of the United States and its economic system, that he was a valuable engineer, and that he had made valuable and significant contributions to this country’s war efforts during World War II and the Korean War. Soon'after the conclusion of the hearing, the-EIPSB notified petitioner that it had affirmed the Secretary’s action and that it had decided that the granting of clearance to petitioner for access to classified information was “not clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” Petitioner requested that he be furnished with a detailed statement of findings supporting the Board’s decision. He was informed, however, that s'ecurity considerations prohibited such disclosure.- On September 16, 1955, petitioner requested review by the Industrial Personnel Security Review Board. On March 12, 1956, almost three years after the Secretary’s action and nearly one year after the second hearing, he received a letter from the Director of the Office of Industrial Personnel Security Review informing him that the EIPSB had found that from 1942-1947 petitioner associated closely with his then wife and her friends, knowing that they were active in behalf of and sympathized with the Communist Party, that during part of this period petitioner maintained a sympathetic association with a number of officials of the Russian Embassy, that during this period petitioner’s political views were similar to those of his then wife, that petitioner had been a member of a suspect bookshop association, had invested money in a suspect radio station, had attended a suspect dinner, and had, on occasion,,. Communist publications in his home, and that petitioner’s credibility as a witness in the proceedings was doubtful. The letter also stated that the doubts concerning petitioner’s credibility affected the Board’s evaluation of his trustworthiness and that only trustworthy persons could be afforded access to classified information. The EIPSB determination was affirmed.. After the EIPSB decision in 1954, petitioner filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia asking for a declaration that the revocation was unlawful and void and for an order restraining respondents from acting' pursuant to it. He also asked for an order requiring respondents to advise ERCO that the clearance revocation was void. Following the affirmance of the EIPSB order by the Industrial Personnel Review Board, petitioner moved for summary judgment in the District Court. The Government cross-filed for dismissal of the complaint or summary judgment. The District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, 150 F. Supp. 958, and the' Court of Appeals affirmed that disposition, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 87, 254 F. 2d 944. The Court of Appeals recognized that petitioner had suffered substantial harm from the clearance revocation. But in that court’s view, petitioner’s suit presented no “justiciable controversy” — no controversy which the courts could finally and effectively decide. This conclusion followed from the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that the Executive Department alone is competent to evaluate the competing considerations which exist in determining the persons who are to be afforded security clearances. The court also rejected petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his livelihood without the traditional- safeguards required by “due process of law” such as-confrontation of his accusers and access to confidential reports used to determine his fitness. Central to this determination was the. court’s unwillingness to order the Government to choose between disclosing the identities of informants or giving petitioner clearance. Petitioner contends that the action of the Department of Defense in barring him from access to classified information on the' basis óf statements of confidential informants made to investigators was not authorized by either Congress or the President and has' denied him “liberty” and “property” without “due process of Ism” in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. The alleged property is petitioner’s employment; the alleged liberty is petitioner’s freedom to practice his chosen profession. Respondents admit,-as they must, that the revocation of security clearance caused petitioner to lose his .job with ERCO and has seriously affected, if not destroyed, his ability to obtain employment' in the aeronautics field. Although the right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the “liberty” and “property” concepts of the Fifth Amendment, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 352 (concurring opinion); cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589-590; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 684, respondents contend that the admitted interferences which have occurred are indirect by-products of necessary governmental action to protect the integrity of secret information and hence are not unreasonable and do not constitute deprivations within the meaning, of the Amendment. Alternatively, respondents urge that even if petitioner has been restrained in the enjoyment of constitutionally protected rights, he was accorded due process of law in that he was permitted to utilize those procedural safeguards consonant with an effective clearance program, in the administration of which the identity of informants and their statements are kept secret to insure an unimpaired flow to the Government of information concerning subversive conduct. But in view of our conclusion that this case should be decided on the narrower ground of “authorization,” we find that we need not determine the answers to these questions. The issue, as we see it, is whether the Department of Defense has been authorized to create an industrial security clearance program under which affected persons may lose their jobs and may be restrained in following their chosen professions on the basis of fact determinations concerning their fitness for clearance made in proceedings in which they are denied the traditional procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. Prior to World War II, only sporadic efforts were made to control the clearance of persons who worked in private . establishments which manufactured materials for national defense. Report .of the Commission on Government Security, 1957, S. Doc. No. 64, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 236. During World War II the War Department instituted a formalized program to obtain the discharge from war plants of persons engaged in sabotage, espionage, and willful activity designed to disrupt the national defense program. Id., at 237. In 1946, the War Department began to require contractors, before being given access to classified information, to sign secrecy agreements which required consent before their employees were permitted access to Top Secret or Secret information. Id., at 238. At the outset, each armed service administered its own industrial clearance program. Id., at 239. Later, the PSB and IERB were established by the' Department of Defense and the Secretaries of the armed services to administer a more centralized program. Ibid. Confusion existed concerning the criteria and procedures to be employed by these boards. Ibid. Eventually, generalized procedures were established with the approval of the Secretaries which provided in part that before the IERB “[t]he hearing will be conducted in such manner as to protect from disclosure information affecting the national security or tending to' compromise investigative sources or methods . . . .” See “Procedures, Governing Appeals to the Industrial Employment Review Board, dated 7 November 1949,” note 4, supra, §4(c). After abolition of these boards in 1953, and the establishment of the IPSB, various new sets of procedures were promulgated which likewise provided for the non-disclosure of information “tending to compromise investigative sources or methods or the indentity of confidential informants.” All of these programs and procedures were established .by directives issued by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force'. None was the creature of statute or of an' Executive Order issued by the President. Respondents maintain that congressional authorization to the President to fashion a program which denies security clearance to persons on the basis of confidential information which the individuals have no opportunity to confront and test is unnecessary because the President has inherent authority to maintain military secrets inviolate. And respondents argue that if a statutory grant of power is necessary, such a grant can readily be inferred “as a necessarily implicit authority from the generalized provisions” of legislation dealing with the armed services. But the question which must be decided in this case is not whether the. President has inherent power to act or whether Congress has granted him such a power; rather, it is whether either the President or Congress exercised such a power and delegated to the Department of Defense the authority to fashion such a program. Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important, where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty of who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examinátion. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, e. g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242-244; Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47; Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458, 474; In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273, but also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny. E. g., Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190; Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292; Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 19; Carter v. Kubler, 320 U. S. 243; Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U. S. 269. Nor, as it has been pointed out; has Congress ignored these fundamental requirements in enacting regulatory legislation. Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 168-169 (concurring opinion).' Professor Wigmore, commenting on the importance of cross-examination, states in his treatise, 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1367: “For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of Evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement (unless by special exception) should be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has found increasing strength in lengthening experience.” Little need be added to this incisive summary statement except to point out that under the present clearance procedures not only is the testimony of absent witnesses allowed to stand without the probing questions of the person under attack which often uncover inconsistencies, lapses of recollection,- and bias, but, in addition, even the members of the clearance boards do not see the informants. or know their identities, but normally rely on an investigator’s summary report of what the. informant said without even examining the investigator personally. We must determine against this background, whether the President or Congress has delegated to the Department of Defense the authority to by-pass these traditional and well-recognized safeguards in an industrial security cleárance program which can operate to injure individuals substantially by denying to them the opportunity to follow chosen private professions. Respondents cite two Executive Orders which they believe show presidential delegation. The first, Exec. Order No. 10290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795, was entitled “Prescribing Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards For' The Classification, Transmission, And Handling, By Departments And Agencies of the Executive Branch, Of Official Information Which Requires Safeguarding In The Interest Of The Security Of The United States.” It provided, in relevant part: “Part V — Dissemination of Classified Security Information “29. General, a. No person shall be entitled to knowledge or possession of, or access to, classified security information solely by virtue of his office or position. “b. Classified security information shall not be discussed with or in the presence of unauthorized persons, and the latter shall not be permitted to inspect or have access to such information. “c. The head of each agency shall establish a system for controlling the dissemination of classified security information adequate to the needs of his agency. “30. Limitations on dissemination — a. Within the Executive Branch. The dissemination of classified' security information shall be limited to persons whose official duties require knowledge of such information. Special measures shall be. employed to limit the dissemination of ‘Top Secret’ security information to the absolute minimum. Only that portion of ‘Top Secret’ security information necessary to the proper planning and appropriate action of any organizational unit or individual shall be released to such unit or individual. “b. Outside ■ the Executive Branch. Classified security information shall not be disseminated outside the Executive Branch by any person or agency having access thereto or knowledge thereof except under conditions and through channels authorized by the head of the disseminating agency, even though such person or agency may have been solely or partly responsible for its production.” The second, Exec. Order No. 10501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049, which revoked Exec. Order No. 10290, is entitled “Safeguarding Official Information In The Interests Of The Defense Of The United States” and provides in relevant part: “Sec. 7. Accountability and Dissemination. “ (b) Dissemination Outside the Executive Branch. Classified defense information shall not be disseminated outside the executive branch except under conditions and through channels authorized by the head of the disseminating department or agency, even though the person or agency to which dissemination of such information is proposéd to be made may have been solely or partly responsible for its production.” Clearly, neither of these orders empowers any executive agency to fashion security programs whereby persons are deprived of their present civilian employment and of the opportunity of continued activity in their chosen professions without being accorded the chance to challenge effectively the evidence and testimony upon which an adverse security determination might rest. Turning to the legislative enactments which might be deemed as delegating authority to the Department of Defense to fashion programs under which persons may be seriously restrained in their employment opportunities through a denial of clearance without the safeguards of cross-examination and confrontation, we note the Government’s own assertion, made in its brief, that “[w]ith petitioner’s contention that the Industrial Security Program is not explicitly authorized by statute we may readily agree . . . The first proffered statute is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 171 et seq. That Act created the Department of Defense and gave to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the armed services the authority to administer their departments. Nowhere in the Act, or its amendments, is there found specific authority to create a clearance program similar to the one now in effect. Another Act cited by respondents is the Armed Service Procurement Act of 1947, as amended. It provides in 10 U. S. C. § 2304 that: “(a) Purchases of and contracts, for property or services covered by this chapter shall be made, by formal advertising. However, the head of an agency may negotiate such a purchase or contract, if— “(12) the purchase or contract is for property or services whose procurement he determines should not be publicly disclosed because of their character, ingredients, or components.” It further provides in 10 U. S. C. § 2306: “(a) The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting may not be used. Subject to this limitation and subject to subsections (b)-(e), the head of an agency may, in negotiating contracts under section 2304 of this title, make any kind of contract that he considers will promote the best interests of the United States.” Respondents argue that these statutes, together with 18 U. S. C. § 798, which makes it a crime willfully and knowingly to communicate to unauthorized persons information concerning cryptographic or intelligence activities, and 50 U. S. C. § 783 (b), which makes it a crime for an officer or employee of the United States to communicate classified information to agents of foreign governments or officers and members of “Communist organizations,” reflect a recognition by Congress of .the existence of military secrets and the necessity of keeping those secrets inviolate. Although these statutes make it apparent that Congress recognizes the existence of military secrets, they hardly constitute an authorization to create an elaborate clearance program which embodies procedures traditionally believed to be inadequate to protect affected persons. Lastly, the Government urges that if we refuse to adopt its “inferred” authorization reasoning, nevertheless, congressional ratification is apparent by the continued appropriation of funds to finance aspects of the program fashioned by the Department of Defense. Respondents refer us to Hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 774-781. At those hearings, the Committee was asked to approve the appropriation of funds to finance a program under which reimbursement for lost wages would be made to employees of government contractors who were temporarily denied, but later granted, security clearance. Apparently, such reimbursements had been made prior to that time out of general appropriations. Although a specific appropriation was eventually made for this purpose, it could not conceivably constitute a ratification of the hearing procedures, for the procedures were in no way involved in the special reimbursement program. Respondents’ argument on delegation resolves itself into the following: The President, in general terms, has authorized the Department of Defense to create procedures to restrict the dissemination of classified information and has apparently acquiesced in the elaborate program established by the Secretary of Defense even where application of the program results in restraints on traditional freedoms without the use of long-required procedural protections. Similarly, Congress, although it has not enacted specific legislation relating to clearance procedures to be utilized for industrial workers, has acquiesced in the existing Department of Defense program and has ratified it by specifically appropriating funds to finance one aspect of it. If acquiescence or implied ratification were enough to show delegation of authority to take actions within the area of questionable constitutionality, we might agree with respondents that delegation has been shown here. In many circumstances, where the Government’s freedom to act is clear, and the Congress or the President has provided general standards of action and has acquiesced in administrative interpretation, delegation may be inferred. Thus, even in the absence of specific delegation, •we have no difficulty in finding, as we do, that the Department of Defense has been authorized to fashion and apply an industrial clearance program which affords affected persons the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. But this case does not present that situation. We deal here with substantial restraints on employment opportunities of numerous persons imposed in a manner which is in conflict with our long-accepted notions of fair procedures. Before we are asked to judge whether, in the context of security clearance cases, a person may be deprived of the right to follow his chosen profession without full hearings where accusers may be confronted, it must be made clear that the President or Congress, within their respective constitutional powers, specifically has decided that the imposed procedures are necessary and warranted and has authorized their use. Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178; Scull v. Virginia, 359 U. S. 344. Such decisions cannot be assumed by acquiescence or non-action. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331; Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 301-302. They must be made explicitly.not only to assure that individuals are not deprived of cherished rights under procedures not actually authorized, see Peters v. Hobby, supra, but also because explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful and purposeful consideration by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws. Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by default to administrators who, under our system of government, are not endowed with authority to decide them. Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected by the action the traditional safeguards of due process. See, e. g., The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101; Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S. 167, 172; Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 299-300; American Power Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, 329 U. S. 90, 107-108; Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. S. 146, 156; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49. Cf. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. These cases reflect the Court’s concern that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by implication or without the most explicit action by the Nation’s lawmakers, even in areas where it is possible that the Constitution presents no inhibition. In the instant case, petitioner’s work opportunities have been severely limited on the basis of a fact determination rendered after a hearing which failed to comport with our traditional ideas of fair procedure. The type of hearing was the product of administrative decision not explicitly , authorized by either Congress or the President. Whether those procedures under the circumstances comport with the Constitution we do not decide. Nor do we decide whether the President has inherent authority to create such a program, whether congressional action is necessary, or what the limits on executive or legislative authority may be. We decide only that in the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for proceedings not inconsistent herewith. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Whittaker concur in the judgment on the ground that it has not been shown that either Congress or the President authorized the procedures whereby petitioner’s security clearance was revoked, intimating no viéws as to the validity of those procedures. Petitioner was given a Confidential clearance by the Army on August 9, 1949, a Top Secret clearance by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Military. District of .Washington on November 9, 1949, and a Top Secret clearance by the Air Materiel Command on February 3,1950.' ERCO did classified contract work for the various services. In 1951, in connection with a classified research project for the Navy, it entered into a security agreement in which it undertook “to provide and maintain a system of security controls within its . . . own organization in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Defense Industrial Security Manual . . . .” The Manual, in turn, provided in paragraphs 4 (e) and 6: “The Contractor shall exclude (this does not imply the dismissal or separation of any employee) from any part of its plants, factories, or sites at which work for any military department is being performed, any person or persons whom the Secretary of the military department concerned or his duly authorized representative, in the interest of security, may designate in writing. “No individual shall.be permitted to have access to classified matter unless cleared by the Government or the Contractor, as the case may be, as specified in the following subparagraphs and then he will be given access to siich matter only to the extent of his clearance. . . .” The PSB was created pursuant to an interim agreement dated October 9, 1947, between the Army, Navy, and Air Force and pursuant-to a memorandum of agreement between the Provost Marshal General and- the Air Provost Marshal, dated March 17, 1948. “It was a three-man board, with one representative from each of the military departments .... Its functions were to grant or deny clearance for employment on aeronautical or classified contract work when such consent was required, and to suspend individuals, whose continued employment was considered inimical to the security interests of the United States, from employment on classified work.” Report of the Commission on Government Security, 1957, S. Doc. No. 64, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 239. It established its own. procédures which were approved by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. See “Procedures Governing the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board, dated 19 June 1950.” The IERB was a four-member board which was given jurisdiction to hear and review appeals from decisions of the PSB. Its charter, dated 7 November 1949 and signed by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, contemplated that it would afford hearings to persons denied clearance. And see “Procedures Governing Appeals to the Industrial Employment Review Board, dated 7 November 1949.” The letter read, in part: “That over a period of years, 1943-1947, at or near Washington, D. C., you have closely and sympathetically associated with persons who are reported to be or to have been members of the Communist Party; that during the period 1944-1947 you entertained and were visited at your home by military representatives of the Russian Embassy, Washington, D. C.; that, further, you attended social functions during the period 1944-1947 at the Russian Embassy, Washington, D. C.; and on 7 April 1947 attended the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, Third Annual Dinner, Statler Hotel, Washington, D. C. (Cited as Communist Front organization, Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities).” The Boards were abolished pursuant to a memorandum of March 27, 1953, issued by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to the Chairman of the Munitions Board. It provided in part: “5. The Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force shall establish such number of geographical regions within the United States as seems appropriate to the work-load in each region. There shall then be established within each region an Industrial Personnel Security Board. This board shall consist of two separate and distinct divisions, a Screening Division and an Appeal Division, with' equal representation of the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force on each such division. The Appeal Division shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from the decision of the Screening Division and its decisions shall be determined by a majority vote which shall be final, subject only to reconsideration on its own motion or at the request of the appellant for'good cause shown or at the request of the Secretary of any military department.” The memorandum from the-Secretary of Defense also provided: “6. The Secretaries of the Army, Návy and Air Force, shall within thirty days (30), establish such geographical regions and develop joint uniform standards, criteria, and detailed procedures to implement the ab.ove-described program. • In developing the standards, criteria, and procedures, full consideration shall be given to the rights of individuals, consistent with security requirements. After approval by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the standards, criteria, a.nd procedures shall govern the operations of the Board.” The memorandum provided: “7. All cases pending before the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board and the Industrial Employment Review Board shall be referred for action under this order to the appropriate Industrial Personnel Security Board.” The memorandum further provided: “4. The Criteria Governing Actions by the Industrial Employment Review Board, dated 7 November 1949, as revised 10 November 1950, and approved by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, shall govern security clearances of industrial facilities and industrial personnel by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force until such time as uniform- criteria are established in connection with paragraph 6 of this memorandum.” See note 2, supra. The Chairman of the Board of ERCO, Colonel Henry Berliner, later testified by affidavit as follows: “During the year 1953, and for many -years previous' thereto, I was the principal stockholder of Engineering and Research Corporation, a corporation which had .its principal place of business at River-dale,. Maryland. I was also, the chairman of the board, and the principal executive officer of this corporation. “I'am acquainted with William Lewis Greene. Prior to the month of- April, 1953, Mr. Greene was Vice-President in charge of engineering and General Manager, of Engineering and Research Corporation. He has been employed by this corporation since 1937. His progress in the company had been consistent. He was one of our most valued and valuable employees, and was responsible for much of the work which Engineering and Research Corporation was doing.' In April, 1953, the company received a letter from the Secretary of the Navy advising us. that clearance had been denied to Mr. Greene and advising us that it would be necessary to bar him from access to our plant. In view of his position-with the company, there was no work which he could do in light of this denial-of clearance by the Navy. As a result, it was necessary. for the company to discharge him. There was no. other reason for Mr. Greene’s discharge, and in the absence of the letter referred to, he could have continued in the employment of Engineering and Research Corporation indefinitely.” The President of ERCO wrote to the Secretary of the Navy as follows: . “The Honorable R. B. Anderson “Secretary of the Navy “Washington 25, D. C. “My dear Mr. Secretary: . “Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of April 17, 1953 in which you state that you have reviewed the case history file oh William Lewis Greene and have concluded that his continued access to Navy classified security information is inconsistent with the best interests ’ of National Security. “You request this company to exclude Mr. Greene from our plants, factories or sites and to bar him from information, in the interests of protecting Navy classified projects and classified security information. “In accordance with your request, please be advised that since receipt of your letter this company has excluded Mr. Greene from any part of our plants, factories or sites and barred him access to all classified security information. “For your further information, Mr. Greene tendered his resignation as an officer of this corporation and has left the plant. We shall have no further contact with him until his status is clarified although vve have not yet formally 'accepted his resignation. “Mr. Greene is Vice President of this company in charge of engineering. His knowledge, experience and executive ability have proven of inestimable value in the past. The loss of his services at this time is a serious blow to company operations. Accordingly, we should like the privilege of a personal conference to discuss the matter further. “Furthermore, you state that you are referring the case to the Secretary of Defense recommending that the Industrial Employment Review Board’s decision Of January 29, 1952 be overruled. If it is appropriate, we should like very much to have the privilege of discussing the matter with the Secretary of Defense. “Please accept our thanks for any official courtesies which you are in a position to extend. “Respectfully yours, “Engineering and Research Corporation “By /s/ L. A. Wells’? On May 4, 1953, pursuant to the memorandum of the Secretary of Defense dated March' 27, 1953, see note 6, supra, the Secretaries of the military departments established regional Industrial Personnel Security Boards governed by generalized standards, criteria, and procedures. The specifications were contained in a letter to- petitioner’s counsel dated April 9, 1954, which was sent nineteen days before the hearing. That letter provided in part: “Security considerations permit disclosure of the following information that has thus far resulted in the denial of clearance to Mr. Greene : “1. During 1942 SUBJECT, was a member of the Washington Book Shop Association, an organization that has been officially cited by the Attorney General of the United States as Communist and subversive. “2. SUBJECT’S first wife, Jean Hinton Greene, to whom he was married from approximately December 1942 to approximately December 1947, was an ardent Communist during the greater part of the period of the marriage. “3. During the period of SUBJECT’S first marriage he and his wife had many Communist publications in their home, including the ‘Daily Worker’; ‘Soviet Russia Today’; ‘In Fact’; and Karl Marx’s ‘Das Kapital.’ “4. Many apparently' reliable witnesses have testified that during the period of SUBJECT’S first marriage his personal political sympathies were in general accord with those of his' wife, in that he was sympathetic towards Russia; followed the Communist Party ‘line’; presented ‘fellow-traveller’ arguments; was apparently influenced by ‘Jean’s wild theories’; etc. [Nothing in the record establishes that any witness “testified” at any hearing on these subjects and everything in the record indicates that they could have done no more than make such statements to investigative officers.] “5. In about 1946 'SUBJECT invested approximately $1000. in the Metropolitan Broadcasting Corporation and later became a director of its Radio Station WQQW. It has been reliably reported that many .of the stockholders of the Corporation were Communists or pro-Communists .and that the news coverage and radio programs of Station WQQW frequently paralleled the Communist Party ‘line.’ [This station is, now Station WGMS, Washington’s “Good Music Station.” Petitioner stated that he invested money in the station because he liked classical music and he considered it a good investment.] “6. On. 7 April 1947 SUBJECT and his wife Jean attended the Third Annual Dinner of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, an organization that has' been officially cited as a Communist front. [This dinner was also attended by many Washington notables, including several members of this Court.] “7. Beginning about 1942 and continuing for several' years thereafter SUBJECT maintainéd sympathetic associations with various officials of the Soviet Embassy, including Major Constantine I. Ovchinnikov, Col. Pavél F. Berezin, Major Pavel N. Asséev, Col. Ilia M. Saraev, and- Col. Anatoly Y. Golkovsky. [High-level executives of ERCO, as above noted, testified that these associations were carried on to secure business for the corporation.] “8. During 1946 and 1947 SUBJECT had frequent sympathetic association with Dr. Vaso Syrzentic of the Yugoslav Embassy. Dr. Syrzentic has been identified as ah agent of the International Communist Party. [Petitioner testified that he met this individual once in connection with a business transaction.] “9. During 1943 SUBJECT was in contact with Col. Alexander Hess of the Czechoslovak Embassy, who has been identified as an agent of the Red Army Intelligence. [This charge was apparently abandoned as no adverse finding was based on it.] “10. During 1946 and 1947 SUBJECT maintained close and sympathetic association with Mr. and Mrs. Nathan Gregory Silvermaster and William Ludwig Ullman. Silvermaster and Ullman have been identified as members of a Soviet Espionage Apparatus active in Washington, • D. C., during the 1940’s. [Silvermaster was a top ■ economist in the Department of Agriculture and the direct superior of petitioner’s ex-wifé who then worked in that department.] “11. SUBJECT had a series of contacts with Laughlin Currie during the period 1945-48. Currie has also been identified as a member of the Silvermaster espionage group. [Petitioner met Currie in the executive offices'of the President at a time when Currie was a Special Assistant to the President.] “12. During the period between 1942 and 1947 SUBJECT maintained frequent and close associations with many Communist Party members, including R-S-, and his wife E-, BW- and his wife M-, M- P-, M-- L. D-, R- N-and I- S-. [These persons were apparently friends of petitioner’s ex-wife.] “13. During substantially the same period SUBJECT maintained close association with many persons who have been identified as strong supporters of the Communist conspiracy, including S-J. R-, S-1^- — , O-L--, E-F — -and VG-■ .[These persons were apparently friends of his ex-wife.] “It is noted, that all of the above information has previously been discussed with Mr. Greene at his hearing before the Industrial Employment Review Board, and that a copy of the transcript of that hearing was made available to you in August of last year,” Petitioner stated by affidavit in support of his motion for sum'mary judgment that “[a]fter my discharge from Engineering and Research Corporation, I made every possible effort to secure other employment at a salary commensurate, with my experience, but I was unable to do so because all of my work history had been, in the field of aeronautics. In spite.of everything I could do, the best position I could obtain was a draftsman-engineer in an architectural firm. I was obliged to go to work for a salary of $4,400 per year, because the basis upon which a higher salary would be justified was experience in a field which was not particularly useful in the type of work which I was able to obtain. As a result of the actions of the defendants complained of, the field of aeronautical engineering was closed to me.” For instance, the following questions were asked in connection with the so-called “left wing” radio station in which petitioner owned stock, petitioner’s acquaintanceship .with alleged subversives, and petitioner’s business relationships- with foreign governments: “Q. We have information here, Mr. Greene, that one particular individual specifically called your attention to the fact that [Congressman] Rankin and [Senator] Bilbo had characterized this station as a Communist station, run by and for Communists ? “Q. We have information here, this has come from an informant characterized to be of known reliability in which -he refers to conversations he had with you about January of 1947 in which you told him that you had visited M — :-P-the previous evening and hq,d become rather chummy with him, do you wish to comment on that ? “Q. Concerning your relationship with S-L-, we have information here from an informant characterized as being one of knowii reliability, in which S-L-told this informant that shortly following her Western High School speech in 1947, she remarked to you that probably many people will learn things about Russia and she quoted you as replying, ‘Well I hope they learn something good, at least.’ Do you wish to say anything about that? “Q. Information we have, Mr. Greene, indicates first of all, that you didn’t meet these Russians in 1942 but you met them in early 1943. “Q. Now, we have further information, Mr. Greene, indicating that the initiative of'these contacts came from Col. Berezin. “Q. We have information here indicating that as a matter of fact, sir, we do know that the meeting between you and Col. Berezin was arranged through Hess and Hochfeld as you indicated. We also have information from a' source identified as being one of known reliability referring to á conversation that this source had with Hess in April 1943 in which Hess stated that he had been talking to one Harry, not further identified but presumed to be Hochfeld and that Harry said to Hess that he had a young engineer who is a good friend of ours and of our cause and Harry wanted Hess to set up a meeting between Berezin and yourself. Can you give us some reason why Harry might have referred to you as a good friend of our cause? “Q. .Of course, we can make certain assumptions as to why Col. Berezin might have wanted to meet you back in December 1942 when we look at a statement like this indicating that you were considered a good friend of their’s and of their cause. Of course, some weight is lent to this assumption by the fact that your wife was strongly pro-Communist and after she left you she became very active in Communist affairs, in case you don’t know that, I’ll pass it on to you.” And the following questions were asked of various witnesses presented by petitioner evidently because the. Board had confidential information that petitioner’s ex-wife was “eccentric.” “Q. Now you were in Bill’s home, that red brick house that you’re talking about. “Q. Was there anything unusual about the house itself, the interior of it, was-it dirty? “Q. Were there any beds in their house- which had no mattresses on them? “Q. Did you ever hear it said that Jean slept on a board in order to keep the common touch? “Q. When you were in Jean’s home did she dress conventionally when she received her guests? “Q. Let me ask you this, conventionally when somebody would invite you for dinner at their home would you expect them, if they were a woman to wear a dress and shoes and stockings and the usual clothing of the evening or would you expect them to appear in overalls?” The notification stated: “Security considerations prohibit the furnishing to an- appellant of a detailed statement of the findings on appeal inasmuch as the entire file is considered and comments made by the Appeal Division panel on security matters which could not for security reasons form the basis of a statement of reasons.” This Board was created by the Secretary of Defense on February 2, 1955, and given power to review adverse decisions rendered by the regional boards. This was the first time that petitioner was charged or found to be untrustworthy. The complaint was filed before the establishment of the Industrial Personnel Security Review Board. See note 18, supra. The Court of Appeals stated: “We have no doubt that Greene has in fact been injured. He was forced out of a-job that paid him $18,000 per year. He has since been reduced, so far as this record shows, to working as an architectural draftsman at a salary of some $4,400 per year. Further, as an aeronautical engineer of considerable experience he says (without real contradiction) that he is effectively barred from pursuit of many aspects of his profession, given the current dependence of most phases of the aircraft industry on Defense Department contracts not only for production .but for research and development work as well. ... Nor do we doubt that, following the ■ Government’s action, some stigma, in- greater or less degree, has attached to Greene.” 103 U. S. App. D. C. 87, 95-96, 254 F. 2d 944, 952-953. We note our agreement with respondents’ concession that petitioner has standing to bring this suit and to assert whatever rights he may have. Respondents’ actions, directed at petitioner as an individual, caused substantial injuries, Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 152 (concurring opinion), and, were they the subject of a suit between private persons, they could be attacked as an invasion of a legally protected right to be free from arbitrary interference with private contractual relationships. Moreover, petitioner has the right to be free from unauthorized actions of government officials which substantially impair his property interests. Cf. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605. The Industrial Personnel Security Review Regulation, 20 Fed. Reg. 1553, recommended by the Secretaries of the. Army, Navy, and Air Force, and approved by the Secretary of Defense, provided: “§ 67.1-4. Release of information. All personnel in the Program will comply with applicable directives pertaining to the safeguarding of classified information and the handling of investigative reports. No classified information, nor any information which might compromise investigative sources or methods or the identity of confidential informants, will be disclosed to any contractor or contractor employee, or to his lawyer or representatives, or to any other person not authorized to have access to such information. In addition, in a case involving a contractor employee the contractor concerned will be advised only of the final determination in the- case to grant, deny, or revoke clearance,' and of any decision to suspend a clearance granted previously pending final determination in the case. The contractor will not be given a copy of the Statement of Reasons issued to the contractor employee except at the written request of the contractor employee concerned.” See “Charter of the Industrial Employment Review Board, dated 7 November 1949,” note 4, supra; “Charter of the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board, dated 19 June 1950,” note 3, supra; Memorandum issued by the Secretary of Defen'se to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to the Chairman of the Munitions Board, dated March 27, 1953, notes 6, 7, 8 and 9, supra; "The Industrial Personnel"and Facility Security Clearance Program,” effective May 4, 1953, note 13, supra; “The Industrial Personnel Security Review Regulation,” 20 Fed. Reg. 1553, 32 CFR Part 67 (1958 Supp.); Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information, 20 Fed. Reg. 6213, 21 Fed. Reg. 2814. When Festus more than two thousand years ago reported to King Agrippa that Felix had given him a prisoner named Paul and that the priests and elders désired to have judgment against Paul, Festus ds reported to have stated: “It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to dié, before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him.” Acts 25:16. Professor Wigmore explains in some detail the emergence of the principle in Anglo-American law that' confrontation and cross-examination are. basic ingredients in a' fair trial. 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1364. And see O’Brian, National Security and Individual Freedom, 62. For instance, in the instant case, to establish the charge that petitioner’s “personal political sympathies were in general accord with those of his wife,” the EIPSB apparently relied on statements made to investigators by “old”' friends of petitioner. Thus, the following questions were asked petitioner: “Q. I’d-like to read to you a quotation from the testimony of a person who had identified himself as having been a very close friend of yours over a long period of years. He states that you, as saying to him one day that you were reading a great deal of pro-Communist books and other literature. Do you-wish to comment on that? “Q. Incidentally this man’s testimony concerning you was entirely favorable in one respect. He stated that he didn’t-think you were, a Communist but he did state that he thought that you had been influenced by Jean’s viewpoints and that he had received impressions definite that it was your wife who was parlor pink and that you were going along with her. “Q. This same friend testified that he believed that you were influenced by Jean’s wild theories and he decided at that time-to have no further association with you and your wife .... “Q. . . . Here’s another man who indicates that he has been a friend of yours over a long period of time who' states that he was a visitor in your home on occasions 'and that regarding some of these .visits, he met .some of your wife’s friends, these people we’ve' been talking about in the past and that one occasion, he mentioned in particular, the topic of, conversation was China and that you set forth in the conversation and there' seemed general agreement among all of you .at that time that the revolutionists in China were not actually Communists but were agrarian reformists which as you probably know is part of the Communist propaganda line of several years back. ... “Q. Mr. Greene we’ve got some information here indicating that during the period of your marriage to your first wife that she was constantly finding fault with the American institutions, opposing the American Capitalistic System, and never had anything but praise for the Russians and everything they attempted to do. Did you find that to be the case.? “Q. We have a statement here from another witness with respect to yourself in which he states that you felt that the modern people in this country were too rich and powerful, that the capitalistic system of this country was to the disadvantage of the working people and that the working people were exploited by the rich. “Q. I have a statement from another one of your associates to the effect that you would at times, present to him a fellow-traveler argume'nt. This man indicated to us that he' was pretty well versed on the Communist Party line himself at that time and found you parroting arguments which he assumed that you got from your wife. Do you wish to comment on that?” Confrontation of the persons who allegedly made these statements would have been of prime importance to petitioner, for cross-examination might have shown that these “witnesses” were hazy in recollecting long-past incidents, or were irrationally motivated by bias or vindictiveness. This is made clear by the following testimony of Jerome D. Fen'ton, Director, Industrial Personnel Security, Department of Defense, before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, given on November 23/1955: • “[Q.] . . . What other type of evidence is received by the hearing boards besides the evidence of persons under oath? “[A.] The reports from the various governmental investigative agencies. “[Q.] And the reports .of the various governmental investigations might, themselves, be hearsay, might they not? “[A.] I think that is a fair statement. “[Q.] In fact, they might be, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District [sic] said with respect to the port security program, second, or third, or fourth-hand hearsay, might they not? [This question refers to the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Parker v. Lester, 227 F. 2d 708.] “[A.] The answer is ‘Yes.’ ‘.‘[Q.] Can you tell me what type of help is given t.o the hearing board in these reports with respect to the matter of evaluation? What is the nature of the evaluation that is used for this purpose? “[A.] Well, each board has a person who is called a security adviser, who is an expert in that particular area. Each screening board has one, and those individuals are well-trained people who know how to evaluate reports and evaluate information. They know how to separate the wheat from the chaff, and they assist these boards. “ [Q-] This expert, then, has to take-the report and make his own determination in assisting- the board as to the reliability of a witness that he has never seen, or perhaps hasn’t even had the opportunity, to see the person who interviewed the witness? “[A.] Well, he has nothing to do with the witness; no. ' “[Q.] What is that? “[A.] He has not interviewed the witness; no.” Hearings before Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate Judiciary Committee, on S. Res. 94, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-624. And cf. Richardson, The Federal Employee Loyalty Program, 51 Col. L. Rev. .546, and Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. Res. 231, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 327-339 (statement.-of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). No better, for this purpose, is Exec. Order No. 8972, 6 Fed. Reg. 6420, filed on December 12, 1941, which empowered the Secretary of War “to establish and-maintain military guards and patrols, and to take other appropriate measures, to protect from injury or destruction national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities . . . .” Even if that order is relevant authority for programs created after World War II, which is doubtful, it provides no specific authorization for non-confrontation hearings. As far as appears, the most substantial official notice which Congress had of the non-confrontation procedures used in screening industrial workers was embodied in S. Doc. No. 40, 84th ,Cong., 1st Sess., a 354-page compilation of laws, executive orders, and regulations relating to internal security, printed at the request of a single Senator, which reproduced, among other docun/ents and without specific comment, the Industrial Personnel Security Review Regulation. At the hearings to which we have been referred, the following passage from the testimony of the Department of Defense representative constitutes the only description made to the Committee concerning the ^procedures used in the Department’s clearance program: “In connection with the procurement programs of the Department of Defense, regulations have been prescribed to provide uniform standards and criteria for determining the eligibility of contractors, contractor employees, and certain other individuals, to have access to classified defense information. The regulations also establish administrative procedures governing the disposition of cases in which a military department, or activity thereof, has made a recommendation or determination (a) with respect to the denial, suspension, • or revocation of a clearance of a'contractor or contractor employee; and (b) with respect to the denial or withdrawal of authorization for access by certain other individuals. “While the Department of Defense assumes, unless information to the contrary is received, that all contractors and contractor employees are loyal to the Government of the United States, the responsibilities of the Military Establishment necessitate vigorous application of policies designed to minimize the security risk incident to the use of classified information by such contractors and contractor employees. Accordingly, measures are taken to provide continuing assurance that no contractor or contractor employee will be granted a clearance if available information indicates that the granting of such clearance may not be clearly consistent with the interests of national security. At the same time, every possible safeguard within the limitations of national security will be provided 'to ensure that no contractor or contractor employee will be denied a clearance without an opportunity for a fair hearing.” Id,., at 774. This description hardly. constitutes even notice to the Committee of the nature of the hearings afforded. Thus the appropriation could not “plainly show a purpose to bestow the precise authority which is claimed.” Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 303, n. 24. Likewise, appropriations of specific amounts for the Munitions Board or its successors, agencies with multifold objectives, without any mention of the uses to which the funds could be put, cannot be considered as a ratification of the use of the specified hearing procedures. It 'is estimated that approximately three million persons having access to classified information are covered by the industrial security program. Brown,.-Loyalty and Security (1958), 179-180; Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Special Committee on the Federal'Loyalty-Security Program (1956), 64. My brother Harlan very kindly credits me with “colorful characterization” in stating this as the issue. While I take great pride in authorship, I must say that in.this instance I merely agreed with the statement of the issue by the Solicitor General and his cO-counsel in five different places in the Brief for the United States. See pp. 2, 17, 19, 29, 59.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES et al. v. FLORIDA NURSING HOME ASSOCIATION et al. No. 80-532. Decided March 2, 1981 Per Curiam. Petitioners, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and its Secretary, seek review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordering them to make payments to various nursing homes. These payments represent the amount that Florida was found to have underpaid these nursing homes in the course of its Medicaid reimbursements from July 1, 1976, to October 18, 1977. Because we conclude that the court below misapplied the prevailing standard for finding a waiver of the State’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, we grant a writ of certiorari and reverse. I In 1972, Congress amended the Medicaid Program to provide that every “skilled nursing facility and intermediate care facility” must be reimbursed by participating States on a “cost related basis.” 86 Stat. 1426, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (13)(E). This amendment was to take effect on July 1, 1976, ibid., and had the effect of altering some reimbursement arrangements based on “flat rates” established by the States. Regulations implementing this change were not promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) until 1976. As a result, the regulations provided that HEW would not enforce the new “cost related” reimbursement requirement until January 1, 1978. 46 CFR §250.30 (a)(3) (iv) (1976). In March 1977, respondents, an association of Florida nursing homes and various individual nursing homes in southern Florida, brought suit in federal court against the Secretary of HEW and petitioners. They argued that the delay in enforcement created by the implementing regulations was inconsistent with the statutory directive that cost-related reimbursements begin on July 1, 1976. In addition to prospective relief, they sought retroactive relief in the form of payments by the State of the difference between the reimbursement they had received since July 1, 1976, and the amounts they would have received under a cost-related system. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held the regulations invalid, relying on its previous decision in Golden Isles Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Califano, 442 F. Supp. 201 (1977), aff’d, 616 F. 2d 1355 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Golden Isles Con valescent Center, Inc., 449 U. S. 872 (1980). These two cases were consolidated for consideration of the availability of retroactive relief, and the District Court held that such relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling that the regulations were invalid, but reversed the District Court’s determination that retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 616 F. 2d 1355 (1980). The court acknowledged that retroactive monetary relief against a State in federal court is forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment “if not consented to by the state.” Id., at 1362. It found the requisite consent, however, based on two acts of the State. First, Florida law provides that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is a “body corporate” with the capacity to “sue and be sued,” Fla. Stat. § 402.34 (1979). 616 F. 2d, at 1363. In addition to this general waiver of sovereign immunity, the court found a specific waiver of the Eleventh Amendment’s immunity from suit in federal court in an agreement under the Medicaid Program in which the Department agreed to “recognize and abide by all State and Federal Laws, Regulations, and Guidelines applicable to participation in and administration of, the Title XIX Medicaid Program.” Ibid. “By contracting with appellants to be bound by all federal laws applicable to the Medicaid program, the state has expressly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consented to suit in federal court regarding any action by providers alleging a breach of these laws.” Ibid. II The analysis in this case is controlled by our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). There we applied the Eleventh Amendment to retroactive grants of welfare benefits and discussed the proper standard for a waiver of this immunity by a State. On the latter issue we stated that “we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ ” Id., at 673, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909). We added that the “mere fact that a State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts.” 415 U. S., at 673. The holding below, finding a waiver in this case, cannot be reconciled with the principles set out in Edelman. As the Court of Appeals recognized, the State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services “does not constitute a waiver by the state of its constitutional immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court.” 616 F. 2d, at 1363. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 441 (1900). And the fact that the Department agreed explicitly to obey federal law in administering the program can hardly be deemed an express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. This agreement merely stated a customary condition for any participation in a federal program by the State, and Edelman already established that neither such participation in itself, nor a concomitant agreement to obey federal law, is sufficient to waive the protection of the Eleventh Amendment. 415 U. S., at 673-674. We therefore reverse the decision below. It is so ordered. Justice Marshall dissents and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, substantially for the reasons stated in his dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 688 (1974). Justice Blackmun also dissents and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals substantially for the reasons stated in Justice Marshall’s dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 688 (1974). In a commentary accompanying the new regulations, the Secretary noted that no States would be able to accumulate needed data in time to meet the statutory deadline of July 1, 1976. For this reason, cost-related reimbursement was not required under the regulations until January 1, 1978, but the States were “encouraged to meet each requirement of the regulations as soon as possible.” 41 Fed. Reg. 27305 (1976). The Golden Isles case and this case remained consolidated on appeal. The decision below, however, produced two separate petitions for cer-tiorari. The first, Taylor v. Golden Isles Convalescent Center, Inc., cert. denied, 449 U. S. 872 (1980), involved jurisdictional and venue issues. The present petition relates only to the availability of retroactive relief. Petitioners argue that under Florida law a waiver of immunity can only be accomplished by a state statute. See Fla. Const., Art. 10, § 13. No such waiver is present here. In addition, it is worth noting that in October 1976 Congress repealed a provision requiring States participating in Medicaid to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pub. L. 94-552, 90 Stat. 2540. This repeal was made retroactive to January 1, 1976.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHWEIKER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al. v. GRAY PANTHERS No. 80-756. Argued April 29, 1981 Decided June 25, 1981 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 50. George W. Jones argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, and Robert P. Jaye. Gill Deford argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Neal S. Dudovits and Toby S. Edelman. Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General, and William E. Daily and Janis L. Summers, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Indiana as amicus curiae urging reversal. Peter L. Cassady, William E. Marple, and Thomas W. Jordan, Jr., filed a brief for John H. Foard et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The Medicaid program provides federal funds to States that pay for medical treatment for the poor. An individual’s entitlement to Medicaid benefits depends on the financial resources “available” to him. Some States determine eligibility by assuming — “deeming”—that a portion of the spouse’s income is “available” to the applicant. “Deeming” thus has the effect of reducing both the number of eligible individuals and the amount of assistance paid to those who qualify. The question in this case is whether the federal regulations that permit States to “deem” income in this manner are arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. I The Medicaid program, established in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Act), 79 Stat. 343, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), “provid[es] federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 301 (1980). Each participating State develops a plan containing “reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (17). An individual is entitled to Medicaid if he fulfills the criteria established by the State in which he lives. State Medicaid plans must comply with requirements imposed both by the Act itself and by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). See § 1396a (1976 ed. and Supp. III). A As originally enacted, Medicaid required participating States to provide medical assistance to “categorically needy” individuals who received cash payments under one of four welfare programs established elsewhere in the Act. See § 1396a (a) (10) (1970 ed.). The categorically needy were persons whom Congress considered especially deserving of public assistance because of family circumstances, age, or disability. States, if they wished, were permitted to offer assistance also to the “medically needy”- — persons lacking the ability to pay for medical expenses, but with incomes too large to qualify for categorical assistance. In either case, the Act required the States to base assessments of financial need only on “such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient.” § 1396a (a) (17) (B) (emphasis added). Specifically, eligibility decisions could “not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or recipient of assistance . .. unless such applicant or recipient is such individual’s spouse” or minor, blind, or disabled child. § 1396a (a) (17) (D). Believing it reasonable to expect an applicant’s spouse to help pay medical expenses, some States adopted plans that considered the spouse’s income in determining Medicaid eligibility and benefits. These States calculated an amount considered necessary to pay the basic living expenses of the spouse and “deemed” any of the spouse’s remaining income to be “available” to the applicant, even where the applicant was institutionalized and thus no longer living with the spouse. B In 1972, Congress replaced three of the four categorical assistance programs with a new program called Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI), 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq., Pub. L. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1465. Under SSI, the Federal Government displaced the States by assuming responsibility for both funding payments and setting standards of need. In some States the number of individuals eligible for SSI assistance was significantly larger than the number eligible under the earlier, state-run categorical need programs. The expansion of general welfare accomplished by SSI portended increased Medicaid obligations for some States because Congress retained the requirement that all recipients of categorical welfare assistance — now SSI — were entitled to Medicaid. Congress feared that these States would withdraw from the cooperative Medicaid program rather than expand their Medicaid coverage in a manner commensurate with the expansion of categorical assistance. “[I]n order not to impose a substantial fiscal burden on these States” or discourage them from participating, see S. Rep. No. 93-553, p. 56 (1973), Congress offered what has become known as the “§ 209 (b) option.” Under it, States could elect to provide Medicaid assistance only to those individuals who would have been eligible under the state Medicaid plan in effect on January 1, 1972. States thus became either “SSI States” or “§ 209 (b) States” depending on the coverage that they offered. The Secretary promulgated regulations governing the administration of Medicaid benefits in both SSI States and § 209 (b) States. The regulations described the circumstances in which the income of one spouse may be “deemed” available to the other. In SSI States, “deeming” is conducted in the following manner: When the applicant and his spouse live in the same household, the spouse’s income and resources always are considered in determining eligibility, “whether or not they are actually contributed.” 42 CFR § 435.723 (b) (1980). When the applicant and spouse cease to share the same household, the spouse’s income is disregarded the next month, § 435.723 (d), unless both are eligible for assistance. In the latter case, the income of both is considered for six months after their separation. § 435.723 (c). Greater “deeming” is authorized in § 209 (b) States. The regulations require such States to “deem” income at least to the extent required in SSI States. § 435.734. And, if they choose, § 209 (b) States may “deem” to the full extent that they did before 1972. Ibid. II Respondent, an organization dedicated to helping the Nation’s elderly, filed this suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia attacking some of the Secretary’s regulations applicable in § 209 (b) States. Respondent argued that “deeming” impermissibly employs an “arbitrary formula” to impute a spouse’s income to an institutionalized Medicaid applicant. According to respondent, “deeming” is inconsistent with § 1902 (a) (17) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (17), which provides that only income “available” to the applicant may be considered in establishing entitlement to and the amount of Medicaid benefits. In respondent’s view, before a State may take into account the income of a spouse in calculating the benefits of any institutionalized applicant, the State must make a factual determination that the spouse’s income actually is contributed to that applicant. The District Court agreed with respondent and declared the regulations invalid. Gray Panthers v. Secretary, Dept. of HEW, 461 F. Supp. 319 (1978). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but under a different theory. Gray Panthers v. Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, 203 U. S. App. D. C. 146, 629 F. 2d 180 (1980). Citing this Court’s decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971), the court held that the regulations were invalid because the Secretary, in authorizing “deeming” of income between nonco-habiting spouses, had failed to “tak[e] . . . into account” two “relevant factors.” 203 U. S. App. D. C., at 149-150, 629 F. 2d, at 183-184. First, where spouses are separated they maintain two households rather than one. For those already put to this additional expense, it is unfair to continue to treat the couple as a “single economic unit” jointly responsible for the medical expenses of each. Id., at 151, 629 F. 2d, at 185. Second, the requirement of support carries with it the potential to interject “disruptive forces” into people’s lives. Id., at 152, 629 F. 2d, at 186. The noninstitutionalized spouse is “faced with the 'choice’ of reducing his or her standard of living to a point apparently set near the poverty line, or being responsible for the eviction of his or her spouse from the institution.” Ibid. One aspect of this “disruption,” according to the court, was the fact that the “deeming” requirement creates an incentive for couples to divorce. Id., at 152, n. 14, 629 F. 2d, at 186, n. 14. Because the court believed that the Secretary had not adequately considered these effects of “deeming,” it affirmed the District Court’s order invalidating the regulations and remanded to the Secretary for reconsideration. We granted certiorari sub nom. Harris v. Gray Panthers, 449 U. S. 1123 (1981), to resolve disagreement among the Courts of Appeals over the validity of “deeming” income in determining Medicaid benefits. III Congress explicitly delegated to the Secretary broad authority to promulgate regulations defining eligibility requirements for Medicaid. We find that the regulations at issue in this case are consistent with the statutory scheme and also are reasonable exercises of the delegated power. The Court of Appeals therefore was not justified in invalidating them, and we reverse. A The Social Security Act is among the most intricate ever drafted by Congress. Its Byzantine construction, as Judge Friendly has observed, makes the Act “almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.” Friedman v. Berger, 547 F. 2d 724, 727, n. 7 (CA2 1976), cert, denied, 430 U. S. 984 (1977). Perhaps appreciating the complexity of what it had wrought, Congress conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad authority to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of the Act. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 (1977). Of special relevance in the present case is the delegation of authority in § 1902 (a) (17) (B) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a)(17)(B), one of the provisions setting requirements for state Medicaid plans. Participating States must grant benefits to eligible persons “taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant” (emphasis added). In view of this explicit delegation of substantive authority, the Secretary’s definition of the term “available” is “entitled to more than mere deference or weight,” Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S., at 426. Rather, the Secretary’s definition is entitled to “legislative effect” because, “[i]n a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term.” Id., at 425. Although we do not abdicate review in these circumstances, our task is the limited one of ensuring that the Secretary did not “exeee[d] his statutory authority” and that the regulation is not arbitrary or capricious. Id., at 426. B We do not think that the regulations at issue, insofar as they authorize some “deeming” of income between spouses, exceed the authority conferred on the Secretary by Congress. Section 1902 (a)(17)(D) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (17) (D), enacted in 1965, provides that, in calculating benefits, state Medicaid plans must not “take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient is such individual’s spouse or such individual’s child who is under age 21 or [in certain circumstances] is blind or disabled . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It thus is apparent that, from the beginning of the Medicaid program, Congress authorized States to presume spousal support. Norman v. St. Clair, 610 F. 2d 1228, 1236 (CA5 1980), cert, pending sub nom. Schweiker v. Norman, No. 80-498. The legislative history of this provision is fully consistent with its language. The Senate and House Reports accompanying the 1965 amendments used virtually identical language in endorsing the concept of “deeming” between spouses. The Senate Report states in pertinent part: “The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to support each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their minor children .... Such requirements for support may reasonably include the payment by such relative, if able, for medical care. Beyond such degree of relationship, however, requirements imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationships among members of the family group. Thus, States may not include in their plans provisions for requiring contributions from relatives other than a spouse or the parent of a minor child . . . .” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 78 (1965) (emphasis added). Accord, H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 68 (1965). Senator Long, who headed the Senate’s conference delegation, summarized the effect of subsection (17) as follows: “No income can be imputed to an individual unless actually available; and the financial responsibility of an individual for an applicant may be taken into account only if the applicant is the individual’s spouse . . . .” Ill Cong. Rec. 18350 (1965). This confirms our view that “Congress intended that income deemed from a spouse” could “be a part of the 'available’ income which the state may consider in determining eligibility.” Norman v. St. Clair, supra, at 1237. If “deeming” were not permissible, subsection (17) (D) would be superfluous. Payments actually received by a Medicaid applicant — whether from a spouse or a more distant relative — are taken into account automatically. Thus, if there is to be content to subsection (17)(D)’s distinction between the responsibility of a spouse and that of a more distant relative, the subsection must envision that States can “deem” the income of the former but not the latter. See 610 F. 2d., at 1237. Respondent is unable to offer a persuasive alternative explanation of subsection (17) (D). It suggests that Congress included the subsection simply to permit States to enforce their “relative responsibility laws” against a noncontributing spouse. In other words, respondent believes that Congress intended to prohibit States from automatically taking into account a spouse’s income in computing benefits, but simultaneously to authorize States to sue any spouse who failed to contribute income to a Medicaid applicant. We find this argument unpersuasive. It is not “an answer to say that the state can take action against the spouse to recover that which the spouse was legally obligated to pay. [It is] unrealistic to think that the state will engage in a multiplicity of continuing individual lawsuits to recover the money that it should not have had to pay out in the first place. [Because States cannot practically do so, there would be] an open invitation for the spouse to decide that he or she does not wish to make the excess payment.” Brown v. Stanton, 617 F. 2d 1224, 1234 (CA7 1980) (Pell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), cert, pending, No. 79-1690. Nothing in the 1972 amendments suggests that Congress intended to terminate the practice of “deeming” already contained in many state plans; rather, Congress appears to have ratified this practice implicitly. As noted above, the 1972 SSI program consolidated and set national standards for three of the four categorical grant programs. Traditionally, all recipients of categorical aid were entitled to Medicaid. Congress, however, did not want to force additional Medicaid obligations on States. It therefore enacted § 209 (b) to ensure that States that do not wish to do so would not have to enlarge Medicaid eligibility to SSI levels. States using the § 209 (b) option thus were told they could retain virtually all of the Medicaid eligibility limitations — including “deeming” — that were allowed under the original Act. C Respondent nevertheless insists that the Secretary’s regulation is inconsistent with provisions of the statute and also contrary to statements in the legislative history. The Act requires Medicaid determinations to be made only on the basis of the income “available to the applicant.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a)(17)(B) (emphasis added). According to respondent, the use of that term demonstrates that Medicaid entitlements must be determined on the basis of income “actually in the hands ... of the institutionalized spouse,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 30, not imputed on the basis of an “arbitrary formula.” Respondent acknowledges the duty of spousal support as a general matter, id., at 26-27, but argues that the Act nevertheless requires an individualized determination of availability in each case. We take a different view. It is clear beyond doubt that Congress was wary of imputing the income of others to a Medicaid applicant. Yet, as we noted above, Congress treated spouses differently from most other relatives by explicitly authorizing state plans to “take into account the financial responsibility” of the spouse. 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (17) (D). Congress thus demonstrated that “deeming” is not antithetical to the general statutory requirement that Medicaid eligibility be based solely on resources “available” to the applicant. “Available” resources are different from those in hand. We think that the requirement of availability refers to resources left to a couple after the spouse has deducted a sum on which to live. It does not, as respondent argues, permit the State only to consider the resources actually paid by the spouse to the applicant. See Herweg v. Ray, 619 F. 2d 1265, 1272 (CA8 1980) (en banc) (opinion of Ross, J.) (aff’g by an equally divided court 481 F. Supp. 914 (SD Iowa 1978)), cert, pending, No. 80-60. Sound principles of administration confirm our view that Congress authorized “deeming” of income between spouses. The administration of public assistance based on the use of a formula is not inherently arbitrary. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 781, 782, 784 (1975). There are limited resources to spend on welfare. To require individual determinations of need would mandate costly factfinding procedures that would dissipate resources that could have been spent on the needy. Id., at 784. Sometimes, of course, Congress has required individualized findings of fact. In this case, however, the Act and legislative history make clear that Congress approved some “deeming” of income between individuals and their spouses, at least where States had enacted rules to this effect before 1972. IV We are not without sympathy for those with minimal resources for medical care. But our “sympathy is an insufficient basis for approving a recovery” based on a theory inconsistent with law. Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U. S. 268, 284 (1980). This suit is a direct attack on regulations authorizing the concept of “deeming” in the abstract. Hardships resulting from provisions in particular state plans that set aside inadequate sums for the contributing spouse, see n. 19, supra, are not at issue here. We hold that the Secretary properly exercised the authority delegated by Congress in promulgating regulations permitting “deeming” of income between spouses in § 209 (b) States. Cf. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416 (1977). Accordingly, we reverse the decision under review and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The categorically needy were those entitled to assistance under four programs: Old Age Assistance, 42 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. (1970 ed.); Aid to Families with Dependent Children, §601 et seq.; Aid to the Blind, § 1201 et seq.; and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, § 1351 et seq. See also 42 U. S. C. §§ 1381-1385 (1970 ed.). The Secretary approved these state plans. Thus, of the four state-administered categorical programs, only Aid to Families with Dependent Children survived the enactment of SSI. Section 209 (b) of the 1972 amendments, as amended, and as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (f), provides, in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter ... no State not eligible to participate in the State plan program established under sub-chapter XVI of this chapter shall be required to provide medical assistance to any aged, blind, or disabled individual (within the meaning of sub-chapter XVI of this chapter) for any month unless such State would be (or would have been) required to provide medical assistance to such individual for such month had its plan for medical assistance approved under this subchapter and in effect on January 1, 1972, been in effect in such month, except that for this purpose any such individual shall be deemed eligible for medical assistance under such State plan if (in addition to meeting such other requirements as are or may be imposed under the State plan) the income of any such individual as determined in accordance with section 1396b (f) of this title (after deducting any supplemental security income payment and State supplementary payment made with respect to such individual, and incurred expenses for medical care as recognized under State law) is not in excess of the standard for medical assistance established under the State plan as in effect on January 1,1972.” States exercising the § 209 (b) option were required to adopt a “spend-down” provision. See ibid. Under it, an individual otherwise eligible for SSI but whose income exceeded the state standard could become eligible for Medicaid when that part of his income in excess of the standard was consumed by expenses for medical care. Ibid. Fifteen States now use the § 209 (b) option. They are: Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia. (Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are similarly situated with respect to Medicaid coverage because the SSI program never took effect there.) The Secretary permits States to change from “SSI-status” to “§ 209 (b)-status” at any time. New York has filed to become a § 209 (b) State. Pet. for Cert. 10, n. 11. The regulation provides, in pertinent part, that “the agency must consider the income and resources of spouses and parents as available to the individual in the manner specified [for SSI States] or in a more extensive manner, but not more extensive than the requirements in effect under the Medicaid plan on January 1, 1972.” The District Court correctly found that respondent had standing to sue because respondent alleged and proved that some of its members are persons adversely affected by the Secretary’s regulations. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 511 (1975), with Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 735 (1972). Because this is a suit against the Secretary, the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) without regard to the amount in controversy. Cf. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). The principal regulation at issue was 42 CFR §435.734 (1980), quoted in n. 7; supra. Also challenged were “deeming” regulations applicable in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 42 CFR §§ 436.602, 436.711, 436.821 (1980). Subsection (17) provides that a state plan for medical assistance must— “include reasonable standards ... for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient . . . , (C) provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources, and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient is such individual’s spouse or such individual’s child who is under age 21 or (with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program established under subchapter XYI of this chapter), is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in section 1382c of this title (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such program); and provide for flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by taking into account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under State law.” The District Court thus did not need to reach respondent’s alternative arguments that the regulations deprived its members of due process and equal protection. The Secretary has promulgated provisional regulations allowing § 209 (b) jurisdictions either to ignore the spouse’s income or to consider it to the extent that it would be considered in an SSI State. See 45 Fed. Reg. 82254 (1980). At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary said that the new regulations probably would be rescinded if the Court of Appeals’ decision were reversed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-7. The dissenting opinion, which would affirm the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, attaches significance to the fact that the preamble to the provisional regulations incorporates the sociological analysis of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Post, at 53-56. But this reflects no independent judgment of the Secretary, and is entitled to no weight. In issuing the provisional regulations, the Secretary simply was adhering to the lower court’s reasoning and mandate. 45 Fed. Reg., at 82255 (the new regulations “are based on the Court of Appeals’ decision in Gray Panthers”). See Herweg v. Ray, 619 E. 2d 1265 (CA8 1980) (en banc), cert, pending, No. 80-60; Brown v. Stanton, 617 F. 2d 1224 (CA7 1980), cert, pending, No. 79-1690; Norman v. St. Clair, 610 F. 2d 1228 (CA5 1980), cert, pending sub nom. Schweiker v. Norman, No. 80-498. Although we quote passages from these decisions in this opinion, we do not necessarily endorse other language in them. The District Court in the same case described the Medicaid statute as “an aggravated assault on the English language, resistant to attempts to understand it.” 409 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (SDNY 1976). Counsel for respondent acknowledged at oral argument that individual suits against spouses often would be useless, even if the State made the effort to bring them, because the court might not order the spouse to pay out of funds needed to maintain a reasonable standard of living. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-39. States exercising the § 209 (b) option were obliged only to amend their Medicaid plans to include a “spend-down” provision. See n. 5, supra. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 78 (1965) (States may “not assume the availability of income which may not, in fact, be available”); 111 Cong. Rec. 15804 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff) (“only income and resources actually available to an applicant may be considered in determining need”); id., at 7216 (remarks of Rep. Mills) (“[n]o income can be imputed to an individual unless actually available”). E. g., Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 (1975) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) calculations under 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a)) ; Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251 (1974) (AFDC calculations under 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (7)). See also Lewis v. Martin, 397 U. S. 552 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968). A brief amicus curiae paints a distressing picture of individuals forced to choose between abandoning an institutionalized spouse and living in poverty. Brief for John H. Foard et al. as Amici Curiae 4-11. Yet, as the dissenting judge below pointed out, the principal “villain” in this case is not “deeming” per se, but inflation. 203 U. S. App. D. C., at 155, 629 F. 2d, at 189 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Many States have not recently reviewed the amount that the contributing spouse may set aside for his own living expenses and thereby exempt from “deeming.” As the Secretary concedes, that amount even when first set was “near subsistence level.” Brief for Petitioners 4. Over time, with inflation, that dollar amount in some States may have become inadequate to support the noninstitution-alized spouse. We note, in any event, that respondent’s position would not eliminate difficult choices for the contributing spouse. This lawsuit seeks only to enjoin the “deeming” of income to an institutionalized spouse. Supra, at 40-41; App. 17a. Respondent thus concedes the legality of “deeming” where spouses cohabit. To adopt respondent’s construction of the statute would create an incentive to shunt ailing spouses into nursing homes to circumvent the “deeming” that otherwise would occur. The dissenting opinion suggests that the jederal regulations authorizing “deeming” are invalid because the provisions of some state plans “allo[w] a State to deem more income than [can] realistically be considered 'available.’ ” Post, at 56. We think the dissent addresses a problem not presently before the Court. This case presents the question whether any “deeming” is consistent with the “availability” requirement of subsection (17) (B). We hold that it is. We do not, however, decide whether state plans that set aside inadequate sums for the contributing spouse are consistent with other provisions of the statute, such as the requirement that States “reasonably] evaluat[e] . . . income or resources.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a)(17)(C). In sum, whatever deficiencies may exist in specific state plans are not at issue in this case. The Court of Appeals thus erred in its reliance on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971). The court believed that the Secretary had not “taken the relevant factors into account.” 203 U. S. App. D. C., at 150, 629 F. 2d, at 184. The preceding discussion demonstrates, however, that Congress itself already had considered the “relevant factors” in authorizing “deeming” between spouses. Supra, at 44-48. In these circumstances, the Secretary need not do more. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 548-549 (1978). By holding for respondent on statutory grounds, the lower courts pretermitted respondent’s constitutional arguments. See n. 11, supra. These arguments are, of course, open to be litigated on remand. We express no view as to their merit.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al. v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL. No. 73-1742. Argued January 15, 1975 Decided April 16, 1975 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., dissented. Powell, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Gerald P. Norton argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Johnson, and Edmund B. Clark Richard E. Ayres argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Stephen P. Duggan. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by John C. Danjorth, Attorney General, and Walter W. Nowotny, Jr., and Dan Summers, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Missouri; by John L. Hill, Attorney General, Larry F. York, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip K. Maxwell and Douglas G. Caroom, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Texas; by Max N. Edwards and John Hardin Young for the American Iron and Steel Institute; by Cameron F. MacRae, Harry H. Voigt, and Henry V. Nickel for the Edison Electric-Institute; and by R. Gordon Gooch and Larry B. Feldcamp for Exxon Corp. et al. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case, 419 U. S. 823 (1974), to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which required petitioner Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to disapprove a portion of the implementation plan submitted to him by the State of Georgia pursuant to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. The case presents an issue of statutory construction which is illuminated by the anatomy of the statute itself, by its legislative history, and by the history of congressional efforts to control air pollution. I Congress initially responded to the problem of air pollution by offering encouragement and assistance to the States. In 1955 the Surgeon General was authorized to study the problem of air pollution, to support research, training, and demonstration projects, and to provide technical assistance to state and local governments attempting to abate pollution. 69 Stat. 322. In 1960 Congress directed the Surgeon General to focus his attention on the health hazards resulting from motor vehicle emissions. Pub. L. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162. The Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 392, authorized federal authorities to expand their research efforts, to make grants to state air pollution control agencies, and also to intervene directly to abate interstate pollution in limited circumstances. Amendments in 1965, § 101, 79 Stat. 992, and in 1966, 80 Stat. 954, broadened federal authority to control motor vehicle emissions and to make grants to state pollution control agencies. The focus shifted somewhat in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 485. It reiterated the premise of the earlier Clean Air Act “that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.” Ibid. Its provisions, however, increased the federal role in the prevention of air pollution, by according federal authorities certain powers of supervision and enforcement. But the States generally retained wide latitude to determine both the air quality standards which they would meet and the period of time in which they would do so. The response of the States to these manifestations of increasing congressional concern with air pollution was disappointing. Even by 1970, state planning and implementation under the Air Quality Act of 1967 had made little progress. Congress reacted by taking a stick to the States in the form of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, enacted on December 31 of that year. These Amendments sharply increased federal authority and responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air pollution. Nonetheless, the Amendments explicitly preserved the principle: “Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State . . . .” § 107 (a) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1678,42 U. S. C. § 1857c-2 (a). The difference under the Amendments was that the States were no longer given any choice as to whether they would meet this responsibility. For the first time they were required to attain air quality of specified standards, and to do so within a specified period of time. The Amendments directed that within 30 days of their enactment the Environmental Protection Agency should publish proposed regulations describing national quality standards for the “ambient air,” which is the statute’s term for the outdoor air used by the general public. After allowing 90 days for comments on the proposed standards, the Agency was then obliged to promulgate such standards. § 109 (a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1679, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-4 (a)(1). The standards were to be of two general types: “primary” standards, which in the judgment of the Agency were “requisite to protect the public health,” §109 (b)(1), and “secondary” standards, those that in the judgment of the Agency were “requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air.” §109 (b)(2). Within nine months after the Agency’s promulgation of primary and secondary air quality standards, each of the 50 States was required to submit to the Agency a plan designed to implement and maintain such standards within its boundaries. § 110 (a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1680, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-5 (a)(1). The Agency was in turn required to approve each State’s plan within four months of the deadline for submission, if it had been adopted after public hearings and if it satisfied eight general conditions set forth in § 110 (a)(2). Probably the principal of these conditions, and the heart of the 1970 Amendments, is that the plan provide for the attainment of the national primary ambient air quality standards in the particular State “as expeditiously as practicable but ... in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such plan.” § 110 (a) (2)(A). In providing for such attainment, a State’s plan must include “emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations”; it must also contain such other measures as may be necessary to insure both timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of national ambient air standards. § 110 (a)(2)(B). Although the Agency itself was newly organized, the States looked, to it for guidance in formulating the plans they were required to submit. On April 7,1971 — scarcely three months after the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments — the Agency published proposed guidelines for the preparation, adoption, and submission of such plans. 36 Fed. Reg. 6680. After receiving numerous comments, including those from respondent Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), it issued final guidelines on August 14, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 1586. See 40 CFR Part 51 (1974). The national standards themselves were timely promulgated on April 30, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186. See 40 CFR Part 50 (1974). No one can doubt that Congress imposed upon the Agency and States a comprehensive planning task of the first magnitude which was to be accomplished in a relatively short time. In the case of the States, it was soon realized that in order to develop the requisite plans within the statutory nine-month deadline, efforts would have to be focused on determining the stringent emission limitations necessary to comply with national standards. This was true even though compliance with the standards would not be necessary until the attainment date, which normally would be three years after Agency approval of a plan. The issue then arose as to how these stringent limitations, which often could not be satisfied without substantial research and investment, should be applied during the period prior to that date. One approach was that adopted by Florida, under which the plan’s emission limitations would not take effect until the attainment date. Under this approach, no source is subject to enforcement actions during the preattainment period, but all are put on notice of the limitations with which they must eventually comply. Since the Florida approach basically does not require preattainment date pollution reductions on the part of those sources which might be able to effect them, the Agency encouraged an alternative approach. Under it a State’s emission limitations would be immediately effective. The State, however, would have the authority to grant variances to particular sources which could not immediately comply with the stringent emission limitations necessary to meet the standards. Georgia chose the Agency’s preferred approach. Its plan provided for immediately effective categorical emission limitations, but also incorporated a variance procedure whereby particular sources could obtain individually tailored relief from general requirements. This variance provision, Ga. Code Ann. § 88-912 (1971), was one of the bases upon which the Agency’s approval of the Georgia plan was successfully challenged by respondents in the Court of Appeals. It is the only aspect of that court’s decision as to which the Agency petitioned for certiorari. II The Agency’s approval of Georgia’s variance provision was based on its interpretation of § 110 (a)(3), which provides that the Agency shall approve any revision of an implementation plan which meets the §110 (a) (2) requirements applicable to an original plan. The Agency concluded that § 110 (a) (3) permits a State to grant individual variances from generally applicable emission standards, both before and after the attainment date, so long as the variance does not cause the plan to fail to comply with the requirements of § 110 (a)(2). Since that section requires, inter alia, that primary ambient air standards be attained by a particular date, it is of some consequence under this approach whether the period for which the variance is sought extends beyond that date. If it does not, the practical effect of treating such preattainment date variances as revisions is that they can be granted rather freely. This interpretation of §110 (a) (3) was incorporated in the Agency’s original guidelines for implementation plans, 40 CFR §§ 51.6 (c), 51.32 (f) (1973). Although a spokesman for respondent NRDC had earlier stated that the Agency’s guideline in this regard “correctly provides that variances which do not threaten attainment of a national standard are to be considered revisions of the plan,” that organization later developed second thoughts on the matter. Its present position, in which it is joined by another environmental organization and by two individual respondents who reside in affected air quality control regions within the State of Georgia, is that variances, applicable to individual sources may be approved only if they meet the stringent procedural and substantive standards of § 110 (f). This section permits one-year “postponements” of any requirement of a plan, subject to conditions which will be discussed below. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents, and ordered the Agency to disapprove Georgia’s variance provision, although it did not specify which of the § 110 (a)(2) requirements were thereby violated. It held that while the revision authority of §110 (a)(3) was available for generally applicable changes of an implementation plan, the postponement provision of § 110 (f) was the only method by which individual sources could obtain relief from applicable emission limitations. In reaching this conclusion the court rejected petitioners’ suggestion that whether a proposed variance should be treated as a “revision” under § 110 (a)(3), or as a “postponement” under § 110 (f), depended on whether it would affect attainment of a national ambient air standard, rather than on whether it applied to one source or to many. Other Circuits have also been confronted with this issue, and while none has adopted the Agency’s position, all have differed from the Fifth Circuit. The first case was Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F. 2d 875 (CA1 1973). For reasons to be discussed, infra, at 91-94, the First Circuit rejected the revision authority as a basis for a variance procedure. It nonetheless concluded that prior to the three-year date for mandatory attainment of primary standards, a State could grant variances to sources which could not immediately meet applicable emission limitations. The court reasoned: “We can see value in permitting a state to impose strict emission limitations now, subject to individual exemptions if practicability warrants; otherwise it may be forced to adopt less stringent limitations in order to accommodate those who, notwithstanding reasonable efforts, are as yet unable to comply. “The Administrator sees his power to allow such exemption procedures as deriving from the 'revision’ authority in § [110] (a)(3). We tend to view it more as a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme, which anticipates greater flexibility during the preattainment period.” 478 F. 2d, at 887. The First Circuit’s resolution, which has been described as “Solomonesque,” is not tied to any specific provision of the Clean Air Act. Rather, it is quite candidly a judicial creation providing flexibility which, according to its creators, Congress may be inferred to have intended to provide. Two other Circuits subsequently followed the First Circuit. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 483 F. 2d 690, 693-694 (CA8 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 494 F. 2d 519, 523 (CA2 1974). Neither expanded on the First Circuit’s reasoning. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a third approach to this question, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 507 F. 2d 905, 911-917 (1974). After considering legislative history, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend the postponement mechanism to be the exclusive source for variances. But the court also did not adopt the Agency’s view that variances could be authorized as § 110 (a) (3) revisions, although it did not explain its rejection of this interpretation. Rather, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the First Circuit that flexibility was “a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme.” It explained: “As long as a possible variance from a state plan will not preclude the attainment or maintenance of such standards, we discern no legislative intent to commit a state, in toto, to its initial plan, without any flexibility whatsoever.” 507 F. 2d, at 913. The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the First Circuit’s distinction between the preattainment and postattainment periods. It concluded that statutory support for flexibility was as strong after the attainment date as before, especially in light of the Act’s encouragement of the States to adopt plans even stricter than those required to attain national standards. The court thus adopted an approach which differs from the Agency’s, but which reaches the same result — authorization of variances on standards other than those required for § 110 (f) postponements, both before and after the attainment date, so long as the variance does not prevent timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of national ambient air standards. After the Courts of Appeals for the First, Eighth, Fifth, and Second Circuits had spoken, but prior to the decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Agency modified its guidelines to comply with the then-unanimous rulings that after the attainment date the postponement provision was the only basis for obtaining a variance. 39 Fed. Reg. 34533-34535, adding 40 CFR §§ 51.11 (g), 51.15 (d) and revising § 51.32 (f). At the same time, the Agency formally disapproved variance provisions to the extent they authorized variances extending beyond attainment dates, unless the standards of § 110 (f) were met. 39 Fed. Reg. 34535, adding 40 CFR § 52.26. Because the Agency has conformed its regulations to the decisions of the First, Eighth, and Second Circuits, this case on its facts is now limited to the validity of the Georgia variance provision insofar as it authorizes variances effective before Georgia’s attainment date, which is in July 1975. The Agency nonetheless has not abandoned its original view that the revision section authorizes variances which do not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of national ambient air standards. Moreover, the Agency is candid in admitting that should we base our decision on its interpretation of § 110 (a)(3), the decision would support the approval of implementation plans which provide for variances effective after the attainment date. The disparity among the Courts of Appeals rather strongly indicates that the question does not admit of an easy answer. Without going so far as to hold that the Agency’s construction of the Act was the only one it permissibly could have adopted, we conclude that it was at the very least sufficiently reasonable that it should have been accepted by the reviewing courts. Ill Both of the sections in controversy are contained in § 110 of the amended Clean Air Act, which is entitled “Implementation Plans.” Section 110 (a) (3) provides in pertinent part: “(A) The Administrator shall approve any revision of an implementation plan applicable to an air quality control region if he determines that it meets the requirement of paragraph (2) and has been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and public hearings.” Section 110 (f) provides: “(1) Prior to the date on which any stationary source or class of moving sources is required to comply with any requirement of an applicable implementation plan the Governor of the State to which such plan applies may apply to the Administrator to postpone the applicability of such requirement to such source (or class) for not more than one year. If the Administrator determines that— “(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirement before such date, “(B) such source (or class) is unable to comply with such requirement because the necessary technology or other alternative methods of control are not available or have not been available for a sufficient period of time, “(C) any available alternative operating procedures and interim control measures have reduced or will reduce the impact of such source on public health, and “ (D) the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare, “then the Administrator shall grant a postponement of such requirement.” As previously noted, respondents contend that “variances” applicable to individual sources — for example, a particular factory — may be approved only if they meet the stringent procedural and substantive standards set forth in § 110 (f). As is apparent from the text of § 110 (f), its postponements may be for no more than one year, may be granted only if application is made prior to the date of required compliance, arid must be supported by the Agency’s determination that the source’s continued operation “is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare.” Petitioners, on the other hand, rely on the revision authority of § 110 (a)(3) for the contention that a state plan may provide for an individual variance from generally applicable emission limitations so long as the variance does not cause the plan to fail to comply with the requirements of §110 (a)(2). Since a variance would normally implicate only the § 110 (a) (2) (A) requirement that plans provide for attainment and maintenance of national ambient air standards, treatment as revisions would result in variances being readily approved in two situations: first, where the variance does not defer compliance beyond the attainment date; and second, where the national standards have been attained and the variance is not so great that a plan incorporating it could not insure their continued maintenance. Moreover, a§110(a)(3) revision may be granted on the basis of hearings conducted by the State, whereas a § 110 (f) postponement is available only after the Agency itself conducts hearings. There is thus considerable practical importance attached to the issue of whether variances are to be treated as revisions or as postponements, or for that matter, as the First Circuit would have it, as neither until the mandatory attainment date but as postponements thereafter. This practical importance reaches not merely the operator of a particular source who believes that circumstances justify his receiving a variance from categorical limitations. It also reaches the broader issue of whether Congress intended the States to retain any significant degree of control of the manner in which they attain and maintain national standards, at least once their initial plans have been approved or, under the First Circuit’s approach, once the mandatory attainment date has arrived. To explain our conclusion as to Congress’ intent, it is necessary that we consider the revision and postponement sections in the context of other provisions of the amended Clean Air Act, particularly those which distinguish between national ambient air standards and emission limitations. As we have already noted, primary ambient air standards deal with the quality of outdoor air, and are fixed on a nationwide basis at levels which the Agency determines will protect the public health. It is attainment and maintenance of these national standards which § 110 (a) (2) (A) requires that state plans provide. In complying with this requirement a State’s plan must include “emission limitations,” which are regulations of the composition of substances emitted into the ambient air from such sources as power plants, service stations, and the like. They are the specific rules to which operators of pollution sources are subject, and which if enforced should result in ambient air which meets the national standards. The Agency is plainly charged by the Act with the responsibility for setting the national ambient air standards. Just as plainly, however, it is relegated by the Act to a secondary role in the process of determining and enforcing the specific, source-by-source emission limitations which are necessary if the national standards it has set are to be met. Under § 110 (a)(2), the Agency is required to approve a state plan which provides for the timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of ambient air standards, and which also satisfies that section’s other general requirements. The Act gives the Agency no authority to question the wisdom of a State’s choices of emission limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of § 110 (a)(2), and the Agency may devise and promulgate a specific plan of its own only if a State fails to submit an implementation plan which satisfies those standards. § 110 (c). Thus, so long as the ultimate effect of a State’s choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation. This analysis of the Act’s division of responsibilities is not challenged by respondents insofar as it concerns the process of devising and promulgating an initial implementation plan. Respondents do, however, deny that the States have such latitude once the initial plan is approved. Yet the third paragraph of § 110 (a), and the one immediately following the paragraphs which specify that States shall file implementation plans and that the Agency shall approve them if they satisfy certain broad criteria, is the section which requires the Agency to “approve any revision of an implementation plan” if it “determines that it meets the requirements” of § 110 (a)(2). On its face, this provision applies to any revision, without regard either to its breadth of applicability, or to whether it is to be effective before or after the attainment date; rather, Agency approval is subject only to the condition that the revised plan satisfy the general requirements applicable to original implementation plans. Far from evincing congressional intent that the Agency assume control of a State’s emission limitations mix once its initial plan is approved, the revision section is to all appearances the mechanism by which the States may obtain approval of their developing policy choices as to the most practicable and desirable methods of restricting total emissions to a level which is consistent with the national ambient air standards. In order to challenge this characterization of § 110 (a)(3), respondents principally rely on the contention that the postponement provision, § 110 (f), is the only mechanism by which exceptions to a plan’s requirements may be obtained, under any circumstances. Were this an accurate description of § 110 (f), we would agree that the revision authority does not have the broad application asserted by the Agency. Like the Ninth Circuit, however, we believe that § 110 (f) serves a function different from that of supervising state efforts to modify the initial mix of emission limitations by which they implement national standards. In our view, § 110 (f) is a safety valve by which may be accorded, under certain carefully specified circumstances, exceptions to the national standards themselves. That this is its role is strongly suggested by the process by which it became a part of the Clean Air Act. The House version of the Amendment, H. R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., contained no provisions for either postponements or, most significantly, mandatory deadlines for the attainment of national ambient air standards. The Senate bill, S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., did contain both the three-year deadline, which now appears in §110 (a)(2), and the predecessor of the present §110 (f). That predecessor permitted the governor of a State to petition a three-judge district court for “relief from the effect” of expiration of the three-year deadline as to a region or persons, and provided for the grant of such relief upon a showing of conditions similar to those now appearing in § 110 (f). Under its language the postponement provision plainly applied only when deferral of a national deadline was sought. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate’s general approach to the deadline issue. Its report states: “The conference substitute follows the Senate . amendment in establishing deadlines for implementing primary ambient air quality standards but leaves the States free to establish a reasonable time period within which secondary ambient air quality standards will be implemented. The conference substitute modifies the Senate amendment in that it allows the Administrator to grant extensions for good causes shown upon application by the Governors.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No*91-1783, p. 45 (1970). (Emphasis added.) Nowhere does the report suggest that other changes in the Senate’s proposed § 111 (f) were intended to dramatically broaden its reach, such that it would not merely be available to obtain deferral of the strict deadlines for compliance with national standards, but would also be the exclusive mechanism for any ameliorative modification of a plan, no matter how minor. That the postponement provision was intended merely as a method of escape from the mandatory deadlines becomes even clearer when one considers the summary of the conference’s work which Senator Muskie presented to the Senate. The summary referred to a provision under which a single two-year extension of the deadline could be obtained were it shown to be necessary at the time a State’s initial plan was submitted. It then immediately discussed the postponement provision, as follows: “A Governor may also apply for a postponement of the deadline if, when the deadline approaches, it is impossible for a source to meet a requirement under an implementation plan, interim control measures have reduced (or will reduce) the adverse health effects of the source, and the continued operation of the source is essential to national security or the public health or welfare of that State.” 116 Cong. Rec. 42384-42385. (Emphasis added.) This limited view of the role of § 110 (f) is reinforced by comparison with the section which immediately precedes it in the statute, § 110 (e). This is the provision to which Senator Muskie’s summary was obviously referring when it stated that the three-year deadline could be extended for up to two years if proper application were made at the time a State first submitted its plan. Like i 110 (f), § 110 (e) is available only if an emission source is unable to comply with plan requirements because “the necessary technology or other alternatives are not available or will not be available soon enough to permit compliance.” Section 110 (e) also contains a requirement parallel to that of § 110 (f)(1)(C), that available alternative procedures and control measures have been considered and utilized. Unlike § 110 (f), however, § 110 (e) contains no requirement that “the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare.” Section 110 (e) thus permits a two-year extension on a showing considerably less stringent than that required for a § 110 (f) one-year postponement. This disparity is quite logical, however, because the relief under § 110 (e) is limited to an initial two-year period, whereas that under § 110 (f)- is available at any time, so long as application is made prior to the effective date of the relevant requirement. On the other hand, the disparity between the standards of § 110 (e) and those of § 110 (f) would be inexplicable were § 110 (f) also the sole mechanism by which States could modify the particular emission limitations mix incorporated in their initial implementation plans, even though the desired modifications would have no impact on the attainment or maintenance of national standards. Respondents’ interpretation requires the anomalous conclusion that Congress, having stated its goal to be the attainment and maintenance of specified ambient air standards, nonetheless made it significantly more difficult for a State to modify an emission limitations mix which met those standards both before and after modification than for a State to obtain a two-year deferral in the attainment of the standards themselves. The interpretation suffers, therefore, not only from its contrariety to the revision authority which Congress provided, but also from its willingness to ascribe inconsistency to a carefully considered congressional enactment. We believe that the foregoing analysis of the structure and legislative history of the Clean Air Amendments shows that Congress intended to impose national ambient air Standards to be attained within a specific period of time. It also shows that in §§ 110 (e) and (f) Congress carefully limited the circumstances in which timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of these standards could be compromised. We also believe that Congress, consistent with its declaration that “[e]ach State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality” within its boundaries, § 107 (a), left to the States considerable latitude in determining specifically how the standards would be met. This discretion includes the continuing authority to revise choices about the mix of emission limitations. We therefore conclude that the Agency’s interpretation of §§110 (a)(3) and 110 (f) was “correct,” to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the “correct” one. Given this conclusion, as well as the facts that the Agency is charged with administration of the Act, and that there has undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States and other parties affected by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency. Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1965); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U. S. 477, 480-481 (1921). We are not persuaded to the contrary by any of the arguments advanced by respondents or by the Courts of Appeals whieh have rejected § 110 (a)(3) as authority for granting variances. To these various arguments we now turn. IV The principal basis on which the Fifth Circuit rejected the Agency’s view of the revision and postponement sections was its analysis of their language. The court focused first on the fact that § 110 (f) speaks in terms of “any stationary source,” and of the postponement of “any requirement of an applicable implementation plan.” (Emphasis added.) This language, according to the Fifth Circuit, belies the Agency’s contention that the postponement section is inapplicable to those variances which do not jeopardize the attainment or maintenance of national standards. The court went on to state, without citation or supporting reasoning: “A revision is a change in a generally applicable requirement; a postponement or variance [is a] change in the application of a requirement to a particular party. The distinction between the two is familiar and clear.”' 489 F. 2d 390, 401. We think that the Fifth Circuit has read more into §110(f), and more out of §110 (a)(3), than careful analysis can sustain. In the first place, the “any stationary source” and “any requirement” language of § 110 (f) serves only to define the matters with respect to which the governor of a State may apply for a postponement. The language does not, as the Fifth Circuit would have it, state that all sources desirous of any form of relief must rely solely on the postponement provision. While § 110 (f) makes its relief available to any source which can qualify for it, regardless of whether the relief would jeopardize national standards, the section does not even suggest that other forms of relief, having no impact on the national goal of achieving air quality standards, are not also available on appropriately less rigorous showings. As for the Fifth Circuit’s observation that “a revision is a change in a generally applicable requirement,” whereas a “postponement or variance” deals with particular parties, we are not satisfied that the distinction is so “familiar and clear.” While a variance is generally thought to be of specific applicability, whether a revision is general or specific depends on what is being revised. In this instance, it is implementation plans which are being revised, and it is clear that such plans may be quite detailed, both as to sources and the remedial steps required of the sources. Not only does § 110 (a)(2)(B) specify that a plan shall include “emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance,” but respondents themselves have urged that the very specific variances which have already been granted in Georgia should have been, and may still be, treated as “compliance schedules” contained within the original plan. A further difficulty with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the language of §§ 110 (a)(3) and 110 (f) is that it entirely overlooks an obvious distinction between revisions and postponements. In normal usage, to “postpone” is to defer, whereas to “revise” is to remake or amend. In the implementation plan context, normal usage would suggest that a postponement is a deferral of the effective date of a requirement which remains a part of the applicable plan, whereas a revision is a change in the plan itself which deletes or modifies the requirement. If by revision a requirement of a plan is removed, then a person seeking relief from that requirement has no need to seek its postponement, and § 110 (f) is by its terms inapplicable. But if such a person cannot obtain a revision, because for example the plan as so revised would no longer insure timely attainment of the national standards, then under the Act he has no alternative but to comply or to obtain a postponement of the requirement’s effective date — if he can satisfy the stringent conditions of §110 (f). This distinction between the two is so straightforward, and so consistent with the structure and history of the Act, as discussed in Part III of this opinion, that we perceive no basis for the Fifth Circuit’s strained line of analysis. The Fifth Circuit also relied on the “technology forcing” nature of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. It reasoned that because the statute was intended to force technology to meet specified, scheduled standards, it was essential to insure that commitments made at the planning stage could not be readily abandoned when the time for compliance arrived. According to the Fifth Circuit, § 110 (f) “is the device Congress chose to assure this.” 489 F. 2d, at 401. Clearly § 110 (f) does present a formidable hurdle for those proposed departures from earlier commitments which are in fact subject to its stringent conditions. What the Fifth Circuit failed to consider, however, is that so long as the national standards are being attained and maintained, there is no basis in the present Clean Air Act for forcing further technological developments. Agency review assures that variances granted under § 110 (a) (3) will b.e consistent with the § 110 (a) (2) (A) requirement that the national standards be attained as expeditiously as practicable and maintained thereafter. Thus § 110(a)(3) variances ex hypothesi do not jeopardize national standards, and the technology-forcing character of the Amendments is no reason at all for judging them under the provisions of § 110 (f). The First Circuit also rejected the Agency’s contention that variances could be handled under the revision procedure, supra, at 72-73, but it did so for reasons different from those relied upon by the Fifth Circuit. It stated: “Had Congress meant [§ 110 (f)] to be followed only if a polluter, besides violating objective state requirements, was shown to be preventing maintenance of a national standard, it would have said so. To allow a polluter to raise and perhaps litigate that issue is to invite protracted delay. The factual question could have endless refinements: is it the individual variance-seeker or others whose pollution is preventing maintenance of standards? See e. g., Getty Oil Company v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972), remanded with directions, 467 F. 2d 349 (3rd Cir. 1972), . . . where Getty raised this issue in various forums.” 478 F. 2d, at 886. Respondents also stress this argument: treating variances as revisions rather than as postponements would invite litigation, would be impractical in application, and would therefore result in degradation of the environment. Aside from the fact that it goes more to the wisdom of what Congress has chosen to do than to determining what Congress has done, we believe this argument to be overstated. As made clear in the Getty case cited by the First Circuit, a polluter is subject to existing requirements until such time as he obtains a variance, and variances are not available under the revision authority until they, have been approved by both the State and the Agency. Should either entity determine that granting the variance would prevent attainment or maintenance of national air standards, the polluter is presumably within his rights in seeking judicial review. This litigation, however, is carried out on the polluter’s time, not the public’s, for during its pendency the original regulations remain in effect, and the polluter’s failure to comply may subject him to a variety of enforcement procedures. We are further impressed that the Agency itself has displayed no concern for the purported administrative difficulty of treating variances as revisions. Ordinarily, an agency may be assumed capable of meeting the responsibilities which it contends are placed upon it. Were respondents able to make a contrary showing, that fact might have some weight in interpreting Congress’ intent, although we would doubt its relevance unless Congress were also shown to have been aware of the problem when it drafted legislation which otherwise is consistent with the Agency’s contentions. Respondents have made no such showings. The judgments which the Agency must make when passing on variances under § 110 (a) (3) are whether the ambient air complies with national standards, and if so whether a proposed variance would cause a plan to fail to insure maintenance of those standards. These judgments are little different from those which the Agency had to make when it approved the initial plans into which respondents seek to have the States frozen. In each instance the Agency must measure the existing level of pollution, compare it with the national standards, and determine the effect on this comparison of specified emission modifications. That Congress is of the opinion that the Agency can feasibly and reliably perform these functions is manifest not only in its 1970 legislation, but also in a 1974 amendment designed to conserve energy. The amendment provides that the Agency should report to each State on whether its implementation plan could be revised in relation to fuel burning stationary sources, “without interfering with the attainment and maintenance of any national ambient air quality standard.” § 110 (a) (3) (B) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 88 Stat. 256, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-5 (a)(3)(B) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). (Emphasis added.) V Respondents have put forward several additional arguments which have not been specifically adopted by any court of appeals. The first is based on legislative history. Respondents focus on the fact that while the Conference Committee accepted the Senate’s concept of a three-year maximum deadline for attainment of national standards, it also strengthened the Senate’s provision by specifying that attainment should be achieved “as expeditiously as practicable but ... in no case later than three years.” (Emphasis added.) Respondents further make the contention that the Conference Committée altered the Senate’s version of the postponement provision to “provide that a source’s attempt to delay compliance with 'any requirement’ of a State Plan would be considered a ‘postponement.’ ” Brief for Respondents 36. According to respondents the latter change “was necessary to conform” the postponement provision with the Conference Committee’s “as expeditiously as practicable” requirement. The argument is that because any variance would delay attainment of national standards beyond the date previously considered the earliest practicable, and that because the Act requires attainment as soon as practicable, any variance must therefore be treated as a postponement. This argument is not persuasive, for multiple reasons. First, this interpretation of the Conference Committee’s work finds no specific support in legislative documents or debates. This is true despite the significance of the change which, under respondents’ interpretation, was made — the expansion of § 110 (f) from a safety valve against mandatory deadlines into the exclusive mechanism by which a State could make even minor modifications of its emission limitations mix. Respondents’ interpretation arises instead from their own reading of the statute and inferences as to legislative purpose. Second, as we have already discussed, and contrary to respondents’ contention, § 110 (f) simply does not state that any deferral of compliance with “any requirement” of a state plan “would be considered a postponement.” Rather, it merely states that a postponement may be sought with respect to any source and any requirement. Third, respondents’ reading equates “practicable” in § 110 (a)(2)(A) with § 110 (f)’s “essential to national security or to the public health or welfare.” Yet plainly there could be many circumstances in which attainment in less than three years would be impracticable, and thus not required, but in which deferral could not possibly be justified as essential to the national security, or public health or welfare. Fourth, the statute requires only attainment as expeditiously as practicable, not attainment as expeditiously as was thought practicable when the initial implementation plan was devised. Finally, even if respondents’ argument had force with regard to a preattainment variance, it would still be of no relevance whatsoever once the national standards were attained. A variance which does not compromise national standards that have been attained does no damage to the congressional goals of attaining the standards as expeditiously as practicable and maintaining them thereafter. The last of respondents’ arguments which merit our attention is related to the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that revisions are restricted to general requirements, and that all specific modifications must therefore be funneled through the postponement provision. Respondents go one step further and contend that the revision authority is limited not only to general changes, but to those which also are initiated by the Agency in order to “accelerate abatement or attain it in greater concert with other national goals.” Brief for Respondents 26. This highly restrictive view of § 110 (a) (3) is based on § 110 (a) (2)(H), which specifies that to obtain Agency approval a State’s plan must provide a mechanism for revision to take account of revised national standards, of more expeditious methods of achieving the standards, and of Agency determinations that a plan is substantially inadequate. The argument is specious. Section 110(a)(2)(H) does nothing more than impose a minimum requirement that state plans be capable of such modifications as are necessary to meet the basic goal of cleansing the ambient air to the extent necessary to protect public health, as expeditiously as practicable within a three-year period. The section in no way prevents the States from also permitting ameliorative revisions which do not compromise the basic goal. Nor does it, by requiring a particular type of revision, preclude those of a different type. As we have already noted, §110 (a)(3) requires the Agency to approve “any revision” which is consistent with §110(a)(2)’s minimum standards for an initial plan, and which the State adopted after reasonable public notice and hearing; no other restrictions whatsoever are placed on the Agency’s duty to approve revisions. VI For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was in error when it concluded that the postponement provision of § 110 (f) is the sole method by which may be obtained specific ameliorative modifications of state implementation plans. The Agency had properly concluded that the revision mechanism of § 110 (a)(3) is available for the approval of those variances which do not compromise the basic statutory mandate that, with carefully circumscribed exceptions, the national primary ambient air standards be attained in not more than three years, and maintained thereafter. To the extent that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was to the contrary, it is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F. 2d 390 (1974). We issued a stay of the contested portion of the court’s judgment on June 10, 1974, 417 U. S. 942. Section 110 (a)(2),42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2), reads as follows: “The Administrator shall, within four months after the date required for submission of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or disapprove such plan, or each portion thereof. The Administrator shall approve such plan, or any portion thereof, if he determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and that— “(A) (i) in the case of a plan implementing a national primary ambient air quality standard, it provides for the attainment of such primary standard as expeditiously as practicable but (subject to subsection (e)) in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such plan (or any revision thereof to take account of a revised primary standard); and (ii) in the case of a plan implementing a national secondary ambient air quality standard, it specifies a reasonable time at which such secondary standard will be attained; “(B) it includes emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such other, measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such primary or secondary standard, including, but not limited to, land-use and transportation controls; “(C) it includes provision for establishment and operation of appropriate devices, methods, systems, and procedures necessary to (i) monitor, compile, and analyze data on ambient air quality and, (ii) upon request, make such data available to the Administrator; “(D) it includes a procedure, meeting the requirements of paragraph (4), for review (prior to construction or modification) of the location of new sources to which a standard of performance will apply; “(E) it contains adequate provisions for intergovernmental cooperation, including measures necessary to insure that emissions of air pollutants from sources located in any air quality control region will not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of such primary or secondary standard in any portion of such region outside of such State or in any other air quality control region; “(F) it provides (i) necessary assurances that the State will have adequate personnel, funding, and authority to carry out such implementation plan, (ii) requirements for installation of equipment by owners or operators of stationary sources to monitor emissions from such sources, (iii) for periodic reports on the nature and amounts of such emissions; (iv) that such reports shall be correlated by the State agency with any emission limitations or standards established pursuant to this Act, which reports shall be available at reasonable times for public inspection; and (v) for authority comparable to that in section 303, and adequate contingency plans to implement such authority; “(G) it provides, to the extent necessary and practicable, for periodic inspection and testing of motor vehicles to enforce compliance with applicable emission standards; and “(H) it provides for revision, after public hearings, of such plan (i) from time to time as may be necessary to take account of revisions of such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard or the availability of improved or more expeditious methods of achieving such primary or secondary standard; or (ii) whenever the Administrator finds on the basis of information available to him that the plan is substantially inadequate to achieve the national ambient air quality primary or secondary standard which it implements.” While sources would not be subject to enforcement actions based on their levels of emissions prior to the attainment date, they could be required to adhere to schedules for the planning, contracting, and construction necessary to assure that their emissions would be within permissible levels as of the attainment date. See 40 CFR §§ 51.15 (c), 52.524 (b) (1974). At least in the case of Florida, this approach has apparently been modified by subsequent adoption of schedules which require compliance by a number of specified sources prior to July 1, 1975. See 40 CFR § 52.524 (c) (1974). All other States within the Fifth Circuit, except Florida, also adopted plans with limitations which were effective immediately or, in the case of Texas, only a few months thereafter. Georgia Code Ann. §88 — 912 (1971) reads as follows: “Variances.— “The department may grant specific or general classes of variances from the particular requirements of any rule, regulation or general order to such specific persons or class of persons or such specific source or general classes of sources of air contaminants upon such conditions as it may deem necessary to protect the public health and welfare, if it finds that strict compliance with such rule, regulation or general order is inappropriate because of conditions beyond the control of the person or classes of persons granted such variances, or because of special circumstances which would render strict compliance unreasonable, unduly burdensome-, or impractical due to special physical conditions or causes, or because strict compliance would result in substantial curtailment or closing down of one or more businesses, plants or operations, or because no alternative facility or method of handling is yet available. Such variances may be limited in time. In determining whether or not such variances shall be granted, the department shall give consideration to the protection of the public health, safety and general welfare of the public, and weigh the equities involved and the relative advantages and disadvantages to the resident and the occupation or activity affected. Any person or persons seeking a variance shall do so by filing a petition therefor with the director of the department. The director shall promptly investigate such petition and make a recommendation as to the disposition thereof. If such recommendation is against the granting of the variance, a hearing shall be held thereon within 15 days after notice to the petitioner. If the recommendation of the director is for the granting of a variance, the department may do so without a hearing: Provided, however, that upon the petition of any person aggrieved by the granting of a variance, a public hearing shall be held thereon. A variance granted may be revoked or modified by the department after a public hearing which shall be held after giving at least 15 days prior notice. Such notice shall be served upon all persons, known to the department, who will be subjected to greater restrictions if such variance is revoked or modified, or are likely to be affected or who have filed with the department a written request for such notification.” The pertinent text of § 110 (a) (3) appears infra, at 75. Title 40 CFR § 51.32 (f) (1973) reads as follows: “A State’s determination to defer the applicability or any portion^) of the control strategy with respect to such source(s) will not necessitate a request for postponement under this section unless such deferral will prevent attainment of maintenance of a national standard within the time specified in such plan: Provided, however, That any such determination will be deemed a revision of an applicable plan under § 51.6.” Hearings, on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 — Part I (Title I), before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 45 n. 51 (statement of Richard E. Ayres). The text of § 110 (f) appears infra, at 75-76, and n. 14. Other Circuits which have ordered the disapproval of implementation plan variance procedures have likewise failed to identify the offended requirement, even though §110 (a) (2) quite clearly mandates approval of any plan which satisfies its minimum conditions. See n. 2, supra. Since petitioners have not raised the point in this Court, we have no occasion to consider it. See § 116 of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1689 and 88 Stat. 259, 42 U. S. C. § 1857d-l (1970 cd, Supp. IV). The attainment dates for several air quality control regions within other Fifth Circuit States are as late as May 31, 1977, by virtue of two-year extensions granted pursuant to § 110(e). See n. 20, infra. Section 110 (f) (2) specifies the procedural requirements for postponement. It reads as follows: “(2) (A) Any determination under paragraph (1) shall (i) be made on the record after notice to interested persons and opportunity for hearing, (ii) be based upon a fair evaluation of the entire record at such hearing, and (iii) include a statement setting forth in detail the findings and conclusions upon which the determination is based. “(B) Any determination made pursuant to this paragraph shall be subject to judicial review by the United States court of appeals for the circuit which includes such State upon the filing in such court within 30 days from the date of such decision of a petition by any interested person praying that the decision be modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of the petition shall forthwith be sent by registered or certified mail to the Administrator and thereupon the Administrator shall certify and file in such court the record upon which the final decision complained of was issued, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28, United States Code. Upon the filing of such petition the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm or set aside the determination complained of in whole or in part. The findings of the Administrator with respect to questions of fact (including each determination made under subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph (1)) shall be sustained if based upon a fair evaluation of the entire record at such hearing. “(C) Proceedings before the court under this paragraph shall take precedence over all the other causes of action on the docket and shall be assigned for hearing and decision at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way. “(D) Section 307 (a) of this title (relating to subpoenas) shall be applicable to any proceeding under this subsection.” We recognize that attainment of the standards is required as soon as “practicable,” and that a preattainment variance could not be granted under the revision authority if immediate compliance by a particular source were “practicable” and such compliance would expedite attainment. See infra, at 96-97, and n. 30. Exceptions are the Agency’s authority to set emission limitations for new motor vehicles, § 202 et seq. of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1690-1698 and 88 Stat. 258, 42 U. S. C. § 1857Í-1 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV); to set emission limitations for aircraft, §231 et seq. of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1703-1705, 42 U. S. C. § 1857f-9 et seq.; to set emission limitations for categories of new stationary sources, § 111 of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1683, and amended, 85 Stat. 464, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-6 (1970 ed. and Supp. I); and to regulate the sale of fuels and fuel additives, § 211 of the' Clean Air Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1698 and 85 Stat. 464, 42 U. S. C. § 1857f-6c (1970 ed. and Supp. I). Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 507 F. 2d 905, 911-913 (1974). Section 111 (f) of the Clean Air Act, as would have been added by S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., read as follows: . “(1) No later than one year before the expiration of the period for the attainment of ambient air of the quality established for any national ambient air quality standard promulgated pursuant to section 110 of this Act, the Governor of a State in which is located all or part of an air quality control region designated or established pursuant to this Act may file a petition in the district court of the United States for the district in which all or a part of such air quality control region is located against the United States for relief from the effect of such expiration (A) on such region or portion thereof, or (B) on a person or persons in such air quality control region. In the event that such region is an interstate air quality control region or portion thereof, any Governor of any State which is wholly or partially included in such interstate region shall be permitted to intervene for the presentation of evidence and argument on the question of such relief. “(2) Any action brought pursuant to this subsection shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and appeal shall be to the Supreme Court. Proceedings before the three judge court, as authorized by this subsection, shall take precedence on the docket over all other causes of action and shall be assigned for hearing and decision at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way. “(3) (A) In any such proceeding the Secretary shall intervene for the purpose of presenting evidence and argument on the question of whether relief should be granted. “(B) The court, in its discretion, may permit any interested person residing in any affected State to intervene for the presentation of evidence and argument on the question of relief. "(4) The court, in view of the paramount interest of the United States in achieving ambient air quality necessary to protect the health of persons shall grant relief only if it determines such relief is essential to the public interest and the general welfare of the persons in such region, after finding— “ (A) that substantial efforts have been made to protect the health of persons in such region; and “(B) that means to control emissions causing or contributing to such failure are not available or have not been available for a sufficient period to achieve compliance prior to the expiration of the period to attain an applicable standard; or “ (C) that the failure to achieve such ambient air quality standard is caused by emissions from a Federal facility for which the President has granted an exemption pursuant to section 118 of this Act. “(5) The court, in granting such relief shall not extend the period established by this Act for more than one year and may grant renewals for additional one year periods only after the filing of a new petition with the court. "(6) The Secretary, in consultation with any affected State or States, shall take such action as may be necessary to modify any implementation plan or formulate any new implementation plan for the period of such extension. “(7) No extension granted pursuant to this section shall effect compliance with any emission requirement, timetable, schedule of compliance, or other element of any implementation plan unless such requirement, timetable, schedule of compliance, or other element of such plan is the subject of the specific order extending the time for compliance with such national ambient air quality standard.” This fact, as well as the “safety valve” nature of the Senate’s predecessor to the postponement provision, is also apparent from the Senate report: “Finally, the Committee would, recognize that compliance with the national ambient air quality standards deadline may not be possible. If a Governor judges that any region or regions or portions thereof within his State will not meet the national ambient air quality standard within the time provided, [§111 (f) of] the bill would authorize him — one year before the deadline — to file a petition against the United States in the District Court of the United States for the district where such region or portion thereof is located for relief from the effect of such expiration.” S. Rep. No. 91-1196, pp. 14-15 (1970). Section 110 (e), 42 U. S. C. § 1857e-5 (e), reads as follows: "(1) Upon application of a Governor of a State at the time of submission of any plan implementing a national ambient air quality primary standard, the Administrator may (subject to paragraph (2)) extend the three-year period referred to in subsection (a)(2) (A) (i) for not more than two years for an air quality control region if after review of such plan the Administrator determines that— “(A) one or more emission sources (or classes of moving sources) are unable to comply with the requirements of such plan which implement such primary standard because the necessary technology or other alternatives are not available or will not be available soon enough to permit compliance within such three-year period, and “(B) the State has considered and applied as a part of its plan reasonably available alternative means of attaining such primary standard and has justifiably concluded that attainment of such primary standard within the three years cannot be achieved. “(2) The Administrator may grant an extension under paragraph (1) only if he determines that the State plan provides for— “(A) application of the requirements of the plan which implement such primary standard to all emission sources in such region other than the sources (or classes) described in paragraph (1)(A) within the three-year period, and “(B) such interim measures of control of the sources (or classes) described in paragraph (1)(A) as the Administrator determines to be reasonable under the circumstances.” The language of § 110 (f) would also seem to support any number of successive one-year postponements, so long as application is timely. Thére is potentially some dispute as to this, however, because the Conference Committee deleted, without comment, language in the Senate predecessor to § 110 (f) that explicitly permitted successive postponements. See proposed §111 (f)(5) of the Clean Air Act, as would have been added by S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., n. 18, supra. This question is not presented by this case, and we do not decide it. We simply note the possibility of successive postponements as an additional element which would reasonably explain the imposition of harsher standards in § 110 (f) than in § 110 (e). We note, however, that there may be substantial difficulties in determining whether a proposed modification is of general or specific application. Requirements written in general terms may in fact be of very specific impact, as a result of the limited number of similar sources, or even of conscious efforts to evade restrictions on “specific” changes. For example, the regulation at issue in Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F. 2d 349 (CA3 1972), spoke of all fuel-burning equipment having a maximum rate of heat input equal to or greater than 500 million Btu per hour, and located in New Castle County, Del., south of U. S. Route 40. There was only one such installation. The Florida plan, for example, presently contains compliance schedules which specify not merely particular business operations, but also the principal emission sources within particular operations. See 40 CFR § 52.524 (c) (1974). Brief for Respondents 48-49. Respondents do not, however, suggest any statutory basis for incorporating compliance schedules into a plan once it has been approved. We know of none save the revision authority which respondents would have us declare unavailable for modifications of a specific nature. - Much of the confusion which has afflicted the Fifth Circuit and the other Courts of Appeals probably has been generated by the States’ practice of referring to exceptions from categorical limitations as “variances” rather than as “revised compliance schedules,” and also by the fact that in practice a “variance” typically has the effect of deferring the date on which compliance with categorical limitations is required. Our concern, however, is not with the nomenclature assigned to exceptions, but rather with whether they are of a nature that may be authorized as § 110 (a) (3) revisions. That an exception which does not jeopardize national standards may in effect be a deferral does not change the facts (1) that it revises a plan from one which requires a source to comply by, say, July 1972, to one which requires its compliance as of, say, May 1975, and (2) that the plan as so revised still possesses all of the characteristics which it must under §110 (a)(2). An exception which does jeopardize national standards, on the other hand, cannot be a revision because it would deprive the revised plan of a characteristic without which it cannot under the Act be an applicable plan. See § 110 (d) which defines “applicable implementation plan” as the “implementation plan, or most recent revision thereof, which has been approved under [§ 110 (a)(2)] . . . .” Such an exception must be obtained, if at all, as a postponement of the requirements of the applicable plan. The First Circuit’s decision was strongly criticized in Comment, Variance Procedures under the Clean Air Act: The Need for Flexibility, 15 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 324 (1973). The Comment was especially concerned with the conclusion that § 110 (f) was the exclusive postattainment variance mechanism, focusing on this conclusion’s lack of support in the statute and legislative history, on its inconsistency with other provisions of the statute, and on its untoward results. A second commentator, writing prior to any of the Court of Appeals decisions, reached conclusions similar to those we today express. Luneburg, Federal-State Interaction under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 14 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 637 (1973). (At the time he wrote this article, Mr. Luneburg was an attorney in the Enforcement Division, Environmental Protection Agency, Region I.) Emission limitations contained in an implementation plan may be enforced in several ways. Aside from whatever state procedures are available under the plan, § 113 of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1686, and amended, 88 Stat. 259, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-8 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), imposes a duty of enforcement on the Agency. The Agency may issue compliance orders (the violation of which carries severe monetary penalties), or it may bring civil actions for injunctive relief. In addition, § 304 of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U. S. C. § 1857h-2, provides for citizen suits against any person alleged to be in violation of an emission limitation, and against the Administrator where he is alleged to have failed to perform a nondiseretionary act. Plaintiffs in such actions may be awarded attorneys’ fees. § 304 (d). We recognize that numerous applications for changes of a specific nature have a potential for creating a different kind of problem from that posed by the formulation of general regulations. Such a problem would arise when the grant of a variance to one source would not affect national standards, but the simultaneous or subsequent grant of similar variances to similar sources could result in the plan’s failure to insure the attainment and maintenance of the standards. As we have noted in the text, however, the Agency charged with the administration of the Act, and made ultimately responsible for the attainment and maintenance of the national standards, does not view this problem as anywhere near insurmountable. Variances under § 110 (a) (3) cannot be granted until first the State, and then the Agency, have determined that they will not jeopardize the standards. • We cannot, and do not attempt to foresee, at this stage in the administration of the statute, all of the questions, to say nothing of the answers, that may arise in the allocation of a limited number of available variances. The fact that the interpretation placed on the section by the Agency may on occasion require administrative flexibility and ingenuity to a greater degree than would a more rigid alternative is not, of course, a reason for rejecting the Agency’s otherwise reasonable construction. Compare the language of § 110 (f), supra, at 75-76, and n. 14, with that of the Senate’s proposed § 111 (f), n. 18, supra. In light of our textual comments concerning respondents’ interpretation of the Conference Committee’s changes, we think that a considerably simpler and more satisfactory explanation is available. The most substantial difference between the two, other than the forum for decision, would have been that § 110 (f) is triggered by an application filed prior to the date of compliance with any requirement-of a plan, whereas fill (f) is triggered by a filing at least a year prior to the deadline for attainment. The Conference Committee’s change can be quite reasonably viewed as a recognition that the extreme circumstances justifying breach of the national standards could be present with respect to a requirement taking effect either before or after the attainment date. That might occur, for example, if technological difficulties should prevent required preattainment construction of necessary abatement equipment, or if increasing population density should eventually cause more stringent limitations to be necessary to maintain the national standards. Once it is determined that postponements should be available with regard to any requirement of a plan, and not merely to those tied directly to the attainment date, then the change from “region” and “person or persons” to “any stationary source or class of moving sources” follows rather naturally. The latter phrase is far more convenient for use in conjunction with “any requirement of an applicable implementation plan,” yet is not significantly more or less inclusive than -the former (while the final version requires source-by-source postponements, and does not provide for relief with respect to an entire region, that requirement was in any event implicit in proposed § 111(f) (4)’s conditions for granting relief; and while “class of moving sources” is less inclusive than “person or persons,” the restriction is not only sensible in light of the small emissions from any single moving source, but it also has no discernible relevance to our inquiry). Whether the Georgia variance provision meets the practicability standard with regard to preattainment variances is a different issue. It authorizes variances on the basis of conditions beyond the control of the persons involved, on the basis of circumstances which would render strict compliance “unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or impractical,” on the basis of findings that strict compliance would result in substantial curtailment or closing down of business operations, and because alternatives are not yet available. See n. 6, supra. Respondents, however, did not attack the Georgia variance procedure on this more limited ground, and we need not consider the issue. See n. 2, supra. Respondents also claim that their view of revisions is supported by the context in which the term is used in other parts of the amended Act. We disagree. Two instances, §§ 110 (a) (2) (A) (i) and 110 (c)(1)(C), are references to the revision mechanism required by § 110 (a)(2)(H), but do not suggest that there may not also be other types of revisions. The other two, §§ 110 (a) (1) and 110 (d), are entirely neutral both in terms of whether revisions are specific or general and in terms of whether they may occur independently of §110 (a)(2)(H).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WHIRLPOOL CORP. v. MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR No. 78-1870. Argued January 9, 1980 Decided February 26, 1980 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Robert E. Mann argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Ronald J. Hein, Jr., and Mark A. Lies II. Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Edwin S. Kneedler, Benjamin W. Mintz, and Dennis K. Kade. Robert T. Thompson, Stephen A. Bokat, and Stanley T. Kaleczyc filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, and Steven M. Gunn and Sharon L’Herault. Special Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Minnesota; by J. Albert Woll, Elliott Bredhoff, John Fillion, George H. Cohen, Robert M. Weinberg, Laurence Gold, and George Kaujmann for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.; and by Michael Churchill for the, Philadelphia Area Project on Occupational Safety and Health. Jeffrey B. Schwartz filed a brief for the American Public Health Association as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against any employee who exercises “any right afforded by” the Act. The Secretary of Labor (Secretary) has promulgated a regulation providing that, among the rights that the Act so protects, is the right of an employee to choose not to perform his assigned task because of a reasonable apprehension of death or serious injury coupled with a reasonable belief that no less drastic alternative is available. The question presented in the case before us is whether this regulation is consistent with the Act. "No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this Act.” I The petitioner company maintains a manufacturing plant in Marion, Ohio, for the production of household appliances. Overhead conveyors transport appliance components throughout the plant. To protect employees from objects that occasionally fall from these conveyors, the petitioner has installed a horizontal wire-mesh guard screen approximately 20 feet above the plant floor. This mesh screen is welded to angle-iron frames suspended from the building’s structural steel skeleton. 'Maintenance employees of the petitioner spend several hours each week removing objects from the screen, replacing paper spread on the screen to catch grease drippings from the material on the conveyors, and performing occasional maintenance work on the conveyors themselves. To perform these duties, maintenance employees usually are able to stand on the iron frames, but sometimes find it necessary to step onto the steel mesh screen itself. In 1973, the company began to install heavier wire in the screen because its safety had been drawn into question. Several employees had fallen partly through the old screen, and on one occasion an employee had fallen completely through to the plant floor below but had survived. A number of maintenance employees had reacted to these incidents by bringing the unsafe screen conditions to the attention of their foremen. The petitioner company’s contemporaneous safety instructions admonished employees to step only on the angle-iron frames. On June 28, 1974, a maintenance employee fell to his death through the guard screen in an area where the newer, stronger mesh had not yet been installed. Following this incident, the petitioner effectuated some repairs and issued an order strictly forbidding maintenance employees from stepping on either the screens or the angle-iron supporting structure. An alternative but somewhat more cumbersome and less satisfactory method was developed for removing objects from the screen. This procedure required employees to stand on power-raised mobile platforms and use hooks to recover the material. On July 7, 1974, two of the petitioner's maintenance employees, Virgil Deemer and Thomas Cornwell, met with the plant maintenance superintendent to voice their concern about the safety of the screen. The superintendent disagreed with their view, but permitted the two men to inspect the screen with their foreman and to point out dangerous areas needing repair. Unsatisfied with the petitioner's response to the results of this inspection, Deemer and Cornwell met on July 9 with the plant safety director. At that meeting, they requested the name, address, and telephone number of a representative of the local office of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Although the safety director told the men that they “had better stop and think about what [they] were doing,” he furnished the men with the information they requested. Later that same day, Deemer contacted an official of the regional OSHA office and discussed the guard screen. The next day, Deemer and Cornwell reported for the night shift at 10:45 p. m. Their foreman, after himself walking on some of the angle-iron frames, directed the two men to perform their usual maintenance duties on a section of the old screen. Claiming that the screen was unsafe, they refused to carry out this directive. The foreman then sent them to the personnel office, where they were ordered to punch out without working or being paid for the remaining six hours of the shift. The two men subsequently received written, reprimands, which were placed in their employment files. A little over a month later, the Secretary filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, alleging that the petitioner’s actions against Deemer and Corn-well constituted discrimination in violation of § 11 (c)(1) of the Act. As relief, the complaint prayed, inter alia, that the petitioner be ordered to expunge from its personnel files all references to the reprimands issued to the two employees, and for a permanent injunction requiring the petitioner to compensate the two employees for the six hours of pay they had lost by reason of their disciplinary suspensions. Following a bench trial, the District Court found that the regulation in question justified Deemer’s and Cornwell’s refusals to obey their foreman’s order on July 10, 1974. The court found that the two employees had “refused to perform the cleaning operation because of a genuine fear of death or serious bodily harm,” that the danger presented had been “real and not something which [had] existed only in the minds of the employees,” that the employees had acted in good faith, and that no reasonable alternative had realistically been open to them other than to refuse to work. The District Court nevertheless denied relief, holding that the Secretary’s regulation was inconsistent with the Act and therefore invalid. Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30, 32-34. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment. 593 F. 2d 715. Finding ample support in the record for the District Court’s factual determination that the actions of Deemer and Cornwell had been justified under the Secretary’s regulation, id., at 719, n. 5, the appellate court disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion that the regulation is invalid. Id., at 721-736. It accordingly remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. Id., at 736. We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 823, because the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case conflicts with those of two other Courts of Appeals on the important question in issue. See Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F. 2d 707 (CA5 1977); Marshall v. Certified Welding Corp., No. 77-2048 (CA10 Dec. 28, 1978). That question, as stated at the outset of this opinion, is whether the Secretary’s regulation authorizing employee “self-help” in some circumstances, 29 CFR § 1977.12 (b)(2) (1979), is permissible under the Act. II The Act itself creates an express mechanism for protecting workers from employment conditions believed to pose an emergent threat of death or serious injury. Upon receipt of an employee inspection request stating reasonable grounds to believe that an imminent danger is present in a workplace, OSHA must conduct an inspection. 29 U. S. C. § 657 (f)(1). In the event this inspection reveals workplace conditions or practices that “could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or before the imminence of such danger can be eliminated through the enforcement procedures otherwise provided by” the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 662 (a), the OSHA inspector must inform the affected employees and the employer of the danger and notify them that he is recommending to the Secretary that injunctive relief be sought. § 662 (c). At this juncture, the Secretary can petition a federal court to restrain the conditions or practices giving rise to the imminent danger. By means of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the court may then require the employer to avoid, correct, or remove the danger or to prohibit employees from working in the area. § 662 (a). To ensure that this process functions effectively, the Act expressly accords to every employee several rights, the exercise of which may not subject him to discharge or discrimination. An employee is given the right to inform OSHA of an imminently dangerous workplace condition or practice and request that OSHA inspect that condition or practice. 29 U. S. C. § 657 (f) (1) . He is given a limited right to assist the OSHA inspector in inspecting the workplace, §§ 657 (a)(2), (e), and (f)(2), and the right to aid a court in determining whether or not a risk of imminent danger in fact exists. See § 660 (c)(1). Finally, an affected employee is given the right to bring an action to compel the Secretary to seek injunctive relief if he believes the Secretary has wrongfully declined to do so. § 662 (d). In the light of this detailed statutory scheme, the Secretary is obviously correct when he acknowledges in his regulation that, “as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace.” By providing for prompt notice to the employer of an inspector’s intention to seek an injunction against an imminently dangerous condition, the legislation obviously contemplates that the employer will normally respond by voluntarily and speedily eliminating the danger. And in the few instances where this does not occur, the legislative provisions authorizing prompt judicial action are designed to give employees full protection in most situations from the risk of injury or death resulting from an imminently dangerous condition at the worksite. As this case illustrates, however, circumstances may sometimes exist in which the employee justifiably believes that the express statutory arrangement does not sufficiently protect him from death or serious injury. Such circumstances will probably not often occur, but such a situation may arise when (1) the employee is ordered by his employer to work under conditions that the employee reasonably believes pose an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury, and (2) the employee has reason to believe that there is not sufficient time or opportunity either to seek effective redress from his employer or to apprise OSHA of the danger. Nothing in the Act suggests that those few employees who have to face this dilemma must rely exclusively on the remedies expressly set forth in the Act at the risk of their own safety. But nothing in the-Act explicitly provides otherwise. Against this background of legislative silence, the Secretary has exercised his rulemaking power under 29 U. S. C. § 657 (g)(2) and has determined that, when an employee in good faith finds himself in such a predicament, he may refuse to expose himself to the dangerous condition, without being subjected to “subsequent discrimination” by the employer. The question before us is whether this interpretative regulation constitutes a permissible gloss on the Act by the Secretary, in light of the Act’s language, structure, and legislative history. Our inquiry is informed by an awareness that the regulation is entitled to deference unless it can be said not to be a reasoned and supportable interpretation of the Act. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555; Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356. A The regulation clearly conforms to the fundamental objective of the Act — to prevent occupational deaths and serious injuries. The Act, in its preamble, declares that its purpose and policy is “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources. . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b). (Emphasis added.) To accomplish this basic purpose, the legislation’s remedial orientation is prophylactic in nature. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U. S. 442, 444-445. The Act does not wait for an employee to die or become injured. It authorizes the promulgation of health and safety standards and the issuance of citations in the hope that these will act to prevent deaths or injuries from ever occurring. It would seem anomalous to construe an Act so directed and constructed as prohibiting an employee, with no other reasonable alternative, the freedom to withdraw from a workplace environment that he reasonably believes is highly dangerous. Moreover, the Secretary’s regulation can be viewed as an appropriate aid to the full effectuation of the Act’s “general duty” clause. That clause provides that “[e]ach employer... .shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.” 29 U. S. C. § 654 (a)(1). As the legislative history of this provision reflects it was intended itself to deter the occurrence of occupational deaths and serious injuries by placing on employers a mandatory obligation independent of the specific health and safety standards to be promulgated by the Secretary... Since.OSHA inspectors cannot be present around the clock in every workplace, the Secretary's regulation ensures that employees will in all circumstances enjoy the rights afforded them by the “general duty” clause. The regulation thus on its face appears to further the overriding purpose of the Act, and rationally to complement its remedial scheme. In the absence of some contrary indication in the legislative history, the Secretary’s regulation must, therefore, be upheld, particularly when it is remembered that safety legislation is to be liberally construed to effectuate the congressional purpose. United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U. S. 784, 798; Lilly v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 317 U. S. 481, 486. B In urging reversal of the judgment before us, the petitioner relies primarily on two aspects of the Act’s legislative history. 1 Representative Daniels of New Jersey sponsored one of several House bills that led ultimately to the passage of the Act. As reported to the House by the Committee on Education and Labor, the Daniels bill contained a section that was soon dubbed the “strike with pay” provision. This section provided that employees could request an examination by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) of the toxicity of any materials in their workplace. If that examination revealed a workplace substance that had “potentially toxic or harmful effects in such concentration as used or found,” the employer was given 60 days to correct the potentially dangerous condition. Following the expiration of that period, the employer could not require that an employee be exposed to toxic concentrations of the substancé unless the employee was informed of the hazards and symptoms associated with the substance, the' employee was instructed in the proper precautions for dealing with the substance, and the employee was furnished with personal protective equipment. If these conditions were not met, an employee could “absent himself from such risk of harm for the period necessary to avoid such danger without loss of regular compensation for such period.” This provision encountered stiff opposition in the House. Representative Steiger of Wisconsin introduced a substitute bill containing no “strike with pay” provision. In response, Representative Daniels offered a floor amendment that, among other things, deleted his bill's “strike with pay” provision. He suggested that employees instead be afforded the right to request an immediate OSHA inspection of the premises, a right which the Steiger bill did not provide. The House ultimately adopted the Steiger bill. The bill that was reported to and, with a few amendments, passed by the Senate never contained a “strike with-pay” provision. It did, however, give employees the means by which they could request immediate Labor Department inspections. These two characteristics of the bill were underscored on the floor of the Senate by Senator Williams, the bill's sponsor. After passage of the Williams bill by the Senate, it and the Steiger bill were submitted to a Conference Committee. There, the House acceded to the Senate bill’s inspection request provisions. The petitioner reads into this legislative history a congressional intent incompatible with an administrative interpretation of the Act such as is embodied in the regulation at issue in this case. The petitioner argues that Congress’ overriding concern in rejecting the “strike with pay” provision was to. avoid giving employees a unilateral authority to walk off the job which they might abuse in order to intimidate or harass their employer. Congress deliberately chose instead, the petitioner maintains, to grant employees the power to request immediate administrative inspections of the workplace which could in appropriate cases lead to coercive judicial remedies. As the petitioner views the regulation, therefore, it gives to workers precisely what Congress determined to withhold from them. We read the legislative history differently. Congress rejected a provision that did not concern itself at all with conditions posing real and immediate threats of death or severe injury. The remedy which the rejected provision furnished employees could have been invoked only after 60 days had passed following HEW’s inspection and notification that improperly high levels of toxic substances were present in the workplace. Had that inspection revealed employment conditions posing a threat of imminent and grave harm, the Secretary of Labor would presumably have requested, long before expiration of the 60-day period, a court injunction pursuant to other provisions of the Daniels bill. Consequently, in rejecting the Daniels bill’s “strike with pay” provision, Congress was not rejecting a legislative provision dealing with the highly perilous and fast-moving situations covered by the regulation now before us. It is also important to emphasize that what primarily troubled Congress about the Daniels bill’s “strike with pay” provision was its requirement that employees be paid their regular salary after having properly invoked their right to refuse to work under the section. It is instructive that virtually every time the issue of an employee's right to absent himself from hazardous work was discussed in the legislative debates, it was in the context of the employee’s right to continue to receive his usual compensation. When it rejected the “strike with pay” concept, therefore, Congress very clearly meant to reject a law unconditionally imposing upon employers an obligation to continue to pay their employees their regular paychecks when they absented themselves from work for reasons of safety. But the regulation at issue here does not require employers to pay workers who refuse to perform their assigned tasks in the face of imminent danger. It simply provides that in such cases the employer may not “discriminate” against the employees involved. An employer “discriminates” against an employee only when he treats that employee less favorably than he treats others similarly situated. 2 The second aspect of the Act’s legislative history upon which the petitioner relies is the rejection by Congress of provisions contained in both the Daniels and the Williams bills that would have given Labor Department officials, in imminent-danger situations, the power temporarily to shut down all or part of an employer’s plant. These provisions aroused considerable opposition in both Houses of Congress. The hostility engendered in the House of Representatives led Representative Daniels to delete his version of the provision in proposing amendments to his original bill. The Steiger bill that ultimately passed the House gave the Labor Department no such authority. The Williams bill, as approved by the Senate, did contain an administrative shutdown provision, but the Conference Committee rejected this aspect of the Senate bill. The petitioner infers from these events a congressional will hostile to the regulation in question here. The regulation, the petitioner argues, provides employees with the very authority to shut down an employer’s plant that was expressly denied a more expert and objective United States Department of Labor. As we read the pertinent legislative history, however, the petitioner misconceives the thrust of Congress’ concern. Those in Congress who prevented passage of the administrative shutdown provisions in the Daniels and Williams bills were opposed to the unilateral authority those provisions gave to federal officials, without any judicial safeguards, drastically to impair the operation of an employer’s business. Congressional opponents also feared that the provisions might jeopardize the Government’s otherwise neutral role in labor-management relations. Neither of these congressional concerns is implicated by the regulation before us. The regulation accords no authority to Government officials. It simply permits private employees of a private employer to avoid workplace conditions that they believe pose grave dangers to their own safety. The employees have no power under the regulation to order their employer to correct the hazardous condition or to clear the dangerous workplace of others. Moreover, any employee who acts in reliance on the regulation runs the risk of discharge or reprimand in the event a court subsequently finds that he acted unreasonably or in bad faith. The regulation, therefore, does not remotely resemble the legislation that Congress rejected. c For these reasons we conclude that 29 CFR § 1977.12 (b) (2) (1979) was promulgated by the Secretary in the valid exercise of his authority under the Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. 84 Stat. 1590, as amended, 92 Stat. 183, 29 U. S. C. § 651 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II). Section 11 (c)(1) of the Act, 84 Stat. 1603, 29 U. S. C. § 660 (c)(1), provides in full: The regulation, 29 CFR § 1977.12 (1979), provides in full: “(a) In’addition to protecting employees who file complaints, institute proceedings, or testify in .proceedings under or related to the Act, section 11 (c) also protects employees from discrimination occurring because of the exercise 'of any right afforded by this Act.’ Certain rights are explicitly provided in the Act; for example, there is a right to participate as a party in enforcement proceedings (sec. 10). Certain other rights exist by necessary implication. For example, employees may request information from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; such requests would constitute the exercise of a right afforded by the Act. Likewise, employees interviewed by agents of the Secretary in the course of inspections or investigations could not subsequently be discriminated against because of their cooperation. “(b)(1) On the other hand, review of the Act and examination of the legislative history discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace. Hazardous conditions which may be violative of the Act wiE ordinarily be corrected by the employer, once brought lo his attention. If corrections are not accomplished, or if there is dispute about the existence of a hazard, the employee wiE normally have opportunity to request inspection of the workplace pursuant to section 8 (f) of the Act, or to seek the assistance of other pubEc agencies which have responsibEity in the field of safety and health. Under such circumstances, therefore, an employer would not ordinarily be in violation of section 11 (c) by taking action to discipline an employee for refusing to perform normal job activities because of alleged safety or health hazards. “(2) However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace. If the employee, with no reasonable alternative, refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous condition, he would' be protected • against subsequent discrimination. The condition causing the employee’s apprehension of death or injury must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real danger of death or serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels. In addition, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible, must also have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition.” As a result of this fatality, the Secretary conducted an investigation that led to the issuance of a citation charging the company with maintaining an unsafe walking and working surface in violation of 29 U. S. C. § 654 (a)(1). The citation required immediate abatement of the hazard and proposed a $600 penalty. Nearly five years following the accident, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission affirmed the citation, but decided to permit the petitioner six months in which to correct the unsafe condition. Whirlpool Corp., 1979 CCH OSHD ¶ 23,552. A petition to review that decision is pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The record does not disclose the substance of this conversation beyond the fact that it concerned the safety of the guard screen. This order appears to have been in direct violation of the outstanding company directive that maintenance work was to be accomplished without stepping on the screen apparatus. Both employees apparently returned to work the following day without further incident. See n. 2, supra. See n. 3, supra. In its petition for certiorari, the petitioner did not cite this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision as raising a question for review. Accordingly, the issue of whether the regulation covers the particular circumstances of this ease is not before the Court. This Court’s Rule 23 (1) (c) ; General Pictures Co. v. Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175, 177-179. These usual enforcement procedures involve the issuance of citations and imposition of penalties. When an OSHA inspection reveals a violation of 29 U. S. C. § 654 or of any standard promulgated under the Act, the Secretary may issue a citation for the alleged violation, fix a reasonable time for the dangerous condition’s abatement, and propose a penalty. §§ 658 (a), 659 (a), 666. The employer may contest the citation and proposed penalty. §§ 659 (a), (c). Should he do so, the effective date of the abatement order is postponed until the completion of all administrative proceedings initiated in good faith. §§ 659 (b), 666 (d). Such proceedings may include a hearing before an administrative law judge and review by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. §§ 659 (c), 661 (i). Such an order may continue pending the consummation of the Act’s normal enforcement proceedings. § 662 (b). Should the Secretary determine that “there are no reasonable grounds to believe that a violation or danger exists be shall notify the em-ployefe] ... of such determination.” § 657 (f)(1). See n. 3, supra. The petitioner has raised no issue concerning whether or not this regulation was promulgated in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 553. Thus, we accept the Secretary’s designation of the regulation as “interpretative,” and do not consider whether it qualifies as an “interpretative rule” within the meaning of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 553 (b) (A). The Act’s legislative history contains numerous references to the Act’s preventive purpose and to the tragedy of each individual death or accident. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 2 (1970) (hereinafter S. Rep.), Leg. Hist. 142; 116 Cong. Rec. 37628 (1970), Leg. Hist. 516-517 (Sen. Nelson); 116 Cong. Rec. 37628, 37630 (1970), Leg. Hist. 518, 522 (Sen. Cranston); 116 Cong. Rec. 37630 (1970), Leg. Hist. 522-523 (Sen. Randolph); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, pp. 14, 23 (1970) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.), Leg. Hist. 844, 853; 116 Cong. Rec. 38366 (1970), Leg. Hist. 978 (Rep. Young); 116 Cong. Rec. 38367-38368 (1970), Leg. Hist. 981 (Rep. Anderson); 116 Cong. Rec. 38386 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1031, 1032 (Rep. Dent); 116 Cong. Rec. 42203 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1210 (Rep. Daniels). As stated by Senator Yarborough, a sponsor of the Senate bill: “We are talking about people’s lives, not the indifference of some cost accountants. We are talking about assuring the men and women who work in our plants and factories that they will go home after a day’s work with their bodies intact.” 116 Cong. Rec. 37625 (1970), Leg. Hist. 510. House and Senate debates are reprinted, along with the House, Senate, and Conference Reports, in a one-volume Committee Print entitled Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 1971) (cited supra and hereafter as Leg. Hist.). See S. Rep. 9-10, Leg. Hist. 149-150; H. R. Rep. 21-22, Leg. Hist. 851-852. It is also worth noting that the Secretary’s interpretation of 29 U. S. C. § 660 (c)(1) conforms to the interpretation that Congress clearly wished the courts to give to the parallel antidiscrimination provision of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977; 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II). The legislative history of that provision, 30 U. S. C. §815 (c)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II), establishes that Congress intended it to protect “the refusal to work in conditions which are believed to be unsafe or unhealthful.” S. Rep. No. 95-181, p. 35 (1977). See id., at 36; 123 Cong. Rec. 20043-20044 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Church, Sen. Williams, Sen. Javits). H. R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), Leg. Hist. 893-976 (bill as reported to the House). See H. R. Rep., Leg. Hist. 831. Section 19(a)(5) of H. R. 16785, supra, Leg. Hist. 969-970 (as reported to the House floor) provided in relevant part: “The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall publish ... a list of all known or potentially toxic substances and the concentrations at which such toxicity is known to occur; and shall determine following a request by any employer or authorized representative of any group of employees whether any substance normally found in the working place has potentially toxic or harmful effects in such concentration as used or found; and shall submit such determination both to employers and affected employees as soon as possible. Within sixty days of such determination by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare of potential toxicity of any substance, an employer shall not require any employee to be exposed to such substance designated above in toxic or greater concentrations unless it is accompanied by information, made available to employees, by label or other appropriate means, of the known hazards or toxic or long-term ill effects, the nature of the substance, and the signs, symptoms, emergency treatment and proper conditions and precautions of safe use, and personal protective equipment is supplied which allows established work procedures to be performed with such equipment, or unless such exposed employee may absent himself from such risk of harm for the period necessary to avoid such danger without loss of regular compensation for such period.” The Committee Report explained the provision as follows: “There is still a real danger that an employee may be economically coerced into self-exposure in order to earn his livelihood, so the bill allows an employee to absent himself from that specific danger for the period of its duration without loss of pay. . . . Nothing herein restricts the right of the employer, except as he is obligated under other agreements, to assign a worker to other non-prohibited work during this time. This should eliminate possible abuse by allowing the employer to avoid payment for work not performed.” H. R. Rep. 30, Leg. Hist. 860. H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), Leg. Hist. 763-830 (bill as originally introduced). See H. Res. 1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), Leg. Hist. 977. 116 Cong. Rec. 38376, 38377-38378, 38707 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1004, 1005, 1008-1009, 1071 (Rep. Daniels). See 116 Cong. Rec. 38369 (1970), Leg. Hist. 986 (Rep. Perkins). Representative Daniels explained to the House why he was proposing his amendment: “The provision on employees not losing pay was so generally misunderstood that we have decided to drop it. We have no provision for payment of employees who want to absent themselves from risk of harm; instead, we have this amendment which enables employees subject to a risk of harm to get the Secretary into the situation quickly. Instead of making provisions for employees when their employer is not providing a safe workplace, we have strengthened the enforcement by this amendment provision to try and minimize the amount that employees will be subject to the risk of harm.” 116 Cong. Rec. 38377-38378 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1009. 116 Cong. Rec. 38715 (teller vote), 38723-38724 (rollcall vote) (1970), Leg. Hist. 1091, 1112-1115. Representative Daniels’ proposed amendments were never acted upon. His original bill was voted down in favor of the Steiger bill. See 116 Cong. Rec. 38704-38705 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1064 (the Chairman and Rep. Perkins); 116 Cong. Rec. 38707 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1072 (Rep. O’Hara). S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), Leg. Hist. 204-295 (bill as reported to Senate by Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare). See S. Rep., Leg. Hist. 141. See S. 2193, supra, § 8 (f) (1), Leg. Hist. 252-253. “[D]espite some wide-spread contentions to the contrary, . . . the committee bill does not contain a so-called strike-with-pay provision. Rather than raising a possibility for endless disputes over whether employees were entitled to walk off the job with full pay, it was decided in committee to enhance the prospects of compliance by the employer through such means as giving the employees the right to request a special Labor Department investigation or inspection.” 116 Cong. Rec. 37326 (1970), Leg. Hist. 416. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1765, pp. 37-38 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1190-1191. See 29 U. S. C. §657 (f). See H. R. 16785, supra n. 19, § 12 (b), Leg. Hist. 956 (bill as reported to House). Congress’ concern necessarily was with the provision’s compensation requirement. The law then, as it does today, already afforded workers a right, under certain circumstances, to walk off their jobs when faced with hazardous conditions. See 116 Cong. Rec. 42208 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1223-1224 (Rep. Scherle) (reference to Taft-Hartley Act). Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, employees have a protected right to strike over safety issues. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U. S. 9. Similarly, Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 143, provides that “the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees [shall not] be deemed a strike.” The effect of this section is to create an exception to a no-strike obligation in a collective-bargaining agreement. Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 385. The existence of these statutory rights also makes clear that the Secretary’s regulation does not conflict with the general pattern of federal labor legislation in the area of occupational safety and health. See also 29 CFR § 1977.18 (1979). See 116 Cong. Rec. 37326 (1970), Leg. Hist. 416 (Sen. Williams); 116 Cong. Rec. 38369 (1970), Leg. Hist. 986 (Rep. Perkins); 116 Cong. Rec. 38376, 38377-38378, 38707 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1005, 1009, 1071 (Rep. Daniels); 116 Cong. Rec. 38379 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1011 (Rep. Randall); 116 Cong. Rec. 38391 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1046 (Rep. Feighan); 116 Cong. Rec. 38714 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1089 (Rep. Horton). The petitioner cites two passages in the legislative debates that, at first blush, appear to suggest that Congress was also concerned with employee walkouts not accompanied by pay. One is a statement by Representative Cohelan, a supporter of the Daniels bill, that “a comprehensive occupational safety and health program . . . must permit the worker to leave his post whenever and wherever conditions exist that endanger his health or safety.” 116 Cong. Rec. 38375 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1001. The other is a statement by another Member that the Daniels bill did not authorize “strikes without pay.” 116 Cong. Rec. 38708 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1075. Read in context, however, it is clear that both statements were referring to the “strike with pay” provision contained in the Daniels bill. Deemer and Cornwell were clearly subjected to “discrimination” when the petitioner placed reprimands in their réspective employment files. Whether the two employees were also discriminated against when they were denied pay for the approximately six hours they did not work on July 10, 1974, is a question not now before us. The District Court dismissed the complaint without indicating what relief it thought would have been appropriate had it upheld the Secretary’s regulation. The Court of Appeals expressed no view concerning the limits of the relief to which the Secretary might ultimately be entitled. On remand, the District Court will reach this issue. The version contained in the Daniels bill would have authorized the Secretary to issue a shutdown order of no more than five days’ duration. See H. R. 16785, supra n. 19, § 12 (a), Leg. Hist. 955-956 (bill as reported to the House); H. R. Rep. 25, Leg. Hist. 855. As reported to the Senate, the version contained in the Williams bill limited the permissible duration of the administrative order to 72 hours and required that a Regional Director of the Labor Department concur in the order. S. 2193, supra n. 24, § 11 (b), Leg. Hist. 263-264. See S. Rep. 12-13, Leg. Hist. 152-153; S. Rep. 56-57, Leg. Hist. 195-196 (individual views of Sen. Javits). On the floor of the Senate, amendments were adopted that would have required the Labor Department official authorizing the inspector’s actions to be an official appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate and that would have mandated that the employer be given prior notice of the reasons for the shutdown. 116 Cong. Rec. 37621-37622 (1970), Leg. Hist. 499-500; 116 Cong. Rec. 37624-37625 (1970), Leg. Hist. 508-509. See S. 2193, supra n. 24, §12 (b), Leg. Hist. 562-563 (bill as passed by Senate). 116 Cong. Rec. 38372, 38376, 38378, 38707 (1970), Leg. Hist. 993, 1005, 1009-1010, 1011, 1071 (Rep. Daniels). As Representative Daniels explained: “[B]usiness groups have expressed great fears about the potential for abuse. They believe that the power to shut down a plant should not be vested in an inspector. While there is no documentation for this fear, we recognize that it is very prevalent. The Courts have shown their capacity to respond quickly in emergency situations, and we believe that the availability of temporary restraining orders will be sufficient to deal with emergency situations. Under the Federal rules of civil procedure, these orders can be used ex parte. If the Secretary uses the authority that he is given efficiently and expeditiously, he should be able to get a court order within a matter of minutes rather than hours.” 116 Cong. Rec. 38378 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1009-1010. H. R. 19200, supra n. 21, § 12, Leg. Hist. 796-798. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1765, supra n. 27, at 40, Leg. Hist. 1193. See 116 Cong. Rec. 35607, 37602 (1970), Leg. Hist. 299, 452-453 (Sen. Saxbe); 116 Cong. Rec. 37338 (1970), Leg. Hist. 425 (Sen. Dominick) ; 116 Cong. Rec. 37602 (1970), Leg. Hist. 453-454 (Sen. Schweiker); 116 Cong. Rec. 41763 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1149 (Sen. Prouty); H. R. Rep. 55-57, Leg. Hist. 885-887 (minority report); 116 Cong. Rec. 38368 (1970), Leg. Hist. 983 (Rep. Anderson); 116 Cong. Rec. 38372, 38702 (1970), Leg. Hist. 992, 1058 (Rep. Steiger); 116 Cong. Rec. 38378-38379 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1011-1012 (Rep. Randall); 116 Cong. Rec. 38393 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1050 (Rep. Michel); 116 Cong. Rec. 38394 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1052 (Rep. Broomfield); 116 Cong. Rec. 38704 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1062 (Rep. Sikes); 116 Cong. Rec. 38713 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1087 (Rep. Robison); 116 Cong. Rec. 42203.(1970), Leg. Hist. 1210 (Rep. Daniels). See 116 Cong. Rec. 37346 (1970), Leg. Hist. 448 (Sen. Tower); H. R. Rep. 55-57, Leg. Hist. 885-887 (minority report); 116 Cong. Rec. 38393 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1050 (Rep. Michel). Some of these Members of Congress expressed particular fears over the possible pressures which might be brought to bear on an inspector during a strike.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MAYO FOUNDATION FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 09-837. Argued November 8, 2010 Decided January 11, 2011 Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Matthew D. McGill, Amir C. Tayrani, and John W. Windhorst, Jr. Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Deputy Solicitor Gen eral Kneedler, Acting Assistant Attorney General DiCicco, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Teresa E. McLaughlin, and Bridget M. Rowan Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Hospital Association by F. Curt Kirschner, Jr., and Ritu K. Singh; for the Association of American Medical Colleges et al. by Jonathan S. Franklin, Robert A. Burgoyne, and Mark Emery; for BJC Healthcare et al. by Mark H. Churchill, Paul M. Thompson, Robin L. Greenhouse, and Jeffrey W. Mikoni; for the Loyola University Medical Center by Stephen B. Kin-naird, Charles E. Reiter III, and Nancy Iredale; for the University of Alabama at Birmingham et al. by Robert A Long, Jr., Michael R. Levy, Michael A. Schlanger, and Mark W. Mosier; for the University of Texas System by John P. Elwood, Barry D. Burgdorf, Donald F. Wood, and Harry M. Reasoner; and for Carlton M. Smith by Mr. Smith, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Committee of Interns and Residents SEIU et al. by Thomas M. Kennedy; and for the Doctors Council SEIU by Richard M. Betheil. Kristin E. Hickman, pro se, filed a brief as amicus curiae. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Nearly all Americans who work for wages pay taxes on those wages under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), which Congress enacted to collect funds for Social Security. The question presented in this case is whether doctors who serve as medical residents are properly viewed as “student[s]” whose service Congress has exempted from FICA taxes under 26 U. S. C. § 3121(b)(10). I A Most doctors who graduate from medical school in the United States pursue additional education in a specialty to become board certified to practice in that field. Petitioners Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, Mayo Clinic, and the Regents of the University of Minnesota (collectively Mayo) offer medical residency programs that provide such instruction. Mayo’s residency programs, which usually last three to five years, train doctors primarily through hands-on experience. Residents often spend between 50 and 80 hours a week caring for patients, typically examining and diagnosing them, prescribing medication, recommending plans of care, and performing certain procedures. Residents are generally supervised in this work by more senior residents and by faculty members known as attending physicians. In 2005, Mayo paid its residents annual “stipends” ranging between $41,000 and $56,000 and provided them with health insurance, malpractice insurance, and paid vacation time. Mayo residents also take part in “a formal and structured educational program. ” Brief for Petitioners 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Residents are assigned textbooks and journal articles to read and are expected to attend weekly lectures and other conferences. Residents also take written exams and are evaluated by the attending faculty physicians. But the parties do not dispute that the bulk of residents’ time is spent caring for patients. B Through the Soeial Security Act and related legislation, Congress has created a comprehensive national insurance system that provides benefits for retired workers, disabled workers, unemployed workers, and their families. See United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 254, 258, and nn. 1, 7 (1982). Congress funds Social Security by taxing both employers and employees under FICA on the wages employees earn. See 26 U. S. C. § 3101(a) (tax on employees); § 3111(a) (tax on employers). Congress has defined “wages” broadly, to encompass “all remuneration for employment.” § 3121(a) (2006 ed. and Supp. III). The term “employment” has a similarly broad reach, extending to “any service, of whatever nature, performed ... by an employee for the person employing him.” § 3121(b). Congress has, however, exempted certain categories of service and individuals from FICA’s demands. As relevant here, Congress has excluded from taxation “service performed in the employ of ... a school, college, or university . . ' if such service is performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such school, college, or university.” §3121(b)(10) (2006 ed.). The Social Security Act, which governs workers’ eligibility for benefits, contains a corresponding student exception materially identical to § 3121(b)(10). 42 U. S. C. § 410(a)(10). Since 1951, the Treasury Department has applied the student exception to exempt from taxation students who work for their schools “as an incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study” there. 16 Fed. Reg. 12474 (adopting Treas. Regs. 127, § 408.219(c)); see Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d), 26 CFR §31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) (2010). Until 2005, the Department determined whether an individual’s work was “incident to” his studies by performing a case-by-case analysis. The primary considerations in that analysis were the number of hours worked and the course load taken. See, e. g., Rev. Rui. 78-17, 1978-1 Cum. Bull. 307 (services of individual “employed on a full-time basis” with a part-time course load are “not incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study”). For its part, the Social Security Administration (SSA) also articulated in its regulations a case-by-case approach to the corresponding student exception in the Social Security Act. See 20 CFR § 404.1028(c) (1998). The SSA has, however, “always held that resident physicians are not students.” SSR 78-3, Cum. Bull. 1978, pp. 55-56. In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the SSA could not categorically exclude residents from student status, given that its regulations provided for a case-by-case approach. See Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F. 3d 742, 747-748. Following that decision, the Internal Revenue Service received more than 7,000 claims seeking FICA tax refunds on the ground that medical residents qualified as students under §3121(b)(10) of the Internal Revenue Code. 568 F. 3d 675, 677 (CA8 2009). Facing that flood of claims, the Treasury Department “determined that it [wa]s necessary to provide additional clarification of the ter[m]” “student” as used in § 3121(b)(10), particularly with respect to individuals who perform “services that are in the nature of on the job training.” 69 Fed. Reg. 8605 (2004). The Department proposed an amended rule for comment and held a public hearing on it. See id., at 76405. On December 21, 2004, the Department adopted an amended rule prescribing that an employee’s service is “incident” to his studies only when “[t]he educational aspect of the relationship between the employer and the employee, as compared to the service aspect of the relationship, [is] predominant.” Id., at 76408; Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i), 26 CFR § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i) (2005). The rule categorically provides that “[t]he services of a full-time employee” — as defined by the employer’s policies, but in any event including any employee normally scheduled to work 40 hours or more per week — “are not incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study.” 69 Fed. Reg. 76408; Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii), 26 CFR §31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii) (the full-time employee rule). The amended provision clarifies that the Department’s analysis “is not affected by the fact that the services performed . . . may have an educational, instructional, or training aspect.” Ibid. The rule also includes as an example the case of “Employee E,” who is employed by “University V” as a medical resident. 69 Fed. Reg. 76409; Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(e), 26 CFR §31.3121(b)(10)-2(e) (Example 4). Because Employee E’s “normal work schedule calls for [him] to perform services 40 or more hours per week,” the rule provides that his service is “not incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study,” and he accordingly is not an exempt “student” under § 3121(b)(10). 69 Fed. Reg. 76409, 76410; Treas. Reg. §31.3121(b)(10)-2(e), 26 CFR § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(e) (Example 4). C After the Department promulgated the full-time employee rule, Mayo filed suit seeking a refund of the money it had withheld and paid on its residents’ stipends during the second quarter of 2005. 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1166-1167 (Minn.2007); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. United States, Civ. No. 06-5084 (D Minn., Apr. 1, 2008), App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a. Mayo asserted that its residents were exempt under §3121(b)(10) and that the Treasury Department’s full-time employee rule was invalid. The District Court granted Mayo’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the full-time employee rule is inconsistent with the unambiguous text of §3121, which the court understood to dictate that “an employee is a ‘student’ so long as the educational aspect of his service predominates over the service aspect of the relationship with his employer.” 503 F. Supp. 2d, at 1175. The court also determined that the factors governing this Court’s analysis of regulations set forth in National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U. S. 472 (1979), “indicate that the full-time employee exception is invalid.” 503 F. Supp. 2d, at 1176; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a. The Government appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. 568 F. 3d 675. Applying our opinion in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), the Court of Appeals concluded that “the statute is silent or ambiguous on the question whether a medical resident working for the school full-time is a ‘student’” for purposes of § 3121(b)(10), and that the Department’s amended regulation “is a permissible interpretation of the statut[e].” 568 F. 3d, at 679-680, 683. We granted Mayo’s petition for certiorari. 560 U. S. 938 (2010). II A We begin our analysis with the first step of the two-part framework announced in Chevron, supra, at 842-843, and ask whether Congress has “directly addressed the precise question at issue.” We agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress has not done so. The statute does not define the term “student,” and does not otherwise attend to the precise question whether medical residents are subject to PICA. See 26 U. S. C. §3121(b)(10). Mayo nonetheless contends that the Treasury Department’s full-time employee rule must be rejected under Chevron step one. Mayo argues that the dictionary definition of “student” — one “who engages in ‘study’ by applying the mind ‘to the acquisition of learning, whether by means of books, observation, or experiment’ ” — plainly encompasses residents. Brief for Petitioners 22 (quoting Oxford Universal Dictionary 2049-2050 (3d ed. 1955)). And, Mayo adds, residents are not excluded from that category by the only limitation on students Congress has imposed under the statute — that they “be ‘enrolled and regularly attending classes at [a] school.’” Brief for Petitioners 22 (quoting §3121(b)(10)). Mayo’s reading does not eliminate the statute’s ambiguity as applied to working professionals. In its reply brief, Mayo acknowledges that a full-time professor taking evening classes — a person who presumably would satisfy the statute’s class-enrollment requirement and apply his mind to learning — could be excluded from the exemption and taxed because he is not “ ‘predominantly]’ ” a student. Reply Brief for Petitioners 7. Medical residents might likewise be excluded on the same basis; the statute itself does not resolve the ambiguity. The District Court interpreted § 3121(b)(10) as unambiguously foreclosing the Department’s rule by mandating that an employee be deemed “a ‘student’ so long as the educational aspect of his service predominates over the service aspect of the relationship with his employer.” 503 F. Supp. 2d, at 1175. We do not think it possible to glean so much from the little that § 3121 provides. In any event, the statutory text still would offer no insight into how Congress intended predominance to be determined or whether Congress thought that medical residents would satisfy the requirement. To the extent Congress has specifically addressed medical residents in § 3121, moreover, it has expressly excluded these doctors from exemptions they might otherwise invoke. See §§ 3121(b)(6)(B), (7)(C)(ii) (excluding medical residents from exemptions available to employees of the District of Columbia and the United States). That choice casts doubt on any claim that Congress specifically intended to insulate medical residents from FICA’s reach in the first place. In sum, neither the plain text of the statute nor the District Court’s interpretation of the exemption “speak[s] with the precision necessary to say definitively whether [the statute] applies to” medical residents. United States v. Eurodif S. A., 555 U. S. 305, 319 (2009). B In the typical case, such an ambiguity would lead us inexorably to Chevron step two, under which we may not disturb an agency rule unless it is “ ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U. S. 232, 242 (2004) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 227 (2001)). In this case, however, the parties disagree over the proper framework for evaluating an ambiguous provision of the Internal Revenue Code. Mayo asks us to apply the multifactor analysis we used to review a tax regulation in National Muffler, supra. There we explained: “A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.” Id., at 477. The Government, on the other hand, contends that the National Muffler standard has been superseded by Chevron. The sole question for the Court at step two under the Chevron analysis is “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 467 U. S., at 843. Since deciding Chevron, we have cited both National Muffler and Chevron in our review of Treasury Department regulations. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200, 219 (2001) (citing National Muffler); Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 554, 560-561 (1991) (same); United States v. Boyle, 469 U. S. 241, 246, n. 4 (1985) (citing Chevron); see also Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U. S. 382, 387, 389 (1998) (citing Chevron and Cottage Savings). Although we have not thus far distinguished between National Muffler and Chevron, they call for different analyses of an ambiguous statute. Under National Muffler, for example, a court might view an agency’s interpretation of a statute with heightened skepticism when it has not been consistent over time, when it was promulgated years after the relevant statute was enacted, or because of the way in which the regulation evolved. 440 U. S., at 477. The District Court in this case cited each of these factors in rejecting the Treasury Department’s rule, noting in particular that the regulation had been promulgated after an adverse judicial decision. See 503 F. Supp. 2d, at 1176; see also Brief for Petitioners 41-44 (relying on the same considerations). Under Chevron, in contrast, deference to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute does not turn on such considerations. We have repeatedly held that “[a]geney inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework.” National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 981 (2005); accord, Eurodif S. A., supra, at 316. We have instructed that “neither antiquity nor contemporaneity with [a] statute is a condition of [a regulation’s] validity.” Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 740 (1996). And we have found it immaterial to our analysis that a “regulation was prompted by litigation.” Id., at 741. Indeed, in United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U. S. 822, 838 (2001), we expressly invited the Treasury Department to “amend its regulations” if troubled by the consequences of our resolution of the case. Aside from our past citation of National Muffler, Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less deferential standard of review to Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the rules of any other agency. In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have expressly “[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.” Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U. S. 150, 154 (1999). See, e. g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212, 222-223 (1989) (declining to apply “a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power”). The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context. Chevron recognized that “[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a con-gressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” 467 U. S., at 843 (internal quotation marks omitted). It acknowledged that the formulation of that policy might require “more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.” Id., at 844 (internal quotation marks omitted). Filling gaps in the Internal Revenue Code plainly requires the Treasury Department to make interpretive choices for statutory implementation at least as complex as the ones other agencies must make in administering their statutes. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 596 (1983) (“In an area as complex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and new problems”). We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other regulations. As one of Mayo’s amici points out, however, both the full-time employee rule and the rule at issue in National Muffler were promulgated pursuant to the Treasury Department’s general authority under 26 U. S. C. § 7805(a) to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Internal Revenue Code. See Brief for Carlton M. Smith 4-7. In two decisions predating Chevron, this Court stated that “we owe the [Treasury Department’s] interpretation less deference” when it is contained in a rule adopted under that “general authority” than when it is “issued under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision.” Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U. S. 247, 253 (1981); United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U. S. 16, 24 (1982) (quoting Rowan). Since Rowan and Vogel were decided, however, the administrative landscape has changed significantly. We have held that Chevron deference is appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Mead, 533 U. S., at 226-227. Our inquiry in that regard does not turn on whether Congress’s delegation of authority was general or specific. For example, in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., supra, we held that the Federal Communications Commission was delegated “the authority to promulgate binding legal rules” entitled to Chevron deference under statutes that gave the Commission “the authority to 'execute and enforce,’ ” and “to 'prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions’ of,” the Communications Act of 1934. 545 U. S., at 980-981 (quoting 47 U. S. C. §§ 151, 201(b)). See also Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83, 87, 88-89 (1990) (applying Chevron deference to rule promulgated pursuant to delegation of “general authority to 'make rules and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions’ ” (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 405(a) (1982 ed.))). We believe Chevron and Mead, rather than National Muffler and Rowan, provide the appropriate framework for evaluating the full-time employee rule. The Department issued the full-time employee rule pursuant to the explicit authorization to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U. S. C. § 7805(a) (2006 ed.). We have found such “express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking” to be “a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment.” Mead, supra, at 229. The Department issued the full-time employee rule only after notice-and-comment procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 76405, again a consideration identified in our precedents as a “significant” sign that a rule merits Chevron deference. Mead, supra, at 230-231; see, e. g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U. S. 158, 173-174 (2007). We have explained that “the ultimate question is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to treat [the regulation] as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of ‘gap-filling’ authority.” Id., at 173 (emphasis deleted). In the Long Island Care case, we found that Chevron provided the appropriate standard of review “[w]here an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and duties, where the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency uses foil notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule, [and] where the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority.” 551 U. S., at 173. These same considerations point to the same result here. This case falls squarely within the bounds of, and is properly analyzed under, Chevron and Mead. C The full-time employee rule easily satisfies the second step of Chevron, which asks whether the Department’s rule is a “reasonable interpretation” of the enacted text. 467 U. S., at 844. To begin, Mayo accepts that “the ‘educational aspect of the relationship between the employer and the employee, as compared to the service aspect of the relationship, [must] be predominant’ ” in order for an individual to qualify for the exemption. Reply Brief for Petitioners 6-7 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i), 26 CFR § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i)). Mayo objects, however, to the Department’s conclusion that residents who work more than 40 hours per week categorically cannot satisfy that requirement. Because residents' employment is itself educational, Mayo argues, the hours a resident spends working make him “more of a student, not less of one.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 15, n. 3 (emphasis deleted). Mayo contends that the Treasury Department should be required to engage in a case-by-case inquiry into “what [each] employee does [in his service] and why” he does it. Id., at 7. Mayo also objects that the Department has drawn an arbitrary distinction between “hands-on training” and “classroom instruction.” Brief for Petitioners 35. We disagree. Regulation, like legislation, often requires drawing lines. Mayo does not dispute that the Treasury Department reasonably sought a way to distinguish between workers who study and students who work, see IRS Letter Ruling 9332005 (May 3,1993). Focusing on the hours an individual works and the hours he spends in studies is a perfectly sensible way of accomplishing that goal. The Department explained that an individual’s service and his “course of study are separate and distinct activities” in “the vast majority of cases,” and reasoned that “[e]mployees who are working enough hours to be considered full-time employees . . . have filled the conventional measure of available time with work, and not study.” 69 Fed. Reg. 8607. The Department thus did not distinguish classroom education from clinical training but rather education from service. The Department reasonably concluded that its full-time employee rule would “improve administrability,” id., at 76405, and it thereby “has avoided the wasteful litigation and continuing uncertainty that would inevitably accompany any purely case-by-case approach” like the one Mayo advocates, United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 302 (1967). As the Treasury Department has explained, moreover, the full-time employee rule has more to recommend it than administrative convenience. The Department reasonably determined that taxing residents under FICA would further the purpose of the Social Security Act and comport with this Court’s precedent. As the Treasury Department appreciated, this Court has understood the terms of the Social Security Act to “‘import a breadth of coverage,’” 69 Fed. Reg. 8605 (quoting Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 365 (1946)), and we have instructed that “exemptions from taxation are to be construed narrowly,” Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U. S. 741, 752 (1969). Although Mayo contends that medical residents have not yet begun their “working lives” because they are not “fully trained,” Reply Brief for Petitioners 13 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Department certainly did not act irrationally in concluding that these doctors — “who work long hours, serve as highly skilled professionals, and typically share some or all of the terms of employment of career employees” — are the kind of workers that Congress intended to both contribute to and benefit from the Social Security system, 69 Fed. Reg. 8608. The Department’s rule takes into account the SSA’s concern that exempting residents from FICA would deprive residents and their families of vital disability and survivor-ship benefits that Social Security provides. Id., at 8605. Mayo wonders whether the full-time employee rule will result in residents being taxed under FICA but denied coverage by the SSA. The Government informs us, however, that the SSA continues to adhere to its longstanding position that medical residents are not students and thus remain eligible for coverage. Brief for United States 29-30; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33-34. * * * We do not doubt that Mayo’s residents are engaged in a valuable educational pursuit or that they are students of their craft. The question whether they are “students” for purposes of § 3121, however, is a different matter. Because it is one to which Congress has not directly spoken, and because the Treasury Department’s rule is a reasonable construction of what Congress has said, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS v. ADAMS No. 82-11. Argued March 30, 1983 Decided June 22, 1983 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Powell and Rehn-QUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 800. William J. Cohen argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was C. Whitney Slabaugh. Robert W. Miller argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal raises the question whether notice by publication and posting provides a mortgagee of real property with adequate notice of a proceeding to sell the mortgaged property for nonpayment of taxes. I — I To secure an obligation to pay $14,000, Alfred Jean Moore executed a mortgage in favor of appellant Mennonite Board of Missions (MBM) on property in Elkhart, Ind., that Moore had purchased from MBM. The mortgage was recorded in the Elkhart County Recorder’s Office on March 1, 1973. Under the terms of the agreement, Moore was responsible for paying all of the property taxes. Without MBM’s knowledge, however, she failed to pay taxes on the property. Indiana law provides for the annual sale of real property on which payments of property taxes have been delinquent for 15 months or longer. Ind. Code §6-1.1-24-1 et seq. (1982). Prior to the sale, the county auditor must post notice in the county courthouse and publish notice once each week for three consecutive weeks. §6-1.1-24-3. The owner of the property is entitled to notice by certified mail to his last known address. §6-1.1-24-4. Until 1980, however, Indiana law did not provide for notice by mail or personal service to mortgagees of property that was to be sold for nonpayment of taxes. After the required notice is provided, the county treasurer holds a public auction at which the real property is sold to the highest bidder. § 6-1.1-24-5. The purchaser acquires a certificate of sale which constitutes a lien against the real property for the entire amount paid. §6-1.1-24-9. This lien is superior to all other liens against the property which existed at the time the certificate was issued. Ibid. The tax sale is followed by a 2-year redemption period during which the “owner, occupant, lienholder, or other person who has an interest in” the property may redeem the property. §6-1.1-25-1. To redeem the property an individual must pay the county treasurer a sum sufficient to cover the purchase price of the property at the tax sale and the amount of taxes and special assessments paid by the purchaser following the sale, plus an additional percentage specified in the statute. §6-1.1-25-2. The county in turn remits the payment to the purchaser of the property at the tax sale. §6-1.1-25-3. If no one redeems the property during the statutory redemption period, the purchaser may apply to the county auditor for a deed to the property. Before executing and delivering the deed, the county auditor must notify the former owner that he is still entitled to redeem the property. §6-1.1-25-6. No notice to the mortgagee is required. If the property is not redeemed within 30 days, the county auditor may then execute and deliver a deed for the property to the purchaser, §6-1.1-25-4, who thereby acquires “an estate in fee simple absolute, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances . ” § 6-1. l-25-4(d). After obtaining a deed, the purchaser may initiate an action to quiet his title to the property. § 6-1.1-25-14. The previous owner, lienholders, and others who claim to have an interest in the property may no longer redeem the property. They may defeat the title conveyed by the tax deed only by proving, inter alia, that the property had not been subject to, or assessed for, the taxes for which it was sold, that the taxes had been paid before the sale, or that the property was properly redeemed before the deed was executed. §6-1.1-25-16. In 1977, Elkhart County initiated proceedings to sell Moore’s property for nonpayment of taxes. The county provided notice as required under the statute: it posted and published an announcement of the tax sale and mailed notice to Moore by certified mail. MBM was not informed of the pending tax sale either by the County Auditor or by Moore. The property was sold for $1,167.75 to appellee Richard Adams on August 8, 1977. Neither Moore nor MBM appeared at the sale or took steps thereafter to redeem the property. Following the sale of her property, Moore continued to make payments each month to MBM, and as a result MBM did not realize that the property had been sold. On August 16,1979, MBM first learned of the tax sale. By then the redemption period had run and Moore still owed appellant $8,237.19. In November 1979, Adams filed a suit in state court seeking to quiet title to the property. In opposition to Adams’ motion for summary judgment, MBM contended that it had not received constitutionally adequate notice of the pending tax sale and of the opportunity to redeem the property following the tax sale. The trial court upheld the Indiana tax sale statute against this constitutional challenge. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. 427 N. E. 2d 686 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction, 459 U. S. 908 (1982), and we now reverse. II In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950), this Court recognized that prior to an action which will affect an interest in life, liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State must provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Invoking this “elementary and fundamental requirement of due process,” ibid., the Court held that published notice of an action to settle the accounts of a common trust fund was not sufficient to inform beneficiaries of the trust whose names and addresses were known. The Court explained that notice by publication was not reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of the pending proceeding and was therefore inadequate to inform those who could be notified by more effective means such as personal service or mailed notice: “Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with actual notice, we are unable to regard this as more than a feint.” Id., at 315. In subsequent cases, this Court has adhered unwaveringly to the principle announced in Mullane. In Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112 (1956), for example, the Court held that notice of condemnation proceedings published in a local newspaper was an inadequate means of informing a landowner whose name was known to the city and was on the official records. Similarly, in Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U. S. 208 (1962), the Court concluded that publication in a newspaper and posted notices were inadequate to apprise a property owner of condemnation proceedings when his name and address were readily ascertainable from both deed records and tax rolls. Most recently, in Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444 (1982), we held that posting a summons on the door of a tenant's apartment was an inadequate means of providing notice of forcible entry and detainer actions. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 13-15 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 174-175 (1974); Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U. S. 99, 102 (1966); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1956); New York City v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U. S. 293, 296-297 (1953). This case is controlled by the analysis in Mullane. To begin with, a mortgagee possesses a substantial property interest that is significantly affected by a tax sale. Under Indiana law, a mortgagee acquires a lien on the owner’s property which may be conveyed together with the mortgag- or’s personal obligation to repay the debt secured by the mortgage. Ind. Code §32-8-11-7 (1982). A mortgagee’s security interest generally has priority over subsequent claims or liens attaching to the property, and a purchase-money mortgage takes precedence over virtually all other claims or liens including those which antedate the execution of the mortgage. § 32-8-11-4. The tax sale immediately and drastically diminishes the value of this security interest by granting the tax-sale purchaser a lien with priority over that of all other creditors. Ultimately, the tax sale may result in the complete nullification of the mortgagee’s interest, since the purchaser acquires title free of all liens and other encumbrances at the conclusion of the redemption period. Since a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale. Cf. Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52, 67 (1853). When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly recorded, constructive notice by publication must be supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee’s last known available address, or by personal service. But unless the mortgagee is not reasonably identifiable, constructive notice alone does not satisfy the mandate of Mullane, Neither notice by publication and posting, nor mailed notice to the property owner, are means “such as one desirous of actually informing the [mortgagee] might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 315. Because they are designed primarily to attract prospective purchasers to the tax sale, publication and posting are unlikely to reach those who, although they have an interest in the property, do not make special efforts to keep abreast of such notices. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, supra, at 116; New York City v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, at 296; Mullane, supra, at 315. Notice to the property owner, who is not in privity with his creditor and who has failed to take steps necessary to preserve his own property interest, also cannot be expected to lead to actual notice to the mortgagee. Cf. Nelson v. New York City, 352 U. S. 103, 107-109 (1956). The county’s use of these less reliable forms of notice is not reasonable where, as here, “an inexpensive and efficient mechanism such as mail service is available.” Greene v. Lindsey, supra, at 455. Personal service or mailed notice is required even though sophisticated creditors have means at their disposal to discover whether property taxes have not been paid and whether tax-sale proceedings are therefore likely to be initiated. In the first place, a mortgage need not involve a complex commercial transaction among knowledgeable parties, and it may well be the least sophisticated creditor whose security interest is threatened by a tax sale. More importantly, a party’s ability to take steps to safeguard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation. It is true that particularly extensive efforts to provide notice may often be required when the State is aware of a party’s inexperience or incompetence. See, e. g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, supra, at 13-15; Covey v. Town of Somers, supra. But it does not follow that the State may forgo even the relatively modest administrative burden of providing notice by mail to parties who are particularly resourceful. Cf. New York City v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U. S., at 297. Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable. Furthermore, a mortgagee’s knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending. The latter “was the information which the [county] was constitutionally obliged ... to give personally to the appellant — an obligation which the mailing of a single letter would have discharged.” Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U. S., at 214. We therefore conclude that the manner of notice provided to appellant did not meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Indiana Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Because a mortgagee has no title to the mortgaged property under Indiana law, the mortgagee is not considered an “owner” for purposes of § 6-1.1-24-4. First Savings & Loan Assn. of Central Indiana v. Furnish, 174 Ind. App. 265, 272, n. 14, 367 N. E. 2d 596, 600, n. 14 (1977). Indiana Code §6-1.1-24-4.2 (1982), added in 1980, provides for notice by certified mail to any mortgagee of real property which is subject to tax sale proceedings, if the mortgagee has annually requested such notice and has agreed to pay a fee, not to exceed $10, to cover the cost of sending notice. Because the events in question in this case occurred before the 1980 amendment, the constitutionality of the amendment is not before us. The decision in Mullane rejected one of the premises underlying this Court’s previous decisions concerning the requirements of notice in judicial proceedings: that due process rights may vary depending on whether actions are in rem or in personam. 339 U. S., at 312. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 206 (1977). Traditionally, when a state court based its jurisdiction upon its authority over the defendant’s person, personal service was considered essential for the court to bind individuals who did not submit to its jurisdiction. See, e. g., Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 275 (1896); Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 320 (1890); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 726, 733-734 (1878) (“[D]ue process of law would require appearance or personal service before the defendant could be personally bound by any judgment rendered”). In Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927), the Court recognized for the first time that service by registered mail, in place of personal service, may satisfy the requirements of due process. Constructive notice was never deemed sufficient to bind an individual in an action in personam. In contrast, in in rem or quasi in rem proceedings in which jurisdiction was based on the court’s power over property within its territory, see generally Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 196-205, constructive notice to nonresidents was traditionally understood to satisfy the requirements of due process. In order to settle questions of title to property within its territory, a state court was generally required to proceed by an in rem action since the court could not otherwise bind nonresidents. At one time constructive service was considered the only means of notifying nonresidents since it was believed that “[pjrocess from the tribunals of one State cannot run into another State.” Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, at 727. See Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 255 (1907). As a result, the nonresident acquired the duty “to take measures that in some way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition.” Id., at 262. If he “fail[ed] to get notice by the ordinary publications which have been usually required in such cases, it [was] his misfortune.” Ibid. Rarely was a corresponding duty imposed on interested parties who resided within the State and whose identities were reasonably ascertainable. Even in actions in rem, such individuals were generally provided personal service. See, e. g., Arndt v. Griggs, supra, at 326-327. Where the identity of interested residents could not be ascertained after a reasonably diligent inquiry, however, their interests in property could be affected by a proceeding in rem as long as constructive notice was provided. See Hamilton v. Brown, supra, at 275; American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 61-62, 65-66 (1911). Beginning with Mullane, this Court has recognized, contrary to the earlier line of cases, that “an adverse judgment in rem directly affects the property owner by divesting him of his rights in the property before the court.” Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 206. In rejecting the traditional justification for distinguishing between residents and nonresidents and between in rem and in personam actions, the Court has not left all interested claimants to the vagaries of indirect notice. Our cases have required the State to make efforts to provide actual notice to all interested parties comparable to the efforts that were previously required only in in personam actions. See infra, this page. In this case, the mortgage on file with the County Recorder identified the mortgagee only as “MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS a corporation, of Wayne County, in the State of Ohio.” We assume that the mortgagee’s address could have been ascertained by reasonably diligent efforts. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S., at 317. Simply mailing a letter to “Mennonite Board of Missions, Wayne County, Ohio,” quite likely would have provided actual notice, given “the well-known skill of postal officials and employés in making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 397-398 (1914). We do not suggest, however, that a governmental body is required to undertake extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public record. Indeed, notice by mail to the mortgagee may ultimately relieve the county of a more substantial administrative burden if the mortgagee arranges for payment of the delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale. This appeal also presents the question whether, before the County Auditor executes and delivers a deed to the tax-sale purchaser, the mortgagee is constitutionally entitled to notice of its right to redeem the property. Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 229 (1946). Because we conclude that the failure to give adequate notice of the tax-sale proceeding deprived appellant of due process of law, we need not reach this question.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHWEIKER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. McCLURE et al. No. 81-212. Argued March 1, 1982 Decided April 20, 1982 Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Deputy Solicitor General Getter argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Edwin S. Kneedler, Lynne K. Zusman, Robert P. Jaye, and Henry Eigles. Harvey Sohnen argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Stefan M. Rosenzweig, Clifford Sweet, Sally Hart Wilson, and Gill Deford. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by David R. Brink for the American Bar Association; and by Mary Ellen McCarthy for Coalition of Senior Citizens, Inc., et al. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether Congress, consistently with the requirements of due process, may provide that hearings on disputed claims for certain Medicare payments be held by private insurance carriers, without a further right of appeal. I-H Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), commonly known as the Medicare program, is administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. It consists of two parts. Part A, which is not at issue in this case, provides insurance against the cost of institutional health services, such as hospital and nursing home fees. §§ 1395c-1395i-2 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Part B is entitled “Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits for the Aged and Disabled.” It covers a portion (typically 80%) of the cost of certain physician services, outpatient physical therapy, X-rays, laboratory tests, and other medical and health care. See §§ 1395k, 1395l, and 1395x(s) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Only persons 65 or older or disabled may enroll, and eligibility does not depend on financial need. Part B is financed by the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund. See § 1395t (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). This Trust Fund in turn is funded by appropriations from the Treasury, together with monthly premiums paid by the individuals who choose voluntarily to enroll in the Part B program. See §§ 1395j, 1395r, and 1395w (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Part B consequently resembles a private medical insurance program that is subsidized in major part by the Federal Government. Part B is a social program of substantial dimensions. More than 27 million individuals presently participate, and the Secretary pays out more than $10 billion in benefits annually. Brief for Appellant 9. In 1980, 158 million Part B claims were processed. Ibid. In order to make the administration of this sweeping program more efficient, Congress authorized the Secretary to contract with private insurance carriers to administer on his behalf the payment of qualifying Part B claims. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395u (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). (In this case, for instance, the private carriers that performed these tasks in California for the Secretary were Blue Shield of California and the Occidental Insurance Co.) The congressional design was to take advantage of such insurance carriers’ “great experience in reimbursing physicians.” H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1965). See also 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(a); S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1965). The Secretary pays the participating carriers’ costs of claims administration. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(c). In return, the carriers act as the Secretary’s agents. See 42 CFR § 421.5(b) (1980). They review and pay Part B claims for the Secretary according to a precisely specified process. See 42 CFR part 405, subpart H (1980). Once the carrier has been billed for a particular service, it decides initially whether the services were medically necessary, whether the charges are reasonable, and whether the claim is otherwise covered by Part B. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395y(a) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); 42 CFR §405.803(b) (1980). If it determines that the claim meets all these criteria, the carrier pays the claim out of the Government’s Trust Fund—not out of its own pocket. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395u(a)(1), 1395u(b)(3), and 1395u(c) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Should the carrier refuse on behalf of the Secretary to pay a portion of the claim, the claimant has one or more opportunities to appeal. First, all claimants are entitled to a “review determination,” in which they may submit written evidence and arguments of fact and law. A carrier employee, other than the initial decisionmaker, will review the written record de novo and affirm or adjust the original determination. 42 CFR §§ 405.807-405.812 (1980); McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 411 (ND Cal. 1980). If the amount in dispute is $100 or more, a still-dissatisfied claimant then has a right to an oral hearing. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C); 42 CFR §§ 405.820-405.860 (1980). An officer chosen by the carrier presides over this hearing. § 405.823. The hearing officers “do not participate personally, prior to the hearing [stage], in any case [that] they adjudicate.” 503 F. Supp., at 414. See 42 CFR § 405.824 (1980). Hearing officers receive evidence and hear arguments pertinent to the matters at issue. § 405.830. As soon as practicable thereafter, they must render written decisions based on the record. § 405.834. Neither the statute nor the regulations make provision for further review of the hearing officer’s decision. See United States v. Erika, Inc., post, p. 201. II This case arose as a result of decisions by hearing officers against three claimants. The claimants, here appellees, sued to challenge the constitutional adequacy of the hearings afforded them. The District Court for the Northern District of California certified appellees as representatives of a nationwide class of individuals whose claims had been denied by carrier-appointed hearing officers. 503 F. Supp., at 412-414. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court concluded that the Part B hearing procedures violated appel-lees’ right to due process “insofar as the final, unappealable decision regarding claims disputes is made by carrier appointees . . . .” Id., at 418. The court reached its conclusion of unconstitutionality by alternative lines of argument. The first rested upon the principle that tribunals must be impartial. The court thought that the impartiality of the carrier’s hearing officers was compromised by their “prior involvement and pecuniary interest.” Id., at 414. “Pecuniary interest” was shown, the District Court said, by the fact that “their incomes as hearing officers are entirely dependent upon the carrier’s decisions regarding whether, and how often, to call upon their services.” Id., at 415. Respecting “prior involvement,” the court acknowledged that hearing officers personally had not been previously involved in the cases they decided. But it noted that hearing officers “are appointed by, and serve at the will of, the carrier [that] has not only participated in the prior stages of each case, but has twice denied the claims [that] are the subject of the hearing,” and that five out of seven of Blue Shield’s past and present hearing officers “are former or current Blue Shield employees.” Id., at 414. (Emphasis in original.) See also 42 CFR § 405.824 (1980). The District Court thought these links between the carriers and their hearing officers sufficient to create a constitutionally intolerable risk of hearing officer bias against claimants. The District Court’s alternative reasoning assessed the costs and benefits of affording claimants a hearing before one of the Secretary’s adminstrative law judges, “either subsequent to or substituting for the hearing conducted by a carrier appointee.” 503 F. Supp., at 415. The court noted that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976), makes three factors relevant to such an inquiry: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Considering the first Mathews factor, the court listed three considerations tending to show that the private interest at stake was not overwhelming. The court then stated, however, that “it cannot be gainsaid” that denial of a Medicare beneficiary’s claim to reimbursement may impose “considerable hardship.” 503 F. Supp., at 416. As to the second Mathews factor of risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of added process, the District Court found the record “inconclusive.” 503 F. Supp., at 416. The court cited statistics showing that the two available Part B appeal procedures frequently result in reversal of the carriers’ original disposition. But it criticized these statistics for failing to distinguish between partial and total reversals. The court stated that hearing officers were required neither to receive training nor to satisfy “threshold criteria such as having a law degree.” Ibid. On this basis it held that “it must be assumed that additional safeguards would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of Part B benefits.” Ibid. On the final Mathews factor involving the Government’s interest, the District Court noted that carriers processed 124 million Part B claims in 1978. 503 F. Supp., at 416. The court stated that “[o]nly a fraction of those claimants pursue their currently-available appeal remedies,” and that “there is no indication that anything but an even smaller group of claimants will actually pursue [an] additional remedy” of appeal to the Secretary. Ibid. Moreover, the court said, the Secretary already maintained an appeal procedure using administrative law judges for appeals by Part A claimants. Increasing the number of claimants who could use this Part A administrative appeal “would not be a cost-free change from the status quo, but neither should it be a costly one.” Ibid. Weighing the three Mathews factors, the court concluded that due process required additional procedural protection over that presently found in the Part B hearing procedure. The court ordered that the appellees were entitled to a de novo hearing of record conducted by an administrative law judge of the Social Security Administration. App. to Juris. Statement 36a. We noted probable jurisdiction, 454 U. S. 890 (1981), and now reverse. HH tí v í> The hearing officers involved in this case serve in a quasi-judicial capacity, similar in many respects to that of administrative law judges. As this Court repeatedly has recognized, due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities. E. g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238, 242-243, and n. 2 (1980). We must start, however, from the presumption that the hearing officers who decide Part B claims are unbiased. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 421 (1941). This presumption can be rebutted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 578-579 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57, 60 (1972). See also In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice’”) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 (1954)). But the burden of establishing a disqualifying interest rests on the party making the assertion. Fairly interpreted, the factual findings made in this case do not reveal any disqualifying interest under the standard of our cases. The District Court relied almost exclusively on generalized assumptions of possible interest, placing special weight on the various connections of the hearing officers with the private insurance carriers. The difficulty with this reasoning is that these connections would be relevant only if the carriers themselves are biased or interested. We find no basis in the record for reaching such a conclusion. As previously noted, the carriers pay all Part B claims from federal, and not their own, funds. Similarly, the salaries of the hearing officers are paid by the Federal Government. Cf. Mar shall v. Jerrico, Inc., supra, at 245, 251. Further, the carriers operate under contracts that require compliance with standards prescribed by the statute and the Secretary. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395u(a)(1)(A)-(B), 1395u(b)(3), and 1395u(b) (4) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); 42 CFR §§ 421.200, 421.202, and 421.205(a) (1980). In the absence of proof of financial interest on the part of the carriers, there is no basis for assuming a derivative bias among their hearing officers. B Appellees further argued, and the District Court agreed, that due process requires an additional administrative or judicial review by a Government rather than a carrier-appointed hearing officer. Specifically, the District Court ruled that “[ejxisting Part B procedures might remain intact so long as aggrieved beneficiaries would be entitled to appeal carrier appointees’ decisions to Part A administrative law judges.” 503 F. Supp., at 417. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court applied the familiar test prescribed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 335. See supra, at 193-195. We may assume that the District Court was correct in viewing the private interest in Part B payments as “considerable,” though “not quite as precious as the right to receive welfare or social security benefits.” 503 F. Supp., at 416. We likewise may assume, in considering the third Mathews factor, that the additional cost and inconvenience of providing administrative law judges would not be unduly burdensome. We focus narrowly on the second Mathews factor that considers^the risk of erroneous decision and the probable value, if any, of the additional procedure. The District Court’s reasoning on this point consisted only of this sentence: “In light of [appellees’] undisputed showing that carrier-appointed hearing officers receive little or no formal training and are not required to satisfy any threshold criteria such as having a law degree, it must be assumed that additional safeguards would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of Part B benefits.” 503 F. Supp., at 416 (footnote omitted). Again, the record does not support these conclusions. The Secretary has directed carriers to select as a hearing officer “ ‘an attorney or other qualified individual with the ability to conduct formal hearings and with a general understanding of medical matters and terminology. The [hearing officer] must have a thorough knowledge of the Medicare program and the statutory authority and regulations upon which it is based, as well as rulings, policy statements, and general instructions pertinent to the Medicare Bureau.’” App. 22, quoting Dept. of HEW, Medicare Part B Carriers Manual, ch. VII, p. 12-21 (1980) (emphasis added). The District Court did not identify any specific deficiencies in the Secretary’s selection criteria. By definition, a “qualified” individual already possessing “ability” and “thorough knowledge” would not require further training. The court’s further general concern that hearing officers “are not required to satisfy any threshold criteria” overlooks the Secretary’s quoted regulation. Moreover, the District Court apparently gave no weight to the qualifications of hearing officers about whom there is information in the record. Their qualifications tend to undermine rather than to support the contention that accuracy of Part B decisionmaking may suffer by reason of carrier appointment of unqualified hearing officers. “[D]ue Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). We have considered appellees’ claims in light of the strong presumption in favor of the validity of congressional action and consistently with this Court’s recognition of “congressional solicitude for fair procedure . . . .” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 693 (1979). Appellees simply have not shown that the procedures prescribed by Congress and the Secretary are not fair or that different or additional procedures would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of Part B benefits. > h — I The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for judgment to be entered for the Secretary. ordered. o CO - Hearing officers may decide to reopen proceedings under certain circumstances. See 42 CFR §§ 405.841-405.850 (1980). Appellee William McClure was denied partial reimbursement for the cost of an air ambulance to a specially equipped hospital. The hearing officer determined that the air ambulance was necessary, but that McClure could have been taken to a hospital closer to home. Appellee Charles Shields was allowed reimbursement for a cholecystectomy but was denied reimbursement for an accompanying appendectomy. The hearing officer reasoned that the appendectomy was merely incidental to the cholecystec-tomy. Appellee “Ann Doe” was denied reimbursement for the entire cost of a sex-change operation. The hearing officer ruled that the operation was not medically necessary. The District Court recognized that hearing officer salaries are paid from a federal fund and not the carrier’s resources. McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 415 (1980). In this connection, the court referred to the judicial canon requiring a judge to disqualify himself from cases where a “ ‘lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter. ’ ” 503 F. Supp., at 414—415, quoting Judicial Conference of the United States, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(l)(b). The court found that application to hearing officers of standards more lax than those applicable to the judiciary posed “a constitutionally-unacceptable risk of decisions tainted by bias.” 503 F. Supp., at 415. Additionally, the court thought it significant that “no meaningful, specific selection criteria governed] the appointment of hearing officers” and that hearing officers were trained largely by the carriers whose decisions they were called upon to review. Ibid. “Eligibility for Part B Medicare benefits is not based on financial need. Part B covers supplementary rather than primary services. Denial of a particular claim in a particular case does not deprive the claimant of reimbursement for other, covered, medical expenses.” Id., at 416. “[Appellant] establishes] that between 1975 and 1978, carriers wholly or partially reversed, upon ‘review determination,’ their initial determinations in 51-57 percent of the cases considered. Of the adverse determination decisions brought before hearing officers, 42-51 percent of the carriers’ decisions were reversed in whole or in part.” Ibid. The court added that appellees “are not entitled to further appeal or review of the Adminstrative Law Judge’s decision.” App. to Juris. Statement 36a. The Secretary’s regulations provide for the disqualification of hearing officers for prejudice and other reasons. See 42 CFR § 405.824 (1980); App. 23-25. Appellees neither sought to disqualify their hearing officers nor presently make claims of actual bias. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34 (argument of counsel for appellees). Before this Court, appellees urge that the Secretary himself is biased in favor of inadequate Part B awards. They attempt to document this assertion — not mentioned by the District Court — by relying on the fact that the Secretary both has helped carriers identify medical providers who allegedly bill for more services than are medically necessary and has warned carriers to control overutilization of medical services. See Brief for Appellees 17-18. This action by the Secretary is irrelevant. It simply shows that he takes seriously his statutory duty to ensure that only qualifying Part B claims are paid. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395y(a) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); 42 CFR § 405.803(b) (1980). It does not establish that the Secretary has sought to discourage payment of Part B claims that do meet Part B requirements. Such an effort would violate Congress’ direction. Absent evidence, it cannot be presumed. Similarly, appellees adduced no evidence to support their assertion that, for reasons of psychology, institutional loyalty, or carrier coercion, hearing officers would be reluctant to differ with carrier determinations. Such assertions require substantiation before they can provide a foundation for invalidating an Act of Congress. The District Court’s analogy to judicial canons, see n. 4, supra, is not apt. The fact that a hearing officer is or was a carrier employee does not create a risk of partiality analogous to that possibly arising from the professional relationship between a judge and a former partner or associate. We simply have no reason to doubt that hearing officers will do their best to obey the Secretary’s instruction manual: “ ‘The individual selected to act in the capacity of [hearing officer] must not have been involved in any way with the determination in question and neither have advised nor given consultation on any request for payment which is a basis for the hearing. Since the hearings are of a nonadversary nature, be particularly responsive to the needs of unrepresented parties and protect the claimant’s rights, even if the claimant is represented by counsel. The parties’ interests must be safeguarded to the full extent of their rights; in like manner, the government’s interest must be protected. “ ‘The [hearing officer] should conduct the hearing with dignity and exercise necessary control and order. . . . The [hearing officer] must make independent and impartial decisions, write clear and concise statements of facts and law, secure facts from individuals without causing unnecessary friction, and be objective and free of any influence which might affect impartial judgment as to the facts, while being particularly patient with older persons and those with physical or mental impairments. “ ‘The [hearing officer] must be cognizant of the informal nature of a Part B hearing .... The hearing is nonadversary in nature in that neither the carrier nor the Medicare Bureau is in opposition to the party but is interested only in seeing that a proper decision is made.’” App. 22, 31-32, quoting Dept. of HEW, Medicare Part B Carriers Manual, ch. XII, pp. 12-21, 12-29 (1980). Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 403 (1971) (“congressional plan” is that social security administrative system will operate essentially “as an adjudicator and not as an advocate or adversary”). The claim determination and appeal process available for Part A claims differs from the Part B procedure. See generally 42 CFR part 405, sub-part G (1980), as amended, 45 Fed. Reg. 73932-73933 (1980). See also United States v. Erika, Inc., post, at 206-207, and nn. 8 and 9. No authoritative factual findings were made, and perhaps this conclusion would have been difficult to prove. It is known that in 1980 about 158 million Part B claims — up from 124 million in 1978 — were filed. Even though the additional review would be available only for disputes in excess of $100, a small percentage of the number of claims would be large in terms of number of cases. The District Court’s opinion may be read as requiring that hearing officers always be attorneys. Our cases, however, make clear that due process does not make such a uniform requirement. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 499 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 486, 489 (1972). Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 271 (1970). Neither the District Court in its opinion nor the appellees before us make a particularized showing of the additional value of a law degree in the Part B context. The record contains information on nine hearing officers. Two were retired administrative law judges with 15 to 18 years of judging experience, five had extensive experience in medicine or medical insurance, one had been a practicing attorney for 20 years, and one was an attorney with 42 years’ experience in the insurance industry who was self-employed as an insurance adjuster. Record, App. to Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 626, 661-662, 682-685.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CROWN COAT FRONT CO., INC. v. UNITED STATES. No. 371. Argued February 13-14, 1967. Decided April 10, 1967. Edwin J. McDermott, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. David L. Rose argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Sanders and Richard A. Posner. Thomas Kiernan filed a brief, as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court., The standard disputes clause in government contracts requires that “any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract,” not disposed of by agreement, shall be decided by the contracting officer, with the right of appeal within 30 days to the depártment head or his representative (normally a board of contract appeals) whose decision shall be final “unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith.” The “arising under” claims subject to final administrative determination are those claims asserted under other clauses of the contract calling for equitable adjustment of the purchase price or extensions of time upon the occurrence of certain events. One of these clauses is the so-called “changes” clause which permits the contracting officer to make changes within the scope of the contract, provides that if any change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for the performance of, the work, “an equitable adjustment shall be made in the contract price or delivery schedule,” and states that failure to agree upon an adjustment shall be a question of fact within the meaning of the disputes clause. This case involves a claim for an equitable adjustment, asserted under the changes clause and rejected by the contracting officer and the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The contractor brought suit in the District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1346 alleging that the decision of the Board was arbitrary, capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. The District Court dismissed the case as barred by 28 U. S. ;C. § 2401 (a) which provides that “Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues . . . 'The principal question here is whether the “right of action” with respect to a claim within the disputes clause first accrues at the time of the final administrative action or at an earlier date. The facts are quite simple. On May 14, 1956, petitioner contracted with the United States to furnish a spécified number of canteen covers which were to be lined with mildew-resistant felt of certain specifications.' The Government, which was authorized to inspect materials to be used under the contract, tested and rejected certain samples of felt purchased- by petitioner because they allegedly did not contain the contract quantities of mildew inhibitors. Petitioner agreed to a price reduction, however, and was permitted to complete the contract. Final delivery, originally scheduled for October 11, 1956, was made on December 14, 1956. Allegedly, in March 1959, petitioner' first, discovered the nature of the tests which the United States had performed on the felt. Claiming that the use of such tests was not within the contemplation of the contract and constituted a change in contract specifications, petitioner filed a claim with the contracting officer in October 1961, demanding an equitable adjustment in the contract price in the form of a refund of the price reduction and compensation for increased costs occasioned by substantial delay resulting from the Government's rejection of the felt samples. The contracting officer denied the claim. On February 28, 1963/ the Board of Contract Appeals affirmed the contracting officer's decision. On July 31, 1963, more than six years after 'petitioner had completed performance of the contract, petitioner brought suit in the District Court alleging that the. Board’s decision was capricious, arbitrary and not supported by substantial evidence and that it was entitled to. an equitable adjustment as provided ill the contract. The United States, among other things, denied that the claim was within the disputes clause and asserted that the suit was time-barred by § 2401 (a). Without deciding whether the claim arose under the contract within the meaning of the disputes clause, the Dis- ■ trict Court dismissed the suit as barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed in a five-to-four decision. 363 F. 2d 407. Relying an McMahon v. United States, 342 U. S. 25, and its own decision in States Marine Corp. of Delaware v. United States, 283 F. 2d 776, which arose under the . Suits in Admiralty Act, the majority below concluded that the right of action first accrued no later than December 14, 1956, the date of the final delivery of the disputed canteen covers, and was therefore time-barred by § 2401 (a). The court disagreed with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Northern Metal Co. v. United States, 350 F. 2d 833, which, like States Marine, supra, involved the Suits in Admiralty Act. 41 Stat. 525, as amended. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit •had agreed with States Marine as to when the time bar begins to run but had held that the statute was tolled during the pendency of the administrative proceedings. Because of this apparent conflict, we granted certiorari, 385 U. S. 811. We reverse. Since the decision below, the Court of Claims has decided Nager Electric Co., Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 234, 368 F. 2d 847, a unanimous decision by that court supported by an exhaustive opinion by JudgeJDavis dealing with the application of the “first accrual” language of 28 U. S. C. § 2501 to both breach and disputes clause - claims under the typical government contract. The con-' elusion of the Court of Claims was that it would adhere to what it considered to be its long-standing rule: (1) when administrative proceedings with respect to a ^contractor’s claim subject to the disputes clause extend beyond the completion of the contract, his right of action first accrues when the administrative action is final, and not before, •and (2) when the contractor has breach claims as well as disputes clause claims the statute begins to run on breach claims as well only at the conclusion of administrative action on the claims arising under the contract. As will be evident below, we . do not reach the question of breach claims in this case. But with respect to claims arising under the contract, such as one asserted under the changes clause, we agree with the Court of Claims and essentially for the reasons which that court articulated. 1. We start with the obvious: Section 2401 (a) provides a time limit upon bringing civil actions against thedjnited States. The' “civil action”, referred to is a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction. ‘ Cf. Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States, 345 U. S. 59. Such a civil suit is seemingly, barred if the right-to bring it first accrued more than six years prior to the date of filing the suit. Our initial inquiry is, therefore, when the right of the contractor in this case to bring suit in the District Court first accrued. In our opinion, if its claim arose under thie contract, it first accrued at the time of the final decision of the Armed Services Board. of Contract Appeals, that is, upon the completion of the administrative proceedings contemplated and required by the' provisions of the contract. With respect to claims arising under the typical government contract, the contractor has agreed in effect to convert what otherwise might be claims for breach of contract into claims for equitable adjustment. The changes clause, for example, permits the Government to make changes in contract specifications. Such changes are not breaches of contract. They do give rise to claims for equitable adjustments which the Government agrees to make, if the cost of performance is increased or the time for performance changed. But whether and to what extent an adjustment is required are questions to be answered by the methods provided in the contract itself. The contractor must present his claim to the contracting officer, whose decision is final unless appealed for final action by the department head or his representative,, here the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. Until that Board has acted, the contractor’s claim is not subject to adjudication in the courts. Until then, he has only the right to have the existence and extent of his claimed adjustment determined by the administrative process agreed upon. But, as we have said, the “right of action” of which § 2401 (a) speaks is not the right to administrative action but the right to file a civil action in the courts against the United States. Under the contract we have here, the contractor’s claim was subject only to administrative, not judicial, determination in the first instance, with the right to resort to the courts only upon the making of that administrative determination. It is now crystal clear thát the contractor must seek the relief provided for under the contract or be barred from any relief in the courts. In United States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U. S. 234, the question was whether a contractor’s failure to exhaust the administrative appeal provisions of a government construction contract bars him from-bringing suit in the Court of Claims to recover damages. The Court held that it did. According to the Court,, the disputes clause “is a clear, unambiguous provision applicable at all times and binding on all parties to the contract. No court is justified in disregarding its letter or spirit.... It creates a mechanism whereby adjustments may be made and errors ..corrected on an administrative level, thereby permitting the Government to mitigate or avoid large damage claims that might otherwise be created. United States v. Blair, 321 U. S. 730, 735. This mechanism, moreover, is exclusive in nature. Solely through its operation may claims be made and adjudicated as to matters arising under the contract. . . . And in the absence of some clear evidence that the appeal procedure is inadequate or unavailable, that procedure must be pursued and exhausted, before a con tractor, can be heard to complain in a court.” 328 U. S. 234, 239-240. See also United States v. Blair, 321 U. S. 730, and United States v. Callahan Walker Co., 317 U. S. 56, 61, where the disputes clause procedures are described ag the “only avenue for relief.” 2. .Even when the contractual scheme has run its course and the contractor is free to file his suit ip court, he is not entitled to demand a de novo determination of his claim for an equitable adjustment. The evidence in support of his case must have been presented administratively and the record there made will be the record before the reviewing court. United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 709; United States v. Utah Construction Co., 384 U. S. 394. The court performs principally a reviewing function* Only if it is alleged, and proved that the administrative determination was arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence may the court refuse to honor it. This much is clear not only from the disputes clause itself but from the Wunderlich Act. In that statute, entitled “An Act to permit review . . . ,” 68 Stat. 81, Congress widened the scope of judicial review but. at the same time recognized the finality of the administrative decision absent the specified grounds for setting it aside. The focus of the court action is the validity' of the administrative decision. . Until that decision is made, the contractor cannot know what claim he has or on what grounds administrative action may be vulnerable. It is only then that his claim or right to bring a civil action against the United States matures and, as the .Court of Claims said, that he has “the right to demand payment . . . the hallmark of accrual of a claim in this court.” 177 Ct. CL, at 252, 368 F. 2d, at 859.' 3. Tp hold that the six-year time period runs from the completion of the contract, as the Government insists, would have unfortunate impact. The contractor is compelled to resort to administrative proceedings which may be protracted and which may last not only beyond the completion of the contract but continue for more than six years thereafter. If the time bar starts running from the completion date, the contractor could, thus be barred from the courts by the time his administrative appeal is finally decided. This would be true whether he wins or loses before the board of appeals. Even if he prevailed there and was granted the equitable adjustment he sought, the Government would be immune from suit to enforce the award if more than six years had passed since the completion of the contract. This is not an appealing result, nor, in our view, one that Congress intended. The Wunderlich Act evidences a congressional purpose to. insure adequate judicial review of administrative decisions on claims arising under government contracts; it is very doubtful that it anticipated no review at all if administrative proceedings, compulsory on the contractor, continued for more than six years beyond the contract’s completion date. The Government suggests that the contractor, may easily avoid such untoward results by the timely filing of a protective suit which could remain inactive pending the conclusion of administrative proceedings. But the contractor is not legally entitled to ask the courts to adjudicate his claim as an original matter. Nor-can'he-sensibly ask- the courts to review a decision which has not yet been made. He cannot, with honesty, make the necessary allegations to support an action for review until the administrative process is completed and the agency decision known. Since it would remain quiescent until the administrative decision is rendered, the protective suit would be a sheer formality in any event — a procedural trap for the unwary and an additional complication for those who - manage the dockets of the courts. Certainly it would be no help to those contractors fbr whom it is already too late to file such a suit, which is true of the petitioner in this case. 4. The Government challenges what the Court of Claims in Nager Electric considered to be the long-standing rule found in its own past cases. It asserts that many of the cases from which the purported rule was sifted do not involve the standard disputes clause and those that do state the rule by way of dictum only. But we think the Court of Claims fairly reflected the thrust and tenor of its prior opinions. At least, based on those eases, the ordinary contractor would have been wholly justified in concluding that he had six years from the conclusion of administrative proceedings to file his suit. Nor, aside from the decision in this case, have we been cited to any court of appeals decisions in Tucker Act (24 Stat. 505) cases, which are contrary to the rule followed by the Court of Claims. 5. This brings us to the cases in this Court upon which the Government and the Court of Appeals have relied: McMahon v. United States, 342 U. S. 25; Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270; and Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States, 345 U. S. 59. None of them was a Tucker Act suit involving a disputes clause claim. McMahon was an action brought by an injured seaman against the United States for negligence and unseaworthiness. The Suits in Admiralty Act requires actions to be brought within two years after . “the cause of action arises.” The Clarification Act, 57 Stat. 45, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1291 (a), which brought such .a seaman⅛ suit within the ambit of the Suits in Admiralty Act, permits court action only if the claim has been administratively disallowed, but sets no time within which a claim must be presented to the administrative body. The Court held that the limitations period ran from the time of the injury, not from the date of the disallowance of the claim. The Court saw no indications that Congress in passing the Clarification Act intended to postpone the usual time of accrual of the cause of action until the date of disallowance, since this would permit the claimant to postpone indefinitely the commencement of the running of the statutory period. The Court has pointed out before, however, the hazards •inherent in attempting to define for all purposes when a ' “cause of action” first “accrues.” Such words are to be “interpreted in the light of the general purposes of the statute and of its other provisions, and with due regard to those practical ends which are to be served by any limitation of the time within which an action must be brought.” Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U. S. 58, 62; see also United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 748. Cases under the Suits in Admiralty Act do not necessarily rule Tucker Act claims. .The purpose of the Clarification Act was to prevent • unnecessary litigation by providing for notice of injury to the United States and for the opportunity to settle claims administratively. But while suit was permitted only if a claim had-been “disallowed,” the applicable regulations provided that if a claim was not rejected within 60 days after filing, it would be deemed to have been administratively disallowed and the claimant would be free to enforce his claim. There was no chance for administrative action to consume the entire limitations period and therefore bar all resort to the courts. In disputes clause cases, however, final administrative action, which the claimant must await, may occur more than six years after the completion of the contract. When it does, the claimant would be time-barred if the six-year period is measured from the date of final performance. Nor does the claimant in cases like the one before us have unlimited discretion as to when to file his claim. The standard changes clause requires him to present his claim within 30 days and most other clauses in government contracts calling for an equitable adjustment also contain their own time limitations. Where this is not true, the contractor cannot delay unreasonably in presenting his claim. This is the rule thei Court of Claims follows. See Nager Electric, supra, 177 Ct. Cl., at 259, 368 F. 2d, at 864. Nor. do Soriano or Unexcelled control this case. In Soriano the six-year time bar was held to run from the date of the requisitioning of foodstuffs and equipment by Philippine guerrilla forces and not from , the date of the disallowance of a claim filed with the Army Claims Service. The majority in that case expressly held that the .administrative action was not a prerequisite to suit in the Court'of Claims. Likewise, in Unexcelled, where the statutory period was held to run- from the date of the breach of statutory duty- under the Walsh-Healey Act (49 Stat. 2036), rather than from the date'of the admin- . istrative determination of the liquidated damages due the Government, it seems apparent that the United States, to which damages were payable, could have brought suit without first resorting to administrative remedies. 6. Finally, the Government relies on Public Law 89-505, 80 Stat. 304, 28 U. S. C. § 2415 (1964 ed., Supp. II), enacted on July 18, 1966, which for the first time established a general statute of limitations on government tort claims and on suits by the Government for money damages founded on any contract, express or implied. Such suits must now be brought within “six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law.” As an example of such administrative proceedings, the relevant committee reports and hearings mentioned the administrative proceedings required under the standard disputes clause contained in government contracts. H. R. Rep. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 4; S. Rep. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3; Hearing on H. R. 13652 before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1966). Based on this new provision, the Government argues that. Congress necessarily assumed that the right of action of the United States in disputes clause situations first accrues and the limitations period begins to run prior to the completion of administrative proceedings. Otherwise there would have been no need for the one-year period following final administrative decision in order to save actions which might otherwise be barred by the six-year limitation. What this amounts to, the Government says, is a congressional construction of the similar “first accrual” language of the older limitations on private actions contained in § 2401 (a) and § 2501. Likewise, it argues, this construction precludes holdings such as that of the Third Circuit in Northern Metal Co. v. United States, 350 F. 2d 833, to the effect that the statute is tolled during the pendency of administrative proceedings. This argument is not without force. There is no question of the power of Congress to define the limits of its waiver of sovereign immunity. But we are not convinced that Congress intended to issue any determinative construction of § 2401' in formulating and passing § 2415. Neither in the hearing on H. R. 13652 nor in the committee reports did Congress focus on the first accrual language of § 2401, on the existing construction of that language by the Court of Claims or any other court or on the situation of the government contractor desiring to sue the United States during or after the •conclusion of administrative proceedings under the disputes clause. The bill was recommended to the Congress by the Department of Justice at the time the Department was litigating Nager Electric in the Court of Claims in which the Department. ultimately took the position that the private contractor’s right of action first accrues no later than the completion of the contract. This position was rejected by the Court of Claims, in favor of what is considered to be its existing rule — that the private contractor’s right to sue on a disputes clause claim first accrues with the termination of administrative proceedings. Given the Wunderlich Act, and the prior litigative history of disputes clause issues in- this Court and in the Court of Claims, we are doubtful that Con-' gress intended to bar a private contractor’s suit on a disputes clause claim where administrative proceedings continue for more than six years after the completion of the contract. Congress understood what the impact of such a rule would be if applied to the Government and made due allowance for it by allowing the Government the one-year grace period. We see no indications that it had in -mind the private litigant whose right to sue the United States is governed by § 2401. • We are hesitant to believe that in passing a statute aimed at equalizing the litigative .opportunities between-the Government and private parties Congress consciously extended a one-year saving period to the Government to overcome the effects of protracted administrative proceedings and refused similar relief to the contractor. At least we are sufficiently doubtful that we prefer to await a somewhat clearer signal from the Congress. We therefore conclude that if the claim filed by the contractor in this case was a claim “arising under” the contract and was therefore subject to administrative determination, (1) its right to bring a civil action first accrued when the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals finally ruled on its claim and (2) its suit in the District Court was timely filed. The Government in its answer to the complaint, however, denied that the claim arose under the contract, characterized it instead as a pure breach of contract claim which accrued no later-than the date of the completion of the contract. The District Court did not decide this issue; nor do we. This matter will be open on remand to the District Court. If the claim is not within the disputes clause, the court may then determine whether it is time-barred. Reversed and remanded. The disputes-clause contained in the contract between petitioner and thé Government provides: “Except as otherwisé provided. in this contract, any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this .contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail or. otherwise furnish a. copy thereof to the Contractor. Within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor may appeal by mail-” ing or otherwise furnishing to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Secretary, and the decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative for the hearing of such appeals shall, unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, be final and conclusive; provided that, if no such appeal is taken, the decision of the Contracting Officer shall b'e final and conclusive. In connection' with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. ■ Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer’s decision.” For the disputes clause presently in use, see 32 CFR § 597.103-12. Claims not arising under those other clauses of the contract calling for eqüitable adjustment and therefore not within the disputes clause will sometimes be referred to herein as “breach” claims. See United States v. Utah Construction Co., 384 U. S. 394, 403-418. The record in this case, contains only excerpts from the changes clause of the contract at issue here. The standardized version of the changes clause, for fixed-price supply contracts provides, in its entirety,- that: “The Contracting Officer may at any time, by a written order, and without notice to the sureties, make changes, within the general scope of this contract, in any one or more of the following: (i) Drawings', designs, or specifications, where the supplies to be furnished are to be specially manufactured for the Government' in accordance therewith; (ii) method of shipment or packing; and (iii) place of delivery. If any such change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for the performance of any part of the work under this contract, whether changed or not changed by any such order, an equitable adjustment shall be made in the contract price or delivery schedule, or both, and the contract shall' be modified in writing accordingly. Any claim by the Contractor for adjustment under this clause must be asserted within 30 days from the date of receipt by the Contractor of the notification of change, provided, however; that the Contracting Officer, if he decides that the facts justify such action, may receive and act upon any such claim, asserted at any time prior to final payment under this contract. Where the cost of property made obsolete or excess as result of a change is included in the Contractor’s claim for adjustment, the Contracting Officer shall have the right-to prescribe the manner of disposition of such property. Failure to agree to any adjustment shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause of this contract entitled. ‘Disputes.’ However, nothing in this clause shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with the contract as changed.” 32 CFR § 7.103-2. The excerpted version of the changes clause in this case appears in the unreported opinion of the District Court, and it seems substantially identical to the full clause quoted above. Section 1346 in relevant part provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of “. . . (2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded .... upon any express of implied' contract with the United States . \ . .” Section 2501 provides as follows: “Every claim of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” Where the administrative proceedings have not extended beyond the date of completion of the contract, the Court of Claims’ rule has been that “the claim accrues, and the statutory period com-menees, at the time of completion or acceptance (if the latter is contemplated).” 177 Ct. Cl. 234, 242, 368 F. 2d 847, 853. The Court of Claims summarized its prior rulings with respect to co-existing breach and disputes cláuse claims as follows: “Reading them all together; these opinions show, we think, that where a contractor has both ‘disput'es-clause’ items and ‘breach-type’- claims under a single contract, the following standards have controlled in this court: (i) there should be only one suit to enforce the various claim-items; (ii) the contractor can bring suit on the ripened ‘breach-type’ items before completion of the administrative process on the ‘disputes-elause’ items, but if he does so he may well lose the latter claims unless he includes them (by proper amendment, if necessary, as they mature) in his court action; but (iii) the contractor need not file suit on the ‘breach-type’ items until after the end, of the administrative process, when all the items have ripened and can be included in the one petition. In sum, our rule has been that the time-bar will not fall until six years after the administrative determination, but suit can be filed earlier, with the plaintiff taking the risk that he may thereby split his cause of action.” 177 Ct. CL, at 248-249, 368 F. 2d, at 857. We do not have a situation here where the- United States refuses to process the claim in accordance with its agreement or otherwise departs from the agreed-upon scheme for settling disputed issues within the disputes clause. 41 U. S. C. §§321 and 322 provide as follows: ■ “§ 321. Limitation on pleading contract-provisions relating to finality;' standards of review. “No provision' of any contract entered- into by the United States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or ageiicy or his duly authorized - representative or board in a dispute involving-, a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any-suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, That any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence. “§ 322. Contract-provisions making decisions final on questions of law. “No Government contract-shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board.” The Committee Report on the Wunderlich Act disaffirms any intention to confer any new rights on the contractor other than the widened scope of review and refers specifically to the six-year statute of limitations barring stale suits against the Government. But the report does not suggest when the limitations period begins to run or purport to alter of ⅛. disagree with the then-extant judicial constructions of either ⅜⅞⅛¾⅛ § 2501 by .the Court of Claims or by any other eou/t. See H. R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Bess. We should in this respect heed the words of the Court of Claims: “The United States has known for decades that contract suits will be timely in this court, if they are filed within six years after the. administrative determination, and has probably acted on that assumption in keeping records and retaining evidence. On the other hand, to say abruptly at this moment that limitation runs from the contract’s completion, regardless of subsequent mandatory administrative proceedings, would undoubtedly cut off scores of contractors who, relying on our past decisions, have waited to bring suit until the ending of the administrative process. There is no adequate reason to disrupt these justified expectations.” 177 Ct. Cl., at 253-254, 368 F. 2d, at 860. The cases cited by’the Court of Claims are the following: Electric Boat Co. v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 361, 367-368, cert. denied, 297 U. S. 710; Austin Eng’r Co. v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 559, 562-564; Holton, Seelye & Co. v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 477, 501, 65 F. Supp. 903, 907; Griffin v. United States, 110 Ct. Cl. 330, 372-373, 77 F. Supp. 197, 206, rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. United States v. Jones, 336 U. S. 641; Art Center School v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 218, 226, 142 F. Supp. 916, 921; Empire Institute of Tailoring, Inc. v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 165, 168, 161 F. Supp. 409, 411 ; International Potato Corp. v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 604, 606-607, 161 F. Supp. 602, 604-605; Clifton Products, Inc. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 806, 809, 169 F. Supp. 511, 512-513; Cosmopolitan Mfg. Co. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 142, 144, 297 F. 2d 546, 547, cert. denied sub nom. Arlene Coats v. United States, 371 U. S. 818; Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 24, 29-30, 355 F. 2d 627, 631. The Court of Claims also dealt with Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 139 Ct. Cl. 642, 644, 153 F. Supp. 397, 399, a'case containing statements seemingly contrary to those found in the above cases. The Court of Claims dealt with the matter as follows: “Similarly, the contractor in the cases before us (and the mass of such cases) is not left at large to present his claim administratively ■ whenever he likes. The Disputes clause does not itself fix a time within which a disputed issue of fact must be- presented to the contracting officer, but that is not ordinarily true of the. various substantive contractual clauses which lead to equitable adjustments or. comparable relief under the contract. Those specific clauses usually have built-in time limits, and where no specific period is established in. the contract the contractor cannot delay unreasonably. Cf. Dawnic Steamship Corp. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 537, 579 (1940). Neither.this court nor the administrative tribunals have had any' great difficulty in handling belated claims by contractors under the various contract-adjustment articles.' Contractors have not been able to extend the limitations period unduly by unilaterally postponing the commencement of the administrative process.” 177 Ct. Cl., at 259-260, 368 F. 2d, at 864. The court also noted that: “The standard Changes clause in construction contracts provides that claims for adjustment must be asserted within 10 days; the Changed Conditions clause calls for an immediate notification to the contracting officer; the Delays-Damages clause contemplates a notice within 10 days of excusable delays; the Price -Adjustment for Suspension, Delays, or Interruption of Work clause sets 20 days as the normal period. See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U. S. 394, 397-399 n. 1, 416 n. 14, 86 S. Ct. 1545, 16 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1966).” Id., at 259, n. 29, 368 F. 2d, at 864, n. 29. The 30-dav period within which a fixed-price supply contractor must assert his claim for equitable adjustment arising from changes, see text above and supra, n. 3, ,may be shortened in accordance with Department procedure, 32 CFR § 7.103-2, or with negotiations, 32 CFR § 597.103-2. The congressional intent to “put the Government on a parity with those private litigants who may sue” and “to equalize the position of litigants” is sufficiently evident. See Hearing on H. R. 13652 before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 9, 11 (1966); H. R. Rep.. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 4; S. Rep. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2. Whether Congress succeeded in establishing exact equality between contractors and the Government is of course another question. In this regard, it-is interesting to note that in addition to the one year following the termination of -administrative proceedings in which the Government can institute a suit under §2415, subsection (e) of that provision provides that: “In the event that any action to which this section applies is timely brought and is thereafter .dismissed without prejudice, the action may be reeommencecl within one year after such dismissal, regardless of whether the action would otherwise then be barred by this section.. In any action so recommenced the defendant shall -not be barred from interposing any claim which would not have been barred' in the original action.” 28 U. S. C. §2415 (e) (1964 ed., Supp. II).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION CO. v. COMMERCIAL METALS CO. No. 81-622. Argued March 31, 1982 Decided April 27, 1982 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. James H. Pipkin, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Charles G. Cole, Michael R. Johnson, and Harold S. Lentz. David M. Sudbury argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Richard Gary Thomas and Robert L. Feldman. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Nelson J. Cooney, Robert A. Hirsch, Alan J. Thiemann, and Kenneth E. Siegel for the American Trucking Associations, Inc.; and by Patricia A. Smith for the Association of American Railroads. Frederic L. Wood filed a brief for the National Industrial Traffic League as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a common carrier’s violation of credit regulations issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) bars the carrier’s collection of a lawful freight charge from a shipper-consignor who, under the terms of the shipment’s bill of lading, is primarily liable for the charge. I Petitioner Southern Pacific Transportation Company (SP) is a common carrier by rail. Respondent Commercial Metals Company (Metals), a Delaware corporation with principal place of business in Dallas, Tex., is in the business of buying and selling steel goods. Petitioner instituted this action against respondent in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to recover freight charges for three cars of steel cobble shipped by rail in 1974 from Detroit, Mich., to Alhambra, Cal. Each of the three shipments was consigned by Metals to Penn Central Transportation Company, as initial carrier, under the uniform straight bill of lading prescribed by the ICC. Each bill of lading included a “nonrecourse” clause that the consignor might sign. That clause reads: “Subject to Section 7 of Conditions, if the shipment is to be delivered to the consignee without recourse on the consignor, the consignor shall sign the following statement: The carrier shall not make delivery of this shipment without payment of freight and all other lawful charges.” In each instance, respondent Metals, as consignor, failed to execute this nonre-course clause. Metals, however, already had received payment for the goods prior to shipment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, 6, 24-25; Brief for Respondent 21. The first of the three cars was tendered to Penn Central at Detroit on April 11, 1974, for transportation to Careo Steel Corporation (Careo), as consignee, in Alhambra. SP released the car to Careo on April 25 without collecting the freight charge in advance of delivery. On the same day, however, SP mailed to Careo a bill for $4,634.11, the correct amount of the charge. Careo was not a credit patron of SP and had never applied to SP for credit. SP never before had made a delivery to Careo. Nevertheless, the carrier made no investigation of Carco’s credit standing. The second and third shipments took place on May 2, 1974, when Metals consigned two other cars of cobble to Penn Central for transportation to Careo. SP delivered the cars to Careo on May 16. This time, SP released the cars only after receiving checks from Careo in the respective amounts of $5,761.79 and $2,383.67 for the freight charges. The larger amount was correct, but the smaller check should have been for $3,283.66 and thus was $900 short. On May 20, SP issued freight bills in the correct amounts to Careo. The two checks were dishonored by Carco’s bank for insufficient funds. In August 1974, after efforts to collect the unpaid freight charges from Careo had proved fruitless, SP filed suit against Careo in a California state court. Attempts to serve the summons and complaint were unsuccessful. On December 17,1976, more than 30 months after the shipments, SP notified Metals of Carco’s failure to pay the freight charges. SP requested that Metals, as the consignor who had failed to execute the nonrecourse provision in the bills of lading, pay the $13,679.56 total charges in satisfaction of its primary liability for the three shipments. This was the first notice to Metals that the freight charges had not been collected from Careo. When payment was not forthcoming, SP instituted the present action against Metals in federal court. On this record, stipulated by the parties, the District Court ruled that SP had established a prima facie case for the recovery of the freight charges from Metals. It found the charges correct and in accord with applicable tariffs and that no part of those charges had been paid. App. 22. “Absent a showing of valid and affirmative defenses,” then, Metals was liable to the carrier. Id., at 23. The court rejected Metals’ claim that the passage of time barred SP’s recovery; although Metals lacked notice until December 1976 that the charges for the 1974 shipments had not been paid, the court noted that the applicable period of limitation was three years and that the carrier had been making efforts to locate Carco and to receive payment. The District Court, however, went on to hold that Metals had established a valid equitable defense to SP’s collection of the charges by showing that SP had failed to comply with the ICC’s credit regulations promulgated pursuant to § 3(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 3(2). App. 23. See 49 CFR pt. 1320 (1981). The court was not persuaded by SP’s suggestion that Metals had failed to avail itself of its contractual opportunity for exoneration afforded by the non-recourse provision in the bills of lading. The court concluded: “The loss sustained by [SP] was due entirely to its own fault and negligence by failing to take the proper credit precautions when it delivered the goods to Careo. ... I think that it is fundamentally unfair and inequitable for the defendant in this case to pay for the gross negligence of the plaintiff.” App. 24. Accordingly, judgment was entered for Metals. Id., at 26. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that judgment. 641 F. 2d 235 (1981). Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that in the absence of a valid defense, Metals must be held liable to SP for the freight charges. Id., at 236. The court felt, however, that § 3(2) of the Act, the payment-before-delivery provision, provided a barrier to the carrier’s collection of the charges from the consignor. The implementing regulation, which modified the statutory mandate by allowing for delivery of freight on credit for up to five days, nevertheless was “quite strict.” Ibid. Thus, Metals could assert as a defense the carrier’s extension of credit to Careo without adequate precautions for a period in excess of that provided by the regulation. The court concluded: “Under these circumstances, we are compelled to hold that the carrier’s failure to comply with the applicable ICC regulations is a defense, available to [Metals], in an action by [SP] for unpaid freight charges.” Id., at 239. Because of a conflict in the decided cases, we granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 1052 (1981). HH I — ( Since 1919, the ICC has prescribed a uniform bill of lading for use on all interstate domestic shipments of freight by rail. See In re Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671 (1919), modified, 64 I. C. C. 357 (1921), further modified, 66 I. C. C. 63 (1922). The bill of lading is the basic transportation contract between the shipper-consignor and the carrier; its terms and conditions bind the shipper and all connecting carriers. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Leatherwood, 250 U. S. 478, 481 (1919). “Each [term] has in effect the force of a statute, of which all affected must take notice.” Ibid. Unless the bill provides to the contrary, the consignor remains primarily liable for the freight charges. When the ICC first promulgated the uniform bill of lading, it stated: “The consignor, being the one with whom the contract of transportation is made, is originally liable for the carrier’s charges and unless he is specifically exempted by the provisions of the bill of lading, or unless the goods are received and transported under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an exemption for him, the carrier is entitled to look to the consignor for his charges.” In re Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C., at 721. This rule has not changed over time. Recently, the ICC again observed that the consignor’s liability “is governed by the bill of lading contract between the parties and must be decided by interpreting that contract.” C-G-F Grain Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 351 I. C. C. 710, 712 (1976). Clearly, then, under the contract between Metals as consignor and SP as the carrier, the consignor was primarily liable for the freight charges in question. Just as clearly, however, Metals was in a position to effectuate its release from liability by executing the nonrecourse clause in the bill of lading. Signing that clause would have operated to excuse Metals from liability. By failing to execute the nonrecourse provision, Metals continued to be primarily liable for those charges. Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 320 U. S. 508, 513 (1944); New York, N. H. & H.R. Co. v. California Fruit Growers Exchange, 125 Conn. 241, 254-255, 5 A. 2d 353, 359, cert. denied, 308 U. S. 567 (1939). See also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron Co., 265 U. S. 59, 65-67 (1924). It is perhaps appropriate to note that a carrier has not only the right but also the duty to recover its proper charges for services performed. Id., at 65-66, and n. 3. See Pitts burgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577, 581-583 (1919). This rule of strict adherence to statutory standards is in line with the historic purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act — to achieve uniformity in freight transportation charges, and thereby to eliminate the discrimination and favoritism that had plagued the railroad industry in the late 19th century. Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U. S. 356, 361 (1943); New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U. S. 361, 391 (1906). Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly found that SP had established a prima facie case of Metals’ liability for the freight charges in question by proving that Metals had failed to sign the nonrecourse clause. This much, indeed, is conceded by Metals. Brief for Respondent 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Ill SP concedes that its failure to collect all freight charges from Carco before releasing the shipments violated the ICC regulation with regard to at least the first of the three shipments. Id., at 4, 17. See 49 CFR § 1320.1 (1981), quoted in n. 6, supra. The question, then, is whether the Court of Appeals properly found that SP’s violation of the regulation provided Metals with an equitable affirmative defense to SP’s prima facie case. A. The ICC has comprehensively regulated the extension of credit to shippers by rail carriers. See 49 CFR pt. 1320 (1981). Yet neither the statute under which the regulations were promulgated, 49 U. S. C. §3(2), nor the regulations themselves intimate that a carrier’s violation of the credit rules automatically precludes it from collecting the lawful freight charge. Nor does either contain any words of affirmative defense to a freight charge action. Indeed, to the extent the ICC has spoken to this question, it has stated: “[A] violation of section 3(2) by [a carrier], in itself, would have had no effect on [a consignor’s] responsibility for payment of undercharges.” C-G-F Grain Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 351 I. C. C., at 712. Although § 3(2) “prohibits a rail carrier from delivering freight without collecting all charges thereon[,] ... it contains no provision shielding a consignor from liability for lawful charges.” Ibid. Thus, at least in dictum, the ICC has suggested that “[t]he question of [a consignor’s] liability [under a bill of lading] does not turn on whether any provision of the act has been violated.” Ibid. We view the absence of any provision for an affirmative defense in the ICC’s credit regulations as an administrative construction of the statute that aids our determination of congressional intent. “[L]egislative silence is not always the result of a lack of prescience; it may instead betoken permission or, perhaps, considered abstention from regulation. . . . Accordingly, caution must temper judicial creativity in the face of legislative or regulatory silence.” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555, 565 (1980). We so regard the administrative silence here. When an administrative agency historically has engaged in comprehensive regulation of an industry’s credit practices, the agency’s silence regarding an affirmative defense based on a violation of those regulations must be deemed significant. B. The legislative and administrative history of the credit regulations further indicates that this silence was not inadvertent — the intent of the rules was to protect carriers, not to penalize them. Prior to 1918, the Federal Government did not regulate the extension of credit by rail carriers. Wartime regulation revealed, however, that a general requirement of payment before delivery would protect the working capital of carriers and avoid discrimination among credit recipients. Cf. Ex parte No. MC-1, 2 M. C. C. 365, 374 (1937). After the first World War, when Congress returned the railroads to private control, § 405 of the Transportation Act, 1920, 41 Stat. 479, added paragraph (2) to § 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act. See n. 5, supra. The regulations adopted by the ICC in 1920 under the statute as so amended permitted railroads to extend limited credit to shippers on a nondiscriminatory basis. The regulations have remained largely unchanged to the present time. Until 1971, no court seriously suggested that a violation of the credit regulations precluded a carrier from collecting a freight charge from the party with primary liability. Instead, a defense of estoppel based on a violation of the credit regulations was held to be inconsistent with the purpose of the regulations themselves. Courts were concerned that a rule permitting selective estoppels would defeat the antidiscrim-inatory purpose of the Act and would weaken the capital structure of common carriers. See, e. g., Western Maryland R. Co. v. Cross, 96 W. Va. 666, 673, 123 S. E. 572, 575 (1924); Chicago Junction R. Co. v. Duluth Log Co., 161 Minn. 466, 469, 202 N. W. 24, 25 (1925); East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Franklin County Distilling Co., 184 S. W. 2d 505, 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). Despite the absence of any textual or historical support for an affirmative defense in either the statute or the regulations, the Court of Appeals concluded that Metals could raise SP’s failure to comply fully with the regulations as an absolute equitable defense to SP’s freight charge action. The Court of Appeals relied primarily on what it regarded as “a closely analogous situation,” 641 F. 2d, at 237, presented in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F. 2d 56 (CA7 1971). On examination, however, that Seventh Circuit case plainly is distinguishable from the present one. The defendant there was a consignee to whom goods had been delivered under bills of lading marked “prepaid.” Relying upon the carrier’s explicit representation of prepayment, the consignee paid the amount of the freight charges to the shipper-consignor. In fact, however, the carrier had extended credit to the consignor and had failed to collect the charges within the period allowed by the regulations. When the consignor went out of business, the carrier turned to the consignee for payment. The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, held the carrier estopped. Admiral differs from this case in four crucial respects. First, in Admiral, the carrier not only violated ICC credit regulations but also made to the defendant a material misrepresentation regarding prepayment. The carrier here, in contrast, was charged solely with failure to observe the applicable ICC credit regulations. Second, in the Seventh Circuit case, the consignee-defendant had paid full freight charges to the consignor. Had the Seventh Circuit also awarded relief to the carrier, it would have “require[d] an innocent consignee to defray freight charges exactly double the amount contemplated by the applicable tariffs.” 442 F. 2d, at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring). Here, the defendant paid no freight charges; thus, an award of relief to the carrier creates no possibility of enforcing a double payment. Third, in Admiral, the grounds for equitable estoppel were created by the consignee’s payment of freight charges in detrimental reliance on the carrier’s misrepresentation. The carrier’s violation of the credit regulations offered only “additional grounds for the intervention of the principles of equity.” Id., at 60 (majority opinion). In this case, there is no suggestion that the consignor knew of, or changed its position detrimentally in reliance on, the carrier’s credit violation. Fourth, and most significant, the defendant-consignee in the Seventh Circuit case had no means by which to protect itself from freight charge liability. In this case, of course, the defendant-consignor could have protected itself completely simply by signing the nonrecourse clause in the bills of lading. C. Finally, public policy concerns disfavor judicial implication of affirmative defenses based on carrier violations of the Commission's credit regulations. We recognize that the regulations are technical. Thousands of railcars are delivered every day by the country’s railroads. See Association of American Railroads, Yearbook of Railroad Facts 25 (1981) (approximately 62,000 deliveries per day). Almost inevitably, some cars will be delivered to noncredit patrons, some freight bills will be sent out late, and some accounts will not be collected within the specified time. A 1966 study by the ICC’s Bureau of Enforcement found that almost a third of 15,751 bills examined were overdue and that over half of those overdue were delinquent more than 10 days. See In re Regulations for Payment of Rates and Charges, 326 I. C. C. 483, 485 (1966). After appraising this data, the ICC agreed that “the evidence establishes many and continued violations of the credit regulations. However, we are unable to conclude on this record that rigid rules . . . would provide a practical or desirable solution. [Tjhere are many reasons for credit violations which are beyond correction by rules, e. g., where shippers have unexpected peak workloads, where there are controversies over amounts due, where additional information is needed such as weights or evaluations, where standard office procedures are in the process of change, where temporary cash flow problems occur, and where it becomes necessary to check the validity of charges with third persons. Stringent credit rules . . . would destroy the flexibility needed to meet problems of this nature.” Id., at 489-490. Indeed, in 1980, the ICC proposed repealing the credit regulations altogether, noting that “apparent, widespread noncompliance with the regulations indicates that the payment periods and other time limits prescribed are simply not realistic for many of the situations in which they apply.” Ex parte Nos. MC-1, 73, 143, and 170, 45 Fed. Reg. 31766. It thus appears that the Court of Appeals in the present case implied an affirmative defense that would penalize railroads for violations of the credit regulations just as the agency responsible for administering those regulations was pronouncing them unrealistic. The prospect raised for the carrier is that it will be barred from recovering lawful freight charges, even from a consignor'who fails to execute the non-recourse clause, for possibly unavoidable violations of the credit rules. “The obvious consequence would be to discourage [carriers] from extending credit where the operation of this rather difficult statute is in doubt.” Bruce’s Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U. S. 743, 753 (1947). Ironically, those shippers who pay their bills currently in a responsible manner would suffer as a result. Metals argues that a ruling for SP places SP “in the unrealistic position of being incapable of doing any wrong” and therefore creates “no incentive [for carriers] to improve inefficient and careless credit practices.” Brief for Respondent 12. Metals further claims that the loss at issue here would not have occurred if SP only had complied with its obligations under the regulations. Id., at 24. The answer to this is that the ICC has ample authority to police the credit practices of carriers and thereby to deter improper practices. This authority includes the power to issue a cease-and-desist order, see Shaw Warehouse Co. v. Southern R. Co., 308 I. C. C. 609, 633-634, 637 (1959), appeal dism’d sub nom. Southern R. Co. v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 29 (ND Ala. 1960); the power to seek a federal-court injunction requiring a carrier to comply with the regulations, see ICC v. All-American, Inc., 505 F. 2d 1360 (CA7 1974); and the power to bring suit for the $5,000 civil forfeiture, provided by 49 U. S. C. § 16(8) and 49 U. S. C. § 11901(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III), for each knowing violation of an order of the Commission, see, e. g., United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 385 F. 2d 161 (CA10 1967), cert. denied sub nom. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States, 391 U. S. 919 (1968); United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 308 F. Supp. 293 (ED Pa. 1969). Thus, the ICC may regulate the credit practices of carriers even without the judicially created remedy of forfeiture of freight charges. Furthermore, a reading of the cited cases reveals that the question whether a credit violation has occurred often will require the ICC or the courts to conduct a factual inquiry as to the carrier’s intent to violate the regulations. The “credit violation defense” adopted by the Court of Appeals requires a carrier to forfeit freight charges without regard to the nature of its violation. This inflexible approach disenables courts from considering the carrier’s intent, the degree of the shipper’s fault, the effect of enforcement on the carrier’s existing permissible credit practices, and other subjective factors in deciding whether or not to enforce a shipper’s primary liability for freight charges. Metals also advances a number of “double payment” cases in support of its claim for an affirmative defense. See, e. g., Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Campbell Soup Co., 455 F. 2d 1219 (CA8 1972); Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F. 2d 56 (CA7 1971); Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Titan Industrial Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1348 (SDNY), aff’d, 419 F. 2d 835 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1042 (1970); Southern Pacific Co. v. Valley Frosted Foods Co., 178 Pa. Super. 217, 116 A. 2d 70 (1955). To be sure, these cases speak in equity terms. But none of these cases turned solely on a carrier’s violation of credit regulations. Each and all of them involved a carrier’s misrepresentation, such as a false assertion of prepayment on the bill of lading, upon which a consignee detrimentally relied only to find itself later sued by the carrier for the same freight charges. We find that these double payment cases constitute their own category and stand against the placement of duplication of liability upon an innocent party. See Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F. 2d, at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring). As we have noted above, no similar double payment liability is in prospect here. Metals, not the carrier, selected the consignee. Furthermore, Metals has been paid for its goods while the carrier has not been paid for its services. The carrier unsuccessfully has pursued its remedies against the consignee before turning to the shipper-consignor for payment. Nor had the statute of limitation run when SP finally sued Metals for payment. We, of course, are in no position to condone slipshod collection practices and a carrier’s violation of the governing regulations. But the terms of the bill of lading are specific and clear. Metals’ failure to execute the nonrecourse provision in the bill of lading specifically placed upon it primary liability for the freight charges. To permit SP’s violation of the credit regulations to be raised as an affirmative defense to its prima facie case would serve to nullify the enforceability of the nonrecourse clause. Nor do we believe that judicial implication of such a defense is necessary to encourage carrier compliance with credit rules. Railroads have real economic incentives to collect their freight charges from consignees insofar as they are able. The remedies for a carrier’s violations of the regulations are best left to the ICC for such resolution as it thinks proper. We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals erred by permitting Metáis to assert an affirmative defense against SP based on its violation of the ICC credit regulations. Such “equities” as may exist by virtue of the carrier’s delay and its violation of the credit regulations are insufficient in magnitude to overcome the time-honored rule that under such circumstances, no “act or omission of the carrier (except the running of the statute of limitations) [will] estop or preclude it from enforcing payment of the full amount by a person liable therefor.” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron Co., 265 U. S., at 65. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The shipments moved over the respective lines of the Penn Central, the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company (an SP subsidiary), and the SP. Pursuant to an interline agreement, SP has paid the other two carriers their proportionate shares of the freight charges earned on the shipments. Section 7 of the Conditions of the Bill of Lading reads in pertinent part: “The owner or consignee shall pay the freight and average, if any, and all other lawful charges accruing on said property; but, except in those instances where it may lawfully be authorized to do so, no carrier by railroad shall deliver or relinquish possession at destination of the property covered by this bill of lading until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid. The consignor shall be liable for the freight and all other lawful charges, except that if the consignor stipulates, by signature, in the space provided for that purpose on the face of this bill of lading that the carrier shall not make delivery without requiring payment of such charges and the carrier, contrary to such stipulation, shall make delivery without requiring such payment, the consignor (except as hereinafter provided) shall not be liable for such charges. . . . The term ‘delivering carrier’ means the line-haul carrier making ultimate delivery.” (Emphasis added.) SP suggests that the $900 difference was occasioned by a transposition of the initial digits. Brief for Petitioner 31, n. 21. No explanation of the one-eent variance is offered. In 1978, the Interstate Commerce Act was revised and recodified by Pub. L. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337, as 49 U. S. C. § 10101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III). Because the transactions at issue in this case took place prior to 1978, we refer to the Act in its prior form unless otherwise specified. Section 3(2) reads: “No carrier by railroad . . . shall deliver or relinquish possession at destination of any freight . . . shipment transported by it until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid, except under such rules and regulations as the Commission may from time to time prescribe to govern the settlement of all such rates and charges and to prevent unjust discrimination . . . .” The applicable regulation reads in pertinent part: “The carrier, upon taking precautions deemed by it to be sufficient to assure payment of the tariff charges within the credit periods specified in this part, may relinquish possession of the freight in advance of the payment of the tariff charges thereon and may extend credit in the amount of such charges to those who undertake to pay such charges, such persons herein being called shippers, for a period of i days (or 5 days where retention or possession of freight by the carrier until tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid will retard prompt delivery or will retard prompt release of equipment or station facilities) as set forth in this part.” 49 CFR § 1320.1 (1981) (emphasis added). In agreement with the decision of the Fifth Circuit in the present case is Brown Transportation Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 301, 241 S. E. 2d 15 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U. S. 1014 (1978) (with two Justices dissenting). The contrary result has been reached in other cases. See, e. g., Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Pacheco Int’l Corp., 488 F. Supp. 68 (CD Cal. 1979), and Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Marcelletti, 256 Mich. 411, 240 N. W. 4 (1932). There is disagreement, too, as to whether equitable defenses may be asserted in various other situations where regulated carriers seek to recover lawful tariff charges. Compare, e. g., Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Hofberger, 259 Ark. 322, 532 S. W. 2d 759 (1976), and Westover v. United Van Lines, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 865, 270 S. E. 2d 74 (1980) (defenses upheld), with Bartlett-Collins Co. v. Surinam Nav. Co., 381 F. 2d 546 (CA10 1967); American Red Ball Transit Co. v. McCarthy, 114 N. H. 514, 323 A. 2d 897 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 930 (1975); Western Maryland R. Co. v. Cross, 96 W. Va. 666, 123 S. E. 572 (1924); and Arizona Feeds v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 21 Ariz. App. 346, 519 P. 2d 199 (1974) (defenses not recognized). This division prompted one commentator some years ago to refer to the “striking lack of uniformity in decisions concerning the liability of consignors and consignees despite the obvious need for uniformity in interstate commercial transactions.” Note, Carriers: Federal Bills of Lading: Liability of Parties to a Prepaid Shipment, 38 Cornell L. Q. 596, 603 (1953). The form of the bill of lading has been modified several times since 1922, see, e. g., In re Bills of Lading, 245 I. C. C. 527 (1941), but only the 1921 and 1922 modifications affected the provisions of the bill of lading relevant to this case. Metals now asserts, as well, that SP’s actions violated § 7 of the Conditions of the Bill of Lading, see n. 2, supra, and thus constituted a complete abrogation of SP’s contractual obligations under the bill of lading. See Brief for Respondent 11. SP answers that this argument was presented to neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 4. Because the Court of Appeals did not rely on this theory to grant respondent relief, and because we did not grant certiorari to consider this breach-of-contract claim, we decline to address it. The methodology of this study was questioned by the railroads. The roads’ own figures, however, showed that of 445,984 collectible items accrued during the period of the investigation, more than 10,000 resulted in credit violations. 326 I. C. C., at 486. The facts of this case illustrate the problems that may arise when a court ventures to create law in this highly technical field. The rulings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals denied SP recovery not only for the first car, which was delivered without any payment upon the freight charge, but also for the two cars for which it did demand payment before delivery and received checks for the charges. Yet acceptance of a proper check as payment for a freight charge is an acknowledged commercial practice in the railroad industry. See Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 U. S. 520, 522 (1931); see also 49 CFR § 1320.13 (1981). It therefore is at least possible that SP’s insistence on payment by check before releasing the second and third cars constituted compliance with the regulations, which require only that the railroad take “precautions deemed by it to be sufficient to assure payment of the tariff charges.” 49 CFR § 1320.1 (1981). It is true, of course, that the check for one car was understated by $900, but, as has been noted, SP mailed a freight bill for the correct amount to Careo within four days of the delivery. See 49 CFR § 1320.5 (1981) (carrier may extend credit for up to 30 days on balance due in the event of undercharges). Furthermore, it is by no means clear that SP could safely have deferred delivery of the second and third cars until after Careo had paid the charges on the first car. The carrier’s lien for unpaid charges covers only the goods in the immediate shipment. 49 U. S. C. § 105. See Atlas S.S. Co. v. Colombian Land Co., 102 F. 358, 361 (CA2 1900). Once Careo offered to pay the charges on the second and third cars, even serious suspicion about Carco’s financial health might not have allowed SP to withhold delivery without risking liability to Careo for conversion of its goods. See 49 U. S. C. § 88 (carrier’s duty to deliver goods on demand).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 07-1601. Argued February 24, 2009 Decided May 4, 2009 Kathleen M. Sullivan argued the cause for petitioner in No. 07-1607. With her on the briefs were Crystal Nix Hines, William B. Adams, Cisselon Nichols Hurd, and Michael Johnson. Maureen E. Mahoney argued the cause for petitioners in No. 07-1601. With her on the briefs were J. Scott Ballenger, Charles G. Cole, Bennett Evan Cooper, Roger Nober, Orest B. Dachniwsky, J. Michael Hemmer, David P. Young, and Robert C. Bylsma. Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief for the United States were former Solicitor General Garre, Acting Assistant' Attorney General Guzman, Pratik A. Shah, James R. MacAyeal, Aaron P. Avila, and Patricia K. Hirsch. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, James Humes, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Gordon Burns, Deputy Solicitor General, Ken Alex, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donald A. Robinson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Ann Rushton and Janill L. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for respondent State of California. Together with No. 07-1607, Shell Oil Co. v. United States et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the Association of American Railroads by Carter G. Phillips, G. Paul Moates, and Eric A Shumsky; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Thomas C. Jackson, Robin S. Conrad, Amar D. Sarwal, Donald D. Evans, Leslie Hulse, Douglas T. Nelson, Harry M. Ng, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for General Electric Co. by Laurence H. Tribe, Thomas C. Goldstein, Michael C. Small, and Jonathan Massey; for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr., and Leon F. DeJulius, Jr.; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Lawrence A Salibra II, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 07-1607 were filed for the Civil Justice Association of California by Fred J. Hiestand; for the International Association of Defense Counsel by Mary-Christine Sungaila, Jeremy B. Rosen, Bradley S. Pauley, and Felix Shafir; and for Teck Comineo Metals, Ltd., by Theodore B. Olson, Matthew D. McGill, and Amir C. Tayrani. Joel W. Nomkin filed a brief for Newmont USA Ltd. et al. as amici curiae in both cases. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Act), 94 Stat. 2767, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§9601-9675, in response to the serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 55 (1998). The Act was designed to promote the “‘timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites’ ” and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the contamination. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. UGI Util., Inc., 423 F. 3d 90, 94 (CA2 2005); see also Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U. S. 479, 483 (1996); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F. 2d 1074, 1081 (CA1 1986). These cases raise the questions whether and to what extent a party associated with a contaminated site may be held responsible for the full costs of remediation. I In 1960, Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B), began operating an agricultural chemical distribution business, purchasing pesticides and other chemical products from suppliers such as Shell Oil Company (Shell). Using its own equipment, B&B applied its products to customers’ farms. B&B opened its business on a 3.8-acre parcel of former farmland in Arvin, California, and in 1975, expanded operations onto an adjacent 0.9-acre parcel of land owned jointly by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company and the Southern Pacific Transportation Company (now known respectively as the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company and Union Pacific Railroad Company) (Railroads). Both parcels of the Arvin facility were graded toward a sump and drainage pond located on the southeast corner of the primary parcel. See Appendix, infra. Neither the sump nor the drainage pond was lined until 1979, allowing waste water and chemical runoff from the facility to seep into the ground water below. During its years of operation, B&B stored and distributed various hazardous chemicals on its property. Among these were the herbicide dinoseb, sold by Dow Chemicals, and the pesticides D-D and Nemagon, both sold by Shell. Dinoseb was stored in 55-gallon drums and 5-gallon containers on a concrete slab outside B&B’s warehouse. Nemagon was stored in 30-gallon drums and 5-gallon containers inside the warehouse. Originally, B&B purchased D-D in 55-gallon drums; beginning in the mid-1960’s, however, Shell began requiring its distributors to maintain bulk storage facilities for D-D. From that time onward, B&B purchased D-D in bulk. When B&B purchased D-D, Shell would arrange for delivery by common carrier, f.o.b. destination. When the product arrived, it was transferred from tanker trucks to a bulk storage tank located on B&B’s primary parcel. From there, the chemical was transferred to bobtail trucks, nurse tanks, and pull rigs: During each of these transfers leaks and spills could — and often did — occur. Although the common carrier and B&B used buckets to catch spills from hoses and gaskets connecting the tanker trucks to its bulk storage tank, the buckets sometimes overflowed or were knocked over, causing D-D to spill onto the ground during the transfer process. Aware that spills of D-D were commonplace among its distributors, in the late 1970’s Shell took several steps to encourage the safe handling of its products. Shell provided distributors with detailed safety manuals and instituted a voluntary discount program for distributors that made improvements in their bulk handling and safety facilities. Later, Shell revised its program to require distributors to obtain an inspection by a qualified engineer and provide self-certification of compliance with applicable laws and regulations. B&B’s Arvin facility was inspected twice, and in 1981, B&B certified to Shell that it had made a number of recommended improvements to its facilities. Despite these improvements, B&B remainéd a “ ‘[s]loppy’ [ojperator.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 07-1601, p. 130a, ¶ 186(Y). Over the course of B&B’s 28 years of operation, delivery spills, equipment failures, and the rinsing of tanks and trucks allowed Nemagon, D-D, and dinoseb to seep into the soil and upper levels of ground water of the Arvin facility. In 1983, the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) began investigating B&B’s violation of hazardous waste laws, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) soon followed suit, discovering significant contamination of soil and ground water. Of particular concern was a plume of contaminated ground water located under the facility that threatened to leach into an adjacent supply of potential drinking water. Although B&B undertook some efforts at remediation, by 1989 it had become insolvent and ceased all operations. That same year, the Arvin facility was added to the National Priority List, see 54 Fed. Reg. 41027, and subsequently, DTSC and EPA (Governments) exercised their authority under 42 U. S. C. § 9604 to undertake cleanup efforts at the site. By 1998, the Governments had spent more than $8 million responding to the site contamination; their costs have continued to accrue. In 1991, EPA issued an administrative order to the Railroads directing them, as owners of a portion of the property on which the Arvin facility was located, to perform certain remedial tasks in connection with the site. The Railroads did so, incurring expenses of more than $3 million in the process. Seeking to recover at least a portion of their response costs, in 1992 the Railroads brought suit against B&B in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. In 1996, that lawsuit was consolidated with two recovery actions brought by DTSC and EPA against Shell and the Railroads. The District Court conducted a 6-week bench trial in 1999 and four years later entered a judgment in favor of the Governments. In a lengthy order supported by 507 separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court held that both the Railroads and Shell were potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under CERCLA — the Railroads because they were owners of a portion of the facility, see 42 U. S. C. §§9607(a)(l)-(2), and Shell because it had “arranged for” the disposal of hazardous substances through its sale and delivery of D-D, see § 9607(a)(3). Although the court found the parties liable, it did not impose joint and several liability on Shell and the Railroads for the entire response cost incurred by the Governments. The court found that the site contamination created a single harm but concluded that the harm was divisible and therefore capable of apportionment. Based on three figures — the percentage of the total area of the facility that was owned by the Railroads, the duration of B&B’s business divided by the term of the Railroads’ lease, and the Court's determination that only two of three polluting chemicals spilled on the leased parcel required remediation and that those two chemicals were responsible for roughly two-thirds of the overall site contamination requiring remediation — the court apportioned the Railroads’ liability as 9% of the Governments’ total response cost. Based on estimations of chemical spills of Shell products, the court held Shell liable for 6% of the total site response cost. The Governments appealed the District Court’s apportionment, and Shell cross-appealed the court’s finding of liability. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Shell did not qualify as a “traditional” arranger under § 9607(a)(3), insofar as it had not contracted with B&B to directly dispose of a hazardous waste product. 520 F. 3d 918, 948 (CA9 2008). Nevertheless, the court stated that Shell could still be held liable under a “ ‘broader’ category of arranger liability” if the “disposal of hazardous wastes [wa]s a foreseeable byproduct of, but not the purpose of, the transaction giving rise to” arranger liability. Ibid. Relying on CERCLA’s definition of “disposal,” which covers acts such as “leaking” and “spilling,” 42 U. S. C. §6903(3), the Ninth Circuit concluded that an entity could arrange for “disposal” “even if it did not intend to dispose” of a hazardous substance. 520 F. 3d, at 949. Applying that theory of arranger liability to the District Court’s findings of fact, the Ninth Circuit held that Shell arranged for the disposal of a hazardous substance through its sale and delivery of D-D: “Shell arranged for delivery of the substances to the site by its subcontractors; was aware of, and to some degree dictated, the transfer arrangements; knew that some leakage was likely in the transfer process; and provided advice and supervision concerning safe transfer and storage. Disposal of a hazardous substance was thus a necessary part of the sale and delivery process.” Id., at 950. Under such circumstances, the court concluded, arranger liability was not precluded by the fact that the purpose of Shell’s action had been to transport a useful and previously unused product to B&B for sale. On the subject of apportionment, the Court of Appeals found “no dispute” on the question whether the harm caused by Shell and the Railroads was capable of apportionment. Id., at 942. The court observed that a portion of the site contamination occurred before the Railroad parcel became part of the facility, only some of the hazardous substances were stored on the Railroad parcel, and “only some of the water on the facility washed over the Railroads’ site.” Ibid. With respect to Shell, the court noted that not all of the hazardous substances spilled on the facility had been sold by Shell. Given those facts, the court readily concluded that “the contamination traceable to the Railroads and Shell, with adequate information, would be allocable, as would be the cost of cleaning up that contamination.” Ibid. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in finding that the record established a reasonable basis for apportionment. Because the burden of proof on the question of apportionment rested with Shell and the Railroads, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s apportionment of liability and held Shell and the Railroads jointly and severally liable for the Governments’ cost of responding to the contamination of the Arvin facility. The Railroads and Shell moved for rehearing en banc, which the Court of Appeals denied over the dissent of eight judges. See id., at 952 (Bea, J., dissenting). We granted certiorari to determine whether Shell was properly held liable as an entity that had “arranged for disposal” of hazardous substances within the meaning of § 9607(a)(3), and whether Shell and the Railroads were properly held liable for all response costs incurred by EPA and the State of California. See 554 U. S. 945 (2008). Finding error on both points, we now reverse. II CERCLA imposes strict liability for environmental contamination upon four broad classes of PRPs: “(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, “(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, “(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and “(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance ...42 U. S. C. § 9607(a). Once an entity is identified as a PEP, it may be compelled to clean up a contaminated area or reimburse the Government for its past and future response costs. See Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161 (2004). In these cases, it is undisputed that the Railroads qualify as PRPs under both §§ 9607(a)(1) and 9607(a)(2) because they owned the land leased by B&B at the time of the contamination and continue to own it now. The more difficult question is whether Shell also qualifies as a PRP under § 9607(a)(3) by virtue of the circumstances surrounding its sales to B&B. To determine whether Shell may be held liable as an arranger, we begin with the language of the statute. As relevant here, § 9607(a)(3) applies to an entity that “arrange[sj for disposal... of hazardous substances.” It is plain from the language of the statute that CERCLA liability would attach under § 9607(a)(3) if an entity were to enter into a transaction for the sole purpose of discarding a used and no longer useful hazardous substance. It is similarly clear that an entity could not be held liable as an arranger merely for selling a new and useful product if the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst to the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination. See Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F. 3d 160, 164 (CA2 1999); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F. 2d 1313, 1318 (CA11 1990). Less clear is the liability attaching to the many permutations of “arrangements” that fall between these two extremes — cases in which the seller has some knowledge of the buyers’ planned disposal or whose motives for the “sale” of a hazardous substance are less than clear. In such cases, courts have concluded that the determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a “disposal” or a “sale” and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was one Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions. See Freeman, 189 F. 3d, at 164; Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R. Co., 142 F. 3d 769, 775 (CA4 1998) (“ ‘[T]here is no bright line between a sale and a disposal under CERCLA. A party’s responsibility ... must by necessity turn on a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the transaction’ ” (quoting United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (ND Ill. 1992))); Florida Power & Light Co., 893 F. 2d, at 1318. Although we agree that the question whether § 9607(a)(3) liability attaches is fact intensive and case specific, such liability may not extend beyond the limits of the statute itself. Because CERCLA does not specifically define what it means to “arrangfe] for” disposal of a hazardous substance, see, e. g., United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F. 3d 1227, 1231 (CA6 1996); Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F. 3d 746, 751 (CA7 1993); Florida Power & Light Co., 893 F. 2d, at 1317, we give the phrase its ordinary meaning. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 555 U. S. 271, 276 (2009); Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979). In common parlance, the word “arrange” implies action directed to a specific purpose. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 64 (10th ed. 1993) (defining “arrange” as “to make preparations for: plan[;] ... to bring about an agreement or understanding concerning”); see also Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F. 3d, at 751 (words “‘arranged for’... imply intentional action”). Consequently, under the plain language of the statute, an entity may qualify as an arranger under § 9607(a)(3) when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance. See Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F. 3d, at 1231 (“[I]t would be error for us not to recognize the indispensable role that state of mind must play in determining whether a party has ‘otherwise arranged for disposal... of hazardous substances’ ”). The Governments do not deny that the statute requires an entity to “arrang[e] for” disposal; however, they interpret that phrase by reference to the statutory term “disposal,” which the Act broadly defines as “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water.” 42 U. S. C. § 6903(3); see also § 9601(29) (adopting the definition of “disposal” contained in the Solid Waste Disposal Act). The Governments assert that by including unintentional acts such as “spilling” and “leaking” in the definition of disposal, Congress intended to impose liability on entities not only when they directly dispose of waste products but also when they engage in legitimate sales of hazardous substances knowing that some disposal may occur as a collateral consequence of the sale itself. Applying that reading of the statute, the Governments contend that Shell arranged for the disposal of D-D within the meaning of § 9607(a)(3) by shipping D-D to B&B under conditions it knew would result in the spilling of a portion of the hazardous substance by the purchaser or common carrier. See Brief for United States 24 (“Although the delivery of a useful product was the ultimate purpose of the arrangement, Shell’s continued participation in the delivery, with knowledge that spills and leaks would result, was sufficient to establish Shell’s intent to dispose of hazardous substances”). Because these spills resulted in wasted D-D, a result Shell anticipated, the Governments insist that Shell was properly found to have arranged for the disposal of D-D. While it is true that in some instances an entity’s knowledge that its product will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entity’s intent to dispose of its hazardous wastes, knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity “planned for” the disposal, particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an unused, useful product. In order to qualify as an arranger, Shell must have entered into the sale of D-D with the intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during the transfer process by one or more of the methods described in § 6903(3). Here, the facts found by the District Court do not support such a conclusion. Although the evidence adduced at trial showed that Shell was aware that minor, accidental spills occurred during the transfer of D-D from the common carrier to B&B’s bulk storage tanks after the product had arrived at the Arvin facility and had come under B&B’s stewardship, the evidence does not support an inference that Shell intended such spills to occur. To the contrary, the evidence revealed that Shell took numerous steps to encourage its distributors to reduce the likelihood of such spills, providing them with detailed safety manuals, requiring them to maintain adequate storage facilities, and providing discounts for those that took safety precautions. Although Shell’s efforts were less than wholly successful, given these facts, Shell’s mere knowledge that spills and leaks continued to occur is insufficient grounds for concluding that Shell “arranged for” the disposal of D-D within the meaning of § 9607(a)(3). Accordingly, we conclude that Shell was not liable as an arranger for the contamination that occurred at B&B’s Arvin facility. Ill Having concluded that Shell is not liable as an arranger, we need not decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District Court’s apportionment of Shell’s liability for the cost of remediation. We must, however, determine whether the Railroads were properly held jointly and severally liable for the foil cost of the Governments’ response efforts. The seminal opinion on the subject of apportionment in CERCLA actions was written in 1983 by Chief Judge Carl Rubin of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802. After reviewing CERCLA’s history, Chief Judge Rubin concluded that although the Act imposed a “strict liability standard,” id., at 805, it did not mandate “joint and several” liability in every case, see id., at 807. Rather, Congress intended the scope of liability to “be determined from traditional and evolving principles of common law.” Id., at 808. The Chem-Dyne approach has been folly embraced by the Courts of Appeals. See, e. g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F. 3d 889, 901-902 (CA5 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F. 2d 252, 268 (CA3 1992); O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F. 2d 176, 178 (CA1 1989); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F. 2d 160, 171-173 (CA4 1988). Following Chem-Dyne, the Courts of Appeals have acknowledged that “[t]he universal starting point for divisibility of harm analyses in CERCLA cases” is §433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F. 3d 706, 717 (CA8 2001); Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. v. Bush, 292 F. 3d 254, 259 (CADC 2002); United States v. R. W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F. 2d 1497, 1507 (CA6 1989). Under the Restatement, “when two or more persons acting independently eaus[e] a distinct or single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division according to the contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of the total harm that he has himself caused. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 433A, 881 (1976); Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), pp. 313-314____ But where two or more persons cause a single and indivisible harm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §875; Prosser at 315-316.” Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp., at 810. In other words, apportionment is proper when “there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §433A(l)(b), p. 434 (1963-1964) (hereinafter Restatement). Not all harms are capable of apportionment, however, and CERCLA defendants seeking to avoid joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a reasonable basis for apportionment exists. See Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp., at 810 (citing Restatement § 433B (1976)) (placing burden of proof on party seeking apportionment). When two or more causes produce a single, indivisible harm, “courts have refused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm.” Id., §433A, Comment i, at 440 (1963-1964). Neither the parties nor the lower courts dispute the principles that govern apportionment in CERCLA cases, and both the District Court and Court of Appeals agreed that the harm created by the contamination of the Arvin site, although singular, was theoretically capable of apportionment. The question then is whether the record provided a reasonable basis for the District Court’s conclusion that the Railroads were liable for only 9% of the harm caused by contamination at the Arvin facility. The District Court criticized the Railroads for taking a “‘scorched earth,’ all-or-nothing approach to liability,” failing to acknowledge any responsibility for the release of hazardous substances that occurred on their parcel throughout the 13-year period of B&B’s lease. According to the District Court, the Railroads’ position on liability, combined with the Governments’ refusal to acknowledge the potential divisibility of the harm, complicated the apportioning of liability. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 07-1601, at 236a-237a, ¶ 455 (“All parties ... effectively abdicated providing any helpful arguments to the court and have left the court to independently perform the equitable apportionment analysis demanded by the circumstances of the case”). Yet despite the parties’ failure to assist the court in linking the evidence supporting apportionment to the proper allocation of liability, the District Court ultimately concluded that this was “a classic ‘divisible in terms of degree’ case, both as to the time period in which defendants’ conduct occurred, and ownership existed, and as to the estimated maximum contribution of each party’s activities that released hazardous substances that caused Site contamination.” Id., at 239a, ¶462. Consequently, the District Court apportioned liability, assigning the Railroads 9% of the total remediation costs. The District Court calculated the Railroads’ liability based on three figures. First, the court noted that the Railroad parcel constituted only 19% of the surface area of the Arvin site. Second, the court observed that the Railroads had leased their parcel to B&B for 13 years, which was only 45% of the time B&B operated the Arvin facility. Finally, the court found that the volume of hazardous-substance-releasing activities on the B&B property was at least 10 times greater than the releases that occurred on the Railroad parcel, and it concluded that only spills of two chemicals, Nemagon and dinoseb (not D-D), substantially contributed to the contamination that had originated on the Railroad parcel and that those two chemicals had contributed to two-thirds of the overall site contamination requiring remediation. The court then multiplied .19 by .45 by .66 (two-thirds) and rounded up to determine that the Railroads were responsible for approximately 6% of the remediation costs. “Allowing for calculation errors up to 50%,” the court con-eluded that the Railroads could be held responsible for 9% of the total CERCLA response cost for the Arvin site. Id., at 252a, ¶ 489. The Court of Appeals criticized the evidence on which the District Court’s conclusions rested, finding a lack of sufficient data to establish the precise proportion of contamination that occurred on the relative portions of the Arvin facility and the rate of contamination in the years prior to B&B’s addition of the Railroad parcel. The court noted that neither the duration of the lease nor the size of the leased area alone was a reliable measure of the harm caused by activities on the property owned by the Railroads, and — as the court’s upward adjustment confirmed — the court had relied on estimates rather than specific and detailed records as a basis for its conclusions. Despite these criticisms, we conclude that the facts contained in the record reasonably supported the apportionment of liability. The District Court’s detailed findings make it abundantly clear that the primary pollution at the Arvin facility was contained in an unlined sump and an unlined pond in the southeastern portion of the facility most distant from the Railroads’ parcel and that the spills of hazardous chemicals that occurred on the Railroad parcel contributed to no more than 10% of the total site contamination, see id., at 247a-248a, some of which did not require remediation. With those background facts in mind, we are persuaded that it was reasonable for the court to use the size of the leased parcel and the duration of the lease as the starting point for its analysis. Although the Court of Appeals faulted the District Court for relying on the “simplest of considerations: percentages of land area, time of ownership, and types of hazardous products,” 520 F. 3d, at 943, these were the same factors the court had earlier acknowledged were relevant to the apportionment analysis, see id., at 936, n. 18 (“We of course agree with our sister circuits that, if adequate information is available, divisibility may be established by ‘volumetric, chronological, or other types of evidence,’ including appropriate geographic considerations” (citations omitted)). The Court of Appeals also criticized the District Court’s assumption that spills of Nemagon and dinoseb were responsible for only two-thirds of the chemical spills requiring remediation, observing that each PRP’s share of the total harm was not necessarily equal to the quantity of pollutants that were deposited on its portion of the total facility. Although the evidence adduced by the parties did not allow the court to calculate precisely the amount of hazardous chemicals contributed by the Railroad parcel to the total site contamination or the exact percentage of harm caused by each chemical, the evidence did show that fewer spills occurred on the Railroad parcel and that of those spills that occurred, not all were carried across the Railroad parcel to the B&B sump and pond from which most of the contamination originated. The fact that no D-D spills on the Railroad parcel required remediation lends strength to the District Court’s conclusion that the Railroad parcel contributed only Nemagon and dinoseb in quantities requiring remediation. The District Court’s conclusion that those two chemicals accounted for only two-thirds of the contamination requiring remediation finds less support in the record; however, any miscalculation on that point is harmless in light of the District Court’s ultimate allocation of liability, which included a 50% margin of error equal to the 3% reduction in liability the District Court provided based on its assessment of the effect of the Nemagon and dinoseb spills. Had the District Court limited its apportionment calculations to the amount of time the Railroad parcel was in use and the percentage of the facility located on that parcel, it would have assigned the Railroads 9% of the response cost. By including a two-thirds reduction in liability for the Nemagon and dinoseb with a 50% “margin of error,” the District Court reached the same result. Because the District Court’s ultimate allocation of liability is supported by the evidence and comports with the apportionment principles outlined above, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Railroads are subject to joint and several liability for all response costs arising out of the contamination of the Arvin facility. IV For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by holding Shell liable as an arranger under CERCLA for the costs of remediating environmental contamination at the Arvin, California, facility. Furthermore, we conclude that the District Court reasonably apportioned the Railroads’ share of the site remediation costs at 9%. The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. APPENDIX Because D-D is corrosive, bulk storage of the chemical led to numerous tank failures and spills as the chemical rusted tanks and eroded valves. F.o.b. destination means “the seller must at his own expense and risk transport the goods to [the destination] and there tender delivery of them....” U. C. C. §2-319(l)(b) (2001). The District Court found that B&B assumed “stewardship” over the D-D as soon as the common carrier entered the Arvin facility. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 07-1601, p. 124a, ¶ 160. The ground water at the Arvin site is divided into three zones. The A-zone is located 60-80 feet below the ground. It has been tested and found to have high levels of contamination. The B-zone is located 150 feet below ground. Although the B-zone is not currently used as a source of drinking water, it has the potential to serve as such a source. No contamination has yet been found in that zone. The C-zone is an aquifer located 200 feet below ground. It is the sole current source of drinking water and, thus far, has suffered no contamination from the Arvin site. Although the Railroads did not produce precise figures regarding the exact quantity of chemical spills on each parcel in each year of the facility’s operation, the District Court found it “indisputable that the overwhelming majority of hazardous substances were released from the B&B parcel.” Id., at 248a, ¶ 477. The court explained that “the predominant activities conducted on the Railroad parcel through the years were storage and some washing and rinsing of tanks, other receptades, and chemical application vehicles. Mixing, formulating, loading, and unloading of ag-chemieal hazardous substances, which contributed most of the liability causing releases, were predominantly carried out by B&B on the B&B parcel.” Id., at 247a-248a, ¶476. 5 For purposes of the statute, a “person” is defined as “an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.” 42 U. S. C. §9601(21). Under CERCLA, PRPs are liable for: “(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; “(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan; “(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and “(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.” § 9607(a)(4). “Hazardous waste” is defined as “a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which . . . may . . . pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.” § 6903(5)(B); §9601(29). CERCLA defines “hazardous substance” to include a variety of chemicals and toxins including those designated by EPA as air pollutants, water pollutants, and solid wastes. §9601(14). As the Governments point out, insofar as the District Court made reference to equitable considerations favoring apportionment, it erred. Equitable considerations play no role in the apportionment analysis; rather, apportionment is proper only when the evidence supports the divisibility of the damages jointly caused by the PRPs. See generally United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F. 3d 706, 718-719 (CA8 2001); United States v. Brighton, 153 F. 3d 307, 318-319 (CA6 1998); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F. 3d 1489, 1513 (CA11 1996). As the Court of Appeals explained, “[a]pportionment... looks to whether defendants may avoid joint and several liability by establishing a fixed amount of damage for which they are liable,” while contribution actions allow jointly and severally liable PRPs to recover from each other on the basis of equitable considerations. 520 F. 3d 918, 939-940 (CA9 2008); see also 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1) (providing that, “[i]n resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate”). The error is of no consequence, however, because despite the District Court’s reference to equity, its actual apportionment decision was properly rooted in evidence that provided a reasonable basis for identifying the portion of the harm attributable to the Railroads.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WITTERS v. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR THE BLIND No. 84-1070. Argued November 6, 1985 Decided January 27, 1986 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which O’Connor, J., joined. White, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 490. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 490. O’CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 493. Michael P. Farris argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Timothy R. Malone, Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General, Philip H. Austin, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and David R. Minkel, Assistant Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Acting Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Michael C. McConnell, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Michael Jay Singer; for the American Jewish Committee by Samuel Rabinove and Richard T. Foltin; for the American Jewish Congress by Marc D. Stem and Ronald A. Krauss; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Samual Eric Hans Ericsson, Kimberly Wood Colby, and Forest D. Montgomery; for the Rutherford Institute et al. by Larry L. Crain, Guy 0. Farley, Jr., John W. Whitehead, James J. Knicely, Thomas 0. Kotouc, Wendell R. Bird, and William B. Hollberg; and for the National Legal Christian Foundation. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Charles B. Wiggins, Jack D. Novik, Charles S. Sims, and Burt Neubome; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State by Lee Boothby and Walter E. Carson; and for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et al. by Ruti G. Teitel, Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, and Steven M. Freeman. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment precludes the State of Washington from extending assistance under a state vocational rehabilitation assistance program to a blind person studying at a Christian college and seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Finding no such federal constitutional barrier on the record presented to us, we reverse and remand. f — { Petitioner Larry Witters applied in 1979 to the Washington Commission for the Blind for vocational rehabilitation services pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code §74.16.181 (1981). That statute authorized the Commission, inter alia, to “[pjrovide for special education and/or training in the professions, business or trades” so as to “assist visually handicapped persons to overcome vocational handicaps and to obtain the maximum degree of self-support and self-care.” Ibid. Petitioner, suffering from a progressive eye condition, was eligible for vocational rehabilitation assistance under the terms of the statute. He was at the time attending Inland Empire School of the Bible, a private Christian college in Spokane, Washington, and studying the Bible, ethics, speech, and church administration in order to equip himself for a career as a pastor, missionary, or youth director. App. 7-8. The Commission denied petitioner aid. It relied on an earlier determination embodied in a Commission policy statement that “[t]he Washington State constitution forbids the use of public funds to assist an individual in the pursuit of a career or degree in theology or related areas,” id., at 4, and on its conclusion that petitioner’s training was “religious instruction” subject to that ban. Id., at 1. That ruling was affirmed by a state hearings examiner, who held that the Commission was precluded from funding petitioner’s training “in light of the State Constitution’s prohibition against the state directly or indirectly supporting a religion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. F-6. The hearings examiner cited Wash. Const., Art. I, § 11, providing in part that “no public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment,” and Wash. Const., Art. IX, §4, providing that “[a]ll schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence.” App. to Pet. for Cert. F-4. That ruling, in turn, was upheld on internal administrative appeal. Petitioner then instituted an action in State Superior Court for review of the administrative decision; the court affirmed on the same state-law grounds cited by the agency. The State Supreme Court affirmed as well. Witters v. Commission for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P. 2d 53 (1984). The Supreme Court, however, declined to ground its ruling on the Washington Constitution. Instead, it explicitly reserved judgment on the state constitutional issue and chose to base its ruling on the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. The court stated: “The Supreme Court has developed a 3-part test for determining the constitutionality of state aid under the establishment clause of the First Amendment. ‘First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”’ Lemon v. Kurtzman, [403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971)]. To withstand attack under the establishment clause, the challenged state action must satisfy each of the three criteria. ” Id., at 627-628, 689 P. 2d, at 55. The Washington court had no difficulty finding the “secular purpose” prong of that test satisfied. Applying the second prong, however, that of “principal or primary effect,” the court held that “[t]he provision of financial assistance by the State to enable someone to become a pastor, missionary, or church youth director clearly has the primary effect of advancing religion.” Id., at 629, 689 P. 2d, at 56. The court, therefore, held that provision of aid to petitioner would contravene the Federal Constitution. In light of that ruling, the court saw no need to reach the “entanglement” prong; it stated that the record was in any case inadequate for such an inquiry. We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. 1002 (1985), and we now reverse. II The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has consistently presented this Court with difficult questions of interpretation and application. We acknowledged in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), that “we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.” Id., at 612, quoted in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 393 (1983). Nonetheless, the Court’s opinions in this area have at least clarified “the broad contours of our inquiry,” Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 761 (1973), and are sufficient to dispose of this case. We are guided, as was the court below, by the three-part test set out by this Court in Lemon and quoted supra, at 484-485. See Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 382-383 (1985). Our analysis relating to the first prong of that test is simple: all parties concede the unmistakably secular purpose of the Washington program. That program was designed to promote the well-being of the visually handicapped through the provision of vocational rehabilitation services, and no more than a minuscule amount of the aid awarded under the program is likely to flow to religious education. No party suggests that the State’s “actual purpose” in creating the program was to endorse religion, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 74 (1985), quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring), or that the secular purpose articulated by the legislature is merely “sham.” Wallace, supra, at 64 (Powell, J., concurring). The answer to the question posed by the second prong of the Lemon test is more difficult. We conclude, however, that extension of aid to petitioner is not barred on that ground either. It is well settled that the Establishment Clause is not violated every time money previously in the possession of a State is conveyed to a religious institution. For example, a State may issue a paycheck to one of its employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and the State may do so even knowing that the employee so intends to dispose of his salary. It is equally well settled, on the other hand, that the State may not grant aid to a religious school, whether cash or in kind, where the effect of the aid is “that of a direct subsidy to the religious school” from the State. Grand, Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S., at 394. Aid may have that effect even though it takes the form of aid to students or parents. Ibid.; see, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 248-251 (1977); Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973). The question presented is whether, on the facts as they appear in the record before us, extension of aid to petitioner and the use of that aid by petitioner to support his religious education is a permissible transfer similar to the hypothetical salary donation described above, or is an impermissible “direct subsidy.” Certain aspects of Washington’s program are central to our inquiry. As far as the record shows, vocational assistance provided under the Washington program is paid directly to the student, who transmits it to the educational institution of his or her choice. Any aid provided under Washington’s program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients. Washington’s program is “made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited,” Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 782-783, n. 38, and is in no way skewed towards religion. It is not one of “the ingenious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian schools that periodically reach this Court,” id., at 785. It creates no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education, see id., at 785-786. It does not tend to provide greater or broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid to religious education, nor are the full benefits of the program limited, in large part or in whole, to students at sectarian institutions. On the contrary, aid recipients have full opportunity to expend vocational rehabilitation aid on wholly secular education, and as a practical matter have rather greater prospects to do so. Aid recipients’ choices are made among a huge variety of possible careers, of which only a small handful are sectarian. In this case, the fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to support religious education is made by the individual, not by the State. Further, and importantly, nothing in the record indicates that, if petitioner succeeds, any significant portion of the aid expended under the Washington program as a whole will end up flowing to religious education. The function of the Washington program is hardly “to provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.” Id., at 783; see Sloan v. Lemon, supra; cf. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 363-364 (1975). The program, providing vocational assistance to the visually handicapped, does not seem well suited to serve as the vehicle for such a subsidy. No evidence has been presented indicating that any other person has ever sought to finance religious education or activity pursuant to the State’s program. The combination of these factors, we think, makes the link between the State and the school petitioner wishes to attend a highly attenuated one. On the facts we have set out, it does not seem appropriate to view any aid ultimately flowing to the Inland Empire School of the Bible as resulting from a state action sponsoring or subsidizing religion. Nor does the mere circumstance that petitioner has chosen to use neutrally available state aid to help pay for his religious education confer any message of state endorsement of religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S., at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Thus, while amici supporting respondent are correct in pointing out that aid to a religious institution unrestricted in its potential uses, if properly attributable to the State, is “clearly prohibited under the Establishment Clause,” Grand, Rapids, supra, at 395, because it may subsidize the religious functions of that institution, that observation is not apposite to this case. On the facts present here, we think the Washington program works no state support of religion prohibited by the Establishment Clause. f — H I — I 1 — I We therefore reject the claim that, on the record presented, extension of aid under Washington’s vocational rehabilitation program to finance petitioner’s training at a Christian college to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director would advance religion in a manner inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. On remand, the state court is of course free to consider the applicability of the “far stricter” dictates of the Washington State Constitution, see Witters v. Commission for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d, at 626, 689 P. 2d, at 55. It may also choose to reopen the factual record in order to consider the arguments made by respondent and discussed in nn. 3 and 5, supra. We decline petitioner’s invitation to leapfrog consideration of those issues by holding that the Free Exercise Clause"! requires Washington to extend vocational rehabilitation aid to petitioner regardless of what the State Constitution com- ffi1" mands or further factual development reveals, and we express no opinion on that matter. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568 (1947). The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. In 1983 the Washington Legislature repealed chapters 74.16 and 74.17 of the Code, enacting in their place a new chapter 74.18. The statutory-revision abolished the Commission for the Blind and created respondent Department of Services for the Blind. See 1983 Wash. Laws, ch. 194, § 3. We shall refer to respondent for purposes of this opinion as “the Commission.” Washington Rev. Code, ch. 74.18, see n. 1, supra, establishes a requirement that aid recipients be persons who “(1) have no vision or limited vision which constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (2) can reasonably be expected to benefit from vocational rehabilitation services in terms of employability.” Wash. Rev. Code §74.18.130 (1983) (effective June 30,1983). It has not been established whether petitioner is eligible for aid under the new standard. That determination, however, will have no effect on any claim asserted by petitioner for reimbursement of aid withheld beginning in 1979. Respondent offers extensive argument before this Court relating to the practical workings of the state vocational assistance program. Focusing on the asserted practical “nature and operation of that program,” Brief for Respondent 6, respondent asserts that the nature of the program in fact leads to an impermissible “symbolic union” of governmental and religious functions, “requiring] government choices at every step of the rehabilitation process” and “intertwining . . . governmental decisionmaking . . . with decisionmaking by church and school authorities.” Id., at 20. Respondent contends that the program therefore violates the second and third prongs of the Lemon test in a way that “hands off” aid, such as that provided pursuant to the GI Bill, does not. Id., at 11. This argument, however, was not presented to the state courts, and appears to rest in large part on facts not part of the record before us. Because this Court must affirm or reverse upon the case as it appears in the record, Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139, 159 (1851); see also New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U. S. 392, 450, n. 66 (1970), we have no occasion to consider the argument here. Nor is it appropriate, as a matter of good judicial administration, for us to consider claims that have not been the subject of factual development in earlier proceedings. On remand, it will be up to the Washington Supreme Court as a matter of state procedural law whether and to what extent it should reopen the record for the introduction of evidence on the issues raised for the first time in this Court. This is not the ease described in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 396 (1985) (‘Where ... no meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the student and aid to the school, ‘the concept of a loan to individuals is a transparent fiction’ ”), quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 264 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.); see also Wolman, supra, at 250. We decline to address the “entanglement” issue at this time. As a prudential matter, it would be inappropriate for us to address that question without the benefit of a decision on the issue below. Further, we have no reason to doubt the conclusion of the Washington Supreme Court that that analysis could be more fruitfully conducted on a more complete record.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF CHICAGO et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 101. Argued November 20, 1969 Decided December 9, 1969 Gordon P. MacDougall argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With him on the brief were Raymond F. Simon, Charles E. Griffith III, Robert E. Kendrick, Arthur K. Bolton, Harold N. Hill, Jr., J. Robert Coleman, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., William G. Mahoney, Bernard Rane, Mark Goldstein, Eugene W. Ward, Chester L. Rigsby, Weldon A. Cousins, and Leon M. Despres. Howard E. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States et al. urging reversal in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General McLaren, and Robert W. Ginnane. James W. Hoeland argued the cause for appellees Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. et al. in both cases. With him on the brief were Clifford T. Coomes, Joseph L. Lenihan, Harry R. Begley, and P. C. Mullen. Paul Rodgers filed a brief for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. Together with No. 102, City of Chicago et al. v. United States et al., also on appeal from the same court. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in these cases is whether orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission discontinuing investigations respecting the notice of rail carriers to terminate or change the operation or services of interstate passenger trains are judicially reviewable on the. complaint of aggrieved persons. Section 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 72 Stat. 571, 49 U. S. C. § 13a (1), provides, with details not important here, that a rail carrier may file notice of such discontinuance or change with the Commission and that within 30 days the Commission may make an investigation of the proposed discontinuance or change. Apart from interim relief, the Commission may order continuance of the operation and service for a period not to exceed one year. One of the present cases involves two interstate passenger trains between Chicago and Evansville, Indiana, discontinued by the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 331 I. C. C. 447, and the other involves two interstate passenger trains between New Orleans and Cincinnati discontinued by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 333 I. C. C. 720. In each case the Commission, addressing itself to the standards in § 13a (1), found that continued operation of the trains was not required by public convenience and necessity and that. continued operation would unduly burden interstate commerce. It thereupon entered in each case an order terminating its investigation of the proposed discontinuance. Appellants in each case — cities, state regulatory agencies, and other interested parties — brought these suits before the same three-judge court to review the Commission’s decisions. It is provided by 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (a): “Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend, in whole or in any part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” The District Court held that decisions terminating investigations under § 13a (1) are not “orders” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (a). 294 F. Supp. 1103, 1106. The cases are here on direct appeal, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253, 2325, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 395 U. S. 957. As stated in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140, we start with the presumption that aggrieved persons may obtain review of administrative decisions unless there is “persuasive reason to believe” that Congress had no such purpose. Certainly under § 13a (1) the carrier, if overruled by the Commission, could obtain review. We can find no talismanic sign indicating that Congress desired to deny review to opponents of interstate discontinuances alone. Section 13a in its present form came into the Act in 1958 and was designed to supersede the prior confused and time-consuming procedure under which the States supervised the discontinuance of passenger trains. Accordingly, Congress provided a uniform federal scheme to take the place of the former procedure. A single federal standard was to govern train discontinuances whether interstate or intrastate, though the procedure of § 13a (1) for discontinuance of an interstate train was made somewhat different from the procedure for discontinuance of intrastate trains. But the Commission is to have the final say in each case and “precisely the same substantive standard” now governs discontinuance of either interstate or intrastate operations. Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 93, 103. Whether the Commission should make an investigation of a § 13a (1) discontinuance is of course within its discretion, a matter which is not reviewable. New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, aff’d, 359 U. S. 27. But when the Commission undertakes to investigate, it is under a statutory mandate: “Whenever an investigation shall be made by said Commission, it shall be its duty to make a report in writing in respect thereto, which shall state the conclusions of the Commission, together w;ith its decision, order, or requirement in the premises . . . .” 49 TJ. S. C. §14(1). A decision to investigate indicates that a substantial question exists under the statutory standards. The Commission’s report therefore deals with the merits. We cannot say that an answer that discontinuance should not be allowed is agency “action,” while an answer saying the reverse is agency “inaction.” The technical form of the order is irrelevant. In each case the Commission is deciding the merits. The present cases are kin to the “negative orders” which we dealt with in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 142-143: “An order of the Commission dismissing a complaint on the merits and maintaining the status quo is an exercise of administrative function, no more and no less, than an order directing some change in status. The nature of the issues foreclosed by the Commission’s action and the nature of the issues left open, so far as the reviewing power of courts is concerned, are the same. . . . We conclude, therefore, that any distinction, as such, between ‘negative’ and ‘affirmative’ orders, as a touchstone of jurisdiction to review the Commission’s orders, serves no useful purpose, and insofar as earlier decisions have been controlled by this distinction, they can no longer be guiding.” The District Court reasoned that since “the statute is self-implementing,” only an “order” requiring action is reviewable. 294 F. Supp., at 1106. But that theory is of the vintage we discarded in Rochester Telephone. Reversed. Section 13a (2), applicable to discontinuance of intrastate trains, provides that where a State bars discontinuance or change in operation or service of a train, or where the state authority has not acted on a carrier’s application for such discontinuance or change within 120 days, the carrier may petition the Commission for a grant of such authority. There is a conflict among the District Courts. Minnesota v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 107 (D. C. Minn.), and New Hampshire v. Boston & Maine Corp., 251 F. Supp. 421 (D. C. N. H.), are in accord with the District Court in the instant cases. Opposed to that view are Vermont v. Boston & Maine Corp., 269 F. Supp. 80 (D. C. Vt.), and New York v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 989 (D. C. N. D. N. Y.). And see City of Williamsport v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 899, 282 F. Supp. 46 (D. C. M. D. Pa.), aff’d, 392 U. S. 642. “Without reciting individual cases the subcommittee is satisfied that State regulatory bodies all too often have been excessively conservative and unduly repressive in requiring the maintenance of uneconomic and unnecessary services and facilities. Even when allowing the discontinuance or change of a service or facility, these groups have frequently delayed decisions beyond a reasonable time limit. In many such cases, State regulatory commissions have shown a definite lack of appreciation for the serious impact on a railroad’s financial condition resulting from prolonged loss-producing operations. “To improve this situation, the subcommittee proposes to give the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction in the field of discontinuance or change of rail services and facilities similar to the jurisdiction it now has over intrastate rates under section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act so that when called upon to do so it may deal with such matters that impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. This, the subcommittee believes, would protect and further the broad public interest in a sound transportation system and would prevent undue importance being attached to matters of a local nature.” S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 22. For a review of the legislative history of § 13a (2), see Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 93, 100-103. See n. 1, supra. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §551 (6) (1964 ed., Supp IV), defines “order” as including a “negative” form of “a final. disposition” by agency action. And that kind of “order” is subject to judicial review. 5 U. S. C. §§551 (13), 701 (b)(2), 702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). When carriers file new rates, the Commission has authority on its own initiative or on complaint to make an investigation either with or without suspension of the new rates. 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7). Where the Commission finds the proposed rates lawful, its order reads: “[T]he investigation proceedings [are] discontinued.” See Eastern Central Motor Carriers Assn. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 314 I. C. C. 5, 51. Such orders are reviewable. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 318, aff’d, 379 U. S. 6.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCOFIELD et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 273. Argued January 14, 1969. Decided April 1, 1969. James Urdan argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, and Dominick L. Manoli. John Silard argued the cause for respondent International Union, United Automobile Workers. With him on the brief were Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., and Stephen I. Schlossberg. Walter S. Davis filed a brief for the Wisconsin Manufacturers Assn, et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Half the production employees of the Wisconsin Motor Corporation are paid on a piecework or incentive basis. They and the other employees are represented by respondent union, which has had contractual relations with the company since 1937. In 1938 the union initiated a ceiling on the production for which its members would accept immediate piecework pay. This was done at first by gentlemen’s agreement among the members, but since 1944 by union rule enforceable by fines and expulsion. As the rule functions now, members may produce as much as they like each day, but may only draw pay up to the ceiling rate. The additional production is “banked” by the company; that is, wages due for it are retained by the company and paid out to the employee for days on which the production ceiling has not been reached because of machine breakdown or for some other reason. If the member demands to be paid in full each pay period over the ceiling rate the company will comply, but the union assesses a fine of $1 for each violation, and in cases of repeated violation may fine the member up to $100 for “conduct unbecoming a union member.” Failure to pay the fine may lead to expulsion. As the trial examiner found, the company’s complaint is not and cannot be that “the employee, for the pay he receives, has not given the requisite quid pro quo in production.” 145 N. L. R. B. 1097, 1120. Rather, the question is the extent to which the group will forgo for pay the rest periods it has bargained for, and the discipline which the union may invoke to achieve unity toward this end which, the trial examiner found, was “manifestly a matter affecting the interest of the group and in which its collective bargaining strength hinges upon the cooperation of its individual components.” Ibid. The collective bargaining contract between employer and union defines a “machine rate” of hourly pay guaranteed to the employees. The piecework rate, as defined by the contract, is set at such a level that “the average competent operator working at a reasonable pace [as determined by a time study] shall earn not less than the machine rate of his assigned task.” Allowances are made in the time study for setting up machinery, cleaning tools, fatigue, and personal needs. By ignoring these allowances or by speed and efficiency it is possible for an industrious employee to produce faster than the machine rate. If he does so, he is entitled to additional pay. Union members, however, are subject to the banking procedures imposed by the union rule. The margin between the “machine” rate set by the contract and the ceiling rate set by the union was 100 per hour in 1944. As a result of collective bargaining between company and union over both the machine and ceiling rates, the margin has been increased to between 450 and 500, depending on the skill level of the job. The company has regularly urged the union to abandon the ceiling and has never agreed to refuse employees immediate pay for work done over the ceiling. However, the parties have bargained over the ceiling rate and the company has extracted from the union promises to increase the ceiling rate. The company opens its work records to the union to permit it to check compliance with the ceiling; pays union stewards for time spent in this checking activity as legitimate union business; and banks money for union members complying with the rule. The ceiling rate is also used in computing piece rate increases and in settling grievances. This case arose in 1961 when a random card check by the union showed that petitioners, among other union members, had exceeded the ceiling. The union membership imposed fines of $50 to $100, and a year’s suspension from the union. Petitioners refused to pay the fines, and the union brought suit in state court to collect the fines as a matter of local contract law. Petitioners then initiated charges before the National Labor Relations Board, arguing that union enforcement of its rule through the collection of fines was an unfair labor practice. Petitioners asserted that their right to refrain from “concerted activities,” National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 157, was impaired by the union’s effort to “restrain or coerce” them, in violation of NLRA, § 8 (b)(1)(A). The trial examiner, after extensive findings, concluded that there was no violation of the Act, and his findings and recommendations were adopted by the Board, 145 N. L. R. B. 1097 (1964), whose order was enforced by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 393 F. 2d 49 (1968). We affirm. I. We are met at the outset with the contention that the petition for certiorari was untimely filed. In civil suits certiorari must be applied for “within ninety days after the entry of [the] judgment or decree” of which review is sought. 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (c). In this case an opinion of March 5, 1968, concluded that “upon presentation, an appropriate decree will be entered.” A decree was in fact entered on April 16, 1968. The petition for certiorari was docketed here on July 6, 1968, within 90 days of the decree but not of the opinion. In our view, the petition for certiorari was timely filed. Petitioners here received a copy of the March 5 opinion, but were given no notice of any entry of judgment on that date, as would be required by Rule 36 of the new Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective July 1, 1968. Since no notice was given and it could not have been clear to petitioners whether there was a March 5 judgment or not we hold, without abandoning the standard that a “judgment for our purposes is final when the issues are adjudged” and settled with finality, Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U. S. 548, 551-552 (1945); FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U. S. 206, 212 (1952), that in this case the relevant date is that of the entry of the decree. Cf. Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 6 Wall. 153, 156 (1868). II. Section 8 (b)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice to “restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [§ 7]: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . Based on the legislative history of the section, including its proviso, the Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175, 195 (1967), distinguished between internal and external enforcement of union rules and held that “Congress did not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union’s internal regulations to affect a member’s employment status.” A union rule, duly adopted and not the arbitrary fiat of a union officer, forbidding the crossing of a picket line during a strike was therefore enforceable against voluntary union members by expulsion or a reasonable fine. The Court thus essentially accepted the position of the National Labor Relations Board dating from Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N. L. R. B. 727 (1954) where the Board also distinguished internal from external enforcement in holding that a union could fine a member for his failure to take part in picketing during a strike but that the same rule could not be enforced by causing the employer to exclude him from the work force or by affecting his seniority without triggering violations of §§ 8 (b)(1), 8 (b)(2), 8 (a)(1), 8 (a)(2), and 8 (a)(3). These sections form a web, of which §8 (b)(1)(A) is only a strand, preventing the union from inducing the employer to use the emoluments of the job to enforce the union’s rules. This interpretation of §8 (b)(1), as the Court explained in Allis-Chalmers, 388 U. S., at 193-195, was reinforced by the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 which, although it dealt with the internal affairs of unions, including the procedures for imposing fines or expulsion, did not purport to overturn or modify the Board’s interpretation of § 8 (b) (1). And it was this interpretation which the Board followed in Allis-Chalmers and in the case now before us. Although the Board’s construction of the section emphasizes the sanction imposed, rather than the rule itself, and does not involve the Board in judging the fairness or wisdom of particular union rules, it has become clear that if the rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating § 8 (b)(1). In both Skura and Marine Workers, the Board was concerned with union rules requiring a member to exhaust union remedies before filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. That rule, in the Board’s view, frustrated the enforcement scheme established by the statute and the union would commit an unfair labor practice by fining or expelling members who violated the rule. The Marine Workers case came here and the result reached by the Board was sustained, the Court agreeing that the rule in question was contrary to the plain policy of the Act to keep employees completely free from coercion against making complaints to the Board. Frustrating this policy was beyond the legitimate interest of the labor organization, at least where the member’s complaint concerned conduct of the employer as well as the union. Under this dual approach, § 8 (b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule. This view of the statute must be applied here. III. In the case at hand, there is no showing in the record that the fines were unreasonable or the mere fiat of a union leader, or that the membership of petitioners in the union was involuntary. Moreover, the enforcement of the rule was not carried out through means unacceptable in themselves, such as violence or employer discrimination. It was enforced solely through the internal technique of union fines, collected by threat of expulsion or judicial action. The inquiry must therefore focus on the legitimacy of the union interest vindicated by the rule and the extent to which any policy of the Act may be violated by the union-imposed production ceiling. As both the trial examiner and the Court of Appeals noted, union opposition to unlimited piecework pay systems is historic. Union apprehension, not without foundation, is that such systems will drive up employee productivity and in turn create pressures to lower the piecework rate so that at the new, higher level of output employees are earning little more than they did before. The fear is that the competitive pressure generated will endanger workers’ health, foment jealousies, and reduce the work force. In addition, the findings of the trial examiner were that the ceiling served as a yardstick for the settlement of job allowance grievances, that it has played an important role in negotiating the minimum hourly rate and that it is the standard for "factoring” the hourly rate raises into the piecework rate. The view of the trial examiner was that “in terms of a union’s traditional function of trying to serve the economic interests of the group as a whole, the Union has a very real, immediate, and direct interest in it.” 145 N. L. R. B., at 1135. It is doubtless true that the union rule in question here affects the interests of all three participants in the labor-management relation: employer, employee, and union. Although the enforcement of the rule is handled as an internal union matter, the rule has and was intended to have an impact beyond the confines of the union organization. But as Allis-Chalmers and Marine Workers made clear, it does not follow from this that the enforcement of the rule violates §8 (b)(1) (A), unless some impairment of a statutory labor policy can be shown. The principal contention of the petitioners is that the rule impedes collective bargaining, a process nurtured in many ways by the Act. But surely this is not the case here. The union has never denied that the ceiling is a bargainable issue. It has never refused to bargain about it as far as this record shows. Indeed, the union has at various times agreed to raise its ceiling in return for an increase in the piece rate, and the ceiling has been regularly used to compute the new piece rate. In light of this bargaining history it can hardly be said that the union rule has removed this issue from the bargaining table. The company has repeatedly sought an agreement eliminating the piecework ceiling, an agreement which, had it been obtained, unquestionably would have been violated by the union rule. But the company could not attain this. Although, like the union, it could have pressed the point to impasse, Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 379 U. S. 203, 209-215 (1964), followed by strike or lockout, it has never done so. Instead, it has signed contracts recognizing the ceiling, has tolerated it, and has cooperated in its administration by honoring requests by employees to bank their pay for over-ceiling work. We discern no basis in the statutory policy encouraging collective bargaining for giving the employer a better bargain than he has been able to strike at the bargaining table. Nor does the union ceiling itself or compliance with it by union members violate the collective contract. The company and the union have agreed to an incentive pay scale, but they have also established a guaranteed minimum or machine rate considerably below the union ceiling and defined in the contract as the rate of production of an average, efficient worker. The contract therefore leaves in the hands of the employee the option of taking full advantage of his allowances, performing only as an average employee and not reaching even the ceiling rate. At least there is nothing before us to indicate that the company disciplines individuals who work at only the machine rate or individuals who produce more but who choose not to exceed the union ceiling. The same decision can be made collectively by the union. Although it has agreed in the contract to a pay scale for production in excess of ceiling, that fact in the context of this case does not support an inference that the union has agreed not to impose the ceiling or that its action in announcing one is somehow contrary to the contract. And if neither union nor member is in breach of contract for establishing and adhering to the ceiling, it is equally clear that the rule neither causes nor invites a contract violation by the employer who stands ready to pay an employee for his over-ceiling production or to bank it at his request. Petitioners purport to characterize the union rule as featherbedding, but it is hard to square this with the collective agreement that an average, efficient employee produces at a “machine” rate substantially below the ceiling. Beyond that, however, Congress has addressed itself specifically to the problem of featherbedding in § 8 (b)(6), making it an unfair labor practice “to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed . . . .” 61 Stat. 142, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(6). This narrow prohibition was enacted partly because the Congress found it difficult to define with more particularity just where the area between shiftlessness and overwork should lie. Since Congress has addressed itself to the problem specifically and left a broad area for private negotiation, there is no present occasion for the courts to interfere with private decision. Indeed, there is no claim before us that the rule violates §8 (b)(6). If the company wants to require more work of its employees, let it strike a better bargain. The labor laws as presently drawn will not do so for it. This leaves the possible argument that because the union has not successfully bargained for a contractual ceiling, it may not impose one on its own members, for doing so will discriminate between members and those others who are free to earn as much as the contract permits. All members of the bargaining unit, however, have the same contractual rights. In dealing with the employer as bargaining agent, the union has accorded all employees uniform treatment. If members are prevented from taking advantage of their contractual rights bargained for all employees it is because they have chosen to become and remain union members. In Allis-Chalmers, the union members were subject to the discipline of an internal rule which strengthened the union’s hand in bargaining and in this respect benefited both the members who obeyed the rule and the nonmembers who did not. The same is true here, and the price of obeying the rule is not as high as in Allis-Chahners. There the member could be replaced for his refusal to report to work during a strike; here he need simply limit his production and suffer whatever consequences that conduct may entail. If a member chooses not to engage in this concerted activity and is unable to prevail on the other members to change the rule, then he may leave the union and obtain whatever benefits in job advancement and extra pay may result from extra work, at the same time enjoying the protection from competition, the high piece rate, and the job security which compliance with the union rule by union members tends to promote. That the choice to remain a member results in differences between union members and other employees raises no serious issue under § 8 (b) (2) and § 8 (a) (3) of the Act, because the union has not induced the employer to discriminate against the member but has merely forbidden the member to take advantage of benefits which the employer stands willing to confer. Those sections are not aimed at completely internal union discipline of union members, even though the discipline may result in the member’s refusal to accept work offered by the employer. Allis-Chalmers makes this quite clear. The union rule here left the collective bargaining process unimpaired, breached no collective contract, required no pay for unperformed services, induced no discrimination by the employer against any class of employees, and represents no dereliction by the union of its duty of fair representation. In light of this, and the acceptable manner in which the rule was enforced, vindicating a legitimate union interest, it is impossible to say that it contravened any policy of the Act. We affirm, holding that the union rule is valid and that its enforcement by reasonable fines does not constitute the restraint or coercion proscribed by § 8 (b)(1)(A). Affirmed. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. There is a union security clause in the current contract, giving each employee, after a 30-day waiting period, the option of becoming and remaining a member in good standing of the union, or of declining membership but paying the union a “service fee.” There is also a “day rate,” lower than the machine rate, which applies to periods in which the incentive worker has not been producing, or has produced scrap, through no fault of the company’s. That rate is of no concern here. Unless the rule or its enforcement impinges on some policy of the federal labor law, the regulation of the relationship between union and employee is a contractual matter governed by local law. As the trial examiner put it in this case, the Board “never intended ... to suggest that the disciplinary action [s] in enforcement of [union] rules . . . were affirmatively protected under the Act, as opposed to merely being not violations thereof.” It is thus a “federally unentered enclave” open to state law. 145 N. L. R. B., at 1133. The Board has long held that § 8 (b) (1) (A)’s legislative history requires a narrow construction which nevertheless proscribes unacceptable methods of union coercion, such as physical violence to induce employees to join the union or to join in a strike. In re Maritime Union, 78 N. L. R. B. 971, enforced, 175 F. 2d 686 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1949). The Court has held that the “policy of the Act is to insulate employees’ jobs from their organizational rights.” Radio Officers’ Union v. National Labor Relations Board, 347 U. S. 17, 40 (1954). As an employee, he may be a “good, bad, or indifferent” member so long as he meets the financial obligations of the union security contract. Thus the Board has found an unfair labor practice by union and employer where an employee was discharged for violation of a union rule limiting production. Printz Leather Co., 94 N. L. R. B. 1312 (1951). But as a union member, so long as he chooses to remain one, he is subject to union discipline. As part of the bill of rights of union members, the Landrum-Griffin Act guaranteed freedom of speech and assembly “Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.” Pub. L. 86-257, Tit. I, §101 (a)(2), 73 Stat. 522, 29 U. S. C. §411 (a)(2). Local 188, International Union of Operating Engineers, 148 N. L. R. B. 679 (1964). Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America, 159 N. L. R. B. 1065 (1966). National Labor Relations Board v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U. S. 418 (1968). The company prefers to employ the minimum number of the most energetic men available; a piecework pay scheme without a ceiling could help it obtain its objective of winnowing the men and reducing their piecework rate. Each employee, as well, has an interest in the ceiling. A slow worker would prefer a low ceiling to protect himself against invidious comparison with faster workers and a possible reduction of the work force beginning with him. A fast worker may prefer to earn as much as possible in a day and so desire a high ceiling or none at all. But all workers have an interest in maintaining a ceiling to the extent that it is necessary to prevent reductions in the piecework rate. The employer and the union (representing the group) may seek to vindicate their interests in bargaining. The individual member may express his interest within the union councils in determining what the group position shall be— and here the trial examiner found that the employees overwhelmingly approved of the ceiling — or through exercising the option of withdrawing from the union. The trial examiner suggests that if the ceilings did not exist, the management might well invent them to serve its own purposes: maintaining careful work standards and a low scrap rate, and permitting the prediction of production output. 145 N. L. R. B., at 1119-1120. Senator Taft, cosponsor of the bill and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, stated on the floor of the Senate that to do more “would require a practical application of the law by the courts in hundreds of different industries, and a determination of facts which it seemed to me would be almost impossible.” By contrast, he said, “we did accept one provision” which “seemed to be a fairly clear case, easy to determine” and narrow. 93 Cong. Rec. 6441.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

POLAR ICE CREAM & CREAMERY CO. v. ANDREWS et al., CONSTITUTING THE FLORIDA MILK COMMISSION, et al. No. 38. Argued November 20, 1963. —Decided January 6, 1964. Joe J. Harrell argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was J. A. McClain, Jr. Mallory E. Horne and Johnson S. Savary argued the cause for appellees. With them on the brief were Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, and Joseph C. Jacobs, Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. We have before us the recurring question of the validity of a State’s attempt to regulate the supply and distribution of milk and milk products. Challenged in this case is Florida’s system of regulation of the dealings between milk distributors and local producers. The appellant, Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Company, located in Pensacola, Florida, 16 miles from the Florida-Alabama state line, is a processor and distributor of fluid milk and milk products. It sells fluid milk and milk products for human consumption to consumers and dealers within the State of Florida in competition with nearby Alabama distributors. Pursuant to contracts let after competitive bidding, it also supplies large quantities of milk to military installations, both within and without the State of Florida. It purchases, processes and sells as fluid milk or milk products approximately 5,000,000 gallons of milk each year. Prior to the regulations challenged here, Polar purchased approximately 30% of its milk requirements from dairy farm producers located within the State of Florida. The remaining 70% was procured from producers, producer pools or brokers in other States, such as Alabama, Mississippi, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Virginia, and Illinois. Its customary arrangement with Florida producers was to pay 61 cents per gallon for a specified quantity of milk from each producer and approximately 35.5 cents per gallon for all milk over that quantity. The price Polar paid its out-of-state sources varied; some milk was purchased for as low as 30-35 cents per gallon from Alabama, Virginia, and Arkansas sources. Polar’s Florida producers could at no time supply all of Polar’s milk requirements, but at times produced and sold to Polar amounts equal to or greater than Polar’s sales of fluid milk for human consumption to consumers and dealers in Florida, excluding sales to the military, -sales on reservations, and sales to local schools. The statute and the orders of the Florida Milk Commission challenged by Polar regulate the dealings between milk distributors and milk producers located within the Pensacola Milk Marketing Area. First, they require that a Pensacola milk distributor pay a minimum price of 61 cents per gallon for all milk purchased from Pensacola producers and sold in Florida as Class I milk, defined as fluid milk or milk products sold in fluid form with exceptions, and substantially lower minimum prices for milk sold as Class II, III, and IV milk, consisting chiefly of nonbeverage milk such as cream, sour cream and other dairy products. Second, the Commission has established a method by which a proportion of a distributor’s monthly sales in various classes is allocated to designated Pensacola producers. Each Pensacola producer with whom Polar does business between September 1 and November 30 of each year, called the base-fixing period, is assigned an earned base, representing the ratio of milk delivered by such producer to the total milk delivered by all of Polar’s Pensacola producers during the base-fixing period. The resultant percentage is then applied to the number of gallons of milk Polar sells in Class I, II, III, and IV channels monthly, in that order, to determine the number of gallons for which each earned-base producer must be paid the minimum prices assigned to each class or utilization. The allocation of a producer’s deliveries must first be to Class I utilization, with allocation continued thereafter in descending order through the lower classifications. Only deliveries by Pensacola producers are considered in calculating the ratio of each producer’s deliveries to total deliveries to Polar during the base-fixing period and therefore the percentage assigned to these producers totals 100%. The result is that all óf Polar’s Class I sales must be attributed to its Pensacola earned-base producers. Only then may their milk be used for the less remunerative utilizations, and only if these producers do not fulfill Polar’s need for Class I milk may other milk be used for this purpose and thus command a premium price. Moreover, the formula requires that all the milk Polar sells in Florida be first attributed to the purchases that it makes from Pensacola producers. The earned-base percentages remain the same until the next base-fixing period. Third, the statute forbids termination of the business relationship between a distributor and producer with whom the distributor has had a continuous course of dealings without just cause and provides that rejection or refusal to accept any milk tendered or offered for delivery by a producer in ordinary continuance of a previous course of dealings is a ground for revocation of the distributor’s license. These statutory provisions have been construed to mean that a Florida distributor in a regulated marketing area must accept from his earned-base producers all the milk tendered by such producers, including milk in excess of Class I needs. A distributor is relieved of the obligation to purchase milk from earned-base producers only upon a showing of just cause, which is not met by a demonstration that the Commission’s minimum prices are burdensome or that milk is available elsewhere at a lower price. It is this three-pronged regulatory structure, requiring Polar to accept its total supply of Class I milk, military milk aside, from designated Pensacola producers at a fixed price, and obligating it to take all milk which these producers offer, which Polar argues imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. The Florida Milk Commission also proposed special provisions dealing with milk that is sold to military installations of the United States — military milk. Although challenged by Polar at the outset of this litigation, this plan was not voted into effect. While the present status of military milk under Florida law is not entirely clear from the record or arguments of the parties, we read the testimony of the Commission to mean that Polar is not required to purchase military milk from its Pensacola producers, as it is Class I milk. However, if Polar does utilize milk obtained from its earned-base producers for military sales, it must pay the minimum price applicable to Class I sales. Polar challenges this producer price requirement as inconsistent with the federal procurement policy of competitive bidding, and the Federal Government's exclusive jurisdiction over the installations on which this milk is consumed. To finance the activities of the Milk Commission, Florida imposes a tax or regulatory fee of 15/100 of 1 cent per gallon of all milk handled by Florida distributors regardless of where purchased or to whom it is sold, including milk that Polar sells to military installations. This tax abates if at any time the revenue exceeds by 25% the total amount of Commission expenditures as budgeted for that fiscal year. Polar, which clearly is obliged to pay this fee, contends that the State is without jurisdiction to include milk sold and delivered to military reservations, exclusive jurisdiction to which has been ceded to the United States, in calculating the amount of the tax. Since Polar’s objections to the Florida Milk Control Act posed substantial federal questions, a three-judge District Court was convened, 28 U. S. C. § 2281, and testimony was taken and arguments heard in respect to the above questions. This court found that the Florida Milk Control Act was a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power and accordingly rejected Polar’s claims that the Act, in fixing producer prices without assuring Polar any rate of return and in compelling Polar to take all the milk of its earned-base producers, denied it due process of law and equal protection. The District Court also found that Florida’s fee on milk distributed by Polar to military installations was a regulatory fee based on the privilege of doing business in Florida and not a tax and concluded that this measure therefore did not unduly burden interstate commerce or infringe upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States over the military installations Polar serves. The Florida producer price controls were said not to conflict with the Federal Procurement Statutes, 10 U. S. C. § 2301 et seq., since they did not impose any restriction on the price paid by the Federal Government for its purchases from Polar. Although finding that the Florida regulations were intended to protect and favor Florida milk producers, the court upheld these regulations over Commerce Clause objections because there was no showing that the alleged discrimination against out-of-state producers burdened or restricted interstate commerce. The decision in Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, invalidating a state restriction imposed on a milk distributor to shield local milk producers from the effects of out-of-state competition, was deemed inapplicable to Florida’s regulations. Because of the serious questions raised under the Commerce Clause and previous decisions here dealing with milk regulations, we noted probable jurisdiction. 372 U. S. 939. We have determined that under prior cases in this Court dealing with state regulation of the milk industry the Florida law as applied in this case cannot withstand attack based upon the Commerce Clause and that the judgment below must be reversed. I. The controlling cases are Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511; Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525; and Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349. In Baldwin, the Metropolitan Milk District in the State of New York obtained about 70% of its supplies from New York sources, the remaining 30% from other States. The New York law forbade the sale in New York of milk obtained by a distributor from other States unless the distributor had paid a price which would be lawful under the New York price regulations. This provision was attacked by a New York milk distributor, all of whose milk supply was purchased in Vermont for less than the established New York price. Remarking that the New York law aimed at keeping “the system unimpaired by competition from afar,” 294 U. S., at 519, the Court struck down this provision as an impermissible burden upon interstate commerce. New York could not outlaw Vermont milk purchased at below New York prices, for to do so would “set a barrier to traffic between one state and another as effective as if customs duties, equal to the price differential, had been laid upon, the thing transported,” 294 U. S., at 521 — which is forbidden to the States by the Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 2, and reserved to Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Nice distinctions between direct and indirect burdens were said to be irrelevant “when the avowed purpose of the obstruction, as well as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states. . . . [A] chief occasion of the commerce clauses was ‘the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs barriers and other economic retaliation.’ Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, vol. II, p. 308; vol. Ill, pp. 478, 547, 548; The Federalist, No. XLII; Curtis, History of the Constitution, vol. 1, p. 502; Story on the Constitution, § 259. If New York, in order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers, may guard them against competition with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the nation.” 294 U. S., at 522. To the argument that the law was in reality a health measure, since farmers must be protected from competition if they are to provide the reliable supply of healthful milk which the locality is entitled to have, the Court said, “Let such an exception be admitted, and all that a state will have to do in times of stress and strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be protected against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists or perish altogether. To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity. The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” 294 U. S., at 523. Baldioin was heavily relied upon in both Du Mond and Dean, supra. In Du Mond, New York was found to have no power under the Commerce Clause to forbid an out-of-state distributor from establishing additional processing plants and additional sources of milk within the State. In Dean, the City of Madison was prevented from reserving the Madison market to producers and distributors located within a specified distance of the city, although purported considerations of public health were advanced as justifying the restriction. The principles of Baldwin are as sound today as they were when announced. They justify, indeed require, invalidation as a burden on interstate commerce of that part of the Florida regulatory scheme which reserves to its local producers a substantial share of the Florida milk market. II. Under the controls challenged here, Polar must buy from its Florida producers, and pay 61 cents per gallon for it, an amount of raw milk equal to its Class I sales if it is available from these producers. If more than this amount is offered, Polar must also take the surplus at the lower established prices. And these obligations continue to bind Polar even though both its Class I needs and the surplus obtainable from Florida producers may steadily increase. Polar obviously will not and cannot use outside milk for those uses for which it is required to use Florida milk. Polar may turn to out-of-state sources only after exhausting the supply offered by its Pensacola producers. Under the challenged regulations, an Alabama dairy farmer could not become one of Polar's regular producers and sell all of his milk to that company. Since he could not share in the Class I market — Pensacola producers are probably able to supply that market — his milk could command only the lower prices applicable to the less remunerative uses, prices which would not cover his cost of production. The consequences for interstate commerce are clear. In Baldwin New York’s price control removed any economic incentive for a local distributor to purchase out-of-state milk and thereby encouraged its distributors first to consume the local supply of milk before turning to out-of-state sources. Out-of-state milk was denied an equal opportunity to compete with New York-produced milk to the extent that the out-of-state supply bore additional transportation charges. The Florida controls preempt for the Florida producers a large share of the Florida market, especially the most lucrative fluid milk market. Out-of-state milk may not participate in this part of the Florida market, unless local production is inadequate, and given the exclusive domain of the Florida producers over Class I sales, out-of-state milk may not profitably serve the remainder of the Florida market, since it is relegated to the surplus market alone. These barriers are precisely the kind of hindrance to the introduction of milk from other States which Baldwin condemned as an “unreasonable clog upon the mobility of commerce. They set up what is equivalent to a rampart of customs duties designed to neutralize advantages belonging to the place of origin. They are thus hostile in conception as well as burdensome in result.” 294 U. S., at 527. The exclusion of foreign milk from a major portion of the Florida market cannot be justified as an economic measure to protect the welfare of Florida dairy farmers or as a health measure designed to insure the existence of a wholesome supply of milk. This much Baldwin and Dean made clear. Nor is it an escape from Baldwin to say that Polar has no interest in providing a satisfactory blend price as a basis for ongoing relationships with any out-of-state producer and that its only interest is in buying surplus milk at distress prices from out-of-state sources and selling it at Class I prices in the Florida market, all to the detriment of Florida producers and an orderly market. For this is but another assertion that a State may preempt its market for its own producers to the exclusion of production from other areas. Florida has no power “to prohibit the introduction within her territory of milk of wholesome quality acquired [in another State], whether at high prices or at low ones,” 294 U. S. 521; the State may not, in the sole interest of promoting the economic welfare of its dairy farmers, insulate the Florida milk industry from competition from other States. Florida, it is true, does not prevent distributors located in other States from selling wholesome fluid milk in the Florida market. But allowing competition on the distributor level is no justification for barring interstate milk from the most lucrative segment of Florida’s raw milk market. Given such distributor competition as there is, there is still milk, in other States which Polar can and wants to acquire and which it will not acquire in the face of the Florida regulations. The burden on commerce and the embargo on out-of-state milk remain. The cases relied upon by the Commission do not save the regulatory scheme challenged here. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, established that minimum retail and wholesale prices for milk purchased and sold within the State do not offend the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Nor is such price regulation an impermissible burden upon commerce, Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, even as applied to a distributor who purchases and cools milk within the State and then transports it to another State for processing and sale, since the burden on commerce is indirect and only incidental to the regulation of an essentially local activity. Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346. In none of these cases was there any attempt to reserve a local market for local producers or to protect local producers from out-of-state competition by means of purchase and allocation requirements imposed upon milk distributors. The power which we deny to Florida is reserved to Congress under the Commerce Clause, and we are offered nothing indicating either congressional consent to, or acquiescence in, a regulatory scheme such as Florida has employed. On the contrary, under the present Act authorizing federal marketing orders in the milk industry, such an order may not “prohibit or in any manner limit, in the case of the products of milk, the marketing ... of any milk or product thereof produced in any production area in the United States.” This provision, as the Court explained in Lehigh Valley Coop. v. United States, 370 U. S. 76, was intended to prevent the Secretary of Agriculture from setting up trade barriers to the importation of milk from other production areas in the United States. We seriously doubt that Congress, in denying the power to the Secretary, thereby granted it to the States. III. We turn to the matter of Polar’s sales to United States military reservations. Florida does not purport to regulate the price which Polar must charge for milk sold to the Government on or off military bases. Florida regulates only the price which Polar must pay for its milk, not what it must sell it for. Since the holding in Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245, dealt only with the conflict between federal procurement regulations and a State’s attempt to prescribe the prices which a distributor must charge for milk sold to the United States, it is not applicable here. Likewise, because Florida regulates only producer prices applicable to sales made by producers to the distributor, none of which occur on military bases, its law is not vulnerable as an attempt to legislate with regard to transactions occurring within federal enclaves subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Cf. Standard Oil v. California, 291 U. S. 242, and James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134. However, in the Paul case the United States initially attacked California’s producer prices, along with its distributor prices, as in conflict with federal procurement regulations, an issue which was abandoned in this Court and which was expressly saved in the Court’s opinion. It is that issue which Polar now presents to us. For good reason we again put off decision of this question to another day. At the outset of this litigation, the trial court temporarily enjoined the application to Polar of a Milk Commission order establishing prices to be paid Florida producers for milk to be sold to military installations and requiring purchases of such milk from designated producers. That order, however, was voted down by the Pensacola producers, leaving considerable confusion, amply demonstrated by the record before us, concerning the status of so-called military milk under the outstanding orders of the Commission. It would seem— although we are not sure, and there were no findings below about these matters — that military milk is Class I milk but that Polar nevertheless need not use Pensacola milk for military sales and is free to purchase out-oUstate milk for this purpose, although if it does use milk purchased from its earned-base producers, it must pay 61 cents per gallon for it. It was apparent from the oral argument that Polar and the Commission were in dispute as to the impact of the existing regulations upon military sales, and we would hesitate to adjudicate the issue tendered in the absence of more helpful testimony and additional consideration of the matter in the court below, particularly since it is not at all clear that Polar has been using Pensacola milk for its military sales, or even that it wants to in the future. If it is free to utilize outside milk, acquired at whatever price, it may not want to pursue the matter at all. Besides, Polar is obtaining a substantial percentage of its total needs from outside the State and the production of Polar’s Pensacola producers may be wholly exhausted by other, nonmilitary, uses to which it may be put. Moreover, consideration of the possible impact of producer-pricing systems upon federal procurement regulations may be premature at this time, in view of our invalidation of other provisions of the Florida law, provisions not entirely unrelated to the issue of military milk. The whole problem of military sales may take on a different aspect upon remand of this case. IV. Polar challenges that provision of the Florida Milk Control Act which imposes a tax in the amount of 15/100 of 1 cent upon each gallon of milk distributed by a Florida distributor. To the extent the computation of the tax includes milk which it sells to Fort Benning, Tyndall Air Force Base, and the Pensacola Naval Air Station, all being federal enclaves over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction, Polar argues that the taxing measure is invalid as beyond the jurisdiction of the State to impose. We do not agree. Polar’s reliance on James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, and Standard Oil v. California, 291 U. S. 242, is misplaced. The James case dealt with a 2% gross receipts tax levied upon every person engaging in the business of contracting within the State, as applied to a contractor undertaking construction of locks and dams for the United States in certain navigable streams. The Court denied West Virginia’s jurisdiction to assess a gross-receipts tax with respect to work done by the contractor at its plants in Pennsylvania, as well as to work done within the exterior limits of West Virginia on property over which the United States had acquired exclusive jurisdiction. In Standard Oil v. California, California undertook to lay an excise tax upon every gasoline distributor for each gallon of motor vehicle fuel “sold and delivered by him in this State.” The Court found the tax invalid where both sale and delivery occurred within the boundaries of the Pre-sidio of San Francisco, a federal enclave over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction. In these cases the tax was deemed to fall upon the facilities of the United States or upon activities conducted within these facilities, the principle of both cases being that there was nothing occurring within the State, beyond the borders of the federal enclave, to which the tax could attach. Contrariwise, the Florida tax is on the privilege of engaging in the business of distributing milk or acting as a distributor; a distributor is defined as “any milk dealer who operates a milk gathering station or processing plant where milk is collected and bottled or otherwise processed and prepared for sale.” Fla. Stat. § 501.02. The incidence of the tax appears to be upon the activity of processing or bottling milk in a plant located within Florida, and not upon work performed on a federal enclave or upon the sale and delivery of milk occurring within the boundaries of federal property. Standard Oil and Dravo do not reach this case, for the activity Florida taxes — the processing or bottling of milk — occurs at Polar’s plant prior to the sale and delivery of milk to the Government. It may be urged that a distributor is a dealer and that a dealer is one who sells milk, including one who sells to and upon federal enclaves. But even so, distributing has, by definition, its processing dimension, a substantial activity occurring within Florida. This is enough to sustain the tax. Besides, 4 U. S. C. § 105; enacted subsequent to James and Standard Oil, supra, confers upon the States jurisdiction to levy and collect a sales or use tax “in any Federal area,” and a sales or use tax is defined as “any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by, sales ... of tangible personal property . . . .” 4 U. S. C. § 110. We think this provision provides ample basis for Florida to levy a tax measured by the amount of milk Polar distributes monthly, including milk sold to the United States for use on federal enclaves in Florida. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Chapter 501 of the Florida Statutes establishes a comprehensive scheme for regulation of the milk industry and establishes the Florida Milk Commission. The Act empowers the Commission, inter alia, to supervise and regulate the entire milk industry, including the production, transportation, manufacture, storage, distribution and sale of milk, to establish milk markets within the State, to fix prices to be paid producers within a regulated marketing area by distributors, milk dealers and producer-distributors, and generally to adopt and enforce all rules, regulations, and orders necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. Fla. Stat. § 501.04. In addition the Commission is authorized to revoke or suspend the license of a milk distributor or dealer when satisfied that the dealer or distributor has rejected or refused milk delivered by a producer in ordinary continuance of a previous course of dealings or when satisfied that the dealer or distributor has committed any act injurious to the public health or public welfare in demoralization of the price structure of pure milk to such an extent as to interfere with an ample supply. Fla. Stat. §§ 501.09 (3) (a), (e). Before the Commission may exercise its supervisory and regulatory powers in any marketing area, however, at least 10% of the producers in that area must petition the Commission for such regulation and a majority of the producers in that area must vote in favor of regulation. Fla. Stat. § 501.20 (1). In November 1961, the dairy farmers producing milk in the four westernmost Florida counties, Escambia, Santa Rosa, Okaloosa and Walton, voted to place that area under the control of the Florida Milk Commission and thereby subject to the provisions of the Florida Milk Control Act and the orders issued pursuant thereto. Thereupon in January 1962, the Commission issued a series of orders covering the four-county area, termed the Pensacola Milk Marketing Area, and a letter to Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. specifying its obligations under the newly imposed regulatory structure. In August 1962, the Commission issued other orders and rules further implementing and defining the earned-base allocation plan challenged herein. The minimum price established in Official Order PEN-4, January 18, 1962, for the Pensacola area for Class II milk was 1 cent per gallon less than the minimum price established for this class milk in the Miami, Florida, Federal Milk Marketing Order, No. 118, and for Class III milk was 26 cents per gallon. There was no price set for Class IV utilization in this order. Official Order No. 20-29, covering all regulated marketing areas in Florida, effective March 4, 1962, retained the 61 cents per gallon minimum on Class I milk, and adopted the monthly prices in the Miami, Florida, Federal Milk Marketing Order, less 1 cent per gallon, for Class II, III and IV milk. All of the above prices are subject to minor adjustments for variations from the 4% average butterfat content of the milk distributed in each class. Classes of milk are defined as follows in Official Order No. 20-28: “It Is Hereby Ordered That: “1. Class I Milk is hereby defined as all fluid milk or milk products sold in fluid form with the exception of buttermilk, chocolate drink and cream. “2. Class II Milk shall be all skim milk and butterfat: “(a) Used to produce acidophilus milk, buttermilk, chocolate drink, half and half, light cream, heavy cream and sour cream, and “(b) Contained in inventories in the form of milk products designated as Class I milk pursuant to paragraph (1) of this section on hand at the end of each month and accounting period; provided, that Class II classification of shrinkage prorated to skim and butterfat, respectively, in producer milk shall not exceed two per cent (2%) of skim and butterfat in producer milk. “3. Class III Milk shall be all skim milk and butterfat: “(a) Used to produce any product other than those specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section; “(b) That portion of fortified milk or skim milk not classified as Class I milk pursuant to subparagraph (l)(a) of this section, and “(c) In total shrinkage of skim milk and butterfat, respectively, such shrinkage to be prorated to producer milk and other source milk received in the form of fluid milk or skim milk. “4. Class IV Milk shall be all milk the skim portion of which is: “(a) Disposed of for fertilizer or livestock feed, and "(b) Dumped after such prior notification as the Commission administrator may require.” Milk utilized by the consumer in fluid form, beverage milk, commands a substantially higher price than milk of the identical quality which is used to make manufactured milk products, such as butter, cheese, ice cream and so forth. Accordingly the processor or distributor of milk is able to pay the producer a higher price for milk which is sold in fluid form for human consumption, and most milk-pricing systems require milk to be classified according to use. See Lehigh Valley Coop. v. United States, 370 U. S. 76, 79. The milk industry generally maintains a reserve to meet the changing demands for beverage milk. Since the supply of milk is greater than the demands of the fluid milk market, the excess, referred to as surplus milk, must be channeled to the less-desirable, lower-priced outlets. This explains how Polar is able to purchase milk in Alabama and other States for as low as 30 and 35 cents per gallon and how Polar was able to pay its producers, prior to regulation, as high as 61 cents per gallon for a specified quantity of milk. Where a distributor sells milk in both fluid and manufactured forms, problems of allocation arise. Under Federal Milk Marketing Orders establishing marketwide pools, the total proceeds received from the sale of milk by regulated handlers or distributors are pooled. A “blend” or average price is calculated by multiplying the “pool” milk disposed of in each class by the established minimum prices for each class, with some further adjustments not pertinent here. See Lehigh Valley Coop., supra, at 80. The “blend” price is then divided among the producers according to the amount of milk each producer sells, regardless of the use to which his milk is actually put. The blend price thus represents an average based upon the combined use of all regulated milk within a marketing area. Until the Florida Milk Commission’s Rule 220-1.05 was promulgated on August 24, 1962, the applicability of the allocation provision to milk utilized in less than Class I channels was unclear. The Commission’s letter of January 25, 1962, to Polar’s earned-base producers, assigning them bases for 1962, specified that the bases entitled them to that percentage of Polar’s Class I milk sales each month, without referring to Class II, III or IV utilizations. The total of the percentages assigned to these 26 producers was 100%, thus entitling them collectively to all of Polar’s Class I sales for 1962. Rule 220-1.05 (6) provides: “Base Percentage; Computation and Application. “(a) During the base fixing period, a base percentage shall be determined for each producer by calculating the ratio of the milk delivered by each producer to the total milk delivered by all producers for the entire base fixing period, which percentage is referred to herein as 'earned base.’ This computation shall be made immediately following the close of the base fixing period, and within thirty (30) days thereafter, each producer shall be notified by mail of his base percentage and the base percentage of all other producers participating in that particular base. During this period, each plant shall supply the local Deputy Administrator with a summary of its base computations. The producer notification must illustrate how the base percentage for the producer concerned has been determined. “1. The base percentage earned by each producer shall be applied to the total number of gallons of milk utilized in Class I channels by each distributor and producer-distributor to determine the number of gallons of milk for which the producer must be paid at the Class I price fixed by the Commission. In case a producer fails to produce the amount of milk that his 'earned base’ entitles him to, in Class I channels, such deficit must be reallocated to the other 'earned base’ producers in proportion to their ‘earned bases,’ and the Class I price paid for the milk so reallocated. “2. The method outlined above for computing allocations to Class I utilization shall be followed in computing allocations for all other classes. “3. First allocation of a producer’s deliveries shall be to Class I utilization, with allocation continued thereafter in descending order of price through Class IV classification. The balance of any producer’s production after the above allocations may then be placed in the lowest price classification. “4. In computing Class I sales to be allocated to producers, no adjustment shall be made for milk received by distributors and/or producer-distributors from sources other than ‘earned base’ producers.” Section 501.05 (3) provides: “The relationship between a producer and a distributor, under which milk produced by the producer is regularly delivered to and accepted by the distributor, when once established, shall not be terminated either by the producer or by the distributor without just cause therefor, and the approval of the commission. Just cause will be considered by the commission as any cause deemed just by a prudent and reasonable man.” Section 501.09 (3) provides: “The commission may decline to grant any license ... or revoke a license . . . when satisfied of the existence of any of the following . . . “(a) That a milk dealer has rejected, without reasonable cause, any milk delivered to and accepted by the milk dealer from a producer delivered by or on behalf of the producer in ordinary continuance of a previous course of dealing, or that a milk dealer has rejected without reasonable cause, or has rejected without reasonable advance notice, any milk_ tendered or offered for delivery to the milk dealer by or on behalf of a producer in ordinary continuance of a previous course of dealing. It is intended hereby to provide and require that a milk dealer shall not reject or refuse to accept any milk tendered or offered for delivery by or on behalf of a producer in ordinary continuance of a previous course of dealing unless there exists reasonable cause for the rejection or refusal to accept such milk and unless the milk dealer has also given . . . advance notice . . . .” In Borden Co. v. Odham, 121 So. 2d 625, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the Commission’s power to apply the percentage allocation provisions to Class II and III as well as Class I milk and to require a distributor to accept milk in excess of Class I requirements, so long as the Commission acted reasonably. However, since the statute at that time only required reasonable notice for a refusal of milk delivered in the ordinary course of dealings between a distributor and producer, the court held that the Commission’s additional requirement of just cause was beyond its authority. The statute, note 5, supra, has subsequently been amended to require both just cause and reasonable notice before refusal or rejection of milk delivered by an earned-base producer is permissible. In Florida Dairy, Inc., v. Florida Milk Comm’n, 149 So. 2d 867, a milk distributor sought to terminate its relationship with producers on the ground that it could produce its own milk at a lower price than that paid to producers and that the required prices rendered the distributor unable to meet the competition from producer-distributors in its area. The Commission’s finding that just cause was not met by this showing because of the injury to producers that would result from the termination and the consequent loss of business was upheld. See Foremost Dairies v. Odham, 121 So. 2d 636, upholding over Commerce Clause objections a Commission order providing for an annual base-fixing period and providing that base percentages earned by each producer are applicable to all classes of milk. Mr. E. V. Fisher, Administrator of the Florida Milk Commission, testified below that Polar is required to accept all the milk produced and tendered by Polar’s earned-base producers, and that refusal of any milk tendered without just cause is ground for a show-cause order and disciplinary proceedings. And see Rule 220-1.05 (4), (6). Official Order PEN-2, however, provides that an earned-base producer who delivers milk in excess of Class I needs during the base-fixing period may have his subsequent earned-base reduced; this order is to discourage Pensacola producers from increasing their production to the point of supplying surplus milk, defined as milk in excess of Class I needs. In the court below and in the jurisdictional statement filed with this Court, Polar also objected that this regulatory structure violated the due process and equal protection of the laws provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Polar has not pursued these issues in its brief or argument before this Court. They appear on their face to be without merit, and, in any case, our resolution of the other claims asserted renders a decision on these issues unnecessary. Fla. Stat. §§501.09 (4) (b), 501.09 (8): “For the privilege of continuing in or engaging in the business of distributing milk or acting as a distributor under the provisions of this chapter, there is imposed upon every distributor a tax in an amount equal to fifteen-one hundredths of one cent upon each gallon of milk distributed by each distributor during each calendar month. The amount of such tax shall be remitted by each distributor to the commission at the time that the monthly reports are required to be filed by the distributor with the commission as provided by this chapter.” “If at any time during a fiscal year the revenues received by the commission under this chapter exceed by at least twenty-five per cent the total amount of expenditures as budgeted by the commission for that fiscal year, the payment of taxes provided for in this subsection, and in §501.09 (4), on milk distributed by distributors, will be discontinued and such taxes are not imposed for the calendar months remaining in that fiscal year commencing with the first calendar month following the time when such revenues so collected exceed by at least twenty-five per cent the total amount of expenditures so budgeted for that fiscal year.” In response to the argument that New York’s price requirements were necessary to enhance the economic welfare of Vermont farmers and thereby ensure their observance of sanitary and health requirements, the Court stated that “the evils springing from uncared for cattle must be remedied by measures of repression more direct and certain than the creation of a parity of prices between New York and other states. . . . Whatever relation there may be between earnings and sanitation is too remote and indirect to justify obstructions to the normal flow of commerce in its movement between states.” 294 U. S. at 524. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, where a purported local health measure was invalidated because reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve and protect local interests, were available. The Florida. Milk Commission has informed us that Florida producers would operate at a loss unless a proportion of their sales of milk were put to Class .1 use and that therein lies the purpose of the Class I purchase and allocation requirement. We do not see why the situation is different for non-Florida producers. A recent study of movement patterns of fluid milk and milk products in the Southeastern States indicates that the quantity of fluid milk and other products from Grade A milk moving across state lines within this area was relatively small, and that among six States in the area, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee and Florida, Florida had by far the highest percentage of fluid milk and milk products distributed in the same areas as processed. This percentage was 95%.' Carley and Purcell, Milk Movement Patterns In The Southeast, 44 (So. Coop. Series, Bull. 84, April 1962). Another study during sample months of 1959 shows that Florida producers supplied 99.3% of the market for fluid milk in Florida; for all markets, local producer shipments were in excess of 90% of total milk supplies received and that the remainder in each area was obtained from sources located in other Florida markets. Only in northwest Florida did receipts from other States amount to 2.6% of supplies. In no other area was this amount above 1% of total receipts. R. E. L. Greene and H. W. Wurburton, An Economic Evaluation of Fluid Milk Supply, Movement and Utilization in Florida, 61 (Dept, of Agricultural Economics, Fla. Agricultural Experiment Station). It may be that the economic burden of the tax ultimately falls upon purchasers of Polar’s milk, including the United States. Decisions of this Court make clear, however, that the fact that the economic burden of a tax may fall on the Government is not determinative of the validity of the tax. As was said in respect to a sales tax applied to materials, the cost of which the Government was obliged to pay: “The Government, rightly we think, disclaims any contention that the Constitution, unaided by Congressional legislation, prohibits a tax exacted from the contractors merely because it is passed on economically, by the terms of the contract or otherwise, as a part of the construction cost to the Government. So far as such a non-discriminatory state tax upon the contractor enters into the cost of the materials to the Government, that is but a normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two independent taxing sovereignties. The asserted right of the one to be free of taxation by the other does not spell immunity from paying the added costs, attributable to the taxation of those who furnish supplies to the Government and who have been granted no tax immunity.” Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, 8-9. Fla. Stat. § 501.02 provides: “ ‘Milk dealer’ means any person who purchases or handles milk within the state, for sale in this state, or sells milk within the state in any market as defined in this chapter. Each corporation which if a natural person would be a milk dealer within the meaning of this chapter, and any subsidiary of such corporation, shall be deemed a milk dealer within the meaning of this definition. A producer who delivers milk only to a milk dealer shall not be deemed a milk dealer.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. CENTRAL-ILLINOIS SECURITIES CORP. et al. NO. 226. Argued January 12-13, 1949. Decided June 27, 1949. Roger S. Foster argued the cause for the Securities & Exchange Commission. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Robert L. Stern, Harry G. Slater, Jerome S. Katzin and Myer Feldman. Lawrence R. Condon argued the cause for Streeter et al., petitioners in No. 227 and respondents in No. 266. With him on the brief was Milton Maurer. Francis H. Scheetz argued the cause and filed a brief for the Home Insurance Co. et al., petitioners in No. 243 and respondents in No. 266. Alfred Berman argued the cause for the Central-Illinois Securities Corp. et al., petitioners in No. 266 and respondents in Nos. 226, 227 and 243. With him on the brief were Abraham Shamos, J. Howard Rossbach, Philip W. Amram and Herbert L. Cobin. Louis Boehm argued the cause for White et al., respondents. With him on the brief was Raymond L. Wise. W. E. Tucker and Paul D. Miller were counsel for the Engineers Public Service Co. Mr. Justice Rutledge delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an amended plan filed under § 11 (e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 by Engineers Public Service Company. The plan provided, inter alia, for satisfying the claims of Engineers’ preferred stockholders in cash as a preliminary to distributing the remaining assets to common stockholders and dissolving the company. Broadly, the question is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission, in reviewing the plan, correctly applied the “fair and equitable” standard of § 11 (e) in determining the amounts to be paid the preferred stockholders in satisfaction of their claims. As will appear, the ultimate effect of the Commission’s determination was to allow the holders of the three series of Engineers’ outstanding cumulative preferred stock to receive the call (or voluntary liquidation and redemption) prices for their shares, namely, $105 per share, $110 per share and $110 per share, rather than the involuntary liquidation preference which, for each of the three series, was $100 per share. Common shareholders oppose the allowance to the preferred of the call price value, insisting that the maximum to which the preferred are entitled is the involuntary liquidation preference of $100. In this view the District Court and, generally speaking, the Court of Appeals have concurred, declining to give effect to the plan as approved in this respect by the Commission. Consequently we are confronted not only with issues concerning the propriety of the Commission’s action in applying the “fair and equitable” standard of § 11 (e), but with the further question whether its judgment in these matters is to be given effect or that of the District Court, either as exercised by it or as modified in certain respects by the Court of Appeals. The facts and the subsidiary issues involved in the various determinations are of some complexity and must be set forth in considerable detail for their appropriate understanding and disposition. At the time the Public Utility Holding Company Act was enacted, the holding company system dominated by Engineers consisted of 17 utility and nonutility companies. Of these, nine were direct subsidiaries of Engineers and eight were indirect subsidiaries. Integration proceedings under § 11 (b) (1) of the Act were instituted with respect to Engineers and its subsidiaries in 1940. In a series of orders issued in 1941 and 1942 the Securities and Exchange Commission directed Engineers to dispose of its interests in all companies except either Virginia Electric and Power Company or Gulf States Utilities Company, and designated Virginia as the principal system if Engineers failed to elect between it and Gulf States. At the time the plan now under review was filed Engineers had complied with the divestment orders to the extent of disposing of all its properties except its interest in Virginia, consisting of 99.8 per cent of that company’s common stock, and its interest in Gulf States and El Paso Electric Company, consisting of all their common stock. Engineers’ principal assets were the securities representing its interest in these companies and $14,650,000 in cash and United States Treasury securities. Engineers had no debts. It had outstanding three series of cumulative preferred stock of equal rank: 143,951 shares of $5 annual dividend series, 183,406 shares of $5.50 series, and 65,098 shares of $6 series. As has been said, all three series had involuntary liquidation preferences of $100 per share, call prices of $105 for the $5 series and $110 for the $5.50 and $6 series, and voluntary liquidation preferences equal to the call prices. Proceedings before the Commission. The Plan as Originally Filed. The plan as originally filed by Engineers provided for the retirement of all three series of preferred stock by payment of the involuntary liquidation preference of $100 per share, plus accrued dividends to the date of payment. The remaining properties of Engineers were then to be distributed among the common stockholders, and Engineers was to dissolve. In order to insure adequate presentation of the views of the preferred stockholders, Engineers’ board of directors authorized one of its members, Thomas W. Streeter, who was primarily interested in the preferred stock, to retain counsel partly at the company’s expense. Streeter and members of his family are petitioners in No. 227. These preferred stockholders and representatives of a group of institutional investors who held preferred stock, the Home Insurance Company and Tradesmens National Bank and Trust Company, petitioners in No. 243, appeared before the Commission in opposition to the plan. They contended that they should receive amounts equal to the voluntary liquidation preference of the preferred. After summarizing the issuing prices, the dividend history, and the market history of the three series of preferreds, the Commission analyzed the assets coverage and earnings coverage of the stock. The preferred stock of Engineers represented 17.5 per cent of the consolidated capitalization and surplus of the system. That stock was junior to the 66.2 per cent of the consolidated capitalization and surplus which consisted of securities of Engineers’ subsidiaries held by the public, and senior to 16.3 per cent, consisting of Engineers’ total common stock and surplus. The system’s average earnings coverage of fixed charges and preferred dividends for the last five years prior to the submission of the plan was 1.4 times. For these five years Engineers’ average earnings coverage of preferred dividends was 1.5 times. Certain expert testimony concerning the going-concern or investment value of the preferred stock was adduced before the Commission. Dr. Ralph E. Badger was an expert witness on behalf of certain preferred stockholders. He made a detailed analysis of the earnings and assets of Engineers and of the three series of preferred stock. He then compared Engineers and the preferred stock with relevant information concerning other comparable companies and securities. He concluded that, apart from their call provisions and on the basis of quality and yield, the three series of preferred stock should be valued at $108.70, $119.57, and $130.33 respectively, but that because of the redemption privilege, “the present investment values are represented by their call price, plus a slight premium to account for the time required to effect a call.” The fair investment values of the preferred, in view of the redemption privilege, were: $5 series— $106.25; $5.50 series — $111.38; $6 series — $111.50. No rebuttal testimony was introduced, and there was no serious challenge to Badger’s conclusions that the fair investment value of each series of the preferred exceeded the call prices. Donald C. Barnes, Engineers’ president, testified that apart from the impact of § 11 of the Act and taking into account the call prices, the fair value of the preferreds, i. e., “what a willing buyer would pay and what a willing seller would take in today’s market for such securities,” was somewhat above the redemption prices. Barnes spoke of several factors, viz., possibilities of continued inflation, of depression, government competition, adverse changes in regulatory policy, or developments in atomic energy, all “common to the utility industry generally,” which might have a future adverse effect on the value of Engineers preferred. Both witnesses agreed, however, as Engineers stated in its brief before the Commission, that “the present value or investment worth of these three series of stock, on a going concern basis and apart from the Act, under prevailing yields applied to comparable securities” was in excess of the call prices. Barnes also testified that the preferred stock would have been called if it had not been for the impact of § 11. The Commission first held that “the dissolution of Engineers [was] 'necessary’ under the standards of the Act.” However, since such a liquidation, under Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 323 U. S. 624, “does not mature preferred stockholders’ claims,” the so-called involuntary liquidation provision of Engineers’ charter was not operative. The Otis case ruled “that Congress did not intend that its exercise of power to simplify should mature rights, created without regard to the possibility of simplification of system structure, which otherwise would only arise by voluntary action of stockholders or, involuntarily, through action of creditors.” 323 U. S. at 638. After announcing that in a § 11 reorganization “a security holder must receive, in the order of his priority, from that which is available for the satisfaction of his claim, the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered,” the Commission considered all the charter provisions which affected the preferred, “such as the dividend rate and the call price as well as the liquidation preferences,” and analyzed the financial condition of the company “with particular regard to the asset and earnings coverage of the preferred.” On the basis of the undisputed testimony the Commission found that the going-concern or investment value of the preferred was at least equal to the respective call prices. Since the call prices operated as ceilings on the value of the security by providing with respect to each series, “a means, apart from the Act, whereby the security can be retired at a maximum price,” no attempt was made to determine whether the investment value of any series of preferred would exceed the call price if there were no call provision. The Commission concluded that the payment of only $100 per share, plus accrued dividends, would not be fair and equitable to the preferred stockholders. It therefore refused to approve that provision of the plan which provided for retirement of the preferred at involuntary liquidation preferences. Turning its attention to whether the plan was fair to the common stock, the Commission stated that, because of the accumulation of large amounts of idle cash, elimination of preferred stock having fixed dividend requirements was “highly beneficial to the common.” Moreover, by implementing adjustment of the system to compliance with the Act, retirement of the preferred brought the common closer to the time when it would begin receiving dividends. Engineers contended that payment to the preferred of any amount in excess of $100 per share was unfair, because certain divestments required by the Act resulted in losses to the common stock and also eliminated the advantages of a “diversified portfolio of securities.” In reply to this the Commission noted that it did not accept the hypothesis that losses were incurred by divestments caused by the Act, and stated that the preferred claims, measured by their going-concern value, were entitled to absolute priority, and that what remained to junior security holders after satisfying this priority was necessarily their fair share. Certain mechanical features of the plan were also disapproved by the Commission. The Amended Plan. Engineers then acquiesced in the Commission’s determination and submitted an amended plan. In addition to meeting the Commission’s mechanical objections to the original plan, the amended plan provided for payment of the preferred stocks at their voluntary liquidation or call prices. Over the objections of certain common stockholders, the Commission approved the plan as amended. It stated that, in the event the common stockholders continued to litigate the fairness of the plan after approval by the district court, it would be appropriate “to achieve expeditious compliance with the Act and fairness to the persons affected ... for Engineers to make prompt payment of $100 per share and accrued dividends in order to stop the accrual of further dividends, and set up an escrow arrangement.” The escrow would secure the payment of the amount in issue and also “an additional amount to provide the preferred 'for the period of the escrow a return on the amount in escrow which is measured by the return which would have been received by it if the stock remained outstanding.’ ” Such an escrow could be established under court supervision without returning the plan to the Commission. Holding Company Act Release No. 7119, p. 6. By later order the Commission provided for the establishment of such an escrow at the option of Engineers if it appeared likely that common stockholders would litigate beyond the district court. Holding Company Act Release No. 7190. Proceedings in the District Court. The Commission applied to the District Court for the District of Delaware for approval of the plan as amended. § 11 (e). Certain common stockholders, respondents in Nos. 226, 227, and 243, and petitioners in No. 266, filed objections to the plan, contending that the Commission had erred in awarding to the preferred stockholders the equivalent of the voluntary liquidation preferences of their shares. The Streeter group of preferred stockholders objected to the Commission’s finding of the appropriateness of an escrow arrangement to stop the accrual of further dividends in the event of continued litigation. The District Court considered the case on the record made before the Commission. It preferred not to determine whether the involuntary liquidation preferences controlled, but stated that “in each case the inquiry is one of relative rights based on colloquial equity.” 71 F. Supp. 797, 802. That standard, thought the court, necessitated consideration of various factors to which it was thought the Commission had attached little or no importance. Thus it was important to consider not only the charter provisions but the issuing price in terms of what the company received for the securities, and the market history of the preferred. These factors might more than offset the factor of investment value, the testimony as to which the court accepted. In any event, thought the court, several other considerations have this effect. The Act, in addition to compelling the preferred stockholders to surrender “this present enhanced value,” worked hardships on the common. All classes of securities, the court said, suffered losses as a result of the divestment orders issued by the Commission under the Act. Earnings retained in the system at a sacrifice to the common contributed to the enhancement of the value of the preferred. These standards of “colloquial equity,” which the District Court conceived to be controlling in our decision in Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra, compelled the conclusion that it would not be fair and equitable to give the preferred more than $100 per share. Arguments concerning the worth of the preferred in the absence of a Public Utility Holding Company Act were thought not profitable to consider “for there is a Public Utility Holding Company Act.” In effect amending the plan to provide for payment of the preferred at $100 per share, the District Court approved the plan as thus amended. The escrow agreement prescribed by the Commission was approved, the court concluding that there was no merit in the preferred stockholders’ objections to this feature. 71 F. Supp. 797. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarded as a central issue in the case the question whether the District Court had exceeded the scope of review properly exercised by a district court reviewing a plan under § 11 (e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. It concluded that the District Court was charged with the duty of exercising a full and independent judgment as to the fairness and equity of a plan, “to function as an equity reorganization tribunal within the limitations prescribed by the Act.” 168 F. 2d 722, 736. Turning to the various factors which should have been taken into consideration in arriving at the equitable equivalent to the rights surrendered by the preferred shareholders, the Court of Appeals criticized the Commission for finding the investment value of the preferred as if there were no Holding Company Act while omitting to evaluate the common by the same standard, and for failing to consider factors other than the investment value. It was thought that the Commission should have estimated the future earning power of Engineers, absent a Holding Company Act, and apportioned that power between preferred and common stockholders in accordance with their respective claims. It was also thought that, in the process of valuing the preferred and the common by the same approach, the Commission should have considered “the substantial losses which occurred to Engineers by virtue of divestitures compelled by the Act.” Losses of this nature “should be returned to the credit side of the enterprise’s balance sheet as a matter of bookkeeping.” Id. at 737-738. But even an investment value figure properly arrived at is “only one of a series of factors to be used in arriving at equitable equivalents.” The Commission was required to consider “All pertinent factors and all substantial equities,” which presumably included the “colloquial equities” adverted to by the District Court. Id. at 738. The District Court, however, was held to have erred in one particular: it had amended the plan by substituting its own valuation of $100 per share for the preferred stock for that of the Commission. The court had no power to do this. It could only reject the Commission’s valuation, and return the case to the Commission for further action in the light of the court’s views. At the time the opinion of the Court of Appeals was rendered, the plan had been consummated, with the exception of the payment of the disputed amounts in excess of the involuntary liquidation preferences of the preferred. The escrow arrangement, which had been employed to preserve the issue of the amount to which the preferred was entitled after having been approved by the Commission and the District Court, was held to be proper. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions presented in the administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. 335 U. S. 851. I. The Court of Appeals was of the view that the question of the extent of “the power conferred on the district courts ... by the Act” was one which went “to the heart of the instant controversy.” 168 F. 2d at 729. The Commission apparently took the position before that court that the District Court had erred in setting aside the agency’s conclusions unless those conclusions lacked “any rational and statutory foundation.” This view was rejected by the Court of Appeals. Distinguishing judicial review under § 24 (a) as being limited to the inquiry whether the Commission “has plainly abused its discretion in these matters,” Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 208, the Court of Appeals held that a § 11 (e) court was charged with the duty of exercising a full and independent judgment as to the fairness and equity of a plan, “to function as an equity reorganization tribunal within the limitations prescribed by the Act.” 168 F. 2d at 736. This position is maintained before this Court by the representatives of the common stockholders. The preferred stockholders’ representatives urge that the Court of Appeals erred in this regard, and that the conclusion of the Commission should not have been disturbed by the District Court, because that conclusion was supported by substantial evidence and was within the agency’s statutory authority. The District Court, in their view, exceeded the proper scope of review. The Commission apparently no longer takes so restrictive a view of the District Court’s function as it formerly held. It now concedes that that court had power to review “independently” the method of valuation employed. But it urges that in this case the question, whether a proper method of valuation was employed, is one of law, since Congress has itself prescribed the standard for compensating the various classes of security holders instead of delegating to the Commission the task of fixing that standard. In the alternative the Commission argues that “If, as the court below seemed to assume, the question is not one of law, . . . the scope of review under Section 11 (e) is limited in the same manner as that applicable to determinations of the Interstate Commerce Commission under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,” which is said to embody a similar statutory scheme and under which administrative determinations of valuation are sustained if supported by substantial evidence and not contrary to law. Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. S. 448, 473; R. F. C. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R. Co., 328 U. S. 495, 505-509. The problem of the scope of review which Congress intended the district court to exercise under § 11 (e) arises from and is complicated by the fact that Congress provided not one, but two procedures for reviewing Commission orders of the type now in question. The first is afforded by § 11 (e) itself. It relates to orders approving voluntary plans submitted by any registered holding company or subsidiary for compliance with subsection (b). The Commission is authorized to approve such a plan if, after notice and opportunity for hearing, it “shall find such plan, as submitted or as modified, necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected by such plan.” Then follows the provision that “the Commission, at the request of the company, may apply to a court ... to enforce and carry out the terms and provisions of such plan. If . . . the court, after notice and opportunity for hearing, shall approve such plan as fair and equitable and as appropriate to effectuate the provisions of section 11,” the court is authorized “as a court of equity” to take exclusive jurisdiction and possession of the company or companies and their assets, and to appoint a trustee, which may be the Commission, for purposes of carrying out the plan. The alternative mode of review is provided by § 24 (a). It applies to all orders issued by the Commission under the Act and in abbreviated form is as follows: “Any person or party aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission . . . may obtain a review of such order in the circuit court of appeals ... by filing in such court, within sixty days ... a written petition .... [T]he Commission shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the record upon which the order complained of was entered. . . . [S]uch court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order, in whole or in part. No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission or unless there were reasonable grounds for failure so to do. The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” The District Court and the Court of Appeals, focusing their attention primarily on § 11 (e), emphasized the section’s requirement of approval by the District Court, that court’s declared status “as a court of equity,” and the absence from § 11 (e) of such explicit provisions as those of § 24 (a) making the Commission’s findings of fact conclusive, if supported by substantial evidence; limiting the court to consideration of objections urged before the Commission in the absence of reasonable grounds for failure to urge them; and restricting the court’s consideration to the record made before the Commission in the absence of any showing requiring remand to the Commission for the taking of additional evidence. Chiefly from these factors the two courts reached their respective conclusions that the District Court was required to exercise a full and independent judgment as to the fairness and equity of the plan, functioning as an equity reorganization tribunal within the limitations prescribed by the Act. However, they differed, as has been noted, concerning the scope of those limitations. The District Court thought it was authorized to substitute its own judgment for that of the Commission as to whether the plan was “fair and equitable,” after considering independently the various matters it denominated as “colloquial equities.” Accordingly, after reaching numerous conclusions on those matters contrary to the Commission’s or not given final effect in its determinations, the court arrived at an over-all judgment opposite to that of the Commission and held the plan not “fair and equitable” to the common stockholders in awarding the preferred more than $100 per share. Modifying the plan to allow the latter only that amount, the court ordered it enforced as modified. The Court of Appeals was in general agreement with the District Court concerning its power to exercise a full and independent judgment in giving or withholding approval of the plan as “fair and equitable” and, on the whole, was in accord with the District Court’s dispositions of the matters of “colloquial equity.” Stressing statements appearing in the legislative history of § 11, the court thought they gave basis for a strong analogy between the functions of district courts under § 11 (e) and those of such courts “when called upon under the Sherman and Hepburn Acts to effect compulsory corporate readjustments required by the public policy expressed in those acts.” The court’s opinion then added: “We think that it will not be contended that a district court . . . adjudging a controversy arising under the Sherman Act would function other than as in an original equity proceeding, exercising all the powers and duties inherent in a court of equity under such circumstances.” 168 F. 2d at 729. Accordingly, the court upheld the District Court’s view that it had power, as a court of equity, to withhold approval and enforcement of the plan upon its own independent judgment of the “colloquial equities,” notwithstanding the Commission’s contrary judgment and, apparently, even though the Commission’s judgment involved no clear error of law or abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals, however, viewed somewhat differently the limitations placed by the Act upon the power of review. “The proceedings before the equity reorganization court are not strictly de novo since the district court can only approve a plan when it has been approved by the Commission. See Application of Securities and Exchange Commission, D. C. Del., 50 F. Supp. 965, 966.” 168 F. 2d at 732. The District Court, it was said, could receive evidence aliunde the Commission’s record, could decide on that evidence and the Commission’s record that the plan is unfair and inequitable, and remand the cause to the Commission for further consideration, or could remand without taking new evidence. The District Court therefore was wrong in ordering enforcement of the plan as modified by itself. It could only approve and enforce or refuse approval and remand. Only a plan approved by the Commission and by the court could be enforced. These views were thought supported by the history of the law of reorganization, including equity receiverships, reorganization of insolvent companies under former § 77 B of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 207 et seq., and Chapter X reorganizations (id. at § 501 et seq.), although the court did not “mean to imply that Congress intended to grant a Section 11 (e) court the same full and untrammeled scope that a court of bankruptcy would have in a Chapter X proceeding.” 168 F. 2d at 735-736. Nevertheless, “Any question which goes to the issue of what is fair and equitable may be raised and must be passed upon.” Id. at 735. Moreover, since “the critical phrase employed alike by courts of equity and by Congress in framing the test under which a plan shall be approved or disapproved, has always embraced the phrase ‘fair and equitable’ or its substantial equivalent,” the court thought that the power and functions of the district courts in review of plans submitted did not “vary much from statute to statute and from case to case,” id. at 734, i. e., whether the plan was to be consummated by way of equity receivership, by action under former § 77 B, by suit under Chapter X, by a proceeding under § 77, 11 U. S. C. § 205, or by petition to a district court under § 11(e). The variant views held respectively by the Commission, the District Court, the Court of Appeals, and the parties to the proceeding demonstrate the complexity of the problem. Each view has a rational basis of support, but none is without its difficulties, either in statutory terms, history and intent or in practical consequences. The legislative history of § 11 (e) throws little light on the problem. There was, surprisingly, only casual, indeed tangental, discussion of it. The analogy to proceedings under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, drawn by the Commission and referred to by the Court of Appeals, rests chiefly upon the statement of Senator Wheeler, co-sponsor of the bill, made during a colloquy in debate on the Senate floor and set forth in the margin. But that statement did not occur in any detailed consideration of the scope and incidence of judicial review. It arose only as it were incidentally in the course of extended discussion which centered about the receivership provisions of § 11 (e) as it stood at the time of the debate. Moreover, the discussion did not and could not take account of the fact that, under our subsequent decisions in the Western Pacific and Denver & Rio Grande cases, supra, matters of valuation in § 77 reorganizations have been held to be exclusively for the Interstate Commerce Commission, not for the district courts, except as stated above. Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., supra; R. F. C. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R. Co., supra. Significantly, this fact seems not to have been taken into account when the Court of Appeals included the § 77 proceedings among its general grouping of reorganization procedures for analogical purposes. And in this respect the Commission makes clear its difference from the Court of Appeals, pointing out that under the Western Pacific and Bio Grande decisions the Commission decides questions of valuation, subject only to the narrow scope of review there allowed. But, as if to complicate the matter further, the Commission’s analogy is somewhat weakened by the fact that the Western Pacific and Bio Grande rulings concerning review of valuation matters rested upon language in § 77 not repeated in § 11 (e) of the Act presently in question. That language, appearing in subsection (e) of § 77, provided: “If it shall be necessary to determine the value of any property for any purpose under this section, the Commission shall determine such value and certify the same to the court in its report on the plan.” This, the Court held, left to the Interstate Commerce Commission the determination of value “without the necessity of a reexamination by the court, when that determination is reached with material evidence to support the conclusion and in accordance with legal standards.” 318 U. S. at 472-473. On the other hand, the opposing analogy drawn by the Court of Appeals from the history of the law of reorganization in general is highly indiscriminate. Insofar as it includes equity receiverships, e. g., pursuant to Sherman and Hepburn Act readjustments, it ignores the important fact that in such proceedings there is no effort to brigade the administrative and judicial processes. Nor does it take account of the substantial differences “from statute to statute,” e. g., between proceedings under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act as construed in the Western Pacific and Bio Grande cases, on the one hand, and Chapter X reorganizations, on the other. Moreover, and perhaps most important, it substitutes analogy drawn from other statutes and judicial proceedings, together with a reading of § 11 (e) in comparative isolation from the other provisions of the Act, for a consideration of that section in the context of the Act, as a whole and particularly with reference to any effort toward harmonizing the section with § 24 (a) and bringing the two as close together as possible in practical operation. Of course Congress could provide two entirely dissimilar procedures for review, depending on whether appeal were taken by an aggrieved person to a Court of Appeals or the plan were submitted by the Commission at the Company’s request to a district court. But it is hard to imagine any good reason that would move Congress to do this deliberately. The practical effect of assuming that Congress intended the review under § 11 (e) to be conducted wholly without reference to or consideration of the limitations expressly provided for the review under § 24 (a) certainly would produce incongruous results which would be very difficult to impute to Congress in the absence of unmistakably explicit command. For one thing the consequence would be, in effect, to create to a very large possible extent differing standards for administration and application of the act, depending upon which mode of review were invoked. In the one instance, apart from reviewable legal questions, the Commission’s expert judgment on the very technical and complicated matters to deal with which the Commission was established, would be controlling. In the other instance, it would have to give way to the contrary view of whatever district court the plan might be submitted to. Conceivably the same plan might be brought under review by both routes. Indeed, in one instance the District Court for Delaware, to which the plan here was submitted, held that its determination of the issues in a § 11 (e) proceeding was precluded by a prior affirmation of the same order by a Court of Appeals in a § 24 (a) review proceeding. See L. J. Marquis & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 134 F. 2d 822, and Application of Securities and Exchange Commission, 50 F. Supp. 965. Presumably, under the views now taken by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, if district court review under § 11 (e) could be had first, that determination likewise would be conclusive as against contrary views held by the Commission and a Court of Appeals in a later § 24 (a) proceeding. Moreover, apart from legal questions, the controlling standard would be fixed by the discretion of the district court to which the plan might be submitted. And since such a court might be any of the many district courts available for that purpose, there hardly could be the uniform application of the “fair and equitable” standard which Congress undoubtedly had in mind when it entrusted its primary administration to the Commission’s expert judgment and experience, and when it drafted the detailed provisions of § 24 (a) for review. To the extent at least that the standard contemplated an area of expert discretion, its content under the view taken by the District Court and the Court of Appeals could not be uniform, but would vary from court to court as the judicial discretion might differ from that of the Commission or other courts. In contrast with the specific limitations of § 24 (a), the very brevity and lack of specificity of § 11 (e), together with the paucity and tentative character of the legislative history, concerning the scope of review under the latter section, give caution against reading its .terms as importing a breadth of review highly inconsistent with the limitations expressly provided by § 24 (a). Both sections are parts of the same statute, designed to give effect to the same legislative policies and to secure uniform application of the statutory standards. That statutory context and those objects should outweigh any general considerations or analogies drawn indiscriminately from differing statutes or from the history of reorganizations in general, leading as these do to incongruities and diversities in practical application of the Act’s terms and policies. Indeed we think it is fair to conclude that the primary-object of § 11 (e) was not to provide a highly different scope of judicial review from that afforded by § 24 (a), but was to enable the Commission, by giving it the authority to invoke the court’s power, to mobilize the judicial authority in carrying out the policies of the Act. To do this the court “as a court of equity” was authorized to “take exclusive jurisdiction and possession of” the company or companies and their assets and to appoint a trustee to hold and administer the assets under the court’s direction. True, the court was to approve the plan as fair and equitable; but nothing was said expressly as to the scope of review or the resolution of differences in discretionary matters between the Commission and the court. The court’s characterization as “a court of equity” was appropriate in relation to the powers of enforcement conferred. We do not think it was intended to define with accuracy the scope of review to be exercised over matters committed to the Commission’s discretion and expert judgment, not involving questions of law, or to set up a different and conflicting standard in those matters from the one to be applied in proceedings under § 24 (a). This view is not inconsistent with Senator Wheeler’s comparison with § 77 proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, which perhaps, despite its rather casual interjection, most nearly approaches disclosure of the legislative intent as to the present problem. It may be added that, in general, the courts which have dealt with the problem appear to have taken the view we take, as against the one prevailing in the District Court and the Court of Appeals which reviewed this case, although in no case has the question been so sharply-focused as here. While § 11 (e), as we have noted, does not contain language the equivalent of subsection (e) of § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act upon which this Court rested its ruling concerning review of valuations in the Western Pacific case, that lack may be supplied in this case by the correlation we think is required between the terms of § 11 (e) and those of § 24 (a). Accordingly we are unable to accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the District Court that the latter was free, in passing upon the Commission’s valuations, to disregard its judgment in the large areas of discretion committed by the Act to that judgment. Administrative finality is not, of course, applicable only to agency findings of “fact” in the narrow, literal sense. The Commission’s findings as to valuation, which are based upon judgment and prediction, as well as upon “facts,” like the valuation findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission in reorganizations under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., supra, are not subject to reexamination by the court unless they are not supported by substantial evidence or were not arrived at “in accordance with legal standards.” Administrative determinations of policy, often based upon undisputed basic facts, in an area in which Congress has given the agency authority to develop rules based upon its expert knowledge and experience, are exemplified by Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., supra, in which the Commission determined that preferred stock purchased by management in the over-the-counter market during the formulation of a holding company reorganization plan could not be exchanged for common stock participation in the reorganized company, as could other preferred stock; instead management was to be paid cost plus interest for the preferred stock so purchased. The Commission’s determination was made in the exercise of its duty to determine that a plan is “fair and equitable” within the meaning of § 11 (e) and that it is not “detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers” within the meaning of § 7 (d) (6) and § 7 (e). On certiorari to the Court of Appeals which had reviewed the Commission’s order under § 24 (a) of the Act, we held that the Commission’s action was “an allowable judgment which we cannot disturb.” 332 U. S. 194, at 209. This holding was not based upon the fact that the Commission’s order was reviewed under § 24 (a) of the Act rather than under § 11 (e), but upon the ground that the Commission’s determination was made in an area in which Congress had delegated policy decisions of this sort to the Commission, and therefore that the agency determination was “consistent with the authority granted by Congress.” Id. at 207. We think this view is applicable when review is had under § 11 (e) as much as when it arises under § 24 (a). Even with the latitude allowed by our present ruling for play of the Commission’s judgment, it remains to consider whether in this case the Commission has complied with the statutory standards in its determination that the plan as amended by it is fair and equitable. The common shareholders deny this. And, contrary to the preferred shareholders’ position, the Commission has argued, alternatively to its contentions concerning the scope of review, that application of the “fair and equitable” standard of § 11 (e) in this case presents questions of law which have been decided erroneously by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. Taken most broadly, this argument of the Commission seems to be that the entire matter of applying the “fair and equitable” standard involves only legal issues, with the result that each subsidiary question raised and determined in that process becomes independently reviewable and judicially determinable. If so, of course, the question of the proper scope of review would become irrelevant, at any rate for the purposes of this case, since it was determined solely on the record made before the Commission. But the Commission does not stop with this broad argument. It goes on to consider particular questions which arose in the valuation process and to urge that they presented questions of law which the reviewing courts erroneously determined. Among these are whether the court’s dispositions violated the “absolute priority” standard attributed to the Otis case; whether their requirement that the Commission value the common stock in the same manner as it did the preferred, rather than simply awarding to the common shareholders all of Engineers’ assets remaining after giving the preferred the equitable equivalent of their shares as determined, violated the statutory standard; whether the courts rightly required the Commission to take into account alleged losses incurred by Engineers in earlier dispositions of company properties made to comply with the Act; and whether the Commission improperly failed to take into account other matters of “colloquial equity” the courts considered not only proper but essential to a fair and equitable determination. We think at least some of these matters do raise legal issues, particularly in the light of the Otis decision, which should now be considered and resolved. Accordingly we turn to them for that purpose. II. Challenges to the Investment Value Theory of Valuation. The principal effect of the Otis decision was to rule that in simplification proceedings pursuant to §§ 11 (b) (2) and (e) of the Act the involuntary charter liquidation preference does not of itself determine the amounts shareholders are to receive, but instead the amounts allocated should be the equitable equivalent of the securities’ investment value on a going-concern basis. The common shareholders seek to avoid the effect of this ruling by various arguments presently to be stated, which should be considered and determined in the light of the Otis decision and the Commission’s practice consistent with that decision, a summary of which practice is set forth in the Appendix to this opinion. In the Otis case the plan called for the dissolution of the United Light and Power Company, the top holding company in the system, in obedience to a Commission order requiring the elimination of that company, whose existence violated the “great-grandfather clause” of § 11 (b) (2). Since both common and preferred stockholders were to receive, in exchange for their stock in United Power, stock in its subsidiary, the United Light and Railways Company, which was itself a holding company, the effect of the dissolution was to eliminate the top holding company in a multi-tiered holding company system, leaving both classes of security holders with an investment in a continuing holding company enterprise. The assets of United Power were insufficient to satisfy the claims of the company’s preferred stockholders, if the charter liquidation preference of the preferred was applicable. The Commission found however that “if all the assumed earnings materialized and were applied to liquidating the preferred current and deferred dividends, in approximately fifteen years the arrearages would be paid and the common would be in a position to receive dividends,” 323 U. S. at 632, and that only by forced liquidation could the common be deprived of all right to future earnings and the preferred be given the right to prospective earnings in excess of the dividends guaranteed by charter. The Commission concluded that “in its ‘over-all judgment’ Power’s common had a legitimate investment value of a proportion of 5.48 per cent of Power’s assets to the preferred’s value of 94.52 per cent.” Ibid. Relying on the legislative history of the Act, 323 U. S. at 636-637, and upon the fact that the charter provision was not drafted in contemplation of the legislative policy embodied in the Act, id. at 637-638, we held that the Commission had not erred in its method of valuation. By this ruling we rejected the easier solution of permitting liquidations or reorganizations compelled by the Act to mature charter rights and thus to shift investment values from one class of security holders to another. In so ruling, this Court did not abandon the “absolute priority” standard insofar as embodied in the requirement that the plan be “fair and equitable.” That standard requires that each security holder be given the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered, but the equitable equivalent is not invariably the charter liquidation preference, as it is in the case of liquidations or reorganizations brought about through the action of creditors or stockholders. The principle of the Otis case is that the measure of equitable equivalence for purposes of simplification proceedings compelled by the Holding Company Act is the value of the securities “on the basis of a going business and not as though a liquidation were taking place.” 323 U. S. at 633. The decisions of the Commission, from the commencement of its enforcement of the Public Utility Holding Company Act to the present time, show a consistent and developing application of the investment value rule approved in the Otis case. At least since its decision in that case charter provisions have been held invariably not to be determinative. Federal courts which have had occasion to speak in this connection have recognized that charter liquidation provisions are not the measures of stockholders’ rights in liquidations and reorganizations compelled by the Act. Seeking to distinguish the Otis case, the representatives of the common stockholders contend that here the charter liquidation provisions are applicable, from which of course it would follow that those provisions are the measure of equitable equivalence. It is urged first that Engineers’ charter liquidation provision is phrased in more comprehensive terms than was the one in Otis, and that the framers of Engineers’ charter contemplated the possibility of governmental action of the kind required by the Holding Company Act. A comparison of the two charter provisions reveals no significant difference between them. Engineers’ charter was drafted some four years earlier than the Otis charter. Each contract was made at a time when the legislative policy embodied in the Holding Company Act “was not foreseeable.” 323 U. S. at 638. A further asserted distinction is that there is here a “genuine liquidation,” i. e., a termination of the holding company enterprise by the liquidation of the last holding company in the system; while in the Otis case “the holding company enterprise continued essentially unchanged, even though the particular corporation there involved was being dissolved pursuant to the mandate of the Act, as an incident to the simplification of the continuing system.” It would probably suffice to observe that the word “liquidation,” as used in Engineers’ charter liquidation provision, quite obviously means liquidation of Engineers, not liquidation of other corporations or of the holding company enterprise of which Engineers is a part. But there are more fundamental reasons which require the rejection of this argument. The legislative history relied upon in the Otis case, 323 U. S. at 636-637, contains no hint that Congress intended to preserve investment values only when the policy of the Act required a reduction in the number of holding companies in a system rather than the elimination of the system’s last holding company. And the Otis opinion rejected the Commission’s argument in that case that the result there was justified by the fact that the holding company enterprise was to continue. We said that the reason for the inapplicability of charter provisions “does not lie in the fact that the business of Power continues in another form. That is true of bankruptcy and equity reorganization. It lies in the fact that Congress did not intend that its exercise of power to simplify should mature rights, created without regard to the possibility of simplification of system structure, which otherwise would only arise by voluntary action of stockholders or, involuntarily, through action of creditors.” 323 U. S. at 638. Far from aiding the distinction urged by the common stockholders, Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182, supports the conclusion that investment values rather than charter provisions provide the measure of the preferred stockholders’ rights. In that case the Court held that the charter liquidation provision of a railroad corporation merging with another railroad under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act was not determinative of the amount to which holders of cumulative preferred stock were entitled, and that “In appraising a stockholder’s position in a merger as to justice and reasonableness, it is not the promise that a charter made to him but the current worth of that promise that governs, it is not what he once put into a constituent company but what value he is contributing to the merger that is to be made good.” 334 U. S. at 199. Again this result depended, not upon the fact that the merger left a continuing enterprise, but upon the fact that Congress, in its efforts to achieve a particular economic goal, wished to avoid shifting investment values from one class of securities to another by maturing contract rights which would not otherwise have matured. As did the Otis opinion, which was said to construe “a federal statute of very similar purposes,” the Schwabacher opinion assumed “that Congress intended to exercise its power with the least possible harm to citizens.” Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra at 638. The final reason for rejecting the asserted distinction between liquidation of the particular corporation and liquidation of the holding company enterprise serves also to answer a further, related argument made by the representatives of the common stockholders. It is said that payment of the preferred stockholders in cash rather than in securities of a new corporation and the consequent termination of these stockholders’ investment “matures” the preferred claims and makes this a “genuine liquidation.” These arguments, which necessarily imply that the Commission may not choose the elimination of one company in a system rather than another or payment in cash rather than securities as means of conforming the enterprise to the requirements of the Act, without varying the standard by which stockholders are to be compensated, are answered in the Otis opinion. We held there that security values should not “be made to depend on whether the Commission, in enforcing compliance with the Act, resorts to dissolution of a particular company in the holding company system, or resorts instead to the devices of merger or consolidation, which would not run afoul of a charter provision formulated years before adoption of the Act in question. The Commission in its enforcement of the policies of the Act should not be hampered in its determination of the proper type of holding company structure by considerations of avoidance of harsh effects on various stock interests which might result from enforcement of charter provisions of doubtful applicability to the procedures undertaken.” 323 U. S. at 637-638. The common stockholders argue also that, even if the charter liquidation provision be deemed inapplicable, the “fair and equitable” standard requires the application of the “doctrine of frustration.” It is said that frustration of a contract by governmental edict or any other supervening event not contemplated by the parties requires that “the loss ... lie where it falls. Neither party can be compelled to pay for the other’s disappointed expectations.” In such a case, it is said, “the face amount of the security — which theoretically mirrors the senior security holder’s contribution to the enterprise — is all that he is entitled to recover.” Again the Otis case is said to be distinguishable in that there the preferred stockholders were to receive a participation in the continuing enterprise, while here their investment is terminated by payment in cash. But, as we observed above, the Commission is not to be hampered in its enforcement of the policies of the Act “by considerations of avoidance of harsh effects on various stock interests.” The authorities relied upon in support of the frustration argument would not compel the result for which the common stockholders contend, even in the absence of the Otis decision. Considerable reliance is placed upon The United Light & Power Co., 10 S. E. C. 1215, and the affirmance of that decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York Trust Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 131 F. 2d 274. In that case the plan, a different feature of which was reviewed in the Otis case, provided for payment to the company’s debenture holders in cash. The Commission, after deciding that voluntary liquidation preferences were not payable, and that the bondholders had no right to receive the premium “by virtue of any other recognized legal or equitable principle,” held that there was no right to compensation for the termination of the investment, which, like the termination of the stockholders’ investments, had been “brought about by the act of a sovereign power — in this case a congressional mandate.” 10 S. E. C. at 1223, 1228. In affirming the Commission’s determination, the Court of Appeals held that “the contract is no longer binding and further performance is excused. . . . where, as here, the essential existence of one of the parties to a contract has become illegal and impossible because contrary to a new concept of public policy which was unforeseeable when the contract was made.” 131 F. 2d at 276. Since the corporation was under no obligation to call the bonds, “it might well let the rights of those in interest be determined as though there had been no call option. The order under review was, accordingly, fair and reasonable to all parties in interest since it provided for the payment of the bonds in a way which discharged in full the contract obligations of the dissolved corporation.” Ibid. Even if it is assumed that no distinction is to be made between bonds and preferred stock, neither the decision of the Court of Appeals nor that of the Commission in the New York Trust case is inconsistent with the later Otis decision or with the position of the Commission in this case, insofar as each holds that performance of the charter contract is excused. Engineers is no longer required by its contract either to continue the payment of preferred dividends beyond the dissolution date provided in the plan or to redeem the preferred at either voluntary or involuntary charter liquidation prices. Moreover the New York Trust case need not be construed to fix the measure of the senior security holder’s claim at the face amount of his security. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 151 F. 2d 424, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized that the doctrine of impossibility or frustration applied in the New York Trust case excused the corporation from its contractual obligations and agreed with the Commission that it would not be fair and equitable to pay redemption premiums in the circumstances of that case. But the Court observed that “whether, upon retirement of outstanding bonds . . . payment of principal, accrued interest, and redemption premiums is the equitable equivalent of the bondholders’ rights depends upon the facts of each particular case.” 151 F. 2d at 430. The doctrine of impossibility or frustration explains the conclusion that the corporation is excused from performing its contract, but it does not provide a measure of the security holders’ claims. For that measure, we must look to the intention of Congress, as we did in the Otis case. III. Application of the Investment Value Theory: The Commission’s Alleged Failure to Take Account of Prior Divestment Losses Sustained by Engineers; Its Alleged Failure to Value the Common Stock by the Same Method as Was Used in Valuing the Preferred; “Colloquial Equities.” It was the Commission’s duty in passing upon the fairness and equity of the plan to accord each security holder, in the order of his priority, the investment or going-concern value of his security. Here, as in the Otis case, the manifest solvency of Engineers “simplifies the problem of stockholders’ rights .... The creditors are satisfied.” 323 U. S. at 633-634. Valuation on the basis of a going concern necessarily has primary relationship to value as of the time the shareholders’ surrender becomes effective, not as of some earlier, remote period or one long afterward. Moreover, “Like the bankruptcy and reorganization statutes, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, in providing that plans for simplification be ‘fair and equitable,’ incorporates the principle of full priority in the treatment to be accorded various classes of security interests. This right to priority in assets which exists between creditors and stockholders, exists also between various classes of stockholders. When by contract as evidenced by charter provisions one class of stockholders is superior to another in its claim against earnings or assets, that superior position must be recognized by courts or agencies which deal with the earnings or assets of such a company. Fairness and equity require this conclusion.” These are the governing principles to be applied in consideration of the differences between the Commission and the reviewing courts concerning the matters listed in the heading of this paragraph. It is important to note that the doctrine of allowing equitable equivalents of present going-concern value to replace stated charter liquidation value as the measure of security satisfaction did not and was not intended to destroy charter or contract right to priority of satisfaction. A. The investment value or going-concern value theory rests upon the premise that Congress intended to exercise its power to simplify holding company systems and to remove uneconomic companies without destroying legitimate investment value. It is consistent with this premise that the investment value determined by the Commission be the investment value the securities would have if it were not for the liquidation required by the Act. This does not mean, however, that the agency must value the stock as if the Act had never affected the holding company system of which the particular company dealt with in the plan is a part. When the Commission values a security interest by determining the value that interest would have if it were not for the present liquidation or reorganization required by the Act, it substantially complies with the statutory mandate. There are at least two sufficient reasons, both of which are illustrated by the present case. It would be administratively impossible, in determining the investment value of securities in a corporation being liquidated, to reevaluate every transaction in the gradual simplification of the system of which the company is a part, as if the Act had never been passed. If the Commission were required to reconstitute Engineers’ balance sheet as if the Act had never been passed, it would be necessary, for example, retroactively to evaluate the economic consequences of the compelled divestment of Engineers’ interest in Puget Sound Power and Light Corporation in 1943 and to determine whether and to what extent Engineers would have gained or lost by retaining its interest in Puget Sound to the present time. The difficulties of going through such a procedure, multiplied by the number of divestments compelled by the Act over many years, would be insuperable. The second reason lies in the basis for the Otis rule itself. Since Congress intended that investment values should be preserved in each liquidation or divestiture required by the Act, we may assume that it intended the Commission to value securities in a particular liquidation as if that liquidation were not taking place, but not as if the Act had never been passed; for, if investment values have been preserved in the early divestitures, it is useless to reconstitute the balance sheet as if the divestitures had not taken place. The Commission’s determinations upon which the various divestiture orders were based may not be collaterally attacked. B. We have observed that the standard of compensation to be accorded security holders does not depend upon whether their security interests are to be retired by exchanging them for new securities in a continuing enterprise or by payment in cash. However, these different methods of compensating the security holder determine which of varying methods of arriving at investment value will be employed by the Commission. Where the security holder is to receive new securities, the Commission is faced with a dual valuation problem. It must evaluate the security to be surrendered and the securities to be received in exchange. Recognizing the inherent complexity of this problem, this Court has held that a security holder may be accorded the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered without placing a dollar valuation upon either the rights surrendered or the securities given in compensation therefor. In the Otis case, in which the plan contemplated compensating both preferred and common stockholders of United Power in common stock of Power’s sole subsidiary, the Commission was required to apportion the Power common between the two classes by evaluating the expectation of income from the new stock and the risk factor of that stock in relation to the rights being surrendered. In effect the Commission’s task was to apportion to the new stock earning power substantially equivalent to that surrendered. But when the claims of the senior security holders are to be satisfied by payment in cash, the Commission appropriately varies its approach. In such a case it holds that “the most workable hypothesis for finding a fair equivalent between cash received and the security surrendered under the compulsion of the plan, is that of reinvestment in a security of comparable risk.” The question to which the Commission seeks the answer is, “How much money would it cost the preferred stockholders to replace their securities with comparable ones?” Badger sought to provide an answer to this question by deriving from his analysis and comparison a proper yield basis for Engineers’ preferred, which, taking into account the effect of the risk factor, he found to be 4.6%. Capitalization of this rate gave the preferreds values ranging from $108.70 per share to $130.33 per share, amounts well in excess of the call prices. The testimony of Engineers’ president, Barnes, as to “what a willing buyer would pay and what a willing seller would take in today’s market for such securities,” absent a Public Utility Holding Company Act, coincided with that of Badger, as to the estimated going-concern value in cash of the preferred. The Commission did not rely exclusively on this expert testimony but made its own study of the market and dividend history and the earnings coverage and assets coverage of the preferred. This served not only as a check upon the accuracy of Badger’s premises but as a basis for the Commission’s exercise of its independent judgment. The Commission found it unnecessary to make its own independent estimate of the dollar value of the preferred stock, absent a Holding Company Act. When it became apparent that the going-concern value would exceed the call prices of the stocks by a considerable amount, the exact going-concern value became immaterial, because the call price, at which the corporation could always retire the preferred without reference to the Act, marked the limits of the preferreds’ claims. The common stockholders contend that this method of valuation, as employed in this case, produced only “a hypothetical market value of the preferreds based on market prices as of the time when the testimony of Badger and Barnes was given (the first few months of 1946).” They criticize Badger, whose evidence was undisputed and was accepted by the Commission, for failing to employ, as a basis for comparison, median prices and yields of the securities chosen for comparison, computed on the basis of prices covering a representative period of time; they complain that the low yield rates and high market levels of January, 1946, were abnormal. And it is said that the Commission and Badger failed properly to evaluate Engineers’ economic future, absent a Holding Company Act, i. e., failed to make “a prediction as to what will occur in the future, an estimate . . . based on an informed judgment which embraces all facts relevant to future earning capacity and hence to present worth, including, of course, the nature and condition of the properties, the past earnings record, and all circumstances which indicate whether or not that record is a reliable criterion of future performance.” Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 526. We may concede that, even though the preferred is to be paid in cash and thus should receive cash sufficient to purchase a comparable investment with a comparable yield, the Commission would be wrong in selecting, as a basis for valuation, abnormal or highly speculative market values of a transient nature. But this was not done. Badger stated that “The prices of preferred stocks today are predicated on fundamental conditions prevailing in the money markets, conditions which are of a permanent nature.” He added that the values he placed upon the preferreds were “values of a permanent nature and . . . not values of a temporary or speculative nature.” His conclusion was supported by a summary of the pertinent economic considerations, including the effects of Government financing and the large Government debt, together with a comparison of yields of Government bonds, high grade corporate bonds, and high grade preferred stocks from 1932 to 1945. Finally, Badger’s analysis of Engineers’ economic status, absent a Holding Company Act, of Engineers’ preferred, and of comparable securities of other companies was thorough and adequate. The Commission made its own independent study of Engineers’ economic record. In evaluating Badger’s testimony regarding the quality of Engineers’ preferreds, the proper yield basis for the stock, and economic considerations underlying the prediction that current yields and price levels were relatively permanent, the Commission exercised its informed and expert judgment. At the time it passed upon the plan it was able to say that “no serious challenge was made in the proceedings to Badger’s conclusion that the fair investment value of the preferred on a going concern basis is in excess of the call price.” Holding Company Act Release No. 7041, p. 31. Engineers, in its brief before the Commission, conceded that “these amounts ($106.25, $111.38, $111.50, respectively) are substantially the present value or investment worth of these three series of stock, on a going concern basis and apart from the Act, under prevailing yields applied to comparable securities.” Ibid. The Commission’s determination that the investment values of the preferreds were in excess of their call prices has ample support in the record. But the common stockholders contend that a drop in yield rates, caused by a lowering of support levels of Government securities, should be taken into consideration by this Court in appraising the Commission’s determination. Any changes which had occurred since the date of consummation would of course be irrelevant, for the preferred stockholders could not be required to surrender their investment and their advantageous dividend rate and yet remain subjected to the risk of fluctuation in the value of their erstwhile investment. But the common stockholders have failed to show that the investment values of the preferreds have fallen below the call prices even after that date. An argument which has been variously articulated by the District Court, the Court of Appeals, and the common stockholders runs to the effect that the Commission’s method of valuation, which assigned no value to the common stock, amounts to giving the preferred the investment value it would have had in the absence of a § 11 liquidation, while giving the common something less than its investment value apart from the liquidation. As the District Court phrased it, “The argument for payment of the premium is comparable to dealing cards off the top of a deck. When full hands (based on theoretical ‘investment value’) have been dealt to all the senior security holders, the common would merely get whatever happens to remain. Under the Act the interests of all investors must be considered.” 71 F. Supp. at 802. The initial error in this argument is its assumption that the Commission deals from less than a full deck, that the impact of § 11 has caused losses to Engineers. For, if investment values have not been destroyed by the operation of § 11, giving the preferred stockholders the investment value of their shares will not deprive the common of any part of the investment value of their stock. We have already dealt with the hypothesis accepted by the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the impact of the Act prior to the liquidation involved here has caused losses by forcing the company to divest itself of its interests in numerous operating companies. In addition, however, it is said that value disappeared in the liquidation of Engineers itself, in spite of the fact that when Engineers’ management came forward with a plan for the liquidation of Engineers, they had asserted that there was no economic justification for the continued existence of that corporation, in fact had characterized it as an “economic monstrosity.” In the light of the present record it seems futile to argue that the dissolution of Engineers injured the common stockholders by depriving them of the so-called advantages of “leverage,” diversity of investment and a centralized management, arguments which, incidentally, were largely rejected by Congress at the time of the passage of the Act. The record indicates that whatever tax advantage would be derived from reporting income on a consolidated basis was not commensurate with the cost of preserving Engineers. Even if we could find that investment value had been destroyed by the liquidation of Engineers, or if we could find that the operation of the Act prior to the formulation of Engineers’ plan had inflicted losses on the Engineers system and could take such losses into account, these facts would be irrelevant, except to the extent that such losses had impaired the investment value of Engineers’ preferred by lowering its assets coverage or otherwise adversely affecting the economic prospects of the company apart from the Act. Eor the “fair and equitable” standard requires that, before the junior security holder may share, the senior security holder must receive the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered, in this case the investment value. Since the investment value of the preferred must be measured in cash in this case, there is no occasion for “an examination of the correlative rights of the preferred and common stockholders.” The rights of the common are not entitled to recognition until the rights of the preferred have been fully satisfied. C. The District Court, with the apparent approval of the Court of Appeals, cast the standard of “fair and equitable” in the mold of “colloquial equities.” Making payment of the preferred in excess of $100 per share unfair, it thought, were various “colloquial equities,” which may or may not have had an incidental bearing on the investment value of the shares. The issuing price was one such factor. The “important consideration” was “not what the preferred security holders paid, but how much the company received for their stock,” and since it was “practically certain” that the company received no more than $98 per share for any of the three series of preferreds and that the public paid no more than $100 per share, there was “no consideration of colloquial equity why the preferreds should be paid a premium.” 71 F. Supp. at 801. Other “colloquial equities” were the market history of the preferred, the fact that earnings had been retained in the system, thus enhancing the value of the preferred at a sacrifice to the common, and the hardship worked by the Act upon the common stock in the form of forced divestitures and frustration of the enterprise. In deciding the case on the assumption that “the inquiry is one of relative rights based on colloquial equity,” and that the Otis case accorded participation to security holders “in accordance with the standard of colloquial equity,” the District Court erred insofar as by “colloquial equities” it meant considerations which do not bear upon the investment or going-concern value the preferred would have absent the liquidation compelled by the Act. Congress, perhaps believing that the application of such an amorphous standard as that of “colloquial equity” was beyond the competence of courts and commissions, has instead prescribed the requirement that investment values be preserved. IV. The Escrow Arrangement. As we have stated, the plan has been consummated by the payment to the preferred of $100 per share, and the difference between the amount paid and the amount which would be payable under the plan approved by the Commission has been deposited in escrow, together with an amount sufficient to give the preferred, during the period of the litigation, a return on the sum in escrow “measured by the return which would have been received by [the preferred stockholders] if the stock remained outstanding.” The preferred stockholders, who received $100 per share at the time of the consummation of the plan, will thus receive, on the additional $5 or $10 per share held in escrow, substantially the same return they would have derived by the retention of $5 or $10 worth of Engineers’ preferred stock. But the preferred stockholders contend that the plan should not have been consummated until such time as they were paid in full the amounts due them in satisfaction of their claims; that, in addition to the principal amount in escrow and interest thereon, they should receive an amount equal to dividends on the $100 per share received at the time of consummation, to the date of payment of the $5 or $10 held in escrow. Their argument is a technical one: it is said that the Commission actually applied the redemption provision to limit the amount of payment to them, since in the absence of that provision they would have been entitled to an investment value higher than the call prices; that by the terms of that provision the company had no right to terminate dividends except by payment of the full call prices. The answer is that the Commission did not apply the redemption provision, which, like the involuntary liquidation provision, was inoperative, but held that fairness required that the preferreds be paid no more than the call price, since the company could have called the stock at that price at any time, absent the Act. The total sum in escrow is not sufficient to meet the preferred stockholders’ demand. It is not apparent how they could recover the difference between the sum in escrow and the sum they claim in this proceeding. But we need not learn, for the escrow provision adopted by the District Court on the recommendation of the Commission in order to expedite consummation of the plan was fair to the preferred stockholders. The $100 per share received at the time of the consummation of the plan could have been invested in comparable securities at the current rate of return. On the $5 or $10 per share held in escrow the preferred stockholders will receive, for the period between the date of consummation and the date of payment, a return which approximates the favorable rate of return they received on their preferred stock in Engineers. Their position is at least substantially the same as it would have been had they received $105 or $110 per share at the time of the consummation of the plan. Our specific consideration has applied to the major features of difference between the Commission and the reviewing courts. In our opinion, in these respects, the Commission’s action has not been contrary to law and its findings were sustained by adequate evidence. Consequently, in accordance with the views we have stated concerning the scope of judicial review, the Commission’s order should have been sustained. We have considered other contentions advanced by the parties and find nothing in them which would warrant a different conclusion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Me. Justice Douglas and Me. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. APPENDIX. SECUEITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF INVESTMENT VALUE THEOEY. The Commission first applied the investment value standard in a series of cases holding common stock entitled to participate with preferred in the new securities given to satisfy claims in the dissolving corporation, although in each case the book value of the corporation’s assets was exceeded by the charter claims of the preferred. This application of the standard was approved by this Court in Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 323 U. S. 624. Satisfaction of preferred claims at less than their face amount by payment partly in cash and partly in new securities has also been approved by the Commission. In other cases holding that, in the circumstances of the particular case, retirement of preferred stock having a call or voluntary liquidation price in excess of the involuntary liquidation price by payment in cash at the latter price is fair and equitable, the Commission has considered a number of factors other than charter provisions. In a number of contemporaneous cases, the Commission approved plans which provided for liquidation of bonds by payment in cash at the face amount of the bonds without premium. Even in the earliest of these cases, in addition to holding that the indenture provision requiring payment of a premium in the event of voluntary call was inapplicable, the Commission observed the absence of other legal or equitable considerations which might have made payment of a premium fair and equitable. And in the later cases, the Commission’s opinions “emphasized such circumstances, not articulated in the earlier cases, as the interest rate, maturity date, and risk factors incident to the particular security which is to be prepaid as bearing upon the fairness of the proposed discharge of the security.” American Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6176, p. 12. In American Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6176, the Commission applied the investment value theory to allow payment of premiums on bonds retired under compulsion of § 11 (e). After pointing out the trend observed in the preceding paragraph and attributing it to experience gained in considering a large number of cases, the Commission held that the investment value theory should be applied where its application resulted in the payment of the- bonds at prices in excess of their face value. Commissioner Healy, who had persistently dissented in the line of cases finally approved by this Court in the Otis case, dissented vigorously. He contended that the Otis case should be limited to its facts and that the earlier cases refusing to require payment of premiums on bonds should be taken as holding that payment of bonds at their face amount without premium “was fair because . . . contract rights were satisfied, not because the debentures were valued and found to be worth their principal.” Id. at 46. He thought it highly significant that a consistent application of the investment value standard would require retirement of bonds at less than their principal amount, in cases in which the bonds were not “worth their principal,” and that the Commission had not suggested that its approach should extend so far. Id. at 47-48. Less than one year later the Commission made a parallel application of the investment value theory to a case involving the retirement of noncallable preferred stock, holding unfair a plan providing for the retirement of that stock by payment in cash equivalent to the liquidation preference. The United Light and Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6603. Commissioner Healy, who died November 16, 1946, dissented, stating for the last time his view that the claim should be paid at its liquidation preference, i. e., that the contract controlled. After this decision, in which the Commission divided 3-2, a rehearing was granted. While decision on rehearing was pending, the company proposed a substitute voluntary proposal, which the Commission approved. United Light and Railways Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7951. The next application of the investment value theory employed by the Commission’s majority was made in this case, decided December 5, 1946. Since this decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals on review, the Commission has again applied the investment value theory to require payment of preferred stock in cash at investment values equal to call prices. Pennsylvania Edison Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8550. In a number of cases the Commission has approved plans which provided for the payment of preferred stock at call prices, where there was no contention that the premium was not payable. But these eases have not been regarded as precedents in cases in which the company resists payment of the preferred stock or bonds in amounts in excess of the face value or involuntary liquidation price. United Light and Power Co., 10 S. E. C. 1215, 1227. 49 Stat. 803, 822, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (e). Engineers Public Service Co., 9 S. E. C. 764; The Western Public Service Co., 10 S. E. C. 904; Engineers Public Service Co., 12 S. E. C. 41; Engineers Public Service Co., 12 S. E. C. 268. The latter two orders were reviewed on the petition of Engineers by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which, on November 22, 1943, set aside those orders and remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. Engineers Public Service Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 199, 138 F. 2d 936. On the applications of both Engineers and the Commission, this Court granted certiorari. 322 U. S. 723. We were prevented by lack of a quorum from deciding the case, and when we were advised that the partial consummation of the plan now under consideration rendered the question moot, we ordered the decision of the Court of Appeals vacated. 332 U. S. 788. The cash with which the preferred was to be paid was to consist of treasury cash on hand, cash obtained by a short-term bank loan, and $21,964,632 in cash which Engineers’ common stockholders were to pay into the company’s treasury in exchange for warrants entitling them to purchase one share of Gulf States’ common stock at $11.50 per share, for each share of Engineers owned. The provision for the bank loan was deleted from the amended plan, by requirement of the Commission, and the cash which would have been thus obtained was to be obtained from special dividends declared by the three operating subsidiaries. After retirement of the preferred, the common stock of El Paso and Virginia (the two remaining companies whose common stock was owned by Engineers) was to be distributed among the 13,000 common stockholders of Engineers as a final liquidation dividend, after which Engineers and the system’s service company were to dissolve. The $5 series was issued in March, 1928, and was sold, with a conversion privilege which had since expired, to the public at $100 per share. The $5.50 preferred was issued in October of the same year and was sold, with warrants (inoperative at the time the plan was proposed) entitling holders to purchase common stock, to the public at $99.50 per share. The $6 series was issued in September, 1930, and sold to the public at $100. Except for the period from July 1, 1933, to July 31, 1936, dividends on the preferred stock were never in arrears. The arrearages for this single period of delinquency were satisfied in 1936 and 1937. “The $5.00 series reached a high of $123.00 in 1929; its average price with the conversion privilege was $60.94; and $80.50 since the expiration of that privilege, its overall average since issue is $67.16. The $5.50 series had an average of $53.98 while its warrant right existed, and an average of $85.23 since; it reached a high of $109.00 in 1929, and its overall average since issue is $64.52. The $6.00 preferred reached its highest market price in 1945; its average price since issue is $62.77. As of February 13, 1946, the latest date covered in the hearings, the $5.00 series was selling at 105%, the $5.50 series at 105%, and the $6.00 series at 109. “Engineers common, issued in 1925, reached a high of 79% in 1929 and a low of 1% in 1935. On February 13, 1946 it was selling at 36.” Holding Company Act Release No. 7041, p. 27, n. 45. Quotations in the text through note 11 are from this Release unless otherwise indicated. The Commission summarized Badger’s testimony as follows: “After analyzing the earnings and assets of Engineers, he [Badger] selected for comparison the preferred stocks of five public utility holding companies which he believed to be similar to Engineers. These companies were compared with Engineers for the years 1940 to 1945 with reference to ‘times all charges and preferred dividends earned,’ ‘proportion of prior obligations to total capitalization,’ ‘book value of equity per share of preferred,’ 'percent of net quick assets to prior obligations’ and ‘times parent company dividends were earned.’ It appeared that in general the position of Engineers’ preferred was somewhat below the average of the five other companies until the disposition of Puget Sound in 1943. As a consequence of that disposition, its position improved to slightly over the average for those companies. Badger concluded that on an overall basis Engineers was in a median or average position as compared to the five companies studied. On the basis of a comparison of the yields of the five securities studied, he concluded that the $5.00 preferred of Engineers had an average value of $107.49 a share, the $5.50 preferred an average value of $118.31 a share, and the $6.00 preferred an average value of $129.07 a share. “Badger also prepared a study of the preferred stocks of ten operating and holding companies selected for the similarity of their earnings to those of Engineers. These companies on an average earned all charges and preferred dividends 1.49 times in 1943, as against 1.40 times for Engineers. In 1944 they earned overall charges 1.48 times, as against 1.54 times for Engineers. They covered preferred dividends, 2.52 times in 1943, as against 2.48 for Engineers, and in 1944 covered preferred dividends 2.46 times, as against a similar coverage of 3.20 for Engineers. The stocks selected sold at prices to yield between 3.9 and 5.4%, or an average yield for the ten stocks of 4.5%. Badger applied this yield to the several classes of Engineers’ preferred and obtained corresponding values of $111.11 for the $5.00 preferred, $122.22 for the $5.50 preferred, and $133.33 for the $6.00 preferred. Badger concluded, however, that in his opinion, and in view of the ‘investment characteristics’ of the company and the conditions of the money market, a proper yield for the Engineers preferred, absent a call price, would be 4.6%, so that the corresponding investment worth per share of the three series would be . . . .” the amounts stated in the text. Holding Company Act Release No. 7041, p. 30. The Commission cited several of its previous opinions for support of this result: Buffalo, Niagara & Eastern Power Corp., Holding Co. Act Release No. 6083; New England Power Association, Holding Company Act Release No. 6470; American Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6176. At the time of the hearings the company had on hand in its treasury some $14,650,000 in idle cash, and it was estimated that by the end of 1946 this sum would reach $16,825,000. These funds had accumulated from property dispositions and retained earnings, the management having pursued a policy of withholding dividends on the common until it was satisfied that the system had made the adjustments required by the Act. The Commission observed: “In all of its divestments, Engineers has been free in its choice of methods, and, within limits, to choose the time for divestment. All sales have been negotiated by Engineers at arm’s-length. If, as in the case of Puget Sound, the sale brought less than the carrying value on the books of Engineers, the indication is that the carrying value was excessive and not that the sales price was low. It is significant that the market price of Engineers’ common when the plan was filed was the highest since 1932 and that the price has been rising steadily since 1942 when the program of simplification got under way. . . . Engineers’ common reached a low of 11/8 in 1935. By 1945, when the plan was filed, it had reached a high of 37.” Holding Company Act Release No. 7041, p. 34, n. 55. See also note 38 infra. The bank loan which the plan proposed in orde'r to raise cash with which to pay off the preferred was found by the Commission to be unnecessary. See note 3 supra. Retention of $65,000,000 of Virginia stock by a trusteeship arrangement which necessitated retention of a large part of Engineers’ staff was found unnecessary. All stock of Virginia could be distributed immediately upon payment of the preferred at $100 per share and creation of an appropriate escrow to protect the preferred shareholders’ rights to additional payments found due. The plan was also found “incomplete and unfair” because it failed to include a provision for supervision by the Commission over the payment of fees and expenses incurred in connection with the plan. Counsel for the Commission has taken the position in these proceedings that this provision regarding an escrow did not constitute an “amendment” to the plan, stating that “The Commission expressly refused to amend the plan and said if an escrow turns out to be necessary it can be done under the aegis of the Court, and we have viewed the escrow device simply as a device in connection with the mechanics of consummation.” Commissioner Caffrey, while joining fully in the Commission’s opinion, added that Engineers, as a holding company of a single utility company, would have been subject to proceedings under § 11 (b) (2) of the Act had it not come forward with a plan. Its dissolution, therefore, was a logical step following the required compliance with the Commission’s orders under § 11 (b) (1), and was not voluntary. Commissioner Hanrahan concurred but thought the discussion of the investment values of the preferred wholly unnecessary, for in his view the liquidation was voluntary, and the preferred should therefore receive the voluntary liquidation preferences provided in Engineers’ charter. Holding Company Act Release No. 7119. Examples selected by the court were divestitures of interests in Puget Sound Power & Light Company and El Paso Natural Gas Company. See note 11 supra and note 38 infra. "The Commission takes the position before us that ‘Unless the conclusions of the Commission lack “any rational and statutory foundation” they should not have been disturbed by the court below for the “fair and equitable” rule of Section 11 (e) . . . [was] inserted by the framers of the act in order to protect the various interests at stake. . . . The very breadth of the statutory language precludes a reversal of the Commission’s judgment save where it has plainly abused its discretion in these matters’, citing, among other authorities, Securities Comm’n v. Chenery Corp. (the second Chenery case), 332 U. S. 194, 195, at pages 207, 208.” 168 F. 2d at 729. See note 16, infra. The Court of Appeals held that the rule of review declared in the Chenery case was inapplicable in the present case because Chenery involved a proceeding for review under § 24 (a) of the Act, while this is a proceeding under § 11 (e). But see text infra. The pertinent part of § 11 (e) is in terms as follows: “If, after notice and opportunity for hearing, the Commission shall find such plan, as submitted or as modified, necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected by such plan, the Commission shall make an order approving such plan; and the Commission, at the request of the company, may apply to a court, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (f) of section 18, to enforce and carry out the terms and provisions of such plan. If, upon any such application, the court, after notice and opportunity for hearing, shall approve such plan as fair and equitable and as appropriate to effectuate the provisions of section 11, the court as a court of equity may, to such extent as it deems necessary for the purpose of carrying out the terms and provisions of such plan, take exclusive jurisdiction and possession of the company or companies and the assets thereof, wherever located; and the court shall have jurisdiction to appoint a trustee, and the court may constitute and appoint the Commission as sole trustee, to hold or administer, under the direction of the court and in accordance with the plan theretofore approved by the court and the Commission, the assets so possessed.” 49 Stat. 822, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (e). The full text of § 24 (a) is as follows: “Sec. 24. (a) Any person or party aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission under this title may obtain a review of such order in the circuit court of appeals of the United States within any circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the entry of such order, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon any member of the Commission, or upon any officer thereof designated by the Commission for that purpose, and thereupon the Commission shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the record upon which the order complained of was entered. Upon the filing of such transcript such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order, in whole or in part. No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission or unless there were reasonable grounds for failure so to do. The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. If application is made to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper. The Commission may modify its findings as to the facts by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and it shall file with the court such modified or new findings, which, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and its recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting aside of the original order. The judgment and decree of the court affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 28, secs. 346 and 347).” 49 Stat. 834, 15 U. S. C. § 79x. S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13; 168 F. 2d at 729. 79 Cong. Rec. 8845: “Mr. BORAH. Mr. President, I desire to ask the Senator from Montana a question. “On page 50, beginning with line 2, the bill provides as follows: “ 'In any such proceeding a reorganization plan for a registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof shall not become effective unless such plan shall have been approved by the Commission after opportunity for hearing prior to its submission to the court.’ “I do not exactly understand that language. Does it mean that the court’s jurisdiction with reference to the reorganization, or what shall be permitted by decree of the court, is limited; or is it simply recommendatory to the court? “Mr. WHEELER. We do exactly the same thing at the present time, as I understand, with reference to the Interstate Commerce Commission. A plan for the reorganization of a railroad is supposed to be submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission for its approval before it is approved by the court. We put this provision in here in practically the same manner, as I recall, as the existing provision with reference to the Interstate Commerce Commission in the case of railroad reorganizations. . . . . . “The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Minton] has called my attention to the fact that the provision does not oust the jurisdiction of the court at all, because the court has to approve the plan even though the Commission approves it. In other words there is really a double check upon the plan, and final determination rests as in the past in the courts.” Lahti v. New England Power Assn., 160 F. 2d 845 (C. A. 1st Cir., 1947), aff’g In re New England Power Assn., 66 F. Supp. 378 (D. Mass. 1946); Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. v. S. E. C., 151 F. 2d 424 (C. A. 8th Cir., 1945), aff’g In re Laclede Gas Light Co., 57 F. Supp. 997 (E. D. Mo. 1944); In re Electric Bond & Share Co., 73 F. Supp. 426 (S. D. N. Y. 1946); In re Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., 74 F. Supp. 528 (D. Minn. 1947); In re Kings County Lighting Co., 72 F. Supp. 767 (E. D. N. Y. 1947), aff’d sub nom., Public Service Commission of N. Y. v. S. E. C., 166 F. 2d 784 (C. A. 2d Cir., 1948); In re New England Public Service Co., 73 F. Supp. 452 (D. Me. 1947). In re Community Gas & Power Co., 168 F. 2d 740 (C. A. 3d Cir., 1948), aff’g 71 F. Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1947); In re North West Utilities Co., 76 F. Supp. 63 (D. Del. 1948); In re Interstate Power Co., 71 F. Supp. 164 (D. Del. 1947); accord, Illinois Iowa Power Co. v. North American Light & Power Co., 49 F. Supp. 277 (D. Del. 1943); but see In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., 151 F. 2d 326 (C. A. 3d Cir., 1945), reversing 59 F. Supp. 274 (D. Del. 1945). Group of Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U. S. 523, 565; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482; Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106; Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510; Marine Properties v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U. S. 78; Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. S. 448; Otis & Co. v. S. E. C., 323 U. S. 624, 634. See the Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 155. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 151 F. 2d 424, 430. The Court of Appeals in this case agreed that charter provisions were not determinative, 168 F. 2d at 736. While the district judge declined to decide whether the involuntary liquidation preference applied in this case, he has elsewhere indicated his awareness that charter provisions do not control in liquidations compelled by the Act. In re Consolidated Electric & Gas Co., 55 F. Supp. 211, 216; In re North Continent Utilities Corp., 54 F. Supp. 527, 530-531. Engineers’ charter provides that preferred shareholders shall receive $100 per share, plus accrued dividends, “In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of this Corporation.” In Otis the liquidation preference was payable “Upon the dissolution or liquidation of the corporation, whether voluntary or involuntary.” 323 U. S. at 630, n. 6. The conclusion that liquidation compelled by governmental edict was not foreseen at the time Engineers’ charter was drafted is reenforced by a statement appearing in the record, made by counsel for Engineers, one of the draftsmen of the charter, apparently in connection with another case, that a § 11 liquidation “is an arbitrarily and forced statutory termination of the enterprise, and it has no relation whatsoever to any factors which the parties could have had in mind when they entered the enterprise.” The common stockholders contend that the repeated references in the legislative history of the Holding Company Act to Continental Insurance Company v. United States, 259 U. S. 156 (S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 33; H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50; 79 Cong. Rec. 4607, 8432) “leave no doubt that at least when a genuine liquidation is compelled by the Act,” charter provisions were intended to control. But these congressional references to the Continental case were in support of propositions other than that charter liquidation provisions are applicable to liquidations compelled by the Act. The Otis opinion pointed out that the Continental case “turned ... on the charter rights of the preferred to share equally with the common in earnings which had become assets, . . . not on whether a right to share was matured or varied by governmental action.” 323 U. S. at 639. The opinion proceeds to refute expressly the contentions made by the common stockholders here: “We do not feel constrained by [the Continental case’s] dealing with charter rights as in a normal liquidation to hold that where liquidation is adopted as a matter of administrative routine, the preferences are thereby matured.” Ibid. The Otis case was described as follows: “In construing the words 'fair and equitable’ in a federal statute of very similar purposes, we have held that although the full priority rule applies in liquidation of a solvent holding company pursuant to a federal statute, the priority is satisfied by giving each class the full economic equivalent of what they presently hold, and that, as a matter of federal law, liquidation preferences provided by the charter do not apply. We said that, although the company was in fact being liquidated in compliance with an administrative order, the rights of the stockholders could be valued 'on the basis of a going business and not as though a liquidation were taking place.’ Consequently the liquidation preferences were only one factor in valuation rather than determinative of amounts payable.” 334 U. S. at 199. American Law Institute, Restatement, Contracts § 468, comment on subsection (3). The analogy between bonds and preferred stock, cf. 2 Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations 1247, n. r. (4th ed., 1941), is subject to obvious limitations. For example, if the claims of bondholders rather than preferred stockholders had been in issue in the Otis case, United Power would have been an insolvent rather than a solvent corporation and so subject to bankruptcy. At least with reference to the issue of whether amounts in excess of the face value of a security are payable, we need not distinguish between treatment to be accorded bonds and preferred stock. The Commission’s tendency has been to treat both the same. See, e. g., The United Light & Power Co., 10 S. E. C. 1215, 1226-1227; Cities Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 4944. The citation by the Otis majority, “Compare New York Trust Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 131 F. 2d 274; In re Laclede Gas Light Co., 57 F. Supp. 997,” is of no assistance to the common stockholders here, for it is in support of and directly following the sentence: “Where pre-existing contract provisions exist which produce results at variance with a legislative policy which was not foreseeable at the time the contract was made, they cannot be permitted to operate.” 323 U. S. at 638. Affirming In re Laclede Gas Light Co., 57 F. Supp. 997. Two other decisions in the courts of appeals, which cite and purport to follow the New York Trust case, reason that the premium is payable only in the event of voluntary redemption of the bond, that the redemption is not voluntary, and therefore that the premium is not payable. Since this syllogism disposes of each case without reference to the doctrine of frustration, the frustration rationale of the New York Trust case is an alternative ground in both cases. City National Bank & Trust Co. v. S. E. C., 134 F. 2d 65; In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., 151F. 2d 326. 323 U. S. at 634. See also the quoted statement of the Commission’s views, as opposed to those of Commissioner Healy, set forth id. at 635, n. 17; Holding Company Act Release No. 4215, p. 12. The Court of Appeals took the Commission’s method to be valuation “as if the Act had never been passed.” It criticized the Commission for valuing the preferreds on this basis but not valuing the common in the same manner. 168 F. 2d at 737-738. The Court of Appeals thought that, if the Commission wished to value the securities “ex the Act, losses of the sort referred to in this paragraph must be weighed into the calculation, i. e., such losses should be returned to the credit side of the enterprise’s balance sheet as a matter of bookkeeping.” 168 F. 2d at 738. In the Puget Sound reorganization Engineers received as of 1943 approximately a 3% interest in the new common stock in return for its- old 99.3% common stock interest. The old common was estimated to be 18 to 34 years away from dividends in the absence of a reorganization. 13 S. E. C. 226. As in the Otis case, the controversy was over the question of whether Engineers was entitled to any participation in the new company, in view of the remote and contingent character of its earnings expectations. Engineers subsequently sold the interest it received in the reorganization for $764,765. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Engineers lost through the Puget Sound divestment is based upon the premise that actual earnings of the new company were considerably higher during 1946 and the first half of 1947 than the estimated earnings upon which the Commission based its reorganization allowance to Engineers. 168 F. 2d at 737, citing Moody’s Public Utility Manual (1947) 53, and Supp. Yol. 19, at 1914. The Commission correctly observes that this is an oversimplification of the complex problems involved in the valuation of Engineers’ interest in Puget Sound and of the relationship between that interest in 1943 and its hypothetical value today if no recapitalization and divestment had occurred. It notes that the earnings figures taken from Moody’s fail to reflect the use of a much lower depreciation allowance that the Commission thought appropriate in making its earnings estimate, capital expenditures since 1943, and divestment of certain properties after Puget Sound had ceased to be subject to the Act. The period taken by the Court of Appeals can hardly be assumed to provide a reliable average earnings figure. Absent the impact of the Act, recapitalization of Puget Sound would probably have been necessary in the exercise of sound business judgment, a consideration which imports numerous additional uncertainties. Further, the evaluation of the Puget Sound divestiture required by the Court of Appeals would compel the Commission to estimate the effects of Engineers’ hypothetical lack of the $764,765 received from the sale of the securities received in the Puget recapitalization, funds which were actually used to purchase additional interests in other companies and to make payments to Engineers’ preferred stocks. Certain tax advantages derived from the sale of Puget would have to be taken into account. The Court of Appeals also cited the El Paso Natural Gas Company divestiture as an example of a loss to Engineers caused by the Act, saying, “Under this divestiture Engineers lost a profit of at least $4,000,000.” 168 F. 2d at 737. In 1931 Engineers loaned El Paso $3,500,000 and received in return $3,500,000 in bonds and an option to purchase 192,119 shares of El Paso’s common stock. As a result of the exercise or assignment of some of these options and the resale in 1936, 1937 and 1944 of stock acquired by their exercise, Engineers realized a profit, in addition to the repayment of the loan, of $2,700,000 on its El Paso investment. The statement that these transactions involved a loss of $4,000,000 to Engineers is based upon the assumptions that the timing of the sales was compelled by § 11 and not by managerial judgment, that in the absence of § 11 management would have sold the stock at the very peak of the market, and upon other equally dubious premises. Engineers’ system consisted of 17 companies before the Commission began its integration proceedings. See note 2 and text, supra. Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. S. 448, 482-483; Group of Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U. S. 523, 565-566; Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 323 U. S. 624, 639-640. Badger’s analysis, as summarized by the Commission, is stated in note 8, supra. See text supra, paragraph following note 8. The Court of Appeals stated that the Commission erred in failing to “give any substantial consideration to the future earning power of Engineers and its subsidiaries which the Supreme Court has held is one of the fundamental tests for reorganization valuation.” 168 F. 2d at 736-737. A precise finding as to prospective earnings of a continuing Engineers would be the controlling subsidiary finding upon which a precise finding as to going-concern value “ex the Act” would be based. See Group of Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U. S. 523, 540; Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 525; 6 Collier, Bankruptcy 3849-3855 (14th ed., 1947). But where it is clear that the prospective earnings of the corporation would be more than enough to continue payment of preferred dividends and to carry the going-concern value, absent call provisions, well above the call price, there is no necessity for making a precise forecast of future earnings, for the call price marks the ceiling. Cf. Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. S. 448, 479-483. The District Court made a finding with respect to Badger’s conclusion as to the permanence of the current yield rate and concluded that “The extremely low money rates which resulted in Badger’s finding that the preferred stocks of Engineers have an 'investment value’ greater than $100 per share, largely reflect artificial factors which are clearly subject to changes at any time and may well be of purely transitory character.” It is difficult to reconcile this “finding” with the following statement which appears in the court’s published opinion: “I accept Dr. Badger’s values and, in the absence of a showing of changed circumstances, I shall assume that those values are applicable at the present time.” 71 F. Supp. at 801. At any rate, this is predominately a question of fact, and the Commission’s determination, supported as it was by substantial evidence, should not have been disturbed, absent supervening economic developments prior to the consummation of the plan which clearly required reconsideration. The changes in interest rates which had occurred at the time of the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals were merely cited to indicate that future changes might affect the accuracy of Badger’s predictions. The Court of Appeals states that the Commission "made no finding as to the ‘value’ of the common stock,” and that “the Commission ascribed ‘investment value’ to the preferreds but failed to make a similar approach to the common.” 168 F. 2d at 737. Central-Illinois Securities Corporation and Christian A. Johnson, representing the common stockholders, complain that “the Commission’s determination of the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered by Engineers’ stockholders failed utterly to take account of the correlative rights of the preferred and common.” See note 38 and text, supra. The Commission stated in its opinion that "Engineers has produced an abundance of evidence showing that once it has disposed of El Paso and Gulf, it will have no reason to continue as a separate corporate entity for it would then be the parent of a single operating company, Virginia. In that situation, Engineers admits that it would be an 'economic monstrosity’ and all participants in this proceeding seem to be in agreement with that conclusion. The record does not clearly indicate what it will cost to maintain Engineers after Gulf States and El Paso have been divested. Estimates range from $172,000 to $365,000 a year. The company freely admits that Engineers could in no way justify any such continuing expenditure. Virginia is able to undertake its own financing and service and is large enough to stand independently. Any functions Engineers might perform should more properly be carried out by Virginia’s own management.” Holding Company Act Release No. 7041, p. 18. “Leverage” is the term used to describe the advantage gained by junior interests through the rental of capital at a rate lower than the rate of return which they receive in the use of that borrowed capital. Assuming that the hypothetical Engineers could have used to advantage the $39,000,000 in capital supplied by the preferred stockholders, the Commission could properly have found that such “leverage” was not worth the risk that earnings might drop below the amount required to pay dividends on the preferred, thereby endangering the junior equity of $66,768,148 (the market value of the securities received by the common under the plan, as of the date of consummation, less the amount paid in the exercise of Gulf warrants). In the light of the facts stated in the following quotation from the Commission’s opinion, it is highly unlikely that the hypothetical Engineers would have had use for the capital supplied by the preferred stockholders: “The retirement of the preferred stock will be of immediate benefit to the common stockholders. As indicated above, the company at the time of the hearings had on hand idle treasury cash of over $14,650,000, while it is estimated that this sum will reach approximately $16,825,000 by the end of 1946. These funds have been accumulated through property dispositions and retained earnings. The management has pursued a policy of withholding dividends on the common stock until it is satisfied that the system has made all the adjustments that will be required of it under the Holding Company Act. As a consequence the company has now accumulated a large amount of idle funds while it continues to have outstanding three substantial issues of preferred stock having fixed dividend requirements. Under the circumstances the elimination of this prior charge is highly beneficial to the common.” Holding Company Act Release No. 7041, p. 32. S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12; Additional Views by Representative Eicher, H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47; Statement of House Managers, H. R. Rep. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71; Committee of Public Utility Executives, Summary of S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., with Annotations, June, 1935, 5, 7. See note 7, supra. Cf. Continental Insurance Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 156, in which the principal issue was whether, when the charter provided that preferred and common should share equally on dissolution in the assets of the corporation, earnings retained in the systems should be regarded as assets and shared with the preferred in a dissolution forced by the antitrust laws. It was held that these retained earnings were assets and should be shared by the preferred. See note 38 and text supra. In escrow is the sum of $4,000,000, comprised as follows: $3,204,795, which is equal to $5, $10, and $10 per share respectively of the three series of preferred; $484,325, which is an amount equal to simple interest for three years at the rate of 4.76% on the $5 preferred, 5% on the $5.50 preferred, and 5.45% on the $6 preferred; $310,880, which will cover all fees and other compensation and all remuneration or expenses claimed in connection with the plan. The preferred stockholders object that the Commission failed to give them notice and an opportunity to be heard on the recommendation that an escrow be established. The escrow recommendation was made by way of an amending order, Holding Company Act Release No. 7190, and the Commission seems to have insisted throughout that its recommendation did not have the effect of amending the plan, but that the establishment of an escrow was within the power of the District Court. See note 13 supra. The District Court, which ordered the creation of the escrow, afforded the preferred stockholders a hearing on the propriety of that provision and upon whether the plan should be consummated prior to a final determination by the court of last resort of the amounts due the preferred stock. Applications for stay of consummation were denied in turn by the District Court, by the Court of Appeals and by a Justice of this Court. There was no occasion to hold a hearing on the question of whether the plan should be consummated by payment of $100 and the creation of an escrow at the time the Commission passed on the plan, for it approved the plan’s provision for payment of $105 and $110. The necessity of deciding whether there should be consummation and an escrow first arose in the District Court. It was proper for the Commission, when it became apprised of determined opposition to the plan on the part of certain common stockholders, to recommend that the plan be consummated and that an escrow be created to protect the rights of the preferred, in the interest of expeditiously bringing the remnant of the Engineers system into compliance with the Act, without holding a hearing on the propriety of its recommendation. In the District Court and in the Court of Appeals, the preferred stockholders were accorded full hearing. This Appendix is merely a summary of Commission decisions and does not purport to declare any rulings of law. Community Power and Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 182; Federal Water Service Cory., 8 S. E. C. 893; United Power and Light Co., 13 S. E. C. 1 (the Otis case); Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 13 S. E. C. 226; Southern Colorado Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 4501; Virginia Public Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 4618. These cases are discussed in Dodd, The Relative Rights of Preferred and Common Shareholders in Recapitalization Plans Under the Holding Company Act, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 295. Commissioner Healy, who concurred in the result in the Community Power Case, dissented in the other cases, contending that the claim of the preferred was measured by the contract right. His view of the meaning of § 11 (e) led him to dissent in cases involving applications of the investment value rule which produced the results reached in this case. See text at note 6, infra. New England Power Assn., Holding Company Act Release No. 6470, 66 F. Supp. 378, affirmed sub nom. Lahti v. New England Power Assn., 160 F. 2d 845. Cities Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 4944, pp. 16-17; Georgia Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 5568, pp. 16-17, 20-27. The United Light and Power Co., 10 S. E. C. 1215, 1222, affirmed sub nom. New York Trust Co. v. S. E. C., 131 F. 2d 274; North American Light & Power Co., 11 S. E. C. 820, 824, affirmed sub nom. City National Bank & Trust Co. v. S. E. C., 134 F. 2d 65; North Continent Utilities Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 4686, p. 12, approved and enforced, 54 F. Supp. 527; Consolidated Electric & Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 4900, p. 7, approved and enforced, 57 F. Supp. 997, affirmed sub nom. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. S. E. C., 151 F. 2d 424. The United Light and Power Co., 10 S. E. C. 1215, 1222; North American Light & Power Co., 11 S. E. C. 820, 824. See note 1, supra. While contending that the majority’s approach was not consistent with the cases refusing to allow premiums, he admitted “that a close reading of the Commission’s opinions in those cases discloses some language which the investing public may or may not have realized vaguely heralded the present doctrine.” Holding Company Act Release No. 6176 at p. 47. The Commission, in its brief in the case at bar, declines to predict what it would do if faced with the problem suggested by Commissioner Healy, asserting that much would depend on the exact nature of the security and the circumstances of the particular case. Commissioner Healy’s position is explained in the following statement: “When I signed the Report of the National Power Policy Committee to President Roosevelt I understood the much quoted reference to preservation of investment values to refer to the values of operating company securities in holding company portfolios. I did not then and do not now believe it was intended as a basis for denying the senior security holders their full priority rights or for compelling common stockholders to pay premiums upon the redemption or retirement of senior securities forced by federal statute.” The United Light and Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6603, pp. 43-44. Commissioner Caffrey thought the liquidation preference applicable for a reason irrelevant here. See El Paso Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 5499. E. g., Minnesota Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 5850; Mississippi River Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 5776; The North American Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 5796.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFORNIA et al. v. SOUTHLAND ROYALTY CO. et al. No. 76-1114. Argued December 7, 1977 Reargued April 17, 1978 Decided May 31, 1978 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, Marshall, and Blackmtjn, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 531. Stewart and Powell, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Randolph W. Deutsch reargued the cause for petitioners in No. 76-1114. With him on the briefs were Janice E. Kerr and J. Calvin Simpson. Deputy Solicitor General Barnett reargued the cause for petitioner in No. 76-1587. On the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Richard A. Allen, Robert W. Perdue, and Philip R. Telleen. C. Frank Reifsnyder, Arthur R. Formanek, and Richard S. Morris filed briefs for petitioner in No. 76-1133. J. Evans Attwell reargued the cause for respondents in all cases. With him on the brief were Martin N. Erck, Sherman S. Poland, Bernard A. Foster III, and Roger L. Brandt. William Pannill and F. H. Pannill filed a brief for respondent Crane County Development Co. John L. Hill, Attorney General, reargued the cause for the State of Texas as amicus curiae urging affirmance in all cases. With him on the brief were David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General, Steve Van, Assistant Attorney General, and Frank C. Cooksey. Together with No. 76-1133, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Southland Royalty Co. et al.; and No. 76-1587, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Southland Royalty Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Frederick Moving and James A. WUderotter filed a brief for the Associated Gas Distributors as amicus curiae urging reversal in all cases. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by James R. Patton, Jr,, Harry E. Barsh, Jr., Edwin W. Edwards, Governor, and William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General, for the State of Louisiana; and by Toney Anaya, Attorney General, Vernon O. Henning, Assistant Attorney General, and William O. Jordan, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New Mexico. Peter H. Schiff and Richard A. Solomon filed a brief for the Public Service Commission of the State of New York as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1925 the owners of certain acreage in Texas executed a lease which gave to Gulf Oil Corp., as lessee, the exclusive right to produce and market oil and gas from that land for the next 50 years. Gulf was entitled to drill wells, string telephone and telegraph wires, and build storage facilities and pipelines on the land. Gulf would also have “such other privileges as are reasonably requisite for the conduct of said operations.” App. 135. In exchange, the owners were to receive a royalty based on the quantity of natural gas produced and the number of producing wells, as well as other royalties and payments. The following year, the owners of the property sold one-half of their mineral fee interest to respondent South-land Royalty Co. and the rest to other respondents. In 1951 Gulf contracted to sell casinghead gas from the leased property to the El Paso Natural Gas Co., an interstate pipeline. After this Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672 (1954), Gulf applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Power Commission authorizing the sale in interstate commerce of 30,000 Mcf per day. By order dated May 28, 1956, the Commission granted a certificate of unlimited duration, and this certificate was among those construed as “permanent” by this Court in Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U. S. 170, 175 (1960). Gulf entered into a second contract to sell additional volumes of gas to El Paso in 1972, and obtained a certificate of unlimited duration for those volumes in 1973. The original 50-year lease obtained by Gulf expired on July 14, 1975, and, under local law, the lessee’s interest in the remaining oil and gas reserves terminated and reverted to respondents. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland Royalty Co., 496 S. W. 2d 547 (Tex. 1973). Just prior to expiration of the lease, respondents arranged to sell the remaining casinghead gas to an intrastate purchaser, at the higher prices available' in the intrastate market. El Paso, in order to preserve one of its sources of supply, then filed a petition with the Commission seeking a determination that the remaining gas reserves could not be diverted to the intrastate market without abandonment authorization pursuant to § 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 824, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (b) (1976 ed.). The Commission agreed with this contention, relying on the “principle established by Section 7 (b) that 'service’ may not be abandoned without our permission and approval.” El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 F. P. C. 145, 150, 10 P. U. R. 4th 344, 348 (1975). The Commission held that respondents could not, upon termination of the lease, sell gas in intrastate commerce without prior permission from the Commission under § 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act and that Gulf was also obligated to seek abandonment permission. The Commission reaffirmed this view in an order denying rehearing, but added language insuring that any deliveries of gas to El Paso during the period that the Commission’s order was under review would not constitute a dedication of those reserves to the interstate market. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 F. P. C. 2821, 11 P. U. R. 4th 488 (1975). On respondents’ petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Southland Royalty Co. v. FPC, 543 F. 2d 1134 (1976). The court held that Gulf, as a tenant for a term of years, could not legally dedicate that portion of the gas which Southland and other respondents might own upon expiration of the lease. Because of the importance of the question presented to the authority of the Federal Power Commission, now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, we granted the petition for certiorari. 433 U. S. 907. We reverse. The fundamental purpose of the Natural Gas Act is to assure an adequate and reliable supply of gas at reasonable prices. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U. S. 137, 147, 151-154 (1960); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 360 U. S. 378, 388 (1959). To this end, not only must those who would serve the interstate market obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity but also, under § 7 (b) of the Act: “No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.” 15 U. S. C. § 717f (b) (1976 ed.). The Commission may therefore control both the terms on which a service is provided to the interstate market and the conditions on which it, will cease: “An initial application of an independent producer, to make movements of natural gas in interstate commerce, leads to a certificate of public convenience and necessity under which the Commission controls the basis on which 'gas may be initially dedicated to interstate use. Moreover, once so dedicated there can be no withdrawal of that supply from continued interstate movement without Commission approval.’ ” Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., supra, at 156. The Act was “so framed as to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges.” Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, supra, at 388. The jurisdiction of the Commission extends to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce or the sale in interstate commerce for resale to consumers. § 1 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 717 (b) (1976 ed.). Gas which flows across state lines for resale is dedicated to interstate commerce regardless of the intentions of the producer. California v. Lo-Vaca Co., 379 U. S. 366 (1965). The Court there approved an approach to questions of the Commission’s jurisdiction based on the physical flow of the gas: “We said in Connecticut Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 324 U. S. 515, 529, 'Federal jurisdiction was to follow the flow of electric energy, an engineering and scientific, rather than a legalistic or governmental, test.’ And that is the test we have followed under both the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act, except as Congress itself has substituted a so-called legal standard for the technological one. Id., at 530-531.” Id., at 369. The Court reasoned that in the circumstances of that case, “[t]he fact that a substantial part of the gas will be resold [in interstate commerce] . . . invokes federal jurisdiction at the outset over the entire transaction.” Ibid. In this litigation the Commission held that once gas began to flow in interstate commerce from a field subject to a certificate of unlimited duration, that flow could not be terminated unless the Commission authorized an abandonment of service. The initiation of interstate service pursuant to the certificate dedicated all fields subject to that certificate. The expiration of a lease on the field of gas did not affect the obligation to continue the flow of gas, a service obligation imposed by the Act. We think that the Commission’s interpretation of the abandonment provision of the Natural Gas Act is a permissible one. In Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, the Court recognized that the obligation to serve the interstate market imposed by a certificate of unlimited duration could not be terminated by private contractual arrangements. In that case, a producing company which had contracted with a pipeline to supply gas for 20 years sought a certificate from the Commission limited to that period. The Commission insisted on a permanent certificate; and this Court upheld its authority to do so, holding that even after the contract had expired, the producer would remain under an obligation to supply gas to the pipeline, unless permission to abandon service had been obtained. The obligation on the producer which survived after the contract term “will not be one imposed by contract but by the Act.” 364 U. S., at 155. The obligation to continue the service despite the provisions of the sales contract was held essential to effectuate the purposes of the Act; otherwise producers and pipelines would be free to make arrangements that would circumvent the ratemaking and supply goals of the statute. Id., at 142-147. Similar principles control this litigation. This issuance of a certificate of unlimited duration covering the gas at issue here created a federal obligation to serve the interstate market until abandonment authorization had been obtained. The Commission reasonably concluded that under the statute the obligation to continue service attached to the gas, not as a matter of contract but as a matter of law, and bound all those with dominion and power of sale over the gas, including the lessors to whom it reverted. Just as in Sunray, the service obligation imposed by the Commission survived the expiration of the private agreement which gave rise to the Commission’s jurisdiction. Respondents seek to distinguish Sunray on the ground that the producer in that case owned all of the gas covered by the certificate, but the central theme of that opinion is that the Act is concerned with the continuation of “service” rather than with particular sales of gas or contract rights. The Court traced the language of the statute to show that “all the matters for which a certificate is required — the construction of facilities or their extension, as well as the making of jurisdictional sales — must be justified in terms of a ‘service’ to which they relate.” Id., at 150. The Court specifically noted that “§ 7 (b) does not refer to the abandonment of the continuation of sales, but rather to the abandonment of ‘services.’ ” Id., at 150 n. 17. The Commission “ [had] long drawn a distinction between the underlying service to the public a natural gas company performs and the specific manifestation — the contractual relationship — which that service takes at a given moment.” Id., at 152. Just as the federal obligation to continue service was held paramount to private arrangements in Sunray, that obligation must be recognized here. Once the gas commenced to flow into interstate commerce from the facilities used by the lessees, § 7 (b) required that the Commission’s permission be obtained prior to the discontinuance of “any service rendered by means of such facilities.” Private contractual arrangements might shift control of the facilities and thereby determine who is obligated to provide that service, but the parties may not simply agree to terminate the service obligation without the Commission’s permission. Respondents contend that the gas at issue here was never impressed with an obligation to serve the interstate market because it was never “dedicated” to an interstate sale. The core of their argument is that “no man can dedicate what he does not own.” Brief for Respondent Southland Royalty Co. et al. 8. This maxim has an appealing resonance, but only because it takes unfair advantage of an ambiguity in the term “dedicate.” For most lawyers, as well as laymen, to “dedicate” is to “give, present, or surrender to public use.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 589 (1961). But gas which is “dedicated” pursuant to the Natural Gas Act is not surrendered to the public; it is simply placed within the jurisdiction of the Commission, so that it may be sold to the public at the “just and reasonable” rates specified by § 4 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (a) (1976 ed.). Judicial review insures that those rates will not be confiscatory. See FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942); FPC v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602-603 (1944). Thus, by “dedicating” gas to the interstate market, a producer does not effect a gift or even a sale of that gas, but only changes its regulatory status. Here, the lessee dedicated the gas by seeking and receiving a certificate of unlimited duration from the Commission. Respondents apparently had no objection, for they could have intervened in those proceedings but did not do so. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 F. P. C. 917, 919 n. 3 (1975). Respondents also appear to argue that they should not be viewed as “natural gas companies” with respect to the Wad-dell Ranch gas because they have not voluntarily committed any act that would place them within the Commission’s jurisdiction. As we have seen, this argument is somewhat beside the point, for the obligation to serve the interstate market had already attached to the gas, and respondents became obligated to continue that service when they assumed control of the gas. In the Commission’s language, “the dedication involved is not the dedication of an individual party or producer, but the dedication of gas.” 54 F. P. C., at 149, 10 P. U. R. 4th, at 348. In any event, we perceive no unfairness in holding respondents, as lessors, responsible for continuation of the service until abandonment is obtained. Respondents were “mineral lease owners who entered into a lease that permitted the lease holders to make interstate sales.” 54 F. P. C., at 920. They did not object when Gulf sought a certificate from the Commission. Indeed, as the Commission pointed out, Gulf may even have been under a duty to seek interstate purchasers for the gas. Id., at 919. Gas leases are typically construed to include a duty diligently to develop and market, see, e. g., 5 H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 853 (1977), and at the time the certificate was sought the interstate market was the major outlet for gas, see Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 360 U. S., at 394. Having authorized Gulf to make interstate sales of gas, respondents could not have expected those sales to be free from the rules and restrictions that from time to time would cover the interstate market. Cf. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 482 (1911). In Sunray, the Court discussed the “practical consequences” for the consumer if the term of the sales contract limited the term of the certificate. 364 U. S., at 143, 142-147. The Court reasoned: “If petitioner’s contentions . . . were . . . sustained, the way would be clear for every independent producer of natural gas to seek certification only for the limited period of its initial contract with the transmission company, and thus automatically be free at a future date, untrammelled by Commission regulation, to reassess whether it desired to continue serving the interstate market.” Id., at 142. A “local economy which had grown dependent on natural gas as a fuel” might experience disruption or significantly higher prices. Id., at 143. These observations are equally pertinent to private arrangements by way of leases. If the expiration of a lease to mineral rights terminated all obligation to provide interstate service, producers would be free to structure their leasing arrangements to frustrate the aims and goals of the Natural Gas Act. Respondents suggest that the Commission could require a voluntary assumption of the service obligation by the lessor as a condition to certificates issued in the future. It is obvious that this solution does nothing to protect those communities presently depending on the flow of gas pursuant to a certificate of unlimited duration already issued. Moreover, the Court questioned in Sunray whether the conditioning power could be used to achieve indirectly what the Act did not authorize the Commission to do directly. Id., at 152. In light of this tension, the Court concluded that “the Commission’s power to protect the public interest under § 7 (e) need not be restricted to these indirect and dubious methods.” Ibid. We conclude that the Commission acted within its statutory powers in requiring that respondents obtain permission to abandon interstate service. “A regulatory statute such as the Natural Gas Act would be hamstrung if it were tied down to technical concepts of local law.” United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U. S. 392, 400 (1965). By tying the concept of dedication to local property law, respondents would cripple the authority of the Commission at a time when the need for decisive action is greatest. Guided by Sunray, we believe that the structure and purposes of the Natural Gas Act require a broader view of the Commission’s authority. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. The “Waddell” lease, executed on July 14, 1925, covered 45,771 acres in Crane County, Tex. In the same year Gulf executed an identical lease, the “Goldsmith” lease, with the owners of 19,840 acres in Ector County, Tex. The gas remaining at the expiration of both leases is at issue in this litigation, but because the parties are in agreement that there are no material differences in the language or history of these leases, we shall discuss only the Waddell lease. The Commission’s order of May 28, 1956, had granted more than 100 certificates with identical language. This Court’s decision in Sun Oil, though prompted by a dispute over a specific certificate, interpreted the Commission’s order as it applied to the entire “batch of certificates.” 364 U. S., at 175. Texaco, Inc., owner of a 25% interest in the reversion under the Goldsmith Lease, see n. 1, supra, also filed a petition with the Commission, seeking a declaration that upon expiration of the lease the fee owners would be free to sell the remaining gas to intrastate purchasers. Although Texaco’s interest was adverse to El Paso, Texaco’s petition raised the same issues as El Paso’s petition and was therefore consolidated with it. The State of California and its Public Utilities Commission intervened in the consolidated proceeding. In California v. Lo-Vaca Co., an interstate pipeline had entered into a private contractual arrangement with a producer that all gas purchased pursuant to the agreement would be for internal use only. Despite this explicit reservation intended to remove this gas from the jurisdiction of the Commission, the Court held that the Commission had jurisdiction over the entire transaction because at least some part of the contract gas, physically commingled in the pipeline .with gas from other sources, would be sold to other interstate purchasers. An analogy in state law may be found in the power of a tenant to seek a change in the zoning status of leased property. See, e. g., Newport Associates, Inc. v. Solow, 30 N. Y. 2d 263, 283 N. E. 2d 600 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 931 (1973); Richman v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 254, 258, 137 A. 2d 280, 283 (1958). Moreover, the type of regulation which the Commission has here imposed is not without precedent. As we recognized in Sunray, § 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act “follows a common pattern in federal utility regulation.” 364 U. S., at 141-142. Section 1 (18) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (18), similarly provides that “no carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment.” At a very early date the Interstate Commerce Commission interpreted this provision to require that a certificate of abandonment be obtained prior to the cessation of operations over leased tracks, even though the lease had expired by its own terms. Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co., 146 I. C. C. 171 (1928). In Lehigh Valley R. Co. Proposed Abandonment of Operation, 202 I. C. C. 659 (1935), the Commission held that even a lessor which had ceased to operate as a railroad prior to enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act would be required to seek permission to abandon a railroad line which had reverted to it upon expiration of a lease. Long before Gulf applied for its certificate, this Court approved these decisions. See Smith v. Hoboken R., Warehouse & S. S. Connecting Co., 328 U. S. 123, 130 (1946) (“[A] certificate is required under § 1 (18) whether the lessee or the lessor is abandoning operations”); Thompson v. Texas Mexican R. Co., 328 U. S. 134, 144-145 (1946) (“[T]he fact that the trackage contract was entered into in 1904 prior to the passage of the Act is immaterial; the provisions of the Act, including § 1 (18), are applicable to contracts made before as well as after its enactment”) . These precedents demonstrate that the specific type of obligation imposed here — an obligation to continue interstate service until abandonment has been obtained — is within the range of regulatory possibilities that must be anticipated by one profiting from interstate operations.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JOHNSON et al. v. NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT et al. No. 71-5685. Argued November 8, 1972 Decided November 20, 1972 Carl Jay Nathanson argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Joel Lewittes, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Iris A. Steel, Assistant Attorney General. Henry A. Weinstein filed a brief for respondent the Board of Education, Union Free School District No. 27. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by J. Harold Flannery for the Center for Law and Education, Harvard University, et al., and by John E. Coons for the American Federation of Teachers et al. Per Curiam. We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 449 F. 2d 871 (1971), affirming the District Court’s dismissal of petitioners’ complaint challenging the constitutionality of New York Education Law § 701 et seq. (1971). 405 U. S. 916 (1972). However, respondents’ brief states that “[o]n May 3, 1972, the qualified voters of the respondent school district elected by majority vote to assess a tax for the purchase of all textbooks for grades one through six in the schools of the district.” In light of this fact, and given the suggestion at oral argument that the books themselves have a life expectancy of five years, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to determine whether this case has become moot.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFANO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. TORRES No. 77-88. Decided February 27, 1978 Together with No. 77-126, Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Colon et al., also on appeal from the same court. Per Curiam. Certain benefits under the Social Security Act, as amended in 1972, are payable only to residents of the United States, defined as the 50 States and the District of Columbia. The District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held in these cases that this geographic limitation is unconstitutional as applied to persons who upon moving to Puerto Rico lost the benefits to which they were entitled while residing in the United States. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, responsible for the administration of the Social Security Act, has appealed. I One of the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act created a uniform program, known as the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, for aid to qualified aged, blind, and disabled persons. 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V). This federally administered program replaced the federal-state programs of Old Age Assistance, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U. S. C. § 301 et seq.; Aid to the Blind, 49 Stat. 645, 42 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq.; Aid to the Disabled, 64 Stat. 555, 42 U. S. C. § 1351 et seq.; and Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. The exclusion of Puerto Rico in the amended program is apparent in the definitional section. Section 1611 (f) of the Act, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1382 (f) (1970 ed., Supp. V), states that no individual is eligible for benefits during any month in which he or she is outside the United States. The Act defines “the United States” as “the 50 States and the District of Columbia.” § 1614 (e), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1382c (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V). The repeal of the pre-existing programs did not apply to Puerto Rico. Thus persons in Puerto Rico are not eligible to receive SSI benefits, but are eligible to receive benefits under the pre-existing programs. Appellee Torres received SSI benefits while residing in Connecticut; the benefits were discontinued when he moved to Puerto Rico. Similarly, appellees Colon and Vega received benefits as residents of Massachusetts and New Jersey, respectively, but lost them on moving to Puerto Rico. Torres filed a complaint in the District Court of Puerto Rico claiming that the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the SSI program was unconstitutional, and a three-judge court was convened to adjudicate the suit. Viewing the geographic limitations in the law as an interference with the constitutional right of residents of the 50 States and the District of Columbia to travel, the court searched for a compelling governmental interest to justify such interference. Finding none, the court held §§ 1611 (f) and 1614 (e) unconstitutional as applied to Torres. Torres v. Mathews, 426 F. Supp. 1106. Soon after that decision appellees Colon and Vega also sued in the Puerto' Rico District Court. Relying on the Torres decision, a single judge enjoined the Social Security Administration from discontinuing their SSI benefits on the basis of their change of residency to Puerto Rico. II In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974), this Court held that laws prohibiting newly arrived residents in a State or county from receiving the same vital benefits as other residents unconstitutionally burdened the right of interstate travel. As the Court said in Memorial Hospital, “the right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same right to vital governmental benefits and privileges in the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents.” Id., at 261. In the present cases the District Court altogether transposed that proposition. It held that the Constitution requires that a person who travels to Puerto Rico must be given benefits superior to those enjoyed by other residents of Puerto Rico if the newcomer enjoyed those benefits in the State from which he came. This Court has never held that the constitutional right to travel embraces any such doctrine, and we decline to do so now. Such a doctrine would apply with equal force to any benefits a State might provide for its residents, and would require a State to continue to pay those benefits indefinitely to any persons who had once resided there. And the broader implications of such a doctrine in other areas of substantive law would bid fair to destroy the independent power of each State under our Constitution to enact laws uniformly applicable to all of its residents. If there ever could be a case where a person who has moved from one State to another might be entitled to invoke the law of the State from which he came as a corollary of his constitutional right to travel, this is surely not it. For we deal here with a constitutional attack upon a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits. Such a statute “is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.” Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185 (1976). “So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket.” Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546 (1972). See also Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 53-54; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210 (1977); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 640 (1937). The judgments are reversed. So ordered. Mr. Justice Brennan would affirm. Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set these cases for oral argument. This Court’s jurisdiction is based on 28 U. S. C. § 1252. The SSI benefits are significantly larger. The record does not show whether the appellees applied for benefits under the pre-existing programs while in Puerto Rico. The complaint had also relied on the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in attacking the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the SSI program. Acceptance of that claim would have meant that all otherwise qualified persons in Puerto Rico are entitled to SSI benefits, not just those who received such benefits before moving to Puerto Rico. But the District Court apparently acknowledged that Congress has the power to treat Puerto Rico differently, and that every federal program does not have to be extended to it. Puerto Rico has a relationship to the United States “that has no parallel in our history.” Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 596 (1976). Cf. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901). See Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 Geo. L. J. 219 (1967); Hector, Puerto Rico: Colony or Commonwealth?, 6 N. Y. U. J, Int’l L. & Pol. 115 (1973). The opinion of the District Court is unreported. The constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified. United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757-758 (1966); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 105-106 (1971). By contrast the “right” of international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 125 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 505-506 (1964). As such this “right,” the Court has held, can be regulated within the bounds of due process. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965). For purposes of this opinion we may assume that there is a virtually unqualified constitutional right to travel between Puerto Rico and any of the 50 States of the Union. At least three reasons have been advanced to explain the exclusion of persons in Puerto Rico from the SSI program. First, because of the unique tax status of Puerto Rico, its residents do not contribute to the public treasury. Second, the cost of including Puerto Rico would be extremely great — an estimated $300 million per year. Third, inclusion in the SSI program might seriously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report of the Undersecretary’s Advisory Group on Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands 6 (Oct. 1976).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JOHNSON v. RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, INC., ET AL. No. 73-1543. Argued December 11, 1974 Decided May 19, 1975 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in Parts I — III of which Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Douglas and Brennan, JJ., joined, post, p. 468. Deborah M. Greenberg argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit.III, Morris J. Bailer, Eric Schnapper, William E. Caldwell, and Louis H. Poliak. Arthur M. Wisehart argued the cause for respondent Railway Express Agency, Inc. With him on the briefs was Peter G. Wolfe. James L. Highsaw, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for respondents Brotherhood of Railway Clerks et al. Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, Keith A. Jones, David L. Rose, Michael A. Middleton, and Joseph T. Eddins filed a brief for the United States as'amicus curiae. Mb. Justice: Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the issue whether the timely filing of a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), pursuant to § 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 259, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5, tolls the running of the period of limitation applicable to an action, based on the same facts, instituted under 42 U. S. C. § 1981. I Petitioner, Willie Johnson, Jr., is a Negro. He started to work for respondent Railway Express Agency, Inc., now, by change of name, REA Express, Inc. (REA), in Memphis, Tenn., in the spring of 1964 as an express handler. On May 31,1967, while still employed by REA, but now as a driver rather than as a handler, petitioner, with others, timely filed with the EEOC a charge that REA was discriminating against its Negro employees with respect to seniority rules and job assignments. He also charged the respondent unions, Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Tri-State Local and Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Lily of the Valley Local, with maintaining racially segregated memberships (white and Negro respectively). Three weeks later, on June 20, REA terminated petitioner’s employment. Petitioner then amended his charge to include an allegation that he had been discharged because of his race. The EEOC issued its “Final Investigation Report” on December 22, 1967. App. 14a. The report generally supported petitioner’s claims of racial discrimination. It was not until more than two years later, however, on March 31, 1970, that the Commission rendered its decision finding reasonable cause to believe petitioner’s charges. And 9% more months went by before the EEOC, on January 15, 1971, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e), as it then read, gave petitioner notice of his right to institute a Title VII civil action against the respondents within 30 days. After receiving this notice, petitioner encountered some difficulty in obtaining counsel. The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, on February 12, 1971, permitted petitioner to file the right-to-sue letter with the court’s clerk as a complaint, in satisfaction of the 30-day requirement. The court also granted petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and it appointed counsel to represent him. On March 18, counsel filed a “Supplemental Complaint” against REA and the two unions, alleging racial discrimination on the part of the defendants, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Act and of 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The unions and REA respectively moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for dismissal of all claims. The District Court dismissed the § 1981 claims as barred by Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. §28-304 (Supp. 1974). Petitioner’s remaining claims were dismissed on other grounds. In his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, petitioner, with respect to his § 1981 claims, argued that the running of the one-year period of limitation was suspended during the pendency of his timely filed administrative complaint with the EEOC under Title VII. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. 489 F. 2d 525 (1973). See also Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1040, 1045-1046 (Del. 1973). Because of an apparent conflict between that ruling, and language and holdings in cases from other Circuits, we granted certiorari restricted to the limitation issue. We invited the Solicitor General to file a brief as amicus curiae expressing the views of the United States. 417 U. S. 929 (1974). II A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted “to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974). It creates statutory rights against invidious discrimination in employment and establishes a comprehensive scheme for the vindication of those rights. Anyone aggrieved by employment discrimination may lodge a charge with the EEOC. That Commission is vested with the “authority to investigate individual charges of discrimination, to promote voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title VII, and to institute civil actions against employers or unions named in a discrimination charge.” 415 U. S., at 44. Thus, the Commission itself may institute a civil action. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. III). If, however, the EEOC is not successful in obtaining “voluntary compliance” and, for one reason or another, chooses not to sue on the claimant’s behalf, the claimant, after the passage of 180 days, may demand a right-to-sue letter and institute the Title VII action himself without waiting for the completion of the conciliation procedures. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. III). See H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 12 (1971); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). In the claimant’s suit, the federal district court is empowered to appoint counsel for him, to authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security, and even to allow an attorney’s fee. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. Ill) and 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (k). Where intentional engagement in unlawful discrimination is proved, the court may award backpay and order “such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. III). The backpay, however, may not be for more than the two-year period prior to the filing of the charge with the Commission. Ibid. Some District Courts have ruled that neither compensatory nor punitive damages may be awarded in the Title VII suit. Despite Title VII’s range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in employment, the aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in his search for relief. “[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 48. In particular, Congress noted "that the remedies available to the individual under Title VII are co-extensive with the indiv[i] dual’s right to sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, and that the two procedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971). See also S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971). Later, in considering the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have deprived a claimant of any right to sue under § 1981. 118 Cong. Rec. 3371-3373 (1972). B. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1981, being the present codification of § 16 of the century-old Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144, on the other hand, on its face relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well settled among the Federal Courts of Appeals — and we now join them — that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race. An individual who establishes a cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages. See, e. g., Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F. 2d 799 (CA1), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 940 (1968); Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F. 2d 673 (CA5 1967). And a backpay award under § 1981 is not restricted to the two years specified for backpay recovery under Title VII. Section 1981 is not coextensive in its coverage with Title VII. The latter is made inapplicable to certain employers. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e (b) (1970 ed., Supp. III). Also, Title VII offers assistance in investigation, conciliation, counsel, waiver of court costs, and attorneys’ fees, items that are unavailable at least under the specific terms of § 1981. Ill Petitioner, and the United States as amicus curiae, concede, as they must, the independence of the avenues of relief respectively available under Title VII and the older § 1981. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 416-417, n. 20 (1968). Further, it has been noted that the filing of a Title VII charge and resort to Title VIPs administrative machinery are not prerequisites for the institution of a § 1981 action. Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F. 2d 500, 503-504 (CA6 1974); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F. 2d 1044, 1046 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 916 (1972); Young v. In ternational Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F. 2d 757, 761-763 (CA3 1971). Cf. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F. 2d 476, 487 (CA7), cert. denied sub nom. International Harvester Co. v. Waters, 400 U. S. 911 (1970). We are satisfied, also, that Congress did not expect that a § 1981 court action usually would be resorted to only upon completion of Title VII procedures and the Commission’s efforts to obtain voluntary compliance. Conciliation and persuasion through the administrative process, to be sure, often constitute a desirable approach to settlement of disputes based on sensitive and emotional charges of invidious employment discrimination. We recognize, too, that the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation, that lack of success in the legal action could weaken the Commission’s efforts to induce voluntary compliance, and that a suit is privately oriented and narrow, rather than broad, in application, as successful conciliation tends to be. But these are the natural effects of the choice Congress has made available to the claimant by its conferring upon him independent Administrative and judicial remedies. The choice is a valuable one. Under some circumstances, the administrative route may be highly preferred over the litigatory; under others, the reverse may be true. We are disinclined, in the face of congressional emphasis upon the existence and independence of the two remedies, to infer any positive preference for one over the other, without a more definite expression in the legislation Congress has enacted, as, for example, a proscription of a § 1981 action while an EEOC claim is pending. We generally conclude, therefore, that the remedies available under Title VII and under § 1981, although related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent. With this base established, we turn to the limitation issue. IV A. Since there is no specifically stated or otherwise relevant federal statute of limitations for a cause of action under § 1981, the controlling period would ordinarily be the most appropriate one provided by state law. See O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318 (1914) (Civil Rights Act of 1871); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 701-704 (1966) (Labor Management Relations Act); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461 (1947) (National Bank Act); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906) (Sherman Act); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610 (1895) (Patent Act). For purposes of this case, the one-year limitation period in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-304 (Supp. 1974) clearly and specifically has application. See Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F. 2d 730 (CA8 1975). The cause of action asserted by petitioner accrued, if at all, not later than June 20, 1967, the date of his discharge. Therefore, in the absence of some circumstance that suspended the running of the limitation period, petitioner’s cause of action under § 1981 was time barred after June 20, 1968, over 2% years before petitioner filed his complaint. B. Respondents argue that the only circumstances that would suspend or toll the running of the limitation period under § 28-304 are those expressly provided under state law. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-106 to 28-115 (1955 and Supp. 1974) and 28-301 (1955). Petitioner concedes, at least implicitly, that no tolling circumstance described in the State’s statutes was present to toll the period' for his § 1981 claim. He argues, however, that state law should not be given so broad a reach. He claims that, although the duration of the limitation period is bottomed on state law, it is federal law that governs other limitations aspects, such as tolling, of a § 1981 cause of action. Without launching into an exegesis on the nice distinctions that have been drawn in applying state and federal law in this area, we think it suffices to say that petitioner has overstated his case. Indeed, we may assume that he would argue vigorously in favor of applying state law if any of the Tennessee tolling provisions could be said to assist his cause. Any period of limitation, including the one-year period specified by § 28-304, is understood fully only in the context of the various circumstances that suspend it from running against a particular cause of action. Although any statute of limitations is necessarily arbitrary, the length of ■ the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones. In virtually all statutes of limitations the chronological length of the limitation period is interrelated with provisions regarding tolling, revival, and questions of application. In borrowing a state period of limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a federal court is relying on the State’s wisdom in setting a limit, and exceptions thereto, on the prosecution of a closely analogous claim. There is nothing anomalous or novel about this. State law has been followed in a variety of cases that raised questions concerning the overtones and details of application of the state limitation period to the federal cause of action. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U. S., at 706 (characterization of the cause of action); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S., at 465-467 (place where cause of action arose); Barney v. Oelrichs, 138 U. S. 529 (1891) (absence from State as a tolling circumstance). Nor is there anything peculiar to a federal civil rights action that would justify special reluctance in applying state law. Indeed, the express terms of 42 U. S. C. § 1988 suggest that the contrary is true. C. Although state law is our primary guide in this area, it is not, to be sure, our exclusive guide. As the Court noted in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U. S., at 706-707, considerations of state law may be displaced where their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under consideration. ■ Petitioner argues that a failure to toll the limitation period in this case will conflict seriously with the broad remedial and humane purposes of Title VII. Specifically, he urges that Title VII embodies a strong federal policy in support of conciliation and voluntary compliance as a means of achieving the statutory mandate of equal employment opportunity. He suggests that failure to toll the statute on a § 1981 claim during the pendency of an administrative complaint in the EEOC would force a plaintiff into premature and expensive litigation that would destroy all chances for administrative conciliation and voluntary compliance. We have noted this possibility above and, indeed, it is conceivable, and perhaps almost to be expected, that failure to toll will have the effect of pressing a civil rights complainant who values his § 1981 claim into court before the EEOC has completed its administrative proceeding. One answer to this, although perhaps not a highly satisfactory one, is that the plaintiff in his § 1981 suit may ask the court to stay proceedings until the administrative efforts at conciliation and voluntary compliance have been completed. But the fundamental answer to petitioner’s argument lies in the fact — presumably a happy one for the civil rights claimant — that Congress clearly has retained § 1981 as a remedy against private employment discrimination separate from and independent of the more elaborate and time-consuming procedures of Title VII. Petitioner freely concedes that he could have filed his § 1981 action at any time after his cause of action accrued; in fact, we understand him to claim an unfettered right so to do. Thus, in a very real sense, petitioner has slept on his § 1981 rights. The fact that his slumber may have been induced by faith in the adequacy of his Title VII remedy is of little relevance inasmuch as the two remedies are truly independent. Moreover, since petitioner’s Title VII court action now also appears to be time barred because of the peculiar procedural history of this case, petitioner, in effect, would have us extend the § 1981 cause of action well beyond the life of even his Title VII cause of action. We find no policy reason that excuses petitioner’s failure to take the minimal steps necessary to preserve each claim independently. V Petitioner cites American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974), and Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424 (1965), in support of his position. Neither case is helpful. The respective periods of limitation in those cases were derived directly from federal statutes rather than by reference to state law. Moreover, in each case there was a substantial body of relevant federal procedural law to guide the decision to toll the limitation period, and significant underlying federal policy that would have conflicted with a decision not to suspend the running of the statute. In the present case there is no relevant body of federal procedural law to guide our decision, and there is no conflicting federal policy to protect. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the tolling effect given to the timely prior filings in American Pipe and in Burnett depended heavily on the fact that those filings involved exactly the same cause of action subsequently asserted. This factor was more than a mere abstract or theoretical consideration because the prior filing in each case necessarily operated to avoid the evil against which the statute of limitations was designed to protect. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. The applicable statute later was amended to allow a period of 90 days, after issuance of the notice, in which to bring the Title VII action. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. Ill), as amended by Pub. L. 92-261, §4 (a), 86 Stat. 106. “28-304. Personal tort actions — Malpractice of attorneys— Civil rights actions — Statutory penalties. — Actions for libel, for injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, criminal conversation, seduction, breach of marriage promise, actions and suits against attorneys for malpractice whether said actions are grounded or based in contract or tort, civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes, and actions for statutory penalties shall be commenced within one (1) year after cause of action accrued.” The District Court also based its dismissal of petitioner’s § 1981 claim against REA on the alternative ground that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. App. 102a. The Court of Appeals did not address the exhaustion argument. Inasmuch as we limited our grant of certiorari to the limitation issue, 417 U. S. 929 (1974), we have no occasion here to express a view as to whether a § 1981 claim of employment discrimination is ever subject to a requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. The claims against the unions were dismissed on res judicata grounds. App. 101a. The Court of Appeals agreed with that disposition. 489 F. 2d 525, 530 n. 1 (CA6 1973). This issue, also, was not included in our grant of certiorari. See, e. g., Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F. 2d 1011, 1017 n. 16 (CA5 1971); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 156 U. S. App. D. C. 69, 84-86, n. 30, 478 F. 2d 979, 994-996, n. 30 (1973). Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1341-1342 (Haw. 1974); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854, 855-856 (ND Ga. 1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 835-838 (ND Cal. 1973). Cf. Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832, 842-843 (WD Tex. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 488 F. 2d 691 (CA5 1974). Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F. 2d 757 (CA3 1971); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F. 2d 1377 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 982 (1972); Caldwell v. Na tional Brewing Co., 443 F. 2d 1044 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 916 (1972); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F. 2d 500 (CA6 1974); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F. 2d 476 (CA7), cert. denied sub nom. International Harvester Co. v. Waters, 400 U. S. 911 (1970); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F. 2d 621 (CA8 1972); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., supra. In the petition for certiorari ■ it was argued that § 28-304 was inapplicable to petitioner’s claim because that statute is limited to claims for damages, whereas petitioner sought injunctive relief as well as backpay. Our limited grant of certiorari foreclosed our considering whether some other Tennessee statute, such as Tenn. Code Ann. §28-309 (1955) (six years fbr an action on,a contract) or § 28-310 (1955) (10 years on an action not otherwise provided for), might be the appropriate one. We also have no occasion to consider whether Tennessee’s express application of the one-year limitation period to federal civil rights actions is an impermissible discrimination against the federal cause of action, see Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F. 2d 543, 546-547 (CA8 1945), aff’d, 327 U. S. 757 (1946), or whether the enactment of the limitation period after the cause of action accrued, Tenn. Pub. Acts 1969, c. 28, did not touch the pre-existing federal claim. See generally Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 66 (1955). At oral argument petitioner advanced just such a proposition with respect to the applicability of Tennessee’s saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. §28-106 (1955). Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. See also Pet. for Cert. 21 n. 27. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1988 provides: “The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposit-ion of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction •of punishment on the party found guilty.” We are not unmindful of the significant delays that have attended administrative proceedings in the EEOC. See, e. g., Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F. 2d 745 (CA5 1972); EEOC v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1329 (Del. 1974). In Burnett, the Court considered the effect of a prior filing of an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in state court on the applicable three-year FELA period of limitation. The action had been dismissed because under state law the venue was improper. In view of the express federal policy liberally allowing transfer of improper-venue cases, see 28 U. S. C. § 1406 (a), and the desirability of uniformity in the enforcement of FELA claims, the Court concluded that the prior filing tolled the statute. In American Pipe we considered the effect that a timely filed civil antitrust purported class action should have on the applicable four-year federal period of limitation. The District Court found the suit an inappropriate one for class action status. In the light of the history of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 and the purposes of litigatory efficiency served by class actions, we concluded that the prior filing had a tolling effect. We note expressly how little is at stake here. We are not really concerned with the- broad question whether these respondents can be compelled to conform their practices to the nationally mandated policy of equal employment opportunity. If the respondents, or any of them, presently are actually engaged in such conduct, there necessarily will be claimants who are in a position now either to file a charge under Title VII or to sue under § 1981. The question in this case is only whether this particular petitioner has waited so long that he has forfeited his right to assert his § 1981 claim in federal court.' Petitioner argues that the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC has the effect of placing the charged employer on notice that a claim of discrimination is being asserted. Thus, petitioner argues, the employer, has the opportunity to protect itself against the loss- of evidence', the -disappearance and fading- memories of witnesses, and the unfair surprise that could result from a sudden revival of a claim that long has-been allowed'to slumber. See Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S. 342, 348-349 (1944). Even if we were to ignore the substantial span of time that could result from. tacking the § 1981 limitation period to the frequently protracted period of EEOC consideration) we are not at all certain that a Title VII charge affords the charged party the protection that petitioner suggests. -See, e. g., Tipler v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F. 2d 125, 131 (CA6 1971). Only'where there is complete identity of the causes of action will the protections suggested by petitioner necessarily exist and will the courts, have an opportunity to assess the influence of the policy of repose inherent in a limitation period. See generally Developments in the Law— Statutes of Limitation, 63 Harv. L. Rev. .1177, 1185-1186 (1950).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. ELIAS-ZACARIAS No. 90-1342. Argued November 4, 1991 Decided January 22, 1992 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 484. Maureen E. Mahoney argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Wright, Stephen J. Marzen, and Alice M. King. James Robertson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Carol F. Lee and Peter A. Von Mehren. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Immigration Lawyers Association by Kevin R. Johnson, Joshua R. Flown, and Robert Rubin; for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights et al. by Arthur C. Helton, 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr., and Andrew I. Schoen-koltz; and for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by Arthur L. Bentley III and Julian Fleet Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question presented by this case is whether a guerrilla organization’s attempt to coerce a person into performing military service necessarily constitutes “persecution on account of . . . political opinion” under § 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added, 94 Stat. 102, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42). I Respondent Elias-Zacarias, a native of Guatemala, was apprehended in July 1987 for entering the United States without inspection. In deportation proceedings brought by petitioner Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Elias-Zacarias conceded his deportability but requested asylum and withholding of deportation. The Immigration Judge summarized Elias-Zacarias’ testimony as follows: “[A]round the end of January in 1987 [when Elias-Zacarias was 18], two armed, uniformed guerrillas with handkerchiefs covering part of their faces came to his home. Only he and his parents were there. . . . [T]he guerrillas asked his parents and himself to join with them, but they all refused. The guerrillas asked them why and told them that they would be back, and that they should think it over about joining them. “[Elias-Zacarias] did not want to join the guerrillas because the guerrillas are against the government and he was afraid that the government would retaliate against him and his family if he did join the guerrillas. [H]e left Guatemala at the end of March [1987] . . . because he was afraid that the guerrillas would return.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a-41a. The Immigration Judge understood from this testimony that Elias-Zacarias’ request for asylum and for withholding of deportation was “based on this one attempted recruitment by the guerrillas.” Id., at 41a. She concluded that Elias-Zacarias had failed to demonstrate persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and was not eligible for asylum. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(a). She further concluded that he did not qualify for withholding of deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) summarily dismissed Elias-Zacarias’ appeal on procedural grounds. Elias-Zacarias then moved the BIA to reopen his deportation hearing so that he could submit new evidence that, following his departure from Guatemala, the guerrillas had twice returned to his family’s home in continued efforts to recruit him. The BIA denied reopening on the ground that even with this new evidence Elias-Zacarias had failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum and had failed to show that the results of his deportation hearing would be changed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, treating the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen as an affirmance on the merits of the Immigration Judge’s ruling, reversed. 921 F. 2d 844 (1990). The court ruled that acts of conscription by a nongovernmental group constitute persecution on account of political opinion, and determined that Elias-Zacarias had a “well-founded fear” of such conscription. Id., at 850-852. We granted certiorari. 500 U. S. 915 (1991). II Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1158(a), authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who is a "refugee" as defined in the Act, i. e., an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 423, 428, n. 5 (1987). The BIA's determination that Elias-Zacarias was not eligible for asylum must be upheld if "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole." 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(4). It can be reversed only if the evidence presented by Elias-Zacarias was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292, 300 (1939). The Court of Appeals found reversal warranted. In its view, a guerrilla organization's attempt to conscript a person into its military forces necessarily constitutes "persecution on account of. . . political opinion," because "the person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile to the persecutor and because the persecutors' motive in carrying out the kidnapping is political." 921 F. 2d, at 850. The first half of this seems to us untrue, and the second half irrelevant. Even a person who supports a guerrilla movement might resist recruitment for a variety of reasons — fear of combat, a desire to remain with one’s family and friends, a desire to earn a better living in civilian life, to mention only a few. The record in the present case not only failed to show a political motive on Elias-Zacarias’ part; it showed the opposite. He testified that he refused to join the guerrillas because he was afraid that the government would retaliate against him and his family if he did so. Nor is there any indication (assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously believed that Elias-Zacarias’ refusal was politically based. As for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the guerrillas’ “motive in carrying out the kidnapping is political”: It apparently meant by this that the guerrillas seek to fill their ranks in order to carry on their war against the government and pursue their political goals. See 921 F. 2d, at 850 (citing Arteaga v. INS, 836 F. 2d 1227, 1232, n. 8 (CA9 1988)); 921 F. 2d, at 852. But that does not render the forced recruitment “persecution on account of . . . political opinion.” In construing statutes, “we must, of course, start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.” Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962); see Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, at 431; INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U. S. 183, 189 (1984). The ordinary meaning of the phrase “persecution on account of . . . political opinion” in § 101(a)(42) is persecution on account of the victim’s political opinion, not the persecutor’s. If a Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is not, within the ordinary meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account of political opinion; and if a fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats, it is not engaging in persecution on account of religion. Thus, the mere existence of a generalized “political” motive underlying the guerrillas’ forced recruitment is inadequate to establish (and, indeed, goes far to refute) the proposition that Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on account of political opinion, as §101(a)(42) requires. Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not taking sides with any political faction is itself the affirmative expression of a political opinion. That seems to us not ordinarily so, since we do not agree with the dissent that only a “narrow, grudging construction of the concept of ‘political opinion,’ ” post, at 487, would distinguish it from such quite different concepts as indifference, indecisiveness, and risk averseness. But we need not decide whether the evidence compels the conclusion that Elias-Zacarias held a political opinion. Even if it does, Elias-Zacarias still has to establish that the record also compels the conclusion that he has a “well-founded fear” that the guerrillas will persecute him because of that political opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight with them. He has not done so with the degree of clarity necessary to permit reversal of a BIA finding to the contrary; indeed, he has not done so at all. Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected to provide direct proof of his persecutors’ motives. We do not require that. But since the statute makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial. And if he seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA’s determination, he must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution. That he has not done. The BIA’s determination should therefore have been upheld in all respects, and we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment to the contrary. It is so ordered. Quite beside the point, therefore, is the dissent's assertion that "the record in this case is more than adequate to support the cone lusion that this respondent's refusal [to join the guerrillas] was a form of expressive conduct that constituted the statement of a `political opinion," post, at 488 (emphasis added). To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it-and also compels the further conclusion that Elias-Zacarias had a well-founded fear that the guerrillas would persecute him because of that political opinion. The dissent misdescribes the record on this point in several respects. For example, it exaggerates the “well foundedness” of whatever fear Elias-Zacarias possesses, by progressively transforming his testimony that he was afraid the guerrillas would “ ‘take me or kill me,’ ” post, at 484, into, first, “the guerrillas’ implied threat to ‘take’ him or to ‘kill’ him,” post, at 489 (emphasis added), and, then, into the flat assertion that the guerrillas “responded by threatening to ‘take’ or to ‘kill’ him,” post, at 490 (emphasis added). The dissent also erroneously describes it as “undisputed” that the cause of the harm Elias-Zacarias fears, if that harm should occur, will be “the guerrilla organization’s displeasure with his refusal to join them in their armed insurrection against the government.” Post, at 484 (emphasis added). The record shows no such concession by the INS, and all Elias-Zacarias said on the point was that he feared being taken or killed by the guerrillas. It is quite plausible, indeed likely, that the taking would be engaged in by the guerrillas in order to augment their troops rather than show their displeasure; and the killing he feared might well be a killing in the course of resisting being taken.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?