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PERRY et al. v. SINDERMANN No. 70-36. Argued January 18, 1972 Decided June 29, 1972 Stewart, J„ delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, BlackmuN, and RehNquist, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 603. BreNNAN, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Douglas, J., joined, post, p. 604. Marshall, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 605. Powell, J., took no part in the decision of the case. W. O. Shafer argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Lucius D. Bunion. Michael H. Gottesman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were George H. Cohen and Warren Burnett. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by David Rubin and Richard J. Medalie for the National Education Association; by John Ligtenberg and Andrew J. Leahy for the American Federation of Teachers; and by Herman I. Orentlicher and William W. Van Alstyne for the American Association of University Professors. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. From 1959 to 1969 the respondent, Robert Sindermann, was a teacher in the state college system of the State of Texas. After teaching for two years at the University of Texas and for four years at San Antonio Junior College, he became a professor of Government and Social Science at Odessa Junior College in 1965. He was employed at the college for four successive years, under a series of one-year contracts. He was successful enough to be appointed, for a time, the cochairman of his department. During the 1968-1969 academic year, however, controversy arose between the respondent and the college administration. The respondent was elected president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association. In this capacity, he left his teaching duties on several occasions to testify before committees of the Texas Legislature, and he became involved in public disagreements with the policies of the college’s Board of Regents. In particular, he aligned himself with a group advocating the elevation of the college to four-year status — a change opposed by the Regents. And, on one occasion, a newspaper advertisement appeared over his name that was highly critical of the Regents. Finally, in May 1969, the respondent’s one-year employment contract terminated and the Board of Regents voted not to offer him a new contract for the next academic year. The Regents issued a press release setting forth allegations of the respondent’s insubordination. But they provided him no official statement of the reasons for the nonrenewal of his contract. And they allowed him no opportunity for a hearing to challenge the basis of the nonrenewal. The respondent then brought this action in Federal District Court. He alleged primarily that the Regents’ decision not to rehire him was based on his public criticism of the policies of the college administration and thus infringed his right to freedom of speech. He also alleged that their failure to provide him an opportunity for a hearing violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due process. The petitioners— members of the Board of Regents and the president of the college — denied that their decision was made in retaliation for the respondent’s public criticism and argued that they had no obligation to provide a hearing. On the basis of these bare pleadings and three brief affidavits filed by the respondent, the District Court granted summary judgment for the petitioners, It concluded that the respondent had “no cause of action against the [petitioners] since his contract of employment terminated May 31, 1969, and Odessa Junior College has not adopted the tenure system.” The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court. 430 F. 2d 939. First, it held that, despite the respondent's lack of tenure, the nonrenewal of his contract would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if it in fact was based on his protected free speech. Since the actual reason for the Regents' decision was “in total dispute” in the pleadings, the court remanded the case for a full hearing on this contested issue of fact. Id., at 942-943. Second, the Court of Appeals held that, despite the respondent’s lack of tenure, the failure to allow him an opportunity for a hearing would violate the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process if the respondent could show that he had an “expectancy” of re-employment. It, therefore, ordered that this issue of fact also be aired upon remand. Id., at 943-944. We granted a writ of certiorari, 403 U. S. 917, and we have considered this case along with Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, p. 564. I The first question presented is whether the respondent’s lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment, taken alone, defeats his claim that the nonrenewal of his contract violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that it does not. For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests— especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to “produce a result which [it] could not command directly.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible. We have applied this general principle to denials of tax exemptions, Speiser v. Randall, supra, unemployment benefits, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404—405, and welfare payments, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 627 n. 6; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374. But, most often, we have applied the principle to denials of public employment. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 192; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 485-486; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 495-496; Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 894; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278, 288; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11, 17; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-606; Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 54; United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568. We have applied the principle regardless of the public employee’s contractual or other claim to a job. Compare Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, with Shelton v. Tucker, supra. Thus, the respondent’s lack of a contractual or tenure “right” to re-employment for the 1969-1970 academic year is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifically held that the nonrenewal of a nontenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Shelton v. Tucker, supra; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra. We reaffirm those holdings here. In this case, of course, the respondent has yet to show that the decision not to renew his contract was, in fact, made in retaliation for his exercise of the constitutional right of free speech. The District Court foreclosed any opportunity to make this showing when it granted summary judgment. Hence, we cannot now hold that the Board of Regents’ action was invalid. But we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is a genuine dispute as to “whether the college refused to renew the teaching contract on an impermissible basis — as a reprisal for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.” 430 F. 2d, at 943. The respondent has alleged that his nonretention was based on his testimony before legislative committees and his other public statements critical of the Regents’ policies. And he has alleged that this public criticism was within the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ protection of freedom of speech. Plainly, these allegations present a bona fide constitutional claim. For this Court has held that a teacher’s public criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis for termination of his employment. Pickering v. Board of Education, supra. For this reason we hold that the grant of summary judgment against the respondent, without full exploration of this issue, was improper. II The respondent’s lack of formal contractual or tenure security in continued employment at Odessa Junior College, though irrelevant to his free speech claim, is highly relevant to his procedural due process claim. But it may not be entirely dispositive. We have held today in Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, p. 564, that the Constitution does not require opportunity for a hearing before the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher’s contract, unless he can show that the decision not to rehire him somehow deprived him of an interest in “liberty” or that he had a “property” interest in continued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a formal contract. In Roth the teacher had not made a showing on either point to justify summary judgment in his favor. Similarly, the respondent here has yet to show that he has been deprived of an interest that could invoke procedural due process protection. As in Roth, the mere showing that he was not rehired in one particular job, without more, did not amount to a showing of a loss of liberty. Nor did it amount to a showing of a loss of property. But the respondent’s allegations — which we must construe most favorably to the respondent at this stage of the litigation — do raise a genuine issue as to his interest in continued employment at Odessa Junior College. He alleged that this interest, though not secured by a formal contractual tenure provision, was secured by a no less binding understanding fostered by the college administration. In particular, the respondent alleged that the college had a de facto tenure program, and that he had tenure under that program. He claimed that he and others legitimately relied upon an unusual provision that had been in the college’s official Faculty Guide for many years: “Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work.” Moreover, the respondent claimed legitimate reliance upon guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System that provided that a person, like himself, who had been employed as a teacher in the state college and university system for seven years or more has some form of job tenure. Thus, the respondent offered to prove that a teacher with his long period of service at this particular State College had no less a “property” interest in continued employment than a formally tenured teacher at other colleges, and had no less a procedural due process right to a statement of reasons and a hearing before college officials upon their decision not to retain him. We have made clear in Roth, supra, at 571-572, that “property” interests subject to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, “property” denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by “existing rules or understandings.” Id., at 577. A person’s interest in a benefit is a “property” interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing. Ibid. A written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly is evidence of a formal understanding that supports a teacher’s claim of entitlement to continued employment unless sufficient “cause” is shown. Yet absence of such an explicit contractual provision may not always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a “property” interest in re-employment. For example, the law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictions long has employed a process by which agreements, though not formalized in writing, may be “implied.” 3 A. Corbin on Contracts §§ 561-572A (1960). Explicit contractual provisions may be supplemented by other agreements implied from “the promisor's words and conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” Id., at § 562. And, “[t]he meaning of [the promisor's] words and acts is found by relating them to the usage of the past.” Ibid. A teacher, like the respondent, who has held his position for a number of years, might be able to show from the circumstances of this service — and from other relevant facts — that he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure. Just as this Court has found there to be a “common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant” that may supplement a collective-bargaining agreement, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U. S. 574, 579, so there may be an unwritten “common law” in a particular university that certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure. This is particularly likely in a college or university, like Odessa Junior College, that has no explicit tenure system even for senior members of its faculty, but that nonetheless may have created such a system in practice. See C. Byse & L. Joughin, Tenure in American Higher Education 17-28 (1959). In this case, the respondent has alleged the existence of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials, that may justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent “sufficient cause.” We disagree with the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that a mere subjective “expectancy” is protected by procedural due process, but we agree that the respondent must be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his claim of such entitlement in light of “the policies and practices of the institution.” 430 F. 2d, at 943. Proof of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency. Therefore, while we do not wholly agree with the opinion of the Court of Appeals, its judgment remanding this case to the District Court is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. The press release stated, for example, that the respondent had defied his superiors by attending legislative committee meetings when college officials had specifically refused to permit him to leave his classes for that purpose. The petitioners claimed, in their motion for summary judgment, that the decision not to retain the respondent was really based on his insubordinate conduct. See m 1, supra. The petitioners, for whom summary judgment was granted, submitted no affidavits whatever. The respondent’s affidavits were very short and essentially repeated the general allegations of his complaint. The findings and conclusions of the .District Court — only several lines long — are not officially reported. The Court of Appeals suggested that the respondent might have a due process right to some kind of hearing simply if he asserts to college officials that their decision was based on his constitutionally protected conduct. 430 F. 2d, at 944. We have rejected this approach in Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, at 575 n. 14. The relevant portion of the guidelines, adopted as “Policy Paper 1” by the Coordinating Board on October 16, 1967, reads: “A. Tenure “Tenure means assurance to an experienced faculty member that he may expect to continue in his academic position unless adequate cause for dismissal is demonstrated in a fair hearing, following established procedures of due process. “A specific system of faculty tenure undergirds the integrity of each academic institution. In the Texas public colleges and universities, this tenure system should have these components: “(1) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time instructor or a higher rank, the probationary period for a faculty member shall not exceed seven years, including within this period appropriate full-time service in all institutions of higher education. This is subject to the provision that when, after a term of probationary service of more than three years in one or more institutions, a faculty member is employed by another institution, it may be agreed in writing that his new appointment is for a probationary period of not more than four years (even though thereby the person’s total probationary period in the academic profession is extended beyond the normal maximum of seven years). “(3) Adequate cause for dismissal for a faculty member with tenure may be established by demonstrating professional incompetence, moral turpitude, or gross neglect of professional responsibilities.” The respondent alleges that, because he has been employed as a “full-time instructor” or professor within the Texas College and University System for 10 years, he should have “tenure” under these provisions. We do not now hold that the respondent has any such legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure. For “[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 577. If it is the law of Texas that a teacher in the respondent’s position has no contractual or other claim to job tenure, the respondent’s claim would be defeated.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES v. SYNAR, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, et al. No. 85-1377. Argued April 23, 1986 Decided July 7, 1986 Burgee, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 736. White, J., post, p. 759, and Blackmun, J., post, p. 776, filed dissenting opinions. Lloyd, N. Cutler argued the cause for appellant in No. 85-1377. With him on the briefs were John H. Pickering, William T. Lake, Richard K. Lahne, and Neal T. Kilmin-ster. Steven R. Ross argued the cause for appellants in No. 85-1379. With him on the briefs were Charles Tiefer and Michael L. Murray. Michael Davidson argued the cause for appellant in No. 85-1378. With him on the briefs were Ken U. Benjamin, Jr., and Morgan J. Frankel. Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Spears, Edwin S. Kneedler, Robert E. Kopp, Neil H. Koslowe, and Douglas Letter. Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for appellees Synar et al. With him on the brief was Katherine A. Meyer. Lois G. Williams argued the cause for appellees National Treasury Employees Union et al. With her on the brief were Gregory O’Duden and Elaine D. Kaplan. Together with No. 85-1378, United States Senate v. Synar, Member of Congress, et al., and No. 85-1379, O’Neill, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, et al. v. Synar, Member of Congress, et al., also on appeal from the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Tax Limitation Committee et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Sam Kazman, and Lucinda Low Swartz; and for Howard H. Baker, Jr., pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Robert M. Weinberg, Peter 0. Shinevar, Laurence Gold, George Kauf-mann, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Thomas A. Woodley, Mark Roth, Darryl J. Anderson, and Anton G. Hajjar; for the Coalition for Health Funding et al. by Stephan E. Lawton and Jack N. Goodman; for the National Federation of Federal Employees by Patrick J. Riley; and for William H. Gray III et al. by Richard A. Wegman, Paul S. Hoff, and Thomas H. Stanton. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Jewish Congress by Neil H. Cogan; and for Edward Blankstein by Eric H. Karp. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by these appeals is whether the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the doctrine of separation of powers. i — i a> On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, 2 U. S. C. §901 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. Ill), popularly known as the “Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.” The purpose of the Act is to eliminate the federal budget deficit. To that end, the Act sets a “maximum deficit amount” for federal spending for each of fiscal years 1986 through 1991. The size of that maximum deficit amount progressively reduces to zero in fiscal year 1991. If in any fiscal year the federal budget deficit exceeds the maximum deficit amount by more than a specified sum, the Act requires across-the-board cuts in federal spending to reach the targeted deficit level, with half of the cuts made to defense programs and the other half made to nondefense programs. The Act exempts certain priority programs from these cuts. § 255. These “automatic” reductions are accomplished through a rather complicated procedure, spelled out in §251, the so-called “reporting provisions” of the Act. Each year, the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) independently estimate the amount of the federal budget deficit for the upcoming fiscal year. If that deficit exceeds the maximum targeted deficit amount for that fiscal year by more than a specified, amount, the Directors of OMB and CBO independently calculate, on a program-by-program basis, the budget reductions necessary to ensure that the deficit does not exceed the maximum deficit amount. The Act then requires the Directors to report jointly their deficit estimates and budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors’ reports, then reports his conclusions to the President. § 251(b). The President in turn must issue a “sequestration” order mandating the spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General. § 252. There follows a period during which Congress may by legislation reduce spending to obviate, in whole or in part, the need for the sequestration order. If such reductions are not enacted, the sequestration order becomes effective and the spending reductions included in that order are made. Anticipating constitutional challenge to these procedures, the Act also contains a “fallback” deficit reduction process to take effect “[i]n the event that any of the reporting procedures described in section 251 are invalidated.” § 274(f). Under these provisions, the report prepared by the Directors of OMB and the CBO is submitted directly to a specially created Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, which must report in five days to both Houses a joint resolution setting forth the content of the Directors’ report. Congress then must vote on the resolution under special rules, which render amendments out of order. If the resolution is passed and signed by the President, it then serves as the basis for a Presidential sequestration order. B Within hours of the President’s signing of the Act, Congressman Synar, who had voted against the Act, filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief that the Act was unconstitutional. Eleven other Members later joined Congressman Synar’s suit. A virtually identical lawsuit was also filed by the National Treasury Employees Union. The Union alleged that its members had been injured as a result of the Act’s automatic spending reduction provisions, which have suspended certain cost-of-living benefit increases to the Union’s members. A three-judge District Court, appointed pursuant to 2 U. S. C. § 922(a)(5) (1982 ed., Supp. III), invalidated the reporting provisions. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (DC 1986) (Scalia, Johnson, and Gasch, JJ.). The District Court concluded that the Union had standing to challenge the Act since the members of the Union had suffered actual injury by suspension of certain benefit increases. The District Court also concluded that Congressman Synar and his fellow Members had standing under the so-called “congressional standing” doctrine. See Barnes v. Kline, 245 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 21, 759 F. 2d 21, 41 (1985), cert. granted sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 475 U. S. 1044 (1986). The District Court next rejected appellees’ challenge that the Act violated the delegation doctrine. The court expressed no doubt that the Act delegated broad authority, but delegation of similarly broad authority has been upheld in past cases. The District Court observed that in Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 420 (1944), this Court upheld a statute that delegated to an unelected “Price Administrator” the power “to promulgate regulations fixing prices of commodities.” Moreover, in the District Court’s view, the Act adequately confined the exercise of administrative discretion. The District Court concluded that “the totality of the Act’s standards, definitions, context, and reference to past administrative practice provides an adequate ‘intelligible principle’ to guide and confine administrative decisionmaking.” 626 F. Supp., at 1389. Although the District Court concluded that the Act survived a delegation doctrine challenge, it held that the role of the Comptroller General in the deficit reduction process violated the constitutionally imposed separation of powers. The court first explained that the Comptroller General exercises executive functions under the Act. However, the Comptroller General, while appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is removable not by the President but only by a joint resolution of Congress or by impeachment. The District Court reasoned that this arrangement could not be sustained under this Court’s decisions in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). Under the separation of powers established by the Framers of the Constitution, the court concluded, Congress may not retain the power of removal over an officer performing executive functions. The congressional removal power created a “here-and-now subservience” of the Comptroller General to Congress. 626 F. Supp., at 1392. The District Court therefore held that “since the powers conferred upon the Comptroller General as part of the automatic deficit reduction process are executive powers, which cannot constitutionally be exercised by an officer removable by Congress, those powers cannot be exercised and therefore the automatic deficit reduction process to which they are are central cannot be implemented.” Id., at 1403. Appeals were taken directly to this Court pursuant to § 274(b) of the Act. We noted probable jurisdiction and expedited consideration of the appeals. 475 U. S. 1009 (1986). We affirm. II A threshold issue is whether the Members of Congress, members of the National Treasury Employees Union, or the Union itself have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act in question. It is clear that members of the Union, one of whom is an appellee here, will sustain injury by not receiving a scheduled increase in benefits. See § 252(a)(6)(C)(i); 626 F. Supp., at 1381. This is sufficient to confer standing under § 274(a)(2) and Article III. We therefore need not consider the standing issue as to the Union or Members of Congress. See Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U. S. 312, 319, n. 3 (1984). Cf. Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U. S. 274 (1986); Barnes v. Kline, supra. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the case. III We noted recently that “[t]he Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951 (1983). The declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of government, of course, was- to “diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson’s words echo the famous warning of Montesquieu, quoted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 47, that “ ‘there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates’ . . . The Federalist No. 47, p. 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu’s thesis that checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty. The Framers provided a vigorous Legislative Branch and a separate and wholly independent Executive Branch, with each branch responsible ultimately to the people. The Framers also provided for a Judicial Branch equally independent with “[t]he judicial Power . . . extending] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States.” Art. III, § 2. Other, more subtle,' examples of separated powers are evident as well. Unlike parliamentary systems such as that of Great Britain, no person who is an officer of the United States may serve as a Member of the Congress. Art. I, § 6. Moreover, unlike parliamentary systems, the President, under Article II, is responsible not to the Congress but to the people, subject only to impeachment proceedings which are exercised by the two Houses as representatives of the people. Art. II, § 4. And even in the impeachment of a President the presiding officer of the ultimate tribunal is not a member of the Legislative Branch, but the Chief Justice of the United States. Art. I, § 3. That this system of division and separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous, and open debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power. The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts. The President appoints “Officers of the United States” with the “Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . Art. II, § 2. Once the appointment has been made and confirmed, however, the Constitution explicitly provides for removal of Officers of the United States by Congress only upon impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate. An impeachment by the House and trial by the Senate can rest only on “Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Art. II, § 4. A direct congressional role in the removal of officers charged with the execution of the laws beyond this limited one is inconsistent with separation of powers. This was made clear in debate in the First Congress in 1789. When Congress considered an amendment to a bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs, the debate centered around whether the Congress “should recognize and declare the power of the President under the Constitution to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs without the advice and consent of the Senate.” Myers, 272 U. S., at 114. James Madison urged rejection of a congressional role in the removal of Executive Branch officers, other than by impeachment, saying in debate: “Perhaps there was no argument urged with more success, or more plausibly grounded against the Constitution, under which we are now deliberating, than that founded on the mingling of the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government in one body. It has been objected, that the Senate have too much of the Executive power even, by having a control over the President in the appointment to office. Now, shall we extend this connexion between the Legislative and Executive departments, which will strengthen the objection, and diminish the responsibility we have in the head of the Executive?” 1 Annals of Cong. 380 (1789). Madison’s position ultimately prevailed, and a congressional role in the removal process was rejected. This “Decision of 1789” provides “contemporaneous and weighty evidence” of the Constitution’s meaning since many of the Members of the First Congress “had taken part in framing that instrument.” Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 790 (1983). . This Court first directly addressed this issue in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1925). At issue in Myers was a statute providing that certain postmasters could be removed only “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The President removed one such Postmaster without Senate approval, and a lawsuit ensued. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, declared the statute unconstitutional on the ground that for Congress to “draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power . . . would be ... to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers.” Id., at 161. A decade later, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), relied upon heavily by appellants, a Federal Trade Commissioner who had been removed by the President sought backpay. Humphrey’s Executor involved an issue not presented either in the Myers case or in this case — i. e., the power of Congress to limit the President’s powers of removal of a Federal Trade Commissioner. 295 U. S., at 630. The relevant statute permitted removal “by the President,” but only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, upheld the statute, holding that “illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President [with respect to Federal Trade Commissioners].” Id., at 628-629. The Court distinguished Myers, reaffirming its holding that congressional participation in the removal of executive officers is unconstitutional. Justice Sutherland’s opinion for the Court also underscored the crucial role of separated powers in our system: “The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitution; and in the rule which recognizes their essential co-equality.” 295 U. S., at 629-630. The Court reached a similar result in Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349 (1958), concluding that, under Humphrey’s Executor, the President did not have unrestrained removal authority over a member of the War Claims Commission. In light of these precedents, we conclude that Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws. As the District Court observed: “Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey.” 626 F. Supp., at 1401. The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess. Our decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), supports this conclusion. In Chadha, we struck down a one-House “legislative veto” provision by which each House of Congress retained the power to reverse a decision Congress had expressly authorized the Attorney General to make: “Disagreement with the Attorney General’s decision on Chadha’s deportation — that is, Congress’ decision to deport Chadha — no less than Congress’ original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.” Id., at 964-955. To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws, Chadha makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible. The dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized. “[T]he debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 129 (1976). Indeed, we also have observed only recently that “[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.” Chadha, supra, at 951. With these principles in mind, we turn to consideration of whether the Comptroller General is controlled by Congress. I — I <J Appellants urge that the Comptroller General performs his duties independently and is not subservient to Congress. We agree with the District Court that this contention does not bear close scrutiny. The critical factor lies in the provisions of the statute defining the Comptroller General’s office relating to remov-ability. Although the Comptroller General is nominated by the President from a list of three individuals recommended by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, see 31 U. S. C. § 703(a)(2), and confirmed by the Senate, he is removable only at the initiative of Congress. He may be removed not only by impeachment but also by joint resolution of Congress “at any time” resting on any one of the following bases: “(i) permanent disability; “(ii) inefficiency; “(iii) neglect of duty; “(iv) malfeasance; or “(v) a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.” 31 U. S. C. §703(e)(1)B. This provision was included, as one Congressman explained in urging passage of the Act, because Congress “felt that [the Comptroller General] should be brought under the sole control of Congress, so that Congress at any moment when it found he was inefficient and was not carrying on the duties of his office as he should and as the Congress expected, could remove him without the long, tedious process of a trial by impeachment.” 61 Cong. Rec. 1081 (1921). The removal provision was an important part of the legislative scheme, as a number of Congressmen recognized. Representative Hawley commented: “[H]e is our officer, in a measure, getting information for us ... . If he does not do his work properly, we, as practically his employers, ought to be able to discharge him from his office.” 58 Cong. Rec. 7136 (1919). Representative Sisson observed that the removal provisions would give “[t]he Congress of the United States . . . absolute control of the man’s destiny in office.” 61 Cong. Rec. 987 (1921). The ultimate design was to “give the legislative branch of the Government control of the audit, not through the power of appointment, but through the power of removal.” 58 Cong. Rec. 7211 (1919) (Rep. Temple). Justice White contends: “The statute does not permit anyone to remove the Comptroller at will; removal is permitted only for specified cause, with the existence of cause to be determined by Congress following a hearing. Any removal under the statute would presumably be subject to post-termination judicial review to ensure that a hearing had in fact been held and that the finding of cause for removal was not arbitrary.” Post, at 770. That observation by the dissenter rests on at least two arguable premises: (a) that the enumeration of certain specified causes of removal excludes the possibility of removal for other causes, cf. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 315-316 (1903); and (b) that any removal would be subject to judicial review, a position that appellants were unwilling to endorse. Glossing over these difficulties, the dissent’s assessment of the statute fails to recognize the breadth of the grounds for removal. The statute permits removal for “inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,” or “malfeasance.” These terms are very broad and, as interpreted by Congress, could sustain removal of a Comptroller General for any number of actual or perceived transgressions of the legislative will. The Constitutional Convention chose to permit impeachment of executive officers only for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” It rejected language that would have permitted impeachment for “maladministration,” with Madison arguing that “[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.” 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 550 (1911). We need not decide whether “inefficiency” or “malfeasance” are terms as broad as “maladministration” in order to reject the dissent’s position that removing the Comptroller General requires “a feat of bipartisanship more difficult than that required to impeach and convict.” Post, at 771 (White, J., dissenting). Surely no one would seriously suggest that judicial independence would be strengthened by allowing removal of federal judges only by a joint resolution finding “inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,” or “malfeasance.” Justice White, however, assures us that “[rjealistic consideration” of the “practical result of the removal provision,” post, at 774, 773, reveals that the Comptroller General is unlikely to be removed by Congress. The separated powers of our Government cannot be permitted to turn on judicial assessment of whether an officer exercising executive power is on good terms with Congress. The Framers recognized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty. In constitutional terms, the removal powers over the Comptroller General’s office dictate that he will be subservient to Congress. This much said, we must also add that the dissent is simply in error to suggest that the political realities reveal that the Comptroller General is free from influence by Congress. The Comptroller General heads the General Accounting Office (GAO), “an instrumentality of the United States Government independent of the executive departments,” 31 U. S. C. § 702(a), which was created by Congress in 1921 as part of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 23. Congress created the office because it believed that it “needed an officer, responsible to it alone, to check upon the application of public funds in accordance with appropriations.” H. Mansfield, The Comptroller General: A Study in the Law and Practice of Financial Administration 65 (1939). It is clear that Congress has consistently viewed the Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch. The Reorganization Acts of 1945 and 1949, for example, both stated that the Comptroller General and the GAO are “a part of the legislative branch of the Government.” 59 Stat. 616; 63 Stat. 205. Similarly, in the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, Congress required the Comptroller General to conduct audits “as an agent of the Congress.” 64 Stat. 835. Over the years, the Comptrollers General have also viewed themselves as part of the Legislative Branch. In one of the early Annual Reports of Comptroller General, the official seal of his office was described as reflecting “the independence of judgment to be exercised by the General Accounting Office, subject to the control of the legislative branch. . . . The combination represents an agency of the Congress independent of other authority auditing and checking the expenditures of the Government as required by law and subjecting any questions arising in that connection to quasi-judicial determination.” GAO Ann. Rep. 5-6 (1924). Later, Comptroller General Warren, who had been a Member of Congress for 15 years before being appointed Comptroller General, testified: “During most of my public life, . . . I have been a member of the legislative branch. Even now, although heading a great agency, it is an agency of the Congress, and I am an agent of the Congress.” To Provide for Reorganizing of Agencies of the Government: Hearings on H. R. 3325 before the House Committee on Expenditures, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 (1945) (emphasis added). And, in one conflict during Comptroller General McCarl’s tenure, he asserted his independence of the Executive Branch, stating: “Congress . . . is . . . the only authority to which there lies an appeal from the decision of this office. . . . . I may not accept the opinion of any official, inclusive of the Attorney General, as controlling my duty under the law.” 2 Comp. Gen. 784, 786-787 (1923) (disregarding conclusion of the Attorney General, 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 476 (1923), with respect to interpretation of compensation statute). Against this background, we see no escape from the conclusion that, because Congress has retained removal authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with executive powers. The remaining question is whether the Comptroller General has been assigned such powers in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. V The primary responsibility of the Comptroller General under the instant Act is the preparation of a “report.” This report must contain detailed estimates of projected federal revenues and expenditures. The report must also specify the reductions, if any, necessary to reduce the deficit to the target for the appropriate fiscal year. The reductions must be set forth on a program-by-program basis. In preparing the report, the Comptroller General is to have “due regard” for the estimates and reductions set forth in a joint report submitted to him by the Director of CBO and the Director of OMB, the President’s fiscal and budgetary adviser. However, the Act plainly contemplates that the Comptroller General will exercise his independent judgment and evaluation with respect to those estimates. The Act also provides that the Comptroller General’s report “shall explain fully any differences between the contents of such report and the report of the Directors.” § 251(b)(2). Appellants suggest that the duties assigned to the Comptroller General in the Act are essentially ministerial and mechanical so that their performance does not constitute “execution of the law” in a meaningful sense. On the contrary, we view these functions as plainly entailing execution of the law in constitutional terms. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of “execution” of the law. Under §251, the Comptroller General must exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act. He must also interpret the provisions of the Act to determine precisely what budgetary calculations are required. Decisions of that kind are typically made by officers charged with executing a statute. The executive nature of the Comptroller General’s functions under the Act is revealed in § 252(a)(3) which gives the Comptroller General the ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to be made. Indeed, the Comptroller General commands the President himself to carry out, without the slightest variation (with exceptions not relevant to the constitutional issues presented), the directive of the Comptroller General as to the budget reductions: “The [Presidential] order must provide for reductions in the manner specified in section 251(a)(3), must incorporate the provisions of the [Comptroller General’s] report submitted under section 251(b), and must be consistent with such report in all respects. The President may not modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determinations, specifications, bases, amounts, or percentages set forth in the report submitted under section 251(b) in determining the reductions to be specified in the order with respect to programs, projects, and activities, or with respect to budget activities, within an account . . . .” § 252(a)(3) (emphasis added). See also § 251(d)(3)(A). Congress of course initially determined the content of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act; and undoubtedly the content of the Act determines the nature of the executive duty. However, as Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly — by passing new legislation. Chadha, 462 U. S., at 968. By placing the responsibility for execution of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive function. The Constitution does not permit such intrusion. VI We now turn to the final issue of remedy. Appellants urge that rather than striking down § 251 and invalidating the significant power Congress vested in the Comptroller General to meet a national fiscal emergency, we should take the lesser course of nullifying the statutory provisions of the 1921 Act that authorizes Congress to remove the Comptroller General. At oral argument, counsel for the Comptroller General suggested that this might make the Comptroller General removable by the President. All appellants urge that Congress would prefer invalidation of the removal provisions rather than invalidation of § 261 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act. Severance at this late date of the removal provisions enacted 65 years ago would significantly alter the Comptroller General’s office, possibly by making him subservient to the Executive Branch. Recasting the Comptroller General as an officer of the Executive Branch would accordingly alter the balance that Congress had in mind in drafting the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, to say nothing of the wide array of other tasks and duties Congress has assigned the Comptroller General in other statutes. Thus appellants’ argument would require this Court to undertake a weighing of the importance Congress attached to the removal provisions in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 as well as in other subsequent enactments against the importance it placed on the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. Fortunately this is a thicket we need not enter. The language of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act itself settles the issue. In § 274(f), Congress has explicitly provided “fallback” provisions in the Act that take effect “[i]n the event. . . any of the reporting procedures described in section 251 are invalidated.” § 274(f)(1) (emphasis added). The fallback provisions are ‘“fully operative as a law/” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 108 (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210, 234 (1932)). Assuming that appellants are correct in urging that this matter must be resolved on the basis of congressional intent, the intent appears to have been for § 274(f) to be given effect in this situation. Indeed, striking the removal provisions would lead to a statute that Congress would probably have refused to adopt. As the District Court concluded: “[T]he grant of authority to the Comptroller General was a carefully considered protection against what the House conceived to be the pro-executive bias of the OMB. It is doubtful that the automatic deficit reduction process would have passed without such protection, and doubtful that the protection would have been considered present if the Comptroller General were not removable by Congress itself. . . .” 626 F. Supp., at 1394. Accordingly, rather than perform the type of creative and imaginative statutory surgery urged by appellants, our holding simply permits the fallback provisions to come into play. VII No one can doubt that Congress and the President are confronted with fiscal and economic problems of unprecedented magnitude, but “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives — or the hallmarks — of democratic government . . . .” Chadha, supra, at 944. We conclude that the District Court correctly held that the powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 violate the command of the Constitution that the Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the District Court are affirmed. Our judgment is stayed for a period not to exceed 60 days to permit Congress to implement the fallback provisions. It is so ordered. In his signing statement, the President expressed his view that the Act was constitutionally defective because of the Comptroller General’s ability to exercise supervisory authority over the President. Statement on Signing H. J. Res. 372 Into Law, 21 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1491 (1985). An individual member of the Union was later added as a plaintiff. See 475 U. S. 1094 (1986). The First Congress included 20 Members who had been delegates to the Philadelphia Convention: IN THE SENATE Richard Bassett (Delaware) Pierce Butler (South Carolina) Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut) William Few (Georgia) William Samuel Johnson (Connecticut) Rufus King (New York) John Langdon (New Hampshire) Robert Morris (Pennsylvania) William Paterson (New Jersey) George Read (Delaware) Caleb Strong (Massachusetts) IN THE HOUSE Abraham Baldwin (Georgia) Daniel Carroll (Maryland) George Clymer (Pennsylvania) Thomas FitzSimons (Pennsylvania) Elbridge Gerry (Massachusetts) Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire) James Madison (Virginia) Roger Sherman (Connecticut) Hugh Williamson (North Carolina) Appellants therefore are wide of the mark in arguing that an affirmance in this case requires easting doubt on the status of “independent” agencies because no issues involving such agencies are presented here. The statutes establishing independent agencies typically specify either that the agency members are removable by the President for specified causes, see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §41 (members of the Federal Trade Commission may be removed by the President “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”), or else do not specify a removal procedure, see, e. g.,2 U. S. C. § 437c (Federal Election Commission). This case involves nothing like these statutes, but rather a statute that provides for direct congressional involvement over the decision to remove the Comptroller General. Appellants have referred us to no independent agency whose members are removable by the Congress for certain causes short of impeachable offenses, as is the Comptroller General, see Part IV, infra. We reject appellants’ argument that consideration of the effect of a removal provision is not “ripe” until that provision is actually used. As the District Court concluded, “it is the Comptroller General’s presumed desire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress, which creates the here-and-now subservience to another branch that raises separation-of-powers problems.” Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1392 (DC 1986). The Impeachment Clause of the Constitution can hardly be thought to be undermined because of nonuse. Congress adopted this provision in 1980 because of “the special interest of both Houses in the choice of an individual whose primary function is to provide assistance to Congress.” S. Rep. No. 96-570, p. 10. Although the President could veto such a joint resolution, the veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress. Thus, the Comptroller General could be removed in the face of Presidential opposition. Like the District Court, 626 F. Supp., at 1393, n. 21, we therefore read the removal provision as authorizing removal by Congress alone. The dissent relies on Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), as its only Court authority for this point, but the President did not assert that he had removed the Federal Trade Commissioner in compliance with one of the enumerated statutory causes for removal. See id., at 612 (argument of Solicitor General Reed); see also Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp., at 1398. Since 1921, the Comptroller General has been assigned a variety of functions. See, e. g., 2 U. S. C. § 687 (1982 ed., Supp. III) (duty to bring suit to require release of impounded budget authority); 42 U. S. C. § 6384(a) (duty to impose civil penalties under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975); 15 U. S. C. § 1862 (member of Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board); 45 U. S. C. § 711(d)(1)(C) (member of Board of Directors of United States Railway Association); 31 U. S. C. §§ 3551-3556 (1982 ed., Supp. III) (authority to consider bid protests under Competition in Contracting Act of 1984). Because we conclude that the Comptroller General, as an officer removable by Congress, may not exercise the powers conferred upon him by the Act, we have no occasion for considering appellees’ other challenges to the Act, including their argument that the assignment of powers to the Comptroller General in §251 violates the delegation doctrine, see, e. g., A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MILLS v. HABLUETZEL No. 80-6298. Argued January 12, 1982 Decided April 5, 1982 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined, and in Part I of which Powell, J., joined, post, p. 102. Powell, J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment, post, p. 106. Michael E. Mankins argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Lola L. Bonner argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was John H. Flinn. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. This Court has held that once a State posits a judicially enforceable right of children to support from their natural fathers, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from denying that same right to illegitimate children. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973). In this case we are required to determine the extent to which the right of illegitimate children recognized in Gomez may be circumscribed by a State’s interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District, upheld against federal constitutional challenges the State’s one-year statute of limitation for suits to identify the natural fathers of illegitimate children. We noted probable jurisdiction. 451 U. S. 936. We begin by reviewing the history of the statute challenged by appellant. I Like all States, Texas imposes upon parents the primary responsibility for support of their legitimate children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. (Code) §§4.02, 12.04(3) (1975 and Supp. 1982). That duty extends beyond the dissolution of marriage, Code § 14.05, regardless of whether the parent has custody of the child, Hooten v. Hooten, 15 S. W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), and may be enforced on the child’s behalf in civil proceedings. Code § 14.05(a). Prior to our decision in Gomez, Texas recognized no enforceable duty on the part of a natural father to support his illegitimate children. See Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S. W. 2d 208 (Tex. 1965); Lane v. Phillips, 69 Tex. 240, 6 S. W. 610 (1887); Bjorgo v. Bjorgo, 391 S. W. 2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). A natural father could even assert illegitimacy as a defense to prosecution for criminal nonsupport. See Curtin v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 625, 238 S. W. 2d 187 (1950). Reviewing the Texas law in Gomez, we held that “a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally.” 409 U. S., at 538. “[O]nce a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers,” we stated, “there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother.” Ibid. Although we recognized that “the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity . . . are not to be lightly brushed aside,” we concluded that they did not justify “an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination.” Ibid. Accordingly, we held Texas’ denial of support rights to illegitimate children to be a denial of equal protection of law. In response to our decision in Gomez, the Texas Legislature considered legislation that would have provided illegitimate children with a cause of action to establish the paternity of their natural fathers and would have imposed upon those fathers the same duty of support owed to legitimate children. The legislature did not enact that legislation, however, choosing instead to establish a procedure by which natural fathers voluntarily could legitimate their illegitimate children and thereby take upon themselves the obligation of supporting those children. Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S. W. 2d 189, 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). No provision was made for illegitimate children to seek support from fathers who fail to support them. Not suprisingly, this legislation was found by Texas courts to be an inadequate response to Gomez. A panel of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that, because of Gomez, “[w]hen the Legislature later provided judicial relief against the father on behalf of a legitimate child for support, it necessarily provided the same relief on behalf of an illegitimate child.” In re R - V - M -, 530 S. W. 2d 921, 922-923 (1975). Only after this judicial recognition of a right to support did the Texas Legislature establish procedures for a paternity and support action on behalf of illegitimate children. Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Hernandez, supra, at 191. The rights of illegitimate children to obtain support from their biological fathers are now governed by Chapter 13 of Title 2 of the Code § 13.01 et seq. The Code recognizes that establishment of paternity is the necessary first step in all suits by illegitimate children for support from their natural fathers. See In re Miller, 605 S. W. 2d 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Delley, 581 S. W. 2d 519, 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Accordingly, Chapter 13 establishes procedures to be followed in judicial determinations of paternity and works in conjunction with other provisions of the Code to establish the duty of fathers to support their illegitimate children. See Code §§ 12.04, 14.05. Once paternity has been determined, Chapter 13 authorizes the court to order the defendant father “to make periodic payments or a lump-sum payment, or both, for the support of the child until he is 18 years of age,” Code § 14.05(a). See Code § 13.42(b). Although it granted illegitimate children the opportunity to obtain support by establishing paternity, Texas was less than generous. It significantly truncated that opportunity by the statutory provision at issue in this case, § 13.01: “A suit to establish the parent-child relationship between a child who is not the legitimate child of a man and the child’s natural father by proof of paternity must be brought before the child is one year old, or the suit is barred.” Texas views this provision as part of the substantive right accorded illegitimate children, not simply as a procedural limitation on that right. Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Hernandez, supra, at 192-193. Moreover, Texas courts have applied § 13.01 literally to mean that failure to bring suit on behalf of illegitimate children within the first year of their life “results in [their] being forever barred from the right to sue their natural father for child support, a limitation their legitimate counterparts do not share.” In re Miller, supra, at 334. Thus, in response to the constitutional requirements of Gomez, Texas has created a one-year window in its previously “impenetrable barrier,” through which an illegitimate child may establish paternity and obtain paternal support. h — t HH Appellant in this case is the mother of a child born out of wedlock in early 1977. In October 1978, she and the Texas Department of Human Resources, to which appellant had assigned the child’s support rights, brought suit on behalf of the child to establish that appellee was his natural father. Appellee answered by asserting that the action was barred by § 13.01 because the child was one year and seven months old when the suit was filed. The trial court agreed with ap-pellee and dismissed the suit. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, and discretionary review was denied by the Texas Supreme Court upon a finding of no reversible error. The Court of Civil Appeals, relying upon its decision in Texas Dept, of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S. W. 2d 189 (1980), held that the one-year limitation was not tolled during minority and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Hernandez decision in turn relied upon the constitutional analysis in Texas Dept, of Human Resources v. Chapman, 570 S. W. 2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), where another division of the Court of Civil Appeals had found that “the legitimate state interest in precluding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims” was rationally related to the one-year bar and therefore did not deny illegitimate children equal protection of the law. Id., at 49. Appellant argues that the § 13.01 bar imposes a burden on illegitimate children that is not shared by legitimate children, and that the burden is not justified by the State’s interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. In addition, appellant argues that §13.01 deprives illegitimate children of their right to support without due process of law. Because we agree with appellant’s first argument, we need not consider her second. III Our decision in Gomez held that “a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally.” 409 U. S., at 538. Specifically, we held that a State which grants an opportunity for legitimate children to obtain paternal support must also grant that opportunity to illegitimate children. If Gomez and the equal protection principles which underlie it are to have any meaning, it is clear that the support opportunity provided by the State to illegitimate children must be more than illusory. The period for asserting the right to support must be sufficiently long to permit those who normally have an interest in such children to bring an action on their behalf despite the difficult personal, family, and financial circumstances that often surround the birth of a child outside of wedlock. It would hardly satisfy the demands of equal protection and the holding of Gomez to remove an “impenetrable barrier” to support, only to replace it with an opportunity so truncated that few could utilize it effectively. The fact that Texas must provide illegitimate children with a bona fide opportunity to obtain paternal support does not mean, however, that it must adopt procedures for illegitimate children that are coterminous with those accorded legitimate children. Paternal support suits on behalf of illegitimate children contain an element that such suits for legitimate children do not contain: proof of paternity. Such proof is often sketchy and strongly contested, frequently turning upon conflicting testimony from only two witnesses. Indeed, the problems of proving paternity have been recognized repeatedly by this Court. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U. S. 347, 357, 361 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259, 269 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 772 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S., at 538. Therefore, in support suits by illegitimate children more than in support suits by legitimate children, the State has an interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims, and may impose greater restrictions on the former than it imposes on the latter. Such restrictions will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest. See Lalli v. Lalli, supra, at 265; Trimble v. Gordon, supra, at 767; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 510 (1976). The State’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims will justify those periods of limitation that are sufficiently long to present a real threat of loss or diminution of evidence, or an increased vulnerability to fraudulent claims. The equal protection analysis in this case, therefore, focuses on two related requirements. First, the period for obtaining support granted by Texas to illegitimate children must be sufficiently long in duration to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related to the State’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Applying these two requirements to the one-year right granted by Texas, we find a denial of equal protection. By granting illegitimate children only one year in which to establish paternity, Texas has failed to provide them with an adequate opportunity to obtain support. Paternity suits in Texas “may be brought by any person with an interest in the child,” Code § 11.03, but during the child’s early years will often be brought by the mother. It requires little experience to appreciate the obstacles to such suits that confront unwed mothers during the child’s first year. Financial difficulties caused by childbirth expenses or a birth-related loss of income, continuing affection for the child’s father, a desire to avoid disapproval of family and community, or the emotional strain and confusion that often attend the birth of an illegitimate child all encumber a mother’s filing of a paternity suit within 12 months of birth. Even if the mother seeks public financial assistance and assigns the child’s support claim to the State, it is not improbable that 12 months would elapse without the filing of a claim. Several months could pass before a mother finds the need to seek such assistance, takes steps to obtain it, and is willing to join the State in litigation against the natural father. A sense of the inadequacy of this one-year period is accentuated by a realization that failure to file within 12 months “results in illegitimates being forever barred from the right to sue their natural father for child support,” In re Miller, 605 S. W. 2d, at 334, while legitimate children may seek such support at any time until the age of 18. Moreover, this unrealistically short time limitation is not substantially related to the State’s interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. In Gomez we recognized that the problems of proof in paternity suits “are not to be lightly brushed aside,” but held that such problems do not justify a complete denial of support rights to illegitimate children. 409 U. S., at 538. Neither do they justify a period of limitation which so restricts those rights as effectively to extinguish them. We can conceive of no evidence essential to paternity suits that invariably will be lost in only one year, nor is it evident that the passage of 12 months will appreciably increase the likelihood of fraudulent claims. Accordingly, we conclude that the one-year period for establishing paternity denies illegitimate children in Texas the equal protection of law. The judgment of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. Since the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision in this ease, the Texas Legislature has amended § 13.01 to increase to four years the period for asserting paternity claims. 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 674, § 2, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 13.01 (Supp. 1982). Appellee argues that this amendment renders appellant’s claim moot, or at least requires a remand so that the Texas courts can determine whether the amendment is retroactive. We disagree. The case is not moot because § 13.01, as applied by the courts below, continues to stand as a bar to appellant’s assertion of a paternity claim against appellee. At the filing of appellant’s claim the child was more than one year old, and on September 1, 1981, the effective date of the amendment, the child was more than four years old. It seems probable that the amendment would not be applied retroactively by Texas courts. “It is well established law in Texas that after a cause of action has become barred by a statute of limitation, the defendant has a vested right to rely on the statute as a defense, and the state legislature cannot divest the defendant of this right by thereafter lifting the bar of limitation which had accrued in favor of the defendant. Any statute that had such an effect would be considered a retroactive law violative of Article 1, sec. 16 of the Constitution of the State of Texas.” Penry v. Wm. Barr, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 126, 128 (ED Tex. 1976) (citations omitted). See also Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S. W. 249 (1887); Brant- ley v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 536 S. W. 2d 72, 74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State, 380 S. W. 2d 123, 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Prior to filing this support suit against appellee, appellant sought financial assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. As conditions to eligibility for such assistance, appellant was required “to assign the State any rights to support” held by the child, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(A), and “to cooperate with the State ... in establishing the paternity of [the] child born out of wedlock with respect to whom aid [was] claimed.” 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(B)(i). The decisions of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court are not officially reported. Appellant contends that time limitations on the right of illegitimate children to prove paternity would never be justified by the State’s desire to avoid litigation of stale or fraudulent claims because “[t]he interests of the state, and those of the alleged father, to prevent incorrect claims of paternity are . . . protected by the recent advance in blood and genetic testing.” Brief for Appellant 29. We previously have recognized that blood tests are highly probative in proving paternity, Little v. Streater, 452 U. S. 1, 6-8 (1981), but disagree with appellant’s contention that their existence negates the State’s interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. Traditional blood tests do not prove paternity. They prove nonpater-nity, excluding from the class of possible fathers a high percentage of the general male population. H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 123-136 (1971). Thus, the fact that a certain male is not excluded by these tests does not prove that he is the child’s natural father, only that he is a member of the limited class of possible fathers. More recent developments in the field of blood testing have sought not only to “prove nonpater-nity” but also to predict paternity with a high degree of probability. See Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. Fam. L. 543 (1978). The proper evidentiary weight to be given to these techniques is still a matter of academic dispute. See, e. g., Jaffee, Comment on the Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and Other Statistical Evidence: Response to Terasaki, 17 J. Fam. L. 457 (1979). Whatever evidentiary rule the courts of a particular State choose to follow, if the blood test evidence does not exclude a certain male, he must thereafter turn to more conventional forms of proof — evidence of lack of access to the mother, his own testimony, the testimony of others— to prove that, although not excluded by the blood test, he is not in fact the child’s father. As to this latter form of proof, the State clearly has an interest in litigating claims while the evidence is relatively fresh. This interest is particularly real under Texas procedures. Texas law requires that putative fathers submit to blood tests. Code § 13.02. Refusal to submit to the tests may result in a citation for contempt, Code § 13.02(b), and may be introduced to the jury as evidence that the putative father has not been biologically excluded from the class of possible fathers. Code § 13.06(d). The results of the blood tests are introduced at a pretrial conference held for the purpose of dismissing the complaint if the father has been excluded by the tests from the class of possible fathers. Code §§ 13.04,13.05(a). Thus, the only paternity cases which actually go to trial in Texas are those in which the putative father has refused to submit to blood tests or has not been excluded by their results, cases in which conventional types of evidence are of paramount importance. Lalli v. Lalli and Trimble v. Gordon involved the right of illegitimate children to inherit from their natural fathers, while Mathews v. Lucas involved the right of illegitimate children to receive social security benefits. There is no reason to think that the factual differences between those cases and the present case call for a variation of the general principle which those cases have laid down. In Lucas the Court expressly relied on Gomez v. Perez in reaching its result. 427 U. S., at 507. And in Lalli the requirement imposed by New York law for an illegitimate child to inherit from its natural father was that the paternity of the father be declared in a judicial proceeding sometime before his death. 439 U. S., at 263. Thus, even those of our eases which have dealt with entitlement to government benefits, or with the intestate distribution of a natural father’s property, have frequently involved support orders or adjudications of paternity as a means for establishing the entitlement or the right there sought. See n. 2, supra. The Texas Family Code imposes no period of limitation on the right of a legitimate child to obtain support from its father, a right which lasts until the child is 18 years old. § 14.05(a). Although Texas law includes a 4-year limitations period applicable to “[ejvery action ... for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed,” Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art., 5529 (Vernon 1982), the running of that period is tolled during minority. Art. 5535. See also In re Miller, 605 S. W. 2d, at 334. Appellee contends that the one-year limitation of § 13.01 also is justified by the State’s “interest in the continuation of the institutions of family and marriage” and the avoidance of any state actions that would “discourage either institution or . . . encourage persons to have children out of wedlock.” Brief for Appellee 21. Important as such a state interest might be, we have repeatedly held that “imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.” Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972). See also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S., at 265; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S., at 769-770; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S., at 505. The restrictions imposed by States to control problems of proof, like the restriction imposed by Texas in this case, often take the form of statutes of limitation. “Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. . . . They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost.” Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 314 (1945). Because such statutes “are by definition arbitrary,” ibid., they are best left to legislative determination and control. Normally, therefore, States are free to set periods of limitation without fear of violating some provision of the Constitution. In this case, however, the limitation period enacted by the Texas Legislature has the unusual effect of emasculating a right which the Equal Protection Clause requires the State to provide to illegitimate children.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 530. Argued April 24-25, 1956. Decided June 4, 1956. Kurt L. Hanslowe argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Harold A. Cranefield, Max Raskin and Redmond H. Roche, Jr. Beatrice Lampert, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, appellee. With her on the brief were Vernon W. Thomson, Attorney General, and Stewart G. Honeck, Deputy Attorney General. Jerome Powell argued the cause for the Kohler Company, appellee. With him on the brief were John C. Gall, John F. Lane, William F. Howe and Lyman C. Conger. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by John Ben Shepperd, Attorney General, and Burnell Wald-rep, Philip Sanders and John Atchison, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Texas, and E. R. Callister, Attorney General, and Raymond W. Gee, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Utah, and Eugene Cook, Attorney General, for the State of Georgia. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, as stated in the brief for the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, presents the question whether or not a State may enjoin through its labor statute, the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, union conduct of a kind which may be an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Appellant concedes that a State may punish violence arising in labor relation controversies under its generally applicable criminal statutes. It does not admit or deny the charged violence. The union considers the coercion immaterial in this case. Its position is that a State may not exercise this police power through an agency that is concerned only with labor relations. The argument is that a State Board will use this power to stop force and violence in order to further state labor policy, thus creating a conflict with the federal policy as developed by the National Labor Relations Board. The union argues that Wisconsin has no jurisdiction to enjoin the alleged conduct under its labor act because such conduct would be an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act. This controversy arose out of the failure of appellant and the Kohler Company to reach an accord concerning a new collective-bargaining agreement. As the parties were unable to agree, Kohler’s production workers struck and picketed the premises of the company. Ten days later Kohler filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board charging appellant and others with committing unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act. It was alleged that appellant’s members had engaged in mass picketing, thereby obstructing ingress to and egress from the Kohler plant; interfered with the free and uninterrupted use of public ways; prevented persons desiring to be employed by Kohler from entering the plant; and coerced employees who desired to work, and threatened them and their families with physical injury. The State Board found the allegations to be true and issued an order that directed the union and certain of its members to cease all such activities. The order appears below. Without change of substance it was enforced by a Wisconsin Circuit Court, and the State Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. 269 Wis. 578, 70 N. W. 2d 191. As the appeal raised an important question of federalism, we noted probable jurisdiction. 350 U. S. 957. The Kohler Company is subject to the National Labor Relations Act. It seems agreed, and we think correctly in view of the findings of fact, that the alleged conduct of the union in coercing employees in the exercise of their rights is a violation of §8 (b)(1) of that Act. Since there is power under the Act to protect employees against violence from labor organizations by assuring their right to refrain from concerted labor activities, the National Labor Board might have issued an order similar to that of the State Board. The provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, cover the labor relations of the Kohler Company. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 31. These provisions may be assumed to include the coercion not only of strikers but also of other persons seeking employment with the plant. By virtue of the Commerce Clause, Congress has power to regulate all labor controversies in or affecting interstate commerce, such as are here involved. If the congressional enactment occupies the field, its control by the Supremacy Clause supersedes or, in the current phrase, pre-empts state power. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1, 9. In the 1935 Act, § 10 (a), the Board was empowered to prevent unfair labor practices. By § 10 (a) this power was made “exclusive.” 49 Stat. 449, 453, 29 U. S. C. § 160. In the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, the word “exclusive” was omitted but the phrase, “shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise,” was re-enacted without significant change. The omission was explained in the Conference Report. Yet under the 1935 Wagner Act this Court ruled that Wisconsin, under its same Labor Peace Act, could enjoin union conduct of the kind here involved. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740. At that time, however, the federal Act made no provision for enjoining union activities. With the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the Congress recognized that labor unions also might commit unfair labor practices to the detriment of employees, and prohibited, among other practices, coercion of employees who wish to refrain from striking. See n. 5, supra. Appellant urges that this amendment eliminated the State’s power to control the activities now under consideration through state labor statutes. It seems obvious that §8 (b)(1) was not to be the exclusive method of controlling violence even against employees, much less violence interfering with others approaching an area where a strike was in progress. No one suggests that such violence is beyond state criminal power. The Act does not have such regulatory pervasiveness. The state interest in law and order precludes such interpretation. Senator Taft explained that the federal prohibition against union violence would allow state action. Appellant is of the view that such references were “to the general state criminal law against violence and coercion, not to state labor relations statutes.” But this cannot be correct since Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, the leading case dealing with violence under this same Wisconsin statute, was well known to Congress. The fact that the Labor Management Relations Act covered union unfair practices for the first time does not make the Allen-Bradley case obsolete. Orders which originate in state boards and become effective through the state judiciary should give more careful protection to the rights of labor than the purely judicial orders of a court. There is no reason to re-examine the opinions in which this Court has dealt with problems involving federal-state jurisdiction over industrial controversies. They have been adequately summarized in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 474-477. As a general matter we have held that a State may not, in the furtherance of its public policy, enjoin conduct “which has been made an ‘unfair labor practice’ under the federal statutes.” Id., at 475, and cases cited. But our post-Taft-Hartley opinions have made it clear that this general rule does not take from the States power to prevent mass picketing, violence, and overt threats of violence. The dominant interest of the State in preventing violence and property damage cannot be questioned. It is a matter of genuine local concern. Nor should the fact that a union commits a federal unfair labor practice while engaging in violent conduct prevent States from taking steps to stop the violence. This conclusion has been explicit in the opinions cited in note 12. The States are the natural guardians of the public against violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from the fear and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction. We would not interpret an act of Congress to leave them powerless to avert such emergencies without compelling directions to that effect. We hold that Wisconsin may enjoin the violent union conduct here involved. The fact that Wisconsin has chosen to entrust its power to a labor board is of no concern to this Court. Affirmed. The question presented is narrowed by appellant in another paragraph to apply only to instances, as here, where the National Board, has asserted jurisdiction over certain other labor practices arising from the same employer-union relationship. These proceedings include a plea by the employer that the state-enjoined union conduct constitutes a defense to a union charge filed with the Board. Appellant also asserted that the State should act only after the Board has passed upon the pending union complaint. In view of our disposition of this appeal, we do not consider these narrower issues material. Wisconsin Statutes, 1953, c. Ill, p. 1903. § 111.04, p. 1905: “111.04 Rights of employes. Employes shall have the right of self-organization and the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in lawful, concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and such employes shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities.” §111.06 (2), p.1907: “ (2) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employe individually or in concert with others: “(a) To coerce or intimidate an employe in the enjoyment of his legal rights, including those guaranteed in section 111.04, or to intimidate his family, picket his domicile, or injure the person or property of such employe or his family. “(f) To hinder or prevent, by mass picketing, threats, intimidation, force or coercion of any kind the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance to or egress from any place of employment, or to obstruct or interfere with free and uninterrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, railways, airports, or other ways of travel or conveyance.” §111.07, p. 1908: “111.07 Prevention of unfair labor practices. (1) Any controversy concerning unfair labor practices may be submitted to the board in the manner and with the effect provided in this subchapter, but nothing herein shall prevent the pursuit of legal or equitable relief in courts of competent jurisdiction.” “It is ordered that the Respondent Unions, their officers, members and agents immediately cease and desist from “1. Coercing and intimidating any person desiring to be employed by the Kohler Company in the enjoyment of his legal rights, intimidating his family, picketing his domicile, or injuring the person or property of such persons or his employe. “2. Hindering or preventing by mass picketing, threats, intimidation, force or coercion of any kind the pursuit of lawful work or employment by any person desirous of being employed by the Kohler Company. “3. Obstructing or interfering in any way with entrance to and egress from the premises of the Kohler Company. “4. Obstructing or interfering with the free and uninterrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, railways or private drives leading to the premises of the Kohler Company. “It is further ordered that the Respondent Unions, their officers, members and agents take the following affirmative action: “1. Limit the number of pickets around the Kohler Company premises to a total of not more than 200, with not more than 25 at any one entrance. Such pickets are to march in single file and to at all times maintain a space of at least 20 feet in width at each entrance to the Kohler Company premises over which pickets will not pass and on which persons either on foot or in conveyance may freely enter or leave the premises without interference.” The legal problems have received considerable attention in recent years. A collection of available articles appears in Note, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 602. See also Further Comments on Federalism, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 540; Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal versus State Jurisdiction, 42 A. B. A. J. 415. “Sec. 8. . . . “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 . . . .” 61 Stat. 136, 141, 29 U. S. C. §158 (b)(1); “Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .” 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. §157. Cf. In the Matter of Local #1150, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 84 N. L. R. B. 972; In the Matter of Perry Norvell Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 225; United Mine Workers of America, District 2, 96 N. L. R. B. 1389. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 182, First. Cf. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 120, I. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52: “(1) The House bill omitted from section 10 (a) of the existing law the language providing that the Board’s power to deal with unfair labor practices should not be affected by other means of adjustment or prevention, but it retained the language of the present act which makes the Board’s jurisdiction exclusive. The Senate amendment, because of its provisions authorizing temporary injunctions enjoining alleged unfair labor practices and because of its provisions making unions suable, omitted the language giving the Board exclusive jurisdiction of unfair labor practices, but retained that which provides that the Board’s power shall not be affected by other means of adjustment or prevention. The conference agreement adopts the provisions of the Senate amendment. By retaining the language which provides the Board’s powers under section 10 shall not be affected by other means of adjustment, the conference agreement makes clear that, when two remedies exist, one before the Board and one before the courts, the remedy before the Board shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, other remedies.” United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U. S. 656, 666-669, a state case that allowed tort recovery, makes this clear. 93 Cong. Rec. 4437: “The Senator from Oregon a while ago said that the enactment of this proposed legislation will result in duplication of some of the State laws. It will duplicate some of the State laws only to the extent, as I see it, that actual violence is involved in the threat or in the operation. “Mr. President, I may say further that one of the arguments has suggested that in ease this provision covered violence it duplicated State law. I wish to point out that the provisions agreed to by the committee covering unfair labor practices on the part of labor unions also might duplicate to some extent that State law. Secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes, and so forth, may involve some violation of State law respecting violence which may be criminal, and so to some extent the measure may be duplicating the remedy existing under State law. But that, in my opinion, is no valid argument.” See also 93 Cong. Rec. 4024; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50. There it was said: “The only employee or union conduct and activity forbidden by the state Board in this case was mass picketing, threatening employees desiring to work with physical injury or property damage, obstructing entrance to and egress from the company's factory, obstructing the streets and public roads surrounding the factory, and picketing the homes of employees. So far as the fourteen individuals are concerned, their status as employees of the company was not affected. “We agree with the statement of the United States as amicus curiae that the federal Act was not designed to preclude a State from enacting legislation limited to the prohibition or regulation of this type of employee or union activity. The Committee Reports on the federal Act plainly indicate that it is not ‘a mere police court measure’ and that authority of the several States may be exerted to control such conduct. Furthermore, this Court has long insisted that an 'intention of Congress to exclude States from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested.’. . . Congress has not made such employee and union conduct as is involved in this case subject to regulation by the federal Board.” 315 U. S. 740, 748-749. See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 477, 482; United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U. S. 656, 666-669; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 488; International Union v. O’Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 459; International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 245, 253. Cf. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 467; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470, 479.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FOLEY v. CONNELIE, SUPERINTENDENT OF NEW YORK STATE POLICE, et al. No. 76-839. Argued November 8, 1977 Decided March 22, 1978 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 300. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 300. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 302. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 307. Jonathan A. Weiss argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was David S. Preminger. Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General. Vilma S. Martinez and Morris J. Baller filed a brief for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We noted probable jurisdiction in this case to consider whether a State may constitutionally limit the appointment of members of its police force to citizens of the United States. 430 U. S. 944 (1977). The appellant, Edmund Foley, is an alien eligible in due course to become a naturalized citizen, who is lawfully in this country as a permanent resident. He applied for appointment as a New York State trooper, a position which is filled on the basis of competitive examinations. Pursuant to a New York statute, N. Y. Exec. Law § 215 (3) (McKinney 1972), state authorities refused to allow Foley to take the examination. The statute provides: “No person shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States.” Appellant then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking a declaratory judgment that the State’s exclusion of aliens from its police force violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After Foley was certified as representative of a class of those similarly situated, a three-judge District Court was convened to consider the merits of the claim. The District Court held the statute to be constitutional. 419 F. Supp. 889 (1976). We affirm. I The essential facts in this case are uncontroverted. New York Exec. Law § 215 ,(3) (McKinney 1972) prohibits appellant and his class from becoming state troopers. It is not disputed that the State has uniformly complied with this restriction since the statute was enacted in 1927. Under it, an alien who desires to compete for a position as a New York State trooper must relinquish his foreign citizenship and become an American citizen. Some members of the class, including appellant, are not currently eligible for American citizenship due to waiting periods imposed by congressional enactment. A trooper in New York is a member of the state police force, a law enforcement body which exercises broad police authority throughout the State. The powers of troopers are generally described in the relevant statutes as including those functions traditionally associated with a peace officer. Like most peace officers, they are charged with the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of suspected criminals, investigation of suspect conduct, execution of warrants and have powers of search, seizure and arrest without a formal warrant under limited circumstances. In the course of carrying out these responsibilities an officer is empowered by New York law to resort to lawful force, which may include the use of any weapon that he is required to carry while on duty. All troopers are on call 24 hours a day and are required to take appropriate action whenever criminal activity is observed. Perhaps the best shorthand description of the role of the New York State trooper was that advanced by the District Court: “State police are charged with the enforcement of the law, not in a private profession and for the benefit of themselves and their clients, but for the benefit of the people at large of the State of New York.” 419 F. Supp., at 896. II Appellant claims that the relevant New York statute violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. The decisions of this Court with regard to the rights of aliens living in our society have reflected fine, and often difficult, questions of values. As a Nation we exhibit extraordinary hospitality to those who come to our country, which is not surprising for we have often been described as “a nation of immigrants.” Indeed, aliens lawfully residing in this society have many rights which are accorded to noncitizens by few other countries. Our cases generally reflect a close scrutiny of restraints imposed by States on aliens. But we have never suggested that such legislation is inherently invalid, nor have we held that all limitations on aliens are suspect. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 648 (1973). Rather, beginning with a case which involved the denial of welfare assistance essential to life itself, the Court has treated certain restrictions on aliens with “heightened judicial solicitude,” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971), a treatment deemed necessary since aliens — pending their eligibility for citizenship — have no direct voice in the political processes. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938). Following Graham, a series of decisions has resulted requiring state action to meet close scrutiny to exclude aliens as a class from educational benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1 (1977); eligibility for a broad range of public employment, Sugarman v. Dougall, supra; or the practice of licensed professions, Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973). These exclusions struck at the noncitizens’ ability to exist in the community, a position seemingly inconsistent with the congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent residence. See Graham, supra, at 377-378; Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications — A More Modest Role For Equal Protection?, 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 89, 101. It would be inappropriate, however, to require every statutory exclusion of aliens to clear the high hurdle of "strict scrutiny,” because to do so would “obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.” Mauclet, supra, at 14 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). The act of becoming a citizen is more than a ritual with no content beyond the fanfare of ceremony. A new citizen has become a member of a Nation, part of a people distinct from others. Cf. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832). The individual, at that point, belongs to the polity and is entitled to participate in the processes of democratic decisionmaking. Accordingly, we have recognized “a State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions,” Dougall, supra, at 648, as part of the sovereign’s obligation “ 'to preserve the basic conception of a political community.’ ” 413 U. S., at 647. The practical consequence of this theory is that ''our scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters firmly within a State’s constitutional prerogatives.” Dougall, supra, at 648. The State need only justify its classification by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification. This is not intended to denigrate the valuable contribution of aliens who benefit from our traditional hospitality. It is no more than recognition of the fact that a democratic society is ruled by its people. Thus, it is clear that a State may deny aliens the right to vote, or to run for elective office, for these lie at the heart of our political institutions. See 413 U. S., at 647-649. Similar considerations support a legislative determination to exclude aliens from jury service. See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff’d, 426 U. S. 913 (1976). Likewise, we have recognized that citizenship may be a relevant qualification for fulfilling those ''important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions,” held by “officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.” Dougall, supra, at 647. This is not because our society seeks to reserve the better jobs to its members. Rather, it is because this country entrusts many of its most important policy responsibilities to these officers, the discretionary exercise of which can often more immediately affect the lives of citizens than even the ballot of a voter or the choice of a legislator. In sum, then, it represents the choice, and right, of the people to be governed by their citizen peers. To effectuate this result, we must necessarily examine each position in question to determine whether it involves discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which substantially affects members of the political community. The essence of our holdings to date is that although we extend to aliens the right to education and public welfare, along with the ability to earn a livelihood and engage in licensed professions, the right to govern is reserved to citizens. Ill A discussion of the police function is essentially a description of one of the basic functions of government, especially in a complex modern society where police presence is pervasive. The police function fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency. Police officers in the ranks do not formulate policy, per se, but they are clothed with authority to exercise an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers. The execution of the broad powers vested in them affects members of the public significantly and often in the most sensitive areas of daily life. Our Constitution, of course, provides safeguards to persons, homes and possessions, as well as guidance to police officers. And few countries, if any, provide more protection to individuals by limitations on the power and discretion of the police. Nonetheless, police may, in the exercise of their discretion, invade the privacy of an individual in public places, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). They may under some conditions break down a door to enter a dwelling or other building in the execution of a warrant, e. g., Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301 (1958), or without a formal warrant in very limited circumstances; they may stop vehicles traveling on public highways, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977). An arrest, the function most commonly associated with the police, is a serious matter for any person even when no prosecution follows or when an acquittal is obtained. Most arrests are without prior judicial authority, as when an officer observes a criminal act in progress or suspects that felonious activity is afoot. Even the routine traffic arrests made by the state trooper — for speeding, weaving, reckless driving, improper license plates, absence of inspection stickers, or dangerous physical condition of a vehicle, to describe only a few of the more obvious common violations — can intrude on the privacy of the individual. In stopping cars, they may, within limits, require a driver or passengers to disembark and even search them for weapons, depending on time, place and circumstances. That this prophylactic authority is essential is attested by the number of police officers wounded or killed in the process of making inquiry in borderline, seemingly minor violation situations — for example, where the initial stop is made for a traffic offense but, unknown to the officer at the time, the vehicle occupants are armed and engaged in or embarked on serious criminal conduct. Clearly the exercise of police authority calls for a very high degree of judgment and discretion, the abuse or misuse of which can have serious impact on individuals. The office of a policeman is in no sense one of “the common occupations of the community” that the then Mr. Justice Hughes referred to in Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915). A policeman vested with the plenary discretionary powers we have described is not to be equated with a private person engaged in routine public employment or other “common occupations of the community” who exercises no broad power over people generally. Indeed, the rationale for the qualified immunity historically granted to the police rests on the difficult and delicate judgments these officers must often make. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 555-557 (1967); cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 245-246 (1974). In short, it would be as anomalous to conclude that citizens may be subjected to the broad discretionary powers of non-citizen police officers as it would be to say that judicial officers and jurors with power to judge citizens can be aliens. It is not surprising, therefore, that most States expressly confine the employment of police officers to citizens, whom the State may reasonably presume to be more familiar with and sympathetic to American traditions. Police officers very clearly fall within the category of “important nonelective . . . officers who participate directly in the . . . execution ... of broad public policy.” Dougall, 413 U. S., at 647 (emphasis added). In the enforcement and execution of the laws the police function is one where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the particular position. A State may, therefore, consonant with the Constitution, confine the performance of this important public responsibility to citizens of the United States. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. We recognize that New York’s statute may effectively prevent some class members from .ever becoming troopers since state law limits eligibility for these positions to those between the age of 21 and 29 years. N. Y. Exec. Law §215 (3) (McKinney 1972). One indication of this attitude is Congress’ determination to malee it relatively easy for immigrants to become naturalized citizens. See 8 U. S. C. § 1427 (1976 ed.). The alien’s status is, at least for a time, beyond his control since Congress has imposed durational residency requirements for the attainment of citizenship. Federal law generally requires an alien to lawfully reside in this country for five years as a prerequisite to applying for naturalization. 8 U. S. C. § 1427 (a) (1976 ed.). In Mauclet, for example, New York State policy reflected a legislative judgment that higher education was “ ‘no longer ... a luxury; it is a necessity for strength, fulfillment and survival.’ ” 432 U. S., at 8 n. 9. This is not to say, of course, that a State may accomplish this end with a citizenship restriction that "sweeps indiscriminately,” Dougall, 413 U. S., at 643, without regard to the differences in the positions involved. See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Urban Police Function 119 (App. Draft 1973); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police 22-23 (1973); President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 10 (1967). After the event, some abuses of power may be subject to remedies by one showing injury. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). And conclusive evidence of criminal conduct may be kept from the knowledge of a jury because of police error or misconduct. Twenty-four States besides New York specifically require United States citizenship as a prerequisite for becoming a member of a statewide law enforcement agency: see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 42-406 (1964); Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 1031 (West Supp. 1978); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.13 (2) (West Supp. 1976); Ga. Code § 92A-214 (Supp. 1977); 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 121, §307.9 (1975); Ind. Rules & Regs., Tit. 10, Art. 1, ch. 1, §4-7 (1976); Iowa Code § 80.15 (1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74r-2113 (c) (Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 16.040 (2)(c) (1971); Mich. Comp. Laws §28.4 (1967); Miss. Code Ann. § 45-3-9 (Supp. 1977); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 43.060 (1969); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 31-105 (3) (a) (v) (Supp. 1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. §281.060 (1) (1975); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 106-R:20 (Supp. 1975); N. J. Stat. Ann. §53:1-9 (West Supp. 1977); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-6 (1972); N. D. Cent. Code § 39-03-04 (4) (Supp. 1977); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 181.260 (1) (a) (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 71, § 1193 (Purdon 1962); R. I. Gen. Laws § 42-28-10 (1970); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §3-7-9 and §3-1-4 (1974); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Am., Art. 4413 (9) (2) (Vernon 1976); Utah Code Ann. §27-11-11 (1976). Oklahoma requires its officers to be citizens of the State. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, § 2-105 (a) (Supp. 1976). Nine other States require American citizenship as part of a general requirement applicable to all types of state officers or employees: see Ala. Code, Tit. 36, § 2-1 (a) (1) (1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-201 (1974); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 78-1 (1976); Idaho Code § 59-101 (1976) and Idaho Const., Art. 6, § 2; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, § 556 (Supp. 1977); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, § 12 (West Supp. 1977); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.22 (1978); Tenn. Code Ann. §8-1801 (Supp. 1977); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 3, § 262 (1972); W. Va. Const., Art. 4, § 4. Police powers in many countries are exercised in ways that we would find intolerable and indeed violative of constitutional rights. To taire only one example, a large number of nations do not share our belief in the freedom of movement and travel, requiring persons to carry identification cards at all times. This, inter alia, affords a rational basis for States to require that those entrusted with the execution of the laws be individuals who, even if not native Americans, have indicated acceptance and allegiance, to our Constitution by becoming citizens. Cf. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm’n, 424 U. S. 645 (1976); Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N. W. 2d 97 (1971), dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 405 U. S. 950 (1972).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS et al. v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 06-1037. Argued January 9, 2008 Decided June 19, 2008 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Ginsburg, and Auto, JJ., joined, post, p. 150. Robert D. Klausner argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney-General of Kentucky, David Brent Irvin, Assistant Attorney General, C. Joseph Beavin, James D. Allen, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Kenneth H. Kirschner, N. Scott Lilly, William P. Hanes, and J. Eric Wampler. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Clem ent, Acting Solicitor General Garre, Ronald S. Cooper, Lorraine C. Davis, and Carolyn L. Wheeler Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Michigan et al. by Michael A Cox, Attorney General of Michigan, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Larry F. Brya, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, John Suthers of Colorado, Joseph R. Biden III of Delaware, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Gary K. King of New Mexico, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, and Greg Abbott of Texas; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Richard Ruda; for the National Association of State Retirement Administrators et al. by Robert E. Tarcza; and for the National School Boards Association by Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., and Lisa E. Soronen. Laurie A. McCann and Melvin R. Radowitz filed a brief for AARP et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The Commonwealth of Kentucky permits policemen, firemen, and other “hazardous position” workers to retire and to receive “normal retirement” benefits after either (1) working for 20 years; or (2) working for 5 years and attaining the age of 55. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 16.576,16.577(2) (Lexis 2003), 61.592(4) (Lexis Supp. 2003). It permits those who become seriously disabled but have not otherwise become eligible for retirement to retire immediately and receive “disability retirement” benefits. See § 16.582(2)(b) (Lexis 2003). And it treats some of those disabled individuals more generously than it treats some of those who became disabled only after becoming eligible for retirement on the basis of age. The question before us is whether Kentucky’s system consequently discriminates against the latter workers “because of . . . age.” Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), § 4(a)(1), 81 Stat. 603, 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). We conclude that it does not. I A Kentucky has put in place a special retirement plan (Plan) for state and county employees who occupy “[h]azardous position[sj,” e. g., active duty law enforcement officers, firefighters, paramedics, and workers in correctional systems. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.592(1)(a) (Lexis Supp. 2003). The Plan sets forth two routes through which such an employee can become eligible for what is called “normal retirement” benefits. The first makes an employee eligible for retirement after 20 years of service. The second makes an employee eligible after only 5 years of service provided that the employee has attained the age of 55. See §§ 16.576, 16.577(2), 61.592(4). An employee eligible under either route will receive a pension calculated in the same way: Kentucky multiplies years of service times 2.5% times final preretirement pay. See § 16.576(3). Kentucky’s Plan has special provisions for hazardous position workers who become disabled but are not yet eligible for normal retirement. Where such an employee has worked for five years or became disabled in the line of duty, the employee can retire at once. See §§ 16.576(1), 16.582(2) (Lexis 2003). In calculating that employee’s benefits Kentucky will add a certain number of (“imputed”) years to the employee’s actual years of service. The number of imputed years equals the number of years that the disabled employee would have had to continue working in order to become eligible for normal retirement benefits, i. e., the years necessary to bring the employee up to 20 years of service or to at least 5 years of service when the employee would turn 55 (whichever number of years is lower). See § 16.582(5)(a) (Lexis 2003). Thus, if an employee with 17 years of service becomes disabled at age 48, the Plan adds 3 years and calculates the benefits as if the employee had completed 20 years of service. If an employee with 17 years of service becomes disabled at age 54, the Plan adds 1 year and calculates the benefits as if the employee had retired at age 55 with 18 years of service. The Plan also imposes a ceiling on imputed years equal to the number of years the employee has previously worked (i. e., an employee who has worked eight years cannot receive more than eight additional imputed years), see § 16.582(5)(a); it provides for a certain minimum payment, see § 16.582(6) (Lexis 2003); and it contains various other details, none of which is challenged here. B Charles Lickteig, a hazardous position worker in the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, became eligible for retirement at age 55, continued to work, became disabled, and then retired at age 61. The Plan calculated his annual pension on the basis of his actual years of service (18 years) times 2.5% times his final annual pay. Because Lickteig became disabled after he had already become eligible for normal retirement benefits, the Plan did not impute any additional years for purposes of the calculation. Lickteig complained of age discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); and the EEOC then brought this age discrimination lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Kentucky’s Plan administrator, and other state entities (to whom we shall refer collectively as “Kentucky”). The EEOC pointed out that, if Lickteig had become disabled before he reached the age of 55, the Plan, in calculating Lickteig’s benefits, would have imputed a number of additional years. And the EEOC argued that the Plan failed to impute years solely because Lickteig became disabled after he reached age 55. The District Court, making all appropriate evidence-related assumptions in the EEOC’s favor, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56, held that the EEOC could not establish age discrimination; and it granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed that judgment. EEOC v. Jefferson Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. 424 F. 3d 467 (2005). The Sixth Circuit then granted rehearing en banc, held that Kentucky’s Plan did violate the ADEA, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 467 F. 3d 571 (2006). Kentucky sought certiorari. In light of the potentially serious impact of the Circuit’s decision upon pension benefits provided under plans in effect in many States, we granted the writ. See, e. g., Ind. Code §§ 36-8-8-13.3(b) and (c) (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 38.23 and 38.556(2)(d) (West 2005); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 135-1 and 135-5 (Lexis 2007); 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5102 and 5704 (2001 and Supp. 2007); Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-36-501(c)(3) (Supp. 2007). See also Reply Brief for Petitioners 20-21 (predicting, inter alia, large increase in pension liabilities, potential reduction in benefits for all disabled persons, or both); Brief for National Association of State Retirement Administrators et al. as Amici Curiae 8-14 (same). II The ADEA forbids an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added). In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U. S. 604 (1993), the Court explained that where, as here, a plaintiff claims age-related “disparate treatment” (i. e., intentional discrimination “because of... age”) the plaintiff must prove that age “actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Id., at 610 (emphasis added); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 141 (2000). The Court noted that “[t]he employer may have relied upon a formal, facially discriminatory policy requiring adverse treatment” because of age, or “the employer may have been motivated by [age] on an ad hoc, informal basis.” Hazen Paper, 507 U. S., at 610. But “[w]hatever the employer’s decisionmaking process,” a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment cannot succeed unless the employee’s age “actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Cf. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U. S. 228, 239-240 (2005) (plurality opinion) (describing “disparate-impact” theory, not here at issue, which focuses upon unjustified discriminatory results). In Hazen Paper, the Court considered a disparate-treatment claim that an employer had unlawfully dismissed a 62-year-old employee with over 9Vz years of service in order to avoid paying pension benefits that would have vested after 10 years. The Court held that, without more evidence of intent, the ADEA would not forbid dismissal of the claim. A dismissal based on pension status was not a dismissal “because of . . . age.” 507 U. S., at 611-612. Of course, pension status depended upon years, of service, and years of service typically go hand in hand with age. Id., at 611. But the two concepts were nonetheless “analytically distinct.” Ibid. An employer could easily “take account of one while ignoring the other.” Ibid. And the dismissal in question, if based purely upon pension status (related to years of service), would not embody the evils that led Congress to enact the ADEA in the first place: The dismissal was not based on a “prohibited stereotype” of older workers, did not produce any “attendant stigma” to those workers, and was not “the result of an inaccurate and denigrating generalization about age.” Id., at 612. At the same time, Hazen Paper indicated that discrimination on the basis of pension status could sometimes be unlawful under the ADEA, in particular where pension status served as a “proxy for age.” Id., at 613. Suppose, for example, an employer “targeted] employees with a particular pension status on the assumption that these employees are likely to be older.” Id., at 612-613. In such a case, Hazen Paper suggested, age, not pension status, would have “actually motivated” the employer’s decisionmaking. Hazen Paper also left open “the special case where an employee is about to vest in pension benefits as a result of his age, rather than years of service.” Id., at 613. We here consider a variation on this “special case” theme. Ill Kentucky’s Plan turns normal pension eligibility either upon the employee’s having attained 20 years of service alone or upon the employee’s having attained 5 years of service and reached the age of 55. The ADEA permits an employer to condition pension eligibility upon age. See 29 U. S. C. § 623(0(1)(A)(i) (2006 ed.). Thus we must decide whether a plan that (1) lawfully makes age in part a condition of pension eligibility, and (2) treats workers differently in light of their pension status, (3) automatically discriminates because of age. The Government argues “yes.” But, following Hazen Paper’s approach, we come to a different conclusion. In particular, the following circumstances, taken together, convince us that, in this particular instance, differences in treatment were not “actually motivated” by age. First, as a matter of pure logic, age and pension status remain “analytically distinct” concepts. Hazen Paper, 507 U. S., at 611. That is to say, one can easily conceive of decisions that are actually made “because of” pension status and not age, even where pension status is itself based on age. Suppose, for example, that an employer pays all retired workers a pension, retirement eligibility turns on age, say, 65, and a 70-year-old worker retires. Nothing in language or in logic prevents one from concluding that the employer has begun to pay the worker a pension, not because the worker is over 65, but simply because the worker has retired. Second, several background circumstances eliminate the possibility that pension status, though analytically distinct from age, nonetheless serves as a “proxy for age” in Kentucky’s Plan. Cf. id., at 613. We consider not an individual employment decision, but a set of complex systemwide rules. These systemic rules involve, not wages, but pensions— a benefit that the ADEA treats somewhat more flexibly and leniently in respect to age. See, e. g., 29 U. S. C. § 623(0(1)(A)(i) (explicitly allowing pension eligibility to turn on age); § 623(/)(2)(A) (allowing employer to consider (age-related) pension benefits in determining level of severance pay); § 623(0(3) (allowing employer to consider (age-related) pension benefits in determining level of long-term disability benefits). And the specific benefit at issue here is offered to all hazardous position workers on the same nondiscriminatory terms ex ante. That is to say, every such employee, when hired, is promised disability retirement benefits should he become disabled prior to the time that he is eligible for normal retirement benefits. Furthermore, Congress has otherwise approved of programs that calculate permanent disability benefits using a formula that expressly takes account of age. For example, the Social Security Administration now uses such a formula in calculating Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. § 415(b)(2)(B)(iii); 20 CFR § 404.211(e) (2007). And until (and in some cases after) 1984, federal employees received permanent disability benefits based on a formula that, in certain circumstances, did not just consider age, but effectively imputed years of service only to those disabled workers younger than 60. See 5 U. S. C. § 8339(g) (2006 ed.); see also Office of Personnel Management, Disability Retirement Under the Civil Service Retirement System, Retirement Facts 4, p. 3 (rev. Nov. 1997), online at http://www.opm.gov/forms/pdfimage/RI83-4.pdf (as visited June 16, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Third, there is a clear non-age-related rationale for the disparity here at issue. The manner in which Kentucky calculates disability retirement benefits is in every important respect but one identical to the manner in which Kentucky calculates normal retirement benefits. The one significant difference consists of the fact that the Plan imputes additional years of service to disabled individuals. But the Plan imputes only those years needed to bring the disabled worker’s years of service to 20 or to the number of years that the individual would have worked had he worked to age 55. The disability rules clearly track Kentucky’s normal retirement rules. It is obvious, then, that the whole purpose of the disability rules is, as Kentucky claims, to treat a disabled worker as though he had become disabled after, rather than before, he had become eligible for normal retirement benefits. Age factors into the disability calculation only because the normal retirement rules themselves permissibly include age as a consideration. No one seeking to help disabled workers in the way that Kentucky’s rules seek to help those workers would care whether Kentucky’s normal system turned eligibility in part upon age or upon other, different criteria. That this is so is suggested by the fact that one can readily construct a plan that produces an identical disparity but is age neutral. Suppose that Kentucky’s Plan made eligible for a pension (1) day-shift workers who have 20 years of service, and (2) night-shift workers who have 15 years of service. Suppose further that the Plan calculates the amount of the pension the same way in either case, which method of calculation depends solely upon years of service (say, giving the worker a pension equal to $1,000 for each year of service). If the Plan were then to provide workers who become disabled prior to pension eligibility the same pension the workers would have received had they worked until they became pension eligible, the Plan would create a disparity between disabled day-shift and night-shift workers: A day-shift worker who becomes disabled before becoming pension eligible would, in many instances, end up receiving a bigger pension than a night-shift worker who becomes disabled after becoming pension eligible. For example, a day-shift worker who becomes disabled prior to becoming pension eligible would receive an annual pension of $20,000, while a night-shift worker who becomes disabled after becoming pension eligible, say, after 16 years of service, would receive an annual pension of $16,000. The disparity in this example is not “actually motivated” by bias against night-shift workers. Rather, such a disparity, like the disparity in the case before us, is simply an artifact of Plan rules that treat one set of workers more generously in respect to the timing of their eligibility for normal retirement benefits but which do not treat them more generously in respect to the calculation of the amount of their normal retirement benefits. The example helps to show that the Plan at issue in this case simply seeks to treat disabled employees as if they had worked until the point at which they would be eligible for a normal pension. The disparity turns upon pension eligibility and nothing more. Fourth, although Kentucky’s Plan placed an older worker at a disadvantage in this case, in other cases, it can work to the advantage of older workers. Consider, for example, two disabled workers, one of whom is aged 45 with 10 years of service, one of whom is aged 40 with 15 years of service. Under Kentucky’s scheme, the older worker would actually get a bigger boost of imputed years than the younger worker (10 years would be imputed to the former, while only 5 years would be imputed to the latter). And that fact helps to confirm that the underlying motive is not an effort to discriminate “because of. . . age.” Fifth, Kentucky’s system does not rely on any of the sorts of stereotypical assumptions that the ADEA sought to eradicate. It does not rest on any stereotype about the work capacity of “older” workers relative to “younger” workers. See, e. g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 590 (2004) (noting that except on one point, all the findings and statements of objectives in the ADEA are “either cast in terms of the effects of age as intensifying over time, or are couched in terms that refer to ‘older’ workers, explicitly or implicitly relative to ‘younger’ ones” (emphasis added)). The Plan does assume that all disabled workers would have worked to the point at which they would have become eligible for a pension. It also assumes that no disabled worker would have continued working beyond the point at which he was both (1) disabled and (2) pension eligible. But these “assumptions” do not involve age-related stereotypes, and they apply equally to all workers, regardless of age. Sixth, the nature of the Plan’s eligibility requirements means that, unless Kentucky were severely to cut the benefits given to disabled workers who are not yet pension eligible (which Kentucky claims it will do if its present Plan is unlawful), Kentucky would have to increase the benefits available to disabled, pension-eligible workers, while lacking any clear criteria for determining how many extra years to impute for those pension-eligible workers who already are 55 or older. The difficulty of finding a remedy that can both correct the disparity and achieve the Plan’s legitimate objective — providing each disabled worker with a sufficient retirement benefit, namely, the normal retirement benefit that the worker would receive if he were pension eligible at the time of disability — further suggests that this objective and not age “actually motivated” the Plan. The above factors all taken together convince us that the Plan does not, on its face, create treatment differences that are “actually motivated” by age. And, for present purposes, we accept the District Court’s finding that the Government has pointed to no additional evidence that might permit a factfinder to reach a contrary conclusion. See App. 28-30. It bears emphasizing that our opinion in no way unsettles the rule that a statute or policy that facially discriminates based on age suffices to show disparate treatment under the ADEA. We are dealing today with the quite special case of differential treatment based on pension status, where pension status — with the explicit blessing of the ADEA — itself turns, in part, on age. Further, the rule we adopt today for dealing with this sort of case is clear: Where an employer adopts a pension plan that includes age as a factor, and that employer then treats employees differently based on pension status, a plaintiff, to state a disparate-treatment claim under the ADEA, must come forward with sufficient evidence to show that the differential treatment was “actually motivated” by age, not pension status. And our discussion of the factors that lead us to conclude that the Government has failed to make the requisite showing in this case provides an indication of what a plaintiff might show in other cases to meet his burden of proving that differential treatment based on pension status is in fact discrimination “because of” age. IV The Government makes two additional arguments. First, it looks for support to an amendment that Congress made to the ADEA after this Court’s decision in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158 (1989). In Betts, the employer denied a worker disability benefits on the ground that its bona fide benefit program provided disability benefits only to workers who became disabled prior to age 60, and the worker in that case became disabled at age 61. Id., at 163. The ADEA at that time exempted from its prohibitions employment decisions taken pursuant to the terms of “ ‘any bona fide employee benefit plan . . . which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act.” Id., at 161 (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(2) (1982 ed.)). And the Court held that the employer’s decision fell within that exception. 492 U. S., at 182. Subsequently Congress amended the ADEA to make clear that it covered age-based discrimination in respect to all employee benefits. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, § 102, 104 Stat. 978, 29 U. S. C. § 630(0 (2000 ed.). Congress replaced the “not a subterfuge” exception with a provision stating that age-based disparities in the provision of benefits are lawful only when they are justified in respect to cost savings. Id., at 978-979, 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i). We agree with the Government that the amendment broadened the field of employer actions subject to antidiscrimination rules and it narrowed the statutorily available justifications for age-related differences. But these facts cannot help the Government here. We do not dispute that ADEA prohibitions apply to the Plan at issue, and our basis for finding the Plan lawful does not rest upon amendment-related justifications. Rather, we find that the discrimination is not “actually motivated” by age. Thus Hazen Paper, not Betts, provides relevant precedent. And the amendment cited by the Government is beside the point. Second, the Government says that we must defer to a contrary EEOC interpretation contained in an EEOC regulation and compliance manual. The regulation, however, says only that providing “the same level of benefits to older workers as to younger workers” does not violate the Act. 29 CFR § 1625.10(a)(2) (2007). The Government’s interpretation of this language is not entitled to deference because, on its face, the regulation “does little more than restate the terms of the statute itself.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 257 (2006) (denying deference to an agency interpretation of its own regulation in light of the “near equivalence” of the statute and regulation). The compliance manual provides more explicitly that benefits are not “equal” insofar as a plan “reduces or eliminates benefits based on a criterion that is explicitly defined (in whole or in part) by age.” 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 3, p. 627:0004 (2001) (bold typeface deleted). And the compliance manual further provides that “[biasing disability retirement benefits on the number of years a disabled employee would have worked until normal retirement age by definition gives more constructive years of service to younger than to older employees” and thus violates the Act. See id., at 627:0010. These statements, while important, cannot lead us to a different conclusion. See National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U. S. 101, 111, n. 6 (2002) (noting that compliance manuals are “‘“entitled to respect” under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)’ ”); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 587 (2000). Following Hazen Paper, we interpret the Act as requiring a showing that the discrimination at issue “actually motivated” the employer’s decision. Given the reasons set forth in Part III, supra, we conclude that evidence of that motivation was lacking here. And the EEOC’s statement in the compliance manual that it automatically reaches a contrary conclusion—a statement that the manual itself makes little effort to justify—lacks the necessary “power to persuade” us. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). y The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF INCOME MAINTENANCE v. HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al. No. 83-2136. Argued March 27, 1985 Decided May 20, 1985 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Charles A. Miller argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, Donald M. Longley, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael A. Roth. Kathryn A. Oberly argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, and Howard S. Scher. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, James C. O’Connell and Barbara L. Greenspan, Special Assistant Attorneys General, John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Thomas E. Warriner, Assistant Attorney General, Elisabeth C. Brandt, Deputy Attorney General, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Beverly Jones Heydinger, Assistant Attorney General; for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Thomas A. Bamico and William L. Pardee, Assistant Attorneys General; and for the American Psychiatric Association et al. by Joel I. Klein, Paul M. Smith, and R. Emmett Poundstone III. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Services performed for patients between the ages of 21 and 65 in an “institution for mental diseases” (IMD) are not covered by the Medicaid Act. The Secretary of Health and Human Services has adopted a definition of that term that is broad enough to encompass an “intermediate care facility” (ICF). The Middletown Haven Rest Home is an ICF that provides care for persons with mental illness as well as other diseases. The narrow question presented by this case is whether Middletown Haven is an IMD within the meaning of the Act. The broader question is whether the Secretary’s definition of an IMD, which permits an ICF to be classified as an IMD, is consistent with the intent of Congress. During the period between January 1977 and September 1979, the State of Connecticut paid Middletown Haven for the services it provided to Medicaid eligible patients, including those between the ages of 21 and 65 who had been transferred to Middletown Haven from state mental hospitals. Under the Medicaid program, the State received federal reimbursement of $1,634,655 for those payments. After receiving information that Connecticut was discharging large numbers of mental patients from state mental institutions into ICFs and skilled nursing facilities, and after numerous meetings with state officials, the Department of Health and Human Services selected Middletown Haven, which is certified by the State as an ICF, for review and audit. The Department believed that the State was receiving federal financial aid in violation of applicable regulations that prohibited aid to IMDs. Middletown Haven is a privately owned, 180-bed facility that is licensed by the Connecticut State Department of Health as a “Rest Home with Nursing Supervision” with authority “to care for persons with certain psychiatric conditions.” During the years 1977-1979 over 77% of its patients suffered from a major mental illness, and over half of its patients were transferees from state mental hospitals. Middletown Haven employed a professional staff, including three psychiatrists, that specialized in the care of the mentally ill; they viewed it as a psychiatric facility. In sum, there was ample evidence for the review team’s conclusion that Middletown was “primarily engaged” in providing diagnostic treatment and care for persons with mental diseases within the meaning of the applicable regulations. After the completion of its audit, the Department gave notice to the State that the federal reimbursement of $1,634,655 was not allowable because Middletown Haven had been identified as an IMD and because payments for services to the mentally ill between the ages of 21 and 65 in IMDs were not eligible for federal financial participation. The State’s request for administrative review of the disallowance decision was consolidated with similar requests by the States of Illinois, Minnesota, and California. The Department’s Grant Appeals Board upheld the disallowance. The State then obtained judicial review by filing this action. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that the Secretary’s decision was not supported by the statute and set aside the disallowance. Connecticut v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 1077 (1983). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 731 F. 2d 1052 (1984), expressly rejecting the contrary reasoning of the Eighth Circuit. See Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F. 2d 852 (1983). The square conflict on an important question of statutory construction prompted us to grant certiorari. 469 U. S. 929 (1984). Connecticut contends that the same institution cannot be both an “institution for mental diseases” and an “intermediate care facility”; in other words, IMDs and ICFs are mutually exclusive categories. Because the Secretary acknowledges that Middletown Haven is an ICF, the State concludes that it cannot be an IMD. In our view, however, the State’s position is foreclosed by the plain language of the statute, by the Secretary’s reasonable and longstanding interpretation of the Act, and by the Act’s legislative history. We therefore affirm. I In 1965 Congress authorized the Medicaid program by adding Title XIX to the Social Security Act; the program was established “for the purpose of providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. ” The program offers the financial assistance to States that submit and have approved by the Secretary plans for “medical assistance.” In its present form, the Act authorizes reimbursement for 18 categories of medical assistance. For three types of covered medical services — inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facilities services, and, most importantly, intermediate care facility services — the definition contains an express exception for services performed in IMDs. The thrice-repeated exclusion demonstrates that Congress did not intend the ICF and IMD categories to be mutually exclusive; if Congress had intended separate categories, the IMD exclusion from services in other types of facilities would be unnecessary and illogical. Other provisions of the Act make it clear that services performed for the mentally ill may be covered, provided the services are performed in a hospital, a skilled nursing facility, or an ICF that is not an IMD. Thus, the definition of an ICF expressly describes persons “who because of their mental or physical condition” require institutional care but do not need the level of services provided by a skilled nursing facility or a hospital. And § 1396d(a)(18)(B) prohibits medical assistance for services to individuals under 65 who are patients in IMDs, while another provision, § 1396d(a)(14), also allows such payments for “inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility services, and intermediate care facility services for individuals 65 years of age or over in an institution for mental diseases.” To accept the State’s interpretation would render the language of § 1396d(a)(14) unnecessary and would render lifeless Congress’ approval of ICF services for persons 65 or over in IMDs. “The term ‘medical assistance’ means payment of part or all of the cost of the following care and services ... for individuals[:]. . . “(1) inpatient hospital services (other than services in an institution for mental diseases); “(4)(A) skilled nursing facility services (other than services in an institution for mental diseases) for individuals 21 years of age or older . . . ; “(15) intermediate care facility services (other than such services in an institution for mental diseases) for individuals who are determined ... to be in need of such care. . . .” 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396d(a)(1), (a)(4)(A), (a)(15) (1982 ed., Supp. III) (emphasis added). Thus, there is ample textual support for the conclusion that an ICF may be an IMD. II In the absence of a statutory definition of the term “institution for mental diseases,” it is appropriate to consider the Secretary’s interpretation of that term. The Secretary’s initial definition was provided shortly after the Medicaid program was enacted in 1965. It stated: “Any individual who has not attained 65 years of age and is a patient in an institution for . . . mental diseases; i. e., an institution whose overall character is that of a facility established and maintained primarily for the care and treatment of individuals with . . . mental diseases (whether or not it is licensed) .” (Emphasis added.) A few years later, the Secretary promulgated the following: “Whether an institution is one for . . . mental diseases will be determined by whether its overall character is that of a facility established and maintained primarily for the care and treatment of individuals with . . . mental diseases (whether licensed or not) .... “‘Institution for mental diseases’ means an institution which is primarily engaged in providing diagnosis, treatment or care of persons with mental diseases, including medical attention, nursing care and related services.” The current definition — like the earlier versions — is essentially the same as the original definition developed almost two decades ago. In both the earliest and the later interpretations of “institution for mental diseases,” the Secretary consistently emphasized the “overall character” of the facility when defining an IMD. Congress has never indicated dissatisfaction with the Secretary’s undeviating construction. “We have often noted that the interpretation of an agency charged with the administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference.” Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 141 (1982). Moreover, the agency’s construction need not be the only reasonable one in order to gain judicial approval. It follows that the Secretary was authorized to determine that medical assistance is not available if the overall character of a facility discloses that it is maintained primarily for the care and treatment of individuals with mental diseases. We must therefore reject the State’s suggestion that ICFs and skilled nursing facilities that are primarily engaged in the care of the mentally ill are not “institutions for mental diseases” within the meaning of the Act. HH I — I HH The Medicaid program as enacted in 1965 provided coverage for elderly patients in IMDs, but also contained an express exclusion for patients under 65 years of age in IMDs. The Report of the Senate Committee on Finance made it clear that the IMD exclusion applied to both public and private mental institutions, and explained that it was based on the view that long-term care in mental institutions was a state responsibility. The Committee Report also explained that the decision to provide federal financial assistance to the mentally ill who were 65 years of age or over was based in part on the requirement that the state plan would include adequate provision for individual review of a patient’s needs. Moreover, the Report stated that States had to develop and to implement comprehensive mental health programs. These latter conditions are components of the “Long Amendment,” and provide support for the State’s contention that federal policy favors the transfer of patients — at least the elderly — from IMDs to less restrictive treatment facilities. In 1967, without amending the Medicaid statute, Congress expanded the aid programs for the aged, blind, and disabled by authorizing federal reimbursement for the cost of services in ICFs. The 1967 amendments do not expressly mention IMDs. Four years later, in 1971, Congress' adopted the amendment to the Medicaid statute that enlarged the definition of covered medical services to include services performed by ICFs. The amendments retained the IMD exclusion, an exclusion that remains in the Act today. The next year, Congress added coverage for “inpatient psychiatric hospital services for individuals under 21.” In its deliberations on the 1972 amendments, Congress also considered the desirability of extending Medicaid “mental hospital coverage” to persons between the ages of 21 and 65, but decided not to do so. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 236 (1981). The State points to several aspects of this lengthy legislative history to support its argument that the exception for IMDs should be narrowly construed to encompass only traditional custodial mental hospitals. It places special emphasis on the “Long Amendment,” which surely indicates that federal policy favors the transfer of mentally ill patients to alternative and less restrictive care facilities when feasible. It also notes that when federal assistance for ICFs was first authorized in 1967, no express exclusion for IMDs was made, and that the text of the Act plainly contemplates that ICF services will be provided for the mentally ill. Finally, it points to a number of comments by legislators indicating that they assumed that the IMD exclusion only referred to traditional mental hospitals. The history on which the State relies does clearly establish that an individual is not ineligible for Medicaid simply because his need for care is based on a diagnosis of mental illness. Moreover, it is perfectly clear that hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and intermediate care facilities are not ineligible simply because they provide care and treatment for mentally ill patients. However, the legislative history also demonstrates that Congress has thrice since 1965 not accepted proposals to lift the IMD exclusion for persons under 65. But most damaging to the State’s position is a statement by Congress from the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, which authorized Medicaid funding for ICF services for the elderly in IMDs. In explaining this amendment, the Conference Report stated: “The Senate amendment added a new section to the House bill which provided that when a State chooses to cover individuals age 65 and over in institutions for . . . mental diseases it must cover such care in intermediate care facilities as well as in hospitals and skilled nursing homes.” This statement of congressional intent is consistent with the plain language of the statute and with the Secretary’s longstanding administrative interpretation: hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and ICFs can be IMDs and the terms are not mutually exclusive. The State has persuasively argued that its position represents sound and enlightened policy. It has not, however, established that Congress has only excluded “hospitals” in which a mental illness is treated instead of “institutions for mental diseases.” The express authorization for coverage of individuals 65 years of age or over uses language that plainly indicates that a hospital, a skilled nursing facility, or an ICF may be an IMD; this indication is unambiguously confirmed by the fact that the same parenthetical exclusion for IMDs applies to all three types of facilities. Moreover, the Secretary’s interpretation of “institution for mental diseases” comports with the plain language of the statute. Finally, the legislative history does not reveal any clear expression of contrary congressional intent. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. App. 35a-37a. Id., at 17a. Id., at 22a-23a. Id., at 14a. Although Middletown Haven did not hold itself out to the media as a mental institution, and although the level of care provided to patients at the facility was less restrictive than that provided in a typical mental hospital, Middletown Haven did hold itself out as a facility specializing in the treatment of mental diseases to sources of referral. Id., at 15a. Moreover, Middletown Haven cared for individuals' that could have been admitted into mental institutions and had a patient population uncharacteristic of nursing homes. Id., at 20a. The Secretary’s regulations, 42 CFR §435.1009(e) (1984), define an IMD as follows: “an institution that is primarily engaged in providing diagnosis, treatment or care of persons with mental diseases, including medical attention, nursing care and related services. Whether an institution is an institution for mental diseases is determined by its overall character as that of a facility established and maintained primarily for the care and treatment of individuals with mental diseases, whether or not it is licensed as such.” The Secretary has developed criteria designed to focus on what constitutes “primarily engaged” and “overall character.” The review team utilized the following criteria when evaluating Middletown Haven: 1. That a facility is licensed as a mental institution; 2. That it advertises or holds itself out as a mental institution; 3. That more than 50% of the patients have a disability in mental functioning; 4. That it is used by mental hospitals for alternative care; 5. That patients who may have entered a mental hospital are accepted directly from the community; 6. That the facility is in proximity to a state mental institution (within a 25-mile radius); 7. That the age distribution is uncharacteristic of nursing home patients; 8. That the basis of Medicaid eligibility for patients under 65 is due to a mental disability, exclusive of services in an institution for mental disease; 9. That the facility hires staff specialized in the care of the mentally ill; and 10. That independent professional reviews conducted by state teams report a preponderance of mental patients in the facility. App. 12a-13a, 22a-23a. Id., at 1e-6e. The letter stated that, because federal financial participation “is not available in payments to IMDs for persons aged 21 to 64, and because the State plan does not cover services by such facilities to individuals under 21 or over 65, no payments to IMDs are eligible” for federal financial participation. Id., at 2e. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40d-44d. In addition to filing in District Court, the State sought direct appellate review. The Court of Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 731 F. 2d 1052, 1055 (CA2 1984). 79 Stat. 343. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 301 (1980). 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396, 1396a. See § 1905(a) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396d(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. III), as further amended by the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, § 2335(f), 98 Stat. 1091. The definitions of these three categories of service read as follows: Section 1905(c) of the Act, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1396d(c), provides in part: “For purposes of this subchapter the term ‘intermediate care facility’ means an institution which (1) is licensed under State law to provide, on a regular basis, health-related care and services to individuals who do not require the degree of care and treatment which a hospital or skilled nursing facility is designed to provide, but who because of their mental or physical condition require care and services (above the level of room and board) which can be made available to them only through institutional facilities .... The term ‘intermediate care facility’ also includes any skilled nursing facility or hospital which meets the requirements of the proceeding [sic] sentence.... With respect to services furnished to individuals under age 65, the term ‘intermediate care facility’ shall not include, except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, any public institution or distinct part thereof for mental diseases or mental defects.” It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that courts should give effect, if possible, to every word that Congress has used in a statute. See, e. g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979). Cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-845 (1984). The Act expressly provides the Secretary with authority to “make and publish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with” the Act “as may be necessary [for its] efficient administration.” 42 U. S. C. § 1302. U. S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Supplement D—Medical Assistance Programs Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, ¶ D-4620.2 (1966). Regulations fashioned shortly thereafter restated the essence of this definition: covered “ ‘[ijnpatient hospital services’ are those items and services ordinarily furnished by the hospital for the care and treatment of inpatients ... in an institution maintained primarily for treatment and care of patients with disorders other than . . . mental diseases.” 45 CFR § 249.10(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis added); see also §249.10(b)(4)(i) (skilled nursing home services are “those items and services furnished by a skilled nursing home maintained primarily for the care and treatment of inpatients with disorders other than . . . mental diseases”). 45 CFR §§ 248.60(a)(3)(ii) and (b)(7) (1972). See n. 5, supra. The State recognizes that the “substance of these provisions has not changed materially since their first adoption.” Brief for Petitioner 8. See Unemployment Compensation Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153 (1946); see also American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 461 U. S. 402, 423 (1983) (“We need only conclude that [the agency’s interpretation] is a reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions”). The State also contends that the disallowance undermines the cooperative federalism concept on which the public assistance programs are based. More specifically, the State argues that the disallowance was based on an interpretation of the Act that did not crystallize until after it had received and spent the federal money. In our view, the Secretary’s position has been established with sufficient clarity at least since the 1972 regulations to make this argument untenable. The general policy of federal-state cooperation that underlies the entire program does favor a liberal interpretation of the eligibility provisions of the Act, but as is true of the policy favoring the development of less restrictive treatment programs for the mentally ill that is reflected in the “Long Amendment,” see infra, this page and 534, we must nevertheless respect the apparent limits that Congress has placed on its own decision to fund the implementation of sound policy. 79 Stat. 352. The statute provided that the term “medical assistance” did not include “(A) any such payments with respect to care or services for any individual who is an inmate of a public institution (except as a patient in a medical institution); or “(B) any such payments with respect to care or services for any individual who has not attained 65 years of age and who is a patient in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases.” Ibid. The statute also contained a prohibition against payments for certain services rendered in IMDs. Id., at 351-352. The Report stated: “Since the enactment of the Social Security Act, patients in public mental and tuberculosis hospitals have not been eligible under the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act, and only prior to 1951 were individuals eligible who were patients in private mental and tuberculosis hospitals. The reason for this exclusion was that long-term care in such hospitals had traditionally been accepted as a responsibility of the States.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 144 (1965). See also H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 (1965). The Senate Report continued: 26 A second safeguard, under the committee’s bill, is a provision that the State plan include a provision for an individual plan for each patient in the mental hospital to assure that the care provided to him is in his best interests and that there will be initial and periodic review of his medical and other needs. The committee is particularly concerned that the patient receive care and treatment designed to meet his particular needs. Thus, under the committee bill, the State plan would also need to assure that the medical care needed by the patient will be provided him and that other needs considered essential will be met and that there will be periodic redetermination of the need for the individual to be in the hospital. “The committee believes that responsibility for the treatment of persons in mental hospitals — whether or not they be assistance recipients — is that of the mental health agency of the State.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 145-146 (1965). See also H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 (1965). The Report further stated: “The committee believes it is important that States move ahead promptly to develop comprehensive mental health plans as'contemplated in the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963. In order to make certain that the planning required by the committee’s bill will become a part of the overall State mental health planning under the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963, the committee’s bill makes the approvability of a State’s plan for assistance for aged individuals in mental hospitals dependent upon a showing of satisfactory progress toward developing and implementing a comprehensive mental health program — including utilization of community mental health centers, nursing homes, and other alternative forms of care.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 146 (1965). See also H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 (1965). See 110 Cong. Rec. 21346-21348 (1964); 79 Stat. 347; 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396a(a)(20), 1396a(a)(21). Commenting on the “Long Amendment,” the Senate Report stated, in part: “The committee bill provides for the development in the State of alternative methods of care and requires that the maximum use be made of the existing resources in the community which offer ways of caring for the mentally ill who are not in hospitals. This is intended to include provision for persons who no longer need care in hospitals and who can, with financial help and social services to the extent needed, make their way in the community.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 146 (1965). See also H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 (1965). 81 Stat. 920-921. The amendments did, however, provide: “(d) Except when inconsistent with the purposes of this section or contrary to any provision of this section, any modification, pursuant to this section, of an approved State plan shall be subject to the same conditions, limitations, rights, and obligations as obtain with respect to such approved State plan.” Id., at 920. The amendments were not actually signed until January 2, 1968, but are generally described as the “1967 amendments.” 85 Stat. 809. The amendment also contained a definition of the term “intermediate care facility” that largely tracks the language contained in the 1967 amendments. That definition, however, contained this comment on services for persons under age 65: “With respect to services furnished to individuals under age 65, the term ‘intermediate care facility’ shall not include, except as provided in subsection (d), any public institution or distinct part thereof for mental diseases or mental defects.” Ibid. A straightforward reading of this sentence strongly implies that a private institution for mental diseases may qualify as an ICF. 86 Stat. 1460-1461. The Senate Report on the bill contains this statement: “The committee also believes that the potential social and economic benefits of extending medicaid inpatient mental hospital coverage to mentally ill persons between the ages of 21 and 65 deserves to be evaluated and has therefore authorized demonstration projects for this purpose.” S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 281 (1972). See also id,., at 57. The proposal was, however, rejected in conference. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1605, p. 65 (1972). Although the history of the IMD exclusion in various amendments to the Act suggests that Congress may have assumed that it would refer primarily to public institutions, the State does not argue that it is so confined. We are confident that Congress would have used the term “public” if it had not intended the exclusion to encompass private institutions as well. See Social Security Amendments of 1971: Hearings on H. R. 1 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 924-941 (1972) (statements of Dr. Jonathan Leopold, Commissioner, Vermont Dept. of Mental Health, and Dr. Kenneth Gaver, Commissioner, Ohio Dept. of Mental Hygiene and Corrections); Social Security Amendments of 1970: Hearings on H. R. 17550 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 500-550 (1970); Social Security Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H. R. 12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 1741 (1967) (statement of Dr. Robert W. Gibson, American Psychiatric Association). The 1971 amendments were technically corrected to explain that the IMD exclusion did not prevent reimbursement for ICF services provided to the elderly in IMDs. 86 Stat. 1329, 1459-1460; S. Rep. No. 92-1230, pp. 320-321 (1972). H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1605, p. 64 (1972).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GEORGE CAMPBELL PAINTING CORP. v. REID et al., MEMBERS OF NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al. No. 673. Argued April 30, 1968. Decided June 10, 1968. Albert A. Blinder argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Theodore M. Ruzow and Stephen Hochhauser. Paul W. Hessel argued the cause for appellee New York City Housing Authority. With him on the brief were Harry Levy and I. Stanley Stein. Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellee Attorney General of New York. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, pro se, and Brenda Solojf, Assistant Attorney General. Me. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Public Authorities Law of New York, § 2601, provides that a clause must be inserted in all contracts awarded by a public authority of the State for work or services to provide that upon refusal of “a person” to testify before a grand jury, to answer any relevant question, or to waive immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, such person and any firm or corporation of which he is a member, officer, or director shall be disqualified for five years from contracting with any public authority, and any existing contracts may be canceled by the public authority without incurring any penalty or damages. During 1964, appellant, a closely held family corporation, entered into three painting contracts with appel-lee New York City Housing Authority. Each of these contained the standard disqualification clause. The contracts were executed by appellant’s president, George Campbell, Jr., who was also a director and stockholder of the corporation. Early in 1965, appellant became aware that the District Attorney of New York County was conducting an investigation before a grand jury of alleged bid rigging on public contracts, including those of appellant. Thereafter, George Campbell, Jr., resigned as appellant’s president and director and divested himself of his stock. He remained in appellant’s employ as an “estimator.” A few weeks thereafter, Campbell was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury. He refused to sign the waiver of immunity. In due course, the Public Housing Authority notified appellant that, pursuant to the provision in its contracts, the contracts were terminated and Campbell and the corporation were disqualified from doing business with the Authority for five years. After proceedings in the lower courts of New York, the New York Court of Appeals denied relief to appellant. It held that the disqualification was valid and that § 2601 of the Public Authorities Law is constitutional, citing Gardner v. Broderick, 20 N. Y. 2d 227, 229 N. E. 2d 184 (1967) (reversed this day, ante, p. 273). The Court of Appeals also rejected appellant’s claim that it should not have been disqualified because Campbell resigned as president and director before he was called to testify. We noted probable jurisdiction. 390 U. S. 918 (1968). We do not consider the constitutionality of § 2601 of New York’s Public Authorities Law or the validity or effect of the contract provisions incorporating that section. Appellant’s claim is that these provisions operated unconstitutionally to require its president, Mr. Campbell, to waive the benefits of his privilege against self-incrimination. But appellant cannot avail itself of this point, assuming its validity. It has long been settled in federal jurisprudence that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is “essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.” It “cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.” United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698, 699 (1944); see also Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. ICC, 221 U. S. 612, 622 (1911); Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 382-385 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 74-75 (1906). If a corporation cannot avail itself of the privilege against self-incrimination, it cannot take advantage of the claimed invalidity of a penalty imposed for refusal of an individual, its president, to waive the privilege. Since the privilege is not available to it, appellant, a corporation, cannot invoke the privilege to challenge the constitutionality of § 2601 of the Public Authorities Law. A fortiori, it cannot assail the validity of the provision in the contracts into which it entered, incorporating the substance of that section. As to appellant’s claim that its due process rights were denied by the imposition of the penalty despite Mr. Campbell’s purported resignation from managerial positions, we do not reach the abstract legal question that is urged upon us. We see no reason to disturb the finding of the New York Court of Appeals that “the resignation was tendered and accepted solely for the purpose of avoiding the statutory disqualification,” and the conclusion of that court that the purported resignation should be disregarded for purposes of this case. Affirmed. Section 2602 provides for disqualification on the same basis without reference to any contractual clause. The Court of Appeals noted that § 2603 of the Public Authorities Act vests the State Supreme Court with jurisdiction, for stated reasons, to remove the disqualification.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CONTAINER CORPORATION OF AMERICA v. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD No. 81-523. Argued January 10, 1983 — Decided June 27, 1983 Franklin C. Latcham argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Prentiss Willson, Jr. Neal J. Gobar, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was George Deukmejian, Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Marlow W. Cook, Lee H. Spence, and Robert L. Ash for Allied Lyons p. 1. c. et al.; by J. Elaine Bialczak for Coca-Cola Co.; by George W. Beatty and William L. Goldman for Colgate-Palmolive Co.; by James H. Peters, Paul H. Frankel, and Jean A. Walker for the Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce; by Valentine Brookes and Lawrence V. Brookes for EMI Limited et al.; by William H. Allen, John B. Jones, Jr., and Mark I. Levy, for the Financial Executives Institute; by Neil Papiano and Dennis A. Page for Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.; and by Jeffrey G. Balkin, pro se, for Jeffrey G. Balkin et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, Theodore V. Spangler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, and David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, for the State of Idaho et al.; by Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, Fred H. Montgomery, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Lloyd B. Foster for the State of Illinois; by Michael J. Rieley, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Montana; by Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General, and Lisa Gillard Gmuca, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New Mexico; by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Francis V. Dow, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter H. Schiff for the State of New York; by Robert 0. Wefald, Attorney General, and Kenneth M. Jakes, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of North Dakota; by Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, Stanton F. Long, Deputy Attorney General, William F. Gary, Solicitor General, and Theodore W. de Looze, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Oregon; by William D. Dexter, Wilson Condon, Attorney General of Alaska, James R. Eads, Jr., J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, CarlR. Ajello, Attorney General of Connecticut, Richard S. Gebelein, Attorney General of Delaware, David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, and Theodore V. Spangler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank K. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Warren R. Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General of New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, M. C. Banks, Deputy Attorney General, Robert 0. Wefald, Attorney General of North Dakota, and Albert R. Hausauer, Assistant Attorney General, Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, and David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, for the Multistate Tax Commission et al.; by Richard B. Geltman and Tany S. Hong, Attorney General of Hawaii, for the National Governors’ Association et al.; by Charles F. Brannan for the National Farmers Union; for Citizens for Tax Justice et al.; and by Frank M. Keesling, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Lloyd N. Cutler and William T. Lake for the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; by John J. Easton, Jr., Attorney General, and Paul P. Hanlon for the State of Vermont; by Francis D. Morrissey and Peter B. Powles for the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al.; by Don S. Harnack and Richard A. Hanson for Caterpillar Tractor Co.; by Joanne M. Garvey and Roy E. ■ Crawford for the Committee on Unitary Tax; by John S. Nolan for the Confederation of British Industry; by Norman B. Barker for Gulf Oil Corp.; by Anthon S. Cannon, Jr,, for the International Bankers Association in California et al.; by Kenneth Heady for Phillips Petroleum Co.; by John R. Hupper and Paul M. Dodyk for Shell Petroleum N. V.; by Norman B. Barker and Dean C. Dunlavey for Sony Corp. et al.; and by Joseph H, Guttentag, Carolyn E. Agger, and Daniel M. Lewis for the Union of Industries of the European Community. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This is another appeal claiming that the application of a state taxing scheme violates the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. California imposes a corporate franchise tax geared to income. In common with a large number of other States, it employs the “unitary business” principle and formula apportionment in applying that tax to corporations doing business both inside and outside the State. Appellant is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Illinois and doing business in California and elsewhere. It also has a number of overseas subsidiaries incorporated in the countries in which they operate. Appellee is the California authority charged with administering the State’s franchise tax. This appeal presents three questions for review: (1) Was it improper for appellee and the state courts to find that appellant and its overseas subsidiaries constituted a “unitary business” for purposes of the state tax? (2) Even if the unitary business finding was proper, do certain salient differences among national economies render the standard three-factor apportionment formula used by California so inaccurate as applied to the multinational enterprise consisting of appellant and its subsidiaries as to violate the constitutional requirement of “fair apportionment” ? (3) In any event, did California have an obligation under the Foreign Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, to employ the “arm’s-length” analysis used by the Federal Government and most foreign nations in evaluating the tax consequences of intercorporate relationships? i — i A Various aspects of state tax systems based on the “unitary business” principle and formula apportionment have provoked repeated constitutional litigation in this Court. See, e. g., ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307 (1982); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dept., 458 U. S. 354 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S. 425 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267 (1978); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436 (1964); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920). Under both the Due Process and the Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, a State may not, when imposing an income-based tax, “tax value earned outside its borders.” ASARCO, supra, at 315. In the case of a more-or-Iess integrated business enterprise operating in more than one State, however, arriving at precise territorial allocations of “value” is often an elusive goal, both in theory and in practice. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 438; Butler Bros. v. McColgan, supra, at 507-509; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra, at 121. For this reason and others, we have long held that the Constitution imposes no single formula on the States, Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 445 (1940), and that the taxpayer has the “‘distinct burden of showing by “clear and cogent evidence” that [the state tax] results in extraterritorial values being taxed . . . .’” Exxon Corp., supra, at 221, quoting Butler Bros. v. McColgan, supra, at 507, in turn quoting Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U. S. 682, 688 (1936). One way of deriving locally taxable income is on the basis of formal geographical or transactional accounting. The problem with this method is that formal accounting is subject to manipulation and imprecision, and often ignores or captures inadequately the many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the components of a single enterprise. See generally Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 438-439, and sources cited. The unitary business/ formula apportionment method is a very different approach to the problem of taxing businesses operating in more than one jurisdiction. It rejects geographical or transactional accounting, and instead calculates the local tax base by first defining the scope of the “unitary business” of which the taxed enterprise’s activities in the taxing jurisdiction form one part, and then apportioning the total income of that “unitary business” between the taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the world on the basis of a formula taking into account objective measures of the corporation’s activities within and without the jurisdiction. This Court long ago upheld the constitutionality of the unitary business/formula apportionment method, although subject to certain constraints. See, e. g., Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U. S. 123 (1931); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, supra; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra. The method has now gained wide acceptance, and is in one of its forms the basis for the the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (Uniform Act), which has at last count been substantially adopted by 23 States, including California. B Two aspects of the unitary business/formula apportionment method have traditionally attracted judicial attention. These are, as one might easily guess, the notions of “unitary business” and “formula apportionment,” respectively. (1) The Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution do not allow a State to tax income arising out of interstate activities — even on a proportional basis — unless there is a “ ‘minimal connection’ or ‘nexus’ between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and ‘a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise.’ ” Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, supra, at 219-220, quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 436, 437. At the very-least, this set of principles imposes the obvious and largely self-executing limitation that a State not tax a purported “unitary business” unless at least some part of it is conducted in the State. See Exxon Corp., supra, at 220; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., supra, at 444. It also requires that there be some bond of ownership or control uniting the purported “unitary business.” See ASARCO, supra, at 316-317. In addition, the principles we have quoted require that the out-of-state activities of the purported “unitary business” be related in some concrete way to the in-state activities. The functional meaning of this requirement is that there be some sharing or exchange of value not capable of precise identification or measurement — beyond the mere flow of funds arising out of a passive investment or a distinct business operation— which renders formula apportionment a reasonable method of taxation. See generally ASARCO, supra, at 317; Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 438-442. In Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra, we held that a State could tax on an apportioned basis the combined income of a vertically integrated business whose various components (manufacturing, sales, etc.) operated in different States. In Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, supra, we applied the same principle to a vertically integrated business operating across national boundaries. In Butler Bros. v. McColgan, supra, we recognized that the unitary business principle could apply, not only to vertically integrated enterprises, but also to a series of similar enterprises operating separately in various jurisdictions but linked by common managerial or operational resources that produced economies of scale and transfers of value. More recently, we have further refined the “unitary business” concept in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev enue, 447 U. S. 207 (1980), and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S. 425 (1980), where we upheld the States’ unitary business findings, and in ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307 (1982), and F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dept., 458 U. S. 354 (1982), in which we found such findings to have been improper. The California statute at issue in this case, and the Uniform Act from which most of its relevant provisions are derived, track in large part the principles we have just discussed. In particular, the statute distinguishes between the “business income” of a multijurisdictional enterprise, which is apportioned by formula, Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §§25128-25136 (West 1979), and its “nonbusiness” income, which is not. Although the statute does not explicitly require that income from distinct business enterprises be apportioned separately, this requirement antedated adoption of the Uniform Act, and has not been abandoned. A final point that needs to be made about the unitary business concept is that it is not, so to speak, unitary: there are variations on the theme, and any number of them are logically consistent with the underlying principles motivating the approach. For example, a State might decide to respect formal corporate lines and treat the ownership of a corporate subsidiary as per se a passive investment. In Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U. S., at 440-441, however, we made clear that, as a general matter, such a per se rule is not constitutionally required: “Superficially, intercorporate division might appear to be a[n]. . . attractive basis for limiting apportionability. But the form of business organization may have nothing to do with the underlying unity or diversity of business enterprise.” Id., at 440. Thus, for example, California law provides: Even among States that take this approach, however, only-some apply it in taxing American corporations with subsidiaries located in foreign countries. The difficult question we address in Part V of this opinion is whether, for reasons not implicated in Mobil, that particular variation on the theme is constitutionally barred. “In the case of a corporation . . . owning or controlling, either directly or indirectly, another corporation, or other corporations, and in the case of a corporation . . . owned or controlled, either directly or indirectly, by another corporation, the Franchise Tax Board may require a consolidated report showing the combined net income or such other facts as it deems necessary.” Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §25104 (West 1979). (2) Having determined that a certain set of activities constitute a “unitary business,” a State must then apply a formula apportioning the income of that business within and without the State. Such an apportionment formula must, under both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, be fair. See Exxon Corp., supra, at 219, 227-228; Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U. S., at 272-273; Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc., 283 U. S., at 134. The first, and again obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal consistency — that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed. The second and more difficult requirement is what might be called external consistency — the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated. The Constitution does not “invalidat[e] an apportionment formula whenever it may result in taxation of some income that did not have its source in the taxing State . . . Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 272 (emphasis added). See Underwood Typewriter Co., 254 U. S., at 120-121. Nevertheless, we will strike down the application of an apportionment formula if the taxpayer can prove “by ‘clear and cogent evidence’ that the income attributed to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted ... in that State,’ [Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc.,] 283 U. S., at 135, or has ‘led to a grossly distorted result,’ [Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 326 (1968)].” Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 274. California and the other States that have adopted the Uniform Act use a formula — commonly called the “three-factor” formula — which is based, in equal parts, on the proportion of a unitary business’ total payroll, property, and sales which are located in the taxing State. See Cal. Tax & Rev. Code Ann. §§25128-25136 (West 1979). We approved the three-factor formula in Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942). Indeed, not only has the three-factor formula met our approval, but it has become, for reasons we discuss in more detail infra, at 183, something of a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas are judged. See Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 282 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U. S. 553, 561 (1965). Besides being fair, an apportionment formula must, under the Commerce Clause, also not result in discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce. See Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 444; cf. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 444-448 (1979) (property tax). Aside from forbidding the obvious types of discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, this principle might have been construed to require that a state apportionment formula not differ so substantially from methods of allocation used by other jurisdictions in which the taxpayer is subject to taxation as to produce double taxation of the same income and a resultant tax burden higher than the taxpayer would incur if its business were limited to any one jurisdiction. At least in the interstate commerce context, however, the anti-discrimination principle has not in practice required much in addition to the requirement of fair apportionment. In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, supra, in particular, we explained that eliminating all overlapping taxation would require this Court to establish not only a single constitutionally mandated method of taxation, but also rules regarding the application of that method in particular cases. 437 U. S., at 278-280. Because that task was thought to be essentially legislative, we declined to undertake it, and held that a fairly apportioned tax would not be found invalid simply because it differed from the prevailing approach adopted by the States. As we discuss infra, at 185-187, however, a more searching inquiry is necessary when we are confronted with the possibility of international double taxation. n 5» Appellant is m the business of manufacturing custom-ordered paperboard packaging. Its operation is vertically integrated, and includes the production of paperboard from raw timber and wastepaper as well as its composition into the finished products ordered by customers. The operation is also largely domestic. During the years at issue in this case — 1963, 1964, and 1965 — appellant controlled 20 foreign subsidiaries located in four Latin American and four European countries. Its percentage ownership of the subsidiaries (either directly or through other subsidiaries) ranged between 66.7% and 100%. In those instances (about half) in which appellant did not own a 100% interest in the subsidiary, the remainder was owned by local nationals. One of the subsidiaries was a holding company that had no payroll, sales, or property, but did have book income. Another was inactive. The rest were all engaged — in their respective local markets — in essentially the same business as appellant. Most of appellant’s subsidiaries were, like appellant itself, fully integrated, although a few bought paperboard and other intermediate products elsewhere. Sales of materials from appellant to its subsidiaries accounted for only about 1% of the subsidiaries’ total purchases. The subsidiaries were also relatively autonomous with respect to matters of personnel and day-to-day management. For example, transfers of personnel from appellant to its subsidiaries were rare, and occurred only when a subsidiary could not fill a position locally. There was no formal United States training program for the subsidiaries’ employees, although groups of foreign employees occasionally visited the United States for 2-6 week periods to familiarize themselves with appellant’s methods of operation. Appellant charged one senior vice president and four other officers with the task of overseeing the operations of the subsidiaries. These officers established general standards of professionalism, profitability, and ethical practices and dealt with major problems and long-term decisions; day-to-day management of the subsidiaries, however, was left in the hands of local executives who were always citizens of the host country. Although local decisions regarding capital expenditures were subject to review by appellant, problems were generally worked out by consensus rather than outright domination. Appellant also had a number of its directors and officers on the boards of directors of the subsidiaries, but they did not generally play an active role in management decisions. Nevertheless, in certain respects, the relationship between appellant and its subsidiaries was decidedly close. For example, approximately half of the subsidiaries’ long-term debt was either held directly, or guaranteed, by appellant. Appellant also provided advice and consultation regarding manufacturing techniques, engineering, design, architecture, insurance, and cost accounting to a number of its subsidiaries, either by entering into technical service agreements with them or by informal arrangement. Finally, appellant occasionally assisted its subsidiaries in their procurement of equipment, either by selling them used equipment of its own or by employing its own purchasing department to act as an agent for the subsidiaries. B During the tax years at issue in this case, appellant filed California franchise tax returns. In 1969, after conducting an audit of appellant’s returns for the years in question, appellee issued notices of additional assessments for each of those years. The respective approaches and results reflected in appellant’s initial returns and in appellee’s notices of additional assessments capture the legal differences at issue in this case. In calculating the total unapportioned taxable income of its unitary business, appellant included its own corporate net earnings as derived from its federal tax form (subject to certain adjustments not relevant here), but did not include any income of its subsidiaries. It also deducted — as it was authorized to do under state law, see supra, at 167, and n. 1 — all dividend income, nonbusiness interest income, and gains on sales of assets not related to the unitary business. In calculating the share of its net income which was appor-tionable to California under the three-factor formula, appellant omitted all of its subsidiaries’ payroll, property, and sales. The results of these calculations are summarized in the margin. The gravamen of the notices issued by appellee in 1969 was that appellant should have treated its overseas subsidiaries as part of its unitary business rather than as passive investments. Including the overseas subsidiaries in appellant’s unitary business had two primary effects: it increased the income subject to apportionment by an amount equal to the total income of those subsidiaries (less intersubsidiary dividends, see n. 5, supra), and it decreased the percentage of that income which was apportionable to California. The net effect, however, was to increase appellant’s tax liability in each of the three years. Appellant paid the additional amounts under protest, and then sued in California Superior Court for a refund, raising the issues now before this Court. The case was tried on stipulated facts, and the Superior Court upheld appellee’s assessments. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1981), and the California Supreme Court refused to exercise discretionary review. We noted probable jurisdiction. 456 U. S. 960 (1982). H-I I — I HH , <T ^ We address the unitary business issue first. As previously noted, the taxpayer always has the “distinct burden of showing by ‘clear and cogent evidence’ that [the state tax] results in extraterritorial values being taxed.” Supra, at 164. One necessary corollary of that principle is that this Court will, if reasonably possible, defer to the judgment of state courts in deciding whether a particular set of activities constitutes a “unitary business.” As we said in a closely related context in Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U. S. 534 (1951): “The general rule, applicable here, is that a taxpayer claiming immunity from a tax has the burden of establishing his exemption. “This burden is never met merely by showing a fair difference of opinion which as an original matter might be decided differently. ... Of course, in constitutional cases, we have power to examine the whole record to arrive at an independent judgment as to whether constitutional rights have been invaded, but that does not mean that we will re-examine, as a court of first instance, findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.” Id., at 537-538 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). See id., at 538 (concluding that, “in light of all the evidence, the [state] judgment [on a question of whether income should be attributed to the State] was within the realm of permissible judgment”). The legal principles defining the constitutional limits on the unitary business principle are now well established. The factual records in such cases, even when the parties enter into a stipulation, tend to be long and complex, and the line between “historical fact” and “constitutional fact” is often fuzzy at best. Cf. AS ARCO, 458 U. S., at 326-328, nn. 22, 23. It will do the cause of legal certainty little good if this Court turns every colorable claim that a state court erred in a particular application of those principles into a de novo adjudication, whose unintended nuances would then spawn further litigation and an avalanche of critical comment. Rather, our task must be to determine whether the state court applied the correct standards to the case; and if it did, whether its judgment “was within the realm of permissible judgment.” B In this case, we are singularly unconvinced by appellant’s argument that the State Court of Appeal “in important part analyzed this case under a different legal standard,” F. W. Woolworth, 458 U. S., at 363, from the one articulated by this Court. Appellant argues that the state court here, like the state court in F. W. Woolworth, improperly relied on appellant’s mere potential to control the operations of its subsidiaries as a dispositive factor in reaching its unitary business finding. In fact, although the state court mentioned that “major policy decisions of the subsidiaries were subject to review by appellant,” 117 Cal. App. 3d, at 998, 173 Cal. Rptr., at 127, it relied principally, in discussing the management relationship between appellant and its subsidiaries, on the more concrete observation that “[h]igh officials of appellant gave directions to subsidiaries for compliance with the parent’s standard of professionalism, profitability, and ethical practices.” Id., at 998, 173 Cal. Rptr., at 127-128. Appellant also argues that the state court erred in endorsing an administrative presumption that corporations engaged in the same line of business are unitary. This presumption affected the state court’s reasoning, but only as one element among many. Moreover, considering the limited use to which it was put, we find the “presumption” criticized by appellant to be reasonable. Investment in a business enterprise truly “distinct” from a corporation’s main line of business often serves the primary function of diversifying the corporate portfolio and reducing the risks inherent in being tied to one industry’s business cycle. When a corporation invests in a subsidiary that engages in the same line of work as itself, it becomes much more likely that one function of the investment is to make better use — either through economies of scale or through operational integration or sharing of expertise — of the parent’s existing business-related resources. Finally, appellant urges us to adopt a bright-line rule requiring as a prerequisite to a finding that a mercantile or manufacturing enterprise is unitary that it be characterized by “a substantial flow of goods.” Brief for Appellant 47. We decline this invitation. The prerequisite to a constitutionally acceptable finding of unitary business is a flow of value, not a flow of goods. As we reiterated in F. W. Wool worth, a relevant question in the unitary business inquiry is whether ‘“contributions to income [of the subsidiaries] resulted] from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.’” 458 U. S., at 364, quoting Mobil, 445 U. S., at 438. “[Substantial mutual interdependence,” F. W. Woolworth, supra, at 371, can arise in any number of ways; a substantial flow of goods is clearly one but just as clearly not the only one. C The State Court of Appeal relied on a large number of factors in reaching its judgment that appellant and its foreign subsidiaries constituted a unitary business. These included appellant’s assistance to its subsidiaries in obtaining used and new equipment and in filling personnel needs that could not be met locally, the substantial role played by appellant in loaning funds to the subsidiaries and guaranteeing loans provided by others, the “considerable interplay between appellant and its foreign subsidiaries in the area of corporate expansion,” 117 Cal. App. 3d, at 997, 173 Cal. Rptr., at 127, the “substantial” technical assistance provided by appellant to the subsidiaries, id., at 998-999, 173 Cal. Rptr., at 128, and the supervisory role played by appellant’s officers in providing general guidance to the subsidiaries. In each of these respects, this case differs from ASARCO and F. W. Woolworth, and clearly comes closer than those cases did to presenting a “functionally integrated enterprise,” Mobil, supra, at 440, which the State is entitled to tax as a single entity. We need not decide whether any one of these factors would be sufficient as a constitutional matter to prove the existence of a unitary business. Taken in combination, at least, they clearly demonstrate that the state court reached a conclusion “within the realm of permissible judgment.” > > — ( We turn now to the question of fair apportionment. Once again, appellant has the burden of proof; it must demonstrate that there is “‘no rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise, Exxon Corp., 447 U. S., at 220, quoting Mobil, supra, at 437, by proving that the income apportioned to California under the statute is “out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the appellant in that State,” Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc., 283 U. S., at 135. Appellant challenges the application of California’s three-factor formula to its business on two related grounds, both arising as a practical (although not a theoretical) matter out of the international character of the enterprise. First, appellant argues that its foreign subsidiaries are significantly more profitable than it is, and that the three-factor formula, by ignoring that fact and relying instead on indirect measures of income such as payroll, property, and sales, systematically distorts the true allocation of income between appellant and the subsidiaries. The problem with this argument is obvious: the profit figures relied on by appellant are based on precisely the sort of formal geographical accounting whose basic theoretical weaknesses justify resort to formula apportionment in the first place. Indeed, we considered and rejected a very similar argument in Mobil, pointing out that whenever a unitary business exists, “separate [geographical] accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of income received in various States, may fail to account for contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale. Because these factors of profitability arise from the operation of the business as a whole, it becomes misleading to characterize the income of the business as having a single identifiable ‘source.’ Although separate geographical accounting may be useful for internal auditing, for purposes of state taxation it is not constitutionally required.” 445 U. S., at 438 (citation omitted). Appellant’s second argument is related, and can be answered in the same way. Appellant contends: “The costs of production in foreign countries are generally significantly lower than in the United States, primarily as a result of the lower wage rates of workers in countries other than the United States. Because wages are one of the three factors used in formulary apportionment, the use of the formula unfairly inflates the amount of income apportioned to United States operations, where wages are higher.” Brief for Appellant 12. Appellant supports this argument with various statistics that appear to demonstrate, not only that wage rates are generally lower in the foreign countries in which its subsidiaries operate, but also that those lower wages are not offset by lower levels of productivity. Indeed, it is able to show that at least one foreign plant had labor costs per thousand square feet of corrugated container that were approximately 40% of the same costs in appellant’s California plants. The problem with all this evidence, however, is that it does not by itself come close to impeaching the basic rationale behind the three-factor formula. Appellant and its foreign subsidiaries have been determined to be a unitary business. It therefore may well be that in addition to the foreign payroll going into the production of any given corrugated container by a foreign subsidiary, there is also California payroll, as well as other California factors, contributing — albeit more indirectly — to the same production. The mere fact that this possibility is not reflected in appellant’s accounting does not disturb the underlying premises of the formula apportionment method. Both geographical accounting and formula apportionment are imperfect proxies for an ideal which is not only difficult to achieve in practice, but also difficult to describe in theory. Some methods of formula apportionment are particularly problematic because they focus on only a small part of the spectrum of activities by which value is generated. Although we have generally upheld the use of such formulas, see, e. g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267 (1978); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920), we have on occasion found the distortive effect of focusing on only one factor so outrageous in a particular case as to require reversal. In Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, supra, for example, an apportionment method based entirely on ownership of tangible property resulted in an attribution to North Carolina of between 66% and 85% of the taxpayer’s income over the course of a number of years, while a separate accounting analysis purposely skewed to resolve all doubts in favor of the State resulted in an attribution of no more than 21.7%. We struck down the application of the one-factor formula to that particular business, holding that the method, “albeit fair on its face, operates so as to reach profits which are in no just sense attributable to transactions within its jurisdiction.” Id.,at 134. The three-factor formula used by California has gained wide approval precisely because payroll, property, and sales appear in combination to reflect a very large share of the activities by which value is generated. It is therefore able to avoid the sorts of distortions that were present in Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. Of course, even the three-factor formula is necessarily imperfect. But we have seen no evidence demonstrating that the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in the three-factor formula is greater than the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in the sort of separate accounting urged upon us by appellant. Indeed, it would be difficult to come to such a conclusion on the basis of the figures in this case: for all of appellant’s statistics showing allegedly enormous distortions caused by the three-factor formula, the tables we set out at nn. 11, 12, supra, reveal that the percentage increase in taxable income attributable to California between the methodology employed by appellant and the methodology employed by appellee comes to approximately 14%, a far cry from the more than 250% difference which led us to strike down the state tax in Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc., and a figure certainly within the substantial margin of error inherent in any method of attributing income among the components of a unitary business. See also Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 272-273; Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331 (1939); Underwood Typewriter Co., supra, at 120-121. V For the reasons we have just outlined, we conclude that California’s application of the unitary business principle to appellant and its foreign subsidiaries was proper, and that its use of the standard three-factor formula to apportion the income of that unitary business was fair. This proper and fair method of taxation happens, however, to be quite different from the method employed both by the Federal Government in taxing appellant’s business, and by each of the relevant foreign jurisdictions in taxing the business of appellant’s subsidiaries. Each of these other taxing jurisdictions has adopted a qualified separate accounting approach — often referred to as the “arm’s-length” approach — to the taxation of related corporations. Under the “arm’s-length” approach, every corporation, even if closely tied to other corporations, is treated for most — but decidedly not all — purposes as if it were an independent entity dealing at arm’s length with its affiliated corporations, and subject to taxation only by the jurisdictions in which it operates and only for the income it realizes on its own books. If the unitary business consisting of appellant and its subsidiaries were entirely domestic, the fact that different jurisdictions applied different methods of taxation to it would probably make little constitutional difference, for the reasons we discuss supra, at 170-171. Given that it is international, however, we must subject this case to the additional scrutiny required by the Foreign Commerce Clause. See Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U. S., at 446; Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U. S., at 446; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 482 (1888). The case most relevant to our inquiry is Japan Line. A Japan Line involved an attempt by California to impose an apparently fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, ad valorem property tax on cargo containers which were instrumental-ities of foreign commerce and which were temporarily located in various California ports. The same cargo containers, however, were subject to an unapportioned property tax in their home port of Japan. Moreover, a convention signed by the United States and Japan made clear, at least, that neither National Government could impose a tax on temporarily imported cargo containers whose home port was in the other nation. We held that “[w]hen a State seeks to tax the instru-mentalities of foreign commerce, two additional considerations, beyond those articulated in [the doctrine governing the Interstate Commerce Clause], come into play.” 441 U. S., at 446. The first is the enhanced risk of multiple taxation. Although consistent application of the fair apportionment standard can generally mitigate, if not eliminate, double taxation in the domestic context, “neither this Court nor this Nation can ensure full apportionment when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign. If an instrumentality of commerce is domiciled abroad, the country of domicile may have the right, consistently with the custom of nations, to impose a tax on its full value. If a State should seek to tax the same instrumentality on an apportioned basis, multiple taxation inevitably results. . . . Due to the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the aggregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full value, a state tax, even though ‘fairly apportioned’ to reflect an instrumentality’s presence within the State, may subject foreign commerce ‘“to the risk of a double tax burden to which [domestic] commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids.” ’ ” Id., at 447-448, quoting Evco v. Jones, 409 U. S. 91, 94 (1972), in turn quoting J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311 (1938) (footnote omitted). The second additional consideration that arises in the foreign commerce context is the possibility that a state tax will “impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.” 441 U. S., at 448. “A state tax on instrumentalities of foreign commerce may frustrate the achievement of federal uniformity in several ways. If the State imposes an apportioned tax, international disputes over reconciling apportionment formulae may arise. If a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax structure, foreign nations disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate against American-owned instrumentalities present in their jurisdictions. ... If other States followed the taxing State’s example, various instrumentalities of commerce could be subjected to varying degrees of multiple taxation, a result that would plainly prevent this Nation from ‘speaking with one voice’ in regulating foreign commerce.” Id., at 450-451 (footnote omitted). On the basis of the facts in Japan Line, we concluded that the California tax at issue was constitutionally improper because it failed to meet either of the additional tests mandated by the Foreign Commerce Clause. Id., at 451-454. This case is similar to Japan Line in a number of important respects. First, the tax imposed here, like the tax imposed in Japan Line, has resulted in actual double taxation, in the sense that some of the income taxed without apportionment by foreign nations as attributable to appellant’s foreign subsidiaries was also taxed by California as attributable to the State’s share of the total income of the unitary business of which those subsidiaries are a part. Second, that double taxation stems from a serious divergence in the taxing schemes adopted by California and the foreign taxing authorities. Third, the taxing method adopted by those foreign taxing authorities is consistent with accepted international practice. Finally, our own Federal Government, to the degree it has spoken, seems to prefer the taxing method adopted by the international community to the taxing method adopted by California. Nevertheless, there are also a number of ways in which this case is clearly distinguishable from Japan Line. First, it involves a tax on income rather than a tax on property. We distinguished property from income taxation in Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U. S., at 444-446, and Exxon Corp., 447 U. S., at 228-229, suggesting that “[t]he reasons for allocation to a single situs that often apply in the case of property taxation carry little force” in the case of income taxation. 445 U. S., at 445. Second, the double taxation in this case, although real, is not the “inevitable]” result of the California taxing scheme. Cf. Japan Line, 441 U. S., at 447. In Japan Line, we relied strongly on the fact that one taxing jurisdiction claimed the right to tax a given value in full, and another taxing jurisdiction claimed the right to tax the same entity in part — a combination resulting necessarily in double taxation. Id., at 447, 452, 455. Here, by contrast, we are faced with two distinct methods of allocating the income of a multinational enterprise. The “arm’s-length” approach divides the pie on the basis of formal accounting principles. The formula apportionment method divides the same pie on the basis of a mathematical generalization. Whether the combination of the two methods results in the same income being taxed twice or in some portion of income not being taxed at all is dependent solely on the facts of the individual case. The third difference between this case and Japan Line is that the tax here falls, not on the foreign owners of an instrumentality of foreign commerce, but on a corporation domiciled and headquartered in the United States. We specifically left open in Japan Line the application of that case to “domestically owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce,” id., at 444, n. 7, and — to the extent that corporations can be analogized to cargo containers in the first place — this case falls clearly within that reservation. In light of these considerations, our task in this case must be to determine whether the distinctions between the present tax and the tax at issue in Japan Line add up to a constitutionally significant difference. For the reasons we are about to explain, we conclude that they do. B In Japan Line, we said that “[e]ven a slight overlapping of tax — a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a domestic context — assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned.” Id., at 456 (footnote omitted). If we were to take that statement as an absolute prohibition on state-induced double taxation in the international context, then our analysis here would be at an end. But, in fact, such an absolute rule is no more appropriate here than it was in Japan Line itself, where we relied on much more than the mere fact of double taxation to strike down the state tax at issue. Although double taxation in the foreign commerce context deserves to receive close scrutiny, that scrutiny must take into account the context in which the double taxation takes place and the alternatives reasonably available to the taxing State. In Japan Line, the taxing State could entirely eliminate one important source of double taxation simply by adhering to one bright-line rule: do not tax, to any extent whatsoever, cargo containers “that are owned, based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in international commerce . . . Id., at 444. To require that the State adhere to this rule was by no means unfair, because the rule did no more than reflect consistent international practice and express federal policy. In this case, California could try to avoid double taxation simply by not taxing appellant’s income at all, even though a good deal of it is plainly domestic. But no party has suggested such a rule, and its obvious unfairness requires no elaboration. Or California could try to avoid double taxation by adopting some version of the “arm’s-length” approach. That course, however, would not by any means guarantee an end to double taxation. As we have already noted, the “arm’s-length” approach is generally based, in the first instance, on a multicorporate enterprise’s own formal accounting. But, despite that initial reliance, the “arm’s-length” approach recognizes, as much as the formula apportionment approach, that closely related corporations can engage in a transfer of values that is not fully reflected in their formal ledgers. Thus, for example, 26 U. S. C. § 482 provides: And, as one might expect, the United States Internal Revenue Service has developed elaborate regulations in order to give content to this general provision. Many other countries have similar provisions. A serious problem, however, is that even though most nations have adopted the “arm’s-length” approach in its general outlines, the precise rules under which they reallocate income among affiliated corporations often differ substantially, and whenever that difference exists, the possibility of double taxation also exists. Thus, even if California were to adopt some version of the “arm’s-length” approach, it could not eliminate the risk of double taxation of corporations subject to its franchise tax, and might in some cases end up subjecting those corporations to more serious double taxation than would occur under formula apportionment. “In any case of two or more . . . businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary [of the Treasury] may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such . . . businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such . . . businesses.” That California would have trouble avoiding double taxation even if it adopted the “arm’s-length” approach is, we think, a product of the difference between a tax on income and a tax on tangible property. See supra, at 187-188. Allocating income among various taxing jurisdictions bears some resemblance, as we have emphasized throughout this opinion, to slicing a shadow. In the absence of a central coordinating authority, absolute consistency, even among taxing authorities whose basic approach to the task is quite similar, may just be too much to ask. If California’s method of formula apportionment “inevitably” led to double taxation, see supra, at 188, that might be reason enough to render it suspect. But since it does not, it would be perverse, simply for the sake of avoiding double taxation, to require California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double taxation. Cf. Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U. S., at 278-280. It could be argued that even if the Foreign Commerce Clause does not require California to adopt the “arm’s-length” approach to foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations, it does require that whatever system of taxation California adopts must not result in double taxation in any particular case. The implication of such a rule, however, would be that even if California adopted the “arm’s-length” method, it would be required to defer, not merely to a single internationally accepted bright-line standard, as was the case in Japan Line, but to a variety of § 482-type reallocation decisions made by individual foreign countries in individual cases. Although double taxation is a constitutionally disfavored state of affairs, particularly in the international context, Japan Line does not require forbearance so extreme or so one-sided. C We come finally to the second inquiry suggested by Japan Line — whether California’s decision to adopt formula apportionment in the international context was impermissible because it “may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential,” 441 U. S., at 448, and “prevents the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one voice’ in international trade,” id., at 453, quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276, 286 (1976). In conducting this inquiry, however, we must keep in mind that if a state tax merely has foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign affairs, we cannot infer, “[ajbsent some explicit directive from Congress, . . . that treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical treatment by the States.” Mobil, 445 U. S., at 448. See also Japan Line, 441 U. S., at 456, n. 20; Michelin Tire Corp., supra, at 286. Thus, a state tax at variance with federal policy will violate the “one voice” standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear federal directive. The second of these considerations is, of course, essentially a species of pre-emption analysis. (1) The most obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax is the threat it might pose of offending our foreign trading partners and leading them to retaliate against the Nation as a whole. 441 U. S., at 450. In considering this issue, however, we are faced with a distinct problem. This Court has little competence in determining precisely when foreign nations will be offended by particular acts, and even less competence in deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please. The best that we can do, in the absence of explicit action by Congress, is to attempt to develop objective standards that reflect very general observations about the imperatives of international trade and international relations. This case is not like Mobil, in which the real issue came down to a question of interstate rather than foreign commerce. 445 U. S., at 446-449. Nevertheless, three distinct factors, which we have already discussed in one way or another, seem to us to weigh strongly against the conclusion that the tax imposed by California might justifiably lead to significant foreign retaliation. First, the tax here does not create an automatic “asymmetry,” Japan Line, supra, at 453, in international taxation. See supra, at 188, 192-193. Second, the tax here was imposed, not on a foreign entity as was the case in Japan Line, but on a domestic corporation. Although, California “counts” income arguably attributable to foreign corporations in calculating the taxable income of that domestic corporation, the legal incidence of the tax falls on the domestic corporation. Third, even if foreign nations have a legitimate interest in reducing the tax burden of domestic corporations, the fact remains that appellant is without a doubt amenable to be taxed in California in one way or another, and that the amount of tax it pays is much more the function of California’s tax rate than of its allocation method. Although a foreign nation might be more offended by what it considers unorthodox treatment of appellant than it would be if California simply raised its general tax rate to achieve the same economic result, we can only assume that the offense involved in either event would be attenuated at best. A state tax may, of course, have foreign policy implications other than the threat of retaliation. We note, however, that in this case, unlike Japan Line, the Executive Branch has decided not to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to the state tax. The lack of such a submission is by no means dispositive. Nevertheless, when combined with all the other considerations we have discussed, it does suggest that the foreign policy of the United States — whose nuances, we must emphasize again, are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court — is not seriously threatened by California’s decision to apply the unitary business concept and formula apportionment in calculating appellant’s taxable income. (2) When we turn to specific indications of congressional intent, appellant’s position fares no better. First, there is no claim here that the federal tax statutes themselves provide the necessary pre-emptive force. Second, although the United States is a party to a great number of tax treaties that require the Federal Government to adopt some form of “arm’s-length” analysis in taxing the domestic income of multinational enterprises, that requirement is generally waived with respect to the taxes imposed by each of the contracting nations on its own domestic corporations. This fact, if nothing else, confirms our view that such taxation is in reality of local rather than international concern. Third, the tax treaties into which the United States has entered do not generally cover the taxing activities of subnational governmental units such as States, and in none of the treaties does the restriction on “non-arm’s-length” methods of taxation apply to the States. Moreover, the Senate has on at least one occasion, in considering a proposed treaty, attached a reservation declining to give its consent to a provision in the treaty that would have extended that restriction to the States. Finally, it remains true, as we said in Mobil, that “Congress has long debated, but has not enacted, legislation designed to regulate state taxation of income.” 445 U. S., at 448. Thus, whether we apply the “explicit directive” standard articulated in Mobil, or some more relaxed standard which takes into account our residual concern about the foreign policy implications of California’s tax, we cannot conclude that the California tax at issue here is pre-empted by federal law or fatally inconsistent with federal policy. < The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is Affirmed. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Certain forms of nonbusiness income, such as dividends, are allocated on the basis of the taxpayer’s commercial domicile. Other forms of nonbusiness income, such as capital gains on sales of real property, are allocated on the basis of situs. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §§25123-25127 (West 1979). See generally Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 417, 386 P. 2d 40 (1963); Superior Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 406, 386 P. 2d 33 (1963). See the opinion of the California Court of Appeal in this case, 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 990-991, 993-995, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123, 124-126 (1981). See also Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 25137 (West 1979) (allowing for separate accounting or other alternative methods of apportionment when total formula apportionment would “not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer’s business activity in this state”). We note that the Uniform Act does not speak to this question one way or the other. See also Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §26105 (West 1979) (defining “ownership or control”). A necessary corollary of the California approach, of course, is that intercorporate dividends in a unitary business not be included in gross income, since such inclusion would result in double-counting of a portion of the subsidiary’s income (first as income attributed to the unitary business, and second as dividend income to the parent). See § 25106. Some States, it should be noted, have adopted a hybrid approach. In Mobil itself, for example, a nondomiciliary State invoked a unitary business justification to include an apportioned share of certain corporate dividends in the gross income of the taxpayer, but did not require a combined return and combined apportionment. The Court in Mobil held that the taxpayer’s objection to this approach had not been properly raised in the state proceedings. 445 U. S., at 441, n. 15. Justice Stevens, however, reached the merits, stating in part: “Either Mobil’s worldwide ‘petroleum enterprise’ is all part of one unitary business, or it is not; if it is, Vermont must evaluate the entire enterprise in a consistent manner.” Id., at 461 (citation omitted). See id., at 462 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (outlining alternative approaches available to State); cf. The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 93-96 (1982). See generally General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means: Key Issues Affecting State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Need Resolving 31 (1982). Mobil did, in fact, involve income from foreign subsidiaries, but that fact was of little importance to the case for two reasons. First, as discussed in n. 5, supra, the State in that case included dividends from the subsidiaries to the parent in its calculation of the parent’s apportionable taxable income, but did not include the underlying income of the subsidiaries themselves. Second, the taxpayer in that case conceded that the dividends could be taxed somewhere in the United States, so the actual issue before the Court was merely whether a particular State could be barred from imposing some portion of that tax. See 445 U. S., at 447. There were a number of reasons for appellant’s relatively hands-off attitude toward the management of its subsidiaries. First, it comported with the company’s general management philosophy emphasizing local responsibility and accountability; in this respect, the treatment of the foreign subsidiaries was similar to the organization of appellant’s domestic geographical divisions. Second, it reflected the fact that the packaging industry, like the advertising industry to which it is closely related, is highly sensitive to differences in consumer habits and economic development among different nations, and therefore requires a good dose of local expertise to be successful. Third, appellant’s policy was designed to appeal to the sensibilities of local customers and governments. There was also a certain spillover of goodwill between appellant and its subsidiaries; that is, appellant’s customers who had overseas needs would on occasion ask appellant’s sales representatives to recommend foreign firms, and, where possible, the representatives would refer the customers to appellant’s subsidiaries. In at least one instance, appellant became involved in the actual negotiation of a contract between a customer and a foreign subsidiary. After the notices of additional tax, there followed a series of further adjustments, payments, claims for refunds, and assessments, whose combined effect was to render the figures outlined in text more illustrative than real as descriptions of the present claims of the parties with regard to appellant’s total tax liability. These subsequent events, however, did not concern the legal issues raised in this case, nor did they remove either party’s financial stake in the resolution of those issues. We therefore disregard them for the sake of simplicity. Total income of unitary business Percentage attributed to California Amount attributed to California Tax (5.5%) 1963.... $26,870,427.00 11.041 $2,966,763.85 $163,172.01 1964.... 28,774,320.48 10.6422 3,062,220.73 168,422.14 1965.... 32,280,842.90 9.8336 3,174,368.97 174,590.29 See Exhibit A-7 to Stipulation; Record 36, 76, 77, 79, 104, 126. According to the notices, appellant’s actual tax obligations were as follows: Total income of unitary business Percentage attributed to California Amount attributed to California Tax (5.5%) 1963.... $37,348,183.00 8.6886 $3,245,034.23 $178,476.88 1964.... 44,245,879.00 8.3135 3,673,381.15 202,310.95 1965.... 46,884,966.00 7.6528 3,588,012.68 197,340.70 See Exhibit A-7 to Stipulation; Record 76, 77, 79. This approach is, of course, quite different from the one we follow in certain other constitutional contexts. See, e. g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U. S. 413 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 285 (1964). It should also go without saying that not every claim that a state court erred in making a unitary business finding will pose a substantial federal question in the first place. AS ARCO and F. W. Woolworth are consistent with this standard of review. ASARCO involved a claim that a parent and certain of its partial subsidiaries, in which it held either minority interests or bare majority interests, were part of the same unitary business. The State Supreme Court upheld the claim. We concluded, relying on factual findings made by the state courts, that a unitary business finding was impermissible because the partial subsidiaries were not realistically subject to even minimal control by ASARCO, and were therefore passive investments in the most basic sense of the term. 458 U. S., at 320-324. We held specifically that to accept the State’s theory of the case would not only constitute a misapplication of the unitary business concept, but would “destroy” the concept entirely. Id., at 326. F. W. Woolworth was a much closer case, involving one partially owned subsidiary and three wholly, owned subsidiaries. We examined the evidence in some detail, and reversed the state court’s unitary business finding, but only after concluding that the state court had made specific and crucial legal errors, not merely in the conclusions it drew, but in the legal standard it applied in analyzing the case. 458 U. S., at 363-364. In any event, although potential control is, as we said in F. W. Woolworth, not “dispositive” of the unitary business issue, id., at 362 (emphasis added), it is relevant, both to whether or not the components of the purported unitary business share that degree of common ownership which is a prerequisite to a finding of unitariness, and also to whether there might exist a degree of implicit control sufficient to render the parent and the subsidiary an integrated enterprise. As we state supra, at 167-169, there is a wide range of constitutionally acceptable variations on the unitary business theme. Thus, a leading scholar has suggested that a “flow of goods” requirement would provide a reasonable and workable bright-line test for unitary business, see Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 Nat. Tax J. 487, 501-502 (1968); Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment of Dividends and the Delineation of the Unitary Business, 14 Tax Notes 155 (Jan. 25, 1982), and some state courts have adopted such a test, see, e. g., Commonwealth v. ACF Industries, Inc., 441 Pa. 129, 271 A. 2d 273 (1970). But see, e. g., McLure, Operational Interdependence Is Not the Appropriate “Bright Line Test” of a Unitary Business — At Least Not Now, 18 Tax Notes 107 (Jan. 10, 1983). However sensible such a test may be as a policy matter, however, we see no reason to impose it on all the States as a requirement of constitutional law. Cf. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 445 (1940). See n. 15, supra. See also, e. g., F. W. Woolworth, 458 U. S., at 365 (“no phase of any subsidiary’s business was integrated with the parent’s”); ibid, (undisputed testimony stated that each subsidiary made business decisions independently of parent); id., at 366 (“each subsidiary was responsible for obtaining its own financing from sources other than the parent”); ibid. (“With one possible exception, none of the subsidiaries’ officers during the year in question was a current or former employee of the parent”) (footnote omitted). Two of the factors relied on by the state court deserve particular mention. The first of these is the flow of capital resources from appellant to its subsidiaries through loans and loan guarantees. There is no indication that any of these capital transactions were conducted at arm’s length, and the resulting flow of value is obvious. As we made clear in another context in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 850 U. S. 46, 50-53 (1955), capital transactions can serve either an investment function or an operational function. In this case, appellant’s loans and loan guarantees were clearly part of an effort to ensure that “[t]he overseas operations of [appellant] continue to grow and to become a more substantial part of the company’s strength and profitability.” Container Corporation of America, 1964 Annual Report 6, reproduced in Exhibit I to Stipulation of Facts. See generally id., at 6-9, 11. The second noteworthy factor is the managerial role played by appellant in its subsidiaries’ affairs. We made clear in F. W. Woolworth Co. that a unitary business finding could not be based merely on “the type of occasional oversight — with respect to capital structure, major debt, and dividends — that any parent gives to an investment in a subsidiary . . . .” 458 U. S., at 369. As Exxon illustrates, however, mere decentralization of day-to-day management responsibility and accountability cannot defeat a unitary business finding. 447 U. S., at 224. The difference lies in whether the management role that the parent does play is grounded in its own operational expertise and its overall operational strategy. In this case, the business “guidelines” established by appellant for its subsidiaries, the “consensus” process by which appellant’s management was involved in the subsidiaries’ business decisions, and the sometimes uncompensated technical assistance provided by appellant, all point to precisely the sort of operational role we found lacking in F. W. Woolworth. First, the one-third-eaeh weight given to the three factors is essentially arbitrary. Second, payroll, property, and sales still do not exhaust the entire set of factors arguably relevant to the production of income. Finally, the relationship between each of the factors and income is by no means exact. The three-factor formula, as applied to horizontally linked enterprises, is based in part on the very rough economic assumption that rates of return on property and payroll — as such rates of return would be measured by an ideal accounting method that took all transfers of value into account — are roughly the same in different taxing jurisdictions. This assumption has a powerful basis in economic theory: if true rates of return were radically different in different jurisdictions, one might expect a significant shift in investment resources to take advantage of that difference. On the other hand, the assumption has admitted weaknesses: an enterprise’s willingness to invest simultaneously in two jurisdictions with very different true rates of return might be adequately explained by, for example, the difficulty of shifting resources, the decreasing marginal value of additional investment, and portfolio-balancing considerations. The “arm’s-length” approach is also often applied to geographically distinct divisions of a single corporation. The stipulation of facts indicates that the tax returns filed by appellant’s subsidiaries in their foreign domiciles took into account “only the applicable income and deductions incurred by the subsidiary or subsidiaries in that country and not. . . the income and deductions of [appellant] or the subsidiaries operating in other countries.” App. 72. This does hot conclusively demonstrate the existence of double taxation because appellant has not produced its foreign tax returns, and it is entirely possible that deductions, exemptions, or adjustments in those returns eliminated whatever overlap in taxable income resulted from the application of the California apportionment method. Nevertheless, appellee does not seriously dispute the existence of actual double taxation as we have defined it, Brief for Ap-pellee 114-121, but cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29, and we assume its existence for the purposes of our analysis. Cf. Japan Line, 441 U. S., at 452, n. 17. But see infra, at 196-197 (discussing whether state scheme is preempted by federal law). Note that we deliberately emphasized in Japan Line the narrowness of the question presented: “whether instrumentalities of commerce that are owned, based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in international commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad valorem property taxation by a State.” 441 U. S., at 444. Indeed, in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-349, which was argued last Term and carried over to this Term, application of worldwide combined apportionment resulted in a refund to the taxpayer from the amount he had paid under a tax return that included neither foreign income nor foreign apportionment factors. We have no need to address in this opinion the constitutionality of combined apportionment with respect to state taxation of domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries. See also n. 32, infra. Cf. Treasury Department’s Model Income Tax Treaty of June 16,1981, Art. 9, reprinted in CCH Tax Treaties ¶158 (1981) (hereinafter Model Treaty) (“Where ... an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State. . . and . . . conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which, but for those conditions would have accrued to one of the enterprises, but by reason of those conditions have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly”); J. Bischel, Income Tax Treaties 219 (1978) (hereinafter Bischel). See generally G. Harley, International Division of the Income Tax Base of Multinational Enterprise 143-160 (1981) (hereinafter Harley); Madere, International Pricing: Allocation Guidelines and Relief from Double Taxation, 10 Tex. Int’l L. J. 108, 111-120 (1975). See Surrey, Reflections on the Allocation of Income and Expenses Among National Tax Jurisdictions, 10 L. & Policy Int’l Bus. 409 (1978); Bischel 459-461, 464-466; B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 15.06 (4th ed. 1979); Harley 143-160. Another problem arises out of the treatment of intercorporate dividends. Under formula apportionment as practiced by California, inter-corporate dividends attributable to the unitary business are, like many other intercorporate transactions, considered essentially irrelevant and are not included in taxable income. See n. 5, swpra. If the “arm’s-length” method were entirely consistent, it would tax intercorporate dividends when they occur, just as all other investment income is taxed. (In which State that dividend could be taxed is not particularly important, since the issue here is international rather than interstate double taxation. See Mobil, 445 U. S., at 447-448.) It could also be argued that this would not, strictly speaking, result in double taxation, since the income taxed would be income “of” the parent rather than income “of” the subsidiary. The effect, however, would often be to penalize an enterprise simply because it has adopted a particular corporate structure. In practice, therefore, most jurisdictions allow for tax credits or outright exemptions for intercorporate dividends among closely tied corporations, and provision for such credits or exemptions is often included in tax treaties. See generally Model Treaty, Art. 23; Bischel 2. No suggestion has been made here that appellant’s dividends from its subsidiaries would have to be exempt entirely from domestic state taxation. And the grant of a credit, which is the approach taken by federal law, see 26 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., does not in fact entirely eliminate effective double taxation: the same income is still taxed twice, although the credit insures that the total tax is no greater than that which would be paid under the higher of the two tax rates involved. Moreover, once the Federal Government has allowed a credit for foreign taxes on a particular intercorporate dividend, we are not persuaded why, as a logical matter, a State would have to grant another credit of its own, since the federal credit would have already vindicated the goal of not subjecting the taxpayer to a higher tax burden that it would have to bear if its subsidiary’s income were not taxed abroad. At the federal level, double taxation is sometimes mitigated by provisions in tax treaties providing for intergovernmental negotiations to resolve differences in the approaches of the respective taxing authorities. See generally Model Treaty, Art. 25; 2 New York University, Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation § 31.03[2] (1982) (hereinafter N. Y. U. Institute). But cf. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 428,443-444 (1963) (role of such provisions procedural rather than substantive). California, however, is in no position to negotiate with foreign governments, and neither the tax treaties nor federal law provides a mechanism by which the Federal Government could negotiate double taxation arising out of state tax systems. In any event, such negotiations do not always occur, and when they do occur they do not always succeed. We recognize that the fact that the legal incidence of a tax falls on a corporation whose formal corporate domicile is domestic might be less significant in the case of a domestic corporation that was owned by foreign interests. We need not decide here whether such a case would require us to alter our analysis. The Solicitor General did submit a memorandum opposing worldwide formula apportionment by a State in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-349, a case that was argued last Term, and carried over to this Term. Although there is no need for us to speculate as to the reasons for the Solicitor General’s decision not to submit a similar memorandum or brief in this case, cf. Brief for National Governors’ Association et al. as Amici Curiae 6-7, there has been no indication that the position taken by the Government in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. still represents its views, or that we should regard the brief in that case as applying to this case. See generally Model Treaty, Art. 7(2); Bischel 33-38, 459-461. See Model Treaty, Art. 1(3); Bischel 718; N. Y. U. Institute § 31.04[3], See Bischel 7. See 124 Cong. Rec. 18400, 19076 (1978). There is now pending one such bill of which we are aware. See H. R. 2918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALL STATES FREIGHT, INC., et al. v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD CO. et al. No. 22. Argued October 21, 1964. Decided December 14, 1964. Homer S. Carpenter argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was John S. Fessenden. Edward A. Kaier and Eugene E. Hunt argued the cause for appellees. With them on the brief were Margaret P. Allen and John A. Daily. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Frank. Goodman, Lionel Kestenbaum and Fritz R. Kahn. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge district court setting aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which had disallowed certain freight rates filed by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company (hereafter “the New Haven”) and other rail carriers. The issue presented is whether § 1 (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, which requires carriers “to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable classifications of property for transportation, with reference to which,rates, tariffs, regulations, or practices are or may be made or prescribed,” is applicable to so-called all-commodity freight rates. The Commission, with three members dissenting, held that § 1 (6) does apply to such rates, and that the section was violated by the rate schedules here in question. . 315 I. C. C. 419. The District Court held that' § 1 (6) requires “the maintenance in being of class rates” but does not prohibit “competitively compelled departures from classifications, within the established maxima, absent some other violation of the Act than the mere departure from the classification.” 221 F. Supp.' 370, 374. We agree with the District Court and affirm the judgment before us. A general word as to the basic distinction between class rates and commodity rates may be appropriate before proceeding to the specifics of the present case. Class rates were at the foundation of the railroad rate structure at the time of the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887. Such rates are applied to traffic through two separate tariffs. One tariff, the “classification,” assigns each of the many thousand commodities carried by rail to one of presently some 30 categories or classes, based upon the commodity’s particular characteristics.. A companion tariff specifies the rate at which each class of freight will be carried. By contrast, commodity rates, which were also in existence at the time of the original passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, are rates made specifically applicable for the carriage of a particular commodity or group of commodities from one designated point to another. The original function of commodity rates, which are generally lower than class rates, was to encourage the movement of bulk commodities, such as coal and grain. With the onset and rapid growth of intermodal competition, the railroads increasingly turned to commodity rates in an effort to prevent diversion of traffic to other modes of transportation. Since 1932, numerous all-commodity or all-freight rail rates have been established between various points throughout the country. Typically, such rates have not literally applied to all commodities, but to a broad number, and they have often applied only to mixed carload shipments. Today only a small fraction of rail carload tonnage moves on class rates; by far the major portion moves on commodity rates of some kind. In the summer of 1958 the rail carriers competing with the New Haven established a trailer-on-flatcar service.. Under this system truck-trailers loaded with various commodities are brought to the railroad’s loading ramp for carriage on freight cars to destination for delivery to the consignee at the railroad’s unloading ramp. . This type' of service was instituted in an effort to meet motor carrier competition. Eastern Central Motor Carriers Assn. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 314 I. C. C. 5. The New Haven had physical clearance problems and equipment shortages which prevented its participation in this type of freight transportation, and during the first two months that the trailer-on-flatcar rates were in effect bn competing railroads, the New Haven lost the equivalent of more than 350 cars of traffic from Boston to St. Louis, and suffered substantial further losses of traffic westward from othdr New England points. In order to compete with the trailer-on-flatcar rates, and in an effort to cope with a significant imbalance between eastbound and westbound traffic over its lines, the New Haven filed with, the Commission the all-commodity rates which have become the subject of the present litigation. These rates applied to traffic between specified New England points and Chicago and St. Louis. Restricted to boxcar freight moving westward, in straight or mixed carloads, the rates were graduated according to minimum weight per car. They did not apply to certain designated kinds of traffic. The Commission initially suspended the rates, but allowed them to become effective on July 6, 1959, and they have remained in effect since that date. Various motor carrier associations and some of their individual members protested the rates, but in February 1961, Division 2 of the Commission filed a report approving them. 313 I. C. C. 275. On reconsideration later that year, the full Commission held by a divided vote that the rates violated § 1 (6) of the Act. 315 I. C. C. 419. The District Court set aside the Commission’s order and enjoined its enforcement, holding that the order rested on an erroneous interpretation of § 1 (6) of the Act. The intervening protestants brought this appeal here, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 376 U. S. 961. It is clear that § 1 (6) gives the Commission power to require that carriers maintain just and reasonable classifications in conjunction with the setting of class rates. The question here posed is whether that section applies to commodity rates as well, and specifically whether it applies to all-commodity rates. No doubt the language of the statute, “just and reasonable classifications of property” and “just and reasonable regulations and practices affecting classifications” is susceptible of a construction which would embrace the rates in issue here. The rates do not apply to a single, uniquely identifiable article but to a large group of commodities, which could be described as a classification of property. But the fact that the terms of the statute can be interpreted broadly enough to encompass these rates without doing violence to the English language does not settle the problem. It remains to inquire whether the legislative history warrants or the statutory structure supports such a broad interpretation. At the time of the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act the vast preponderance of rail freight traffic moved pn class rates. These classes as well as the rates applicable to them varied greatly among different railroads and different sections of the country. When the Interstate Commerce Act was formulated, consideration was given to empowering the Commission to prescribe classifications, but it was finally concluded that the provisions of the bill which required publication of rates and classifications, together with the provisions regulating unreasonable rates, would ultimately prove adequate to achieve the desired uniformity of classifications. Beginning with its First Annual Report, however, the Commission expressed its concern with the continuing lack of uniformity in freight classifications, and seven years later recommended that it be empowered to make a uniform classification. In 1906 the Hepburn Act gave the Commission power for the first time to prescribe maximum reasonable rates, but transportation charges could still be increased by changes in the classification of any commodity. The Commission had succeeded in exercising power over classifications in proceedings under §§ 1, 2, and 3 of the Act, and in many cases had declared classifications of particular commodities to be unreasonable. However, the power of the Commission to halt manipulation of the classification rate system had been thrown into serious doubt by a case decided in 1905. It was against this background that § 1 (6) was enacted in 1910 as part of the Mann-Elkins Act, which also gave the Commission power to find classifications unreasonable and to. prescribe reasonable classifications for the future. The immediate genesis of these provisions seems to have been a special message to Congress by President Taft recommending “. . . that the commission shall be fully empowered, beyond any question, to pass upon the classifications of commodities for purposes of fixing rates, in like manner as it may now do with respect to the maximum rate applicable to any transportation.” During the course of the debate on the proposed bill in the House of Representatives, Congressman Russell, a member of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, said “[T]he shipper can be extorted from; he can be made to pay an unjust rate just as well through classification as he can through the fixing of a rate. The . carriers can put an article in one classification, subject to a given rate, and if the Interstate Commerce Commission sees fit to declare that rate unreasonable, and reduce it, declaring what shall be a reasonable rate to take its place, the carrying corporation can obtain the same benefit and put the shipper under the same disadvantages by simply changing the classification of the article;” Chairman Mann stated that “classification of freight is just as "important as rates, because by. moving a particular article from one class to another you affect the rates.” He added that “in the course of time undoubtedly the power of the commission to have control of classifications will lead to greater uniformity and possibly to complete uniformity of classifications.” The Senate Report alluded only to the doubt which had been recently cast upon the Commission’s power to deal, with classifications. This legislative history makes it apparent that the object of § 1 (6) was to give the Commission clear power to deal with the twin problems which had arisen in the administration of class rates — the possibility of their manipulation to avoid maximum rate regulation and their lack ,qf uniformity. Those problems never affected commodity rates, because those rates were competitively compelled reductions from whatever class rates , would otherwise be applicable, and because standardization of commodity rates would have been completely inconsistent with their basic function of accommodating specific particularized competitive . conditions. The legislative history thus fully supports the conclusion that the reach of § 1 (6) of the Act was confined to class rates. This conclusion is amply confirmed by the pattern of the Commission’s decisions since § 1 (6) was enacted. The course of those decisions makes clear that the Commission has given full consideration to the question of whether § 1 (6) applies to all-commodity rates, and has squarely decided that the section is inapplicable. All-commodity rates first came under scrutiny of the Commission more than 25 years ago. In 1937 and 1938, the Commission approved all-commodity rates on four different occasions without the slightest suggestion that the rates were subject to the provisions of § 1 (6). The principal concern of the Commission’s inquiry in these cases was to ascertain whether the rates were prejudicial to any person, locality, or déscription of traffic. In a similar case decided in 1939, Commissioner Alldredge filed a dissent expressing the view that § 1 (6) did apply to all-commodity rates, and that the rates in question violated that section by lumping into a single category articles which had traditionally been assigned to different categories under the customary classification criteria.' With Commissioner Alldredge’s dissent putting in issue the applicability of § 1 (6), it is clear that the Commission consciously rejected his position. Two years later, however, the view taken by Commissioner Alldredge prevailed in a two-to-one order by Division 3, which struck down all-commodity rates as violative of § 1 (6). With the decisions thus in conflict, the problem received consideration by the full Commission a year later in All Freight to Pacific Coast, 248 I. C. C. 73. There the Commission squarely held that § 1 (6) does not apply to all-commodity rates. Its report stated: “Respondents now maintain a full line of class rates . governed by the western classification from and to all of the points involved in this proceeding, as required by section 1 (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act. They also maintain hundreds of lower rates as exceptions to the classification,. including commodity rates, that are not subject to the classification ratings nor to rules as to mixing of commodities in carloads. “Class rates normally reflect the maximum of reasonableness on goods falling within the various classes of traffic. Commodity rates are established, and necessary or desirable exceptions to the classification are made, when circumstances and conditions suggest that the class basis is too high for application on the traffic. We have approved this basis of rate making, and have never required commodity rates to conform to the ratings of the classification.” 248 I. C. C., at 86-87, In a separate concurrence, Commissioner Eastman said: “As is well known, the classifications; of freight which the railroads publish are for the purpose of governing the application of their class rates. The latter are used when no . rate has been published applying specifically to the movement in question, such specific rates being called commodity rates. The railroads carry, of course, a vast multitude of separate and distinct commodities, and the class rates are a convenient device for avoiding the publication of a like multitude of separate and distinct rates. . . .” 248 I. C. C., at 88. Thereafter, the Commission rejected other challenges to all-commodity rates based on § 1 (6) upon the authority of the Pacific Freight decision, and the two-to-one decision based on § 1 (6) which Division 3 had previously rendered was recalled and decided upon another ground. In the years that followed, the Pacific Freight case was regarded as controlling, and all-commodity rate cases were decided without reference to the provisions of § 1 (6). Finally, it is significant that in approving the trailer-on-flatcar service instituted by the New Haven’s rail competitors in 1958, the Commission did not discern any problem created by § 1 (6). Thus both the legislative history and the course of the Commission’s decisions clearly impel the conclusion that § 1 (6) does not apply to all-commodity rates. In reaching this conclusion, we hardly need add that, as the Act is structured, these rates are subject to full policing by the Commission under other provisions. If a commodity rate is too high, the Commission may reduce it. If a commodity rate unjustly discriminates against a shipper, the Commission may order the discrimination removed. If a commodity rate results in an undue preference in favor of or an unreasonable prejudice against any person, locality, or description of traffic, the Commission may require that appropriate adjustments be made. If a commodity rate is unreasonably low, the Commission may order that it be increased. The District Court’s opinion contains, by way of dicta, considerable discussion concerning the continuing validity of the concept of value of service as a factor in the setting of railroad freight rates, and that subject was also discussed in' the briefs and oral arguments in this Court. But the extent to which value of service may continue as a valid element in assessing thé lawfulness, of rates under the sections of the Act applicable to commodity rates is a question we need not and dó not decide. We decide only that the District Court was correct in holding that the issues in this case, “should never have been framed under §1 (6).” Affirmed. “It is made the duty of all common carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable classifications of property for transportation, with reference to which rates, tariffs, regulations, or practices are or may be made or prescribed, and just and reasonable regulations and practices affecting classifications, rates, or tariffs, the issuance, form, and substance of tickets, receipts, and bills of lading, the manner and method of presenting, marking, packing, and delivering property for transportation, the facilitiés for transportation, the carrying of personal, sample, and excess baggage, and all other matters relating to or connected with the receiving,'handling, transporting, storing, and delivery of property subject to the provisions of this chapter which may be necessary or proper to. secure the safe and prompt-receipt, handling, transportation, and delivery of property subject to the provisions of this chapter upon just and reasonable terms, and every unjust and unreasonable classification, regulation, and practice is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.” 49 U. S. C. § 1 (6) (1958 ed.). The characteristics of a commodity which are generally considered in determining the classification to which it should be assigned are: 1. Shipping weight per cubic foot. 2. Liability to damage. 3. Liability to damage other commodities with which it is transported. 4. Perishability. 5. Liability to spontaneous combustion or explosion. 6. Susceptibility to theft. 7. Value per pound in comparison with other articles. 8. Ease or difficulty in loading or unloading. 9. Stowability. 10. Excessive weight. 11. Excessive length. 12. Care or attention necessary in loading and transporting; 13. Trade conditions. 14. Value of service. 15. Competition with other commodities transported. Motor Carrier Rates in New England, 47 M. C. C.. 657, 660-661; Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 262 I. C. C. 447, 508; Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 76, 25 I. C. C. 442, 472-473. Every day the New Haven was dispatching approximately 150 émpty boxcars to Chicago and St. Louis, with' an annual carrying capacity of 3,000,000 tons. The rates did not apply to import, export, or ex-water traffic. In addition, certain commodities were excluded, such as livestock, explosives, scientific equipment, and easily damaged goods. The Commission’s report also spoke of the rates as “constituting a destructive competitive practice in contravention, of the national transportation policy,” but in a brief filed here the Commission has pointed out that this statement was “merely an adjunct to the Commission’s ruling that the rates violated Section 1 (6),” and that this conclusion “cannot be sustained as an independent basis for disallowing the rates, in the absence of additional findings.” The Commission and the United States did not appeal. • Instead, the Commission reopened the case for further hearings, since it entertained doubt as.;to the adequacy of its findings. Those further hearings have been postponed pending resolution of this' appeal. . The Commission has filed a brief on the merits, however, agreeing,-as do . all the parties, that the § 1 (6) issue is necessarily presented by "this appeal. We agree, and further agree with the Commission that there is nothing in the District Court’s judgment or in our disposition of this appeal to prevent.further Commission proceedings with respect to these rates. S. Rep. No. 46,49th Cong., 1st Sess., 188. 1 I. C. C. Ann. Rep. 30-32 (1887). 8 I. C. C. Ann. Rep. 38-39. See also 5 I. C. C. Ann. Rep. 33. 34 Stat. 589, 49.U. S. C. § 15 (1) (1958 ed.). James Pyle & Sons v. East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia R. Co., 1 I. C. C. 465 (1888); Thurber v. New York Central & H. R. Co., 3 I. C. C. 473 (1890); see National Hay Assn. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 9 I. C. C. 264 (1902). Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 134 F. 942, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 202 U. S. 613. In this case the court struck down a Commission order commanding the reclassification of hay and straw to a lower-rated class. 36 Stat. 546, 551, 552; 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 (6), 15 (1), 15 (7) (1958. ed.). H. R. Rep. No. 923, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 3. 45 Cong. Rec. 5142. 45 Cong. Rec. 4578. Ibid. The Senate Report stated: “Some doubt has been raised as to whether, under the provisions of section 15 of the existing act, the commission is empowered to review classifications of freight as well as rates, and to make orders dealing with improper classifications. (Judson on Interstate Com-' merce, Ed. of 1908, secs. 209, 210.) By section 9 of the bill, this doubt is removed and the power is expressly vested in the commission.” S. Rep. No. 355, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1910). The authority primarily relied on by the Judson treatise was the Lake Shore casa, note 12, supra. Freight from Boston to East Hartford, 223 I. C. C. 421 (Div. 4, 1937); Commodities between Chicago, Ill., and Twin Cities, 226 I. C. C. 356 (Div. 3, 1938); All Freight between Boston & Maine Railroad Points, 226 I. C. C. 387 (Div. 4, 1938); All Freight from Chicago and St. Louis to Birmingham, 226 I. C. C. 455 (Div. 3, 1938). All Freight between Harlem River, N. Y., and Boston, 234 I. C. C. 673 (Div. 3, 1939). See also Commissioner Alldredge’s dissents in the following cases: All Freight from Chicago and St. Louis to Santa Rosa, N. Mex., 243 I. C. C. 517 (Div. 2, 1941); All Freight between Los Angeles and Albuquerque, 28 M. C. C. 161 (Div. 3, 1941). All Freight from Eastern Ports to the South, 245 I. C. C. 207 (Div. 3, 1941). See also the decision under §216 (b) of the Interstate- Commerce Act by Commissioners Alldredge and Johnson in AU Freight from Chicago and St. Louis to El Paso, Tex., 28 M. C. C. 727 (Div. 2, 1941). All Freight from Butte, Mont., to Spokane, Wash., 251 I. C. C. 291 (Div. 2, 1942); All Freight Rates to Points in Southern Territory, 253 I. C. C. 623 (1942). All Freight from Eastern Ports to the South, 251 I. C. C. 361 (1942). See All Freight, Straight Carloads, to and from the South, 258 I. C. C. 579 (Div. 2, 1944); All-Commodity Rates between Calif. and Ore., Wash., 293 I. C. C. 327 (Div. 3, 1954). Eastern Central Motor Carriers Assn. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 314 I. C. C. 5, 48-49. The trailer-on-flatcar rates, unlike the all-commodity rates involved in the present case-, are subject to a mixing rule requiring that the lading consist of at least two commodities, no one of which shall exceed 60% of- the total volume of the lading. But the New.Hayen points out that this mixing-rule is satisfied whenever two straight trailerloads, each containing a different commodity, are tendered at the same loading platform under a single bill of lading, even though they may be consigned by different shippers and destined for different consignees. 49 U. 8. C. §§ 1 (5) and 15 (Í) (1958 ed.). 49 U. S. C. §§ 2 and 15 (1) (1958 ed.). 49 U. S. C. §§3 (1) and 15 (1) (1958 ed.). 49 U. 8. C. §§ 1 (5), 15a (2), 15a (3), and 15 (1) (1958 ed.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHMIDT, DIRECTOR OF WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. v. LESSARD No. 73-568. Decided January 14, 1974 Per Curiam. In October and November 1971, appellee Alberta Lessard was subjected to a period of involuntary commitment under the Wisconsin State Mental Health Act, Wis. Stat. § 51.001 et seq. While in confinement, she filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, on behalf óf herself and all other persons 18 years of age or older who were being held involuntarily pursuant to the Wisconsin involuntary-commitment laws, alleging that the statutory scheme was violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) and 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Since both declaratory and injunctive relief were sought, a District Court of three judges was convened, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281. After hearing argument and receiving briefs, the District Court filed a comprehensive opinion, declaring the Wisconsin statutory scheme unconstitutional. 349 F. Supp. 1078. The opinion concluded by stating that “Alberta Lessard and the other members of her class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief against further enforcement of the present Wisconsin scheme against them. . . . [Miss Lessard] is also entitled to an injunction against any further extensions of the invalid order which continues to make her subject to the jurisdiction of the hospital authorities.” Id., at 1103. Over nine months later, the District Court entered a judgment, which simply stated that “It is Ordered and Adjudged that judgment be and hereby is entered in accordance with the Opinion heretofore entered . . . .” The defendant-appellants now seek to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. That statute provides that “Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” In response, the appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Relying upon this Court’s decision in Gunn v. University Committee to End the War, 399 U. S. 383, she claims that the District Court’s judgment did not constitute “an order granting or denying” an injunction. In Gunn, a statutory three-judge court had found a Texas breach of the peace statute unconstitutional. There, as here, the opinion of the District Court concluded by stating that the plaintiffs “are entitled to . . . injunctive relief.” University Committee to End the War v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 469, 475 (WD Tex.). The District Court in Gunn, however, entered no further order or judgment of any kind; the concluding paragraph of the opinion was the only mention of injunctive relief. Thus, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, because of the total absence of any order “granting or denying” an injunction. Although the language of the District Court opinion here parallels that in Gunn, there is thus an important distinction between the two cases. While the record in Gunn was devoid of any order granting injunctive relief, there was in the present case a judgment entered “in accordance with the Opinion.” Since the opinion of the District Court by its own terms authorizes the granting of injunctive relief to the appellee, we believe that the judgment here is sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Yet, although sufficient to invoke our appellate jurisdiction, the District Court’s order provides a wholly inadequate foundation upon which to premise plenary judicial review. Rule 65 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part: “Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained . . . .” The order here falls far short of satisfying the second and third clauses of Rule 65 (d). Neither the brief judgment order nor the accompanying opinion is “specific” in outlining the “terms” of the'injunctive relief granted; nor can it be said that the order describes “in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts sought to be restrained.” Rather, the defendants are simply told not to enforce “the present Wisconsin scheme” against those in the appellee’s class. As we have emphasized in the past, the specificity provisions of Rule 65 (d) are no mere technical requirements. The Rule was designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood. International Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Assn., 389 U. S. 64, 74-76; Gunn, supra, at 388-389. See generally 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 65.11; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2955. Since an injunctive order prohibits conduct under threat of judicial punishment, basic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed. The requirement of specificity in injunction orders performs a second important function. Unless the trial court carefully frames its orders of injunctive relief, it is impossible for an appellate tribunal to know precisely what it is reviewing. Gunn, supra, at 388. We can hardly begin to assess the correctness of the judgment entered by the District Court here without knowing its precise bounds. In the absence of specific injunctive relief, informed and intelligent appellate review is greatly complicated, if not made impossible. Hence, although the order below is sufficient to invoke our appellate jurisdiction, it plainly does not satisfy the important requirements of Rule 65 (d). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Vacated and remanded. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. The record in this case suggests that a good deal of confusion has been engendered by the absence of a specific injunctive order. About six months after the opinion in this action was entered, the appellee submitted a memorandum to the District Court, alleging numerous instances of “noncompliance” with the decision and requesting affirmative judicial relief. No action was taken on this request, and, on July 18, 1973, both the appellee and the appellants joined in a "Motion to Reconvene for Clarification of Opinion.” That motion outlined the uncertainty that had followed the District Court’s original opinion, and asked the court to “clarify” its precise holdings. The District Court has taken no action on this joint motion, perhaps because of the subsequent filing of a notice of appeal. "The judicial contempt power is a potent weapon. When it is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be a deadly one. Congress responded to that danger by requiring that a federal court frame its orders so that those who must obey them will know what the court intends to require and what it means to forbid.” International Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Assn., 389 U. S. 64, 76.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LOCAL NUMBER 93, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, C. L. C. v. CITY OF CLEVELAND et al. No. 84-1999. Argued February 25, 1986 Decided July 2, 1986 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O’ConnoR, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 530. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 531. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 535. William L. Summers argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Robert A. Dixon. Assistant Attorney General Reynolds argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Walter W. Barnett, and David K. Flynn. Edward R. Stege, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Vanguards of Cleveland. John D. Maddox argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents city of Cleveland et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et al. by Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Abigail T. Kelman, Meyer Eisenberg, Allen L. Bothenberg, and Dennis Rapps; for the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, C. L. C., by Edward J. Hickey, Jr., and Thomas A. Woodley; for Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, et al. by Robert M. Weinberg, Michael H. Gottesman, Jeremiah A. Collins, Edward D. Foy, Jr., and George H. Cohen; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Marian M. Johnston, Deputy Attorney General, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Robert M. Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska, W. Cary Edwards, Attorney General of New Jersey, Paul Bardacke, Attorney General of New Mexico, David Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, Charles G. Brown, Attorney General of West Virginia, Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Elisabeth S. Shuster; for the city of Atlanta et al. by Anthony W. Robinson; for the city of Birmingham, Alabama, by James P. Alexander, Linda A. Friedman, and James K. Baker; for the city of Detroit by Daniel B. Edelman, John H. Suda, Charles L. Reischel, Frederick N. Merkin, and Robert Cramer; for the Affirmative Action Coordinating Center et al. by Frank E. Deale and Jules Lobel; for the International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters by Lembhard G. Howell; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Paul C. Saunders, Harold R. Tyler, James Robertson, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, Richard T. Seymour, Grover G. Hankins, Charles E. Carter, E. Richard Larson, and Burt Neubome; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Julius L. Chambers, Ronald L. Ellis, Clyde E. Murphy, Eric Schnapper, Grover G. Hankins, Antonia Hernandez, and Kenneth Kimerling; for the National Conference of Black Mayors, Inc., by Conrad K. Harper; for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers by Roy D. Bates, William I. Thornton, Jr., John W. Witt, Roger F. Cutler, George Agnost, James D. Montgomery, Clifford D. Pierce, Jr., William H. Taube, Charles S. Rhyne, J. Lamar Shelley, Robert J. Alfton, James K. Baker, Frank B. Gummey III, and Barbara Mather; for the National League of Cities et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and David A. Strauss; and for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Marsha Levick and Emily J. Spitzer. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Thomas R. Bagby filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether § 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g), precludes the entry of a consent decree which provides relief that may benefit individuals who were not the actual victims of the defendant’s discriminatory practices. I On October 23, 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland (Vanguards), an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a complaint charging the City and various municipal officials (hereinafter referred to collectively as the City) with discrimination on the basis of race and national origin “in the hiring, assignment and promotion of firefighters within the City of Cleveland Fire Department.” App. 6. The Vanguards sued on behalf of a class of blacks and Hispanics consisting of firefighters already employed by the City, applicants for employment, and “all blacks and Hispanics who in the future will apply for employment or will be employed as firemen by the Cleveland Fire Department.” Id., at 8. The Vanguards claimed that the City had violated the rights of the plaintiff class under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and 42 U. S. C. §§1981 and 1983. Although the complaint alleged facts to establish discrimination in hiring and work assignments, the primary allegations charged that black and Hispanic firefighters “have . . . been discriminated against by reason of their race and national origin in the awarding of promotions within the Fire Department.” App. II. The complaint averred that this discrimination was effectuated by a number of intentional practices by the City. The written examination used for making promotions was alleged to be discriminatory. The effects of this test were said to be reinforced by the use of seniority points and by the manipulation of retirement dates so that minorities would not be near the top of promotion lists when positions became available. In addition, the City assertedly limited minority advancement by deliberately refusing to administer a new promotional examination after 1975, thus cancelling out the effects of increased minority hiring that had resulted from certain litigation commenced in 1973. As just noted, the Vanguards’ lawsuit was not the first in which the City had to defend itself against charges of race discrimination in hiring and promotion in its civil services. In 1972, an organization of black police officers filed an action alleging that the Police Department discriminated against minorities in hiring and promotions. See Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (ND Ohio 1972). The District Court found for the plaintiffs and issued an order enjoining certain hiring and promotion practices and establishing minority hiring goals. In 1977, these hiring goals were adjusted and promotion goals were established pursuant to a consent decree. Thereafter, litigation raising similar claims was commenced against the Fire Department and resulted in a judicial finding of unlawful discrimination and the entry of a consent decree imposing hiring quotas similar to those ordered in the Shield Club litigation. See Headen v. City of Cleveland, No. C73-330 (ND Ohio, Apr. 25, 1975). In 1977, after additional litigation, the Headen court approved a new plan governing hiring procedures in the Fire Department. By the time the Vanguards filed their complaint, then, the City had already unsuccessfully contested many of the basic factual issues in other lawsuits. Naturally, this influenced the City’s view of the Vanguards’ case. As expressed by counsel for the City at oral argument in this Court: “[W]hen this case was filed in 1980, the City of Cleveland had eight years at that point of litigating these types of cases, and eight years of having judges rule against the City of Cleveland. “You don’t have to beat us on the head.' We finally learned what we had to do and what we had to try to do to comply with the law, and it was the intent of the city to comply with the law fully . . . .” Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42. Thus, rather than commence another round of futile litigation, the City entered into “serious settlement negotiations” with the Vanguards. See Letter dated December 24, 1980, from Edward R. Stege, Jr., and Mark I. Wallach to Hon. Thomas J. Lambros. On April 27, 1981, Local Number 93 of the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C. L. C. (Local 93 or Union), which represents a majority of Cleveland’s firefighters, moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) to intervene as a party-plaintiff. The District Court granted the motion and ordered the Union to submit its complaint in intervention within 30 days. Local 93 subsequently submitted a three-page document entitled “Complaint of Applicant for Intervention.” Despite its title, this document did not allege any causes of action or assert any claims against either the Vanguards or the City. It expressed the view that “[p]romotions based upon any criterion other than competence, such as a racial quota system, would deny those most capable from their promotions and would deny the residents of the City of Cleveland from maintaining the best possible fire fighting force,” and asserted that “Local #93’s interest is to maintain a well trained and properly staffed fire fighting force and [Local 93] contends that promotions should be made on the basis of demonstrated competency, properly measured by competitive examinations administered in accordance with the applicable provisions of Federal, State, and Local laws.” App. 27, 28. The “complaint” concluded with a prayer for relief in the form of an injunction requiring the City to award promotions on the basis of such examinations. Id., at 28. In the meantime, negotiations between the Vanguards and the City continued, and a proposed consent decree was submitted to the District Court in November 1981. This proposal established “interim procedures” to be implemented “as a two-step temporary remedy” for past discrimination in promotions. Id., at 33. The first step required that a fixed number of already planned promotions be reserved for minorities: specifically, 16 of 40 planned promotions to Lieutenant, 3 of 20 planned promotions to Captain, 2 of 10 planned promotions to Battalion Chief, and 1 of 3 planned promotions to Assistant Chief were to be made to minority firefighters. Id., at 33-34. The second step involved the establishment of “appropriate minority promotion goal[s],” id., at 34, for the ranks of Lieutenant, Captain, and Battalion Chief. The proposal also required the City to forgo using seniority points as a factor in making promotions. Id., at 32-33. The plan was to remain in effect for nine years, and could be extended upon mutual application of the parties for an additional 6-year period. Id., at 36. The District Court held a 2-day hearing at the beginning of January to consider the fairness of this proposed consent decree. Local 93 objected to the use of minority promotional goals and to the 9-year life of the decree. In addition, the Union protested the fact that it had not been included in the negotiations. This latter objection particularly troubled the District Judge. Indeed, although hearing evidence presented by the Vanguards and the City in support of the decree, the Judge stated that he was “appalled that these negotiations leading to this consent decree did not include the intervenors . . . ,” and refused to pass on the decree under the circumstances. Tr. 134 (Jan. 7, 1982). Instead, he concluded: “I am going to at this time to defer this proceeding until another day and I am mandating the City and the [Vanguards] to engage the Fire Fighters in discussions, in dialogue. Let them know what is going on, hear their particular problems.” Id., at 151. At the same time, Judge Lambros explained that the Union would have to make its objections more specific to accomplish anything: “I don’t think the Fire Fighters are going to be able to win their position on the basis that, ‘Well, Judge, you know, there’s something inherently wrong about quotas. You know, it’s not fair.’ We need more than that.” Id., at 153. A second hearing was held on April 27. Local 93 continued to oppose any form of affirmative action. Witnesses for all parties testified concerning the proposed consent decree. The testimony revealed that, while the consent decree dealt only with the 40 promotions to Lieutenant already planned by the City, the Fire Department was actually authorized to make up to 66 offers; similarly, the City was in a position to hire 32 rather than 20 Captains and 14 rather than 10 Battalion Chiefs. After hearing this testimony, Judge Lambros proposed as an alternative to have the City make a high number of promotions over a relatively short period of time. The Judge explained that if the City were to hire 66 Lieutenants rather than 40, it could “plug in a substantial number of black leadership that can start having some influence in the operation of this fire department” while still promoting the same nonminority officers who would have obtained promotions under the existing system. Tr. 147-148 (Apr. 27, 1982). Additional testimony revealed that this approach had led to the amicable resolution of similar litigation in Atlanta, Georgia. Judge Lambros persuaded the parties to consider revamping the consent decree along the lines of the Atlanta plan. The proceedings were therefore adjourned and the matter was referred to a United States Magistrate. Counsel for all three parties participated in 40 hours of intensive negotiations under the Magistrate’s supervision and agreed to a revised consent decree that incorporated a modified version of the Atlanta plan. See App. 79 (Report of Magistrate). However, submission of this proposal to the court was made contingent upon approval by the membership of Local 93. Despite the fact that the revised consent decree actually increased the number of supervisory positions available to nonminority firefighters, the Union members overwhelmingly rejected the proposal; On January 11, 1983, the Vanguards and the City lodged a second amended consent decree with the court and moved for its approval. This proposal was “patterned very closely upon the revised decree negotiated under the supervision of [the] Magistrate . . . ,” App. to Pet. for Cert. A31, and thus its central feature was the creation of many more promotional opportunities for firefighters of all races. Specifically, the decree required that the City immediately make 66 promotions to Lieutenant, 32 promotions to Captain, 16 promotions to Battalion Chief, and 4 promotions to Assistant Chief. These promotions were to be based on a promotional examination that had been administered during the litigation. The 66 initial promotions to Lieutenant were to be evenly split between minority and nonminority firefighters. However, since only 10 minorities had qualified for the 52 upper-level positions, the proposed decree provided that all 10 should be promoted. The decree further required promotional examinations to be administered in June 1984 and December 1985. Promotions from the lists produced by these examinations were to be made in accordance with specified promotional “goals” that were expressed in terms of percentages and were different for each rank. The list from the 1985 examination would remain in effect for two years, after which time the decree would expire. The life of the decree was thus shortened from nine years to four. In addition, except where necessary to implement specific requirements of the consent decree, the use of seniority points was restored as a factor in ranking candidates for promotion. Id., at A29-A38. Local 93 was mentioned twice in the proposal. Paragraph 16 required the City to submit progress reports concerning compliance to both the Union and the Vanguards. Id., at A36. In paragraph 24, the court reserved exclusive jurisdiction with respect to applications or claims made by “any party, including Intervenor.” Id,., at A38. The decree imposed no legal duties or obligations on Local 93. On January 19, the City was ordered to notify the members of the plaintiff class of the terms of the proposed decree. In addition, persons who wished to object to the proposal were ordered to submit their objections in writing. Local 93 filed the following formal objection to the proposed consent decree: “Local #93 has consistently and steadfastly maintained that there must be a more equitable, more fair, more just way to correct the problems caused by the [City]. Many alternatives to the hopefully soon to be unnecessary ‘remedial’ methods embodied in the law have been explored and some have been utilized. “Local #93 reiterates it’s [sic] absolute and total objection to the use of racial quotas which must by their very nature cause serious racial polarization in the Fire Service. Since this problem is obviously the concern of the collective representative of all members of the fire service, Intervenors, Local #93. [sic] We respectfully urge this court not to implement the ‘remedial’ provisions of this Decree.” App. 98. Apart from thus expressing its opinion as to the wisdom and necessity of the proposed consent decree, the Union still failed to assert any legal claims against either the Vanguards or the City. The District Court approved the consent decree on January 31, 1983. Judge Lambros found that “[t]he documents, statistics, and testimony presented at the January and April 1982 hearings reveal a historical pattern of racial discrimination in the promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department.” App. to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland A3-A4. He then observed: “While the concerns articulated by Local 93 may be valid, the use of a quota system for the relatively short period of four years is not unreasonable in light of the demonstrated history of racial discrimination in promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department. It is neither unreasonable nor unfair to require non-minority firefighters who, although they committed no wrong, benefited from the effects of the discrimination to bear some of the burden of the remedy. Furthermore, the amended proposal is more reasonable and less burdensome than the nine-year plan that had been proposed originally.” Id., at A5. The Judge therefore overruled the Union’s objection and adopted the consent decree “as a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of the claims raised in this action.” Ibid. The District Court retained exclusive jurisdiction for “all purposes of enforcement, modification, or amendment of th[e] Decree upon the application of any party . . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. A38. The Union appealed the overruling of its objections. A panel for the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F. 2d 479 (1985). The court rejected the Union’s claim that the use of race-conscious relief was “unreasonable,” finding such relief justified by the statistical evidence presented to the District Court and the City’s express admission that it had engaged in discrimination. The court also found that the consent decree was “fair and reasonable to non-minority firefighters,” emphasizing the “relatively modest goals set forth in the plan,” the fact that “the plan does not require the hiring of unqualified minority firefighters or the discharge of any non-minority firefighters,” the fact that the plan “does not create an absolute bar to the advancement of non-minority employees,” and the short duration of the plan. Id., at 485. After oral argument before the Court of Appeals, this Court decided Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984). “Concerned with the potential impact of Stotts,” the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs, 753 F. 2d, at 485-486, but ultimately concluded that Stotts did not affect the outcome of the case. The court noted that the District Court in Stotts had issued an injunction requiring layoffs over the objection of the City, while in this case the City of Cleveland had agreed to the plan. The court reasoned that even if Stotts holds that Title VII limits relief to those who have been actual victims of discrimination, “[t]he fact that this case involves a consent decree and not an injunction makes the legal basis of the Stotts decision inapplicable.” 753 F. 2d, at 486. Local 93 petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The sole issue raised by the petition is whether the consent decree is an impermissible remedy under § 706(g) of Title VII. Local 93 argues that the consent decree disregards the express prohibition of the last sentence of § 706(g) that “[n]o order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g) (emphasis added). According to Local 93, this sentence precludes a court from awarding relief under Title VII that may benefit individuals who were not the actual victims of the employer’s discrimination. The Union argues further that the plain language of the provision that “[n]o order of the court” shall provide such relief extends this limitation to orders entered by consent in addition to orders issued after litigation. Consequently, the Union concludes that a consent decree entered in Title VII litigation is invalid if — like the consent decree approved in this case — it utilizes racial preferences that may benefit individuals who are not themselves actual victims of an employer’s discrimination. The Union is supported by the United States as amicus curiae. We granted the petition in order to answer this important question of federal law. 474 U. S. 816 (1985). The Court holds today in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, p. 421, that courts may, in appropriate cases, provide relief under Title VII that benefits individuals who were not the actual victims of a defendant’s discriminatory practices. We need not decide whether this is one of those cases, however. For we hold that whether or not § 706(g) precludes a court from imposing certain forms of race-conscious relief after trial, that provision does not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II We have on numerous occasions recognized that Congress intended voluntary compliance to be the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) (quoting United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F. 2d 354, 379 (CA8 1973)) (Title VII sanctions intended to cause employers “‘to self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country’s history’”). See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 364 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 228 (1982); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1983). This view is shared by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has promulgated guidelines setting forth its understanding that “Congress strongly encouraged employers ... to act on a voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems which constituted barriers to equal employment opportunity _” 29 CFR § 1608.1(b) (1985). According to the EEOC: “The principle of nondiscrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the principle that each person subject to Title VII should take voluntary action to correct the effects of past discrimination and to prevent present and future discrimination without awaiting litigation, are mutually consistent and interdependent methods of addressing social and economic conditions which precipitated the enactment of Title VII. Voluntary affirmative action to improve opportunities for minorities and women must be encouraged and protected in order to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in Title VII.” § 1608.1(c) (footnote omitted). It is equally clear that the voluntary action available to employers and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimination may include reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits individuals who were not actual victims of discrimination. This was the holding of Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). In Weber, an employer and a union agreed in collective bargaining to reserve for black employees 50% of the openings in an in-plant, craft-training program until the percentage of black craftworkers in the plant was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. After considering both the purposes of Title VII and its legislative history, we concluded that “[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had ‘been excluded from the American dream for so long’ constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.” Id., at 204 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we held that Title VII permits employers and unions voluntarily to make use of reasonable race-conscious affirmative action, although we left to another day the task of “defin[ing] in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans.” Id., at 208. Of course, Weber involved a purely private contractual agreement rather than a consent decree. But, at least at first blush, there does not seem to be any reason to distinguish between voluntary action taken in a consent decree and voluntary action taken entirely outside the context of litigation. Indeed, in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 88, n. 14 (1981), we held that a District Court’s order denying entry of a consent decree is appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) because such an order undermines Congress’ “strong preference for encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims” under Title VII. Moreover, the EEOC’s guidelines concerning “Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 29 CFR pt. 1608 (1985), plainly contemplate the use of consent decrees as an appropriate form of voluntary affirmative action. See, e. g., §1608.8. True, these guidelines do not have the force of law, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976), but still they “‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’” Id., at 142 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)). Therefore, absent some contrary indication, there is no reason to think that voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action such as was held permissible in Weber is rendered impermissible by Title VII simply because it is incorporated into a consent decree. Local 93 and the United States find a contrary indicator in § 706(g), which governs the courts’ remedial power under Title VII. They contend that § 706(g) establishes an independent limitation on what courts — as opposed to employers or unions — can do, prohibiting any “order of the court” from providing rélief that may benefit nonvictims. They argue that a consent decree should be treated as an “order” within the meaning of § 706(g) because it possesses the legal force and character of a judgment decreed after a trial. They rely for this conclusion on several characteristics of consent decrees: first, that a consent decree looks like and is entered as a judgment; second, that the court retains the power to modify a consent decree in certain circumstances over the objection of a signatory, see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932) (Swift II); third, that noncompliance with a consent decree is enforceable by citation for contempt of court, see United States v. City of Miami, 664 F. 2d 435, 440, and n. 8 (CA5 1981) (opinion of Rubin, J.). To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of judgments entered after litigation. At the same time, because their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble contracts. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U. S. 223, 235-237 (1975); United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971). More accurately, then, as we have previously recognized, consent decrees “have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees,” a dual character that has resulted in different treatment for different purposes. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., supra, at 235-237, and n. 10. The question is not whether we can label a consent decree as a “contract” or a “judgment,” for we can do both. The question is whether, given their hybrid nature, consent decrees implicate the concerns embodied in § 706(g) in such a way as to require treating them as “orders” within the meaning of that provision. Because this Court’s cases do not treat consent decrees as judicial decrees in all respects and for all purposes, we think that the language of § 706(g) does not so clearly include consent decrees as to preclude resort to the voluminous legislative history of Title VII. The issue is whether, when Congress used the phrase “[n]o order of the court shall require” in § 706(g), it unmistakably intended to refer to consent decrees. In addition to the fact that consent decrees have contractual as well as judicial features, the use of the verb “require” in § 706(g) suggests that it was the coercive aspect of a judicial decree that Congress had in mind. We turn therefore to the legislative history, since the language of § 706(g) does not clearly settle the matter. The conclusion in Weber that “Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action” when it enacted Title VII was largely based upon the legislative history, which shows that Congress was particularly concerned to avoid undue federal interference with managerial discretion. Weber, 443 U. S., at 205-207. As originally enacted, Title VII regulated only private enterprises; the liberal Republicans and Southern Democrats whose support was crucial to obtaining passage of the bill expressed misgivings about the potential for Government intrusion into the managerial decisions of employers and unions beyond what was necessary to eradicate unlawful discrimination. Id., at 206. Their votes were obtained only after they were given assurances that “management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.” H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29 (1963). See also, 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 14314 (remarks of Sen. Miller); id., at 15893 (remarks of Rep. McCulloch). As one commentator points out, rather than seeking to outlaw voluntary affirmative action, the more conservative proponents of Title VII who held the balance of power in 1964 “were far more concerned to avoid the intrusion into business autonomy that a rigid color-blind standard would entail.” Note, Preferential Relief Under Title VII, 65 Va. L. Rev. 729, 771, n. 224 (1979). See also, Weber, supra, at 207-208, n. 7 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 15893 (1964) (remarks of Rep. MacGregor)) (Congress was not legislating about “‘preferential treatment or quotas in employment’” because it believed that “‘the problems raised by these controversial questions are more properly handled at a governmental level closer to the American people and by communities and individuals themselves’ ”). The legislative history pertaining specifically to § 706(g) suggests that it was drafted with this concern in mind and, in fact, that a principal purpose of the last sentence of § 706(g) was to protect managerial prerogatives of employers and unions. See H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 11 (1963) (first version of § 706(g) preserving employer defense of “cause”); 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-2571 (1964) (amending this version to substitute for “any reason other than discrimination” in place of “cause”); id., at 2567 (remarks of Rep. Celler, the amendment’s sponsor, that the amendment’s purpose was “to specify cause”); id., at 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey that § 706(g) makes clear “that employers may hire and fire, promote and refuse to promote for any reason, good or bad” except when such decisions violate the substantive provisions of Title VII). Thus, whatever the extent of the limits § 706(g) places on the power of the federal courts to compel employers and unions to take certain actions that the employers or unions oppose and would not otherwise take, § 706(g) by itself does not restrict the ability of employers or unions to enter into voluntary agreements providing for race-conscious remedial action. The limits on such agreements must be found outside § 706(g). From this, it is readily apparent that consent decrees are not included among the “orders” referred to in § 706(g), for the voluntary nature of a consent decree is its most fundamental characteristic. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U. S., at 235-237; United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971); Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U. S. 19 (1959); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U. S. 900, 902 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). As we observed in United States v. Armour & Co.: “Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the litigation. Thus, the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve.” 402 U. S., at 681-682 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Indeed, it is the parties’ agreement that serves as the source of the court’s authority to enter any judgment at all. See United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 (1964) (cannot enter consent decree to which one party has not consented); Ashley v. City of Jackson, supra, at 902 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). More importantly, it is the agreement of the parties, rather than the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally based, that creates the obligations embodied in a consent decree. Consequently, whatever the limitations Congress placed in § 706(g) on the power of federal courts to impose obligations on employers or unions to remedy violations of Title VII, these simply do not apply when the obligations are created by a consent decree. The features of consent decrees designated by the Union and the United States do not require a contrary result. The fact that a consent decree looks like a judgment entered after a trial obviously does not implicate Congress’ concern with limiting the power of federal courts unilaterally to require employers or unions to make certain kinds of employment decisions. The same is true of the court’s conditional power to modify a consent decree; the mere existence of an unexer-cised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court. Finally, we reject the argument that a consent decree should be treated as an “order” within the meaning of § 706(g) because it can be enforced by a citation for contempt. There is no indication in the legislative history that the availability of judicial enforcement of an obligation, rather than the creation of the obligation itself, was the focus of congressional concern. In fact, judicial enforcement is available whether race-conscious relief is provided in a collective-bargaining agreement (as in Weber) or in a consent decree; only the form of that enforcement is different. But the difference between contractual remedies and the contempt power is not significant in any relevant sense with respect to § 706(g). For the choice of an enforcement scheme — whether to rely on contractual remedies or to have an agreement entered as a consent decree — is itself made voluntarily by the parties. Thus, it does not implicate Congress’ concern that federal courts not impose unwanted obligations on employers and unions any more than the decision to institute race-conscious affirmative action in the first place; in both cases the parties have themselves created obligations and surrendered claims in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory compromise. r-H hH I — I Relying upon Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984), and Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642 (1961), Local 93—again joined by the United States — contends that we have recognized as a general principle that a consent decree cannot provide greater relief than a court could have decreed after a trial. They urge that even if § 706(g) does not directly invalidate the consent decree, that decree is nonetheless void because the District Court “would have been powerless to order [such an injunction] under Title VII, had the matter actually gone to trial.” Brief for Petitioner 17. We concluded above that voluntary adoption in a consent decree of race-conscious relief that may benefit nonvictims does not violate the congressional objectives of § 706(g). It is therefore hard to understand the basis for an independent judicial canon or “common law” of consent decrees that would give § 706(g) the effect of prohibiting such decrees anyway. To be sure, a federal court is more than “a recorder of contracts” from whom parties can purchase injunctions; it is “an organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions . . . .” IB J. Moore, J. Lucas, & T. Currier, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.409[5], p. 331 (1984) (hereinafter Moore). Accordingly, a consent decree must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, consistent with this requirement, the consent decree must “com[e] within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings,” Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 289, 297 (1880), and must further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based, EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F. 2d 795, 799 (CA10 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Courtwright v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 952 (1980); Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 231 U. S. App. D. C. 79, 87, 90, 718 F. 2d 1117, 1125, 1128 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 1219 (1984). However, in addition to the law which forms the basis of the claim, the parties’ consent animates the legal force of a consent decree. See Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra; Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 89-90, 718 F. 2d, at 1127-1128; Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317 (1959). Therefore, a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial. See, e. g., Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra, at 295-297; Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 327-331 (1928) (Swift I) (Brandeis, J.); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, at 799-800; Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 89-91, 718 F. 2d, at 1127-1130; Sansom Committee v. Lynn, 735 F. 2d 1535, 1538-1539 (CA3), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1017 (1984); Turner v. Orr, 759 F. 2d 817, 825-826 (CA8 1985). This is not to say that the parties may agree to take action that conflicts with or violates the statute upon which the complaint was based. As noted above, the fact that the parties have consented to the relief contained in a decree does not render their action immune from attack on the ground that it violates § 703 of Title VII or the Fourteenth Amendment. However, inasmuch as the limits placed by § 706(g) on the remedial authority of a federal court — whatever these may be — are not implicated by voluntary agreements, there is no conflict with or violation of § 706(g) when a federal court enters a consent decree that provides such relief. Accordingly, to the extent that the consent decree is not otherwise shown to be unlawful, the court is not barred from entering a consent decree merely because it might lack authority under § 706(g) to do so after a trial. This simply was not the case in either Railway Employees v. Wright or Firefighters v. Stotts, in both of which the Court found conflicts between a judicial decree and the underlying statute. In Wright, a railroad and the unions representing most of its employees were charged with discriminating against nonunion employees in violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The parties entered a consent decree that prohibited, among other things, the establishment of a union shop, a restriction that was also contained in the Railway Labor Act at the time. When the Act was amended several years later to permit union shops, the unions moved to modify the consent decree; their motion was opposed by the plaintiffs and by the railroad. This Court reversed the District Court’s denial of this motion, holding that refusal to modify the consent decree constituted an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. The Court recognized that the District Court retained power to modify the consent decree and that “a sound judicial discretion” may call for such modification “if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have arisen.” 364 U. S., at 646-647. Because it viewed the intervening amendment of the Railway Labor Act as rendering the consent decree incompatible with the terms of the Act, the Court regarded as “established” the conclusion that, had the decree represented relief awarded after trial, it would have been an abuse of discretion to deny modification. Id., at 648-650. This left only the question whether “th[e] result [is] affected by the fact that we are dealing with a consent decree.” Id., at 648-650. Citing Swift II for the proposition that the power to modify a consent decree is the same as the power to modify a litigated decree, the Court held that a District Court “must... be free to modify the terms of the consent decree when a change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives.” 364 U. S., at 650-651. Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984), also involved a consent decree that the Court concluded was in conflict with the underlying statute, in that case Title VII. The plaintiffs and the city of Memphis entered into a consent decree that included the use of racial preferences for hiring and promoting firefighters. After the decree had been in effect for just over a year, budget deficits forced Memphis to lay off a number of firefighters. Because layoffs pursuant to Memphis’ “last hired, first fired” rule would undo the gains made by minority firefighters under the decree, the plaintiffs sought and obtained an injunction requiring Memphis to modify its seniority rules to protect new black employees. We reversed. We held first that the injunction could not be upheld as merely enforcing the terms of the consent decree. Id., at 572-576. The plaintiffs argued in the alternative that the injunction was justified by the change in circumstances brought about by the budget deficits and that it thus constituted a proper modification of the decree. We rejected this argument, reasoning that “the District Court’s authority to impose a modification of a decree is not wholly dependent on the decree,” but must also be consistent with the underlying statute. Id., at 576, n. 9. Noting that the Court in Wright “held that when a change in the law brought the terms of the decree into conflict with the statute pursuant to which the decree was entered, the decree should be modified over the objections of one of the parties bound by the decree,” we reasoned: “By the same token, and for the same reason, a district court cannot enter a disputed modification of a consent decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting order is inconsistent with that statute.” 467 U. S., at 576, n. 9. Because we concluded that the District Court would have been precluded by Title VII from issuing an injunction such as the one it had issued after a trial, id., at 577-583, we rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and held that “the District Court was precluded from granting such relief over the City’s objection” by modifying the consent decree, id., at 576-577, n. 9. Because § 706(g) is not concerned with voluntary agreements by employers or unions to provide race-conscious relief, there is no inconsistency between it and a consent decree providing such relief, although the court might be barred from ordering the same relief after a trial or, as in Stotts, in disputed proceedings to modify a decree entered upon consent. IV Local 93 and the United States also challenge the validity of the consent decree on the ground that it was entered without the consent of the Union. They take the position that because the Union was permitted to intervene as of right, its consent was required before the court could approve a consent decree. This argument misconceives the Union’s rights in the litigation. A consent decree is primarily a means by which parties settle their disputes without having to bear the financial and other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that one party — whether an original party, a party that was joined later, or an intervenor — could preclude other parties from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to present evidence and have its objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392, 400 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 711 F. 2d 1117, 1126 (CA2 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1005 (1984). Here, Local 93 took full advantage of its opportunity to participate in the District Court’s hearings on the consent decree. It was permitted to air its objections to the reasonableness of the decree and to introduce relevant evidence; the District Court carefully considered these objections and explained why it was rejecting them. Accordingly, “the District Court gave the union all the process that [it] was due . . . .” Zipes, supra, at 400. Of course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party, and a fortiori may not impose duties or obligations on a third party, without that party’s agreement. A court’s approval of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting interve-nors; if properly raised, these claims remain and may be litigated by the intervenor. 3B Moore ¶ 24.16[6], p. 181; see also, United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843, 845-846 (CA3 1979); Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 563 F. 2d 1233, 1237-1238 (CA5 1977). And, of course, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree. See, e. g., United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 (1964); Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U. S., at 902 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); IB Moore ¶ 0.409[5], p. 326, n. 2. However, the consent decree entered here does not bind Local 93 to do or not to do anything. It imposes no legal duties or obligations on the Union at all; only the parties to the decree can be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with its terms. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S., at 676-677. Moreover, the consent decree does not purport to resolve any claims the Union might have under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267 (1986), under § 703 of Title VII, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), or as a matter of contract, see W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757 (1983). Indeed, despite the efforts of the District Judge to persuade it to do so, the Union failed to raise any substantive claims. Whether it is now too late to raise such claims, or — if not — whether the Union’s claims have merit are questions that must be presented in the first instance to the District Court, which has retained jurisdiction to hear such challenges. The only issue before us is whether § 706(g) barred the District Court from approving this consent decree. We hold that it did not. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. The Cleveland Fire Department has six ranks of officers. From the lowest to the highest rank, these are: Lieutenant, Captain, Battalion Chief, Assistant Chief, and Chief. To obtain a promotion, a firefighter must satisfy minimum experience requirements and pass a written examination. The examination is apparently quite difficult; approximately 80% of the applicants failed the 1984 promotional examination. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Firefighters who pass the written examination are assigned a •place on a promotion eligibility list. Although rankings on the lists are based primarily on test scores, additional points are assigned on the basis of seniority. There is a separate list for each rank. These lists are to remain effective for one year, but may be extended for an additional year, and, as a practical matter, lists are ordinarily used for the full 2-year period. Promotions are made from the lists as positions become available. The vote was 660 to 89. This rejection was anticipated in the Magistrate’s Report to the District Court: “Acceptance by the general membership has always been recognized as a touch and go proposition. It was, however, believed that a favorable recommendation by Mr. Summers [counsel for the Union] and the Union’s Executive Board would be given serious consideration by the general membership. Unfortunately, recent events having no bearing on this lawsuit, pertaining to the proposed closing of fire stations, have again strained relations between the firefighters and the City. Counsel fear that these feelings may rebound in a negative vote on this issue. It can only be hoped that the general membership will realize that voting down this proposal is not a way of getting back at the City and that rejection based upon such reasoning will simply delay the day when firefighters can stand together, without regard to race, and pursue their common interests and goals rather than wasting available resources, financial or otherwise, by engaging in intramural battles. Realistically, however, there is little room for optimism at this time.” App. 78. In addition to Local 93, three individual members of the Union voiced objections to the proposed consent decree in personal letters to the District Court. The basis of their objections was the same as the Union’s. App. to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland A3 (memorandum opinion and order of District Court). The Court of Appeals also distinguished Stotts on the ground that the injunction imposed by the District Court in that ease “had the direct effect of abrogating a valid seniority system to the detriment of non-minority workers,” while “[i]n this ease, the consent decree assured the integrity of the existing seniority system.” 753 F. 2d, at 486. The petition for certiorari sets forth two questions: “1. May a District Court adopt provisions in a consent decree purporting to remedy a Title VII violation that it would have had no authority to order as a remedy if the matter had gone to trial? “2. May a municipal employer voluntarily adopt an affirmative action promotional scheme over the objections of an intervenor union duly elected to represent all employees when said promotional scheme adversely affects the rights and interests of the employees and awards relief to minority employees regardless of whether they were actual victims of past racial discrimination?” The first of these questions plainly asks only whether Title VII precludes the entry of this consent decree. Although the second question can conceivably be read to embody a more general challenge respecting the effect of the consent decree on petitioner’s legal rights, neither the petition for certiorari nor the brief on the merits discusses any issue other than whether this consent decree was prohibited by § 706(g) of Title VII. Moreover, petitioner limited its challenge below to whether the consent decree was “reasonable,” and then, after Stotts was decided, to whether the consent decree was permissible under § 706(g). Finally, the District Court’s retention of jurisdiction leaves it open for petitioner to press whatever other claims it might have before that court, see infra, at 530. Therefore,- we deem it necessary to decide only the question whether § 706(g) precluded the District Court from entering this consent decree. The United States took exactly the opposite position in Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). See Brief for United States and EEOC, O. T. 1978, Nos. 78-432, 78-435, and 78-436, pp. 26-38. We emphasize that, in light of this holding, nothing we say here is intended to express a view as to the extent of a court’s remedial power under § 706(g) in eases where that provision does apply. That question is addressed in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, at 444-479. Unlike Weber, which involved a private employer, this case involves a public employer whose voluntary actions are subject to the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as to the limitations of § 703 of Title VII. In the posture in which this case comes to us, we have no occasion to address the circumstances, if any, in which voluntary action by a public employer that is permissible under § 703 would nonetheless be barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, as is explained infra, at 530, we leave questions regarding the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the underlying agreement to further proceedings before the District Court. Nor need we decide what limits §703 places on an employer’s ability to agree to race-conscious relief in a voluntary settlement that is not embodied in a consent decree, or what showing the employer would be required to make concerning possible prior discrimination on its part against minorities in order to defeat a challenge by nonminority employees based on § 703. Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267 (1986). In any event, there may be instances in which a public employer, consistent with both the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Wygant and §703 as interpreted in Weber, could voluntarily agree to take race-conscious measures in pursuance of a legitimate remedial purpose. The only issue before us is whether, assuming, arguendo, that § 706(g) would bar a court from ordering such race-conscious relief after trial in some of these instances, § 706(g) also bars a court from approving a consent decree entered into by the employer and providing for such relief. The EEOC has not joined the brief for the United States in this case. The United States’ brief has been filed only on behalf of the Attorney General, who has some limited enforcement responsibility under Title VII, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1), and the Federal Government in its capacity as an employer, § 2000e-16. Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Although the legislative history of the 1972 amendments does not reflect the same concern with preserving the managerial discretion of governmental employers that was evident in 1964 with respect to the private sector, there is also no indication that Congress intended to leave governmental employers with less latitude under Title VII than had been left to employers in the private sector when Title VII was originally enacted. See generally Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1972). Thus, we do not suggest that voluntary action by employers or unions is outside the ambit of Title VII regardless of its effect on nonminorities. We already rejected such arguments in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976), and Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). Section 706(g), by its own terms, limits courts, not employers or unions, and focuses on preserving certain management prerogatives from interference by the federal courts. The rights of nonminorities with respect to action by their employers are delineated in § 703 of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2, and, in cases involving governmental employees, by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Weber, supra; Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267 (1986). However, as is discussed below, the court’s exercise of the power to modify the decree over the objection of a party to the decree does implicate § 706(g). Infra, at 527-528. Parties may choose to settle their disputes by consent decree rather than by private contract for a number of reasons. As one commentator points out, “[plublic law settlements are often complicated documents designed to be carried out over a period of years, ... so any purely out-of-court settlement would suffer the decisive handicap of not being subject to continuing oversight and interpretation by the court.” Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Duke L. J. 887, 899. In addition to this advantage, the National League of Cities and its joining amici add: “A consent decree has several other advantages as a means of settling litigation. It is easier to obtain enforcement of a consent decree because it will be unnecessary to prove many facts that would otherwise have to be shown in order to establish the validity of an ordinary contract. A court that maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree will have a more flexible repertoire of enforcement measures. And it is likely to be easier to channel litigation concerning the validity and implications of a consent decree into a single forum — the court that entered the decree— thus avoiding the waste of resources and the risk of inconsistent or conflicting obligations.” Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 25. For all of these reasons, consent decrees have become widely used as devices to facilitate settlement. Indeed, we have little doubt that the interpretation of § 706(g) proposed by the Union and the United States would make it substantially more difficult to settle Title VII litigation, contrary to the expressed congressional preference for voluntary remedial action.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CANTON RAILROAD CO. v. ROGAN et al., CONSTITUTING THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MARYLAND. No. 96. Argued November 28-29, 1950. Decided February 26, 1951. John Henry Lewin argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Hall Hammond, Attorney General of Maryland,' and Harrison L. Winter, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. [This opinion applies also to No. 205, Western Maryland R. Co. v. Rogan, post, p. 520.] Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of Maryland imposes on steam railroad companies a franchise tax, measured by gross receipts, apportioned to the length of their lines within the State. Appellant Canton Railroad Company, a Maryland corporation, challenges the validity of the tax under the Import-Export Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 2, insofar as the gross income by which the tax is measured includes revenues derived from the handling of goods moving in foreign trade. Canton is a common carrier of freight operating entirely within the City of Baltimore, Maryland. It maintains a marine terminal in the port of Baltimore and railroad lines connecting this terminal with the lines of major trunk-line railroads. Its operating revenues are derived from services which fall into the following classifications: Switching freight cars from the piers to the lines of connecting railroads. Storage pending forwarding, for which a charge is made for each day beyond a free period. Wharfage, or the privilege of using Canton’s piers for the transfer of cargo to lighters or to trucks. Weighing of loaded freight cars. Furnishing a crane for use in unloading vessels. This crane is operated by a stevedoring company, which pays Canton a set charge per ton for the “crane privilege.” A substantial proportion of the freight moved to and from the port consists of exports from and imports into the United States. In its report to the State Tax Commission for 1946, Canton showed gross receipts from its railroad business in Maryland of $1,588,744.48, of which it claimed $705,957.21 to be exempt from taxation because derived from operations in foreign commerce. After a hearing, the Commission rejected Canton’s contention that a part of its gross receipts was constitutionally exempt from the tax, assessed its gross receipts at the higher figure, and imposed a tax of $39,092.34. The Commission’s order was affirmed both by the Baltimore Circuit Court and by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, two judges dissenting. -Md.-, 73 A. 2d 12. The case is here on appeal. The Constitution commands in Art. I, § 10, cl. 2 that “No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws . . . .” The Maryland court held that the tax does not violate this provision of the Constitution; and we agree. If this were a tax on the articles of import and export, we would have the kind of problem presented in Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S. 69; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652; and Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 337 U. S. 286. But the present tax is not on the articles of import and export; nor is it the equivalent of a direct tax on the articles, as was held to be true of stamp taxes on foreign bills of lading (Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283), stamp taxes on charter parties in foreign commerce (United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1); and stamp taxes on policies insuring exports against maritime risks. Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U. S. 19. It is true that the latter cases indicate that the prohibition of the Import-Export Clause against taxes on imports and exports involves more than an exemption from taxes laid upon the goods themselves. Moreover, Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, following the reasoning of Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 444-445, gave like immunity to the business of selling goods in foreign commerce when gross receipts were taxed. Cf. Anglo-Chilean Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218. Though appellant is not engaged in the import-export business, it claims that its handling of goods, which are destined for export or which arrive as imports, is part of the process of exportation and importation. In support of the argument it refers to language in Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, supra, and Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, supra, relative to when the export process starts; and it argues that, if the baseballs and the baseball bats in Spalding and the oil in Richfield were immune from the sales taxes because those commodities had been committed to exportation, the same immunity should be allowed here since the goods handled by appellant were similarly committed. The difference is that in the present case the tax is not on the goods but on the handling of them at the port. An article may be an export and immune from a tax long before or long after it reaches the port. But when the tax is on activities connected with the export or import the range of immunity cannot be so wide. To export means to carry or send abroad; to import means to bring into the country. Those acts begin and end at water’s edge. The broader definition which appellant tenders distorts the ordinary meaning of the terms. It would lead back to every forest, mine, and factory in the land and create a zone of tax immunity never before imagined. For if the handling of the goods at the port were part of the export process, so would hauling them to or from distant points or perhaps mining them or manufacturing them. The phase of the process would make no difference so long as the goods were in fact committed to export or had arrived as imports. Appellant claims that loading and unloading are a part of its activities. But close examination of the record indicates that it merely rents a crane for loading and unloading and does not itself do the stevedoring work. Hence we need not decide whether loading for export and unloading for import are immune from tax by reason of the Import-Export Clause. Cf. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U. S. 422. We do conclude, however, that any activity more remote than that does not commence the movement of the commodities abroad nor end their arrival and therefore is not a part of the export or import process. The objection to Maryland’s tax on the ground that interstate commerce is involved is not well taken. It is settled that a nondiscriminatory gross receipts tax on an interstate enterprise may be sustained if fairly apportioned to the business done within the taxing state (see Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255) and not reaching any activities carried on beyond the borders of the state. Where transportation is concerned, an apportionment according to the mileage within the state is an approved method. Greyhound Lines v. Medley, 334 U. S. 653, 663. Affirmed. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. By Mr. Justice Jackson, whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter joins, reserving judgment. In this case, I reserve judgment in the belief that today’s decision of the Court may be found, upon consideration of matters not briefed or argued, to be untenable. One of the fundamental federal policies, established by the Constitution itself, is that “No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another . . . .” Art. I, § 9, cl. 6. This policy is further implemented by a requirement that federal duties, imposts and excises be uniform (Art. I, § 8, cl. 1), and by a prohibition of any federal tax or duty on articles exported from a state (Art. I, § 9, el. 5). But this policy of equality of access to the high seas can also be upset by the states. Hence the Constitution forbids any state, without the consent of Congress, to lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except to pay the cost of inspection laws. Art. I, § 10, cl. 2. This detailed constitutional concern about exports and imports is a manifestation of a realistic recognition that a state or city with a safe harbor sits at a gateway with not only an inevitable natural advantage, but also a strategic one which may be exploited if not restrained. Political influence of wealthy and populous port areas was feared in the making of federal law, hence the restrictions on Congress. The disposition of cities and states to. exploit their location astride the Nation’s portals also was feared, hence the restriction on the states. If the roads to the ports may be obstructed with local regulation and taxes, inland producers may be made to pay tribute to the seaboard for the privilege of exportation, and the longer the road to port, the more localities that may lay burdens on the passing traffic. The evident policy of the Constitution is to avoid these burdens and maintain free and equal access to foreign ports for the inland areas. If the constitutional policy can be avoided by shifting the tax from the exported article itself to some incident such as carriage, unavoidable in the process of exportation, then the policy is a practical nullity. I think prohibition of a tax on exports and imports goes beyond exempting specific articles from direct ad valorem duties— it prohibits taxing exports and imports as a process. This is a matter of giving the inland farms and factories a fair access to the sea which will enable them to compete in foreign commerce, as well as to make imports as equally available as possible, regardless of distance from port. Ocean rates to a given foreign port are the same from all Atlantic ports, so that any differences in the costs of reaching the coast from the inland cannot be offset and represent net differences in the costs of reaching foreign markets. Congress, the Interstate Commerce Commission, this Court, and American rail and motor carriers have all concurred in the development of rate structures on the premise that exports are to be recognized as such from the time they are delivered to the carrier for export and not merely when they reach the water’s edge. There is a wealth of statutory material relating to the carriage of goods for export by railroads, motor carriers, and shipping companies. Railroads have established lawful tariffs for export goods substantially less than for like goods destined for local markets. Texas & P. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197; Texas & P. R. Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627. In the latter case, this Court recognized that export and import shipments, although not made on through bills, might lawfully be transported at rates below those charged for domestic traffic between the same points. Id., at 636. The differential, I believe, is sometimes as much as fifty percent of the local tariff over the same route. Of course, if the export character of the goods is not to be recognized until they are ready to board or have boarded ship, this is a rank discrimination against local shippers quite without justification. What Maryland has done, if these goods while in transit do constitute exports, is to tax gross proceeds of their transportation and handling, not merely the profits therefrom. This adds directly to the cost of their reaching ship-side, and the greater distance they travel, the greater possible accumulation of tax burden. Clearly, this is an obstruction in the path of the federal policy. However, the effect of the federal policy on the validity of the Maryland tax was not advanced in the courts below nor here by railroad counsel, so I do not wish to express a final view on the matter. But I suspect today’s decision will cause mischief in quarters we have not considered. Md. Ann. Code (1943 Supp.), Art. 81, §§ 94% and 95. This case involved a federal tax equivalent to 3 per cent of the price “upon all tennis rackets, golf clubs, baseball bats,” etc. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, § 600 (f),. 40 Stat. 300, 316. It presented, as did the Fairbank, Hvoslef, and Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. cases, a question under Art. I, § 9, cl. 5 of the Constitution, which provides, “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.” The tax required of appellant is "upon such proportion of its gross earnings as the length of its line in this State bears to the whole length of its line.” § 95 (b), supra, note 1. As demonstrative that Congress is vitally concerned about exports and imports, see 15 U. S. C. § 173, respecting the annual report on statistics of commerce required of the Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, in which he must outline the “kinds, quantities, and values” of all articles exported of imported, showing the exports to and imports from each foreign country and their values, the exports being required to be broken down into those manufactured in the United States and their value, and those manufactured in other countries and their value. Also, although the Interstate Commerce Act does not apply to carriers engaged in foreign commerce insofar as their carriage beyond the limits of the United States is concerned, 49 U. S. C. § 902 (i) (3); 49 C. F. R.. § 141.67, their state-side activities have received considerable attention. Chapter 12, Part III of the Act, relating to water carriers, defines “common carrier by water” as “any person which holds itself out to the general public to engage in the transportation by water in interstate or foreign commerce of passengers or property (Emphasis supplied.) 49 U. S. C. §902 (d). Section 905 (b) of the same Title states: “It shall be the duty of common carriers by water to establish reasonable through routes . . . with common carriers by railroad . . . and just and reasonable rates . . . applicable thereto .... Common carriers by water may establish reasonable through routes and rates . . . with common carriers by motor vehicle. . . .” And § 905 (c) provides that, “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water to . . . give . . . any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, . . . territory, or description of traffic Further congressional concern is evidenced in 49 U. S. C. § 906 (a) : “Every common carrier by water shall file with the Commission, and print, and keep open to public inspection tariffs showing all rates, fares, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, and practices for the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of passengers and property between, places on its own route, and between such places and places on the route of any other such carrier or on the route of any common carrier by railroad or by motor vehicle, when a through route and joint rate shall have been established. . . .” See also 49 U. S. C. .§6, par. (12), providing: “If any common carrier subject to this chapter and chapters 8 and 12 of this title enters into arrangements with any water carrier operating from a port in the United States to a foreign country ... for the handling of through business between interior points of the United States and such foreign country, the Commission may by order require such common carrier to enter into similar arrangements with any or all other lines of steamships operating from said port to the same foreign country.” The ever-present concern with through routes and joint rates would appear a strong indication that the Congress regards goods as in export from the time they are first consigned to a carrier for a foreign destination, not from the time they reach the ship on which they are to be carried.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHIPPS. No. 83. Argued December 10, 1948. Decided March 14, 1949. Stanley M. Silverberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson and Helen Goodner. W. Clayton Carpenter argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Montgomery Dorsey and William L. Branch. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a tax-free liquidation by a parent corporation of some of its subsidiaries. At the time of the liquidation the parent had earnings and profits available for distribution, and the subsidiaries had an aggregate net deficit. The issue now before us is whether the rule of Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. 2d 931, requires the subtraction of the subsidiaries’ deficit from the parent’s earnings and profits, in determining whether a subsequent distribution by the parent constituted dividends or a return of capital to its stockholders. The Sansome case, supra, arose from a tax-free reorganization in which the transferor corporation had a surplus in earnings and profits available for distribution. It was there held that those earnings and profits, for purposes of a subsequent distribution by the transferee corporation to its stockholders, retain their status as earnings or profits and are taxable to the recipients as dividends. The rule has been held to include liquidations of a subsidiary by its parent. Robinette v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 513; U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 115-11, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1938 and made retroactive, 52 Stat 447. The facts were stipulated, and so found by the Tax Court. So far as relevant, they are as follows: In December, 1936, Nevada-California Electric Corporation liquidated five of its wholly-owned subsidiaries by distributing to itself all of their assets, subject to their liabilities, and by redeeming and canceling all of their outstanding stock. No gain or loss on the liquidation was recognized for income tax purposes under § 112 (b) (6) of the Revenue Act of 1936. On the date of liquidation, one of the subsidiaries had earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, in the amount of $90,362.77. The four others had deficits which aggregated $3,147,803.62. On December 31, 1936, the parent had earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, in the amount of $2,129,957.81, which amount does not reflect the earnings or deficits of the subsidiaries. In 1937, Nevada-California had earnings of $390,387.02. In the years 1918 to 1933 inclusive the parent and its subsidiaries filed consolidated income tax returns. Respondent was the owner of 2,640 shares of the preferred stock of Nevada-California. During 1937 that corporation made a pro rata cash distribution to its preferred stockholders in the amount of $802,284, of which respondent received $18,480. The Commissioner determined that the distribution was a dividend under § 115 of the Revenue Act of 1936 and constituted ordinary income in its entirety. Of the 1937 distribution, approximately 49% was chargeable to earnings and profits of the taxable year. Consequently, respondent conceded in the Tax Court that that percentage of her share, or about nine thousand dollars, was taxable as a dividend under § 115 (a) (2). The Tax Court held in her favor that the balance was not a taxable dividend out of earnings and profits, on the theory that all of Nevada-California’s accumulated earnings and profits, plus the accumulated earnings and profits of the subsidiary that had a surplus, were erased by the aggregate deficits of the other four subsidiaries. 8 T. C. 190. The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided court, 167 F. 2d 117. We brought the case here on a writ of certiorari, 335 U. S. 807, because of its importance in the administration of the revenue laws, and because of an alleged conflict of the decision below with that of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cranson v. United States, 146 F. 2d 871. Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. 2d 931, arose thus: A Corporation sold out all its assets to B Corporation, both organized under the laws of New Jersey. B Corporation assumed all liabilities and issued its stock to the stockholders of A Corporation, without change in the proportions of' their holdings. The only change was that the charter of B Corporation- gave it slightly broader powers. At the time of the reorganization, A Corporation had on its books a large surplus and undivided profits. The new corporation made no profit and the company soon dissolved. The liquidating distributions in 1923, the year when the dissolution was begun, did not exhaust the amount of accumulated profits of the predecessor corporation, and the Commissioner contended that those distributions were taxable to the stockholders as dividends and not, as claimed by them, as a return of capital. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the Commissioner, and held that since the reorganization was nontaxable under § 202 (c) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1921, the accumulated earnings and profits of the transferor retained their character as such for tax purposes in the hands of the transferee and were consequently taxable on distribution as ordinary income under § 201 of the same Act. The view of the court was thus expressed by Judge Learned Hand: “Hence we hold that a corporate reorganization which results in no ‘gain or loss’ under section 202 (c) (2) (42 Stat. 230) does not toll the company’s life as continued venture under section 201, and that what were ‘earnings or profits’ of the original, or subsidiary, company remain, for purposes of distribution, ‘earnings or profits’ of the successor, or parent, in liquidation.” 60 F. 2d 931, 933. The rule has been consistently followed judicially and has received explicit Congressional approval. The rationale of the Samóme decision as a “continued venture” doctrine has been often repeated in the cases, and in some of them the fact that the successor corporation has differed from the predecessor merely in identity or form has lent it plausibility. Other cases, however, demonstrate that the “continued venture” analysis does not accurately indicate the basis of the decisions. The rule that earnings and profits of a corporation do not lose their character as such by virtue of a tax-free reorganization or liquidation has been applied where more than one corporation has been absorbed or liquidated, where there has been a “split-off” reorganization, and where the reorganization has resulted in substantial changes in the proprietary interests. In Commissioner v. Munter, 331 U. S. 210, this Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which had held in favor of the taxpayer on the ground that the ownership of the successor corporation was so different from that of the two predecessors that there was not sufficient continuity of the corporate entity to apply the Samóme doctrine. The opinion of the Court stated our unanimous view of the basis of the rule: “A basic principle of the income tax laws has long been that corporate earnings and profits should be taxed when they are distributed to the stockholders who own the distributing corporation. . . . Thus unless those earnings and profits accumulated by the predecessor corporations and undistributed in this reorganization are deemed to have been acquired by the successor corporation and taxable upon distribution by it, they would escape the taxation which Congress intended. . . . The congressional purpose to tax all stockholders who receive distributions of corporate earnings and profits cannot be frustrated by any reorganization which leaves earnings and profits undistributed in whole or in part.” 331 U. S. at 214, 215. See Murchison’s Estate v. Commissioner, 76 F. 2d 641, 642; Putnam v. United States, 149 F. 2d 721, 726; Samuel L. Slover, 6 T. C. 884, 886. We conclude from the cases that the Sansome rule is grounded not on a theory of continuity of the corporate enterprise but on the necessity to prevent escape of earnings and profits from taxation. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Harter v. Helvering, 79 F. 2d 12, is not inconsistent with this view. In that case the situation was as follows: A Corporation and B Corporation, each of which had accumulated earnings and profits, merged to form C Corporation. By the operation of the Sansome rule, the earnings and profits retained their character as such in the hands of C. Some time later, D Corporation acquired all the stock of C, and thereafter liquidated it in a transaction in which no gain or loss was recognized. At the time of the liquidation of C Corporation, D Corporation, the parent, had a deficit in earnings and profits. The court held, in determining the amount of earnings and profits available to D Corporation after the liquidation for distribution as dividends, that its deficit should be deducted from the accumulated earnings and profits acquired from its subsidiary. It is vigorously contended that the logic of the Harter case compels the allowance of a deduction of the deficits of the subsidiaries from the accumulated earnings and profits of the parent. We believe this view to be the product of inadequate analysis. The difference between the Harter situation and the problem before us may perhaps be clarified by comparing them taxwise if neither liquidation had occurred. Briefly stated, in the case of a distribution to a corporation with a deficit from either current or prior losses, the corporation receiving the distribution has no taxable income or earnings or profits available for current distribution until current income exceeds current losses, and no accumulated earnings or profits until its actual deficit from prior losses is erased. See 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (1942) § 9.30, and cases cited therein n. 44 et seg. In the instant situation, however, the parent did have accumulated earnings and profits available for distribution as dividends, absent the liquidation. Congressional intent to tax such earnings and profits on their distribution cannot be prevented by the fact of an intervening reorganization or liquidation. The operation of the Sansome rule on the taxation of corporate distributions is brought into high relief by consideration of the economic relation between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. Congress requires that earnings and profits, current or accumulated, be taxed to the recipients thereof as dividends on their distribution. If a subsidiary has a surplus in earnings and profits, the parent has a choice of two methods by which it may “realize” this surplus. It may cause the subsidiary to declare a dividend, or it may liquidate its interest or part of its interest in the subsidiary. In the former case, the distribution would of course be taxable as ordinary income to the parent insofar as that distribution, plus the parent’s other income, represented net income to it. If the parent uses the second method, two alternatives again are available: the liquidation may take the form of a sale outright, or may be performed within the framework of the reorganization sections of the Internal Revenue Code or its predecessor acts. If the former, gain is of course realized, and is also recognized for tax purposes. We note in passing, in this connection, that such gain will correspond, if at all, only by coincidence with the amount of earnings and profits of the subsidiary. If the latter, Congress has determined that the gain shall not be recognized at that time, but that such recognition shall be deferred. If the subsidiary has a deficit in earnings and profits, the deficit may be “realized” by the parent only by liquidation, and the same two alternatives are present as when the subsidiary has a surplus: sale, and reorganization within § 112. Again, in the former case, loss is realized and also recognized. And in the case of a reorganization or liquidation in the framework of the Code, the recognition of loss is deferred by Congressional mandate to a later time. If the assets of the parent and subsidiary are combined via a tax-free reorganization or liquidation, the effect of the Sansome rule is simply this: a distribution of assets that would have been taxable as dividends absent the reorganization or liquidation does not lose that character by virtue of the tax-free transaction. Respondent’s contention that the logic of the Sansome rule requires subtracting the deficit of the subsidiary from the earnings and profits of the parent as a corollary of carrying over the earnings and profits of the subsidiary has a superficial plausibility; but the plausibility disappears when it is noted that the taxpayer would thus obtain an advantage taxwise that would not be available absent the liquidation, since there is no way to “declare” a deficit, and thus no method of loss realization open to the parent parallel to a declaration of dividends as a mode of realizing the profits of a subsidiary. It is urged upon us that the deficits of the subsidiaries should be subtracted from the earnings and profits of the parent in order to make the tax consequences of the liquidation correspond with corporate accounting practice. The answer is brief. The Sansome rule itself, as applied to earnings and profits, has never been thought to be controlled by ordinary corporate accounting concepts; its uniform effect is to treat for tax purposes as earnings or profits assets which are properly considered capital for many if not most corporate purposes, and it has long been a commonplace of tax law that similar divergences often occur. See Commissioner v. Wheeler, 324 U. S. 542, 546; Putnam v. United States, 149 F. 2d 721, 726; 1 Mertens, op. cit. § 9.33; Rudick, op. cit. 878-906. Congress has expressed its purpose to tax all stockholders who receive distributions of earnings and profits. In order to facilitate simplification of corporate financial structures, it has further provided that certain intercorporate transactions shall be free of immediate tax consequences to the corporations. There has been judicially superimposed by the Sansome rule, with the subsequent explicit ratification of Congress, the doctrine that tax-free reorganizations shall not disturb the status of earnings and profits otherwise available for distribution. Nevada-California at the time of the 1937 distribution to respondent had such earnings and profits. Since we believe that to allow deduction from these earnings of the deficits of its subsidiaries would be in effect to recognize losses the tax effects of which Congress has explicitly provided should be deferred, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result. “SEC. 112. RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS. “(a) General Rule. — Upon the sale or exchange of property the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under section 111, shall be recognized, except as hereinafter provided in this section. "(b) Exchanges Solely in Kind.— “(6) Property received by corporation on complete liquidation op another. — No gain or loss shall be recognized upon the receipt by a corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation. . . .” 49 Stat. 1648, 1678-79. It does not appear in what years occurred the subsidiaries’ losses which resulted in their deficits, or to what extent they were set off against the net income of the parent in consolidated return years. To the extent that such set-offs did exist, the basis of the subsidiaries’ stock to Nevada-California had been reduced and the losses realized by the parent and availed of for tax purposes prior to the liquidation. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 113 (b)-l, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1936. “SEC. 115. DISTRIBUTIONS BY CORPORATIONS. “(a) Definition of Dividend. — The term ‘dividend’ when used in this title (except in section 203 (a) (3) and section 207 (c) (1), relating to insurance companies) means any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders, whether in money or in other property, (1) out of its earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of the earnings or profits of the taxable year (computed as of the close of the taxable year without diminution by reason of any distributions made during the taxable year), without regard to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was made. “(b) Source of Distributions. — For the purposes of this Act every distribution is made out of earnings or profits to the extent thereof, and from the most recently accumulated earnings or profits. Any earnings or profits accumulated, or increase in value of property accrued, before March 1, 1913, may be distributed exempt from tax, after the earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, have been distributed, but any such tax-free distribution shall be applied against and reduce the adjusted basis of the stock provided in section 113.” 49 Stat. 1687. Respondent agrees that the earnings and profits of the subsidiary with a surplus become, by virtue of the Sansome rule, earnings and profits of the parent, whatever the ultimate treatment of the deficits of the other subsidiaries. Section 201 of the 1921 Act specifies what corporate distributions are taxable as dividends; §202 (c) (2) provides for the nonrecognition of gain or loss from certain corporate reorganizations. Commissioner v. Munter, 331 U. S. 210; United States v. Kauffmann, 62 F. 2d 1045; Murchison’s Estate v. Commissioner, 76 F. 2d 641; Harter v. Helvering, 79 F. 2d 12; Georday Enterprises, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 F. 2d 384; Reed Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F. 2d 288; Robinette v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 513; Putnam v. United States, 149 F. 2d 721. See also Coudon v. Tait, 61 F. 2d 904, which was decided a few months after Sansome and reached the same result independently. The Senate Finance Committee Report on § 115 (h) of the Revenue Act of 1936, S. Rep. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 19 (1939-1 Cum. Bull, (part 2) 678, 690), recognized the rule of the Sansome case, and said that the amendment made by that Act intended no change in existing law, but was added only in the interest of clarity. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 115-11, promulgated under the 1936 Act, incorporates the substance of the report. The Revenue Act of 1938 amended § 115 (h) only by extending its application to distributions of “property or money” as well as of “stock or securities”; the effect was to make § 115 (h) harmonize with § 112 (b) (6) and (7); and Treasury Regulations 101, promulgated under the 1938 Act, was amended to conform. The Internal Revenue Code contains the section substantially unchanged. Section 501 of the Second Revenue Act of 1940 added § 115 (1) to the Internal Revenue Code, to elaborate the law with regard to the effect of tax-free distributions on earnings and profits. The reports accompanying the bill in Congress, H. R. Rep. No. 2894, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 41 (1940-2 Cum. Bull. 496, 526), and S. Rep. No. 2114, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 25 (1940-2 Cum. Bull. 528, 546-547), both recognize the application of “the principle under which the earnings and profits of the transferor by reason of the transfer become the earnings and profits of the transferee.” Ibid., p. 25. The reports do not mention deficits. See, e. g., Murchison’s Estate v. Commissioner, Reed Drug Co. v. Commissioner, United States v. Kauffmann, all supra, n. 6. Harter v. Helvering, Baker v. Commissioner, 80 F. 2d 813. Barnes v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 282; Estate of McClintic, 47 B. T. A. 188; Stella K. Mandel, 5 T. C. 684. Commissioner v. Munter, supra. See Note, The Effect of Tax-Free Reorganizations on Subsequent Corporate Distributions, 48 Col. L. Rev. 281; Atlas, The Case of the Disappearing Earnings and Profits, in Seventh Annual Institute of Federal Taxation, 1155; ef. 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (1942) §9.58; 1 Montgomery, Federal Taxes — Corporations and Partnerships 1948-49, 154 (1948); Green, Recent Trends Under the Sansome Rule, in Sixth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation, 338; cf. Rudick, “Dividends” and “Earnings or Profits” Under the Income Tax Law: Corporate Non-Liquidating Distributions, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 865, 896. Senior Investment Corp., 2 T. C. 124, did not involve the question before us, but was concerned with the applicability, for purposes of computing surtax on undistributed profits, of §§26 (c) (1) and 26 (c) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1936, the' latter as amended by § 501 (а) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1942, to the transferor corporation in a tax-free reorganization. 49 Stat. 1664; 56 Stat. 798, 954. The question of “inheritance” of a deficit was not in issue. See Green, supra, note 12, at 341. The operation of the Sansome rule is restricted, of course, to earnings and profits which are not considered to be distributed to its own stockholders by the transferor corporation in a tax-free reorganization. Commissioner v. Munter, 331 U. S. 210, 215-16; Samuel L. Slover, 6 T. C. 884. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.112(b) (б) -4 as to the effect of a tax-free reorganization on minority stockholders of the transferor corporation. On the merits, respondent’s argument is not convincing. It fails to take into account the difference between the concept of surplus or deficit, which is a summary of the operations of the corporation reporting it, and the concept of gain or loss, which reports the effect of the tax-free transaction itself. So various are the possible permutations and combinations of the economic factors that equivalence of surplus or deficit in the accounts of the subsidiary with the gain or loss to the parent would be mere coincidence. Consider for example the case where a corporation acquires all the stock of another which at the time has a large deficit. If the subsidiary is soon liquidated, the deficit will still be large, and the parent may realize little or no loss on the liquidation. See the first two texts cited note 12, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. CAPITAL TRANSIT COMPANY et al. NO. 40. Argued October 20-21, 1949. Decided November 14, 1949. Philip Elman argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellants in No. 40. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Bergson, Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., William J. Hickey, Richard E. Guggenheim, Daniel W. Knowlton and Edward M. Reidy. Manuel J. Davis argued the cause for the Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co., and S. Harrison Kahn argued the cause for the Alexandria, Barcroft & Washington Transit Co., and filed a brief for those appellants in No. 41. Samuel O. Clark, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for the Capital Transit Co., appellee in Nos. 40 and 41. With him on the brief were Edmund L. Jones, F. G. Await and Daryal A. Myse. Lloyd B. Harrison argued the cause for the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, appellee in Nos. 40 and 41. With him on the brief was Vernon E. West. By special leave of Court Henry E. Ketner argued the cause and filed a brief for the State Corporation Commission of Virginia et al., as amici curiae, urging affirmance. John O’Dea filed a brief as People’s Counsel, Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, appellee in No. 40. Per Curiam. In United States v. Capital Transit Co., 325 U. S. 357, we upheld the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate certain of Capital Transit’s bus and streetcar rates. The rates involved were in two different categories. Transit operated, as it still does, a bus and streetcar system within the District connecting the residential area with the central business area. It was also one of four bus companies carrying passengers from that central business area to the Pentagon Building and other Defense establishments located just across the Potomac in Virginia. Each day thousands of Government employees living in the District boarded Transit’s streetcars near their residences, rode to the District’s business area, and there transferred to one of the Virginia busses for carriage to the nearby Virginia establishments. In the above case we sustained a Commission order fixing a through fare for the entire trip between the District residential area and the Virginia governmental installations. Transit had strongly urged that its bus and streetcar transportation between residential and business areas, being wholly within the District, could not be treated as part of an interstate movement. For reasons stated in our former opinion we rejected Transit’s contention, holding that the daily stream of Government workers from the District to Virginia and back again was an interstate movement and therefore subject to regulation by the Commission. This holding applied to Transit carriage even where Transit passengers traveled between the District and Virginia on other bus lines. Transit also contended that jurisdiction of the Commission was precluded by a proviso in §216 (e) of the Motor Carrier Act exempting “intrastate transportation” of motor carriers from regulation by the Commission. This contention was repeated on motion for rehearing. We rejected it. Our holding that Transit’s part of the District-Virginia movements was “interstate transportation” necessarily-made the § 216 (e) exemption inapplicable. After our holding the Commission entered a new order putting into effect the rate order we had sustained. In the present cases, here on appeal from a three-judge District Court under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253 and 2101 (b), the new order was enjoined on the ground that Transit’s transportation, which we had held to be interstate, had now become “intrastate.” On the same ground, that court also held that Transit was exempt from Commission jurisdiction under the proviso in § 216 (e). The District Court also cited to support its ruling our recent decision in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218. The District Court apparently took the position that changed conditions since our decision in the prior Transit case had deprived the Commission of its jurisdiction. When we sustained the Commission’s order in that case, Transit was itself operating one of the four bus lines carrying Government workers from the District central business area to Virginia. It issued transfers to passengers on its busses and streetcars between the District business and residential areas. These transfers were good for rides on Transit’s own District-Virginia busses, but Transit would not give transfers good on the three competitive lines. We adverted to and relied on this situation as one of the reasons supporting the Commission’s requirement that Transit make similar arrangements for through fares with the other lines. April 1, 1947, Transit abandoned its District-Virginia bus line. Because of this the District Court held that since that date all of Transit’s carriage of Virginia-bound passengers has been “intrastate transportation.” The District. Court’s annulment of the Commission’s order on the above ground cannot stand. Our previous holding was that all of Transit’s intra-District carriage of passengers bound to and from the Virginia establishments was part of an “interstate” movement and therefore subject to Commission regulation throughout, upon proper Commission findings. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, does not conflict with our prior holding that Transit’s transportation was part of a continuous stream of interstate transportation. We adhere to that holding. Transit’s intra-District streetcar and bus transportation of passengers going to and from the Virginia establishments is an integral part of an interstate movement. In support of the District Court’s judgment it is urged that there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings that its exercise of jurisdiction was necessary to a national transportation system “adequate to meet the needs of . . . the national defense.” The argument seems to be that the Commission should have altered this finding made in the prior proceedings because the nation is no longer at war. Another factor pointed out is that there are now fewer Army and Navy workers who work in the Virginia installations. Neither of these arguments is sufficient to justify setting aside findings made by the Commission on this point. The evidence before the Commission in the two proceedings indicates that the same reasons exist for Commission action now as before. And despite attempted interference with the Commission’s power by the Public Utilities Commission of the District, it is still true that neither the District nor Virginia has adequate power to regulate the through rates for this daily stream of interstate travel. It is also argued here that the orders should be set aside because they are confiscatory. But the record fails to show that this issue was properly presented to the Commission for its determination. Therefore the question of confiscation is not ripe for judicial review. We have examined other contentions urged in support of the District Court’s judgments and find that all are without merit. The judgments of the District Court in these cases are reversed and the causes are remanded to it with directions to dismiss these actions. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The District Court simultaneously enjoined enforcement of two subsequent related Commission orders. One order declined to permit cancellation of the prescribed through rates and schedules. 47 M. C. C. 205. The other increased the former prescribed maximum rates and provided for divisions of through fares among the companies carrying the District-Virginia passengers. 270 I. C. C. 651.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE et al. No. 95-1726. Argued January 7, 1997 Decided May 27, 1997 Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Malcolm L. Stewart, and J. Douglas Wilson. David N. Yellen argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John A. Ciraldo, by appointment of the Court, 518 U. S. 1037, Peter Goldberger, by appointment of the Court, 518 U. S. 1037, and Michael C. Bourbeau, by appointment of the Court, 518 U. S. 1037. David Duncan, Lisa B. Kemler, and David M. Zlotnick filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In 28 U. S. C. § 994(h), Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) to “assure” that the Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence “at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of” adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. We are asked to decide whether, by “maximum term authorized,” Congress meant (1) the maximum term available for the offense of conviction including any applicable statutory sentencing enhancements, as the United States argues, or (2) the maximum term available without such enhancements, as the Commission has determined. We conclude that the Commission’s interpretation is inconsistent with § 994(h)’s plain language, and therefore hold that “maximum term authorized” must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. I A In 1984, Congress created the Commission and charged it with “establishing] sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system.” 28 U. S. C. § 991; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 367-370 (1989). The Commission, however, was not granted unbounded discretion. Instead,. Congress articulated general goals for federal sentencing and imposed upon the Commission a variety of specific requirements. See §§994(b)-(n). Among those requirements, Congress directed that the Commission “shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in which the defendant is eighteen years old or older and— “(1) has been convicted of a felony that is— “(A) a crime of violence; or “(B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. 841). . .; and “(2) has previously been convicted of two or more prior [such] felonies . . . .” 28 U. S. C. § 994(h). The Commission sought to implement this directive by promulgating the “Career Offender Guideline,” which created a table of enhanced total offense levels to be used in calculating sentences for “career offenders.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §4B1.1 (Nov. 1987) (USSG). Pursuant to that Guideline, each defendant who qualifies for career offender status is automatically placed in criminal history “Category VI,” the highest available under the Guidelines. The table then assigns the appropriate offense level based on the so-called “offense statutory maximum.” When the Commission coined the phrase “offense statutory maximum,” it defined it, unhelpfully, as “the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction.” USSG App. C, amdt. 267 (Nov. 1989) (adding §4B1.1, comment., n. 2). Neither the Career Offender Guideline itself, however, nor the accompanying commentary designated which “maximum term” was to be used when federal law established a basic statutory maximum for persons convicted of a particular offense, but also provided an enhanced maximum penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense. The Courts of Appeals, required to choose between sentencing “at or near the maximum” of the base sentence, or of the base sentence plus the relevant statutory enhancements, uniformly concluded that the “offense statutory maximum” for a defendant with prior convictions was the enhanced maximum term. The Commission subsequently amended the Career Offender Guideline’s commentary to preclude consideration of statutory enhancements in calculating the “offense statutory maximum.” Rejecting the approach prevailing in the Courts of Appeals, the Commission defined the phrase “offense statutory maximum” as: “the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction that is a crime of violence or controlled substance offense, not including any increase in that maximum term under a sentencing enhancement provision that applies because of the defendant’s prior criminal record . . . USSG App. C, amdt. 506 (Nov. 1994) (amending USSG §4B1.1, comment., n. 2). Pursuant to its authority under 28 U. S. C. § 994(u), the Commission opted to give Amendment 506 retroactive effect, providing sentencing courts with discretion to reduce sentences imposed before the amendment’s November 1, 1994, effective date. See USSG §1B1.10(c) (Nov. 1996). B Prior to the adoption of Amendment 506, respondents George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer were convicted of various federal controlled substance offenses in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. Each respondent qualified as a career offender under USSG §4B1.1 (Nov. 1987), had received the required notice that an enhanced penalty would be sought, and was sentenced under the Career Offender Guideline using the enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed each respondent’s conviction and sentence. Following the adoption of Amendment 506, however, each respondent sought a reduction in his sentence. In the cases of respondents Dyer and Hun-newell, the District Court found that the amendment was contrary to 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and 28 U. S. C. § 994(h), and refused to reduce the sentences. In respondent La-Bonte’s case, however, a different judge of the same District Court upheld the amendment and reduced LaBonte’s sentence. The First Circuit consolidated the ensuing appeals and a divided panel, applying the approach set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), upheld Amendment 506 as an appropriate exercise of the Commission’s discretion. 70 F. 3d 1396, 1403-1409 (1995). The First Circuit looked to the statutory language and “f[ou]nd no clear congressional directive regarding the meaning of the term ‘maximum’ as that term is used in section 994(h).” Id., at 1406. In the court’s view, the meaning of the word “maximum” was influenced by its presence in the phrase “ ‘maximum term authorized for [certain] categories of defendants.’” Id., at 1404 (bracketed term in original). While acknowledging that the phrase could apply exclusively to that category of repeat offenders for whom the Government filed a notice to seek sentence enhancement, the court also observed that the word “categories” could plausibly be defined “to include all offenders (or all repeat offenders) charged with transgressing the same criminal statute, regardless of whether the prosecution chooses to invoke the sentence-enhancing mechanism against a particular defendant.” Id., at 1404-1405 (emphasis added). Under the latter view, the court reasoned, the- word “maximum” would necessarily refer to the unenhanced statutory maximum “since this represents the highest possible sentence applicable to all defendants in the category.” Id., at 1405. Based on that perceived ambiguity, the court explained that the “Career Offender Guideline, read through the prism of Amendment 506, adopts an entirely plausible version of the categorical approach that the statute suggests.” Id., at 1407. The court thus held that the Career Offender Guideline, as construed under Amendment 506, was a reasonable implementation of § 994(h)’s command to designate sentences at or near the authorized maximum term. Id., at 1409. In validating Amendment 506, the First Circuit here reached the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit later did in United States v. Dunn, 80 F. 3d 402, 404 (1996). Five other Courts of Appeals, however, have reached the opposite conclusion, finding Amendment 506 at odds with the plain language of § 994(h). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 518 U. S. 1016 (1996), and now reverse. II Congress has delegated to the Commission “significant discretion in formulating guidelines” for sentencing convicted federal offenders. Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 377. Broad as that discretion may be, however, it must bow to the specific directives of Congress. In determining whether Amendment 506 accurately reflects Congress’ intent, we turn, as we must, to the statutory language. If the Commission’s revised commentary is at odds with § 994(h)’s plain language, it must give way. Cf. Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 38 (1993) (explaining that the Guidelines commentary “is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute”). In § 994(h), Congress directed the Commission to “assure” that for adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or crime of violence, the Guidelines prescribe a sentence of imprisonment “at or near the maximum term authorized.” 28 U. S. C. § 994(h). We do not start from the premise that this language is imprecise. Instead, we assume that in drafting this legislation, Congress said what it meant. Giving the words used their “ordinary meaning,” Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990), we find that the word “maximum” most naturally connotes the “greatest quantity or value attainable in a given case.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1396 (2d ed. 1958); Black’s Law Dictionary 979 (6th ed. 1990) (“The highest or greatest amount, quality, value, or degree”). We similarly conclude, and the parties do not dispute, that the phrase “term authorized” refers not to the period of incarceration specified by the Guidelines, but to that permitted by the applicable sentencing statutes. Accordingly, the phrase “maximum term authorized” should be construed as requiring the “highest” or “greatest” sentence allowed by statute. Respondents, however, argue that “maximum term authorized” refers only to the highest penalty authorized by the offense of conviction, excluding any statutory sentencing enhancements. We find little merit in that contention. In calculating the “highest” term prescribed for a specific offense, it is not sufficient merely to identify the basic penalty associated with that offense. Congress has expressly provided enhanced maximum penalties for certain categories of repeat offenders in an effort to treat them more harshly than other offenders. Section 994(h) explicitly refers, for example, to 21 U. S. C. § 841, which establishes a base “term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years” for certain drug traffickers, but then adds that “[i]f any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 years.” § 841(b)(1)(C). Where Congress has enacted a base penalty for first-time offenders or nonqualifying repeat offenders, and an enhanced penalty for qualifying repeat offenders, the “maximum term authorized” for the qualifying repeat offenders is the enhanced, not the base, term. As a consequence, the “maximum term authorized” for repeat offenders convicted under § 841(b)(1)(C) is 30 years — the enhanced statutory maximum — not the unenhanced maximum of 20 years. Respondents’ assertion that § 994(h) is ambiguous is based, at least in part, on a strained construction of the phrase “categories of defendants.” They claim that the word “categories” can be defined broadly to encompass all repeat offenders charged with violating the same criminal statute— including those for whom the Government did not file a notice under § 851(a)(1) and who are therefore ineligible for the penalty enhancement. See n. 1, supra. If “categories of defendants” is defined in this way, respondents argue, a sentence “at or near the maximum term authorized” for this broader “category” of repeat offenders would necessarily permit only the unenhanced maximum because this is the highest possible sentence that could apply to all of the defendants within that category. We see at least two serious flaws in this reasoning. First, respondents’ construction of the word “categories” is overin-elusive because it subsumes within a single category both defendants who have received notice under § 851(a)(1) and those who have not. The statutory scheme, however, obviously contemplates two distinct categories of repeat offenders for each possible crime. The Commission is no more free to ignore this distinction than it is to ignore the distinction made between those defendants who distributed certain controlled substances and those whose distribution also directly resulted in the death of a user. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Thus, for defendants who have received the notice under § 851(a)(1), as respondents did here, the “maximum term authorized” is the enhanced term. For defendants who did not receive the notice, the unenhanced maximum applies. Second, to read the phrase “categories of defendants” as respondents suggest would largely eviscerate the penalty enhancements Congress enacted in statutes such as § 841. We are unwilling to read § 994(h) as essentially rendering meaningless entire provisions of other statutes to which it expressly refers. Under respondents’ novel construction, a repeat drug or violent felon could only receive a sentence at or near the maximum allowed for defendants who had no such prior qualifying convictions or who had never received the notice under § 851(a)(1). Indeed, if this interpretation of the term “categories” were adopted, a sentencing court could be forbidden to impose the enhanced maximum penalty. Congress surely did not establish enhanced penalties for repeat offenders only to have the Commission render them a virtual nullity. Respondents further seek to circumvent §994(h)’s plain meaning by claiming that Amendment 506 satisfies Congress’ mandate to sentence repeat offenders “at or near” the maximum sentence authorized. The flexibility afforded by the phrase “at or near,” respondents contend, justifies the Commission’s decision to rely on the unenhanced maximum. This statutory phrase unquestionably permits a certain degree of flexibility for upward and downward departures and adjustments. The pertinent issue, however, “is not how close the sentence must be to the statutory maximum, but to which statutory maximum it must be close.” United States v. Fountain, 83 F. 3d 946, 952 (CA8 1996), cert. pending, No. 96-6001. Whatever latitude § 994(h) affords the Commission in deciding how close a sentence must come to the maximum to be “near” it, the statute does not license the Commission to select as the relevant “maximum term” a sentence that is different from the congressionally authorized maximum term. Finally, respondents rely heavily on the Commission’s stated justifications for choosing the unenhanced maximum. We are unmoved. First, the Commission asserted that, by precluding the use of the statutory enhancements, Amendment 506 “avoids unwarranted double counting” of the defendant’s prior offenses. 59 Fed. Reg. 23608, 23609 (1994). That argument is entirely beside the point. Congress has instructed the Commission to assure that the sentences of repeat offenders closely track the statutory maximum. The number of steps the Commission employs to achieve that requirement is unimportant, provided the Commission’s mechanism results in sentences “at or near” the “maximum term authorized.” Second, respondents invoke the Commission’s assertion that its amended commentary eliminates “unwarranted disparity associated with variations in the exercise of prosecu-tional discretion in seeking enhanced penalties based on prior convictions.” Ibid. As we understand it, this argument posits that if the Government provides notice under § 851(a)(1) to one defendant, but not to another, the resulting difference in the maximum possible term is an “unwarranted disparity.” Insofar as prosecutors, as a practical matter, may be able to determine whether a particular defendant will be subject to the enhanced statutory maximum, any such discretion would be similar to the discretion a prosecutor exercises when he decides what, if any, charges to bring against a criminal suspect. Such discretion is an integral feature of the criminal justice system, and is appropriate, so long as it is not based upon improper factors. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 464-465 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607 (1985). Any disparity in the maximum statutory penalties between defendants who do and those who do not receive the notice is a foreseeable— but hardly improper — consequence of the statutory notice requirement. III In sum, we hold that the phrase “at or near the maximum term authorized” is unambiguous and requires a court to sentence a career offender “at or near” the “maximum” prison term available once all relevant statutory sentencing enhancements are taken into account. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. We note that imposition of an enhanced penalty is not automatic. Such a penalty may not be imposed unless the Government files an information notifying the defendant in advance of trial (or prior to the acceptance of a plea) that it will rely on that defendant’s prior convictions to seek a penalty enhancement. 21 U. S. C. § 851(a)(1). If the Government does not file such notice, however, the lower sentencing range will be applied even though the defendant may otherwise be eligible for the increased penalty. See United States v. Smith, 984 F. 2d 1084, 1087 (CA10), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 873 (1993); United States v. Garrett, 959 F. 2d 1005, 1009-1011 (CADC 1992); United States v. Amis, 926 F. 2d 328, 329-330 (CA3 1991); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F. 2d 541, 558-560 (CA9 1989). See United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F. 3d 723, 731-733 (CA3 1996), cert. pending, No. 96-6810; United States v. Branham, 97 F. 3d 835, 845-846 (CA6 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 79 F. 3d 584, 595-601 (CA7 1996), cert. pending, Nos. 95-8469, 95-9335; United States v. Fountain, 83 F. 3d 946, 950-953 (CA8 1996), cert. pending, No. 96-6001; United States v. Novey, 78 F. 3d 1483, 1486-1488 (CA10 1996), cert. pending, No. 95-8791. Indeed, the Commission has explicitly recognized that “the phrase ‘maximum term authorized’ should be construed as the maximum term authorized by statute.” USSG §4B1.1, comment., backg’d (Nov. 1987) (emphasis added). And, in our view, the phrase refers to all applicable statutes that would affect the district court’s calculation of the prison term. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, however, 18 U. S. C. § 3584 does not affect the maximum term authorized. Section 3584 merely instructs a sentencing court whether to run “multiple terms of imprisonment” consecutively or concurrently; it says nothing about how the individual term is to be calculated. §3584 (emphasis added). Of course, § 3584(c), which the dissent highlights, post, at 770, directs that “[mjultiple terms of imprisonment... shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.” 18 U. S. C, § 3584(c) (emphasis added). Each of the sections cited by the dissent falls within this “administrative purposes” carve-out, which in no way undercuts, and in fact plainly bolsters, our point. Respondents’ reliance on United States v. R. L. C., 503 U. S. 291 (1992), is inapposite. There, we construed 18 U. S. C. § 5037(c), which provides that the sentence ordered by a court for a juvenile delinquent may not extend beyond “the maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult.” We held that the applicable “maximum” term authorized was the upper limit of the Guidelines range that would apply to a similarly situated adult offender. 503 U. S., at 306-307. R. L. C. involved a directive to a sentencing court, however, whereas 28 U. S. C. § 994(h) is a directive to the Commission. Because § 994(h) is designed to cabin the Commission’s discretion in the promulgation of guidelines for career offenders, it would be entirely circular to suggest that the Commission had complied with § 994(h) merely by specifying sentences “at or near” the top of the Guidelines range. The Commission itself recognizes that the “maximum term authorized” within the meaning of § 994(h) is the statutory maximum, not the otherwise applicable Guidelines maximum. See n. 4, supra. Inasmuch as we find the statute at issue here unambiguous, we need not decide whether the Commission is owed deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AYRSHIRE COLLIERIES CORP. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 467. Argued April 7, 8,1947. — Decided April 28, 1947. Earl B. Wilkinson argued the cause for Ayrshire Collieries Corporation et al., appellants. With him on the brief were Arthur R. Hall and J. Alfred Moran. Carson L. Taylor argued the cause for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, appellant. With him on the brief were William L. Hunter, A. N. Whitlock and M. L. Bluhm. Daniel W. Knowlton argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appel-lees. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Assistant Attorney General Berge, Edward Dumbauld, David 0. Mathews, Nelson Thomas and Daniel H. Kunkel. Charles W. Stadell argued the cause for the Central Illinois District Coal Traffic Bureau et al., appellees. With him on the brief was Erie J. Zoll, Jr., who submitted on brief for the Alton Railroad Company et al., appellees. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the' opinion of the Court. Appellants filed complaints in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana seeking a temporary stay, an interlocutory injunction and a permanent injunction against the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, dated July 9, 1945. This order had been entered in connection with findings by the Commission that certain railroad tariffs were unlawful and that other rates should be prescribed in lieu thereof. Coal to Beloit, Wis., and Northern Illinois, 263 I. C. C. 179. The complaints requested that the court convene a specially constituted court of three judges, as required by the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, 220, 28 U. S. C. § 47, to hear the motions “for a temporary or interlocutory injunction and for final hearing in this proceeding.” Circuit Judge Evans and District Judge Igoe were then assigned to sit with District Judge Baltzell to hear and determine these applications, and the cases were consolidated for all purposes. The applications for a temporary stay and an interlocutory injunction were assigned for hearing on January 3, 1946. But on that day, it appearing that the Commission had postponed the effective date of its order to April 8, 1946, the court ordered that “the hearing upon the petitioners’ application for an interlocutory injunction and temporary stay heretofore assigned and set for January 3, 1946, be and the same hereby is, continued to the day of final hearing herein and that said final hearing shall be had on March 25, 1946 . . . .” The Commission made a further postponement of the effective date of its order to July 8, 1946, in order that the carriers subject to the order might avoid the necessity of preparing and filing new tariffs prior to the termination of the court proceeding. It also appeared that the illness of Judge Baltzell made it impossible for the court to convene as scheduled on March 25. And so the court reassigned the case for trial on April 22, with Judge Baltzell being replaced by Circuit Judge Major. Argument was held on April 22 before Circuit Judges Evans and Major and District Judge Igoe at the “final hearing upon the plaintiffs’ petitions for a permanent injunction.” On June 5, 1946, findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed and entered under the signatures of Judges Major and Igoe; the Commission’s order was sustained in all respects and a judgment was entered dismissing the complaints. The following notation was made in the margin of the findings of fact and conclusions of law: “Judge Evan A. Evans became ill subsequent to the hearing of these causes and he is and has been unable to participate in a determination thereof. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment have therefore been entered by the remaining judges of such court.” The ease was brought here on direct appeal. We are of the opinion that the District Court’s judgment was void, only two of the three judges having participated in the determination of the case. We accordingly do not reach the issues involving the Commission’s authority and the merits of its order, issues that have been argued at length before us. The applicable provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 220, 28 U. S. C. § 47, state: “. . . No interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any order made or entered by the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be issued or granted by any district court of the United States, or by any judge thereof, or by any circuit judge acting as district judge, unless the application for the same shall be presented to a circuit or district judge, and shall be heard and determined by three judges, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge, and unless a majority of said three judges shall concur in granting such application. When such application as aforesaid is presented to a judge, he shall immediately call to his assistance to hear and determine the application two other judges. . . . Provided, That in cases where irreparable damage would otherwise ensue to the petitioner, a majority of said three judges concurring, may, on hearing, . . . allow a temporary stay or suspension, in whole or in part, of the operation of the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission for not more than sixty days . . . and upon the final hearing of any suit brought to suspend or set aside, in whole or in part, any order of said commission the same requirement as to judges and the same procedure as to expedition and appeal shall apply. . . The requirement that three judges hear and determine suits to enjoin or set aside Interstate Commerce Commission orders had its origin in the provisions of the Expediting Act of February 11, 1903, 32 Stat. 823. That Act required three circuit judges, or two circuit judges and a district judge, to hear cases brought by the United States to enforce the antitrust and commerce laws. This feature was then extended by the Hepburn Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 584, 592, to all suits brought to enforce or enjoin any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, “including the hearing on an application for a preliminary injunction.” The Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, created the Commerce Court and vested in it jurisdiction over suits to enjoin Commission orders; that court was composed of five judges, four of them constituting a quorum and at least three being required to concur in all decisions. Finally, the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913 transferred this jurisdiction to three-judge district courts, as detailed above. United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 232-233. The policy of requiring the deliberation of three judges in suits to enjoin the enforcement of Interstate Commerce Commission orders is thus a well-established one. It is grounded in the legislative desire to guard against ill-considered action by a single judge in the important and complex situations frequently presented by Commission orders. Such matters are deemed to warrant the full deliberation which a court of three judges is likely to secure. This requirement, of course, is necessarily technical. It is not a broad social measure to be construed with liberality. It is a technical rule of procedure to be applied as such. See Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 250-251. While due consideration must be given to the statutory policy of expediting the disposition of applications to enjoin the enforcement of Commission orders, the plain language of the Urgent Deficiencies Act compels strict adherence to the command that such applications “shall be heard and determined by three judges, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge.” And we must insist upon obedience to that legislative will even though the disposition of some applications may thereby be delayed. When the framers of the Urgent Deficiencies Act declared that these applications “shall be heard and determined by three judges,” we assume that they meant exactly what they said. The requirement that three judges hear and determine an application means that they must adjudicate the issues of law and fact which are presented by the case, a function which implies that they must weigh the arguments and testimony offered by both sides and vote either to grant or deny the relief sought by the moving party. In addition, “Compliance with the statute requires the assent of the three judges given after the application is made evidenced by their signatures or an announcement in open court with three judges sitting followed by a formal order tested as they direct.” Cumberland Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 260 U. S. 212, 218. All three judges, in other words, must fully perform the judicial function. See Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 369-370. It is significant that this Act makes no provision for a quorum of less than three judges. Two judges of a three-judge circuit court of appeals, on the other hand, ordinarily constitute a statutory quorum for the hearing and determination of cases. 28 U. S. C. § 212. The absence of such a quorum provision as to three-judge district courts is a strong corroborating indication that participation by all three judges is necessary to render a valid decision. The Act provides, it is true, that a decision may be reached by a three-judge court if a “majority of said three judges” concur. But that means only that the decision of the three judges need not be unanimous; it does not imply that two judges alone may hear and determine the case. Moreover, we cannot say that the failure of the third judge to participate in the determination of a case, where the other two are in agreement as to the result, is without significance. The decision reached by two judges is not necessarily the one which might have been reached had they had the benefit of the views and conclusions of the third judge. And should the latter have publicly indicated an opinion differing from that of his colleagues, his position might be helpful to the litigants and to this Court if the case were appealed. It is readily apparent that this statutory requirement has not been met in this case. While all three judges of the specially constituted court heard the oral argument, only two of them participated in the determination of the case. The findings of fact, the conclusions of law and the judgment were all entered without the approval, concurrence or dissent of the third judge. He thus missed the very essence of the judicial function in this case — the actual adjudication of the issues of law and fact. All that we have here is an adjudication by two judges. But under the statute it is not enough that there be an adjudication by two judges. They lack any statutory authority to hear and determine an application to enjoin the enforcement of a Commission order. Any action of theirs in granting or denying such an application is as void as similar action by a single judge. See Cumberland Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra, 218-219; Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 282 U. S. 10, 16. It is suggested, however, that the three-judge requirement applies only to applications for interlocutory injunctions against the enforcement of Interstate Commerce Commission orders; and since the decision in this case was one denying a permanent injunction, no complaint can be made that the decision was rendered by less than three judges. Reference is made in this respect to § 266 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 380, which deals with injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes or state administrative orders on the ground of unconstitutionality of the statute involved. Prior to 1925, that section indicated that a three-judge court was necessary only to pass upon applications for interlocutory injunctions. A single judge had jurisdiction to hear the cause on final hearing and to grant or deny a permanent injunction, thereby permitting him to reconsider and decide questions already passed upon by the three judges on the application for an interlocutory injunction. To end that anomalous situation, an amendment was added by the Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 938, to the effect that “The requirement respecting the presence of three judges shall also apply to the final hearing in such suit in the district court . . . The problem then arose as to whether the words “such suit” in this amendment referred only to a suit in which an interlocutory injunction was in fact sought or to a suit in which it might have been, but was not, requested. A series of decisions by this Court has made it clear that the former interpretation is the correct one. A three-judge court must be convened for final hearings on applications for permanent injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes only where an interlocutory injunction has been sought and pressed to a hearing. Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 272 U. S. 317; Smith v. Wilson, 273 U. S. 388; Public Service Commission v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 289 U. S. 67; McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S. 419. Where an interlocutory injunction is not sought and pressed, a single judge may hear and determine the application for a permanent injunction. By analogy, it is claimed that the same rule should obtain under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, that a three-judge court should be necessary for final hearings on applications for permanent injunctions only where interlocutory injunctions have been sought and pressed. While it is admitted that an interlocutory injunction was sought in this case, the argument is made that the application was not pressed to a hearing, the need for such temporary relief having been eliminated by the postponement of the effective date of the Commission order. The whole emphasis of the Act, like that of § 266 of the Judicial Code, is said to be directed toward the prevention of improvident issuance of interlocutory injunctions or restraining orders. Since there was no such danger in this case, the conclusion is reached that the underlying reason for the convening of a three-judge district court is absent here. The answer to this argument is to be found in the clear language of the Act itself. It provides simply: “and upon the final hearing of any suit brought to suspend or set aside, in whole or in part, any order of said commission the same requirement as to judges and the same procedure as to expedition and appeal shall apply.” Unlike § 266 of the Judicial Code, there is no reference here to “such suit”- — to a suit where an interlocutory injunction is sought and pressed. Rather there is an unambiguous reference to the final hearing of “any suit” brought to enjoin the enforcement of a Commission order. That can only mean any suit seeking permanent relief, regardless of whether interlocutory relief is also requested. And since “the same requirement as to judges” is to apply to the final hearing of any suit, three judges must hear and determine the matter. In addition, this portion of the Urgent Deficiencies Act was part of the original enactment and was not added to meet a problem like that which arose under § 266 of the Judicial Code. It was drawn against a background of prior statutes which provided for injunctive relief against the enforcement of Commission orders without regard to the presence of a request for temporary relief. The Hepburn Act required a three-judge court for “all” suits brought to enjoin a Commission order, “including the hearing on an application for a preliminary injunction,” — a clear indication that a three-judge court was also necessary where only permanent relief was sought. And the statute which created the Commerce Court, from which the district courts inherited their jurisdiction in this instance, referred to “cases” brought to enjoin or set aside Commission orders, making no distinction as to those in which only permanent relief was sought. We can only conclude that the framers of the Urgent Deficiencies Act meant to require a three-judge court in any suit brought to enjoin the enforcement of a Commission order, including a suit where an interlocutory injunction is not sought and pressed to a hearing. Time and again this Court has referred to the three-judge court requirement under this Act without making the distinction which has been made under § 266 of the Judicial Code. Lambert Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U. S. 377, 381-382; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 781, 784-785; United States v. Griffin, supra, 232-233. Indeed, without passing upon the precise problem, this Court has affirmed judgments of three-judge district courts which had granted permanent injunctions in cases where no interlocutory injunctions had been sought or pressed. See, e. g., United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105. And see Hudson & Manhattan R. Co. v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 137, 140. The language and background of the Act, which have been augmented by the consistent understanding of this Court, thus combine to require the use of a three-judge district court in all cases in which a permanent or interlocutory injunction is sought against the enforcement of a Commission order. It matters not in a particular case whether an interlocutory injunction is requested or whether, if such relief is asked, the application is pressed to a hearing. This Act seeks to guard against more than an improvident issuance of interlocutory injunctions by single judges; it also seeks to prevent single judges from issuing permanent injunctions. To that end, Congress has required the use of a three-judge court and we are bound to carry out the letter and the spirit of that requirement. That two judges might, in a particular instance, give the same protection against single-judge action as three judges does not justify ignoring or relaxing the plain requirement that three judges hear and determine all applications to enjoin the enforcement of Commission orders. If such an amendment to the Act is to be made, it must be made by Congress rather than by this Court. Since the judgment entered by two judges in this case was void and without statutory authority, we have no alternative but to vacate the judgment and dismiss the appeal. Appellants will be free, of course, to suggest that the District Court be reconvened in accordance with the Act so that three judges may hear and determine the application to enjoin the Commission order in issue. So ordered. Mr. Justice Rutledge dissents. Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22,1913, 38 Stat. 208, 219,220, 28 U. S. C. §§ 45 and 47a; Judicial Code § 238, as amended by the Act of February 13,1925,43 Stat. 936,938,28 U. S. C. § 345. In Ohio v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 386, affirmed, 292 U. S. 498, a case under the Urgent Deficiencies Act was argued before a court of three judges, all of whom participated in the discussions leading to a determination of the case. One of the judges died before the decision was announced. An opinion written by the judge who died was found among his papers after his death and was published as the opinion of the court, concurred in by the other two judges. The opinion had been written pursuant to an arrangement made at a prior conference of the three judges. The findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were filed some time after the opinion, were signed only by the two surviving judges. The matter, however, was not raised by the parties on appeal and was not considered or decided by this Court. The mere fact that the case was entertained by this Court is no basis for considering it as authoritative on the jurisdictional issue, it being the firm policy of this Court not to recognize the exercise of jurisdiction as precedent where the issue was ignored. United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159, 172; Snow v. United States, 118 U. S. 346, 354-355; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, 87; Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 191 U. S. 225, 236; Arant v. Lane, 245 U. S. 166, 170. Cf. Frellsen & Co. v. Crandell, 217 U. S. 71, where this Court, after Mr. Justice Brewer’s death, adopted as its opinion one previously written by him. In James v. Clements, 217 F. 51, a case had been argued and submitted to a three-judge circuit court of appeals and a decision rendered by a divided vote. A petition for rehearing had been filed and the court had decided that the prior decision was erroneous and that the opposite result should be announced without further briefs or argument. But before an order to that effect could be promulgated, one of the judges died. Since the other two judges were divided in their views, the case was restored for argument before a full bench of three judges. See also Ryan v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 44 F. Supp. 912, 914. But see 32 Stat. 823, as amended by 58 Stat. 272, 15 U. S. C. (Supp. Y, 1946) § 29, which provides that the senior circuit judge and the two circuit judges next in order of seniority shall “hear and determine” appeals from district court judgments in antitrust cases where this Court is unable to consider the appeals because of a lack of a quorum. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416. The same understanding, that the Urgent Deficiencies Act requires three judges for all applications to enjoin Commission orders while § 266 of the Judicial Code requires a three-judge court only for applications for interlocutory injunctions, is shown in the remarks of Mr. Justice Van Devanter at the Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2060 and S. 2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 33 (S. 2060 later became the Act of February 13,1925): “Section 238 as amended and reenacted in the bill would permit cases falling within four particular classes, and those only, to come from the district courts directly to the Supreme Court. The first and fourth classes are confined to antitrust and interstate commerce cases covered by the second section of the expedition act of February 11, 1903, and the provision in the act of October 22, 1913, respecting the enforcement, suspension, etc., of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. These cases are heard in the district court by three judges, one of whom must be a circuit judge. This and the character of the cases make it suggest that they should go directly to the Supreme Court rather than through the circuit courts of appeals. The third class is confined to cases wherein the enforcement of a State statute or of an order of a State board or commission is suspended by an interlocutory injunction. Applications for such injunctions are heard in the district court by three judges, one being a circuit judge. These injunctions now go directly to the Supreme Court for review, and the bill continues that procedure. . . See also Mr. Justice Van Devanter’s remarks at Hearing before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 8206, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15. See also 50 Stat. 752, 28 U. S. C. § 380a, providing that no interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement of, or setting aside, any Act of Congress on the ground of unconstitutionality shall be issued by a district court, unless the application shall be presented to a circuit or district judge and shall be heard and determined by three judges, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. FINKELSTEIN No. 89-504. Argued April 24, 1990 Decided June 18, 1990 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, O’Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined except as to n. 8. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 631. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 632. Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, and Edwin S. Kneedler. Kenneth V. Handal argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dennis G. Lyons and Mary G. Sprague. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services may immediately appeal a district court order effectively declaring invalid regulations that limit the kinds of inquiries that must be made to determine whether a person is entitled to disability insurance benefits and remanding a claim for benefits to the Secretary for consideration without those restrictions. We hold that the Secretary may appeal such an order as a “final decision” under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. I Respondent Finkelstein is the widow of a wage earner who died in 1980 while fully insured under Title II of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. (1982 ed.). In 1983, respondent applied to the Social Security Administration for widow’s disability benefits, claiming that her heart condition made her disabled within the meaning of the section of the Social Security Act providing for surviving spouses’ disability insurance benefit payments, § 223, as added, 70 Stat. 815, and as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Section 423(d)(2)(B) states that a widow shall not be determined to be disabled unless her impairment is of a level of severity which, “under regulations prescribed by the Secretary,” is deemed sufficient to preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful activity. Under regulations promulgated by the Secretary, 20 CFR §§ 404.1577, 404.1578(a)(1) (1989), a surviving spouse is deemed disabled only if the spouse suffers from a physical or mental impairment meeting or equaling the severity of an impairment included in the Secretary’s Listing of Impairments located at Appendix 1 to 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P (1989). If the surviving spouse’s, impairment does not meet or equal one of the listed impairments, the Secretary will not find the spouse disabled; in particular, the Secretary will not consider whether the spouse’s impairment nonetheless makes the spouse disabled, given the spouse’s age, education, and work experience. The Secretary’s practice for spouses’ disability insurance benefits thus differs significantly from the regulations for determining whether a wage earner is entitled to disability insurance benefits. For wage earners, the Secretary has established a “five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U. S. 137, 140 (1987). Under that five-step process, even if a wage earner’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the listed impairments, the wage earner may nonetheless be entitled to disability insurance benefits if the Secretary determines that his “impairment in fact prevents him from working.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U. S. 521, 535 (1990). The Secretary maintains that the difference between the wage earner regulations and the surviving spouse regulations is supported by a difference between the two pertinent statutory definitions of disability. Compare 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(2)(A) with § 423(d)(2)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Respondent’s application for benefits was denied on the ground that her heart condition did not meet or equal a listed impairment. After exhausting administrative remedies, respondent sought judicial review of the Secretary’s decision in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, invoking § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 53 Stat. 1370, 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) (1982 ed.). The District Court sustained the Secretary’s conclusion that respondent did not suffer from an impairment that met or equaled a listed impairment. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a. The District Court nonetheless concluded that “the case must be remanded to the Secretary,” id., at 17a, because the record was “devoid of any findings” regarding respondent’s inability to engage in any gainful activity even though her impairment was not equal to one of the listed impairments, see ibid. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the Secretary’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Finkelstein v. Bowen, 869 F. 2d 215 (1989). The Court of Appeals relied on its past decisions holding that “'remands to administrative agencies are not ordinarily appealable.’ ” Id., at 217 (citation omitted). Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged an exception to that rule for cases “in which an important legal issue is finally resolved and review of that issue would be foreclosed ‘as a practical matter’ if an immediate appeal were unavailable,” ibid, (citation omitted), that exception was deemed inapplicable in this case because the Secretary might persist in refusing benefits even after consideration of respondent’s residual functional capacity on remand, and the District Court might thereafter order that benefits be granted, thereby providing the Secretary with an appealable final decision. Id., at 220. The Court of Appeals conceded that the Secretary might not be able to obtain review at a later point if he concluded on remand that respondent was entitled to benefits based on her lack of residual functional capacity, but it believed this argument for immediate appeal-ability to be foreclosed by a prior decision of the Circuit. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 1055 (1990). II We begin by noting that the issue before us is not the broad question whether remands to administrative agencies are always immediately appealable. There is, of course, a great variety in remands, reflecting in turn the variety of ways in which agency action may be challenged in the district courts and the possible outcomes of such challenges. The question before us rather is whether orders of the type entered by the District Court in this case are immediately appealable by the Secretary. It is necessary therefore to consider precisely what the District Court held and why it remanded this case to the Secretary. Although the District Court sustained the Secretary’s conclusion that respondent did not suffer from an impairment that met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment, it concluded that the Secretary’s ultimate conclusion that respondent was not disabled could not be sustained because other medical evidence suggested that respondent might not be able to engage in any gainful activity. Considering it “anomalous” that an impairment actually leaving respondent without the residual functional capacity to perform any gainful activity could be insufficient to warrant benefits just because it was not equal to one of the listed impairments, the District Court directed the Secretary “to inquire whether [respondent] may or may not engage in any gainful activity, as contemplated by the Act.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. The District Court’s order thus essentially invalidated, as inconsistent with the Social Security Act, the Secretary’s regulations restricting spouses’ disability insurance benefits to those claimants who can show that they have impairments with “specific clinical findings that are the same as ... or are medically equivalent to” one of the listed impairments, 20 CFR § 404.1578(a)(1) (1989). Cf. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 465-466 (1983). The District Court stated that it was “remand[ing]” the case to the Secretary because the record contained no findings about the functional impact of respondent’s impairment; in effect it ordered the Secretary to address respondent’s ailment without regard for the regulations that would have precluded such consideration. The District Court’s order thus reversed the Secretary’s conclusion that respondent was not disabled and remanded for further consideration of respondent’s medical condition. Once the nature of the District Court’s action is clarified, it becomes clear how this action fits into the structure of § 405 (g). The first sentence of § 405(g) provides that an individual denied benefits by a final decision of the Secretary may obtain judicial review of that decision by filing “a civil action” in federal district court. The use of the term “a civil action” suggests that at least in the context of § 405(g), each final decision of the Secretary will be reviewable by a separate piece of litigation. The fourth and eighth sentences of § 405(g) buttress this conclusion. The fourth sentence states that in such a civil action, the district court shall have the power to enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” (Emphasis added.) This sentence describes the action that the District Court actually took in this case. In particular, although the fourth sentence clearly foresees the possibility that a district court may remand a cause to the Secretary for rehearing (as the District Court did here), nonetheless such a remand order is a “judgment” in the terminology of § 405(g). What happened in this case is that the District Court entered “a judgment . . . reversing the decision of the Secretary, with . . . remanding the cause for a rehearing.” The District Court’s remand order was unquestionably a “judgment,” as it terminated the civil action challenging the Secretary’s final determination that respondent was not entitled to benefits, set aside that determination, and finally decided that the Secretary could not follow his own regulations in considering the disability issue. Furthermore, should the Secretary on remand undertake the inquiry mandated by the District Court and award benefits, there would be grave doubt, as the Court of Appeals recognized, whether he could appeal his own order. Thus it is that the eighth sentence of § 405(g) provides that “[t]he judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions.” (Emphasis added.) Respondent makes several arguments countering this construction of § 405(g) and of the District Court’s order, none of which persuade us. First, respondent argues that the remand in this case was ordered not pursuant to the fourth sentence of § 405(g), but under the sixth sentence of that section, which states in pertinent part that the District Court may “at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” Respondent points out that the District Court stated that it was ordering a remand because the evidence on the record was insufficient to support the Secretary’s conclusion and that further factfinding regarding respondent’s ailment was necessary. We do not agree with respondent that the District Court’s action in this case was a “sixth-sentence remand.” The sixth sentence of § 405(g) plainly describes an entirely different kind of remand, appropriate when the district court learns of evidence not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding that might have changed the outcome of that proceeding. For the same reason, we reject respondent’s argument, based on the seventh sentence of § 405(g), that the district court may enter an appealable final judgment upon reviewing the Secretary’s postremand “additional or modified findings of fact and decision.” The postremand review conducted by the District Court under the seventh sentence refers only to cases that were previously remanded under the sixth sentence. The seventh sentence states that the district court may review “[s]uch additional or modified findings of fact,” a reference to the second half of the sixth sentence of § 405(g), which requires that “the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision . . . The phrase “such additional evidence” refers in turn to the “additional evidence” mentioned in the first half of the sixth sentence that the district court may order the Secretary to take in a sixth-sentence remand. See supra, at 625-626. But as the first half of the sixth sentence makes clear, the taking of this additional evidence may be ordered only upon a showing that there is material new evidence. The postremand judicial review contemplated by the seventh sentence of § 405(g) does not fit the kind of remand ordered by the District Court in this case. Respondent also argues that the eighth sentence of § 405(g), providing that the judgment of the district court “shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions,” does not compel the conclusion that a judgment entered pursuant to the fourth sentence is immediately appealable. In respondent’s view, Congress used the the term “final” in the eighth sentence only to make clear that a court’s decision reviewing agency action could operate as law of the case and res judicata. Cf. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U. S. 320, 336 (1958). But even if it is true that Congress used the term “final” to mean “conclusively decided,” this reading does not preclude the construction of “final” to include “appealable,” a meaning with which “final” is usually coupled. Nor does respondent consider the significance of Congress’ use of the term “judgment” to describe the action taken by the District Court in this case. Although respondent argues that the words “final decisions,” as used in 28 U. S. C. § 1291, encompass no more than what was meant by the terms “final judgments and decrees” in the predecessor statute to § 1291, respondent recognizes that “final judgments” are at the core of matters appealable under § 1291, and respondent does not contest the power of Congress to define a class of orders as “final judgments” that by inference would be appealable under § 1291. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U. S. 427, 434 (1956). This is what Congress has done in the fourth sentence of § 405(g). More generally, respondent argues that a power in the district court to remand to an agency is always incident to the power to review agency action and that § 405(g) only expanded the district courts’ equitable powers; therefore, she insists, it is improper to construe § 405(g) as a limit on the district courts’ power to remand. This argument misapprehends what Congress sought to accomplish in § 405(g). The fourth sentence of § 405(g) does not “limit” the district courts’ authority to remand. Rather, the fourth sentence directs the entry of a final, appealable judgment even though that judgment may be accompanied by a remand order. The fourth sentence does not require the district court to choose between entering a final judgment and remanding; to the contrary, it specifically provides that a district court may enter judgment “with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Finally, respondent argues that we already decided last Term, in Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U. S. 877 (1989), that a remand order of the kind entered in this case is not appealable as a final decision. Although there is language in Hudson supporting respondent’s interpretation of that case, we do not find that language sufficient to sustain respondent’s contentions here. In Hudson, we held that under the EAJA, 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a federal court may award a Social Security claimant attorney’s fees for representation during administrative proceedings held pursuant to a district court order remanding the action to the Secretary. We were concerned there with interpreting the term “any civil action” in the EAJA, not with deciding whether a remand order could be appealed as a “final decision” under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We noted in Hudson that the language of § 2412(d)(1)(A) must be construed with reference to the purpose of the EAJA and the realities of litigation against the Government. The purpose of the EAJA was to counterbalance the financial disincentives to vindicating rights against the Government through litigation; given this purpose, we could not believe that Congress would “throw the Social Security claimant a lifeline that it knew was a foot short” by denying her attorney’s fees for the mandatory proceedings on remand. Hudson, supra, at 890. We also recognized that even if a claimant had obtained a remand from the district court, she would not be a “prevailing party” for purposes of the EAJA until the result of the administrative proceedings held on remand was known. 490 U. S., at 887-888. We therefore concluded that for purposes of the EAJA, the administrative proceedings on remand “should be considered part and parcel of the action for which fees may be awarded.” Id., at 888. We did not say that proceedings on remand to an agency are “part and parcel” of a civil action in federal district court for all purposes, and we decline to do so today. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1291 provides that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” Title 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) (1982 ed.) provides: “Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business, or, if he does not reside or have his principal place of business within any such judicial district, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the Secretary or a decision is rendered under subsection (b) of this section which is adverse to an individual who was a party to the hearing before the Secretary, because of failure of the claimant or such individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall review only the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations. The court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based. Such additional or modified findings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the extent provided for review of the original findings of fact and decision. The judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions. Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Secretary or any vacancy in such office.” For example, a district court may on occasion order a remand to an agency even though the district court action was filed by the agency, not someone seeking judicial review, e. g., United States v. Alcon Laboratories, 636 F. 2d 876 (CA1), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 1017 (1981). In other cases the district court may order a remand to the agency but the person seeking judicial review may seek to appeal on the ground that broader relief should have been granted by the district court, e. g., Bohms v. Gardner, 381 F. 2d 283 (CA8 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 964 (1968). None of these situations are presented in this case, and we express no opinion about appealability in those circumstances. Specifically, the District Court noted that an Administrative Law Judge “found that the ‘medical findings shown in the medical evidence of record establish the existence of mitral valve prolapse,’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a, which does not meet or equal one of the listed impairments but might, in the District Court’s view, prevent respondent from engaging in any gainful activity, ibid. Neither party suggests that the Secretary’s decision denying respondent benefits without considering her mitral valve prolapse was not a “final decision of the Secretary” within the meaning of § 405(g). See, e. g., Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F. 2d 872 (CA11 1986); Borders v. Heckler, 777 F. 2d 954, 955 (CA4 1985); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F. 2d 283, 287 (CA3 1985); Booz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F. 2d 1378, 1381 (CA9 1984); Dorsey v. Heckler, 702 F. 2d 597, 604-605 (CA5 1983); Cagle v. Califano, 638 F. 2d 219, 221 (CA10 1981). Although all the Circuits recognize that new evidence must be “material” to warrant a sixth-sentence remand, it is not clear whether the Circuits have interpreted the requirement of materiality in the same way. See Dorsey, supra, at 605, n. 9 (criticizing “stricter position” of Fourth and Tenth Circuits); Godsey v. Bowen, 832 F. 2d 443, 444 (CA7 1987) (expressing skepticism about existence of conflict); Borders, supra, at 956 (also skeptical). We express no opinion on the proper definition of materiality in this context. It is true, as respondent maintains, that the District Court did not caption its order as a “judgment,” much less a “final judgment.” The label used by the District Court of course cannot control the order’s appealability in this case, any more than it could when a district court labeled a non-appealable interlocutory order as a “final judgment.” See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S. 737 (1976). Respondent also makes two arguments based on subsequent legislative history to counter the conclusion that Congress intended orders entered under the fourth sentence of § 405(g) to be appealable final judgments. First, she relies on a committee print prepared by the Social Security Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee which, in summarizing amendments to the Social Security Act, stated that under prior law, a district court could remand a case to the Secretary on its own motion and that the judgment of the district court would be final after the Secretary filed any modified findings of fact and decision with the court, and that no change had been made by the amendments. See The Social Security Amendments of 1977: Brief Summary of Major Provisions and Detailed Comparison With Prior Law, WMCP No. 95-72, p. 26 (1978) (Brief Summary). The committee print’s observations are entirely consistent with the construction we have placed on remands ordered under the sixth sentence of § 405(g). Moreover, leaving aside all the usual difficulties inherent in relying on subsequent legislative history, see, e. g., United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 281-282 (1947), we note that the print specifically warned that it was prepared by the subcommittee staff for informational purposes only and was not considered or approved by the subcommittee, and that it was designed not to be a section-by-section analysis of the amendments but only a “narrative synopsis.” Brief Summary, at I, V. We therefore cannot assign this committee print any significant weight. Second, respondent relies on a House Judiciary Committee Report on amendments to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), stating that a district court’s remand decision under § 405(g) is not a “final judgment.” H. R. Rep. No. 99-120, p. 19 (1985). Again, we cannot conclude that this subsequent legislative history overthrows the language of § 405(g). In the first place, this part of this particular Committee Report concerned the proper time period for filing a petition for attorney’s fees under EAJA, not appealability. Second, the Committee relied in particular on Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F. 2d 104 (CA4 1983), for the proposition that a remand order is not a final judgment, but Guthrie also concerned the time for filing an attorney’s fees petition, and it is far from clear that Guthrie did not involve a sixth-sentence remand. Guthrie, in turn, relied on Gilcrist v. Schweiker, 645 F. 2d 818, 819 (CA9 1981), which, quite unlike the present case, involved an appeal from a district court remand order that did “no more than order clarification of the administrative decision.” Title 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part: “Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. ROCK ISLAND MOTOR TRANSIT CO. et al. No. 25. Argued November 7, 1950. Decided February 26, 1951. Daniel W. Knowlton argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellants. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perl-man, Acting Assistant Attorney General Underhill and Edward M. Reidy. ■ Allen Crenshaw was also of counsel for the Interstate Commerce Commission. Harry E. Boe argued the cause for the Rock Island Motor Transit Company, appellee. With him on the brief were Martin L. Cassell, W. F. Peter and A. B. Enoch. Ernest Porter and Bert F. Wisdom submitted on brief for the Iowa State Commerce Commission, appellee. George Cosson, Jr. was also of counsel. Einar Viren submitted on brief for the Omaha Chamber of Commerce, appellee. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. Questions of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to tighten the restrictions on operations of a railroad’s motor-carrier affiliate are raised by this appeal. In the Commission’s view the operations must be modified in order to make them truly auxiliary to or supplemental of the rail service. They are conducted (1) under a certificate of convenience and necessity issued in 1941 under § 207 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and (2) under an order of 1944 approving the acquisition of another motor carrier. The certificate contains the condition that the Commission might impose other terms to restrict the holder’s operation to service which is auxiliary to or supplemental of rail service. The order contains neither this condition nor any other relating to the specific operating rights of the carrier. The issues involve a basic power of the Commission to regulate the operations of motor carriers affiliated with railroads so as to assure that at all times the motor operations shall be consonant with the National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899. The Commission has decided that that policy requires the motor operations of railroads and their affiliates to be auxiliary to and supplemental of train service. This raises questions as to how the planned auxiliary and supplemental service is to be -achieved. Differences also exist as to what phases of motor-carrier operations are auxiliary to and supplemental of rail or train service. The Rock Island Motor Transit Company, a wholly-owned corporate subsidiary of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company and its predecessors, is a common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in transporting property in inter- and intrastate commerce, exclusively, for all practical purposes, along the rail lines of its parent corporation in Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas and Kansas. Many of Transit’s operations alongside its parent are in different localities and under other I. C. C. authorities than the certificate and order here involved. This appeal deals with additional operating restrictions placed subsequent to the Commission’s formal approval of Transit’s purchase and operation, upon two of Transit’s acquisitions. The first is a segment of the so-called White Line Purchase. The Line was in process of perfecting its “grandfather rights” under § 206 (a), Motor Carrier Act, at the time of appellees’ agreement to purchase. The order directing issue of the certificate to Rock Island recognized this. This purchase was authorized under § 213, Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 555, April 1, 1938, Docket No. MC-F-445; reported 5 M- C. C. 451, 15 M. C. C. 763. The segments of the White Line Purchase here involved are those between Des Moines, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebraska, and Des Moines, Iowa, and Silvis, Illinois, included in Transit’s certificate of convenience and necessity issued in No. MC 29130, December 3, 1941. That certificate had only the following provisions in any way applicable to this controversy: “Service is authorized to and from the intermediate points on the above-specified routes which are also stations on the lines of The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company. “The operations authorized on the above-specified routes are subject to such further limitations, restrictions, or modifications as we may find it necessary to impose or make in order to insure that the service shall be auxiliary or supplementary to the train service of The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company and shall not unduly restrain competition.” The second acquisition is the so-called Frederickson Purchase, authorized November 28, 1944, Docket No. MC-F-2327, under § 5, Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 905, by which Transit acquired, from the holders of a certificate of convenience and necessity, a route between Atlantic, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebraska. Neither the report nor the order contained provisions alike or akin to these just quoted from the White Line certificate. No order for a certificate has yet been entered and no certificate has been issued. The routes here involved are a major part of the Rock Island’s truck route between Chicago and Omaha. The eastern end of that route from Silvis, Illinois, to Chicago is operated under other I. C. C. authority. Transit has been operating the above routes since their respective dates. Under those authorities, Transit states it has engaged in trucking service as follows: “(a) a coordinated rail-service, at rail rates auxiliary to the existing service of appellee’s affiliated railroad; (b) a motor service in substitution of rail service, at rail rates; and (c) a motor common carrier service at rates and tariffs observed and applied by appellee’s predecessors, as modified from time to time.” On February 5, 1945, the Commission directed reopening of the dockets to give reconsideration to the above certificate and order, “solely to determine (a) the conditions or restrictions, if any appear necessary, which should be imposed to insure that the motor carrier service performed by The Rock Island Motor Transit Company is limited to that which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, rail service, and (b) the condition, if any appears necessary, which should be imposed so as to make the authority granted to The Rock Island Motor Transit Company subject to such further conditions or restrictions as the Commission may find necessary to impose in order to insure that the service shall be auxiliary to, or supplemental of, rail service.” At the end of that reconsideration, an order was entered to modify the White Purchase certificate and the Fred-erickson order in the following respects: “1. The service to be performed by The Rock Island Motor Transit Company shall be limited to service which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, train service of The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company, hereinafter called the Railroad. “2. The Rock Island Motor Transit Company shall not render any service to or from any point not a station on a rail line of the Railroad. “3. No shipments shall be transported by The Rock Island Motor Transit Company between any of the following points, or through, or to, or from, more than one of said points: Omaha, Nebr., Des Moines, Iowa, and collectively Davenport and Bettendorf, Iowa, and Rock Island, Moline, and East Moline, Ill. “4. All contractual arrangements between The Rock Island Motor Transit Company and the Railroad shall be reported to us and shall be subject to revision, if and as we find it to be necessary, in order that such arrangements shall be fair and equitable to the parties. “5. Such further specific conditions as we, in the future, find it necessary to impose in order to insure thaf the service shall be auxiliary to, or supplemental of, train service.” Rock Island Motor Transit Co., 55 M. C. C. 567, 597-598, affirming 40 M. C. C. 457. It is from those modifications that Transit sought relief through §§ 1336 and 2325 of 28 U. S. C. from a three-judge district court. The relief was granted and the orders were annulled and their enforcement enjoined. 90 F. Supp. 516. The United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission appealed under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction. Transit’s objection to the order modifying the provisions under which it operates these routes may be generalized as a contention that the Commission’s order changes or revokes a part of Transit’s operating authority, previously granted by the Commission, without any failure by Transit to comply with any term, condition or limitation of the Commission authority under which Transit functions. Changes or revocations may only be made under § 212 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, for such failures. The Commission, on the other hand, takes the position . that there is no change in or revocation of its authorization to operate as a motor common carrier. It looks upon the certificate for the White Line route and. the order for the Frederickson Purchase as being controlled by the Interstate Commerce Act and Transit’s applications for purchase approval. The Commission understands the Declaration of Policy, § 202 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act, enacted at the inception of federal regulation of motor carriers in 1935, 49 Stat. 543, as directing it to preserve the inherent advantages of such transportation in the public interest. It finds support for this view in the National Transportation Policy set out in the 1940 amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 899, declaring that the Act should be administered so as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of rail, motor and water transportation. It treats § 213 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and present § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act as authorizing mergers, consolidations and acquisitions between rail and motor carriers only within the Transportation Policy. Although § 207, providing for the issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity, has no clause requiring special justification for railroads to receive motor-carrier operating rights, such as appears in the proviso in former § 213 and present § 5, the Commission applies the rules of the National Transportation Policy so as to read the proviso into § 207 in order to preserve the inherent advantages of motor-carrier service. The trial court accepted Transit’s argument. 90 F. Supp. at 519. The court found the undisputed fact to be that the Commission, in this modification proceeding, was not acting under § 212 of the Interstate Commerce Act, authorizing changes or revocations in operating authority, but under claimed power subsequently to impose conditions to insure that the operations would be auxiliary to, or supplemental of, rail service; that Transit’s operations were at all times auxiliary and supplemental to rail service within the Commission’s definition of that service when the acquisitions were approved, and could not be changed or revoked except under § 212; that such restrictions as were proposed would interfere with the full motor common-carrier rights of Transit’s predecessors guaranteed to them by the “grandfather clause,” § 206, and transferred to Transit by a purchase approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. A glance at the proposed restrictions, supra, pp. 425-426, shows the practical disadvantages to Transit. It cannot carry on a general all-motor operation on its own billings or under motor rates, joint, or local. It cannot haul through motor traffic at rail tariffs between the “key points,” Omaha, Des Moines and the Bettendorf-Rock Island-Moline center. Furthermore, Transit rests under the threat of possible future restrictions as need may be shown for their application to hold its operations, under changing conditions, to those then reasonably determined by the Commission to be needed to keep Transit’s motor service auxiliary and supplemental to its parent’s rail service. Transit alleges that the restrictions would bar it from participation in traffic on the affected routes that now produce a gross revenue of more than a million dollars a year. As damage to Transit, if the Commission order is enforced, was admitted, proof of the amount was dispensed with. With the situation as above stated in mind, we take up the question of the validity of the Commission’s action in this case. Statutory Authority. — The Commission has power at the time of its approval of an application to limit the authority to be granted by certificates of convenience and necessity for the operation of motor carriers, whether the certificate is issued on an original application under § 207 or after acquisition under § 213 of the Motor Carrier Act, § 5 (2) Interstate Commerce Act. Section 206 requires a certificate. Section 207 gives discretion to the Commission according to the statutory standards of convenience and necessity to authorize a part or all of the requested operations. The service múst be performed according to the “requirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission.” The practice of the Commission from the beginning of motor-carrier regulation has been to restrict motor-carrier operations both geographically and functionally. The same was true of railroad motor-carrier affiliates. We think that at the time of issuance of the certificate, if the Commission reasonably deems the restriction useful in protecting competition, or for other statutory purposes, the Commission may require the railroad-affiliated motor carrier to perform only those services that are auxiliary and supplemental to the rail service. That the railroads. made use of motor carriage primarily in such fashion was known to the Congress before the enactment of any regulatory legislation in the field. Such a restriction is a logical method to insure the maximum development of the two transportation agencies — rails and motors — as coordinate transportation services in accordance with the Declaration of Policy, § 202 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543, later incorporated into the National Transportation Policy, prefixed to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899. Specific statutory authority is found in the requirements of the proviso in § 213 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended in 1940, quoted in note 3, supra. Railroad operations as motor carriers are forbidden by that acquisition section except to enable a railroad “to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations.” A spate of cases can be cited to support the practice, some of which were specifically called to Congress’ attention prior to the enactment of the 1940 Act. With this knowledge that the Commission was granting certificates when it deemed the proposed railroad motor-carrier affiliates would operate as auxiliary to and supplemental of railroad service, Congress reenacted § 213 of the Motor Carrier Act in § 5 (2) of the Transportation Act of 1940. Such limitation was in furtherance of the National Transportation Policy, for otherwise the resources of railroads might soon make over-the-road truck competition impossible, as unregulated truck transport, it was feared, might have crippled some railroads. Motor transportation then would be an adjunct to rail transportation, and hoped-for advancements in land transportation from supervised competition between motors and rails would not materialize. The control of the bulk of rail and motor transportation would be concentrated in one type of operation. Complete rail domination was not envisaged as a way to preserve the inherent advantages of each form of transportation. As indicated above in the text just preceding note 4, the Commission reads into § 207 the same requirement. Thus a consistent attitude toward the use of motors by railroads is maintained. It also relies on its understanding of the directions of the National Transportation Policy “to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each/’ rail, motor, and water; and its reliance on that Policy is further justified by the Whittington amendment stating that “all the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.” 54 Stat. 899. But power in the Commission, before issuance of a certificate or approval of acquisition, to limit railroad motor operations so as to make them auxiliary and supplemental to rail service does not necessarily imply power to change the conditions designed to bring about the desired coordination, after issuance of the certificate. The parent railroad may have acquired or developed its motor affiliate in reliance on the conditions stated in the certificate. So far as the present case is concerned, there is a provision, quoted above, pp. 423-424, making the certificate for the White Line operation subject to further limitations, restrictions or modifications the Commission might find necessary to insure a continuance of auxiliary and supplemental operation and to avoid undue restraint on competition. It was a clause like this in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60, that occasioned the comment that “if the Commission later determines that the balance of public convenience and necessity shifts through competition or otherwise, so that injury to the public from impairment of the inherent advantages of motor transportation exceeds the advantage to the public of efficient rail transportation, the Commission may correct the tendency by restoration of the rail movement requirement or otherwise.” Id. at 71-72. As the issue in the Parker case was the right to issue certificates to railway subsidiaries when existing over-the-road motor carriage might have been utilized, no determination was made there as to whether or not such a reservation was valid. Its effect on the present issues comes from the ruling there made that the Commission had power to balance the public interests in the different methods of transportation so as to preserve the inherent advantages of each, even though its action might bring some disadvantage to one system or the other. This duty was said to have been imposed upon the Commission by the National Transportation Policy. Id. at p. 66. When competition, public interest in the preservation of the inherent advantages of rails and motors, and use of motor service by railroads in their operations are the basis, as they are (see National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 and § 5 (2) (b)), for allowing acquisitions of motor routes by railroads, we think it consonant with that policy to reserve the right to make further limitations, restrictions or modifications to insure that the. service remain auxiliary or supplemental. Congress could not have expected the Commission to be able to determine once and for all the provisions essential to maintain the required balance. Such a reservation, of course, does not provide unfettered power in the Commission to change the certificate at will. That would violate § 212, allowing suspension, change or revocation only for the certificate holders’ willful failure to comply with the Act or lawful orders or regulations of the Commission. The reservation by its terms does not offend against the provision of § 212 that a certificate “shall remain in effect until suspended or terminated,” as § 212 provides. The Commission asserts the modifications were made in accordance with the certificate. The reservation would not authorize changes in operation or service unconnected with the plan of coordinated operation; and indeed Transit was not originally authorized to operate independently and at large. What the reservation does allow are changes to insure that the operations will continue as auxiliary or supplemental to the train service. The consolidation section, § 5 (2), permits a railroad to purchase a motor carrier only “with the approval and authorization of the Commission.” That approval is contingent upon a finding of public advantage and lack of undue restraint on competition. Then approval is to be made “upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications, so found to be just and reasonable.” We note the directions of § 208 as to the certificate, requiring that it “shall specify the service to be rendered” and that “there shall, at the time of issuance and from time to time thereafter, be attached to the exercise of the privileges granted by the certificate such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations as the public convenience and necessity may . . . require.” We note also §§ 216 (c) and 217 (a) with their provisions allowing common carriers by motor to establish through routes and joint rates with other carriers, motor or otherwise. Sections 208, 216 (c) and 217 (a) with their general provisions do not in our opinion override the specific requirement of the National Transportation Policy that the inherent advantages of all modes of transportation be retained, or of § 5 that acquisition of motor routes by railroads shall require the above special findings and may be subject to special conditions. Section 208 does not seem to conflict with § 5 (b), and § 216 (c) is based on voluntary action. And we need not pause over the contention that limitations placed upon rail-owned motor carriers transform them from common into contract carriers under the definitions in § 203. The language of the proviso of § 5 (2) (b), we hold, gives the Commission power to enforce the reservation in the certificate set out on pp. 423-424, supra. We turn then to the question whether the five directed modifications of the certificate, pp. 425-426, supra, fairly may be said to be of a character auxiliary to or supplemental of train service and not such a change or revocation in part as is contemplated by the procedure of § 212, for failure to comply with statutory or regulatory provisions. Auxiliary and Supplemental. — The Interstate Commerce Act sets out only generally requirements that must be met by railroad applicants for motor-carrier certificates. In acquisition cases under § 5 (2) the certificate is not to be issued without the statutory findings discussed above that the proposed merger or consolidation will be in the “public interest” and that the railroad can use the motor service “to public advantage in its operations.” The words “auxiliary to or supplemental of” are not taken from the Act. There is no such specific limitation for railroad operation of motor carriers. Their connotation is to be gathered from the context in which they have been employed by the Commission. The certificate, pp. 423-424, supra, used the phrase to avoid undue restraint on competition. That has been its use from the beginning. The only competition at which the limitation was directed was full railroad competition with over-the-road motor carriers. Appellees urge that the meaning of the words is limited by its application through the restrictions on the certificates at the time it was issued, December 3, 1941. Appellees assert that under their certificate they could and did transport at either rail or truck billing and rates, with no restriction of movement along the route. The auxiliary and supplemental requirement, they argue, is adequately complied with by restricting the service to points “which are also stations on the lines of The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company.” The Commission, appellees contend, was functioning with this geographical concept of auxiliary and supplemental in mind when, in 1941, reservation was made in Transit’s certificate. To support this assertion, appellees call attention to the case in which the phrase “auxiliary and supplementary” was first applied to authorize motor service of railroad affiliates, Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc.—Barker Motor Freight, 1 M. C. C. 101 at 113, October 8, 1936. Later, in 5 M. C. C. 9, March 6, 1937, the form was changed as shown below. That this authorization permitted general motor-carrier service along the rail lines, appellee states, is shown by Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., Extension—Lebanon, Ohio, 47 M. C. C. 837, decided January 6, 1948. See also, Southern Pacific Company—Valley Motor Lines, Inc., 39 M. C. C. 441, 447. The Commission asserts that the meaning of “auxiliary and supplemental” as used in the Barker Purchase and thereafter was not geographical. This, it says, is shown by the explanation in 5 M. C. C. at p. 11, a later Barker report and order. In 1943, after the certificate here in question was issued, the Commission defined “auxiliary and supplemental” in the Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Company Application, 41 M. C. C. 721. The Commission notes that the Valley case, supra, came after Texas & Pacific, and now considers it disapproved by a subsequent denial of reconsideration of Texas & Pacific. 55 M. C. C. 567, 584-585. The question has evidently produced a difference of opinion in the Commission. Appellees charged that the Commission had tightened its “concept of what is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, rail service.” 55 M. C. C. 567, 583. The Commission refused to accept that assumption and therefore did not discuss the necessity of proceeding under § 212 in changing or partially revoking the certificate. It held: “We conclude that approval of the acquisition by Transit was solely for the purpose of enabling Transit to perform a service auxiliary to and supplemental of rail service; that such intent or purpose was adequately evidenced by the report of division 5 including the reservation of a right specifically to restrict if need should be found; that Transit has no cause for any complaint that it was misled to its prejudice and that our concept at the time of the original decision herein, as to what constitutes service auxiliary to or supplemental of rail service, though now described in greater detail, has not been revised to Transit’s prejudice; and that there is no element of unfairness in our exercise now of any authority which we have to restrict future operations.” 55 M. C. C. 567, 585. It is to be noted also that the examiner’s report on the White Line Purchase in 1938 recommended “that no truck service shall be conducted at other than rail rates.” On objection by appellee this requirement was eliminated. 5 M. C. C. 451, 458; 55 M. C. C. 567, 576 ff.; 90 E. Supp. 516, 518. Furthermore, the Commission required the ap-pellee to file tariffs for truck rates and truck billing with the Commission. 90 F. Supp. 516, 518. The District Court concluded as a matter of law as follows: “3. Prior to and at the time of the approval of the White Line transaction and the issuance in said proceeding of plaintiff’s certificate, and at the time of the approval of the acquisition of the Frederickson certificate, the term, 'auxiliary to and supplemental of train service’ did not prohibit the rendition of all-motor service directly for the shipping public at all-motor rates in addition to service at rail rates in substitution for and in lieu of the rail service of plaintiff's affiliated railroad.” What was in the Commission’s mind as to the meaning of auxiliary and supplemental at the time it issued its certificate, we cannot be sure. At present a motor service is auxiliary and supplemental to rail service, in the Commission’s view, when the railroad-affiliated motor carrier in a subordinate capacity aids the railroad in its rail operations by enabling the railroad to give better service or operate more cheaply rather than independently competing with other motor carriers. Undoubtedly the Commission has not consistently required each rail-affiliated motor carrier to forego motor billings or tariffs. Key points to break traffic are relatively new. 28 M. C. C. 5. Rail affiliates have been permitted to leave the line of the railroad to serve communities without other transportation service. Those divergences, however, are an exercise of the discretionary and supervisory power with which Congress has endowed the Commission. It is because Congress could not deal with the multitudinous and variable situations that arise that the Commission was given authority to adjust services within the limits of the Motor Carrier Act. § 208. The Commission has continually evidenced, as indicated above, by opinion and certification its intention to have rail-owned motor carriers serve in auxiliary and supplemental capacity to the railroads. Appellees urge that the new conditions mark a new Commission policy; that it is such a change in the certificate as was condemned in the case of water carriers by United States v. Seatrain Lines, 329 U. S. 424, 428. Without relying upon the statutory differences between Commission power over motor and water carriers, pp. 429-432, we believe that case is inapplicable to these circumstances. In Seatrain a certificate was granted to carry “commodities generally.” For the Commission then to modify this to “in railroad cars only” or “except in railroad cars” would limit the freight authorized to be carried by the certificate. Transit’s certificate, on the other hand, required service auxiliary and supplemental to rails, and the modification was not a change of policy as to that but an additional requirement to insure coordinated service. The new conditions, pp. 425-426, supra, are of a character that aids rail operation and minimizes competition with over-the-road motor carriers. Such added conditions are not changes in or revocations of a certificate in whole or in part but a carrying out of the reservation in the certificate. The Commission has expressed its policy to limit rail affiliates to services in aid of rail transportation by the phrase, perhaps too summary, auxiliary and supplemental. Though the phrase is difficult to define precisely, its general content is set out in Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co. Application, 41 M. C. C. 721, 726, quoted n. 19, supra. While the practice of the Commission has varied in the conditions imposed, the purpose to have rail-connected motor carriers act in coordination with train service has not. Circumstances change. Different conditions are required under different circumstances to maintain the balance between rail and motor carriage. We do not think the meaning of auxiliary and supplemental is limited to the Commission’s practice at any particular time. So long as it may fairly be said that the practice required from the motor carrier falls within the meaning the Commission has given to auxiliary and supplemental, the condition is valid. Such restrictions hamper railroad companies in the use of their physical facilities — stations, terminals, warehouses — their personnel and their capital in the development of their transportation enterprises to encompass all or as much of motor transportation as the roads may desire. The announced transportation policy of Congress did not permit, such development. We hold that the new conditions are within the limits covered by the reservation of power to impose such further limitations as might be found necessary “to insure that the service shall be auxiliary or supplementary to the train service” of The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company. Frederickson Purchase. — The statement of facts at the beginning of this opinion shows the Fredericksons possessed certificates issued under the proviso of § 206, the “grandfather clause.” Transit agreed to purchase these rights subject to the approval of the Commission. This approval was given by a report and order. The order approved the purchase of the “operating rights and property . . . subject to the terms and conditions set out in the findings in said report.” The findings complied with § 5 (2) (a) and (b) of the Transportation Act. They stated, “The Rock Island Motor Transit Company will be entitled to a certificate covering the previously-described portion of rights granted in Nos. MC-530 and MC-530 (Sub-No. 1), which rights are herein authorized to be unified with rights otherwise confirmed in The Rock Island Motor Transit Company, with duplications eliminated; . . . The words “previously-described portion of rights granted” cover the Frederickson certificates as “a motor-vehicle common carrier of general commodities over regular routes between” named points. The Frederickson certificates also covered irregular routes for certain commodities. These latter rights were not purchased. The rights purchased were over-the-road motor-carrier rights. Neither those certificates nor the report or order on the purchase application contained anything specifically limiting the operations to service auxiliary to and supplemental of the Rock Island train service. There was a finding, in the words of the proviso to § 5 (2) (b), that the purchase “will enable The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company ... to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations.” The transaction was consummated in January 1945, over six years after the approval of the White Line Purchase and over three years after the issue of that original certificate, here-inbefore discussed. The basic question posed as to this purchase is similar to that in the White Line Purchase. Has the Commission power to place in the Frederickson certificates the modifications ordered for the White Line certificate? We will solve the problem by determining that the order approving the purchase has not the finality of a certificate but is rather only a tentative approach to the consummation of the purchase subject to changes in conditions and requirements. The power to issue the certificate with the White Line modified conditions follows, a priori, from what we have said in the foregoing division of this decision. This leaves unanswered the question of the power of the Commission to modify a railroad-affiliated motor carrier’s certificate so as to make its operation auxiliary to and supplemental of the rail service, when no reservation for or restriction to that effect has been placed in the order directing the issue of the certificate or the certificate itself. If any such procedure should be undertaken by the Commission, that answer should await a fully developed statement and argument by the interests affected. Our reasons for holding that the Commission may validly insert the proposed limitations in the certificate follow. Closings of loans and purchases involve nice timing adjustments. The transportation industry is familiar with the complexities of closings involving clearances or impositions of prior and underlying mortgages and partition of obligations among syndicates of lenders or purchasers, from rail system mortgages to secure various classes of obligees in reorganizations to simple borrowings for trusteed equipment. It understands the business risks of purchase or sale ahead of final commitment by a separate entity. A request for a statement of the terms of the proposed certificate of convenience and necessity would doubtless have been complied with by the Commission. If not, the closing with Frederickson could have been made by escrow or otherwise simultaneously with the issue of the certificate. Transit had had experience with the problems of coordination between rail and motor service. In this application it objected to a limitation on freight of immediately prior or immediately subsequent rail carriage. The limitation was not put in the report as a condition. While the report stressed the rail operating advantages of the use of trucks, it did not deal with the terms auxiliary and supplemental. If the problem of limitation of the certificate to motor service in rail operation occurred to the applicant or the Commission, precedents from the Barker case to the White Line application would have indicated an inclusion in the certificate of a limitation of auxiliary to and supplemental of rail service. Transit maintains that the order is final; that the result is the same as though the service requirements of the order of approval were written into the operating certificate as directed by the statute. § 208. “The decisions of the Commission,” argues Transit, reflect “finality of action.” Neither of the latter two cases in the note bear in any way on the present point. In both, certificates had been issued and the Commission said, in so many words, the certificates are final. In the Smith Bros. case, it added: “We may issue decision upon decision, and order upon order, on an application for a certificate so long as sufficient reason therefor appears and until all controversy is determined, but once a certificate, duly and regularly issued, becomes effective, our authority to terminate it is expressly marked off and limited. All the antecedent decisions and orders are essentially procedural in character, and may be set aside, modified, or vacated, but the certificate marks the end of the proceeding, just as the entry of a final judgment or decree marks the end of a court proceeding.” P. 472. What slight bearing Seatrain has weighs on the side of the interlocutory character of the approval order. The sentence referred to reads: “But, as the Commission has said as to motor carrier certificates, while the procedural 'orders’ antecedent to a water carrier certificate can be modified from time to time, the certificate marks the end of that proceeding.” P. 432. As under the statute, §§ 206, 207, 208, motor carriers must have certificates authorizing their operations, we conclude that the certificate is the final act or order that validates the operation. Until its form and content are fixed by delivery to the applicant, the power to frame it in accordance with statutory directions persists. It may be said that, as the order permitted Transit to purchase the Frederickson “operating rights,” it must have freedom to use all the seller’s motor-carrier privileges; that the absence of a reservation defeats Commission power to insert “auxiliary and supplemental” restrictions in the certificate. Since we hold the order of approval is not the final order, we reject the premise. Other Objections. — A number of other objections to the enforcement of the orders were presented by appellees and considered by the Court. We comment briefly on those we think merit notice. “Grandfather rights” under § 206 of the Transportation Act were the basis of the White and Frederickson applications for certificates of convenience and necessity. Transit acquired the sellers’ rights to certificates. Appellees contend that as the sellers were entitled to broader operating rights than are allowed the purchaser under the modified certificate, the right to “substantial parity between future operations and prior bona fide operations” guaranteed by § 206 is infringed by limiting the motor service to that auxiliary and supplemental to rail service. A railroad purchaser does not necessarily receive all rights a certificate holder possesses. Because of the National Transportation Policy and § 5, making a railroad’s purchase subject to conditions, as hereinbefore described, approval may be conditioned by the Commission on the railroad purchaser’s willingness to accept a narrower certificate than that possessed by the seller. Finally, the appellee asserts that its certificate is property akin to a franchise; that it has invested large sums in the acquisition and equipment of its routes and service, and that what it alleges is revocation deprives it of property without due process of law. We think that our previous holding in this decision that Transit took its certificate and obtained approval of its acquisitions to operate in the aid of the railroad, auxiliary and supplemental thereto, makes it obvious that Transit had nothing of which it was deprived by the contested order. The judgment of the three-judge District Court is reversed and the proceeding is remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Burton dissent and would affirm the District Court’s opinion. They are of the opinion that the Commission partially revoked the certificates involved in a manner not authorized by the Interstate Commerce Act. Sec. 212 (a), 49 Stat. 555, 52 Stat. 1238, 54 Stat. 924: “Certificates, permits, and licenses shall be effective from the date specified therein, and shall remain in effect until suspended or terminated as herein provided. Any such certificate, permit, or license may, upon application of the holder thereof, in the discretion of the Commission, be amended or revoked, in whole or in part, or may upon complaint, or on the Commission’s own initiative, after notice and hearing, be suspended, changed, or revoked, in whole or in part, for willful failure to comply with any provision of this part, or with any lawful order, rule, or regulation of the Commission promulgated thereunder, or with any term, condition, or limitation of such certificate, permit, or license: . . . .” 40 M. C. C. 457, 473: “It is our opinion, originally indicated in the Kansas City Southern case and confirmed by nearly a decade of experience in motor-carrier regulations, that the preservation of the inherent advantages of motor-carrier service and of healthy competition between railroads and motor carriers and the promotion of economical and efficient transportation service by all modes of transportation and of sound conditions in the transportation and among the several carriers, in short the accomplishment of the purposes forming the national transportation policy, require that, except- where unusual circumstances prevail, every grant to a railroad or to a railroad affiliate of authority to operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle or to acquire such authority by purchase or otherwise should be so conditioned as definitely to limit the future service by motor vehicle to that which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, train service.” §213 (a),49Stat. 556: “Provided, however, That if a carrier other than a motor carrier is an applicant, or any person which is controlled by such a carrier other than a motor carrier or affiliated therewith within the meaning of section 5 (8) of part I, the Commission shall not enter such an order unless it finds that the transaction proposed will promote the public interest by enabling such carrier other than a motor carrier to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations and will not unduly restrain competition.” This proviso remains in the Interstate Commerce Act, § 5 (2) (b). 54 Stat. 906. “We appreciate, of course, that section 207, unlike section 5, does not require of a railroad, undertaking to prove that public convenience and necessity require a motor service which it proposes, any greater measure of proof than is required of any other applicant. But this does not mean that it is as easy for one applicant, as for another, to prove need for a proposed service or that this Commission considering an application by a railroad for authority to perform an all-motor service, not in aid of its rail service but in competition therewith and with other motor carriers; can ignore the circumstance that such applicant is a railroad whose operation as proposed would ordinarily be inconsistent with the principles underlying the national transportation policy. In other words, a railroad applicant for authority to operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle, though required to do no more than prove, as any other applicant, that its service is required by public convenience and necessity, has a special burden, not by reason of any attitude or action on our part, but by reason of the very circumstance that it is a railroad. Where it fails to show special circumstances negativing any disadvantage to the public from this fact, a grant of authority to supply motor service other than service auxiliary, to and supplemental of train service is not justified.” Rock Island Motor Transit Co., 40 M. C. C. 457, 471, 473-474; cf. Kansas City Southern Transport Co., 10 M. C. C. 221, 237. Appellees deduce these limitations from the new condition (1), p. 425, supra. As the Commission does not challenge the statement, and the record shows that the Commission so treats such conditions, we accept that interpretation. 55 M. C. C. 567, 581 if. See 41 M. C. C. 721, 726; text at n. 19, infra. § 207: “Provided, however, That no such certificate shall be issued to any common carrier of passengers by motor vehicle for operations over other than a regular route or routes, and between fixed termini, except as such carriers may be authorized to engage in special or charter operations.” Crescent Express Lines v. United States, 320 U. S. 401. Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, 140 I. C. C. 685, 721, 745, 749; Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 336 if.; and see Report of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation on the Regulation of Transportation Agencies other than Railroads, S. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 if., 35. Report of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation on Transportation Legislation, H. R. Doc. No. 89, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6. Proviso to § 5. See Commissioner Eastman, Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, United States Senate, on S. 3606, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 23: “The reason for that proviso was that at the time when this act was under consideration by your committee, there was a feeling on the part of many that railroads, for example, ought not be permitted to acquire motor carriers at all. It was pointed out, in opposition to that view, that there were many cases where railroads could use motor vehicles to great advantage in their operations, in substitution for rail service, as many of them are now doing. Many railroad men, for example, feel that the operation of way trains has become obsolete; that the motor vehicle can handle such traffic between small stations much more economically and conveniently than can be done by a way train; and the motor vehicles are being used in that way by many railroads. The same is true of many terminal operations. The motor vehicle is a much more flexible unit than a locomotive switching cars, and it can be used to great advantage and with great economy in many railroad operations.” And see statements of Sen. Wheeler, 79 Cong. Rec. 5655, and Rep. Sadowski, 79 Cong. Rec. 12206. Cf. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60. See also § 212 (b). E. g., Kansas City Southern Transport Co., 10 M. C. C. 221, 53d Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission 107, November 1, 1939; Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., 5 M. C. C. 9, 51st Annual Report 68-69. The Commission, in Appendix B to its brief in Nos. 38 and 39, United States v. Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co., decided today, post, page 450, has collected 120 cases, beginning in 1936 with vol. 1 of the Motor Carrier Reports, dealing with the issuance of certificates to motor subsidiaries of rail carriers. The great bulk of these cases makes specific reference to the auxiliary and supplemental standard. See Meek and Bogue, Federal Regulation of Motor Carrier Unification, 50 Yale L. J. 1376, 1408 ff. The Commission’s view is evidenced in Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., 1 M. C. C. 101, 111: “While we have no doubt that the railroad could, with the resources at its command, expand and improve the partnership service and that, so far as numbers are concerned, there is now an ample supply of independent operators in the territory for the furnishing of competitive service, we are not convinced that the way to maintain for the future healthful competition between rail and truck service is to give the railroads free opportunity to go into the kind of truck service which is strictly competitive with, rather than auxiliary to, their rail operations. The language of section 213, above quoted, is evidence that Congress was not convinced that this should be done. Truck service would not, in our judgment, have developed to the extraordinary extent to which it has developed if it had been under railroad control. Improvement in the particular service now furnished by the partnership might flow from control by the railroad, but the question involved is broader than that and concerns the future of truck service generally. The financial and soliciting resources of the railroads could easily be so used in this field that the development of independent service would be greatly hampered and restricted, and with ultimate disadvantage to the public.” In original applications under § 207, the fact that the applicant is a railroad brings up other questions of transportation policy. See note 4, supra. The variant “auxiliary to or supplementary to” appears to be used interchangeably with “auxiliary to and supplemental of.” "2_ That the service to be rendered by the Barker Motor Freight, Incorporated, in the event the pertinent applications now pending before the Commission are subsequently approved by us, be confined to service auxiliary and supplementary to that performed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in its rail operations and in territory parallel and adjacent to its rail lines.” “Provided, however, (1-) that operations under the authority herein granted shall be confined between the points and over the routes described in the appendix, (2) that the authority herein granted shall not be construed to include the right of rendering service from or to, or the interchanging of traffic at, any point other than a station of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, ....’’ 5 M. C. C. at 15. “Under the Barker certificate applicant performs two distinct types of service; (1) substituted service for the railroad, and (2) independent motor carrier service for the general public. The latter service involves the transportation of general commodities, in any quantity, under motor carrier bills of lading and tariffs and at motor carrier rates. . . . Substituted service was being performed by applicant at the time of the hearing in January, 1945, over several routes most of which radiate out of Pittsburgh and Columbus. Independent service also was being performed at that time only over regular routes extending principally between the following points:’ .... Applicant has its own agents and representatives who deal with the shippers in the performance of the independent service. In January 1945, 200 units of equipment were being used in independent service and 500 in substituted service.” “The only definite restriction on the operating authority which was imposed in the Barker case and later cases has been designed to confine the motor-carrier operations acquired to the territory of the railroad through limiting the rights so as to authorize service only at stations on the railroad. Although, at times, a condition formerly was sometimes included in acquisition cases to the effect that service to be rendered should be 'auxiliary and supplementary’ to the railroad’s service, there has been no indication in the reports that such condition was intended to prohibit rendition of all motor-carrier service directly for the shipping public under the operating rights in addition to, in substitution for, and in lieu of, the parent railroad’s service, or to restrict the operation solely to one in combination with the railroad’s operation; nor is it our understanding that it has been so construed by the carriers.” “The scope of the operations proposed to be retained is broader than intended by the conditions we stated in our prior report. Hence, it will be of advantage to the parties in this and later proceedings if we here amplify the meaning of those conditions. Approved operations are those which are auxiliary or supplementary to train service. Except as hereinafter indicated, nonapproved operations are those which otherwise compete with the railroad itself, those which compete with an established motor carrier, or which invade to a substantial degree a territory already adequately served by another rail carrier. “Approved operations are best illustrated by the substitution of trucks for peddler or way-freight service in what is commonly called ‘station-to-station’ service.” “Condition 1 [same as condition 1, p. 425, supra] limits the character of service to be performed by the petitioner to that which is auxiliary to or supplemental of the rail service of the railway. It limits the service to be performed by truck to the transportation of the rail traffic of the railway. It permits the public to receive an improved rail service through the use of trucks instead of trains as a means of fulfilling the railway’s undertaking to transport. Petitioner’s status as a common carrier by motor vehicle is not dependent upon its having direct dealings with the shipping public. Willett Co. of Indiana, Inc., Extension—Ill., Ind., and Ky., 21 M. C. C. 405. Its service is necessarily limited to points served by the railway, hence condition 2. Condition 1 permits all-motor movements in the handling of rail traffic at railroad rates and on railroad bills of lading. To and from certain points on segments of the rail lines, the improved service was to be accomplished by performing the movements partly by train and partly by motor vehicle, an auxiliary or supplemental service coordinated with the train service, hence condition 3. Since petitioner’s certificates limit the service to be performed to that which is auxiliary to or supplemental of the rail service of the railway, it is without authority to engage in operations unconnected with the rail service and, accordingly, may not properly be a party to tariffs containing all-motor or joint rates, nor participate in a directory providing for the substitution of train service for motor-vehicle service at its option. To the extent petitioner is performing or participating in all-motor movements on the bills of lading of a motor carrier and at all-motor rates, it is performing a motor service in competition with the rail service and the service of existing motor carriers; and, to the extent it is substituting rail service for motor-vehicle service, the rail service is auxiliary to or supplemental of the motor-vehicle service rather than the motor-vehicle service being auxiliary to or supplemental of rail service.” P. 726. See Kansas City Southern Transport Co., 28 M. C. C. 5, 24; Rock Island Motor Transit Co. Extension, Eldon, Iowa, 33 M. C. C. 349, 361; Rock Island Motor Transit Co.—PurchaseWhite Line, 40 M. C. C. 457, 478. “As previously stated, from the date of the decision in the Barker case to shortly before enactment of the Transportation Act, 1940, the principles there recognized and applied, controlled the disposition of practically every rail-motor acquisition case. However, beginning with Frisco Transp. Co.—Purchase—Reddish, 35 M. C. C. 132, and continuing until quite recently, the practice of specifically reserving the right later to impose such restrictions as might be necessary to insure that future operations under the acquired authority should be limited to the rendition of service auxiliary to, or supplemental of, train service was not followed. With such departure from the former practice there also appears to have developed a tendency in rail-motor acquisition proceedings to treat the Barker case restrictions as geographical or territorial only in their intent rather than as substantive limitations upon the character of the service which might be rendered by a railroad or its affiliate under any acquired right.” 40 M. C. C. at 469. Rock Island Motor Transit Co. Extension—Wellman, Iowa, 31 M. C. C. 643. See 55 M. C. C. 567, 584. And cf. National Resources Planning Board, Transportation and National Policy (1942), H. R. Doc. 883, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 155, 156: “In the present highly dynamic state of the transportation industry, it would be national folly to place the agencies in any kind of strait jacket. Each mode needs an opportunity to grow and change with the times. No drastic move to allocate traffic arbitrarily or to achieve a similar end by indirect means should be permitted private concerns or forced upon them by Government. The public has struggled long and taxed itself heavily to develop the newer agencies and to revive the old for the purpose of weakening the monopolistic position once occupied by the railroads and of improving and expanding the services offered to users. It would be unfortunate if public policy or private practice were now employed to halt and reverse this trend, and thus to turn back the hands of the transportation clock to an earlier time.” “Certain of Transit’s present freight operations are subject to the limitation that service shall be solely that which is auxiliary to and supplemental of the train service of the railroad, and either that freight so handled shall have an immediately prior or subsequent rail haul by the railroad, or that it shall not be transported from, to, or between more than one of specified key points. However, its route between Atlantic and Omaha, Nebr., over U. S. Highway 6, serving all points which are stations on the railroad, is part of a route to and from Chicago, Ill., via Des Moines, acquired pursuant to authority granted in Rock Island M. Transit Co.—Purchase—White Line M. Frt., 5 M.C.C. 451, and is not so restricted.” Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. Co.—Purchase—J. H. Frederickson, etc., 39 M. C. C. 824 (no printed report). United States v. Seatrain Lines, 329 U. S. 424; Boulevard Transit Lines v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 594, 595; Smith Bros., Revocation of Certificate, 33 M. C. C. 465, 472. The phrase is derived from Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15, 22, followed in United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475, 481.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. WELLER No. 77. Argued December 10, 1970 Decided February 24, 1971 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Black, HarlaN, BrenNAN, White, Marshall, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 261. James van B. Springer argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Beatrice Rosenberg, Philip R. Monahan, and Roger A. Pauley. Marvin M. Karpatkin argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Michael N. Pollet, Melvin L. Wulj, and Rhoda H. Karpatkin. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we are called upon once again to construe the elusive provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731. Somewhat ironically, the argument that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal is made by the appellant, the United States. The appellee, on the other hand, insists the case is properly here. A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California indicted the appellee for refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces, a violation of 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V). In the Selective Service proceedings leading up to his induction notice, the appellee sought conscientious objector status. He specifically requested that his lawyer be allowed to accompany him at the time of his personal appearance before his local board, but the board, relying on 32 CFR § 1624.1 (b), denied the request and conducted the personal appearance without the appel-lee’s counsel present. Subsequently, the board declined to reopen the appellee’s I-A classification, and the appel-lee unsuccessfully exhausted administrative review. His order to report for induction, his refusal to submit, and this prosecution followed. The appellee moved before trial to dismiss his indictment on the ground, among others, that the denial of counsel at the time of his personal appearance before the board deprived him of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. The District Court did not squarely decide this constitutional claim, but granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the regulation prohibiting representation by counsel at a registrant’s personal appearance was not authorized by the Military Selective Service Act. 309 F. Supp. 50. The court relied primarily upon Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, in which our opinion underscored “the Court’s concern that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by implication or without the most explicit action by the Nation’s lawmakers, even in areas where it is possible that the Constitution presents no inhibition.” 360 U. S., at 508. Viewing the personal appearance as “a critical stage of an administrative process at which substantial rights are adjudicated,” 309 F. Supp., at 51, the District Court found the various provisions of the Selective Service Act conferring rulemaking power on the Executive insufficient to authorize a regulation denying counsel at local board hearings. The United States filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Subsequently, the Government reconsidered its position and concluded that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, the Solicitor General filed a motion asking us to remand the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. We postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing of the case on the merits. 397 U. S. 985. We now conclude that this appeal is not properly here and, pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act, remand the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellee urges that we have jurisdiction under either of two sections of the Act, one relating to dismissal of an indictment based on the construction of the statute on which the indictment is founded and the other to motions in bar. Considering first the “construction of the statute” provision, the controlling precedent is this Court’s decision in United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431. In that case, as in this one, there were in issue both a statute and a regulation promulgated pursuant to it. In finding jurisdiction in Mersky, however, the Court noted that “neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only together do they have any force. In effect, therefore, the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other.. .. When the statute and regulations are so inextricably intertwined, the dismissal must be held to involve the construction of the statute.” 361 U. S., at 438. The relation between the Selective Service Act and the regulation forbidding representation by counsel before local boards is wholly different from the situation in Mersky. The regulation is not at all “called for by the statute itself,” 361 U. S., at 438. Indeed, so independent are the statute and the regulation that it would be entirely possible for a regulation covering the same subject matter to provide exactly the reverse of what the present regulation requires. It cannot be said here that “the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other.” Since this statute and this regulation fall so far short of being “inextricably intertwined,” we conclude that the dismissal of the appellee’s indictment was not “based upon the . . . construction of the statute.” We turn, accordingly, to the “motion in bar” provision of the Criminal Appeals Act. Two preliminary observations are necessary. First, a “motion in bar” must be taken to mean whatever was meant by a “special plea in bar” in the Act as originally passed in 1907. Second, this Court has never settled on a definitive interpretation of what constitutes a “motion in bar.” During its debates on the Criminal Appeals Act in 1907, Congress paid relatively little attention to the “special plea in bar” section of the Act. The clearest statement of its meaning was given by one of the bill’s cosponsors, Senator Patterson: “A special plea in bar is that which is set up as a special defense notwithstanding the defendant may be guilty of the offenses with which he is charged; it is for some outside matter; yet it may have been connected with the case.” The tenor of this definition accords with traditional usage, for at common law the most usual special plea in bar took the form of confession and avoidance. 1 J. Chitty, Treatise on Pleading and Parties to Actions *551-552 (16th Am. ed. 1883). In criminal cases the most common special pleas in bar presented claims of double jeopardy or pardon, 2 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure § 742 (2d ed. 1913), and sometimes the statute of limitations, id., at § 799 (5). A characteristic common to all these definitions is that a special plea in bar did not deny that a defendant had committed the acts alleged and that the acts were a crime. Rather, it claimed that nevertheless he could not be prosecuted for his crime because of some extraneous factor. A situation in which the defendant claims that his act was simply not a crime would be beyond the scope of this test. Our decisions are consistent with this reading of the “motion in bar” provision. In early cases under the section, the most familiar plea in bar interposed the statute of limitations. E. g., United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 236-237; United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 83-84. In other cases defendants have claimed immunity because of prior self-incriminatory testimony or a statutory grant of immunity. United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251; United States v. Hoffman, 335 U. S. 77, 78; United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424. See also United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116 (speedy trial); United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531 (governing regulation revoked after violation but before indictment); United States v. Thompson, 251 U. S. 407 (first grand jury refused to indict; charges submitted to second grand jury without court approval); United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278 (challenge to federal jurisdiction). Testing the appellee’s motion to dismiss by this standard, we think it plain that it cannot qualify as a “motion in bar.” The appellee did not deny that he refused to submit to induction, but he claimed that his conduct was not a crime because of the prior denial of counsel. He has not confessed to a crime and claimed immunity from prosecution; he argues that he has committed no crime. We conclude, therefore, that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal under either the “construction of the statute” or “motion in bar” provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings in that court. It is so ordered. The end of our problems with this Act is finally in sight. The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, § 14 (a), 84 Stat. 1890, amended the Criminal Appeals Act to read in pertinent part as follows: “In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.” This Court’s appellate jurisdiction of Government appeals in federal criminal cases has thus been eliminated. Pending cases, however, are not affected, since subsection (b) of the amending section provides: “The amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to any criminal case begun in any district court before the effective date of this section.” The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 took effect on January 2, 1971. The appellee in this case was indicted on January 15, 1969. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, §12 (a), 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), provides in pertinent part: “[A]ny person . . . who . . . refuses . . . service in the armed forces ... or who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this title . . . shall, upon conviction in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment . . . 32 CFR § 1624.1 (b) (1970) provides in pertinent part: “[N]o registrant may be represented before the local board by anyone acting as attorney or legal counsel.” The District Court cited Military Selective Service Act § 10 (b) (3), 50 U. S. C. App. § 460 (b) (3) (1964 ed., Supp. V), and § 1 (c) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §451 (c). See also Military Selective Service Act §§ 5 (a)(1), 10(b)(1), 50 U. S. C. App. §§455 (a)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. V), 460 (b)(1). See 18 U. S. C. §3731: “If an appeal shall be taken, pursuant to this section, to the Supreme Court of the United States which, in the opinion of that Court, should have been taken to a court of appeals, the Supreme Court shall remand the case to the court of appeals, which shall then have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same as if the appeal had been taken to that court in the first instance.” Ibid.: “An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances: “From a decision or judgment . . . dismissing any indictment . . . where such decision or judgment is based upon the . . . construction of the statute upon which the indictment ... is founded. “From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.” The dissenting opinions would have found jurisdiction wanting in Mersky. 361 U. S., at 444, 453, It is suggested in dissent that we have jurisdiction because of the language in 50 U. S. C. App. § 460 (b) (3) (1964 ed., Supp. V) conferring upon local boards the power “to hear and determine” claims for exemption and deferment from military service. The record does not indicate that this statutory language was mentioned by the appellee in the District Court, and the court did not rely upon the “hear and determine” clause in dismissing the indictment. The theory of the dissent was not urged before this Court, perhaps because the parties realized that it can hardly be said that a dismissal of an indictment was “based upon” a construction of a statutory provision that the District Court never even considered. United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 292-293, n. 22; Note 4 of Advisory Committee to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 54 (c), reprinted following Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 54, 18 U. S. C. App. United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S., at 300 and nn. 53-54. 41 Cong. Rec. 2753. Only two eases appear difficult to reconcile with the test adopted in text, and these are of dubious parentage. In United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, and United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, defendants were being prosecuted for refusals to answer which they justified on grounds of Fifth Amendment privilege. Murdock itself, however, said that the plea was not appropriately presented as one in bar. 284 U. S., at 151. In Covington, we cited Murdock in assuming jurisdiction. 395 U. S., at 59 n. 2.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HOWE v. SMITH, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. No. 80-5392. Argued April 28, 1981 Decided June 17, 1981 BurgeR, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BrenNAN, White, Marshall, BlackmuN, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. SteveNS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 487. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 487. William A. Nelson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was James L. Morse. Barbara E. Etkind argued the cause for the federal respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, and Deputy Solicitor General Frey. John J. Easton, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, argued the cause for respondent Ciuros. With him on the brief were Peter M. Nowlan and Alan B. Coulman, Assistant Attorneys General. Briefs of amicus curiae urging reversal were filed by Ernest Winsor for Families & Friends of Prisoners, Inc., et al.; and by David J. Gottlieb for the Kansas Defender Project. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this case is whether a State may transfer a prisoner to federal custody pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 5003 in the absence of a prior determination that the prisoner who is being transferred has a need for specialized treatment available in the federal prison system. I In December 1974, the Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Vermont announced that he would soon close the 187-year-old Windsor prison, the State’s only maximum-security facility, because Windsor had become inadequate in several respects. Rebideau v. Stoneman, 398 F. Supp. 805, 808, n. 7 (Vt. 1975). In anticipation of that closing, the United States and Vermont entered into an agreement pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 5003 (a) by which the United States agreed to house in federal prisons up to 40 prisoners originally committed to the prisons of Vermont. The contract recited that the Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons had certified that facilities were available at federal institutions to accommodate 40 Vermont prisoners. In 1975, when Windsor was finally closed, Vermont was left with several minimum-security community correctional centers and the Vermont Correction and Diagnostic Treatment Facility at St. Albans, Vt. St. Albans has the capacity for short-term incarceration of inmates with high security needs, but it is not designed for long-term incarceration of inmates classified as high security risks. II The petitioner, Robert Howe, was convicted in a Vermont court of first-degree murder arising out of the rape and strangulation of an elderly female neighbor. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and assigned to the St. Albans facility to begin serving his sentence. Because of the nature of his offense and the length of his term, however, the Classification Committee of the Vermont Department of Corrections determined that he should be kept in a maximum-security facility and recommended that he be transferred to a federal prison. Accordingly, the Vermont Department of Corrections held a hearing to decide whether he should be transferred to a federal institution. Howe was afforded advance notice of the hearing and of the reasons for the proposed transfer; he was present at the hearing; and he was represented by a law adviser from the facility’s staff, who submitted various items of evidence in opposition to the proposed transfer. The hearing officer recommended that the petitioner be transferred to a federal institution on the ground that “no treatment programs exist in the State of Vermont, which could provide both treatment and long term maximum security supervision” for him. App. 25. The hearing officer found that Howe was dangerous and could not be integrated into a community-based program. The State relied on a psychiatric report describing Howe as a “ ‘dangerous person who could well repeat the same pattern of assaultive behavior toward women at any time in the future.’ ” Id., at 26. The hearing officer also found that Howe would be “highly resistant to treatment” and that he was an escape risk. Indeed, Howe had escaped from the maximum-security wing of St. Albans while detained there prior to his trial. On March 9, 1977, Vermont’s Acting Commissioner of Corrections approved Howe’s transfer to the federal prison system. Under the terms of the contract between the United States and Vermont, he was incarcerated initially in the federal penitentiary at Atlanta, Ga., and later was transferred to the federal penitentiary at Terre Haute, Ind. As an inmate in the federal maximum-security penitentiaries, Howe enjoyed the same complete freedom of movement within the institution as other prisoners. By contrast, at St. Albans, he had not been given this freedom of movement, but had been generally confined to the maximum-security wing. The programs at St. Albans were substantially the same as those at the federal prisons, although Howe had less opportunity to take advantage of them because of the restrictions on his mobility at the state facility. The only two programs in which he actually participated at St. Albans were psychiatric counseling and educational courses. At Terre Haute, he ran a sewing machine until he had a heart attack. His principal activities now are knitting and crocheting. On December 5, 1978, the petitioner filed this civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, naming as defendants the Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Respondent William Ciuros, Vermont’s Commissioner of Corrections, intervened. Relying on Lono v. Fenton, 581 F. 2d 645 (CA7 1978) (en banc), the petitioner challenged his transfer to the federal prison system on the ground that the federal officials lacked statutory authority to accept custody. It was the petitioner’s position that the sole statutory authority for transfers of state inmates, § 5003, requires federal authorities to make an individual determination that each state prisoner so transferred needs a particular specialized treatment program available in the federal prison system. The petitioner argued that no such individual determination had been made in his case, and that the transfer had not been effected for special treatment needs but for general penological reasons, that is, maximum-security incarceration. Following a hearing, the District Court denied the petitioner’s request for relief, holding: “[T]he [A]ct plainly and unambiguously requires no showing of specialized treatment needs or facilities before a Vermont state prisoner may be transferred to the federal prison system in accordance with the contract under which [the petitioner] was so transferred. . . . 18 U. S. C. 5003 (a) requires nothing more of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons than a certification that facilities exist within the federal system in which state prisoners may be accommodated. That requirement has been met in the case at hand.” 480 F. Supp. 111, 115 (1978). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 625 F. 2d 454 (1980). The court observed that 18 U. S. C. § 5003 authorizes states to contract not simply for “treatment” but for the “custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of persons convicted.” It reasoned that nothing in the language of the statute gives “treatment” primacy or provides a basis for concluding that, whatever other services are provided, “treatment” must always be furnished to prisoners transferred under the statute. While acknowledging that there was a modicum of support in the legislative history for the petitioner’s argument, the Court of Appeals rejected it because it “has no basis in the language of the statute.” 625 F. 2d, at 457. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Circuits. Sub nom. Howe v. Civiletti, 449 U. S. 1123 (1981). Ill The challenge here is not to the action of the State of Vermont in seeking to transfer the petitioner, but to the authority of the Federal Government, in the official person of the Attorney General, to receive and to hold him in a federal penitentiary. Under 18 U. S. C. § 4001 (a) “no citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” The petitioner avers that he is being held by the federal authorities illegally because neither § 5003 nor any other provision authorizes his detention. In particular, he argues that § 5003 has a narrow and limited thrust, that is, that a state prisoner may not be transferred to a federal institution except for an identified specialized treatment and that, before any such transfer may be made, the Federal Government must conduct an inquiry and make an individualized determination that the transferee needs, and the federal facility can provide, that treatment. On the other hand, the respondents contend that § 5003 is not so limited, and that the petitioner’s detention is clearly authorized by the plain language of that provision. Because § 5003 obviously authorizes federal detention of state prisoners under some circumstances, our task is to determine the precise nature of those circumstances and whether appropriate circumstances are present in this case. A As in every ease involving the interpretation of a statute, analysis must begin with the language employed by Congress. Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). By its terms, § 5003 (a) authorizes the Attorney General to contract with a state or territory “for the custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of persons convicted of criminal offenses in the courts of [that] State or Territory.” On its face, the authority furnished by this language encompasses much more than a limited authority to provide for the specialized treatment needs of state prisoners. “Treatment” is, after all, only one of several services cataloged; the focus of the statute, is upon care, custody, subsistence, education, and training as well as upon treatment. Nothing in the construction of the provision supports the view that “treatment” is more important than any of the other listed categories, and nothing in the passage can be fairly read as requiring that some kind of “treatment” must be furnished to every state prisoner transferred to a federal facility pursuant to a contract authorized by § 5003 (a). The petitioner does not contest the breadth of the charter granted by the language just quoted. Rather, he focuses on the requirement that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons certify the availability of “proper and adequate treatment facilities and personnel.” The petitioner reads this requirement as imposing a substantive limitation or restriction on the purposes for which prisoners may be transferred: to wit, a prisoner may be transferred only for treatment. The petitioner’s reading of the statute strains the plain meaning of its language. The act of certification by the Director is nothing more than the starting point in the process of contractual negotiation envisioned by § 5003 (a). Absent surplus capacity in the federal system, discussions between federal and state authorities regarding the transfer of state prisoners to federal facilities would be pointless. Once the Director certifies that a surplus capacity exists — that is, that there is room for more inmates — the transfer becomes a possibility. The certification clause cannot be read as requiring any more than that federal facilities and personnel must be available to handle whatever prisoners are received. There is no special significance to the fact that the Director certifies the existence of “treatment facilities,” as opposed to prison facilities generally. First, the term “treatment facilities” is an appropriate general reference to the existing federal prison facilities. It is true, of course, that other terms may be used — and, in fact, are used — to describe the federal prisons; that, however, does not belie the appropriateness of the term “treatment facilities” as a general reference to the federal penal system. Second, if, as the petitioner advocates, the phrase “treatment facilities” is read as a substantive restriction upon the purposes for which a prisoner may be transferred, § 5003 is rendered internally inconsistent. According to the petitioner, by virtue of § 5003 (a), a state prisoner may be transferred to a federal prison only if that facility affords him specialized treatment found to be needed. However, § 5003 (c) provides, with certain exceptions not applicable to this case, that all state prisoners in federal custody are subject to the same statutory and regulatory scheme that governs federal prisoners. And that statutory and regulatory scheme contains provisions that would undermine § 5003 (a) as that section is read by the petitioner. For example, by statute, federal prisoners may be transferred from one facility to another at the discretion of the Attorney General, 18 U. S. C. § 4082 (b), and federal officials have discretion to decide which inmates have access to rehabilitation programs, Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976). It makes no sense to interpret § 5003 as forcing federal authorities to accept only a state prisoner who is in need of treatment at a particular facility when those same officials are free to transfer that same prisoner from the facility, thereby denying him access to the treatment program. In sum, the plain language of § 5003 (a) authorizes contracts not simply for treatment, but also for the custody, care, subsistence, education, and training of state prisoners in federal facilities. The certification requirement is simply a housekeeping measure designed to ensure that the federal system has the capacity to absorb the state prisoners. Nothing in the language of § 5003 (a) restricts or limits the use of federal prison facilities to those state prisoners who are in need of some particular treatment. B When the terms of a statute are unambiguous, our inquiry comes to an end, except “in 'rare and exceptional circumstances.’ ” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 187, n. 33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, 60 (1930)). No rare and exceptional circumstances are present here; our reading of the statute is fully supported by the legislative history of § 5003. The petitioner disagrees. He notes that, when asked on the Senate floor to explain § 5003 (a), Senator McCarran answered that, whereas 18 U. S. C. § 4002 allows the Federal Government to contract with state officials for the confinement of federal prisoners, " [t]his bill would authorize a more or less reciprocal arrangement whereby, under certain conditions in a limited category of cases . . . the Attorney General may contract with State officials for the custody of persons convicted and sentenced under State laws.” 97 Cong. Rec. 13543 (1951). The petitioner finds significance in the Senator’s use of the words “under certain conditions” and “in a limited category of cases.” Read as a whole, the legislative record reveals that § 5003 was enacted to provide a practical solution to a simple problem, that is, to permit the states to transfer their prisoners to federal custody in the same way that the Federal Government for years had been placing prisoners in state custody pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 4002. Until this century, there was no federal prison system to speak of; instead, federal prisoners were housed in state prisons. By 1952, however, a sufficient number of federal prisons had been built that Congress could respond to requests from the states that the Federal Bureau of Prisons provide facilities in cases where state facilities were inadequate in some way. Section 5003 was the congressional response to this evolving situation. A desire to help states with insufficient facilities, a sentiment that permeates the legislative history of § 5003, may be detected even in the remarks of Senator McCarran quoted by the petitioner. The Senator described the new section as a “reciprocal” of § 4002, one authorizing the Attorney General to extend to the states the same type of service he was authorized to receive from them under § 4002. Because federal officials exercise broad authority under § 4002, the “reciprocal” authority purportedly extended under § 5003 (a) likely was understood by Congress to be equally broad. In addition to Senator McCarran’s remarks, the petitioner relies heavily upon a passage in the Report of the House Judiciary Committee on the bill that was to become § 5003. The Committee stated: “The proposed legislation restricts or limits the use of Federal prison facilities to those convicted State offenders who are in need of treatment. The term “treatment” as used in this bill, in addition to its ordinary meaning of providing medical care, is also meant to include corrective and preventive guidance and training as defined in the Youth Corrections Act.” H. R. Rep. No. 1663, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1952). The petitioner’s reliance upon this passage is understandable, but a single sentence — especially one taken from a Report issued five months after one chamber, the Senate, had passed § 5003 — cannot obscure the unmistakable intent of Congress to create by § 5003 broad authority in federal officials to accept custody of state prisoners in the federal prisons. Indeed, nowhere is this intent clearer than in another passage from the very same page: “State prisons for many years housed and cared for Federal prisoners — until the Federal Government built its own institutions. Today, by [virtue of §4002], the Attorney General is authorized to contract for the care and custody of our Federal prisoners. . . . The committee sees no reason why Federal facilities and personnel should not, in turn, be made available for State offenders, provided, of course, the Federal Government is reimbursed for any expenses involved.” Ibid. The legislative history of § 5003 reveals that Congress perceived a need to respond to state requests for the federal prison system to undertake “custody, treatment, and training” of state prisoners where the states lacked an institutional capacity to do so themselves. S. Rep. No. 978, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1951). It is clear that § 5003 was a broad response to this perceived need. Nothing in the legislative history of § 5003 makes this case one of the “rare and exceptional cases” requiring a departure from the plain language of the statute. C Because the Attorney General, and through him the Bureau of Prisons, are charged with the administration of § 5003, their view of the meaning of the statute is entitled to considerable deference. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 274—275 (1974); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). Moreover, in this case, the Bureau’s interpretation of the statute merits greater than normal weight because it was the Bureau that drafted the legislation and steered it through Congress with little debate. The contract between the United States and Vermont that served as the basis for the petitioner’s transfer to federal custody is just one indication that the Federal Bureau of Prisons has construed § 5003 as broadly authorizing it to accept whatever prisoners are referred to it by state officials. In nearly 30 years of administering this statute, several Attorneys General have interpreted the statute consistently as a grant of plenary authority to contract with the states, limited only by certification that space and personnel were available. Furthermore, Congress has had ample opportunity to express whatever dissatisfaction it might have regarding this administrative interpretation of § 5003. As early as 1952, in its Annual Report, the Bureau of Prisons advised Congress of its view of the statute: “[Section 5003] authorize^] the Attorney General, when adequate facilities and personnel are available, to contract with State officials for the care and custody of State prisoners. . . . “The confinement of Federal prisoners in State institutions has been authorized since 1776. . . . The present act affords an opportunity for reciprocity which had not hitherto existed. While it is not anticipated that the new statute will be used widely, States may on occasion wish to request Federal care for particular prisoners who need facilities available in the Federal prison system but not in their own. For example, a State may wish to transfer a vicious intractable offender who cannot be handled readily in its own institutions, or a female prisoner for whom appropriate facilities are not available, or a prisoner needing special medical or psychiatric care.” U. S. Dept, of Justice, Annual Report of the Bureau of Prisons 16-17 (1952) (emphasis added). Congress indicated no reservation or objection to this interpretation of § 5003 in 1952, or in any year thereafter. Furthermore, in 1965, when Congress added § 5003 (d) so as to include the Canal Zone within the purview of § 5003, the Senate Report expressly described § 5003 (a) as broadly permitting the transfer of persons convicted in the Canal Zone to federal prisons. S. Rep. No. 799, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1965). The contemporaneous and uniform construction of § 5003 (a) by the agency that proposed its enactment and is charged with its enforcement has been that the statute authorizes contracts based upon a broad range of purposes, including the transfer shown by this record. In the absence of any evidence of congressional objection, the agency’s interpretation must be given great weight. IV The plain language, the legislative history, and the longstanding administrative interpretation of § 5003 (a) clearly demonstrate that the provision is a broad charter authorizing the transfer of state prisoners to federal custody. There is no basis in § 5003 (a) for the petitioner’s challenge to his transfer to federal custody. Given our disposition of this issue, it is unnecessary to address the other arguments made by the petitioner. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Title 18 U. S. C. § 5003 provides in pertinent part: “(a) The Attorney General, when the Director [of the United States Bureau of Prisons] shall certify that proper and adequate treatment facilities and personnel are available, is hereby authorized to contract with the proper officials of a State or Territory for the custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of persons convicted of criminal offenses in the courts of such State or Territory: Provided, That any such contract shall provide for reimbursing the United States in full for all costs or other expenses involved. “(e) Unless otherwise specifically provided in the contract, a person committed to the Attorney General hereunder shall be subject to all the provisions of law and regulations applicable to persons committed for violations of laws of the United States not inconsistent with the sentence imposed.” The contract between the United States and Vermont provides in pertinent part: “1. The [United States] will undertake the custody, care and treatment, including the furnishings and subsistence and all necessary medical and hospital services and supplies, of State prisoners committed to the Federal institution. . . . “2. The State may without prior approval by the [United States] and without individual application to the [United States] transfer up to 40 State prisoners for commitment to a Bureau of Prisons facility.” 625 F. 2d 454, 455, n. 1 (1980). The federal respondents argue that the petitioner lacked standing to bring this action because he is not a federal prisoner, but merely a prisoner of the State of Vermont temporarily in the custody of the Federal Government. This argument, raised for the first time in this Court, fails to give adequate weight to the plain language of § 4001 (a) proscribing detention of any kind by the United States, absent a congressional grant of authority to detain. If the petitioner is correct that neither § 5003 nor any other Act of Congress authorizes his detention by federal authorities, his detention would be illegal even though that detention is on behalf, and at the pleasure, of the State of Vermont. Though the Seventh Circuit, in both Lono v. Fenton, 581 F. 2d 645 (1978) (en banc), and Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F. 2d 1130 (1980), held that absence of suitable state facilities is a precondition for a § 5003 transfer, the petitioner expressly disavows that contention in this Court. Reply Brief for the Petitioner 7. The petitioner argues only that § 5003 requires a finding that the proposed transferee is in need of specialized treatment and that the needed treatment is in fact available in the federal system. The petitioner argues that the concept of “treatment” is limited to such things as medical treatment, psychiatric treatment, alcohol or drug rehabilitation programs, and special programs for juveniles. In his view, the concept does not include secure incarceration for dangerous offenders. The petitioner notes that there are statutes referring to federal prisons as “penal institutions” or “correctional institutions.” But those statutes were passed by Congresses other than the Congress that passed § 5003. Moreover, those statutes typically concern the operation or management of prisons as institutional entities rather than processing of prisoners within them. In any event, places of confinement under sentence have long been described in alternative terms. See n. 1, supra. Only one Circuit has adopted the reading of § 5003 (a) urged by the petitioner. Lono v. Fenton, 581 F. 2d 645 (CA7 1978) (en banc). Each of the other Circuits to consider the meaning of § 5003 (a) has rejected the petitioner’s interpretation of that provision. Sisbarro v. Warden, 592 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1979); Beshaw v. Fenton, 635 F. 2d 239 (CA3 1980); United States ex rel. Gereau v. Henderson, 526 F. 2d 889 (CA5 1976); Fletcher v. Warden, 641 F. 2d 850 (CA10 1981).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL MINES CORP. v. CARYL, TAX COMMISSIONER OF WEST VIRGINIA No. 89-337. Decided June 28, 1990 Per Curiam. Petitioner National Mines Corp. (National) is principally-engaged in the business of producing and selling coal. Among its other activities, National mines coal in Kentucky and Pennsylvania and sells it wholesale in West Virginia. During the period relevant here, West Virginia imposed a gross receipts tax on wholesale sales of tangible property. W. Va. Code § ll-13-2c (1983). Local producers were subject to taxes on their production activities, but exempt from the tax on wholesale activities. § 11-13-2. On December 22, 1980, the State Tax Department of West Virginia assessed $475,345.02 in business and occupation tax (plus interest and penalties) for the period January 1, 1975, through December 31, 1979, on National’s wholesale sales of coal in West Virginia. National filed a petition for reassessment, asserting that the tax violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The State Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment, concluding that the tax was fairly apportioned, that the measure of the tax was reasonably related to the benefits conferred by the State, and that the tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce. A few days before National appealed to the State Circuit Court, this Court issued its opinion in Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638 (1984), which held that the West Virginia business and occupation tax sought to be collected from petitioner was unconstitutional. National’s action was held in abeyance while the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered a similar challenge to the state tax in light of Armco. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Rose, 177 W. Va. 20, 850 S. E. 2d 531 (1986). After analyzing the retro-activity of Armco under a state-law test that it considered to “follow closely the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 106-107 (1971),” 177 W. Va., at 23, n. 6, 350 S. E. 2d, at 534, n. 6, the court concluded that Armco applied prospectively only. The State Supreme Court thus permitted the State to collect the gross receipts taxes due for fiscal years prior to the date of decision in Armco. 177 W. Va., at 25-26, 350 S. E. 2d, at 536-537. The State Circuit Court in this case followed Ashland Oil to uphold the State’s collection of the assessed taxes. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to consider National’s petition for appeal. In its petition for certiorari to this Court, National contends, among other claims, that the state court erred in following Ashland Oil’s nonretroactivity decision and allowing the State to enforce an unconstitutional tax statute. We agree. For the reasons stated today in Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, ante, p. 916, we hold that Armco applies retroactively under the reasoning of either the plurality or the dissent in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167 (1990). Because the State Circuit Court failed to consider the constitutionality of the taxes assessed against National in light of our decision in Armco, we grant the petition for cer-tiorari, reverse the judgment of the State Circuit Court, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 06-1457. Argued February 19, 2008 Decided June 26, 2008 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Thomas, and Auto, JJ., joined, arid in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to Part III. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 555. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 555. Roberts, C. J., and Breyer, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Walter Dellinger argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioner in No. 06-1457 were Sri Srinivasan, Mark S. Davies, Zachary D. Stern, Paul J. Pantano, Jr., and Michael A. Yuffee. Donald B. Ayer, Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Shay Dvoretzky, Juliet J. Karastelev, Robert F. Shapiro, Keith R. McCrea, Kent L. Jones, William H. Penniman, Michael J. Gergen, and Jared W. Johnson filed briefs for petitioners in No. 06-1462. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondent FERC in support of petitioners in both cases pursuant to this Court’s Rule 12.6. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Clement, Eric D. Miller, Cynthia A. Marlette, Robert H. Solomon, and Lona T. Perry. Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for nonfederal respondents in both cases. With him on the brief for respondents Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County et al. were Richard G. Taranto, Paul J. Kaleta, Eric Christensen, John E. McCaffrey, David D’Alessandro, and Kelly A. Daly. Randolph Lee Elliott and Milton J. Grossman filed a brief in both cases for respondent Golden State Water Company. William J. Kayatta, Jr., Jared S. des Rosiers, Catherine R. Connors, Randolph L. Wu, Mary F. McKenzie, Harvey Y. Morris, and Elizabeth M. McQuillan filed a brief in both cases for respondents Public Utilities Commission of the State of California et al. Together with No. 06-1462, American Electric Power Service Corp. et al. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for Coral Power, L. L. C., et al. by Richard R Bress, Stephanie S. Lim, Barry J. Blonien, Jeffrey D. Watkiss, James N. Westwood, and Joseph M. Paul; for the Electric Power Supply Association et al. by Kenneth W. Starr, Neil L. Levy, Robert R. Gasaway, Ashley C. Parrish, David G. Tewksbury, Scott M. Abeles, David B. Johnson, Barry Russell, Timm Abendroth, Henry S. May, Jr., Catherine O’Harra, Peter W. Brown, and Daniel W. Douglass; for the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., et al. by Roy T. Englert, Jr., Gary A. Orseck, and Donald J. Russell; for Powerex Corp. et al. by David C. Frederick, Scott H. Angstreich, Paul W. Fox, Deanna E. King, Gary D. Bachman, Howard E. Shapiro, Brett A. Snyder, Jesse A. Dillon, Donald A. Kaplan, John Longstreth, and Alan Z. Yudkowsky; and for William J. Baumol et al. by John N. Estes III and Jeffrey A. Lamken. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Jane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor General, and Susan Hedman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Martha Coakley of Massachusetts, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Mike McGrath of Montana, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, and Patrick C. Lynch of Rhode Island; for AARP by Barbara Jones, Stacy Canan, Michael Schuster, and William Julian II; for the American Public Power Association et al. by Scott H. Strauss, Susan N. Kelly, Wallace F. Tillman, and Richard Meyer; for the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel et al. by Lynn Hargis and Scott L. Nelson; for the Large Public Power Council by Jonathan D. Schneider and Harvey L. Reiter; for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners et al. by James Bradford Ramsay; and for the Public Utility Law Project of New York, Inc., by Gerald A Norlander. A brief of amicus curiae was filed in both cases for the State of Washington by Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General, Jeffrey D. Goltz, Deputy Attorney General, Donald T. Trotter and Robert D. Cedarbaum, Senior Counsel, Tina E. Kondo, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Brady R. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) must presume that the rate set out in a freely negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the “just and reasonable” requirement imposed by law. The presumption may be overcome only if FERC concludes that the contract seriously harms the public interest. These cases present two questions about the scope of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine: First, does the presumption apply only when FERC has had an initial opportunity to review a contract rate without the presumption? Second, does the presumption impose as high a bar to challenges by purchasers of wholesale electricity as it does to challenges by sellers? I A Statutory Background The Federal Power Act (FPA), 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, gives the Commission the authority to regulate the sale of electricity in interstate commerce—a market historically characterized by natural monopoly and therefore subject to abuses of market power. See 16 U. S. C. § 824 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V). Modeled on the Interstate Commerce Act, the FPA requires regulated utilities to file compilations of their rate schedules, or “tariffs,” with the Commission, and to provide service to electricity purchasers on the terms and prices there set forth. §824d(e). Utilities wishing to change their tariffs must notify the Commission 60 days before the change is to go into effect. §824d(d). Unlike the Interstate Commerce Act, however, the FPA also permits utilities to set rates with individual electricity purchasers through bilateral contracts. § 824d(e), (d). As we have explained elsewhere, the FPA “departed from the scheme of purely tariff-based regulation and acknowledged that contracts between commercial buyers and sellers could be used in ratesetting.” Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 479 (2002). Like tariffs, contracts must be filed with the Commission before they go into effect. 16 U. S. C. § 824d(c), (d). The FPA requires all wholesale-electricity rates to be “just and reasonable.” § 824d(a). When a utility files a new rate with the Commission, through a change to its tariff or a new contract, the Commission may suspend the rate for up to five months while it investigates whether the rate is just and reasonable. § 824d(e). The Commission may, however, decline to investigate and permit the rate to go into effect— which does not amount to a determination that the rate is “just and reasonable.” See 18 CFR §35.4 (2007). After a rate goes into effect, whether or not the Commission deemed it just and reasonable when filed, the Commission may conclude, in response to a complaint or on its own motion, that the rate is not just and reasonable and replace it with a lawful rate. 16 U. S. C. § 824e(a) (2000 ed., Supp. V). The statutory requirement that rates be “just and reasonable” is obviously incapable of precise judicial definition, and we afford great deference to the Commission in its rate decisions. See FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 389 (1974); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 767 (1968). We have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission is not bound to any one ratemaking formula. See Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U. S. 211, 224 (1991); Permian Basin, supra, at 776-777. But FERC must choose a method that entails an appropriate “balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.” FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 603 (1944). In exercising its broad discretion, the Commission traditionally reviewed and set tariff rates under the “cost-of-service” method, which ensures that a seller of electricity recovers its' costs plus a rate of return sufficient to attract necessary capital. See J. McGrew, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 152, 160-161 (2003) (hereinafter McGrew). In two cases decided on the same day in 1956, we addressed the authority of the Commission to modify rates set bilaterally by contract rather than unilaterally by tariff. In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, we rejected a natural-gas utility’s argument that the Natural Gas Act’s requirement that it file all new rates with the Commission authorized it to abrogate a lawful contract with a purchaser simply by filing a new tariff, see id., at 336-337. The filing requirement, we explained, is merely a precondition to changing a rate, not an authorization to change rates in violation of a lawful contract (i. e., a contract that sets a just and reasonable rate). See id., at 339-344. In FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348, 352-353 (1956), we applied the holding of Mobile to the analogous provisions of the FPA, concluding that the complaining utility could not supersede a contract rate simply by filing a new tariff. In Sierra, however, the Commission had concluded not only (contrary to our holding) that the newly filed tariff superseded the contract, but also that the contract rate itself was not just and reasonable, “solely because it yield[ed] less than a fair return on the net invested capital” of the utility. 350 U. S., at 355. Thus, we were confronted with the question of how the Commission may evaluate whether a contract rate is just and reasonable. We answered that question in the following way: “[T]he Commission’s conclusion appears on its face to be based on an erroneous standard. . . . [W]hile it may be that the Commission may not normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain. ... In such circumstances the sole concern of the Commission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest — as where it might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.” Id., at 354-355 (emphasis deleted). As we said in a later case, “[t]he regulatory system created by the [FPA] is premised on contractual agreements voluntarily devised by the regulated companies; it contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.” Permian Basin, supra, at 822. Over the past 50 years, decisions of this Court and the Courts of Appeals have refined the Mobile-Sierra presumption to allow greater freedom of contract. In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div., 358 U. S. 103, 110-113 (1958), we held that parties could contract out of the Mobile-Sierra presumption by specifying in their contracts that a new rate filed with the Commission would supersede the contract rate. Courts of Appeals have held that contracting parties may also agree to a middle option between Mobile-Sierra and Memphis Light: A contract that does not allow the seller to supersede the contract rate by filing a new rate may nonetheless permit the Commission to set aside the contract rate if it results in an unfair rate of return, not just if it violates the public interest. See, e. g., Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F. 2d 950, 953 (CADC 1983); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 587 F. 2d 671, 675-676 (CA5 1979). Thus, as the Mobile-Sierra doctrine has developed, regulated parties have retained broad authority to specify whether FERC can review a contract rate solely for whether it violates the public interest or also for whether it results in an unfair rate of return. But the Mobile-Sierra presumption remains the default rule. Moreover, even though the challenges in Mobile and Sierra were brought by sellers, lower courts have concluded that the Mobile-Sierra presumption also applies where a purchaser, rather than a seller, asks FERC to modify a contract. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. FERC, 210 F. 3d 403, 404-405, 409-410 (CADC 2000); Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F. 2d 361, 372 (CA1 1988). This Court has seemingly blessed that conclusion, explaining that under the FPA, “[w]hen commercial parties . . . avail themselves of rate agreements, the principal regulatory responsibility [is] not to relieve a contracting party of an unreasonable rate.” Verizon, 535 U. S., at 479 (citing Sierra, supra, at 355). Over the years, the Commission began to refer to the two modes of review—one with the Mobile-Sierra presumption and the other without—as the “public interest standard” and the “just and reasonable standard.” See, e. g., In re Southern Company Servs., Inc., 39 FERC ¶ 63,026, pp. 65,134, 65,141 (1987). Decisions from the Courts of Appeals did likewise. See, e. g., Kansas Cities v. FERC, 723 F. 2d 82, 87-88 (CADC 1983); Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F. 2d 937, 961 (CA1 1993). We do not take this nomenclature to stand for the obviously indefensible proposition that a standard different from the statutory just-and-reasonable standard applies to contract rates. Rather, the term “public interest standard” refers to the differing application of that just-and-reasonable standard to contract rates. See Philadelphia Elec. Co., 58 F. R C. 88, 90 (1977). (It would be less confusing to adopt the Solicitor General’s terminology, referring to the two differing applications of the just-and-reasonable standard as the “ordinary” “just and reasonable standard” and the “public interest standard.” See Reply Brief for Respondent FERC 6.) B Recent FERC Innovations; Market-Based Tariffs In recent decades, the Commission has undertaken an ambitious program of market-based reforms. Part of the impetus for those changes was technological evolution. Historically, electric utilities had been vertically integrated monopolies. For a particular geographic area, a single utility would control the generation of electricity, its transmission, and its distribution to consumers. See Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F. 3d 1361, 1363 (CADC 2004). Since the 1970’s, however, engineering innovations have lowered the cost of generating electricity and transmitting it over long distances, enabling new entrants to challenge the regional generating monopolies of traditional utilities. See generally New York v. FERC, 535 U. S. 1, 7-8 (2002); Public Util. Disk No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. FERC, 272 F. 3d 607, 610 (CADC 2001) (per curiam). To take advantage of these changes, the Commission has attempted to break down regulatory and economic barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale electricity. It has sought to promote competition in those areas of the industry amenable to competition, such as the segment that generates electric power, while ensuring that the segment of the industry characterized by natural monopoly — namely, the transmission grid that conveys the generated electricity — cannot exert monopolistic influence over other areas. See New York, supra, at 9-10; Snohomish, supra. To that end, FERC required in Order No. 888 that each transmission provider offer transmission service to all customers on an equal basis by filing an “open access transmission tariff.” Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540 (1996); see New York, supra, at 10-12. That requirement prevents the utilities that own the grid from offering more favorable transmission terms to their own affiliates and thereby extending their monopoly power to other areas of the industry. To further pry open the wholesale-electricity market and to reduce technical inefficiencies caused when different utilities operate different portions of the grid independently, the Commission has encouraged transmission providers to establish “Regional Transmission Organizations” — entities to which transmission providers would transfer operational control of their facilities for the purpose of efficient coordination. Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811-812 (2000); see Midwest ISO, supra, at 1364. It has encouraged the management of those entities by “Independent System Operators,” not-for-profit entities that operate transmission facilities in a nondiseriminatory manner. See Midwest ISO, supra. In addition to coordinating transmission service, Regional Transmission Organizations perform other functions, such as running auction markets for electricity sales and offering contracts for hedging against potential grid congestion. See Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid Integration, 28 Energy L. J. 147 (2007). Against this backdrop of technological change and market-based reforms, the Commission over the past two decades has begun to permit sellers of wholesale electricity to file “market-based” tariffs. These tariffs, instead of setting forth rate schedules or rate-fixing contracts, simply state that the seller will enter into freely negotiated contracts with purchasers. See generally Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 697, 72 Fed. Reg. 39904 (2007) (hereinafter Market-Based Rates); McGrew 160-167. FERC does not subject the contracts entered into under these tariffs (as it subjected traditional wholesale-power contracts) to § 824d’s requirement of immediate filing, apparently on the theory that the requirement has been satisfied by the initial filing of the market-based tariffs themselves. See Brief for Respondent FERC 28-29 (hereinafter Brief for FERC). FERC will grant approval of a market-based tariff only if a utility demonstrates that it lacks or has adequately mitigated market power, lacks the capacity to erect other barriers to entry, and has avoided giving preferences to its affiliates. See Market-Based Rates ¶ 7, 72 Fed. Reg. 39907. In addition to the initial authorization of a market-based tariff, FERC imposes ongoing reporting requirements. A seller must file quarterly reports summarizing the contracts that it has entered into, even extremely short-term contracts. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F. 3d 1006, 1013 (CA9 2004). It must also demonstrate every four months that it still lacks or has adequately mitigated market power. See ibid. If FERC determines from these filings that a seller has reattained market power, it may revoke the authority prospectively. See Market-Based Rates ¶ 5, 72 Fed. Reg. 39906. And if the Commission finds that a seller has violated its Regional Transmission Organization’s market rules, its tariff, or Commission orders, the Commission may take appropriate remedial action, such as ordering refunds, requiring disgorgement of profits, and imposing civil penalties. See ibid. Both the Ninth Circuit and the D. C. Circuit have generally approved FERC’s scheme of market-based tariffs. See Lockyer, supra, at 1011-1013; Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F. 3d 364, 365 (CADC 1998). We have not hitherto approved, and express no opinion today, on the lawfulness of the market-based-tariff system, which is not one of the issues before us. It suffices for the present cases to recognize that when a seller files a market-based tariff, purchasers no longer have the option of buying electricity at a rate set by tariff and contracts no longer need to be filed with FERC (and subjected to its investigatory power) before going into effect. C California’s Electricity Regulation and Its Consequences In 1996, California enacted Assembly Bill 1890 (AB 1890), which massively restructured the California electricity market. See 1996 Cal. Stat. ch. 854 (codified at Cal. Pub. Util. Code Ann. §§ 330-398.5 (West 2004 and Supp. 2008)); see generally Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N. Y. U. Annual Survey of Am. Law 155, 172-185 (2001) (hereinafter Cudahy). The bill transferred operational control of the transmission facilities of California’s three largest investor-owned utilities to an Independent Service Operator (Cal-ISO). See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 464 F. 3d 861, 864 (CA9 2006). It also established the California Power Exchange (CalPX), a nonprofit entity that operated a short-term market — or “spot market” — for electricity. The bill required California’s three largest investor-owned utilities to divest most of their electricity-generation facilities. It then required those utilities to purchase and sell the bulk of their electricity from and to the CalPX’s spot market, permitting only limited leeway for them to enter into long-term contracts. See Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. FERC, 471 F. 3d 1053, 1068 (CA9 2006) (case below). In 1997, FERC approved the Cal-ISO as consistent with the requirements for an Independent Service Operator established in Order No. 888. FERC also approved the CalPX and the investor-owned utilities’ authority to make sales at market-based rates in the CalPX, finding that, in light of the divesture of their generation units and other conditions imposed under the restructuring plan, those utilities had adequately mitigated their market power. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 81 FERC ¶ 61,122, pp. 61,435, 61,435-61,436, 61,537-61,548 (1997). The CalPX opened for business in March 1998. In the summer of 1999, it expanded to include an auction for sales of electricity under “forward contracts”—contracts in which sellers promise to deliver electricity more than one day in the future (sometimes many years). But the participation of California’s large investor-owned utilities in that forward market was limited because, as we have said, AB 1890 strictly capped the amount of power that they could purchase outside of the spot market. See 471 F. 3d, at 1068. That diminishment of the role of long-term contracts in the California electricity market turned out to be one of the seeds of an energy crisis. In the summer of 2000, the price of electricity in the CalPX’s spot market jumped dramatically — more than fifteenfold. See ibid. The increase was the result of a combination of natural, economic, and regulatory factors: “flawed market rules; inadequate addition of generating facilities in the preceding years; a drop in available hydropower due to drought conditions; a rupture of a major pipeline supplying natural gas into California; strong growth in the economy and in electricity demand; unusually high temperatures; an increase in unplanned outages of extremely old generating facilities; and market manipulation.” CAlifornians for Renewable Energy, Inc. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Servs., 119 FERC ¶ 61,058, pp. 61,243, 61,247 (2007). Because California’s investor-owned utilities had for the most part been forbidden to obtain their power through long-term contracts, the turmoil in the spot market hit them hard. See Cudahy 174. The high prices led to rolling blackouts and saddled utilities with mounting debt. In late 2000, the Commission took action. A central plank of its emergency effort was to eliminate the utilities’ reliance on the CalPX’s spot market and to shift their purchases to the forward market. To that end, FERC abolished the requirement that investor-owned utilities purchase and sell all power through the CalPX and encouraged them to enter into long-term contracts. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Servs., 93 FERC ¶ 61,294, pp. 61,980, 61,982 (2000); see also 471 F. 3d, at 1069. The Commission also put price caps on wholesale electricity. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Servs., 95 FERC ¶ 61,418, p. 62,545 (2001). By June 2001, electricity prices began to decline to normal levels. Id., at 62,546. D Genesis of These Cases The principal respondents in these cases are western utilities that purchased power under long-term contracts during that tumultuous period in 2000 and 2001. Although they are not located in California, the high prices in California spilled over into other Western States. See 471 F. 3d, at 1069. Petitioners are the sellers that entered into the contracts with respondents. The contracts between the parties included rates that were very high by historical standards. For example, respondent Snohomish signed a 9-year contract to purchase electricity from petitioner Morgan Stanley at a rate of $105/ megawatt hour (MWh), whereas prices in the Pacific Northwest have historically averaged $24/MWh. The contract prices were substantially lower, however, than the prices that Snohomish would have paid in the spot market during the energy crisis, when prices peaked at $3,300/MWh. See id., at 1069-1070. After the crisis had passed, buyer’s remorse set in and respondents asked FERC to modify the contracts. They contended that the rates in the contracts should not be presumed to be just and reasonable under Mobile-Sierra because, given the sellers’ market-based tariffs, the contracts had never been initially approved by the Commission without the presumption. See Nevada Power Co. v. Enron Power Marketing, Inc., 103 FERC ¶ 61,353, pp. 62,382, 62,387 (2003). Respondents also argued that contract modification was warranted even under the Mobile-Sierra presumption because the contract rates were so high that they violated the public interest. See 103 FERC, at 62,383, 62,387-62,395. In a preliminary order, the Commission instructed the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to consider 12 different factors in deciding whether the presumption could be overcome for the contracts, such as the terms of the contracts, the available alternatives at the time of sale, the relationship of the rates to Commission benchmarks, the effect of the contracts on the financial health of the purchasers, and the impact of contract modification on national energy markets. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded that the Mobile-Sierra presumption should apply to the contracts and that the contracts did not seriously harm the public interest. In fact, according to the ALJ, even if the Mobile-Sierra presumption did not apply, respondents would not be entitled to have the contracts modified. 103 FERC, at 62,390-62,394. Between the ALJ’s decision and the Commission’s ruling, the Commission’s staff issued a report (Staff Report) concluding that unlawful activities of various sellers in the spot market had affected prices in the forward market. See id., at 62,396. Respondents raised the report at oral argument before the Commission, and some of them argued that petitioners “were unlawfully manipulating market prices, thereby engaging in fraud and deception in violation of their market-based rate tariffs.” Ibid. Petitioners contended, however, that the Staff Report demonstrated only a correlation between rates in the spot and forward markets, not a causal connection. See ibid. FERC affirmed the ALJ. The Commission first held that the Mobile-Sierra presumption did apply to the contracts at issue. Although agreeing with respondents that the presumption applies only where FERC has had an initial opportunity to review a contract rate, the Commission relied on the somewhat metaphysical ground that the grant of market-based authority to petitioners qualified as that initial opportunity. See 103 FERC, at 62,388-62,389. The Commission then held that respondents could not overcome the Mobile-Sierra presumption. It recognized that the Staff Report had “found that spot market distortions flowed through to forward power prices,” 103 FERC, at 62,396-62,397, but concluded that this finding, even if true, was not “determinative” because: “a finding that the unjust and unreasonable spot market caused forward bilateral prices to be unjust and unreasonable would be relevant to contract modification only where there is a ‘just and reasonable’ standard of review. . . . Under the ‘public interest’ standard, to justify contract modification it is not enough to show that forward prices became unjust and unreasonable due to the impact of spot market dysfunctions; it must be shown that the rates, terms and conditions are contrary to the public interest.” Id., at 62,397. The Commission determined that under the factors identified in Sierra, as well as under a totality-of-the-circumstances test, respondents had not demonstrated that the contracts threatened the public interest. See 103 FERC, at 62,397-62,399. On rehearing, respondents reiterated their complaints, including their charge that “their contracts were the product of market manipulation by Enron, Morgan Stanley and other [sellers].” 105 FERC ¶ 61,185, pp. 61,979, 61,989 (2003). The Commission answered that there was “no evidence to support a finding of market manipulation that specifically affected the contracts at issue.” Id., at 61,989. Respondents filed petitions for review in the Ninth Circuit, which granted the petitions and remanded to the Commission, finding two flaws in the Commission’s analysis. First, the court agreed with respondents that rates set by contract (whether pursuant to a market-based tariff or not) are presumptively reasonable only where FERC has had an initial opportunity to review the contracts without applying the Mobile-Sierra presumption. To satisfy that prerequisite under the market-based tariff regime, the court said, the Commission must promptly review the terms of contracts after their formation and must modify those that do not appear to be just and reasonable when evaluated without the Mobile-Sierra presumption (rather than merely revoking market-based authority prospectively but leaving preexisting contracts intact). See 471 F. 3d, at 1075-1077, 1079-1085. This initial review must include an inquiry into “the market conditions in which the contracts at issue were formed,” and market “dysfunction” is a ground for finding a contract not to be just and reasonable. Id., at 1085-1087. Second, the Ninth Circuit held that even assuming that the Mobile-Sierra presumption applied, the standard for overcoming that presumption is different for a purchaser’s challenge to a contract, namely, whether the contract rate exceeds a “zone of reasonableness.” 471 F. 3d, at 1088-1090. We granted certiorari. See 551 U. S. 1189 (2007). II A Application of Mobile-Sierra Presumption to Contracts Concluded Under Market-Based Rate Authority As noted earlier, the FERC order under review here agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s premise that the Commission must have an initial opportunity to review a contract without the Mobile-Sierra presumption, but maintained that the authorization for market-based rate authority qualified as that initial review. Before this Court, however, FERC changes its tune, arguing that there is no such prerequisite — or at least that FERC could reasonably conclude so and therefore that Chevron deference is in order. See Brief for FERC 20-21, 33-34; Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). We will not uphold a discretionary agency decision where the agency has offered a justification in court different from what it provided in its opinion. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 94-95 (1943). But FERC has lucked out: The Chenery doctrine has no application to these cases, because we conclude that the Commission was required, under our decision in Sierra, to apply the Mobile-Sierra presumption in its evaluation of the contracts here. That it provided a different rationale for the necessary result is no cause for upsetting its ruling. “To remand would be an idle and useless formality. Chenery does not require that we convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong game.” NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759, 766-767, n. 6 (1969) (plurality opinion). We are in broad agreement with the Ninth Circuit on a central premise: There is only one statutory standard for assessing wholesale-electricity rates, whether set by contract or tariff — the just-and-reasonable standard. The plain text of the FPA states that “[a]ll rates . . . shall be just and reasonable.” 16 U. S. C. § 824d(a); see also § 824e(a) (2000 ed., Supp. V). But we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Sierra as requiring (contrary to the statute) that the Commission apply the standard differently, depending on when a contract rate is challenged. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, Sierra was premised on the idea that “as long as the rate was just and reasonable when the contract was formed, there would be a presumption . . . that the reasonableness continued throughout the term of the contract.” 471 F. 3d, at 1077. In other words, so long as the Commission concludes (either after a hearing or by allowing a rate to go into effect) that a contract rate is just and reasonable when initially filed, the rate will be presumed just and reasonable in future proceedings. That is a misreading of Sierra. Sierra was grounded in the commonsense notion that “[i]n wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the party charged [are] often sophisticated businesses enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to negotiate a ‘just and reasonable’ rate as between the two of them.” Verizon, 535 U. S., at 479. Therefore, only when the mutually agreed-upon contract rate seriously harms the consuming public may the Commission declare it not to be just and reasonable. Sierra thus provided a definition of what it means for a rate to satisfy the just-and-reasonable standard in the contract context — a definition that applies regardless of when the contract is reviewed. The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, essentially read Sierra “as the equivalent of an estoppel doctrine,” whereby an initial Commission opportunity for review prevents the Commission from modifying the rates absent serious future harm to the public interest. Tewksbury & Lim, Applying the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine to Market-Based Rate Contracts, 26 Energy L. J. 437, 457-458 (2005). But Sierra said nothing of the sort. And given that the Commission’s passive permission for a rate to go into effect does not constitute a finding that the rate is just and reasonable, it would be odd to treat that initial “opportunity for review” as curtailing later challenges. The Ninth Circuit found support for its prerequisite in our decision in FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. 380 (1974). In that case, we warned that the Commission’s attempt to rely solely on market forces to evaluate rates charged by small natural-gas producers was inconsistent with the Natural Gas Act’s insistence that rates be just and reasonable. See id., at 397. The Ninth Circuit apparently took this to mean that all initially filed contracts must be subject to review without the Mobile-Sierra presumption. But Texaco had nothing to do with that doctrine. It held that the Commission had improperly implemented a scheme of total deregulation by applying no standard of review at all to small-producer rates. See 417 U. S., at 395-397. It did not cast doubt on the proposition that in a proper regulatory scheme, the ordinary mode for evaluating contractually set rates is to look to whether the rates seriously harm the public interest, not to whether they are unfair to one of the parties that voluntarily assented to the contract. Cf. id., at 391, n. 4. Nor do we agree with the Ninth Circuit that FERC must inquire into whether a contract was formed in an environment of market “dysfunction” before applying the Mobile-Sierra presumption. Markets are not perfect, and one of the reasons that parties enter into wholesale-power contracts is precisely to hedge against the volatility that market imperfections produce. That is why one of the Commission’s responses to the energy crisis was to remove regulatory barriers to long-term contracts. It would be a perverse rule that rendered contracts less likely to be enforced when there is volatility in the market. (Such a rule would come into play, after all, only when a contract formed in a period of “dysfunction” did not significantly harm the consuming public, since contracts that seriously harm the public should be set aside even under the Mobile-Sierra presumption.) By enabling sophisticated parties who weathered market turmoil by entering long-term contracts to renounce those contracts once the storm has passed, the Ninth Circuit’s holding would reduce the incentive to conclude such contracts in the future. Such a rule has no support in our case law and plainly undermines the role of contracts in the FPA’s statutory scheme. To be sure, FERC has ample authority to set aside a contract where there is unfair dealing at the contract formation stage — for instance, if it finds traditional grounds for the abrogation of the contract such as fraud or duress. See 103 FERC, at 62,399-62,400 (“[T]here is no evidence of unfairness, bad faith, or duress in the original negotiations”). In addition, if the “dysfunctional” market conditions under which the contract was formed were caused by illegal action of one of the parties, FERC should not apply the Mobile-Sierra presumption. See Part III, infra. But the mere fact that the market is imperfect, or even chaotic, is no reason to undermine the stabilizing force of contracts that the FPA embraced as an alternative to “purely tariff-based regulation.” Verizon, 535 U. S., at 479. We may add that evaluating market “dysfunction” is a very difficult and highly speculative task — not one that the FPA would likely require the agency to engage in before holding sophisticated parties to their bargains. We reiterate that we do not address the lawfulness of FERC’s market-based-rates scheme, which assuredly has its critics. But any needed revision in that scheme is properly addressed in a challenge to the scheme itself, not through a disfigurement of the venerable Mobile-Sierra doctrine. We hold only that FERC may abrogate a valid contract only if it harms the public interest. B Application of “Excessive Burden” Exception to High-Rate Challenges We turn now to the Ninth Circuit’s second holding: that a “zone of reasonableness” test should be used to evaluate a buyer’s challenge that a rate is too high. In our view that fails to accord an adequate level of protection to contracts. The standard for a buyer’s challenge must be the same, generally speaking, as the standard for a seller’s challenge: The contract rate must seriously harm the public interest. That is the standard that the Commission applied in the proceedings below. We are again in agreement with the Ninth Circuit on a starting premise: It is clear that the three factors we identified in Sierra — “where [a rate] might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory,” 350 U. S., at 355—are not all precisely applicable to the high-rate challenge of a purchaser (where, for example, the relevant question is not whether “other customers” [of the utility] would be excessively burdened, but whether any customers of the purchaser would be); and that those three factors are in any event not the exclusive components of the public interest. In its decision below, the Commission recognized both these realities. See 103 FERC, at 62,397 (“Nevada Companies failed to show that the contract terms at issue impose an excessive burden on their customers” (emphasis added)); id., at 62,398 (“The record also demonstrates that Snohomish presented no evidence that its contract with Morgan Stanley adversely affected Snohomish or its ratepayers” (emphasis added)); id., at 62,398-62,399 (evaluating the “totality of circumstances”); see also Brief for FERC 41-42. Where we disagree with the Ninth Circuit is on the overarching “zone of reasonableness” standard it established for evaluating a high-rate challenge and setting aside a contract rate: whether consumers’ electricity bills “are higher than they would otherwise have been had the challenged contracts called for rates within the just and reasonable range,” i. e., rates that equal “marginal cost.” 471 F. 3d, at 1089. The Ninth Circuit derived this test from our statement in Sierra that a contract rate would have to be modified if it were so low that it imposed an “excessive burden” on other wholesale purchasers. The Ninth Circuit took “excessive burden” to mean merely the burden caused when one set of consumers is forced to pay above marginal cost to compensate for below-marginal-cost rates charged other consumers. See 471 F. 3d, at 1088. And it proceeded to apply a similar notion of “excessive burden” to high-rate challenges (where all the burden of the above-marginal-cost contract rate falls on the purchaser’s own customers, and does not affect the customers of third parties). Id., at 1089. That is a misreading of Sierra and our later cases. A presumption of validity that disappears when the rate is above marginal cost is no presumption of validity at all, but a reinstitution of cost-based rather than contract-based regulation. We have said that, under the Mobile-Sierra presumption, setting aside a contract rate requires a finding of “unequivocal public necessity,” Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 822, or “extraordinary circumstances,” Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U. S. 571, 582 (1981). In no way can these descriptions be thought to refer to the mere exceeding of marginal cost. The Ninth Circuit’s standard would give short shrift to the important role of contracts in the FPA, as reflected in our decision in Sierra, and would threaten to inject more volatility into the electricity market by undermining a key source of stability. The FPA recognizes that contract stability ultimately benefits consumers, even if short-term rates for a subset of the public might be high by historical standards — which is why it permits rates to be set by contract and not just by tariff. As the Commission has recently put it, its “first and foremost duty is to protect consumers from unjust and unreasonable rates; however, . . . uncertainties regarding rate stability and contract sanctity can have a chilling effect on investments and a seller’s willingness to enter into long-term contracts and this, in turn, can harm customers in the long run.” Market-Based Rates ¶ 6, 72 Fed. Reg. 33906-33907. Besides being wrong in principle, in its practical effect the Ninth Circuit’s rule would impose an onerous new burden on the Commission, requiring it to calculate the marginal cost of the power sold under a market-based contract. Assuming that FERC even ventured to undertake such an analysis, rather than reverting to the anden regime of cost-of-service ratesetting, the regulatory costs would be enormous. We think that the FPA intended to reserve the Commission’s contract-abrogation power for those extraordinary circumstances where the public will be severely harmed. III Defects in FERC’s Analysis Supporting Remand Despite our significant disagreement with the Ninth Circuit, we find two errors in the Commission’s analysis, and we therefore affirm the judgment below on alternative grounds. First, it appears, as the Ninth Circuit concluded, see 471 F. 3d, at 1090, that the Commission may have looked simply to whether consumers’ rates increased immediately upon the relevant contracts’ going into effect, rather than determining whether the contracts imposed an excessive burden on consumers “down the line,” relative to the rates they could have obtained (but for the contracts) after elimination of the dysfunctional market. For example, the Commission concluded that two of the respondents would experience “rate decreases of approximately 20 percent for retail service” during the period covered by the contracts. 103 FERC, at 62,397. But the baseline for that computation was the rate they were paying before the contracts went into effect. That disparity is certainly a relevant consideration; but so is the disparity between the contract rate and the rates consumers would have paid (but for the contracts) further down the line, when the open market was no longer dysfunctional. That disparity, past a certain point, could amount to an “excessive burden.” That is what was contemplated by Sierra, which involved a challenge 5 years into a 15-year contract. The “excessive burden” on other customers to which the opinion referred was assuredly the current burden, and not only the burden imposed at the very outset of the contract. See 350 U. S., at 355. The “unequivocal public necessity” that justifies overriding the Mobile-Sierra presumption does not disappear as a factor once the contract enters into force. Thus, FERC’s analysis on this point was flawed — or at least incomplete. As the Ninth Circuit put it, “[i]t is entirely possible that rates had increased so high during the energy crises because of dysfunction in the spot market that, even with the acknowledged decrease in rates, consumers still paid more under the forward contracts than they otherwise would have.” 471 F. 3d, at 1090. If that is so, and if that increase is so great that, even taking into account the desirability of fostering market-stabilizing long-term contracts, the rates impose an excessive burden on consumers or otherwise seriously harm the public interest, the rates must be disallowed. Second, respondents alleged before FERC that some of the petitioners in these cases had engaged in market manipulation in the spot market. See, e. g., 105 FERC, at 61,989 (“Snohomish and Nevada Companies argue that their contracts were the product of market manipulation by Enron, Morgan Stanley and other Respondents, which, as established by the Commission Staff, engaged in market manipulation”). The Staff Report concluded, as we have said, that the abnormally high prices in the spot market during the energy crisis influenced the terms of contracts in the forward market. But the Commission dismissed the relevance of the Staff Report on the ground that it had not demonstrated that forward market prices were so high as to overcome the Mobile-Sierra presumption. We conclude, however, that if it is clear that one party to a contract engaged in such extensive unlawful market manipulation as to alter the playing field for contract negotiations, the Commission should not presume that the contract is just and reasonable. Like fraud and duress, unlawful market activity that directly affects contract negotiations eliminates the premise on which the Mobile-Sierra presumption rests: that the contract rates are the product of fair, arms-length negotiations. The mere fact that the unlawful activity occurred in a different (but related) market does not automatically establish that it had no effect upon the contract — especially given the Staff Report’s (unsurprising) finding that high prices in the one market produced high prices in the other. We are unable to determine from the Commission’s orders whether it found the evidence inadequate to support the claim that respondents’ alleged unlawful activities affected the contracts at issue here. It said in its order on rehearing, 105 FERC, at 61,989, that “[w]e .. . found no evidence to support a finding of market manipulation [by respondents] that specifically affected the contracts at issue.” But perhaps that must be read in light of the Commission’s above described rejection of the Staff Report on the ground that high spot-market prices caused by manipulation are irrelevant unless the forward market prices fail the Mobile-Sierra standard; and in light of the statement in its initial order, in apparent response to the claim of spot-market manipulation by respondents, 103 FERC, at 62,397, that “a finding that the unjust and unreasonable spot market prices caused forward bilateral prices to be unjust and unreasonable would be relevant to contract modification only where there is a ‘just and reasonable’ standard of review.” We emphasize that the mere fact of a party’s engaging in unlawful activity in the spot market does not deprive its forward contracts of the benefit of the Mobile-Sierra presumption. There is no reason why FERC should be able to abrogate a contract on these grounds without finding a causal connection between unlawful activity and the contract rate. Where, however, causality has been established, the Mobile-Sierra presumption should not apply. On remand, the Commission should amplify or clarify its findings on these two points. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice and Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. We also use “Commission” to refer to the Federal Power Commission, FERC’s predecessor. In a holding not challenged before this Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the contracts at issue did not contain “Memphis clause[s],” 471 F. 3d 1053, 1079 (2006) (citing United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div., 358 U. S. 103 (1958)), see supra, at 534, that would have precluded application of the Mobile-Sierra presumption. We do not say, as the dissent alleges, post, at 561 (opinion of Stevens, J.), that the public interest is not also relevant in a challenge to unilaterally set rates. But it is the “ ‘sole concern’ ” in a contract case. See FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348, 355 (1956). The dissent criticizes the Commission’s decision because it took into account under the heading “totality of the circumstances” only the circumstances of the contract formation, not “circumstances exogenous to contract negotiations, including natural disasters and market manipulation by entities not parties to the challenged contract.” Post, at 567. Those considerations are relevant to whether the contracts impose an “excessive burden” on consumers relative to what they would have paid absent the contracts. It is precisely our uncertainty whether the Commission considered those “circumstances exogenous to contract negotiations,” discussed in Part III of our opinion, that causes us to approve the remand to FERC. Elsewhere the Ninth Circuit softened this standard somewhat, saying that “[e]ven if a particular rate exceeds marginal cost... it may still be within this reasonable range — or ‘zone of reasonableness’ — if that higher-than-cost-based price results from normal market forces and is part of a general trend toward rates that do reflect cost.” 471 F. 3d, at 1089. We are not sure (and we think no one can be sure) precisely what this means. It has no basis in our opinions, and is in any event wrong because its point of departure (the general principle that rates cannot exceed marginal cost) contradicts Mobile-Sierra. The Ninth Circuit purported to find support for its “zone of reasonableness” test in the case law of the District of Columbia Circuit. But the cited case stands only for the proposition that a market-based scheme must ensure that market forces will, “over the long pull,” cause rates to approximate marginal cost. Interstate Natural Gas Assn, of Am. v. FERC, 285 F. 3d 18, 31 (2002). Nowhere does the opinion suggest that the standard for reforming a particular contract validly entered into under a market-based scheme is whether the rates approximate marginal cost. By the same token, our approval of FERC’s decision not to set prospective area rates solely with reference to pre-existing contract prices, Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 792-793 (1968), does not support, as the dissent thinks, post, at 562-563, n. 2, the view that the standard for abrogating an existing, valid contract is anything less than the Mobile-Sierra standard. That is the standard Permian Basin applied when actually confronted with the issue of contract modification. See 390 U. S., at 781-784, 821-822. The dissent claims that we have misread the FPA because its provisions “do not distinguish between rates set unilaterally by tariff and rates set bilaterally by contract.” Post, at 556. But the dissent’s interpretation, whatever plausibility it has as an original matter, cannot be squared with Sierra, which plainly distinguished between unilaterally and bilaterally set rates, and said that the only relevant consideration for the Commission in the latter case is whether the public interest is harmed. And the circumstances identified in Sierra as implicating the public interest refer to something more than a small dent in the consumer’s pocket, which is why our subsequent cases have described the standard as a high one. At the end of the day, the dissent simply argues against the settled understanding of the FPA that has prevailed in this Court, lower courts, and the Commission for half a century. Although the dissent is correct that we have never used the phrase “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” in our cases, that is probably because the understanding of it was so uniform that no circuit split concerning its meaning arose until the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous decision in these cases. If one searches the Commission’s reports, over 600 decisions since 2000 alone have cited the doctrine, see Brief for Electric Power Supply Association et al. as Amici Curiae 15, and the Courts of Appeals have used the term “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” (or “Sierra-Mobile” doctrine) over 75 times since 1974. If there were ever a context where long-settled understanding should be honored it is here, where a statutory decision (subject to revision by Congress) has been understood the same way for many years by lower courts, by this Court, by the federal agency the statute governs, and hence surely by the private actors trying to observe the law.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO. v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION OF KANSAS. No. 62. Argued December 13, 1962. Decided February 18, 1963. Mark H. Adams argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Lawrence I. Shaw, F. Vinson Roach, Mark H. Adams II and Joe Rolston. Charles C. McCarter argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Hugh B. Cox. Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Guilfoyle, Ralph S. Spritzer, Richard A. Solomon, Howard E. Wahrenbrock and Arthur H. Fribourg filed a brief for the Federal Power Commission, as amicus curiae. Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed for the State of Texas by Will Wilson, Attorney General, and Limoard Shivers, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Alabama by MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General; for the State of Colorado by Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General; for the State of Georgia by Eugene Cook, Attorney General; for the State of Illinois by William G. Clark, Attorney General; for the State of Louisiana by Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General; for the State of Mississippi by Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General; for the State of Montana by Forrest H. Anderson, Attorney General; for the State of Nebraska by Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General; for the State of Nevada by ■Charles E. Springer, Attorney General; for the State of New Mexico by Earl E. Hartley, Attorney General; for the State of North Dakota by Leslie R. Burgum, Attorney General; for the State of Oklahoma by Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General, and Ferrell Rogers; for the State of Utah by A. Pratt Kesler, Attorney General; for the State of Wyoming by W. M. Haight, Acting Attorney General; and for the Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association by W. W. Heard. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether orders of the Kansas State Corporation Commission which require the appellant, an interstate pipeline company, to purchase gas ratably from all wells connecting with its pipeline system in each gas field within the State invalidly encroach upon the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission conferred by the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 717-717w. The appellant’s pipeline system is connected to some 1,100 natural gas wells in the Kansas Hugoton Field under about 125 purchase contracts between the appellant and various producers. The contracts have been duly filed with the Federal Power Commission. Under the oldest contract, known as the Republic “A” contract, which was made in 1945 with Republic Natural Gas Company, and is still in force as modified in 1953, appellant was obligated to purchase gas from Republic up to the maximum production allowables for Republic’s Kansas wells connected to appellant’s system. Appellant’s contracts with its other producers provide that appellant’s purchase commitments thereunder are expressly subject to the agreement with Republic. Thus appellant was bound to purchase from its other producers only so much of its requirements as were not satisfied by the quantities which the Republic contract required to be taken from Republic wells. Appellant’s requirements until 1958 were such that its purchases from its various producers were nevertheless roughly ratable, that is, in like proportion to the legally fixed allowables for each of the 1,100 wells in the Hugo-ton Field. However, after 1958 appellant’s requirements aggregated substantially less than the total allowables for the Hugoton wells. Thus the balance of the total requirements, after the contractually required purchases from Republic of the maximum allowables for the Republic wells, resulted in appellant’s purchases from appellant’s other producers of proportions substantially below the allowables for those producers’ wells. This imbalance brought about the orders of the State Commission of which appellant complains. A Kansas statute empowers the State Commission so to “regulate the taking of natural gas from any and all . . . common sources of supply within this state as to prevent the inequitable or unfair taking from such common source of supply . . . and to prevent unreasonable discrimination ... in favor of or against any producer in any such common source of supply.” The Commission adopted in 1944, avowedly as a conservation measure, a basic proration order designed to effect ratable production and to protect correlative rights in the Hugoton Field. In 1959, in order to require appellant to take gas from Republic wells in no higher proportion to the allowables than from the wells of the other producers, the Commission entered the order specifically directing appellant to purchase gas ratably from all 1,100 Hugoton wells. That order was superseded in February 1960 by the general order, directed at all natural gas purchasers taking Kansas gas. These orders presented the appellant with the alternatives of complying with the obligations of the Republic contract and increasing its takes from the other producers’ wells — thus taking more gas from Kansas than it could currently use — or of risking liability for a breach of the Republic contract by decreasing its takes from the Republic wells below the allowables. Appellant challenged the two orders in the Kansas courts on the ground, among others, that they unconstitutionally invaded the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act. The Kansas Supreme Court sustained the orders, 188 Kan. 351, 355, 362 P. 2d 599, 609; on rehearing, 188 Kan. 624, 364 P. 2d 668. We noted probable jurisdiction of an appeal to this Court, 370 U. S. 901. We disagree with the Kansas Supreme Court, for we hold that the State Commission’s orders did invade the exclusive jurisdiction which the Natural Gas Act has conferred upon the Federal Power Commission over the sale and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale. I. We consider first the ground relied upon by the Kansas Supreme Court, that the orders constitute only state regulation of the “production or gathering” of natural gas, which is exempted from the federal regulatory domain by the terms of § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717 (b). These orders do not regulate “production or gathering” within that exemption. In a line of decisions beginning with Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 324 U. S. 681, 598, and Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 331 U. S. 682, 689-693, it has been consistently held that “production” and “gathering” are terms narrowly confined to the physical acts of drawing the gas from the earth and preparing it for the first stages of distribution. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672, 680-681; Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 266 F. 2d 208; Huber Corp. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 236 F. 2d 550. Appellant is not a producer but a purchaser of gas from producers, and none of its activities in Kansas shown upon this record involves “production and gathering, in the sense that those terms are used in § 1 (b) . ...” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, supra, at 678. II. The Kansas Supreme Court also sustained the orders on the ground that neither order threatened any actual invasion of the regulatory domain of the Federal Power Commission since it “in no way involves the price of gas.” 188 Kan., at 624, 364 P. 2d, at 668. It is true that it was settled even before the passage of the Natural Gas Act, that direct regulation of the prices of wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce is beyond the constitutional power of the States — whether or not framed to achieve ends, such as conservation, ordinarily within the ambit of state power. See Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298; cf. Public Utilities Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83. But our inquiry is not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms with prices or volumes of purchases, cf. Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 478. The Natural Gas Act precludes not merely direct regulation by the States of such contractual matters. See Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 506-509. The Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of “all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce, whether by a pipeline company or not and whether occurring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate pipeline company.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, supra, at 682; see H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2. The federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales of natural gas, Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U. S. 44, or for state regulations which would indirectly achieve the same result. These state orders necessarily deal with matters which directly affect the ability of the Federal Power Commission to regulate comprehensively and effectively the transportation and sale of natural gas, and to achieve the uniformity of regulation which was an objective of the Natural Gas Act. They therefore invalidly invade the federal agency’s exclusive domain. The danger of interference with the federal regulatory scheme arises because these orders are unmistakably and unambiguously directed at purchasers who take gas in Kansas for resale after transportation in interstate commerce. In effect, these orders shift to the shoulders of interstate purchasers the burden of performing the complex task of balancing the output of thousands of natural gas wells within the State, cf. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340 — a task which would otherwise presumably be the State Commission’s. Moreover, any readjustment of purchasing patterns which such orders might require of purchasers who previously took unratably could seriously impair the Federal Commission’s authority to regulate the intricate relationship between the purchasers’ cost structures and eventual costs to wholesale customers who sell to consumers in other States. This relationship is a matter with respect to which Congress has given the Federal Power Commission paramount and exclusive authority. See Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 610. The prospect of interference with the federal regulatory power in this area is made even more acute by the fact that criminal sanctions imposed by state statute for noncompliance fall upon such purchasers and not upon the local producers. Therefore, although collision between the state and federal regulation may not be an inevitable consequence, there lurks such imminent possibility of collision in orders purposely directed at interstate wholesale purchasers that the orders must be declared a nullity in order to assure the effectuation of the comprehensive federal regulation ordained by Congress. It may be true, as the State Commission urges, that accommodation on the part of the Federal Power Commission could avoid direct collision — but this argument misses the point. Not the federal but the state regulation must be subordinated, when Congress has so plainly-occupied the regulatory field. Cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236. We have already said that the question to be asked under this statute is “whether state authority can practicably regulate a given area and, if we find that it cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority governs.” Federal Power Comm’n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 19-20. III. Appellee’s principal contention, sustained by the Kansas Supreme Court, is that ratable taking is essential for the conservation of natural gas, and that conservation is traditionally a function of state power. There is no doubt that the States do possess power to allocate and conserve scarce natural resources upon and beneath their lands. We have recognized such power with particular respect to natural gas. Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. S. 8; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300. But the problem of this case is not as to the existence or even the scope of a State’s power to conserve its natural resources; the problem is only whether the Constitution sanctions the particular means chosen by Kansas to exercise the conceded power if those means threaten effectuation of the federal regulatory scheme. We have already held that a purpose, however legitimate, to conserve natural resources, does not warrant direct interference by the States with the prices of natural gas wholesales in interstate commerce, Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm’n, 355 U. S. 391; Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Corporation Comm’n, 355 U. S. 425. It has been suggested that those decisions are at variance with Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n, 286 U. S. 210, in which we sustained a state proration order designed to further conservation, against a challenge under the Commerce Clause. We reject that suggestion. The Court in Champlin carefully limited that holding to regulations which, the Court observed precisely, “apply only to production and not to sales or transportation of crude oil or its products.” (Italics supplied.) The Court further noted, “[s]uch production is essentially a mining operation and therefore is not a part of interstate commerce . . . .” 286 U. S., at 235. (Italics supplied.) And, after enactment of the Natural Gas Act, in confirming state power to achieve conservation objectives, the Court took care to say, “[t]hese ends have been held to justify control over production even though the uses to which property may profitably be put are restricted.” Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil <& Gas Co., supra, at 185-186. (Italics supplied.) Thus our cases have consistently recognized a significant distinction, which bears directly upon the constitutional consequences, between conservation measures aimed directly at interstate purchasers and wholesales for resale, and those aimed at producers and production. The former cannot be sustained when they threaten, as here, the achievement of the comprehensive scheme of federal regulation. Of course, the Kansas method before us would fail, for the reasons given, even if it were Kansas’ only means of attaining these ends. The State does not, however, appear to be without alternative means of checking waste and disproportionate or discriminatory taking. Moreover, the invalidation of this particular form of state regulation does not result in a regulatory “gap” of the sort which the Act was designed to prevent. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, supra, at 682-683. For example, we have very recently recognized that the Commission can and should take appropriate account of certain conservation factors in certification proceedings. Federal Power Comm’n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., supra, at 20-22. See also McGrath, Federal Regulation of Producers in Relation to Conservation of Natural Gas, 44 Geo. L. J. 676 (1956). IV. Although what we have said answers the question for decision, it is appropriate that we comment upon a suggestion advanced both by appellant and by the Federal Power Commission as amicus curiae. That suggestion was that if we should hold, as we do hold, that the orders in validly invade the federal regulatory jurisdiction, the judgment should not be reversed but the case should rather be remanded to the Kansas Supreme Court. The theory is that the Kansas Supreme Court might, in light of our holding, now hold that the orders effected a modification of the Republic “A” contract such as to permit performance of the contract through takings from the Republic wells in such lower amounts as may be necessary to achieve ratability with the takings from the wells of appellant’s other producers. In short, the suggestion is that the state court, if afforded the opportunity, might now so harmonize the Republic contract with the Commission’s order that there would result no measurable effect upon interstate transmissions or sales. We reject this suggestion for several reasons. First, both opinions of the Kansas Supreme Court show that the court clearly recognized the substantiality of the federal question in the asserted encroachment of the orders upon the federal regulatory scheme. The court squarely decided the federal question in favor of the validity of the orders. Neither opinion rests this holding on an independent nonfederal ground of decision, and the appellant and the Commission, by suggesting a remand, in effect concede as much. Nor is there any undecided aspect of the case upon which the Kansas Supreme Court might still sustain the orders upon a nonfederal ground. Cf. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95. We and the Kansas Supreme Court are therefore in complete agreement that the federal question as to the validity of the orders cannot be avoided. It would hardly be seemly for us to ask the Kansas Supreme Court to reconsider its holding because we have reached a different conclusion on that question. Furthermore we have difficulty perceiving how we could properly invite the Kansas Supreme Court to interpret the Republic “A” contract in light of the orders with a view to possible abatement of the federal question. That contract was not in any respect made an issue in this lawsuit — indeed, Republic is not a party; the controversy is solely between the appellant and the State and concerns only the validity of the orders. To invite consideration by the Kansas Supreme Court of the possible accommodation of the contract with the orders so as to avoid the asserted invalid trespass on the federal regulatory area, is necessarily to ask the Kansas court to do one of two things: (1) to determine whether the orders can be accommodated with a contract which is in no sense before the court and in the absence of one of the contracting parties; or (2) to vacate its holding that the orders are not invalid for encroachment on the federal domain, and abstain from deciding that question pending the decision of some action which may squarely pit the contract against the orders. In the circumstances, to follow the suggestion to remand would on our part be highly irregular. In any event the suggestion misconceives the true nature of the question which the Kansas Supreme Court and this Court were called upon to decide. The federal question does not arise from an asserted actual and immediate conflict between the federal and state regulations. The question is whether the state orders may stand in the face of the pervasive scope of federal occupation of the field. Cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra, at 241-244. Indeed, even if the issue of the accommodation of the Republic “A” contract with the orders had been actually framed in the lawsuit, the mere fact that the Kansas court might make the suggested accommodation would not necessarily permit the Kansas court or this Court to avoid decisions of the federal question, since even then it would have to be determined whether the orders invalidly jeopardize the Natural Gas Act’s objective of uniformity. See Federal Power Comm’n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., supra, at 28. For, if the federal question could be avoided or postponed just short of actual collision, by ad hoc accommodation on the part of every State, then the scope of federal regulatory power would vary in accordance with the kaleidoscopic variations of local contract law. The judgments are reversed and the causes are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The general order of the Commission, which was embodied in Rule 82-2-219, provided: Ratable ProductioN of Gas from CommoN Source of Supply “In each common source of supply under proration by this Commission, each purchaser shall take gas in proportion to the allowables from all the wells to which it is connected and shall maintain all such wells in substantially the same proportionate status as to overproduction or underproduction; provided, however, this rule shall not apply when a difference in proportionate status results from the inability of a well to produce proportionately with other wells connected to the purchaser (Authorized by G. S. 1959, Supp. 55-703; Effective February 8, I960).” This order, directed generally at all purchasers within the Commission’s jurisdiction, superseded an order of October 7, 1959, which specifically required appellant “to take gas ratably from all wells to which it is connected in the Kansas Hugoton Gas Field.” When the general order was promulgated, the specific order was rescinded. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, considered the validity of both orders as though both were still in force. For purposes of our jurisdiction and consideration of the merits, it makes no difference whether the specific order survived, for the superseding general order was no less clearly directed at the appellant. For a history of the discovery and development of the Hugoton Field, and the Kansas Commission’s earlier efforts to insure correlative rights in, and to regulate the taking of gas from, that field, see generally American Bar Association Section of Mineral Law, Conservation of Oil and Gas — A Legal History, 1948 (1949), 165-183. The original Republic “A” contract, as amended, fixed the minimum-take requirements in terms of a percentage of appellant’s natural gas needs for a particular district which it served from the Hugoton Field. A decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in 1952 modified that term of the contract by holding that appellant’s takes from particular Republic wells could not exceed the production allowables set by the Commission for those wells, regardless of whether the total allowables might be lower than the percentage stipulated by the contract. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Republic Natural Gas Co., 172 Kan. 450, 241 P. 2d 708. The substantial underages in appellant’s purchases were attributed to two factors: First, the rate of increase in the allowables for the wells from which appellant was taking had exceeded the increases in appellant’s requirements from the Hugoton Field; and second, appellant’s projected expansion of its system had been delayed unexpectedly by failure to secure the requisite certificates of convenience and necessity from the Federal Power Commission. Neither factor is material to the questions presented by this appeal. The statute, as amended in 1959, is Kan. Gen. Stat., 1949 (Supp. 1959), §55-703, captioned “Production regulations; rules and formulas.” The terms of the statute speak of “taking” rather than “purchasing” of natural gas; the Commission has decreed that the two terms are synonymous. It was the view of the dissenting judge in the court below, however, that the “taking” comprehended by the statute, nowhere defined in the statute itself, referred only to production so that the Commission lacked authority under state law to regulate purchasing in the manner of the present orders. See 188 Kan. 355, 365, 362 P. 2d 599, 606. The operative clause of this order designated the order as the basic guide for “the production of natural gas” from the Hugoton Field. No provisions of the order imposed enforceable obligations or sanctions upon purchasers, although one section admonished, “. . . purchasers . . . from any well, shall endeavor to limit their takes of gas to the quantities fixed in the schedule as the allowable production for such well . . . .” Pending in a Kansas trial court are two suits by Republic against appellant to recover damages for appellant’s failure to purchase gas in the quantities required by the contracts. Thus we have no need to consider the effect of the “production or gathering” exemption upon ratable-tahe orders directed exclusively at independent producers of natural gas. For contrasting views on that question, compare Kelly, Gas Proration and Ratable Taking in Texas, 19 Tex. Bar J. 763, 797 (1956), with Comment, Ratable Taking of Natural Gas, 11 S. W. L. J. 358, 360-361 (1957). Persistent efforts to narrow the scope of the broader exclusive federal jurisdiction conferred by the statute have been unavailing. See, inter alia, H. R. 4051, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 4099, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 1758, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; and S. 1498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. “Attempts to weaken this protection [of consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural-gas companies] by amend-atory legislation exempting independent natural-gas producers from federal regulation have repeatedly failed, and we refuse to achieve the same result by a strained interpretation of the existing statutory language.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, supra, at 685. Our decisions in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179, and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U. S. 190, are not contrary. “In those cases we were dealing with constitutional questions and not the construction of the Natural Gas Act.” Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., supra, at 45. See American Bar Association Section of Mineral and Natural Resources Law, Conservation of Oil and Gas — A Legal History, 1958 (I960), 342. See, e. g., Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, supra, at 602-603; cf. Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., supra. The availability of regulatory alternatives, particularly in the form of proration and similar orders directed at producers, has been much discussed. See the view of a member of the Kansas Corporation Commission, Byrd, Contractual and Property Rights as Affected by Conservation Laws and Regulations, Tenth Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, 1, 6-7 (1959); see also American Bar Association Section of Mineral Law, Conservation of Oil and Gas — A Legal History, 1948 (1949), 170-171; Kulp, Oil and Gas Rights (1954), § 10.100; 1 Kuntz, Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas (1962), §4.7. It has been urged that as a practical matter restrictions upon purchasers more effectively and easily achieve ratable taking, see 1A Summers, Oil and Gas (1954), 139 and n. 9.30. On the contrary, it has also been argued that the very objectives sought to be achieved here may be achieved through ratable production orders, Comment, Ratable Taking of Natural Gas, 11 S. W. L. J. 358, 359, 362 (1957). We note too the suggestion of a witness in the proceeding below that the result sought by the orders herein might have been achieved by requiring Republic to decrease production from its wells rather than by requiring appellant to increase its purchases from those wells. R. 33. This apparently was also the view of the dissenting judge below, 188 Kan., at 365, 362 P. 2d, at 606. See, as to the obligation of the States to pursue alternatives which avoid interference with federally protected interstate commerce, Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 354-356. There is no occasion to consider appellant’s further argument that the Kansas Commission’s orders were tainted by an improper motive, that is, to require overproduction of Kansas Hugoton wells in order to prevent disadvantageous drainage to Texas and Oklahoma, which share the Hugoton Field with Kansas. The relevancy of motive to the validity of such regulations has been questioned, Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 276. See, however, Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55, 69-70, where the Court invalidated a state proration order “shown to bear no reasonable relation either to the prevention of waste or the protection of correlative rights . . . .”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHAMPLIN REFINING CO. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 21. Argued November 8, 9, 1945. — Reargued October 18, 21, 1946. Decided November 18, 1946. Dan Moody argued the cause for appellant on the original argument. With him on the briefs was Harry 0. Glasser. Both argued the cause on reargument. Edward Dumbauld argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appel-lees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Mc-Grath, Assistant Attorney General Berge, Daniel W. Knowlton and Nelson Thomas. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. The Interstate Commerce Commission, acting under § 19 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, ordered the appellant to furnish certain inventories, schedules, maps and charts of its pipe line property. Champlin’s objections that the Act does not authorize the order, or if it be construed to do so is unconstitutional, were overruled by the Commission and again by the District Court which dismissed the company’s suit for an injunction. These questions of law are brought here by appeal. Judicial Code § 238, 28 U. S. C. § 345. Champlin owns and operates a line of six-inch pipe five hundred and sixteen miles in length lying in five states. Originating at Champlin’s Enid, Oklahoma refinery, it crosses Kansas, Nebraska, a part of South Dakota, and ends in Iowa. It is used only to convey the company’s own refinery products to its own terminal stations at Hutchinson, Kansas; Superior, Nebraska; and Rock Rapids, Iowa, at each of which the line connects with storage facilities from which deliveries are made. The statute, so far as relevant, says that it shall apply “to common carriers engaged in” “transportation of oil or other commodity” by pipe line from one state to another. It provides also that “common carrier” includes “all pipeline companies.” This language on its face would seem to cover the appellant’s operation. Champlin contends, however, that the “transportation” mentioned in the Act does not refer to the carriage of one’s -own goods. The District Court has found that Champlin is the sole owner of the products transported through its pipe line; it has never transported, offered to transport, or been asked to transport any products belonging to any other company or person; its pipe line does not connect with any other pipe line but only with storage tanks at the three terminal points; there are no facilities for putting any petroleum product into the line other than at the Enid refinery; delivery of the products at the three terminal points is made from Champlin’s storage tanks by means of truck racks or railroad tank car racks and is not made directly from the pipe line in any instance; no tariffs stating ‘ transportation charges have been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission or with any state commission or regulatory body. Because of these facts the appellant suggests that the language and holding of this Court concerning the Uncle Sam Oil Company in The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, approved in Valvoline Oil Company v. United States, 308 U. S. 141, govern this case. The Uncle Sam Company operation is described as “simply drawing oil from its own wells across a state line to its own refinery for its own use, and that is all . . . .” The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 562. The Court considered this was not “transportation” within the meaning of the Act. But we think it would expand the actual holding of that case to apply its conclusion to Champlin. The controlling fact under the statute is transporting commodities from state to state by pipe line. Admittedly Champlin is not a common carrier in the sense of the common law carrier for hire. However, the Act does not stop at this but goes on to say that its use of the term “common carrier” is to include all pipe line companies — a meaningless addition if it thereby included only what the term without more always had included. While Champlin technically is transporting its own oil, manufacturing processes have been completed; the oil is not being moved for Champlin’s own use. These interstate facilities are operated to put its finished products in the market in interstate commerce at the greatest economic advantage. Examination of Champlin’s pricing methods supports the view that appellant is engaged in transportation even though the products are still its own when moved. The District Court found that price at the terminal points includes f. o. b. price at the Enid refinery and an additional sum called a differential. The differential is the through railroad freight rate from Enid to the final destination (usually the purchaser’s place of business), less the carrying charges from the pipe line terminal to final destination. The District Court found, however, that competitive and other conditions “sometimes cause departures from the prices arrived at in accordance with the formula above described.” Appellant states that as to some deliveries “rail rates were used merely as a basis for calculating a delivered price, not as a charge for transportation.” Even so, and even though departures from the calculated differential are substantial and frequent, we think this practice points up a significant distinction'from the Uncle Sam case. We hold that Champlin’s operation is transportation within the meaning of the Act and that the statute supports the Commission’s order to furnish information. Appellant further contends that, as so construed, the Act exceeds the commerce power of Congress and violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because, it is argued, this interpretation converts a private pipe line into a public utility and requires a private carrier to become a common carrier. But our conclusion rests on no such basis and affords no such implication. The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is not dependent on the technical common carrier status but is quite as extensive over a private carrier. This power has yet been invoked only to the extent of requiring Champlin to furnish certain information as to facilities being used in interstate marketing of its products. The commerce power is adequate to support this requirement whether appellant be considered a private carrier or a common carrier. • The contention that the statute as so construed violates the due process clause by imposing upon a private carrier the obligations of a conventional common carrier for hire is too premature and hypothetical to warrant consideration on this record. The appellant in its entire period of operation has never been asked to carry the products of another and may never be. So far, the Commission has made no order which changes the appellant’s obligations to-any other company or person. If it does, it will be timely to consider concrete requirements and their specific effects on appellant. At present, appellant is asked only to provide information about a subject within the power possessed by Congress and delegated to the Commission, and that cannot be considered a taking of property even if it arouses appellant’s premonitions. We hold that the order before us is authorized by statute and that in this respect the statute is within the commerce power and does not offend the Fifth Amendment. Affirmed. “. . . the commission shall . . . investigate, ascertain, and report the value of all the property owned or used by every common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act. . . . The commission shall make an inventory which shall list the property of every common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act in detail, and show the value thereof as hereinafter provided, and shall classify the physical property, as nearly as practicable, in conformity with the classification of expenditures for road and equipment, as prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.” 37 Stat. 701, 49 U. S. C. § 19a. On May 15, 1941, the Interstate Commerce Commission, by letter addressed to the president of the Champlin Refining Company, requested that the company prepare and file with the Commission “a complete inventory of the pipe line property of the Champlin Refining Company, except land, showing the quantities, units, classes, kinds, and condition thereof.” The Commission enclosed with its letter copies of its Valuation Orders Nos. 26 and 27, with which the inventory was to comply. The Champlin company did not respond to the request in a manner satisfactory to the Commission, and on June 12, 1944, the Commission made the order of which the company here complains. It directed the company to comply with the provisions of Valuation Orders Nos. 26 and 27 within ninety days of the service of the order. In response to the Commission’s letter of May 15, 1941, the Champlin company filed with the Commission information and charts which it believed would satisfy the Commission’s request. The Commission, however, returned that report to the company, because in it the company had not recognized that it was a statutory common carrier and had not compiled the report from that viewpoint. The company then requested a hearing before the Commission to determine its status. On December 14, 1942, and on reargument, June 12, 1944, the Commission decided that appellant is a common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act. After the Commission had issued its supplementary order of June 12, 1944, appellant petitioned the district court for an injunction against the order. In accordance with §§ 46 and 47 of Title 28, U. S. C., the district judge convened a three judge court, which heard the case and dismissed appellant's petition. § 1. “(1) That the provisions of this Act shall apply to common carriers engaged in— “(b) The transportation of oil or other commodity ... by pipe line . . . from one State ... to any other State . . . “(3) (a) The term‘common carrier’as used in this Act shall include all pipe-line companies; express companies; sleeping-car companies; and all persons, natural or artificial, engaged in such transportation as aforesaid as common carriers for hire.” 41 Stat. 474, as amended, 48 Stat. 1102, 49 U. S. C. § 1. The last words of § 1 (3) (a), “engaged in such transportation as aforesaid as common carriers for hire,” do “not affect the generality of the first clause as to pipe-line companies.” Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U. S. 141, 146.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 418. Argued April 18, 1960. Decided May 2, 1960. J. R. Goldthwaite, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Al Philip Kane, Charles V. Koons and Thomas S. Adair. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Stuart Rothman and Herman M. Levy.. Per Curiam. The Board found that the petitioner unions, during the course of a strike, coerced employees of the Ohio Consolidated Telephone Company in the exercise of their right to refrain from or discontinue participation therein, in violation of § 8 (b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act. It entered an order requiring the unions to cease and desist “from in any manner restraining or coercing employees of Ohio Consolidated Telephone Company or any other employer in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals enforced the order after deleting the words “in any manner.” 266 F. 2d 823. Because of an asserted conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Labor Board v. Local 926, Int. Union of Operating Engrs., 267 F. 2d 418, we brought the case here. 361 U. S. 893. The only challenge here to the order as so amended is to its validity as extended to “any other employer,” as well as the telephone company. Petitioners were not found to have engaged in violations against the employees of any employer other than Ohio Consolidated and we find neither justification.nor necessity for extending the coverage of the order generally by the inclusion therein of the phrase “any other employer.” “It would seem . . . clear that the authority conferred on the Board to restrain the practice which it has found . . . to have [been] committed is not an authority to restrain generally all other unlawful practices which it has neither found to have been pursued nor persuasively to be related to the proven unlawful conduct.” Labor Board v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U. S. 426, 433 (1941). See also May Stores Co. v. Labor Board, 326 U. S. 376 (1946). That loaned employees of other affiliated companies were included within the ambit of petitioners’ coercive acts plainly does not evidence such a generalized scheme against all telephone employers, for it was only the employment of such employees at the struck plant that brought them within the scope of the unions’ activities. We therefore conclude that the inclusion in the order of the words “or any other employer” was unwarranted and the order is modified by striking the same therefrom. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. Modified and affirmed. That section reads in pertinent part: Sec. 8 (b). “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 61 Stat. 141. Section 7 provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).” 61 Stat. 140. In the Court of Appeals, the Board sought to justify the breadth of its order by relying on two compromise settlement agreements involving activities of the International and other locals against other employers.- Neither the opinion of the Board nor that of the Court of Appeals in this case indicates that any reliance was placed on such agreements, and in this Court the Board disclaims any such reliance.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HATHORN et al. v. LOVORN et al. No. 81-451. Argued April 27, 1982 Decided June 15, 1982 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., concurred in the judgment. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 271. James C. Mayo argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Laurel G. Weir argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Assistant Attorney General Reynolds argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Barbara E. Etkind, Brian K. Landsberg, and Joan A. Magagna. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether a state court may order implementation of a change in election procedure over objections that the change is subject to preclearance under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. I — I Since 1960, the Louisville School District has been coextensive with Winston County, Miss. Until last December, the Louisville mayor and city aldermen appointed three of the five members of the District’s Board of Trustees, and Winston County voters residing outside Louisville elected the other two members. In 1964, the Mississippi Legislature enacted a statute providing in part: “The boards of trustees of all municipal separate school districts, either with or without added territory, shall consist of five (5) members, each to be chosen for a term of five (5) years, but so chosen that the term of office of one (1) member shall expire each year. . . . [I]n any county in which a municipal separate school district embraces the entire county in which Highways 14 and 15 intersect, one (1) trustee shall be elected from each supervisors district.” 1964 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 391, p. 563, codified, as amended, in Miss. Code Ann. §37-7-203(1) (Supp. 1981). Winston County is the only Mississippi county in which Highways 14 and 15 intersect. Officials in that county never implemented § 37-7-203(1) because they believed the statute’s reference to Highways 14 and 15 violated a state constitutional prohibition against local, private, or special legislation. In 1975, five Winston County voters filed an action in the Chancery Court of Winston County, seeking to enforce the neglected 1964 state statute. These plaintiffs, respondents here, named numerous Louisville and Winston County officials as defendants. The Chancery Court dismissed respondents’ complaint, holding that the statute violated Mississippi’s constitutional bar against local legislation. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, striking only the specific reference to Highways 14 and 15 and upholding the remaining requirement that, “in any county in which a municipal separate school district embraces the entire county,” each supervisors district must elect one trustee. Lovorn v. Hathom, 365 So. 2d 947 (1979) (en banc). The court then “remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion.” Id., at 952. The local officials, petitioners here, filed a petition for rehearing, in which they argued for the first time that the Chancery Court could not implement the reformed statute until the change had been precleared under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied the petition without comment, and this Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Hathorn v. Lovorn, 441 U. S. 946 (1979). On remand, the Chancery Court ordered an election pursuant to the redacted statute. The court set out detailed procedures governing the election, including the requirement that “[i]f no candidate receives a majority of the vote cast at any of said elections . . . , a runoff election shall be held . . . between the two candidates receiving the highest vote [in the first election].” Record 143. The court derived the latter requirement from Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-217 (Supp. 1981), which mandates runoffs in elections conducted under §37-7-203(1). See Miss. Code Ann. §37-7-209 (Supp. 1981). The Chancery Court also agreed with petitioners’ claim that the changes in election procedure fell within § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and directed petitioners to submit the election plan to the United States Attorney General for preclearance. Record 141, 146-147. Upon review of petitioners’ submission, the Attorney General objected to the proposed change in election procedure “insofar as it incorporate[d] a majority vote requirement.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-8. Because of the substantial black population in Winston County, an apparent pattern of racially polarized voting in the county, and the historical absence of blacks from various local governing boards, the Attorney General concluded that the runoff procedure could have a discriminatory effect. Ibid,. Respondents attempted to overcome this obstacle by both joining the Attorney General as a defendant and persuading the Chancery Court to hold the election without the runoff procedure. The court, however, refused to join the Attorney General and held that state law unambiguously required runoff elections. Buffeted by apparently conflicting state and federal statutes, the Chancery Court concluded that its decree calling for an election would “remain in force subject to compliance with the Federal Voters Rights Act [sic] as previously ordered by this Court.” Record 342. Failing to obtain an election from the Chancery Court, respondents once again appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. That court observed that its “prior decision, which the United States Supreme Court declined to reverse or alter in any respect, became and is the law of the case.” Carter v. Luke, 399 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (1981). The court explained that because the prior decision upheld a statute referring to the statute requiring runoffs, and because both parties had agreed during oral argument to abide by the runoff procedure, the Chancery Court properly enforced the law requiring runoffs and improperly conditioned the election on compliance with the Voting Rights Act. Accordingly, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Chancery Court’s decree referring to the Voting Rights Act and “remanded with directions for the lower court to call and require the holding of an election.” Ibid. We granted certio-rari to decide whether the Mississippi Supreme Court properly ordered the election without insuring compliance with federal law. 454 U. S. 1122 (1981). II Before addressing the federal question raised by the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision, we must consider respondents’ assertion that the lower court decision rests upon two adequate and independent state grounds. First, respondents contend that the state court’s reliance upon the law of the case bars review of the federal question. It has long been established, however, that “[w]e have jurisdiction to consider all of the substantial federal questions determined in the earlier stages of [state proceedings],. . . and our right to re-examine such questions is not affected by a ruling that the first decision of the state court became the law of the case . . . .” Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 87 (1955). See also Davis v. O'Hara, 266 U. S. 314, 321 (1924); United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 191 U. S. 84, 93 (1903). Because we cannot review a state court judgment until it is final, a contrary rule would insulate interlocutory state court rulings on important federal questions from our consideration. In this case the Mississippi Supreme Court’s first decision plainly did not appear final at the time it was rendered. The court’s remand “for further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion,” 365 So. 2d, at 952 (en banc), together with its failure to address expressly the Voting Rights Act issue, suggested that the Chancery Court could still consider the federal issue on remand. Indeed, the Chancery Court interpreted its mandate in precisely this manner. Under these circumstances, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s subsequent reliance on the law of the case cannot prevent us from reviewing federal questions determined in the first appeal. Respondents also argue that the Mississippi Supreme Court pretermitted consideration of the Voting Rights Act because petitioners’ reliance upon the issue in a petition for rehearing was untimely. We have recognized that the failure to comply with a state procedural rule may constitute an independent and adequate state ground barring our review of a federal question. Our decisions, however, stress that a state procedural ground is not “adequate” unless the procedural rule is “strictly or regularly followed.” Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146, 149 (1964). State courts may not avoid deciding federal issues by invoking procedural rules that they do not apply evenhandedly to all similar claims. Even if we construe the Mississippi Supreme Court’s denial of petitioners’ petition for rehearing as the silent application of a procedural bar, we cannot conclude that the state court consistently relies upon this rule. Respondents cite two cases indicating that the Mississippi Supreme Court will consider an issue raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing “[o]nly in exceptional cases. ” New & Hughes Drilling Co. v. Smith, 219 So. 2d 657, 661 (Miss. 1969); Rigdon v. General Box Co., 249 Miss. 239, 246, 162 So. 2d 863, 864 (1964). Although these opinions may summarize the court’s practice prior to 1969, we have been unable to find any more recent decisions repeating or applying the rule. On the contrary, the Mississippi Supreme Court now regularly grants petitions for rehearing without mentioning any restrictions on its authority to consider issues raised for the first time in the petitions. One particular decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court, decided only last year, demonstrates that the court does not consistently preclude consideration of issues raised for the first time on rehearing. In Quinn v. Branning, 404 So. 2d 1018 (1981), the court held that part of a criminal statute violated the State Constitution’s prohibition against local legislation. Striking the offensive language, the court approved the rest of the statute and affirmed the underlying conviction. The defendant then petitioned for rehearing, pointing out that the affidavit against him did not allege a crime under the reformed statute. The court agreed with this contention, granted the petition in part, and reversed the conviction, all without mentioning the rule against consideration of new issues on rehearing. The striking similarity between Quinn and this case, both involving issues that the parties could have foreseen but that arose with urgency only after the court upheld part of a challenged statute, persuades us that the Mississippi Supreme Court is not “strictly or regularly” following a procedural rule precluding review of issues raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. The denial of rehearing in this case, although not appearing sufficiently final to permit our immediate review, must have rested either upon a substantive rejection of petitioners’ federal claim or upon a procedural rule that the state court applies only irregularly. Thus, there are no independent and adequate state grounds barring our review of the federal issue. Ill Respondents do not dispute that the change in election procedures ordered by the Mississippi courts is subject to pre-clearance under §5. They urge, however, that the Voting Rights Act deprives state courts of the power even to decide whether §5 applies to a proposed change in voting procedures. Under their analysis of the Act, a state court asked to implement a change in the State’s voting laws could not inquire whether the change was subject to §5. Even if the change plainly fell within § 5, the court would have to ignore that circumstance and enter a decree violating federal law. Both the language and purposes of the Voting Rights Act refute this notion. Only last Term we summarized the principles governing state court jurisdiction to decide federal issues. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U. S. 478 (1981). We begin, in every case, “with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction” over those claims. Id., at 478. Only “an explicit statutory directive, [an] unmistakable implication from legislative history, or ... a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests” will rebut the presumption. Ibid. Most important for our purposes, even a finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims arising under a federal statute usually “will not prevent a state court, from deciding a federal question collaterally.” Id., at 483, n. 12. Respondents rest their jurisdictional argument on three sections of the Act. Section 14(b) provides that “[n]o court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia. . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to . . . section 5 . . . 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. § 19737(b). We have already held, however, that this provision governs only declaratory judgments approving proposed changes in voting procedure. Other courts may decide the distinct question of whether a proposed change is subject to the Act. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 557-560 (1969); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130 (1981). Sections 5 and 12(f) of the Act provide somewhat stronger support for respondents’ claim. Section 5 provides that “[ajny action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code,” 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, while § 12(f) declares that “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section.” 79 Stat. 444, 42 U. S. C. § 1973j(f). It is possible that these sections grant the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over “action[s] under” § 5 or “proceedings instituted pursuant” to § 12. We need not resolve that question in this case, however, because respondents’ state suit fell within neither of these categories. Instead, respondents’ initial suit was an action to compel compliance with a forgotten state law. Nothing in § 5 or § 12 negates the presumption that, at least when the issue arises collaterally, state courts may decide whether a proposed change in election procedure requires preclearance under § 5. The policies of the Act support the same result. The Voting Rights Act “implemented Congress’ firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.” Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 548. Fearing that covered jurisdictions would exercise their ingenuity to devise new and subtle forms of discrimination, Congress prohibited those jurisdictions from implementing any change in voting procedure without obtaining preclearance under § 5. Granting state courts the power to decide, as a collateral matter, whether § 5 applies to contemplated changes in election procedures will help insure compliance with the preclearance scheme. Approval of this limited jurisdiction also avoids placing state courts in the uncomfortable position of ordering voting changes that they suspect, but cannot determine, should be precleared under § 5. Accordingly, we hold that the Mississippi courts had the power to decide whether §5 applied to the change sought by respondents. If the Mississippi courts had the power to make this determination, then it is clear that they also had the duty to do so. “State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation ... to uphold federal law.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 494, n. 35 (1976) (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 341-344 (1816)). Section 5 declares that whenever a covered jurisdiction shall “enact or seek to administer any . . . standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,” see n. 1, swpra, it must obtain either preclearance from the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Our opinions repeatedly note that failure to follow either of these routes renders the change unenforceable. See, e. g., Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 46 (1978); United States v. Board of Supervisors, 429 U. S. 642, 645 (1977) (per curiam). When a party to a state proceeding asserts that § 5 renders the contemplated relief unenforceable, therefore, the state court must examine the claim and refrain from ordering relief that would violate federal law. IV Our holding mandates reversal of the lower court judgment. Under our analysis, the change in election procedure is subject to § 5, see n. 16, supra, and the Mississippi courts may not further implement that change until the parties comply with §5. At this time, however, we need not decide whether petitioners are entitled to any additional relief. The United States has initiated a federal suit challenging the change at issue here, see n. 8, supra, and we agree with the Solicitor General that the District Court entertaining that suit should address the problem of relief in the first instance. As we noted in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 395-397 (1971), a local district court is in a better position than this Court to fashion relief, because the district court “is more familiar with the nuances of the local situation” and has the opportunity to hear evidence. Id., at 397. In this case, the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi will be better able to decide whether a special election is necessary, whether a more moderate form of interim relief will satisfy § 5, or whether new elections are so imminent that special relief is inappropriate. We hold only that the Mississippi courts must withhold further implementation of the disputed change in election procedures until the parties demonstrate compliance with § 5. Accordingly, the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. Justice Powell concurs in the judgment. Section 5 provides in relevant part: “Whenever a [covered] State or political subdivision . . . shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,. . . such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f )(2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made. . . .” 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Section 4 of the Act, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b, defines covered jurisdictions. Mississippi Const., Art. 4, §90, provides: “The legislature shall not pass local, private, or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, but-such matters shall be provided for only by general laws, viz.: “(p) Providing for the management or support of any private or common school, incorporating the same, or granting such school any privileges.” The voters initially filed their suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. That court stayed federal proceedings to give the Mississippi courts an opportunity to construe the state statute at issue. Record 320. In 1979, pursuant to a notice of voluntary dismissal by stipulation, the court dismissed the federal action without prejudice. Id,., at 323. The voters also charged that the electoral system then in force violated the constitutional principle of one person/one vote. This issue is not before us. As we have explained on numerous occasions, covered jurisdictions may satisfy § 5 by submitting proposed changes to the Attorney General. If the Attorney General objects to the proposal, the jurisdiction may either request reconsideration or seek a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A covered jurisdiction, of course, also may seek a declaratory judgment in the first instance, omitting submission to the Attorney General. See generally Blanding v. DuBose, 454 U. S. 393 (1982); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 548-550 (1969). At that time, the Attorney General noted, blacks constituted approximately 39% of the Winston County population but were not a majority in any of the districts from which trustees were to be elected. The Attorney General also observed that the Louisville School District appears to be the only countywide district in which Mississippi requires runoff elections. Shortly before petitioners filed their petition for certiorari, the Chancery Court set an election for December 5, 1981. That court, the Mississippi Supreme Court, and this Court denied motions to stay the election. See 454 U. S. 1070 (1981). On December 1, the United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, seeking to enjoin implementation of the voting change involved in this case. The District Court refused to issue a temporary restraining order and has not taken any other action. The December 5 election was held as scheduled. Although the record does not reflect the results of the election, the United States has informed us that a runoff election was held. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10, n. 12. 28 U. S. C. §1257; O’Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U. S. 430 (1982); Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 (1945). The Chancellor, in fact, noted that it “would have been impossible to have submitted to the Attorney General for approval until this Court had set up the mechanics of the election, for until that was done, the Attorney General would not have the data necessary to either approve or disapprove.” Record 90-91. Nor, of course, does our previous denial of petitioners’ petition for a writ of certiorari preclude us from examining questions decided during the first state appeal. It is “well-settled . . . that denial of certiorari imparts no implication or inference concerning the Court’s view of the merits.” Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U. S. 363, 366, n. 1 (1973). E. g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 512, n. 7 (1978); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 264, n. 4 (1964). In New & Hughes Drilling Co. itself, the Mississippi Supreme Court permitted an exception to the alleged rule barring review of questions raised for the first time on rehearing. A case decided the same year as New & Hughes Drilling Co. is the most recent decision we have found that might have actually applied the procedural rule described by respondents. See Leake County Cooperative v. Dependents of Barrett, 226 So. 2d 608, 614-616 (Miss. 1969). Even that decision, however, may have rested upon a special rule involving waiver of defects in venue. Neither the Mississippi Code nor the Rules of the Supreme Court of Mississippi embody the alleged prohibition against presentation of new issues in petitions for rehearing. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to know whether the Mississippi Supreme Court still adheres to the rule, applying it silently, or whether the court has abandoned the rule. See, e. g., Cortez v. Brown, 408 So. 2d 464 (1981) (en banc); Cash v. Illinois Central Gulf R. Co., 388 So. 2d 871 (1980) (en banc); McKee v. McKee, 382 So. 2d 287 (1980) (en banc); City of Jackson v. Capital Reporter Publishing Co., 373 So. 2d 802 (1979) (en banc); Realty Title Guaranty Co. v. Howard, 355 So. 2d 657 (1977) (en banc); Couch v. Martinez, 357 So. 2d 107 (1978) (en banc); Foster v. Foster, 344 So. 2d 460 (1977) (en banc); McCrory v. State, 342 So. 2d 897 (1977) (en banc); Daniels v. State, 341 So. 2d 918 (1977) (en banc); Mississippi State Highway Comm’n v. Gresham, 323 So. 2d 100, 103 (1975) (en banc); Powers v. Malley, 302 So. 2d 262, 264 (1974). In Mississippi State Highway Comm’n v. Gresham, supra, the court expressly noted that its disposition depended upon a fact mentioned for the first time in the petition for rehearing. In several other decisions, the type of question considered on rehearing suggests that it was raised for the first time by the party petitioning for that relief. E. g., Cortez v. Brown, supra; City of Jackson v. Capital Reporter Publishing Co., supra; Powers v. Malley, supra. These decisions, however, do not expressly acknowledge the novelty of the points raised on rehearing. Respondents also contend that our decisions establish a general rule against review of questions presented for the first time in a petition for rehearing. We have recognized that, under many circumstances, “[q]ues-tions first presented to the highest State court on a petition for rehearing come too late for consideration here.” Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 128 (1945). At the same time, however, we have explained that this bar does not apply if “the State court exerted its jurisdiction in such a way that the case could have been brought here had the questions been raised prior to the original disposition.” Ibid. In this case we conclude that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s first judgment on appeal either decided the federal question on the merits, although in a manner that did not appear final, or avoided the federal question by invoking an inconsistently applied procedural rule. If petitioners had made their claim prior to the court’s original disposition, either of these circumstances would have permitted us to review the federal question. Mississippi plainly is one of the jurisdictions covered by the statute. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 388 U. S. 301, 318 (1966); 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965). The Louisville School District Board of Trustees, like all political entities within the State, accordingly must comply with § 5’s strictures. See Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 46 (1978); United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, 435 U. S. 110 (1978). It is immaterial that the change sought by respondents derives from a statute that predates the Voting Rights Act, because §5 comes into play whenever a covered jurisdiction departs from an election procedure that was “in fact ‘in force or effect’... on November 1, 1964.” Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 395 (1971) (emphasis in original). Finally, the presence of a court decree does not exempt the contested change from § 5. We held only last Term that § 5 applies to any change “reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people,” even if a judicial decree constrains those choices. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130, 153 (1981). Although McDaniel involved a reapportionment plan drafted pursuant to a federal court’s order, its interpretation of § 5 is equally instructive here. When state or local officials comply with a court order to enforce a state statute, there is no doubt that their actions “reflec[t] the policy choices of. . . elected representatives.” Indeed, if § 5 did not encompass this situation, covered jurisdictions easily could evade the statute by declining to implement new state statutes until ordered to do so by state courts. Cf. McDaniel v. Sanchez, supra, at 151 (noting that “if covered jurisdictions could avoid the normal preclearance procedure by awaiting litigation challenging a refusal to redistrict after a census is completed, [§ 5] might have the unintended effect of actually encouraging delay in making obviously needed changes in district boundaries”). In light of McDaniel, we conclude that a state court decree directing compliance with a state election statute contemplates “administ[ration]” of the state statute within the meaning of § 5. Respondents do not claim that Mississippi law restricts the state courts' power to decide questions related to § 5. We frequently permit state courts to decide “collaterally” issues that would be reserved for the federal courts if the cause of action arose directly under federal law. For example, the state courts may decide a variety of questions involving the federal patent laws. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257 (1916); New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U. S. 473 (1912); Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255 (1897). Similarly, although state courts lack jurisdiction to entertain suits brought pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15, they often decide issues concerning the federal antitrust laws in other contexts. See, e. g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980); Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902), quoted with approval in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U. S. 72, 81-82, n. 7 (1982). See generally Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 510-511 (1957). Section 12(d) authorizes preventive relief against persons “engaged or . . . about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by” designated sections of the Voting Rights Act. 79 Stat. 444, 42 U. S. C. § 1973j(d). At least one state court has ruled that it lacks jurisdiction over claims arising under the Voting Rights Act. Ortiz v. Thompson, 604 S. W. 2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). See also Beatty v. Esposito, 411 F. Supp. 107 (EDNY 1976) (finding that state court lacked jurisdiction to decide § 5 issue, without explaining whether state suit arose under the Voting Rights Act). Respondents also based their suit on the Fourteenth Amendment. See n. 4, supra. Neither the parties nor the United States, appearing as amicus curiae, has cited any legislative history bearing upon state court jurisdiction to decide issues arising under the Voting Rights Act. As respondents point out, state court jurisdiction to decide these collateral issues is not absolutely necessary to effectuate the Act’s scheme, because interested parties have the ability to seek relief from a federal district court. Recognition of a limited state power to address § 5 issues, however, furthers the Act’s ameliorative purposes by permitting additional tribunals to enforce its commands. It also insures that the question of coverage will be addressed at the earliest possible time, without requiring duplicative lawsuits. We find little force in respondents’ claim that, if the state courts possess jurisdiction to decide § 5 issues arising in disputes between private parties, they will frustrate the Attorney General’s enforcement of the Act by interpreting the preclearance requirement conservatively. The Attorney General is not bound by the resolution of § 5 issues in cases to which he was not a party. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 373-374, n. 6 (1975). Common notions of collateral estoppel suggest that the state proceedings similarly would not bind other interested persons who did not participate in them. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 15, 1977). Persons dissatisfied with a state court’s collateral resolution of a §5 issue in proceedings involving other parties, therefore, are likely to be able to litigate the issue anew in federal court. Our holding does not prevent state courts from attempting to accommodate both state and federal interests. A state court, for example, might adopt the approach followed by the Chancery Court in this case, and order the parties to submit the proposed relief to the Attorney General. If the Attorney General registers an objection, the court might then order the parties to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia. For example, since the Attorney General objected only to the runoff procedure, the District Court simply might void the results of any runoff elections, permitting the candidates who gathered a plurality of votes in the general election to take those seats. We, of course, intimate no view on the best form of relief, leaving that matter to the District Court’s discretion.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DOE v. CHAO, SECRETARY OF LABOR No. 02-1377. Argued December 3, 2003 Decided February 24, 2004 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Sc alia, J., joined except as to the penultimate paragraph of Part III and footnote 8. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 627. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 641. Jack W. Campbell IV argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Donald B. Ayer, Dominick V. Freda, and Joseph E. Wolfe. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Patricia A. Millett, Leonard Schaitman, Anthony A. Yang, Howard M. Radzely, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Michael P. Doyle. David K. Colapinto, Stephen M. Kohn, and Michael D. Kohn filed a brief for Linda R. Tripp et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. by Marc Rotenberg and David L. Sobel; and for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press by Lucy A Dalglish. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States is subject to a cause of action for the benefit of at least some individuals adversely affected by a federal agency’s violation of the Privacy Act of 1974. The question before us is whether plaintiffs must prove some actual damages to qualify for a minimum statutory award of $1,000. We hold that they must. HH Petitioner Buck Doe filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 83 Stat. 792, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., with the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, the division of the Department of Labor responsible for adjudicating it. The application form called for a Social Security number, which the agency then used to identify the applicant’s claim, as on documents like “multicaptioned” notices of hearing dates, sent to groups of claimants, their employers, and the lawyers involved in their cases. The Government concedes that following this practice led to disclosing Doe’s Social Security number beyond the limits set by the Privacy Act. See 5 U. S. C. § 552a(b). Doe joined with six other black lung claimants to sue the Department of Labor, alleging repeated violations of the Act and seeking certification of a class of “ ‘all claimants for Black Lung Benefits since the passage of the Privacy Act.’” Pet. for Cert. 6a. Early on, the United States stipulated to an order prohibiting future publication of applicants’ Social Security numbers on multicaptioned hearing notices, and the parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court denied class certification and entered judgment against all individual plaintiffs except Doe, finding that their submissions had raised no issues of cognizable harm. As to Doe, the court accepted his uncontroverted evidence of distress on learning of the improper disclosure, granted summary judgment, and awarded $1,000 in statutory damages under 5 U. S. C. § 552a(g)(4). A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part but reversed on Doe’s claim, holding the United States entitled to summary judgment across the board. 306 F. 3d 170 (2002). The Circuit treated the $1,000 statutory minimum as available only to plaintiffs who suffered actual damages because of the agency’s violation, id., at 176-179, and then found that Doe had not raised a triable issue of fact about actual damages, having submitted no corroboration for his claim of emotional distress, such as evidence of physical symptoms, medical treatment, loss of income, or impact on his behavior. In fact, the only indication of emotional affliction was Doe’s conclusory allegations that he was “ ‘torn ... all to pieces’” and “‘greatly concerned and worried’” because of the disclosure of his Social Security number and its potentially “ ‘devastating’ ” consequences. Id., at 181. Doe petitioned for review of the holding that some actual damages must be proven before a plaintiff may receive the minimum statutory award. See Pet. for Cert. i. Because the Fourth Circuit’s decision requiring proof of actual damages conflicted with the views of other Circuits, see, e. g., Orekoya v. Mooney, 330 F. 3d 1, 7-8 (CA1 2003); Wilborn v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 49 F. 3d 597, 603 (CA9 1995); Waters v. Thornburgh, 888 F. 2d 870,872 (CADC 1989); Johnson v. Department of Treasury, IRS, 700 F. 2d 971, 977, and n. 12 (CA5 1983); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F. 2d 327, 330-331 (CA11 1982), we granted certiorari. 539 U. S. 957 (2003). We now affirm. II [I]n order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary ... to regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by such agencies.” Privacy Act of 1974, § 2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896. The Act gives agencies detailed instructions for managing their records and provides for various sorts of civil relief to individuals aggrieved by failures on the Government’s part to comply with the requirements. Subsection (g)(1) recognizes a civil action for agency misconduct fitting within any of four categories (the fourth, in issue here, being a catchall), 5 U. S. C. §§552a(g)(l)(A)-(D), and then makes separate provision for the redress of each. The first two categories cover deficient management of records: subsection (g)(1)(A) provides for the correction of any inaccurate or otherwise improper material in a record, and subsection (g)(1)(B) provides a right of access against any agency refusing to allow an individual to inspect a record kept on him. In each instance, further provisions specify such things as the de novo nature of the suit (as distinct from any form of deferential review), §§552a(g)(2)(A), (g)(3)(A), and mechanisms for exercising judicial equity jurisdiction (by in camera inspection, for example), § 552a(g)(3)(A). The two remaining categories deal with derelictions having consequences beyond the statutory violations per se.. Subsection (g)(1)(C) describes an agency’s failure to maintain an adequate record on an individual, when the result is a determination “adverse” to that person. Subsection (g)(1)(D) speaks of a violation when someone suffers an “adverse effect” from any other failure to hew to the terms of the Act. Like the inspection and correction infractions, breaches of the statute with adverse consequences are addressed by specific terms governing relief: “In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of— “(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000; and “(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court.” §552a (g)(4). III Doe argues that subsection (g)(4)(A) entitles any plaintiff adversely affected by an intentional or willful violation to the $1,000 minimum on proof of nothing more than a statutory violation: anyone suffering an adverse consequence of intentional or willful disclosure is entitled to recovery. The Government claims the minimum guarantee goes only to victims who prove some actual damages. We think the Government has the better side of the argument. To begin with, the Government’s position is supported by a straightforward textual analysis. When the statute gets to the point of guaranteeing the $1,000 minimum, it not only has confined any eligibility to victims of ádverse effects caused by intentional or willful actions, but has provided expressly for liability to such victims for “actual damages sustained.” It has made specific provision, in other words, for what a victim within the limited class may recover. When the very next clause of the sentence containing the explicit provision guarantees $1,000 to a “person entitled to recovery,” the simplest reading of that phrase looks back to the immediately preceding provision for recovering actual damages, which is also the Act’s sole provision for recovering anything (as distinct from equitable relief). With such an obvious referent for “person entitled to recovery” in the plaintiff who sustains “actual damages,” Doe’s theory is immediately questionable in ignoring the “actual damages” language so directly at hand and instead looking for “a person entitled to recovery” in a separate part of the statute devoid of any mention either of recovery or of what might be recovered. Nor is it too strong to say that Doe does ignore statutory language. When Doe reads the statute to mean that the United States shall be liable to any adversely affected subject of an intentional or willful violation, without more, he treats willful action as the last fact necessary to make the Government “liable,” and he is thus able to describe anyone to whom it is liable as entitled to the $1,000 guarantee. But this way of reading the statute simply pays no attention to the fact that the statute does not speak of liability (and consequent entitlement to recovery) in a freestanding, unqualified way, but in a limited way, by reference to enumerated damages. Doe’s manner of reading “entitle[ment] to recovery” as satisfied by adverse effect caused by intentional or willful violation is in tension with more than the text, however. It is at odds with the traditional understanding that tort recovery requires not only wrongful act plus causation reaching to the plaintiff, but proof of some harm for which damages can reasonably be assessed. See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 30 (5th ed. 1984). Doe, instead, identifies a person as entitled to recover without any reference to proof of damages, actual or otherwise. Doe might respond that it makes sense to speak of a privacy tort victim as entitled to recover without reference to damages because analogous common law would not require him to show particular items of injury in order to receive a dollar recovery. Traditionally, the common law has provided such victims with a claim for “general” damages, which for privacy and defamation torts are presumed damages: a monetary award calculated without reference to specific harm. Such a rejoinder would not pass muster under the Privacy Act, however, because a provision of the Act not previously mentioned indicates beyond serious doubt that general damages are not authorized for a statutory violation. An uncod-ified section of the Act established a Privacy Protection Study Commission, which was charged, among its other jobs, to consider “whether the Federal Government should be liable for general damages incurred by an individual as the result of a willful or intentional violation of the provisions of sections 552a(g)(l)(C) or (D) of title 5.” § 5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1907. Congress left the question of general damages, that is, for another day. Because presumed damages are therefore clearly unavailable, we have no business treating just any adversely affected victim of an intentional or willful violation as entitled to recovery, without something more. This inference from the terms of the Commission’s mandate is underscored by drafting history showing that Congress cut out the very language in the bill that would have authorized any presumed damages. The Senate bill would have authorized an award of “actual and general damages sustained by any person,” with that language followed by the guarantee that “in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.” S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 303(c)(1) (1974). Although the provision for general damages would have covered presumed damages, see n. 3, supra, this language was trimmed from the final statute, subject to any later revision that might be recommended by the Commission. The deletion of “general damages” from the bill is fairly seen, then, as a deliberate elimination of any possibility of imputing harm and awarding presumed damages. The deletion thus precludes any hope of a sound interpretation of entitlement to recovery without reference to actual damages. Finally, Doe’s reading is open to the objection that no purpose is served by conditioning the guarantee on a person’s being entitled to recovery. As Doe treats the text, Congress could have accomplished its object simply by providing that the Government would be liable to the individual for actual damages “but in no case . . . less than the sum of $1,000” plus fees and costs. Doe’s reading leaves the reference to entitlement to recovery with no job to do, and it accordingly accomplishes nothing. > There are three loose ends. Doe's argument suggests it would have been illogical for Congress to create a cause of action for anyone who suffers an adverse effect from intentional or willful agency action, then deny recovery without actual damages. But this objection assumes that the language in subsection (g)(1)(D) recognizing a federal “civil action” on the part of someone adversely affected was meant, without more, to provide a complete cause of action, and of course this is not so. A subsequent provision requires proof of intent or willfulness in addition to adverse effect, and if the specific state of mind must be proven additionally, it is equally consistent with logic to require some actual damages as well. Nor does our view deprive the language recognizing a civil action by an adversely affected person of any independent effect, for it may readily be understood as having a limited but specific function: the reference in § 552a(g)(l)(D) to “adverse effect” acts as a term of art identifying a potential plaintiff who satisfies the injury-in-fact and causation requirements of Article III standing, and who may consequently bring a civil action without suffering dismissal for want of standing to sue. See Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 126 (1995) (“The phrase ‘person adversely affected or aggrieved’ is a term of art used in many statutes to designate those who have standing to challenge or appeal an agency decision, within the agency or before the courts”); see also 5 U. S. C. §702 (providing review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act to individuals who have been “adversely affected or aggrieved”). That is, an individual subjected to an adverse ef-feet has injury enough to open the courthouse door, but without more has no cause of action for damages under the Privacy Act. Next, Doe also suggests there is something peculiar in offering some guaranteed damages, as a form of presumed damages not requiring proof of amount, only to those plaintiffs who can demonstrate actual damages. But this approach parallels another remedial scheme that the drafters of the Privacy Act would probably have known about. At common law, certain defamation torts were redressed by general damages but only when a plaintiff first proved some “special harm,” i. e., “harm of a material and generally of a pecuniary nature.” 3 Restatement of Torts §575, Comments a and b (1938) (discussing defamation torts that are “not actionable per se”); see also 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts §575, Comments a and b (1976) (same). Plaintiffs claiming such torts could recover presumed damages only if they could demonstrate some actual, quantifiable pecuniary loss. Because the recovery of presumed damages in these cases was supplemental to compensation for specific harm, it was hardly unprecedented for Congress to make a guaranteed minimum contingent upon some showing of actual damages, thereby avoiding giveaways to plaintiffs with nothing more than “abstract injuries,” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 101-102 (1983). In a final effort to save his claim, Doe points to a pair of statutes with remedial provisions that are worded similarly to § 552a(g)(4). See Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1201(i)(2)(A), 90 Stat. 1665-1666, 26 U. S. C. §6110(j)(2)(A); § 1202(e)(1), 90 Stat. 1687, 26 U. S. C. § 7217(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1982); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, § 201, 100 Stat. 1866,18 U. S. C. § 2707(c). He contends that legislative history of these subsequent enactments shows that Congress sometimes used language similar to 5 U. S. C. §552a(g)(4) with the object of authorizing true liquidated damages remedies. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-938, p. 348 (1976) (discussing § 1202(e)(1) of the Tax Reform Act); S. Rep. No. 99-541, p. 43 (1986) (discussing §201 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act). There are two problems with this argument. First, as to § 1201(i)(2)(A) of the Tax Reform Act, the text is too far different from the language of the Privacy Act to serve as any sound basis for analogy; it does not include the critical limiting phrase “entitled to recovery.” But even as to § 1202(e)(1) of the Tax Reform Act and § 201 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the trouble with Doe’s position is its reliance on the legislative histories of completely separate statutes passed well after the Privacy Act. Those of us who look to legislative history have been wary about expecting to find reliable interpretive help outside the record of the statute being construed, and we have said repeatedly that “ ‘subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its enactment,’” Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 170, n. 5 (2001) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 118, n. 13 (1980)). V The “entitlement] to recovery” necessary to qualify for the $1,000 minimum is not shown merely by an intentional or willful violation of the Act producing some adverse effect. The statute guarantees $1,000 only to plaintiffs who have suffered some actual damages. The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. The Privacy Act says nothing about standards of proof governing equitable relief that may be open to victims of adverse determinations or effects, although it may be that this inattention is explained by the general provisions for equitable relief within the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 706. Indeed, the District Court relied on the APA in determining that it had jurisdiction to enforce the stipulated order prohibiting the Department of Labor from using Social Security numbers in multiparty captions. Doe v. Herman, Civ. Action No. 97-0G43-B, 1998 WL 34194937, *5-*7 (DC Va., Mar. 18, 1998). Indeed, if adverse effect of intentional or willful violation were alone enough to make a person entitled to recovery, then Congress could have conditioned the entire subsection (g)(4)(A) as applying only to “a person entitled to recovery.” That, of course, is not what Congress wrote. As we mentioned before, Congress used the entitled-to-recovery phrase only to describe those entitled to the $1,000 guarantee, and it spoke of entitlement and guarantee only after referring to an individual’s actual damages, indicating that “actual damages” is a further touchstone of the entitlement. 3 Restatement of Torts §621, Comment a (1938) (“It is not necessary for the plaintiff [who is seeking general damages in an action for defamation] to prove any specific harm to his reputation or any .other loss caused thereby”); 4 id., § 867, Comment d (1939) (noting that damages are available for privacy torts “in the same way in which general damages are given for defamation,” without proof of “pecuniary loss [or] physical harm”); see also 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 621, Comment a (1976). The Commission ultimately recommended that the Act should “permit the recovery of special and general damages . . . but in no case should a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000 or more than the sum of $10,000 for general damages in excess of the dollar amount of any special damages.” Personal Privacy in an Information Society: The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission 531 (July 1977). On this point, we do not understand Justice Ginsburg’s dissent to take issue with our conclusion that Congress explicitly rejected the proposal to make presumed damages available for Privacy Act violations. Instead, Justice Ginsburg appears to argue only that Congress would have wanted nonpecuniary harm to qualify as actual damages undér subsection (g)(4)(A). Post, at 635, n. 4 (plaintiff may recover for emotional distress ‘“that he proves to have been actually suffered by him’” (quoting 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, at 402, Comment b)). That issue, however, is not before us today. See n. 12, infra. While theoretically there could also have been a third category, that of “nominal damages,” it is implausible that Congress intended tacitly to recognize a nominal damages remedy after eliminating the explicit reference to general damages. Justice Scalia does not join this paragraph or footnote 8. Justice Ginsburg responds that our reading is subject to a similar criticism: “Congress more rationally [c]ould have written: ‘actual damages ... but in no case shall a person who proves such damages [in any amount] receive less than $1,000.”’ Post, at 630. Congress’s use of the entitlement phrase actually contained in the statute, however, is explained by drafting history. The first bill passed by the Senate authorized recovery of both actual and general damages. See supra, at 622 and this page. At that point, when discussing eligibility for the $1,000 guarantee, it was reasonable to refer to plaintiffs with either sort of damages by the general term “a person entitled to recovery.” When subsequent amendment limited recovery to actual damages by eliminating the general, no one apparently thought to delete the inclusive reference to entitlement. But this failure to remove the old language did not affect its reference to “actual damages,” the term remaining from the original pair, “actual and general.” Nor are we convinced by the analysis mentioned in the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, that any plaintiff who can demonstrate that he was adversely affected by intentional or willful agency action is entitled to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees under 5 U. S. C. § 552a(g)(4)(B), and is for that reason “a person entitled to recovery” under subsection (g)(4)(A). See 306 F. 3d 170, 188-189 (CA4 2002). Instead of treating damages as a recovery entitling a plaintiff to costs and fees, see, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 1988(b) (allowing “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to a “prevailing party” under many federal civil rights statutes); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247-258 (1975) (discussing history of American courts’ power to award fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs), this analysis would treat costs and fees as the recovery entitling a plaintiff to minimum damages; it would get the cart before the horse. We also reject the related suggestion that the category of cases with actual damages not exceeding $1,000 is so small as to render the minimum award meaningless under our reading. It is easy enough to imagine pecuniary expenses that might turn out to be reasonable in particular cases but fall well short of $1,000: fees associated with running a credit report, for example, or the charge for a Valium prescription. Since we do not address the definition of actual damages today, see n. 12, infra, this challenge is too speculative to overcome our interpretation of the statute’s plain language and history. In support of Doe’s position, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent also cites another item of extratextual material, an interpretation of the Privacy Act that was published by the Office of Management and Budget in 1975 as a guideline for federal agencies seeking to comply with the Act. Post, at 633. The dissent does not claim that any deference is due this interpretation, however, and we do not ñnd its unelaborated conclusion persuasive. The Courts of Appeals are divided on the precise definition of actual damages. Compare Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F. 2d 327, 331 (CA11 1982) (actual damages are restricted to pecuniary loss), with Johnson v. Department of Treasury, IRS, 700 F. 2d 971, 972-974 (CA5 1983) (actual damages can cover adequately demonstrated mental anxiety even without any out-of-pocket loss). That issue is not before us, however, since the petition for certiorari did not raise it for our review. We assume without deciding that the Fourth Circuit was correct to hold that Doe’s complaints in this case did not rise to the level of alleging actual damages. We do not suggest that out-of-pocket expenses are necessary for recovery of the $1,000 minimum; only that they suffice to qualify under any view of actual damages.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. TEXAS et al. No. 91-1729. Argued March 1, 1993 Decided April 5, 1993 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, O’ConnoR, Scalia, Kennedy, SouteR, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 539. Thomas G. Hungar argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Ger-son, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, William Ranter, and Bruce G. Forrest. James C. Todd argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Will Pryor, First Assistant Attorney General, Mary F. Keller, Deputy Attorney General, Edwin N. Horne and Christopher Johnsen, Assistant Attorneys General, and Jorge Vega. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we decide the question left open in West Virginia v. United States, 479 U. S. 305, 312-313, n. 5 (1987): whether Congress intended the Debt Collection Act of 1982 to abrogate the United States’ federal common-law right to collect prejudgment interest on debts owed to it by the States. We hold that it did not. Texas incurred the instant debts as a result of participation in the Food Stamp Program, 78 Stat. 703, as amended, 7 U. S. C. §2011 et seq. Under that program, the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the United States Department of Agriculture provides food stamp coupons to participating States, and the States then distribute the coupons to qualified individuals and households. §§ 2013(a), 2014. Regulations implementing the Food Stamp Program permit participating States to distribute the coupons either over the counter or through the mail. 7 CFR § 274.3(a) (1986); 7 CFR § 274.3(a)(3) (1992). While mail issuance generally is cheaper and more convenient, States that choose to use that distribution method must reimburse the Federal Government for a portion of the replacement cost for any lost or stolen coupons. 7 U. S. C. § 2016(f). Specifically, a State must reimburse the Government for all such losses above a “tolerance level” set by regulation. Texas, through its Department of Human Services, contractually bound itself to comply with all federal regulations governing the program. See 7 CFR §§ 272.2(a)(2), 272.2(b)(1) (1986). Texas incurred substantial mail issuance losses, in part because United States Postal employees stole food stamps that had been mailed by the Texas Department of Human Services to qualified households. Because those losses exceeded the applicable tolerance level, Texas was bound to reimburse the Federal Government for the excess losses. The FNS notified Texas of its debt in the amount of $412,385, and informed it that prejudgment interest would begin to accrue on the balance unless payment was made within 30 days. Texas sought administrative relief in the form of a waiver of liability. After the Food Stamp Appeals Board denied the requested relief, Texas sued the United States in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. In addition to challenging the Appeals Board’s refusal to grant a waiver of liability, Texas argued that the Debt Collection Act precluded the imposition of prejudgment interest on any amount it owed the Federal Government. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States on both issues. With respect to the prejudgment interest issue, the District Court adopted the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 F. 2d 788 (1989), which held that the Government’s common-law right to prejudgment interest on debts owed to it by the States survived enactment of the Debt Collection Act. See Civ. Action Nos. A-87-CA-774, A-88-CA-820 (WD Tex., Nov. 13, 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision concerning waiver, but reversed its decision concerning pre judgment interest. 951 F. 2d 645 (1992). Relying on the language of the Debt Collection Act, the court held that the “Act is not silent concerning whether or not state obligations should be subject to pre judgment interest. The Act specifically excludes states from the payment of interest.” Id., at 651. Because Congress did not impose interest through the specific provisions of the Food Stamp Act “diming the time period relevant in this case, the Courts are not free to ‘supplement’ Congress’ enactment.” Ibid, (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978)). The court rejected the argument that abrogation is inconsistent with the Act’s purpose of enhancing the Government’s ability to collect its debts. In the court’s view, the Federal Government could enforce its claims for unpaid mail issuance losses through the offset procedures built into the Food Stamp Act. Because of a split among the Courts of Appeals on this question, we granted certiorari, 506 U. S. 813 (1992), and now reverse. It is a “longstanding rule that parties owing debts to the Federal Government must pay prejudgment interest where the underlying claim is a contractual obligation to pay money.” West Virginia v. United States, 479 U. S., at 310 (citing Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 289, 295-297 (1941)). In Board of Comm’rs of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 (1939), we held that this common-law right extends to debts owed by state and local governments, but cautioned that a federal court considering the question in an individual case should weigh the federal and state interests involved. We reaffirmed Board of Comm’rs in West Virginia, supra, and upheld the assessment of prejudgment interest on a debt owed by West Virginia to the United States. Just as longstanding is the principle that “[sjtatutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779, 783 (1952); Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991). In such cases, Congress does not write upon a clean slate. Astoria, supra, at 108. In order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must “speak directly” to the question addressed by the common law. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, supra, at 625; Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 315 (1981). Texas argues that this presumption favoring retention of existing law is appropriate only with respect to state common law or federal maritime law. Although a different standard applies when analyzing the effect of federal legislation on state law, id., at 316-317, there is no support in our cases for the proposition that the presumption has no application to federal common law, or for a distinction between general federal common law and federal maritime law in this regard. We agree with Texas that Congress need not “affirmatively proscribe” the common-law doctrine at issue. Brief for Respondents 3-4; see Milwaukee, supra, at 315. But as we stated in Astoria, supra, “courts may take it as a given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the [common law] principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'” 501 U. S., at 108 (quoting Isbrandtsen, supra, at 783). The Debt Collection Act does not speak directly to the Federal Government’s right to collect prejudgment interest on debts owed to it by the States. The Act states that “[t]he head of an executive or legislative agency shall charge a minimum annual rate of interest on an outstanding debt on a United States Government claim owed by a person . . . .” 31 U. S. C. § 3717(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section 3701, in turn, provides that the term “ ‘person’ does not include an agency of the United States Government, of a State government, or of a unit of general local government.” §3701(c). Texas argues that this exemption clearly establishes Congress’ intent to relieve the States of their common-law obligation to pay prejudgment interest. We disagree. The only obligation from which § 3701 exempts the States is the obligation to pay prejudgment interest in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Act. These impose a stringent minimum interest requirement upon private persons owing money to the Federal Government. The statute is silent as to the obligation of the States to pay prejudgment interest on such debts. We agree with the Solicitor General that “Congress’s mere refusal to legislate with respect to the prejudgment-interest obligations of state and local governments falls far short of an expression of legislative intent to supplant the existing common law in that area.” Brief for Petitioners 16. Our conclusion that the States remain subject to common-law prejudgment interest liability is supported by the fact that the Debt Collection Act is more onerous than the common law. Section 3717(a) requires federal agencies to collect prejudgment interest against persons and specifies the interest rate. The duty to pay prejudgment interest under the common law, however, is by no means automatic. Before imposing prejudgment interest, the courts must weigh the competing federal and state interests. West Virginia, 479 U. S., at 309-311; Board of Comm’rs, 308 U. S., at 350. And instead of imposing a preestablished rate of interest, the district courts retain discretion to choose the appropriate rate in a given case. Unlike the common law, § 3717 also imposes processing fees and penalty charges, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3717(e)(1), (e)(2). Given these differences, it is logical to conclude that the Act was intended to reach only one subset of potential debtors — persons—and to leave the other subset alone. It is reasonable to apply more stringent requirements to debts owed by private persons and to keep the more flexible common law in place for debts owed by state and local governments. The evident purpose of the Debt Collection Act reinforces our reading of the plain language. The Act was designed “[t]o increase the efficiency of Government-wide efforts to collect debts owed the United States and to provide additional procedures for the collection of debts owed the United States.” 96 Stat. 1749; S. Rep. No. 97-378, p. 2 (1982) (the Act responded to “increasing concern .. . expressed in Congress and elsewhere over the increasing backlog of unpaid debts owed the federal government”). This suggests that Congress passed the Act in order to strengthen the Government’s hand in collecting its debts. Yet under the reading proposed by Texas and the Court of Appeals, the Act would have the anomalous effect of placing delinquent States in a position where they had less incentive to pay their debts to the Federal Government than they had prior to its passage. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the States would not have an incentive to delay payment of their debts because the Food Stamp Act makes state agencies liable for actual losses caused by coupon shortages or unauthorized issuances, and permits the Federal Government to recover these debts through an administrative offset procedure. 951 F. 2d, at 650. But the Debt Collection Act applies to all federal agencies, not just the FNS. Thus, the existence of a mechanism in the Food Stamp Act allowing the FNS to collect its debts does nothing to encourage prompt payment of debts govern-mentwide. That the FNS may have already possessed adequate sanctions to compel payment is not a reason to conclude that the generic language in the Debt Collection Act was meant to abrogate the existing common-law obligation of the States generally. Texas concedes that Congress intended to enhance the Government’s debt collection efforts by passing the Act. It argues, however, that Congress was concerned primarily with debts owed by private persons. Accordingly, runs the argument, Congress meant to relieve the States of their duty to pay interest because the States were not the root of the debt collection problem. Part of this argument persuades; Congress in the Act tightened the screws, so to speak, on the prejudgment interest obligations of private debtors to the Government, and not on the States. It may be inferred from this fact that the former were the root of the Government’s debt collection problems which inspired the Act. But it does not at all follow that because Congress did not tighten the screws on the States, it therefore intended that the screws be entirely removed. The more logical conclusion is that it left the screws in place, untightened. As a last-ditch argument, Texas contends that its liability for losses in the mail is not a contractual debt for which it owes prejudgment interest, but rather a penalty unilaterally imposed by Congress. See Rodgers v. United States, 332 U. S. 371, 374-376 (1947) (penalties are not normally subject to prejudgment interest). This argument fails because the obligation of Texas to reimburse the Government for a portion of the stamps lost in the mail is quite different from that involved in Rodgers. There the penalties in question were unilaterally imposed by the Agricultural Adjustment Act on farmers who exceeded their production quotas; there was no suggestion that the farmers ever consented to such penalties. Here, on the other hand, Texas signed a Federal/State Agreement, the express terms of which bound the State to act in accordance with the implementing regulations. 7 CFR § 272.2(a)(2) (1986); see also n. 2, supra. Thus, 7 CFR § 274.3(c)(4) (1986), which imposed liability for mail issuance losses above a specified tolerance level, was incorporated into Texas’ Federal/State Agreement. The requirement that the States reimburse the Federal Government for a certain portion of mail issuance losses is not a penalty, but a contractual obligation which the State assumed. For these reasons, we hold that the Debt Collection Act left in place the federal common law governing the obligation of the States to pay prejudgment interest on debts owed to the Federal Government. The judgment of the Court of Appeals to the contrary is accordingly Reversed. The regulatory tolerance level in place for the mail issuance losses in this case was 0.5% of each reporting area’s total mail issuances for each calendar quarter. 7 CFR § 274.3(c)(4)(i) (1986). Title 7 CFR § 272.2(a)(2) (1992) provides in pertinent part: “The basic components of the State Plan of Operation are the Federal/ State Agreement, the Budget Projection Statement, and the Program Activity Statement.... The Federal/State Agreement is the legal agreement between the State and the Department of Agriculture. This Agreement is the means by which the State elects to operate the Food Stamp Program and to administer the program in accordance with the Food Stamp Act of 1977, as amended, regulations issued pursuant to the Act and the FNS-approved State Plan of Operations.” Subsection (b)(1) sets out the exact wording of the preprinted Federal/ State Agreement. The provisions relevant to this dispute are as follows: “The State of — and the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), hereby agree to act in accordance with the provisions of the Food Stamp Act of 1977, as amended, implementing regulations and the FNS-approved State Plan of Operation. The State and FNS (USDA) further agree to fully comply with any changes in Federal law and regulations. This agreement may be modified with the mutual written consent of both parties. “The State agrees to: 1. Administer the program in accordance with the provisions contained in the Food Stamp Act of 1977, as amended, and in the manner prescribed by regulations issued pursuant to the Act; and to implement the FNS-approved State Plan of Operation.” 7 CFR § 272.2(b)(1) (1992)'. The Tenth Circuit holds that the Debt Collection Act of 1982 did not abrogate the Federal Government’s common-law right to collect prejudgment interest against the States. Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 F. 2d 788 (1989). The Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits all hold to the contrary. See Perales v. United States, 751 F. 2d 96 (CA2 1984) (per curiam); Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. United States, 781 F. 2d 334 (CA3 1986); Arkansas by Scott v. Block, 825 F. 2d 1254 (CA8 1987). Both Texas and the Court of Appeals rely on Congress’ authority to impose interest obligations on the States through specific statutes, such as the Medicaid Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396b(d)(5), and the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 418(j) (1982 ed.), to support the proposition that the Debt Collection Act extinguished the Federal Government’s common-law right to collect prejudgment interest. Both statutes, however, codified and made mandatory the common-law right to collect prejudgment interest at a specified interest rate. Like the Debt Collection Act, these statutes changed the common law. Congress’ obvious desire to enhance the common law in specific, well-defined situations does not signal its desire to extinguish the common law in other situations. Texas also relies on the recent amendment to 7 U. S. C. § 2022 adding a provision requiring prejudgment interest on specific obligations arising under the Food Stamp Act of 1977. Pub. L. 100-435, § 602, 102 Stat. 1674 (1988). But “subsequent legislative history is a ‘hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier’ Congress.” Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (I960)). Texas’ argument also fails because, like the Medicaid Act and the Social Security Act provisions, the Food Stamp Act of 1977 did not merely codify the common law without change. Rather, it contains a mandatory provision requiring prejudgment interest at a specified rate. The interest rate required under § 3717 is “the average investment rate for the Treasury tax and loan accounts for the 12-month period ending on September 30 of each year, rounded to the nearest whole percentage point.” 31 U. S. C. § 3717(a)(1). Both Texas and the Court of Appeals rely upon our decision in Penn-hurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), for the proposition that the Federal Government may not collect prejudgment interest because neither the Debt Collection Act nor the Food Stamp Act expressly require prejudgment interest. This reliance is misplaced. In Pennhurst, we held that in order to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds, Congress must speak unambiguously. Id., at 17. This makes sense because the States cannot voluntarily and knowingly agree to a condition that is not clearly expressed. Ibid. Because the duty to pay prejudgment interest on debts owed to the United States existed long before either the Food Stamp Program or the Debt Collection Act was created, the rule in Pennhurst does not apply. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773, 790, n. 17 (1983).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL CABLE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION et al. v. BRAND X INTERNET SERVICES et al. No. 04-277. Argued March 29, 2005 Decided June 27, 2005 Paul T. Cappuccio argued the cause for petitioners in No. 04-277. With him on the briefs were Howard J. Symons, Tara M. Corvo, Paul Glist, John D. Seiver, David E. Mills, Daniel L. Brenner, Neal M. Goldberg, Michael S. Schooler, Edward J. Weiss, and Henk Brands. Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for federal petitioners in No. 04-281. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Pate, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Del-rahim, James A. Feldman, Catherine G. O’Sullivan, Nancy C. Garrison, John A. Rogovin, Austin C. Schlick, Daniel M. Armstrong, Jacob M. Lewis, and Nandan M. Joshi. Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for respondents in both eases. With him on the brief were Amy Howe, John W Butler, Earl W. Comstock, Alison B. Macdonald, Harvey L. Reiter, Matthew J. Verschelden, and Andrew Jay Schwartzman. William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, David Borsykowsky, Assistant Attorney General, and Ellen S. LeVine filed a brief in both cases for respondents State of Vermont et al. Michael K. Kellogg, Sean A. Lev, and James G. Harralson filed a brief in both cases for respondents BellSouth et al. Andrew G. McBride, Eve Klindera Reed, William P. Barr, Michael E. Glover, Edward Shakin, and John P Frantz filed a brief in both cases for respondents Verizon Telephone Companies et al. Mark D. Schneider, Marc A. Goldman, and Jeffrey A. Rackow filed a brief in both cases for respondent MCI, Inc. Together with No. 04-281, Federal Communications Commission et al. v. Brand X Internet Services et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the Telecommunications Industry Association by Colleen L. Boothby and Andrew M. Brown; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and David Price. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the State of New Jersey, Board of Public Utilities, by Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, and Kenneth J. Sheehan, Deputy Attorney General; for AARP et al. by Stacy Canan and Michael Schuster; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, Christopher A Hansen, Jennifer Stisa Granick, and Marjorie Heins; and for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners by James Bradford Ramsay. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., subjects all providers of “telecommunications servicie]” to mandatory common-carrier regulation, § 153(44). In the order under review, the Federal Communications Commission concluded that cable companies that sell broadband Internet service do not provide “telecommunications servic[ej” as the Communications Act defines that term, and hence are exempt from mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II. We must decide whether that conclusion is a lawful construction of the Communications Act under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. We hold that it is. I The traditional means by which consumers in the United States access the network of interconnected computers that make up the Internet is through “dial-up” connections provided over local telephone facilities. See 345 F. 3d 1120, 1123-1124 (CA9 2003) (cases below); In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Red. 4798, 4802-4803, ¶ 9 (2002) (hereinafter Declaratory Ruling). Using these connections, consumers access the Internet by making calls with computer modems through the telephone wires owned by local phone companies. See Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 489-490 (2002) (describing the physical structure of a local telephone exchange). Internet service providers (ISPs), in turn, link those calls to the Internet network, not only by providing a physical connection, but also by offering consumers the ability to translate raw Internet data into information they may both view on their personal computers and transmit to other computers connected to the Internet. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Red. 11501, 11531, ¶63 (1998) (hereinafter Universal Service Report or Report); P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law 988 (2d ed. 1999) (hereinafter Huber); 345 F. 3d, at 1123-1124. Technological limitations of local telephone wires, however, retard the speed at which data from the Internet may be transmitted through end users’ dial-up connections. Dial-up connections are therefore known as “narrowband,” or slower speed, connections. “Broadband” Internet service, by contrast, transmits data at much higher speeds. There are two principal kinds of broadband Internet service: cable modem service and Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service. Cable modem service transmits data between the Internet and users’ computers via the network of television cable lines owned by cable companies. See id., at 1124. DSL service provides high-speed access using the local telephone wires owned by local telephone companies. See WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F. 3d 690, 692 (CADC 2001) (describing DSL technology). Cable companies and telephone companies can either provide Internet access directly to consumers, thus acting as ISPs themselves, or can lease their transmission facilities to independent ISPs that then use the facilities to provide consumers with Internet access. Other ways of transmitting high-speed Internet data into homes, including terrestrial- and satellite-based wireless networks, are also emerging. Declaratory Ruling 4802, ¶ 6. II At issue in these cases is the proper regulatory classification under the Communications Act of broadband cable Internet service. The Act, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, defines two categories of regulated entities relevant to these cases: telecommunications carriers and information-service providers. The Act regulates telecommunications carriers, but not information-service providers, as common carriers. Telecommunications carriers, for example, must charge just and reasonable, nondiscriminatory rates to their customers, 47 U. S. C. §§201-209, design their systems so that other carriers can interconnect with their communications networks, § 251(a)(1), and contribute to the federal “universal service” fund, § 254(d). These provisions are mandatory, but the Commission must forbear from applying them if it determines that the public interest requires it. §§ 160(a), (b). Information-service providers, by contrast, are not subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II, though the Commission has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications, see §§ 151-161. These two statutory classifications originated in the late 1970’s, as the Commission developed rules to regulate data-processing services offered over telephone wires. That regime, the “Computer II” rules, distinguished between “basic” service (like telephone service) and “enhanced” service (computer-processing service offered over telephone lines). In re Amendment of Section 64-702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 417-423, ¶¶86-101 (1980) (hereinafter. Computer II Order). The Computer II rules defined both basic and enhanced services by reference to how the consumer perceives the service being offered. In particular, the Commission defined “basic service” as “a pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied information.” Id., at 420, ¶96. By “pure” or “transparent” transmission, the Commission meant a communications path that enabled the consumer to transmit an ordinary-language message to another point, with no computer processing or storage of the information, other than the processing or storage needed to convert the message into electronic form and then back into ordinary language for purposes of transmitting it over the network— such as via a telephone or a facsimile. Id., at 419-420, ¶¶ 94-95. Basic service was subject to common-carrier regulation. Id., at 428, ¶ 114. “[Ejnhanced service,” however, was service in which “computer processing applications [were] used to act on the content, code, protocol, and other aspects of the subscriber’s information,” such as voice and data storage services, id., at 420-421, ¶ 97, as well as “protocol conversion” (i. e., ability to communicate between networks that employ different data-transmission formats), id., at 421-422, ¶99. By contrast to basic service, the Commission decided not to subject providers of enhanced service, even enhanced service offered via transmission wires, to Title II common-carrier regulation. Id., at 428-432, ¶¶ 115-123. The Commission explained that it was unwise to subject enhanced service to common-carrier regulation given the “fast-moving, competitive market” in which they were offered. Id., at 434, ¶ 129. The definitions of the terms “telecommunications service” and “information service” established by the 1996 Act are similar to the Computer II basic- and enhanced-service classifications. “Telecommunications service” — the analog to basic service — is “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public... regardless of the facilities used.” 47 U. S. C. § 153(46). “Telecommunications” is “the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.” § 153(43). “Telecommunications carrier[s]” — those subjected to mandatory Title II common-carrier regulation — are defined as “provider^] of telecommunications services.” §153(44). And “information service” — the analog to enhanced service — is “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications . .. .” § 153(20). In September 2000, the Commission initiated a rulemaking proceeding to, among other things, apply these classifications to cable companies that offer broadband Internet service directly to consumers. In March 2002, that rulemaking culminated in the Declaratory Ruling under review in these cases. In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission con-eluded that broadband Internet service provided by cable companies is an “information service” but not a “telecommunications service” under the Act, and therefore not subject to mandatory Title II common-carrier regulation. In support of this conclusion, the Commission relied heavily on its Universal Service Report See Declaratory Ruling 4821-4822, ¶¶ 36-37 (citing Universal Service Report). The Universal Service Report classified “non-facilities-based” ISPs— those that do not own the transmission facilities they use to connect the end user to the Internet — solely as information-service providers. See Universal Service Report 11533, ¶67. Unlike those ISPs, cable companies own the cable lines they use to provide Internet access. Nevertheless, in the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission found no basis in the statutory definitions for treating cable companies differently from non-facilities-based ISPs: Both offer “a single, integrated service that enables the subscriber to utilize Internet access service . . . and to realize the benefits of a comprehensive service offering.” Declaratory Ruling 4823, ¶38. Because Internet access provides a capability for manipulating and storing information, the Commission concluded that it was an information service. Ibid. The integrated nature of Internet access and the high-speed wire used to provide Internet access led the Commission to conclude that cable companies providing Internet access are not telecommunications providers. This conclusion, the Commission reasoned, followed from the logic of the Universal .Service Report. The Report had concluded that, though Internet service “involves data transport elements” because “an Internet access provider must enable the movement of information between customers’ own computers and distant computers with which those customers seek to interact,” it also “offers end users information-service capabilities inextricably intertwined with data transport.” Universal Service Report 11539-11540, ¶ 80. ISPs, therefore, were not “offering ... telecommunications ... directly to the public,” § 153(46), and so were not properly classified as telecommunications carriers, see id., at 11540, ¶ 81. In other words, the Commission reasoned that consumers use their cable modems not to transmit information “transparently,” such as by using a telephone, but instead to obtain Internet access. The Commission applied this same reasoning to cable companies offering broadband Internet access. Its logic was that, like non-facilities-based ISPs, cable companies do not “offe[r] telecommunications service to the end user, but rather . . . merely us[e] telecommunications to provide end users with cable modem service.” Declaratory Ruling 4824, ¶ 41. Though the Commission declined to apply mandatory Title II common-carrier regulation to cable companies, it invited comment on whether under its Title I jurisdiction it should require cable companies to offer other ISPs access to their facilities on common-carrier terms. Id., at 4839, ¶ 72. Numerous parties petitioned for judicial review, challenging the Commission’s conclusion that cable modem service was not telecommunications service. By judicial lottery, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was selected as the venue for the challenge. The Court of Appeals granted the petitions in part, vacated the Declaratory Ruling in part, and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. In particular, the Court of Appeals vacated the ruling to the extent it concluded that cable modem service was not “telecommunications service” under the Communications Act. It held that the Commission could not permissibly construe the Communications Act to exempt cable companies providing Internet service from Title II regulation. See 345 F. 3d, at 1132. Rather than analyzing the permissibility of that construction under the deferential framework of Chevron, 467 U. S. 837, however, the Court of Appeals grounded its holding in the stare decisis effect of AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F. 3d 871 (CA9 2000). See 345 F. 3d, at 1128-1132. Portland held that cable modem service was a “telecommunications service,” though the court in that case was not reviewing an administrative proceeding and the Commission was not a party to the case. See 216 F. 3d, at 877-880. Nevertheless, Portland’s holding, the Court of Appeals reasoned, overrode the contrary interpretation reached by the Commission in the Declaratory Ruling. See 345 F. 3d, at 1130-1131. We granted certiorari to settle the important questions of federal law that these cases present. 543 U. S. 1018 (2004). Ill We first consider whether we should apply Chevron’s framework to the Commission’s interpretation of the term “telecommunications service.” We conclude that we should. We also conclude that the Court of Appeals should have done the same, instead of following the contrary construction it adopted in Portland. A In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. Filling these gaps, the Court explained, involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than courts. 467 U. S., at 865-866. If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation. Id., at 843-844, and n. 11. The Chevron framework governs our review of the Commission’s construction. Congress has delegated to the Commission the authority to “execute and enforce” the Communications Act, §151, and to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions” of the Act, § 201(b); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 377-378 (1999). These provisions give the Commission the authority to promulgate binding legal rules; the Commission issued the order under review in the exercise of that authority; and no one questions that the order is within the Commission’s jurisdiction. See Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U. S. 232, 238-239 (2004); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 231-234 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 586-588 (2000). Hence, as we have in the past, we apply the Chevron framework to the Commission’s interpretation of the Communications Act. See National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U. S. 327, 333-339 (2002); Verizon, 535 U. S., at 501-502. Some of the respondents dispute this conclusion, on the ground that the Commission’s interpretation is inconsistent with its past practice. We reject this argument. Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework. Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 46-57 (1983). For if the agency adequately explains the reasons for a reversal of policy, “change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.” Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742 (1996); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 186-187 (1991); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212, 226 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). “An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency ... must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis,” Chevron, supra, at 863-864, for example, in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations, see State Farm, supra, at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That is no doubt why in Chevron itself, this Court deferred to an agency interpretation that was a recent reversal of agency policy. See 467 U. S., at 857-858. We therefore have no difficulty concluding that Chevron applies. B The Court of Appeals declined to apply Chevron because it thought the Commission’s interpretation of the Communications Act foreclosed by the conflicting construction of the Act it had adopted in Portland. See 345 F. 3d, at 1127-1132. It based that holding on the assumption that Portland’s construction overrode the Commission’s, regardless of whether Portland had held the statute to be unambiguous. 345 F. 3d, at 1131. That reasoning was incorrect. A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion. This principle follows from Chevron itself. Chevron established a “presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” Smiley, supra, at 740-741. Yet allowing a judicial precedent to foreclose an agency from interpreting an ambiguous statute, as the Court of Appeals assumed it could, would allow a court’s interpretation to override an agency’s. Chevron’s premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps. See 467 U. S., at 843-844, and n. 11. The better rule is to hold judicial interpretations contained in precedents to the same demanding Chevron step one standard that applies if the court is reviewing the agency’s construction on a blank slate: Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction. A contrary rule would produce anomalous results. It would mean that whether an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to Chevron deference would turn on the order in which the interpretations issue: If the court’s construction came first, its construction would prevail, whereas if the agency’s came first, the agency’s construction would command Chevron deference. Yet whether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to interpret a statute does not depend on the order in which the judicial and administrative constructions occur. The Court of Appeals’ rule, moreover, would “lead to the ossification of large portions of our statutory law,” Mead, 533 U. S., at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting), by precluding agencies from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes. Neither Chevron nor the doctrine of stare decisis requires these haphazard results. The dissent answers that allowing an agency to override what a court believes to be the best interpretation of a statute makes “judicial decisions subject to reversal by executive officers.” Post, at 1016 (opinion of Scalia, J.). It does not. Since Chevron teaches that a court’s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an agency is charged with administering is not authoritative, the agency’s decision to construe that statute differently from a court does not say that the court’s holding was legally wrong. Instead, the agency may, consistent with the court’s holding, choose a different construction, since the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason) of such statutes. In all other respects, the court’s prior ruling remains binding law (for example, as to agency interpretations to which Chevron is inapplicable). The precedent has not been “reversed” by the agency, any more than a federal court’s interpretation of a State’s law can be said to have been “reversed” by a state court that adopts a conflicting (yet authoritative) interpretation of state law. The Court of Appeals derived a contrary rule from a mistaken reading of this Court’s decisions. It read Neal v. United States, 516 U. S. 284 (1996), to establish that a prior judicial construction of a statute categorically controls an agency’s contrary construction. 345 F. 3d, at 1131-1132; see also post, at 1016, n. 11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Neal established no such proposition. Neal declined to defer to a construction adopted by the United States Sentencing Commission that conflicted with one the Court previously had adopted in Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991). Neal, supra, at 290-295. Chapman, however, had held the relevant statute to be unambiguous. See 500 U. S., at 463 (declining to apply the rule of lenity given the statute’s clear language). Thus, Neal established only that a precedent holding a statute to be unambiguous forecloses a contrary agency construction. That limited holding accorded with this Court’s prior decisions, which had held that a court’s interpretation of a statute trumps an agency’s under the doctrine of stare decisis only if the prior court holding “determined a statute’s clear meaning.” Maislin Industries, U S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 131 (1990) (emphasis added); see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. 527, 536-537 (1992). Those decisions allow a court’s prior interpretation of a statute to override an agency’s interpretation only if the relevant court decision held the statute unambiguous. Against this background, the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply Chevron to the Commission’s interpretation of the definition of “telecommunications service,” 47 U. S. C. § 153(46). Its prior decision in Portland held only that the best reading of § 153(46) was that cable modem service was a “telecommunications service,” not that it was the only permissible reading of the statute. See 216 F. 3d, at 877-880. Nothing in Portland held that the Communications Act unambiguously required treating cable Internet providers as telecommunications carriers. Instead, the court noted that it was “not presented with a case involving potential deference to an administrative agency’s statutory construction pursuant to the Chevron doctrine,” id., at 876; and the court invoked no other rule of construction (such as the rule of lenity) requiring it to conclude that the statute was unambiguous to reach its judgment. Before a judicial construction of a statute, whether contained in a precedent or not, may trump an agency’s, the court must hold that the statute unambiguously requires the court’s construction. Portland did not do so. As the dissent points out, it is not logically necessary for us to reach the question whether the Court of Appeals misapplied Chevron for us to decide whether the Commission acted lawfully. See post, at 1019-1020 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Nevertheless, it is no “great mystery” why we are reaching the point here. Post, at 1019. There is genuine confusion in the lower courts over the interaction between the Chevron doctrine and stare decisis principles, as the petitioners informed us at the certiorari stage of this litigation. See Pet. for Cert, of Federal Communications Commission et al. in No. 04-281, pp. 19-23; Pet. for Cert. of National Cable & Telecomm. Assn, et al. in No. 04-277, pp. 22-29. The point has been briefed. See Brief for Federal Petitioners 38-44; Brief for Cable-Industry Petitioners 30-36. And not reaching the point could undermine the purpose of our grant of certiorari: to settle authoritatively whether the Commission’s Declaratory Ruling is lawful. Were we to uphold the Declaratory Ruling without reaching the Chevron point, the Court of Appeals could once again strike down the Commission’s rule based on its Portland decision. Portland (at least arguably) could compel the Court of Appeals once again to reverse the Commission despite our decision, since our conclusion that it is reasonable to read the Communications Act to classify cable modem service solely as an “information service” leaves untouched Portland's holding that the Commission’s interpretation is not the best reading of the statute. We have before decided similar questions that were not, strictly speaking, necessary to our disposition. See, e. g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 237 (1997) (requiring the Courts of Appeals to adhere to our directly controlling precedents, even those that rest on reasons rejected in other decisions); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 628-629 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing this Court for not reaching the question whether the Missouri Supreme Court erred by failing to follow directly controlling Supreme Court precedent, though that conclusion was not necessary to the Court’s decision). It is prudent for us to do so once again today. IV We next address whether the Commission’s construction of the definition of “telecommunications service,” 47 U. S. C. §153(46), is a permissible reading of the Communications Act under the Chevron framework. Chevron established a familiar two-step procedure for evaluating whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute is lawful. At the first step, we ask whether the statute’s plain terms “directly ad-dres[s] the precise question at issue.” 467 U. S., at 843. If the statute is ambiguous on the point, we defer at step two to the agency’s interpretation so long as the construction is “a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.” Id., at 845. The Commission’s interpretation is permissible at both steps. A We first set forth our understanding of the interpretation of the Communications Act that the Commission embraced. The issue before the Commission was whether cable companies providing cable modem service are providing a “telecommunications service” in addition to an “information service.” The Commission first concluded that cable modem service is an “information service,” a conclusion unchallenged here. The Act defines “information service” as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications____” § 158(20). Cable modem service is an information service, the Commission reasoned, because it provides consumers with a comprehensive capability for manipulating information using the Internet via high-speed telecommunications. That service enables users, for example, to browse the World Wide Web, to transfer files from file archives available on the Internet via the “File Transfer Protocol,” and to access e-mail and Usenet newsgroups. Declaratory Ruling 4821, ¶ 37; Universal Service Report 11537, ¶ 76. Like other forms of Internet service, cable modem service also gives users access to the Domain Name System (DNS). DNS, among other things, matches the Web page addresses that end users type into their browsers (or “click” on) with the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of the servers containing the Web pages the users wish to aecess. Declaratory Ruling 4821-4822, ¶ 37. All of these features, the Commission concluded, were part of the information service that cable companies provide consumers. Id., at 4821-4823, ¶¶ 36-38; see also Universal Service Report 11536-11539, ¶¶ 75-79. At the same time, the Commission concluded that cable modem service was not “telecommunications service.” “Telecommunications service” is “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.” 47 U. S. C. § 153(46). “Telecommunications,” in turn, is defined as “the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.” § 153(48). The Commission conceded that, like all information-service providers, cable companies use “telecommunications” to provide consumers with Internet service; cable companies provide such service via the high-speed wire that transmits signals to and from an end user’s computer. Declaratory Ruling 4823, ¶ 40. For the Commission, however, the question whether cable broadband Internet providers “offer” telecommunications involved more than whether telecommunications was one necessary component of cable modem service. Instead, whether that service also includes a telecommunications “offering” “turn[ed] on the nature of the functions the end user is offered,” id., at 4822, ¶ 38 (emphasis added), for the statutory definition of “telecommunications service” does not “res[t] on the particular types of facilities used,” id., at 4821, ¶ 35; see § 153(46) (definition of “telecommunications service” applies “regardless of the facilities used”). Seen from the consumer’s point of view, the Commission concluded, cable modem service is not a telecommunications offering because the consumer uses the high-speed wire always in connection with the information-processing capabilities provided by Internet access, and because the transmission is a necessary component of Internet access: “As provided to the end user the telecommunications is part and parcel of cable modem service and is integral to its other capabilities.” Declaratory Ruling 4823, ¶ 39. The wire is used, in other words, to access the World Wide Web, newsgroups, and so forth, rather than “transparently” to transmit and receive ordinary-language messages without computer processing or storage of the message. See supra, at 976 (noting the Computer II notion of “transparent” transmission). The integrated character of this offering led the Commission to conclude that cable modem service is not a “stand-alone,” transparent offering of telecommunications. Declaratory Ruling 4823-4825, ¶¶ 41-43. B This construction passes Chevron's first step. Respondents argue that it does not, on the ground that cable companies providing Internet service necessarily “offe[r]” the underlying telecommunications used to transmit that service. The word “offering” as used in § 153(46), however, does not unambiguously require that result. Instead, “offering” can reasonably be read to mean a “stand-alone” offering of telecommunications, i. e., an offered service that, from the user’s perspective, transmits messages unadulterated by computer processing. That conclusion follows not only from the ordinary meaning of the word “offering,” but also from the regulatory history of the Communications Act. 1 Cable companies in the broadband Internet service business “offe[r]” consumers an information service in the form of Internet access and they do so “via telecommunications,” § 153(20), but it does not inexorably follow as a matter of ordinary language that they also “offe[r]” consumers the high-speed data transmission (telecommunications) that is an input used to provide this service, § 153(46). We have held that where a statute’s plain terms admit of two or more reasonable ordinary usages, the Commission’s choice of one of them is entitled to deference. See Verizon, 535 U. S., at 498 (deferring to the Commission’s interpretation of the term “cost” by reference to an alternative linguistic usage defined by what “[a] merchant who is asked about ‘the cost of providing the goods’ ” might “reasonably” say); National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U. S. 407, 418 (1992) (agency construction entitled to deference where there were “alternative dictionary definitions of the word” at issue). The term “offe[r]” as used in the definition of telecommunications service, §153(46), is ambiguous in this way. It is common usage to describe what a company “offers” to a consumer as what the consumer perceives to be the integrated finished product, even to the exclusion of discrete components that compose the product, as the dissent concedes. See post, at 1006-1007 (opinion of Scalia, J.). One might well say that a car dealership “offers” cars, but does not “offer” the integrated major inputs that make purchasing the ear valuable, such as the engine or the chassis. It would, in fact, be odd to describe a car dealership as “offering” consumers the car’s components in addition to the car itself. Even if it is linguistically permissible to say that the car dealership “offers” engines when it offers cars, that shows, at most, that the term “offer,” when applied to a commercial transaction, is ambiguous about whether it describes only the offered finished product, or the product’s discrete components as well. It does not show that no other usage is permitted. The question, then, is whether the transmission component of cable modem service is sufficiently integrated with the finished service to make it reasonable to describe the two as a single, integrated offering. See ibid. We think that they are sufficiently integrated, because “[a] consumer uses the high-speed wire always in connection with the information-processing capabilities provided by Internet access, and because the transmission is a necessary component of Internet access.” Supra, at 988. In the telecommunications context, it is at least reasonable to describe companies as not “offering” to consumers each discrete input that is necessary to providing, and is always used in connection with, a finished service. We think it no misuse of language, for example, to say that cable companies providing Internet service do not “offer” consumers DNS, even though DNS is essential to providing Internet access. Declaratory Ruling 4810, n. 74, 4822-4823, ¶38. Likewise, a telephone company “offers” consumers a transparent transmission path that conveys an ordinary-language message, not necessarily the data-transmission facilities that also “transmit] . . . information of the user’s choosing,” § 153(43), or other physical elements of the facilities used to provide telephone service, like the trunks and switches, or the copper in the wires. What cable companies providing cable modem service and telephone companies providing telephone service “offer” is Internet service and telephone service respectively — the finished services, though they do so using (or “via”) the discrete components composing the end product, including data transmission. Such functionally integrated components need not be described as distinct “offerings.” In response, the dissent argues that the high-speed transmission component necessary to providing cable modem service is necessarily “offered” with Internet service because cable modem service is like the offering of pizza delivery service together with pizza, and the offering of puppies together with dog leashes. Post, at 1007-1008 (opinion of Scalia, J.). The dissent’s appeal to these analogies only underscores that the term “offer” is ambiguous in the way that we have described. The entire question is whether the products here are functionally integrated (like the components of a car) or functionally separate (like pets and leashes). That question turns not on the language of the Act, but on the factual particulars of how Internet technology works and how it is provided, questions Chevron leaves to the Commission to resolve in the first instance. As the Commission has candidly recognized, “the question may not always be straightforward whether, on the one hand, an entity is providing a single information service with communications and computing components, or, on the other hand, is providing two distinct services, one of which is a telecommunications service.” Universal Service Report 11530, ¶60. Because the term “offer” can sometimes refer to a single, finished product and sometimes to the “individual components in a package being offered” (depending on whether the components “still possess sufficient identity to be described as separate objects,” post, at 1006), the statute fails unambiguously to classify the telecommunications component of cable modem service as a distinct offering. This leaves federal telecommunications policy in this technical and complex area to be set by the Commission, not by warring analogies. We also do not share the dissent’s certainty that cable modem service is so obviously like pizza delivery service and the combination of dog leashes and dogs that the Commission could not reasonably have thought otherwise. Post, at 1007-1008. For example, unlike the transmission component of Internet service, delivery service and dog leashes are not integral components of the finished products (pizzas and pet dogs). One can pick up a pizza rather than having it delivered, and one can own a dog without buying a leash. By contrast, the Commission reasonably concluded, a consumer cannot purchase Internet service without also purchasing a connection to the Internet and the transmission always occurs in connection with information processing. In any event, we doubt that a statute that, for example, subjected offerors of “delivery” service (such as Federal Express and United Parcel Service) to common-carrier regulation would unambiguously require pizza-delivery companies to offer their delivery services on a common-carrier basis. 2 The Commission’s traditional distinction between basic and enhanced service, see supra, at 976-977, also supports the conclusion that the Communications Act is ambiguous about whether cable companies “offer” telecommunications with cable modem service. Congress passed the definitions in the Communications Act against the background of this regulatory history, and we may assume that the parallel terms “telecommunications service” and “information service” substantially incorporated their meaning, as the Commission has held. See, e. g., In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 FCC Red. 8776, 9179-9180, ¶788 (1997) (noting that the “definition of enhanced services is substantially similar to the definition of information services” and that “all services previously considered 'enhanced services’ are ‘information services’ ”); Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 152, 159 (1993) (noting presumption that Congress is aware of “settled judicial and administrative interpretation^]” of terms when it enacts a statute). The regulatory history in at least two respects confirms that the term “telecommunications service” is ambiguous. First, in the Computer II Order that established the terms “basic” and “enhanced” services, the Commission defined those terms functionally, based on how the consumer interacts with the provided information, just as the Commission did in the order below. See supra, at 976-977. As we have explained, Internet service is not “transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied information,” Computer II Order 420, ¶ 96; the transmission occurs in connection with information processing. It was therefore consistent with the statute’s terms for the Commission to assume that the parallel term “telecommunications service” in 47 U. S. C. § 153(46) likewise describes a “pure” or “transparent” communications path not necessarily separately present, from the end user’s perspective, in an integrated information-service offering. The Commission’s application of the basic/enhanced-service distinction to non-facilities-based ISPs also supports this conclusion. The Commission has long held that “all those who provide some form of transmission services are not necessarily common carriers.” Computer II Order 431, ¶ 122; see also id., at 435, ¶ 132 (“acknowledg[ing] the existence of a communications component” in enhanced-service offerings). For example, the Commission did not subject to common-carrier regulation those service providers that offered enhanced services over telecommunications facilities, but that did not themselves own the underlying facilities— so-called “non-facilities-based” providers. See Universal Service Report 11530, ¶ 60. Examples of these services included database services in which a customer used telecommunications to access information, such as Dow Jones News and Lexis, as well as “value added networks,” which lease wires from common carriers and provide transmission as well as protocol-processing service over those wires. See In re Amendment to Sections 6U.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 3 FCC Red. 1150, 1153, n. 23 (1988); supra, at 977 (explaining protocol conversion). These services “combined] communications and computing components,” yet the Commission held that they should “always be deemed enhanced” and therefore not subject to common-carrier regulation. Universal Service Report 11530, ¶60. Following this traditional distinction, the Commission in the Universal Service Report classified ISPs that leased rather than owned their transmission facilities as pure information-service providers. Id., at 11540, ¶ 81. Respondents’ statutory arguments conflict with this regulatory history. They claim that the Communications Act unambiguously classifies as telecommunications carriers all entities that use telecommunications inputs to provide information service. As respondent MCI concedes, this argument would subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation all information-service providers that use telecommunications as an input to provide information service to the public. Brief for Respondent MCI, Inc., 30. For example, it would subject to common-carrier regulation non-facilities-based ISPs that own no transmission facilities. See Universal Service Report 11532-11533, ¶ 66. Those ISPs provide consumers with transmission facilities used to connect to the Internet, see supra, at 974, and so, under respondents’ argument, necessarily “offer” telecommunications to consumers. Respondents’ position that all such entities are necessarily “offering telecommunications” therefore entails mandatory common-carrier regulation of entities that the Commission never classified as “offerors” of basic transmission service, and therefore common carriers, under the Computer II regime. See Universal Service Report 11540, ¶81 (noting past Commission policy); Computer and Communications Industry Assn. v. FCC, 693 F. 2d 198,209 (CADC 1982) (noting and upholding Commission’s Computer II “finding that enhanced services... are not common carrier services within the scope of Title II”). We doubt that the parallel term “telecommunications service” unambiguously worked this abrupt shift in Commission policy. Respondents’ analogy between cable companies that provide cable modem service and facilities-based enhanced-service providers — that is, enhanced-service providers who own the transmission facilities used to provide those services — fares no better. Respondents stress that under the Computer II rules the Commission regulated such providers more heavily than non-facilities-based providers. The Commission required, for example, local telephone companies that provided enhanced services to offer their wires on a common-carrier basis to competing enhanced-service providers. See, e.g., In re Amendment of Sections 6^.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F. C. C. 2d 958, 964, ¶ 4 (1986) (hereinafter Computer III Order). Respondents argue that the Communications Act unambiguously requires the same treatment for cable companies because cable companies also own the facilities they use to provide cable modem service (and therefore information service). We disagree. We think it improbable that the Communications Act unambiguously freezes in time the Computer II treatment of facilities-based information-service providers. The Act’s definition of “telecommunications service” says nothing about imposing more stringent regulatory duties on facilities-based information-service providers. The definition hinges solely on whether the entity “offer[s] telecommunications for a fee directly to the public,” 47 U. S. C. § 158(46), though the Act elsewhere subjects facilities-based carriers to stricter regulation, see § 251(c) (imposing various duties on facilities-based local telephone companies). In the Computer II rules, the Commission subjected facilities-based providers to common-carrier duties not because of the nature of the “offering” made by those carriers, but rather because of the concern that local telephone companies would abuse the monopoly power they possessed by virtue of the “bottleneck” local telephone facilities they owned. See Computer II Order 474-475, ¶¶ 229, 231; Computer III Order 968-969, ¶ 12; Verizon, 535 U. S., at 489-490 (describing the naturally monopolistic physical structure of a local telephone exchange). The differential treatment of facilities-based carriers was therefore a function not of the definitions of “enhanced-service” and “basic service,” but instead of a choice by the Commission to regulate more stringently, in its discretion, certain entities that provided enhanced service. The Act’s definitions, however, parallel the definitions of enhanced and basic service, not the facilities-based grounds on which that policy choice was based, and the Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction. In fact, it has invited comment on whether it can and should do so. See supra, at 979. In sum, if the Act fails unambiguously to classify non-facilities-based information-service providers that use telecommunications inputs to provide an information service as “offer[ors]” of “telecommunications,” then it also fails unambiguously to classify facilities-based information-service providers as telecommunications-service offerors; the relevant definitions do not distinguish facilities-based and non-facilities-based carriers. That silence suggests, instead, that the Commission has the discretion to fill the consequent statutory gap. C We also conclude that the Commission’s construction was “a reasonable policy choice for the [Commission] to make” at Chevron’s second step. 467 U. S., at 845. Respondents argue that the Commission’s construction is unreasonable because it allows any communications provider to “evade” common-carrier regulation by the expedient of bundling information service with telecommunications. Respondents argue that under the Commission’s construction a telephone company could, for example, offer an information service like voice mail together with telephone service, thereby avoiding common-carrier regulation of its telephone service. We need not decide whether a construction that resulted in these consequences would be unreasonable because we do not believe that these results follow from the construction the Commission adopted. As we understand the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission did not say that any telecommunications service that is priced or bundled with an information service is automatically unregulated under Title II. The Commission said that a telecommunications input used to provide an information service that is not “separable from the data-processing capabilities of the service” and is instead “part and parcel of [the information service] and is integral to [the information service’s] other capabilities” is not a telecommunications offering. Declaratory Ruling 4823, ¶ 39; see supra, at 988. This construction does not leave all information-service offerings exempt from mandatory Title II regulation. “It is plain,” for example, that a local telephone company “cannot escape Title II regulation of its residential local exchange service simply by packaging that service with voice mail.” Universal Service Report 11530, ¶ 60. That is because a telephone company that packages voice mail with telephone service offers a transparent transmission path — telephone service — that transmits information independent of the information-storage capabilities provided by voice mail. For instance, when a person makes a telephone call, his ability to convey and receive information using the call is only trivially affected by the additional voice-mail capability. Equally, were a telephone company, to add a time-of-day announcement that played every time the user picked up his telephone, the “transparent” information transmitted in the ensuing call would be only trivially dependent on the information service the announcement provides. By contrast, the high-speed transmission used to provide cable modem service is a functionally integrated component of that service because it transmits data only in connection with the further processing of information and is necessary to provide Internet service. The Commission’s construction therefore was more limited than respondents assume. Respondents answer that cable modem service does, in fact, provide “transparent” transmission from the consumer’s perspective, but this argument, too, is mistaken. Respondents characterize the “information-service” offering of Internet access as consisting only of access to a cable company’s e-mail service, its Web page, and the ability it provides consumers to create a personal Web page. When a consumer goes beyond those offerings and accesses content provided by parties other than the cable company, respondents argue, the consumer uses “pure transmission” no less than a consumer who purchases phone service together with voice mail. This argument, we believe, conflicts with the Commission’s understanding of the nature of cable modem service, an understanding we find to be reasonable. When an end user accesses a third-party’s Web site, the Commission concluded, he is equally using the information service provided by the cable company that offers him Internet access as when he accesses the company’s own Web site, its e-mail service, or his personal Web page. For example, as the Commission found below, part of the information service cable companies provide is access to DNS service. See supra, at 987. A user cannot reach a third-party’s Web site without DNS, which (among other things) matches the Web site address the end user types into his browser (or “clicks” on with his mouse) with the IP address of the Web page’s host server. See P. Albitz & C. Liu, DNS and BIND 10 (4th ed. 2001) (For an Internet user, “DNS is a must. . . . [N]early all of the Internet’s network services use DNS. That includes the World Wide Web, electronic mail, remote terminal access, and file transfer”). It is at least reasonable to think of DNS as a “capability for ... acquiring . .. retrieving, utilizing, or making available” Web site addresses and therefore part of the information service cable companies provide. 47 U. S. C. § 153(20). Similarly, the Internet service provided by cable companies facilitates access to third-party Web pages by offering consumers the ability to store, or “cache,” popular content on local computer servers. See Declaratory Ruling 4810, ¶ 17, and n. 76. Cacheing obviates the need for the end user to download anew information from third-party Web sites each time the consumer attempts to access them, thereby increasing the speed of information retrieval. In other words, subscribers can reach third-party Web sites via “the World Wide Web, and browse their contents, [only] because their service provider offers the ‘capability for . . . acquiring, [storing]... retrieving [and] utilizing... information.’” Universal Service Report 11538, ¶76 (quoting 47 U. S. C. § 153(20)). “The service that Internet access providers offer to members of the public is Internet access,” Universal Service Report 11539, ¶ 79, not a transparent ability (from the end user’s perspective) to transmit information. We therefore conclude that the Commission’s construction was reasonable. V Respondent MCI, Inc., urges that the Commission’s treatment of cable modem service is inconsistent with its treatment of DSL service, see supra, at 975 (describing DSL service), and therefore is an arbitrary and capricious deviation from agency policy. See 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). MCI points out that when local telephone companies began to offer Internet access through DSL technology in addition to telephone service, the Commission applied its Computer II facilities-based classification to them and required them to make the telephone lines used to transmit DSL service available to competing ISPs on nondiscriminatory, common-carrier terms. See supra, at 996 (describing Computer II facilities-based classification of enhaneed-service providers); In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13 FCC Red. 24011, 24030-24031, ¶¶ 36-37 (1998) (hereinafter Wireline Order) (classifying DSL service as a telecommunications service). MCI claims that the Commission’s decision not to regulate cable companies similarly under Title II is inconsistent with its DSL policy. We conclude, however, reasoned explanation for treating cable modem service differently from DSL service. As we have already noted, see supra, at 981-9S2, the Commission is free within the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course if it adequately justifies the change. It has done so here. The traditional reason for its Computer II common-carrier treatment of facilities-based carriers (including DSL carriers), as the Commission explained, was “that the telephone network [was] the primary, if not exclusive, means through which information service providers can gain access to their customers.” Declaratory Ruling 4825, ¶ 44 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission applied the same treatment to DSL service based on that history, rather than on an analysis of contemporaneous market conditions. See Wireline Order 24031, ¶ 37 (noting DSL carriers’ “continuing obligation” to offer their transmission facilities to competing ISPs on nondiscriminatory terms). The Commission in the order under review, by contrast, concluded that changed market conditions warrant different treatment of facilities-based cable companies providing Internet access. Unlike at the time of Computer II, substitute forms of Internet transmission exist today: “[Residential high-speed access to the Internet is evolving over multiple electronic platforms, including wireline, cable, terrestrial wireless and satellite.” Declaratory Ruling 4802, ¶ 6; see also U. S. Telecom Assn. v. FCC, 290 F. 3d 415, 428 (CADC 2002) (noting Commission findings of “robust competition ... in the broadband market”). The Commission concluded that “ ‘broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive market.’” Declaratory Ruling 4802, ¶5. This, the Commission reasoned, warranted treating cable companies unlike the facilities-based enhanced-serviee providers of the past. Id., at 4825, ¶ 44. We find nothing arbitrary about the Commission’s providing a fresh analysis of the problem as applied to the cable industry, which it has never subjected to these rules. This is adequate rational justification for the Commission’s conclusions. Respondents argue, in effect, that the Commission’s justification for exempting cable modem service providers from common-carrier regulation applies with similar force to DSL providers. We need not address that argument. The Commission’s decision appears to be a first step in an effort to reshape the way the Commission regulates information-service providers; that may be why it has tentatively concluded that DSL service provided by facilities-based telephone companies should also be classified solely as an information service. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 17 FCC Red. 8019, 3030, ¶ 20 (2002). The Commission need not immediately apply the policy reasoning in the Declaratory Ruling to all types of information-service providers. It apparently has decided to revisit its longstanding Computer II classification of facilities-based information-service providers incrementally. Any inconsistency between the order under review and the Commission’s treatment of DSL service can be adequately addressed when the Commission fully reconsiders its treatment of DSL service and when it decides whether, pursuant to its ancillary Title I jurisdiction, to require cable companies to allow independent ISPs access to their facilities. See supra, at 979 and this page. We express no view on those matters. In particular, we express no view on how the Commission should, or lawfully may, classify DSL service. * * * The questions the Commission resolved in the order under review involve a “subject matter [that] is technical, complex, and dynamic.” Gulf Power, 534 U. S., at 339. The Commission is in a far better position to address these questions than we are. Nothing in the Communications Act or the Administrative Procedure Act makes unlawful the Commission’s use of its expert policy judgment to resolve these difficult questions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. IP addresses identify computers on the Internet, enabling data packets transmitted from other computers to reach them. See Universal Service Report 11531, ¶ 62; Huber 985. The dissent attempts to escape this consequence of respondents’ position by way of an elaborate analogy between ISPs and pizzerias. Post, at 1011 (opinion of Scaua, J.). This analogy is flawed. A pizzeria “delivers” nothing, but ISPs plainly provide transmission service directly to the public in connection with Internet service. For example, with dial-up service, ISPs process the electronic signal that travels over local telephone wires, and transmit it to the Internet. See supra, at 974-975; Huber 988. The dissent therefore cannot deny that its position logically would require applying presumptively mandatory Title II regulation to all ISPs. The dissent claims that access to DNS does not count as use of the information-processing capabilities of Internet service because DNS is "scarcely more than routing information, which is expressly excluded from the definition of ‘information service.’ ” Post, at 1012-1013, and n. 6 (opinion of Scalia, J.). But the definition of information service does not exclude “routing information.” Instead, it excludes “any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.” 47 U. S. C. § 153(20). The dissent’s argument therefore begs the question because it assumes that Internet service is a “telecommunications system” or “service” that DNS manages (a point on which, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, post, at 1013, n. 6, we need take no view for purposes of this response). Respondents vigorously argue that the Commission’s purported inconsistent treatment is a reason for holding the Commission’s construction impermissible under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Any inconsistency bears on whether the Commission has given a reasoned explanation for its current position, not on whether its interpretation is consistent with the statute.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. INTERNATIONAL VAN LINES No. 71-895. Argued October 12, 1972 Decided November 7, 1972 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Btjrger, C. J., and Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blacicmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 53. Peter G. Nash argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Samuel Huntington, Patrick Hardin, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Norman H. Kirshman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was Louis R. Garcia. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Oold, and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and by Milton Smith, Jerry Kronenberg, and Gerard C. Smetana for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The respondent is a moving and storage company based in Santa Maria, California. In August 1967, Local 381 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America began a campaign to organize the employees of moving and storage firms in the area. By September 21, five of the respondent’s employees had signed union authorization cards; it is undisputed that they constituted a clear majority of what would be an appropriate bargaining unit. Instead of demanding recognition by the respondent, the Union on September 21, 1967, petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for certification as the exclusive bargaining agent of the respondent’s employees. Shortly thereafter, on October 2 and 3, the Union held meetings where it was announced that the respondent had at first consented to a representation election but had later withdrawn its consent. It was decided at the October 3 meeting that all of the moving and storage companies involved in the Union organization campaign should be struck, and on October 4, picketing commenced at the respondent’s place of business. Four of the respondent’s employees, Robert and Manuel Vasquez, Richard Dicus, and Salvador Casillas, were present at the respondent’s premises on the morning when picketing commenced. They refused to cross the picket line. The next morning, Robert and Manuel Vasquez and Richard Dicus received identical telegrams which read: “For failure to report to work as directed at 7 A. M. on Wednesday Oct. 4, 1967 you are being permanently replaced. [Signed] International Van Lines.” It is undisputed that at the time of the discharges, the respondent had not in fact hired permanent replacements. Casillas sought reinstatement in late November, and the other three discharged employees made unconditional offers to return to work on December 12. At least as to these three, the respondent refused reinstatement, claiming that it had at that point hired permanent replacements. The Union then went to the National Labor Relations Board with unfair labor practice charges against the respondent. The Board determined that the labor picketing that commenced on October 4 was activity protected under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and concluded that the subsequent discharges of striking employees discriminated against lawful union activity and were unfair labor practices under §§ 8 (a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(1), (a)(3). It is settled that an employer may refuse to reinstate economic strikers if in the interim he has taken on permanent replacements. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 345-346. It is equally settled that employees striking in protest of an employer’s unfair labor practices are entitled, absent some contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, to unconditional reinstatement with back pay, “even if replacements for them have been made.” Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 278. Since the strike in the instant case continued after the unfair labor practices had been committed by the employer, the Board reasoned that the original economic strike became an unfair labor practice strike on October 5, when the three telegrams were sent. The Board held the four employees to be unfair labor practice strikers and, accordingly, ordered their unconditional reinstatement with back pay. The Board then sought enforcement of its order in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals agreed that the labor picketing was a lawful economic strike, and that the discharges of the striking employees were unfair labor practices. 448 F. 2d 905, 910-911. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the portion of the Board’s order providing for reinstatement with back pay, reasoning as follows: “The strikers whose discharges constituted the unfair labor practice were, at the time of their discharges, protesting only the original grievance. Any strikers subsequently discharged might legitimately be considered unfair labor practice strikers, for they would be protesting not only the original grievance but also the subsequent unfair labor practice. The initially discharged strikers were obviously not protesting their own discharges, which had not yet occurred. To assimilate their status to that of their co-workers who had not yet been discharged would eliminate the distinction between [the] economic-striker-reinstatement rule (Mackay Radio & Tele graph) and the unfair-labor-practice-striker-reinstatement rule (Mastro Plastics) in cases like this one.” Id., at 911-912. Consistent with its determination that the discharged employees were economic strikers entitled to reinstatement only if the employer could not show legitimate and substantial business justifications for refusing to take them back, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for further findings concerning the reasons for the employer’s refusal to rehire them. Id., at 912. Because this decision appeared to involve principles important to the administration of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, we granted the Board’s petition for certiorari, 405 U. S. 953. Both the Board and the Court of Appeals have agreed that the labor picketing was a lawful economic strike, and the validity of that conclusion is not before us. Given that hypothesis, the Board and the Court of Appeals were clearly correct in concluding that the respondent committed unfair labor practices when it fired its striking employees. “[T]he discharge of economic strikers prior ... to the time their places are filled constitutes an unfair labor practice.” NLRB v. Globe Wireless, 193 F. 2d 748, 750; NLRB v. Comfort, Inc., 365 F. 2d 867, 874; NLRB v. McCatron, 216 F. 2d 212, 215. We need not decide, however, whether the Board was correct in determining that the discharged employees assumed the status of unfair labor practice strikers on October 5, 1967, to reach the conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to enforce the Board’s order of reinstatement with back pay. Unconditional reinstatement of the discharged employees was proper for the simple reason that they were the victims of a plain unfair labor practice by their employer. Quite apart from any characterization of the strike that continued after the wrongful discharges occurred, the discharges themselves were a sufficient ground for the Board’s reinstatement order. “Reinstatement is the conventional correction for discriminatory discharges,” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 187, and was clearly within the Board’s authority. 29 U. S. C. § 160(c). It would undercut the remedial powers of the Board with respect to § 8 violations, and subvert the protection of § 7 of the Act, to hold that the employees’ rights to reinstatement arising from the discriminatory discharges were somehow forfeited merely because they continued for a time to engage in their lawful strike after the unfair labor practices had been committed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it refused to enforce the Board’s order that the discharged employees be reinstated with back pay. It is so ordered. Casillas did not receive such a telegram, but the Court of Appeals found that he was discharged at about the same time as the other three, and for the same reasons. 448 F. 2d 905, 909. There remains some question as to whether Casillas, a part-time employee, was actually denied subsequent employment or whether instead there had been no occasion for the employer to use his services. The Court of Appeals remanded to the Board for a determination of this question — a determination that will affect the amount of back pay, if any, that Casillas is entitled to receive. The Court of Appeals also rejected the Board’s finding of an unfair labor practice in the form of conversations between the son of the respondent’s president and the employees, 448 F. 2d, at 908-909, but this aspect of the judgment is not before us. The Court of Appeals construed the picketing as a strike for the purpose of forcing the respondent employer to agree to a consent election, 448 F. 2d, at 910, and held this to be protected under the Act. The respondent disagrees. But since no timely cross-petition for certiorari was filed by the respondents, this question is not before us. Alaska Industrial Board v. Chugach Electric Assn., 356 U. S. 320, 325; NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426, 431-432; Morley Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U. S. 185, 191. We therefore proceed on the premise that the Union was engaged in protected activity, while intimating no view on the merits of this portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals remanded to the Board for a determination of whether Casillas had actually been denied employment subsequent to his request for reinstatement, and did not reach the propriety of the bargaining order entered by the Board. We leave these aspects of the Court of Appeals decision undisturbed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GIVHAN v. WESTERN LINE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al. No. 77-1051. Argued November 7, 1978 Decided January 9, 1979 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SteveNS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 417. David Rubin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Stephen J. Poliak, Richard M. Sharp, and Fred L. Banks. J. Robertshaw argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by David M. Rabban and William Van Alstyne for the American Association of University Professors, .and by William A. Dobrovir and Andra N. Oakes for the Fund for Constitutional Government and the Government Accountability Project. Mb. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Bessie Givhan was dismissed from her employment as a junior high English teacher at the end of the 1970-1971 school year. At the time of petitioner’s termination, respondent Western Line Consolidated School District was the subject of a desegregation order entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. Petitioner filed a complaint in intervention in the desegregation action, seeking reinstatement on the dual grounds that nonrenewal of her contract violated the rule laid down by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F. 2d 1211 (1969), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U. S. 290 (1970), on remand, 425 F. 2d 1211 (1970), and infringed her right of free speech secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In an effort to show that its decision was justified, respondent School District introduced evidence of, among other things, a series of private encounters between petitioner and the school principal in which petitioner allegedly made “petty and unreasonable demands” in a manner variously described by the principal as “insulting,” “hostile,” “loud,” and “arrogant.” After a two-day bench trial, the District Court held that petitioner’s termination had violated the First Amendment. Finding that petitioner had made “demands” on but two occasions and that those demands “were neither 'petty’ nor 'unreasonable/ insomuch as all the complaints in question involved employment policies and practices at [the] school which [petitioner] conceived to be racially discriminatory in purpose or effect/’ the District Court concluded that “the primary reason for the school district’s failure to renew [petitioner’s] contract was her criticism of the policies and practices of the school district, especially the school to which she was assigned to teach.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a. Accordingly, the District Court held that the dismissal violated petitioner’s First Amendment rights, as enunciated in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968), and ordered her reinstatement. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F. 2d 1309 (1977). Although it found the District Court’s findings not clearly erroneous, the Court of Appeals concluded that because petitioner had privately expressed her complaints and opinions to the principal, her expression was not protected under the First Amendment. Support for this proposition was thought to be derived from Pickering, supra, Perry, supra, and Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), which were found to contain “[t]he strong implication . . . that private expression by a public employee is not constitutionally protected.” 555 F. 2d, at 1318. The Court of Appeals also concluded that there is no constitutional right to “press even 'good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient,” saying that to afford public employees the right to such private expression “would in effect force school principals to be ombudsmen, for damnable as well as laudable expressions.” Id., at 1319. We are unable to agree that private expression of one’s views is beyond constitutional protection, and therefore reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case so that it may consider the contentions of the parties freed from this erroneous view of the First Amendment. This Court’s decisions in Pickering, Perry, and Mt. Healthy do not support the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection against governmental abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides to express his views privately rather than publicly. While those cases each arose in the context of a public employee’s public expression, the rule to be derived from them is not dependent on that largely coincidental fact. In Pickering a teacher was discharged for publicly criticizing, in a letter published in a local newspaper, the school board’s handling of prior bond issue proposals and its subsequent allocation of financial resources between the schools’ educational and athletic programs. Noting that the free speech rights of public employees are not absolute, the Court held that in determining whether a government employee’s speech is constitutionally protected, “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern” must be balanced against “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” 391 U. S., at 568. The Court concluded that under the circumstances of that case “the interest of the school administration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate [was] not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.” Id., at 573. Here the opinion of the Court of Appeals may be read to turn in part on its view that the working relationship between principal and teacher is significantly different from the relationship between the parties in Pickering as is evidenced by its reference to its own opinion in Abbott v. Thetford, 534 F. 2d 1101 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 954 (1977). But we do not feel confident that the Court of Appeals’ decision would have been placed on that ground notwithstanding its view that the First Amendment does not require the same sort of Pickering balancing for the private expression of a public employee as it does for public expression. Perry and Mt. Healthy arose out of similar disputes between teachers and their public employers. As we have noted, however, the fact that each of these cases involved public expression by the employee was not critical to the decision. Nor is the Court of Appeals’ view supported by the “captive audience” rationale. Having opened his office door to petitioner, the principal was hardly in a position to argue that he was the “unwilling recipient” of her views. The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the “freedom of speech.” Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public. We decline to adopt such a view of the First Amendment. While this case was pending on appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, supra, was decided. In that case this Court rejected the view that a public employee must be reinstated whenever constitutionally protected conduct plays a “substantial” part in the employer’s’ decision to terminate. Such a rule would require reinstatement of employees that the public employer would have dismissed even if the constitutionally protected conduct had not occurred and, consequently, “could place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing.” 429 U. S., at 285. Thus, the Court held that once the employee has shown that his constitutionally protected conduct played a “substantial” role in the employer’s decision not to rehire him, the employer is entitled to show “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [the employee’s] re-employment even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Id., at 287. The Court of Appeals in the instant case rejected respondents’ Mt. Healthy claim that the decision to terminate petitioner would have been made even if her encounters with the principal had never occurred: “The [trial] court did not make an express finding as to whether the same decision would have been made, but on this record the [respondents] do not, and seriously cannot, argue that the same decision would have been made without regard to the 'demands.’ Appellants seem to argue that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the same decision would have been justified, but that is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been made. . . . Therefore [respondents] failed to make a successful 'same decision anyway’ defense.” 555 F. 2d, at 1315. Since this case was tried before Mt. Healthy was decided, it is not surprising that respondents did not attempt to prove in the District Court that the decision not to rehire petitioner would have been made even absent consideration of her “demands.” Thus, the case came to the Court of Appeals in very much the same posture as Mt. Healthy was presented to this Court. And while the District Court found that petitioner’s “criticism” was the “primary” reason for the School District’s failure to rehire her, it did not find that she would have been rehired hut for her criticism. Respondents’ Mt. Healthy claim called for a factual determination which could not, on this record, be resolved by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated insofar as it relates to petitioner, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. In a letter to petitioner, dated July 28, 1971, District Superintendent C. L. Morris gave the following reasons for the decision not to renew her contract: “(1) [A] flat refusal to administer standardized national tests to the pupils in your charge; (2) an announced intention not to co-operate with the administration of the Glen Allan Attendance Center; (3) and an antagonistic and hostile attitude to the administration of the Glen Allan Attendance Center demonstrated throughout the school year.” In addition to the reasons set out in the District Superintendent’s termination letter to petitioner, n. 1, supra, the School District advanced several other justifications for its decision not to rehire petitioner. The Court of Appeals dealt with these allegations in a footnote: “Appellants also sought to establish these other bases for the decision not to rehire: (1) that Givhan 'downgraded’ the papers of white students; (2) that she was one of a number of teachers who walked out of a meeting about desegregation in the fall of 1969 and attempted to disrupt it by blowing automobile horns outside the gymnasium; (3) that the school district had received a threat by Givhan and other teachers not to return to work when schools reopened on a unitary basis in February, 1970; and (4) that Givhan had protected a student during a weapons shakedown at Riverside in March, 1970, by concealing a student’s knife until completion of a search. The evidence on the first three of these points was inconclusive and the district judge did not clearly err in rejecting or ignoring it. Givhan admitted the fourth incident, but the district judge properly rejected that as a justification for her not being rehired, as there was no evidence that [the principal] relied on it in making his recommendation.” Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F. 2d 1309, 1313 n. 7 (CA5 1977). The Pickering Court’s decision upholding a teacher’s First Amendment claim was influenced by the fact that the teacher’s public statements had not adversely affected his working relationship with the objects of his criticism: “The statements [were] in no way directed towards any person with whom appellant would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a teacher. Thus no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers is presented here. Appellant’s employment relationships with the Board and, to a somewhat lesser extent, with the superintendent are not the kind of close working relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning.” 391 U. S., at 569-570. Although the First Amendment’s protection of government employees extends to private as well as public expression, striking the Pickering balance in each context may involve different considerations. When a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content of his statements that must be assessed to determine whether they “in any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or . . . interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.” Id,., at 572-573. Private expression, however, may in some situations bring additional factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the record in this case does not admit of the argument that petitioner would have been terminated regardless of her “demands.” Even absent consideration of petitioner’s private encounters with the principal, a decision to terminate based on the reasons detailed at nn. 1 and 2, supra, would hardly strike us as surprising. Additionally, in his letter to petitioner setting forth the reasons for her termination, District Superintendent Morris makes no mention of petitioner’s “demands” and “criticism.” See n. 1, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MEMPHIS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al. v. STACHURA No. 85-410. Argued April 2, 1986 Decided June 25, 1986 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BurgeR, C. J., and Brennan, White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan and Stevens, JJ., filed a separate statement, post, p. 313. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 313. Patrick J. Berardo argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Jeffrey A. Heldt argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Erwin B. Ellmann. Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Bruce N. Kuhlik, and Barbard L. Herwig filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Charles S. Sims and Stuart H. Singer filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Gwendolyn H. Gregory, August W. Steinhilber, and Thomas A. Shannon filed a brief for the National School Boards Association as amicus curiae. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to decide whether 42 U. S. C. § 1983 authorizes an award of compensatory damages based on the factfinder’s assessment of the value or importance of a substantive constitutional right. M Respondent Edward Stachura is a tenured teacher in the Memphis, Michigan, public schools. When the events that led to this case occurred, respondent taught seventh-grade life science, using a textbook that had been approved by the School Board. The textbook included a chapter on human reproduction. During the 1978-1979 school year, respondent spent six weeks on this chapter. As part of their instruction, students were shown pictures of respondent’s wife during her pregnancy. Respondent also showed the students two films concerning human growth and sexuality. These films were provided by the County Health Department, and the Principal of respondent’s school had approved their use. Both films had been shown in past school years without incident. After the showing of the pictures and the films, a number of parents complained to school officials about respondent’s teaching methods. These complaints, which appear to have been based largely on inaccurate rumors about the allegedly sexually explicit nature of the pictures and films, were discussed at an open School Board meeting held on April 23, 1979. Following the advice of the School Superintendent, respondent did not attend the meeting, during which a number of parents expressed the view that respondent should not be allowed to teach in the Memphis school system. The day after the meeting, respondent was suspended with pay. The School Board later confirmed the suspension, and notified respondent that an “administration evaluation” of his teaching methods was underway. No such evaluation was ever made. Respondent was reinstated the next fall, after filing this lawsuit. Respondent sued the School District, the Board of Education, various Board members and school administrators, and two parents who had participated in the April 23 School Board meeting. The complaint alleged that respondent’s suspension deprived him of both liberty and property without due process of law and violated his First Amendment right to academic freedom. Respondent sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for these constitutional violations. At the close of trial on these claims, the District Court instructed the jury as to the law governing the asserted bases for liability. Turning to damages, the court instructed the jury that on finding liability it should award a sufficient amount to compensate respondent for the injury caused by petitioners’ unlawful actions: “You should consider in this regard any lost earnings; loss of earning capacity; out-of-pocket expenses; and any mental anguish or emotional distress that you find the Plaintiff to have suffered as a result of conduct by the Defendants depriving him of his civil rights.” App. 94. In addition to this instruction on the standard elements of compensatory damages, the court explained that punitive damages could be awarded, and described the standards governing punitive awards. Finally, at respondent’s request and over petitioners’ objection, the court charged that damages also could be awarded based on the value or importance of the constitutional rights that were violated: “If you find that the Plaintiff has been deprived of a Constitutional right, you may award damages to compensate him for the deprivation. Damages for this type of injury are more difficult to measure than damages for a physical injury or injury to one’s property. There are no medical bills or other expenses by which you can judge how much compensation is appropriate. In one sense, no monetary value we place upon Constitutional rights can measure their importance in our society or compensate a citizen adequately for their deprivation. However, just because these rights are not capable of precise evaluation does not mean that an appropriate monetary amount should not be awarded. “The precise value you place upon any Constitutional right which you find was denied to Plaintiff is within your discretion. You may wish to consider the importance of the right in our system of government, the role which this right has played in the history of our republic, [and] the significance of the right in the context of the activities which the Plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the violation of the right.” Id., at 96. The jury found petitioners liable, and awarded a total of $275,000 in compensatory damages and $46,000 in punitive damages. The District Court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to one of the defendants, reducing the total award to $266,750 in compensatory damages and $36,000 in punitive damages. In an opinion devoted primarily to liability issues, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that respondent’s suspension had violated both procedural due process and the First Amendment. Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F. 2d 211 (1985). Responding to petitioners’ contention that the District Court improperly authorized damages based solely on the value of constitutional rights, the court noted only that “there was ample proof of actual injury to plaintiff Stachura both in his effective discharge . . . and by the damage to his reputation and to his professional career as a teacher. Contrary to the situation in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978) . . . , there was proof from which the jury could have found, as it did, actual and important damages.” Id., at 214. We granted certiorari limited to the question whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the damages award in the light of the District Court’s instructions that authorized not only compensatory and punitive damages, but also damages for the deprivation of “any constitutional right.” 474 U. S. 918 (1985). We reverse, and remand for a new trial limited to the issue of compensatory damages. l — H Petitioners challenge the jury instructions authorizing damages for violation of constitutional rights on the ground that those instructions permitted the jury to award damages based on its own unguided estimation of the value of such rights. Respondent disagrees with this characterization of the jury instructions, contending that the compensatory damages instructions taken as a whole focused solely on respondent’s injury and not on the abstract value of the rights he asserted. We believe petitioners more accurately characterize the instructions. The damages instructions were divided into three distinct segments: (i) compensatory damages for harm to respondent, (ii) punitive damages, and (iii) additional “compensat[ory]” damages for violations of constitutional rights. No sensible juror could read the third of these segments to modify the first. On the contrary, the damages instructions plainly authorized — in addition to punitive damages — two distinct types of “compensatory” damages: one based on respondent’s actual injury according to ordinary tort law standards, and another based on the “value” of certain rights. We therefore consider whether the latter category of damages was properly before the jury. HH I — I h-H A We have repeatedly noted that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 creates “‘a species of tort liability’ in favor of persons who are deprived of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by the Constitution.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 253 (1978), quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417 (1976). See also Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30, 34 (1983); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 258-259 (1981). Accordingly, when § 1983 plaintiffs seek damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts. See Smith v. Wade, supra, at 34; Carey v. Piphus, supra, at 257-258; cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 196, and n. 5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). Punitive damages aside, damages in tort cases are designed to provide “compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant’s breach of duty.” 2 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts §25.1, p. 490 (2d ed. 1986) (emphasis in original), quoted in Carey v. Piphus, supra, at 255. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 395, 397 (1971); id., at 408-409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). To that end, compensatory-damages may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as “impairment of reputation . . . , personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974). See also Carey v. Piphus, supra, at 264 (mental and emotional distress constitute compensable injury in § 1983 cases). Deterrence is also an important purpose of this system, but it operates through the mechanisrn of damages that are compensatory — damages grounded in determinations of plaintiffs’ actual losses. E. g., 4 Harper, James, & Gray, supra, § 25.3 (discussing need for certainty in damages determinations); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.1, pp. 135-136 (1973). Congress adopted this common-law system of recovery when it established liability for “constitutional torts.” Consequently, “the basic purpose” of § 1983 damages is “to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S., at 254 (emphasis added). See also id., at 257 (“damages awards under § 1983 should be governed by the principle of compensation”). Carey v. Piphus represents a straightforward application of these principles. Carey involved a suit by a high school student suspended for smoking marijuana; the student claimed that he was denied procedural due process because he was suspended without an opportunity to respond to the charges against him. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that even if the suspension was justified, the student could recover substantial compensatory damages simply because of the insufficient procedures used to suspend him from school. We reversed, and held that the student could recover compensatory damages only if he proved actual injury caused by the denial of his constitutional rights. Id., at 264. We noted: “Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests . . . Id., at 254. Where no injury was present, no “compensatory” damages could be awarded. The instructions at issue here cannot be squared with Carey, or with the principles of tort damages on which Carey and § 1983 are grounded. The jurors in this case were told that, in determining how much was necessary to “compensate [respondent] for the deprivation” of his constitutional rights, they should place a money value on the “rights” themselves by considering such factors as the particular right’s “importance ... in our system of government,” its role in American history, and its “significance ... in the context of the activities” in which respondent was engaged. App. 96. These factors focus, not on compensation for provable injury, but on the jury’s subjective perception of the importance of constitutional rights as an abstract matter. Carey establishes that such an approach is impermissible. The constitutional right transgressed in Carey — the right to due process of law — is central to our system of ordered liberty. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1967). We nevertheless held that no compensatory damages could be awarded for violation of that right absent proof of actual injury. Carey, 435 U. S., at 264. Carey thus makes clear that the abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages. Respondent nevertheless argues that Carey does not control here, because in this case a substantive constitutional right — respondent’s First Amendment right to academic freedom — was infringed. The argument misperceives our analysis in Carey. That case does not establish a two-tiered system of constitutional rights, with substantive rights afforded greater protection than “mere” procedural safeguards. We did acknowledge in Carey that “the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages” might vary depending on the interests protected by the constitutional right at issue. Id., at 264-265. But we emphasized that, whatever the constitutional basis for § 1983 liability, such damages must always be designed “to compensate injuries caused by the [constitutional] deprivation.” Id., at 265 (emphasis added). See also Hobson v. Wilson, 237 U. S. App. D. C. 219, 277-279, 737 F. 2d 1, 59-61 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1084 (1985); cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30 (1983). That conclusion simply leaves no room for noncompensatory damages measured by the jury’s perception of the abstract “importance” of a constitutional right. Nor do we find such damages necessary to vindicate the constitutional rights that § 1983 protects. See n. 11, supra. Section 1983 presupposes that damages that compensate for actual harm ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations. Carey, supra, at 256-257 (“To the extent that Congress intended that awards under §1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages”). Moreover, damages based on the “value” of constitutional rights are an unwieldy tool for ensuring compliance with the Constitution. History and tradition do not afford any sound guidance concerning the precise value that juries should place on constitutional protections. Accordingly, were such damages available, juries would be free to award arbitrary amounts without any evidentiary basis, or to use their unbounded discretion to punish unpopular defendants. Cf. Gertz, 418 U. S., at 350. Such damages would be too uncertain to be of any great value to plaintiffs, and would inject caprice into determinations of damages in §1983 cases. We therefore hold that damages based on the abstract “value” or “importance” of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases. B Respondent further argues that the challenged instructions authorized a form of “presumed” damages — a remedy that is both compensatory in nature and traditionally part of the range of tort law remedies. Alternatively, respondent argues that the erroneous instructions were at worst harmless error. Neither argument has merit. Presumed damages are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a supplement for an award that fully compensates the alleged injury. When a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may possibly be appropriate. See Carey, 435 U. S., at 262; cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U. S. 749, 760-761 (1985) (opinion of Powell, J.); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 349. In those circumstances, presumed damages may roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for harms that may be impossible to measure. As we earlier explained, the instructions at issue in this case did not serve this purpose, but instead called on the jury to measure damages based on a subjective evaluation of the importance of particular constitutional values. Since such damages are wholly divorced from any compensatory purpose, they cannot be justified as presumed damages. Moreover, no rough substitute for compensatory damages was required in this case, since the jury was fully authorized to compensate respondent for both monetary and nonmone-tary harms caused by petitioners’ conduct. Nor can we find that the erroneous instructions were harmless. See 28 U. S. C. § 2111; McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U. S. 548 (1984). When damages instructions are faulty and the verdict does not reveal the means by which the jury calculated damages, “[the] error in the charge is difficult, if not impossible, to correct without retrial, in light of the jury’s general verdict.” Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S., at 256, n. 12. The jury was authorized to award three categories of damages: (i) compensatory damages for injury to respondent, (ii) punitive damages, and (iii) damages based on the jury’s perception of the “importance” of two provisions of the Constitution. The submission of the third of these categories was error. Although the verdict specified an amount for punitive damages, it did not specify how much of the remaining damages was designed to compensate respondent for his injury and how much reflected the jury’s estimation of the value of the constitutional rights that were infringed. The effect of the erroneous instruction is therefore unknowable, although probably significant: the jury awarded respondent a very substantial amount of damages, none of which could have derived from any monetary loss. It is likely, although not certain, that a major part of these damages was intended to “compensate” respondent for the abstract “value” of his due process and First Amendment rights. For these reasons, the case must be remanded for a new trial on compensatory damages. > hH The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens join the opinion of the Court and also join Justice Marshall’s opinion concurring in the judgment. One member of the School Board described the meeting as follows: “At this time, the public was in a total uproar and completely out of control. . . . People were hollering and shouting and the statement was made from the public that if Mr. Stachura was allowed to return in the morning, they would be there to picket the school. “At this point of total panic, [the School Superintendent] stated in order to maintain peace in our school district, we would suspend Mr. Stachura with full pay and get this mess straightened out.” Tr. 583-584, quoted in Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F. 2d 211, 214 (CA6 1985). Petitioners do not challenge the award of punitive damages in this Court. The jury found petitioners liable based both on the alleged deprivation of procedural due process and on the alleged violation of respondent’s First Amendment rights. The bulk of the award was against the School Board, which was assessed $233,750 in compensatory damages. Three of the individual defendants were each assessed $8,250, while six others were each charged $2,750. Nine individual defendants were assessed punitive damages, ranging from $1,000 to $15,000. Since our decision in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978), several of the Courts of Appeals have concluded that damages awards based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are proper, at least as long as the right in question is substantive. E. g., Bell v. Little Axe Independent School Dist. No. 70, 766 F. 2d 1391 (CA10 1985); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F. 2d 1220, 1227-1229 (CA8 1981); Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F. 2d 13, 17 (CA7 1979) (dicta), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1016 (1980). See also Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1242 (1979). Other courts have determined that our reasoning in Carey forecloses such awards. E. g., Hobson v. Wilson, 237 U. S. App. D. C. 219, 278-279, 737 F. 2d 1, 60-61 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1084 (1985); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F. 2d 391, 402 (CA5 1980); Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F. 2d 461, 463 (CA2 1978). Cf. Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F. 2d 485, 492-494 (CA7 1982), cert. denied, 463 U. S. 1214 (1983). Respondent argues that petitioners did not preserve their challenge to the jury instructions below. Petitioners’ counsel expressly objected to the authorization of damages based on the value of constitutional rights, on the ground that such damages were impermissible under Carey v. Piphus, supra, and on the ground that they required the jury to “speculate as to what the value of the Constitutional right is.” App. 97-98. The District Court responded by stating that it relied on Herrera v. Valentine, supra, at 1227, and on Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F. 2d 892 (CA10), cert. dism’d, 458 U. S. 1123 (1982). App. 98. Both of those cases held that jury instructions similar to those used here were permissible under Carey. This exchange satisfies us that counsel for petitioners “stat[ed] distinctly the matter to which he objeet[ed] and the grounds of his objection,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 51, and that the District Court understood the objection. The jurors were given written copies of the instructions for use in their deliberations. App. 96. Section 1983 reads: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for his willful or malicious conduct and to deter others from similar behavior. E. g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1979); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 9 (5th ed. 1984); C. McCormick, Law of Damages 275 (1935). See also Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U. S. 42, 48 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974). In Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30 (1983), the Court held that punitive damages may be available in a proper § 1983 case. As the punitive damages instructions used in this case explained, however, such damages are available only on a showing of the requisite intent. App. 94-95 (authorizing punitive damages for acts “maliciously, or wantonly, or oppressively done”); Smith v. Wade, supra, at 51. Respondent does not, and could not reasonably, contend that the separate instructions authorizing damages for violation of constitutional rights were equivalent to punitive damages instructions. In these separate instructions, the jury was authorized to find damages for constitutional violations without any finding of malice or ill will. Moreover, the jury instructions separately authorized punitive damages, and the District Court expressly labeled the “constitutional rights” damages compensatory. The instructions concerning damages for constitutional violations are thus impermissible unless they reasonably could be read as authorizing compensatory damages. See generally Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5 (1980). We did approve an award of nominal damages for the deprivation of due process in Carey. 435 U. S., at 266. Our discussion of that issue makes clear that nominal damages, and not damages based on some undefinable “value” of infringed rights, are the appropriate means of “vindicating” rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury: “Common-law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain ‘absolute’ rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal sum of money. By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to eompen-sate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). Our grant of certiorari in this case does not encompass the question whether respondent stated or proved a claim under either the Due Process Clause or the First Amendment. We therefore treat the Court of Appeals’ decision on all liability issues as final for purposes of our decision. Carey recognized that “the task ... of adapting common-law rules of damages to provide fair compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right” is one “of some delicacy.” Id., at 258. We also noted that “the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another.” Id., at 264-265. See also Hobson v. Wilson, 237 U. S. App. D. C., at 279-281, 737 F. 2d, at 61-63. This “delicate” task need not be undertaken here. None of the parties challenges the portion of the jury instructions that permitted recovery for actual harm to respondent, and the instructions that are challenged simply do not authorize compensation for injury. We therefore hold only that damages based on the “value” or “importance” of constitutional rights are not authorized by § 1983, because they are not truly compensatory. For the same reason, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927), and similar cases do not support the challenged instructions. In Nixon, the Court held that a plaintiff who was illegally prevented from voting in a state primary election suffered compensable injury. Accord, Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939). This holding did not rest on the “value” of the right to vote as an abstract matter; rather, the Court recognized that the plaintiff had suffered a particular injury — his inability to vote in a particular election — that might be compensated through substantial money damages. See 273 U. S., at 540 (“the petition . . . seeks to recover for private damage”). Nixon followed a long line of cases, going back to Lord Holt’s decision in Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (1703), authorizing substantial money damages as compensation for persons deprived of their right to vote in particular elections. E. g., Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 65 (1900); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (CA8 1919). Although these decisions sometimes speak of damages for the value of the right to vote, their analysis shows that they involve nothing more than an award of presumed damages for a nonmonetary harm that cannot easily be quantified: “In the eyes of the law th[e] right [to vote] is so valuable that damages are presumed from the wrongful deprivation of it without evidence of actual loss of money, property, or any other valuable thing, and the amount of the damages is a question peculiarly appropriate for the determination of the jury, because each member of the jury has personal knowledge of the value of the right.” Ibid. See also Ashby v. White, supra, at 955, 92 Eng. Rep., at 137 (Holt, C. J.) (“As in an action for slanderous words, though a man does not lose a penny by reason of the speaking [of] them, yet he shall have an action”). The “value of the right” in the context of these decisions is the money value of the particular loss that the plaintiff suffered — a loss of which “each member of the jury has personal knowledge.” It is not the value of the right to vote as a general, abstract matter, based on its role in our history or system of government. Thus, whatever the wisdom of these decisions in the context of the changing scope of compensatory damages over the course of this century, they do not support awards of noncompensatory damages such as those authorized in this case. Throughout his suspension, respondent continued to receive his teacher’s salary.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ZIPES et al. v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. No. 78-1545. Argued December 2, 1981 Decided February 24, 1982 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which Burger, C. J., and Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 401. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in No. 78-1545. With him on the brief were Aram A. Hartunian, Arnold I. Shure, and Kevin M. Forde. William A. Jolley argued the cause for petitioner in No. 80-951. With him on the briefs were Steven A. Fehr, Scott A. Raisher, and George Kaufmann. Laurence A. Carton argued the cause for respondent Trans World Airlines, Inc. With him on the brief was James A. Velde Together with No. 80-951, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Barry Sullivan, Jessica D. Silver, Mark L. Gross, Constance L. Dupre, and Philip B. Sklover filed a brief for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in No. 78-1545 and affirmance in No. 80-951. J. Albert Woll, Robert M. Weinberg, Michael H. Gottesrmn, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 80-951. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Daniel R. Levinson filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The primary question in these cases is whether the statutory time limit for filing charges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. (1970 ed.) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in the District Court. Secondarily, we resolve a dispute as to whether retroactive seniority was a proper remedy in these Title VII cases. I In 1970, the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association (ALSSA), then the collective-bargaining agent of Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight attendants, brought a class action alleging that TWA practiced unlawful sex discrimination in violation of Title VII by its policy of grounding all female flight cabin attendants who became mothers, while their male counterparts who became fathers were permitted to continue flying. After collective bargaining eliminated the challenged practice prospectively, the parties in the case reached a tentative settlement. The settlement, which provided neither backpay nor retroactive seniority, was approved by the District Court. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, found the union to be an inadequate representative of the class because of the inherent conflict between the interests of current and former employees. It remanded the case with instructions that the District Court name individual members of the class to replace ALSSA as the class representative. Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F. 2d 636 (1973). Upon remand, petitioners in No. 78-1545 were appointed as class representatives. TWA moved to amend its answer to assert that the claims of plaintiffs and other class members were barred by Title VIPs “statute of limitations” because they had failed to file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the statutory time limit. 1 App. 89a. Although the District Court granted the motion to amend, it noted that the “delay in pleading the defense of limitations may well ultimately constitute a waiver of the defense.” Id., at 101a. Subsequently, on October 15, 1976, the District Court denied TWA’s motion to exclude class members who had not filed timely charges with the EEOC. In support of its motion, TWA argued that instead of an affirmative defense analogous to a statute of limitations, timely filing with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite not subject to waiver by any action of the defendants. While the District Court agreed that the filing requirements of Title VII are jurisdictional, it denied the motion on the basis that any violation by the airline continued against all the class members until the airline changed the challenged policy. Id., at 131a-132a. On October 19, 1976, the District Court granted the motion of the plaintiff class for summary judgment on the issue of TWA's liability for violating Title VII. Id., at 133a-134a. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of October 18, 1976, granting summary judgment on liability, expressly holding that “TWA’s no motherhood policy . . . provides a clear example of sex discrimination prohibited by §2000e-2(a).” In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1145 (1978). It declined, however, “to extend the continuing violation theory, as did the district court, so as to include in the plaintiff class those employees who were permanently terminated more than 90 days before the filing of EEOC charges.” Id., at 1149. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that timely filing of EEOC charges was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Because TWA could not waive the timely-filing requirement, the Court of Appeals found that approximately 92% of the plaintiffs’ claims were jurisdictionally barred by the failure of those plaintiffs to have filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. The Court of Appeals, however, stayed its mandate pending the filing of petitions in this Court. Petitions for certiorari were filed by the plaintiff class, No. 78-1545, and by TWA, No. 78-1549. This Court granted motions to defer consideration of the petitions pending completion of settlement proceedings in the District Court. 442 U. S. 916 (1979). In connection with the settlement proceedings, the District Court designated two subclasses. Subclass A, consisting of some 30 women, comprised those who were terminated on or after March 2, 1970, as well as those who were discharged earlier, but who had accepted reinstatement in ground duty positions. Subclass B, numbering some 400 women, covered all other members of the class and consisted of those whose claims the Court of Appeals had found to be jurisdictionally barred for failure to satisfy the timely-filing requirement. 2 App. 3. The proposed settlement divided $3 million between the two groups. It also provided each class member with full company and union seniority from the date of termination. The agreement specified that “in the event of the timely objection of any interested person, it is agreed that the amount of seniority and credit for length of service for the compensation period will be determined by the Court in its discretion, pursuant to the provisions of Section 706(g), and all other applicable provisions of law, without contest or objection by TWA.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 80-951, p. 29a. The Independent Federation of Flight Attendants (union), which had replaced ALSSA as the collective-bargaining agent for the flight attendants, was permitted to intervene and to object to the settlement. On the basis that the Court of Appeals had not issued the mandate in its jurisdictional decision, the District Court rejected the union’s challenge to its jurisdiction over Subclass B. Id., at 14a-15a. After holding three days of hearings, the District Court approved the settlement and awarded competitive seniority. It explicitly found that full restoration of retroactive seniority would not have an unusual adverse impact upon currently employed flight attendants in any way atypical of Title VII cases. Id., at 18a-19a. The union appealed. It argued that, because of the Court of Appeals’ earlier opinion, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to approve the settlement or to order retroactive seniority with respect to Subclass B. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that “the principles favoring settlement of class action lawsuits remain the same regardless of whether the disputed legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over the action. ” Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 630 F. 2d 1164, 1169 (1980). It further explained that the question of jurisdiction as to Subclass B had not been finally determined because a challenge to its decision was pending before this Court and observed that the Courts of Appeals were split on the issue. The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims of Subclass A. It concluded: “Where, as here, the jurisdictional question is not settled with finality, parties should not be forced to litigate the issue of jurisdiction if they can arrive at a settlement that is otherwise appropriate for district court approval.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the award of seniority. According to the court, the settlement served the public policy of remedying past acts of sex discrimination and the consequences of those past acts. Moreover, “[t]he right to have its objections heard does not, of course, give the intervenor the right to block any settlement to which it objects.” Ibid. The union petitioned for certiorari, No. 80-951. We granted its petition together with the petitions in No. 78-1545 and No. 78-1549, 450 U. S. 979 (1981), but later removed the TWA case, No. 78-1549, from the argument docket and limited the grant in No. 80-951. 451 U. S. 980 (1981). II The single question in No. 78-1545 is whether the timely filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a Title VII suit in federal court or whether the requirement is subject to waiver and estoppel. In reaching its decision that the requirement is jurisdictional, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on its reading of the statutory language, the absence of any indication to the contrary in the legislative history, and references in several of our cases to the 90-day filing requirement as “jurisdictional.” Other Courts of Appeals that have examined the same materials have reached the opposite conclusion. We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. The structure of Title VII, the congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of our cases all lead to this conclusion. The provision granting district courts jurisdiction under Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-5(e) and (f), does not limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a timely filing with the EEOC. It contains no reference to the timely-filing requirement. The provision specifying the time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts. The legislative history of the filing provision is sparse, but Senator Humphrey did characterize the time period for filing a claim as a “period of limitations,” 110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964), and Senator Case described its purpose as preventing the pressing of “stale” claims, id., at 7243, the end served by a statute of limitations. Although subsequent legislative history is not dispositive, see Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 572, 596 (1980); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 686, n. 7 (1979), the legislative history of the 1972 amendments also indicates that Congress intended the filing period to operate as a statute of limitations instead of a jurisdictional requirement. In the final Conference Committee section-by-section analysis of H. R. 1746, The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7167 (1972), the Committee not only termed the filing period a “time limitation,” but explained: “This subsection as amended provides that charges be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Court decisions under the present law have shown an inclination to interpret this time limitation so as to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of the law; it is not intended that such court decisions should be in any way circumscribed by the extension of the time limitations in this subsection.” This result is entirely consistent with prior case law. Although our cases contain scattered references to the timely-filing requirement as jurisdictional, the legal character of the requirement was not at issue in those cases, and as or more often in the same or other cases, we have referred to the provision as a limitations statute. More weighty inferences however, are to be drawn from other cases. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976), was a Title VII suit against an employer and a union. The District Court denied relief for unnamed class members on the ground that those individuals had not filed administrative charges under the provisions of Title VII and that relief for them was thus not appropriate. The Court of Appeals did not disturb this ruling, but we reversed, saying: “The District Court stated two reasons for its denial of seniority relief for the unnamed class members. The first was that those individuals had not filed administrative charges under the provision of Title VII with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and therefore class relief of this sort was not appropriate. We rejected this justification for denial of class-based relief in the context of backpay awards in Albemarle Paper [Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975),] and . . . reject it here. This justification for denying class-based relief in Title VII suits has been unanimously rejected by the courts of appeals, and Congress ratified that construction by the 1972 amendments. . . .” Id., at 771 (footnote omitted). If the timely-filing requirement were to limit the jurisdiction of the District Court to those claimants who have filed timely charges with the EEOC, the District Courts in Franks and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975), would have been without jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of those who had not filed as well as without jurisdiction to award them seniority. We did not so hold. Furthermore, we noted that Congress had approved the Court of Appeals cases that awarded relief to class members who had not exhausted administrative remedies before the EEOC. It is evident that in doing so, Congress necessarily adopted the view that the provision for filing charges with the EEOC should not be construed to erect a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in the district court. In Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522 (1972), we announced a guiding principle for construing the provisions of Title VII. Declining to read literally another filing provision of Title VII, we explained that a technical reading would be “particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.” Id., at 527. That principle must be applied here as well. The reasoning of other cases assumes that the filing requirement is not jurisdictional. In Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U. S. 229 (1976), we rejected the argument that the timely-filing requirement should be tolled because the plaintiff had been pursuing a grievance procedure set up in the collective-bargaining agreement. We did not reach this decision on the basis that the 180-day period was jurisdictional. Instead, we considered the merits of a series of arguments that grievance procedures should toll the requirement. Such reasoning would have been gratuitous if the filing requirement were a jurisdictional prerequisite. Similarly, we did not sua sponte dismiss the action in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980), on the basis that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because of plaintiff’s failure to comply with a related Title VII time provision. Instead, we merely observed in a footnote that “[petitioner did not assert respondent’s failure to file the action within 90 days as a defense.” Id., at 811, n. 9. By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals in No. 78-1545. H-i H-l Í — i In No. 80-951, the union challenges on several grounds the District Court’s authority to award, over the union’s objection, retroactive seniority to the members of Subclass B. We have already rejected the union’s first contention, namely, that the District Court had no jurisdiction to award relief to those who had not complied with Title VII’s filing requirement. The union also contends that in any event there has been no finding of discrimination with respect to Subclass B members and that the predicate for relief under § 706(g) is therefore missing. This contention is also without merit. The District Court unquestionably found an unlawful discrimination against the plaintiff class, and the class at that time had not been subdivided into Subclasses A and B. Summary judgment ran in favor of the entire class, including both those members who had filed timely charges and those who had not. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment order as well as the finding of a discriminatory employment practice. The court went on, however, to hold that the District Court had no jurisdiction over claims by those who had not met the filing requirement and that those individuals should have been excluded from the class prior to the grant of summary judgment. But as we have now held, that ruling is erroneous. The District Court did have jurisdiction over nonfiling class members. Thus, there was no jurisdictional barrier to its finding of discrimination with respect to the entire class. With the reversal of the Court of Appeals judgment in No. 78-1545 and our dismissal of No. 78-1549, which had challenged the affirmance of the summary judgment order, the order that found classwide discrimination remains intact and is final. The award of retroactive seniority to members of Subclass B as well as Subclass A is not infirm for want of a finding of a discriminatory employment practice. Equally meritless is the union’s contention that retroactive seniority contrary to the collective-bargaining agreement should not be awarded over the objection of a union that has not itself been found guilty of discrimination. In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 764, we read the legislative history of Title VII as giving “emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution, making whole in so far as possible the victims of . . . discrimination . . . .” While recognizing that backpay was the only remedy specifically mentioned in the provision, we reasoned that adequate relief might be denied without a seniority remedy. We concluded that the class-based seniority relief for identifiable vie-tims of illegal discrimination is a form of relief generally appropriate under § 706(g). In Franks, the District Court had found both that the employer had engaged in discrimination and that the discriminatory practices were perpetuated in the collective-bargaining agreements with the unions. 424 U. S., at 751. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), however, makes it clear that once there has been a finding of discrimination by the employer, an award of retroactive seniority is appropriate even if there is no finding that the union has also illegally discriminated. In Teamsters, the parties agreed to a decree which provided that the District Court would decide “whether any discriminatees should be awarded additional equitable relief such as retroactive seniority.” Id., at 331, n. 4. Although we held that the union had not violated Title VII by agreeing to and maintaining the seniority system, we nonetheless directed the union to remain in the litigation as a defendant so that full relief could be awarded the victims of the employer’s post-Act discrimination. Id., at 356, n. 43. Here, as in Teamsters, the settlement left to the District Court the final decision as to retroactive seniority. In resolving the seniority issue, the District Court gave the union all the process that was due it under Title VII in our cases. The union was allowed to intervene. The District Court heard its objections, made appropriate findings, and determined that retroactive seniority should be awarded. The Court of Appeals agreed with that determination, and we have eliminated from our consideration here the question whether on the facts of these cases the Court of Appeals and the District Court were in error in this respect. Accordingly, the judgment in No. 78-1545 is reversed and the judgment in No. 80-951 is affirmed. So ordered. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of these eases. The class was defined as all female flight cabin attendants who were terminated from employment with TWA on or after July 2, 1965, for reasons of pregnancy. The Court of Appeals assumed the class to include only those who would have resumed flight duty after becoming mothers but for TWA’s policy. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1147, and n. 9 (CA7 1978). The class thus included both former employees and current employees, that is, both those who declined and those who accepted ground positions. When suit was filed, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(d) (1970 ed.) required charges to be filed within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. In 1972, this provision was amended to extend the time limit to 180 days and is now codified as § 2000e-5(e). Section 706(g) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g) provides: “If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. ...” The Court of Appeals relied on language in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 779, n. 41 (1976): “[D]istrict courts should take as their starting point the presumption in favor of rightful-place seniority relief, and proceed with further legal analysis from that point; and . . . such relief may not be denied on the abstract basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees but rather only on the basis of unusual adverse impact arising from facts and circumstances that would not be generally found in Title VII cases.” In No. 78-1549, TWA contends (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of liability, (b) that TWA should be required to grant only prospective relief to plaintiffs, and (c) that the Court of Appeals erred in defining the subclass of plaintiffs who had filed timely charges with the EEOC. In view of our decision in No. 78-1545 and No. 80-951, we now dismiss the petition in No. 78-1549 as improvidently granted. See Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U. S. 229, 240 (1976); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 555, n. 4 (1977); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 47 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973). See Carlile v. South Routt School District Re 3-J, 652 F. 2d 981 (CA10 1981); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F. 2d 584 (CA5 1981); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F. 2d 255 (CA6 1979); Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical Corp., 598 F. 2d 829 (CA3 1979); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 185 U. S. App. D. C. 322, 567 F. 2d 429 (1976). One of the questions on which we granted certiorari in No. 80-951 was whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court’s approval of the settlement of jurisdictionally barred claims. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to follow McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F. 2d 276 (CA5 1978) (en banc). Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. TWA, 630 F. 2d 1164, 1168-1169 (1980). In McArthur, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement in a Title VII class action, holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because no plaintiff had filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Because of our holding in No. 78-1545 that timely filing with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, this issue need not be resolved. Title 42 U. S. C. § 2000e — 5(f)(3), for example, reads: “Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. ...” Section 2000e-5(e), the amended version of the filing provision, reads simply: “A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . .” The Senate Labor Committee’s section-by-section analysis of the amendments explained that “[t]his subsection would permit... a limitation period similar to that contained in the Labor-Management Relations Act, as amended.” S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 37 (1971). We have recognized that the National Labor Relations Act was “the model for Title VIPs remedial provisons,” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 366 (1977). Because the time requirement for filing an unfair labor practice charge under the National Labor Relations Act operates as a statute of limitations subject to recognized equitable doctrines and not as a restriction of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, see NLRB v. Local 264, Laborers’ Int’l Union, 529 F. 2d 778, 781-785 (CA8 1976); Shumate v. NLRB, 452 F. 2d 717, 720 (CA4 1971); NLRB v. A. E. Nettleton Co., 241 F. 2d 130, 133 (CA2 1957); NLRB v. Itasca Cotton Mfg. Co., 179 F. 2d 504, 506-507 (CA5 1950), the time limitations under Title VII should be treated likewise. Moreover, when Congress in 1978 revised the filing requirement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), which was modeled after Title VII, see Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750 (1979), the House Conference •Report explicitly stated that “the ‘charge’ requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an action under the ADEA and that therefore equitable modification for failing to file within the time period will be available to plaintiffs under this Act.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950, p. 12. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit points out in its opinion in Coke, supra, at 588-589, references to the filing requirement as a statute of limitations have come to dominate in our opinions: “The trend of the Supreme Court cases is also significant. In the early cases, the Court in dicta referred to such time provisions using the label ‘jurisdictional prerequisite.’ McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 . . . (1973); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 . . . (1974). In the 1976 Robbins & Myers decision the jurisdictional label was used once, but there were numerous references to ‘tolling the limitations period,’ 429 U. S. at 239,. . . and other labels obviously referring to a statute of limitations, as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction. See also United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553 . . . (1977), in which both labels are used. From and after late 1977, all nine justices have concurred in opinions containing dicta using the limitations label to the exclusion of the jurisdictional label. Occidental Life Insurance Company v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 371-[3]72 . . . (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 391-[3]92 . . , (1977); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 818-823 . . . (1980), Delaware State College v. Ricks, [449] U. S. [250]. . . (1980).” In Robbins & Myers, we also held that the expanded 180-day “limitations period,” enacted by the 1972 amendments, was retroactive. 429 U. S., at 244. This holding presupposes that the requirement is not jurisdictional. Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, we quoted from Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 316 (1945): “[C]ertainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment.” Several Courts of Appeals have read Robbins & Myers as implicitly approving equitable tolling. Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F. 2d, at 588; Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical Corp., 598 F. 2d, at 833; Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F. 2d 102, 108-109 (CA2 1978). In noting that the union in Teamsters properly remained a defendant in the litigation, we cited to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). The union here was not joined under Rule 19 when individuals replaced the union as class representatives, but intervened later. Cf. EEOC v. Mac-Millan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA6 1974) (joinder under Rule 19(a) provides union with full opportunity to participate in litigation and formulation of proposed relief, although as practical matter union does not play role in litigation until court finds violation of Title VII).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LOCAL LODGE NO. 1424, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, AFL-CIO, et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 44. Argued January 11, 1960. Decided April 25, 1960. Bernard Dunau argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Plato E. Papps, Louis P. Poulton and Frank L. Gallucci. Norton J. Gome argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Stuart Roth-man, Thomas J. McDermott and Dominick L. Manoli. J. Albert Woll, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioners. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question we decide in this case is whether unfair labor practice complaints, whose charges against these petitioners were sustained by the National Labor Relations Board, were barred by the six-month statute of limitations contained in § 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (b). That section reads in pertinent part: “Provided ... no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months 'prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made . . . On August 10, 1954, petitioners Bryan Manufacturing Company and the International Association of Machinists, AFL, entered into a collective bargaining agreement for a unit of Bryan’s employees. The agreement, as later supplemented in certain respects not material to this litigation, contained the conventional provisions, of which two are relevant here: the “recognition” clause, by which the Union was recognized as “the sole and exclusive bargaining agency for all employees” in the unit; and the “union security” clause, by which all employees were required, subject to a 45-day grace period, to become and remain members of the- Union. On August 30, 1955, a new agreement was entered into, with Bryan, the Union, and petitioner Local Lodge No. 1424, IAM, as signatories, replacing the old agreement and applying additionally to employees at a newly opened plant as well as to those covered by the original agreement. When the original agreement was executed on August 10, 1954, the Union did not represent a majority of the employees covered by it. Under § § 7 and 8 of the Act the Board has evolved the principle, not drawn in question here, that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer and a labor organization to enter into a collective bargaining agreement which contains a union security clause, if at the time of original execution the union does not represent a majority of the employees in the unit. The maintaining of such an agreement in force is a continuing violation of the Act, and the “majority status” of the union at any subsequent date — including the date of execution of any renewals of the original agreement — is immaterial, for it is presumed that subsequent acquisition of a majority status is attributable to the earlier unlawful assistance received from the original agreement. In June and August 1955, 10 months and 12 months after the execution of the original agreement, charges were filed with the Board and served upon the petitioners, alleging the Union’s lack of majority status at the time of execution and the consequent illegality of the continued enforcement of the agreement. Complaints were thereafter issued by the Board’s General Counsel against the Union and the Company. Petitioners contended before the Board that the complaints were barred by the limitations proviso of § 10 (b), set forth above. The Board, two members dissenting, held that the complaints were not barred by limitations, 119 N. L. R. B. 502, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 105 U. S. App. D. C. 102, 264 F. 2d 575. We granted cer-tiorari, 360 U. S. 916, because of the importance of the question in the proper administration of the National Labor Relations Act. For reasons given in this opinion we hold that the complaints against these petitioners are barred by time. We first note the opposing contentions of the parties. The Board starts with the premise that a collective bargaining agreement which contains a union security clause valid on its face, but which was entered into when the Union did not have a majority status, gives rise to two independent unfair labor practices, one being the execution of the agreement, the other arising from its continued enforcement. Conceding that a complaint predicated on the execution of the agreement here challenged was barred by limitations, the Board contends that its complaint was nonetheless timely since it was “based upon” the parties’ continued enforcement, within the period of limitations, of the union security clause. It is then said that even though the former was itself time-barred, the unlawful execution of the agreement was nevertheless “relevant in determining whether conduct within the 6-month period was unlawful,” 119 N. L. R. B., at 504; and that evidence as to it was admissible because § 10 (b) is a statute of limitations, and not a rule of evidence. On the other hand, petitioners contend that, standing alone, the union security clause and its enforcement were wholly innocent; that they were tainted only by virtue of the original unlawful execution of the agreement; and that since a complaint based upon that unfair labor practice was barred by limitations, that event itself could not be utilized to infuse with illegality the otherwise legal union security clause or its enforcement. They say, in short, that to apply in this situation the doctrine that § 10 (b) is a statute of limitations, and not a rule of evidence, is to circumvent the purposes of the section, and that acceptance of the Board’s position would mean that the statute of limitations would never run in a case of this kind. We think petitioners’ position represents the correct view of the matter. It is doubtless true that § 10 (b) does not prevent all use of evidence relating to .events transpiring more than six months before the filing and service of an unfair labor practice charge. However, in applying rules of evidence as to the admissibility of past events, due regard for the purposes of § 10 (b) requires that two different kinds of situations be distinguished. The first is one where occurrences within the six-month limitations period in and of themselves may constitute, as a substantive matter, unfair labor practices. There, earlier events may be utilized to shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period; and for that purpose § 10 (b) ordinarily does not bar such evidentiary use of anterior events. The second situation is that where conduct occurring within the limitations period can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice. There the use of the earlier unfair labor practice is not merely “eviden-tiary,” since it does not simply lay bare a putative current unfair labor practice. Rather, it serves to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful. And where a complaint based upon that earlier event is time-barred, to permit the event itself to be so used in effect results in reviving a legally defunct unfair labor practice. The situation before us is of this latter variety, for the entire foundation of the unfair labor practice charged was the Union’s time-barred lack of majority status when the original collective bargaining agreement was signed. In the absence of that fact enforcement of this otherwise valid union security clause was wholly benign. The Trial Examiner, whose findings were adopted by the Board, observed: Where, as here, a collective bargaining agreement and its enforcement are both perfectly lawful on the face of things, and an unfair labor practice cannot be made out except by reliance on the fact of the agreement’s original unlawful execution, an event which, because of limitations, cannot itself be made the subject of an unfair labor practice complaint, we. think that permitting resort to the principle that § 10 (b) is not a rule of evidence, in order to convert what is otherwise legal into something illegal, would vitiate the policies underlying that section. These policies are to bar litigation over past events “after records have been destroyed, witnesses have gone elsewhere, and recollections of the events in question have become dim and confused,” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 40, and of course to stabilize existing bargaining relationships. “The General Counsel concedes that the 6-month limitation of Section 10 (b) of the Act precludes currently finding the execution of the 1954 agreement to be an unfair labor practice, and also precludes currently finding its enfor cement to' be an unfair labor practice ... at any time prior to the . . . periods beginning 6 months prior to the . . . charges .... However, this concession in no way detracts from the crucial nature of the earlier events, because at the core of the General Counsel’s contentions as to all of the unfair labor practices is his fundamental position that, because of the circumstances prevailing when made, the original union-security agreement of 1954 has never been valid or legal, since it has never met certain overriding requirements of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.” 119 N. L. R. B., at 530. (Emphasis added, except as indicated.) Our view of the matter is lent support by the attitude of the Board itself, whose previous decisions, albeit not always with unanimity among its members or even perhaps with perfect consistency, have recognized that evidentiary rules as to past events must be regarded differently in the two situations we have already depicted. Compare, e. g., Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N. L. R. B. 1193, where evidence as to events during the barred period was used to illuminate current conduct claimed in itself to be an unfair labor practice, with Bowen Products Corp., 113 N. L. R. B. 731, and Greenville Cotton Oil Co., 92 N. L. R. B. 1033, aff’d sub nom. American Federation of Grain Millers, A. F. L. v. Labor Board, 197 F. 2d 451, where the gravamen of the unfair labor practice complained of lay in a fact or event occurring during the barred period. Indeed, some Board cases have gone even further and held § 10 (b) a bar in circumstances when, although none of the material elements of the charge in a timely complaint need necessarily be proved through reference to the barred period — so that utilization of evidence from that period is ostensibly only for the purpose of giving color to what is involved in the complaint — yet the evidence in fact marshalled from within the six-month period is not substantial, and the merit of the allegations in the complaint is shown largely by reliance on the earlier events. See, e. g., News Printing Co., 116 N. L. R. B. 210, 212; Universal Oil Products Co., 108 N. L. R. B. 68; Tennessee Knitting Mills, Inc., 88 N. L. R. B. 1103. However, we express no view on the problem raised by such cases, for here we need not go beyond saying that a finding of violation which is inescapably grounded on events predating the limitations period is directly at odds with the purposes of the § 10 (b) proviso. The applicability of these principles cannot be avoided here by invoking the doctrine of continuing violation. It may be conceded that the continued enforcement, as well as the execution, of this collective bargaining agreement constitutes an unfair labor practice, and that these are two logically separate violations, independent in the sense that they can be described in discrete terms. Nevertheless, the vice in the enforcement of this agreement is manifestly not independent of the legality of its execution, as would be the case, for example, with an agreement invalid on its face or with one validly executed, but unlawfully administered. As the dissenting Board members in this case recognized, in dealing with an agreement claimed to be void by reason of the union's lack of majority status at the time of its execution, “. . . the circumstances which cause the agreement to be invalid existed only at the point in time in the past when the agreement was executed and are not thereafter repeated. For this reason, therefore, the continuing invalidity of the agreement is directly related to and is based solely on its initial invalidity, and has no continuing independent basis.” 119 N. L. R. B., at 516. In any real sense, then, the complaints in this case are “based upon” the unlawful execution of the agreement, for its enforcement, though continuing, is a continuing violation solely by reason of circumstances existing only at the date of execution. To justify reliance on those circumstances on the ground that the maintenance in effect of the agreement is a continuing violation is to support a lifting of the limitations bar by a characterization which becomes apt only when that bar has already been lifted. Put another way, if the § 10 (b) proviso is to be given effect, the enforcement, as distinguished from the execution, of such an agreement as this constitutes a suable unfair labor practice only for six months following the making of the agreement. The Board's ruling is further sought to be supported on the ground that it did not rest on a formal finding that the.execution of the 1954 agreement constituted an unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals, while stating that the Board could not draw “any legal conclusion with regard to events outside the statutory period,” distinguished the decision here as resting on the “mere existence [of the facts surrounding the making of the 1954 contract] rather than on ascribing legal significance to those facts standing alone.” 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 108, 264 F. 2d, at 581 (emphasis by the court). This distinction sacrifices the policy of the Act to procedural formalities. If, as is not disputable, the § 10 (b) limitation was prompted by “complaint that people were being brought to book upon stale charges,” Labor Board v. Pennwoven, Inc., 194 F. 2d 521, 524, it is a particular use of the pre-limitations facts or conduct at which the section is aimed, and it can hardly be thought relevant that the proscribed use has not been labeled as such. The applicability of the policy of § 10 (b) in the Grain Millers case, supra, where in the particular circumstances of that case, and not because of anything arising from § 10 (b), the challenged acts within the limitations period could not be condemned as unlawful without an express declaration that earlier conduct constituted an unfair labor practice (see note 12, ante), was not greater than it is here, where although there was no “finding” that execution of the agreement constituted an unfair labor practice, it is manifest that were that not in fact the case enforcement of the agreement would carry no taint of illegality. The availability of the repose sought to be assured by § 10 (b) cannot turn on the vagaries of any such hypertechnical distinctions, bearing no relation to the purpose of the legislation. It is apparently not disputed that the Board’s position would withdraw virtually all limitations protection from collective bargaining agreements attacked on the ground asserted here. For, once the principle on which the decision below rests is accepted, so long as the contract— or any renewal thereof — is still in effect, the six-month period does not even begin to run. Cf. Bowen Products Corp., supra, at 732. In Lively Photos, Inc., 123 N. L. R. B. 1054, the Board unhesitatingly applied the doctrine of the case at bar to an attack upon an agreement executed more than three and one-half years prior to the filing of the charge. The cease-and-desist order entered in that case directed the severance of a bargaining relationship which had been initiated five years earlier. A doctrine which does such disservice to stability of bargaining relationships could be upheld, in light of the language and evident purpose of § 10 (b), only by a convincing showing that Congress did not intend that provision to be applied so as to bar attacks on collective agreements with unions lacking majority status unless brought within six months of their execution. Far from providing such a showing, the legislative history contains affirmative evidence that Congress was specifically advertent to the problem of agreements with minority unions, had previously been at pains to protect such agreements from belated attack, and manifested an intention, in enacting § 10 (b), not to withdraw that protection. Four years prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, of which the § 10 (b) limitations proviso was one, Congress barred the Board from proceeding, under certain conditions not here relevant, in cases “arising over an agreement between management and labor which has been in existence for three months or longer without complaint being filed.” National Labor Relations Board Appropriation Act, 1944, 57 Stat. 515. This legislation was enacted with specific reference to agreements with minority unions, and was re-enacted in each succeeding session through 1947 At the time the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported S. 1126 (the Senate version of the proposed legislation enacted as the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947), a rider to the appropriations bill for the fiscal year 1948 (H. R. 2700, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.) was pending before the Senate Appropriations Committee, having been previously reported by the House Appropriations Committee in language identical with that of its predecessors. The Labor Committee’s discussion of the proposed § 10 (b) amendment is illuminating: “The principal substantive change in this section is a provision for a 6-month period of limitations upon the filing of charges. The Board itself by adopting a doctrine of laches has to some extent discouraged dilatory filing of charges, and a rider to the current appropriations bill (which if this amendment was adopted would no longer be necessary) contains a 3-month period of limitations with respect to certain kinds of unfair labor practices.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 26. (Emphasis added.) This language cannot be squared with an interpretation of § 10 (b) which would ascribe to Congress, in enacting for the first time a general limitations provision, a purpose to eliminate the then-existing all-embracing limitation specifically applicable to agreements with minority unions. In sustaining the Board’s position, the Court of Appeals also relied on the public character of the right sought to be vindicated by the Board, and the limited scope of judicial review of Board determinations. Observing that “in interpreting, applying and administering a statute of limitations prescribed by Congress in this context [the field of labor relations], the Board — and the courts — are not confronted by precisely the same considerations as apply to statutes of limitations affecting the private rights of two individual litigants,” the Court reasoned that “[t]he Board may have thought that the interests of [employee] self determination outweighed otherwise important competing considerations of burying stale disputes.” 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 108-109, 264 F. 2d, at 581-582. We think this analysis inadmissible here, for the reason that the accommodation between these competing factors has already been made by Congress. It is a commonplace, but one too easily lost sight of, that labor legislation traditionally entails the adjustment and compromise of competing interests which in the abstract or from a purely partisan point of view may seem irreconcilable. The “policy of the Act” is embodied in the totality of that adjustment, and not necessarily in any single demand which may have figured, however weightily, in it. Cf. note 7, ante. It may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that the interest in employee freedom of choice is one of those given large recognition by the Act as amended. But neither can one disregard the interest in “industrial peace which it is the overall purpose of the Act to secure.” Labor Board v. Childs Co., 195 F. 2d 617, 621-622 (concurring opinion of L. Hand, J.). Cf. Colgate Co. v. Labor Board, 338 U. S. 355, 362-363. As expositor of the national interest, Congress, in the judgment that a six-month limitations period did “not seem unreasonable,” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 40, barred the Board from dealing with past conduct after that period had run, even at the expense of the vindication of statutory rights. “It is not necessary for us to justify the policy of Congress. It is enough that we find it in the statute. That policy cannot be defeated by the Board’s policy . . . .” Colgate Co. v. Labor Board, supra, at 363. Cf. Southern S. S. Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31, 47. Reversed. It was so found by the Board, and petitioners have not challenged that finding. Section 7 (61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157) provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).” Section 8 (61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158) provides: “(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; “(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: .... “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8 (a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, ... if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made; . . . “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: . . . “(2) to cause' or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) ... .” The same doctrine is applied to an agreement containing only a “recognition” clause making a union the exclusive bargaining agent -’for all employees in the unit covered by the agreement. See Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 122 N. L. R. B. 1289; Charles W. Carter Co., 115 N. L. R. B. 251, 262; International Metal Products Co., 104 N. L. R. B. 1076; John B. Shriver Co., 103 N. L. R. B. 23, 38; and see the Trial Examiner’s discussion in the present case, 119 N. L. R: B. 502, 555, n. 98. The agreement now in question contained both a union security and a recognition clause, but for convenience we shall deal with the matter in terms of the union security clause alone. See 119 N. L. R. B., at 546, 548. The petition for certiorari also raised an issue as to the propriety of the relief ordered by the Board. Because of our view of the case it becomes unnecessary to reach that question. The most frequently cited Board expression of this principle is that found in Axelson Mfg. Co., 88 N. L. R. B. 761, 766: “As I interpret the statute however, Section 10 (b) enacts a statute of limitations and not a rule of evidence. It forbids the issuance of complaints and, consequently, findings of violation of the statute in conduct not within the 6 months’ period. But it does not, as I construe it, forbid the introduction of relevant evidence bearing on the issue as to whether a violation has occurred during the 6 months’ period. Events obscure, ambiguous, or even meaningless when viewed in isolation may, like the component parts of an equation, become clear, definitive, and informative when considered in relation to other action. Conduct, like language, takes its meaning from the circumstances in which it occurs. Congress can scarcely have intended that the Board, in the performance of its duty to decide the validity of conduct within the 6 months’ period, should ignore reliable, probative, and substantial evidence as to the meaning and the nature of the conduct. Had such been the intent, it seems reasonable to assume that it would have been stated.” The Board, however, has developed certain limits on the applicability of this principle. See p. 421, post, and note 13. It was the view of one member of the Board majority that a presumption of illegality should attend the enforcement of a union security clause, so that sufficient proof of violation results merely from a showing that such a clause is operative, thus putting on the parties to the agreement the burden to defend by proving compliance with the requirements of the proviso to § 8 (a) (3) of the Act, 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (3), see note 2, ante, including majority status at the time of execution. 119 N. L. R. B., at 510. While acceptance of this view would concededly support the result reached below, it was not adopted by the Board, as the concurring member acknowledged. Id., at 511. We too reject it. It rests on the mistaken judgment that the proviso to § 8 (a) (3) permits the inclusion of union security provisions “in derogation of the rights guaranteed employees in the definitive statement of national policy contained in Section 7,” id., at 510, and on the principle that, exoneration of certain types of union security clauses having been granted in a proviso, the burden of proving the proviso's applicability rests on him asserting it. The latter principle need not detain us; insights derived from syntactical analysis form a hazardous basis for the explication of major legislative enactments.. As to the argument drawn from § 7, it would be enough to note that that very provision is in terms limited by the scope of the § 8 (a) (3) proviso. (See note 2, ante.) More to the heart of the matter, it is the entire Act, and not merely one portion of it, which embodies “the definitive statement of national policy.” It is well known, and the legislative history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments plainly shows, that § 8 (a) (3)— including its proviso — represented the Congressional response to the competing demands of employee freedom of choice and union security. Had Congress thought one or the other overriding, it would doubtless have found words adequate to express that judgment. It did not do so; it accommodated both interests, doubtless in a manner unsatisfactory to the extreme partisans of each, by drawing a line it thought reasonable. It is not for the administrators of the Congressional mandate to approach either side of that line grudgingly. Emphasis here by the Trial Examiner. These observations were accepted both by the Board and the Court of Appeals. 119 N. L. R. B., at 503-504; 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 106, 264 F. 2d, at 579. See also Lively Photos, Inc., 123 N. L. R. B. 1054. The Examiner’s Report shows the pertinency of this statutory purpose in the present case. In his analysis of the evidence, he observed: “It is evident that with many witnesses testifying as to numerous different matters, it would protract this report greatly to summarize all of the testimony, or to spell out fully the confusion and inconsistencies therein, much of which is not too surprising, in view of the fact that, with respect to the events of August 1954 [the events “at the core” of the allegations of illegality], there had been a lapse of almost 15 months before testimony was given in November 1955.” 119 N. L. R. B., at 529. In that case, in explaining his consideration of “relevant evidence” antedating the six-month period, the Trial Examiner, whose report was confirmed by the Board, said: “The Respondent’s earlier conduct has been considered here merely for the purpose of bringing into clearer focus the conduct in issue. Even without such consideration, however, the allegations of discrimination would have been found amply supported by such undisputed record facts as bear directly upon the layoffs of [the employees involved within the six-month period].” 87 N. L. R. B., at 1211. See also Local 1418, International Longshoremen’s Assn., 102 N. L. R. B. 720, 729-730, relied on by the Board, and Labor Board v. General Shoe Corp., 192 F. 2d 504; Labor Board v. Clausen, 188 F. 2d 439; and Superior Engraving Co. v. Labor Board, 183 F. 2d 783, cited by a dissenting opinion here. In Bowen Products an employee recalled from layoff was dis-criminatorily placed at the bottom of the relevant seniority list. He unsuccessfully attempted to obtain his proper seniority rating,' and several months later was included in an economic reduction in force. Had his seniority originally been properly computed, he would not have been laid off at that time. The charge was filed and served within six months of the layoff, but more than six months after the original determination of seniority status. .Finding that the only basis for a holding of unlawful layoff would be a finding that that determination had been a violation of the Act, the Board dismissed the complaint. Greenville Cotton Oil (American Federation of Grain Millers) dealt with an alleged discriminatory refusal to reinstate strikers. Conceding that the respondent had engaged permanent replacements, the strikers demanded reinstatement on the ground that the strike had been caused or prolonged by an unfair labor practice committed by the employer prior to the hiring of the replacements. The acts alleged to have cónstituted such unfair practices having taken place more than six months prior to the filing and service of the charge, the Board held § 10 (b) a bar to an order of reinstatement. The complaint in News Printing Co. alleged that a refusal to grant wage increases to certain employees had been motivated by displeasure at their union activities. As a substantive matter, this allegation turned on the respondent’s motive at the time of the refusal, which was within the limitations period. However, the General Counsel was unable to produce sufficient evidence, from within that period, to prove discriminatory motive, and the Board refused to permit reliance on evidence relating to acts occurring prior to the six-month period. The contention that such earlier acts could be referred to in order to justify the inference that the “pattern of unlawful conduct . . . continued on into the present situation” was rejected. 116 N. L. R. B., at 211. Compare Paramount Cap Mfg. Co., 119 N. L. R. B. 785, 786, 799, enforcement granted, 260 F. 2d 109, where the presence of substantial post-limitations evidence was held to justify resort to evidence of earlier conduct. The Universal Oil Products and Tennessee Knitting Mills cases concerned allegations that respondent employers had dominated or assisted labor organizations. Here again, the material issue was as to the relationship of the respondents to the unions involved, as of the date of the charge. Yet in both cases, because the evidence from within the statutory period was too sketchy to warrant a finding of unlawful conduct, the Board refused to permit reference to evidence from the earlier period, declining to rely on an inference that earlier unlawful relationships continued. While it is true that in Paint, Varnish & Lacquer Makers Union (Andrew Brown Co.), 120 N. L. R. B. 1425, the Board found union picketing during the six-month-period to have been undertaken for the unlawful purpose of obtaining recognition, although the only affirmative evidence of such purpose was based on acts done prior to that period, the decision is not inconsistent, so far as presently relevant, with the cases discussed above. Substantial evidence of purpose from within the limitations period was found in reliance on the inference that the earlier motive had continued unchanged. Id., at 1428, 1438. While the permissibility of an inference of this nature was rejected in the preceding cases, we need not now inquire into this seeming disparity of treatment, for it affects the minor premise only, and does not impair the accuracy of the proposition that, however marshalled, acts within the limitations period must under Board doctrine yield some substantial evidence of unlawful conduct. Katz v. Labor Board, 196 F. 2d 411, and Labor Board v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F. 2d 719, relied on below and in dissent here, arose under provisions of the Act (§8 (a)(3), 61 Stat. 140) since repealed (65 Stat. 601), which permitted union security agreements only with unions which possessed a Board certificate that a union security clause had been authorized at a special election of the employees involved. While the language, and perhaps the approach, of these cases may be considered inconsistent with the principles we deem governing here, the decisions on their facts present no such difficulty. Proof of the nonexistence of such a certificate, which of course was a continuing fact, plainly did not require resort to testimony about past events; rather the issue was much like one arising out of an agreement illegal on its face, the only difference being that a separate instrument was involved. We think the rule in conspiracy cases, where the statute of limitations only begins to run upon the commission of the last overt act in furtherance thereof, does not furnish a useful analogy in this case. The statute in question here bars issuance of a complaint “based upon any unfair labor practice” which occurred more than six months prior to the filing of the charge; it does not merely bar proceedings against an unfair labor practice which are not commenced within six months after that unfair labor practice has been committed. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 3282. Our conclusion that the complaints giving rise to the judgment under review are of necessity “based upon” the unfair labor practice of execution of the agreement, and are barred by time, has drawn on this statute’s purpose and history, and we do not assert the universal applicability of our resolution of the particular question presented for decision. In any event, the commission of an overt act pursuant to a conspiratorial agreement represents a renewed affirmation of the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy. The acts constituting enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement cannot well be so characterized. Beyond that, one may question the appropriateness of analogizing this situation, where proper application of a particular statute of limitations involves taking into account competing values, to one which involves an unlawful agreement of a kind unreservedly condemned, and the entire undoing of which is the undiluted purpose of the criminal law. Indeed, the rule advanced in dissent cannot be squared with the Board’s own approach to the statute. See the cases discussed in notes 12 and 13, ante. The immediate impetus to the legislation was the pendency of an N. L. R. B. proceeding involving a closed-shop agreement in effect at the Kaiser shipbuilding yards at Portland, Oregon. The agreement, though executed at a time when only 66 workers were employed, was being applied to a 20,000-man work force. The debates show that the issue of representation by minority unions was in the forefront of legislative concern. See 89 Cong. Rec. 6950 (remarks of Reps. Smith and Tarver), 6953 (Rep. Tarver), 7029 (Sens. Truman and Ball), 7031-7032 (Sen. Wagner). The National Labor Relations Board Appropriation Act, 1945, 58 Stat. 568, made several amendments in the limitations provisions, the principal of which were designed to render the rider inapplicable to agreements with company-dominated unions, and to provide an additional three-month period at the commencement of any renewal of an agreement in which a complaint could be filed. See 9 N. L. R. B. Ann. Rep. (1944), pp. 5-6. Subsequent re-enactments were without relevant change. 59 Stat. 378, 60 Stat. 698. This conclusion seems to us not vitiated by the fact that the Senate Appropriations Committee, subsequent to the issuance of the Labor Committee Report, amended the appropriations rider in a manner perhaps susceptible of an interpretation which would render it inapplicable to agreements with minority unions. S. Rep. No. 146, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 6, 13. Nor is it sufficient to attempt to explain away the language of the Committee Report by reliance on the fact that, while the appropriations riders immunized agreements invalid on their face as well as those invalid for lack of majority status, see 8 N. L. R. B. Ann. Rep. (1943), pp. 7-8, § 10 (b) is more narrowly framed, and concededly does not protect an agreement invalid on its face from attack six months after its execution. Under the broad union security proviso to § 8 (3) of the original Act, 49 Stat. 452, invalidity of an agreement on its face was not a common problem, and we should not have expected Congressional discussion to have been primarily concerned with it. As we have seen, however, agreements with minority unions were specifically the focus of Congressional attention in this period, and the direct relevance of the Committee's discussion to the history of that problem is evident. Adoption of a six-month period of limitations, criticized by opponents of the legislation as “the shortest statute of limitations known to the law,” S. Rep. No. 105 (pt. II), 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5 (Minority Report), was resisted on the ground that it gave “unjust assistance to employers or unions which commit those types of practices which are easily concealed and difficult to detect.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4905 (remarks of Sen. Murray). It need hardly be pointed out that we are not dealing with a case of fraudulent concealment alleged to toll the statute. See 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 110, 264 F. 2d, at 583 (dissenting opinion).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, Petitioner v. GREENE'S ENERGY GROUP, LLC, et al. No. 16-712. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Nov. 27, 2017. Decided April 24, 2018. Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, TX, for Petitioner. Christopher M. Kise, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent. Malcolm L. Stewart, Washington, DC, for Federal Respondent. C. Erik Hawes, Archis V. "Neil" Ozarkar, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Houston, TX, Allyson N. Ho, Judd E. Stone, James D. Nelson, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Dallas, TX, for Petitioner. Pavan K. Agarwal, David B. Goroff, George E. Quillin, Lawrence J. Dougherty, Bradley D. Roush, Foley & Lardner LLP, Washington, DC, Christopher M. Kise, Joshua M. Hawkes, Foley & Lardner LLP, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent Greene's Energy Group, LLC. Sarah T. Harris, General Counsel, Nathan K. Kelley, Solicitor, Thomas W. Krause, Deputy Solicitor, Farheena Y. Rasheed, Mary Beth Walker, Associate Solicitors, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Rachel P. Kovner, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Douglas N. Letter, Mark R. Freeman, William E. Havemann, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Federal Respondent. Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq., establishes a process called "inter partes review." Under that process, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is authorized to reconsider and to cancel an issued patent claim in limited circumstances. In this case, we address whether inter partes review violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. We hold that it violates neither. I A Under the Patent Act, the PTO is "responsible for the granting and issuing of patents." 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1). When an inventor applies for a patent, an examiner reviews the proposed claims and the prior art to determine if the claims meet the statutory requirements. See §§ 112, 131. Those requirements include utility, novelty, and nonobviousness based on the prior art. §§ 101, 102, 103. The Director of the PTO then approves or rejects the application. See §§ 131, 132(a). An applicant can seek judicial review of a final rejection. §§ 141(a), 145. B Over the last several decades, Congress has created administrative processes that authorize the PTO to reconsider and cancel patent claims that were wrongly issued. In 1980, Congress established "ex parte reexamination," which still exists today. See Act To Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, 35 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. Ex parte reexamination permits "[a]ny person at any time" to "file a request for reexamination." § 302. If the Director determines that there is "a substantial new question of patentability" for "any claim of the patent," the PTO can reexamine the patent. §§ 303(a), 304. The reexamination process follows the same procedures as the initial examination. § 305. In 1999, Congress added a procedure called "inter partes reexamination." See American Inventors Protection Act, §§ 4601-4608, 113 Stat. 1501A-567 to 1501A-572. Under this procedure, any person could file a request for reexamination. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2006 ed.). The Director would determine if the request raised "a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent" and, if so, commence a reexamination. §§ 312(a), 313 (2006 ed.). The reexamination would follow the general procedures for initial examination, but would allow the third-party requester and the patent owner to participate in a limited manner by filing responses and replies. §§ 314(a), (b) (2006 ed.). Inter partes reexamination was phased out when the America Invents Act went into effect in 2012. See § 6, 125 Stat. 299-305. C The America Invents Act replaced inter partes reexamination with inter partes review, the procedure at issue here. See id., at 299. Any person other than the patent owner can file a petition for inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012 ed.). The petition can request cancellation of "1 or more claims of a patent" on the grounds that the claim fails the novelty or nonobviousness standards for patentability. § 311(b). The challenges must be made "only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications." Ibid. If a petition is filed, the patent owner has the right to file a preliminary response explaining why inter partes review should not be instituted. § 313. Before he can institute inter partes review, the Director must determine "that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged." § 314(a). The decision whether to institute inter partes review is committed to the Director's discretion. See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2140, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016). The Director's decision is "final and nonappealable." § 314(d). Once inter partes review is instituted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board-an adjudicatory body within the PTO created to conduct inter partes review-examines the patent's validity. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 316(c). The Board sits in three-member panels of administrative patent judges. See § 6(c). During the inter partes review, the petitioner and the patent owner are entitled to certain discovery, § 316(a)(5) ; to file affidavits, declarations, and written memoranda, § 316(a)(8) ; and to receive an oral hearing before the Board, § 316(a)(10). The petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. § 316(e). The owner can file a motion to amend the patent by voluntarily canceling a claim or by "propos[ing] a reasonable number of substitute claims." § 316(d)(1)(B). The owner can also settle with the petitioner by filing a written agreement prior to the Board's final decision, which terminates the proceedings with respect to that petitioner. § 317. If the settlement results in no petitioner remaining in the inter partes review, the Board can terminate the proceeding or issue a final written decision. § 317(a). If the proceeding does not terminate, the Board must issue a final written decision no later than a year after it notices the institution of inter partes review, but that deadline can be extended up to six months for good cause. §§ 316(a)(11), 318(a). If the Board's decision becomes final, the Director must "issue and publish a certificate." § 318(b). The certificate cancels patent claims "finally determined to be unpatentable," confirms patent claims "determined to be patentable," and incorporates into the patent "any new or amended claim determined to be patentable." Ibid. A party dissatisfied with the Board's decision can seek judicial review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. § 319. Any party to the inter partes review can be a party in the Federal Circuit. Ibid. The Director can intervene to defend the Board's decision, even if no party does. See § 143; Cuozzo, supra, at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2143-2144. When reviewing the Board's decision, the Federal Circuit assesses "the Board's compliance with governing legal standards de novo and its underlying factual determinations for substantial evidence." Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362 (C.A.Fed.2013). II Petitioner Oil States Energy Services, LLC, and respondent Greene's Energy Group, LLC, are both oilfield services companies. In 2001, Oil States obtained a patent relating to an apparatus and method for protecting wellhead equipment used in hydraulic fracturing. In 2012, Oil States sued Greene's Energy in Federal District Court for infringing that patent. Greene's Energy responded by challenging the patent's validity. Near the close of discovery, Greene's Energy also petitioned the Board to institute inter partes review. It argued that two of the patent's claims were unpatentable because they were anticipated by prior art not mentioned by Oil States in its original patent application. Oil States filed a response opposing review. The Board found that Greene's Energy had established a reasonable likelihood that the two claims were unpatentable and, thus, instituted inter partes review. The proceedings before the District Court and the Board progressed in parallel. In June 2014, the District Court issued a claim-construction order. The order construed the challenged claims in a way that foreclosed Greene's Energy's arguments about the prior art. But a few months later, the Board issued a final written decision concluding that the claims were unpatentable. The Board acknowledged the District Court's contrary decision, but nonetheless concluded that the claims were anticipated by the prior art. Oil States sought review in the Federal Circuit. In addition to its arguments about patentability, Oil States challenged the constitutionality of inter partes review. Specifically, it argued that actions to revoke a patent must be tried in an Article III court before a jury. While Oil States' case was pending, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in a different case, rejecting the same constitutional arguments. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1288-1293 (2015). The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the Board's decision in this case. 639 Fed.Appx. 639 (2016). We granted certiorari to determine whether inter partes review violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment. 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2239, 198 L.Ed.2d 677 (2017). We address each issue in turn. III Article III vests the judicial power of the United States "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." § 1. Consequently, Congress cannot "confer the Government's 'judicial Power' on entities outside Article III." Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011). When determining whether a proceeding involves an exercise of Article III judicial power, this Court's precedents have distinguished between "public rights" and "private rights." Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 2171, 189 L.Ed.2d 83 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those precedents have given Congress significant latitude to assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts. See ibid. ; Stern, supra, at 488-492, 131 S.Ct. 2594. This Court has not "definitively explained" the distinction between public and private rights, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), and its precedents applying the public-rights doctrine have "not been entirely consistent," Stern, 564 U.S., at 488, 131 S.Ct. 2594. But this case does not require us to add to the "various formulations" of the public-rights doctrine. Ibid . Our precedents have recognized that the doctrine covers matters "which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). In other words, the public-rights doctrine applies to matters " 'arising between the government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it.' " Ibid. (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451, 49 S.Ct. 411, 73 L.Ed. 789 (1929) ). Inter partes review involves one such matter: reconsideration of the Government's decision to grant a public franchise. A Inter partes review falls squarely within the public-rights doctrine. This Court has recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights-specifically, the grant of a public franchise. Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO's authority to conduct that reconsideration. Thus, the PTO can do so without violating Article III. 1 This Court has long recognized that the grant of a patent is a " 'matte[r] involving public rights.' " United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582-583, 19 S.Ct. 286, 43 L.Ed. 559 (1899) (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856) ). It has the key features to fall within this Court's longstanding formulation of the public-rights doctrine. Ab initio, the grant of a patent involves a matter "arising between the government and others." Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 451, 49 S.Ct. 411. As this Court has long recognized, the grant of a patent is a matter between " 'the public, who are the grantors, and ... the patentee.' " Duell, supra, at 586, 19 S.Ct. 286 (quoting Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 59, 5 S.Ct. 25, 28 L.Ed. 656 (1884) ). By "issuing patents," the PTO "take[s] from the public rights of immense value, and bestow [s] them upon the patentee." United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370, 9 S.Ct. 90, 32 L.Ed. 450 (1888). Specifically, patents are "public franchises" that the Government grants "to the inventors of new and useful improvements." Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 533, 20 L.Ed. 33 (1871) ; accord, Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63-64, 119 S.Ct. 304, 142 L.Ed.2d 261 (1998). The franchise gives the patent owner "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). That right "did not exist at common law." Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 494, 13 L.Ed. 504 (1851). Rather, it is a "creature of statute law." Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40, 43 S.Ct. 254, 67 L.Ed. 516 (1923). Additionally, granting patents is one of "the constitutional functions" that can be carried out by "the executive or legislative departments" without " 'judicial determination.' " Crowell, supra, at 50-51, 52 S.Ct. 285 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 452, 49 S.Ct. 411 ). Article I gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." § 8, cl. 8. Congress can grant patents itself by statute. See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 548-550, 14 L.Ed. 532 (1853). And, from the founding to today, Congress has authorized the Executive Branch to grant patents that meet the statutory requirements for patentability. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(1), 151 ; see also Act of July 8, 1870, § 31, 16 Stat. 202; Act of July 4, 1836, § 7, 5 Stat. 119-120; Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-110. When the PTO "adjudicate[s] the patentability of inventions," it is "exercising the executive power." Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 910, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis deleted). Accordingly, the determination to grant a patent is a "matte[r] involving public rights." Murray's Lessee, supra, at 284. It need not be adjudicated in Article III court. 2 Inter partes review involves the same basic matter as the grant of a patent. So it, too, falls on the public-rights side of the line. Inter partes review is "a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent." Cuozzo, 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2144. The Board considers the same statutory requirements that the PTO considered when granting the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Those statutory requirements prevent the "issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain." Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). So, like the PTO's initial review, the Board's inter partes review protects "the public's paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope," Cuozzo, supra, at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2144 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Thus, inter partes review involves the same interests as the determination to grant a patent in the first instance. See Duell, supra, at 586, 19 S.Ct. 286. The primary distinction between inter partes review and the initial grant of a patent is that inter partes review occurs after the patent has issued. But that distinction does not make a difference here. Patent claims are granted subject to the qualification that the PTO has "the authority to reexamine-and perhaps cancel-a patent claim" in an inter partes review. See Cuozzo, supra, at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2137. Patents thus remain "subject to [the Board's] authority" to cancel outside of an Article III court. Crowell, 285 U.S., at 50, 52 S.Ct. 285. This Court has recognized that franchises can be qualified in this manner. For example, Congress can grant a franchise that permits a company to erect a toll bridge, but qualify the grant by reserving its authority to revoke or amend the franchise. See, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409, 421, 37 S.Ct. 158, 61 L.Ed. 395 (1917) (collecting cases). Even after the bridge is built, the Government can exercise its reserved authority through legislation or an administrative proceeding. See, e.g., id., at 420-421, 37 S.Ct. 158 ; Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 194, 205, 31 S.Ct. 603, 55 L.Ed. 699 (1911) ; Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 470, 478-482, 26 L.Ed. 1143 (1882). The same is true for franchises that permit companies to build railroads or telegraph lines. See, e.g., United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 160 U.S. 1, 24-25, 37-38, 16 S.Ct. 190, 40 L.Ed. 319 (1895). Thus, the public-rights doctrine covers the matter resolved in inter partes review. The Constitution does not prohibit the Board from resolving it outside of an Article III court. B Oil States challenges this conclusion, citing three decisions that recognize patent rights as the "private property of the patentee." American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S., at 370, 9 S.Ct. 90 ; see also McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609, 18 S.Ct. 443, 42 L.Ed. 875 (1898) ( "[A granted patent] has become the property of the patentee"); Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 197, 15 L.Ed. 595 (1857) ("[T]he rights of a party under a patent are his private property"). But those cases do not contradict our conclusion. Patents convey only a specific form of property right-a public franchise. See Pfaff, 525 U.S., at 63-64, 119 S.Ct. 304. And patents are "entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise ." Seymour, 11 Wall. at 533 (emphasis added). As a public franchise, a patent can confer only the rights that "the statute prescribes." Gayler, supra, at 494; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 663-664, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834) (noting that Congress has "the power to prescribe the conditions on which such right shall be enjoyed"). It is noteworthy that one of the precedents cited by Oil States acknowledges that the patentee's rights are "derived altogether" from statutes, "are to be regulated and measured by these laws, and cannot go beyond them." Brown, supra, at 195. One such regulation is inter partes review. See Cuozzo, 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2137. The Patent Act provides that, "[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property." 35 U.S.C. § 261. This provision qualifies any property rights that a patent owner has in an issued patent, subjecting them to the express provisions of the Patent Act. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). Those provisions include inter partes review. See §§ 311 - 319. Nor do the precedents that Oil States cites foreclose the kind of post-issuance administrative review that Congress has authorized here. To be sure, two of the cases make broad declarations that "[t]he only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and not in the department which issued the patent." McCormickHarvesting Machine Co., supra, at 609, 18 S.Ct. 443 ; accord, American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S., at 364, 9 S.Ct. 90. But those cases were decided under the Patent Act of 1870. See id ., at 371, 9 S.Ct. 90 ; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co., supra, at 611, 18 S.Ct. 443. That version of the Patent Act did not include any provision for post-issuance administrative review. Those precedents, then, are best read as a description of the statutory scheme that existed at that time. They do not resolve Congress' authority under the Constitution to establish a different scheme. C Oil States and the dissent contend that inter partes review violates the "general" principle that "Congress may not 'withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.' " Stern, 564 U.S., at 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (quoting Murray's Lessee, 18 How., at 284 ). They argue that this is so because patent validity was often decided in English courts of law in the 18th century. For example, if a patent owner brought an infringement action, the defendant could challenge the validity of the patent as an affirmative defense. See Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid? 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1682, 1685-1686, and n. 52 (2013). Or, an individual could challenge the validity of a patent by filing a writ of scire facias in the Court of Chancery, which would sit as a law court when adjudicating the writ. See id., at 1683-1685, and n. 44; Bottomley, Patent Cases in the Court of Chancery, 1714-58, 35 J. Legal Hist. 27, 36-37, 41-43 (2014). But this history does not establish that patent validity is a matter that, "from its nature," must be decided by a court. Stern, supra, at 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (quoting Murray's Lessee, supra, at 284). The aforementioned proceedings were between private parties. But there was another means of canceling a patent in 18th-century England, which more closely resembles inter partes review: a petition to the Privy Council to vacate a patent. See Lemley, supra, at 1681-1682 ; Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for Invention From the Restoration to 1794, 33 L.Q. Rev. 63 (1917). The Privy Council was composed of the Crown's advisers. Lemley, supra, at 1681. From the 17th through the 20th centuries, English patents had a standard revocation clause that permitted six or more Privy Counsellors to declare a patent void if they determined the invention was contrary to law, "prejudicial" or "inconvenient," not new, or not invented by the patent owner. See 11 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 426-427, and n. 6 (1938); Davies, The Early History of the Patent Specification, 50 L.Q. Rev. 86, 102-106 (1934). Individuals could petition the Council to revoke a patent, and the petition was referred to the Attorney General. The Attorney General examined the petition, considered affidavits from the petitioner and patent owner, and heard from counsel. See, e.g., Bull v. Lydall, PC2/81, pp. 180-181 (1706). Depending on the Attorney General's conclusion, the Council would either void the patent or dismiss the petition. See, e.g., Darby v. Betton, PC2/99, pp. 358-359 (1745-1746) (voiding the patent); Baker v. James, PC2/103, pp. 320-321, 346-347 (1752) (dismissing the petition). The Privy Council was a prominent feature of the English system. It had exclusive authority to revoke patents until 1753, and after that, it had concurrent jurisdiction with the courts. See Hulme, 33 L.Q. Rev., at 189-191, 193-194. The Privy Council continued to consider revocation claims and to revoke patents throughout the 18th century. Its last revocation was in 1779. See id., at 192-193. It considered, but did not act on, revocation claims in 1782, 1794, and 1810. See ibid. ; Board of Ordinance v. Parr, PC1/3919 (1810). The Patent Clause in our Constitution "was written against the backdrop" of the English system. Graham, 383 U.S., at 5, 86 S.Ct. 684. Based on the practice of the Privy Council, it was well understood at the founding that a patent system could include a practice of granting patents subject to potential cancellation in the executive proceeding of the Privy Council. The parties have cited nothing in the text or history of the Patent Clause or Article III to suggest that the Framers were not aware of this common practice. Nor is there any reason to think they excluded this practice during their deliberations. And this Court has recognized that, "[w]ithin the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for patentability." Id ., at 6, 86 S.Ct. 684. We conclude that inter partes review is one of those conditions. For similar reasons, we disagree with the dissent's assumption that, because courts have traditionally adjudicated patent validity in this country, courts must forever continue to do so. See post, at 1383 - 1385. Historical practice is not decisive here because matters governed by the public-rights doctrine "from their nature" can be resolved in multiple ways: Congress can "reserve to itself the power to decide," "delegate that power to executive officers," or "commit it to judicial tribunals." Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S., at 451, 49 S.Ct. 411. That Congress chose the courts in the past does not foreclose its choice of the PTO today. D Finally, Oil States argues that inter partes review violates Article III because it shares "every salient characteristic associated with the exercise of the judicial power." Brief for Petitioner 20. Oil States highlights various procedures used in inter partes review: motion practice before the Board; discovery, depositions, and cross-examination of witnesses; introduction of evidence and objections based on the Federal Rules of Evidence; and an adversarial hearing before the Board. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) ; 77 Fed.Reg. 48758, 48761-48763 (2012). Similarly, Oil States cites PTO regulations that use terms typically associated with courts-calling the hearing a "trial," id ., at 48758 ; the Board members "judges," id., at 48763 ; and the Board's final decision a "judgment," id., at 48761, 48766-48767. But this Court has never adopted a "looks like" test to determine if an adjudication has improperly occurred outside of an Article III court. The fact that an agency uses court-like procedures does not necessarily mean it is exercising the judicial power. See Freytag, 501 U.S., at 878, 111 S.Ct. 2631 (opinion of Scalia, J.). This Court has rejected the notion that a tribunal exercises Article III judicial power simply because it is "called a court and its decisions called judgments." Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 563, 53 S.Ct. 751, 77 L.Ed. 1372 (1933). Nor does the fact that an administrative adjudication is final and binding on an individual who acquiesces in the result necessarily make it an exercise of the judicial power. See, e.g., Murray's Lessee, 18 How., at 280-281 (permitting the Treasury Department to conduct "final and binding" audits outside of an Article III court). Although inter partes review includes some of the features of adversarial litigation, it does not make any binding determination regarding "the liability of [Greene's Energy] to [Oil States] under the law as defined." Crowell, 285 U.S., at 51, 52 S.Ct. 285. It remains a matter involving public rights, one "between the government and others, which from [its] nature do[es] not require judicial determination." Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S., at 451, 49 S.Ct. 411. E We emphasize the narrowness of our holding. We address the constitutionality of inter partes review only. We do not address whether other patent matters, such as infringement actions, can be heard in a non-Article III forum. And because the Patent Act provides for judicial review by the Federal Circuit, see 35 U.S.C. § 319, we need not consider whether inter partes review would be constitutional "without any sort of intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings," Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455, n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977). Moreover, we address only the precise constitutional challenges that Oil States raised here. Oil States does not challenge the retroactive application of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place when its patent issued. Nor has Oil States raised a due process challenge. Finally, our decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999) ; James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358, 26 L.Ed. 786 (1882). IV In addition to Article III, Oil States challenges inter partes review under the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment preserves the "right of trial by jury" in "Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." This Court's precedents establish that, when Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, "the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder." Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53-54, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989) ; accord, Atlas Roofing Co., supra, at 450-455, 97 S.Ct. 1261. No party challenges or attempts to distinguish those precedents. Thus, our rejection of Oil States' Article III challenge also resolves its Seventh Amendment challenge. Because inter partes review is a matter that Congress can properly assign to the PTO, a jury is not necessary in these proceedings. V Because inter partes review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. I join the Court's opinion in full. The conclusion that inter partes review is a matter involving public rights is sufficient to show that it violates neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment. But the Court's opinion should not be read to say that matters involving private rights may never be adjudicated other than by Article III courts, say, sometimes by agencies. Our precedent is to the contrary. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) ; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-856, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) ; see also Stern, supra, at 513, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (BREYER, J., dissenting) ("The presence of 'private rights' does not automatically determine the outcome of the question but requires a more 'searching' examination of the relevant factors"). After much hard work and no little investment you devise something you think truly novel. Then you endure the further cost and effort of applying for a patent, devoting maybe $30,000 and two years to that process alone. At the end of it all, the Patent Office agrees your invention is novel and issues a patent. The patent affords you exclusive rights to the fruits of your labor for two decades. But what happens if someone later emerges from the woodwork, arguing that it was all a mistake and your patent should be canceled? Can a political appointee and his administrative agents, instead of an independent judge, resolve the dispute? The Court says yes. Respectfully, I disagree. We sometimes take it for granted today that independent judges will hear our cases and controversies. But it wasn't always so. Before the Revolution, colonial judges depended on the crown for their tenure and salary and often enough their decisions followed their interests. The problem was so serious that the founders cited it in their Declaration of Independence (see ¶ 11). Once free, the framers went to great lengths to guarantee a degree of judicial independence for future generations that they themselves had not experienced. Under the Constitution, judges "hold their Offices during good Behaviour" and their "Compensation ... shall not be diminished during the[ir] Continuance in Office." Art. III, § 1. The framers knew that "a fixed provision" for judges' financial support would help secure "the independence of the judges," because "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." The Federalist No. 79, p. 472 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis deleted). They were convinced, too, that "[p]eriodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to [the courts'] necessary independence." The Federalist No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton). Today, the government invites us to retreat from the promise of judicial independence. Until recently, most everyone considered an issued patent a personal right-no less than a home or farm-that the federal government could revoke only with the concurrence of independent judges. But in the statute before us Congress has tapped an executive agency, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, for the job. Supporters say this is a good thing because the Patent Office issues too many low quality patents; allowing a subdivision of that office to clean up problems after the fact, they assure us, promises an efficient solution. And, no doubt, dispensing with constitutionally prescribed procedures is often expedient. Whether it is the guarantee of a warrant before a search, a jury trial before a conviction-or, yes, a judicial hearing before a property interest is stripped away-the Constitution's constraints can slow things down. But economy supplies no license for ignoring these-often vitally inefficient-protections. The Constitution "reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs," and it is not our place to replace that judgment with our own. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010). Consider just how efficient the statute before us is. The Director of the Patent Office is a political appointee who serves at the pleasure of the President. 35 U.S.C. §§ 3(a)(1), (a)(4). He supervises and pays the Board members responsible for deciding patent disputes. §§ 1 (a), 3(b)(6), 6(a). The Director is allowed to select which of these members, and how many of them, will hear any particular patent challenge. See § 6(c). If they (somehow) reach a result he does not like, the Director can add more members to the panel-including himself-and order the case reheard. See §§ 6(a), (c) ; In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (C.A.Fed.1994) (en banc); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd ., 868 F.3d 1013, 1020 (C.A.Fed.2017) (Dyk, J., concurring), cert. pending, No. 17-751. Nor has the Director proven bashful about asserting these statutory powers to secure the " 'policy judgments' " he seeks. Brief for Petitioner 46 (quoting Patent Office Solicitor); see also Brief for Shire Pharmaceuticals LLC as Amicus Curiae 22-30. No doubt this efficient scheme is well intended. But can there be any doubt that it also represents a retreat from the promise of judicial independence? Or that when an independent Judiciary gives ground to bureaucrats in the adjudication of cases, the losers will often prove the unpopular and vulnerable? Powerful interests are capable of amassing armies of lobbyists and lawyers to influence (and even capture) politically accountable bureaucracies. But what about everyone else? Of course, all this invites the question: how do we know which cases independent judges must hear? The Constitution's original public meaning supplies the key, for the Constitution cannot secure the people's liberty any less today than it did the day it was ratified. The relevant constitutional provision, Article III, explains that the federal "judicial Power" is vested in independent judges. As originally understood, the judicial power extended to "suit[s] at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856). From this and as we've recently explained, it follows that, "[w]hen a suit is made of the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789 ... and is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests with" Article III judges endowed with the protections for their independence the framers thought so important. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court does not quarrel with this test. See ante, at 1376 - 1378. We part ways only on its application. As I read the historical record presented to us, only courts could hear patent challenges in England at the time of the founding. If facts were in dispute, the matter first had to proceed in the law courts. See, e.g., Newsham v. Gray, 2 Atk. 286, 26 Eng. Rep. 575 (Ch. 1742). If successful there, a challenger then had to obtain a writ of scire facias in the law side of the Court of Chancery. See, e.g., Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power To Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Texas L. Rev. 1433, 1446, n. 53 (2000) ; Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid? 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1686-1687 (2013) (Lemley, Juries). The last time an executive body (the King's Privy Council) invalidated an invention patent on an ordinary application was in 1746, in Darby v. Betton, PC2/99, pp. 358-359; and the last time the Privy Council even considered doing so was in 1753, in Baker v. James, PC2/103, pp. 320-321. After Baker v. James, the Privy Council "divest[ed] itself of its functions" in ordinary patent disputes, Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for Invention from the Restoration to 1794 (Pt. II), 33 L.Q. Rev. 180, 194 (1917), which "thereafter [were] adjudicated solely by the law courts, as opposed to the [crown's] prerogative courts," Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1286-1287 (2001) (Mossoff, Rethinking Patents). This shift to courts paralleled a shift in thinking. Patents began as little more than feudal favors. Id., at 1261. The crown both issued and revoked them. Lemley, Juries 1680-1681. And they often permitted the lucky recipient the exclusive right to do very ordinary things, like operate a toll bridge or run a tavern. Ibid. But by the 18th century, inventors were busy in Britain and invention patents came to be seen in a different light. They came to be viewed not as endowing accidental and anticompetitive monopolies on the fortunate few but as a procompetitive means to secure to individuals the fruits of their labor and ingenuity; encourage others to emulate them; and promote public access to new technologies that would not otherwise exist. Mossoff, Rethinking Patents 1288-1289. The Constitution itself reflects this new thinking, authorizing the issuance of patents precisely because of their contribution to the "Progress of Science and useful Arts." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "In essence, there was a change in perception-from viewing a patent as a contract between the crown and the patentee to viewing it as a 'social contract' between the patentee and society." Waltersheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. Pat. & T. Off. Soc. 771, 793 (1995). And as invention patents came to be seen so differently, it is no surprise courts came to treat them more solicitously. Unable to dispute that judges alone resolved virtually all patent challenges by the time of the founding, the Court points to three English cases that represent the Privy Council's dying gasp in this area: Board of Ordnance v. Wilkinson, PC2/123 (1779); Grill [Grice] v. Waters, PC2/127 (1782); and Board of Ordnance v. Parr, PC1/3919 (1810). Filed in 1779, 1782, and 1810, each involved an effort to override a patent on munitions during wartime, no doubt in an effort to increase their supply. But even then appealing to the Privy Council was seen as a last resort. The 1779 petition (the last Privy Council revocation ever) came only after the patentee twice refused instructions to litigate the patent's validity in a court of law. Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, Privy Council and Scire Facias 1700-1883, p. 6 (Nov. 6, 2017) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3054989 (citing Board of Ordnance v. Wilkinson, PC2/123 (1779), and PC1/11/150 (1779)). The Council did not act on the 1782 petition but instead referred it to the Attorney General where it appears to have been abandoned. Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, Privy Council and Scire Facias, supra, at 17-18. Meanwhile, in response to the 1810 petition the Attorney General admitted that scire facias was the "usual manner" of revoking a patent and so directed the petitioner to proceed at law even as he suggested the Privy Council might be available in the event of a "very pressing and imminent" danger to the public. Id., at 20 (citing PC1/3919 (1810)). In the end, these cases do very little to support the Court's holding. At most, they suggest that the Privy Council might have possessed some residual power to revoke patents to address wartime necessities. Equally, they might serve only as more unfortunate evidence of the maxim that in time of war, the laws fall silent. But whatever they do, these cases do not come close to proving that patent disputes were routinely permitted to proceed outside a court of law. Any lingering doubt about English law is resolved for me by looking to our own. While the Court is correct that the Constitution's Patent Clause " 'was written against the backdrop' " of English practice, ante, at 1377 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966) ), it's also true that the Clause sought to reject some of early English practice. Reflecting the growing sentiment that patents shouldn't be used for anticompetitive monopolies over "goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public," the framers wrote the Clause to protect only procompetitive invention patents that are the product of hard work and insight and "add to the sum of useful knowledge." Id ., at 1372 - 1373. In light of the Patent Clause's restrictions on this score, courts took the view that when the federal government "grants a patent the grantee is entitled to it as a matter of right, and does not receive it, as was originally supposed to be the case in England, as a matter of grace and favor." James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358, 26 L.Ed. 786 (1882) (emphasis added). As Chief Justice Marshall explained, courts treated American invention patents as recognizing an "inchoate property" that exists "from the moment of invention." Evans v. Jordan, 8 F.Cas. 872, 873 (No. 4,564) (C.C.D.Va.1813). American patent holders thus were thought to "hol[d] a property in [their] invention[s] by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm and flock." Hovey v. Henry, 12 F.Cas. 603, 604 (No. 6,742) (C.C.D.Mass.1846) (Woodbury, J.). And just as with farm and flock, it was widely accepted that the government could divest patent owners of their rights only through proceedings before independent judges. This view held firm for most of our history. In fact, from the time it established the American patent system in 1790 until about 1980, Congress left the job of invalidating patents at the federal level to courts alone. The only apparent exception to this rule cited to us was a 4 year period when foreign patentees had to "work" or commercialize their patents or risk having them revoked. Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 263, 283-284 (2016). And the fact that for almost 200 years "earlier Congresses avoided use of [a] highly attractive"-and surely more efficient-means for extinguishing patents should serve as good "reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist" at the time of the founding. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997). One more episode still underscores the point. When the Executive sought to claim the right to cancel a patent in the 1800s, this Court firmly rebuffed the effort. The Court explained: "It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that when a patent has [been issued by] the Patent Office, it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the President, or any other officer of the Government. It has become the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal protection as other property." McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 608-609, 18 S.Ct. 443, 42 L.Ed. 875 (1898) (citations omitted). As a result, the Court held, "[t]he only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and not in the department which issued the patent." Id., at 609, 18 S.Ct. 443. The Court today replies that McCormick sought only to interpret certain statutes then in force, not the Constitution. Ante, at 1376, and n. 3. But this much is hard to see. Allowing the Executive to withdraw a patent, McCormick said, "would be to deprive the applicant of his property without due process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the government by the executive." 169 U.S., at 612, 18 S.Ct. 443. McCormick also pointed to "repeated decisions" in similar cases that themselves do not seem to rest merely on statutory grounds. See id., at 608-609, 18 S.Ct. 443 (citing United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 26 L.Ed. 167 (1880), and United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 9 S.Ct. 90, 32 L.Ed. 450 (1888) ). And McCormick equated invention patents with land patents. 169 U.S., at 609, 18 S.Ct. 443. That is significant because, while the Executive has always dispensed public lands to homesteaders and other private persons, it has never been constitutionally empowered to withdraw land patents from their recipients (or their successors-in-interest) except through a "judgment of a court." United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525, 535, 17 L.Ed. 765 (1865) ; Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1966, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) ("Although Congress could authorize executive agencies to dispose of public rights in lands-often by means of adjudicating a claimant's qualifications for a land grant under a statute-the United States had to go to the courts if it wished to revoke a patent" (emphasis deleted)). With so much in the relevant history and precedent against it, the Court invites us to look elsewhere. Instead of focusing on the revocation of patents, it asks us to abstract the level of our inquiry and focus on their issuance. Because the job of issuing invention patents traditionally belonged to the Executive, the Court proceeds to argue, the job of revoking them can be left there too. Ante, at 1372 - 1375. But that doesn't follow. Just because you give a gift doesn't mean you forever enjoy the right to reclaim it. And, as we've seen, just because the Executive could issue an invention (or land) patent did not mean the Executive could revoke it. To reward those who had proven the social utility of their work (and to induce others to follow suit), the law long afforded patent holders more protection than that against the threat of governmental intrusion and dispossession. The law requires us to honor those historical rights, not diminish them. Still, the Court asks us to look away in yet another direction. At the founding, the Court notes, the Executive could sometimes both dispense and revoke public franchises. And because, it says, invention patents are a species of public franchises, the Court argues the Executive should be allowed to dispense and revoke them too. Ante, at 1374 - 1375. But labels aside, by the time of the founding the law treated patents protected by the Patent Clause quite differently from ordinary public franchises. Many public franchises amounted to little more than favors resembling the original royal patents the framers expressly refused to protect in the Patent Clause. The Court points to a good example: the state-granted exclusive right to operate a toll bridge. Ante, at 1374 - 1375. By the founding, courts in this country (as in England) had come to view anticompetitive monopolies like that with disfavor, narrowly construing the rights they conferred. See Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 544, 9 L.Ed. 773 (1837). By contrast, courts routinely applied to invention patents protected by the Patent Clause the "liberal common sense construction" that applies to other instruments creating private property rights, like land deeds. Davis v. Palmer, 7 F.Cas. 154, 158 (No. 3,645) (C.C.D.Va.1827) (Marshall, C.J.); see also Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent Privilege 990 (listing more differences in treatment). As Justice Story explained, invention patents protected by the Patent Clause were "not to be treated as mere monopolies odious in the eyes of the law, and therefore not to be favored." Ames v. Howard, 1 F.Cas. 755, 756 (No. 326) (C.C.D.Mass.1833). For precisely these reasons and as we've seen, the law traditionally treated patents issued under the Patent Clause very differently than monopoly franchises when it came to governmental invasions. Patents alone required independent judges. Nor can simply invoking a mismatched label obscure that fact. The people's historic rights to have independent judges decide their disputes with the government should not be a "constitutional Maginot Line, easily circumvented" by such "simpl[e] maneuver [s]." Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1310, 1335, 194 L.Ed.2d 463 (2016) (ROBERTS, C.J., dissenting). Today's decision may not represent a rout but it at least signals a retreat from Article III's guarantees. Ceding to the political branches ground they wish to take in the name of efficient government may seem like an act of judicial restraint. But enforcing Article III isn't about protecting judicial authority for its own sake. It's about ensuring the people today and tomorrow enjoy no fewer rights against governmental intrusion than those who came before. And the loss of the right to an independent judge is never a small thing. It's for that reason Hamilton warned the judiciary to take "all possible care ... to defend itself against" intrusions by the other branches. The Federalist No. 78, at 466. It's for that reason I respectfully dissent. The Director has delegated his authority to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2017). This Court has also recognized this dynamic for state-issued franchises. For instance, States often reserve the right to alter or revoke a corporate charter either "in the act of incorporation or in some general law of the State which was in operation at the time the charter was granted." Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190, 214, 20 L.Ed. 550, and n. † (1872). That reservation remains effective even after the corporation comes into existence, and such alterations do not offend the Contracts Clause of Article I, § 10. See Pennsylvania College Cases, supra, at 212-214; e.g., Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 478, 488-489, 21 L.Ed. 98 (1873). The dissent points to McCormick 's statement that the Patent Office Commissioner could not invalidate the patent at issue because it would " 'deprive the applicant of his property without due process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch.' " Post, at 1384 - 1385 (quoting McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 612, 18 S.Ct. 443, 42 L.Ed. 875 (1898) ). But that statement followed naturally from the Court's determination that, under the Patent Act of 1870, the Commissioner "was functus officio " and "had no power to revoke, cancel, or annul" the patent at issue. 169 U.S., at 611-612, 18 S.Ct. 443. Nor is it significant that the McCormick Court "equated invention patents with land patents." Post, at 1384. McCormick itself makes clear that the analogy between the two depended on the particulars of the Patent Act of 1870. See 169 U.S., at 609-610, 18 S.Ct. 443. Modern invention patents, by contrast, are meaningfully different from land patents. The land-patent cases invoked by the dissent involved a "transaction [in which] 'all authority or control' over the lands has passed from 'the Executive Department.' " Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 477, 83 S.Ct. 1373, 10 L.Ed.2d 491 (1963) (quoting Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533, 24 L.Ed. 848 (1878) ). Their holdings do not apply when "the Government continues to possess some measure of control over" the right in question. Boesche, 373 U.S., at 477, 83 S.Ct. 1373 ; see id., at 477-478, 83 S.Ct. 1373 (affirming administrative cancellations of public-land leases). And that is true of modern invention patents under the current Patent Act, which gives the PTO continuing authority to review and potentially cancel patents after they are issued. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 311 -319. Oil States also suggests that inter partes review could be an unconstitutional condition because it conditions the benefit of a patent on accepting the possibility of inter partes review. Cf. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 186 L.Ed.2d 697 (2013) ("[T]he government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even assuming a patent is a "benefit" for purposes of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, that doctrine does not apply here. The doctrine prevents the Government from using conditions "to produce a result which it could not command directly." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). But inter partes review is consistent with Article III, see Part III-A, supra, and falls within Congress' Article I authority, see Part III-C, supra, so it is something Congress can "command directly," Perry, supra, at 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694. Oil States also points out that inter partes review "is initiated by private parties and implicates no waiver of sovereign immunity." Brief for Petitioner 30-31. But neither of those features takes inter partes review outside of the public-rights doctrine. That much is clear from United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 19 S.Ct. 286, 43 L.Ed. 559 (1899), which held that the doctrine covers interference proceedings-a procedure to "determin[e] which of two claimants is entitled to a patent"-even though interference proceedings were initiated by " 'private interests compet[ing] for preference' " and did not involve a waiver of sovereign immunity. Id ., at 582, 586, 19 S.Ct. 286 (quoting Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 59, 5 S.Ct. 25, 28 L.Ed. 656 (1884) ). Also, inter partes review is not initiated by private parties in the way that a common-law cause of action is. To be sure, a private party files the petition for review. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). But the decision to institute review is made by the Director and committed to his unreviewable discretion. See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2140, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016). Some of our concurring colleagues see it differently. See ante, at 1360 (BREYER, J., concurring). They point to language in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986), promoting the notion that the political branches may "depart from the requirements of Article III" when the benefits outweigh the costs. Id., at 851, 106 S.Ct. 3245. Color me skeptical. The very point of our written Constitution was to prevent the government from "depart[ing]" from its protections for the people and their liberty just because someone later happens to think the costs outweigh the benefits. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010). See also Brief for H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui et al. as Amici Curiae 6-37; Brief for Alliacense Limited LLC as Amicus Curiae 10-11; Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, Privy Council and Scire Facias 1700-1883, p. 2 (Nov. 6, 2017) (Addendum), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3054989 (all Internet materials as last visited Apr. 20, 2018); Observations on the Utility of Patents, and on the Sentiments of Lord Kenyon Respecting That Subject 23 (2d ed. 1791) ("If persons of the same trade find themselves aggrieved by Patents taken for any thing already in use, their remedy is at hand. It is by a writ of Scire Facias "); Mancius v. Lawton, 10 Johns. 23, 24 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1813) (Kent, C.J.) (noting the "settled English course" that "[l]etters-patent ... can only be avoided in chancery, by a writ of scire facias sued out on the part of the government, or by some individual prosecuting in its name" (emphasis deleted)). See also, e.g., Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 953, 967-968 (2007) (Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent Privilege) ("[A]n American patent in the late eighteenth century was radically different from the royal monopoly privilege dispensed by Queen Elizabeth or King James in the early seventeenth century. Patents no longer created, and sheltered from competition, manufacturing monopolies-they secured the exclusive control of an inventor over his novel and useful scientific or mechanical invention" (footnote omitted)); Mossoff, Rethinking Patents 1286-1287; H. Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Study of the History and Future of the Patent Monopoly 4 (1947). The 1794 petition the Court invokes, ante, at 1377, involved a Scottish patent. Simpson v. Cunningham, PC2/141, p. 88 (1794). The English and Scottish patents systems, however, were distinct and enforced by different regimes. Gómez-Arostegui, Patent and Copyright Exhaustion in England Circa 1800, pp. 10-16, 37, 49-50 (Feb. 9, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905847. Besides, even in that case the Scottish Lord Advocate " 'was of opinion, that the question should be tried in a court of law.' " Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, Addendum, supra, at 23 (citing Petition of William Cunningham, p. 5, Cunningham v. Simpson, Signet Library Edinburgh, Session Papers 207:3 (Ct. Sess. Feb. 23, 1796)). After all, the English statute of monopolies appeared to require the "force and validitie" of all patents to be determined only by "the Comon Lawes of this Realme & not otherwise." 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 2 (1624). So the Privy Council cases on which the Court relies may not reflect the best understanding of the British constitution.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

February 28, 1955. No. 230. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor, v. Joyce Agency, Inc. Argued February 4, 7, 1955. Decided February 28, 1955. Bessie Margolin argued the cause for petitioner. Certiorari, 348 U. S. 813, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Per Curiam: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564; Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the District Court. The motion of the petitioner to make Goldblatt Bros., Inc., a party in this Court is denied without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to renew said motion in the District Court, or to take such other proceedings for enforcement of the judgment as the petitioner may deem advisable and proper in the circumstances. See Walling v. Reuter, Inc., 321 U. S. 671. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Sylvia S. Ellison and Harold S. Saxe. Stanford Clinton argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert A. Sprecher.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SQUIRE, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. CAPOEMAN et ux. No. 134. Argued January 19, 1956. Decided April 23, 1956. Charles F. Barber argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Hilbert P. Zarky and Carolyn R. Just. John W. Cragun argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Glen A. Wilkinson and Robert W. Barker. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by George W. Shoemaker for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Indians et al., and Houston Bus Hill, Wm. C. Leahy, Wm. J. Hughes, Jr., Roy St. Lewis and Carl L. Shipley for Taunah et al. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether the proceeds of the sale by the United States Government of standing timber on allotted lands on the Quinaielt Indian Reservation may be made subject to capital-gains tax, consistently with applicable treaty and statutory provisions and the Government’s role as respondents’ trustee and guardian. When white men first came to the Olympic Peninsula, in what is now the State of Washington, they found the Quinaielt Tribe of Indians and their neighboring allied tribes occupying a tract of country lying between the Coast Range and the Pacific Ocean. This vast tract, with the exception of a small portion reserved for their exclusive use, was ceded by the Quinaielts and their neighbors to the United States in exchange for protection and tutelage by the treaty of July 1, 1855, and January 25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971. According to this treaty, the Quinaielts were to have exclusive use of their reservation “and no white man shall be permitted to reside thereon without permission of the tribe . . . .” Article II. Years later, Congress passed the General Allotment Act of 1887. Thereunder, Indians were to be allotted lands on their reservations not to exceed 160 acres of grazing land or 80 acres of agricultural land, and 25 years after allotment the allottees were to receive the lands discharged of the trust under which the United States had theretofore held them, and to obtain a patent “in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever,” though the President might extend the period. Respondents, husband and wife, were born on the reservation, and are described by the Government as full-blood, noncompetent Quinaielt Indians. They have lived on the reservation all their lives with the exception of the time served by respondent husband in the Armed Forces of the United States during World War II. Pursuant to the treaty and under the General Allotment Act of 1887, respondent husband was allotted from the treaty-guaranteed reservation 93.25 acres and received a trust patent therefor dated October 1, 1907. During the tax year here in question, the fee title to this land was still held by the United States in trust for him, and was not subject to alienation or encumbrance by him, except with the consent of the United States Government, which consent had never been given. The land was forest land, covered by coniferous trees from one hundred years to several hundred years old. It was not adaptable to agricultural purposes, and was of little value after the timber was cut. In the year 1943, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the United States Department of the Interior entered into a contract of sale for the standing timber on respondent’s allotted land for the total price of $15,080.80. The Government received the sum of $8,418.28 on behalf of respondent in that year. Upon demand of petitioner, Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Washington, respondents filed a joint income tax return on October 10, 1947, for the tax year 1943, reporting long-term capital gain from the sale of the timber in that year. Simultaneously, they paid the taxes shown due. Thereafter, they filed a timely claim for refund of the taxes paid and contended that the proceeds from the sale of timber from the allotted land were not subject to federal income taxation because such taxation would be in violation of the provisions of the Qui-naielt Treaty, the trust patent, and the General Allotment Act. The claim for refund was denied, and this action was instituted. The District Court found that the tax had been unlawfully collected and ordered the refund. 110 F. Supp. 924. The Court of Appeals, agreeing with the District Court but recognizing a conflict between this case and the decision of the Tenth Circuit in the case of Jones v. Taunah, 186 F. 2d 445, affirmed. 220 F. 2d 349. Because of the apparent conflict, we granted certiorari. 350 U. S. 816. The Government urges us to view this case as an ordinary tax case without regard to the treaty, relevant statutes, congressional policy concerning Indians, or the guardian-ward relationship between the United States and these particular Indians. It argues: “As citizens of the United States they are taxable under the broad provisions of Sections 11 and 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which imposes a tax on the net income of every individual, derived from any source whatever. There is no exemption from tax in the Quinaielt Treaty, the General Allotment Act, the taxing statute, or in any other legislation dealing with taxpayers’ affairs. . . . “Even if it be assumed that the United States would be prohibited from imposing a direct tax on the allotted land held in trust for the taxpayers, there would, nevertheless, be no prohibition against a federal tax on the income derived from the land, since a tax on such income is not the same as a tax on the source of the income, the land.” We agree with the Government that Indians are citizens and that in ordinary affairs of life, not governed by treaties or remedial legislation, they are subject to the payment of income taxes as are other citizens. We also agree that, to be valid, exemptions to tax laws should be clearly expressed. But we cannot agree that taxability of respondents in these circumstances is unaffected by the treaty, the trust patent or the Allotment Act. The courts below held that imposition of the tax here in question is inconsistent with the Government’s promise to transfer the fee “free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever.” Although this statutory provision is not expressly couched in terms of nontaxability, this Court has said that “Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith. Hence, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 'The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of, which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be considered as used only in the latter sense.’ Worcester v. The State of Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 582.” Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367. Thus, the general words “charge or incumbrance” might well be sufficient to include taxation. But Congress, in an amendment to the General Allotment Act, gave additional force to respondents’ position. Section 6 of that Act was amended to include a proviso— “That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, in-cumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed and said land shall not be liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuing of such patent . ...” The Government argues that this amendment was directed solely at permitting state and local taxation after a transfer in fee, but there is no indication in the legislative history of the amendment that it was to be so limited. The fact that this amendment antedated the federal income tax by 10 years also seems irrelevant. The literal language of the proviso evinces a congressional intent to subject an Indian allotment to all taxes only-after a patent in fee is issued to the allottee. This, in turn, implies that, until such time as the patent is issued, the allotment shall be free from all taxes, both those in being and those which might in the future be enacted. The first opinion of an Attorney General touching on this question seemed to construe the language of the amendment to Section 6 as exempting from the income tax income derived from restricted allotments. And even without such a clear statutory basis for exemption, a later Attorney General advised that he was— “[U]liable, by implication, to impute to Congress under the broad language of our Internal Revenue Acts an intent to impose a tax for the benefit of the Federal Government on income derived from the restricted property of these wards of the nation; property the management and control of which rests largely in the hands of officers of the Government charged by law with the responsibility and duty of protecting the interests and welfare of these dependent people. In other words, it is not lightly to be assumed that Congress intended to tax the ward for the benefit of the guardian.” Two of these opinions were published as Treasury Decisions. On the basis of these opinions and decisions, and a series of district and circuit court decisions, it was said by Felix S. Cohen, an acknowledged expert in Indian law, that “It is clear that the exemption accorded tribal and restricted Indian lands extends to the income derived directly therefrom.” These relatively contemporaneous official and unofficial writings are entitled to consideration. The Government makes much of a subsequent Attorney General’s opinion, which expressly overruled an earlier opinion, on the authority of Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 418. That case is distinguishable from the case at hand. It involved what the Court characterized as “income derived from investment of surplus income from land,” or income on income, which Cohen termed “reinvestment income.” The purpose of the allotment system was to protect the Indians’ interest and “to prepare the Indians to take their place as independent, qualified members of the modern body politic.” Board of Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 715. To this end, it is necessary to preserve the trust and income derived directly therefrom, but it is not necessary to exempt reinvestment income from tax burdens. It is noteworthy that the Superintendent case did not involve an attempt to tax the land “surplus.” The wisdom of the congressional exemption from tax embodied in Section 6 of the General Allotment Act is manifested by the facts of the instant case. Respondent’s timber constitutes the major value of his allotted land. The Government determines the conditions under which the cutting is made. Once logged off, the land is of little value. The land no longer serves the purpose for which it was by treaty set aside to his ancestors, and for which it was allotted to him. It can no longer be adequate to his needs and serve the purpose of bringing him finally to a state of competency and independence. Unless the proceeds of the timber sale are preserved for respondent, he cannot go forward when declared competent with the necessary chance of economic survival in competition with others. This chance is guaranteed by the tax exemption afforded by the General Allotment Act, and the solemn undertaking in the patent. It is unreasonable to infer that, in enacting the income tax law, Congress intended to limit or undermine the Government’s undertaking. To tax respondent under these circumstances would, in the words of the court below, be "at the least, a sorry breach of faith with these Indians.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 24 Stat. 388, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq. 25 U.S.C. §331. Id., § 348. Ibid. The trust period here involved has regularly been extended by Executive Order. See note following 25 U. S. C. § 348, and see 25 U. S. C. §462, which provides: “The existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands and any restriction on alienation thereof are extended and continued until otherwise directed by Congress.” The term “patent” inadequately describes respondent’s interest. “Congress . . . was careful to avoid investing the allottee with the title in the first instance, and directed that there should be issued to him what ... is in reality an allotment certificate . . . .” Monson v. Simonson, 231 U. S. 341, 345. In pertinent part, the patent provides: “Now know ye, That the United States of America, in consideration of the premises, has allotted, and by these presents does allot, unto the said Horton Capoeman, the land above described, and hereby declares that it does and will hold the land thus allotted (subject to all statutory provisions and restrictions) for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and benefit of the said Indian, and that at the expiration of said period the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian, in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever, . . . .” This sale seems to have followed a pattern generally adopted by the Government in selling timber from Indian allotments. Huge areas of forest are put up for competitive bids by lumber companies. These tracts include the tribal forest lands and individual allotments, with the consent of tribal councils and individual allottees. The successful bidder is required to make an immediate advance payment of a large proportion of the estimated value of the lumber in the tract. Since as much as 640 million board feet have been sold at one time, this requirement makes it economically infeasible for any but the largest companies to submit bids. The uncertainties of such large scale operations, which are to be carried on over 25- or 30-year periods, coupled with local quality and accessibility variables, has resulted in substantially lower than prevailing market bids. In some instances, the return to other sellers of comparable timber was two or three times that received by the Indians. See Transcript of November 28, 1955, Joint Hearing of Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight Function of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and of Subcommittee on Public Works and Resources of the House Committee on Government Operations, 2151-2217, and passim. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 7-8. 25 U. S. C. § 349. See S. Rep. No. 1998, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1558, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. This provision was relied upon by Chief Judge Phillips, dissenting in Jones v. Taunah, 186 F. 2d 445, 449. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 275, 281 (1924). And see id., 302 (1924). Id., 439, 445 (1925). This ruling was followed in 35 Op. Atty. Gen. 1 (1925). And cf. id., 107 (1926). T. D. 3570, III-1 Cum. Bull. 85 (1924); T. D. 3754, IV-2 Cum. Bull. 37 (1925). Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 265. He distinguished cases permitting the imposition of income taxes upon income derived from unrestricted lands, and upon reinvestment income. Id., at 265-266. Mr. Cohen was Chairman of the Department of Interior Board of Appeals, and Assistant Solicitor of the Department. The Handbook has a foreword by Harold L. Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior, and was printed by the United States Government Printing Office. 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 107 (1937). 34 id., 439. 295 U. S., at 421. The Government also relies upon Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691, but that case also is not controlling, since it held only that a competent Indian, who had unrestricted control over lands and income therefrom, was not exempt from income tax solely because of his status as an Indian. Such a tax is specifically authorized by Section 6 of the General Allotment Act. See United States v. Eastman, 118 F. 2d 421. See 220 F. 2d, at 350. In its answer filed in the District Court, the Government admitted that the lands "are generally unsuitable for agricultural purposes . . . .” R. 31. 220 F. 2d 350.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA v. DARLINGTON MANUFACTURING CO. et al. No. 37. Argued December 9-10, 1964.— Decided March 29, 1965 Irving Abramson argued the cause for petitioner in No. 37. With him on the brief were Everett E. Lewis, Donald Grody and Leonard Greenwald. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for petitioner in No. 41. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ordman, Norton J. Come and Nancy M. Sherman. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., and Stuart N. Updike argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With Mr. Ervin on the brief for Darlington Manufacturing Co. was Thornton H. Brooks. With Mr. Updike on the brief for Deering Milliken, Inc., were John Lord O’Brian, Hugh B. Cox and John R. Schoemer, Jr. J. Albert Woll, Robert C. Mayer, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Rowland F. Kirks for the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, and by Gerard D. Reilly for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Together with No. 41, National Labor Relations Board v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. We here review judgments of the Court of Appeals setting aside and refusing to enforce an order of the National Labor Relations Board which found respondent Darlington guilty of an unfair labor practice by reason of having permanently closed its plant following petitioner union’s election as the bargaining representative of Dar-lington’s employees. Darlington Manufacturing Company was a South Carolina corporation operating one textile mill. A majority of Darlington’s stock was held by Deering Mil-liken, a New York “selling house” marketing textiles produced by others. Deering Milliken in turn was controlled by Roger Milliken, president of Darlington, and by other members of the Milliken family. The National Labor Relations Board found that the Milliken family, through Deering Milliken, operated 17 textile manufacturers, including- Darlington, whose products, manufactured in 27 different mills, were marketed through Deering Milliken. In March 1956 petitioner Textile Workers Union initiated an organizational campaign at Darlington which the company resisted vigorously in various ways, including threats to close the mill if the union won a representation election. On September 6, 1956, the union won an election by a narrow margin. When Roger Milliken was advised of the union victory, he decided to call a meeting of the Darlington board of directors to consider closing the mill. Mr. Milliken testified before the Labor Board: “I felt that as a result of the campaign that had been conducted and the promises and statements made in these letters that had been distributed [favoring unionization], that if before we had had some hope, possible hope of achieving competitive [costs] ... by taking advantage of new machinery that was being put in, that this hope had diminished as a result of the election because a majority of the employees had voted in favor of the union . . . .” (R. 457.) The board of directors met on September 12 and voted to liquidate the corporation, action which was approved by the stockholders on October 17. The plant ceased operations entirely in November, and all plant machinery and equipment were sold piecemeal at auction in December. The union filed charges with the Labor Board claiming that Darlington had violated §§ 8 (a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act by closing its plant, and §8 (a)(5) by refusing to bargain with the union after the election. The Board, by a divided vote, found that Darlington had been closed because of the antiunion animus of Roger Milliken, and held that to be a violation of § 8 (a)(3). The Board also found Dar-lington to be part of a single integrated employer group controlled by the Milliken family through Deering Milli-ken; therefore Deering Milliken could be held liable for the unfair labor practices of Darlington. Alternatively, since Darlington was a part of the Deering Milliken enterprise, Deering Milliken had violated the Act by closing part of its business for a discriminatory purpose. The Board ordered back pay for all Darlington employees until they obtained substantially equivalent work or were put on preferential hiring lists at the other Deering Milli-ken mills. Respondent Deering Milliken was ordered to bargain with the union in regard to details of compliance with the Board order. 139 N. L. R. B. 241. On review, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, set aside the order and denied enforcement by a divided vote. 325 F. 2d 682. The Court of Appeals held that even accepting arguendo the Board’s determination that Deeding Milliken had the status of a single employer, a company has the absolute right to close out a part or all of its business regardless of antiunion motives. The court therefore did not review the Board’s finding that Deering Milliken was a single integrated employer. We granted certiorari, 377 U. S. 903, to consider the important questions involved. We hold that so far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases, but disagree with the Court of Appeals that such right includes the ability to close part of a business no matter what the reason. We- conclude that the cause must be remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Preliminarily it should be observed that both petitioners argue that the Darlington closing violated § 8 (a) (1) as well as § 8 (a) (3) of the Act. We think, however, that the Board was correct in treating the closing only under § 8 (a)(3). Section 8 (a)(1) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of” § 7 rights. Naturally, certain business decisions will, to some degree, interfere with concerted activities by employees. But it is only when the interference with § 7 rights outweighs the business justification for the employer’s action that §8 (a)(1) is violated. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357; Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793. A violation of § 8 (a)(1) alone therefore presupposes an act which is unlawful even absent a discriminatory motive. Whatever may be the limits of § 8 (a)(1), some employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they would never constitute violations of § 8 (a)(1), whether or not they involved sound business judgment, unless they also violated § 8 (a) (3). Thus it is not questioned in this case that an employer has the right to terminate his business, whatever the impact of such action on concerted activities, if the decision to close is motivated by other than discriminatory reasons.’ But such action, if discriminatorily motivated, is encompassed within the literal language of § 8 (a)(3). We therefore deal with the Darlington closing under that section. I. We consider first the argument, advanced by the petitioner union but not by the Board, and rejected by the Court of Appeals, that an employer may not go completely out of business without running afoul of the Labor Relations Act if such action is prompted by a desire to avoid unionization. Given the Board’s findings on the issue of motive, acceptance of this contention would carry the day for the Board’s conclusion that the closing of this plant was an unfair labor practice, even on the assumption that Darlington is to be regarded as an independent unrelated employer. A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act. We find neither. So far as legislative manifestation is concerned, it is sufficient to say that there is not the slightest indication in the history of the Wagner Act or of the Taft-Hartley Act that Congress envisaged any such result under either statute. As for judicial precedent, the Board recognized that “[t]here is no decided case directly dispositive of Darling-ton’s claim that it had an absolute right to close its mill, irrespective of motive.” 139 N. L. R. B., at 250. The only language by this Court in any way adverting to this problem is found in Southport Petroleum Co. v. Labor Board, 315 U. S. 100, 106, where it was stated: “Whether there was a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership — which would terminate the duty of reinstatement created by the Board’s order — or merely a disguised continuance of the old employer, does not clearly appear . . . .” The courts of appeals have generally assumed that a complete cessation of business will remove an employer from future coverage by the Act. Thus the Court of Appeals said in these cases: The Act “does not compel a person to become or remain an employee. It does not compel one to become or remain an employer. Either may withdraw from that status with immunity, so long as the obligations of any employment contract have been met.” 325 F. 2d, at 685. The Eighth Circuit, in Labor Board v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F. 2d 908, 914, was equally explicit: “But none of this can be taken to mean that an employer does not have the absolute right, at all times, to permanently close and go out of business ... for whatever reason he may choose, whether union animosity or anything else, and without his being thereby left subject to a remedial liability under the Labor Management Relations Act for such unfair labor practices as he may have committed in the enterprise, except up to the time that such actual and permanent closing . . . has occurred.” The AFL-CIO suggests in its amicus brief that Dar-lington’s action was similar to a discriminatory lockout, which is prohibited “ ‘because designed to frustrate organizational efforts, to destroy or undermine bargaining representation, or to evade the duty to bargain.’ ” One of the purposes of the Labor Relations Act is to prohibit the discriminatory use of economic weapons in an effort to obtain future benefits. The discriminatory lockout designed to destroy a union, like a “runaway shop,” is a lever which has been used to discourage collective employee activities in the future. But a complete liquidation of a business yields no such future benefit for the employer, if the termination is bona fide. It may be motivated more by spite against the union than by business reasons, but it is not the type of discrimination which is prohibited by the Act. The personal satisfaction that such an employer may derive from standing on his beliefs and the mere possibility that other employers will follow his example are surely too remote to be considered dangers at which the labor statutes were aimed. Although employees may be prohibited from engaging in a strike under certain conditions, no one would consider it a violation of the Act for the same employees to quit their employment en masse, even if motivated by a desire to ruin the employer. The very permanence of such action would negate any future economic benefit to the employees. The employer’s right to go out of business is no different. We are not presented here with the case of a “runaway shop,” whereby Darlington would transfer its work to another plant or open a new plant in another locality to replace its closed plant. Nor are we concerned with a shutdown where the employees, by renouncing the union, could cause the plant to reopen. Such cases would involve discriminatory employer action for the purpose of obtaining some benefit from the employees in the future. We hold here only that when an employer closes his entire business, even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness toward the union, such action is not an unfair labor practice. f — Í While we thus agree with the Court of Appeals that viewing Darlington as an independent employer the liquidation of its business was not an unfair labor practice, we cannot accept the lower court’s view that the same conclusion necessarily follows if Darlington is regarded as an integral part of the Deering Milliken enterprise. The closing of an entire business, even though discriminatory, ends the employer-employee relationship; the force of such a closing is entirely spent as to that business when termination of the enterprise takes place. On the other hand, a discriminatory partial closing may have repercussions on what remains of the business, affording employer leverage for discouraging the free exercise of § 7 rights among remaining employees of much the same kind as that found to exist in the “runaway shop” and “temporary closing” cases. See supra, pp. 272-273. Moreover, a possible remedy open to the Board in such a case, like the remedies available in the “runaway shop” and “temporary closing” cases, is to order reinstatement of the discharged employees in the other parts of the business. No such remedy is available when an entire business has been terminated. By analogy to those cases involving a continuing enterprise we are constrained to hold, in disagreement with the Court of Appeals, that a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a)(3) if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer may reasonably have foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect. While we have spoken in terms of a “partial closing” in the context of the Board’s finding that Darlington was part of a larger single enterprise controlled by the Milli-ken family, we do not mean to suggest that an organizational integration of plants or corporations is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of such a violation of § 8 (a) (3). If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being closed for antiunion reasons (1) have an interest in another business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the same line of commercial activity as the closed plant, of sufficient substantiality to give promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement of unionization in that business; (2) act to' close their plant with the purpose of producing such a result; and (3) occupy a relationship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable that its employees will fear that such business will also be closed down if they persist in organizational activities, we think that an unfair labor practice has been made out. Although the Board’s single employer finding necessarily embraced findings as to Roger Milliken and the Milliken family which, if sustained by the Court of Appeals, would satisfy the elements of “interest” and “relationship” with respect to other parts of the Deering Milliken enterprise, that and the other Board findings fall short of establishing the factors of “purpose” and “effect” which are vital requisites of the general principles that govern a case of this kind. Thus, the Board’s findings as to the purpose and foreseeable effect of the Darlington closing pertained only to its impact on the Darlington employees. No findings were made as to the purpose and effect of the closing with respect to the employees in the other plants comprising the Deering Milliken group. It does not suffice to establish the unfair labor practice charged here to argue that the Darlington closing necessarily had an adverse impact upon unionization in such other plants. We have heretofore observed that employer action which has a foreseeable consequence of discouraging concerted activities generally does not amount to a violation of § 8 (a) (3) in the absence of a showing of motivation which is aimed at achieving the prohibited effect. See Teamsters Local v. Labor Board, 365 U. S. 667, and the concurring opinion therein, at 677. In an area which trenches so closely upon otherwise legitimate employer prerogatives, we consider the absence of Board findings on this score a fatal defect in its decision. The Court of Appeals for its part did not deal with the question of purpose and effect at all, since it concluded that an employer’s right to close down his entire business because of distaste for unionism, also embraced a partial closing so motivated. Apart from this, the Board’s holding should not be accepted or rejected without court review of its single employer finding, judged, however, in accordance with the general principles set forth above. Review of that finding, which the lower court found unnecessary on its view of the cause, now becomes necessary in light of our holding in this part of our opinion, and is a task that devolves upon the Court of Appeals in the first instance. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474. In these circumstances, we think the proper disposition of this cause is to require that it be remanded to the Board so as to afford the Board the opportunity to make further findings on the issue of purpose and effect. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 479-480. This is particularly appropriate here since the cases involve issues of first impression. If such findings are made, the cases will then be in a posture for further review by the Court of Appeals on all issues. Accordingly, without intimating any view as to how any of these matters should eventuate, we vacate the judgments of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases to that court with instructions to remand them to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of these cases. Mr. Justice Goldberg took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Deering Milliken & Co. owned 41% of the Darlington stock. Cotwool Manufacturing Corp., another textile manufacturer, owned 18% of the stock. In 1960 Deering Milliken & Co. was merged into Cotwool, the survivor being named Deering Milliken, Inc. The Milliken family owned only 6% of the Darlington stock, but held a majority stock interest in both Deering Milliken & Co. and Cotwool, see n. 1, supra. The Board found that Darlington had interrogated employees and threatened to close the mill if the union won the election. After the decision to liquidate was made (see infra), Darlington employees were told that the decision to close was caused by the election, and they were encouraged to sign a petition disavowing the union. These practices were held to violate § 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, n. 4, infra, and that part of the Board decision is not challenged here. National Labor Relations Act, §§8 (a)(1) and (3), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. §§158 (a)(1) and (3) (1958 ed.), provide in pertinent part: “(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— "(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 [section 157 of this title]; “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . .” The union asked for a bargaining conference on September 12, 1956 (the day that the board of directors voted to liquidate), but was told to await certification by the Board. The union was certified on October 24, and did meet with Darlington officials in November, but no actual bargaining took place. The Board found this to be a violation of §8 (a)(5). Such a finding was in part based on the determination that the plant closing was an unfair labor practice, and no argument is made that § 8 (a) (5) requires an employer to bargain concerning a purely business decision to terminate his enterprise. Cf. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Labor Board, 379 U. S. 203. Since the closing was held to be illegal, the Board found that the gradual discharges of all employees during November and December constituted §8 (a)(1) violations. The propriety of this determination depends entirely on whether the decision to close the plant violated § 8 (a) (3). Members Leedom and Rodgers agreed with the trial examiner that Deering Milliken was not a single employer. Member Rodgers dissented in arguing that Darlington had not violated § 8 (a) (3) by closing. The Board did find that Darlington’s discharges of employees following the decision to close violated §8 (a)(1). See n. 6, supra. NLRA § 7, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1958 ed.), provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3) [section 158 (a)(3) of this title].” It is also clear that the ambiguous act of closing a plant following the election of a union is not, absent an inquiry into the employer’s motive, inherently discriminatory. We are thus not confronted with a situation where the employer “must be held to intend the very consequences which foreseeable and inescapably flow from his actions . . (Labor Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 228), in which the Board could find a violation of § 8 (a) (3) without an examination into motive. See Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, 42-43; Teamsters Local v. Labor Board, 365 U. S. 667, 674-676. The Board predicates its argument on the finding that Deering Milliken was an integrated enterprise, and does not consider it necessary to argue that an employer may not go completely out of business for antiunion reasons. Brief for National Labor Relations Board, p. 3, n. 2. In New Madrid the business was transferred to a new employer, which was held liable for the unfair labor practices committed by its predecessor before closing. The closing itself was not found to be an unfair labor practice. Brief for AFL-CIO, p. 7, quoting from Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Local, 353 U. S. 87, 93. This brief was incorporated by reference as Point I of the petitioner union’s brief in this Court. The Darlington property and equipment could not be sold as a unit, and were eventually auctioned off piecemeal. We therefore are not confronted with a sale of a going concern, which might present different considerations under §§ 8 (a)(3) and (5). Cf. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543; Labor Board v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U. S. 398. Cf. NLKA § 8 (c), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (c) (1958 ed.). Different considerations would arise were it made to appear that the closing employer was acting pursuant to some arrangement or understanding with other employers to discourage employee organizational activities in their businesses. E. g., Labor Board v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F. 2d 346; Labor Board v. Wallick, 198 F. 2d 477. An analogous problem is presented where a department is closed for antiunion reasons but the work is continued by independent contractors. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc., 298 F. 2d 895; Jays Foods, Inc. v. Labor Board, 292 F. 2d 317; Labor Board v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F. 2d 44; Labor Board v. Bank of America, 130 F. 2d 624; Williams Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 128 F. 2d 960. After the decision to close the plant, Darlington accepted no new orders, and merely continued operations for a time to fill pending orders. 139 N. L. R. B., at 244. E. g., Labor Board v. Norma Mining Corp., 206 F. 2d 38. Similarly, if all employees are discharged but the work continues with new personnel, the effect is to discourage any future union activities. See Labor Board v. Waterman S. S. Co., 309 U. S. 206; Labor Board v. National Garment Co., 166 F. 2d 233; Labor Board v. Stremel, 141 F. 2d 317. All of the eases to which we have been cited involved closings found to have been motivated, at least in part, by the expectation of achieving future benefits. See cases cited in notes 16, 18, supra. The two cases which are urged as indistinguishable from Darlington are Labor Board v. Savoy Laundry, 327 F. 2d 370, and Labor Board v. Missouri Transit Co., 250 F. 2d 261. In Savoy Laundry the employer operated one laundry plant where he processed both retail laundry pickups and wholesale laundering. Once the laundry was marked, all of it was processed together. After some of the employees organized, the employer discontinued most of the wholesale service, and thereafter discharged some of his employees. There was no separate wholesale department, and the discriminatory motive was obviously to discourage unionization in the entire plant. Missouri Transit presents a similar situation. A bus company operated an interstate line and an intrastate shuttle service connecting a military base with the interstate terminal. When the union attempted to organize all of the drivers, the shuttle service was sold and the shuttle drivers were discharged. Although the two services were treated as separate departments, it is clear from the facts of the case that the union was attempting to organize all of the drivers, and the discriminatory motive of the employer was to discourage unionization in the interstate service as well as the shuttle service. Nothing we have said in this opinion would justify an employer’s interfering with employee organizational activities by threatening to close his plant, as distinguished from announcing a decision to close already reached by the board of directors or other management authority empowered to make such a decision. We recognize that this safeguard does not wholly remove the possibility that our holding may result in some deterrent effect on organizational activities independent of that arising from the closing itself. An employer may be encouraged to make a definitive decision to close on the theory that its mere announcement before a representation election will discourage the employees from voting for the union, and thus his decision may not have to be implemented. Such a possibility is not likely to occur, however, except in a marginal business; a solidly successful employer is not apt to hazard the possibility that the employees will call his bluff by voting to organize. We see no practical way of eliminating this possible consequence of our holding short of allowing the Board to order an employer who chooses so to gamble with his employees not to carry out his announced intention to close. We do not consider the matter of sufficient significance in the overall labor-management relations picture to require or justify a decision different from the one we have made. In the -view we take of these cases we do not reach any of the challenges made "to the Board’s remedy afforded here. See n. 10, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NEW MOTOR VEHICLE BOARD OF CALIFORNIA et al. v. ORRIN W. FOX CO. et al. No. 77-837. Argued October 3-4, 1978 Decided December 5, 1978 BreNNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Marshall, and RehNQuist, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 111. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which Powell, J., joined, post, p. 113. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 114. Robert L. Mukai, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellants in No. 77-837. With him on the briefs were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Stephen J. Egan, Deputy Attorney General. James R. McCall argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants in No. 77-849. William T. Coleman, Jr., argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief were Girard E. Boudreau, Jr., George R. Baffa, Norin T. Grancell, Otis M. Smith, and Robert W. Culver. Together with No. 77-849, Northern California Motor Car Dealers Assn, et al. v. Orrin W. Fox Co. et al., also on appeal from the same court. Me. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the California Automobile Franchise Act, a motor vehicle manufacturer must secure the approval of the California New Motor Vehicle Board before opening a retail motor vehicle dealership within the market area of an existing franchisee, if and only if that existing franchisee protests the establishment of the competing dealership. The Act also directs the Board to notify the manufacturer of this statutory requirement upon the filing of a timely protest by an existing franchisee. The Board is not required to hold a hearing on the merits of the dealer protest before sending the manufacturer the notice of the requirement. A three-judge District Court for the Central District of California entered a judgment declaring that the absence of such a prior-hearing requirement denied manufacturers and their proposed franchisees the procedural due process mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment, 440 F. Supp. 436 (1977). We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals in both No. 77-837 and No. 77-849, 434 U. S. 1060 (1978). We now reverse. I The disparity in bargaining power between automobile manufacturers and their dealers prompted Congress and some 25 States to enact legislation to protect retail car dealers from perceived abusive and oppressive acts by the manufacturers. California’s version is its Automobile Franchise Act. Among its other safeguards, the Act protects the equities of existing dealers by prohibiting automobile manufacturers from adding dealerships to the market areas of its existing franchisees where the effect of such intrabrand competition would be injurious to the existing franchisees and to the public interest. To enforce this prohibition, the Act requires an automobile manufacturer who proposes to establish a new retail automobile dealership in the State, or to relocate an existing one, first to give notice of such intention to the California New Motor Vehicle Board and to each of its existing franchisees in the same “line-make” of automobile located within the “relevant market area,” defined as “any area within a radius of 10 miles from the site of [the] potential new dealership.” If any existing franchisee within the market area protests to the Board within 15 days, the Board is required to convene a hearing within 60 days to determine whether there is good cause for refusing to permit the establishment or relocation of the dealership. The Board is also required to inform the franchisor, upon the filing of a timely protest, “that a timely protest has been filed, that a hearing is required . . . , and that the franchisor shall not establish or relocate the proposed dealership until the board has held a hearing . . . , nor thereafter, if the board has determined that there is good cause, for not permitting such dealership.” Violation of the statutory requirements by a franchisor is a misdemeanor and ground for suspension or revocation of a license to do business. Appellee General Motors Corp. manufactures, among other makes, Buick and Chevrolet cars. Appellee Orrin W. Fox Co. signed a franchise agreement with appellee General Motors in May 1975 to establish a new Buick dealership in Pasadena. Appellee Muller Chevrolet agreed with appellee General Motors to transfer its existing Chevrolet franchise from Glendale to La Canada, Cal., in December 1975. The proposed establishment of Fox and relocation of Muller were protested respectively by existing Buick and Chevrolet dealers. The New Motor Vehicle Board responded, as required by the Act, by notifying appellees that the protests had been filed and that therefore they were not to establish or relocate the dealerships until the Board had held the hearings required by the Act, nor thereafter if the Board determined that there was good cause for not permitting such dealerships. Before either protest proceeded to a Board hearing, however, appellees General Motors, Fox, and Muller brought the instant action. II At the outset it is important to clarify the nature of the due process challenge before us. Appellees and the dissent characterize the statute as entitling a protesting dealership to a summary administrative adjudication in the-form of a notice having the effect of a temporary injunction restraining appellee General Motors’ exercise of its right to franchise at will. We disagree. The Board’s notice has none of the attributes of an injunction. It creates no duty, violation of which would constitute contempt. Nor does it restrain appellee General Motors from exercising any right that it had previously enjoyed; General Motors had no interest in franchising that was immune from state regulation. It was the Act, not the Board’s notice, that curtailed General Motors’ right to franchise at will. The California Vehicle Code explicitly conditions a motor vehicle manufacturer’s right to terminate, open, or relocate a dealership upon the manufacturer’s compliance with the procedural requirements enacted in the Automobile Franchise Act and, if necessary, upon the approval of the New Motor Vehicle Board. The Board’s notice served only to inform appellee General Motors of this statutory scheme and to advise it of the status, pending the Board’s determination, of its franchise permit applications. Moreover, the Board’s notice can hardly be characterized as an administrative order. Issuance of the notice did not involve the exercise of discretion. The notice neither found nor assumed the existence of any adjudicative facts. The notice did not terminate or suspend any right or interest that General Motors was then enjoying. The notice did not deprive General Motors of any personal property, or terminate any of the incidents of its license to do business. Thus, this is not a case like Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), and Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), relied upon by appellees, in which a state official summarily finds or assumes the existence of certain adjudicative facts and based thereon suspends the enjoyment of an entitlement. There has not yet been either the determination of adjudicative facts, the exercise of discretion, or a suspension. Notwithstanding all this, appellees argue that the state scheme deprives them of their liberty to pursue their lawful occupation without due process of law. Appellees contend that absent a prior individualized trial-type hearing they are constitutionally entitled to establish or relocate franchises while their applications for approval of such proposals are awaiting Board determination. Appellees’ argument rests on the assumption that General Motors has a due process protected interest right to franchise at will — which asserted right survived the passage of the California Automobile Franchise Act. The narrow question before us, then, is whether California may, by rule or statute, temporarily delay the establishment or relocation of automobile dealerships pending the Board’s adjudication of the protests of existing dealers. Or stated conversely, the issue is whether, as the District Court held and the dissent argues, the right to franchise without delay is the sort of interest that may be suspended only on a case-by-case basis through prior individualized trial-type hearings. We disagree with the District Court and the dissent. Even if the right to franchise had constituted a protected interest when California enacted the Automobile Franchise Act, California’s Legislature was still constitutionally empowered to enact a general scheme of business regulation that imposed reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of the right. “[T]he fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 14 (1965). At least since the demise of the concept of “substantive due process” in the area of economic regulation, this Court has recognized that, “[¡legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic problems . . . .” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730 (1963). States may, through general ordinances, restrict the commercial use of property, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926), and the geographical location of commercial enterprises, see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 491 (1955). Moreover, “[c]ertain kinds of business may be prohibited; and the right to conduct a business, or to pursue a calling, may be conditioned. . . . [S]tatutes prescribing the terms upon which those conducting certain businesses may contract, or imposing terms if they do enter into agreements, are within the state’s competency.” Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 528 (1934). In particular, the California Legislature was empowered to subordinate the franchise rights of automobile manufacturers to the conflicting rights of their franchisees where necessary to prevent unfair or oppressive trade practices. “[Sjtates have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law. . . . [T]he due process clause is [not] to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a straitjacket when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive to the public welfare.” Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U. S. 525, 536-537 (1949). See also North Dakota Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U. S. 156 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, supra; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., supra. Further, the California Legislature had the authority to protect the conflicting rights of the motor vehicle franchisees through customary and reasonable procedural safeguards, i. e., by providing existing dealers with notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial tribunal — the New Motor Vehicle Board — before their franchisor is permitted to inflict upon them grievous loss. Such procedural safeguards cannot be said to deprive the franchisor of due process. States may, as California has done here, require businesses to secure regulatory approval before engaging in specified practices. See, e. g., North Dakota Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, supra (pharmacy-operating permit); St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269 (1919) (billboard permits) ; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (1917) (securities registration); Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572 (1913) (milk inspection); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183 (1900) (cigarette sales license). These precedents compel the conclusion that the District Court erred in holding that the California Legislature was powerless temporarily to delay appellees’ exercise of the right to grant or undertake a Buick or Chevrolet dealership and the right to move one’s business facilities from one location to another without providing a prior individualized trial-type hearing. Once having enacted a reasonable general scheme of business regulation, California was not required to provide for a prior individualized hearing each and every time the provisions of the Act had the effect of delaying consummation of the business plans of particular individuals. In the area of business regulation “[g]eneral statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.” Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U. S. 441, 445 (1915). Ill Appellees and the dissent argue that the California scheme constitutes an impermissible delegation of state power to private citizens because the Franchise Act requires the Board to delay franchise establishments and relocations only when protested by existing franchisees who have unfettered discretion whether or not to protest. The argument has no merit. Almost any system of private or quasi-private law could be subject to the same objection. Court approval of an eviction, for example, becomes necessary only when the tenant protests his eviction, and he alone decides whether he will protest. An otherwise valid regulation is not rendered invalid simply because those whom the regulation is designed to safeguard may elect to forgo its protection. See Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526 (1917). IV Appellees next contend that the Automobile Franchise Act conflicts with the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. They argue that by delaying the establishment of automobile dealerships whenever competing dealers protest, the state scheme gives effect to privately initiated restraints on trade, and thus is invalid under Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951). The dispositive answer is that the Automobile Franchise Act’s regulatory scheme is a system of regulation, clearly articulated and afflrmatively expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships. The regulation is therefore outside the reach of the antitrust laws under the “state action” exemption. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977). See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978). The Act does not lose this exemption simply because, as part of its regulatory framework, it accords existing dealers notice and an opportunity to be heard before their franchisor is permitted to locate a dealership likely to subject them to injurious and possibly illegal competition. Protests serve only to trigger Board action. They do not mandate significant delay. On the contrary, the Board has the authority to order an immediate hearing on a dealer protest if it concludes that the public interest so requires. The duration of interim restraint is subject to ongoing regulatory supervision. Appellees’ reliance upon Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., supra, is misplaced. In Schwegmann, the State attempted to authorize and immunize private conduct viola-tive of the antitrust laws. California has not done that here. Protesting dealers who invoke in good faith their statutory right to governmental action in the form of a Board determination that there is good cause for not permitting a proposed dealership do not violate the Sherman Act, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961), and Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 670 (1965) Appellees also argue conflict with the Sherman Act because the Automobile Franchise Act permits auto dealers to invoke state power for the purpose of restraining intrabrand competition. “This is merely another way of stating that the . . . statute will have an anticompetitive effect. In this sense, there is a conflict between the statute and the central policy of the Sherman Act — ‘our charter of economic liberty.’ . . . Nevertheless, this sort of conflict cannot itself constitute a sufficient reason for invalidating the . . . statute. For if an adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, the States’ power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed.” Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 133 (1978). Reversed. The pertinent provisions of the Automobile Franchise Act are as follows: “3062. Establishing or relocating dealerships “(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), in the event that a franchisor seeks to enter into a franchise establishing an additional motor vehicle dealership within a relevant market area where the same line-make is then represented, or relocating an existing motor vehicle dealership the franchisor shall in writing first notify the Board and each franchisee in such line-make in the relevant market area of his intention to establish an additional dealership or to relocate an existing dealership within or into that market area. Within 15 days of receiving such notice or within 15 days after the end of any appeal procedure provided by the franchisor, any such franchisee may file with the board a protest to the establishing or relocating of the dealership. When such a protest is filed, the board shall inform the franchisor that a timely protest has been filed, that a hearing is required pursuant to Section 3066, and that the franchisor shall not establish or relocate the proposed dealership until the board has held a hearing as provided in Section 3066, nor thereafter, if the board has determined that there is good cause for not permitting such dealership. In the event of multiple protests, hearings may be consolidated to expedite the disposition of the issue. “For the purposes of this section, the reopening in a relevant market area of a dealership that has not been in operation for one year or more shall be deemed the establishment of an additional motor vehicle dealership. “3063. Good cause “In determining whether good cause has been established for not entering into or relocating an additional franchise for the same line-make, the board shall take into consideration the existing circumstances, including, but not limited to: “(1) Permanency of the investment. “(2) Effect on the retail motor vehicle business and the consuming public in the relevant market area. “(3) Whether it is injurious to the public welfare for an additional franchise to be established. “(4) Whether the franchisees of the same line-make in that relevant market area are providing adequate competition and convenient consumer care for the motor vehicles of the line-make in the market area which shall include the adequacy of motor vehicle sales and service facilities, equipment, supply of vehicle parts, and qualified service personnel. “(5) Whether the establishment of an additional franchise would increase competition and therefore be in the public interest.” Cal. Veh. Code Ann. §§ 3062, 3063 (West Supp. 1978). Appellants in No. 77-849 were made defendants in intervention by uneontested order of the District Court. On application of appellants in No. 77-837, Mr. Justice RehNQüist stayed the District Court judgment, 434 U. S. 1345, (1977) (in chambers). Appellants in No. 77-837 argue that the District Court should have abstained under the rule of Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941), arguing that the state courts might have construed the Automobile Franchise Act so as to limit or avoid the federal constitutional question. The District Court correctly refused to abstain. Abstention may appropriately be denied where, as here, there is no ambiguity in the challenged state statute. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 439 (1971). A congressional Committee reported in 1956: “Automobile production is one of the most highly concentrated industries in the United States, a matter of grave concern to officers of the Government charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws. Today there exist only 5 passenger-ear manufacturers, 3 of which produce in excess of 95 percent of all passenger cars sold in the United States. There are approximately 40,000 franchised automobile dealers distributing to the public cars produced by these manufacturers. Dealers have an average investment of about $100,000. This vast disparity in economic power and bargaining strength has enabled the factory to determine arbitrarily the rules by which the two parties conduct their business affairs. These rules are incorporated in the sales agreement or franchise which the manufacturer has prepared for the dealer’s signature. “Dealers are with few exceptions completely dependent on the manufacturer for their supply of cars. When the dealer has invested to the extent required to secure a franchise, he becomes in a real sense the economic captive of his manufacturer. The substantial investment of his own personal funds by the dealer in the business, the inability to convert easily the facilities to other uses, the dependence upon a single manufacturer for supply of automobiles, and the difficulty of obtaining a franchise from another manufacturer all contribute toward making the dealer an easy prey for domination by the factory. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the automobile manufacturer, any single dealer is expendable. The faults of the factory-dealer system are directly attributable to the superior market position of the manufacturer.” S. Rep. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1956). See also S. Macaulay, Law and the Balance of Power: The Automobile Manufacturers and Their Dealers (1966). See Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1221-1225; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28-1304.02 (1976); Cal. Veh. Code Ann. §3060 et seq. (West Supp. 1978); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-6-120 (1973); Fla. Stat. §320.641 (1977); Ga. Code § 84-6610 (f) (Supp. 1977); Haw. Rev. Stat. §437-33 (1976); Idaho Code §49-1901 et seq. (1967); Iowa Code § 322A.2 (1977); Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 15-207 (1977); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 93B, § 4 (3) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-1422 (1974); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 357-B:4 III (c) (Supp. 1977); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 64-37-5 (Supp. 1975); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 20-305 (5) (1978); N. D. Cent. Code §51-07-01.1 (Supp. 1977); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4517.41 (Supp. 1977); Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, §565 (j) (Supp. 1978); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 63, § 805 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979); R. I. Gen. Laws §31-5.1-4 (Supp. 1977); S. C. Code § 56-15-40 (3) (c) (1977); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 32-6A-5 (1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1714 (c) (Supp. 1978); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 9, § 4074 (Supp. 1977-1978); Va. Code § 46.1-547 (Supp. 1978); W. Va. Code § 47-17-5 (Supp. 1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. §218.01 (1957 and Supp. 1978-1979). California first adopted special regulations applicable to dealers and manufacturers of automobiles in 1923. 1923 Cal. Stats., ch. 266, §§ 46 (a), (b). These required dealers and manufacturers to apply for certification and special identifying license plates as a condition of exemption from generally applicable registration requirements. In 1957 the former certification procedure became a licensing provision, and all automobile dealers were required to apply for licenses to qualify for and continue to hold the registration exemption. 1957 Cal. Stats., ch. 1319, § 7. In addition, it became unlawful on and after October 1, 1957, to act as a dealer without having procured a license. Ibid. The prohibition on unlicensed activity was extended to manufacturers and motor vehicle transporters by 1967 Cal. Stats., ch. 557, § 1. That statute made it unlawful for any person to act as a dealer, manufacturer, or transporter of motor vehicles without a valid license and certificate issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles. §2. The 1967 statute also created the New Motor Vehicle Board, originally empowered to handle licensing of new automobile retail dealerships and to review decisions of the Department of Motor Vehicles disciplining dealers. Its powers were expanded in 1973 by the Automobile Franchise Act to empower the Board to deal with the establishment of new franchises and the relocation of existing franchises. The California Legislature expressly stated that this Act was passed “in order to avoid undue control of the independent new motor vehicle dealer by the vehicle manufacturer or distributor and to insure that dealers fulfill their obligations under their franchises and provide adequate and sufficient service to consumers generally.” 1973 Cal. Stats., ch. 996, § 1. The Act also sets forth rules and procedures governing franchise cancellations, delivery and preparation obligations and warranty reimbursement. See Cal. Veh. Code Ann. §§ 3060, 3061, 3064, and 3065 (West Supp. 1978). For a helpful discussion of the purpose served by such laws — the promotion of fair dealing and the protection of small business — see Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78, 138 N. W. 2d 214 (1965). This concern has prompted at least 18 other States to enact statutes which, like the Automobile Franchise Act, prescribe conditions under which new or additional dealerships may be permitted in the territory of the existing dealership. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1304.02 (1976); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-6-120 (1973); Fla. Stat. §320.642 (1977); Ga. Code §§84-6610 (f)(8), (10) (Supp. 1977); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§437-28 (a), (b) (22) (1976); Iowa Code § 322A.4 (1977); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 93B, § 4 (3) (e) (1) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-1422 (1974); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §357-B:4 III (c) (Supp. 1977); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 64-37-5 (Supp. 1975); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 20-305 (5) (1978) ; R. I. Gen. Laws § 31-5.1-4 (C) (11) (Supp. 1977); S. D. Comp.'Laws Ann. §§ 32-6A-3 to 32-6A-4 (1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1714 (Supp. 1978); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 9, § 4074 (c) (9) (Supp. 1977-1978); Va. Code § 46.1-547 (d) (Supp. 1978); W. Va. Code § 47-17-5 (i) (Supp. 1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§218.01 (3), (8) (1957 and Supp. 1978-1979). See Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 507 (West Supp. 1978). Within 30 days after the hearing, or of a decision of a hearing officer, the Board must render its decision, or the establishment or relocation of the proposed franchise is deemed approved. See Cal. Veh. Code Ann. §3067 (West Supp. 1978). See n. 1, supra. California Veh. Code Ann. § 11713.2 (West Supp. 1978) provides: “It shall be unlawful and a violation of this code for any manufacturer, manufacturer branch, distributor, or distributor branch licensed under this code: “(1) To modify, replace, enter into, relocate, terminate or refuse to renew a franchise in violation of Article 4 (commencing with Section 3060) of Chapter 6 of Division 2.” The California Legislature expressly identified the state interests being served by the Franchise Act as “the general economy of the state and the public welfare . . which made it “necessary to regulate and to license vehicle dealers [and] manufacturers . . . .” The statute states: “[T]he distribution and sale of new motor vehicles in the State of California vitally affects the general economy of the state and the public welfare and ... in order to promote the public welfare and in the exercise of its police power, it is necessary to regulate and to license vehicle dealers, manufacturers, manufacturer branches, distributors, distributor branches, and representatives of vehicle manufacturers and distributors doing business in California in order to avoid undue control of the independent new motor vehicle dealer by the vehicle manufacturer or distributor and to insure that dealers fulfill their obligations under their franchises and provide adequate and sufficient service to consumers generally.” 1973 Cal. Stats., ch. 996, § 1. The District Court did not pass upon this contention. We choose to address it because the underlying facts are undisputed and the question presented is purely one of law. Appellees state, without challenge by appellants: “117 protests have been filed under § 3062 since the Act became effective (July 1, 1974). Of these, only 42 have gone to a hearing on the merits, and only one has been sustained by the Board .... Thus, of 117 automatic temporary injunctions issued by the Board, only one ever matured into a permanent injunction.” Brief for Appellees 10 n. 13. Dealers who press sham protests before the New Motor Vehicle Board for the sole purpose of delaying the establishment of competing dealerships may be vulnerable to suits under the federal antitrust laws. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508 (1972).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McCARTHY v. PHILADELPHIA CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION No. 75-783. Decided March 22, 1976 Per Curiam. After 16 years of service, appellant’s employment in the Philadelphia Fire Department was terminated because he moved his permanent residence from Philadelphia to New Jersey in contravention of a municipal regulation requiring employees of the city of Philadelphia to be residents of the city. He challenges the constitutionality of the regulation and the authorizing ordinances as violative of his federally protected right of interstate travel. The regulation was sustained by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania and review was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. His timely appeal is here pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). The Michigan Supreme Court held that Detroit’s similar requirement for police officers was not irrational and did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We dismissed the appeal from that judgment because no substantial federal question was presented. Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 405 U. S. 950 (1972). We have therefore held that this kind of ordinance is not irrational. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 343-345 (1975); see War dwell v. Board of Education of Cincinnati, 529 F. 2d 625, 628 (CA6 1976). We have not, however, specifically addressed the contention made by appellant in this case that his constitutionally recognized right to travel interstate as defined in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974), is impaired. Each of those cases involved a statutory requirement of residence in the State for at least one year before becoming eligible either to vote, as in Dunn, or to receive welfare benefits, as in Sha.piro and Memorial Hospital. Neither in those cases, nor in any others, have we questioned the validity of a condition placed upon municipal employment that a person be a resident at the time of his application. In this case appellant claims a constitutional right to be employed by the city of Philadelphia while he is living elsewhere. There is no support in our cases for such a claim. We have previously differentiated between a requirement of continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration. Thus in Shapiro, supra, at 636, we stated: “The residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites.”. And in Memorial Hospital, supra, at 255, quoting Dunn, supra, at 342 n. 13, the Court explained that Shapiro and Dunn did not question “ ‘the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements.' ” This case involves that kind of bona fide continuing-residence requirement. The judgment of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is therefore affirmed. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Blackmun would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument. § 7-401 (u) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter of 1951 ; § 20-101 of the Philadelphia Code (as amended); and § 30.01 of the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations. 19 Pa. Commw. 383, 339 A. 2d 634 (1975). In an unreported order entered on September 2, 1975, that court denied a petition for review. Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N. W. 2d 97 (1971). Although there is a durational residence requirement in the Philadelphia ordinances, appellant does not have standing to challenge that requirement. Nor did any of those cases involve a public agency’s relationship with its own employees which, of course, may justify greater control than that over the citizenry at large. Cf. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973). Appellant seeks review of other alleged errors as if presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari. We decline to review those issues.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. STROOP et al. No. 89-535. Argued March 26, 1990 Decided June 14, 1990 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 485. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 496. Clifford M. Sloan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, and Robert D. Kamenshine. Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia, R. Claire Guthrie, Deputy Attorney General, John A. Rupp, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas J. Czelusta, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for Larry D. Jackson as respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.4, in support of petitioner. Jamie B. Aliperti argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief for respondents Elizabeth Stroop et al. was Claire E. Curry. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we review a determination by petitioner, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, that “child’s insurance benefits” paid pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, see 49 Stat. 623, as amended, 42 U. S. C § 402(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), do not constitute “child support” as that term is used in a provision in Title IV of the Act governing eligibility for Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). See 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed., Supp. V). We uphold the Secretary’s determination and reverse the contrary holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Title IV requires the applicable agencies of States participating in the AFDC program to consider “other income and resources of any child or relative claiming” AFDC benefits “in determining need” for benefits. § 602(a)(7)(A). The state agencies “shall determine ineligible for aid any family the combined value of whose resources . . . exceeds” the level specified in the Act. § 602(a)(7)(B). Central to this case is one of the amendments to Title IV in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. 98-369, §2640, 98 Stat. 1146-1146, affecting eligibility for AFDC benefits. This amendment provides: “. . . [W]ith respect to any month, in making the determination under [§ 602(a)(7)], the State agency— “shall disregard the first $50 of any child support payments received in such month with respect to the dependent child or children in any family applying for or receiving aid to families with dependent children (including support payments collected and paid to the family under section 657(b) of this title). . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). The Secretary has declined to “disregard” under this provision the first $50 of Title II Social Security child’s insurance benefits paid on behalf of children who are members of families applying for AFDC benefits. In the Secretary’s view, the Government-funded child’s insurance benefits are not “child support” for purposes of § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) because that term, as used throughout Title IV, “invariably refers to payments from absent parents.” Brief for Petitioner 13. Respondents are custodial parents receiving AFDC benefits who are aggrieved by the implementation of the DEFRA amendments. They sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia challenging petitioner’s interpretation of the disregard on statutory and constitutional grounds. See Complaint, App. 31-33. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents on the basis of their statutory challenge and thereby avoided reaching the constitutional challenge. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court. Stroop v. Bowen, 870 F. 2d 969, 975 (1989). According to the Court of Appeals, Congress nowhere explicated its use of the term “child support” in § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) and the only known discussion of the purpose of the disregard provision is in our decision in Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S. 587 (1987). As read by the Court of Appeals, Bowen noted that “the disregard of the first $50 paid by a father serves to mitigate the burden of the changes wrought by the DEFRA amendments.” 870 F. 2d, at 974 (citing 483 U. S., at 594). The court reasoned that although we had not considered the question of Title II child’s insurance payments in Bowen, the disregarding of the first $50 of such payments, “received in lieu of payments made by a father,” would serve the same purpose of mitigating the harshness of the DEFRA amendments. 870 F. 2d, at 974. Since AFDC applicants receiving Title II child’s insurance benefits are burdened by the DEFRA amendments no less than applicants receiving payments directly from noncustodial parents, no rational basis exists for according one class of families the mitigating benefit of the disregard while depriving another indistinguishable class of families of the same benefit. The court thus rejected the Secretary’s interpretation of the disregard and added that to construe § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) to exclude the Title II benefits from the disregard would raise constitutional equal protection concerns. Id., at 975. We granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 1018 (1990), to resolve the conflict between the decision of the Fourth Circuit and the contrary holding of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Todd v. Norman, 840 F. 2d 608 (1988). We think the Secretary’s construction is amply supported by the text of the statute which shows that Congress used “child support” throughout Title IV of the Social Security Act and its amendments as a term of art referring exclusively to payments from absent parents. This being the case, we need go no further: “'If the statute is clear and unambiguous “that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” ... In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.’” K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291-292 (1988) (internal citations omitted). As an initial matter, the common usage of “child support” refers to legally compulsory payments made by parents. Black’s Law Dictionary 217 (5th ed. 1979) defines “child support” as “[t]he legal obligation of parents to contribute to the economic maintenance, including education, of their children; enforceable in both civil and criminal contexts. In a dissolution or custody action, money paid by one parent to another toward the expenses of children of the marriage.” Attorneys who have practiced in the area of domestic relations law will immediately recognize this definition. Respondents insist, however, that we have traditionally “turned to authorities of general reference, not to legal dictionaries, to [give] ‘ordinary meaning to ordinary words.’” Brief for Respondents 20 (citing Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83, 91-92 (1990)). But the general reference work upon which respondents principally rely defines “child support” as “money paid for the care of one’s minor child, especially] payments to a divorced spouse or a guardian under a decree of divorce.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 358 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis added) (cited at Brief for Respondents 20). Respondents also seek to bolster their view with definitions of the word “support” from other dictionaries. Ibid. But where a phrase in a statute appears to have become a term of art, as is the case with “child support” in Title IV, any attempt to break down the term into its constituent words is not apt to illuminate its meaning. Congress’ use of “child support” throughout Title IV shows no intent to depart from common usage. As previously noted, the provisions governing eligibility for AFDC benefits, including the “disregard” provision in issue here, are contained in Title IV of the Social Security Act. 42 U. S. C. §§601-679a (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Title IV, as its heading discloses, establishes a unified program of grants “For Aid and Services to Needy Families With Children and For Child-Welfare Services” to be implemented through cooperative efforts of the States and the Federal Government. Part D of Title IV is devoted exclusively to “Child Support and Establishment of Paternity.” See §§651-667. The first provision in Part D authorizes appropriations “[f]or the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such children are living, [and] locating absent parents . . . .” 42 U. S.C. §651 (1982 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). The remainder of Part D, 42 U. S. C. §§652-667 (1982 ed. and Supp. V), abounds with references to “child support” in the context of compulsory support funds from absent parents. See, e. g., §§ 652(a)(1), 652(a)(7), 652(a)(10)(B), 652(a)(10)(C), 652(b), 653(c)(1), 654, 654(6), 654(19)(A), 654(19)(B), 656(b), 657(a), 659(a), 659(b), 659(d), 661(b)(3), 662(b). Section 653, indeed, creates an absent parent “Locator Service.” The statute also makes plain that Congress meant for the Part D Child Support program to work in tandem with the AFDC program which constitutes Part A of Title IV, §§601-615. Section 602(a)(27) requires state plans for AFDC participation to “provide that the State has in effect a plan approved under part D . . . and operates a child support program in substantial compliance with such plan.” Section 602(a)(26) requires State AFDC plans to “provide that, as a condition of eligibility for [AFDC benefits], each applicant or recipient will be required— “(A) to assign the State any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, . . . [and] “(B) to cooperate with the State . . . (ii) in obtaining support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is claimed . . . Part D, in turn, requires state plans implementing Title IV Child Support programs to “provide that (A) in any case in which support payments are collected for an individual with respect to whom an assignment under section 602(a)(26) [in Part A] of this title is effective, such payments shall be made to the State for distribution pursuant to section 657 [in Part D] of this title . . . §654(5). These cross-references illustrate Congress’ intent that the AFDC and Child Support programs operate together closely to provide uniform levels of support for children of equal need. That intent leads to the further conclusion that Congress used the term “child support” in § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi), and in Part A generally, in the limited sense given the term by its repeated use in Part D. The substantial relation between the two programs presents a classic case for application of the “normal rule of statutory construction that ‘ “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.””’ Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 87 (1934) (in turn quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932))). Since the Secretary’s interpretation of the § 602(a)(8)(A) (vi) disregard incorporates the definition of “child support” that we find plain on the face of the statute, our statutory inquiry is at an end. The disregard, accordingly, does not admit of the interpretation advanced by respondents and accepted by both courts below. Though Title II child’s insurance benefits might be characterized as “support” in the generic sense, they are not the sort of child support payments from absent parents envisioned in the Title IV scheme. The Title II payments are explicitly characterized in § 402(d) as “insurance” benefits and are paid out of the public treasury to all applicants meeting the statutory criteria. Thus no portion of any § 402(d) payments may be disregarded under § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi). The Court of Appeals construed the statute the way it did in part because it felt the construction we adopt would raise a serious doubt as to its constitutionality. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. We do not share that doubt. We agree with the Secretary that Congress’ desire to encourage the making of child support payments by absent parents, see, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§602(a)(26)(B)(ii) and 654(5) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (requiring APDC recipients to assist in the collection of child support payments for distribution by the States under Part D)), affords a rational basis for applying the disregard to payments from absent parents, but not to Title II insurance payments which are funded by the Government. This sort of statutory distinction does not violate the Equal Protection Clause “if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S., at 601. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RUDOLPH et ux. v. UNITED STATES. No. 396. Argued April 3, 1962. Decided June 18, 1962. Richard A. Freling argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Felix Atwood. John B. Jones, Jr. argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Wayne G. Barnett, I. Henry Kutz and Norman H. Wolfe. Charles W. Merritt filed a brief for the American Hotel Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Per Curiam. The petition for certiorari in this case was granted because it was thought to present important questions involving the definition of “income” and “ordinary and necessary” business expenses under the Internal Revenue Code. 368 U. S. 913. An insurance company provided a trip from its home office in Dallas, Texas, to New York City for a group of its agents and their wives. Rudolph and his wife were among the beneficiaries of this trip, and the Commissioner assessed its value to them as taxable income. It appears to be agreed between the parties that the tax consequences of the trip turn upon the Rudolphs’ “dominant motive and purpose” in taking the trip and the company’s in offering it. In this regard the District Court, on a suit for a refund, found that the trip was provided by the company for “the primary purpose of affording a pleasure trip ... in the nature of a bonus, reward, and compensation for a job well done” and that from the point of view of the Rudolphs it “was primarily a pleasure trip in the nature of a vacation . . . .” 189 P. Supp. 2, 4-5. The Court of Appeals approved these findings. 291 F. 2d 841. Such ultimate facts are subject to the “clearly erroneous” rule, cf. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U. S. 278, 289-291 (1960), and their review would be of no importance save to the litigants themselves. The appropriate disposition in such a situation is to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U. S. 70, 78 n. 2 (1955). Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Separate opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. Although the reasons given by the Court for dismissing the writ as improvidently granted should have been persuasive against granting certiorari, now that the case is here I think it better to decide it, two members of the Court having dissented on the merits. The courts below concluded (1) that the value of this “all expense” trip to the company-sponsored insurance convention constituted “gross income” to the petitioners within the meaning Qf § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and (2) that the amount reflected was not deductible as an “ordinary and necessary” business expense under § 162 of the Code. Both conclusions are, in my opinion, unassailable unless the findings of fact on which they rested are to be impeached by us as clearly erroneous. I do not think they can be on this record, especially in light of the “seasoned and wise rule of this Court” which “makes concurrent findings of two courts below final here in the absence of very exceptional showing of error.” Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U. S. 211, 214. The basic facts, found by the District Court, are as follows. Petitioners, husband and wife, reside in Dallas, Texas, where the home office of the husband’s employer, the Southland Life Insurance Company, is located. By having sold a predetermined amount of insurance, the husband qualified to attend the company’s convention in New York City in 1956 and, in line with company policy, to bring his wife with him. The petitioners, together with 150 other employees and officers of the insurance company, and 141 wives, traveled to and from New York City on special trains, and were housed in a single hotel during their two-and-one-half-day visit. One morning was devoted to a “business meeting” and group luncheon, the rest of the time in New York City to “travel, sightseeing, entertainment, fellowship or free time.” The entire trip lasted one wyeek. The company paid all the expenses of the convention-trip which amounted to $80,000; petitioners' allocable share being $560. When petitioners did not include the latter amount in their joint income .tax return, the Commissioner assessed a deficiency which was sustained by the District Court, 189 F. Supp. 2, and also by the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, in a per curiam opinion, 291 F. 2d 841, citing its recent decision in Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F. 2d 108, where the same result had been reached. The District Court held that the value of the trip being “in the nature .of a bonus, reward, and compensation for a job well done,” was income to Rudolph, but being “primarily a pleasure trip in the nature of a vacation,” the costs were personal and nondeductible. I. Under § 61 of the 1954 Code was the value of the trip to the taxpayer-husband properly includible in gross income? That section defines gross income as “all income from -whatever source derived,” including, among other items, “compensation for services.” Certain sections of the 1954 Code enumerate particular receipts which are included in the concept of “gross income,” including prizes and awards (with certain exceptions); while other sections, §§ 101-121, specifically exclude certain receipts from “gross income,” including, for example, gifts and inheritances (see Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U. S. 278), and meals or lodgings furnished for the convenience of the employer. The Treasury Regulations emphasize the inclusiveness of the concept of “gross income.” In light of the sweeping scope of § 61 taxing “all gains except those specifically exempted,” Commissioner v. Clenshaw Class Co., 348 U. S. 426, 430; see Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243, 246; James v. United States, 366 U. S. 213, 219, and its purpose to include as taxable income “any economic or financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected,” Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177, 181, it seems clear that the District Court’s findings, if sustainable, bring the value of the trip within the reach of the statute. Petitioners do not claim that the value of the trip is within one of the statutory exclusions from “gross income” (see notes 4 and 5, supra) as did the taxpayer in Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F. 2d 108, 111-112; rather they characterize the amount as a “fringe benefit” not specifically excluded from § 61 by other sections of the statute, yet not intended to be encompassed by its reach. Conceding that the statutory exclusions from “gross income” are not exhaustive, as the Government seems to recognize is so under Glenshaw, it is not now necessary to explore the extent of any such nonstatutory exclusions. For it was surely within the Commissioner’s competence to consider as “gross income” a “reward, or a bonus given to . . . employees for excellence in service,” which the District Court found was the employer’s primary purpose in arranging this trip. I cannot say that this finding, confirmed as it has been by the Court of Appeals, is inadequately supported by this record. II. There remains the question whether, though income, this outlay for transportation, meals, and lodging was deductible by petitioners as an “ordinary and necessary” business expense under § 162. The relevant factors on this branch of the case are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2. In summary, the regulation in pertinent part provides: Traveling expenses, including meals, lodgings and other incidentals, reasonable and necessary in the conduct of the taxpayer's business and directly attributable to it are deductible, but expenses of a trip “undertaken for other than business purposes” are “personal expenses” and the meals and lodgings are “living expenses.” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (a). If a taxpayer who travels to a destination engages in both “business and personal activities,” the traveling expenses are deductible only if the trip is “related primarily” to the taxpayer’s business; if “primarily personal,” the traveling expenses are not deductible even though the taxpayer engages in some business there; yet expenses allocable to the taxpayer’s trade or business there are deductible even though the travel expenses to and frq are not. Id., § 1.162-2 (b)(1). Whether a trip is related primarily to the taxpayer’s business or is primarily personal in nature “depends on the facts and circumstances in each case.” Id., § 1.162-2 (b) (2); so too with expenses paid or incurred in attending a convention. Id., § 1.162-2 (d). Finally, the deductibility of the expenses of a taxpayer’s wife who accompanies her husband depends, first, on whether his trip is a “business trip.” Id., § 1.162-2 (c); if so, it must further be shown that the wife’s presence on the trip also had a bona fide business purpose. Ibid. Where, as here,., it may be arguable that the trip was both for business and personal reasons, the crucial question is whether, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, the purpose of the trip was “related primarily to business” or was, rather, “primarily personal in nature.” That other trips to other conventions or meetings by other taxpayers were held to be primarily related to business is of no relevance here; that certain doctors, lawyers, clergymen, insurance agents or others have or have not been permitted similar deductions only shows that in the circumstances of those cases, the courts thought that the expenses were or were not deductible as “related primarily to business.” The husband places great emphasis on the fact that he is an entrapped “organization man,” required to attend such conventions, and that his future promotions depend on his presence. Suffice it to say that the District Court did not find any element of compulsion; to the contrary, it found that the petitioners regarded the convention in New York City as a pleasure trip in the nature of .a vacation. Again, I cannot say that these findings are without adequate evidentiary support. Supra, pp. 273-274. The trip not having been primarily a business trip, the wife’s expenses are not deductible. It is not necessary, therefore, to examine whether they would or would not be deductible if, to the contrary, the husband’s trip was reláted primarily to business. Where, as here, two courts below have resolved the determinative factual issues against the taxpayers, according to the rules of law set forth in the statute and regulations, it is not for this Court to re-examine the evidence, and disturb their findings, unless “clearly erroneous.” That is not the situation here. I would affirm. A joint return had been filed. As I see this case, there is no need to explore whether the proper reporting procedure for a deductible expense is not to include it in income in the first place, cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17 (b), or to “run it through” the taxpayer’s income with an offsetting deduction in the same amount. E. g., §71 (Alimony and separate maintenance payments), §72 (Annuities; certain proceeds of endowment and life insurance contracts), §73 (Services of child). § 74: “(a) General Rule. — Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section 117 (relating to scholarships and fellowship grants), gross income includes amounts received as prizes and awards. “(b) Exception. — Gross income does not include amounts received as prizes and awards made primarily in recognition of religious, charitable, scientific, educational, artistic, literary, or civic achievement, but only if — ■ “(1) the recipient was selected without any action on his part to enter the contest or proceeding; and “(2) the recipient is not required to render substantial future services as a condition to receiving the prize or award." § 102. § 119. Some of the other exclusions are § 101 (Certain death payments), §103 (Interest on certain governmental obligations), §104 (Compensation for injuries or sickness), § 105 (Amounts received under accident and health plans), §113 (Mustering-out payments for members of the Armed Forces), § 117 (Scholarship and fellowship grants). Treas. Reg. §1.61-1 (a) provides: “Gross income means all income from whatever source derived, unless excluded by law. Gross income includes income realized in any form, whether in money, property, or services. Income may be realized, therefore, in the form of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property, as well as in cash.” See also Treas. Reg. §1.61-2 (a)(1), (d) and §1.74-1 (a). Petitioners rely on § 3401 of the 1954 Code, relating to withholding taxes, and more especially on Treas. Reg. § 31.3401 (a)-l (b) (10) providing that certain fringe benefits are not considered “wages” subject to withholding. The Government admits that not all "fringe benefits” have been taxed as income, but it is enough to point out here that the withholding tax analogy is not perfect, for payments to laid-off employees from company-financed supplemental unemployment benefit plans are “taxable income” to the employees although not “wages” subject to withholding. Rev. Rul. 56-249, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 488, as amplified by Rev. Rul. 60-330, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 46. The District Court said (189 F. Supp., .at 4r-5): “All of the evidence considered, we think it irrefutably leads to this conclusion: That the insurance company was just doing a gracious magnanimous thing of awarding those leading agents a trip just as much as if it had awarded them an automobile, or suit of clothes .... “. . . [W]e conclude, that the trip was earned by . . . Rudolph, and was in the nature of a bonus, reward, and compensation for a job well done.” It is pertinent to note that in addition to the facts referred to on p. 271, supra, the record shows that company-sponsored conventions of the same kind have in recent years been held in Canada, Mexico City, Havana, Colorado and California, places well known for their appeal to tourists, and far removed from the home office in Dallas. While this factor alone does not render the expenses nondeductible, see I. R. S. News Rel. No. IR-394, August 3, 1961, it certainly was a relevant circumstance for the District Court to consider. “(a) In General. — There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including— “(2) traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business No question is raised in this case as to whether the $80,000 paid by the company for the total convention expense is deductible by the corporation. There is no need to explore the lack of symmetry in certain “income” and “deductibility” areas in the 1954 Code permitting employers to provide certain “fringe benefits” to employees — such as parking facilities, swimming pools, medical services — which have not generally been considered income to the employee, but which, if paid for by the employee with his own funds, would not be a deductible expense. The practicalities of a tax system do not demand hypothetical or theoretical perfection, and these workaday problems are properly the concern of the Commissioner, not of the Courts. Although this Regulation is part of those promulgated on April 3, 1958, it is applicable to this 1956 transaction. The power to make the Regulations prospective only, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7805 (b), was not exercised, and they were made applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1953. T. D. 6291, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 63. Moreover, the result here would not be different under the prior comparable Regulation. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23 (a)-2 (a). No claim has been made by the husband in this case that specific business expenses which may have been incurred at the convention in New York are deductible. The only issue is the deductibility of the entire trip expense. Compare Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F. 2d 108, 114 and n. 13. Deductions allowed: Coffey v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 1242 (doctor); Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F. 2d 307 (lawyer); Shutter v. Commissioner, 2 B. T. A. 23 (clergyman); Callinan v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. M. 170 (legal secretary); see Rev. Rul. 59-316, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 57; Rev. Rui. 60-16, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 58. Deductions not allowed: Duncan v. Commissioner, 30 T. C. 386 (doctor); Ellis v. Burnet, 60 App. D. C. 193, 50 F. 2d 343 (lawyer); Reed v. Commissioner, 35 T. C. 199 (lawyer); Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F. 2d 108 (insurance agent); Russell v. Commissioner, 11 T. C. M. 334 (railroad fireman).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

S. D. WARREN CO. v. MAINE BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION et al. No. 04-1527. Argued February 21, 2006 Decided May 15, 2006 William J. Kayatta, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Matthew D. Manaban. G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General of Maine, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for Maine Board of Environmental Protection were Paul Stern, Deputy Attorney General, and Carol A. Blasi and Gerald D. Reid, Assistant Attorneys General. Richard J. Lazarus, Daniel H. Squire, Ethan G. Shenkman, Sean Mahoney, and Ronald A. Shems filed a brief for American Rivers et al. as respondents under this Court’s Rule 12.6. Jeffrey R Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wooldridge, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Greer S. Goldman, Ellen J. Durkee, John L. Smeltzer, and Ann R. Klee. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Augusta, Georgia, by George A. Somerville; for the Edison Electric Institute et al. by Jeffrey L. Fisher, Daniel M. Adamson, Edward H. Comer, Kristy A. N. Bulleit, James H. Hancock, Jr., and Richard S. Wasserstrom; for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by Virginia S. Albrecht, Karma B. Brown, Kathy Robb, Duane J. Desiderio, and Thomas Jon Ward; for the New England Legal Foundation by Martin J. Newhouse, Andrew R. Grainger, and Michael E. Malamut; and for the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District by John B. Weldon, Jr., and Lisa M. McKnight. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Caitlin J. Halligan, Solicitor General, Robert H. Easton, Deputy Solicitor General, Peter H. Lehner, Gregory Silbert, Assistant Solicitor General, and James M. Tierney, Assistant Attorney General, by Rob McKenna, Attorney General of Washington, and Brian Fatter and Ron Lavigne, Assistant Attorneys General, by Roberto J. Sanchez Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, by Susan Shinkman, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: David W. Marquez of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Bill Lockyer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Gregory D. Stumbo of Kentucky, Charles C. Foti, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, George J. Chanos of Nevada, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, Peter C. Harvey of New Jersey, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Patrick C. Lynch of Rhode Island, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and Peggy S. Lautenschlager of Wisconsin; for Friends of the Everglades by John E. Childe; for Former Assistant Administrators of the United States Environmental Protection Agency by Robert G. Dreher, Jennifer Chavez, and Howard I. Fox; for the Hoopa Valley Tribe et al. by Thomas P. Schlosser, Carl Ullman, and Daniel A. Raas; for the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida by Dexter W. Lehtinen, Claudio Riedi, Sonia Escobio O’Donnell, and Enrique D. Arana; the National Wildlife Federation et al. by David K. Mears; for Trout Unlimited et al. by James B. Dougherty; for Water Quality and Riverine Scientists by Richard Roos-Collins and Steven P. Malloch; and for Senator James M. Jeffords by Mr. Jeffords, pro se. Benjamin S. Sharp, Guy R. Martin, and Karen M. McGaffey filed a brief for the Western Urban Water Coalition as amicus curiae. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether operating a dam to produce hydroelectricity “may result in any discharge into the navigable waters” of the United States. If so, a federal license under §401 of the Clean Water Act requires state certification that water protection laws will not be violated. We hold that a dam does raise a potential for a discharge, and state approval is needed. I The Presumpscot River runs through southern Maine from Sebago Lake to Casco Bay, and in the course of its 25 miles petitioner, S. D. Warren Company, operates several hydro-power dams to generate electricity for its paper mill. Each dam creates a pond, from which water funnels into a “power canal,” through turbines, and back to the riverbed, passing around a section of the river just below the impoundment. It is undisputed that since 1935, Warren has needed a license to operate the dams, currently within the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the Federal Power Act. 16 U. S. C. §§817(1), 792; see also Public Utility Act of 1935, §210, 49 Stat. 846. FERC grants these licenses for periods up to 50 years, 16 U. S. C. § 799, after a review that looks to environmental issues as well as the rising demand for power, § 797(e). Over 30 years ago, Congress enacted a specific provision for licensing an activity that could cause a “discharge” into navigable waters; a license is conditioned on a certification from the State in which the discharge may originate that it will not violate certain water quality standards, including those set by the State’s own laws. See Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, § 103, 84 Stat. 108. Today, this requirement can be found in § 401 of the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 877, 33 U. S. C. § 1341: “Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity ... which may result in any discharge into the navigable water[s] shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge originates .. . .” § 1341(a)(1). “Any certification provided under this section shall set forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will comply with [§§ 1311, 1312, 1316, and 1317] and with any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in such certification, and shall become a condition on any Federal license or permit subject to the provisions of this section.” § 1341(d). In 1999, Warren sought to renew federal licenses for five of its hydroelectric dams. It applied for water quality certifications from the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (the state agency responsible for what have come to be known as “401 state certifications”), but it filed its application under protest, claiming that its dams do not result in any “discharge into” the river triggering application of §401. The Maine agency issued certifications that required Warren to maintain a minimum stream flow in the bypassed portions of the river and to allow passage for various migratory fish and eels. When FERC eventually licensed the five dams, it did so subject to the Maine conditions, and Warren continued to deny any need of §401 state certification. After appealing unsuccessfully to Maine’s administrative appeals tribunal, the Board of Environmental Protection, Warren filed this suit in the State’s Cumberland County Superior Court. That court rejected Warren’s argument that its dams do not result in discharges, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed. 2005 ME 27, 868 A. 2d 210. We granted certiorari, 546 U. S. 933 (2005), and now affirm as well. II The dispute turns on the meaning of the word “discharge,” the key to the state certification requirement under §401. The Act has no definition of the term, but provides that “[t]he term ‘discharge’ when used without qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(16). It does define “discharge of a pollutant” and “discharge of pollutants” as meaning “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” § 1362(12). But “discharge” presumably is broader, else superfluous, and since it is neither defined in the statute nor a term of art, we are left to construe it “in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). When it applies to water, “discharge” commonly means a “flowing or issuing out,” Webster’s New International Dictionary 742 (2d ed. 1954); see also ibid. (“[t]o emit; to give outlet to; to pour forth; as, the Hudson discharges its waters into the bay”), and this ordinary sense has consistently been the meaning intended when this Court has used the term in prior water cases. See, e. g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U. S. 360, 364 (1989) (describing a dam’s “'multiport’ structure, which will permit discharge of water from any of five levels”); Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 619, n. 25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting congressional testimony regarding those who “ 'take . .. water out of the stream which has been discharged from the reservoir’ ”); United States v. Arizona, 295 U. S. 174, 181 (1935) (“Parker Dam will intercept waters discharged at Boulder Dam”). In fact, this understanding of the word “discharge” was accepted by all Members of the Court sitting in our only other case focused on §401 of the Clean Water Act, PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U. S. 700 (1994). At issue in PUD No. 1 was the State of Washington’s authority to impose minimum stream flow rates on a hydroelectric dam, and in posing the question presented, the Court said this: “There is no dispute that petitioners were required to obtain a certification from the State pursuant to §401. Petitioners concede that, at a minimum, the project will result in two possible discharges — the release of dredged and fill material during the construction of the project, and the discharge of water at the end of the tailrace after the water has been used to generate electricity.” Id., at 711. The Pud No. 1 petitioners claimed that a state condition imposing a stream flow requirement on discharges of water from a dam exceeded the State’s §401 authority to prevent degradation of water quality, but neither the parties nor the Court questioned that the “discharge of water” from the dam was a discharge within the ambit of §401. Ibid. And although the Court’s opinion made no mention of the dam as adding anything to the water, the majority’s use of the phrase “discharge of water” drew no criticism from the dissent, which specifically noted that “[t]he term ‘discharge’ is not defined in the [Clean Water Act] but its plain and ordinary meaning suggests ‘a flowing or issuing out,’ or ‘something that is emitted.’ ” Id., at 725 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 360 (1991)). In resort to common usage under §401, this Court has not been alone, for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and FERC have each regularly read “discharge” as having its plain meaning and thus covering releases from hydroelectric dams. See, e. g., EPA, Water Quality Standards Handbook § 7.6.3, p. 7-10 (2d ed. 1994) (“EPA has identified five Federal permits and/or licenses that authorize activities that may result in a discharge to the waters[, including] licenses required for hydroelectric projects issued under the Federal Power Act”); FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC, 111 FERC ¶ 61,104, p. 61,505 (2005) (rejecting, in a recent adjudication, the argument that Congress “used the term ‘discharge’ as nothing more than a shorthand expression for ‘discharge of a pollutant or pollutants’ ”). Warren is, of course, entirely correct in cautioning us that because neither the EPA nor FERC has formally settled the definition, or even set out agency reasoning, these expressions of agency understanding do not command deference from this Court. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 258 (2006) (“Chevron deference ... is not accorded merely because the statute is ambiguous and an administrative official is involved”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). But even so, the administrative usage of “discharge” in this way confirms our understanding of the everyday sense of the term. m Warren makes three principal arguments for reading the term “discharge” differently from the ordinary way. We find none availing. A The first involves an interpretive canon we think is out of place here. The canon, noscitur a sociis, reminds us that “a word is known by the company it keeps,” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995), and is invoked when a string of statutory terms raises the implication that the “words grouped in a list should be given related meaning,” Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 36 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368, 371 (1994) (“That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well”). Warren claims that the canon applies to §502(16) of the Clean Water Act, which provides that “[t]he term ‘discharge’ when used without qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(16). Warren emphasizes that the “include[d]” terms, pollutant discharges, are themselves defined to require an “addition” of pollutants to water. § 1362(12). Since “discharge” pure and simple is keeping company with “discharge” defined as adding one or more pollutants, Warren says “discharge” standing alone must require the addition of something foreign to the water into which the discharge flows. And because the release of water from the dams adds nothing to the river that was not there above the dams, Warren concludes that water flowing out of the turbines cannot be a discharge into the river. The problem with Warren’s argument is that it purports to extrapolate a common feature from what amounts to a single item (discharge of a pollutant plus the plural variant involving more than one pollutant). See Beecham, supra, at 371. The argument seems to assume that pairing a broad statutory term with a narrow one shrinks the broad one, but there is no such general usage; giving one example does not convert express inclusion into restrictive equation, and noscitur a sociis is no help absent some sort of gathering with a common feature to extrapolate. It should also go without saying that uncritical use of interpretive rules is especially risky in making sense of a complicated statute like the Clean Water Act, where technical definitions are worked out with great effort in the legislative process. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 125 (1972) (“[I]t is extremely important to an understanding of [§402] to know the definition of the various terms used and a careful reading of the definitions ... is recommended. Of particular significance [are] the words ‘discharge of pollutants’ ”). B Regardless, Warren says the statute should, and even must, be read its way, on the authority of South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U. S. 95 (2004). But that case is not on point. Miccosukee addressed §402 of the Clean Water Act, not § 401, and the two sections are not interchangeable, as they serve different purposes and use different language to reach them. Section 401 recast pre-existing law and was meant to “continu[e] the authority of the State ... to act to deny a permit and thereby prevent a Federal license or permit from issuing to a discharge source within such State.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 69 (1971). Its terms have a broad reach, requiring state approval any time a federally licensed activity “may” result in a discharge (“discharge” of course being without any qualifiers here), 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(1), and its object comprehends maintaining state water quality standards, see n. 1, supra. Section 402 has a historical parallel with §401, for the legislative record suggests that it, too, was enacted to consolidate and ease the administration of some predecessor regulatory schemes, see H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 124-125. But it contrasts with §401 in its more specific focus. It establishes what Congress called the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, requiring a permit for the “discharge of any pollutant” into the navigable waters of the United States, 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a). The triggering statutory term here is not the word “discharge” alone, but “discharge of a pollutant,” a phrase made narrower by its specific definition requiring an “addition” of a pollutant to the water. § 1362(12). The question in Miccosukee was whether a pump between a canal and an impoundment produced a “discharge of a pollutant” within the meaning of §402, see 541 U. S., at 102-103, and the Court accepted the shared view of the parties that if two identified volumes of water are “simply two parts of the same water body, pumping water from one into the other cannot constitute an 'addition’ of pollutants,” id., at 109. Miccosukee was thus concerned only with whether an “addition” had been made (phosphorous being the substance in issue) as required by the definition of the phrase “discharge of a pollutant”; it did not matter under § 402 whether pumping the water produced a discharge without any addition. In sum, the understanding that something must be added in order to implicate §402 does not explain what suffices for a discharge under §401. c Warren’s third argument for avoiding the common meaning of “discharge” relies on the Act’s legislative history, but we think that if the history means anything it actually goes against Warren’s position. Warren suggests that the word “includes” in the definition of “discharge” should not be read with any spacious connotation, because the word was simply left on the books inadvertently after a failed attempt to deal specifically with “thermal discharges.” As Warren describes it, several Members of Congress recognized that “heat is not as harmful as what most of us view as ‘pollut-. ants,’ because it dissipates quickly in most bodies of receiving waters,” 1 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, p. 273 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Clark), and they proposed to regulate thermal discharges less stringently than others. They offered an amendment to exclude thermal discharges from the requirements under § 402, but they also wanted to ensure that thermal discharges remained within the scope of § 401 and so sought to include them expressly in the general provision covering “discharge.” See id., at 1069-1070, 1071. The proposed definition read, “[t]he term ‘discharge’ when used without qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, a discharge of pollutants, and a thermal discharge.” Id., at 1071. Of course, Congress omitted the reference to “thermal discharge,” and settled on the definition we have today. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 502(16), 86 Stat. 887. Warren reasons that once Congress abandoned the special treatment for thermal pollutants, it merely struck the words “thermal discharge” from 33 U. S. C. § 1362(16) and carelessly left in the word “includes.” Thus, Warren argues, there is no reason to assume that describing “discharge” as including certain acts was meant to extend the reach of § 401 beyond acts of the kind specifically mentioned; the terminology of § 401 simply reflects a failed effort to narrow the scope of § 402. This is what might be called a lawyer’s argument. We will assume that Warren is entirely correct about the impetus behind the failed attempt to rework the scope of pollutant discharge under § 402. It is simply speculation, though, to say that the word “includes” was left in the description of a “discharge” by mere inattention, and for reasons given in Part IV of this opinion it is implausible speculation at that. But if we confine our view for a moment strictly to the drafting history, the one thing clear is that if Congress had left “thermal discharge” as an included subclass of a “discharge” under §502(16), Warren would have a stronger noscitur a sociis argument. For a thermal discharge adds something, the pollutant heat, see n. 3, supra. Had the list of examples of discharge been lengthened to include thermal discharges, there would have been at least a short series with the common feature of addition. As it stands, however, the only thing the legislative history cited by Warren demonstrates is the congressional rejection of language that would have created a short series of terms with a common implication of an addition. Warren’s theory, moreover, has the unintended consequence of underscoring that Congress probably distinguished the terms “discharge” and “discharge of pollutants” deliberately, in order to use them in separate places and to separate ends. Warren hypothesizes that Congress attempted to tinker with the definition of “discharge” because it wanted to subject thermal discharges to the requirements of §401, but not §402. But this assumption about Congress’s motives only confirms the point that when Congress fine-tunes its statutory definitions, it tends to do so with a purpose in mind. See Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29-30 (1997) (if “Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). IV Warren’s arguments against reading the word “discharge” in its common sense fail on their own terms. They also miss the forest for the trees. Congress passed the Clean Water Act to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a); see also PUD No. 1, 511 U. S., at 714, the “national goal” being to achieve “water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water,” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(2). To do this, the Act does not stop at controlling the “addition of pollutants,” but deals with “pollution” generally, see § 1251(b), which Congress defined to mean “the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water,” § 1362(19). The alteration of water quality as thus defined is a risk inherent in limiting river flow and releasing water through turbines. Warren itself admits that its dams “can cause changes in the movement, flow, and circulation of a river ... causing] a river to absorb less oxygen and to be less passable by boaters and fish.” Brief for Petitioner 23. And several amici alert us to the chemical modification caused by the dams, with “immediate impact on aquatic organisms, which of course rely on dissolved oxygen in water to breathe.” Brief for Trout Unlimited et al. as Amici Curiae 13; see also, e. g., Brief for National Wildlife Federation et al. as Amici Curiae 6 (explaining that when air and water mix in a turbine, nitrogen dissolves in the water and can be potentially lethal to fish). Then there are the findings of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection that led to this appeal: “The record in this case demonstrates that Warren’s dams have caused long stretches of the natural river bed to be essentially dry and thus unavailable as habitat for indigenous populations of fish and other aquatic organisms; that the dams have blocked the passage of eels and sea-run fish to their natural spawning and nursery-waters; that the dams have eliminated the opportunity for fishing in long stretches of river, and that the dams have prevented recreational access to and use of the river.” In re S. D. Warren Co., L-19713-33-E-N etc. (2003), in App. to Pet. for Cert. A-49. Changes in the river like these fall within a State’s legitimate legislative business, and the Clean Water Act provides for a system that respects the States’ concerns. See 33 U. S. C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution”); § 1256(a) (federal funds for state efforts to prevent pollution); see also §1370 (States may impose standards on the discharge of pollutants that are stricter than federal ones). State certifications under § 401 are essential in the scheme to preserve state authority to address the broad range of pollution, as Senator Muskie explained on the floor when what is now § 401 was first proposed: “No polluter will be able to hide behind a Federal license or permit as an excuse for a violation of water quality standard[s]. No polluter will be able to make major investments in facilities under a Federal license or permit without providing assurance that the facility will comply with water quality standards. No State water pollution control agency will be confronted with a fait accompli by an industry that has built a plant without consideration of water quality requirements.” 116 Cong. Rec. 8984 (1970). These are the very reasons that Congress provided the States with power to enforce “any other appropriate requirement of State law,” 33 U. S. C. § 1341(d), by imposing conditions on federal licenses for activities that may result in a discharge, ibid. Reading § 401 to give “discharge” its common and ordinary meaning preserves the state authority apparently intended. The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia joins all but Part III-C of this opinion. The statutes cross-referenced go to effluent limitations and other limitations, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311, 1312, standards of performance, § 1316, and toxic effluent standards, §1317. As we have explained before, “state water quality standards adopted pursuant to §303 [of the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1313,] are among the ‘other limitations’ with which a State may ensure compliance through the §401 certification process.” PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U. S. 700, 713 (1994). No one disputes that the Presumpscot River is a navigable water of the United States. The term “pollutant” is defined in the Act to mean “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(6). Warren relies on a document from the EPA as a counterexample of the EPA’s position in this regard. See Memorandum from Ann R. Klee, EPA General Counsel, et al., to Regional Administrators, regarding “Agency Interpretation on Applicability of Section 402 of the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers” (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/oge/ doeuments/water_transfers.pdf (as visited Apr. 13, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s ease file). The memorandum does not help Warren, however; it interprets §402 of the Clean Water Act, not §401, and construes the statutory phrase “discharge of a pollutant,” which, as explained below, implies a meaning different under the statute from the word “discharge” used alone. The memorandum, in fact, declares that “[i]t does not address any ... terms under the statute other than ‘addition.’ ” Id., at 18. We note that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine accepted the assertion that “[a]n ‘addition’ is the fundamental characteristic of any discharge.” 2005 ME 27, ¶ 11, 868 A. 2d 210, 215. It then held that Warren’s dams add to the Presumpseot River because the water “losfes its] status as waters of the United States” when diverted from its natural course, and becomes an addition to the waters of the United States when redeposited into the river. 868 A. 2d, at 216 (emphasis deleted). We disagree that an addition is fundamental to any discharge, nor can we agree that one can denationalize national waters by exerting private control over them. Cf. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 69 (1913) (“[T]hat the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable”). Thus, though we affirm the Maine judgment, we do so on different reasoning. The fact that the parties in Miccosukee conceded that the water being pumped was polluted does not transform the Court’s analysis from one centered on the word “addition” to one centered on the word “discharge.” Before Miccosukee, one could have argued that transferring polluted water from a canal to a connected impoundment constituted an “addition.” Miccosukee is at odds with that construction of the statute, but it says nothing about whether the transfer of polluted water from the canal to the impoundment constitutes a “discharge.” Likewise, we are not persuaded by Warren’s claim that the word “into” somehow changes the meaning of the word “discharge” so as to require an addition. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 1-2 (“However one might read the lone word ‘discharge’ by itself, the complete statutory phrase ‘discharge into the navigable waters’ entails the introduction of something into the waters”). The force of this argument escapes us, since one can easily refer to water being poured or discharged out of one place into another without implying that an addition of some hitherto unencountered mixture or quality of water is made. Indeed, the preposition “into” was used without connoting an addition in the Miccosukee analogy cited by Warren. See 541 U. S., at 110 (“[I]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot... and pours it back into the pot, one has not ‘added’ soup or anything else to the pot” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Warren is hesitant to follow its own logic to completion by simply claiming that §401 covers nothing but what §502(16) mentions, the discharge of a pollutant or pollutants. Warren briefly makes another argument for disregarding the plain meaning of the word “discharge,” relying on § 511(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1371(c)(2). This section addresses the intersection of the Act with another statute, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seq. NEPA “imposes only procedural requirements on federal agencies with a particular focus on requiring agencies to undertake analyses of the environmental impact of their proposals and actions.” Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752, 756-757 (2004). Section 511(c)(2) makes the point that nothing in NEPA authorizes any federal agency “authorized to license or permit the conduct of any activity which may result in the discharge of a pollutant” to review “any effluent limitation or other requirement established pursuant to this chapter or the adequacy of any certification under [§ 401].” 33 U. S. C. § 1371(c)(2)(A). Warren argues that reading §401 to cover discharges generally would preclude duplicative NEPA review of certifications involving pollutant discharges, but allow such review of those involving nonpollutant discharges. But Warren overlooks the fact that “discharge of a pollutant” is used in § 511(c)(2) in the course of identifying the agency, not the activity to be certified. Whether a §401 certification involves an activity that discharges pollutants or one that simply discharges, FERC (as an agency that may be described, always, as one with “authority] to license or permit the conduct of any activity which may result in the discharge of a pollutant,” ibid.) may not review it. Thus, nothing in § 511(c)(2) is disturbed by our holding that hydroelectric dams require § 401 state certifications. It is still the ease that, when a State has issued a certification covering a discharge that adds no pollutant, no federal agency will be deemed to have authority under NEPA to “review” any limitations or the adequacy of the § 401 certification.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. ANTHONY GRACE & SONS, INC. No. 439. Argued March 23, 1966. Decided June 6, 1966. Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, David L. Rose and Robert V. Zener. David Fromson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. In United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 709, we held that, aside from questions of fraud, a reviewing court is limited to the administrative record made below in determining the finality to be given departmental decisions and findings made by a Board of Contract Appeals pursuant to a standard government disputes clause. In the present case we are called upon to decide whether the reviewing court or the Board of Contract Appeals should make the original record on an issue which the Board did not resolve because it erroneously dismissed the appeal before it as untimely. The question is framed by the following facts. The Department of the Air Force issued an invitation for bids for the construction of a military housing project at Topsham Air Force Station, Maine. The invitation included a tentative minimum wage schedule which the contractor would have to meet. It also advised that the wage schedule would be finally redetermined by the Secretary of Labor not more than 90 days prior to the commencement of construction and that the Federal Housing Commissioner would then adjust the contract price to reflect any changes made in the wage schedules. In addition, the successful bidder was required to complete certain preparatory acts in order to close the contract and to post a $25,000 deposit to ensure the closing of the contract. Respondent, Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., was the low acceptable bidder and a letter of acceptability was sent to it. That letter reminded respondent that failure to close the contract within a specified number of days was sufficient justification to warrant the Department of the Air Force in cancelling the bid and letter of acceptability, in retaining the deposit for liquidated damages and in determining additional liability for actual damages. A disputes clause in the letter of acceptability made such decision by the Department of the Air Force final unless, within 30 days from the receipt of the decision, respondent appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, whose decision would be final and conclusive unless fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. After receiving subsequent wage schedules from the Secretary of Labor, respondent concluded that certain work was being placed in higher wage categories than was provided in the specifications which accompanied the bid invitation. On the basis of this alleged deviation from the original specifications respondent asked first the Housing Commissioner and then the Department of the Air Force to raise the contract price. These requests were refused and respondent then notified the Air Force that it would be unable to complete the closing until this matter was cleared up. In the ensuing exchange of letters, the contracting officer informed respondent that its bid and the letter of acceptability were being canceled and its deposit was being retained. Pursuant to the disputes clause, respondent appealed this decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, which dismissed the appeal as out of time without considering the merits of the case. Respondent then sued in the Court of Claims to recover its deposit and for damages resulting from the Government’s alleged wrongful cancellation. That court concluded that the appeal to the Board was timely and that the Board had erred in not reaching the merits of the case. With Judges Davis and Laramore dissenting, the court then decided to remand the case to its own trial commissioner, rather than to the Board of Contract Appeals, to make a record and consider the case on its merits. The Government asked us to grant certiorari to consider whether this was in violation of the principles announced in the Wunderlich Act and United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., supra. We granted certiorari, 382 U. S. 901, and we now reverse. This question was anticipated in Bianchi, supra, where we considered what a reviewing court should do when the administrative record is defective, or inadequate or reveals the commission of a prejudicial error. Two suggestions were given: “First, there would undoubtedly be situations in which the court would be warranted, on the basis of the administrative record, in granting judgment for the contractor without the need for further administrative action. Second, in situations where the court believed that the existing record did not warrant such a course, but that the departmental determination could not be sustained under the standards laid down by Congress, we see no reason why the court could not stay its own proceedings pending some further action before the agency involved. Cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 363 U. S. 202. Such a stay would certainly be justified where the department had failed to make adequate provision for a record that could be subjected to judicial scrutiny, for it was clearly part of the legislative purpose to achieve uniformity in this respect.” 373 U. S. 709, 717-718. The policy reflected in this language, which requires utilization of the administrative procedures contractually bargained for, was clearly intended by Congress, see H. R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., supra, at 715-718, and it has been consistently reflected in a long line of decisions by this Court. See United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U. S. 98; United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 457; United States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U. S. 234; United States v. Blair, 321 U. S. 730; United States v. Callahan Walker Construction Co., 317 U. S. 56; Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398. Pre-eminently, this policy is grounded on a respect for the parties’ rights to contract and to provide for their own remedies. See United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., ante, p. 394; United States v. Moorman, supra, at 461-462. But, beyond that, there is also a belief that resort to administrative procedures is an expeditious way to settle disputes, conducive to speed and economy. United States v. Blair, supra, at 735. Such procedures also facilitate a department’s supervisory control over contracting officers and perhaps enhance the possibility of harmonious agreement. Ibid. Further, reliance upon a few expert agencies to make the records and initially to pass on the merits of the claims properly presented to them will lead to greater uniformity in the important business of fairly interpreting government contracts. There can be no doubt that the dispute here over the decision by the Department of the Air Force to cancel respondent’s commitments under the bid and letter of acceptability and to retain the deposit is one which the parties contractually provided should be heard and decided by the administrative process. Barring some compelling policy reason to disregard this provision, the contractor should be held to its contractual agreement even at this stage in the litigation. It is true that this Court has said on several occasions that the parties will not be required to exhaust the administrative procedure if it is shown by clear evidence that such procedure is “inadequate or unavailable.” United States v. Holpuch Co., supra, at 240; United States v. Blair, supra, at 736-737. It may be that the contracting officer, H. B. Zachry Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 115, 344 F. 2d 352, or the Board of Contract Appeals, Southeastern Oil Florida, Inc. v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 480, 115 F. Supp. 198, so clearly reveals an unwillingness to act and to comply with the administrative procedures in the contract that the contractor or supplier is justified in concluding that those procedures have thereby become “unavailable.” Similarly, there may be occasions when the lack of authority of either the contracting officer or the administrative appeals board is so apparent that the contractor or supplier may justifiably conclude that further administrative relief is “unavailable.” But these circumstances are clearly the exceptions rather than the rule and the inadequacy or unavailability of administrative relief must clearly appear before a party is permitted to circumvent his own contractual agreement. When the Board fails to reach and decide an issue because it disposes of the appeal on another ground — here the untimeliness of the appeal — which the Court of Claims later rejects, there is no sound reason to presume that the Board will not promptly and fairly deal with the merits of the undecided issue if it is given the chance to do so. The Court of Claims in this case attempted to justify bypassing the Board of Contract Appeals because it felt the dispute could be resolved more speedily if its Trial Commissioner made the record and initially passed on the merits. The dissenting judges question the factual accuracy of the premises. Even if the premises were sound, however, this argument falls substantially short of establishing that the administrative route is inadequate or unavailable. Nor is it persuasive to say that the administrative remedy is inadequate in this case because the Board of Contract Appeals considers itself unable to review wage determinations by the Secretary of Labor or the corresponding bid adjustments by the Federal Housing Commissioner. The necessity of determining the validity of these determinations and adjustments is speculative at best. The issue involved here is whether the Department of the Air Force was justified in cancelling respondent’s commitments, retaining its deposit and itemizing certain damages. This raises questions concerning the propriety of respondent’s failure to press forward to close the contract regardless of an outstanding wage dispute. And this, in turn, requires an analysis of the original bid invitation and accompanying specifications, the custom and usage of the trade, and the subsequent conduct of both parties to this dispute. Obviously there are factual issues to be resolved and that task is initially for the Board, not the Court. Another argument advanced by the Court of Claims is that it lacks authority to remand the case and the Board may refuse to consider it again. At this stage of the proceedings this fear may be dismissed as a hypothetical one. There will be time enough later, if this fear ever materializes, to consider whether the reviewing court would then be authorized to make its own record. In this regard it should be noted that, in Bianchi, supra, we suggested one way of dealing with this problem: “And in any case in which the department failed to remedy the particular substantive or procedural defect or inadequacy, the sanction of judgment for the contractor would always be available to the court.” 373 U. S. 709, 718. See also Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 383 U. S. 576, 601. Reversed. See the Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494, as amended, 40 U. S. C. §276a (1964 ed.). No provision was made in the bid invitation or letter of acceptability for review of the determinations of the Secretary of Labor or the Housing Commissioner. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has held that in these circumstances it is without jurisdiction to review such determinations. Len Co. & Associates, 1962 B. C. A., ¶ 3498, 17,854 (ASBCA). This Court has indicated that, as to the wage standards set by the Secretary of Labor, there is no judicial review. United States v. Binghamton Construction Co., 347 U. S. 171, 177. This clause, which varies somewhat from the standard disputes clause, reads as follows: “Failure to perform all obligations prior to the time prescribed for closing will be just cause for cancelling all commitments undertaken with you in connection with the housing project and for the recovery under your bid security of liquidated damages in the sum of $25,000, together with actual damages to the Department, such actual damages to be itemized and determined by the Contracting Officer, whose decision will be reduced to writing and furnished to you by mail or otherwise. Such decision shall be final and conclusive unless, within 30 days from the receipt thereof, you appeal in writing to the head of the Department or his duly authorized representative, and his decision shall, unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence, be final and conclusive. In connection with any appeal under this paragraph you will be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of your appeal.” The Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81, 41 U. S. C. §§321-322, provides: “That no provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the finality or eonclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, That any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence. “Sec. 2. No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board.” See Hearing before the Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed Services on H. Res. No. 67, Inquiry Into the Administration and Operation of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 794-795 (1958). See United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., supra; C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 465, 341 F. 2d 600. We see no reason, in this regard, to distinguish between theories of liability not considered below and the issue of damages, which may not initially have been considered if the Board found no liability. If, because of the disposition of the case on appeal, any of these issues becomes important, the Board should be given an opportunity to consider them first. The rule we announce necessarily disapproves of such cases as Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 802, 337 F. 2d 861, and WPG Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 1, 323 F. 2d 874, in which the Court of Claims retained the issue of damages after it reversed the Board's finding of no liability. Brief for the Government, p. 20, n. 14, indicates that it may actually take longer for the Court of Claims to dispose of a case than it would for the boards. To the extent that the Court of Claims may have been worried about duplicity of evidentiary hearings, see United States v. Carlo Bianchi, supra, at 717, it partially answered itself in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 757, 345 F. 2d 833, decided the same day. There the Court of Claims held that when the Board of Contract Appeals has jurisdiction to consider a certain issue and to award full relief and it makes a record on the factual matters underlying that issue, judicial review of those factual findings, for whatever purposes, shall be limited to the record made by the Board. We hold, in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., supra, that factual findings made by a board pursuant to a claim properly before it, if they otherwise satisfy the standards of the Wunderlich Act, shall not be relitigated even in a court action for relief that is not available under the contract. Hence, there will be only one evidentiary hearing. The Board below observed, “The parties are in complete agreement that it was and is their mutual interpretation that in the event a timely appeal is taken thereunder the ‘disputes paragraph’ of the Letter of Acceptability confers jurisdiction on the Board to review a decision relating to cancellation of commitments, withholding of bid security, and itemization and determination of actual damages.” Both the Court of Claims and the Trial Commissioner observed that there were “unresolved issues of fact” underlying the issues in this case. 170 Ct. Cl. 688, 691, 345 F. 2d 808, 810. There is analogy for the rule we announce today in other areas of administrative law. See, e. g., Securities Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, and Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 324 U. S. 515, where this Court ordered the eases remanded to the agencies for further findings and consideration rather than itself curing the inadequacies of the records below. See generally, Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 16.01, 20.06 (1958). The same general rule also applies in the area of labor arbitration. In United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, the arbitrator had failed to determine the amount of back pay to which reinstated employees would be entitled and this Court ordered the matter remanded to the arbitrator for resolution of this issue. The Court observed there that it was the arbitrator’s determination “which was bargained for.” Much the same thing can be said here, although of course the findings and conclusions of the Board of Contract Appeals do not have the same finality on review. See also International Association of Machinists v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 300 F. 2d 127.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. POLLAK et al. NO. 224. Argued March 3, 1952. Decided May 26, 1952. W. Theodore Pierson argued the cause for petitioners in No. 224 and respondents in No. 295. On the brief were Vernon E. West and Lloyd B. Harrison for the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, Edmund L. Jones, F. Oloyd Await, Samuel 0. Clark, Jr., Daryal A. Myse and W. V. T. Justis for the Capital Transit Co., and Mr. Pierson, Vernon C. Kohlhaas and Thomas N. Dowd for the Washington Transit Radio, Inc. Paul M. Segal argued the cause for respondents in No. 224 and petitioners in No. 295. With him on the brief were John W. Willis, Charles L. Black, Jr. and Harry P. Warner. Also on the brief was Franklin S. Poliak, pro se. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question here is whether, in the District of Columbia, the Constitution of the United States precludes a street railway company from receiving and amplifying radio programs through loudspeakers in its passenger vehicles under the circumstances of this case. The service and equipment of the company are subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia. The Commission, after an investigation and public hearings disclosing substantial grounds for doing so, has concluded that the radio service is not inconsistent with public convenience, comfort and safety and “tends to improve the conditions under which the public ride.” The Commission, accordingly, has permitted the radio service to continue despite vigorous protests from some passengers that to do so violates their constitutional rights. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that neither the operation of the service nor the action of the Commission permitting its operation is precluded by the Constitution. The Capital Transit Company, here called Capital Transit, is a privately owned public utility corporation, owning an extensive street railway and bus system which it operates in the District of Columbia under a franchise from Congress. Washington Transit Radio, Inc., here called Radio, also is a privately owned corporation doing business in the District of Columbia. Both are petitioners in No. 224. In March, 1948, Capital Transit experimented with “music as you ride” radio programs received and amplified through loudspeakers in a streetcar and in a bus. Those vehicles were operated on various lines at various hours. A poll of passengers who heard the programs showed that 92% favored their continuance. Experience in other cities was studied. Capital Transit granted Radio the exclusive right to install, maintain, repair and use radio reception equipment in Capital Transit’s streetcars,-busses, terminal facilities, waiting rooms and division headquarters. Radio, in return, agreed to contract with a broadcasting station for programs to be received during a minimum of eight hours every day, except Sundays. To that end Radio secured the services of Station WWDC-FM. Its programs were to meet the specifications stated in Capital Transit’s contract. Radio agreed to pay Capital Transit, after a 90-day trial, $6 per month per radio installation, plus additional compensation dependent upon the station’s receipts from sources such as commercial advertising on the programs. In February, 1949, when more than 20 installations had been made, the service went into regular operation. At the time of the Commission’s hearings, October 27-November 1, 1949, there were 212. On that basis the minimum annual payment to Capital Transit came to $15,264. The potential minimum would be $108,000, based upon 1,500 installations. The contract covered five years, with an automatic five-year renewal in the absence of notice to the contrary from either party. This proceeding began in July, 1949, when the Commission, on its own motion, ordered an investigation. 37 Stat. 983, D. C. Code (1940) §§ 43-408 through 43-410. The Commission stated that Capital Transit had embarked upon a program of installing radio receivers in its streetcars and busses and that a number of protests against the program had been received. Accordingly, the Commission was ordering an investigation to determine whether the installation and use of such receivers was “consistent with public convenience, comfort and safety.” Radio was permitted to intervene. Poliak and Martin, as protesting Capital Transit passengers, also intervened and they are the respondents in No. 224. The Commission concluded “that the installation and use of radios in streetcars and busses of the Capital Transit Company is not inconsistent with public convenience, comfort, and safety” and dismissed its investigation. 81 P. U. R. (N. S.) 122, 126. It denied reconsideration. 49 Stat. 882, D. C. Code (1940) § 43-704. Pollak and Martin appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 49 Stat. 882-884, D. C. Code (1940) §§43-705 through 43-710. John O’Dea, as People’s Counsel, Capital Transit Company and Washington Transit Radio, Inc., were granted leave to intervene. That appeal was dismissed but Poliak and Martin took the case to the Court of Appeals. 49 Stat. 883, D. C. Code (1940) § 43-705. That court partially reversed the judgment of the District Court and gave instructions to vacate the Commission’s order. It remanded the case for further proceedings in conformity with its opinion which included the following statement: “In our opinion Transit’s broadcasts deprive objecting passengers of liberty without due process of law. Service that violates constitutional rights is not reasonable service. It follows that the Commission erred as a matter of law in finding that Transit’s broadcasts are not inconsistent with public convenience, in failing to find that they are unreasonable, and in failing to stop them. “This decision applies to ‘commercials’ and to ‘announcements.’ We are not now called upon to decide whether occasional broadcasts of music alone would infringe constitutional rights.” 89 U. S. App. D. C. 94, 102, 191 F. 2d 450, 458. The Court of Appeals, en banc, denied a rehearing. The Commission, Capital Transit and Radio petitioned this Court for certiorari in No. 224. Contingent upon the granting of certiorari in that case, Poliak and Martin, by cross-petition in No. 295, sought to prohibit Capital Transit from receiving and amplifying in its vehicles not only “commercials” and “announcements,” but also the balance of the radio programs. We granted certi-orari in both cases because of the novelty and practical importance to the public of the questions involved. 342 U. S. 848. We have treated the petitions as though they were cross-petitions in a single case. 1. Further facts. — In this proceeding the courts are expressly restricted to the facts found by the Commission, insofar as those findings do not appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. After reciting that it had given careful consideration to the testimony bearing on public convenience, comfort and safety, the Commission said that— “Erom the testimony of record, the conclusion is inescapable that radio reception in streetcars and busses is not an obstacle to safety of operation. “Further, it is evident that public comfort and convenience is not impaired and that, in fact, through the creation of better will among passengers, it tends to improve the conditions under which the public ride.” 81 P. U. R. (N. S.), at 126. Bearing upon its conclusion as to the public comfort and convenience resulting from the radio programs, the Commission cited the opinions of car and bus operators to the effect that the “music on the vehicles had a tendency to keep the passengers in a better mood, and that it simplified transit operations.” Id., at 125. The Commission also said that its analysis of accidents “reflects the fact that the radio does not in any way interfere with efficient operation and .has not been the cause of any accidents, according to the testimony of ... a safety supervisor.” Ibid. Likewise, the Commission set forth the following as one premise for its conclusions: “A public opinion survey was conducted by Edward G. Doody & Company, from October 11, 1949, to October 17, 1949, in order to determine the attitude of Capital Transit Company customers toward transit radio. This survey employed the rules of random selection and was confined to interviews aboard radio-equipped vehicles. The principal results obtained through the survey, as presented in this record, were as follows: “Of those interviewed, 93.4 per cent were not opposed; that is, 76.3 were in favor, 13.9 said they didn’t care, and 3.2 said they didn’t know; 6.6 per cent were not in favor, but when asked the question 'Well, even though you don’t care for such programs personally, would you object if the majority of passengers wanted busses and streetcars equipped with radio receivers,’ 3.6 said they would not object or oppose the majority will. Thus, a balance of 3 per cent of those interviewed were firmly opposed to the use of radios in transit vehicles.” Ibid. 2. Statutory authority. — Apart from the constitutional issues, the order of the Commission dismissing its investigation was in accord with its prescribed statutory procedure and within the discretion properly vested in the Commission by Congress. Transit radio service is a new income-producing incident of the operation of railway properties. The profit arises from the rental of facilities for commercial advertising purposes. This aspect of the enterprise bears some relation to the long-established practice of renting space for visual advertising on the inside and outside of streetcars and busses. Through these programs Capital Transit seeks to improve its public relations. To minimize objection to the advertising features of the programs, it requires that at least 90% of the radio time be used for purposes other than commercials and announcements. This results in programs generally consisting of 90% music, 5% news, weather reports and matters of civic interest, and 5% commercial advertising. The advertising is confined to statements of 15 to 30 seconds each. It occupies a total of about three minutes in each hour. In view of the findings and conclusions of the Commission, there can be little doubt that, apart from the constitutional questions here raised, there is no basis for setting aside the Commission’s decision. It is within the statutory authority of the Commission to prohibit or to permit and regulate the receipt and amplification of radio programs under such conditions that the total utility service shall not be unsafe, uncomfortable or inconvenient. 3. Applicability of the First and Fifth Amendments.— It was held by the court below that the action of Capital Transit in installing and operating the radio receivers, coupled with the action of the Public Utilities Commission in dismissing its own investigation of the practice, sufficiently involved the Federal Government in responsibility for the radio programs to make the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States applicable to this radio service. These Amendments concededly apply to and restrict only the Federal Government and not private persons. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 330; Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, 382, 384; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84, 89-91; Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; see also, Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318. We find in the reasoning of the court below a sufficiently close relation between the Federal Government and the radio service to make it necessary for us to consider those Amendments. In finding this relation we do not rely on the mere fact that Capital Transit operates a public utility on the streets of the District of Columbia under authority of Congress. Nor do we rely upon the fact that, by reason of such federal authorization, Capital Transit now enjoys a substantial monopoly of street railway and bus transportation in the District of Columbia. We do, however, recognize that Capital Transit operates its service under the regulatory supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia which is an agency authorized by Congress. We rely particularly upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to protests against the radio program, ordered an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience were not impaired thereby. 81 P. U. R. (N. S.), at 126. We, therefore, find it appropriate to examine into what restriction, if any, the First and Fifth Amendments place upon the Federal Government under the facts of this case, assuming that the action of Capital Transit in operating the radio service, together with the action of the Commission in permitting such operation, amounts to sufficient Federal Government action to make the First and Fifth Amendments applicable thereto. 4. No violation of the First Amendment. — Poliak and Martin contend that the radio programs interfere with their freedom of conversation and that of other passengers by making it necessary for them to compete against the programs in order to be heard. The Commission, however, did not find, and the testimony does not compel a finding, that the programs interfered substantially with the conversation of passengers or with rights of communication constitutionally protected in public places. It is suggested also that the First Amendment guarantees a freedom to listen only to such points of view as the listener wishes to hear. There is no substantial claim that the programs have been used for objectionable propaganda. There is no issue of that kind before us. The inclusion in the programs of a few announcements explanatory and commendatory of Capital Transit’s own services does not sustain such an objection. 5. No violation of the Fifth Amendment. — The court below has emphasized the claim that the radio programs are an invasion of constitutional rights of privacy of the passengers. This claim is that no matter how much Capital Transit may wish to use radio in its vehicles as part of its service to its passengers and as a source of income, no matter how much the great majority of its passengers may desire radio in those vehicles, and however positively the Commission, on substantial evidence, may conclude that such use of radio does not interfere with the convenience, comfort and safety of the service but tends to improve it, yet if one passenger objects to the programs as an invasion of his constitutional right of privacy, the use of radio on the vehicles must be discontinued. This position wrongly assumes that the Fifth Amendment secures to each passenger on a public vehicle regulated by the Federal Government a right of privacy substantially equal to the privacy to which he is entitled in his own home. However complete his right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a public conveyance. Streetcars and busses are subject to the immediate control of their owner and operator and, by virtue of their dedication to public service, they are for the common use of all of their passengers. The Federal Government in its regulation of them is not only entitled, but is required, to take into consideration the interests of all concerned. In a public vehicle there are mutual limitations upon the conduct of everyone, including the vehicle owner. These conflicting demands limit policies on such matters as operating schedules and the location of car or bus stops, as well as policies relating to the desirability or nature of radio programs in the vehicles. Legislation prohibiting the making of artifically amplified raucous sounds in public places has been upheld. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77. Conversely, where a regulatory body has jurisdiction, it will be sustained in its protection of activities in public places when those activities do not interfere with the general public convenience, comfort and safety. The supervision of such practices by the Public Utilities Commission in the manner prescribed in the District of Columbia meets the requirements both of substantive and procedural due process when it is not arbitrarily and capriciously exercised. The contention of Poliak and Martin would permit an objector, with a status no different from that of other passengers, to override not only the preference of the majority of the passengers but also the considered judgment of the federally authorized Public Utilities Commission, after notice, investigation and public hearings, and upon a record reasonably justifying its conclusion that the policy of the owner and operator did not interfere with public convenience, comfort and safety but tended, in general, to improve the utility service. We do not agree with that contention. The protection afforded to the liberty of the individual by the Fifth Amendment against the action of the Federal Government does not go that far. The liberty of each individual in a public vehicle or public place is subject to reasonable limitations in relation to the rights of others. This Court expresses no opinion as to the desirability of radio programs in public vehicles. In this case that is a matter for decision between Capital Transit, the public and the Public Utilities Commission. The situation is not unlike that which arises when a utility makes a change in its running schedules or in the locations of its stops in the interests of the majority of the passengers but against the vigorous protests of the few who are inconvenienced by the change. The court below expressly refrained from passing on the constitutionality of the receipt and amplification in public vehicles of occasional broadcasts of music alone. Poliak and Martin, in No. 295, contend that broadcasts even so limited are unconstitutional. However, in view of our holding that the programs before us, containing music, commercial advertising and other announcements are constitutionally permissible, it is clear that programs limited to a like type of music alone would not be less so. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court. Reversed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for reasons stated by him, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Capital Transit Company originates from the Act of Congress of March 4, 1925, authorizing the merger of street railway corporations operating in the District of Columbia. 43 Stat. 1265, D. C. Code (1940) §43-503. The merger was approved by Joint Resolution, January 14, 1933. 47 Stat. 752, 819, D. C. Code (1940) note following § 43-503. That Resolution required the new company to be incorporated under the District Code and its corporate articles to be approved by the Public Utilities Commission of the District. 47 Stat. 753, 819, D. C. Code (1940) note following § 43-503; see 31 Stat. 1284 et seq., D. C. Code (1940) §29-201 et seq. The same Resolution prohibited the establishment of any competitive street railway or bus line without the issuance of a certificate by the Commission to the effect that such line is necessary for the convenience of the public. 47 Stat. 760, D. C. Code (1940) § 44-201. The only competing line in the District is a relatively small interurban line. Typically, the equipment includes a receiving set and six loudspeakers in each vehicle. The set is tuned to a single broadcasting station. The loudspeakers are so located that the radio programs can be heard substantially uniformly throughout the vehicle. The volume of sound is adjusted so as not to interfere with the signals or announcements incident to vehicle operations or generally with conversations between passengers. Uncontradicted testimony listed approximately the following numbers of vehicles equipped with transit radio in the areas named in October, 1949: St. Louis, Missouri, 1,000; Cincinnati, Ohio, 475; Houston, Texas, 270; Washington, D. C., 220; Worcester, Massachusetts, 220; Tacoma, Washington, 135; Evansville, Indiana, 110; Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, 100; suburban Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 75; Allentown, Pennsylvania, 75; Huntington, West Virginia, 55; Des Moines, Iowa, 50; Topeka, Kansas, 50; suburban Washington, D. C., 30. Baltimore, Maryland, was listed but the number of vehicles was not stated. “(a) Program content shall be of good quality and consonant with a high standard of public acceptance and responsibility, it being understood that all programs shall be carefully planned, edited and produced in accordance with accepted practices employed by qualified broadcasting stations. “(b) Commercial announcements shall not exceed sixty (60) seconds in duration, and cumulatively shall not exceed six (6) minutes in any sixty (60) minute period. “(c) Broadcast Station shall agree to cancel or suitably to modify any commercial continuity upon notice from Capital that said continuity, or the sponsor thereof, is objectionable. Broadcast Station shall further agree that it shall give notice to Capital within twenty-four (24) hours after the acceptance of each new sponsor. “(d) Capital is to receive without charge fifty per cent (50%) of the unsold time available for commercial continuity as provided in sub-section (b) hereof, (said free time not to exceed three (3) minutes in any sixty (60) minute period), for institutional and promotional announcements.” “PaR. 66. In the determination of any appeal from an order or decision of the Commission the review by the court shall be limited to questions of law, including constitutional questions; and the findings of fact by the Commission shall be conclusive unless it shall appear that such findings of the Commission are unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” 49 Stat. 883, D. C. Code (1940) § 43-706. On appeal to the District Court— “the Commission shall file with the clerk of the said court the record, including a transcript of all proceedings had and testimony taken before the Commission, duly certified, upon which the said order or decision of the Commission was based, together with a statement of its findings of fact and conclusions upon the said record, and a copy of the application for reconsideration and the orders entered thereon: . . . .” 49 Stat. 883, D. C. Code (1940) § 43-705. We treat the Commission’s certification of its findings and conclusions, expressed in its statement of December 19, 1949, as meeting the above requirement. 81 P. U. R. (N. S.) 122, 124-126. A comparable survey, made April 1-7, 1949, under the same direction, produced substantially the same result. The weight to be attached to these surveys was a proper matter for determination by the Commission. The Commission invited views as to the radio service to be given to it freely, either through sworn testimony or otherwise. Many citizens’ associations appeared or filed resolutions favoring or opposing the radio service. A large majority favored the service. That the Commission gave consideration to the intensity and nature of the individual objections raised appears from the following: “In general, the objections raised by individuals who attended the hearings to radios in transportation vehicles were based upon the following reasons, among others: “It interfered with their thinking, reading, or chatting with their companions; it would lead to thought control; the noise was unbearable; the commercials, announcements, and time signals were annoying; the music was of the poorest class; the practice deprived them of their right to listen or not to listen; they were being deprived of their property rights without due process; their health was being impaired; the safety of operation was threatened because of the effect of radios upon the operators of the vehicles.” 81 P. U. R. (N. S.), at 124. “AMENDMENT [I.] “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... “Amendment [V.] “No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; “[W]hen authority derives in part from Government’s thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself.” American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 401. Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649; and see Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 695-696. See generally, Shipley, Some Constitutional Aspects of Transit Radio, 11 F. C. Bar J. 150. The Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 et seq., as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., has been interpreted by the Federal Communications Commission as imposing upon each licensee the duty of fair presentation of news and controversial issues. F. C. C. Report on Editorializing by Licensees, 1 Pike & Fischer Radio Regulation 91:201 (1949). The interest of some unwilling listeners was there held to justify some limitation on the freedom of others to amplify their speech. The decision, however, did not indicate that it would violate constitutional rights of privacy or due process for the city to authorize some use of sound trucks and amplifiers in public places.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHLESINGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. v. BALLARD No. 73-776. Argued October 15, 1974 Decided January 15, 1975 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 511. White, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 521. Harriet S. Shapiro argued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Hills, Deputy Solicitor General LaFon-tant, Edmund W. Kitch, Robert E. Kopp, and Michael Kimmel. Charles R. Khoury, Jr., argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Morris S. Dees, Jr. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellee Robert C. Ballard is a lieutenant in the United States Navy. After more than nine years of active service as a commissioned officer, he failed, for a second time, to be selected for promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander, and was therefore subject to mandatory discharge under 10 U. S. C. § 6382 (a). He brought suit in federal court claiming that if he had been a woman officer, he would have been subject to a different separation statute, 10 U. S. C. § 6401, under which he would have been entitled to 13 years of commissioned service before a mandatory discharge for want of promotion. He claimed that the application of § 6382 to him, when compared with the treatment of women officers subject to § 6401, was an unconstitutional discrimination based on sex in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Judge issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting Ballard’s discharge. Subsequently, a three-judge District Court was convened to hear the claim pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282, 2284. After hearings upon motions by the Government defendants, that court issued a preliminary injunction against Ballard’s discharge. 350 F. Supp. 167. Thereafter, the case came before the three-judge court for decision on the merits. Relying upon Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, and concluding that the challenged mandatory-discharge provisions are supported solely by considerations of fiscal and administrative policy, the court held that § 6382 is unconstitutional because the 13-year tenure provision of § 6401 discriminates in favor of women without sufficient justification. 360 F. Supp. 643. Accordingly, the court enjoined the Navy from discharging Ballard for failure to be promoted to the grade of lieutenant commander before the expiration of 13 years of commissioned service. Id., at 648. We noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal from that injunctive order. 415 U. S. 912. See 28 U. S. C. § 1253. I At the base of the system governing the promotion and attrition of male line officers in the Navy is a congressional designation of the authorized number of the Navy’s enlisted personnel, 10 U. S. C. § 5401, and a correlative limitation upon the number of active line officers as a percentage of that figure. § 5403. Congress has also established the ratio of distribution of line officers in the several grades above lieutenant in fixed proportions to the total number of line officers. §§ 5442, 5447 (a). The Secretary of the Navy is required periodically to convene selection boards to consider and recommend for promotion male fine officers in each of the separate ranks, § 5701, and must provide the boards so convened with the number of male line officers that may be recommended for promotion to the next higher grade. § 5756. Eligible officers are then recommended for promotion by the selection boards, based upon merit, and are placed on a promotion list and promoted in due course as vacancies occur in the higher ranks. § 5769. Because the number of lieutenant commanders is set by statute, the number of lieutenants, like Ballard, who may be recommended for promotion and placed on a promotion list in any year depends upon the number of vacancies existing and estimated for the coming year in the rank of lieutenant commander. § 5756. Wholly separate promotion lines are established for the various categories of officers. Thus, in addition to the selection boards that are convened to review the promotion of male line officers, different selection boards are convened to recommend for promotion staff corps officers (except for women officers appointed under § 5590), § 5702, male officers in the Marine Corps, § 5703, women line officers, § 5704 (a), and women staff officers who are appointed under § 5590. § 5704 (b). The convening of these separate selection boards permits naval officers within each category to be considered for promotion in comparison with other officers with similar opportunities and experience. Because the Navy has a pyramidal organizational structure, fewer officers are needed at each higher rank than are needed in the rank below. In the absence of some mandatory attrition of naval officers, the result would be stagnation of promotion of younger officers and disincentive to naval service. If the officers who failed to be promoted remained in the service, the promotion of younger officers through the ranks would be retarded. Accordingly, a basic “up or out” philosophy was developed to maintain effective leadership by heightening • competition for the higher ranks while providing junior officers with incentive and opportunity for promotion. It is for this reason, and not merely because of administrative or fiscal policy considerations, that § 6382 (a) requires that lieutenants be discharged when they are “considered as having failed of selection for promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander ... for the second time.” Similar selection-out rules apply to officers in different ranks who are twice passed over for promotion. The phrase “failed of selection for promotion” in § 6382 (a) is a statutory term of art. It does not embrace all eligible officers who have been considered and not selected for promotion. Before an officer is considered to have failed of selection for the first time, he must have been placed within a “promotion zone” established by the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary each year establishes “promotion zones” of officers who will either be selected for promotion to the next higher grade or who will be considered to have failed of selection for promotion for the first time. See §§ 5764, 5776. The number of officers in the zones, established for each grade, is set at a level to ensure a flow of promotions consistent with the appropriate terms of service in each grade, see § 5768, and to provide opportunity for promotion of others in succeeding years. The number of officers within each zone is thus based on “a consideration of the number of vacancies estimated for the next higher grade in each of the next five years, the number of officers who will be eligible for selection in each of those years, and the terms of service that those officers will have completed.” § 5764 (a). Section 6401 is the mandatory-attrition provision that applies to women officers appointed under § 5590, including all women line officers and most women officers in the Staff Corps. It provides for mandatory discharge of a woman officer appointed under § 5590 when she “is not on a promotion list” and “has completed 13 years of active commissioned service in the Navy.” § 6401. Section 6401 was initially intended approximately to equate the length of service of women officers before mandatory discharge for want of promotion with that of male lieutenants discharged under § 6382 (a). Subsequently, however, Congress specifically recognized that the provisions of § 6401 would probably result in longer tenure for women lieutenants than for male lieutenants under § 6382. When it enacted legislation eliminating many of the former restrictions on women officers’ participation in the naval service in 1967, Congress expressly left undisturbed the 13-year tenure provision of § 6401. And both the House and the Senate Reports observed that the attrition provisions governing women line officers would parallel “present provisions with respect to male officers except that the discharge of male officers probably occurs about 2 years earlier.” S. Rep. No. 676, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 12; H. R. Rep. No. 216, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (emphasis added). II It is against this background that we must decide whether, agreeably to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Congress may accord to women naval officers a 13-year tenure of commissioned service under § 6401 before mandatory discharge for want of promotion, while requiring under § 6382 (a) the mandatory discharge of male lieutenants who have been twice passed over for promotion but who, like Ballard, may have had less than 13 years of commissioned service. In arguing that Congress has acted unconstitutionally, appellee relies primarily upon the Court’s recent decisions in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, and Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71. In Frontiero the Court was concerned with “the right of a female member of the uniformed services to claim her spouse as a 'dependent’ for the purposes of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits under 37 U. S. C. §§ 401, 403, and 10 U. S. C. §§ 1072, 1076, on an equal footing with male members.” 411 U. S., at 678. Under the governing statutes, a serviceman could automatically claim his spouse as a “dependent,” but a servicewoman’s male spouse was not considered to be a “dependent” unless he was shown in fact to be dependent upon his wife for more than one-half of his support. The challenged classification was based exclusively on gender, and the Government conceded that the different treatment of men and women service members was based solely upon considerations of administrative convenience. The Court found this disparity of treatment constitutionally invalid. In the words of the plurality opinion: “[A]ny statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands 'dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated,’ and therefore involves the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution] . . . .’ Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S., at 77, 76. We therefore conclude that, by according differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as they require a female member to prove the dependency of her husband.” Id., at 690-691. The case of Reed v. Reed, supra, involved quite similar considerations. In that case the Court considered the constitutionality of an Idaho probate code provision that, in establishing who would administer a decedent’s estate, gave a “mandatory” preference to men over women when they were in the same degree of relationship to the decedent. The Idaho law permitted no consideration of the individual qualifications of particular men or women as potential administrators, but simply preferred males in order to reduce probate expenses by eliminating contests over the relative qualifications of men and women otherwise similarly situated. The Court held that “[b]y providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.” 404 U. S., at 77. In both Reed and Frontiero the challenged classifications based on sex were premised on overbroad generalizations that could not be tolerated under the Constitution. In Reed, the assumption underlying the Idaho statute was that men would generally be better estate administrators than women. In Frontiero, the assumption underlying the Federal Armed Services benefit statutes was that female spouses of servicemen would normally be dependent upon their husbands, while male spouses of servicewomen would not. In contrast, the different treatment of men and women naval officers under §§ 6382 and 6401 reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and female line officers in the Navy-are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service. Appellee has not challenged the current restrictions on women officers’ participation in combat and in most sea duty. Specifically, “women may not be assigned to duty in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy other than hospital ships and transports.” 10 U. S. C. § 6015. Thus, in competing for promotion, female lieutenants will not generally have compiled records of seagoing service comparable to those of male lieutenants. In enacting and retaining § 6401, Congress may thus quite rationally have believed that women line officers had less opportunity for promotion than did their male counterparts, and that a longer period of tenure for women officers would, therefore, be consistent with the goal to provide women officers with “fair and equitable career advancement programs.” H. R. Rep. No. 216, supra, at 5. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351. The complete rationality of this legislative classification is underscored by the fact that in corps where male and female lieutenants are similarly situated, Congress has not differentiated between them with respect to tenure. Thus women staff officers not appointed under § 5590 are subject to the same mandatory attrition rule of § 6382 (a) as are male officers. These include officers in the Medical, Dental, Judge Advocate General’s, and Medical Service Corps. See 10 U. S. C. §§ 5574, 5578, 5578a, 5579. Conversely, active male lieutenants who are members of the Nurse Corps, like female lieutenants in that Corps, are within the ambit of 10 U. S. C. § 6396 (c), which contains a 13-year tenure provision like § 6401. In both Reed and Frontiero the reason asserted to justify the challenged gender-based classifications was administrative convenience, and that alone. Here, on the contrary, the operation of the statutes in question results in a flow of promotions commensurate with the Navy’s current needs and serves to motivate qualified commissioned officers to so conduct themselves that they may realistically look forward to higher levels of command. This Court has recognized that “it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.” Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 17. See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 94. The responsibility for determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend to that business rests with Congress, see U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, els. 12-14, and with the President. See U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. We cannot say that, in exercising its broad constitutional power here, Congress has violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The judgment is reversed. Title 10 U. S. C. §6382 provides: “(a) Each officer on the active list of the Navy serving in the grade of lieutenant, except an officer in the Nurse Corps, and each officer on the active list of the Marine Corps serving in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year in which he is considered as having failed of selection for promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander or major for the second time. However, if he so requests, he may be honorably discharged at any time during that fiscal year. “(d) This section does not apply to women officers appointed under section 5590 of this title or to officers designated for limited duty.” Ballard’s scheduled discharge carried with it an entitlement to a “lump-sum” severance payment of approximately $15,000, 10 U. S. C. ■ § 6382 (c), but would have terminated Ballard’s total service time (including seven years of enlisted service) short of the 20 years of service necessary for substantially greater retirement benefits. Title 10 U. S. C. §6401 (a) provides: “Each woman officer on the active list of the Navy, appointed under section 5590' of this title, who holds a permanent appointment in the grade of lieutenant and each woman officer on the active list of the Marine Corps who holds a permanent appointment in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year in which— “(1) she is not on a promotion list; and “(2) she has completed 13 years of active commissioned service in the Navy or in the Marine Corps. “However, if she so requests, she may be honorably discharged at any time during that fiscal year.” The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in pertinent part that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Although it contains no Equal Protection Clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the Federal Government from engaging in discrimination that is “so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499. See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168. Similarly, the authorized strength of the Supply Corps and the Civil Engineers Corps is established in set proportions to the authorized number of line officers. 10 U. S. C. § 5404 (a). More complicated formulas set the bounds for the numbers of staff officers in ■ other corps. E. g., § 5404 (b). See S. Rep. No. 2120, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 4. Parts of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 that affected naval officers were codified in 10 U. S. C. § 5401 et seq., by the Act of Aug. 10, 1956, 70A Stat. 297. Title 10 U. S. C. § 6382 (a) is a codification of § 312 (h) of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 860, and that section was based, in turn, on § 12 (c) of the Act of June 23, 1938, 52 Stat. 949. Title 10 U. S. C. § 6382 (b) calls for the mandatory, discharge of lieutenants (junior grade) who twice fail to be selected for promotion to the grade of lieutenant. In the grades above lieutenant, statutory provisions require the mandatory retirement, instead of discharge, of officers twice passed over for promotion. 10 U. S. C. • §§ 6376, 6379, 6380. Section 6401 does not apply to women officers, appointed pursuant to 10 U. S. C. §§ 5574, 5578, 5578a, and 5579, who are in the Medical, Dental, Judge Advocate General’s, and Medical Service Corps. These women staff officers are, like male officers, subject to §6382 (a). The reason for the “not on a promotion list” language of § 6401, as contrasted with the “failed of selection” language of §6382 (a), is in part historical. Section 6401 was enacted as §207 (j) of the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 368. The “promotion zone” system was not established for women appointed under § 5590 until 1967. Pub. L. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967). See § 5764(d). See Hearings on S. 1527 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services (subsequently S. 1641), 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 39. Although the statutory eligibility periods for promotion through the ranks to lieutenant commander is somewhat shorter, § 5751 (b), the normal time in service as an ensign, lieutenant (junior grade), and lieutenant is 12 years under peacetime conditions. § 5768 (a). Accordingly, a male line officer who had achieved the rank of lieutenant would typically have completed 12 years of service before being considered for the rank of lieutenant commander, and would have completed 13 years of service before being passed over twice for promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander. See Pub. L. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967). This Act repealed numerical and percentage restrictions on women officers in certain grades, removed restrictions on permanent appointment of women officers to the rank of captain, and authorized women officers under certain circumstances to be eligible for flag rank. Congress also established a “promotion zone” system for women officers and indicated that the promotion and attrition of female officers were generally to correspond to the treatment of male officers. S. Rep. No. 676, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2. According to the brief of the Solicitor General, the tenure differential has since been increased by the removal of time-in-grade restrictions and accelerated promotions resulting from the Vietnam conflict. See Exec. Order No. 11437, Dec. 2, 1968, 3 CFR 754 (1966-1970 Comp.). Thus in recent years the discharge of male officers under § 6382 (a) may have occurred about four years earlier than the discharge of women officers under § 6401, instead of the two years’ ■difference acknowledged by Congress in 1967. The dissenting opinion argues that, in retaining § 6401 in 1967, Congress may not have intended to give a longer tenure to women line officers than to their male counterparts, because “it is certainly plausible to conclude that Congress continued to believe, as it had in 1948, that the separation provisions for men and women would, given the opportunity to work properly, result in equal average tenure for both sexes.” Post, at 517. This conclusion cannot, however, be reconciled with Congress’ recognition that mandatory retirement provisions for women line officers “parallel present provisions with respect to male officers except that the discharge of male officers probably occurs about 2 years earlier.” S. Rep. No. 676, supra, at 12; H. R. Rep. No. 216, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (emphasis added). Alternatively, the dissent seems to imply that the “anomalous” retention in 1967 of the 13-year tenure provision of § 6401 may have resulted from congressional inadvertence. Post, at 514-515. But this view cannot be squared with the legislative history either. A major factor prompting the 1967 amendments was Congress’ express concern that unless restrictions on promotions of women naval officers were lifted, the operation of § 6401 would cause excessive forced retirement of women lieutenants. In discussing the problem, the House Report explicitly described the 13-year provision: “A particularly severe problem of promotion stagnation exists among WAVE officers in the Navy. The present grade limitations on promotion of WAVE officers to the grades of commander-lieutenant commander have so reduced the vacancies that the Navy will be forced to discharge most regular WAVE lieutenants when they reach their 13th year of service if r.elief is not provided. “Present law (sec. 6401, title 10, United States Code) provides that women officers on the active list of the Navy in the grade of lieutenant must be discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year in which they complete 13 years of active commissioned service if not on a promotion list that year. The Navy estimates that without legislative relief, the attrition among women line lieutenants will average 50 percent or more over the next 5 years. The Navy considers such heavy attrition unacceptable.” H. R. Rep. No. 216, supra, at 6. It is thus clear that Congress in 1967 intentionally retained the 13-year tenure provision of § 6401, and did so with specific knowledge that it gave women line officers a longer tenure than their male .counterparts. We observe that because of the restrictions that were removed from women officers’ participation in naval service in 1967, see Act of Nov. 8, 1967, 81 Stat. 374; S. Rep. No. 676, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., more opportunity has become available for women officers. We are told by the Solicitor General that since 1967, the Secretary of the Navy has implemented a program for acceleration of women officers’ promotion and that today women are being considered for promotion within the same time periods as are men. Apparently believing that the need for a tenure differential has subsided, the Department of Defense has submitted a bill to Congress that would substitute for § 6401 the same rule that governs male lieutenants. See §§ 2 (5) and 4(18)(L) of H. R. 12405 (93d Cong., 2d Sess.), which contains a new provision as a proposed replacement of both § 6382 and § 6401. These developments no more than reinforce the view that it is for Congress, and not for the courts, to decide when the policy goals sought to be served by § 6401 are no longer necessary to the Navy’s officer promotion and attrition programs.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COLUMBUS BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. v. PENICK ET AL. No. 78-610. Argued April 24, 1979 Decided July 2, 1979 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, Marshall, BlackmtjN, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 468. Stewart, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 469. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 479. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Powell, J., joined, post, p. 489. Samuel H. Porter argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Earl F. Morris and Curtis A. Loveland. Thomas I. Atkins argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Richard M. Stein, William L. Taylor, Nathaniel R. Jones, Louis R. Lucas, William E. Caldwell, Paul R. Dimond, Robert A. Murphy, Richard S. Kohn, and Norman J. Chachkin. Mark O’Neill filed a brief for the Ohio State Board of Education et al. as respondents under this Court’s Rule 21 (4). Assistant Attorney General Days argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Sara Sun Beale, Brian K. Landsberg, and Robert J. Reinstein. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Richard S. Gebelein, Attorney General of Delaware, Regina M. Small, Deputy Attorney General, Mason E. Turner, Jr., James T. McKinstry, and Philip B. Kurland for the Delaware State Board of Education et al.; and by Charles E. Brown and Ira Owen Kane for the Neighborhood School Coordinating Committee et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Burt Neuborne, E. Richard Larson, Robert Allen Sedler, Winn Newman, and Carole W. Wilson for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Arthur J. Lesemann for the Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, N. J.; by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Bill Lann Lee, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., John Silard, Elliott C. Lichtman, and John Fillion for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al.; and by Stephen J. Poliak, Richard M. Sharp, Wendy S. White, and David Rubin for the National Education Association et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Harriet F. Pilpel, Nathan Z. Der-showitz, and Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress; and by Duane W. Krohnke for Special School District No. 1, Minneapolis, Minn. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The public schools of Columbus, Ohio, are highly segregated by race. .In 1976, over 32% of the 96,000 students in the system were black. About 70% of all students attended schools that were at least 80% black or 80% white. 429 F. Supp. 229, 240 (SD Ohio 1977). Half of the 172 schools were 90% black or 90% white. 583 F. 2d 787, 800 (CA6 1978). Fourteen named students in the Columbus school system brought this case on June 21, 1973, against the Columbus Board of Education, the State Board of Education, and the appropriate local and state officials. The second amended complaint, filed on October 22, 1974, charged that the Columbus defendants had pursued and were pursuing a course of conduct having the purpose and effect of causing and perpetuating segregation in the public schools, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. A declaratory judgment to this effect and appropriate injunctive relief were prayed. Trial of the case began more than a year later, consumed 36 trial days, produced a record containing over 600 exhibits and a transcript in excess of 6,600 pages, and was completed in June 1976. Final arguments were heard in September, and in March 1977 the District Court filed an opinion and order containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 429 F. Supp. 229. The trial court summarized its findings: “From the evidence adduced at trial, the Court has found earlier in this opinion that the Columbus Public Schools were openly and intentionally segregated on the basis of race when Brown [v. Board of Education, 347 IT. S. 483 (Brown /)] was decided in 1954. The Court has found that the Columbus Board of Education never actively set out to dismantle this dual system. The Court has found that until legal action was initiated by the Columbus Area Civil Rights Council, the Columbus Board did not assign teachers and administrators to Columbus schools at random, without regard for the racial composition of the student enrollment at those schools. The Columbus Board even in very recent times .. . has approved optional attendance zones, discontiguous attendance areas and boundary changes which have maintained and enhanced racial imbalance in the Columbus Public Schools. The Board, even in very recent times and after promising to do otherwise, has adjured [sic] workable suggestions for improving the racial balance of city schools. “Viewed in the context of segregative optional attendance zones, segregative faculty and administrative hiring and assignments, and the other such actions and decisions of the Columbus Board of Education in recent and remote history, it is fair and reasonable to draw an inference of segregative intent from the Board’s actions and omissions discussed in this opinion.” Id., at 260-261. The District Court’s ultimate conclusion was that at the time of trial the racial segregation in the Columbus school system “directly resulted from [the Board’s] intentional segre-gative acts and omissions,” id., at 269, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, judgment was entered against the local and state defendants enjoining them from continuing to discriminate on the basis of race in operating the Columbus public schools and ordering the submission of a systemwide desegregation plan. Following decision by this Court in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (Dayton I), in June 1977, and in response to a motion by the Columbus Board, the District Court rejected the argument that Dayton I required or permitted any modification of its findings or judgment. It reiterated its conclusion that the Board’s “ ‘liability in this case concerns the Columbus School District as a whole,’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 94, quoting 429 F. Supp., at 266, asserting that, although it had “no real interest in any remedy plan which is more sweeping than necessary to correct the constitutional wrongs plaintiffs have suffered,” neither would it accept any plan “which fails to take into account the systemwide nature of the liability of the defendants.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 95. The Board subsequently presented a plan that complied with the District Court’s guidelines and that was embodied in a judgment entered on October 7. The plan was stayed pending appeal to the Court of Appeals. Based on its own examination of the extensive record, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments entered against the local defendants. 583 F. 2d 787. The Court of Appeals could not find the District Court’s findings of fact clearly erroneous. Id., at 789. Indeed, the Court of Appeals examined in detail each set of findings by the District Court and found strong support for them in the record. Id., at 798, 804, 805, 814. The Court of Appeals also discussed in detail and found unexceptionable the District Court’s understanding and application of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cases construing it. Implementation of the desegregation plan was stayed pending our disposition of the case. 439 U. S. 1348 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). We granted the Board’s petition for certiorari, 439 U. S. 1066 (1979), and we now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I The Board earnestly contends that when this case was brought and at the time of trial its operation of a segregated school system was not done with any general or specific racially discriminatory purpose, and that whatever unconstitutional conduct it may have been guilty of in the past such conduct at no time had systemwide segregative impact and surely no remaining systemwide impact at the time of trial. A systemwide remedy was therefore contrary to the teachings of the cases, such as Dayton I, that the scope of the constitutional violation measures the scope of the remedy. We have discovered no reason, however, to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals, based on the findings and conclusions of the District Court, that the Board’s conduct at the time of trial and before not only was animated by an unconstitutional, segregative purpose, but also had current, segre-gative impact that was sufficiently systemwide to warrant the remedy ordered by the District Court. These ultimate conclusions were rooted in a series of constitutional violations that the District Court found the Board to have committed and that together dictated its judgment and decree. In each instance, the Court of Appeals found the District Court’s conclusions to be factually and legally sound. A First, although at least since 1888 there had been no statutory requirement or authorization to operate segregated schools, the District Court found that in 1954, when Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (Brown I), was decided, the Columbus Board was not operating a racially neutral, unitary school system, but was conducting “an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of Columbus,” and that “[t]he then-existing racial separation was the direct result of cognitive acts or omissions of those school board members and administrators who had originally intentionally caused and later perpetuated the racial isolation . . . 429 F. Supp., at 236. Such separateness could not “be said to have been the result of racially neutral official acts.” Ibid. Based on its own examination of the record, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court in this respect, observing that, “[wjhile the Columbus school system's dual black-white character was not mandated by state law as of 1954, the record certainly shows intentional segregation by the Columbus Board. As of 1954 the Columbus School Board had ‘carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers and facilities within the school system.’ ” 583 F. 2d, at 798-799, quoting Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189, 201-202 (1973). The Board insists that, since segregated schooling was not commanded by state law and since not all schools were wholly black or wholly white in 1954, the District Court was not warranted in finding a dual system. But the District Court found that the “Columbus Public Schools were officially segregated by race in 1954,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 94 (emphasis added); and in any event, there is no reason to question the finding that as the “direct result of cognitive acts or omissions” the Board maintained “an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of Columbus.” 429 F. Supp., at 236. Proof of purposeful and effective maintenance of a body of separate black schools in a substantial part of the system itself is prima facie proof of a dual school system and supports a finding to this effect absent sufficient contrary proof by the Board, which was not forthcoming in this case. Keyes, supra, at 203. B Second, both courts below declared that since the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), the Columbus Board has been under a continuous constitutional obligation to disestablish its dual school system and that it has failed to discharge this duty. App. to Pet. for Cert. 94; 583 F. 2d, at 799. Under the Fourteenth Amendment and the cases that have construed it, the Board’s duty to dismantle its dual system cannot be gainsaid. Where a racially discriminatory school system has been found to exist, Brown II imposes the duty on local school boards to “effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.” 349 U. S., at 301. “Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems,” and school boards operating such systems were “clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968). Each instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dayton I, 433 U. S., at 413-414; Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 460 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U. S. 484 (1972) (creation of a new school district in a city that had operated a dual school system but was not yet the subject of court-ordered desegregation). The Green case itself was decided 13 years after Brown II. The core of the holding was that the school board involved had not done enough to eradicate the lingering consequences of the dual school system that it had been operating at the time Brown I was decided. Even though a freedom-of-choice plan had been adopted, the school system remained essentially a segregated system, with many all-black and many all-white schools. The board’s continuing obligation, which had not been satisfied, was “ 'to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work .. . now . . . until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed.’ ” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 13 (1971), quoting Green,supra, at 439 (emphasis in original). As The Chief Justice’s opinion for a unanimous Court in Swann recognized, Brown and Green imposed an affirmative duty to desegregate. “If school authorities fail in their affirmative- obligations under these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked. ... In default by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system.” 402 U. S., at 15-16. In Swann, it should be recalled, an initial desegregation plan had been entered in 1965 and had been affirmed on appeal. But the case was reopened, and in 1969 the school board was required to come forth with a more effective plan. The judgment adopting the ultimate plan was affirmed here in 1971, 16 years after Brown II. In determining whether a dual school system has been disestablished, Swann also mandates that matters aside from student assignments must be considered: “[W]here it is possible to identify a ‘white school’ or a ‘Negro school’ simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings and equipment, or the organization of sports activities, a prima facie case of violation of substantive constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause is shown.” 402 U. S., at 18. Further, Swann stated that in devising remedies for legally imposed segregation the responsibility of the local authorities and district courts is to ensure that future school construction and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish the dual school system. Id., at 20-21. As for student assignments, the Court said: “No per se rule can adequately embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interests involved; but in a system with a history of segregation the need for remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority’s compliance with its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition. Where the school authority’s proposed plan for conversion from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence of some schools that are all or predominantly of one race, they have the burden of showing that such school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory.” Id., at 26. The Board’s continuing “affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system” is therefore beyond question, McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 41 (1971), and it has pointed to nothing in the record persuading us that at the time of trial the dual school system and its effects had been disestablished. The Board does not appear to challenge the finding of the District Court that at the time of trial most blacks were still going to black schools and most whites to white schools. Whatever the Board’s current purpose with respect to racially separate education might be, it knowingly continued its failure to eliminate the consequences of its past intentionally segregative policies. The Board “never actively set out to dismantle this duál system.” 429 F. Supp., at 260. C Third, the District Court not only found that the Board had breached its constitutional duty by failing effectively to eliminate the continuing consequences of its intentional systemwide segregation in 1954, but also found that in the intervening years there had been a series of Board actions and practices that could not “reasonably be explained without reference to racial concerns,” id., at 241, and that “intentionally aggravated, rather than alleviated,” racial separation in the schools. App. to Pet. for Cert. 94. These matters included the general practice of assigning black teachers only to those schools with substantial black student populations, a practice that was terminated only in 1974 as the result of a conciliation agreement with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; the intentionally segregative use of optional attendance zones, discon-tiguous attendance areas, and boundary changes; and the selection of sites for new school construction that had the foreseeable and anticipated effect of maintaining the racial separation of the schools. The court generally noted that “[s]ince the 1954 Brown decision, the Columbus defendants or their predecessors were adequately put on notice of the fact that action was required to correct and to prevent the increase in” segregation, yet failed to heed their duty to alleviate racial separation in the schools. 429 F. Supp., at 255. II Against this background, we cannot fault the conclusion of the District Court and the Court of Appeals that at the time of trial there was systemwide segregation in the Columbus schools that was the result of recent and remote intentionally segregative actions of the Columbus Board. While appearing not to challenge most of the subsidiary findings of historical fact, Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, petitioners dispute many of the factual inferences drawn from these facts by the two courts below. On this record, however, there is no apparent reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions entered by the District Court and strongly affirmed by the Court of Appeals after its own examination of the record. Nor do we discern that the judgments entered below rested on any misapprehension of the controlling law. It is urged that the courts below failed to heed the requirements of Keyes, Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), that a plaintiff seeking to make out an equal protection violation on the basis of racial discrimination must show purpose. Both courts, it is argued, considered the requirement satisfied if it were shown that disparate impact would be the natural and foreseeable consequence of the practices and policies of the Board, which, it is said, is nothing more than equating impact with intent, contrary to the controlling precedent. The District Court, however, was amply cognizant of the controlling cases. It is understood that to prevail the plaintiffs were required to “ 'prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional state action/ ” 429 F. Supp., at 251, quoting Keyes, 413 U. S., at 198 — that is, that the school officials had “intended to segregate.” 429 F. Supp., at 254. See also 583 F. 2d, at 801. The District Court also recognized that under those cases disparate impact and foreseeable consequences, without more, do not establish a constitutional violation. See, e. g., 429 F. Supp., at 251. Nevertheless, the District Court correctly noted that actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose. Those cases do not forbid “the foreseeable effects standard from being utilized as one of the several kinds of proofs from which an inference of segregative intent may be properly drawn.” Id., at 255. Adherence to a particular policy or practice, “with full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence upon racial imbalance in a school system is one factor among many others which may be considered by a court in determining whether an inference of segregative intent should be drawn.” Ibid. The District Court thus stayed well within the requirements of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 n. 25 (1979). It is also urged that the District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to observe the requirements of our recent decision in Dayton I, which reiterated the accepted rule that the remedy imposed by a court of equity should be commensurate with the violation ascertained, and held that the remedy for the violations that had then been established in that case should be aimed at rectifying the “incremental segregative effect”, of the discriminatory acts identified. In Dayton I, only a few apparently isolated discriminatory practices had been found; yet a systemwide remedy had been imposed without proof of a systemwide impact. Here, however, the District Court repeatedly emphasized that it had found purposefully segregative practices with current, systemwide impact. 429 F. Supp., at 252, 259-260, 264, 266; App. to Pet. for Cert. 95; 583 F. 2d, at 799. And the Court of Appeals, responding to similar arguments, said: “School board policies of systemwide application necessarily have systemwide impact. 1) The pre-1954 policy of creating an enclave of five schools intentionally designed for black students and known as 'black’ schools, as found by the District Judge, clearly had a 'substantial’— indeed, a systemwide — impact. 2) The post-1954 failure of the Columbus Board to desegregate the school system in spite of many requests and demands to do so, of course, had systemwide impact. 3) So, too, did the Columbus Board’s segregative school construction and siting policy as we have detailed it above. 4) So too did its student assignment policy which, as shown above, produced the large majority of racially identifiable schools as of the school year 1975-76. 5) The practice of assigning black teachers and administrators only or in large majority to black schools likewise represented a systemwide policy of segregation. This policy served until July 1974 to deprive black students of .opportunities for contact with and learning from white teachers, and conversely to deprive white students of similar opportunities to meet, know and learn from black teachers. It also served as discriminatory, systemwide racial identification of schools.” 583 F. 2d, at 814. Nor do we perceive any misuse of Keyes, where we held that purposeful discrimination in a substantial part of a school system furnishes a sufficient basis for an inferential finding of a systemwide discriminatory intent unless otherwise rebutted, and that given the purpose to operate a dual school system one could infer a connection between such a purpose and racial separation in other parts of the school system. There was no undue reliance here on the inferences permitted by Keyes, or upon those recognized by Swann. Furthermore, the Board was given ample opportunity to counter the evidence of segre-gative purpose and current, systemwide impact, and the findings of the courts below were against it in both respects. 429 F. Supp., at 260; App. to Pet. for Cert. 95, 102, 105. Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals committed no prejudicial errors of fact or law, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed. So ordered. A similar group of plaintiffs was allowed to intervene, and the original plaintiffs were allowed to file an amended complaint that was certified as a class action. 429 F. Supp. 229, 233-234 (SD Ohio 1977); App. 50. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment against the state defendants and remanded for further proceedings regarding those parties. 583 F. 2d 787, 815-818 (CA6 1978). No issue with respect to the state defendants is before us now. Petitioners also argue that the District Court erred in requiring that every school in the system be brought roughly within proportionate racial balance. We see no misuse of mathematical ratios under our decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 22-25 (1971), especially in light of the Board’s failure to justify the continued existence of “some schools that are all or predominantly of one race . . . .” Id., at 26; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 102-103. Petitioners do not otherwise question the remedy if a systemwide violation was properly found. In 1871, pursuant to the requirements of state law, Columbus maintained a complete separation of the races in the public schools. 429 F. Supp., at 234-235. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 1888 that state law no longer required or permitted the segregation of schoolchildren. Board of Education v. State, 45 Ohio St. 555, 16 N. E. 373. Even prior to that, in 1881, the Columbus Board abolished its separate schools for black and white students, but by the end of the first decade of this century it had returned to a segregated school policy. Champion Avenue School was built in 1909 in a predominantly black area and was completely staffed with black teachers. Other black schools were established as the black population grew. The Board gerrymandered attendance zones so that white students who lived near these schools were assigned to or could attend white schools, which often were further from their homes. By 1943, a total of five schools had almost exclusively black student bodies, and each was assigned an all-black faculty, often through all-white to all-black faculty transfers that occurred each time the Board came to consider a particular school as a black school. 429 F. Supp., at 234-236. Both our dissenting Brethren and the separate concurrence of Mr. Justice Stewart put great weight on the absence of a statutory mandate or authorization to discriminate, but the Equal Protection Clause was aimed at all official actions, not just those of state legislatures. “[N]o agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, . . . denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws . . . violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of the State.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347 (1880). Thus, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), the discriminatory application of an ordinance fair on its face was found to be unconstitutional state action. Even actions of state agents that may be illegal under state law are attributable to the State. United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945). Our decision in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189 (1973), plainly demonstrates in the educational context that there is no magical difference between segregated schools mandated by statute and those that result from local segregative acts and policies. The presence of a statute or ordinance commanding separation of the races would ease the plaintiff’s problems of proof, but here the District Court found that the local officials, by their conduct and policies, had maintained a dual school system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals agreed, and we fail to see why there should be a lesser constitutional duty to eliminate that system than there would have been had the system been ordained by law. The dissenters in this ease claim a better grasp of the historical and ultimate facts than the two courts below had. But on the issue of whether there was a dual school system in Columbus, Ohio, in 1954, on the record before us we are much more impressed by the views of the judges who have lived with the case over the years. Also, our dissenting Brothers’ suggestion that this Court should play a special oversight role in reviewing the factual determinations of the lower courts in school desegregation cases, post, at 491-492 (RehNQUist, J., dissenting), asserts an omnipotence and omniscience that we do not have and should not claim. It is argued that Dayton I, 433 U. S. 406 (1977), implicitly overruled or limited those portions of Keyes and Swann approving, in certain circumstances, inferences of general, systemwide purpose and current, system-wide impact from evidence of discriminatory purpose that has resulted in substantial current segregation, and approving a systemwide remedy absent a showing by the defendant of what part of the current imbalance was not caused by the constitutional breach. Dayton I does not purport to disturb any aspect of Keyes and Swann; indeed, it cites both cases with approval. On the facts found by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals at the time Dayton first came before us, there were only isolated instances of intentional segregation, which were insufficient to give rise to an inference of systemwide institutional purpose and which did not add up to a facially substantial systemwide impact. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton II), post, at 531, and n. 5. Despite petitioners’ avowedly strong preference for neighborhood schools, in times of residential racial transition the Board created optional attendance zones to allow white students to avoid predominantly black schools, which were often closer to the homes of the white pupils. For example, until well after the time the complaint was filed, petitioners allowed students in “a small, white enclave on Columbus’ predominantly black near-east side ... to escape attendance at black” schools. 429 F. Supp., at 244. The court could perceive no racially neutral reasons for this optional zone. Id., at 245. “Quite frankly, the Near-Bexley Option appears to this Court to be a classic example of a segregative device designed to permit white students to escape attendance at predominantly black schools.” Ibid. This technique was applied when neighborhood schools would have tended to desegregate the involved schools. In the 1960’s, a group of white students were bused past their neighborhood school to a “whiter” school. The District Court could “discern no other explanation than a racial one for the existence of the Moler discontiguous attendance area for the period 1963 through 1969.” Id., at 247. From 1957 until 1963, students living in a predominantly white area near Heimandale Elementary School attended a more remote, but identifiably white school. Id., at 247-248. Gerrymandering of boundary lines also continued after 1954. The District Court found, for instance, that for one area on the west side of the city containing three white schools and one black school the Board had altered the lines so that white residential areas were removed from the black school’s zone and black students were contained within that zone. Id., at 245-247. The Court found that the segregative choice of lines was not justified “as a matter of academic administration” and “had a substantial and continuing segregative impact upon these four west side schools.” Id., at 247. Another example involved the former Mifflin district that had been absorbed into the Columbus district. The Board staff presented two alternative means of drawing necessary attendance zones: one that was desegre-gative and one that was segregative. The Board chose the segregative option, and the District Court was unpersuaded that it had any legitimate educational reasons for doing so. Id., at 248-250. The District Court found that, of the 103 schools built by the Board between 1950 and 1975, 87 opened with racially identifiable student bodies and 71 remained that way at the time of trial. This result was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances in light of the sites selected, and the Board was often specifically warned that it was, without apparent justification, choosing sites that would maintain or further segregation. Id., at 241-243. As the Court of Appeals noted: “[T]his record actually requires no reliance upon inference, since, as indicated above, it contains repeated instances where the Columbus Board was warned of the segregative effect of proposed site choices, and was urged to consider alternatives which could have had an integrative effect. In these instances the Columbus Board chose the segregative sites. In this situation the District Judge was justified in relying in part on the history of the Columbus Board’s site choices and construction program in finding deliberate and unconstitutional systemwide segregation.” 583 F. 2d, at 804. Local community and civil rights groups, the “Ohio State University Advisory Commission on Problems Facing the Columbus Public Schools, and officials of the Ohio State Board of Education all called attention to the problem [of segregation] and made certain curative recommendations.” 429 F. Supp., at 255. This was particularly important because the Columbus system grew rapidly in terms of geography and number of students, creating many crossroads where the Board could either turn toward segregation or away from it. See id., at 243. Specifically, for example, the University Commission in 1968 made certain recommendations that it thought not only would assist desegregation of the schools but also would encourage integrated residential patterns. Id., at 256. The Board itself came to similar conclusions about what could be done, but its response was “minimal.” Ibid. See also id., at 264. Additionally, the Board refused to create a site-selection advisory group to assist in avoiding sites with a segregative effect, refused to ask state education officials to present plans for desegregating the Columbus public schools, and refused to apply for federal desegregation-assistance funds. Id., at 257; see id., at 239. The District Court drew “the inference of segregative intent from the Columbus defendants’ failures, after notice, to consider predictable racial consequences of their acts and omissions when alternatives were available which would have eliminated or lessened racial imbalance.” Id., at 240. Petitioners have indicated that a few of the recent violations specifically discussed by the District Court involved so few students and lasted for such a short time that they are unlikely to have any current impact. But that contention says little or nothing about the incremental impact of systemwide practices extending over many years. Petitioners also argue that because many of the involved schools were in areas that had become predominantly black residential areas by the time of trial, the racial separation in the schools would have occurred even without the unlawful conduct of petitioners. But, as the District Court found, petitioners’ evidence in this respect was insufiicient to counter respondents’ proof. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 271 n. 21 (1977); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 287 (1977). And the phenomenon described by petitioners seems only to confirm, not disprove, the evidence accepted by the District Court that school segregation is a contributing cause of housing segregation. 429 F. Supp., at 259; see Keyes, 413 U. S., at 202-203; Swann, 402 U. S., at 20-21. Although the District Court in this case discussed in its major opinion a number of specific instances of purposeful segregation, it made it quite clear that its broad findings were not limited to those instances: “Viewing the Court’s March 8 findings in their totality, this case does not rest on three specific violations, or eleven, or any other specific number. It concerns a school board which since 1954 has by its official acts intentionally aggravated, rather than alleviated, the racial imbalance of the public schools it administers. These were not the facts of the Dayton case.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 94. Mr. Justice RehNQUist’s dissent erroneously states that we have “reliev[ed] school desegregation plaintiffs from any showing of a causal nexus between intentional segregative actions and the conditions they seek to remedy.” Post, at 501. As we have expressly noted, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the Board’s purposefully discriminatory conduct and policies had current, systemwide impact — an essential predicate, as both courts recognized, for a systemwide remedy. Those courts reveal a much more knowledgeable and reliable view of the facts and of the record than do our dissenting Brethren. “For example, there is little dispute that Champion, Felton, Mt. Vernon, Pilgrim and Garfield were de jure segregated by direct acts of the Columbus defendants’ predecessors. They were almost completely segregated in 1954, 1964, 1974 and today. Nothing has occurred to substantially alleviate that continuity of discrimination of thousands of black students over the intervening decades.” 429 F. Supp., at 260 (footnote omitted). “The finding of liability in this case concerns the Columbus school district as a whole. Actions and omissions by public officials which tend to make black schools blacker necessarily have the reciprocal effect of making white schools whiter. '[I]t is obvious that a practice of concentrating Negroes in certain schools by structuring attendance zones or designating “feeder” schools on the basis of race has the reciprocal effect of keeping other nearby schools predominantly white.’ Keyes\_, swpra, at 201]. The evidence in this ease and the factual determinations made earlier in this opinion support the finding that those elementary, junior, and senior high schools in the Columbus school district which presently have a predominantly black student enrollment have been substantially and directly affected by the intentional acts and omissions of the defendant local and state school boards.” Id., at 266.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. v. MERCK & CO., INC. No. 81-1273. Argued December 1, 1982 Decided April 19, 1983 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in Part V of which White and Marshall, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 845. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 860. Jerrold J. Ganzfried argued the cause for petitioners in No. 81-1273 and respondents in No. 81-1472. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, and Michael Kimmel. Philip A. Lacovara argued the cause for respondent in No. 81-1273 and petitioner in No. 81-1472. With him on the briefs was Ronald A. Stem. Together with No. 81-1472, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Robert D. Wallick filed a brief for the Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Stanley L. Temko and Charles Lister filed a brief for SmithKline Corp. as amicus curiae. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue before the Court is the scope of the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to examine the records of a private contractor with whom the Government has entered into fixed-price negotiated contracts. We conclude that, under the circumstances presented in this action, the Comptroller General may inspect the contractor’s records of direct costs, but not records of indirect costs. In 1973 Merck & Co., Inc. (Merck), entered into three contracts with the Defense Supply Agency of the Department of Defense and one contract with the Veterans’ Administration for the sale of pharmaceutical products to the Government. All four contracts were negotiated, rather than awarded after formal advertising. The pharmaceutical products supplied under each contract were standard commercial products sold by Merck in substantial quantities to the general public. App. 41a. The price term proposed by Merck for each contract was based on the catalog price at which Merck sold the item to the general public or was otherwise determined by adequate competition. Before the award of each of the contracts at the fixed price proposed by Merck, there was no actual negotiation of price, and the Government contracting officers did not request Merck to submit cost data in connection with any of the four contracts. As required by 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 65 Stat. 700, 41 U. S. C. § 254(c), each contract contained a standard access-to-records clause granting the Comptroller General the right to examine any directly pertinent records involving transactions related to the contract. Relying on these clauses, in August 1974 the Comptroller General issued a formal demand to Merck for access to the following: “all books, documents, papers, and other records directly pertinent to the contracts, which include, but are not limited to (1) records of experienced costs including costs of direct materials, direct labor, overhead, and other pertinent corporate costs, (2) support for prices charged to the Government, and (3) such other information as may be necessary for use to review the reasonableness of the contract prices and the adequacy of the protection afforded the Government’s interests.” App. 18a. Merck refused to comply with the Comptroller General’s request and commenced this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Comptroller General’s access demand exceeded his statutory authority. The United States intervened and counterclaimed to enforce the Comptroller General’s demand. The District Court granted partial summary judgment for each party. Rejecting Merck’s argument that cost records are not “directly pertinent” to the fixed-price contracts that were the predicate of the General Accounting Office (GAO) demand, the court permitted access to all records “directly pertaining to the pricing and cost of producing the items furnished by . . . Merck under the . . . contracts . . . including manufacturing costs (including raw and packaging materials, labor and fringe benefits, quality control and supervision), manufacturing overhead (including plant administration, production planning, warehousing, utilities and security), royalty expenses, and delivery costs.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 81-1273, p. 39a. The court barred access, however, to records “with respect to research and development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration (except to the extent such data may be included in the cost items listed above).” Id., at 40a. In a brief per curiam opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Merck & Co. v. Staats, 214 U. S. App. D. C. 418, 665 F. 2d 1236 (1981). Both parties sought certiorari. In No. 81-1273, the United States petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals’ determination that records of Merck’s indirect costs are not subject to examination by the Comptroller General. In No. 81-1472, Merck challenges the determination that records of its direct costs are “directly pertinent” to the contracts in question and are therefore subject to examination. Merck also contends that access to its cost records is barred because the Comptroller General’s access demand was not made for a congressionally authorized purpose. We granted certiorari on the petitions of both parties, 456 U. S. 925 (1982), and now affirm. II As with any issue of statutory construction, we “ ‘must begin with the language of the statute itself. ’ ” Bread Political Action Committee v. FEC, 455 U. S. 577, 580 (1982), quoting Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187 (1980). The focal point of controversy is the meaning of the statutory phrase “directly pertain to and involve transactions relating to the contract.” See n. 3, supra. It is plain from the face of the provisions that these are words of limitation designed to restrict the class of records to which access is permitted by requiring some close connection between the type of records sought and the particular contract. The legislative history of the access provisions underscores what the language reflects: the intention of Congress to limit to some degree the Comptroller General’s access powers. As originally introduced, the bill now codified as 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c) provided access to “pertinent” records “involving transactions related to” the contract. See 97 Cong. Rec. 13371 (1951). Representative Hoffman opposed the original bill on the ground that it permitted “unnecessary snooping expeditions” and allowed the GAO to “go into everybody’s business and look it over if they just wanted to take a look at it.” Id., at 13373. He therefore offered a floor amendment to insert the word “directly” before the word “pertinent,” stating that the purpose of the amendment “is to limit the ‘snooping’ that may be carried on under this bill.” Id., at 13377. The sponsor of the original bill, Representative Hardy, did not oppose the amendment, and the amendment passed without debate or discussion. The passage of the Hoffman amendment clearly reveals that Congress did not want unrestricted “snooping” by the Comptroller General into the business records of a private contractor. The Government nevertheless attempts to discount the significance of Congress’ addition of the word “directly.” Based on the lack of opposition to the limiting amendment by the bill’s sponsor and the lack of debate, the Government argues that the Hoffman modification did not significantly alter the scope of the Hardy bill. We cannot agree. The only explanation in the legislative history of the meaning and purpose of the amendment is that of Representative Hoffman. His statement, which, as the explanation of the sponsor of the language, is an “authoritative guide to the statute’s construction,” North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512, 527 (1982), expressly indicates that the intent of the amendment was to curtail the scope of investigation authorized under the bill. Although, as the Government emphasizes, Representative Hoffman did not have the votes to defeat the bill in its entirety, he nevertheless had the votes to circumscribe the inquiry that the Comptroller General was authorized to undertake. Moreover, to accept the Government’s contention that the amendment had no substantive effect would contradict the settled principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 163 (1982). Therefore, in our attempt to give meaning to the words “directly pertinent,” we must be mindful of Congress’ aim to protect contractors from broad-ranging governmental intrusion into their private business affairs. It does not follow, however, that our interpretation of the language added by the Hoffman amendment must be guided solely by that policy, for it is expressive of only one of the aims embraced by Congress in enacting the access-to-records provisions. The legislative history also reveals that Congress sought, in granting the GAO this access authority, to equip that agency with a tool to detect fraud, waste, inefficiency, and extravagance in Government contracting generally. Representative Hardy, the sponsor of the legislation, explained that the two major purposes of the bill were “to give the Comptroller General the proper tools to do the job the Congress has instructed him to do . . . and ... to provide a deterrent to improprieties and wastefulness in the negotiation of contracts.” 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951). With regard to the former purpose, it is clear that Congress envisioned use of the access authority as an adjunct to the Comptroller General’s statutory responsibility to “investigate ... all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds” and to “make recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures.” 31 U. S. C. § 53(a). See also 31 U. S. C. §§ 60, 65(a). Obviously, broad access to cost records would enhance the GAO’s ability to evaluate the reasonableness of the price charged the Government and to identify areas of waste and inefficiency in procurement. Because of the lack of debate or discussion of the Hoffman amendment, however, we do not have any indication in the legislative history, nor indeed in the language of the statute itself, of the scope of access authority left to the GAO after the restrictive words were added to the bill. In defining the degree of limitation, we thus traverse uncharted seas guided only by the two general statutory purposes reflected in the legislative history. Consequently, our task in construing the statutes as they apply in this action is to give effect to both of these congressional aims. The tension between these goals is apparent. For some industries and some types of contracts, including perhaps those at issue here, neither objective can be achieved fully without sacrificing the other. Given these dual, conflicting aims, we must balance the public interest served by full GAO investigations against the private interest in freedom from officious governmental intermeddling in the contractor’s private business affairs. I — i HH I — ( w □> ^ The Government contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that records of Merck’s indirect costs are not “directly pertinent” to the contracts in question. In so arguing, the Government maintains that Merck’s indirect costs are directly pertinent to the fixed-price contracts because Merck uses payments made by the Government under these contracts to defray indirect expenses. Thus, the Government would have us define as “directly pertinent” the records of any costs defrayed from commingled general revenues that include Government payments under the contract. We cannot accept this interpretation of the statute, however, for it completely eviscerates the congressional goal of protecting the privacy of the contractor’s business records. Under the Government’s proposed definition, records of expenditures to purchase raw materials for the manufacture of an entirely different product than that sold under the Government contract or to invest in the stock of another corporation would be subject to inspection by the Comptroller General. Hence, the Government’s interpretation would permit far-ranging governmental scrutiny of a contractor’s business records of nongovernmental transactions completely unrelated to either the contract underlying the access demand or the product procured under that contract. Indeed, carried to its logical extreme, the argument would dictate that few, if any, of a private contractor’s business records would be immune from GAO scrutiny. In short, the Government’s proposed definition of the statutory language admits of no doctrinal limitation, effectively reading the Hoffman limiting language and its “antisnooping” policy out of the statute. B Nor are we persuaded by the Government’s argument that the GAO’s consistent and longstanding interpretation of its authority under the access-to-records statutes supports the view that indirect cost records are subject to examination under the fixed-price contracts in question here. Even if that interpretation could be characterized as consistent, it would not be entitled to deference, for, as we have noted above, it is inconsistent with the statutory language. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 411 (1979). Moreover, to characterize the GAO’s current sweeping view of its access authority as “consistent” would be generous. There is significant evidence indicating that in the past the GAO itself has acknowledged a deficiency in its statutory authority to examine indirect cost records. For example, in a ruling of particular significance for the facts of this case, the Comptroller General determined in 1967 that the access provisions do not confer upon the GAO the right to examine records relating to a contractor’s nongovernmental business, even when such review is necessary to determine whether a catalog-priced item was actually sold in substantial quantities to the general public. App. 162a-163a. Moreover, in late 1969, the GAO prepared a memorandum for Congress in connection with congressional consideration of a proposed grant of additional access authority to the GAO to pursue a study of contractor profits in the defense industry. In the memorandum, the GAO informed Congress that its authority under the 1951 access provisions did not extend to review of records of a contractor’s nongovernmental business and that additional access authority was therefore necessary to conduct a profit study. 115 Cong. Rec. 25800-25801 (1969) (reprinting GAO Memorandum on the Adequacy of the Legal Authority of the Comptroller General to Conduct a Comprehensive Study of Profitability in Defense Contracting). Finally, a 1970 internal memorandum also reveals the GAO’s belief that amendment of the 1951 access statutes would be necessary to give it the power to examine records of indirect costs. App. 160a-161a. The only statements by the GAO directly supportive of its position here occur in testimony before a congressional Subcommittee in 1963 regarding the GAO’s litigation of the scope of its access authority in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). In light of the GAO’s litigation posture during these hearings, as well as the contrary expressions of GAO opinion noted above, this testimony cannot provide persuasive evidence of the GAO’s consistent interpretation or practice. > 1 — H To summarize, the Government has failed to offer a definition of “directly pertinent” that would give any effect to the limiting purpose of that language. In our view, the appropriate accommodation of the competing goals reflected in the legislative history counsels us to draw the line precisely where both lower courts have drawn it. Thus, under the four fixed-price contracts in question, the Comptroller General should be permitted access to records of direct costs. He should be barred, however, from inspecting records of costs incurred in the areas of research and development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration, except to the extent the contractor has allocated these costs as attributable to the particular contract. Direct costs certainly pertain directly to even a fixed-price contract, for direct costs are, by definition, readily identifiable as attributable to the specific product supplied under the contract. Consequently, as a rational businessman, the contractor will have some regard for these costs in setting even a catalog price in order to avoid a loss on the product. Because these costs therefore have a very direct influence on the price charged the Government, the GAO would need to examine records of these costs to determine whether the contractor is making an excessively high profit or the Government is getting a “fair deal” under the contract. Presumably, indirect costs also influence in some manner the setting of a catalog price, although to what extent is unclear, given the somewhat arbitrary accounting allocations that must be made to determine what portion of indirect costs may be attributed to a specific product. Nevertheless, the degree of intrusion into the contractor’s private business affairs occasioned by GAO scrutiny of indirect cost records is far greater, particularly where pure fixed-price contracts are involved. Such an inspection would entail exposure to the GAO of many of the contractor’s nongovernmental transactions. We therefore conclude that the appropriate balance of public and private interests in this situation weighs in favor of access to direct cost records but against access to Merck’s indirect cost records. Our decision in this regard is in accord with that of the majority of the Courts of Appeals to have considered this issue. The Government objects strenuously that barring such access impermissibly constrains the GAO in its efforts to improve the procurement process. In an industry in which indirect costs represent such a large proportion of total costs, access to records of those costs is critical to an understanding of the industry with which the Government is dealing and to an assessment of the fairness of the contract price and the advisability of continued adherence to the negotiated procurement methods employed under those contracts. As we have already noted, however, in adopting the Hoffman amendment, Congress was apparently willing to forgo the benefits that might be gained from permitting the GAO broad access to the contractor’s business records in order to protect those contractors from far-reaching governmental scrutiny of their nongovernmental affairs. By inclusion of that language, Congress injected into the determination of which records are accessible considerations besides the Government’s need for the information. Thus, any impediment that our holding places in the path of the GAO’s power to investigate fully Government contracts is one that Congress chose to adopt, and any arguments that this situation should be changed must be addressed to Congress, not the courts. V We address briefly Merck’s contention that there is yet another independent ground upon which the Comptroller General should be denied access to any of its cost records. Merck argues that the GAO is not entitled to examine these records because the access demand was not made for a congressionally authorized purpose. Specifically, Merck contends that the access-to-records statutes do not permit the Comptroller General to request records for the purpose of either conducting an economic study of the pharmaceutical industry or securing information desired by individual Members of Congress. Much of what we have already said provides an answer to this contention. The legislative history reveals that Congress granted the GAO authority to examine directly pertinent records under individual procurement contracts in order to assess the reasonableness of the prices paid by the Government and to detect inefficiency and wastefulness. Given this authorized purpose, there is no reason to conclude that the GAO may not compile the information that it may lawfully obtain, within the statutory limits outlined above, from an investigation of individual contracts in order to arrive at a picture of the pharmaceutical industry generally. Moreover, the fact that two Senators encouraged the GAO to use its lawful authority to the fullest extent possible is irrelevant. The GAO is an independent agency within the Legislative Branch that exists in large part to serve the needs of Congress. If the records sought by the GAO are within the scope of the access-to-records provisions, the fact that the Comptroller General’s request had its origin in the requests of Congressmen or that the GAO reported the data to Congress does not vitiate its authority. VI Because of the GAO’s mandate to detect fraud, waste, inefficiency, and extravagance through full audits of Government contracts, we cannot accept Merck’s view that the only records directly pertinent to the four fixed-price contracts at issue are those necessary to verify that Merck actually had an established catalog price for the item procured, that it sold the items in substantial quantities to the general public at the catalog price, that it delivered the product specified, and that it received from the Government no more than the amount due under the contract. On the other hand, given the policy of protecting the privacy of contractors’ business records also expressed in the statutory language and legislative history, neither can we accept the Government’s contention that it must be permitted access to all of Merck’s cost records. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below. It is so ordered. A pure fixed-price contract requires the contractor to furnish the goods or services for a fixed amount of compensation regardless of the costs of performance, thereby placing the risk of incurring unforeseen costs of performance on the contractor rather than the Government. See 1R. Nash & J. Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law 413 (3d ed. 1977). Variations on the pure fixed-price contract may contain some formula or technique for adjusting the contract price to account for unforeseen cost elements. See id., at 413-415 (discussing fixed-price contract with escalation clause, fixed-price incentive contract, and fixed-price redeterminable contract). The Government employs two methods of procurement: advertised procurement, i. e., formal solicitation of competitive bids, and procurement by negotiation. A negotiated contract is the method authorized by statute for use in situations in which the formal advertising and bidding procedure is deemed impractical or unnecessary. See 10 U. S. C. § 2804(a); 41 U. S. C. § 252(c). In procuring by negotiation, the Government agency discusses the terms of the procurement with one or more contractors and awards the contract to the party offering the terms most advantageous to the Government. Title 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b), which applies to the Defense Supply Agency contracts, provides: “Except as provided in subsection (c), each contract negotiated under this chapter shall provide that the Comptroller General and his representatives are entitled, until the expiration of three years after final payment, to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of the contractor, or any of his subcontractors, that directly pertain to and involve transactions relating to, the contract or subcontract.” The Veterans’ Administration contract is governed by 41 U. S. C. § 254(c), which provides in pertinent part: “All contracts negotiated without advertising . . . shall include a clause to the effect that the Comptroller General of the United States . . . shall until the expiration of three years after final payment have access to and the right to examine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance of and involving transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts.” Despite the slight difference in wording, there is no substantive difference between the defense and civilian procurement statutes. The Comptroller General issued identical demands to five other pharmaceutical companies. These access-to-records demands apparently were the product of congressional interest in competition and profits in the pharmaceutical industry generally. As early as 1971, Senator Gaylord Nelson suggested during hearings on competition in the drug industry that the Comptroller General invoke his access-to-records authority “to take a look” at the costs incurred by pharmaceutical companies. Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 8020 (1971). Following those hearings, Senator Nelson’s staff continued to urge the General Accounting Office (GAO) to use the access provisions to obtain cost records “without any strings attached so that the high profits could be publicized by product and firm.” App. 144a; id., at 142a-148a. See also Hearings, supra, at 8537, 8581-8583. Finally in June 1973, the GAO responded by proposing a two-phase study of the economics of the pharmaceutical industry to be accomplished through voluntary participation by drug companies. Merck and five other companies agreed to cooperate in the first phase, which contemplated gathering background data on the industry. In April 1974, the GAO issued a proposal for the second phase of the study, aimed at developing data on “salient economic and operational aspects of the industry.” App. 141a. Merck expressed its concern over participating in this phase without adequate assurance of the confidentiality of the cost data it might be requested to supply. Initially the GAO agreed that the data regarding individual companies and individual drug products should remain confidential and anonymous. Id., at 150a. Senators Nelson and Kennedy and their staffs, however, reiterated that the Subcommittee’s objectives could be served only by publication of the data. Ibid. The Comptroller General’s formal demand letters to the six companies that had participated voluntarily in the Phase I study followed. Four of the remaining five pharmaceutical companies that received demand letters also challenged the Comptroller General’s request. See SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, Nos. 81-2082, 81-2268; Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980) (per curiam), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981); United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 F. 2d 672 (CA7 1979); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904 (CA7), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978). The parties agree that the scope of the Comptroller General’s authority under the access-to-records clauses in the four contracts turns on the meaning of the statutory language, rather than on the intention of the parties to the contract. We also emphasize at the outset that Merck does not challenge the authority of Congress to impose, as a condition of doing business with the Government, a requirement that contractors disclose all of their cost records to the Comptroller General, regardless of the pertinence of these records to the particular contract. Rather, Merck bases its arguments on its interpretation of the statutory language. In partial dissent, Justice Blackmun objects that, after a nod in the direction of the statutory language, we inexplicably wander off to explore the statutory purposes. Post, at 860. As we observe infra, at 834, however, the statutory language does not tell us exactly which records are subject to GAO examination. It is a well-settled canon of statutory construction that, where the language does not dictate an answer to the problem before the Court, “we must analyze the policies underlying the statutory provision to determine its proper scope.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 517 (1982). Accordingly, we examine the legislative history to assess the purposes Congress sought to serve by the language it chose. As shown infra, the statutory purposes clearly revealed by the legislative record justify allowing access to direct cost records. This bill was modeled on, and as originally proposed was identical to, a January 1951 amendment to the First War Powers Act of 1941. See Act of Jan. 12, 1951, 64 Stat. 1257. That amendment was a piece of emergency legislation adopted in response to the crisis conditions created by the Korean War. Because of severe wartime inflation, many defense contractors holding fixed-priced contracts could not meet their obligations. To alleviate the problem, Congress gave President Truman emergency authority to renegotiate Government contracts. See H. R. Rep. No. 3227, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1950). The access-to-records provisions were included in order to deter fraud and profiteering in the renegotiation process. 96 Cong. Rec. 17123 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (“The amendment will give power to the General Accounting Office to go into the books and delve into the records of these contractors who have been relieved to determine whether or not there is fraud or overreaching or whether they have done anything untoward”). Although the initial access-to-records legislation in the January 1951 amendments was of limited duration, Congress shortly thereafter passed the permanent version at issue here. Representative Hardy, the sponsor of both the temporary and permanent access-to-records provisions, learned that Government procurement officers were negotiating contract modifications under two permanent procurement statutes that lacked access provisions, the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. “In order to plug this loophole,” Representative Hardy introduced the bill to require inclusion of access-to-records clauses in contracts negotiated under these statutes. 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy). Representative Hardy further explained the inspiration for the bill. Because of the absence of competitive safeguards when the Government procures by negotiation rather than by formal solicitation of bids, Representative Hardy identified a need to establish “every reasonable safeguard against waste and extravagance in the spending of” Government funds in the context of negotiated contracts. 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951). By permitting the GAO “to check the transaction both from the Government records and the contractors’ books,” the bill would ensure that the Government did not “come out on the short end of the deal.” Ibid. Representative Hardy then cited a number of “typical situations in which the authority of this bill would play an effective part.” Ibid. One example dealt with detection of an inefficient market structure under which, because the Government was purchasing automotive parts from a dealer who in turn bought from a middleman, the Government was paying a price that included “profits upon profits and completely wasteful administrative and handling costs.” Ibid. Thus, contrary to Merck’s assertion, the 1951 access statutes were designed to detect more than fraud and abuse in the negotiation of procurement contracts. Representative Hardy himself remarked that GAO review under the access provisions would disclose “a lot of other situations besides those involving fraud.” Id., at 13199. It is possible that the 1951 Congress was aware of this tension. The addition of the Hoffman amendment was a clear compromise. Representative Hoffman had adamantly opposed the Hardy bill from the outset because of the breadth of authority it would give to the GAO. The amendment he offered emerged from a discussion between Representative Hardy and Representative Hoffman and represented the extent of the limitation upon GAO’s access authority that Representative Hardy would accept. See 97 Cong. Rec. 13377 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hoffman). It does not follow, as Justice White assumes, post, at 852, from the fact that the Hoffman amendment was a compromise that the restrictive language is to be given no effect at all. In dissent, Justice White refers to the Hoffman amendment as “largely a sop to the bill’s opponents.” Post, at 853. The legislative record, however, tells us that a majority voted for the Hoffman amendment, and we must give weight to the expressed will of a legislative majority. Justice White also interprets the Hoffman amendment as an “assurance that the bill would not be used as a basis for inspection of books and records having no substantial connection with Government procurement.” Ibid. Notwithstanding this recognition of the amendment’s purpose, however, Justice White adopts a construction of “directly pertinent” that completely eviscerates the limiting purpose of the Hoffman amendment, for he would allow the GAO access to any records helpful in determining the amount of profit being made by the contractor. See post, at 856. Thus, under the guise of “interpretation” of the statute, Justice White has “construed” the statute so broadly as to give it a reading indistinguishable in effect from the bills to expand the GAO’s access authority that were rejected by Congress in the 1970’s. See n. 12, infra. Such an approach therefore bespeaks legislation, rather than interpretation. Recognizing the extreme encroachment upon the privacy of a contractor’s business records which his interpretation of the statutes would permit, Justice White attempts to bring “balance” and “reason” to bear on the situation by invoking courts’ powers under Fourth Amendment principles to limit the GAO’s right of access. Post, at 857-858. If, however, Congress had intended the GAO demands to be limited only by the Fourth Amendment, it need not have concerned itself with requiring that records be directly pertinent to the contract. By indirect costs we mean costs incurred in the areas of research and development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration, which are not directly attributable to a particular product. It is significant to note that the profit study of the defense industry, which Congress authorized as part of the Military Appropriations Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-121, § 408, 83 Stat. 204, is the only occasion on which Congress has deliberately granted the GAO the kind of broad-ranging authority it asserts here. In conferring this authority, Congress, wary of equipping the GAO to conduct a “fishing expedition,” 115 Cong. Ree. 25795 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff), carefully limited such authority to “only a single study.” Id., at 25793 (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). Although not conclusive with respect to interpretation of the 1951 access statutes, subsequent congressional rebuffs of GAO requests for expansion of its access authority are instructive both with regard to the GAO’s view of the limits of the 1951 legislation and Congress’ apparent reluctance to broaden that legislation. For example, a Senate bill introduced in 1973 directed that “the Comptroller General . . . shall. . . have access for the purpose of audit and examination to any books, documents, papers and records . . . which in the opinion of. . . the Comptroller General may be related or pertinent to the . . . contracts . . . [or] subcontracts.” S. 2049, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (emphasis added). Another Senate bill which, like S. 2049 never emerged from committee, would have granted the Comptroller General authority to undertake a study of profits made on Government and commercial contracts by contractors having Government contracts aggregating $1 million or more. To enable the Comptroller General to make such studies, the bill gave him the authority to demand from title contractor “such information maintained in the normal course of business ... as the Comptroller General determines necessary or appropriate.” S. 3014, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See also S. 2268, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). We observe that Justice White’s dissent makes no attempt at all to deal with this evidence of the GAO’s own view of the limits of its access authority. Given the GAO’s historic position, excepting of course its position in the Hewlett-Packard case and the current litigation, see infra, contractors like Merck who entered into fixed-price negotiated contracts with the Government had no reason to expect that consenting to inclusion of the access-to-records clause would subject their businesses to the kind of broad-ranging inquiry which Justice White’s dissent approves. Hewlett-Packard, like this case, involved a request by the Comptroller General to review cost records of a contractor who entered into fixed-price negotiated contracts. During that litigation, a congressional Subcommittee commenced hearings to investigate “the need for, or desirability of, recommending legislative action” in light of Hewlett-Packard’s refusal to permit inspection of its cost records under the access provisions. Hearings on Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement before the Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). During the course of these hearings, Robert F. Keller, General Counsel of the GAO, testified concerning the GAO’s position with respect to the Hewlett-Packard situation. “It is our position that the contract clause and the statute give us the right to examine the cost records of the contractor and other pertinent data that relates [sic] to the items included in the contract, in sufficient completeness and detail to permit us to determine the reasonableness of the negotiated prices.” Id., at 10. Mr. Keller further stated that the GAO could “go beyond direct manufacturing costs” into such areas as “how research costs are allocated as between the Government contract and commercial business.” Id., at 23. In legislative hearings in 1965, which in part addressed “the extent of the GAO’s right to examine contractor books and records,” Hearings on Comptroller General Reports to Congress on Audits of Defense Contracts before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965), the Comptroller General again referred to his position in the Hewlett-Packard case, which was still pending in the courts, regarding the proper interpretation of the access provisions. Id., at 45. Direct costs would include the direct manufacturing and overhead costs incurred in producing the specific drug items procured under the four contracts, as identified by the District Court. See swpra, at 829-880. Justice White objects that this line drawing permits a contractor to restrict the GAO’s access authority by the particular accounting practices the contractor chooses to adopt. Post, at 856-857, n. 18. That objection, however, is not accurate. We have indicated that, as a general matter, because of the congressional intent to protect the privacy of the contractor’s records involving nongovernmental transactions, the Government is precluded from inspecting records of indirect costs. Nevertheless, the Government is permitted access to some records falling within the latter category if the contractor has made the extra effort of identifying, for his own purposes, some indirect costs that he thinks may be attributable to specific products. To the extent the contractor has done so, the Government is permitted access to records of those costs. This principle does not tie the Government’s entire access authority to the accounting practices adopted by the contractor. Such inspection represents a windfall, as it were, to the Government based upon the extra effort the contractor has made in allocating his costs. Without that effort, the Government would not otherwise be permitted to inspect such records because of privacy concerns. Given this added benefit to the Government, it is anomalous to argue that its access authority is being “limited” by the contractor’s accounting method. By contrast, where the contract that serves as the predicate for the GAO’s access demand is cost-based — as in a cost-plus contract — the contractor is in no position to complain of the intrusiveness of GAO inspection of indirect cost records. By claiming from the Government full reimbursement for these costs under the cost-based contract, the contractor represents that these costs are justified as attributable to the performance of the Government contract, and not to any nongovernmental transactions. Therefore, the public interest served by permitting the GAO to inspect records supporting these claims clearly outweighs any privacy interests the contractor possesses in those records. Justice White suggests that, when indirect cost records relate both to governmental and nongovernmental transactions, the GAO should be permitted access to the records of any indirect costs that it can prove had a direct and substantial impact on the price charged to the Government under the contract. Post, at 857. This approach is unworkable for both the Government and contractors. To decide these “close questions” of direct pertinence, the parties to the fixed-price contract may be forced to resort to the courts. Bright-line rules upon which the parties’ expectations may be firmly established are preferable to the protracted litigation that Justice White’s suggestion would engender. In addition to the decision below, see SmithKline Corp. v. Stoats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, Nos. 81-2082, 81-2268, and Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Stoats, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980) (per curiam), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981). See also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967) (permitting access to records of direct production costs, including direct material, direct labor, and overhead costs), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). The Government suggests that direct costs may represent as little as 9% of the sales price of a pharmaceutical product. Brief for Petitioners in No. 81-1273, p. 34. We observe, however, that the Government has conceded in this action that it has no reason to suspect that Merck has engaged in any fraud or impropriety in connection with the negotiation or performance of these contracts. App. 41a-44a, 76a. Nor does the Government have any reason to believe that the prices charged under these contracts were unreasonable in any way. Id., at 42a, 76a. In fact, the price under each of the contracts was the lowest price at which Merck sold each of the products to anyone at the time the contracts were awarded. Id., at 26a, 42a. The extent of any burden is, however, unclear. In fact, in testimony before Congress the Comptroller General candidly expressed doubts about the usefulness of access to records of indirect costs in the pharmaceutical industry, suggesting that the attempt to determine from these records the portion of indirect costs allocable to individual drug products would be “a waste of time.” Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 8578 (1972). The GAO’s own recognition of this dilemma has prompted it, as outlined in n. 12, supra, to seek expanded access authority from Congress. Its efforts for expansion are more appropriately directed to that forum. The record indicates that compilation of information lawfully obtainable under its access authority is what the GAO intended to accomplish. One GAO official explained: “[I]f we were to use our right of access under specified Federal contracts, we would attempt, insofar as possible, to present a report similar to that which we had proposed to present under the April 1974 proposal [for the second phase of the economic study of the pharmaceutical industry].” App. 154a-155a (emphasis added). GAO officials also recognized that the statutory restrictions on its access authority would necessitate some changes in the approach contemplated under the prior two-phase study based on the voluntary participation of the pharmaceutical companies. Ibid.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM et al. v. AGNEW et al. No. 66. Argued December 10, 1946. Decided January 6, 1947. J. Leonard Townsend argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath, Robert L. Stern and George B. Vest. Hugh H. Obear argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, here on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, presents important problems under § 30 and § 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162, 193, 194, as amended, 49 Stat. 684, 709, 12 U. S. C. §§ 77, 78. Section 30 of the Act provides that the Comptroller of the Currency, whenever he is of the opinion that a director or officer of a national bank has violated any law relating to the bank, shall warn him to discontinue the violation and, if the violation continues, may certify the facts to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Board is granted power to order that the director or officer be removed from office if it finds after notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard that he has continued to violate the law. Section 32 of the Act prohibits, inter alia, any partner or employee of any partnership “primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities” from serving at the same time as an officer, director, or employee of a member bank. Pursuant to the procedure outlined in § 30 the Board ordered respondents removed from office as directors of the Paterson National Bank on the ground that they were employees of a firm "primarily engaged” in underwriting within the meaning of § 32. Respondents brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia to review the action of the Board or to enjoin its action. The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, holding that the Board exceeded its authority and that an injunction should issue. 153 F. 2d 785. First. The Board contends that the removal orders of the Board made under § 30 are not subject to judicial review in the absence of a charge of fraud. It relies on the absence of an express right of review and on the nature of the federal bank supervisory scheme of which § 30 is an integral part. Cf. Adams v. Nagle, 303 U. S. 532; Switchmen’s Union v. Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297; Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114. A majority of the Court, however, is of the opinion that the determination of the extent of the authority granted the Board to issue removal orders under § 30 of the Act is subject to judicial review and that the District Court is authorized to enjoin the removal if the Board transcends its bounds and acts beyond the limits of its statutory grant of authority. See American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309-310. That being decided, it seems plain that the claim to the office of director is such a personal one as warrants judicial consideration of the controversy. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407; Stark v. Wickard, supra, p. 305. Second. We come then to the merits. Respondents for a number of years have been directors of the Paterson National Bank, a national banking association and a member of the Federal Reserve System. Since 1941 they have been employed by Eastman, Dillon & Co., a partnership, which holds itself out as being “Underwriters, Distributors, Dealers and Brokers in Industrial, Railroad, Public Utility and Municipal Securities.” During the fiscal year ending February 28, 1943, its gross income from the underwriting field was 26 per cent of its gross income from all sources, while its gross income from the brokerage business was 42 per cent of its gross income from all sources. The same percentages for the fiscal year ending February 29, 1944, were 32 per cent and 47 per cent respectively; and for the period from March 1, 1944, to July 31, 1944, 39 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. Of the total number of transactions, as well as the total market value of the securities bought and sold by the firm as broker and as dealer for an indefinite period prior to September 20, 1943, about 15 per cent were in the underwriting field. The firm is active in the underwriting field, getting what business it can. In 1943 it ranked ninth among 94 leading investment bankers in the country with respect to its total participations in underwritings of bonds. For a time during 1943 it ranked first among the underwriters of the country. Apart from municipals and rails, its participation in underwritings during 1943 amounted to $14,657,000. Since October, 1941, respondents have done no business with the bank other than a strictly commission business with its customers. Nor has the firm done business with the bank since the fall of 1941. These are the essential facts found by the Board. On the basis of these facts the Board concluded that during the times relevant here Eastman, Dillon & Co. was “primarily engaged” in the underwriting business and that respondents, being employees of the firm, were disqualified from serving as directors of the bank. The Court of Appeals concluded that when applied to a single subject “primary” means first, chief, or principal; that a firm is not “primarily engaged” in underwriting when underwriting is not by any standard its chief or principal business. Since this firm’s underwriting business did not by any quantitative test exceed 50 per cent of its total business, the court held that it was not “primarily engaged” in the underwriting business within the meaning of § 32 of the Act. We take a different view. It is true that “primary” when applied to a single subject often means first, chief, or principal. But that is not always the case. For other accepted and common meanings of “primarily” are “essentially” (Oxford English Dictionary) or “fundamentally” (Webster’s New International). An activity or function may be “primary” in that sense if it is substantial. If the underwriting business of a firm is substantial, the firm is engaged in the underwriting business in a primary way, though by any quantitative test underwriting may not be its chief or principal activity. On the facts in this record we would find it hard to say that underwriting was not one primary activity of the firm and brokerage another. If “primarily” is not used in the sense we suggest, then the firm is not “primarily engaged” in any line of‘business though it specializes in at least two and does a substantial amount of each. One might as well say that a professional man is not “primarily engaged” in his profession though he holds himself out to serve all comers and devotes substantial time to the practice but makes the greater share of his income on the stock market. That is the construction given the Act by the Board. And it is, we think, not only permissible but also more consonant with the legislative purpose than the construction which the Court of Appeals adopted. Firms which do underwriting also engage in numerous other activities. The Board indeed observed that, if one was not “primarily engaged” in underwriting unless by some quantitative test it was his principal activity, then § 32 would apply to no one. Moreover, the evil at which the section was aimed is not one likely to emerge only when the firm with which a bank director is connected has an underwriting business which exceeds 50 per cent of its total business. Section 32 is directed to the probability or likelihood, based on the experience of the 1920’s, that a bank director interested in the underwriting business may use his influence in the bank to involve it or its customers in securities which his underwriting house has in its portfolio or has committed itself to take. That likelihood or probability does not depend on whether the firm’s underwriting business exceeds 50 per cent of its total business. It might, of course, exist whatever the proportion of the underwriting business. But Congress did not go the whole way; it drew the line where the need was thought to be the greatest. And the line between substantial and unsubstantial seems to us to be the one indicated by the words “primarily engaged.” There is other intrinsic evidence in the Banking Act of 1933 to support our conclusion. Section 20 of the Act outlaws affiliation of a member bank with an organization “engaged principally” in the underwriting business. Section 19 provides control over bank holding companies. In order to vote its stock in controlled banks a bank holding company must show that it does not own, control, or have any interest in, and is not participating in the management or direction of any organization “engaged principally” in the underwriting business. On the other hand, when Congress came to deal with the practice of underwriters taking checking deposits, it used language different from what it used either in §§ 19 and 20 on the one hand or in § 32 on the other. By § 21 it prohibited any organization “engaged” in the underwriting business “to engage at the same time to any extent whatever” in the business of receiving checking deposits. Thus within the same Act we find Congress dealing with several types of underwriting firms — those “engaged” in underwriting, those “primarily engaged” in underwriting, those “engaged principally” in underwriting. The inference seems reasonable to us that Congress by the words it chose marked a distinction which we should not obliterate by reading “primarily” to mean “principally.” The Court of Appeals laid some stress on the fact that Congress did not abolish'the bank affiliate system but only those underwriter affiliates which were under the control of a member bank or which were under a common control with it. Section 20. Since Congress made majority control critical under § 20, it was thought that under § 32 a firm was not “primarily engaged” in underwriting unless underwriting constituted a majority of its business. But the two situations are not comparable. In § 32 Congress was not dealing with the problem of control of underwriters by banks or vice versa. The prohibited nexus is in no way dependent on the presence or absence of control, nor would it be made so even if “primarily engaged” in underwriting were construed to mean principally engaged in that business. Section 32 was designed, as we have said, to remove tempting opportunities from the management and personnel of member banks. In no realistic sense do those opportunities disappear merely because the underwriting activities of the outside firm with which the officer, director, or employee is connected happens to fall below 51 per cent. Fifty-one per cent, which is relevant in terms of control, is irrelevant here. The fact then that Congress did not abolish underwriter affiliates serves as no guide in determining whether “primarily engaged” in underwriting as used in § 32 means principally engaged or substantially engaged in that business. Section 32 is not concerned, of course, with any showing that the director in question has in fact been derelict in his'duties or has in any way breached his fiduciary obligation to the bank. It is a preventive or prophylactic measure. The fact that respondents have been scrupulous in their relationships to the bank is therefore immaterial. There is a suggestion that if “primarily” does not mean principally but merely connotes substantiality, § 32 constitutes an unlawful delegation of authority to the Board. But we think it plain under our decisions that if substantiality is the statutory guide, the limits of administrative action are sufficiently definite or ascertainable so as to survive challenge on the grounds of unconstitutionality. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 397-400; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 142-146; Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 424-428; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 512-516. Reversed. Section 30 also provides: “That such order and the findings of fact upon which it is based shall not be made public or disclosed to anyone except the director or officer involved and the directors of the bank involved, otherwise than in connection with proceedings for a violation of this section. Any such director or officer removed from office as herein provided who thereafter participates in any manner in the management of such bank shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, in the discretion of the court.” Not material here is an exception “in limited classes of cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may allow such service by general regulations when in the judgment of the said Board it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments.” § 32. The issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution, at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds or other similar securities. The firm does not deal in United States Government bonds. Defined in § 2 (b) as direct or indirect ownership or control of more than 50 per cent of the voting stock of the organization in question, common ownership or control of 50 per cent or more of such voting stock, or a majority of common directors. See note 4, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, et al. No. 72-985. Argued January 16, 1974 Decided April 1, 1974 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion- of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., ' joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 78. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Parts I and II-A of which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 79. Brennan, J., post, p. 91, and Marshall, J., post, p. 93, filed dissenting . opinions. John H. Anderson argued the cause for the California Bankers Assn., appellant in No. 72-985 and appellee in No. 72-1073. With him. on the briefs was Frederick M. Pownall. Charles C. Marson argued the cause for Stark et al., appellants in No. 72-1196 and appellees in Ño. 72-1073. With him on the briefs were Joseph Remcho, Neil Horton', Anthony G. Amsterdam, Melvin L. Wulf, Burt Neuborne, and Hope Eastman. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for Shultz et al., appellants in No. 72-1073 and appellees in Nos. 72-985 and 72-1196. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Grampton, Edward R. Korman, and Leonard J. Henzke, Jr. Together with No. 72-1073, Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. v. California Bankers Assn. et al.; and No. 72-1196, Stark et al. v. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury, et al., also on appeal from the same court. Me. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. These appeals present questions concerning the constitutionality of the so-called Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (Act), and the implementing regulations promulgated thereunder by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Act, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959, and 31 Ü. S. C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122, was enacted by Congress in 1970 following extensive hearings concerning the unavailability of foreign and domestic bank records of customers thought to be engaged in activities entailing criminal or civil liability. Under the Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe by regulation certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements for banks and other financial institutions in this country. Because it has a bearing on our treatment of some of the issues raised by the parties, we think it important to note that the Act's civil and criminal penalties attach only upon violation of regulations promulgated by the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do nothing, the Act itself would impose no penalties on anyone. The express purpose of the Act is to require the maintenance of records, and the making of certain reports/ which “have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.” 12 U. S. C. §§ 1829b (a)(2), 1951; 31 U. S. C. §1051. Congress was apparently concerned with two major problems in connection with the enforcement of the regulatory, tax, and criminal laws of the United States. First, there was a need .to insure that domestic banks and financial institutions continue to maintain adequate records of their financial transactions with their customers. Congress found that the recent growth of financial institutions in the United States had been paralleled by an increase in criminal activity which made use of these institutions. . While mány of the records which the Secretary by regulation ultimately required to be kept had been traditionally maintained by the voluntary action of many domestic fináncial institutions, Congress noted that in recent years some larger banks had abolished or limited the practice of photocopying checks, drafts, and similar instruments drawn on them and presented for payment. The absence of such records, whether through failure to make them in the, first instance or through failure to retain them, was thought to seriously impair the ability of the Federal Government to enforce the myriad criminal, tax, and regulatory provisions of laws which Congress had enacted. At the same time, it was recognized by Congress that such required records would “not be made automatically available for law enforcement purposes [but could] only be obtained through existing legal process.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, p. 10 (1970); see S. Rep. No. 91-1139, p. 5 (1970). In addition, Congress felt that there were situations where the deposit and withdrawal of large amounts of currency or of monetary instruments which were the equivalent of currency should be actually reported to the Government. While reports of this nature had been required by previous regulations issued by the Treasury Department, it was felt that more precise and detailed reporting requirements were needed. The Secretary was therefore authorized to require the reporting of what may be described as large domestic financial transactions in . currency or its equivalent. Second, Congress was concerned about a serious and widespread use of foreign financial institutions, located in jurisdictions with strict laws of secrecy as to bank activity, for the purpose of violating or evading-domestic criminal, tax, and regulatory enactments. The House Report on the bill, No. 91-975, supra, at 12-13, described the situation in these words: “Considerable testimony was received by the Committee from the Justice Department, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Defense Department and the Agency for International Development about serious and wide-, spread use of foreign financial facilities located in secrecy jurisdictions for the purpose of violating American law. Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions have permitted proliferation of ‘white collar’ crime; have served as the financial underpinning of organized criminal operations in the United States; have been .utilized by Americans to evade income taxes, conceal assets illegally and purchase gold; have allowed Americans and others to avoid the law and regulations governing securities and exchanges; have served as essential ingredients in frauds including schemes to defraud the United States; have served as the ultimate depository of black market proceeds from Vietnam; have served as a source of questionable financing for conglomerate and other corporate stock acquisitions, mergers and takeovers; have covered conspiracies to steal from the U. S. defense and foreign aid. funds; and have sérved as the cleansing agent for ‘hot’ or illegally obtained monies. “The debilitating effects of the use of these secret institutions on Americans and the American economy are vast. It' has been estimated that hundreds of millions in tax revenues have been lost. Unwarranted and unwanted credit is being pumped into our markets. There have been some cases of corporation directors,, officers and employees who, through deceit and violation of law, enriched themselves or endangered the financial soundness of their companies to the detriment of their .stockholders. Criminals engaged in illegal gambling, skimming, and narcotics traffic are opérating their financial affairs with an impunity that approaches statutory exemption. “When law enforcement personnel are confronted with the secret foreign bank account or the secret financial institution they are placed in an impossible position. In order to receive evidence and testimony regarding activities in the' secrecy jurisdiction they must subject themselves to a time consuming and ofttimes fruitless foreign legal process. Even when procedural obstacles are overcome, the foreign jurisdictions rigidly' enforce their secrecy laws against .their own domestic institutions and employees. “One of the most damaging effects of an American’s-use of secret foreign financial facilities is its undermining of the fairness of our tax laws. Secret foreign financial facilities, particularly in Switzerland, are available only to the wealthy. • To open a secret Swiss account normally requires a substantial deposit, but such an account offers a convenient means of evading U. S. taxes, in these days when the citizens of this country are crying out for tax reform and relief, it is grossly unfair to leave the secret foreign bank account open as a convenient avenue of tax evasion. The former U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York has characterized the secret foreign bank account as the largest single tax loophole permitted by American law.”' ' While most of the recordkeéping requirements imposed by the Secretary under the Act merely require the banks to keep records which, most of them had in the past voluntarily kept and retained, and while much, of the required reporting of domestic transactions had been required by earlier Treasury regulations in effect for nearly 30 years, there is no denying the impressive sweep of the authority conferred upon the Secretary by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. While an. Act conferring such broad authority over transactions such as these might well surprise or even shock those who. lived in an earlier era, the latter did not live to see. the time when bank accounts would join . chocolate, cheese, and watches as a symbol of the Swiss economy. Nor did they live to see the heavy utilization of our domestic banking system by the minions of organized crime as well as by millions of legitimate businessmen. The challenges made here to, the Bank Secrecy Act are directed not to any want of legislative authority in Congress to treat the subject,.but instead to the Act’s asserted violation of specific constitutional prohibitions. I - Title I of the Act, and the implementing regulations promulgatedfherei mder "by the Secretary of the Treasury, require financial institutions t' maintain records of the identities of. their customers, to make microfilm copies of certain checks drawn on them, and to keep records of certain other items.. Title II of the Act and its'implementing regulations require reports of certain domestic and foreign currency transactions. A. Title I — The Recordkeeping Requirements . Title I of the Act contains the general record-keeping requirements for banks and other financial institutions, as provided by the Secretary by regulation. Section 101 of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1829b, applies by its terms only to federally insured banks. It contains congressional, findings “that adequate records maintained by insured banks have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings.” :The major requirements of the section are that insured banks record the identities of persons having accounts with them and of persons having signature authority thereover, in such form as the Secretary may require. To the extent that the Secretary determines by regulation that süch records would have the requisite “high degree of usefulness,” the banks must make and maintain microfilm or other reproductions of each check, draft, or other instrument drawn on it and presented to it for payment, and must maintain a record of each check, draft, or other instrument received by it for deposit or collection, together with an identification-of the party for whose account it is to be deposited or collected. Section 101 further authorizes the Secretary to require insured banks to maintain a record of the identity of all individuals who engage in transactions which are reportable by the bank under Title II of the Act, and authorizes the Secretary to prescribe the required retention period for such records. Section 102, 12 U. S. C. § I730d, amends the National Housing Act to authorize the Secretary to apply similar recordkeeping requirements to. institutions insured thereunder. Sections 122-123 of the Act, 12 U. S..'C. §§ 1952-1953, authorize the Secretary 'to issue regulations applying similar recordkeeping requirements to additional domestic financial, institutions. Although an initial draft of Title I, see H. R. 15073, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., would have compelled the Secretary to promulgate regulations requiring banks to maintain copies of all items received for collection or presented for payment, the Act as- finally passed required the maintenance only of such records and microfilm copies as the Secretary determined to have a “high degree of usefulness.” Upon passage of the Act, the • Treasury Department established a task force which consulted with representatives from financial institutions, trade associations, and governmental agencies to determine the type of records whicn.should be maintained. Whereas the original regulations promulgated by the Secretary had. required the copying of all checks, the task force decided, and the regulations were accordingly .amended, to require check copying only as to checks in excess of $100. The regulations also require the copying of-only “on us” checks: checks drawn on the bank or issued and payable by it. 31 CFR § 103.34 (b) (3). The regulations exempt from the copying requirements certain “on us” checks such as dividend, payroll, and employee benefit checks, provided they are drawn on an account expected to average at least one hundred checks per month. The regulations also require banks to maintain records of the identity and taxpayer identification number of each person maintaining a financial interest in each deposit or share account opened after June 30, 1972, and to microfilm various other financial documents. 31 CFR § 103.34. In addition, the Secretary’s regulations require all financial institutions to maintain a microfilm , or other copy of each extension of credit in an amount exceeding $5,000 except those secured by interest in real property, and to microfilm each advice, request, or instruction given or received regarding the transfer of funds, currency, or other money or credit in amounts exceeding $10,000 to a person, account, or place outside the United States.' 31 CFR § 103.33. Reiterating the stated intent of the Congress, see, e. g., H, R. Rep.-No. 91-975, supra, at 10;' S. Rep. No. 91-1139, supra, at 5, the regulations provide that inspection, review, or access to the records required by the Act to be maintained is governed by existing legal process. 31 CFR § 103.51. Finally, §§ 125-127 of the Act provide for civil and criminal penalties for willful violations of the recordkeeping requirements. 12 U. S. C. §§ 1955-1957. B. Title II — Foreign Financial Transaction. •Reporting Requirements Chapter 3 of Title II of the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder generally require persons to report the transportation of monetary instruments into or out of the United States, or receipts of such instruments in the United States from places outside the United States, if the transportation or receipt involves instruments of a value greater than $5,000. Chapter 4 of Title II of the Act and the implementing regulations generally require United States citizens, residents, and businessmen to file- reports of their relationships with foreign financial institutions. The legislative history of the foreign-transaction reporting provisions indicates that the Congress was concerned with the circumvention of United States regulatory, tax, and criminal laws which United States citizens and residents were accomplishing through the medium of secret foreign bank transactions. S. Rep. No. 91-1139, supra, at 7; H. R. Rep. No..91-975, supra, at 13. Section 231 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1101, requires anyone connected with the transaction to report, in the manner prescribed by the Secretary, the transportation into or out' of the country of monetary instruments exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion. As prQvided by the Secretary’s regulations, the report must include information as to the amount of the instrument, the date of receipt, the form of instrument, and the person'from whom it was réceived. See 31 CFR §§ 103.23, 103.25. The regulations exempt various Glasses of persons from this reporting requirement, including banks, brokers of other dealers in securities, common carriers, and others engaged in the business of transporting currency •for banks. 31 CFR § 103.23 (c). Monetary instruments which are transported without the filing of a required report, or with a materially erroneous report, are subject to forfeiture under § 232 of the Act, • 31 . U. S. C. §1102; a person who has failed to file the required report or who has filed a false report is subject to civil penalties Under §§ 207 and 233, 31 U. S. C. §§ 1056 and 1103, as well as criminal penalties under §§ 209 and 210, 31 U. S. C. §§ 1058 and 1059. Section 241 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1121, authorizes the Secretary to prescribe regulations requiring residents and citizens of the United States, as well as nonresidents iri the United States and doing business therein, to maintain records and file reports with respect to their transactions and relationships with foreign financial agencies. Pursuant to this authority, the regulations require each person subject to. the jurisdiction of . the United States to make a report on yearly tax returns of ány “financial interest in, or signature" or other authority over, a bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign country.” 31 CFR §103.24. Violations of the reporting requirement of § 241 as implemented by the regulations are also subject to civil and criminal penalties under §§ 207, 209, and- 210 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 1056, 1058, and 1059. - C. Title II — Domestic Financial Transaction Reporting Requirements In addition to the foreign transaction reporting requirements discussed above, Title II of the Act provides for certain reports of domestic transactions where such reports have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations-or proceedings. Prior to the enactment of the Act, financial institutions had been providing reports of their customers’ large currency transactions pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Treasury which had required reports of all currency transactions that, in the judgment of the institution, exceeded those “commensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry ■ or profession of the person or organization concerned.” In passing the Act, Congress recognized that the use of financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, in furtherance of activities designed to evade the regulatory mechanisms of" the United States, had markedly increased. H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, supra, at 10; S. Rep. No. 91-1139,, supra, at 2-3. Congress recognized the importance of reports of large and unusual currency transactions in ferreting out criminal activity and desired to strengthen the statutory basis for requiring such reports. H. R., Rep. No. 91-975, supra, at 11-12. in particular, Congress intended to authorize.more definite standards for determining what constitutes the type of unusual transaction that should be reported.. S. Rep. No. 91-1139, supra, at 6. Section 221 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1081, therefore delegates to the Secretary the authority for specifying the currency transactions which should be reported, “if they involve the payment, receipt, or transfer of United States currency, or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may specify.” Section 222 of -the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1082, provides that the Secretary may require such reports from the domestic financial institution involved or the parties to the transactions or both. Section 223 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1083, authorizes the Secretary to designate financial institu- • tions to receive such reports. In the implementing regulations promulgated under this authority, the Secretary has required only that financial institutions file certain reports with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The regulations require that a report be made for each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency, or other. payment or transfer “which involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000.” 31 CFR § 103.22. The regulations exempt from the reporting requirement certain intrabank transactions and “transactions with an established customer maintaining a deposit. relationship [in amounts] commensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry, or profession of the customer concerned.” Ibid. Provision is also made in the regulations whereby information obtained by tlie Secretary may in some instances and in confidence be available to other departments or agencies of the United States. 31 CFR § 103.43; see 31 U. S. C. § 1061. There is also provision made in the regulations whereby the Secretary may in his sole discretion make exceptions to or grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulation. 31 CFR § 103.45 (a). Failure to file the required report or the .filing of a false report subjects the banks to criminal and civil penalties. 31 U. S. C. §§ 1056, 1058, 1059. II This litigation began- in June 1972 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Various plaintiffs applied for a temporary-restraining order prohibiting the defendants, including the Secretary of the Treasury and heads of other federal agencies, from enforcing the provisions of -the Bank Secrecy Act, enacted by Congress on October 26, 1970, and thereafter implemented by the Treasury regulations. The plaintiffs below included- several named individual bank customers, the Security National Bank, the California Bankers Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), suing on behalf of itself and its various bank customer members. The plaintiffs’ principal contention in the District Court was that the Act and the regulations were violative of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. The complaints also alleged that the Act violated the First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the foreign and domestic reporting provisions of Title II of the Act, and requested the convening of a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2284 to entertain the myriad of constitutional challenges to the Act. The three-judge District Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the recordkeeping requirements of. Title 1 of the Act and the accompanying regulations, and the requirements of Title II of the Act and the regulations for reports concerning the import and export of currency and monetary instruments and relationships with foreign financial institutions. The District Court concluded, however, with one judge dissenting, that the domestic reporting provisions of §§ 221-223 of Title II of the Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 1081-1083, were repugnant to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. 347 F. Supp. 1242 (1972). The court held that since the domestic reporting provisions oflthe Act permitted the Secretary of the Treasury to require detailed reports of virtually ¿11 domestic financial transactions, including those involving personal Checks and drafts, and since the Act could conceivably be administered in such a manner- as to compel disclosure of all details of a customer’s financial affairs, the domestic reporting provisions must fall as facially violative of the Fourth Amendment. Their enforcement was. enjoined. . Both the plaintiffs and the Government defendants filed timely notices of appeal from the portions of the District Court judgment adverse to them. We noted probable jurisdiction oyer three separate appeals from the . decision below pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1252 and 1253. 414 ü. S. 816 (1973): k No. 72-985. The apDellant i» this appeal is the California .Bankers Association, an association of all state and national banks doing business in California! The Association challenges the constitutionality of the record-keeping provisions of Title I, as implemented by the regulations, on two grounds. First, the Association contends that the Act violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because there is no rational relationship between the objectives of the Act and the recordkeeping required, and because the Act places an unreasonable burden on the Association’s member banks. Second, the Association contends that the recordkeeping requirements of Title I violate the First Amendment right of privacy and anonymity of the member' banks’ customers. No. 72-1196. This appeal was filed on behalf of a number of plaintiffs in the original suit in the District Court: on behalf of the Security National Bank, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union as a depositor in a bank subject to the recordkeeping requirements, and as a representative of its bank customer members, and on behalf of certain bank customers. The appeal first challenges the constitutionality of the recordkeeping requirements of Title I of the Act and the implementing regulations, as does the appeal in No. 72-985, supra. Second, the appeal challenges the constitutionality of the foreign financial transaction reporting requirements of Title II of the Act and the implementing regulations. These recordkeeping and foreign reporting requirements are challenged on three grounds: first, that the.requirements constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; second, that the requirements constitute a coerced creation and retention of documents in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege- against compulsory self-incrimination; and third, that the requirements violate the First Amendment rights of free speech and free association. No. 72-1073. In this appeal, the Secretary of the Treasury, as appellant, challenges that portion of the District Court’s order holding the domestic financial transaction reporting requirements of Title II to violate the Fourth Amendment. The Government contends that the District Court erred in holding these provisions of Title If to be unconstitutional on their face, without considering the actual implementation of the statute by the Treasury. regulations. The Government' urges that since only those who violate these regulations may incur civil or criminal penalties, it is the actual regulations issued by th,e Secretary of the Treasury, and not the broad authorizing language of the statute, which are to be tested against the standards of the Fourth Amendment; and that when so tested they are valid. For convenience, we will refer throughout the remainder of this opinion to the District Court plaintiffs as plaintiffs, since they are both appellants and appellees in. the appeals filed in this Court. Ill We entertain serious doubt as to the standing of the plaintiff California Bankers Association to litigate the claims which it asserts here. Its complaint alleged that it is an unincorporated association consisting of 158 state and national banks doing business in California. So far . as appears from the complaint, the Association is not in any way engaged in the banking business, and is not even subject to the Secretary’s regulations-which it challenges. While the District Court found that the Association sued on behalf of its member banks, the Association’s complaint contains no such allegation. The Association seeks to litigate, not only claims on behalf of its member banks, but also claims of injury to the depositors of its member banks.. Since the Government has not questioned the standing of. the Association to litigate the claims peculiar to banks, and more importantly since plaintiff Security National Bank has standing as an affected bank, and therefore determination of the Association’s standing would in no way avoid resolution of any constitutional issues, we assume without deciding that the Association does have standing. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 189 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428 (1963). We proceed then to consider the initial contention of the bank plaintiffs that the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the Secretary’s regulations under the authority of Title I deprive the banks of due process by imposing unreasonable burdens upon them, and by seeking to make the banks the agents of the Government in surveillance of its citizens. Such recordkeeping requirements are scarcely a novelty. The Internal Revenue Code, for example, contains a general authorization to th$ Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe by regulation records to be kept by both business and individual taxpayers, 26 U. S. C. § 6001, which has been implemented by the Secretary in various regulations. And this Court has been faced with numerous cases involving similar recordkeeping requirements. Similar requirements imposed on the countless businesses subject to the Emergency Price Control Act during the Second World War were upheld in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1 (1948), the Court observing that there was “a sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the Government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally require the keeping of particular records, subject to inspection . . . .” Id., at 32. In United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941), the Court held that employers subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act could be required to keep records of wages paid and hours worked: “Since, as we have held, Congress may require production foyinterstate commerce to conform to [wage and hour] conditions, it may require the employer, as a means of enforcing the valid law, to keep a record showing whether he has in fact complied with it.” Id., at 125. We see no. reason to reach a different result here. The plenary authority of Congress over both interstate and-foreign commerce is not open to dispute, and that body was not limited to any one particular approach to effectuate its concern that negotiable instruments moving in the channels of that commerce were significantly aiding criminal enterprise. The Secretary of the Treasury, authorized by Congress, concluded that copying and retention of certain negotiable instruments by the bank upon which they were drawn would facilitate the detec-' tion and apprehension of participants in such criminal enterprises. Congress could have closed the channels of commerce entirely to negotiable instruments, had it thought that so drastic a solution were warranted; it could have made the transmission of the proceeds of any criminal activity by negotiable instruments in interstate or foreign commerce a separate criminal offense. Had it chosen to do the latter, under the precise authority of Darby or Shapiro, supra, it could have required that each individual engaging in the sending of negotiable instruments through the channels of commerce maintain a record of such action: the ban^; plaintiffs concede as much. The bank plaintiffs contend, however, that the Act does not have as its primary purpose regulation of the banks themselves, arid therefore the requirement that the banks keep the records is an unreasonable burden on the banks. Shapiro and Darby, which involved legislation imposing recordkeeping requirements in aid of substantive regulation, are therefore said not to control. But provisions requiring reporting or recordkeeping by the paying institution, rather than the individual who receives the payment, are by no means unique. The Internal Revenue Code and its regulations, for example, contain provisions which require businesses to report income payments to third parties (26 U. S. C. § 6041 (a)), employers to keep records of certain payments made to employees (Treas. Reg. § 31.6001 et seq.)f corporations to report dividend payments made to third parties (26 U. S. C. § 6042), cooperatives to report patronage dividend payments (26 U. S. C. § 6044), brokers to report customers’ gains and losses (26 U. S. C. § 6045), and banks to report payments of interest made to depositors (26 U; S, C. | 6049). In Darby an identifiable class of employer was made subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act, and in Shapiro an identifiable class of business had been placed under the Price Control Act; in each of those instances, Congress found that the purpose of its regulation was adequately secured by requiring records to be kept by the persons subject to the substantive ' commands of the legislation. In this case, however, Congress determined that recordkeeping alone would suffice for its purposes, and that no correlative substantive legislation was required. Neither this fact, nor the fact that the principal' congressional concern is with the activities of the banks' customers, rather than with the activities of the banks themselves, serves to invalidate the legislation on due process grounds. The bank plaintiffs proceed from the premise that they are complete bystanders with respect to transactions involving drawers and drawees of their negotiable instruments. But such is hardly the case. A voluminous body of law has grown up defining the rights of the drawer, the payee, and the drawee bank with respect to various kinds of negotiable instruments. The recognition of such rights, both in the various States of this. country and in other countries, is itself a part of the reason why the banking business has flourished and played so prominent a part in commercial transactions. The bank is a party to any negotiable instrument drawn upon it by a depositor, and upon acceptance or payment of an instrument incurs obligations to the payee. While it obviously is not privy to the background of a. transaction in which a negotiable instrument is used, the existing wide acceptance and availability of negotiable instruments is of inestimable benefit to the banking industry as well as to commerce in general. Banks are therefore not consgripted neutrals in transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties to the instruments with a substantial stake in their con-, tinued availability and acceptance. Congress not illogically decided that if records of transactions of negotiable instruments were to be kept and maintained, in order to be available as evidence under customary legal process if the occasion warranted, the bank was the most easily identifiable party to the instrument and therefore should do the recordkeeping. We believe this conclusion is consistent with Darby and Shapiro, and that there is a sufficient connection between the evil Congress sought to address and the recordkeeping procedure it required to pass muster under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The bank plaintiffs somewhat halfheartedly argue, on the basis of the costs which they estimate will be incurred by the banking industry in complying with 'the Secretary’s recordkeeping requirements, that this cost burden alone deprives them of due process of law. They cite no cases for this proposition, and it does not warrant extended treatment. In its complaint filed in the District Court, plaintiff Security National Bank asserted that it was an “insured” national bank; to the extent that Congress has acted to require records on the part of banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or of financial institutions insured under the National Housing Act, Congress is simply imposing a condition on the spending of public funds. See, e. g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937). Since there was no allegation in the complaints filed in the District Court, and since it is not contended here that any bank plaintiff is not covered by FDIC or Housing Act insurance, it is unnecessary to consider what questions would arise had Congress relied solely upon its power over interstate commerce to impose the recordkeeping requirements. The cost burdens imposed on the banks by the record-keeping requirements are far from unreasonable, and we hold that such burdens do not deny the banks due process of law. • The bank plaintiffs also contend that the record-keeping requirements imposed by the Secretary pursuant to the Act undercut a depositor’s right to effectively challenge a third-party summons issued by the Intérnal. Revenue Service. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971); Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 (1973). Whatever wrong such a result might work on a depositor, it works no injury on his bank. It is true that in a limited class of cases this Court has permitted a party who suffered injury as a result of the operation of a law to assert his rights even though the sanction of the law was borne by another, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), and conversely, the Court has allowed a party upon whom the sanction falls to rely.on the wrong done to a third party in obtaining relief, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). Whether the bank might in other circumstances rely on an injury to its depositors, or whether, instead, this case is governed by the general rule that one has standing only to vindicate his own rights, e. g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 166 (1972), need not now be decided, since, in any event, the claim is premature. Claims of depositors against the compulsion by lawful process of bank records involving the depositors’ own transactions must wait until such process issues. Certain of the plaintiffs below, appellants in No. 72-1196, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the Security National Bank,- and various individual plaintiff depositors; argue that if “the dominant purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act is the creation, preservation, and collection of evidence of crime : . . [i]t is against the standards applicable to the criminal law, then, that its constitutionality must be measured.” They contend that the recordkeeping requirements violate the provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and First Amendments to the Constitution. At this point, we deal only with such constitutional challenges as they relate to the recordkeeping provisions of Title I of the Act. We see nothing in the Act which violates the Fourth Amendment rights of any of these plaintiffs. Neither the provisions of Title I nor thé implementing regulations require that any information contained in the records be disclosed to the Government; both the legislative history and the regulations make specific reference to the fact that access to the records is to be controlled by existing legal process. Plaintiffs urge that when the bank makes and keeps records under the compulsion of the Secretary’s regulations it acts as an agent of the Government, and thereby engages in a “seizure” of the records of its customers. But all of the records which the Secretary requires to be kept pertain to transactions to which the bank was itself a party. - See United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 316 (1972). The fact that a large number of banks voluntarily kept records of this sort before they were required to do so by regulation is an indication that the records were thought useful to the bank in the conduct of its own business, as well as in reflecting transactions of its customers. We decided long ago that an Internal Revenue summons directed to a third-party bank was not a violation of the Fourth-Amendment rights of either the bank or the person under investigation by the taxing authorities. See First National Bank v. United States, 267 U. S. 576 (1925), aff’g 295 F. 142 (SD Ala. 1924); Donaldson v. United States, supra, at 522. “[I]t is difficult to see how the shmmoning of a third party, and the records of á third party, can violate the rights of the-taxpayer, even if a criminal prosecution is-contemplated or in progress." Id., at 537 (Douglas, J., concurring)^ Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the broad authorization given by the Act to the Secretary to require the maintenance of records, coupled with the broad authority to require certain reports of financial transactions, amounts to the power to commit an unlawful search of the banks and the customers. This argument is based on the fact that 31 CFR § 103.45, as it existed when the District Court ruled in the case, permitted the Secretary to impose additional recordkeeping or reporting, requirements by written order or authorization; this authority has now been deleted from the regulation; plaintiffs thus argue that the Secretary could order the immediate reporting of any records made or kept under the compulsion of the Act. We, of course, must examine the statute and the regulations as they now exist.. Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam) v. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281 n. 38 (1969). Even if plaintiffs were correct in Urging that we decide the case on the basis of the regulation as it existed at the time the District Court ruled, their contention would be without merit. Whatever the Secretary might have authorized under the regulation/ he did' not in fact require, the reporting of any records made or kept under the compulsion of the Act. Indeed, since the legislative history of the Act clearly indicates that records which it authorized the Secretary to require were to be available only by normal legal process, it is doubtful that the Secretary would have the authority ascribed to him by plaintiffs even under the earlier form of the regulation. But in any event, whether or not he had the authority, he did not exercise it, and in fact none of the records were required to be reported. Since we hold that the mere maintenance of'.the records by the banks under the compulsion of the regulations invaded no Fourth Amendment right of any depositor, plaintiffs' attack on the record-keeping requirements under that Amendment fails. That the bank in making the records required by the Secretary acts under the compulsion of the regulation is clear, but if is equally clear that in doing so it neither searches nor seizes records in which the depositor has a Fourth Amendment right. Plaintiffs have briefed their contentions in such a way that we cannot be entirely certain whether their Fifth Amendment attack is directed only to the reporting provisions of the regulations, or to the recordkeeping provisions as well. To the extent that it is directed to the regulations requiring the banks to keep records, it is without merit. Incorporated banks, like other organizations, have no privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, e. g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 74-75 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 382-384 (1911); United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 699 (1944). Since a party incriminated by evidence produced by a third party sustains no violation of his own Fifth Amendment rights, Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457, 458 (1913); Couch v. United States, 409 U. S., at 328, the depositor plaintiffs here present no meritorious Fifth Amendment challenge to the recordkeeping requirements. Plaintiff ACLU makes an additional challenge to the recordkeeping requirements of Title I. It argues that those provisions, and the implementing regulations, violate its members’ First Amendment rights, since the provisions could possibly be used to obtain, the identities of its members and contributors through the examination of the organization’s bank records. This Court has recognized that an organization may have standing to assert that constitutional rights of its members be protected from governmentally compelled disclosure of their membership in the organization, and that absent a countervailing governmental interest, such infdrmation may not be compelled. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). See Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (ED Ark.), aff’d per curiam, 393 U. S. 14 (1968). Those cases, however, do not elicit a per se rule that would forbid such. disclosure in a situation where the governmental interest would override the associational interest in maintaining such confidentiality. Each of them was litigated after a subpoena or summons had already been served for the records of the organization, and an action brought by the organization to prevent the actual disclosure of the records. No such disclosure has been sought by the Government here, and the ACLIJ’s challenge is therefore premature. This Court, in the absence of a concrete fact situation in which competing associational and governmental interests can be weighed, is simply not in a position to determine whether an effort to compel disclosure of such records would or would not be barred by cases such as NAACP v. Alabama, supra The threat to any First Amendment rights of the ACLU or its members from the mere existence of the records in the hands of the bank is a good deal more remote than the threat assertedly posed by the Army’s system of compilation and distribution of information which we declined to adjudicate in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1 (1972)., IV We proceed now to address the constitutional challenges directed at the reporting requirements of the regulations authorized in Title II of the Act. Title II authorizes the Secretary to require reporting of two general categories of banking transactions: foreign and domestic. The District Co.urt upheld the constitutionality of the foreign transaction reporting requirements of regulations issued under Title II; certain of the plaintiffs below, appellants in No. 72-1196, have appealed from that portion of the District Court’s judgment, and here renew their contentions of constitutional infirmity in the foreign reporting regulations based upon the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The District Court invalidated the Act insofar as it authorized the Secretary to promulgate regulations requiring banks to report domestic transactions involving their customers, and the Government in No. 72-1073 appeals from that portion of the District Court’s judgment. - As noted above, the regulations issued by the Secretary under, the authority of Title II contain two essential reporting requirements with respect tú foreign financial transactions. Chapter 3 of Title II of the Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 1101-1105, and the corresponding regulation, 31 CFR § 103.23, require individuals to report transportation of monetary instruments into or out of the United States, or receipts of such instruments in the United States from places outside the United States, if the instrument transported or received has a value in excess of $5,000. Chapter 4 of Title II of the Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 1121-1122, and the corresponding regulation, 31 CFR § 103.24, generally require United States citizens, residents, and businessmen to file reports of their relationships with foreign financial institutions. The domestic reporting provisions of the Act as implemented by the regulations, in contrast to the foreign reporting requirements, apply only to banks and financial institutions'. In enacting the statute, Congress provided in § 221, 31 U. S. C. § 1081, that the Secretary might specify the types of currency transactions which should be reported: “Transactions involving any domestic financial im stitutión shall be reported to the Secretary at such time,'in such'manner, and in such detail as the Secretary may require if they involve the payment, receipt, or transfer of United States currency, or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may specify, in such amounts, denominations, or both, or under such circumstances, as the Secretary' shall by regulation prescribe.” Section 222 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1082, authorizes the Secretary to require such reports from the domestic financial institution involved, from the parties to the transactions, or from both. In exercising his authority under these sections, the Secretary has promulgated, regulations which require only that the financial, institutions make the report to the Internal Revenue Service; he has not required any report from the individual par- ■ ties to domestic financial transactions. The applicable regulation, 31 CFR § 103.22, requires the financial institution to “file a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution, which involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000.” The regulation exempts several types of currency transactions from this reporting requirement, including transactions “with an established customer maintaining a deposit relationship with the bank, in amounts which'the. bank may reasonably conclude do not exceed amounts commensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry or profession of the customer concerned.” Ibid. A. Fourth Amendment Challenge to the Foreign Reporting Requirements The District Court, in differentiating for constitutional. purposes between the foreign reporting requirements and. the domestic reporting requirements imposed by the Secretary; relied upon our opinion in United States v. U. S. District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), for the proposition that Government surveillance in the area of foreign relations is in some instances subject to less .constitutional restraint than would be similar activity in domestic affairs. Our analysis does not take iis over this ground. The plenary authority of Congress to regulate foreign commeice, and to delegate significant portions of this power to the Executive, is well established. C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 109 (1948); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933). Plaintiffs contend that in exercising that authority to require reporting of previously described foreign financial transactions, Congress and the Secretary have abridged their Fourth' Amendment rights. . The familiar language, of the Fourth Amendment pro'tects “[t]he right of the people to .be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” Since a státute requiring the filing and subsequent publication of a corporate tax return has been upheld against, a Fourth Amendment challenge, Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 174-176 (1911), reporting requirements are by. no means per se violations of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, a contrary holding might well fly in the face of the settled sixty-year history of self-assessment of individual and corporate income taxes in the United States. This Court has on numerous occasions recognized the importance of the self-regulatory aspects of that system, and interests of the Congress in enforcing it: “In assessing income taxes the Government relies primarily upon the disclosure by the taxpayer of the relevant facts. This disclosure it requires him to make in his annual return. To ensure full and honest disclosure, to discourage fraudulent attempts to evade the tax, Congress imposes sanctions. Such sanctions may confessedly be either criminal or civil.” Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399 (1938). • To the - extent that the reporting requirements of the Act and the settled practices of- the- tax collection process ■ are similar, this history must be overcome by those who argue that the reporting requirements are a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs contend, however, that Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), establishes the invalidity of the foreign reporting requirement under the Fourth Amendment, and that the particular requirements imposed are so indiscriminate in their nature that the regulations must be deemed to be the equivalent of a general warrant of. the kind condemned as obnoxious to. the Fourth Amendment in cases such as Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 (1965). We do not think these cases would support plaintiffs even if their contentions were directed at. the domestic reporting requirements; in light of the fact that the foreign reporting requirements deal with matters in foreign commerce, we think plaintiffs’ reliance on the cases to challenge those requirements must fail. Boyd v. United States, supra, is a case which has been the subject of repeated citation, discussion, and explanation since the time of its decision 88 years ago. In Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U. S. 1 (1961), the Court described the Boyd holding as follows: “The Boyd case involved a statute providing that in proceedings other than criminal arising under the revenue laws, the Government could secure an order of the court requiring the production by an opposing claimant or defendant of any documents under his control which, the Government asserted, might tend to prove any of the Government’s allegations. If production were not made, the allegations were to be taken as confessed. On the Government’s motion, the District Court had entered such an order, requiring the claimants in a forfeiture proceeding to produce a specified invoice. Although the claimants objected that the order was improper and the statute unconstitutional in coercing self-incriminatory disclosures and permitting unreasonable searches and seizures, they did, under protest, produce the invoice, which was, again over their constitutional objection, admitted into evidence. This Court held that on such a record a judgment for the United States could not stand, and that the statute was invalid as repugnant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.” Id., at 110. But the Boyd Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all requirements that information be made available to the Government: “[T]he supervision authorized to be exercised by officers of the revenue over the manufacture or custody of excisable articles, and the entries thereof in' books required by law to be kept for their inspection, are necessarily excepted out of the category of unreasonable searches and seizures."’ 116 U. S., at 623-624. Stanford v. Texas, supra, involved a warrant issued by a state judge which described petitioner’s home and authorized the search and seizure of “books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas.” This Court found the warrant to be an unconstitutional general warrant, and invalidated the search and seizure conducted ¡pursuant, to it. Unlike the situation in Stanford, the Secretary’s regulations do not authorize indiscriminate rummaging among the records of the plaintiffs, nor do the reports they require deal with literary material as in Stanford; the information sought is about commerce, not literature. The reports of foreign financial transactions required by the regulations must contain information as to a relatively limited group of financial transactions in foreign . commerce, and are reasonably related to the statutory purpose of assisting in the Enforcement of the laws of the United States. Of primary importance, in addition, is the fact that the information required by the foreign reporting requirements pertains only to commercial transactions which take place across national boundaries. Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in his .opinion-for the Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), observed: “Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one. entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and ,his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.” Id., at 154. . This settled proposition has been reaffirmed as recently as last Term in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 272 (1973). If reporting of income may be required as an aid to enforcement of the federal revenue statutes, and' if those entering and leaving the country may be examined as to their belongings and effects, all without violating the Fourth Amendment, we see no reason to invalidate the Secretary’s regulations here. The statutory authorization for the regulations was based upon a conclusion by Congress that international currency transactions and foreign financial institutions were being used by residents of the United States to circumvent the enforcement of the laws of the United States. The regulations are sufficiently tailored so as to single out transactions found to have the greatest potential for such circumvention and which involve substantial amounts of money. They are therefore reasonable in the light of that statutory purpose, and consistent with the Fourth Amendment. B. Fourth Amendment Challenge to the Domestic Reporting Requirements The District Court examined the domestic reporting requirements imposed on plaintiffs by looking to the broad authorization of the Act itself, without specific reference to the regulations promulgated under its • authority. The District Court observed: “[Although to date the Secretary has required reporting only by the financial institutions and then only of currency transactions over $10,000, he is empowered by the Act, as indicated above, to require, if he so decides, reporting not only by the financial institution, but also by other parties to or participants iñ transactions with the institutions and, further, that the Secretary may require reports, not only of currency transactions but of any transaction involving any monetary instrument — and in any amount — large or small.” 347 F. Supp., at 1246. The District Court went on to pose, as the question to be resolved, whether “these provisions, broadly authorizing an executive agency of government to require financial institutions and parties [thereto] ... to routinely report . . . the detail of almost every conceivable financial transaction . . . [are] such an invasion of a.citizen’s right of privacy as amounts to an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Ibid. Since, as we have observed earlier in this opinion, the statute is not self-executing, and were the Secretary to . take no action whatever under his authority there would be no possibility of criminal or civil sanctions being irtiposed on anyone, the District Court was wrong in framing the question in this manner. The question is not what sort of reporting requirements might have been imposed by the Secretary under the broad authority given him in the Act, but rather what sort of reporting requirements he did in fact impose under that authority. “Even where some of. the provisions of a comprehensive legislative enactment are ripe for adjudication, portions of the enactment not immediately involved are not thereby thrown open for a judicial determination of constitutionality. ‘Passing upon the possible significance of the manifold provisions of a broad statute in advance of efforts to apply the separate provisions is analogous to rendering an advisory' opinion, upon a statute "or a declaratory judgment upon a hypothetical case.’ Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 402.” Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U. S., at 71. The . question for decision, therefore, is whether the regulations relating to the reporting of domestic transactions, violations of which could subject those required to report to civil or criminal penalties, invade any Fourth Amendment right of those required to report. To that question we now turn. The regulations issued by the Secretary require the reporting of domestic financial transactions only by financial institutions. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632 (1950), held that organizations engaged in commerce could be required by the Government to file reports dealing with particular phases of their activities. The language used by the Court in that case is instructive: “It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186. Although the ‘right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued- by civilized men/ Brandéis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 471, at 478, is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 70, neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. Hale v. Henkel, supra; United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694. “While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation, cf. Federal Trade Comm’n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. Cf. United States v. White, supra. They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows thém the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry, with them an enhanced measure of regulation. [Citations omitted.] Even if one were to regard the request for information in' this case as caused by .nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest.” 338 U. S., at 651-652. ' .We have no difficulty then in determining that the Secretary’s requirements for the reporting of domestic financial transactions abridge no Fourth Amendment right of the banks themselves. The bank is not a mere stranger or bystander with respect to the transactions which it is required to record or report. The bank is itself a party to each of these transactions, earns portions of its income from conducting such transactions, and in the past may have' kept records of similar transactions on a voluntary basis for its own purposes. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S., at 316. The regulations presently in effect governing the reporting of domestic currency transactions require information as to the personal and business identity of the person conducting the ' transaction and of the person or organization for whom it was conducted, as well as a summary description of the nature of the transaction. It is conceivable, and perhaps likely, that the bank might not of its own volition compile this amount of detail for its own purposes, and therefore to that extent the regulations put the bank in the position of seeking information from the. customer in order to. eventually report it to the Government. But as we have noted above, “neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret.” United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra, at 652. ' The regulations do not impose unreasonable reporting requirements on the banks. The regulations require the reporting of information with respect to abnormally large transactions in currency, much of which information the bank as a party to the transaction already possesses or would acquire in its own interest. To the extent that the regulations in connection with such transactions require the bank to obtain information from a customer simply because the Government wants it, the information is sufficiently described and limited in nature, and sufficiently related to a tenable congressional determination as to improper use of transactions of that type in interstate commerce, so as to withstand the Fourth Amendment challenge made by the bank plaintiffs. “[T]he inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. ‘The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable/ ” United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra, at 652-653; see Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 208 (1946). In addition to the Fourth Amendment challenge to the domestic reporting requirements made by the bank plaintiffs, we are faced with a similar challenge by the depositor plaintiffs, who contend that since the reports of domestic transactions which the-bank is required to make will include transactions to which the depositors were parties, the requirement that the bank make a report of the transaction violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the depositor. The complaint filed in the District Court by the ACLÜ and the depositors contains no allegation by any of the individual depositors that they were engaged in the type of $10,000 domestic currency transaction which would necessitate that their bank report it 'to the Government. This is not a situation where there might have been. a mere oversight in the specificity of the pleadings and where this Court could properly infer that participation in such a transaction was necessarily inferred from the fact that the individual plaintiffs allege that they are in fact “depositors.” Such an inference can be made, for example, as to the recordkeeping provisions of Title J, which require the banks to keep various records of . certain transactions by check; as our discussitín of the challenges by the individual depositors to the recordkeeping provisions, supra, implicitly recognizes, the allegation that one is a depositor is sufficient to permit consideration of the challenges to the recordkeeping provisions, since any depositor would to some degree be affected by them. Here, however, we simply cannot assume that the mere fact that one is a depositor in a bank means that he has engaged or will engage in a transaction involving more than $10,000 in currency, which is the only type of domestic transaction which the Secretary’s regulations require that the banks report. That being so, the depositor plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the domestic reporting regulations, since they do not show that their transactions are required to be reported. “Plaintiffs in the federal courts ‘must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.’ Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973). There must be a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ such as to ‘assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). ... . Abstract injury is not enough. It must be alleged that the plaintiff ‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923). The injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. -103, 109-110 (1969).,; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89-91 (1947).” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 493-494 (1974) (footnote omitted). We therefore hold that the Fourth Amendment claims of the depositor plaintiffs may not be considered on the record before us. Nor do we think that the California Bankers Association or the Security National Bank can vicariously assert such Fourth Amendment claims on behalf of bank customers in general. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary require that a report concerning a domestic currency transaction involving more than $10,000 be filed only by the financial institution which is a party to the transaction; the regulations do, not require a report from the customer. 31 CFR § 103.22; see 31 u. S. C. § 1082. Both the bank and depositor plaintiffs here argue that the regulations are constitutionally defective because they do not require the financial institution to notify the customer that a report will be filed concerning the domestic currency transaction. Since we have held that the depositor plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing of injury to make a constitutional challenge to the domestic reporting requirements, we do not address ourselves to the necessity of notice to those bank customers whose transactions must be reported. The fact that the regulations do not require the banks to notify the customer of the report violates no constitutional right of the banks, and the banks in any event are left free to adopt whatever customer notification procedures they desire. C. Fifth Amendment Challenge to the Foreign and Domestic Reporting Requirements The District Court rejected the depositor plaintiffs’ claim that the foreign reporting requirements violated the depositors’ Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and found it unnecessary to consider the similarly based challenge to the domestic reporting requirements since the latter were found to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The appeal of the depositor plaintiffs in No. 72-1196 challenges the foreign reporting requirements under the Fifth Amendment, and their brief likewise challenges the domestic reporting requirements as violative of that Amendment. Since they are free to urge in this Court reasons for affirming the judgment of the District Court which may not have been relied upon by the District Court, we consider here the Fifth Amendment objections to both the foreign and the domestic reporting requirements. As we noted above, the bank plaintiffs, being corporations, have no constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by virtue of the Fifth Amendment. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906). Their brief urges that they may vicariously assert Fifth Amendment claims on behalf of their depositors. But since we hold infra that those depositor plaintiffs who are actually parties in this litigation are premature in asserting any Fifth Amendment claims, we do not believe that the banks under these circumstances have standing to- assert Fifth Amendment claims on behalf of customers in general. The individual depositor plaintiffs below made various allegations in the complaint and affidavits filed, in the District Court. Plaintiff Stark alleged that he was, in addition to being president of plaintiff Security National Bank, a customer of and depositor in the bank. Plaintiff Marson alleged that he was a customer of and- depositor in the Bank of America. Plaintiff Lieberman alleged that he- had repeatedly in the recent past transported or shipped one or- more monetary instruments exceeding $5,000 in value from' the United States to places outside the United States, and expected to do likewise in the near future. Plaintiffs Lieberman, Harwood,. Bruer, and Durell each alleged that they maintained a financial interest in and signature authority over one or more bank accounts in foreign countries. This, so far as we can ascertain from the record, is the sum and substance of the depositors’ allegations of fact upon which they seek to mount an attack on the reporting requirements of regulations-as violative of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination granted to each of them by the Fifth Amendment. Considering first the challenge of the depositor plaintiffs to the foreign reporting requirements, we hold that such claims are premature.- In United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927), this. Court reviewed a judgment óf the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 15 F. 2d 809 (1926),' which had held that the Fifth Amendment protected, the respondent from being punished for failure to file an income tax return. This Court reversed the decision below, stating: “As the defendant’s income was taxed', the statute of course required- a return. See United States v. Sischo, 262 U. S. 165. In the decision that this was contrary to the Constitution we are of opinion that the protection of the Fifth Amendment was pressed too far. If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the, return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all. We are not called on to decide what, if anything, he might have withheld; Most of the items warranted no complaint. It would be an extreme if not.an extravagant application of the •Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in crime. But if the defendant desired to test that or any other point he should have tested if in the return so that it. could be passed upon. He could not draw a, conjurer’s circle around the whole matter by his own declaration that to write any word upon the government blank would bring him into danger of the law.” 274 U. S.,'at 263-264. Here the depositor plaintiffs allege that they intend to engage in foreign currency transactions or dealings with foreign banks which the Secretary’s regulations will require them to report, but they make no additional allegation that any of the information required by the Secretary will tend tó incriminate them. It will be time enough for us to determine what, if any, relief from the reporting requirement they may obtain in a.judicial proceeding when they have properly and specifically raised a claim of privilege with respect to particular items of information required by the Secretary,, and the Secretary has overruled their claim of privilege. The posture of plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights here is strikingly similar to those asserted in Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U. S., at 105-110. The Communist Party there sought to assert the Fifth Amendment claims of its officers as a defense to the registration requirement of the Subversive Activities Control Act, although the officers were not at that stage of the proceeding required by the Act to register; and had neither registered nor refused to register on the ground that registration might incriminate them. The Court said: “If a claim of privilege is made, it may or may not be honored, by the Attorney General. We cannot, on the basis of supposition- that privilege will be claimed, and not honored, proceed now to adjudicate the constitutionality under the Fifth Amendment of the registration provisions. Whatever procéeding may be taken after and if the privilege is claimed will provide an adequate forum for litigation of that issue.” Id., at 107. Plaintiffs argue that cases such as Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70 (1965), have relaxed the requirements of earlier cases, but we do not find that contention supported by the language or holding of that case. There the Attorney General had petitioned for and obtained an order from the Subversive Activities Control Board compelling certain named members of the Communist Party to register their affiliation. In response to the Attorney General's petitions, both before the Board and in subsequent judicial proceedings, the Communist Party members had asserted the privilege against self-incrimination, and their claims had been réjected by the Attorney General. >A previous decision of this Court had held that an affirmative answer to the inquiry as to membership in the Communist Party was an incriminating admission protected under the Fifth Amendment. Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159 (1950). The differences then between the posture of the depositor plaintiffs in this case and that of petitioner in Albertson v. SACB supra, are evident. We similarly think that the depositor plaintiffs’ challenges to the domestic reporting requirements are premature. As we noted above, it is not apparent from the-allegations of the complaints in these actions that any of the depositor plaintiffs would be engaged in $10,000 domestic transactions with the bank which the latter would be required to report under the Secretary’s regulations pertaining to such domestic transactions. Not only is there no allegation that any depositor engaged in such transactions, but there is no allegation in the complaint that any report which such a bank was required to make would contain infofmation incriminating any depositor. To what extent, if any, depositors may claim a privilege arising from the Fifth Amendment by reason of the obligation of the bank to report such a transaction may be left for resolution when the claim of privilege is properly asserted. Depositor plaintiffs rely on Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968), and Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85 (1968), as supporting the merits of their Fifth Amendment claim. In each of those cases, however, a claim of privilege was asserted as a defense to the requirement of reporting particular information required by the law under challenge, and those decisions therefore in no way militate against our conclusion that depositor plaintiffs’ efforts to litigate the Fifth Amendment issue at this time are premature. D. Plaintiff ACLU’s First Amendment Challenge to the Foreign and Domestic Reporting Requirements The ACLU claims that the reporting requirements with respect to foreign and domestic transactions invade its associational interests protected by the First Amendment. We have earlier held a similar claim by this organization to be speculative and hypothetical when addressed to the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the Secretary. Supra, at 55-57. The requirement that particular transactions be reported to the Government, rather than that records of them' be available through normal legal process, removes part of the speculative quality of the claim. But the only allegation found in the complaints with respect to the financial activities of the ACLU states that it maintains accounts at one of the San Francisco offices of the Wells Fargo Bank & Trust Company. There is no allegation that the ACLU engages with any regularity in abnormally large domestic currency transactions, transports or receives monetary instruments from channels of foreign commerce, or maintains accounts in financial institutions in foreign countries. Until there is some showing that the reporting requirements contained in the Secretary’s regulations would require the reporting of information with respect to the organization’s financial activities, no concrete controversy is presented to. this Court for adjudication. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S., at 493-494. V All of the bank; and depositor plaintiffs have stressed in their presentations to the District Court and to this Court that the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act are focused in large part on the acquisition of information to assist, in the enforcement of the criminal laws. While, as we have noted, Congress seems to have been equally concerned with civil liability which might go undetected by reason of transactions of the type required to be recorded or reported' concern for the enforcement of the criminal law was undoubtedly prominent in the minds of the legislators who considered the Act. We do not think it is strange or irrational that Congress, having its attention called to what appeared to be serious and organized efforts to avoid - detection of criminal activity, should have legislated to rectify the situation. We have no doubt that Congress, in the. sphere of its legislative authority, may just as properly address itself to the effective enforcement of criminal laws which it has previously enacted as to the enactment of those laws in the first instance. In so . doing, it is of course subject to the strictures of the Bill of Rights, and may not transgress those strictures. But the fact that a legislative enactment manifests a concern for the enforcement of the criminal law does not cast any generalized pall of constitutional suspicion over it. Having concluded that on the record in these appeals, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, and having concluded that the enactment in question was within the legislative authority of Congress, our inquiry is at an end. On the appeal of the California Bankers Association in No. 72-985 from that portion of the judgment of the District Court upholding the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the Secretary pursuant to Title I, the judgment is affirmed. On the appeal of the bank and depositor plaintiffs in No. 72-1196 from that portion of the District Court’s judgment upholding the recordkeeping requirements and regulations of Title I and the foreign reporting requirements imposed under the authority of Title II, the judgment is likewise affirmed. On the Government’s appeal in No. 72-1073 from that portion of the District Court’s judgment which held that the domestic reporting requirements imposed under Title II of the Act violated the Constitution, the judgment is reversed. The cause is remanded to the District Court for disposition consistent with this opinion. So ordered. See generally S. Rep. No. 91-1139 (1970); H. R. Rep. No. 91-975 (1970); Hearings on Foreign Bank Secrecy and Bank Records (H..R. 15073) before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1969-1970); Hearings on Foreign Bank Secrecy (S. 3678 and H. R. 15073) before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Seé n. 11, infra.. Under §123 (b), 12-VU. S. C. § 1953 (b), the authority of the' Secretary extends to any person engaging in the business of: "(1) Issuing or redeeming checks; money orders, travelers’ checks, or similar instruments, except as an incident to the conduct of its own nonfinancial business. “(2) Transferring funds or credits domestically or internationally. “(3) Operating a currency exchange or otherwise dealing in foreign currencies or credits. “ (4) Operating a credit card system. “(5) Performing such similar, related, or substitute functions for any of the foregoing-or for banking as may be specified by the Secretary in regulations.” Section 122 of the Act, 12 U.. S. C. § 1952, authorizes the Secretary ..to require .reports with respect to the ownership, control, and management of uninsured domestic financial institutions. See House Hearings, supra, n. 1, at 60-61; 80. 146, 162, 314, 316, 321, 333; S. Rep. No. 91-1139, supra, at lS — 19 (supplemental view§). For a summary of the task force study, see Hearings to amend the Bank Secrecy Act (S. 3814 and S. 3828) before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 60-64 (1972). The Secretary initially issued regulations on April 5, 1972, implementing the provisions of the Act. See 31 CFR pt. 103 (37 Fed. Reg. 6912). The Treasury Department task force found that law enforcement would not be greatly impaired by limiting the check-copying requirement to checks in excess of $100. An Assistant Secretary of the Treasurj' estimated that this exclusion would eliminate 90% of all personal checks from the microfilming requirement. Senate Hearings on S. 3814, supra, at 42, 44, 57-58. The regulations were thus amended shortly after their promulgation to exclude the copying of checks drawn for $100 or less. 31 CFR § 103.34 (b) (3), as amended, 37 Fed. Reg. 23114 (1972), 38 Fed. Reg. 2174 (1973), effective Jan. 17,1973. Exempted by 31 CFR § 103.34 (b) (3) are dividend'checks, payroll checks, employee benefit checks, insurance claim checks, medical benefit checks, checks drawn on governmental agency accounts, checks drawn by brokers or dealers in securities, checks drawn on fiduciary accounts, checks drawn on other financial institutions, and pension or annuity checks, provided they are drawn on an account expected to average at least one hundred checks per month. Title 31 CFR § 103.34 (b) requires that each bank retain either the original or a microfilm or other copy or reproduction of (1) documents granting signature authority over accounts; (2) statements or ledger cards showing transactions in each account; (3) each item involving more than $10,000 remitted or transferred to a person, account, or place outside the United States; (4) a record of each remittance or transaction of funds, currency, monetary instruments, checks, investment securities, or credit, of more than $10,000'to a person, account, or place outside the United States; (5) each check or draft in an amount' exceeding $10,000 drawn on or issued by a foreign bank which the domestic bank has paid or presented to a nonbank drawee for payment; (6) each item of more than $10,000 received directly from a bank, broker, or dealer in foreign exchange outside the United States; (7) a record of each receipt of currency, monetary instruments, cheeks, or investment securities, and each transfer of funds or credit in amounts exceeding $10,000 received directly from a bank, broker, or dealer in foreign exchange outside • the- United States; (8) records needed to reconstruct a demand deposit account and to tracé checks in excess of $100 deposited in such account. Title 31 CFR § 103.35 requires brokers and dealers in securities to maintain similar information with respect to their brokerage accounts. The prescribed retention period for all records under the regulations is, five years, except for the records required for reconstructing a demand deposit account, which must be retained ■ for only two years. 31 CFR § 103.36(c). Title 31 CFR § 103.51 provides: . “Except 4s provided in §§ 103.34 (a) (1) and 103.35 (a)(1), and except for the purpose of assuring compliance with the record-keeping and reporting requirements of this part, this part does not .authorize the Secretary or any other person to "inspect or review the records required to be maintained by subpart C of this part. Other inspection,- review or access to such records is governed by other applicable law.” • This regulation became effective January 17, 1973. 37 Fed. Reg. 23114 (1972); 38 Fed. Reg. 2174 (1973). , . “Monetary instrument” is'.defined by §203 (1) of the Act as “coin and currency of. the United States, and in addition, such fofeign coin and currencies, and such types. of travelers’ checks, bearer negotiable instruments, bearer investment securities, bearer sécurities, and stock with title' passing upon delivery, or'the equivalent thereof, as the Secretary may by regulation specify for the purposes of the provision of this title to which the regulation relates.” 31 U.'S. C. § 1052 (l). The form provided by the Treasury Department for the reporting of these transactions is Form 4790 (Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments). See Motion to Affirm on behalf of the United States in No. 72-985, App. C, pp. 29-30. ' The report must identify the person required- to file the report, his capacity, and the identity of persons for whom he acts, and müst specify the amounts and types of monetary instruments, the method of transportation, and,'if applicable, the name of the person' from whom the shipment was received. In issuing these regulations, the Secretary relied upon the authority of two statutory provisions: (1) the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, as amended by § 2, Act of Mar. 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1, and by § 301, First War Powers Act, 1941,55 Stat. 839, see - 12 U. S. C. § 95a (1940 ed., Supp. V); and (2) § 251 of the Revised Statutes, 31 U. S. C. § 427. The previous regulations promulgated by the Secretary, see 31 CFR § 102.1 (1949), 10 Fed. Reg. 6556, originally mentioned .transactions involving $1,000 or more in denominations of $50 or more, or. $10,000 or more in any denominations. In 1952, the former amount was raised to $2,500 in denominations of $100 or more. See 17 Fed. Reg. 1822, 2306.' When these regulations were revised in- 1959 to simplify the reporting form, the Secretary noted the great value of the reports to law enforcement. See Treasury Release No. A-590, Aug. 3,, 1959, included in the Jurisdictional Statement for'the United ■ States in No. 72-1073, App. E, pp. 127-130. The. proper interpretation, of this section is a source of dispute in these appeals. See n. 29, infra. “Currency” is defined in the Secretary’s regulations as the “coin and currency of the United States or of any other, country, which circulate in and are customarily used and accepted as money in the country in which issued. It includes U. S. silver certificates, U. S. notes and Federal Reserve notes, but does not include bank checks or other negotiable instruments not customarily accepted as money.” 31 CFR § 103.11. The form prescribed by the Secretary, see 31 CFR § .103,25 (a), for the reporting of the domestic currency transactions is Treasury Form 4789 (Currency Transaction Report). See Jurisdictional Statement for the United States in No. 72-1073, App. D, p. 121'. Form 4789 requires information similar to that required by the previous Treasury reporting form, see n. 12, supra, including (1) the name, address, business or profession and social security .number of the person conducting the transaction; (2) similar information as to the person or organization for whom it was conducted; (3). a summary description of the nature of the transaction, the type,amount, and denomination of the currency involved and a description of any check involved in the transaction; ‘(4) the type of identification presented; and (5) the identity of the reporting financial institution.' The regulations also provide that the names of all customers whose currency transactions in excess of $10,000 are not reported on Form 4789 must be reported to the Secretary on demand. 31 CFR § 103.22. Transactions with Federal Reserve Banks or Federal Home Loan Banks, or solely with or originated by financial institutions or foreign banks, are -also excluded from these reporting requirements. 31 CFR § 103.22. Section 212 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1061, authorizes the Secretary to provide by regulation for the availability of information provided in the reports required by the Act to other departments and agencies of the Federal Government. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has promulgated 31 CFR § 103.43, which provides: “The Secretary may make any information set forth in any report received pursuant to this part available to any other department or agency of the United States upon the request of the head of such department or agency, made in writing and stating the particular information desired, the criminal, tax or regulatory investigation or proceeding in connection with which the information is sought and the official need therefor. Any information made Available under this section to other departments or agencies of the United States shall be received by them in confidence, and shall not be disclosed to any person except for official purposes relating to the investigation or proceeding in connection with which the information is sought.” . The last sentence of this regulation was added by an amendment, see 37 Fed. Reg. 23114 (1972); 38 Fed. Reg. 2174 (1973), effective Jam 17, 1973. Title.31 CFR §103.45 (a) provides: "The Secretary, in his sole discretion, may by written order or authorization make exceptions to or grant exemptions' from the requirements of this part. Such exceptions or exemptions may be conditional or unconditional,, may apply to particular persons or to classes of persons, and may apply to particular transactions or classes of transactions. They shall, however, be applicable only as expressly stated in the order of authorization, and they shall be revocable in the sole discretion of the Secretary.” When originally promulgated, this regulation additionally gave the Secretary the authority to “impose additional recordkeeping or reporting requirements authorized by statute, or otherwise modify, the requirements of” the Act. 37 Fed. Reg. 6915 (1972). The amendment to the present form became effective January 17, 1973. 37 Fed. Reg. 23114 (1972); 38 Fed. Reg. 2174 (1973).’ See, • e. g., Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3 (records to be kept by taxpayers who participate in tax-free exchanges in connection with a corporate, reorganization); § 1.374-3 (records to be kept by a railroad corporation engaging in a tax-free exchange in connection with a railroad reorganization)'; § 1.857-6 (real estate investment trusts must keep records of stock ownership); § 1.964-3 (shareholders must keep records of their interest in a controlled foreign corporation); § 1.1101-4 (records to be kept by a stock or security holder who receives stock or securities or other property upon a distribution made by a qualified bank holding corporation); § 1.1247-5 (foreign investment company must keep records sufficient to verify what taxable income it may have); § 1.6001-1 (all persons liable to tax under subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code shall keep records sufficient to establish gross income, deductions, and credits); § 31.6001 et seq. (requirements that various employers keep records of withholding under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act); §§ 45.6001-2 to 45.6001-4 (records ¡o be kept by manufacturers of butter and cheese); §46.6001-2 (records to be kept by manufacturers of sugar); § 46.6001-4 (records to be kept by persons paying premiums on policies issued by foreign insurers). Treas. Reg. §301.7207-1 provides for criminal penalties for willful delivery or' disclosure to the Internal Revenue Service of a document known by the person disclosing it to be false as to any material matter. ■ 20 Brief for Appellant California Bankers Association in No. 72-985, Congress had befare it ample testimony that the requirement that banks reproduce checks and maintain other records would significantly aid in the enforcement of federal tax, regulatory, and criminal laws. See House Hearings, supra, n. 1, at 151, 322, 359; Senate Hearings, supra, n. 1, at 61-68, 175, 230, 250-255, 282. While a substantial portion of the checks drawn on banks in the United States may never be of any utility for law enforcement, tax or regulatory purposes, the regulations do limit the check-copying requirement to checks in excess of $100. 31 CFR §§ 103.34 (b)(3) and (4). This $100 exception was added to the regulations since this litigation was instituted, see n. 5,' supra; in reviewing the judgment of the District Court in this case, we look to the statute and the regulations as they now stand, not as they once did. Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam.); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281 n. 381 (1969). The California Bankers Association contends that the $100 exception is meaningless since microfilm cameras cannot discriminate between checks in different amounts. There was, however, testimony during the House Hearings that, an additional step could be added to the check-handling procedures to sort out those checks not required to be copied, and that many banks have equipment that can sort checks on a dollar-amount basis. House Hearings, supra, n. 1, at 322, 359. In any event, it is clear that, the Act and regulations do not require banks to microfilm all checks, which some banks have traditionally done, but instead leave the decision to the banks. Given the fact that the cost burden placed on the banks in implementing the. recordkeeping requirements of the statute and regulations is also a reasonable one, see n. 22, infra, we do not think that the recordkeeping requirements are unreasonable. The only figures in the record as to the cost burden placed on the banks by the recordkeeping requirements show that the Bank of America, one of the largest banks in the United States, with 997 branches, $29 billion in deposits, and a net income in excess of $178- million (Moody’s Bank and Finance Manual 633-636 (1972)), expended $392,000 in 1971, including start-up costs, to comply with the microfilming requirements of Title I of the Act. Affidavit of William Ehler, App. 24-25. The hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency indicated that the cost of making microfilm copies of checks ranged from 1% mills per- check for small banks down to about %. mill or less for large banks. See House Hearings, supra, n. 1, at 341, 354-356; H. Rep. No. 91-975, supra, at 11. The'House Report further indicates that the legislation was not expected to significantly increase the costs of the banks involved since it was found that many banks already followed the practice of maintaining the records contemplated by the legislation. See ti. 18. supra. Chapter 4 of the Act, § 241, 31 U. S. C.' § 1121, authorizes the Secretary to require by regulation the maintenance of records by persons who engage in any transaction or maintain a relationship, directly or indirectly, on behalf of themselves or others, with a foreign financial agency. The Secretary has, by regulation, required the maintenance of such records by persons having such financial interests and by domestic financial institutions which engage in monetary transactions outside the United States. 31 CFR §§ 103.32, .103.33. The Act also provides that production of such records shall be compelled only by “a subpena or summons duly authorized and issued' or as may otherwise be required by law.” 31 U. S. C. § 1121 (b). Though it is not apparent from the various briefs filed iii this Court by the plaintiffs below whether this particular record-keeping requirement is challenged, our holding that a mere requirement that records be kept does not violate any constitutional right of the banks or of the depositors necessarily disposes of such a claim, since there is no indication at this point that there has been any attempt to compel the production of such records. The ACLU recognizes that these cases, and the other cases it cites involved situations in which a subpoena or summons had already issued. Brief for Appellant ACLU in No. 72-1196, p. 57. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953). The ACLU contends that present injunctive relief is essential, since the banks might not notify it of the fact that their records have been subpoenaed, and might comply with the subpoena without giving the ACLU a chance to obtain judicial review. While noting that “most banks formally prohibit” it (citing American Banker, May 12, 1972, p. 1, cols. 3-4), the ACLU also contends that the “day-to-day practice of permitting 'informal’ access to bank records is, unfortunately, widespread.” Brief for Appellant ACLU in No. 72-1196, p. 58. The record contains no showing of any attempt by the Government, formal or informal, to compel the production of bank records containing information relating to'the ACLU; we accordingly express no opinion whether notice would in such an instance be required by either the Act or the Constitution. See n’ 29, infra. We hold here and in other parts of this opinion that certain of the plaintiffs did not make the requisite allegations in the District Court to give them standing to challenge the Act and the regulations issued pursuant to it. In so holding, we do not, of course,'mean to imply, that such claims would be ■ meritorious if presented by a litigant who has standing. Plaintiffs similarly contend that the Secretary’s regulation requiring the reporting of domestic currency transactions only by the banks or financial institutions which are parties thereto, violates a specific requirement of the Act. ■ Section 222 of the Act, 31 XL S. C. § 1082, provides in pertinent part: “The report of any transaction required to be reported under this chapter shall be signed or otherwise made both by the domestic financial institution involved and by one or more of the other parties thereto or participants therein, as the Secretary may require.” Plaintiffs contend that this language requires the Secretary to require either a signature on the report by the individual customer in the currency transaction, or a report from' that customer. Since the Secretary has only required a report from the financial institution, plaintiffs urge, in addition, that there win not be notice to the individual customer of the report made by the financial institution. : In rebuttal, the Government urged in oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 64-70, that not only does §206 of the Act, 31 IT S. C. § 1055, give the Secretary broad authority to make exceptions to the requirements of the Act in promulgating the regulations, but that the House and Senate Reports on the bills considered by each house of the Congress, each of which contained a provision identical to the language of §222, indicated that, each chamber read that language differently. The Senate Committee believed that the language permitted the Secretary to require reports from the financial institution, the customer, or both, S. Rep. No. 91-1139, supra, at 15, while the Hoffse Committee felt that the language required reports to be filed by both the financial institution and the customer, H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, supra, at 22. We similarly do not reach this claim as it relates to the depositor plaintiffs since they failed to allege sufficient injury below. Whatever the merits of such a contention vis-á-vis the depositors, the regulation clearly has no adverse effect on any constitutional right of the banks, since the statute indisputably authorizes the Secretary to require a report from the bank. There have been recent hearings in Congress on various legislative proposals to amend the Bank Secrecy Act. Hearings to amend the Bank Secrecy Act (S. 3814-and S. 3828) before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee on.' Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,.92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)! See S. 3814 and S. 3828, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The House Report, No. 91-975, p. 10, states: “Petty criminals, members of the underworld, those engaging in ‘white collar’ crime and income tax evaders use, in one way or another, financial institutions in carrying on their affairs.” That was the reason for requiring the report of large domestic cash transactions. “Criininals deal in money — cash or its equivalent. The deposit and withdrawal of large amounts of currency or its equivalent (monetary instruments) under unusual circumstances may betray a criminal activity. The money in many’of these transactions may represent anything from the proceeds of a lottery racket to money for the bribery of public officials.” Id., at 11. A sponsor on the floor of the House stated: “With respect to full financial recordkeeping, the problem can be simply stated; in the past decade, as organized crime and criminals have become more sophisticated, more and greater use has been made by criminal elements of our Nation’s financial institutions. Law enforcement officials believe that an effective attack on organized crime requires the maintenance of adequate and appropriate records by financial institutions.” 116 Cong. Rec. 16950. . Congressman Patman, author of the bill, stated: “This is really a bill which, if enacted into law, will be the longest step in the direction of stopping crime than any other we have had before this Congress in a long time.” Id., at 16951. .While it started with a different objective, it was changed to serve an additional purpose; “We also discovered that secret foreign bank accounts were not the only criminal activities related to the banking field. The major law enforcement authority — the Justice Department — of the U. S. Government called our attention to the urgent need for regulations which would make uniform and adequate the present recordkeeping practices, or lack of recordkeeping practices, by domestic banks and other financial institutions.” Id., at 16952.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TENNESSEE et al. v. DUNLAP No. 75-95. Argued March 22, 1976 Decided June 10, 1976 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alex B. Shipley, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was R. A. Ashley, Jr., Attorney General. William Terry Denton argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Solicitor General Bork, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, and John F. Cooney filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, challenging the termination of his employment as a technician with the Tennessee Air National Guard as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners are the defendants below — the State of Tennessee and its Governor, the Tennessee Air National Guard, and various officials of the Tennessee Air National Guard. The National Guard Technicians Act of 1968 provides generally that a National Guard technician, who is a full-time civilian employee of the National Guard, must be a member of the National Guard, and that a technician who is separated from the Guard “shall be promptly separated from his technician employment.” 32 U. S. C. §§ 709 (b), (e)(1). The same section of the Act provides that “a technician may, at any time, be separated from his technician employment for cause.” § 709 (e) (3). On December 8, 1972, respondent was discharged from the Tennessee Air National Guard for the stated reason that his term of enlistment had expired. Five days later respondent was notified by his commander that his employment as a technician would be terminated in 30 days because he was no longer a member of the Guard. Respondent concedes the validity of the statutory requirement that a technician maintain his status as a member of the National Guard. Accordingly, the focus of his claims is petitioners’ refusal to permit his re-enlistment. In his complaint respondent alleged that prior to December 8 he had attempted, without success, to re-enlist in the Guard. He further alleged that his request for a hearing before the board charged with making a recommendation on his re-enlistment was denied, that he was never supplied a copy of any charges against him, and that the only reason he ever received for the refusal of his requested re-enlistment was a general one that it was not in the best interest of the Guard to allow him to re-enlist. In fact, respondent alleged, the reason he was denied re-enlistment was to effect his discharge as a technician without the necessity of affording him the administrative recourse he would have had if he had been terminated as a technician directly and “for cause” under § 709 (e)(3). Liberally construed, the complaint then asserted three constitutional claims: (1) that the mechanism by which respondent was refused re-enlistment denied him procedural due process; (2) that the “alleged discretion” vested in his commander to decide whéther his re-enlistment was in the best interest of the Guard does not comport with due process because of the lack of “any objective or ascertainable standards or criteria” to guide the exercise of that discretion; and (3) that the denial of re-enlistment was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore violative of due process. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the denial of re-enlistment was a military action not subject to review by a civilian court. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. It apparently agreed with the District Court that a decision to refuse re-enlistment in the Guard would ordinarily be nonreviewable in a civil court. But the Court of Appeals held that respondent should be given the opportunity to prove that his denial of, re-enlistment was based not on any military considerations, but on a desire to terminate his technician employment in such a way as to circumvent § 709 (e) (3)'s requirement of “cause,” which would have been applicable if his technician employment had been terminated directly. “In order for [§709 (e)(3)] to have meaning,” the court concluded, “the unreviewable discretion of Guard officials to permit or refuse re-enlistments must not extend to decisions which are made for the purpose of affecting a guardsman's technician employment.” 514 F. 2d 130, 133 (1975). In other words, the court held that if a denial of re-enlistment reflects no more than a desire to terminate employment as a technician, cause must be shown under §709 (e)(3). And from this the court concluded that there was a genuine issue as to whether respondent had a property interest in continued employment sufficient to support his due process contentions. We granted certiorari. 423 U. S. 821 (1975). We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that § 709 (e) (3) has any application to this case. Subsection (3) of § 709 (e) provides only one of several bases for the termination of a technician’s employment. As already indicated, subsection (1) requires that a technician “who is separated from the National Guard or ceases to hold the military grade specified for his position . . . shall be promptly separated from his technician employment.” Subsection (2) provides that a technician “who fails to meet . . . military security standards . . . may be separated from his employment as a technician and concurrently discharged from the National Guard.” And subsection (3), to repeat, provides additionally that “a technician may, at any time, be separated from his technician employment for cause.” There is nothing in the language or structure of §709 (e), or in its legislative history, to suggest that subsection (3)’s requirement of cause was intended to qualify subsection (l)’s mandate that termination of employment accompany separation from the Guard. Nor is there anything to- suggest that subsection (3) was intended to have any bearing on whether one is separated from the Guard. Indeed, the relevant House and Senate committee reports summarize the three subsections as providing “for termination of civilian employment upon loss of Guard membership, failure to meet military security standards, or separation for cause.” H. R. Rep. No. 1823, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1446, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1968) (emphasis added). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1823, p. 8; S. Rep. No. 1446, p. 7. The clear and sole import of subsection (3), then, is that if a technician remains a member of the National Guard and is otherwise eligible for continued employment under subsections (1) and (2), he may nevertheless be discharged for cause. There can be no significance, therefore, to the claim that the denial of re-enlistment to respondent was designed to circumvent the requirements of § 709 (e)(3). Nor can §709 (e)(3) provide the foundation for any due process claim in this case, since the property interest it creates in continued employment is confined, in all events, to the guardsman’s term of enlistment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The Secretary of the Army or the Air Force, in this case the Air Force, may by regulation exempt technicians from the requirement of membership in the Guard. 32 U. S. C. § 709 (b). The Senate and House committee reports contemplated the exemption of about 5% of the technicians — principally secretaries, clerk-typists, and security guards. H. R. Rep. No. 1823, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1446, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968). Respondent has not been exempted from the requirement of Guard membership. The complaint also included a general assertion of discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Never adequately alleged, and not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals, this assertion is not before us. Respondent asserts in his brief that he had a property interest in the form of a legitimate expectation of re-enlistment and continued employment. See Perry v. Sindermann. 408 U. S. 593, 599-603 (1972). This assertion was not pleaded in respondent’s complaint, was not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals, and accordingly is not before us.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOGAN v. WALKER BANK & TRUST CO. No. 51. Argued November 7-8, 1966. Decided December 12, 1966. Theodore S. Perry argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 51. John J. Wilson argued the cause for petitioner in No. 73. With him on the briefs was Charles J. Steele. Richard A. Posner argued the cause for petitioner in No. 88. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, David L. Rose and Kathryn H. Baldwin. Joseph S. Jones argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 51. James F. Bell argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in Nos. 73 and 88. Robert Y. Button, Attorney General, and Kenneth C. Patty, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in all cases. Henry T. Wickham filed a brief for the Virginia Bankers Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in Nos. 73 and 88. Together with No. 73, First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. v. Commercial Security Bank, and No. 88, Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency v. Commercial Security Bank, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases involve the construction of those portions of the National Bank Act, 44 Stat. 1228, 12 U. S. C. § 36 (c), which authorize a national banking association, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, to establish and operate new branches within the limits of the municipality in which the bank is located, if such operation is “at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question.” Two national banks with their main banking houses in Logan and Ogden, Utah, respectively, seek to open branches in those municipalities. The Utah statute prohibits Utah banks, with certain exceptions not here relevant, from establishing branches except by taking over an existing bank which has been in operation for not less than five years. Utah Code Ann., Tit. 7, c. 3, § 6 (1965 Supp.). In No. 51, First National Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., the petitioner seeks to establish a new branch in Logan, where its principal banking house is located, without taking over an established bank. The District Court approved its doing so but the Court of Appeals reversed. 352 F. 2d 90 (C. A. 10th Cir.), sub nom. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon. In No. 73, First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. v. Commercial Security Bank, and No. 88, Saxon v. Commercial Security Bank, First Security seeks to establish a new branch in Ogden, in which its home office is situated, without taking over an established bank. The District Court held that state law must be complied with, 236 F. Supp. 457, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a judgment, without opinion, citing Walker Bank & Trust Co., supra. In view of a conflict between these holdings and the decision in First National Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F. 2d 267 (C. A. 4th Cir.), we granted certiorari, and consolidated the three cases for argument. 384 U. S. 925. We affirm the judgments. 1. The Facts. In No. 51, the petitioner maintains its principal banking house in Logan, Utah, which is a second class city under Utah law (Utah Code Ann., Tit. 10, c. 1, § 1 (1953, as amended)), and is therefore subject to § 7-3-6 of the Utah Code, supra. It applied to the Comptroller of the Currency for a certificate to establish an “inside” branch office in Logan. At the time of the application there were no other banks with their main banking offices in Logan. However, there were two branches of banks whose home offices were situated outside of Logan, one of which belonged to respondent, Walker Bank & Trust Co., whose home office was located in Salt Lake City. After a hearing, the Comptroller ordered the certificate issued. The respondent subsequently filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Comptroller and First National claiming the action of the Comptroller to be void since the proposed branch was not taking over an established bank in Logan, as required by Utah, law. The District Court dismissed the complaint. It found “express authority” under Utah law for state banks to establish branch offices in Logan, relying on the general authority of the statute and holding that the subsequent conditions, such as the acquisition of another bank, did not “change the ‘express authority’ into a lack of authority on the part of State banks or a lack of a statutory expression of such authority, and [did] not add to the Federal statute a requirement that compliance be made by National banks with all State conditions.” 234 F. Supp. 74, 78, n. 8. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Congress in enacting § 36 (c)(1) acceded to state law and created “a competitive equality between state and national banks.” Finding that the trial court’s interpretation was to the contrary, it declared “the proper approach is for the Comptroller to look at all the State law on branch banking not just part of it.” 352 F. 2d 90, 94. In Nos. 73 and 88, the First Security Bank of Utah, a national bank, applied for a certificate from the Comptroller to establish a branch bank in Ogden, where it maintained its principal banking house. Its proposal was to open a new branch and not to take over an existing bank in Ogden. Under Utah law, Ogden is also a second class city and the “take over” provision of § 7-3-6, supra, was therefore applicable. Two other banks have their main offices in Ogden. After the Comptroller approved the issuance of the certificate, respondent filed suit in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia asking for injunctive and other relief. The District Court imposed all of the restrictions of § 7-3-6' of Utah law on the establishment of national banks and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, by a judgment without opinion, but cited the opinion of the 10th Circuit, Walker Bank & Trust Co., supra. 2. The National Bcmk Act: Its Background. There has long been opposition to the exercise of federal power in the banking field. Indeed, President Jefferson was opposed to the creation of the first Bank of the United States and President Jackson vetoed the Act of Congress extending the charter of the second Bank of the United States. However, the authority of Congress to act in the field was resolved in the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). There Chief Justice Marshall, while admitting that it does not appear that a bank was in the contemplation of the Framers of the Constitution, held that a national bank could be chartered under the implied powers of the Congress as an instrumentality of the Federal Government to implement its fiscal powers. The paramount power of the Congress over national banks has, therefore, been settled for almost a century and a half. Nevertheless, no national banking act was adopted until 1863 (12 Stat. 665), and it was not until 1927 that Congress dealt with the problem before us in these cases. This inaction was possibly due to the fact that at the turn of the century, there were very few branch banks in the country. At that time only five national and 82 state banks were operating branches with a total of 119 branches. By the end of 1923, however, there were 91 national and 580 state banks with a total of 2,054 branches. The Comptroller of the Currency, in his Annual Report of 1923, recommended congressional action on branch banking. The report stated that if state banks continue to engage “in unlimited branch banking it will mean the eventual destruction of the national banking system . . . .” H. R. Doc. No. 90, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1924). Soon thereafter legislation was introduced to equalize national and state branch banking. The House Report on the measure, H. R. Rep. No. 83, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1926), stated among other things: “The bill recognizes the absolute necessity of taking legislative action with reference to the branch banking controversy. The present situation is intolerable to the national banking system. The bill proposes the only practicable solution by stopping the further extension of state-wide branch banking in the Federal reserve system by State member banks and by permitting national banks to have branches in those cities where State banks are allowed to have them under State laws.” This bill failed to pass in the Senate and, although Congress continued to study the problem, it was not until 1927 that the McFadden Act was adopted. The bill originated in the House and, in substance, proposed that both national and state banks be permitted to establish “inside” branches within the municipality of their main banking facilities, in those States that permitted branch banking at the time of the enactment of the bill. H. R. Rep. No. 83, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1926). The intent of the Congress to leave the question of the desirability of branch banking up to the States is indicated by the fact that the Senate struck from the House bill the time limitation, thus permitting a subsequent change in state law to have a corresponding effect on the authority of national banks to engage in branching. The Senate Report concluded that the Act should permit “national banks to have branches in those cities where State banks are allowed to have them under State laws.” S. Rep. No. 473, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1926). In the subsequent Conference Committee, the Senate position was adopted. State banks which were members of the Federal Reserve System were also limited to “inside” branches. A grandfather clause permitted retention of branches operated at the date of enactment. H. R. Rep. No. 1481, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1926). The Act was finally passed on February 25, 1927, and became known as the McFadden Act of 1927, taking its name from its sponsor, Representative McFadden. At the time of its enactment he characterized it in this language: “As a result of the passage of this act, the national bank act has been so amended that national banks are able to meet the needs of modern industry and commerce and competitive equality has been established among all member banks of the Federal reserve system.” (Emphasis added.) 68 Cong. Rec. 5815 (1927). During the economic depression there was much agitation that bank failures were due to small undercap-italized rural banks and that these banks should be supplanted by branches of larger and stronger banks. The Comptroller of the Currency advocated that national banks be permitted to branch regardless of state law. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency pursuant to S. Res. No. 71, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 7-10 (1931). Senator Carter Glass held a similar belief and introduced a bill that would authorize national banks to organize branches irrespective of state law beyond and “outside” the municipality of its principal banking house. His proposal was strenuously opposed and was eventually defeated. It was not until the Seventy-third Congress that the Banking Act of 1933 was adopted. Senator Glass, the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and the dominant banking figure in the Congress, was sponsor of the Act. In reporting it to the Senate for passage, he said, the Act “required that the establishment of branch banks by national banks in States which by law permit branch banking should be under the regulations required by State law of State banks.” 77 Cong. Rec. 3726 (1933). In a colloquy on the floor of the Senate with Senator Copeland as to the purpose of the Act (with reference to branch banking by national banks), Senator Glass said that it would be permissible “in only those States the laws of which permit branch banking, and only to the extent that the State laws permit branch banking.” Moreover, to make it crystal clear, when Senator Copeland replied that “it permits branch banking only in those States where the State laws permit branch banking by State banks,” Senator Glass was careful to repeat: “Only in those States and to the extent that the State laws -permit branch banking.” (Emphasis added.) 76 Cong. Rec. 2511 (1933). Remarks of other members of Congress also indicate that they shared the understanding of Senator Glass. For example, Senator Vandenberg stated that §36 (c)(1) provides “that the branch-banking privilege so far as national banks are concerned shall follow the status established by State law in respect to the State privilege.” 76 Cong. Rec. 2262 (1933). Likewise, Senator Long, who had joined a filibuster against an earlier version of the bill, stated at final passage that “[w]e have only undertaken to secure equal treatment for State banks” and that the bill had substantially achieved that result. 77 Cong. Rec. 5862 (1933). In similar tone, Representative Bacon stated that branches of national banks may be established provided “this is permitted by the laws of that State and subject to them.” (Emphasis added.) 77 Cong. Rec. 3949 (1933). And Representative Luce, a member of the Conference Committee, reported to the House: “In the controversy over the respective merits of what are known as 'unit banking' and 'branch banking systems/ a controversy that has been alive and sharp for years, branch banking has been steadily gaining in favor. It is not, however, here proposed to give the advocates of branch banking any advantage. We do not go an inch beyond saying that the two ideas shall compete on equal terms and only where the States make the competition possible by letting their own institutions have branches.” 77 Cong. Rec. 5896 (1933). As finally passed, the Act permitted national banks to establish outside branches if such branches could be established by state banks under state law. It is well to note that the same Act also removed the restriction on outside branch banking by state member banks previously imposed by the McFadden Act. 3. The Policy of Competitive Equality. It appears clear from this résumé of the legislative history of 136(c)(1) and (2) that Congress intended to place national and state banks on a basis of “competitive equality” insofar as branch banking was concerned. Both sponsors of the applicable banking Acts, Representative McFadden and Senator Glass, so characterized the legislation. It is not for us to so construe the Acts as to frustrate this clear-cut purpose so forcefully expressed by both friend and foe of the legislation at the time of its adoption. To us it appears beyond question' that the Congress was continuing its policy of equalization first adopted in the National Bank Act of 1864. See Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U. S. 559, 565-566 (1934); McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347 (1896); Chase Securities Corp. v. Husband, 302 U. S. 660 (1938); Anderson Nat. Bank v. Duckett, 321 U. S. 233 (1944). The Comptroller argues that Utah’s statute “expressly authorizes” state banks to have branches in their home municipalities. He maintains that the restriction, in the subsequent paragraph of the statute limiting branching solely to the taking over of an existing bank, is not applicable to national banks. It is a strange argument that permits one to pick and choose what portion of the law binds him. Indeed, it would fly in the face of the legislative history not to hold that national branch banking is limited to those States the laws of which permit it, and even there “only to the extent that the State laws permit branch banking.” Utah clearly permits it “only to the extent” that the proposed branch takes over an existing bank. The Comptroller also contends that the Act supersedes state law only as to “whether” and “where” branches may be located and not the “method” by which this is effected. We believe that where a State allows branching only by taking over an existing bank, it expresses as much “whether” and “where” a branch may be located as does a prohibition or a limitation to the home office municipality. As to the restriction being a “method,” we have concluded that since it is part and parcel of Utah’s policy, it was absorbed by the provisions of §§ 36 (c)(1) and (2), regardless of the tag placed upon it. Affirmed. The National Bank Act, 44 Stat. 1228, 12 U. S. C. §§36 (c)(1) and (2) provides: “(e) A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city, town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks.” Utah Code Ann., Tit. 7, c. 3, § 6 (1965 Supp.), provides: “7-3-6. Business conducted at banking house — Branching of offices — Violation of section a misdemeanor. — The business of every bank shall be conducted only at its banking house and every bank shall receive deposits and pay checks only at its banking house except as hereinafter provided. “Except in cities of the first class, or within unincorporated areas of a county in which a city of the first class is located, no branch bank shall be established in any city or town in which is located a bank or banks, state or national, regularly transacting a customary banking business, unless the bank seeking to establish such branch shall take over an existing bank. No unit bank organized and operating at a point where there are other operating banks, state or national, shall be permitted to be acquired by another bank for the purpose of establishing a branch until such bank shall have been in operation as such for a period of five years.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking Studies 15, 428 (1941).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AYRSHIRE COLLIERIES CORP. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 25. Argued November 12, 15, 1948. Decided January 3, 1949. Earl B. Wilkinson argued the cause for Ayrshire Collieries Corp. et al., appellants. With him on the brief was J. Alfred Moran. Carson L. Taylor argued the cause for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., appellant. With him on the brief were A. N. Whitlock and M. L. Bluhm. Daniel W. Knowlton argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appel-lees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perl-man, Assistant Attorney General Bergson and Edward Dumbauld. Erie J. Zoll, Jr. argued the cause for the Alton Railroad Co. et al., appellees. With him on the brief were A. E. Funk, Attorney General of Kentucky, M. B. Holifield, Assistant Attorney General, Charles W. Stadell and J. E. Marks. Richard F. Wood was of counsel for Belleville Fuels, Inc. et al., appellees. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal, 38 Stat. 219, 220, 28 U. S. C. §§ 45 and 47a, 43 Stat. 938, 28 U. S. C. § 345 (4), from a decree of a three-judge District Court, which dismissed as without merit two complaints seeking to set aside a rate order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Bituminous coal is produced in great quantities in Indiana, Illinois and western Kentucky. In each State there are producing areas that have long been grouped for rate-making purposes. These groups or districts are the Brazil-Clinton, the Linton-Sullivan, the Princeton-Ayrshire, and the Boonville in Indiana; the Northern Illinois, the Fulton-Peoria, the Springfield, the Belleville, and the Southern in Illinois; and the Western in Kentucky. Group rates have been established by the carriers so that all mines within each producing area are accorded the same rates to the same consuming destinations. The result is that comparative distances of the mines in one producing area from a particular consuming destination are commonly disregarded in fixing the group rate. But the Commission has long concluded that such a system of rate making for coal and other natural resources encourages competitive production and a more even development of an area. The present litigation involves group rates for carload lots from the foregoing groups in Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky to Rockford, Freeport, Dixon and other points in northern Illinois and to Beloit, Wisconsin. The order under attack in this case resulted from two proceedings before the Commission which were heard and considered together on the same record. One was an investigation in which carriers proposed certain increases in rates for carload lots of bituminous coal from some of the Indiana groups to Beloit, Wisconsin, and from all of the Indiana groups to designated Illinois destinations. Like increases in the Illinois intrastate rates to the same Illinois destinations were also sought. These proposed increases have been suspended until disposition of the proceeding. The other proceeding was an investigation instituted by the Commission, on complaint, into the intrastate carload rates from the Illinois groups to the same Illinois destinations to determine whether they were discriminatory, preferential, and prejudicial against interstate commerce and in favor of intrastate commerce. These proceedings are only a recent chapter in the problem of adjustment of the coal rates for this region. The Illinois Commerce Commission ordered a reduction of the intrastate rates in 1930. This resulted in a reduction of certain interstate rates from Indiana and western Kentucky to Rockford and other northern Illinois points. The Interstate Commerce Commission refused to require an increase in intrastate rates to the important Illinois destinations involved here unless the rates from the Indiana groups to the same destinations were increased. Subsequently the Commission found that the rates from the Illinois, Indiana and western Kentucky groups to Beloit, Wisconsin, were in the main not unreasonable but that they were unduly prejudicial to Beloit and unduly preferential to Rockford, if they exceeded the rates from the same origins to Rockford by more than 25 cents. The Commission also found on further hearing that the rates from certain of the Illinois groups to Beloit, Wisconsin, were not unreasonable but that they were unduly prejudicial to Beloit and unduly preferential to Rockford to the extent that they exceeded the Rockford rates by more than 15 cents. The Commission allowed the carriers to increase the rates to Rockford or to reduce the rates to Beloit, or both, in order to relate the rates to Beloit 15 cents over Rockford. But the intrastate rates to Rockford had been prescribed as a maximum by the Illinois Commission and therefore could not be increased. Also to increase the interstate rates without similar increases from the Illinois groups would be disruptive of the rate structure built on the group basis. Accordingly the rates to Beloit were reduced. The carriers subsequently proposed increases in the rates from the Indiana groups and the Illinois groups to Rockford and other Illinois points and, with certain exceptions, from the Indiana groups to Beloit, Wisconsin. These increases conformed to the 15-cent relation between Rockford and Beloit but placed the rates (both interstate and intrastate) more nearly at the general level of interstate rates in that territory. One other fact must be mentioned if the present posture of this rate problem is to be understood. After the Illinois intrastate rates were reduced in 1930 and after the carriers’ unsuccessful effort to have the earlier ones reestablished, the Milwaukee road proposed to reduce its single-line rates from mines in the Brazil and Linton groups which it serves to Rockford, Freeport and other intermediate Illinois points by the amount of the Illinois intrastate reduction. The Commission ordered the proposed rate to be cancelled. The Court affirmed a decree of a District Court which permanently enjoined the order of the Commission. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499. Since that time the rates of the Milwaukee from origins on its line in the Brazil and Linton groups to Rockford and other intermediate points in Illinois have been lower than the contemporaneous rates of carriers serving other origins in these respective groups to the same destinations, with the exception of the Illinois Central which in 1936 published rates from the Linton group to Rockford and other intermediate Illinois points on its lines on the same basis as the Milwaukee’s single-line rates. The Milwaukee and the Illinois Central serve only a part of the mines in the Brazil and Linton groups. But they carry coal from other mines in those groups even though their lines do not reach them, since they are either connecting carriers of lines that do or destination carriers. They are therefore parties to many joint rates. But the joint rates do not reflect reductions which the Milwaukee and Illinois Central made in their single-line rates. And the rate increases proposed, and suspended by the Commission on the present proceedings, continued that previous relationship. Moreover the proposed dual basis of rates to Rockford and other Illinois destinations reached by the Milwaukee was proposed to be extended to Beloit, which previously had enjoyed the same rates from all the mines in the Brazil and Linton groups. As we have noted, the new proposed rates respected the 15-cent differential of Beloit over Rockford. The result was a substantial increase in the joint-line rates from the Brazil and Linton groups to Beloit as well as to Rockford. But Milwaukee’s single-line rates were increased 15 cents to Rockford and none to Beloit. The result would be to accord to mines in the Brazil and Linton groups that were on the Milwaukee lines rates lower to Beloit by 17 and 12 cents, respectively, than accorded the other mines in the two groups. Furthermore the new proposed rates would establish a dual basis of rates to Beloit from the Princeton group as well. The Commission disapproved the dual basis of rates. It considered what would be the fair and reasonable rate relations as between the respective origins in the several groups and as between the groups themselves. It found that present and proposed rates of the Milwaukee and Illinois Central from Indiana to the northern Illinois destinations would result in unjust discrimination as between shippers and receivers of coal and undue preference and prejudice as between the origins in the Brazil and Linton groups and as between the respective Indiana groups. It made the same findings as respects the Milwaukee’s proposed rates from the Brazil, Linton and Princeton groups to Beloit; and in that connection it also found that those rates would result in undue preference and privilege as between the Indiana groups on the one hand and the Illinois groups on the other. The Commission went on to specify rates which it approved. It ruled that the proposed rates would be unreasonable to the extent that they were above the approved rates. 263 I. C. C. 179. We agree with the District Court that the complaints must be dismissed. First. It is contended that the Commission in this proceeding had authority to determine the lawfulness only of the proposed rates, not of the present rates. This proceeding is an investigation and suspension proceeding under § 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 44 Stat. 1447, 49 Ú. S. C. § 15 (7). That section, which gives the Commission broad authority upon complaint or its own initiative to investigate and determine the lawfulness of any new rate, provides that "after full hearing, whether completed before or after the rate . . . goes into effect, the commission may make such order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective.” The power of the Commission to deal with the situation as if the proposed new rates had become effective is necessarily a comprehensive one. It seems too plain for argument that such broad authority is ample for the modification of either proposed or existing rates or both. The power granted the Commission under § 15 (1) to deal with rate schedules already effective supports that view. For once the Commission finds the rate to be unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial or otherwise unlawful, the Commission is granted the power under § 15 (1) to determine and prescribe the just and reasonable rate. The Commission is not bound either to approve or disapprove in toto the new rates that are proposed. It can modify the proposal in any respect and require that the proposed rates as modified or wholly different rates be substituted for the present ones. That has been the view of the Commission since the beginning; and we think it is the correct one. The same result obtains as respects the Milwaukee’s single-line rates from origins on its lines in the Brazil and Linton groups to Beloit, Wisconsin. The Milwaukee had not proposed any change in those rates. But those rates had been republished in the proposed schedules. They were among the rates suspended by the Commission. And the Commission’s order of investigation cited the Milwaukee tariff that contains those rates. Hence the Commission sought to bring them into the investigation and gave Milwaukee all the notice to which it was entitled. That the Commission had authority to include them seems clear to us. Even though we assume they are not “new” rates within the meaning of § 15 (7), they are rates “demanded, charged, or collected” within the meaning of § 15 (1). Second. Section 2 of the Act makes it unlawful for a carrier to receive from one person a greater or less compensation for transporting property than it receives from another for doing a “like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions.” It is pointed out that the purpose of this section is to enforce equality between shippers of like commodities over the same line or haul for the same distance and between the same points. This requirement, it is argued, has not been met in the present case since there is no finding that any of the coal from any origin point to any destination was being charged a higher rate than other coal from the same origin point to the same destination moving over the same line under substantially similar circumstances and conditions. The contention would be well taken if the Commission was not warranted in treating all places within a particular group or district as one origin point. Whether or not the Commission was warranted in doing so, depends primarily on the legality of its action in gathering together various origin points into one rate group for rate-making purposes. As we have noted that has been an historic method of building coal rate structures. The Commission followed that method in this case because in its opinion such a rate structure was necessary to afford consumers, coal operators, and carriers a fair opportunity to compete in the purchase, sale and transportation of coal from the mines in the various groups or districts to the destinations in question. The Commission’s power so to act is not challenged here. Yet once the legality of the grouping of mines for rate purposes is accepted, the result is clear. For the protection of one shipper against unjust discrimination in favor of another within the same group is as clearly within the purpose of § 2 as the protection of one factory against unjust discrimination in favor of another in the same community. The Milwaukee and Illinois Central were granting more favorable rates to some origins than to others in the same groups or districts. Their single-line rates from mines on their own lines were much lower than joint-line rates from other mines in the same group to the same destinations. The latter are rates published by other carriers and in which Milwaukee and Illinois Central join. Milwaukee and Illinois Central therefore are parties to an arrangement which results in some mines getting lower rates than other mines in the same group on shipments to the same destinations. The question remains whether that preferential treatment of shippers at some origins was an unjust discrimination within the meaning of § 2. The single-line rates of Milwaukee and Illinois Central from the Linton group to northern Illinois destinations were 12 cents lower than the joint-line rates to the same points from other mines in the Linton group. The like differential as respects the Brazil group was 17 cents. The proposed schedules continued that dual basis of rates and extended it to Beloit, Wisconsin. The Commission made what seems to us a permissible inference, that rates favorable to the mines on the single-rate routes played an important part in getting the great bulk of the tonnage from the roads having the higher joint rates. Thus Milwaukee served only 4 of the 30 mines in the Brazil group and only 9 of the 31 in the Linton group. But in what the Commission called a representative period, Milwaukee handled under its single-line rates over 95 per cent of the tonnage moving from Brazil to Rockford and over 78 per cent of that from Linton to Rockford. The Commission concluded that the maintenance of the dual basis of rates therefore had an important bearing on the future opportunities of shippers within the respective groups to market their coal in the destination territory. It found that there was severe competition in marketing coal in this territory and that a differentially related and finely balanced rate structure on the coal was necessary in order to meet the needs of the consuming public, the mine operators, and the carriers. For, in general, all of the mines in these groups produce coal of the same quality and grade. A difference of a few cents per ton in the transportation charge is normally sufficient to divert a coal contract from one mine to another. Yet the Commission found that the transportation conditions over the single-line routes do not differ materially from those over the joint-line routes to the same destinations from other mines in the same group; that there is no important difference in the average distances over those respective routes. The latter findings, especially the one respecting the similarity of transportation conditions, are severely challenged as being without any support in the evidence. These findings, when judged by the classic examples of unjust discrimination between shippers, leave much to be desired. But we think they are adequate in this case. They reflect an intimate acquaintance by the Commission with the grouping of mines for rate-making purposes. See 263 I. C. C., p. 196. The groups are themselves designed to equalize competitive opportunities. The location of the mines, their distances from destination territory, the transportation conditions over the lines that serve the various origins within a group — these are all factors which bear on the determination of what mines shall be pulled together into one group. The Commission can draw from its long experience with these groupings to determine whether any variables in transportation conditions warrant a difference of rates as between mines within one group to a common destination. Or to state it otherwise, the attack here could not succeed unless it were on the respective groupings themselves. The appellants, of course, claim the right to initiate rates within the zone of reasonableness. See United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., supra. But the Commission holds that when that power is used to establish a dual basis of rates for this coal mining region, it defeats the system of grouping by unjustly discriminating against some shippers and in favor of others in the same group. The Commission’s conclusion that only by the establishment and maintenance of a single-rate basis can that unjust discrimination be avoided is an informed judgment based on a complex of many factors. It cannot be successfully challenged on this record unless the whole system of rate making on a group basis is undermined. But no such major project is undertaken. What we have just said also disposes of the attack which is made on the findings and conclusion of the Commission that the present and proposed system of dual rates creates an undue preference and prejudice as between the origins in the Brazil and Linton groups in violation of §3(1) of the Act. Third. The Commission found that the differentials maintained by the Milwaukee and Illinois Central as between certain of the Indiana groups constituted an undue preference and prejudice in violation of §3(1) of the Act. The Commission found that the differential, Linton over Brazil, should be 10 cents. This is the standard differential, in effect generally to the northwest. It found that the standard differential, Princeton over Linton, was 7 cents. Milwaukee's differential in the former would be 22 cents; and the differential of the Milwaukee and Illinois Central in the latter would be 19 cents. The main attack of appellants on this phase of the case is the Commission’s conclusion that these differentials are greater than those warranted by the/respective differences in distances. Facts are adduced to show that they fairly reflect differences in distances. But the Commission made plain that in considering the whole problem of rate relations presented by this case it did not rely strictly upon distance. Distance was a factor but it was not controlling. The Commission deemed its task to be the creation of a rate structure that would afford a fair opportunity to compete in the purchase, sale and transportation of the coal from the various mines to the destinations in question. The propriety of that action of the Commission is determinative of another phase of the case as well. It goes to the heart of appellants’ objections to the differentials prescribed by the Commission as fair and reasonable as between the Indiana groups and the Illinois groups. The Commission approved rates from the Indiana groups to twelve Illinois destinations which averaged $1.95 from Brazil, $2.05 from Linton, and $2.12 from Princeton-Boonville. These rates, the Commission found, compared favorably with the proposed rates to the same destinations from the Illinois groups, apart from exceptions not now material. The chief problem of the Commission in this case was to provide a rate structure which would afford fair and reasonable relations of rates to northern Illinois destinations, both as between the respective origin groups and as between Indiana groups and Illinois groups. There had been historically no fixed relation either between the former or the latter. And the appearance of a dual basis of rates greatly distorted the picture. The Commission did in this case what the Court pointed out in United, States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., supra, at 510, it had not done there, viz, it adjudged the fairness of the relation subsisting between Illinois and Indiana rates. Appellants however contend that what the Commission did was wholly arbitrary. They point to instances where the rate from an Indiana group is more than the rate from an Illinois group even though the haul is shorter. They say that what the Commission did was to adjust the rates not to compensate for the transportation service rendered but to favor Illinois groups over Indiana groups. They give illustration after illustration of the inconsistencies between the specific rates, assuming, as the Commission found, that the transportation conditions which were involved were the same. From that argument appellants seek to make two points — (1) that the rates approved by the Commission do not reflect group differentials designed to eliminate discrimination and preference and (2) that, even though they do, individual rates are established that are wholly arbitrary in violation of the principle that each destination is entitled to a reasonable rate. We cannot deny the Commission authority to use averages as a measure of the relationship between the rates of the Indiana groups on the one hand and the Illinois groups on the other. The averages would be some indication of the closeness of the alignment. The important comparison here is in the regional or group differentials. These differentials in the present case were not designed so as to be faithful to the factor of distance. The Commission followed the common practice in giving diminishing weight to distance and increasing weight to competition as the length of the haul increased. The Commission said, 263 I. C. C. at 204, “In approving the foregoing rate relations, we have kept in mind the importance to consumers, coal operators, and railroads of relating these differentially related coal rates, not strictly upon distance, but so as to afford all concerned a fair opportunity to compete in the purchase, sale, and transportation of coal from Illinois and Indiana mines to these destinations. The rates between the various origin groups in these fields have never been made with primary regard for distance, and to so make them now would have the effect eventually of eliminating practically all competition between most of them, a result which would be highly undesirable to the consumer, whose interests we may not disregard.” There is no doubt, therefore, that the Commission believed that the competitive factor was an important one in considering this problem of rate relationships. The result may, as appellants contend, favor some Illinois mines over Indiana as respects certain markets. That would seem to follow, for example, from the elimination of the low single-line rate that the Commission found to be disruptive of rate relations between these groups. But it does not indicate that the rates approved by the Commission were unlawful. That might be established by showing, for example, that the Commission gave weight only to the competitive factor. Yet all that appellants attempt here is to show that discrepancies in rates are not warranted by any difference in transportation conditions or in distance. That is not enough provided the Commission was justified in considering the element of competition. We think it was. Rate structures are not designed merely to favor the revenues of producers and carriers. The Commission has the consumer interest to safeguard as well. And when it undertakes to rationalize the interests of the three, great complexities are often encountered. The economics of the bituminous coal industry have baffled even experts. We would depart from our competence and our limited function in this field if we undertook to accommodate the factors of transportation conditions, distance and competition differently than the Commission has done in this case. That is a task peculiarly for it. In fashioning what the Commission called a differentially related and finely balanced rate structure for this coal, there is no place for dogma or rigid formulae. The problem calls for an expert, informed judgment on a multitude of facts. The result is that the administrative rate-maker is left with broad discretion as long as no statutory requirement is overlooked. Yet that is, of course, precisely the nature of the administrative process in this field. See Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U. S. 534, 548; New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 347-349. Fourth. Appellants argue that the Commission acted beyond its authority because it did not afford the carriers alternative methods of removing the discrimination which was found to exist. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627. And Milwaukee argues that the Commission was without power to direct it to cease from granting the undue preference found to exist between its single-line rate and the higher joint-line rates, since it had no control over the latter. This is not a case like Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. United States, supra, where the Commission issues a so-called alternative order directing the carriers to remove an unjust discrimination or undue preference which has been found. That kind of order leaves a choice to the carriers whether to eliminate the unlawful practice by raising one rate, lowering the other, or altering both. But as we recently held in New York v. United States, supra, at 342, that rule is not applicable where the Commission itself undertakes to correct the unlawful practice by prescribing the just and reasonable rate. The Commission has taken that action here. As we noted above, the present proceeding was one under § 15 (1) and § 15 (7). Section 15 (1) gives the Commission power to determine and prescribe the just and reasonable rate once it finds, inter alia, that any rate charged is unjustly discriminating or unduly preferential or prejudicial. The Commission in the present case has exercised that power. It has prescribed approved rates. They are rates which in the Commission’s judgment will eliminate the unjust discrimination and undue preference found to exist in this rate structure. - Hence the question whether Milwaukee effectively controlled the higher joint-line rates is irrelevant here. New York v. United States, supra. Finally it is suggested that the order is invalid because the Commission did not find that the preferential rates were noncompensatory. But once a forbidden discrim-' ination or preference in rates is found, the Commission may remove it even though the rates are within the zone of reasonableness. New York v. United States, supra, at 344. Affirmed. A prior decree sustaining this order of the Commission was reversed by the Court because one member of the three-judge District Court had not participated in the decision. Ayrshire Corp. v. United States, 331 U. S. 132. Another characteristic of coal rate structures has been the rate differentials. For example, Brazil is the base group in Indiana on coal traffic to the Illinois and Wisconsin destinations involved in this litigation. Hence the rates, expressed in cents per ton, from the other Indiana groups are stated in terms of differences from the Brazil group rate. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 512, 520; Waukesha Lime & Stone Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 26 I. C. C. 515, 518; Wisconsin & Arkansas Lbr. Co. v. Si. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 33 I. C. C. 33, 37-38; Public Utilities Commission v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 33 I. C. C. 103, 106; Southwestern Interstate Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Arkansas W. R. Co., 89 I. C. C. 73, 84-85. And see New York Harbor Case, 47 I. C. C. 643, 712; Illinois Commerce Commission v. United States, 292 U. S. 474, 486. See Intrastate Rates on Bituminous Coal in Illinois, 182 I. C. C. 537, 549-550. The history of this rate problem is briefly summarized by the Commission in its report on the present case. 263 I. C. C. 179. For earlier aspects of it see Intrastate Rates on Bituminous Coal in Illinois, 182 I. C. C. 537; Fairbanks-Morse & Co. v. Alton & S. R., 195 I. C. C. 365, 251 I. C. C. 181; Illinois Coal Traffic Bureau v. Ahnapee & W. R. Co., 204 I. C. C. 225; Coal to Illinois and Wisconsin, 232 I. C. C. 151. And see Coal from Indiana to Illinois, 197 I. C. C. 245, 200 I. C. C. 609, the order in which, as we discuss hereafter in the opinion, was held invalid by United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499. The order entered by the Commission in the proceeding to determine whether the intrastate rates were unjustly discriminatory against interstate commerce is not under attack here. It required the carriers to desist from practices which the Commission found to be discriminatory and to establish and maintain, for the intrastate transportation of coal, rates no lower than the approved rates. “Whenever there shall be filed with the commission any schedule stating a new individual or joint rate, fare, or charge, or any new individual or joint classification, or any new individual or joint regulation or practice affecting any rate, fare, or charge, the commission shall have, and it is hereby given, authority, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders without answer or other formal pleading by the interested carrier or carriers, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice; and pending such hearing and the decision thereon the commission, upon filing with such schedule and delivering to the carrier or carriers affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may from time to time suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice, but not for a longer period than seven months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect; and after full hearing, whether completed before or after the rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice goes into effect, the commission may make such order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective.” “That whenever, after full hearing, upon a complaint made as provided in section 13 of this part, or after full hearing under an order for investigation and hearing made by the Commission on its own initiative, either in extension of any pending complaint or without any complaint whatever, the Commission shall be of opinion that any individual or joint rate, fare, or charge whatsoever demanded, charged, or collected by any common carrier or carriers subject to this part for the transportation of persons or property as defined in the first section of this part, or that any individual or joint classification, regulation, or practice whatsoever of such carrier or carriers subject to the provisions of this part, is or will be unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial, or otherwise in violation of any of the provisions of this part, the Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable individual or joint rate, fare, or charge, or rates, fares, or charges, to be thereafter observed in such case, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, to be charged, and what individual or joint classification, regulation, or practice is or will be just, fair, and reasonable, to be thereafter followed, and to make an order that the carrier or carriers shall cease and desist from such violation to the extent to which the Commission finds that the same does or will exist, and shall not thereafter publish, demand, or collect any rate, fare, or charge for such transportation other than the rate, fare, or charge so prescribed, or in excess of the maximum or less than the minimum so prescribed, as the case may be, and shall adopt the classification and shall conform to and observe the regulation or practice so prescribed.” See Advances in Rates — Western Case, 20 I. C. C. 307, 314; Lignite Coal from N. Dakota, 1261. C. C. 243, 244. “That if any common carrier subject to the provisions of this part shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property, subject to the provisions of this part, than it charges, demands, collects, or receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or them a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, such common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination, which is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful.” See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 280; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., 168 U. S. 144, 166; Barringer & Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 1, 6. See note 3, supra. “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this part to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever . . . .” “The Milwaukee and the Illinois Central join in rates from the Princeton and Boonville groups to these northern Illinois destinations which reflect differences between those groups on the one hand, and the Brazil and Linton points served by those two respondents on the other, that are substantially greater than the so-called standard differentials and greater than are warranted by the respective differences in distance.” The Commission in determining maximum reasonable rates from the Fulton-Peoria group to Iowa destinations developed the so-called Midland scale. See Midland Electric Coal Corp. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 232 I. C. C. 5. It used the so-called Indiana-Illinois scale for the same purpose in connection with certain Indiana groups to eastern-central Illinois destinations. See Coal Trade Assn. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 190 I. C. C. 743. In the present case the Commission made certain adjustments in those scales, see 263 I. C. C. at 186, and used them in the comparison of the approved Indiana rates with the approved Illinois rates. Those combined rates for Indiana to twelve northern Illinois destinations average 86.1 per cent of the Indiana-Illinois scale and 70.7 per cent of the Midland scale, while the combined rates for the Illinois groups to those destinations averaged 85.4 per cent and 70.3 per cent of those scales. The Commission approved rates of $2.22 from Brazil to Beloit, Wisconsin, $2.32 from Linton, and $2.39 from Princeton-Boonville, rates which the Commission found compared favorably with the present rates from the Illinois groups to Beloit. Taken as a whole, the approved rates from Indiana to Beloit averaged 94.3 per cent of the Indiana-Illinois scale and 77.1 per cent of the Midland scale, while the combined present rates from the Illinois groups to Beloit average 92.9 per cent and 76.6 per cent of the respective scales. The Commission made this additional observation concerning the weight it gave to distance, 263 I. C. C. at 204, “And in according such weight to distance as seemed to us to be fair and reasonable, we have also kept in mind that the average distances of record, and as used in this report, especially from Illinois mines, frequently reflect seeming inconsistencies from the same group to destinations in close proximity to each other. For example, Am-boy is located south of and about 12 miles over the Illinois Central and across country less distant from the Illinois groups than Dixon, but the average shortest tariff-route distance from the Springfield group is 9 miles greater and from the southern Illinois group 1 mile greater to the former than to the latter. By use of the short tariff routes the distance to Amboy is 9 miles greater from Springfield and 7 miles greater from southern Illinois than to Dixon. These variations in distance are due to the different routes used and also to the fact that frequently the group rate applies from a larger number of origins to one destination than to another. Thus, to Dixon the Springfield rate is published from 61 origins on 15 originating railroads, but to Amboy the rate applies from only 23 origins on 8 railroads. So also, the southern Illinois rate'applies from 75 origins on 7 roads to Dixon and 65 origins on 5 roads to Amboy. The variations in distance thus brought about are much greater from Illinois groups than from Indiana groups. It is plain, therefore, that comparisons based on distance, especially as between Indiana and Illinois groups to particular destinations, cannot be accepted as controlling, but must be evaluated with the above facts in mind.” The consumer interest traditionally has been prominent in the Commission’s consideration of the type of problem presented here. See Andy’s Ridge Coal Co. v. Southern R. Co., 18 I. C. C. 405, 410; Waukesha Lime & Stone Co. v. Chicago, M., & St. P. R. Co., supra, at 518, 519; Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., supra, at 37, 38; Southwestern Interstate Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Arkansas W. R. Co., supra, at 85; Coal to Illinois and Wisconsin, supra, at 167, 169.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. DAVIS et al. No. 190. Argued March 28, 1962. Decided June 4, 1962. I. Henry Kutz and Harold C. Wilkenfeld argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With them on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorjer, Wayne G. Barnett, Meyer Roth-wacks and Arthur I. Gould. Converse Murdoch argued the cause and filed briefs for the respondents in No. 190 and petitioners in No. 268. Together with No. 268, Davis et al. v. United States, also on certiorari to the same Colirt. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases involve the tax consequences of a transfer of appreciated property by Thomas Crawley Davis to his former wife pursuant to a property settlement agreement executed prior to divorce, as well as the deduct-ibility of his payment of her legal expenses in connection therewith. The Court of Claims upset the Commissioner’s determination that there was taxable gain on the transfer but upheld his ruling that the fees paid the wife’s attorney were not deductible. 152 Ct. Cl. 805, 287 F. 2d 168. We granted certiorari on a conflict in the Court of Appeals and the Court of Claims on the taxability of such transfers. 368 U. S. 813. We have decided that the taxpayer did have a taxable gain on the transfer and that the wife’s attorney’s fees w7ere not deductible. In 1954 the taxpayer and his then wife made a voluntary property settlement and separation agreement calling for support payments to the wife and minor child in addition to the transfer of certain personal property to the wife. Under Delaware law all the property transferred was that of the taxpayer, subject to certain statutory marital rights of the wife including a right of intestate succession and a right upon divorce to a share of the husband’s property. Specifically as a “division in settlement of their property” the taxpayer agreed to transfer to his wife, inter alia, 1,000 shares of stock in the E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. The then Mrs. Davis agreed to accept this division “in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against the husband whatsoever (including but not by way of limitation, dower and all rights under the laws of testacy and intestacy) . . . Pursuant to the above agreement which had been incorporated into the divorce decree, one-half of this stock was delivered in the tax year involved, 1955, and the balance thereafter. Davis’ cost basis for the 1955 transfer was $74,775.37, and the fair market value of the 500 shares there transferred was $82,250.- The taxpayer also agreed orally to pay the wife’s legal expenses, and in 1955 he made payments to the wife’s attorney, including $2,500 for services concerning tax matters relative to the property settlement. I. The determination of the income tax consequences of the stock transfer described above is basically a two-step analysis: (1) Was the transaction a taxable event? (2) If so, how much taxable gain resulted therefrom? Originally the Tax Court (at that time the Board of Tax Appeals) held that the accretion to property transferred pursuant to a divorce settlement could not be taxed as capital gain to the transferor because the amount realized by the satisfaction of the husband’s marital obligations was indeterminable and because, even if such benefit were ascertainable, the transaction was a nontaxable division of property. Mesta v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 933 (1940); Halliwell v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 740 (1941). However, upon being reversed in quick succession by the Courts of Appeals of the Third and Second Circuits, Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F. 2d 986 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F. 2d 642 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1942), the Tax Court accepted the position of these courts and has continued to apply these views in appropriate cases since that time, Hall v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 53 (1947); Patino v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 816 (1949); Estate of Stouffer v. Commissioner, 30 T. C. 1244 (1958); King v. Commissioner, 31 T. C. 108 (1958); Marshman v. Commissioner, 31 T. C. 269 (1958). In Mesta and Halliioell the Courts of Apjseals reasoned that the accretion to the property was “realized” by the transfer and that this gain could be measured on the assumption that the relinquished marital rights were equal in value to the property transferred. The matter was considered settled until the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court, ruled that, although such a transfer might be a taxable event, the gain realized thereby could not be determined because of the impossibility of evaluating the fair market value of the wife’s marital rights. Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F. 2d 27 (1960). In so holding that court specifically rejected the argument that these rights could be presumed to be equal in value to the property transferred for their release. This is essentially the position taken by the Court of Claims in the instant case. H-i I — ! We now turn to the threshold question of whether the transfer in issue was an appropriate occasion for taxing the accretion to the stock. There can be no doubt that Congress, as evidenced by its inclusive definition of income subject to taxation, i. e., “all income from whatever source derived, including . . . [gjains derived from dealings in property,” intended that the economic growth of this stock be taxed. The problem confronting us is simply when is such accretion to be taxed. Should the economic gain be presently assessed against taxpayer, or should this assessment await a subsequent transfer of the property by the wife? The controlling statutory language, which provides that gains from dealings in property are to be taxed upon “§ale or other disposition,” is too general to include or exclude conclusively the transaction presently in issue. Recognizing this, the Government and the taxpayer argue by analogy with transactions more easily classified as within or without the ambient of taxable events. The taxpayer asserts that the present disposition is comparable to a nontaxable division of property between two co-owners, while the Government contends it more resembles a taxable transfer of property in exchange for the release of an independent legal obligation. Neither disputes the validity of the other’s starting point. In support of his analogy the taxpayer argues that to draw a distinction between a wife’s interest in the property of her husband in a common-law jurisdiction such as Delaware and the property interest of a wife in a typical community property jurisdiction would commit a double sin; for such differentiation would depend upon “elusive and subtle casuistries which . . . possess no relevance for tax purposes,” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 118 (1940), and would create disparities between common-law and community property jurisdictions in contradiction to Congress’ general policy of equality between the two. The taxpayer’s analogy, however, stumbles on its own premise, for the inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband’s property by the Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership. The wife has no interest — passive or active — over the management or disposition of her husband’s personal property. Her rights are not descendable, and she must survive him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the marriage she shares in the property only to such extent as the court deems “reasonable.” 13 Del. Code Ann. § 1531 (a). What is “reasonable” might be ascertained independently of the extent of the husband’s property by such criteria as the wife’s financial condition, her needs in relation to her accustomed station in life, her age and health, the number of children and their ages, and the earning capacity of the husband. See, e. g., Beres v. Beres, 52 Del. 133, 154 A. 2d 384 (1959). This is not to say it would be completely illogical to consider the shearing off of the wife’s rights in her husband’s property as a division of that property, but we believe the contrary to be the more reasonable construction. Regardless of the tags, Delaware seems only to place a burden on the husband’s property rather than to make the wife a part owner thereof. In the present context the rights of succession and reasonable share do not differ significantly from the husband’s obligations of support and alimony. They all partake more of a personal liability of the husband than a property interest of the wife. The effectuation of these marital rights may ultimately result in the ownership of some of the husband’s property as it did here, but certainly this happenstance does not equate the transaction with a division of property by co-owners. Although admittedly such a view may permit different tax treatment among the several States, this Court in the past has not ignored the differing effects on the federal taxing scheme of substantive differences between community property and common-law systems. E. g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930). To be sure Congress has seen fit to alleviate this disparity in many areas, e. g., Revenue Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 110, but in other areas the facts of life are still with us. Our interpretation of the general statutory language is fortified by the long-standing administrative practice as sounded and formalized by the settled state of law in the lower courts. The Commissioner’s position was adopted in the early 40’s by the Second and Third Circuits and by 1947 the Tax Court had acquiesced in this view. This settled rule was not disturbed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1960 or the Court of Claims in the instant case, for these latter courts in holding the gain indeterminable assumed that the transaction was otherwise a taxable event. Such unanimity of views in support of a position representing a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute will not lightly be put aside. It is quite possible that this notorious construction was relied upon by numerous taxpayers as well as the Congress itself, which not only refrained from making any changes in the statutory language during more than a score of years but re-enacted this same language in 1954. III. Having determined that the transaction was a taxable event, we now turn to the point on which the Court of Claims balked, viz., the measurement of the taxable gain realized by the taxpayer. The Code defines the taxable gain from the sale or disposition of property as being the “excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis . . . .” I. R. C. (1954) § 1001 (a). The “amount realized” is further defined as “the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received.” I. R. C. (1954) § 1001 (b). In the instant case the “property received” was the release of the wife’s inchoate marital rights. The Court of Claims, following the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, found that there was no way to compute the fair market value of these marital rights and that it was thus impossible to determine the taxable gain realized by the taxpayer. We believe this conclusion was erroneous. It must be assumed, we think, that the parties acted at arm’s length and that they judged the marital rights to be equal in value to the property for which they were exchanged. There was no evidence to the contrary here. Absent a readily ascertainable value it is accepted practice where property is exchanged to hold, as did the Court of Claims in Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 166, 172, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (1954), that the values “of the two properties exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to be equal.” Accord, United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F. 2d 9 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1960); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F. 2d 310 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1943). To be sure there is much to be said of the argument that such an assumption is weakened by the emotion, tension and practical necessities involved in divorce negotiations and the property settlements arising therefrom. However, once it is recognized that the transfer was a taxable • event, it is more consistent with the general purpose and scheme of the taxing statutes to make a rough approximation of the gain realized thereby than to ignore altogether its tax consequences. Cf. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U. S. 56, 67 (1942). Moreover, if the transaction is to be considered a taxable event as to the husband, the Court of Claims’ position leaves up in the air the wife’s basis for the property-received. In the context of a taxable transfer by the husband, all indicia point to a “cost” basis for this property in the hands of the wife. Yet under the Court of Claims’ position her cost for this property, i. e., the value of the marital rights relinquished therefor, would be indeterminable, and on subsequent disposition of the property she might suffer inordinately over the Commissioner’s assessment which she would have the burden of proving erroneous, Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U. S. 446, 468 (1959). Our present holding that the value of these rights is ascertainable eliminates this problem; for the same calculation that determines the amount received by the husband fixes the amount given up by the wife, and this figure, i. e., the market value of the property transferred by the husband, will be taken by her as her tax basis for the property received. Finally, it must be noted that here, as well as in relation to the question of whether the event is taxable, we draw support from the prior administrative practice and judicial approval of that practice. See p. 71, supra. We therefore conclude that the Commissioner’s assessment of a taxable gain based upon the value of the stock at the date of its transfer has not been shown erroneous. IV. The attorney-fee question is much simpler. It is the customary practice in Delaware for the husband to pay both his own and his wife’s legal expenses incurred in the divorce and the property settlement. Here petitioner paid $5,000 of such fees in the taxable year 1955 earmarked for tax advice in relation to the property settlement. One-half of this sum went to the wife’s attorney. The taxpayer claimed that under § 212 (3) of the 1954 Code, which allows a deduction for the “ordinary and necessary expenses paid ... in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax,” he was entitled to deduct the entire $5,000. The Court of Claims allowed the $2,500 paid taxpayer’s own attorney but denied the like amount paid the wife’s attorney. The sole question here is the deductibility of the latter fee; the Government did not seek review of the amount taxpayer paid his own attorney, and we intimate no decision on that point. As to the deduction of the wife’s fees, we read the statute, if applicable to this type of tax expense, to include only the expenses of the taxpayer himself and not those of his wife. Here the fees paid her attorney do not appear to be “in connection with the determination, collection, or refund” of any tax of the taxpayer. As the Court of Claims found, the wife’s attorney “considered the problems from the standpoint of his client alone. Certainly then it cannot be said that . . . [his] advice was directed to plaintiff’s tax problems . . . .” 152 Ct. Cl., at 805, 287 F. 2d, at 171. We therefore conclude, as did the Court of Claims, that those fees were not a deductible item to the taxpayer. Reversed in part and affirmed in part. Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision of these cases. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Davis’ present wife, Grace Ethel Davis, is also a party to these proceedings because a joint return was filed in the tax year in question. The holding in the instant case is in accord with Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F. 2d 27 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1960), but is contra to the holdings in Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F. 2d 642 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1942), and Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F. 2d 986 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1941). 12 Del. Code Ann. (Supp. 1960) § 512; 13 Del. Code Ann. § 1531. In the case of realty, the wife in addition to the above has rights of dower. 12 Del. Code Ann. §§ 502, 901, 904, 905. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 §61 (a). Iiiternal Revenue Code of 1954 §§ 1001, 1002. Any suggestion that the transaction in question was a gift is completely unrealistic. Property transferred pursuant to a negotiated settlement in return for the release of admittedly valuable rights is not a gift in any sense of the term. To intimate that there was a gift to the extent the value of the property exceeded that of the rights released, not only invokes the erroneous premise that every exchange not precisely equal involves a gift but merely raises the measurement problem discussed in Part III, infra, p. 71. Cases in which this Court has held transfers of property in exchange for the release of marital rights subject to gift taxes are based not on the premise that such transactions are inherently gifts but on the concept that in the contemplation of the gift tax statute they are to be taxed as gifts. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303 (1945); see Harris v. Commissioner, 340 TJ. S. 106 (1950). In interpreting the particular income tax provisions here involved, we find ourselves unfettered by the language and considerations ingrained in the gift and estate tax statutes. See Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F. 2d 812 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1947). Under the present administrative practice, the release of marital rights in exchange for property or other consideration is not considered a taxable event as to the wife. For a discussion of the difficulties confronting a wife under a contrary approach, see Taylor and Schwartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements, 7 Tax L. Rev. 19, 30 (1951); Comment, The Lump Sum Divorce Settlement as a Taxable Exchange, 8 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 593, 601-602 (1961). Section 1012 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that: “The basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter and subchapters C (relating to corporate distributions and adjustments), K (relating to partners and partnerships), and P (relating to capital gains and losses). . . .” We do not pass on the soundness of the taxpayer’s other attacks upon this determination, for these contentions were not presented to the Commissioner or the Court of Claims.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. CHANEY et al. No. 83-1878. Argued December 8, 1984 Decided March 20, 1985 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 838. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 840. Deputy Solicitor General Getter argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Leonard Schaitman, John M. Rogers, Thomas Scarlett, and Michael P. Peskoe. Steven M. Kristovich argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were David E. Kendall, Julius LeVonne Chambers, James M. Nabrit III, John Charles Boger, James S. Liebman, and Anthony G. Amsterdam. A brief of amicus curiae urging reversal was filed for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, George C. Smith, and Stephen Weitzman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Society of Law and Medicine et al. by James M. Doyle; and for the Public Citizen by Alan B. Morrison and William B. Schultz. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question of the extent to which a decision of an administrative agency to exercise its “discretion” not to undertake certain enforcement actions is subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §501 et seq. (APA). Respondents are several prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection of drugs. They petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), alleging that under the circumstances the use of these drugs for capital punishment violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U. S. C. §301 et seq. (FDCA), and requesting that the FDA take various enforcement actions to prevent these violations. The FDA refused their request. We review here a decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held the FDA’s refusal to take enforcement actions both reviewable and an abuse of discretion, arid remanded the case with directions that the agency be required “to fulfill its statutory function.” 231 U. S. App. D. C. 136, 153, 718 F. 2d 1174, 1191 (1983). I — H Respondents have been sentenced to death by lethal injection of drugs under the laws of the States of Oklahoma and Texas. Those States, and several others, have recently adopted this method for carrying out the capital sentence. Respondents first petitioned the FDA, claiming that the drugs used by the States for this purpose, although approved by the FDA for the medical purposes stated on their labels, were not approved for use in human executions. They alleged that the drugs had not been tested for the purpose for which they were to be used, and that, given that the drugs would likely be administered by untrained personnel, it was also likely that the drugs would not induce the quick and painless death intended. They urged that use of these drugs for human execution was the “unapproved use of an approved drug” and constituted a violation of the Act’s prohibitions against “mis-branding.” They also suggested that the FDCA’s requirements for approval of “new drugs” applied, since these drugs were now being used for a new purpose. Accordingly, respondents claimed that the FDA was required to approve the drugs as “safe and effective” for human execution before they could be distributed in interstate commerce. See 21 U. S. C. § 355. They therefore requested the FDA to take various investigatory and enforcement actions to prevent these perceived violations; they requested the FDA to affix warnings to the labels of all the drugs stating that they were unapproved and unsafe for human execution, to send statements to the drug manufacturers and prison administrators stating that the drugs should not be so used, and to adopt procedures for seizing the drugs from state prisons and to recommend the prosecution of all those in the chain of distribution who knowingly distribute or purchase the drugs with intent to use them for human execution. The FDA Commissioner responded, refusing to take the requested actions. The Commissioner first detailed his disagreement with respondents’ understanding of the scope of FDA jurisdiction over the unapproved use of approved drugs for human execution, concluding that FDA jurisdiction in the area was generally unclear but in any event should not be exercised to interfere with this particular aspect of state criminal justice systems. He went on to state: “Were FDA clearly to have jurisdiction in the area, moreover, we believe we would be authorized to decline to exercise it under our inherent discretion to decline to pursue certain enforcement matters. The unapproved use of approved drugs is an area in which the case law is far from uniform. Generally, enforcement proceedings in this area are initiated only when there is a serious danger to the public health or a blatant scheme to defraud. We cannot conclude that those dangers are present under State lethal injection laws, which are duly authorized statutory enactments in furtherance of proper State functions. ...” Respondents then filed the instant suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming the same violations of the FDCA and asking that the FDA be required to take the same enforcement actions requested in the prior petition. Jurisdiction was grounded in the general federal-question jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, and review of the agency action was sought under the judicial review provisions of the APA, 5 U. S. C. §§701-706. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner. It began with the proposition that “decisions of executive departments and agencies to refrain from instituting investigative and enforcement proceedings are essentially unreviewable by the courts.” Chaney v. Schweiker, Civ. No. 81-2265 (DC, Aug. 30, 1982), App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a (emphasis in original). The court then cited case law stating that nothing in the FDCA indicated an intent to circumscribe the FDA’s enforcement discretion or to make it reviewable. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The majority began by discussing the FDA’s jurisdiction over the unapproved use of approved drugs for human execution, and concluded that the FDA did have jurisdiction over such a use. The court then addressed the Government’s assertion of unreviewable discretion to refuse enforcement action. It first discussed this Court’s opinions which have held that there is a general presumption that all agency decisions are reviewable under the APA, at least to assess whether the actions were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 139-141 (1967); 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). It noted that the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 701, only precludes judicial review of final agency action — including refusals to act, see 6 U. S. C. §551(13) — when review is precluded by statute, or “committed to agency discretion by law.” Citing this Court’s opinions in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 (1975), and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971), for the view that these exceptions should be narrowly construed, the court held that the “committed to agency discretion by law” exception of § 701(a)(2) should be invoked only where the substantive statute left the courts with “no law to apply.” 231 U. S. App. D. C., at 146, 718 F. 2d, at 1184 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, supra, at 410). The court cited Dunlop as holding that this presumption “applies with no less force to review of . . . agency decisions to refrain from enforcement action.” 231 U. S. App. D. C., at 146, 718 F. 2d, at 1184. The court found “law to apply” in the form of a FDA policy statement which indicated that the agency was “obligated” to investigate the unapproved use of an approved drug when such use became “widespread” or “endangered] the public health.” Id., at 148, 718 F. 2d, at 1186 (citing 37 Fed. Reg. 16504 (1972)). The court held that this policy statement constituted a “rule” and was considered binding by the FDA. Given the policy statement indicating that the FDA should take enforcement action in this area, and the strong presumption that all agency action is subject to judicial review, the court concluded that review of the agency’s refusal was not foreclosed. It then proceeded to assess whether the agency’s decision not to act was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Citing evidence that the FDA assumed jurisdiction over drugs used to put animals to sleep and the unapproved uses of drugs on prisoners in clinical experiments, the court found that the FDA’s refusal, for the reasons given, was irrational, and that respondents’ evidence that use of the drugs could lead to a cruel and protracted death was entitled to more searching consideration. The court therefore remanded the case to the District Court, to order the FDA “to fulfill its statutory function.” The dissenting judge expressed the view that an agency’s decision not to institute enforcement action generally is un-reviewable, and that such exercises of “prosecutorial discretion” presumptively fall within the APA’s exception for agency actions “committed to agency discretion by law.” He noted that traditionally courts have been wary of second-guessing agency decisions not to enforce, given the agency’s expertise and better understanding of its enforcement policies and available resources. He likewise concluded that nothing in the FDCA or FDA regulations would provide a basis for a court’s review of this agency decision. A divided Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing. 233 U. S. App. D. C. 146, 724 F. 2d 1030 (1984). We granted certiorari to review the implausible result that the FDA is required to exercise its enforcement power to ensure that States only use drugs that are “safe and effective” for human execution. 467 U. S. 1251 (1984). We reverse. I — H I — I The Court of Appeals’ decision addressed three questions: (1) whether the FDA had jurisdiction to undertake the enforcement actions requested, (2) whether if it did have jurisdiction its refusal to take those actions was subject to judicial review, and (3) whether if reviewable its refusal was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In reaching our conclusion that the Court of Appeals was wrong, however, we need not and do not address the thorny question of the FDA’s jurisdiction. For us, this case turns on the important question of the extent to which determinations by the FDA not to exercise its enforcement authority over the use of drugs in interstate commerce may be judicially reviewed. That decision in turn involves the construction of two separate but necessarily interrelated statutes, the APA and the FDCA. The APA’s comprehensive provisions for judicial review of “agency actions” are contained in 5 U. S. C. §§701-706. Any person “adversely affected or aggrieved” by agency action, see § 702, including a “failure to act,” is entitled to “judicial review thereof,” as long as the action is a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” see § 704. The standards to be applied on review are governed by the provisions of § 706. But before any review at all may be had, a party must first clear the hurdle of § 701(a). That section provides that the chapter on judicial review “applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that — (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Petitioner urges that the decision of the FDA to refuse enforcement is an action “committed to agency discretion by law” under § 701(a)(2). This Court has not had occasion to interpret this second exception in § 701(a) in any great detail. On its face, the section does not obviously lend itself to any particular construction; indeed, one might wonder what difference exists between § (a)(1) and § (a)(2). The former section seems easy in application; it requires construction of the substantive statute involved to determine whether Congress intended to preclude judicial review of certain decisions. That is the approach taken with respect to § (a)(1) in cases such as South ern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp, 442 U. S. 444 (1979), and Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S., at 567. But one could read the language “committed to agency discretion by law” in § (a)(2) to require a similar inquiry. In addition, commentators have pointed out that construction of § (a)(2) is further complicated by the tension between a literal reading of § (a)(2), which exempts from judicial review those decisions committed to agency “discretion,” and the primary scope of review prescribed by § 706(2)(A) — whether the agency’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” How is it, they ask, that an action committed to agency discretion can be unreviewable and yet courts still can review agency actions for abuse of that discretion? See 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 28:6 (1984) (hereafter Davis); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 58 (1965). The APA’s legislative history provides little help on this score. Mindful, however, of the common-sense principle of statutory construction that sections of a statute generally should be read “to give effect, if possible, to every clause . . . ,” see United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955), we think there is a proper construction of § (a)(2) which satisfies each of these concerns. This Court first discussed § (a)(2) in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971). That case dealt with the Secretary of Transportation’s approval of the building of an interstate highway through a park in Memphis, Tennessee. The relevant federal statute provided that the Secretary “shall not approve” any program or project using public parkland unless the Secretary first determined that no feasible alternatives were available. Id., at 411. Interested citizens challenged the Secretary’s approval under the APA, arguing that he had not satisfied the substantive statute’s requirements. This Court first addressed the “threshold question” of whether the agency’s action was at all reviewable. After setting out the language of § 701(a), the Court stated: “In this case, there is no indication that Congress sought to prohibit judicial review and there is most certainly no ‘showing of “clear and convincing evidence” of a . . . legislative intent’ to restrict access to judicial review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967). . . . “Similarly, the Secretary’s decision here does not fall within the exception for action ‘committed to agency discretion.’ This is a very narrow exception. . . . The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945).” Overton Park, supra, at 410 (footnote omitted). The above quote answers several of the questions raised by the language of § 701(a), although it raises others. First, it clearly separates the exception provided by § (a)(1) from the § (a)(2) exception. The former applies when Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review. The latter applies in different circumstances; even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion. In such a case, the statute (“law”) can be taken to have “committed” the decisionmaking to the agency’s judgment absolutely. This construction avoids conflict with the “abuse of discretion” standard of review in § 706 — if no judicially manageable standards are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion, then it is impossible to evaluate agency action for “abuse of discretion.” In addition, this construction satisfies the principle of statutory construction mentioned earlier, by identifying a separate class of cases to which § 701(a)(2) applies. To this point our analysis does not differ significantly from that of the Court of Appeals. That court purported to apply the “no law to apply” standard of Overton Park. We disagree, however, with that court’s insistence that the “narrow construction” of § (a)(2) required application of a presumption of reviewability even to an agency’s decision not to undertake certain enforcement actions. Here we think the Court of Appeals broke with tradition, case law, and sound reasoning. Overton Park did not involve an agency’s refusal to take requested enforcement action. It involved an affirmative act of approval under a statute that set clear guidelines for determining when such approval should be given. Refusals to take enforcement steps generally involve precisely the opposite situation, and in that situation we think the presumption is that judicial review is not available. This Court has recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 123-124 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 693 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 182 (1967); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869). This recognition of the existence of discretion is attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement. The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. Similar concerns animate the principles of administrative law that courts generally will defer to an agency’s construction of the statute it is charged with implementing, and to the procedures it adopts for implementing that statute. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 543 (1978); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U. S. 60, 87 (1975). In addition to these administrative concerns, we note that when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect. Similarly, when an agency does act to enforce, that action itself provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in some manner. The action at least can be reviewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its statutory powers. See, e. g., FTC v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19 (1929). Finally, we recognize that an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict — a decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U. S. Const., Art. II, §3. We of course only list the above concerns to facilitate understanding of our conclusion that an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2). For good reasons, such a decision has traditionally been “committed to agency discretion,” and we believe that the Congress enacting the APA did not intend to alter that tradition. Cf. 5 Davis §28:5 (APA did not significantly alter the “common law” of judicial review of agency action). In so stating, we emphasize that the decision is only presumptively unreviewable; the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. Thus, in establishing this presumption in the APA, Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency administers. Congress may limit an agency’s exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue. How to determine when Congress has done so is the question left open by Overton Park. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 (1975), relied upon heavily by respondents and the majority in the Court of Appeals, presents an example of statutory language which supplied sufficient standards to rebut the presumption of un-reviewability. Dunlop involved a suit by a union employee, under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 481 et seq. (LMRDA), asking the Secretary of Labor to investigate and file suit to set aside a union election. Section 482 provided that, upon filing of a complaint by a union member, “[t]he Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation . . . has occurred ... he shall . . . bring a civil action . . . .” After investigating the plaintiff’s claims the Secretary of Labor declined to file suit, and the plaintiff sought judicial review under the APA. This Court held that review was available. It rejected the Secretary’s argument that the statute precluded judicial review, and in a footnote it stated its agreement with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the decision was not “an unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” 421 U. S., at 567, n. 7. Our textual references to the “strong presumption” of review-ability in Dunlop were addressed only to the § (a)(1) exception; we were content to rely on the Court of Appeals’ opinion to hold that the § (a)(2) exception did not apply. The Court of Appeals, in turn, had found the “principle of absolute pros-ecutorial discretion” inapplicable, because the language of the LMRDA indicated that the Secretary was required to file suit if certain “clearly defined” factors were present. The decision therefore was not “ ‘beyond the judicial capacity to supervise.’” Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F. 2d 79, 87-88 (CA3 1974) (quoting Davis §28.16, p. 984 (1970 Supp.)). Dunlop is thus consistent with a general presumption of unreviewability of decisions not to enforce. The statute being administered quite clearly withdrew discretion from the agency and provided guidelines for exercise of its enforcement power. Our decision that review was available was not based on “pragmatic considerations,” such as those cited by the Court of Appeals, see 231 U. S. App. D. C., at 147, 718 F. 2d, at 1185, that amount to an assessment of whether the interests at stake are important enough to justify intervention in the agencies’ decisionmaking. The danger that agencies may not carry out their delegated powers with sufficient vigor does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that courts are the most appropriate body to police this aspect of their performance. That decision is in the first instance for Congress, and we therefore turn to the FDCA to determine whether in this case Congress has provided us with “law to apply.” If it has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining the limits of that discretion, there is “law to apply” under § 701(a)(2), and courts may require that the agency follow that law; if it has not, then an agency refusal to institute proceedings is a decision “committed to agency discretion by law” within the meaning of that section. Ill To enforce the various substantive prohibitions contained in the FDCA, the Act provides for injunctions, 21 U. S. C. §332, criminal sanctions, §§333 and 335, and seizure of any offending food, drug, or cosmetic article, § 334. The Act’s general provision for enforcement, § 372, provides only that “[t]he Secretary is authorized to conduct examinations and investigations ...” (emphasis added). Unlike the statute at issue in Dunlop, § 332 gives no indication of when an injunction should be sought, and § 334, providing for seizures, is framed in the permissive — the offending food, drug, or cosmetic “shall be liable to be proceeded against.” The section on criminal sanctions states baldly that any person who violates the Act’s substantive prohibitions “shall be imprisoned ... or fined.” Respondents argue that this statement mandates criminal prosecution of every violator of the Act but they adduce no indication in case law or legislative history that such was Congress’ intention in using this language, which is commonly found in the criminal provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §471 (counterfeiting); 18 U. S. C. § 1001 (false statements to Government officials); 18 U. S. C. § 1341 (mail fraud). We are unwilling to attribute such a sweeping meaning to this language, particularly since the Act charges the Secretary only with recommending prosecution; any criminal prosecutions must be instituted by the Attorney General. The Act’s enforcement provisions thus commit complete discretion to the Secretary to decide how and when they should be exercised. Respondents nevertheless present three separate authorities that they claim provide the courts with sufficient indicia of an intent to circumscribe enforcement discretion. Two of these may be dealt with summarily. First, we reject respondents’ argument that the Act’s substantive prohibitions of “misbranding” and the introduction of “new drugs” absent agency approval, see 21 U. S. C. §§ 352(f)(1), 855, supply us with “law to apply.” These provisions are simply irrelevant to the agency’s discretion to refuse to initiate proceedings. We also find singularly unhelpful the agency “policy statement” on which the Court of Appeals placed great reliance. We would have difficulty with this statement’s vague language even if it were a properly adopted agency rule. Although the statement indicates that the agency considered itself “obligated” to take certain investigative actions, that language did not arise in the course of discussing the agency’s discretion to exercise its enforcement power, but rather in the context of describing agency policy with respect to unapproved uses of approved drugs by physicians. In addition, if read to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, the statement conflicts with the agency rule on judicial review, 21 CFR § 10.45(d)(2) (1984), which states that “[t]he Commissioner shall object to judicial review ... if (i) [t]he matter is committed by law to the discretion of the Commissioner, e. g., a decision to recommend or not to recommend civil or criminal enforcement action . . . .” But in any event the policy statement was attached to a rule that was never adopted. Whatever force such a statement might have, and leaving to one side the problem of whether an agency’s rules might under certain circumstances provide courts with adequate guidelines for informed judicial review of decisions not to enforce, we do not think the language of the agency’s “policy statement” can plausibly be read to override the agency’s express assertion of unreviewable discretion contained in the above rule. Respondents’ third argument, based upon §306 of the FDCA, merits only slightly more consideration. That section provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring the Secretary to report for prosecution, or for the institution of libel or injunction proceedings, minor violations of this chapter whenever he believes that the public interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or ruling.” 21 U. S. C. §336. Respondents seek to draw from this section the negative implication that the Secretary is required to report for prosecution all “major” violations of the Act, however those might be defined, and that it therefore supplies the needed indication of an intent to limit agency enforcement discretion. We think that this section simply does not give rise to the negative implication which respondents seek to draw from it. The section is not addressed to agency proceedings designed to discover the existence of violations, but applies only to a situation where a violation has already been established to the satisfaction of the agency. We do not believe the section speaks to the criteria which shall be used by the agency for investigating possible violations of the Act. IV We therefore conclude that the presumption that agency decisions not to institute proceedings are unreviewable under 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2) is not overcome by the enforcement provisions of the FDCA. The FDA’s decision not to take the enforcement actions requested by respondents is therefore not subject to judicial review under the APA. The general exception to reviewability provided by § 701(a)(2) for action “committed to agency discretion” remains a narrow one, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971), but within that exception are included agency refusals to institute investigative or enforcement proceedings, unless Congress has indicated otherwise. In so holding, we essentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the decision as to whether an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially reviewable. No colorable claim is made in this case that the agency’s refusal to institute proceedings violated any constitutional rights of respondents, and we do not address the issue that would be raised in such a case. Cf. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366 (1974); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 372-374 (1886). The fact that the drugs involved in this case are ultimately to be used in imposing the death penalty must not lead this Court or other courts to import profound differences of opinion over the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution into the domain of administrative law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. See 21 U. S. C. §352(f): “A drug or device shall be deemed to be misbranded . . . [u]nless its labeling bears (1) adequate directions for use . . . Although respondents also requested an evidentiary hearing, the District Court regarded this hearing as having “no purpose apart from serving as a prelude to the pursuit of the very enforcement steps that plaintiffs demanded in their administrative petition.” Chaney v. Schweiker, Civ. No. 81-2265 (DC, Aug. 30, 1982), App. to Pet. for Cert. 77a, n. 15. Respondents have not challenged the statement that all they sought were certain enforcement actions, and this case therefore does not involve the question of agency discretion not to invoke rulemaking proceedings. In response to respondents’ petition, the Commissioner had explained that the FDA had assumed jurisdiction in these cases because, unlike the drugs used for human execution, these drugs were “new drugs” intended by the manufacturer to be used for this purpose, and thus fell squarely within the FDA’s approval jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not explain why this distinction was not “rational.” We do not have in this case a refusal by the agency to institute proceedings based solely on the belief that it lacks jurisdiction. Nor do we have a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has “consciously and expressly adopted a general policy” that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities. See, e. g., Adams v. Richardson, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 267, 480 F. 2d 1159 (1973) (en bane). Although we express no opinion on whether such decisions would be unreviewable under § 701(a)(2), we note that in those situations the statute conferring authority on the agency might indicate that such decisions were not “committed to agency discretion.” Respondents also urge, as did the Court of Appeals, that a statement by the FDA’s lawyers in a footnote to to their “memorandum in support of dismissal” in the District Court indicates that the agency considers the “policy statement” “binding.” The footnote said that the “Federal Register notice . . . sets forth the agency’s current position o[n] the legal status of approved labeling for prescription drugs.” The statement from the memorandum cites no authority, is taken out of context, and on its face does not indicate that the agency considered this position “binding” in any sense of the word. Moreover, we find it difficult to believe that statements of agency counsel in litigation against private individuals can be taken to establish “rules” that bind an entire agency prospectively. Such would turn orderly process on its head.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. HANSEN et ux. No. 380. Argued April 29-30, 1959. Decided June 22, 1959. Meyer Rothwacks argued the causes for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. With him on the brief for the Commissioner were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and Joseph F. Goetten. Lester M. Ponder argued the cause for petitioners in No. 512. With him on the brief were W. Byron Sorrell, John C. Williamson, Cullen B. Jones, Jr. and Thomas M. Scanlon. Emmett E. Mclnnis, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents in No. 380. William S. Miller, Jr. argued the cause for respondent in No. 381. With him on the brief were E. Chas.'Eichénbaum and Leonard L. Scott. Briefs of amici curiae in support of the taxpayers were filed by James C. Moore and L. W. Anderson for the National Automobile. Dealers Association, and by William Waller for Vance L. Wiley et al. Together with No. 381, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Glover, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, argued April 29-30, 1959; and No. 512, Baird et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, argued April 30, 1959. Mr. Justice' Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. These federal income tax cases present questions concerning the proper and timely accrual of gross income deriving from sales of commercial installment paper by retail dealers to finance companies. The taxpayers involved in these cases are two retail automobile dealers and a house trailer dealer. All keep their books on the accrual basis. Most of their sales are “credit sales.” It- appears that they generally negotiate, consummate, and finance such sales in accordance with a common pattern. The dealer and his customer agree upon a “Cash Delivered Price” for a particular vehicle owned by. the dealer. In part payment of that price the customer makes a'down payment to the dealer in cash or “trade in,” or both. To the remaining balance of. that cash-price there is added the cost of insurance on the vehicle and a “finance charge.” The aggregate is sometimes called the “Deferred Balance.” It is evidenced and secured by an assignable or negotiable instrument retaining defeasible title to or a lien on the vehicle — ^generally on a form supplied by the finance company with which the dealer may then be doing business— and’the instrument is signed by the customer, delivered to the dealer, and made payable to him in monthly installments over an agreed period- — one to three years on automobiles and three to five years on Rouse trailers. Thereupon, the dealer delivers the vehicle to his customer, with such memoranda or bill of sale as will enable him to register, license and úse it. Soon after completion of these procedures, these" dealers sell (discount) those instruments (hereafter called “installment paper”) to finance companies for an agreed or formula fixed price, and the dealers guarantee payment, in whole or in part, of the installment paper. Under contracts between the respective dealers and finance companies here concerned, the latter, upon receipt and acceptance of installment paper, are. obligated to pay immediately to the dealers a major percentage.of the purchase price, but they are thereby also authorized to retain the remaining percentage of the price and to credit it on their book's to a “Dealers Reserve Account” in the name of the particular dealer, for the purpose of securing performance by him of his guarantor, endorser, and other liabilities to the finance company. The dealers involved in...these cases recorded on their books in the years the installment paper was sold, and included in their income tax returns for those years, the cash received from the finance companies, but they did not accrue on their books or include in their returns the percentage of the price that was retained by the finance companies and credited to their reserve',accounts. The Commissioner contends that in the year of their sales of installment paper to the .finance companies, the taxpayers acquired a fixed right to receive — even though not until a later .year — the percentage of the purchase money that was retained by the. finance companies and •credited on their books to the dealers’ reserve accounts in that year, and, hence, those amounts constituted accrued income to the taxpayers in that year, and should have been accrued on their books and included in their returns for that year. The taxpayers, on the other hand,- contend that the amounts so retained and credited were.never under or'subject to their control, and were always subject to such- contingent liabilities of the taxpayers to the finance companies that it could not have been known, in the year of-the-sales, how much, if any, of the'reserves, would actually be received-by them in cash, and hence they did not acquire, in the year of any of the sales, a fixed right to receive — in a later year or at any,time — the amounts credited, to them in the reserves, and, therefore, the reserves did not constitute accrued income to them. This presents, in essence, the issue- for decision in these cases.- On the grounds stated, the Commissioner proposed assessment. of income tax deficiencies, for certain years against the respective taxpayers here involved. The taxpayers eanh petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermina-' tion'. After hearings, the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner in each case. The taxpayers petitioned :for review. In No. 380, the Hansen case, the Ninth Circuit reversed, 258 F. 2d 585; in No. 381, the Glover case, the Eighth Circuit reversed, 253 F. 2d 735; and in No. 512, the Baird case; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 256 F. 2d 918. Because of an asserted conflict between those circuits in these cases, and between other circuits on the question involved, and because of the importance of the question to the proper administration of the revenue laws, we granted certiorari in all three cases: Inasftiuch as these cases turn on the same issue, and the Hañéen and Glover cases were consolidated for .argument and argued together in this Court, and the Baird cSse was argued immediately following, it will be convenient to decide the three cases in one opinion. Although the relevant facts in the three cases are very similar and follow the pattern just explained, there- are variations which we think should be set forth. Respondents in No. 380, John R. Hansen and Shirley G. Hansen, are husband and wife and filed joint federal income tax returns for the taxable years 1951, 1952 and 1953 here involved.. During those years, John R. Hansen (“taxpayer”), was a motorcar dealer in Bellevue, Washington, and kept his books on the accrual basis. He frequently sold automobiles on “time payments.” The taxpayer was not bound by any contract to sell his installment paper, but because of his needs for operating capital he consistently sold it to General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”). Although before selling installment paper to GMAC the taxpayer did not have an express contract with that company concerning the terms and conditions of such sales and purchases, he had received its manual covering its policies on those subjects and apparently acted under them. That manual was not put in evidence, but it is intimated in the evidence and findings and stated in the briefs, without contradiction, that it contained provisions to the effect that upon receipt and acceptance of a duly assigned conditional sale contract guaranteed by the dealer, GMAC would pay to the dealer the major percentage (not specified in the evidence or findings) of the agreed price therefor, but would retain the remaining percentage of the price and credit the same on its books to a “Dealers Reserve Account” in the name of the dealer, as security for performance of his obligations to GMAC under his guaranty of payment of the installment paper and for the payment of any other obligation which he might incur to GMAC. Once in each year GMAC would remit to the dealer so much of his accumulated reserve as exceeded 5% of the then aggregate unpaid balances on installment paper which GMAC had purchased from the dealer. Upon negotiating a time sale of an automobile and receiving the down payment and any other sum immediately payable, the taxpayer prepared, on forms supplied by GMAC, a conditional sale contract setting forth a compilation of the figures, including insurance and a finance charge, involved in the time sale and concluding with a statement of the “Time (Deferred) Balance” which was payable at the office of GMAC in fixed monthly installments. When .the customer signed and delivered to the taxpayer the conditional sale contract, the automobile was delivered to the customer and, as recited in that contract, he acknowledged “delivery and acceptance of [it] in good order.” It was the taxpayer’s consistent practice immediately thereafter to assign the conditional sale contract (and guarantee its payment) to GMAC by executing the form of assignment printed at the foot of the form and forwarding it to GMAC for purchase. Upon receipt and acceptanee of the conditional sale contract and assignment, GMAC remitted to the taxpayer the major percentage' of the price it was to pay therefor, but retained the. remaining percentage and credited it on its books to a “Dealers Reserve Account” in the name of the taxpayer, for the purpose of securing performance by him of his obligations to GMAC. - The taxpayer recorded, on his books in the year such installment paper was sold, and included in his income tax return, for that year, the cash received from GMAC, but he did not accrue on his books, or include in his return, the percentage of the price that was retained by GMAC and credited to his reserve account. The Commissioner proposed the assessment of deficiencies in income taxes against the taxpayer and his wife for the years involved upon the grounds earlier stated. The taxpayer sought a redetermination in the Tax Court which, after hearing, sustained the Commissioner, but on taxpayers petition for review the Ninth Circuit reversed, 258 F. 2d 585, and we granted certiorari for the reasons already stated, 358 U. S. 879. Respondent in No. 381, Burl P. Glover (“taxpayer”), during the years 1949, 1950 and 1951 here inyolved, was a motorcar dealer in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and kept his books and filed his income tax returns on a calendar year accrual basis. He frequently sold automobiles on time payments, the unpaid balance of the purchase price of each automobile, including insurance and a finance charge, being evidenced by the customer’s promissory note' payable to the dealer, or his order, in monthly installments over a fixed period, and. secured by a chattel mortgage on the automobile. Before the note and mortgage sales transactions here involved, the taxpayer signed a letter addressed to Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation (obviously written on a form prepared by the addressee) proposing to sell to Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation (“C. I. T.”) such of his notes and mortgages as he chose to sell and as were “acceptable to” C. I. T., and agreeing, among other things, to endorse with “full recourse” certain of the notes accepted and purchased by C. I. T., and to purchase from C. I. T. any automobile that it repossessed or recovered under a note and mortgage bought from him, at a cash price, payable on demand, equal to the then unpaid balance of the note and mortgage, or, failing in that obligation, to pay to C. I. T. the amount of any loss incurred by it in selling such repossessed automobile. The letter also stated that the provisions for “reserves as outlined in [C. I. T.’s] reserve arrangement effective at the time paper [was] purchased by [it],” would apply to such sales, and that 3 times in each 12-month period, if-the dealer was not then indebted" to C. I. T., the latter would pay to the dealer so much of his reserves as exceeded 3% of' the then aggregate unpaid balances on paper purchased from the dealer. Upon consummating a time sale of an automobile with his customer in the manner stated, the taxpayer delivered the automobile to his customer, along with a bill of sale, subject to the mortgage, which enabled the customer to register, license and use it. Soon afterward the taxpayer, pursuant to his letter to C. I. T. just referred to, endorsed the note (and assigned the mortgage) to C. I. T., in some cases without recourse' and in others with full recourse, and forwarded the same to C. I. T. for purchase. Upon receipt and acceptance of the note and mortgage, C. I. T. remitted to the taxpayer the. major percentage (not specified in the evidence or findings) of the agreed price, therefor, but retained the remaining percentage and credited.it on its books- to a “Dealers Reserve Account” in the -name of the taxpayer, for the purpose of securing performance -by him of his obligations to C. I. T. As in the Hansen case, the taxpayer recorded on his books in the year the installment paper was sold, and included in his income tax return for that year, the cash received from C. I. T., but he did not accrue on his books, or include in his return, the percentage of the price that was retained by C. I. T. and credited to his reserve account. And, as in the Hansen case, the Commissioner proposed the assessment of deficiencies in income taxes against the taxpayer for the years involved upon the grounds earlier stated. The taxpayer sought a redetermination in the Tax Court which, after hearing, sustained the Commissioner, but, on the taxpayer’s petition for review, the Eighth Circuit reversed, 253 F. 2d 735, and we granted certiorari for the reasons already stated, 358 U. S. 879. Petitioners in No. 512, Clifton E. Baird and Violet L,. Baird (“taxpayers”), are husband and wife and, during the years 1952, 1953 and 1954 here involved, they were also. partners in , a firm known as “Baird Trailer Sales” (“the partnership”) which was engaged primarily in'selling house trailers at Salem, Indiana. The partnership kept its books and filed its partnership (informational) income tax returns on a fiscal year accrual basis, but the taxpayers kept their personal books, and filed their returns, on a calendar year cash basis. During the years involved the partnership sold many of its trailers on “the installment basis,” the unpaid purchase price of each trailer being evidenced and secured by an assignable or negotiable instrument, retaining in the partnership defeasible title to or a lien on the trailer, signed by the customer, delivered to the partnership, and payable to it in monthly installments over an agreed period. The partnership was not legally obligated to sell its installment paper but its limited operating capital made it necessary, as a practical matter, to do so. Prior to the transactions here involved the partnership entered into contracts, with Minnehoma Financial Company (“Minnehoma”), of Tulsa, Oklahoma, Michigan National Bank, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Midland Discount Corporation (“Midland”), of Cincinnati, Ohio, providing for the sale and purchase of such of the partnership’s installment paper as it offered for sale and as those companies were willing to buy, and throughout the years in question the partnership sold installment paper to each of those companies under those contracts. It was provided in the Minnehoma contract that the partnership, among other liabilities assumed by it to Minnehoma, would unconditionally' guarantee payment when due of all sums called for by any installment paper purchased from it, and, that Minnehoma, upon receipt and acceptance of such installment paper, would remit to the partnership 95% of the agreed price to be paid therefor, but would retain the remaining 5% of the price and .credit it (and also, if it wished, a portion of the “finance charge”) tó a reserve account on its books in the name of the partnership, as security for performance of all endorser, guarantor, and other liabilities- of the partnership to Minnehoma. Under an oral contract with Michigan National Bank, the bank agreed that, upon receipt and acceptance of installment paper endorsed by the partnership with full recourse, it would immediately pay to the partnership a percentage (not specified in the evidence or findings) of the price to be paid therefor, but that the remaining percentage of the price would be retained and credited to a “reserve account” in the bank in the name of the partnership. That reserve account was contemporaneously assigned to the bank by the partnership under the “collateral assignment” shown in the margin. The contract with Midland was evidenced by two letters. In essence they stated that upon receipt and acceptance of installment paper, endorsed by the partnership with full recourse, Midland would “advance” 97% of the price to be paid therefor if on new trailers and 95% of the price if on used trailers, and that the “differentials of 3% and 5%” would be retained and credited on Midland’s books to a reserve account in the name of the partnership, for the purpose of securing performance of its obligations to Midland. They also stated that, when a particular note has been' paid out, the amount credited to the reserve" on account of that note would be immediately paid to the dealer, and that when the “reserve fund exceeds 10% of [the partnership’s] outstandings, the excess will be paid [to the partnership] automatically.” Here, as in the Hansen and Glover cases, the partnership did not accrue on its books, and the taxpayers did not include in their individual returns, in any of the years here involved, the amounts that were retained by Minnehoma, Michigan National Bank and Midland and credited on their respective books to the partnership’s reserve accounts, and, again, as in the Hansen and Glover cases, the Commissioner proposed assessment against the taxpayers of deficiencies in income taxes , for the years involved upon the grounds previously stated. Similarly, the taxpayers sought a redetermination in the Tax Court which, after hearing, sustained the Commissioner. On the taxpayers’ petition for review, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 256 F. 2d 918, and we granted certiorari for the reasons already stated, 358 U. S. 918. We turn, first, to the taxpayers’ contention that, in substance, the purchaser, not the dealer, obtains the loan directly from a finance company, and that the percentage of the loan which is retained by the finance company— although credited on its books to a reserve account in the name of the dealer as collateral security for the payment of his liabilities to the finance company — is the property of the purchaser of the vehicle, not the dealer, and therefore may not be regarded as accrued income to the dealer. The basis óf the contention (filling in the omitted but necessarily involved steps) is that each of these- transactions is a single, “three-cornered” one between the dealer, the finance company and the purchaser; that, in substance, the dealer agrees to sell the vehicle .to the purchaser for “a down payment plus cash” (the term “cash” as here used must necessarily refer to the unpaid balance of the. purchase price); that the purchaser agrees immediately to obtain from the finance company, and it agrees -to make to the purchaser, a loan, on the security of the vehicle, in an amount at least equal to the unpaid balance of the purchase price owing by the purchaser to the dealer for the vehicle; and that the purchaser agrees immediately to pay, or to direct 4he finance company to pay, to the dealer, out of the proceeds of the loan, an amount equal to 95% (in most instances) of the unpaid balance of the purchase price owing by the purchaser to the dealer for the vehicle. Although this leaves an unpaid balance of the purchase price of the vehicle (5% in most instances) still owing by the purchaser to the dealer, it also leayes in possession of the finance company, out of the proceeds of the loan, an amount at least equal to that 5%. Nevertheless the purchaser, with the consent of the dealer, agrees with the finance company that the latter shall retain that 5% and credit it on its books to a reserve account in the name of the dealer, as collateral security for the payment of his contingent liabilities to the finance company. On these assumptions of fact the taxpayers contend that the, reserves retained, by the finance companies, though credited on their books to the dealers’ reserve accounts, are only contingently so credited and are subject to cancellation if the purchaser fails.to pay out his loan and, at all events, the reserves belong to the purchasers, and should not be regarded as accrued income of the dealers. The Ninth Circuit in the Hansen case, heavily relying upon the opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Texas Trailercoach, Inc., v. Commissioner, 251 F. 2d 395, adopted this theory and largely rested its decision upon that ground, 258 F. 2d, at 588, and, to a lesser extent, so did the Eighth Circuit in the Glover case, 253 F. 2d, at 737. The taxpayers contend here that such is the substance, if hot the form, of their' transactions and that, inasmuch as taxation depends on substance and not on form, the Hansen and Glover cases should be affirmed and the Baird case should be reversed on this ground alone. We agree, of course, that the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance, not the form, of the transaction, Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331, 334; Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S. 252, 255; Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170, 174; Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242, 254; United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 168, but we think that the taxpayers have assumed facts which are contrary to the records and are wholly without substance. These records clearly show that, in every instance, the installment paper was executed by. the purchaser and made payable to the dealer (though in the Hansen case' “at the office of” GMAC, and in the Baird case “at the office of” Minnehoma), and that the same was later assigned or endorsed by the dealer and sent to the finance company for purchase, under and subject to the dealer’s contractually assumed contingent liabilities to the finance company respecting it, and that, in every instance, the finance company, upon receipt and acceptance of the installment paper and of the dealer’s obligations respecting it, immediately paid to the dealer a major percentage of the agreed or formula fixed price for the paper; but, pursuant to the terms of the dealer’s contract with the finance company, the latter retained the remaining percentage of the price and credited it on its books to the dealer’s reserve account, as collateral security for the payment of his contingent liabilities to the finance company on. such installment paper. It is therefore clear that the retained percentages of the purchase price of the installment paper, from the time they were entered on the books of the finance companies as liabilities to the respective dealers, were vested in and belonged to the respective dealers, subject only to their several pledges thereof to the respective finance companies as collateral security for the payment of their then contingent liabilities to the finance companies. This brings us to the question whether amounts of purchase price withheld by finance companies as security to cover possible losses on installment paper purchased from dealers, who employ the accrual method of accounting, constitute income to them at the time the withheld amounts are recorded on the books of the finance companies as liabilities to the dealers. The principles governing the accrual and reporting of income by taxpayers who employ the accrual basis have long been settled by the opinions of this Court, Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 281; Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U. S. 182, 184; Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193, 199. In Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, supra, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, said: “Keeping accounts and making returns on the accrual basis, as distinguished from the cash basis, import that it is the right to receive and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in gross income. When the right to receive an amount becomes fixed, the right accrues.” 292 U. S., at 184-185. Those principles are not questioned here, but the parties differ respecting their application to the facts of these cases. The taxpayers contend, first, that they cannot presently compel the finance companies to pay to them the amounts of their reserve accounts, and therefore they have not acquired a presently enforcible right to recover those reserves, and, hence, they should.not be deemed to constitute accrued income to them. Inasmuch as these records show that the pay-out period for automobiles varies from 12 to 36 months and for house trailers from 36 to 60 months, it is doubtless true that the taxpayers, having pledged their reserve accounts to the finance companies as collateral security, cannot presently compel the finance companies, to pay over their reserves. But the question is not whether the taxpayers can presently recover their reserves, for, as stated, it is the time of acquisition of the fixed right to receive the reserves and not the time of their actual receipt that determines whether or not the reserves have accrued and are taxable. The taxpayers next contend that the amounts that were retained by the finance companies and entered on their books as liabilities to the dealers under their reserve accounts, were subject to such contingencies that it could not have been known, in the year of such retentions and credits, what amount of those reserves would .actually be received by them and, hence, they did not acquire, in the year of such retentions and credits, a fixed right to receive: — in a later year or at any time — rthe amounts so withheld and credited to them, and therefore those amounts did not constitute accrued income to them. It is true that the amounts retained by any one of the finance companies, and entered on its books as a liability to a particular dealer, are subject to such liabilities as the dealer may have contractually assumed to the finance company, but only the obligations of the dealer to the finance company arising from those liabilities may be- offset against a like amount in .the dealer’s reserve account. ' Hence, those liabilities and obligations provide the only conditions that can affect- full cash payment to the-dealer of his reserve account. No amount may be charged by the finance company against the dealer’s reserve’account which he has not thus authorized. It follows that only one or the other of two things can happen to the dealer’s reserve account: (1) the finance company is bound to pay the full amount to the dealer in cash, or (2) if the dealer has incurred -obligations to the finance company under his giiaranty, endorsement, or contract of sale, of the installment paper, the finance company may apply so much’of the reserve as is necessary to discharge.those' obligations, and is bound to pay the remainder to the dealer in cash. Does the dealer- “receive” funds which are so taken from his reserve account and applied-to the payment of his obligations to the finance company? The dealer agreed in his contract with the finance company to receive his reserve in offset payment of- his obligations to the finance company and the balance in cash. ■ It would therefore seem that funds in the dealer’s reserve which are applied to the payment of his obligations to the finance company are as much “received” by him as those which the finance company pays to him in cash. The Seventh Circuit took that view in the Baird case, saying: “Ultimately only two things could happen to the funds in the dealer’s reserve accounts: either the amounts would be paid to the partnership in cash or they would be used to satisfy the partnership’s other obligations to the finance companies.” 256 F. 2d, at 924. In any realistic view we think that the dealer has “received” his reserve account whether it is applied, as he authorized, to the payment of his obligations to the finance company, or is paid to him in cash. It follows that the amounts (of purchase price of the installment paper) that were withheld by the finance companies constituted accrued income to these accrual basis dealers at the time the withheld amounts were entered on the books of the finance companies as liabilities to the dealers, for at that time the dealers acquired a fixed right to receive the amounts so retained by the finance companies. The taxpayers complain that such a holding will unfairly require them to pay taxes upon funds which are not available to them for that purpose. Though the funds are not presently available to the taxpayers for the payment of taxes, they are nevertheless owned by the taxpayers, and the latter cannot expect to collateralize their liabilities, for periods running, from 1 to 5 years, by the use of their accrued but untaxed funds. Moreover, it is a normal result of the accrual basis of accounting and reporting that taxes frequently must be paid on accrued funds before receipt of the cash with which to pay .them, just as the Ninth Circuit stated in the Hansen case, 258 F. 2d, at 587. See Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 281, 284-285. To permit accrual basis taxpayers to escape accrual and taxation, in a particular year, of such portions of their sales as they may permit to be retained by buyers, as collateral security, well might violate § 42 (a) of the . 1939 Internal Revenue Code as amended, and, moreover, might well afford opportunities to accrual basis taxpayers to allocate income, to years deemed most advantageous. The Commissioner has broad powers in determining whether accounting methods used by a taxpayer clearly reflect' income, Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 449; Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180, 189-190, and under § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 41, the Commissioner, believing that the accounting method employed by a taxpayer. “does not clearly reflect the income,” may require that “.computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in [his] opinion . . . does clearly reflect the income.” Since 1931 the Internal Revenue Service has consistently maintained that amounts withheld by finance companies to cover possible losses on notes purchased from dealers constitute income to dealers, who employ the accrual method of accounting, from the time the amounts are recorded on the books of the finance companies as liabilities to the dealers. That position, in general, accords with our view. The taxpayers have argued that portions of the Dealers Reserve Accounts consist of percentages of “finance charges” which the finance companies agreed to allow them, and that such percentages of the “finance charges,” not being a part of the purchase price of the installment paper, should in no event be regarded as accrued income to the dealers. However,- the respective taxpayers, each of whom had the burden of showing that he did not owe the taxes which the Commissioner proposed to' assess against him, wholly failed to adduce evidence to support their claims. They failed even to adduce evidence showing whether any percentages of the “finance charges” that may have been allowed to them by the respective finance companies were entered oh the books of the fipance companies as credits . to the respective “Dealers Reserve Accounts,” and if so> whether such .percentages of the “finance charges” so credited had been identified and separated in-.character and amount from the percentages of the purchase price of the installment paper that were retained by the finance companies and entered on their books as liabilities to the dealers in their respective Dealers Reserve Accounts. For these reasons the respective taxpayers have wholly failed to sustain the burden of showing that any part of the amounts credited on the books of the finance companies to the respective Dealers Reserve Accounts was entitled to special treatment. The judgments in No. 380 and No. 381 are reversed and the judgment in No. 512 is affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. The Sixth Circuit in Schaeffer v. Commissioner, 258 F. 2d 861, sustained the Commissioner’s position. Also the Tax Court since Shoemaker-Nash, Inc., v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A. 417 (1940), has by a long line of decisions consistently sustained the Commissioner’s position. On the. other hand the Fourth Circuit has sustained the taxpayers’ position in Johnson v. Commissioner, 233 F. 2d 952. And the Fifth Circuit has sustained the taxpayers’ position in Texas Trailercoach, Inc., v. Commissioner, 251 F. 2d 395, West Pontiac, Inc., v. Commissioner, 257 F. 2d 810, and in several judgments (without opinions) entered on- stipulations specifically presenting anew the same issue which that court had decided in Texas Trailercoach, Inc., v. Commissioner, supra. In entering those judgments (in United States v. Hines Pontiac, 2 P-H Fed. Tax Rep. 2d 5694, United States v. Modern Olds, Inc., 2 P-H Fed. Tax Rep. 2d 5713, and Kilborn v. Commissioner, 2 P-H Fed. Tax Rep. 2d 5812), the Fifth Circuit adhered to its decision in Texas Trailercoach, Inc., v. Commissioner, supra. At the very beginning of the form there is a recital that “The undersigned seller, [the dealer] hereby sells, and the undersigned purchaser or purchasers, jointly and severally, hereby purehase(s), subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter' set forth, the following property, delivery and acceptance of which in good order are hereby acknowledged .by purchaser,” and then follows a detailed description of the automobile, and a coniputation of the amounts which support the “Time (Deferred) Balance” that is payable by the purchaser in monthly installments. The reverse side of the form recites that “[f]or the purpose'of securing payment of the obligation héreunder, seller reserves title, and shall have a. security interest, in said property until said amount is fully paid in 'cash.” It then goes on'to specify the various conditions to be observed by the purchaser, which are' usually found in conditional sale contracts. That assignment, so far as pertinent, provides: “For vahie received, undersigned [the dealer] does hereby sell, ■assign and transfer to the General Motors Acceptance Corporation his . . . right, title and interest in and to-the within contract, herewith submitted for.purchase by it, and the property covered thereby and authorizes said General Motors Acceptance Corporation to do every act and thing necessary to collect and discharge the same. “In consideration of your purchase of the within contract, under-. signed [the dealer] guarantees payment of the full amount remaining unpaid hereon, and covenants if default be made in payment of any instalment herein to pay the ful[ amount then unpaid to General Motors Acceptance Corporation upon demands. . .” This record does not contain C. I. T.’s “reserve arrangement.” The pertinent parts of the taxpayer’s letter, referred to in the text, may be more fully summarized as follows: C. I. T. was to buy from the taxpayer such of his notes and mortgages as he chose to sell and as were “acceptable to” C. I. T. Some of the notes and mortgages were to be endorsed by the dealer to C. I. T. without recourse, but “paper covering commercial cars used for long distance hauling, commercial ears of more than two tons capacity, busses, cars used for taxi, jitney, ‘drive-yourself’ service, or cars sold to relatives or employees” was to bear the dealer’s “full recourse endorsement.” ' Provisions for “reserves as outlined in [C. I. T.’s] reserve arrangement effective at the time paper [was] purchased by [it],” were to be applicable to such sales, but as earlier observed this record does not contain C. I. T.’s “reserve arrangement.” Three times in each i2-month period, if the dealer was not then indebted to C. I. T-., the latter would pay to the dealer his “accumulated reserves in excess of 3% of the then aggregate unpaid balances oh paper purchased from [him],” but if C. I. T. stopped buying installment paper from the dealer the former was authorized to “hold and apply all reserves until liquidation of all paper purchased from [the dealer was] completed.” The taxpayer was to purchase from C. I. T. “each repossessed or recovered car tendered at [the- dealer’s] place of business within 90 days after maturity of the earliest instalment still unpaid,” at a price, payable on demand, equal to “the unpaid balance due on the car,” or, if the dealer failed to do so, he was to pay to C. I. T. the amount of “any deficiency incurred by [C. I. T.] in the resale of such repossessed cars. '. . .” If because of prepayment of a note by a maker, C. I. T. refunded any part of a “service charge,” the taxpayer agreed to pay to C. I. T. the same percentages, if any, of the refund as had originally been credited to his reserve account. Th$ material parts of the contract between the partnership arid Minnehoma may be summarized as follows: Upon receipt and acceptance of installment paper from .the partnership, Minnehoma would remit to the partnership 95% -of the price to be paid therefor, but would retain .the remaining 5% of th^ price and- credit it (and ■ also, if- it wished, a portion of the “finance' charge” paid by the maker) to a reserve account on its books in the name of the partnership. The partnership unconditionally guaranteed payment, when due of all sums called for by the installment paper, and guaranteed that the makers would perforin all obligations assumed by them under that paper, and that in the event the makers failed to pay any installment when -due or to keep any obligation assumed by them under the installment paper, the partnership would repurchase such installment paper from Minnehoma, upon demand, at a price equal to the unpaid balance thereon. Minnehoma was authorized to charge against the partnership’s reserve account any sums for which the partnership might be or become indebted to Minnehoma; and at such times as — after the payment of all contingent liabilities of the-partnership to Minne.homa — the amount then credited to the partnership’s reserve account exceeded 15% of the aggregate unpaid balances of all outstanding installment paper so sold and purchased, Minriehoma would pay such excess, once each month, to the partnership;, and when all installment paper purchased by Minnehoma from the partnership had been paid in full, Minnehoma would pay to the partnership the balance of its reserve account. “Collateral Assignment. “For Valuable Consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned hereby sells, assigns, transfers, and conveys unto Michigan National Bank, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, its successors, and assigns forever, irrevocably, all of his, its, or their right, title and interest in certain sums of money now on deposit or that may hereafter be deposited in the Michigan National Bank, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, and identified and represented by Reserve account in the name of the undersigned in the Michigan National Bank. “This Assignment and Transfer is made as collateral security for the paymént of the direct and indirect liability of the undersigned to the said Michigan National Bank, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, and to secure the payment of the several notes representing said direct and indirect liability and any renewal or renewals thereof, or any installment payment or payments and to secure any obligation . . . which the undersigned may owe to said Michigan National Bank, of Grand Rapids, Michigan. “In the event of default in the payment of said liability or any installment thereof, or any of the several notes at the time when same shall fall due or in the payment of the interest thereon or any part of the principal of said liability then the Michigan National Bank, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, at their election, notice of said election being hereby expressly waived, may apply the total of said sums of money represented by said. Reserve account at the date of election or any part thereof to meet the default in the liability. "Whenever the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full the Michigan National Bank, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, shall reassign said sums of money represented by said Reserve account along with all right, title and interest back to the undersigned. “If in the opinion of the bank the undersigned dealer’s account is in good standing, all sums in this reserve account in excess of ten per cent (10%) of the gross unpaid balance of all contracts outstanding on February 28 of each year will promptly be returned to the undersigned dealer.” Midland’s vice president who handled these transactions with the partnership testified relative to the purpose of the reserve as follows: . “A. Well, we buy this paper from all of our dealers on a straight endorsed basis, in other words, it’s fully recoursed. If a trailer is given to a note-maker and the note-maker can’t pay for it, the dealer has to’take it back, [and] if he can’t pay us . . . the net pay-off on the trailer, we would take the reserve money to liquidate the account.” The record in the Hansen case shows that' the conditional sale contracts were made between the dealer and-the‘purchaser of the vehicle, and that the latter acknowledged to the dealer “delivery and acceptance of [the automobile] in good order” (see Note 2) ; that the dealer consistently assigned his conditional sale contracts to GMAC by executing the form of assignment printed at the foot of the form and sending the same to GMAC for purchase, guaranteeing payment of the full amount remaining unpaid thereon and covenanting that if default be made in the payment of any installment thereof to pay the full amount then unpaid to GMAC upon demand (see Note 3)'. The record in the Glover case shows that the notes and mortgages were payable to the dealer and that, upon a sale of them, he endorsed them, in-some cases without recourse and in others with “full recourse,” and forwarded them to C. I. T. for purchase, subject, of course, to the various obligations he had undertaken to C. I. T., in respect thereto that are shown in Note 5. The record in the Baird case shows that the partnership entered into contracts with its customers,- taking assignable or negotiable instruments retaining defeasible title to or a lien on the trailers evidencing and securing the unpaid purchase price of the trailers; that it assigned its conditional sale contracts to Minnehoma with the guaranties and covenants shown in Note 6; that it endorsed with full recourse, sold and delivered to Michigan National Bank certain of its notes and mortgages, under the further guaranties contained in the “collateral assignment” shown in Note 7; and that it also endorsed with full recourse, sold and delivered other of its notes and mortgages to Midland, and authorized it to retain a percentage of the purchase price to secure performance of its endorser liabilities to Midland. See Note 8. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 729; Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 9; Tressler v. Commissioner, 228 F. 2d 356, 359, n. 6 (C. A. 9th Cir.). Section 42 (a) (as amended by § 114, Revenue Act of 1941, c. 412, 55 Stat. 687), 26 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) §42, so far as pertinent, provides: “ (a) General Rule — The amount of all items of gross income shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting permitted under section 41, any such amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a different period.” The first publication of its views was in G. C. M. 9571, X-2 Cum. Bull. 153- (1931). Its most recently published views on the subject are contained in Rev. Rul. 57-2, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 17, which, so far as pertinent, provides: “Amounts withheld by banks or finance companies to cover possible losses on notes purchased • from dealers' constitute., income to dealers employing the accrual method of accounting, to the extent of their interest therein at- the. time the' amounts are recorded on the books of the -bank or finance company as- a liability to the dealer . . . .” As to the term “finance charges,” the records and briefs in these cases .make one thing clear: it is not a term of art. Its meaning appears to be both erratic and elastic. Nor have we been told by any one of these taxpayers what he intends to be included in his use of the term. ,

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE et al. v. ELLIOTT No. 85-588. Argued April 21, 1986 Decided July 7, 1986 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Powell, Rehnquist, and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, and III of which Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 799. Marshall, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Beauchamp E. Brogan argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Alan M. Parker, Catherine S. Mizell, G. Ray Bratton, N. Richard Glassman, John Barry Burgess, Tommy Coley, pro se, and W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee. Ronald L. Ellis argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Julius LeVonne Chambers, Eric Schnapper, Judith Reed, and Richard H. Dinkins. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Kansas et al. by Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, and David D. Plinsky, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows, Charles A. Graddick of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, Jim Smith of Florida, Richard Opper of Guam, Corinne Watanabe of Hawaii, James T. Jones of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinios, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, James E. Tierney of Maine, Stephen H. Sachs of Maryland, Francis X. Bellotti of Massachusetts, Edward L. Pittman of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, W. Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Michael Turpén of Oklahoma, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, Michael Dun-ston of The Virgin Islands, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, and A. G. McClintock of Wyoming; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell. Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Johnny J. Butler, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Vella M. Fink, and Mark S. Flynn filed a brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. A state Administrative Law Judge determined that petitioner University of Tennessee (hereafter petitioner or University) was not motivated by racial prejudice in seeking to discharge respondent. The question presented is whether this finding is entitled to preclusive effect in federal court, where respondent has raised discrimination claims under various civil rights laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U. S. C. § 1983. h-i In 1981, petitioner informed respondent, a black employee of the University’s Agricultural Extension Service, that he would be discharged for inadequate work performance and misconduct on the job. Respondent requested a hearing under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101 et seq. (1985), to contest his proposed termination. Prior to the start of the hearing, respondent also filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, alleging that his proposed discharge was racially motivated and seeking relief under Title VII and other civil rights statutes, including 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The relief sought included damages, an injunction prohibiting respondent’s discharge, and classwide relief from alleged patterns of discrimination by petitioner. The District Court initially entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the University from taking any job action against respondent, but later lifted this order and permitted the state administrative proceeding to go forward. App. to Pet. for Cert. A27. There followed a hearing at which an administrative assistant to the University’s Vice President for Agriculture presided as an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The focus of the hearing was on 10 particular charges that the University gave as grounds for respondent’s discharge. Respondent denied these charges, which he contended were motivated by racial prejudice, and also argued that the University’s subjecting him to the charges violated his rights under the Constitution, Title VII, and other federal statutes. The ALJ held that he lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate respondent’s federal civil rights claims, but did allow respondent to present, as an affirmative defense, evidence that the charges against him were actually motivated by racial prejudice and hence not a proper basis for his proposed discharge. Id., at A44-45. After hearing extensive evidence, the ALJ found that the University had proved some but not all of the charges against respondent, and that the charges were not racially motivated. Id., at A177-179. Concluding that the proposed discharge of respondent was too severe a penalty, the ALJ ordered him transferred to a new assignment with supervisors other than those with whom he had experienced conflicts. Id., at A179-181. Respondent appealed to the University’s Vice President for Agriculture, who affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Id., at A33-35. The Vice President stated that his review of the record persuaded him that the proposed discharge of respondent had not been racially motivated. Id., at A34. Respondent did not seek review of these administrative proceedings in the Tennessee courts; instead, he returned to federal court to pursue his civil rights claims. There, petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that respondent’s suit was an improper collateral attack on the ALJ’s ruling, which petitioner contended was entitled to pre-clusive effect. The District Court agreed, holding that the civil rights statutes on which respondent relied “were not intended to afford the plaintiff a means of relitigating what plaintiff has heretofore litigated over a five-month period.” Id., at A32. Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the District Court’s judgment. 766 F. 2d 982 (1985). As regards respondent’s Title VII claim, the Court of Appeals looked for guidance to our decision in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U. S. 461 (1982). While Kremer teaches that final state-court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in Title VII actions, it indicates that unreviewed determinations by state agencies stand on a different footing. The Sixth Circuit found the following passage from Kremer directly on point: “EEOC review [pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b)] of discrimination charges previously rejected by state agencies would be pointless if the federal courts were bound by such agency decisions. Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F. 2d 447, 450, n. 1 (CA7 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 928 (1975). Nor is it plausible to suggest that Congress intended federal courts to be bound further by state administrative decisions than by decisions of the EEOC. Since it is settled that decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a trial de novo in federal court, it is clear that unreviewed administrative determinations by state agencies also should not preclude such review even if such a decision were to be afforded pre-clusive effect in a State’s own courts. Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F. 2d 1330 (CA5 1978), Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., supra; Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F. 2d 9 (CA6 1972); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F. 2d 889 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 918 (1972).” Id., at 470, n. 7. The court accordingly held that res judicata did not foreclose a trial de novo on respondent’s Title VII claim. The Sixth Circuit found the question of applying preclusion principles to respondent’s claims under § 1983 and other civil rights statutes a more difficult question. It held that 28 U. S. C. § 1738, which concerns the preclusive effect of “judicial proceedings of any [state] court,” does not require that federal courts be bound by the unreviewed findings of state administrative agencies. The court also declined to fashion a federal common law of preclusion, declaring that “[a]t least implicit in the legislative history of section 1983 is the recognition that state determination of issues relevant to constitutional adjudication is not an adequate substitute for full access to federal court.” 766 F. 2d, at 992. The court recognized that a similar argument for denying res judicata effect to state-court judgments in subsequent § 1983 actions was rejected in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980), and Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U. S. 75 (1984), but distinguished those cases as based on the explicit command of § 1738. We granted certiorari to consider petitioner’s contention that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that state administrative factfinding is never entitled to preclusive effect in actions under Title VII or the Reconstruction civil rights statutes. 474 U. S. 1004 (1985). I — I I — I Title 28 U. S. C. § 1738 governs the preclusive effect to be given the judgments and records of state courts, and is not applicable to the unreviewed state administrative factfind-ing at issue in this case. However, we have frequently fashioned federal common-law rules of preclusion in the absence of a governing statute. See, e. g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313 (1971); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 289-291 (1906). Although § 1738 is a governing statute with regard to the judgments and records of state courts, because § 1738 antedates the development of administrative agencies it clearly does not represent a congressional determination that the decisions of state administrative agencies should not be given preclusive effect. Accordingly, we will consider whether a rule of preclusion is appropriate, first with respect to respondent’s Title VII claim, and next with respect to his claims under the Constitution and the Reconstruction civil rights statutes. Ill Under 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in investigating discrimination charges, must give “substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local [employment discrimination] law.” As we noted in Kremer, 456 U. S., at 470, n. 7, it would make little sense for Congress to write such a provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in federal court. Moreover, our decision in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U. S. 840 (1976), strongly supports respondent’s contention that Congress intended one in his position to have a trial de novo on his Title VII claim. In Chandler, we held that a federal employee whose discrimination claim was rejected by her employing agency after an administrative hearing was entitled to a trial de novo in federal court on her Title VII claim. After reviewing in considerable detail the language of Title VII and the history of the 1972 amendments to the statute, we concluded: “The legislative history of the 1972 amendments reinforces the plain meaning of the statute and confirms that Congress intended to accord federal employees the same right to a trial de novo [following administrative proceedings] as is enjoyed by private-sector employees and employees of state governments and political subdivisions under the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id., at 848. Like the plaintiff in Chandler, the respondent in this case pursued his Title VII action following an administrative proceeding at which the employing agency rejected a discrimination claim. It would be contrary to the rationale of Chandler to apply res judicata to deny respondent a trial de novo on his Title VII claim. Invoking the presumption against implied repeal, petitioner distinguishes Chandler as involving a federal agency determination not entitled to full faith and credit under § 1738. Reply Brief for Petitioners 16. This argument is based on the erroneous premise that § 1738 applies to state administrative proceedings. See Part II, supra. The question actually before us is whether a common-law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting Title VII. On the basis of our analysis in Kremer and Chandler of the language and legislative history of Title VII, we conclude that the Sixth Circuit correctly held that Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims. > 1 — ( This Court has held that § 1738 requires that state-court judgments be given both issue and claim preclusive effect in subsequent actions under 42 U. S. C. §1983. Allen v. McCurry, supra (issue preclusion); Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, supra (claim preclusion). Those decisions are not controlling in this case, where § 1738 does not apply; nonetheless, they support the view that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, did not intend to create an exception to general rules of preclusion. As we stated in Allen: “[Njothing in the language of §1983 remotely expresses any congressional intent to contravene the common-law rules of preclusion or to repeal the express statutory requirements of the predecessor of 28 U. S. C. § 1738. . . . “Moreover, the legislative history of § 1983 does not in any clear way suggest that Congress intended to repeal or restrict the traditional doctrines of preclusion.” 449 U. S., at 97-98. The Court’s discussion in Allen suggests that it would have reached the same result even in the absence of § 1738. We also see no reason to suppose that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, wished to foreclose the adaptation of traditional principles of preclusion to such subsequent developments as the burgeoning use of administrative adjudication in the 20th century. We have previously recognized that it is sound policy to apply principles of issue preclusion to the factfinding of administrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity. In a unanimous decision in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U. S. 394 (1966), we held that the fact-finding of the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals was binding in a subsequent action in the Court of Claims involving a contract dispute between the same parties. We explained: “Although the decision here rests upon the agreement of the parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act, we note that the result we reach is harmonious with general principles of collateral estoppel. Occasionally courts have used language to the effect that res judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such language is certainly too broad. . When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.” Id., at 421-422 (1966) (footnotes omitted). Thus, Utah Construction, which we subsequently approved in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co., 456 U. S., at 484-485, n. 26, teaches that giving preclusive effect to administrative factfinding serves the value underlying general principles of collateral estoppel: enforcing repose. This value, which encompasses both the parties’ interest in avoiding the cost and vexation of repetitive litigation and the public’s interest in conserving judicial resources, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S., at 94, is equally implicated whether factfinding is done by a federal or state agency. Having federal courts give preclusive effect to the fact-finding of state administrative tribunals also serves the value of federalism. Significantly, all of the opinions in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U. S. 261 (1980), express the view that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels the States to give preclusive effect to the factfindings of an administrative tribunal in a sister State. Id., at 281 (opinion of Stevens, J.); 287-289 (White, J., concurring in judgment); 291-292 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Full Faith and Credit Clause is of course not binding on federal courts, but we can certainly look to the policies underlying the Clause in fashioning federal common-law rules of preclusion. “Perhaps the major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to act as a nationally unifying force,” id., at 289 (White, J., concurring in judgment), and this purpose is served by giving preclusive effect to state administrative factfinding rather than leaving the courts of a second forum, state or federal, free to reach conflicting results. Accordingly, we hold that when a state agency “acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,” Utah Construction & Mining Co., supra, at 422, federal courts must give the agency’s factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State’s courts. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Respondent’s complaint also included claims under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, and 1988, as well as the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. App. 17. The hearing continued intermittently for more than five months, involved more than 100 witnesses and 150 exhibits, and generated over 5,000 pages of transcript. App. to Pet. for Cert. A27. In Kremer, an employee filed a Title VII discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 referred the case to the New York State Division of Human Rights, the agency charged with administering the State’s employment discrimination laws. The state agency rejected the employee’s discrimination claim, a judgment that was affirmed both at the agency appellate level and by a reviewing state court. The employee then brought a Title VII action, in which the employer raised a res judicata defense. This Court held that under 28 U. S. C. § 1738 the state court’s judgment affirming the state agency’s finding of no discrimination was entitled to preclu-sive effect in the employee’s Title VII action. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1738 provides in pertinent part: “The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any . . . State, Territory or Possession [of the United States], or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form. “Such . . . records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.” The fact that respondent requested the administrative hearing rather than being compelled to participate in it does not weigh in favor of preclusion. “[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 48 (1974) (footnote omitted). As one respected authority on administrative law has observed: “The law of res judicata, much more than most other segments of law, has rhyme, reason, and rhythm — something in common with good poetry. Its inner logic is rather satisfying. It consists entirely of an elaboration of the obvious principle that a controversy should be resolved once, not more than once. The principle is as much needed for administrative decisions as for judicial decisions. To the extent that administrative adjudications resemble courts’ decisions — a very great extent — the law worked out for courts does and should apply to agencies.” 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §21.9, p. 78 (2d ed. 1983). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83, p. 269 (1982), reaches a similar conclusion: “Where an administrative forum has the essential procedural characteristics of a court, ... its determinations should be accorded the same finality that is accorded the judgment of a court. The importance of bringing a legal controversy to conclusion is generally no less when the tribunal is an administrative tribunal than when it is a court.” Congress of course may decide, as it did in enacting Title VII, that other values outweigh the policy of according finality to state administrative factfinding. See Part III, supra. Respondent argues against preclusion on the grounds that the administrative hearing in this case did not satisfy the standard set out in Utah Construction & Mining Co., Brief for Respondent 39-76, and that the ALJ’s factfinding would not be given preclusive effect in the Tennessee courts, id., at 99-105. These contentions were not passed upon below, and we leave them for resolution on remand.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. CLARK, GUARDIAN No. 78-1513. Argued October 31, 1979 Decided February 26, 1980 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BrennaN, White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 34. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stewart, J., joined, post, p. 36. Harriet S. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, and Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook. Edward L. Merrigan argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Toby S. Edelman, Edward C. King, and Bruce K. Miller filed a brief for Barbara Jenkins as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents the question whether illegitimate children of a federal civil service employee are entitled to survivors’ benefits under the Civil Service Retirement Act when the children once lived with the employee in a familial relationship, but were not living with the employee at the time of his death. I George Isaacson and the appellee Patricia Clark lived together from 1965 through 1971 without benefit of matrimony. They had two children, Shawn and Tricia Clark, born in 1968 and 1971, respectively, and the four lived together as a family. After the appellee and Isaacson separated, the appellee filed a state-court action in Montana seeking a determination of the paternity of the children. In June 1972, the Montana court issued a decree determining that Isaacson was the natural father of the children and ordering him to contribute to their support. Isaacson provided monthly support payments up to the time of his death in 1974. At the time of. death, Isaacson was a federal employee covered by the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U. S. C. § 8331 et seq. The Act provides that each surviving child of a deceased federal employee is entitled to a survivors’ annuity. 5 U. S. C. § 8341 (e)(1). All legitimate and adopted children under 18 years of age qualify for these benefits, but stepchildren or “recognized natural” children under 18 may recover only if they “lived with the employee ... in a regular parent-child relationship.” 5 U. S. C. § 8341 (a)(3)(A). In September 1974, the Civil Service Commission’s Bureau of Retirement, Insurance, and Occupational Health denied the appellee’s application for such annuities for Shawn and Tricia. The Bureau held that 5 U. S. C. § 8341 (a) (3) (A) bars recovery for otherwise qualified children born out of wedlock who, like Shawn and Tricia, were not living with the employee at the time of his death. The Commission’s Board of Appeals and Review affirmed. The appellee then filed this action in the Court of Claims on behalf of her children. She argued that 5 U. S. C. § 8341 (a)(3)(A) allows recovery where, as here, the recognized natural children had once lived with the employee in a parent-child relationship. Alternatively she contended that, if the Commission’s interpretation of 5 U. S. C. § 8341 (a) (3) (A) was correct, that provision violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it impermissibly discriminated against illegitimate children. The Court of Claims granted the appellee’s motion for summary judgment. 218 Ct. Cl. 705, 590 F. 2d 343. Ignoring the statutory issue, the court granted relief on the authority of its earlier decision in Gentry v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 1, 546 F. 2d 343 (1976), rehearing denied, 212 Ct. Cl. 27, 551 F. 2d 852 (1977), which held that the “lived with” requirement of 5 U. S. C. § 8341 (a) (3) (A) unconstitutionally discriminated against illegitimate children. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction pending hearing on the merits, 441 U. S. 960 (1979), and now affirm on the statutory ground presented to but not addressed by the Court of Claims. II The Civil Service Retirement Act provides survivors’ annuities to all legitimate children, but grants the same benefits to children born out' of wedlock only if they “lived with the employee ... in a regular parent-child relationship.” Such a classification based on illegitimacy is unconstitutional unless it bears “an evident and substantial relation to the particular .. . interests this statute is designed to serve.” Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259, 268 (1978) (plurality opinion); see id., at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 767 (1977). The Government’s asserted justification for the classification — that it is an administratively convenient means of identifying children who actually were deprived of support by the employee’s death — is itself open to constitutional question, since the statute does not condition benefits to legitimate children on such a showing. It is well settled that this Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.. E. g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 693 (1979); New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 582, and n. 22 (1979); Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944). Where both .a constitutional issue and an issue of statutory construction are raised, we are not, of course, foreclosed from .considering the statutory question merely because the lower court failed to address it. Califano v. Yamasaki, supra, at 693; University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 328 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.); id., at 281 (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at 411-412 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Accordingly, we turn to the statute to determine whether resolution of the constitutional question is necessary to the disposition of this case. Shawn and Tricia Clark were denied annuities on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirement that they “lived with the employee ... in a regular parent-child relationship.” The appellee contended that her children did meet the requirement because they had lived with the decedent as a family from their birth through 1971. If the appellee’s construction of the statutory language is correct, the children are entitled to survivors’ annuities and decision of the constitutional question is unnecessary. The Civil Service Commission, however, has construed the “lived with” language to require that the children be living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death. When the statutory language is considered on its face, the appellee’s reading is at least as plausible as that of the Government. Shawn and Tricia had “lived with” their father, and we believe those words would not ordinarily imply a temporal limitation. Moreover, Congress has demonstrated in other social welfare legislation that it knows how to restrict the class of eligible beneficiaries to those living with an individual at a particular time. We can find nothing in the legislative history of the statute to indicate that appellee’s construction of the statute is out of harmony with the congressional intent. The original enactment in 1948 made an annuity payable to “an unmarried child, including a dependent stepchild or an adopted child, under the age of eighteen years, or such unmarried child who because of physical or mental disability is incapable of self-support.” Act of Feb. 28, 1948, § 11, 62 Stat. 55. The amount of the annuity depended on whether another parent survived. Although children born out of wedlock were not expressly included, the provision was seemingly broad enough to cover them. The Government argues that, in granting annuities to surviving children, Congress intended to provide funds to replace support lost by the wage earner’s dependents. The Government views the statutory scheme as designed to pay benefits only to those children Congress thought most likely to have been dependent on the wage earner, and to take account of the likelihood of supplementary support from the other parent. We note, however, that only stepchildren were required to show dependency. In 1956, Congress amended the definition of an entitled child to include “an unmarried child, including (1) an adopted child, and (2) a stepchild or recognized natural child who received more than one-half his support from and lived with the . . . employee in a regular parent-child relationship.” Act of July 31, 1956, Title IV, § 1 (j), 70 Stat. 744. For the first time children born out of wedlock were explicitly included, but their eligibility was made subject both to the “lived with” requirement and to the dependency requirement originally applicable only to stepchildren. The legislative history is devoid of any indication whether Congress intended that annuities could be recovered by all recognized natural children who had once lived with the employee in a familial relationship, or only by such children who were living with the employee at the time of death. Nor do the congressional materials illuminate the purpose of the “lived with” requirement. The Government defends the provision as a rational indicator of both dependency and parentage. An illegitimate child who lived with the natural parent, according to this view, is both more likely to have received support from the parent and more likely to be the true issue of that parent than is any illegitimate child who lived apart from the natural parent. It seems unlikely that Congress viewed the requirement as a means of ascertaining either dependency or parentage, however, since the statute also required the child to prove both that he had received more than one-half of his support from the deceased employee and that he was the employee’s “recognized natural child.” Those provisions speak directly to the concerns raised by the Government, and the additional requirement that the child must have lived with the parent would therefore .be superfluous regardless of whether it mandated that the child must have lived with the parent at the time of the parent’s death rather than at some other time. The Government also urges that Congress intended the “lived with” requirement to serve as a means of thwarting fraudulent claims of dependency or parentage, and to promote efficient administration by facilitating the prompt identification of eligible annuitants. It is evident from the facts of this case, however, that the classification is not narrowly tailored as a means of furthering either goal. As we recognized in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 636 (1974), the prevention of fraud is a legitimate goal, but it does not necessarily follow “that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of [appellee’s] subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims.” Thus, even if the “lived with” requirement is assumed to serve as a device to prevent fraud or to promote efficient administration, it raises serious equal protection problems that this Court must seek to avoid by adopting a saving statutory construction not at odds with fundamental legislative purposes. In sum, the legislative history of the 1956 amendments provides no direct guidance on the purpose of the “lived with” provision or on whether it was intended to be restricted to children living with the parent at a particular time. The less restrictive construction proposed by the appellee appears fair and reasonable in light of the language, purpose, and history of the enactment, and it avoids a serious constitutional question. Before we conclude our inquiry, however, we must consider whether a 1966 amendment to the statute affected the children’s right to recovery. Congress enacted the 1966 amendments to the Act upon the request of the Executive Branch’s Committee on Federal Staff Retirement Systems. One of these amendments removed the requirement that children must prove they received one-half of their support from the deceased employee in order to recover survivors’ annuities. Act of July 18, 1966, Title V, § 502, 80 Stat. 300. Congress deleted the dependency requirement in order to ensure recovery for the children of female civil servants, who typically earned less than their husbands and accordingly contributed less than half of the support of their children. Congress also deleted the requirement of proof of dependency for stepchildren and “recognized natural” children, but retained the “lived with” requirement for those claimants. The reason for retaining the requirement was not clearly explained in the Cabinet Committee report, which simply stated: “Stepchildren and natural children are eligible for ben- . efits at present only when they have been dependent on the deceased parent and living with the parent in a regular parent-child relationship. The latter requirement should be retained; but, if it is fulfilled, the benefits should be paid as for any other child, without regard to the dependency requirement.” H. R. Doc. No. 402, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1966). The Government views the 1966 amendment as evidence that Congress intended the “lived with” requirement to serve as a convenient method of determining whether the child received support from the deceased employee. This proposition appears implausible, since in the same sentence the Committee recommended that if the “lived with” requirement were met benefits should be paid “as for any other child, without regard to the dependency requirement.” The Committee’s use of the word “retained” is a further indication that Congress did not intend the “lived with” provision to assume a new function previously performed by the dependency requirement. Moreover, the Government’s position again unnecessarily raises the equal protection question, because legitimate children and adopted children were not required to demonstrate that they had received support from the decedent. In the absence of any persuasive evidence to the contrary, therefore, we assume that Congress’ failure to alter the “lived with” requirement likewise failed to modify the purpose of that provision as envisioned by the Congress that enacted it. We conclude that the “lived with” requirement is satisfied when a recognized natural child has lived with the deceased employee in a “regular parent-child relationship,” regardless of whether the child was living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death. Our consideration of the language and purpose of the statute and of the available legislative history convinces us that this construction is a fair and reasonable reading of the congressional enactment. Furthermore, the construction is necessary to avoid a serious constitutional question. By so holding, we do not believe that we are creating undue administrative difficulties for the Civil Service Commission. In this case, for example, the Commission relied on the Montana court’s paternity decree and affidavits concerning when the appellee’s children lived with the deceased employee. Similar documentary evidence would be equally probative of whether an illegitimate child claiming a survivors’ annuity had ever lived with the deceased employee in a regular parent-child relationship. The judgment of the Court of Claims is Affirmed. On January 1, 1979, the Civil Service Commission was abolished, and the Office of Personnel Management assumed primary responsibility for the civil service retirement program. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111; Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1978, 3 CFR 323 (1979). For convenience, throughout this opinion we shall refer to the agency administering the retirement program as the Civil Service Commission. The appellee contends that this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. We disagree. By an order dated January 27, 1978, the Court of Claims held that the “lived with” requirement of 5 U. S. C. § 8341 (a) (3) (A) applicable to illegitimate children violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court then resolved the issue of relief and entered final judgment on November 6, 1978. The Government filed its notice of appeal on December 5, 1978. The appeal statute relied upon by the Government, 28 U. S. C. § 1252, provides: “Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party.” (Emphasis added.) The appellee first contends that the Government failed to file a timely notice of appeal because it did not appeal the January 27,1978, decision on the liability issue. Section 1252 would have allowed the Government to seek review of this interlocutory order declaring a federal statute unconstitutional, but its permissive language providing that any party “may appeal . . . from an interlocutory or final judgment” plainly did not require the Government to appeal before final judgment was entered. Cf. United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 709 (1963) (review of final judgment under 28 U. S. C. § 1255 entails review of any interlocutory decisions on liability); Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U. S. 1, 47-48 (1943) (same); American Foreign S. S. Co. v. Matise, 423 U. S. 150 (1975) (same rule when jurisdiction based on 28 U. S. C. § 1254); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399, 418 (1923) (same). The appellee also argues that no appeal will lie under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 because the Court of Claims did not declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional. To the contrary, a determination that the “lived with” requirement of 5 U. S. C. § 8341 (a) (3) (A) was unconstitutional was a necessary predicate to the relief the Court of Claims granted to the appellee’s children, and this determination of unconstitutionality may be appealed under § 1252. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21, 30 (1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 20 (1960). It is irrelevant that the Court of Claims reached this holding by relying on its earlier decision in Gentry v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 1, 546 F. 2d 343 (1976), rehearing denied, 212 Ct. Cl. 27, 551 F. 2d 852 (1977). An appeal under §1252 lies for any federal-court decision declaring an Act of Congress unconstitutional in a civil action in which the United States is a party, not just for the first such decision. Cf. Garment Workers v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304 U. S. 243, 249 (1938). The lower federal courts have uniformly held that the “lived with” requirement violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Gentry v. United States, supra; Jenkins v. U. S. Civil Service Comm’n, 460 F. Supp. 611 (DC 1978); Proctor v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 418 (DC 1977) (three-judge court); Tenny v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 224 (ED Mo. 1977); Myers v. Commissioners of Civil Service Comm’n, Civ. No. 8682 (SD Ohio, Aug. 8, 1977). See 45 U. S. C. § 231e (c) (1) (i) (Railroad Retirement Act benefits payable in certain circumstances to “the widow or widower of the deceased employee who was living with such employee at the time of such employee’s death”); 42 U. S. C. § 416 (e) (Social Security Act in part defines legally adopted child as a person who “was at the time of such individual’s death living in such individual’s household”); 42 U. S. C. § 416 (h) (3) (A) (ii) (Social Security Act’s definition of qualified child is met in part when “such insured individual is shown ... to be the father of the applicant and was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual became entitled to benefits or attained age 65, whichever first occurred”). See Visor v. United States, Civ. No. 9922 (2) (ED Mo., Feb. 12, 1955). By authorizing the payment of benefits to an “unmarried child who because of physical or mental disability is incapable of self-support,” Act of Feb. 28, 1948, 62 Stat. 55, Congress apparently intended that, though disabled children over 18 years of age had to show they were unable to support themselves, they did not have to show they were dependent on the deceased parent. The 1956 amendments also provided that a survivors’ annuity was payable to a legitimate child with a surviving parent only if the child proved that he had received more than one-half his support from the deceased employee. Act of July 31, 1956, amending Title IV, § 10(d), 70 Stat. 754. See S. Rep. No. 1187, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1966); The Federal Salary and Fringe Benefits Act of 1966: Hearings on H. R. 14122 before the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1966); Joint Annual Report of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and the Report of the Cabinet Committee on Federal Staff Retirement Systems, H. R. Doc. No. 402, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1966). Two Committees of Congress, in passing on requests for legislation by the Civil Service Commission, have referred to the “lived with” requirement as a “living with” requirement. S. Rep. No. 92-527, p. 1 (1971); S. Rep. No. 1070, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1966). See also H. R. Rep. No. 92-811, p. 3 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 33, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). We read the Committees’ statements as nothing more than acknowledgments of the Commission’s interpretation of the requirement, which was made known to each Committee by letters from the Commission. S. Rep. No. 92-527, supra, at 2-3; S. Rep. No. 1070, supra, at 3-4. In any event, the views of some Congressmen as to the construction of a statute adopted years before by another Congress have “‘very little, if any, significance.’ ” United. States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 170 (1968) (quoting Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 593 (1958)). The 1966 recommendation of the Cabinet Committee on Federal Staff Retirement Systems referred to the “lived with” requirement as allowing benefits to recognized natural children “when they have been . . . living with, the parent in a regular parent-child relationship.” H. R. Doc. No. 402, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1966). This language might appear to be inconsistent with our construction of the “lived with” requirement. The language was formulated by the Executive Branch, however, not by Congress, and at most simply reflects the Civil Service Commission’s interpretation of the statute. We recognize that the Civil Service Commission has interpreted the “lived with” requirement to be a “living with” requirement, although the Government does not inform us whether the agency interpretation was contemporaneous with the 1956 enactment. We do not disregard this evidence of the meaning of the statute. See, e. g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425, n. 9 (1977). In view of our analysis of the statute and its legislative history, and considering the need to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication, however, the agency interpretation would not be decisive even if it were contemporaneous. Because we hold that the Civil Service Retirement Act expressly allows the appellee’s children to receive survivors’ annuities, there is no question that the Court of Claims below had both jurisdiction to entertain their claims and authority to grant recovery. See United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 397-398 (1976); Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 606-607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1007-1009 (1967). In light of our holding, we need not address the Government’s argument that the Court of Claims exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared 5 U. S. C. § 8341 (a)(3)(A)’s “lived with” requirement unconstitutional, severed that requirement from the statute, and awarded relief to the appellee’s children based on the remaining language in the statute. Cf. United States v. Testan, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION, as receiver for MANNING SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION v. TICKTIN et al. No. 87-1865. Argued February 27, 1989 Decided April 3, 1989 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, and David A. Felt. James B. Koch argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Joseph J. Ticktin, pro se, and Irving Faber. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), in its capacity as receiver of a state-chartered savings and loan association (Association), brought this action in Federal District Court against former directors of the Association claiming damages for breach of their fiduciary duties under Illinois law. The District Court, relying on Circuit precedent, held that it had jurisdiction of the case pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1345 because the FSLIC is an agency of the United States. App. 38-46. However, observing that there was substantial ground for difference of opinion on this controlling question of law, the court certified the jurisdictional question for interlocutory appeal. Id., at 39-46. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed because it concluded that a proviso included in 20 Stat. 1042, 12 U. S. C. § 1730(k)(l), withdraws federal jurisdiction in cases in which the FSLIC “is a party in its capacity as . . . receiver ... of an insured State-chartered institution” if the suit “involves only the rights or obligations of investors, creditors, stockholders, and such institution under State law.” 832 F. 2d 1438 (1987). Since that ruling, if correct, will require dismissal of a large number of cases concerning the integrity of our financial institutions, we granted certiorari. 488 U. S. 815 (1988). We resolve the jurisdictional issue by first considering the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1345 and then asking whether 12 U. S. C. § 1730(k)(l) enlarges or contracts the grant of federal jurisdiction in cases commenced by the FSLIC. 1 — 1 Federal jurisdiction over cases commenced by federal agencies is conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1345. That section provides: “Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.” Three limits on this grant of jurisdiction are plain from its text. It applies only to civil litigation “commenced” by the federal party; it requires that the agency be “expressly authorized to sue”; and it is subject to such exceptions as may be “otherwise provided by Act of Congress.” In view of the fact that this case was commenced by the FSLIC, and the fact that the FSLIC is expressly authorized to sue and be sued, §1345 supports federal jurisdiction unless another statute otherwise provides. The question, then, is whether 12 U. S. C. § 1730(k)(l) is such a statute. hH The text of § 1730(k)(l) indicates that it is a statute that confirms and enlarges federal-court jurisdiction over cases to which the FSLIC is a party. It does so in two ways. Prior to the enactment of § 1730(k)(l) in 1966, at least one court had expressed some doubt concerning the FSLIC’s status as an agency of the United States for purposes of asserting jurisdiction under § 1346. See Acron Investments, Inc. v. FSLIC, 363 F. 2d 236 (CA9), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 970 (1966). Clause (A) of the statute removed that doubt. The manifest purpose of enacting clause (A) was to foreclose the possible argument that § 1345 does not confer federal agency jurisdiction in cases brought by the FSLIC. Thus, clause (A) lends added support to the jurisdictional basis found in § 1345. In addition, clause (B) enlarges the category of FSLIC litigation over which federal courts have jurisdiction because it covers all civil cases in which the FSLIC “shall be a party,” whereas § 1345 applies only to those “commenced” by the FSLIC. Thus, the grant of federal jurisdiction in § 1345 is expanded to include cases in which the FSLIC is named as a defendant as well as those in which it intervenes after proceedings are underway. Clause (C) further enlarges federal jurisdiction in cases involving the FSLIC by giving the agency the right to remove civil proceedings from state court to the appropriate federal district court. Thus, placing the proviso to one side for the moment, it is evident that each of the three clauses of § 1730(k)(l) was intended to buttress the FSLIC’s access to a federal forum. There is no doubt that the proviso imposes a limit on this broad grant of federal jurisdiction. It is equally clear, however, that the proviso does not extend to clause (A) and the agency jurisdiction conferred by § 1345. Clause (B) provides that any civil suit in which the FSLIC is a party “shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.” Clause (C), in turn, permits the FSLIC to remove “any such action” to federal court. Accordingly, these jurisdictional grants are predicated on the congressional finding that actions to which the FSLIC is a party “shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.” The proviso qualifies this finding by describing a subcategory of cases to which the FSLIC is a party that “shall not be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.” (Emphasis supplied.) Clause (A), however, does not rely on the presence of a federal question as a jurisdictional prerequisite, but rather confirms that the party-based jurisdiction of § 1345 is applicable in cases brought by the FSLIC. As a result, the proviso’s partial retraction of federal-question jurisdiction has no effect on clause (A), and, a fortiori, no effect on § 1345. The Court of Appeals suggested that notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, Congress must have intended that the proviso apply to clause (A). 832 F. 2d, at 1443-1444. The court reasoned that because clause (B) applies to all civil cases in which the FSLIC is a party— whether as plaintiff or defendant — and because Congress intended to limit this grant of jurisdiction in the manner set out in the proviso, Congress must have intended that the proviso apply to clause (A) as well. To read the proviso otherwise, the court explained, would allow clause (A) “to grant jurisdiction indirectly in those cases that were deliberately and specifically excluded from the jurisdiction granted by part B.” Id., at 1444. The problem with this argument is that in an attempt to give the proviso full effect as applied to each class of cases that might fall within clause (B), the court renders clause (A) entirely redundant. Moreover, reading the proviso so as not to apply to clause (A) does not fail to give the proviso full effect as applied to clause (B). Clause (B) provides federal-question jurisdiction in any case in which the FSLIC is a party and the proviso limits this grant. The fact that clause (A) and § 1345 may provide agency jurisdiction in some of these same cases does not change the fact that the proviso has a real effect — it removes one basis of jurisdiction. We thus conclude that the language of § 1730(k)(l) not only plainly provides that the proviso does not apply to clause (A), but also is given its fullest effect by so reading the statute. Because the proviso does not apply to clause (A), § 1730 (k)(l) is not an Act of Congress that has “otherwise provided” a limitation on the jurisdictional grant in § 1345. Accordingly, the District Court has federal agency jurisdiction over the FSLIC’s action. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The District Court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in FSLIC v. Krueger, 435 F. 2d 633 (1970). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit overruled the pertinent holding of Krueger. 832 F. 2d 1438 (1987). Title 12 U. S. C § 1730(k)(l) provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, (A) the Corporation shall be deemed to be an agency of the United States within the meaning of section 451 of title 28; (B) any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the Corporation shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and the United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction thereof, without regard to the amount in controversy; and (C) the Corporation may, without bond or security, remove any such action, suit, or proceeding from a State court to the United States district court for the district and division embracing the place where the same is pending by following any procedure for removal now or hereafter in effect: Provided, That any action, suit, or proceeding to which the Corporation is a party in its capacity as conservator, receiver, or other legal custodian of an insured State-chartered institution and which involves only the rights or obligations of investors, creditors, stockholders, and such institution under State law shall not be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States. No attachment or execution shall be issued against the Corporation or its property before final judgment in any action, suit, or proceeding in any court of any State or of the United States or any territory, or any other court.” (Emphasis supplied.) Title 28 U. S. C. § 451, in turn, provides in relevant part: “The term ‘agency’ includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense.” Title 12 U. S. C. § 1725(c) provides that the FSLIC “shall have power . . . [t]o sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States See n. 2, supra. Had Congress intended to limit not only the federal-question jurisdiction of clauses (B) and (C) but also the party-based jurisdiction of § 1345, it could easily have drafted a more general proviso asserting that the defined subclass of cases “shall not fall within the federal jurisdiction." Because we conclude that the proviso does not modify clause (A) and that jurisdiction was thus properly asserted under § 1345, we need not address the FSLIC’s alternative arguments that the proviso is inapplicable because this suit does not involve “only . . . rights or obligations . . . under State law!’ and does not involve “only the rights or obligations” of parties listed in the proviso.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SOLIMAN No. 91-998. Argued October 5, 1992 Decided January 12, 1993 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, O’Connoe, and Soutek, JJ., joined. Black-mun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 179. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 180. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 184. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bruton, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Richard Farber, and Teresa E. McLaughlin. David M. Sokolow argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. We address in this decision the appropriate standard for determining whether an office in the taxpayer’s home qualifies as his “principal place of business” under 26 U. S. C. § 280A(c)(l)(A). Because the standard followed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit failed to undertake a comparative analysis of the various business locations of the taxpayer in deciding whether the home office was the principal place of business, we reverse. ► — I Respondent Nader E. Solimán, an anesthesiologist, practiced his profession in Maryland and Virginia during 1983, the tax year in question. Solimán spent 30 to 35 hours per week with patients, dividing that time among three hospitals. About 80 percent of the hospital time was spent at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland. At the hospitals, Solimán administered the anesthesia, cared for patients after surgery, and treated patients for pain. None of the three hospitals provided him with an office. Solimán lived in a condominium in McLean, Virginia. His residence had a spare bedroom which he used exclusively as an office. Although he did not meet patients in the home office, Solimán spent two to three , hours per day there on a variety of tasks such as contacting patients, surgeons, and hospitals by telephone; maintaining billing records and patient logs; preparing for treatments and presentations; satisfying continuing medical education requirements; and reading medical journals and books. On his 1983 federal income tax return, Solimán claimed deductions for the portion of condominium fees, utilities, and depreciation attributable to the home office. Upon audit, the Commissioner disallowed those deductions based upon his determination that the home office was not Soliman’s principal place of business. Solimán filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking review of the resulting tax deficiency. The Tax Court, with six of its judges dissenting, ruled that Soliman’s home office was his principal place of business. 94 T. C. 20 (1990). After noting that in its earlier decisions it identified the place where services are performed and income is generated in order to determine the principal place of business, the so-called “focal point test,” the Tax Court abandoned that test, citing criticism by two Courts of Appeals. Id., at 24-25 (noting Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F. 2d 75 (CA7 1986); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F. 2d 512 (CA2 1984); and Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F. 2d 67 (CA2 1983)). Under a new test, later summarized and adopted by the Court of Appeals, the Tax Court allowed the deduction. The dissenting opinions criticized the majority for failing to undertake a comparative analysis of Soliman’s places of business to establish which one was the principal place. 94 T. C., at 33, 35. The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. A divided panel of that court affirmed. 935 F. 2d 52 (1991). It adopted the test used in the Tax Court and explained it as follows: “[The] test. . . provides that where management or administrative activities are essential to the taxpayer’s trade or business and the only available office space is in the taxpayer’s home, the ‘home office’ can be his ‘principal place of business,’ with the existence of the following factors weighing heavily in favor of a finding that the taxpayer’s ‘home office’ is his ‘principal place of business:’ (1) the office in the home is essential to the taxpayer’s business; (2) he spends a substantial amount of time there; and (3) there is no other location available for performance of the office functions of the business.” Id., at 54. For further support, the Court of Appeals relied upon a proposed IRS regulation related to home office deductions for salespersons. Under the proposed regulation, salespersons would be entitled to home office deductions “even though they spend most of their time on the road as long as they spend ‘a substantial amount of time on paperwork at home.’” Ibid, (quoting proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 52399 (1980), as amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 33320 (1983)). While recognizing that the proposed regulation was not binding on it, the court suggested that it “evince[d] a policy to allow ‘home office’ deductions for taxpayers who maintain ‘legitimate’ home offices, even if the taxpayer does not spend a majority of his time in the office.” 935 F. 2d, at 55. The court concluded that the Tax Court’s test would lead to identification of the “true headquarters of the business.” Ibid. Like the dissenters in the Tax Court, Judge Phillips in his dissent argued that the plain language of § 280A(c)(l)(A) requires a comparative analysis of the places of business to assess which one is principal, an analysis that was not undertaken by the majority. Ibid. Although other Courts of Appeals have criticized the focal point test, their approaches for determining the principal place of business differ in significant ways from the approach employed by the Court of Appeals in this case, see Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F. 2d 495, 497 (CA9 1988); Meiers v. Commissioner, supra, at 79; Weissman v. Commissioner, supra, at 514-516; Drucker v. Commissioner, supra, at 69. Those other courts undertake a comparative analysis of the functions performed at each location. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 503 U. S. 935 (1992). a <$ Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to deduct “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred ... in carrying on any trade or business.” 26 U. S. C. § 162(a). That provision is qualified, however, by various limitations, including one that prohibits otherwise allowable deductions “with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer ... as a residence.” §280A(a). Taxpayers may nonetheless deduct expenses attributable to the business use of their homes if they qualify for one or more of the statute’s exceptions to this disallowance. The exception at issue in this case is contained in § 280A(c)(l): “Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis— “(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade, or business of the taxpayer[,] “(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business, or “(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer’s trade or business. “In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclusive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of his employer.” (Emphasis added.) Congress adopted §280A as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. 94-455, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Before its adoption, expenses attributable to the business use of a residence were deductible whenever they were “appropriate and helpful” to the taxpayer’s business. See, e. g., Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F. 2d 998 (CA2 1970). This generous standard allowed many taxpayers to treat what otherwise would have been nondeductible living and family expenses as business expenses, even though the limited business tasks performed in the dwelling resulted in few, if any, additional or incremental costs to the taxpayer. H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, p. 160 (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-938, p. 147 (1976). Comparing the newly enacted section with the previous one, the apparent purpose of § 280A is to provide a narrower scope for the deduction, but Congress has provided no definition of “principal place of business.” In interpreting the meaning of the words in a revenue Act, we look to the “ ‘ordinary, everyday senses’ ” of the words. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U. S. 569, 571 (1966) (per curiam) (quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 6 (1947)). In deciding whether a location is “the principal place of business,” the commonsense meaning of “principal” suggests that a comparison of locations must be undertaken. This view is confirmed by the definition of “principal,” which means “most important, consequential, or influential.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1802 (1971). Courts cannot assess whether any one business location is the “most important, consequential, or influential” one without comparing it to all the other places where business is transacted. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ suggestion, the statute does not allow for a deduction whenever a home office may be characterized as legitimate. See 935 F. 2d, at 55. That approach is not far removed from the “appropriate and helpful” test that led to the adoption of § 280A. Under the Court of Appeals’ test, a home office may qualify as the principal place of business whenever the office is essential to the taxpayer’s business, no alternative office space is available, and the taxpayer spends a substantial amount of time there. See id., at 54. This approach ignores the question whether the home office is more significant in the taxpayer’s business than every other place of business. The statute does not refer to the “principal office” of the business. If it had used that phrase, the taxpayer’s deduction claim would turn on other considerations. The statute refers instead to the “principal place” of business. It follows that the most important or significant place for the business must be determined. B In determining the proper test for deciding whether a home office is the principal place of business, we cannot develop an objective formula that yields a clear answer in every case. The inquiry is more subtle, with the ultimate determination of the principal place of business being dependent upon the particular facts of each case. There are, however, two primary considerations in deciding whether a home office is a taxpayer’s principal place of business: the relative importance of the activities performed at each business location and the time spent at each place. Analysis of the relative importance of the functions performed at each business location depends upon an objective description of the business in question. This preliminary step is undertaken so that the decisionmaker can evaluate the activities conducted at the various business locations in light of the particular characteristics of the specific business or trade at issue. Although variations are inevitable in case-by-case determinations, any particular business is likely to have a pattern in which certain activities are of most significance. If the nature of the trade or profession requires the taxpayer to meet or confer with a client or patient or to deliver goods or services to a customer, the place where that contact occurs is often an important indicator of the principal place of business. A business location where these contacts occur has sometimes been called the “focal point” of the business and has been previously regarded by the Tax Court as conclusive in ascertaining the principal place of business. See 94 T. C., at 24-25. We think that phrase has a metaphorical quality that can be misleading, and, as we have said, no one test is determinative in every case. We decide, however, that the point where goods and services are delivered must be given great weight in determining the place where the most important functions are performed. Section 280A itself recognizes that the home office gives rise to a deduction whenever the office is regularly and exclusively used “by patients, clients, of customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business.” § 280A(c)(l)(B). In that circumstance, the deduction is allowed whether or not the home office is also the principal place of business. The taxpayer argues that because the point of delivery of goods and services is addressed in this provision, it follows that the availability of the principal place of business exception does not depend in any way upon whether the home office is the point of delivery. We agree with the ultimate conclusion that visits by patients, clients, and customers are not a required characteristic of a principal place of business, but we disagree with the implication that whether those visits occur is irrelevant. That Congress allowed the deduction where those visits occur in the normal course even when some other location is the principal place of business indicates their importance in determining the nature and functions of any enterprise. Though not conclusive, the point where services are rendered or goods delivered is a principal consideration in most cases. If the nature of the business requires that its services are rendered or its goods are delivered at a facility with unique or special characteristics, this is a further and weighty consideration in finding that it is the delivery point or facility, not the taxpayer’s residence, where the most important functions of the business are undertaken. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not regard the necessity of the functions performed at home as having much weight in determining entitlement to the deduction. In many instances, planning and initial preparation for performing a service or delivering goods are essential to the ultimate performance of the service or delivery of the goods, just as accounting and billing are often essential at the final stages of the process. But that is simply because, in integrated transactions, all steps are essential. Whether the functions performed in the home office are necessary to the business is relevant to the determination of whether a home office is the principal place of business in a particular case, but it is not controlling. Essentiality, then, is but part of the assessment of the relative importance of the functions performed at each of the competing locations. We reject the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the availability of alternative office space as an additional consideration in determining a taxpayer’s principal place of business. While that factor may be relevant in deciding whether an employee taxpayer’s use of a home office is “for the convenience of his employer,” § 280(c)(1), it has no bearing on the inquiry whether a home office is the principal place of business. The requirements of particular trades or professions may preclude some taxpayers from using a home office as the principal place of business. But any taxpayer’s home office that meets the criteria here set forth is the principal place of business regardless of whether a different office exists or might have been established elsewhere. In addition to measuring the relative importance of the activities undertaken at each business location, the decision-maker should also compare the amount of time spent at home with the time spent at other places where business activities occur. This factor assumes particular significance when comparison of the importance of the functions performed at various places yields no definitive answer to the principal place of business inquiry. This may be the case when a taxpayer performs income-generating tasks at both his home office and some other location. The comparative analysis of business locations required by the statute may not result in every case in the specification of which location is the principal place of business; the only question that must be answered is whether the home office so qualifies. There may be cases when there is no principal place of business, and the courts and the Commissioner should not strain to conclude that a home office qualifies for the deduction simply because rip other location seems to be the principal place. The taxpayer’s house does not become a principal place of business by default. Justice Cardozo’s observation that in difficult questions of deductibility “[l]ife in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle,” Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 115 (1933), must not deter us from deciding upon some rules for the fair and consistent interpretation of a statute that speaks in the most general of terms. Yet we accept his implicit assertion that there are limits to the guidance from appellate courts in these cases. The consequent necessity to give considerable deference to the trier of fact is but the law’s recognition that the statute is designed to accommodate myriad and ever-changing forms of business enterprise. I — t H — l Under the principles we have discussed, the taxpayer was not entitled to a deduction for home office expenses. The practice of anesthesiology requires the medical doctor to treat patients under conditions demanding immediate, personal observation. So exacting were these requirements that all of respondent’s patients were treated at hospitals, facilities with special characteristics designed to accommodate the demands of the profession. The actual treatment was the essence of the professional service. We can assume that careful planning and study were required in advance of performing the treatment, and all acknowledge that this was done in the home office. But the actual treatment was the most significant event in the professional transaction. The home office activities, from an objective standpoint, must be regarded as less important to the business of the taxpayer than the tasks he performed at the hospital. A comparison of the time spent by the taxpayer further supports a determination that the home office was not the principal place of business. The 10 to 15 hours per week spent in the home office measured against the 30 to 35 hours per week at the three hospitals are insufficient to render the home office the principal place of business in light of all of the circumstances of this case. That the office may have been essential is not controlling. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOEHNING, CHAIRMAN COMMISSIONER, STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, et al. v. INDIANA STATE EMPLOYEES ASSN., INC., et al. No. 74-1544. Decided November 11, 1975 Per Curiam. Respondent Musgrave, an employee of the Indiana State Highway Commission, was dismissed for cause, her request for a pretermination hearing having been denied. She then brought this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit asserting hearing rights rooted in the Federal Constitution and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The District Court held that the controlling state statutes, as yet un-construed by the state courts, might require the hearing-demanded by respondent and so obviate decision on the constitutional issue. It therefore abstained until construction of the Indiana statutes had been sought in the state courts. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding nothing in the language of- the relevant state statutes that would support a claim for a pretermination hearing and then resolving the federal constitutional question in respondent's favor. We reverse. Where the Indiana Administrative Adjudication Act is applicable, “[t]he final order or determination of any issue or case applicable to a particular person shall not be made except upon hearing and timely notice of the time, place and nature thereof.” Ind. Code § 4-22-1-5 (1974). The Act applies to all issues or cases applicable to particular persons “excluding . . . the dismissal or discharge of an officer or employee by a superior officer, but including hearings on discharge or dismissal of an officer or employee for cause where the law authorizes or directs such hearing.” § 4-22-1-2. It may be that the Court of Appeals is correct in its “forecast,” see Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 499 (1941), that when construed together by the state courts, the Administrative Adjudication Act and the Indiana Bipartisan Personnel System Act, which is applicable to Highway Commission employees and which neither expressly authorizes nor precludes termination hearings, would not require the hearing respondent has demanded. On the other hand, the relevant statutory provisions may fairly be read to extend such hearing rights to respondent; and in these circumstances we conclude that the District Court was right to abstain from deciding the federal constitutional issue pending resolution of the state-law question in the state courts. Meridian v. Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 358 U. S. 639, 640 (1959); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82 (1970); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528 (1965); Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41 (1970); Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., supra. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further consideration consistent with this opinion. So ordered. The possibility that the Indiana state courts would adopt the construction contrary to that of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is somewhat enhanced by the fact that the construction adopted by the Seventh Circuit may fairly be said to raise federal constitutional problems under recent procedural due process decisions of this Court, e. g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974), particularly if, as the Seventh Circuit appears to have assumed, the Administrative Adjudication Act would leave respondent without a state-law right to a hearing at any time in connection with her dismissal for cause. The state courts may be reluctant to attribute to their legislature an intention to pass a statute raising constitutional problems, unless such legislative intent is particularly clear. See, e. g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 129-130 (1958); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974). See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071, 1117-1118 (1974). Although the question of respondent's federal constitutional right to a hearing at some time, in connection with a discharge for cause may already have been resolved in respondent's favor in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972); and Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, the tenured employee’s right to a preremoval hearing has been determined by this Court only in the context of a statute providing notice and an opportunity to respond in writing before removal coupled with a full hearing after removal. See concurring opinion of Powell, J., in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 164, 170.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HILTON v. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, et al. No. 560. Argued April 21, 1948. Decided June 1, 1948. Charles Fahy argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Philip Levy and Walter B. Wilbur. Paul A. Sweeney argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison, Robert W. Ginnane and Melvin Richter. John C. Williamson filed a brief for the Veterans of Foreign Wars, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises questions concerning the relative rights of war veteran and nonveteran employees to retention in government service when a program of reduction in the number of government civilian employees makes it necessary for some to be chosen for discharge. The acute point of controversy is this: In the treatment of permanent tenure civil service employees, should qualified honorably discharged war veterans, merely because they are such, be retained in preference to nonveterans, even though those nonveterans have served the Government a substantially longer time than the veterans. The questions depend upon whether certain regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission are valid under a proper interpretation of controlling statutes. The petitioner was for twelve years, from 1934 to 1946, a duly appointed permanent status civil service employee working in the Charleston Navy Yard. His work was of such high quality as to earn him an efficiency rating of “Excellent.” By successive promotions, he arrived at the responsible position of Leadingman Shipfitter at a basic wage of $12.08 per day. January 7, 1946, shortly after the post-hostility reduction of governmental employees began, petitioner was demoted to a position paying $10.08 per day as part of a reduction in force. This demotion apparently was due in part to the fact that he did not have a veteran's preference. October 7, 1946, petitioner was notified that due to curtailment of work and funds it was necessary to eliminate certain positions in his competitive level and that in accordance with civil service regulations his name had been reached for action. He was told that, if he approved, he was then to be placed in a one-year “furlough status” rather than absolutely separated from service because it was hoped that conditions might justify his recall to duty within the year. He was also informed that his “active service” had already been terminated and that unless sooner recalled to duty he would be separated for reduction in force at the end of his one-year furlough period. The civil service regulations said to require termination of petitioner’s active service divide government employees into three main groups — A, B, and C. Group A, which has the highest priority for retention, is composed of “permanent employees”; groups B and C are composed of employees with limited tenures of employment. Group A is divided into five subgroups, the first three of which are of particular importance here. These three subgroups are: Subgroup A-l Plus, (Veterans of World War II) for a one-year period after return to duty; Subgroup A-l, Veterans’ preference employees with “good” (or higher) efficiency ratings; Subgroup A-2, Employees without veterans’ preference with “good” (or higher) efficiency ratings. The result of these Commission groupings is that A-l Plus veterans have the highest retention priority; A-l the second; and A-2, in which, not having a veteran’s preference, petitioner is classified, has the third. Thus if these regulations are valid, every member of both Subgroup A-l Plus and Subgroup A-l must be retained in preference to petitioner. After receiving notice of his one-year furlough, petitioner filed this complaint in district court for declaratory judgment, mandamus, and other relief. The defendants were the Secretary of the Navy and the members of the Civil Service Commission. The complaint charged that petitioner’s demotion and furlough were the result of the Commission’s regulations which prescribed retention priorities for veterans’ preference employees in A-l Plus and A-l over all nonveteran employees without regard to the longer periods of service of some of the nonveteran employees, including petitioner. The failure of the Commission to consider relative length of service in establishing these retention priorities was charged to be “unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, without statutory warrant, and contrary to the express provisions” of applicable statutes. The petitioner’s prayer was that the Commission’s A-l Plus and A-l classifications be declared void, that the Secretary of the Navy be compelled to restore him to his original position as Leadingman Shipfitter, that the Commission be required to rescind the regulations and promulgate new ones in accordance with law, and that “such other and further relief as is just” be granted him. After answer and certain stipulations of fact, both parties moved for summary judgment and the government’s motion was granted. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. 83 U. S. App. D. C. —, 165 F. 2d 251. Importance of the questions raised prompted us to grant certiorari. 333 U. S. 841. First. While admitting petitioner’s right to challenge the validity of Subgroup A-l in this action, the Government contends that he cannot challenge A-l Plus. The premise of this argument is that, even if A-l Plus were invalid, the veterans grouped in it would fall within Subgroup A-l. We find no adequate support for this premise in the record. Veterans in Subgroup A-l Plus could not qualify for A-l unless they had efficiency ratings of “good” or better. But the language defining A-l Plus includes veterans of all ratings, even below “good.” And when the summary judgment in this case was rendered, 61 of the 118 veterans comprising A-l Plus had not been rated at all. True, the Government asserts that 60 of these veterans have now been rated “good” and the sixty-first member has resigned. But the potential membership of Subgroup A-l Plus is not limited to those veterans who were in it when the case was tried. The classification provides for a continuing status of preference of one year for all returning veterans who left government employment for war duty. There is no indication that additional war veterans qualified for classification under A-l Plus will not return to Charleston Navy Yard and reclaim shipfitter jobs in preference to otherwise qualified nonveteran employees. And the Government does not claim that this classification has been repealed or altered so that in the future it can include only those veterans who have an efficiency rating of “good” or higher. Under these circumstances we are unable to say that all members of A-l Plus could qualify or will be able to qualify as members of A-l. Therefore we cannot accept the government's contention that petitioner’s likelihood of injury from A-l Plus is too remote to justify his attack on it. If invalid, there is as much reason for his right to challenge this subgroup as for his right to challenge Subgroup A-l. Second. The Government finds support for Subgroup A-l Plus in § 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, 890, 50 U. S. C. § 308. That section provides reemployment rights to any person who under that Act left a position other than a temporary one in order to perform training and service in the armed forces and who satisfactorily completed his training. It further requires that upon appropriate application after release from training, such person, if still qualified to perform the duties of his old job and “if such position was in the employ of the United States Government, . . . shall be restored to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay.” Section 8 (c) also provides that a person so restored to his old position “shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.” There appears to be little room for contention that there is ambiguity in the language that Congress selected to express its purpose to require the restoration of a former government employee who entered the armed forces to his old position and to give him the right to retention for a year. The language is that such an employee “shall be restored” to his position or to one like it, supplemented by language that he “shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.” We have examined the legislative history of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and find nothing whatever which faintly suggests that Congress intended its language to be less mandatory than implied by the words it used. The command in § 8 (b) (A) that the Federal Government rehire its returning veteran employees contrasted sharply with the requirement in § 8 (b) (B) that a private employer need not reemploy such a veteran when “the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.” This difference was noted by the congressional sponsors of the 1940 Act, who thought that the Federal Government should set an example to private industry by providing jobs for all returning veteran employees. Congress, having thus provided that the veteran who left a government job must be reemployed, also required his retention by declaring that he should not be discharged within a year without cause. Petitioner contends, however, that this Court’s interpretations of § 8 (b) (B) and § 8 (c) in Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U. S. 40, and in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, require a holding that the regulations establishing A-l Plus are invalid. The Trailmobile case dealt only with the obligations of a private employer to veterans after the first year of their return to his employment, and our holding there is of no relevance here. In the other case, Fishgold, following his discharge from the armed forces, had been restored to his old position by his former private employer. Within one year thereafter temporary layoffs became necessary on each of nine days. Fishgold was laid off while nonvet-erans with longer service were continuously kept at work in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement which required that “decreases” in the working force be based primarily upon “length of service.” This Court held that since Fishgold’s layoffs were temporary, he still retained an employment relationship, and thus had not been “discharged” within the meaning of § 8 (c). The statute was held not to require that when slack work compelled a private employer to lay off some workers temporarily a veteran restored to his job be given continuous work for one year after his reinstatement in preference to other nonveteran employees who under the terms of company employer-employee contract were entitled to such work by reason of their greater “length of service.” There are several reasons why we cannot accept petitioner’s argument that the Fishgold case requires the invalidation of the A-l Plus classification. In the first place, we are here concerned with the one-year retention rights of veterans restored under § 8 (b) (A) to their old jobs with the Federal Government, not, as in the Fish-gold case, with the rights of veterans restored to jobs in private industry under § 8 (b) (B). We have previously pointed out that Congress in § 8 (b) (A) imposed a mandatory and unconditional reemployment obligation upon the Federal Government; in other words the section guaranteed that a returning veteran would get back his job with the Government. But § 8 (b) (B) imposed no such unconditional guarantee that a returning veteran would be reemployed by his former private employer. For that subsection does not require restoration of returning veterans to their former private jobs “if the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it unreasonable or impossible” to rehire him. Thus Congress, evidently considering that there were significant differences in industrial and governmental employment practices and potentialities, imposed obligations to rehire returning veterans of a markedly different nature upon government and private employers. It did not define the “unreasonable or impossible” circumstances that might relieve a private employer of the duty to rehire veterans, nor need we attempt to do so now. But it is plain that such circumstances might conceivably be such as seriously to affect, not only the reasonableness and possibility of rehiring, but also the reasonableness and possibility of retaining him for a full year’s continuous work. For this reason, among others, interpretation of § 8 (c)’s prohibition against discharge of a returning veteran must be made in light of whether he returns to a government-guaranteed or to a private non-guaranteed job. Therefore § 8 (c)’s prohibition against “discharge” by a private employer cannot be accepted as determinative of the scope of the congressional prohibition against “discharge” by the Government. The foregoing distinction is illustrated by the fact that civil service workers, unlike the private employees in the Fishgold case, are not confronted by a situation in which their employer, the Government, has an outstanding contract with them providing that they shall be retained in service in proportion to their “length of service” as reductions in force become necessary. Whatever seniority rights government employees have when discharges or reductions in force are made depend entirely upon congressional acts and regulations issued in harmony with them. See 37 Stat. 555, 5 U. S. C. § 652. We have discovered no acts or regulations which can be construed to recognize a nonveteran’s length of government service as a factor sufficient to override the requirement of § 8 (b) (A) and § 8 (c) that a veteran must be restored to his old job with the Federal Government and cannot be discharged therefrom without cause for one year. Thus, unlike the employees in the Fish-gold case whose private-employment contract-derived seniority prevented their being laid off, petitioner has no comparable statutorily derived seniority rights to his job with the Government. Petitioner argues, however, that § 12 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 390, 5 U. S. C. § 861, in effect amended § 8 and conferred retention rights upon him based upon his length of service. For the reasons we give below in discussing the validity of Subgroup A-l, we think this contention is without merit. Finally, the Fishgold decision held only that a temporary layoff did not violate a veteran’s right under § 8 (c) not to be discharged without cause for one year after he had been restored to his old job. Here the petitioner asserts that the statutory one-year prohibition against discharge confers upon a reemployed veteran no security from a furlough for one year without pay, that such a furlough is not a “discharge” within the meaning of §8 (c). The Commission has here treated a furlough of more than thirty days as the equivalent of a discharge. This is in accordance with prior governmental practice which has considered that the furlough of a veteran with military preference violates regulations providing that he shall not be "discharged or dropped” when “reductions in force are being made.” Moreover, § 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act, which safeguards preference eli-gibles against administrative denial of their preference rights, specifically places furloughs and suspensions for more than thirty days without pay on the same basis as discharges. Thus, the common meaning of furlough in governmental practice is not the same as that which the Court in the Fishgold case found to be the meaning of “layoffs” and “furloughs” in “industrial parlance.” To give this one-year “furlough” any less meaning than the statutory word “discharge” would result in depriving government employee veterans of the entire congressional guarantee of a year’s retention in their old jobs. We hold that the furlough, if applied to veterans, would be a “discharge” within the meaning of § 8 (c). Consequently, the Commission acted within its statutory duty by providing veterans a preference against such removals by establishing Subgroup A-l Plus. Third. Petitioner strongly urges invalidity of Subgroup A-l, which gives all permanent employee “Veterans with 'good’ or higher efficiency ratings” retention preferences over all nonveterans, even over nonveterans with higher efficiency ratings and longer government service. While conceding that under some limited circumstances veterans with “good or higher ratings” are granted preference by § 12 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, petitioner argues that the section does not require but actually prohibits any preference for veterans over nonveterans which fails to give substantial weight to a nonveteran’s longer government service. The Government urges that the section requires an absolute retention preference for veterans who have the required efficiency ratings without regard to the fact that nonveterans may have had longer government service. An alternative argument is that, whether absolutely required or not, the Commission’s sub-grouping is well within the power to promulgate “rules and regulations” specifically authorized by § 12. The question presented is therefore one of interpretation of the relevant language of § 12. The part of the section on which petitioner particularly relies reads: “In any reduction in personnel in any civilian service of any Federal agency, competing employees shall be released in accordance with Civil Service Commission regulations which shall give due effect to tenure of employment, military preference, length of service, and efficiency ratings: Provided, That the length of time spent in active service in the armed forces of the United States of each such employee shall be credited in computing length of total service . . Petitioner interprets this portion of § 12 as a congressional command that the Commission must invariably give “due effect” to length of service in determining what employees, whether veterans or nonveterans, shall first be discharged in a reduction-of-force program. In effect he argues that the above language provides no other “military preference” in civil service for a veteran employee over a non veteran with greater “length of service” than that defined in the above proviso, namely, that the length of a veteran’s army service shall be credited in computing the length of his total government service. The part of § 12 on which the Government supports the Commission’s recognition of a veteran’s absolute retention preference without regard to comparative length of service of veterans and nonveterans follows immediately after that section’s language on which petitioner relies, and reads: “. . . Provided further, That preference employees whose efficiency ratings are 'good’ or better shall be retained in preference to all other competing employees and that preference employees whose efficiency ratings are below ‘good’ shall be retained in preference to competing nonpreference employees who have equal or lower efficiency ratings . . . .” The Government interprets this proviso as a special withdrawal of the proviso-defined classes of veterans from the general terms of the first clause of § 12 relating to “length of service.” It views this proviso as the congressional creation of classes of veterans’ “preference employees” who “shall,” if they have the defined efficiency ratings, “be retained in preference to all other competing employees” without regard to length of service as between veterans and nonveterans. Thus, under the government’s interpretation, length of service would be given the “due effect” required by the first clause of § 12 by its consideration in the determination of retention preferences as between veteran and veteran and as between non veter an and non veter an. This interpretation of the proviso and the section, it is argued, would give meaning to all the language used in them, is plainly called for by the language, and harmonizes this portion of the Act with all its other parts and with the Act’s broad purposes. The interpretation is compelled, so the Government argues, by the Act’s legislative history, particularly when the proviso and preceding clauses in the section are viewed in the light of a long series of prior congressional enactments and authorized executive orders granting preferences in government employment to veterans and their close relatives. We agree with the Government that in the light of the foregoing factors no other interpretation of the pertinent parts of the section can fairly be reached. In 1876, seventy-two years ago, Congress passed a law which required any executive department when making “any reduction of force” to “retain those persons who may be equally qualified who have been honorably discharged from the military or naval service of the United States, and the widows an.d orphans of deceased soldiers and sailors.” 19 Stat. 143, 169; 5 U. S. C. § 37. In 1912 Congress greatly strengthened the old 1876 policy by providing that “in the event of reductions being made in the force in any of the executive departments no honorably discharged soldier or sailor whose record in said department is rated good shall be discharged or dropped, or reduced in rank or salary.” 37 Stat. 360, 413. There is nothing ambiguous about this 1912 provision. It was an absolute command that no governmental department should discharge, drop, or reduce in rank any honorably discharged veteran government employee with a rating of “good.” Length of service in no way qualified the preference given the veteran. And subsequent executive orders not only recognized this provision as giving veterans an absolute preference, but also extended the preference to veterans in the field service and to positions not under civil service. Executive Order 4240 of June 4, 1925, as amended by Executive Order 5068 of March 2, 1929, provided, as does Subgroup A-l here, an absolute retention preference for veterans over nonveterans where the veterans’ efficiency ratings were “good,” and a similar absolute preference over nonveterans whose ratings were less than good if the veterans’ ratings were equal to those of the non-veterans. And at the time of passage of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, there were 1943 Civil Service Regulations outstanding which granted veterans with permanent tenure and with a rating of “good” or higher, precisely the same absolute retention preference over nonveterans which is now afforded by Subgroup A-l, here attacked as invalid. Consequently, a holding that veterans with a rating of “good” no longer have a retention preference over nonveterans with longer service, would mean that passage of the Veterans’ Preference Act in 1944 narrowed the long-existing scope of veterans’ preferences in case of reduction in force of government personnel. The purpose of that Act’s sponsors and of Congress in passing it appears to have been precisely the opposite — to broaden rather than narrow the preference. The Senate Civil Service Committee was told by the congressional sponsor of the measure that “this bill takes away no existing veterans’ preference, either by statute or Executive order, but it does strengthen, broaden, and implements the veterans’ preference policy heretofore in effect,” and that it would “give legislative sanction to existing veterans’ preference, to the rules and regulations in the executive branch of the Government . A member of the Civil Service Commission in explaining the bill to the Senate Committee called the proviso here involved the “heart of the section,” and stated that it was “substantially the same” as the 1912 Act, which, as before pointed out, provided for an absolute veterans’ retention preference without regard to length of service. And in explaining the Bill on the floor of the House, the sponsor and active proponents of the measure explained it as strengthening and broadening veterans’ preferences then embodied in statutes and executive orders. Not only did the friends of the Veterans’ Preference Act explain to the Senate Committee on Civil Service and to the Congress the broad preferences the Act would grant. Hostile witnesses graphically pointed out to the Senate Committee what they deemed would be the unfairness of the Act’s effect if passed as written. One such witness representing the Civil Service Reform League said: “I think you ought to give consideration to . . . retention of veterans in civil service regardless of length of service. I do not think it is fair, a veteran be retained in service who has been in the service 6 months as against a person who has been in the service 25 years. I believe some distinction might be made, otherwise you would do a grave injustice to those people who have long years of service in civil service.” And another witness against the Bill pointed out that under it nonveterans would “be the first to be laid off and the last to be taken on.” Thus Congress passed the bill with full knowledge that the long standing absolute retention preferences of veterans would be embodied in the Act. Petitioner makes an appealing argument against this policy. But it is a policy adopted by Congress, and our responsibility is to interpret the Act, not to overrule the congressional policy. Affirmed. The remaining two subgroups of A, not involved here, are: Subgroup A-3, Veterans with efficiency ratings lower than "good.” Subgroup A-4, Non veterans with efficiency ratings lower than “good.” 5 Code Fed. Reg. (Supp. 1945) § 12.303, now found in 5 Code Fed. Reg. (Supp. 1947) §20.3 (a). Hearings before House Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 10132, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 80-82, 118, 235; 86 Cong. Rec. 11697. See 40 Ops. Atty. Gen., No. 115 (Sept. 20, 1946), p. 7, referring to Opinion, Attorney General Mitchell in 1929, interpreting Executive Order 5068, March 2, 1929. The substance of that Order is set out in this opinion at p. 337. The Act not only provides preferences for veterans but under certain circumstances grants preferences to veterans’ wives, widows and mothers. § 2, 5 U. S. C. § 851, as amended by 62 Stat. 3. See H. R. Rep. No. 1289,78th Cong., 2d Sess. 3. Disabled veterans had been granted employment preferences in 1S65. 13 Stat. 571. This statutory policy was expressly preserved by § 7 of the Civil Service Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403, 406, 5 U. S. C. § 638, was carried forward in other Acts, and has been repeated in a most comprehensive manner in § 2 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944. It is of interest that this legislative expression, like the one before us, was a proviso in a section, and that the section as a whole had to do with the manner in which the Civil Service Commission should provide for efficiency ratings in relation to promotions, demotions and dismissals of civil service employees. § 7, Executive Order 3567, October 24,1921. Executive Order 3801, March 3,1923. Departmental Circular 146, U. S. Civil Service Comm’n, October 22,1936. 5 Code Fed. Reg. (Supp. 1943) §§ 12.301-12.313. These regulations, like those attacked here, separated all civil service employees into different categories according to their tenure, with permanent mployees having the highest retention status. Thus all permanent employees, regardless of veterans’ preference and of efficiency rating, enjoyed priority over all employees with limited tenures. Hearings before Senate Committee on Civil Service on S. 1762 and H. R. 4115,78th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9. Id. at 29. Id. at 27,29. Three veterans’ organizations collaborated with the legislative sponsors in drafting the Act. Hearings before Senate Committee on Civil Service on S. 1762 and H. R. 4115, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 8. A representative of one of these organizations stated to the Committee: “This measure gives to honorably discharged veterans of World War I and World War II, their widows, and the wives of disabled veterans who themselves are not qualified, preference in employment where Federal funds are disbursed. It provides, by law, a definite preference both in appointment and retention in Federal positions. While such a preference in many instances now exists by virtue of Executive orders and Civil Service Commission regulations, this bill gives such preference a permanent standing that cannot be changed except by congressional action. The bill, likewise, does not take away from the veteran any rights previously granted under any existing law, Executive order, civil-service rule, or regulation of any department of the Government, but prescribes by law additional preferences and confirms many now existing by regulation.” Id. at 41-42. 90 Cong. Rec. 3502,3503, 3505. Hearings before Senate Committee on Civil Service on S. 1762 and H. R. 4115,78th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34. Id. at 63, 65. It is worthy of note, however, that Congress, in recognition of hardships resulting from replacement of older government employees by veterans, has passed Acts which grant special pensions to employees over 55 years of age who have worked for the Government for 25 years or more and who have been involuntarily separated from the service in reductions in force. 60 Stat. 939, 5 U. S. C. § 69 le; 62 Stat. 48. See 92 Cong. Rec. 9201-9202, H. R. Rep. No. 2443, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1; S. Rep. No. 1678, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. WOOSTER DIVISION OF BORGWARNER CORP. No. 53. Argued November 20-21, 1957. Decided May 5, 1958. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Jerome D. Fenton, Stephen Leonard and Irving M. Kerman. James C. Davis argued the cause for the Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation. With him on the brief was Robert W. Murphy. Harold A. Cranefield and Lowell Goerlich filed a brief for the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-AFL-CIO), as amicus curiae. Together with No. 78, Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, also on certiorari to the same Court. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. In these cases an employer insisted that its collective-bargaining contract with certain of its employees include: (1) a “ballot” clause calling for a pre-strike secret vote of those employees (union and nonunion) as to the employer’s last offer, and (2) a “recognition” clause which excluded, as a party to the contract, the International Union which had been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the employees’ exclusive bargaining agent, and substituted for it the agent’s uncertified local affiliate. The Board held that the employer’s insistence upon either of such clauses amounted to a refusal to bargain, in violation of § 8 (a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The issue turns on whether either of these clauses comes within the scope of mandatory collective bargaining as defined in § 8 (d) of the Act. For the reasons hereafter stated, we agree with the Board that neither clause comes within that definition. Therefore, we sustain the Board’s order directing the employer to cease insisting upon either clause as a condition precedent to accepting any collective-bargaining contract. Late in 1952, the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO (here called International) was certified by the Board to the Wooster (Ohio) Division of the Borg-Warner Corporation (here called the company) as the elected representative of an appropriate unit of the company’s employees. Shortly thereafter, International chartered Local No. 1239, UAW-CIO (here called the Local). Together the unions presented the company with a comprehensive collective-bargaining agreement. In the “recognition” clause, the unions described themselves as both the “International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local Union No. 1239, U. A. W.-C. 1.0.” The company submitted a counterproposal which recognized as the sole representative of the employees “Local Union 1239, affiliated with the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO).” The unions’ negotiators objected because such a clause disregarded the Board’s certification of International as the employees’ representative. The negotiators declared that the employees would accept no agreement which excluded International as a party. The company’s counterproposal also contained the “ballot” clause, quoted in full in the margin. In summary, this clause provided that, as to all nonarbitrable issues (which eventually included modification, amendment or termination of the contract), there would be a 30-day negotiation period after which, before the union could strike, there would have to be a secret ballot taken among all employees in the unit (union and nonunion) on the company’s last offer. In the event a majority of the employees rejected the company’s last offer, the company would have an opportunity, within 72 hours, of making a new proposal and having a vote on it prior to any strike. The unions’ negotiators announced they would not accept this clause “under any conditions.” From the time that the company first proposed these clauses, the employees’ representatives thus made it clear that each was wholly unacceptable. The company’s representatives made it equally clear that no agreement would be entered into by it unless the agreement contained both clauses. In view of this impasse, there was little further discussion of the clauses, although the parties continued to bargain as to other matters. The company submitted a “package” proposal covering economic issues but made the offer contingent upon the satisfactory settlement of “all other issues . . . .” The “package” included both of the controversial clauses. On March 15, 1953, the unions rejected that proposal and the membership voted to strike on March 20 unless a settlement were reached by then. None was reached and the unions struck. Negotiations, nevertheless, continued. On April 21, the unions asked the company whether the latter would withdraw its demand for the “ballot” and “recognition” clauses if the unions accepted all other pending requirements of the company. The company declined and again insisted upon acceptance of its “package,” including both clauses. Finally, on May 5, the Local, upon the recommendation of International, gave in and entered into an agreement containing both controversial clauses. In the meantime, International had filed charges with the Board claiming that the company, by the above conduct, was guilty of an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 8 (a) (5) of the Act. The trial examiner found no bad faith on either side. However, he found that the company had made it a condition precedent to its acceptance of any agreement that the agreement include both the “ballot” and the “recognition” clauses. For that reason, he recommended that the company be found guilty of a per se unfair labor practice in violation of §8 (a)(5). He reasoned that, because each of the controversial clauses was outside of the scope of mandatory bargaining as defined in § 8 (d) of the Act, the company’s insistence upon them, against the permissible opposition of the unions, amounted to a refusal to bargain as to the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. The Board, with two members dissenting, adopted the recommendations of the examiner. 113 N. L. R. B. 1288, 1298. In response to the Board’s petition to enforce its order, the Court of Appeals set aside that portion of the order relating to the “ballot” clause, but upheld the Board’s order as to the “recognition” clause. 236 F. 2d 898. Because of the importance of the issues and because of alleged conflicts among the Courts of Appeals, we granted the Board’s petition for certiorari in No. 53, relating to the “ballot” clause, and the company’s cross-petition in No. 78, relating to the “recognition” clause. 353 U. S. 907. We turn first to the relevant provisions of the statute. Section 8 (a) (5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . . . .” Section 8 (d) defines collective bargaining as follows: “(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession 61 Stat. 142, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d). Read together, these provisions establish the obligation of the employer and the representative of its employees to bargain with each other in good faith with respect to “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . The duty is limited to those subjects, and within that area neither party is legally obligated to yield. Labor Board v. American Insurance Co., 343 U. S. 395. As to other matters, however, each party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree. The company’s good faith has met the requirements of the statute as to the subjects of mandatory bargaining. But that good faith does not license the employer to refuse to enter into agreements on the ground that they do not include some proposal which is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. We agree with the Board that such conduct is, in substance, a refusal to bargain about the subjects that are within the scope of mandatory bargaining. This does not mean that bargaining is to be confined to the statutory subjects. Each of the two controversial clauses is lawful in itself. Each would be enforceable if agreed to by the unions. But it does not follow that, because the company may propose these clauses, it can lawfully insist upon them as a condition to any agreement. Since it is lawful to insist upon matters within the scope of mandatory bargaining and unlawful to insist upon matters without, the issue here is whether either the “ballot” or the “recognition” clause is a subject within the phrase “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” which defines mandatory bargaining. The “ballot” clause is not within that definition. It relates only to the procedure to be followed by the employees among themselves before their representative may call a strike or refuse a final offer. It settles no term or condition of employment — it merely calls for an advisory vote of the employees. It is not a partial “no-strike” clause. A “no-strike” clause prohibits the employees from striking during the life of the contract. It regulates the relations between the employer and the employees. See Labor Board v. American Insurance Co., supra, at 408, n. 22. The “ballot” clause, on the other hand, deals only with relations between the employees and their unions. It substantially modifies the collective-bargaining system provided for in the statute by weakening the independence of the “representative” chosen by the employees. It enables the employer, in effect, to deal with its employees rather than with their statutory representative. Cf. Medo Photo Corp. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 678. The “recognition” clause likewise does not come within the definition of mandatory bargaining. The statute requires the company to bargain with the certified representative of its employees. It is an evasion of that duty to insist that the certified agent not be a party to the collective-bargaining contract. The Act does not prohibit the voluntary addition of a party, but that does not authorize the employer to exclude the certified representative from the contract. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 53 is reversed and the cause remanded for disposition consistent with this opinion. In No. 78, the judgment is affirmed. No. 53 — Reversed and remanded. No. 78 — Affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter joins this opinion insofar as it holds that insistence by the company on the “recognition” clause, in conflict with the provisions of the Act requiring an employer to bargain with the representative of his employees, constituted an unfair labor practice. He agrees with the views of Mr. Justice Harlan regarding the “ballot” clause. The subject matter of that clause is not so clearly outside the reasonable range of industrial bargaining as to establish a refusal to bargain in good faith, and is not prohibited simply because not deemed to be within the rather vague scope of the obligatory provisions of § 8 (d). “Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a). “Sec. 9. (a) Representatives designated' or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . . . .” 61 Stat. 140, 141, 143, 29 U. S. C. §§158 (a)(5), 159 (a). See § 8 (d) as set forth in the text of the opinion, infra, p. 348. “5. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMPANY AND THE UNION “5.4 It is agreed by both the Company and the Union that it is their mutual intent to provide peaceful means for the settlement of all disputes that may arise between them. To assist both parties to carry out this intent in good faith, it is agreed that it is essential that three basic steps be taken with respect to each dispute, in order to permit the greatest opportunity for satisfactory settlement: such steps shall include (1) a clear definition of the issue or issues, officially made known to all employees in the bargaining unit; (2) a reasonable period of good faith bargaining on the issues as defined, after such issues have been made known to all employees in the bargaining unit; and (3) an opportunity for all employees in the bargaining unit to vote, by secret, impartially supervised, written ballot, on whether to accept or reject the Company’s last offer, and on any subsequent offers made. “5.5 It is mutually agreed that the definition of issues referred to in Section 5.4 will include the proposals and counter-proposals of each party; that the reasonable period of good faith bargaining referred to in Section 5.4 shall be at least 30 days, with full discussion of the issue taking place during that period; and that the secret written ballot referred to in Section 5.4 shall be supervised by a representative of the United States Mediation and Conciliation Service, or by some other party mutually agreed upon by the Company and the Union. The Company and the Union further agree that such a ballot shall be taken on Company premises, at reasonable and convenient times, and with proper safeguards, similar to those observed in NLRB elections, being taken to insure freedom of choice.and a fair election. “5.6 It is further mutually agreed that if a majority of employees in the bargaining unit reject the Company’s last offer, and the Company makes a subsequent offer within 72 hours from the time the results of the election are known, another secret, impartially supervised written ballot will be taken within the following 72 hours. “5.7 It is further mutually agreed that the question of whether or not this Agreement is to be terminated is one of the issues subject to vote by such a secret, impartially supervised, written ballot. “5.8 It is further mutually agreed that during the life of this Agreement the Company will not engage in any form of lockout, and the Union will not cause or permit the members of the bargaining unit to take part in any sit-down, stay-in, or slow-down, or any curtailment of work or restriction of production or interference with production, or take part in any strike or stoppage of any kind, or picket the plant, on any matter subject to arbitration, and not in any other matter, until all the bargaining procedure outlined in this Agreement, (including the Grievance Procedure, where applicable, and in all cases the three steps outlined in this Article), have been completely fulfilled.” 113 N. L. R. B. 1288, 1310-1311. Labor Board v. Darlington Veneer Co., 236 F. 2d 85 (C. A. 4th Cir.); Labor Board v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 178 F. 2d 344 (C. A. 5th Cir.). Cf. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board, 213 F. 2d 374 (C. A. 7th Cir.). See note 1, supra. See §§ 201 (c) and 203 (c) of the act, 61 Stat. 152, 154, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171 (c) and 173 (c).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. NACHTIGAL No. 92-609. Decided February 22, 1993 Per Curiam. Respondent Jerry Nachtigal was charged with operating a motor vehicle in Yosemite National Park while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of 36 CFR §§ 4.23(a)(1) and (a)(2) (1992). Driving under the influence (DUI) is a class B misdemeanor and carries a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment, § 1.3(a); 18 U. S. C. § 3581(b)(7), and a $5,000 fine, §§ 3571(b)(6) and (e). As an alternative to a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court may impose a term of probation not to exceed five years. §§ 3561(a)(3), (b)(2). The sentencing court has discretion to attach a host of discretionary conditions to the probationary term. § 3563(b). Respondent moved for a jury trial. Applying our decision in Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U. S. 538 (1989), the Magistrate Judge denied the motion. He reasoned that because DUI carries a maximum term of imprisonment of six months, it is presumptively a “petty” offense which is not embraced by the jury trial guaranty of the Sixth Amendment. He rejected respondent’s contention that the additional penalties transformed DUI into a “serious” offense for Sixth Amendment purposes. Respondent was then tried by the Magistrate Judge and convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992). He was fined $750 and placed on unsupervised probation for one year. The District Court reversed the Magistrate Judge on the issue of entitlement to a jury trial, commenting that the language in our opinion in Blanton was “at variance with the Ninth Circuit precedent of United States v. Craner, [652 F. 2d 23 (1981)],” and electing to follow Craner because our opinion in Blanton did not “expressly overrule” Craner.: App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a, 20a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court, holding that Blanton is “[inapposite,” that Craner controls, and that -respondent is entitled to a jury trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a-4a, judgt. order reported at 953 F. 2d 1389 (1992). The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the Secretary of the Interior, and not Congress, set the maximum prison term at six months, “[t]here is no controlling legislative determination” regarding the seriousness of the offense. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a; see also United States v. Craner, 652 F. 2d 23, 25 (CA9 1981). The court also found it significant that the Secretary of the Interior, in whom Congress vested general regulatory authority to fix six months as the maximum sentence for any regulatory offense dealing with the use and management of the national parks, monuments, or reservations, see 16 U. S. C. §3, chose the harshest penalty available for DUI offenses. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a-4a; see also Craner, supra, at 25. Finally, the court noted that seven of the nine States within the Ninth Circuit guarantee a jury trial for a DUI offense. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a-4a; see also Craner, supra, at 27. Unlike the Court of Appeals and the District Court, we think that this case is quite obviously controlled by our decision in Blanton. We therefore grant the United States’ petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis is granted. In Blanton, we held that in order to determine whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial attaches to a particular offense, the court must examine “objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense.” Blanton, 489 U. S., at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted). The best indicator of society’s views is the maximum penalty set by the legislature. Ibid. While the word “penalty” refers both to the term of imprisonment and other statutory penalties, we stated that “[pjrimary emphasis ... must be placed on the maximum authorized period of incarceration.” Id., at 542. We therefore held that offenses for which the maximum period of incarceration is six months or .less are presumptively “‘petty.’” A defendant can overcome this presumption, and become entitled to a jury trial, only by showing that the additional penalties, viewed together with the maximum prison term, are so severe that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a “ ‘serious’” one. Id., at 543. Finally, we expressly stated that the statutory penalties in other States are irrelevant to the question whether a particular legislature deemed a particular offense “‘serious.’” Id., at 545, n. 11. Applying the above rule, we held that DUI was a petty offense under Nevada law. Since the maximum prison term was six months, the presumption described above applied. We did not find it constitutionally significant that the defendant would automatically lose his license for up to 90 days, and would be required to attend, at his own expense, an alcohol abuse education course. Id., at 544, and n. 9. Nor did we believe that a $1,000 fine or an alternative sentence of 48 hours’ community service while wearing clothing identifying him as a DUI offender was more onerous than six months in jail. Id., at 544-545. The present case, we think, requires only a relatively routine application of the rule announced in Blanton. Because the maximum term of imprisonment is six months, DUI under 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992) is presumptively a petty offense to which no jury trial right attaches. The Court of Appeals refused to apply the Blanton presumption, reasoning that the Secretary of the Interior, and not Congress, ultimately determined the maximum prison term. But there is a controlling legislative determination present within the regulatory scheme. In 16 U. S. C. § 3, Congress set six months as the maximum penalty the Secretary could impose for a violation of any of his regulations. The Court of Appeals offered no persuasive reason why this congressional determination is stripped of its “legislative” character merely because the Secretary has final authority to decide, within the limits given by Congress, what the maximum prison sentence will be for a violation of a given regulation. The additional penalties imposed under the regulations are not sufficiently severe to overcome this presumption. As we noted in Blanton, it is a rare case where “a legislature packs an offense it deems ‘serious’ with onerous penalties that nonetheless do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line.” Blanton, 489 U. S., at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the federal DUI offense carries a maximum fine of $5,000, and respondent faced, as an alternative to incarceration, a maximum 5-year term of probation. While the maximum fine in this case is $4,000 greater than the one in Blanton, this monetary penalty “cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.” Id., at 542. Nor do we believe that the probation alternative renders the DUI offense “serious.” Like a monetary penalty, the liberty infringement caused by a term of probation is far less intrusive than incarceration. Ibid. The discretionary probation conditions do not alter this conclusion; while they obviously entail a greater infringement on liberty than probation without attendant conditions, they do not approximate the severe loss of liberty caused by imprisonment for more than six months. We hold that the Court of Appeals was wrong in refusing to recognize that this case was controlled by our opinion in Blanton rather than by its previous opinion in Craner. An individual convicted of driving under the influence in violation of 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992) is not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The petition of the United States for certiorari is accordingly granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. There are 21 discretionary conditions which the sentencing court may impose upon a defendant. Under 18 U. S. C. § 3563(b), a court may require, among other things, that the defendant (1) pay restitution; (2) take part in a drug and alcohol dependency program offered by an institution, and if necessary, reside at the institution; (3) remain in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons during nights and weekends for a period not exceeding the term of imprisonment; (4) reside at or participate in a program of a community correctional facility for all or part of the probationary term; or (5) remain at his place of residence during nonworking hours, and, if necessary, this condition may be monitored by telephonic or electronic devices. §§ 3563(b)(3), (b)(10), (b)(11), (b)(12), (b)(20).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LEAD CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 124. Argued December 13, 1956. Decided January 22, 1957. Karl Riemer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Lawrence S. Lesser. Hilbert P. Zarky argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, Philip Elman and Joseph F. Goetten. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a companion case to No. 78, United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., ante, p. 306, which was also decided today. During World War II petitioner manufactured engine bearings. In 1944 petitioner expanded its plant in an effort to increase the output of these essential war products. At the same time it applied to the War Production Board for certification that the various additions were necessary in the interest of national defense. However the Board, as in Allen-Bradley, granted certificates of necessity for only a part of the cost of petitioner’s new facilities. In its income tax return for 1944 petitioner exercised the privilege such certification conferred by taking as a deduction a sum based on the accelerated amortization of that part of the costs which had been certified by the Board. In 1951 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue asserted a deficiency against petitioner on grounds unrelated to the present controversy. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for redetermination with the Tax Court claiming that it was entitled to a refund for overpayment of income taxes in 1944. The amount of this overpayment was calculated on the basis that petitioner was entitled to accelerate the amortization of the full cost of those facilities covered by the Board’s “partial certifications.” Petitioner contends that the Board was not authorized to certify only a part of the cost of a facility when the Board had determined that the facility as a whole was necessary to the national defense. The Tax Court granted petitioner’s claim, but on appeal the Second Circuit reversed, holding that petitioner had forfeited its right to challenge the Board’s action by waiting too long after accepting the tax benefits of the “partial certificates” to attack their validity. 230 F. 2d 161. The Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether the Board was authorized to issue such “partial certificates.” For reasons stated in our opinion in No. 78, United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., supra, we hold that the Board was empowered to issue certificates covering only a part of the cost of petitioner’s improvements. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan joins in the Court’s decision for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., ante, p. 311.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SHAUGHNESSY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, v. PEDREIRO. No. 374. Argued March 31, 1955. Decided April 25. 1955. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Olney, John F. Davis, Beatrice Rosenberg and Edward S. Szukelewicz. Aaron L. Danzig argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. f Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. After administrative hearings, the respondent Pedreiro, an alien, was ordered deported under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. . He petitioned the District Court for the Southern District of New York to review the deportation order, declare it void and issue a temporary injunction restraining its execution pending final district court action. In part he contended that there was no legal evidence to support the order and that in violation of due process he had been compelled to incriminate himself in the hearings. Relief was sought only against the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization for the District of New York. The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that either the Attorney General or the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization was an indispensable party and should have been joined. This holding made it unnecessary for the District Court to pass on another ground ' urged for dismissal, that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 precluded judicial review of deportation orders by any method except habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting both contentions of the Government. 213 F. 2d 768. In doing so it followed the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which had held that deportation orders entered under the 1952 Immigration Act can be judicially reviewed in actions for declaratory relief under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Rubinstein v. Brownell, 92 U. S. App. D. C. 328, 206 F. 2d 449, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 346 U. S. 929. But the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that habeas corpus is the only way such deportation orders can be attacked. Batista v. Nicolls, 213 F. 2d 20. Because of this conflict among the circuits and the contention that allowing judicial review of deportation orders other than by habeas corpus conflicts with Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, we granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 882. The Heikkila case, unlike this one, dealt with a deportation order under the Immigration Act of 1917. That Act provided that deportation orders of the Attorney General should be “final” and had long been interpreted as precluding any type of judicial review except by habeas corpus. Heikkila contended that this narrow right of review of deportation orders under the 1917 Act had been broadened by § 10 of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act which authorizes review of agency action by any appropriate method “except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review . . . .” Because this Court had construed the word “final” in the 1917 Act as precluding any review except by habeas corpus, it held that the Administrative Procedure Act gave no additional remedy since § 10 excepted statutes that precluded judicial review. The Court carefully pointed out, however, that it did not consider whether the same result should be reached under the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act “which took effect after Heikkila’s complaint was filed.” Consequently Heikkila.does not control this case and we must consider the effect of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act on the right to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that “Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.” And § 12 of the Act provides that “No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly.” In the subsequent 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act there is no language which “expressly” supersedes or modifies the expanded right of review granted by § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. But the 1952 Immigration Act does provide, as did the 1917 Act, that deportation orders of the Attorney General shall be “final.” The Government contends that we should read this as expressing a congressional purpose to give the word “final” in the 1952 Act precisely the same meaning Heikkila gave “final” in the 1917 Act and thereby continue to deprive deportees of all right of judicial review except by habeas corpus. We cannot accept this. contention. Such a restrictive construction of the finality provision of the present Immigration Act would run counter to § 10 and § 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Their purpose was to remove obstacles to judicial review of agency action under subsequently enacted statutes like the 1952 Immigration Act. And as the Court said in the Heikkila case, the Procedure Act is to be given a “hospitable” interpretation. In that case the Court also referred to ambiguity in the provision making deportation orders of the Attorney General “final.” It is more in harmony with the generous review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to construe the ambiguous word “final” in the 1952 Immigration Act as referring to finality in administrative procedure rather than as cutting off the right of judicial review in whole or in part. And it would certainly not be in keeping with either of these Acts to require a person ordered deported to go to jail in order to obtain review by a court, j The legislative history of both the Administrative Procedure Act and the 1952 Immigration Act supports respondent’s right to full judicial review of this deportation order. The sponsors of the Administrative Procedure Act were Representative Walter in the House and Senator McCarran in the Senate. They were also the sponsors of the 1952 Immigration Act. While the latter Act was under consideration in the House, an amendment was proposed which provided for liberal judicial review of deportation orders. Representative Walter assured the House that the proposed amendment was not needed. He said: “Now, we come to this question of the finality of the decision of the Attorney General. That language means that it is a final decision as far as the administrative branch of the Government is concerned, but it is not final in that it is not the last remedy that the alien has. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act is applicable.” With reference to the same problem Senator McCarran assured the Senate that “the Administrative Procedure Act is made applicable to the bill.” It is argued that these assurances by the chairmen of the committees in charge of the bills were but isolated statements and that other legislative history is sufficient to refute them. We cannot agree. Our holding is that there is a right of judicial review of deportation orders other than by habeas corpus and that the remedy sought here is an appropriate one. ] We also reject the Government’s contention that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization is an indispensable party to an action for declaratory relief of this kind. District Directors are authorized by regulation to issue warrants of deportation, to designate the country to which an alien shall be deported, and to determine when his mental or physical condition requires the employment of a person to accompany him. The regulations purport to make these decisions of the District Director final. It seems highly appropriate, therefore, that the District Director charged with enforcement of a deportation order should represent the Government’s interest. Otherwise in order to try his case an alien might be compelled to go to the District of Columbia to obtain jurisdiction over the Commissioner. To impose this burden on an alien about to be deported would be completely inconsistent with the basic policy of the Administrative Procedure Act to facilitate court review of such administrative action. We know of no necessity for such a harsh rule. Undoubtedly the Government’s defense can be adequately presented by the District Director who is under the supervision of the Commissioner. It is argued, however, that the Commissioner should be an indispensable party because a judgment against a District Director alone would not be final and binding in other immigration districts. But we need not decide the effect of such a judgment. We cannot assume that a decision on the merits in a court of appeals on a question of this kind, subject to review by this Court, would be lightly disregarded by the immigration authorities. Nor is it to be assumed that a second effort to have the same issue decided in a habeas corpus proceeding would do any serious harm to the Government. In habeas corpus proceedings district courts would have the duty to consider previous court decisions on the same matter. And even though in extraordinary circumstances new matters not previously adjudicated may arise in habeas corpus proceedings, this is no adequate reason for subjecting an alien to the great burden of having to go with his witnesses to the District of Columbia, which may be far distant from his home, in order to contest his deportation. Our former cases have established a policy under which indispensability of parties is determined on practical considerations. See, e. g., Williams v. Fanning, 332 U. S. 490. That policy followed here causes us to conclude that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization is not an indispensable party. Affirmed 66 Stat. 163, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 54 Stat. 1238. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, 232, note 4. 98 Cong. Rec. 4416. 98 Cong. Rec. 5778. Compare Paolo v. Garfinkel, 200 F. 2d 280; Rodriguez v. Landon, 212 F. 2d 508. 8 CFR §§ 243.1, 243.2.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BUTZ, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. v. GLOVER LIVESTOCK COMMISSION CO., INC. No. 71-1545. Argued February 27, 1973 Decided March 28, 1973 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas, J., joined, post, p. 189. Keith A. Jones argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wood, Morton Hollander, and William Kanter. R. A. Eilbott, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Edward I. Staten. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture, acting for the Secretary of Agriculture, found that respondent, a registrant under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 159, 7 U. S. C. § 181 et seq., wilfully violated §§ 307 (a) and 312 (a) of the Act, 7 U. S. C. §§ 208 (a) and 213 (a), by incorrect weighing of livestock, and also breached § 401, 7 U. S. C. § 221, by entries of false weights. An order was entered directing that respondent cease and desist from the violations and keep correct accounts, and also suspending respondent as a registrant under the Act for 20 days. Upon review of the decision and order, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld, as supported by substantial evidence, the findings that respondent violated the Act by short-weighting cattle, and also sustained the cease-and-desist order and the order to keep correct accounts. The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the 20-day suspension. 454 F. 2d 109 (1972). We granted certiorari to consider whether, in doing so, the Court of Appeals exceeded the scope of proper judicial review of administrative sanctions. 409 U. S. 947 (1972). We conclude that the setting aside of the suspension was an impermissible judicial intrusion into the administrative domain under the circumstances of this case, and reverse. Respondent operates a stockyard in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. As a registered “market agency” under § 303 of the Act, 7 U. S. C. § 203, respondent is authorized to sell consigned livestock on commission, subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act and the Secretary’s implementing regulations. Investigations of respondent’s operations in 1964, 1966, and 1967 uncovered instances of underweighing of consigned livestock. Respondent was informally warned to correct the situation, but when a 1969 investigation revealed more underweighing, the present proceeding was instituted by the Administrator of the Packers and Stockyards Administration. Following a hearing and the submission of briefs, the Department of Agriculture hearing examiner found that respondent had “intentionally weighed the livestock at less than their true weights, issued scale tickets and accountings to the consignors on the basis of the false weights, and paid the consignors on the basis of the false weights.” The hearing examiner recommended, in addition to a cease-and-desist order and an order to keep correct records, a 30-day suspension of respondent’s registration under the Act. The matter was then referred to the Judicial Officer.After hearing oral argument, the Judicial Officer filed a decision and order accepting the hearing examiner’s findings and adopting his recommendations of a cease-and-desist order and an order to keep correct records. The recommended suspension was also imposed but was reduced to 20 days. The Judicial Officer stated: “It is not a pleasant task to impose sanctions but in view of the previous warnings given respondent we conclude that we should not only issue a cease and desist order but also a suspension of respondent as a registrant under the act but for a lesser period than recommended by complainant and the hearing examiner.” 30 Agri. Dec. 179, 186 (1971). The Court of Appeals agreed that 7 U. S. C. § 204 authorized the Secretary to suspend “any registrant found in violation of the Act,” 454 F. 2d, at 113, that the suspension procedure here satisfied the relevant requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 558, and that “the evidence indicates that [respondent] acted with careless disregard of the statutory requirements and thus meets the test of wilfulness.’ ” 454 F. 2d, at 115. The court nevertheless concluded that the suspension order was “unconscionable” under the circumstances of this case. The court gave two reasons. The first, relying on four previous suspension decisions, was that the Secretary’s practice was not to impose suspensions for negligent or careless violations but only for violations found to be “intentional and flagrant,” and therefore that the suspension in respondent’s case was contrary to a policy of “ ‘achieving] . . . uniformity of sanctions for similar violations.’ ” The second reason given was that “[t]he cease and desist order coupled with the damaging publicity surrounding these proceedings would certainly seem appropriate and reasonable with respect to the practice the Department seeks to eliminate.” Id., at 114, 115. The applicable standard of judicial review in such cases required review of the Secretary’s order according to the “fundamental principle . . . that where Congress has entrusted an administrative agency with the responsibility of selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy 'the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.’ ” American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 112 (1946). Thus, the Secretary’s choice of sanction was not to be overturned unless the Court of Appeals might find it “unwarranted in law or . . . without justification in fact . . . Id., at 112-113; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941); Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U. S. 411, 413-414 (1958); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U. S. 244, 250 (1967); 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law §30.10, pp. 250-251 (1958). The Court of Appeals acknowledged this definition of the permissible scope of judicial review but apparently regarded respondent’s suspension as “unwarranted in law” or “without justification in fact.” We cannot agree that the Secretary’s action can be faulted in either respect on this record. We read the Court of Appeals’ opinion to suggest that the sanction was “unwarranted in law” because “uniformity of sanctions for similar violations” is somehow mandated by the Act. We search in vain for that requirement in the statute. The Secretary may suspend “for a reasonable specified period” any registrant who has violated any provision of the Act. 7 U. S. C. § 204. Nothing whatever in that provision confines its application to cases of “intentional and flagrant conduct” or denies its application in cases of negligent or careless violations. Rather, the breadth of the grant of authority to impose the sanction strongly implies a congressional purpose to permit the Secretary to impose it to deter repeated violations of the Act, whether intentional or negligent. Hyatt v. United States, 276 F. 2d 308, 313 (CA10 1960) ; G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F. 2d 286 (CA7 1958); In re Silver, 21 Agri. Dec. 1438, 1452 (1962). The employment of a sanction within the authority of an administrative agency is thus not rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases. FCC v. WOKO, 329 U. S. 223, 227-228 (1946); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U. S., at 250, 251; G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, supra, at 296; Hiller v. SEC, 429 F. 2d 856, 858-859 (CA2 1970); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F. 2d 107, 110 (CA2 1967) ; Kent v. Hardin, 425 F. 2d 1346, 1349 (CA5 1970). Moreover, the Court of Appeals may have been in error in acting on the premise that the Secretary’s practice was to impose suspensions only in cases of “intentional and flagrant conduct.” The Secretary’s practice, rather, apparently is to employ that sanction as in his judgment best serves to deter violations and achieve the objectives of that statute. Congress plainly intended in its broad grant to give the Secretary that breadth of discretion. Therefore, mere unevenness in the application of the sanction does not render its application in a particular case “unwarranted in law.” Nor can we perceive any basis on this record for a conclusion that the suspension of respondent was so “without justification in fact” “as to constitute an abuse of [the Secretary’s] discretion.” American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S., at 115; Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U. S., at 414; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 455 (1954). The Judicial Officer rested the suspension on his view of its necessity in light of respondent’s disregard of previous warnings. The facts found concerning the previous warnings and respondent’s disregard of these warnings were sustained by the Court of Appeals as based on ample evidence. In that circumstance, the overturning of the suspension authorized by the statute was an impermissible intrusion into the administrative domain. Similarly, insofar as the Court of Appeals rested its action on its view that, in light of damaging publicity about the charges, the cease-and-desist order sufficiently redressed respondent’s violations, the court clearly exceeded its function of judicial review. The fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for the Secretary, not the court. The court may decide only whether, under the pertinent statute and relevant facts, the Secretary made “an allowable judgment in [his] choice of the remedy.” Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U. S. 608, 612 (1946). Reversed. 7 U. S. C. §§ 201-217a. Specifically, registrants are prohibited from engaging in or using “any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device in connection with . . . receiving, marketing, buying, or selling on a commission basis or otherwise, feeding, watering, holding, delivery, shipment, weighing, or handling ... of livestock,” 7 U. S. C. §213 (a), and are required to “keep such accounts, records, and memoranda as fully and correctly disclose all transactions involved in his business 7 U. S. C. §221. The Secretary’s regulations may be found in 9 CFR pt. 201. App. 35. The Court of Appeals stated: “Ordinarily it is not for the courts to modify ancillary features of agency orders which are supported by substantial evidence. The shaping of remedies is peculiarly within the special competence of the regulatory agency vested by Congress with authority to deal with these matters, and so long as the remedy selected does not exceed the agency’s statutory power to impose and it bears a reasonable relation to the practice sought to be eliminated, a reviewing court may not interfere. . . . [A]ppellate courts [may not] enter the more spacious domain of public policy which Congress has entrusted in the various regulatory agencies.” 454 F. 2d 109, 114. The Court of Appeals cited a 1962 decision by the Secretary in which appears a reference to “uniformity of sanctions for similar violations.” In re Silver, 21 Agri. Dec. 1438 (1962). That reference is no support for the Court of Appeals’ decision, however, for the Secretary said expressly in that decision: “False and incorrect weighing of livestock by registrants under the act is a flagrant and serious violation thereof ...” and “even if respondent did not give instructions for the false weighings, his negligence in allowing the false weighings over an extended period brings such situation unthin the reach of the cited cases [sustaining sanctions] and we would still order the sanctions below.” Id., at 1452 (emphasis added). It is by no means clear that respondent’s violations were merely negligent. The hearing examiner found that respondent had “intentionally” underweighed livestock, and the Judicial Officer stated: “We conclude then, as did the hearing examiner, that respondent wilfully violated . . . the act.” (Emphasis added.) “Wilfully” could refer to either intentional conduct or conduct that was merely careless or negligent. It seems clear, however, that the Judicial Officer sustained the hearing examiner’s finding that the violations were “intentional.” See, e. g., In re Martella, 30 Agri. Dec. 1479 (1971); In re Meggs, 30 Agri. Dec. 1314 (1971); In re Producers Livestock Mar keting Assn., 30 Agri. Dec. 796 (1971); In re Trimble, 29 Agri. Dec. 936 (1970); In re Anson, 28 Agri. Dec. 1127 (1969); In re Williamstown Stockyards, 27 Agri. Dec. 252 (1968); In re Middle Georgia Livestock Sales Co., 23 Agri. Dec. 1361 (1964). These cases involve suspension of registrants under the Packers and Stockyards Act for false weighing of producers’ livestock and in none was there a finding that the violation was intentional or flagrant. There are also many cases of suspension for diverse other violations without a finding that the conduct was intentional or flagrant. See, e. g., In re Wallis, 29 Agri. Dec. 37 (1970).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION v. SHELL OIL CO. et al. No. 77-1652. Argued January 15, 1979 Decided February 22, 1979 Howard E. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner in No. 77-1652 and respondent in No. 77-1654. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Barnett, Richard A. Allen, and M. Frazier King, Jr. Charles E. Hill argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 77-1654. Thomas G. Johnson argued the cause for respondents in No. 77-1652. With him on the brief were David G. Stevenson, David M. Whitney, W. 0. Strong III, Richard F. Generelly, Alan Berlin, B. James McGraw, Edwin S. Nail, Justin R. Wolf, Thomas H. Burton, Robert C. Murray, David C. Henri, Arthur S. Berner, Richard G. Harris, William A. Sackmann, Tom P. Hamill, Robert D. Haworth, John L. Williford, Paul W. Hicks, Richard F. Remmers, James D. Olsen, W. B. Wagner, Jr., Pat F. Timmons, John A. Ramsey, Paul J. Broyles, Karen, A. Berndt, George C. Bond, and Kenneth L. Riedman, Jr. Stephen M. Hackerman, Charles M. Darling IV, John M. Young, and Michael B. Silva filed a brief for Tenneco Oil Co. et al., respondents in No. 77-1652. Edwin W. Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General, James R. Patton, Jr., David B. Robinson, and Harry E. Barsh, Jr., filed a brief for the State of Louisiana, respondent in No. 77-1652. Together with No. 77-1654, Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert J. Hobbs for the Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia; by Frederick Moring for the Associated Gas Distributors; and by Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., for the United States Conference of Mayors et al. Avrum M. Gross, Attorney General, Robert M. Maynard, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert H. Loeffler filed a brief for the State of Alaska as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONSBANK OF NORTH CAROLINA, N. A., et al. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE CO. et al. No. 93-1612. Argued December 7, 1994 Decided January 18, 1995 Ginsbtjrg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Edward, C. DuMont argued the cause for petitioners in No. 93-1613. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Mark B. Stern, Jacob M. Lewis, Julie L. Williams, L. Robert Griffin, and Yvonne D Mcln-tire. Steven S. Rosenthal argued the cause for petitioners in No. 93-1612. With him on the briefs were Robert M. Kurucza and Robert G. Bailen. David Overlock Stewart argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Alan G. Priest, Raymond C. Ortman, Jr., and William A. Wilson. Together with No. 93-1613, Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, et al. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bankers Association et al. by John J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, James T. McIntyre, Richard M. Whiting, and David L. Glass; for the Conference of State Bank Supervisors et al. by David W. Roderer, Eric L. Hirschhorn, Donn C. Meindertsma, J. Thomas Cardwell, Leonard J. Rubin, and M. Brooks Senn; and for the New York Clearing House Association by John L. Warden, Michael M. Wiseman, Theodore Edelman, and Norman R. Nelson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Tom Gallagher, Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner of Florida, et al. by David J. Busch, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, pro se, and Mark F. Kohler, Assistant Attorney General, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Gary L. Spaeth, Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and Maureen G. Glynn, Special Assistant Attorney General; for the American Academy of Actuaries by Lauren M. Bloom; for the American Council of Life Insurance by Gary E. Hughes, Allen R. Caskie, and Phillip E. Stano; for the American Land Title Association by Sheldon E. Hochberg; for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners by Susan E. Martin and Ellen Dolíase Wilcox; and for the National Association of Life Underwriters et al. by Ann M. Kappler and Scott A. Sinder. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. These consolidated cases present the question whether national banks may serve as agents in the sale of annuities. The Comptroller of the Currency, charged by Congress with superintendence of national banks, determined that federal law permits such annuity sales as a service to bank customers. Specifically, the Comptroller considered the sales at issue “incidental” to “the business of banking” under the National Bank Act, Rev. Stat. § 5136, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The Comptroller further concluded that annuities are not “insurance” within the meaning of §92; that provision, by expressly authorizing banks in towns of no more than 5,000 people to sell insurance, arguably implies that banks in larger towns may not sell insurance. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas upheld the Comptroller’s conclusions as a permissible reading of the National Bank Act, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. We are satisfied that the Comptroller’s construction of the Act is reasonable and therefore warrants judicial deference. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I Petitioner NationsBank of North Carolina, N. A., a national bank based in Charlotte, and its brokerage subsidiary sought permission from the Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to 12 CFR § 5.34 (1994), for the brokerage subsidiary to act as an agent in the sale of annuities. Annuities are contracts under which the purchaser makes one or more premium payments to the issuer in exchange for a series of payments, which continue either for a fixed period or for the life of the purchaser or a designated beneficiary. When a purchaser invests in a “variable” annuity, the purchaser’s money is invested in a designated way and payments to the purchaser vary with investment performance. In a classic “fixed” annuity, in contrast, payments do not vary. Under the contracts NationsBank proposed to sell, purchasers could direct their payments to a variable, fixed, or hybrid account, and would be allowed periodically to modify their choice. The issuers would be various insurance companies. See Letter from J. Michael Shepherd, Senior Deputy Comptroller, to Robert M. Kurucza (Mar. 21, 1990), App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 93-1612, pp. 35a-36a (Comptroller’s Letter). The Comptroller granted NationsBank’s application. He concluded that national banks have authority to broker annuities within “the business of banking” under 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh. He further concluded that § 92, addressing insurance sales by banks in towns with no more than 5,000 people, did not impede his approval; for purposes of that provision, the Comptroller explained, annuities do not rank as “insurance.” See Comptroller’s Letter 41a-47a. Respondent Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. (VALIC), which sells annuities, challenged the Comptroller’s decision. VALIC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), and 28 U. S. C. §§2201,2202 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Comptroller and NationsBank. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 639 (1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F. 2d 1295 (1993). Relying on its decision in Saxon v. Georgia Assn. of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F. 2d 1010 (1968), the Fifth Circuit first held that § 92 bars banks not located in small towns from selling insurance, and then rejected the Comptroller’s view that annuities are not insurance for purposes of § 92. See 998 F. 2d, at 1298-1302. Four judges dissented from the failure of the court to grant rehearing en banc. The dissenters maintained that the panel had not accorded due deference to the Comptroller’s reasonable statutory interpretations. Variable Annu ity Life Ins. Co. v. Clark[e], 13 F. 3d 833, 837-838 (CA5 1994). We granted certiorari. 511 U. S. 1141 (1994). II A Authorizing national banks to “carry on the business of banking,” the National Bank Act provides that such banks shall have power— “To exercise ... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes .... The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [bank] shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock . . . .” 12 U. S. C. §24 Seventh (1988 ed. and Supp. V). As the administrator charged with supervision of the National Bank Act, see §§ 1, 26-27, 481, the Comptroller bears primary responsibility for surveillance of “the business of banking” authorized by §24 Seventh. We have reiterated: “Tt is settled that courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute. The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.’” Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 403-404 (1987) (quoting Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971)). Under the formulation now familiar, when we confront an expert administrator’s statutory exposition, we inquire first whether “the intent of Congress is clear” as to “the precise question at issue.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). If so, “that is the end of the matter.” Ibid. But “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., at 843. If the administrator’s reading fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design, we give the administrator’s judgment “controlling weight.” Id., at 844. In authorizing NationsBank to broker annuities, the Comptroller invokes the power of banks to “broker a wide variety of financial investment instruments,” Comptroller’s Letter 38a, which the Comptroller considers “part of [banks’] traditional role as financial intermediaries,” ibid., and therefore an “incidental powe[r] . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking.” 12 U. S. C. §24 Seventh; see also Interpretive Letter No. 494 (Dec. 20,1989) (discussing features of financial investment instruments brokerage that bring this activity within the “business of banking”) (cited in Comptroller’s Letter 38a). The Comptroller construes the § 24 Seventh authorization of “incidental powers . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking” as an independent grant of authority; he reads the specific powers set forth thereafter as exemplary, not exclusive. VALIC argues that the Comptroller’s interpretation is contrary to the clear intent of Congress because the banking power on which the Comptroller relies — “brokering] financial investment instruments” — is not specified in §24 Seventh. Brief for Respondent 35-45. According to VALIC, the five specific activities listed in §24 Seventh after the words “business of banking” are exclusive — banks are confined to these five activities and to endeavors incidental thereto. Id., at 35-36. VALIC thus attributes no independent significance to the words “business of banking.” We think the Comptroller better comprehends the Act’s terms. The second sentence of §24 Seventh, in limiting banks’ “dealing in securities,” presupposes that banks have authority not circumscribed by the five specifically listed activities. Congress’ insertion of the limitation decades after the Act’s initial adoption makes sense only if banks already had authority to deal in securities, authority presumably encompassed within the “business of banking” language which dates from 1863. VALIC argues, however, that the limitation was imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, and that the power Glass-Steagall presupposed was specifically granted in the McFadden Act of 1927. Brief for Respondent 46. While the statute’s current wording derives from the Glass-Steagall Act, see Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 184, the earlier McFadden Act does not bolster VALIC’s case, for that Act, too, limited an activity already part of the business national banks did. See Act of Feb. 25, 1927, § 2(b), 44 Stat. 1226 (“Provided, That the business of buying and selling investment securities shall hereinafter be limited to buying and selling without recourse . . . .”); see also Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S., at 407-408 (even before the McFadden Act, banks conducted securities transactions on a widespread basis); 2 F. Redlich, The Molding of American Banking: Men and Ideas, pt. 2, pp. 389-393 (1951) (describing securities activities of prominent early national banks). B As we have just explained, the Comptroller determined, in accord with the legislature’s intent, that “the business of banking” described in §24 Seventh covers brokerage of financial investment instruments, and is not confined to the examples specifically enumerated. He then reasonably concluded that the authority to sell annuities qualifies as part of, or incidental to, the business of banking. National banks, the Comptroller observed, are authorized to serve as agents for their customers in the purchase and sale of various financial investment instruments, Comptroller’s Letter 38a, and annuities are widely recognized as just such investment products. See D. Shapiro & T. Streiff, Annuities 7 (1992) (in contrast to life insurance, “[annuities . . . are primarily investment products”); 1 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 84, p. 295 (1981) (“Annuity contracts must ... be recognized as investments rather than as insurance.”). By making an initial payment in exchange for a future income stream, the customer is deferring consumption, setting aside money for retirement, future expenses, or a rainy day. For her, an annuity is like putting money in a bank account, a debt instrument, or a mutual fund. Offering bank accounts and acting as agent in the sale of debt instruments and mutual funds are familiar parts of the business of banking. See, e. g., Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Governors, FRS, 468 U. S. 207, 215 (1984) (“Banks long have arranged the purchase and sale of securities as an accommodation to their customers.”); First Nat. Bank of Hartford v. Hartford, 273 U. S. 548, 559-560 (1927) (banks have authority to sell mortgages and other debt instruments they have originated or acquired by discount). In sum, modern annuities, though more sophisticated than the standard savings bank deposits of old, answer essentially the same need. By providing customers with the opportunity to invest in one or more annuity options, banks are essentially offering financial investment instruments of the kind congressional authorization permits them to broker. Hence, the Comptroller reasonably typed the permission NationsBank sought as an “incidental powe[r] . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking.” Ill A In the alternative, VALIC argues that 12 U. S. C. § 92 (1988 ed., Supp. V) bars NationsBank from selling annuities as agent. That section provides: “In addition to the powers now vested by law in [national banks] any such [bank] located and doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants . . . may ... act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State in which said bank is located to do business in said State, by soliciting and selling insurance and collecting premiums on policies issued by such company ....” The parties disagree about whether § 92, by negative implication, precludes national banks located in places more populous than 5,000 from selling insurance. We do not reach this question because we accept the Comptroller’s view that, for the purpose at hand, annuities are properly classified as investments, not “insurance.” Again, VALIC contends that the Comptroller’s determination is contrary to the plain intent of Congress, or else is unreasonable. In support of its position that annuities are insurance, VALIC notes first that annuities traditionally have been sold by insurance companies. But the sale of a product by an insurance company does not inevitably render the product insurance. For example, insurance companies have long offered loans on the security of life insurance, see 3 Appleman & Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §1731, p. 562 (1967), but a loan does not thereby become insurance. VALIC further asserts that most States have regulated annuities as insurance and that Congress intended to define insurance under § 92 by reference to state law. Treatment of annuities under state law, however, is contextual. States generally classify annuities as insurance when defining the powers of insurance companies and state insurance regulators. See, e. g., 998 F. 2d, at 1300, n. 2 (citing statutes). But in diverse settings, States have resisted lump classification of annuities as insurance. See, e. g., In re New York State Assn. of Life Underwriters, Inc. v. New York State Banking Dept., 83 N. Y. 2d 353, 363, 632 N. E. 2d 876, 881 (1994) (rejecting “assertion that annuities are insurance which [state-chartered] banks are not authorized to sell,” even though state insurance law “includes ‘annuities’ in its description of ‘kinds of insurance authorized’ ”); In re Estate of Rhodes, 197 Misc. 232, 237, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 406, 411 (Surr. Ct. 1949) (annuity contracts do not qualify for New York estate tax exemption applicable to insurance); Commonwealth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 Pa. 510, 513-516, 98 A. 1072, 1073 (1916) (annuities are not insurance for purposes of tax that insurance companies pay on insurance premiums received within the State); State ex rel. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Ham, 54 Wyo. 148, 159, 88 P. 2d 484, 488 (1939) (same). As our decisions underscore, a characterizátion fitting in certain contexts may be unsuitable in others. See, e. g., Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932) (“meaning [of words] well may vary to meet the purposes of the law”; courts properly give words “the meaning which the legislature intended [they] should have in each instance”); cf. Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 333, 337 (1933) (“The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.”). Moreover, the federal banking law does not plainly require automatic reference to state law here. The Comptroller has concluded that the federal regime is best served by classifying annuities according to their functional characteristics. Congress has not ruled out that course, see Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842; courts, therefore, have no cause to dictate to the Comptroller the state-law constraint VALIC espouses. VALIC further argues that annuities functionally resemble life insurance because some annuities place mortality risk on the parties. Under a classic fixed annuity, the purchaser pays a sum certain and, in exchange, the issuer makes periodic payments throughout, but not beyond, the life of the purchaser. In pricing such annuities, issuers rely on actuarial assumptions about how long purchasers will live. While cognizant of this similarity between annuities and insurance, the Comptroller points out that mortality risk is a less salient characteristic of contemporary products. Many annuities currently available, both fixed and variable, do not feature a life term. Instead they provide for payments over a term of years; if the purchaser dies before the term ends, the balance is paid to the purchaser’s estate. Moreover, the presence of mortality risk does not necessarily qualify an investment as “insurance” under § 92. For example, VALIC recognizes that a life interest in real property is not insurance, although it imposes a mortality risk on the purchaser. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. Some conventional debt instruments similarly impose mortality risk. See Note, Reverse Annuity Mortgages and the Due-on-Sale Clause, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 143, 145-151 (1979). B VALIC also charges the Comptroller with inconsistency. As evidence, VALIC refers to a 1978 letter from a member of the Comptroller’s staff describing annuity investments as insurance arrangements. Brief for Respondent 16-17; see Letter from Charles F. Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory Services Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 16, 1978), App. to Brief in Opposition la-2a (Byrd Letter). We note, initially, that the proposal disfavored in the 1978 letter did not clearly involve a bank selling annuities as an agent, rather than as a principal. See Byrd Letter la (“[T]he bank would purchase a group annuity policy from an insurer and then sell annuity contracts as investments in trust accounts.”). Furthermore, unlike the Comptroller’s letter to NationsBank here, the 1978 letter does not purport to represent the Comptroller’s position. Compare Byrd Letter la (“It is my opinion . . . ”) with Comptroller’s Letter 35a (“The OCC’s legal position on this issue was announced in a [prior 1990 letter]. Since I find neither policy nor supervisory reasons to object to this proposal, the Subsidiary may proceed.”). Finally, any change in the Comptroller’s position might reduce, but would not eliminate, the deference we owe his reasoned determinations. See Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 417 (1993) (quoting NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 351 (1978)). The Comptroller’s classification of annuities, based on the tax deferral and investment features that distinguish them from insurance, in short, is at least reasonable. See Comptroller’s Letter 44a. A key feature of insurance is that it indemnifies loss. See Black’s Law Dictionary 802 (6th ed. 1990) (first definition of insurance is “contract whereby, for a stipulated consideration, one party undertakes to compensate the other for loss on a specified subject by specified perils”). As the Comptroller observes, annuities serve an important investment purpose and are functionally similar to other investments that banks typically sell. See supra, at 259-260. And though fixed annuities more closely resemble insurance than do variable annuities, fixed annuities too have significant investment features and are functionally similar to debt instruments. Moreover, mindful that fixed annuities are often packaged with variable annuities, the Comptroller reasonably chose to classify the two together. * * * We respect as reasonable the Comptroller’s conclusion that brokerage of annuities is an “incidental powe[r]... necessary to carry on the business of banking.” We further defer to the Comptroller’s reasonable determination that 12 U. S. C. §92 is not implicated because annuities are not insurance within the meaning of that section. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is Reversed. The dissenters also observed that 6 of the court’s 13 active judges were disqualified from participating in the case. 13 F. 3d, at 834. We expressly hold that the “business of banking” is not limited to the enumerated powers in §24 Seventh and that the Comptroller therefore has discretion to authorize activities beyond those specifically enumerated. The exercise of the Comptroller’s discretion, however, must be kept within reasonable bounds. Ventures distant from dealing in financial investment instruments — for example, operating a general travel agency — may exceed those bounds. The Comptroller referred to Interpretive Letter No. 494 (Dec. 20,1989) (approving brokerage of agricultural, oil, and metals futures). Assuring that the brokerage in question would not deviate from traditional bank practices, the Comptroller specified that NationsBank “will act only as agent,... will not have a principal stake in annuity contracts and therefore will incur no interest rate or actuarial risks.” Comptroller’s Letter 48a.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SANSONE v. UNITED STATES. No. 365. Argued March 10, 1965.— Decided March 29, 1965. Merle L. Silverstein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Stanley M. Rosenblum. Paul Bender, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer and Joseph M. Howard. Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Sansone was indicted for willfully attempting to evade federal income taxes for the year 1957 in violation of § 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 7201 provides: “Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.” The following facts were established at trial. In March 1956 petitioner and his wife purchased a tract of land for $22,500 and simultaneously sold a portion of the tract for $20,000. In August 1957 petitioner sold another portion of the tract for $27,000. He did not report the gain on. either the 1956 or 1957 sale in his income tax returns for those years. Petitioner conceded that the 1957 transaction was reportable and that, in not reporting it, he understated his tax liability for that year by $2,456.48. He contended, however, that this understatement was not willful since he believed at the time that extensive repairs on a creek adjoining a portion of the tract he retained might be necessary and that the cost of these repairs might wipe out his profit on the 1957 sale. To counter this defense, the Government introduced the following signed statement made by petitioner during the Treasury investigation of his tax return: “I did not report the 1957 sale in our joint income tax return for 1957 because I was burdened with a number of financial obligations and did not feel I could raise the money to pay any tax due. It was my intention to report all sales in a future year and pay the tax due. I knew that I should have reported the 1957 sale, but my wife did not know that it should have been reported. It was not my intention to evade the payment of our proper taxes and I intended to pay any additional taxes due when I was financially able to do so.” At the conclusion of the trial, petitioner requested that the jury be instructed that it could acquit him of the charged offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat taxes in violation of § 7201, but still convict him of either or both of the asserted lesser-included offenses of willfully filing a fraudulent or false return, in violation of § 7207, or willfully failing to pay his taxes at the time required by law, in violation of § 7203. Section 7201 is a felony providing for a maximum fine of $10,000 and imprisonment for five years. Both §§ 7203 and 7207 are misdemeanors with maximum prison sentences of one year under each section, and maximum fines of $10,000 under § 7203 and $1,000 under § 7207. The requested instructions were denied. Petitioner was found guilty by the jury of violating § 7201, and was sentenced by the court to pay a fine of $2,000 and to serve 15 months’ imprisonment. The conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals. 334 F. 2d 287. We granted certiorari to consider the applicability of the lesser-included offense doctrine to these federal tax statutes. 379 U. S. 886. I. We are faced with the threshold question as to whether or not § 7207, which proscribes the willful filing with a Treasury official of any known false or fraudulent “return,” applies to the filing of an income tax return. If § 7207 does not apply to income tax returns, it is obvious that the' defendant was not here entitled to a lesser-included offense charge based on that section. This Court held in Achilli v. United States, 353 U. S. 373, that § 7207’s statutory predecessor, § 3616 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which made it a misdemeanor for any person to deliver to the Collector of Revenue “any false or fraudulent list, return, account, or statement, with intent to defeat or evade the valuation, enumeration, or assessment intended to be made . . (emphasis added), despite its broad language, was not intended by Congress to apply to income tax returns. There were two major bases of this Court’s conclusion in Achilli that § 3616 (a) did not apply to such returns. First, unlike other criminal provisions clearly applicable to income taxes which appeared in the income tax chapter of the 1939 Code and were specifically designed to punish evasion of that tax, § 3616 (a) was placed among the Code’s “General Administrative Provisions” and did not specifically refer to income taxes. Second, § 3616 (a) required that the false or fraudulent return be filed “with intent to defeat or evade the valuation, enumeration, or assessment intended to be made.” This provision, as the Court had already held in Berra v. United States, 351 U. S. 131, if applied to income tax returns would have made § 3616 (a) completely co-extensive with the predecessor of § 7201 where the attempt to evade income taxes was accomplished by' filing a fraudulent income tax return. It was clear that the predecessor of § 7201 applied to this method of attempting to evade income taxes and the Court was unwilling to presume that Congress intended to enact both felony and misdemeanor provisions which completely overlap in this important area. Both of these bases of decision were removed by the 1954 Code. Unlike their predecessors in the 1939 Code, §§ 7201, 7203, and 7207, together with other sections clearly applicable to income tax violations, were all placed in the same section (Part I of Chapter 75) of the 1954 Code. Congress specifically stated that it placed all these provisions in the same part of the Code because it wished them to apply to taxes generally, including income taxes. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 147; H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 108. In contrast, Part II of Chapter 75 contains provisions applicable only to specified taxes, none of which include income taxes. Further, Congress, in enacting § 7207 did not re-enact § 3616 (a)’s requirement that the false or fraudulent return be made with “intent to defeat or evade” the tax due. Thus the second basis for the Court’s conclusion in Achilli that § 3616 (a) did not apply to income taxes was removed. See Berra v. United States, supra, at 134, n. 5. Finally, in providing that the false or fraudulent return be made “willfully,” § 7207 was conformed to the language contained in the other misdemeanor provisions clearly applicable to income taxes. See, e. g., § 7203. We conclude, therefore, that § 7207 applies to income tax violations. Since there is no doubt that §§ 7201 and 7203 also apply to income tax violations, with obvious overlapping among them, there can be no doubt that the lesser-included offense doctrine applies to these statutes in an appropriate case. See Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 495; Berra v. United States, supra. HH 1 — f The basic principles controlling whether or not a lesser-included offense charge should be given in a particular case have been settled by this Court. Rule 31 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part, that the “defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged.” Thus, “[i]n a case where some of the elements of the crime charged themselves constitute a lesser crime, the defendant, if the evidence justifie[s] it . . . [is] entitled to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt of the lesser offense.” Berra v. United States, supra, at 134. See Stevenson v. United States, 162 U. S. 313. But a lesser-offense charge is not proper where, on the evidence presented, the factual issues to be resolved by the jury are the same as to both the lesser and greater offenses. Berra v. United States, supra; Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 63-64. In other words, the lesser offense must be included within but not, on the facts of the case, be completely encompassed by the greater. A lesser-included offense instruction is only proper where the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of the lesser-included offense. Berra v. United States, supra; Sparf v. United States, supra, at 63-64. We now apply the principles declared in these cases to the instant case. III. The offense here charged was a violation of § 7201, which proscribes willfully attempting in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code. As this Court has recognized, this felony provision is “the capstone of a system of sanctions which singly or in combination were calculated to induce prompt and forthright fulfillment of every duty under the income tax law and to provide a penalty suitable to every degree of delinquency.” Spies v. United States, supra, at 497. As such a capstone, § 7201 necessarily includes among its elements actions which, if isolated from the others, constitute lesser offenses in this hierarchical system of sanctions. Therefore, if on the facts of a given case there are disputed issues of fact which would enable the jury rationally to find that, although all the elements of § 7201 have not been proved, all the elements of one or more lesser offenses have been, it is clear that the defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense charge as to such lesser offenses. As has been held by this Court, the elements of § 7201 are willfulness; the existence of a tax deficiency, Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339, 361; Spies v. United States, supra, at 496; and an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax, Spies v. United States, supra. In comparison, § 7203 makes it a misdemeanor willfully to fail to perform a number of specified acts at the time required by law — the one here relevant being the failure to pay a tax when due. This misdemeanor requires only willfulness and the omission of the required act — here the payment of the tax when due. As recognized by this Court in Spies v. United States, supra, at 499, the difference between a mere willful failure to pay a tax (or perform other enumerated actions) when due under § 7203 and a willful attempt to evade or defeat taxes under § 7201 is that the latter felony involves “some willful commission in addition to the willful omissions that make up the list of misdemeanors.” Where there is, in a § 7201 prosecution, a disputed issue of fact as to the existence of the requisite affirmative commission in addition to the § 7203 omission, a defendant would, of course, be entitled to a lesser-included offense charge based on § 7203. Cf. Spies v. United States, supra. In this case, however, it is undisputed that petitioner filed a tax return and that the petitioner’s filing of a false tax return constituted a sufficient affirmative commission to satisfy that requirement of § 7201. The only issue at trial was whether petitioner’s act was willful. Given this affirmative commission and the conceded tax deficiency, if petitioner’s act was willful, that is, if the jury believed, as it obviously did, that he knew that the capital gain on the sale of the property was reportable in 1957, he was guilty of violating both §§ 7201 and 7203. If his act was not willful, he was not guilty of violating either § 7201 or § 7203. Thus on the facts of this case, §§ 7201 and 7203 “covered precisely the same ground.” Berra v. United States, supra, at 134. This being so, on the authorities cited, it is clear that petitioner was not entitled to a lesser-included offense charge based on § 7203. Section 7207 requires the willful filing of a document known to be false or fraudulent in any material manner. The elements here involved are willfulness and the commission of the prohibited act. Section 7207 does not, however, require that the act be done as an attempt to evade or defeat taxes. Conduct could therefore violate § 7207 without violating § 7201 where the false statement, though material, does not constitute an attempt to evade or defeat taxation because it does not have the requisite effect of reducing the stated tax liability. This may be the case, for example, where a taxpayer understates his gross receipts and he offsets this by also understating his deductible expenses. In this example, if the Government in a § 7201 case charged tax evasion on the grounds that the defendant had understated his tax by understating his gross receipts, and the defendant contended that this was not so, as the misstatement of gross receipts had been offset by an understatement of deductible expenses, the defendant would be entitled to a lesser-included offense charge based on § 7207, there being this relevant disputed issue of fact. This would be so, for in such a case, if the jury believed that an understatement of deductible expenses had offset the understatement of gross receipts, while the defendant would have violated § 7207 by willfully making a material false and fraudulent statement on his return, he would not have violated § 7201 as there would not have been the requisite § 7201 element of a tax deficiency. Here, however, there is no dispute that petitioner’s material misstatement resulted in a tax deficiency. Thus there is no disputed issue of fact concerning the existence of an element required for conviction of § 7201 but not required for conviction of § 7207. Given petitioner’s material misstatement which resulted in a tax deficiency, if, as the jury obviously found, petitioner’s act was willful in the sense that he knew that he should have reported more income than he did for the year 1957, he was guilty of violating both §§ 7201 and 7207. If his action was not willful, he was guilty of violating neither. As was true with § 7203, on the facts of this case §§ 7201 and 7207 “covered precisely the same ground,” Berra v. United States, supra, at 134, and thus petitioner was not entitled to a lesser-included offense charge based on § 7207. Petitioner makes one final contention. He argues that he could have been acquitted of attempting to evade or defeat his 1957 taxes, in violation of § 7201, but still have been convicted for willfully failing to pay his tax when due in violation of § 7203 or willfully filing a fraudulent return in violation of § 7207, if the jury believed his statement contained in the government-introduced affidavit, that, although he knew that profit on the sale in question was reportable for 1957 and that tax was due thereon, he intended to report the sale and pay the 1957 tax at some unspecified future date. The basic premise of this argument is that, although all three sections require willfulness, on the facts here, the contents of these willfulness requirements differ. The argument' is made that while an intent to report and pay the tax in the future does not vitiate the willfulness requirements of §§ 7203 and 7207, it does constitute a defense to a willful attempt “in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by” the Internal Revenue Code, in violation of § 7201. While we agree that the intent to report the income and pay the tax sometime in the future does not vitiate the willfulness required by §§ 7203 and 7207, we cannot agree that it vitiates the willfulness requirement of § 7201. No defense to a § 7201 evasion charge is made out by showing that the defendant willfully and fraudulently understated his tax liability for the year involved but intended to report the income and pay the tax at some later time. As this Court has recognized, § 7201 includes the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the assessment of a tax as well as the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the payment of a tax. Lawn v. United States, supra. The indictment here charged an attempt to evade income taxes by defeating the assessment for 1957. The fact that petitioner stated to a revenue agent that he intended to report his 1957 income in some later year, even if taken at face value, would not detract from the criminality of his willful act defeating the 1957 assessment. That crime was complete as soon as the false and fraudulent understatement of taxes (assuming, of course, that there was in fact a deficiency) was filed. See United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U. S. 43, 46. See also Spies v. United States, supra, at 498-499. In sum, it is clear here that there were no disputed issues of fact which would justify instructing the jury that it could find that petitioner had committed all the ele-merits of either or both of the §§ 7203 and 7207 misdemeanors without having committed a violation of the § 7201 felony. This being the case, the petitioner was not entitled to a lesser-included offense charge and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent, believing that there was evidence sufficient to require the Court to charge the jury, as petitioner requested, that they could acquit him on this felony charge of having willfully attempted to evade or defeat taxes in violation of § 7201 but still convict him of the lesser misdemeanor offenses included in the felony charge. See Berra v. United States, 351 U. S. 131, 135 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Achilli v. United States, 353 U. S. 373, 379 (dissenting opinion). Petitioner was charged with a violation of § 7201 for 1956 in addition to the charge for 1957. The jury acquitted him with respect to the 1956 charge, which is consequently not involved in this case. Section 7207 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides: “Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to the Secretary or his delegate any list, return, account, statement, or other document, known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as to any material matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.” Section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides: “Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return (other than a return required under authority of section 6015 or section 6016), keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.” The full instructions requested by petitioner were as follows: No. 1. “Under the law you may find a defendant guilty of a lesser crime than the crimes charged in the indictment. “A statute upon which a lesser crime is based (Section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954), omitting that part of the Act which does not apply in this case, reads as follows: “ ‘Any person required under this title to pay any . . . tax, . . . who willfully fails to pay such tax, ... at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor.’ “and then the statute provides for the penalty. “Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that (with respect to either or both of the counts in this indictment) the defendant willfully failed to pay the correct tax to the United States at the time of the filing of his return, but you further find that the defendant did not willfully attempt to defeat and evade his income taxes by the filing of a false and fraudulent return, you will in your verdict say ‘Guilty of violating a lesser-ineluded offense.’ “If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant willfully failed to pay the correct tax when filing his income tax return or returns under any count or counts of this indictment, you will resolve the doubt in favor of the defendant and acquit him of the lesser-included offense as to such count or counts.” No. 2. “As I have said previously, the law permits the jury to find a defendant guilty of any lesser offense which is necessarily included in the crime charged. The offense charged in the indictment here necessarily includes a lesser offense based upon the following statute (Section 7207 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954), omitting that part of the Act which does not apply in this case; it reads as follows: “ ‘Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to the Secretary [of the Treasury] or his delegate any . . . return, ... or other document known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as to any material matter,’ “and then the statute provides for the penalty. “Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that (with respect to either or both of the counts in this indictment) the defendant willfully delivered to the District Director of Internal Revenue at St. Louis, Missouri his and his wife’s federal joint income tax return or returns for the years 1956 and 1957 which were known by him to be fraudulent or false as to any material matter, but you further find that the defendant did not willfully attempt to defeat and evade his income tax by the filing of a false and fraudulent return, you will in your verdict say ‘Guilty of violating a Iesser-included offense.’ “If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant willfully so delivered under any count or counts of this indictment his and his wife’s federal joint income tax return or returns which were known by him to be fraudulent or false as to a material matter, you will resolve the doubt in favor of the defendant and acquit him of the lesser-ineluded offense as to such count or counts.” This issue divided the Court of Appeals, with two judges holding that § 7207 does not apply to false income tax returns and one judge, concurring in result, dissenting on this point. This Court has long recognized that to hold otherwise would only invite the jury to pick between the felony and the misdemeanor so as to determine the punishment to be imposed, a duty Congress has traditionally left to the judge. See Sparf v. United States, supra, at 63-64; Berra v. United States, supra, at 135. This general principle is particularly applicable in this area. In commenting on § 7201, the House Ways and Means Committee expressly stated that minimum penalties were omitted from § 7201 in order to make it “possible for the judges to better fix the penalties to fit the circumstances.” H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 108. The lack of minimum penalties- also, of course, denies to the prosecutor an unbridled discretion as to the penalty to be imposed upon particular defendants by deciding whether, on the same facts, to charge a felony or a misdemeanor.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. NEW ENGLAND ELECTRIC SYSTEM et al. No. 636. Argued March 23, 1966. Decided May 16, 1966. Philip A. Loomis, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, David Ferber and Solomon Freedman. John R. Quarles argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Richard B. Dunn, Richard W. Southgate and John J. Glessner III. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. New England Electric System (NEES) is a holding company registered under § 5 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Its holdings include both electric and gas utility properties. The electric companies serve retail customers in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. The gas companies serve retail customers in Massachusetts alone. The Commission, proceeding under § 11 of the Act, held that the electric utility subsidiaries of NEES constituted an “integrated electric utility system” as defined in § 2 (a)(29) (A). 38 S. E. C. 193. The question in this case does not concern these electric utility subsidiaries but only the gas utility subsidiaries of NEES, which both NEES and the Commission agree constitute an “integrated gas utility system” within the meaning of § 2 (a)(29)(B) of the Act. By §11 (b)(1) a holding company system is to be limited in operations by the Commission “to a single integrated public-utility system,” provided, however, that it may be permitted to control one or more additional “integrated public-utility systems” if the Commission finds, inter alia, that “[e]ach of such additional systems cannot be operated as an independent system without the loss of substantial economies which can be secured by the retention of control by such holding company of such system.” § 11 (b)(1)(A). (Italics supplied.) It is on the meaning of this proviso that the present controversy depends. The Commission found that divestment of NEES’ gas utilities would not result in a “loss of substantial economies” to these companies within the meaning of § 11 (b) (1) (A). It construed Clause (A) to require a showing that the “additional system cannot be operated under separate ownership without the loss of economies so important as to cause a serious impairment of that system.” The Commission ruled that it was unable “to find that the gas companies could not be soundly and economically operated independently of NEES.” It found that any losses of economies would be offset by the benefits that would flow from the healthy competition between the independently controlled gas and electric companies, promotion of competition between gas utilities and electric utilities being an important purpose of the Act. Accordingly, it ordered that the gas utilities be divested. On petition for review the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the Commission had misinterpreted the statutory phrase “loss of substantial economies.” 346 F. 2d 399. The court held that Clause (A) “called for a business judgment-of what would be a significant loss, not for a finding of total loss of economy or efficiency” (346 F. 2d, at 406), and, believing that on this record and with the statute so interpreted there could have been a finding in favor of NEES, remanded the case to the Commission. We granted certiorari, 382 U. S. 953. We agree with the Commission’s reading of Clause (A) and remand the cause to the Court of Appeals so that there may be a review of the challenged order in light of the proper meaning of the statutory term. The requirement in § 11 of a “single integrated” system is the “very heart” of the Act. The retention of an “additional” integrated system is decidedly the exception. As originally passed by the Senate, § 11 would have limited all registered holding companies to a single “geographically and economically integrated public-utility system.” The House version differed in that it permitted the Commission to make exceptions where limitation of the operations of the holding company was not found to be “in the public interest.” The version with which we deal emerged from a conference committee. The scope of the exception as it appears in the bill’s final form was thus explained to the House: “Section 11 of both bills [i. e., the House and Senate versions], therefore, authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to require a holding company to limit its control over operating utility companies to one integrated public-utility system. “The conference substitute meets the House desire to provide for further flexibility by the statement of additional definite and concrete circumstances under which exception should be made to the form of one integrated system. . . . “The substitute, therefore, makes provision to meet the situation where a holding company can show a real economic need on the part of additional integrated systems for permitting the holding company to keep these additional systems . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 70-71. (Italics supplied.) Additional light is shed on the purpose of § 11 by the remarks of Senator Wheeler, a member of the conference committee: “Since both bills accepted the proposition that a holding company should normally be limited to one integrated system, my colleagues and I conceived it to be our task to find what concrete exceptions, if any, could be made to this rule that would satisfy the demand of the House for some greater flexibility. After considerable discussion the Senate conferees concluded that the furthest concession they could make would be to permit the Commission to allow a holding company to control more than one integrated system if [among other tests] the additional systems were in the same region as the principal system and were so small that they were incapable of independent economical operation . . . .” 79 Cong. Rec. 14479. (Italics supplied.) As the Commission said in 1948: “The legislative'history of Section 11 (b)(1) indicates that it was the intent of Congress to create only a limited exception to the general rule confining holding companies to a single system, and that this exception was created to deal with the situation in which the proven inability of the additional system to stand by itself would result in substantial hardship to investors and consumers were its relationship with the holding company terminated.” Philadelphia Co., 28 S. E. C. 35, 46. While the Commission has variously phrased the rule, it has consistently adhered to that view. This suggests a much more stringent test than “a business judgment of what would be a significant loss,” to quote the Court of Appeals. 346 F. 2d, at 406. Promotion of “economy of management and operation” and “the integration and coordination of related operating properties” (§ 1 (b)(4), 49 Stat. 804, 15 U. S. C. § 79a (b)(4) (italics supplied)) is a theme that runs throughout the Act. But so does the theme of elimination of “restraint of free and independent competition.” § 1 (b) (2), 49 Stat. 803-804, 15 U. S. C. § 79a (b)(2). One of the evils that had resulted from control of utilities by holding companies was the retention in one system of both gas and electric properties and the favoring of one of these competing forms of energy over the other. In the present case the Commission said on this phase of the controversy: “Although the NEES Gas Division handles sales and promotional activities and various other matters for the gas subsidiaries separately from the electric companies, final authority on all important matters rests in the top NEES management. The basic competitive position that exists between gas and electric utility service within the same locality is affected by such vital management decisions as the amount of funds to be raised for or allocated to the expansion or promotion of each type of service.” Competitive advantages to be gained by a separation are difficult to forecast. The gains to competition might well be in the public interest and might well offset the estimated loss in economies of operation resulting from a separation of the gas properties from the utility system. This is a matter for Commission expertise on the total competitive situation, not merely on a prediction whether, for example, a gas company in a holding company system may make more for investors than a gas company converted into an independent regime. The phrase “without the loss of substantial economies” is admittedly not crystal clear. But the Commission’s construction seems to us to be well within the permissible range given to those who are charged with the task of giving an intricate statutory scheme practical sense and application. Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408. And see Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 177 F. 2d 720, 725. Reversed and remanded. 49 Stat. 812, 15 U. S. C. §79e (1964 ed.). NEES, the electric companies, and the gas companies are all parties respondent and are hereafter referred to as respondent. 49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (1964 ed.). 49 Stat. 810, 15 U. S. C. § 79b (a) (29) (A) (1964 ed.). An “integrated public-utility system” as applied to electric utility companies is defined by § 2 (a) (29) (A) as “a system consisting of oiie or more units of generating plants and/or transmission lines and/or distributing facilities, whose utility assets, whether owned by one or more electric utility companies, are physically interconnected or capable of physical interconnection and which under normal conditions may be economically operated as a single interconnected and coordinated system confined in its operations to a single area or region, in one or more States, not so large as to impair (considering the state of the art and the area or region affected) the advantages of localized management, efficient operation, and the effectiveness of regulation.” 49 Stat. 810, 15 U. S. C. § 79b (a) (29) (B) (1964 ed.). An "integrated public-utility system” as applied to gas utility companies is defined by § 2 (a) (29) (B) as “a system consisting of one or more gas utility companies which are so located and related that substantial economies may be effectuated by being operated as a single coordinated system confined in its operations to a single area or region, in one or more States, not so large as to impair (considering the state of the art and the area or region affected) the advantages of localized management, efficient operation, and the effectiveness of regulation.” 49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (b)(1) (1964 ed.). The Commission has long held that a single “integrated public-utility system” cannot include both gas and electric properties. See Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 8 S. E. C. 443, 462-463; The United Gas Improvement Co., 9 S. E. C. 52, 77-83; Philadelphia Co., 28 S. E. C. 35, 44. Respondent does not contest this aspect of the Commission’s reading of the Act. North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S. 686, 704, n. 14; S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 11. North American Co. v. SEC, supra, at 696-697. S. 2796, § 11 (b), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. And see S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 32. S. 2796, §11 (b), as passed by the House of Representatives, and sent to the Senate on July 9, 1935. And see H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17. Respondent concedes that the Commission has, since 1948, “articulated” a test “like the present test.” See Philadelphia Co., 28 S. E. C. 35, 46-47, 53-74; General Public Utilities Corp., 32 S. E. C. 807, 814-815, 826-827, 831; Middle South Utilities, Inc., 35 S. E. C. 1, 11-13. Respondent contends, however, that previous decisions of the Commission applied a less restrictive standard of “substantial economies.” The Commission disagrees, urging that while there was “some variation in choice of words,” it has maintained a basically consistent position and that any semantic differences are due largely to “the varying contentions with which the Commission was dealing.” The cases referred to are North American Co., 11 S. E. C. 194, 208-213; Engineers Public Service Co., 12 S. E. C. 41; Cities Service Power & Light Co., 14 S. E. C. 28, 37; Middle West Corp., 15 S. E. C. 309, 319; Cities Service Co., 15 S. E. C. 962, 984; American Gas & Electric Co., 21 S. E. C. 575, 596-597. We do not read those eases as being inconsistent with the Commission’s position since 1948. In each of these cases the Commission found no showing of “substantial economies" under whatever test might be applied; thus it was not there compelled to go further. There are, to be sure, a few cases in which the Commission permitted retention of small additional systems on the ground that the requirements of §11 (b)(1) were met; in these, however, the Commission did not articulate any standard. See, e. g., Federal Light & Traction Co., 15 S. E. C. 675, 683; Republic Service Corp., 23 S. E. C. 436, 451. But cf. North American Co., 11 S. E. C. 194, 243-244. We cannot say that these early decisions show any clear inconsistency with the standard which the Commission today applies, and has applied since 1948. Under these circumstances, we feel justified in regarding the Commission’s reading of the statute as supported by consistent administrative practice. Section 1 (b) provides “. . . [I]t is hereby declared that the national public interest, the interest of investors in the securities of holding companies and their subsidiary companies and affiliates, and the interest of consumers of electric energy and natural and manufactured gas, are or may be adversely affected ... (2) when subsidiary public-utility companies are subjected to excessive charges for services, construction work, equipment, and materials, or .enter into transactions in which evils result from an absence of arm’s-length bargaining or from restraint of free and independent competition; . . .” (Italics supplied.) See S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 29; Report of National Power Policy Committee, H. R. Doe. No. 137, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (Appendix to S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.). Congress was well aware of the anti-competitive potential of corporate structures through which control of gas and electric utility companies rests under the umbrella of a single holding company. That a holding company so situated might retard expansion of the gas utility company in favor of the electric utility company was expressly discussed in the Senate Hearings on an earlier version of the Act. See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 783. Congress made specific provision in §8 of the Act to prohibit a registered holding company from acquiring an interest in both an electric and a gas utility serving the same territory in a State which prohibits common control, without first obtaining permission from the appropriate state regulatory agency. While § 8 reflects the concern of Congress with this aspect of competition (see S. Rep. No. 621, supra, at 29-30; Report of National Power Policy Committee, supra, at 10), there is no warrant for concluding that §8 was the exclusive legislative effort relating to the problem. The history of the Act reflects the presence of a sophisticated statutory scheme. To some extent, local policy was expected to govern, with § 8 serving to prevent circumvention of that policy by use of the "extra-State device of a holding company.” S. Rep. No. 621, supra, at 29-30. At the same time, § 11 was expected to assist in imposing restrictions with regard to the combination of gas and electricity in one system. . Discussing the interplay between § 8 and § 11, the Senate Committee noted that § 8 only applied to future acquisitions: “The committee felt that while the policy upon which this section was based was essential in the formulation of any Federal legislation on utility holding companies, it did not think that the section should make it unlawful to retain {up to the time that section 11 may require divestment) interests in businesses in which the companies were lawfully engaged on the date of the enactment of the title.” Id., at 7. (Italics supplied.) By fostering competition between gas and electric utility companies, the Act promotes what has been described as “variegated competition.” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 840 (1965) (statement of Dr. Samuel M. Loescher). “But since the distribution of electricity, following geographical divorcements, was to remain a natural monopoly in every region, the only kind of competition to be enhanced was that of ‘variegated competition.’ ” Ibid. See, e. g., Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1249, 1402-1403, 1530-1531, 2257-2277; Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 65. It was only the loss of “substantial economies” that Congress thought would justify an exception from the separation rule of § 11.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHAPMAN, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, v. SHERIDAN-WYOMING COAL CO., INC. No. 60. Argued January 9, 1950. Decided February 6, 1950. Roger P. Marquis argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Vanech, Wilma C. Martin and John C. Harrington. T. Peter Ansberry argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Stephen J. McMahon, Jr. and Seth W. Richardson. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. This action by a lessee of coal-mining rights in public lands seeks to prevent leasing of similar rights in other lands to a competitor. The case is before us only on pleadings. The original complaint was dismissed by the District Court on several grounds but the Court of Appeals affirmed only on the ground that the complaint showed no standing to sue, there being no allegation of special injury to any property right of plaintiff. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 162, 168 F. 2d 557. It gave leave to apply to the District Court to amend in this respect. The District Court denied the privilege, however, holding that the proposed new matter added nothing material, and that amendment would be idle and needlessly prolong the litigation. This, we think, was equivalent in effect to sustaining a demurrer to the amended complaint and requires us to treat well-pleaded facts as true. On this basis, the Court of Appeals reversed and, in substance, held that the amended complaint does state a cause of action. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 288, 172 F. 2d 282. We granted certiorari. 338 U. S. 810. The hypothesis on which the legal issues are to be decided is this: At all relevant times the following regulation, promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, has been in effect: “Showing required that an additional coal mine is needed. The General Land Office will make favorable recommendation that leasing units be segregated and that auctions be authorized only in cases where there has been furnished a satisfactory showing that an additional coal mine is needed and that there is an actual need for coal which cannot otherwise be reasonably met.” 43 CFR 1938, § 193.3. It originated in 1934, when the coal industry was demoralized by excess production capacity described in opinions of this Court. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 361; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, opinion of Cardozo, J., 324, 330; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 395. The policy which the Department embodied in this regulation, and to which it has since adhered, was stated in letters of the Secretary set forth in the margin. In September, 1943, the Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Company leased additional lands located in Wyoming for coal-mining purposes from the Government and, “in reliance upon the Regulation,” has expended large sums in development and built up a prosperous business in the rather low-grade coal mined and largely consumed in that region. In December, 1943, the Big Horn Company applied for a lease of nearby lands for production of competitive coal, and in 1945 applied for additional lands. Meanwhile Big Horn already had established mines on partially exhausted state-owned lands and desired the federal lands to prolong its business. The Sheridan-Wyoming Company, among others, protested on the basis of the regulation. The protest, after hearings, was overruled and, unless prevented, the Secretary will lease to Big Horn. The Secretary has made no finding that there is need for any additional supply of coal and, in fact, there is no such need. If he leases to Big Horn, the two companies will have capacity to produce in excess of the demand for that grade of coal in the limited market. The in vestment, of Sheridan-Wyoming will be substantially impaired and its volume of sales decreased and profitable markets lost. About these three ultimate facts — the regulation, the lease and the threatened lease to a competitor — the parties have argued several intricate and interesting questions as to the standing of the plaintiff to sue, whether the suit really is one against the United States without sovereign consent and whether the Secretary has abused his power in entertaining the application of Big Horn. These questions we do not need to discuss because of the view we take of more fundamental aspects of the case. We think the facts give rise to no cause of action, because the proposed lease does not breach any contract right or invade any property right of plaintiff and does not violate any law. Hence, the leasing is within the discretionary power of the Secretary and courts will not review its exercise. I. Contract Rights. The court below has sustained the complaint for the principal reason that a lease to Big Horn would breach the lease to plaintiff and that plaintiff has a property right to have the lands involved withheld from lease. It is only on this basis of its property rights, created by contract, that plaintiff has been held to have standing to sue; for, if it has such rights, the court below truly said, “The prevention of a breach of a restrictive provision in a contract is one of equity’s most usual functions.” Credited with “the status of one claiming a property right by contract, threatened with invasion,” the plaintiff has been termed by the Court of Appeals “possessor of a valuable right, created by contract in the presence of valid and binding restrictive regulations.” Of course, no express covenant of plaintiff’s lease restricts the Secretary from leasing other lands to other applicants. The restrictive covenant is sought to be supplied by implication. The lease, it is reasoned, was expressly made subject to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U. S. C. §§ 181 et seq.; the lease constructively includes the statute; the regulation which was not referred to in the lease nevertheless had the force and sanction of statute; hence, the restrictive regulation was a covenant of the lease. It is said the threatened lease would violate the regulation. For the purpose of testing the contract-right theory, we shall assume that it does so. What is the contract property right assumed? It is a right to nondevelopment of coal reserves in an indeterminate but substantial part of the public domain for benefit of its own lease. It is not a right necessary to the fullest physical development and enjoyment of all the lands plaintiff acquired for itself, and is one not normally appurtenant to real estate. The assumed covenant is purely negative in character and its whole burden is upon other premises owned by the United States in which the plaintiff has no other interest. They are premises, moreover, in which it is doubtful whether plaintiff could lawfully acquire any other interest in view of the limited areas which the statute allows to one lessee. By the assumed covenant, alienation and utilization of public lands in the manner authorized by Congress is restricted. This is for an unstated and indeterminable period. And it is accomplished not by a covenant expressed in the lease itself, but by one read into it from the regulations. A competent grantor by appropriate covenants could, of course, convey the right claimed here, and equity would enforce it. But when a right “consists in restraining the owner from doing that with, and upon, his property which, but for the grant or covenant, he might lawfully have done,” it is an easement, sometimes called a negative easement, or an amenity. Trustees v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 447. “An equitable restriction,” which prevents development of property by building on it, has been said to be “an easement, or servitude in the nature of an easement,” a “right in the nature of an easement,” and an “interest iií a contractual stipulation which is made for their common benefit.” Such “equitable restrictions” are real estate, part and parcel of the land to which they are attached and pass by conveyance. Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 246, 117 N. E. 244, 245. A contractual restriction which limits the use one may make of his own lands in favor of another and his lands is “sometimes called a negative easement, which is the right in the owner of the dominant tenement to restrict the owner of the servient tenement in the exercise of general and natural rights of property.” It is an interest in lands which can pass only by deed and is in every legal sense an incumbrance. Uihlein v. Matthews, 172 N. Y. 154, 158, 64 N. E. 792, 793. But whatever we might determine to be the technical nature of the collateral property right claimed to result from Sheridan’s lease, to any extent that it added a property right to the plaintiff’s lands it created an incumbrance or subtraction from the aggregate of rights in the United States. Courts would not lightly imply against any land owner a covenant which would restrict alienation or enjoyment of his estate. There are even stronger reasons against implied covenants imposing easements, servitudes, amenities or restrictions upon the public lands. The Mineral Lands Leasing Acts confer broad powers on the Secretary as leasing agent for the Government. We find nothing that expressly prevents him from taking into consideration whether a public interest will be served or injured by opening a particular mine. But we find no grant of authority to create a private contract right that would override his continuing duty to be governed by the public interest in deciding to lease or withhold leases. The leasing Acts strictly limit the area which any one lessee may acquire, either directly or indirectly. 30 U. S. C. § 184. But if, in taking up a permitted allotment of public lands, one may acquire a right that other areas far more extensive must lie fallow and unused for the benefit of his lands, he is acquiring an interest in prohibited lands and an interest that may be worth many times that interest which the statute allows him. And it is acquired without additional purchase price, rental, or royalty. Moreover, it is not denied that the effect of sustaining plaintiff’s suit would be to create a monopoly. Of course, it is a little one, limited to low-grade coal and to an advantageous shipping zone. Big Horn, if it gets no lease, must eventually go out of business, leaving its customers to Sheridan. And the United States could not for some period — we do not know how long — admit any other competitor to the field, unless it can be shown that Sheridan’s supply is not equal to the market. It may, however, continue to acquire additional reserves as its own approach exhaustion. The whole claim of damage here is that competition from Big Horn will impair this snug little monopoly of the market to which plaintiff thinks it has acquired a property right. But the policy of the leasing statute looks the other way. Besides limiting the leasehold of any one lessee, it prevents mineral rights, on pain of forfeiture, from passing into the hands of any unlawful trust or becoming the subject of any contract or conspiracy in restraint of trade. 30 U. S. C. § 184. Its whole policy seems to contemplate the opening of the public domain to competitive exploitation. It nowhere authorizes anyone to grant or to obtain exclusive rights of access to these coal resources. What lessees can acquire from the Government is a supply of coal, not an exclusive market. We do not say that the Secretary may not withhold, or by regulation provide for withholding, lands from lease because the public interest would be injured, through impairing private business, from excess production capacity. But we find no authority to freeze this public interest into an irrevocable private property right. The allegations of the amended complaint therefore do not show a cause of action to enforce a restrictive covenant or property right against leasing other public lands as authorized by statute. II. Violation op Law or Regulation. Since the District Court was overruled by the Court of Appeals only because of the latter’s property rights theory and since the complaint without these allegations had earlier been held insufficient, it may be questioned whether other grounds to sustain the judgment below can be availed of. But even if the allegations fail to show a property right that equity will protect, they might be sufficient to show a special injury or interest, such as would enable plaintiff to raise the question of violation of law or regulation in the proposed leasing. To end a litigation already pending too long, we assume, without deciding, that plaintiff may raise this issue which we now consider. The only claim of law violation is that the Secretary is proposing to violate his own regulation, promulgated pursuant to the Act and hence having the force of law. That it binds him as well as others while it is in effect is not doubted. The regulation on literal reading does not purport to prohibit the Secretary from any leasing unless need for new mines be shown. It does direct the General Land Office (now the Bureau of Land Management) to find need for additional capacity before recommending new leasing. Its recommendation, however, is only advisory and can be overruled or disregarded. On its face, therefore, the regulation would seem to be directed primarily to a procedural matter within the Department of the Interior. However, it is claimed that the letters of Secretary Ickes at the time it was adopted and the uniform practice since, show it to have been a regulation fixing a controlling policy. We proceed on that assumption. In the case before us the Secretary neither repudiates the regulation nor stands upon any right to depart from it. He says that, properly construed, it does not apply to the proposed Big Horn lease. It only prevents a lease which will introduce a new competitor to the field and not, he says, a lease which would only enable an existing mine and an established business to continue. Sheridan argues that this reasoning sanctions an evasion of the regulation in that Big Horn opened its mine on partially depleted state lands knowing it must get federal lands also or quit. The implication is that state lands were used as a sort of portal in which to stand while prying a federal lease out from under the regulation. Plaintiff insists that the Secretary is required to act in the light of conditions when Big Horn first applied, and not as of now when it has built up a going business on the inadequate state leases, aided by war conditions. But the action is one in equity, and “equity will administer such relief as the exigencies of the case demand at the close of the trial.” Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N. Y. 375, 380, 118 N. E. 855, 856; Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N. Y. 261, 273, 91 N. E. 582, 586. The question on injunction is whether the action threatened will be a violation if it now takes place in light of conditions shown by the proposed amended complaint. That pleads findings of the Department which show what has happened since the Big Horn application was filed. Without recourse to federal lands, it has established a mine and a business in the face of Sheridan competition. If time has improved Big Horn’s position in this respect, it must be noted that the delay in acting on its application has been largely due to plaintiff’s protests and litigations. We think a court of equity cannot term unreasonable the view of the Secretary that Big Horn’s lease is not for “an additional coal mine,” need for which must be proved. It does not use federal reserves to add a new competitor to the market. It uses them to keep one there. We think the distinction is substantial and the Secretary’s interpretation of the regulation is permissible, even if not inevitable. The declining market following the war and the growing use of oil may present difficult problems of survival for government lessees and of fair dealing for the Secretary. But courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded or the law violated. We think the District Court rightly concluded that the amended complaint fails to state a legal case for the relief asked. Accordingly, the judgment below is Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “Exhibit ‘A’ “Excerpt from Letter of January 24, 1934, from the Secretary of the Interior to the Director of the Bureau of Geological Survey. “The question of the advisability of withholding new leases of coal lands of the United States has been presented to me. “It is clear from the language of section 2 of the leasing act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 437), and from the interpretation given to Section 13 of that act, relating to oil and gas, by the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Wilbur, 283 U. S. 414, that it is within the discretionary authority of the Secretary of the Interior whether he shall issue any coal leases and coal prospecting permits. In the present situation of the coal industry it is desirable that very few, if any, new coal leases or prospecting permits be issued. “Taking into consideration, however, that there may be some eases where new small coal mines for local needs are advisable and that there may also be cases where leases for shipping mines should not be denied, it is thought that no general order should be issued in effect suspending the operation of the leasing act as to new coal leases and prospecting permits. It is believed that substantially the same result can be reached by declining to offer coal lands for lease or to grant prospecting permits unless an actual need for coal which cannot otherwise be reasonably purchased or obtained is shown. . . . “Hereafter the offering of coal lands for lease by competitive bidding or the granting of prospecting permits should not be recommended unless you have reliable information that there is an actual need for coal which cannot otherwise be reasonably met.” “Exhibit ‘B’ “Excerpt prom Letter or January 24, 1934, prom the Secretary op the Interior to the Commissioner op the General Land Oppice. “In the present situation of the coal industry it is desirable that very few, if any, new coal leases or prospecting permits be issued. “Taking into consideration, however, that there may be some cases where new small coal mines for local needs are advisable and that there may also be cases where leases for shipping mines should not be denied, it is thought that no general order should be issued in effect suspending the leasing act as to new coal leases and prospecting permits. It is believed that substantially the same result can be reached by declining to offer coal lands for lease or to grant prospecting permits unless an actual need is shown for coal which cannot otherwise be reasonably purchased or obtained. . . . “It is advisable that you in the first instance require lease applicants to show fully the need for additional production of coal.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. TEXAS et al. No. 85-1222. Argued December 10, 1986 Decided January 20, 1987 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for petitioner in No. 85-1222. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Robert H. Klonoff, Robert S. Burk, Henri F. Rush, and H. Glenn Scammel. Michael E. Roper argued the cause for petitioners in No. 85-1267. With him on the briefs were Robert B. Batchelder and Hugh L. McCulley. ■ Fernando Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Mary F. Keller, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Larry J. Laurent, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Douglas Fraser, Assistant Attorney General. Together with No. 85-1267, Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. et al. v. Texas et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC or “piggyback”) service, a form of mixed train and truck transportation, enables a carrier to transport a trailer and its contents over rail on a flatcar and then to haul the trailer on the highway. The goods need not be unloaded and reloaded when they move from the rail mode to the truck mode; the shipment remains within the trailer or container during the entire journey. Various forms of TOFC and container-on-flatcar (COFC) service have been offered to the public by railroads, motor carriers, and freight forwarders since the 1930’s. These cases concern the extent of the State of Texas’ jurisdiction over what is known as “Plan II TOFC/COFC service,” which has long been defined as follows: “Plan II (All-Rail): “Door-to-door service performed by the railroad, which moves its own trailers or containers on flatcars under open tariffs usually similar to those of truckers.” See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 403 (1967). The ICC’s statutory authority includes jurisdiction to grant exemptions from regulation as well as to regulate. In 1980, Congress enacted the Staggers Rail Act, 94 Stat. 1895, 49 U. S. C. §10101 et seq., which authorizes the ICC to exempt from state regulation “transportation that is provided by a rail carrier as a part of a continuous intermodal movement.” See § 10505(f). It is undisputed that the ICC may grant an exemption from regulation to interstate TOFC/ COFC transportation provided by a rail carrier. The question presented is whether the grant of authority to the ICC under § 10505(f) encompasses the motor freight portion of a Plan II TOFC/COFC shipment entirely within the State of Texas. HH In 1981, the Commission adopted a regulation exempting Plan II service from state regulation. The regulation unambiguously covers both the motor portion and the rail portion of Plan II service. In a separate case involving interstate Plan II shipments, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the regulation, specifically rejecting an argument that, the Commission had no authority to exempt the motor portion of the intermodal service. It held that “rail-owned truck TOFC/COFC service is ‘transportation that is provided by a rail carrier.’” American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, 656 F. 2d 1115, 1120 (1981). On September 27, 1982, Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, and Southern Pacific Transportation Company (Railroads) petitioned the Railroad Commission of Texas (RCT) to apply the ICC’s exemption to their Texas intrastate TOFC/COFC traffic. App. 7-10. The RCT took the position that it retained the authority to regulate the motor carrier segment of intrastate transportation provided by an interstate rail carrier. The Staggers Rail Act provides that a state commission may regulate intrastate transportation provided by a rail carrier, but only to the extent that it conforms with the federal Act and only if the ICC determines that the State’s proposed regulatory standards and procedures are consistent with federal standards and procedures. The RCT granted a partial exemption which covered the rail but not the pre-rail and post-ex-rail truck service portions of the intrastate TOFC/COFC service. Id., at 11-12. The Railroads petitioned the ICC under 49 U. S. C. § 11501(c) to review the RCT’s decision and to grant the full TOFC/COFC exemption. The ICC held that the State Commission’s assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over “incidental pre-rail and ex-rail over-the-road movements” of Plan II TOFC/COFC service was inconsistent with the federal standards contained in its 1981 regulation. The State of Texas sought review of the ICC’s order in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Railroads intervened as respondents. That court reversed, holding that the truck portion of the intrastate movements at issue was not “transportation . . . provided by a rail carrier” within the meaning of § 10505(f) but rather was “transportation provided by a motor carrier” within the meaning of § 10521(b)(1). Texas v. United States, 770 F. 2d 452 (1985). The Court of Appeals distinguished American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, supra, as limited to TOFC/COFC shipments that at some point in their journey crossed a state boundary. When the service is purely intrastate, the Court of Appeals held, the motor portions of TOFC/ COFC service by railroad-owned trucks constitute transportation provided by a motor carrier under § 10521(b)(1) and for that reason are expressly reserved for state regulation. We granted the petitions for certiorari of the ICC and the Railroads, 476 U. S. 1157 (1986). We are persuaded that the Court of Appeals erred. II It is undisputed that the Commission’s power to grant these exemptions from state regulation is coextensive with its own authority to regulate, or not to regulate, these inter-modal movements by rail carriers. We therefore focus our review on the extent of the Commission’s jurisdiction over the trucking segment of intrastate TOFC/COFC activities. Since all of the railroads interested in this proceeding are engaged in interstate commerce, the Commission has authority over the intrastate transportation, as well as the interstate transportation, provided by such carriers. All of the elements of the Plan II TOFC/COFC service at issue are provided on equipment owned and operated by a rail carrier over which the ICC has jurisdiction. Thus, the plain language of § 10505(f) unambiguously supports the ICC’s position. It is true, of course, that the text of § 10521(b)(1) can be read to support the contrary result because it is possible to regard the rail carrier as a “motor carrier” during the truck portion of the intermodal movement. We believe, however, that the correct, and certainly the more natural, reading of the statute is that all of the TOFC/COFC service provided by interstate rail carriers on equipment which they own is “transportation provided by a rail carrier” subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. The position urged by respondents encounters three serious difficulties. First, it is inconsistent with the agency’s historical treatment of Plan II TOFC/COFC service as “provided by a railroad.” In Ex parte 230, Substituted Service-Charges and Practices of For-Hire Carriers and Freight Forwarders (Piggyback Service), 322 I. C. C. 301, 304-305, 309-312 (1964), the Commission stated: “Under plan II, the railroad holds out to provide a complete door-to-door service under a single bill of lading. Neither the shipper nor the consignee intervenes in any way in the overall transportation activities or does anything beyond tendering the shipment to the railroad at origin or at the shipper’s loading dock.” Id., at 311. The Commission .recognized that the distinctive element of Plan II service was not the use of trailers or containers to offer door-to-door pickup and delivery service via rail and highway, but rather the identity of the carrier offering this service: “[A]ll three — rail carrier, motor carrier, and freight forwarder — are even today providing, through the use of piggyback, services which in physical characteristics are substantially similar. Any one of the three can offer a transportation service which includes door-to-door pickup and delivery, movement of loaded trailers between a shipper’s premises and a rail yard, and line-haul transportation of the loaded trailers by rail. The railroad does this under its plan II TOFC tariff; the trucker does it under plan I, in which it is encouraged by the railroads . . . and the freight forwarder does it through use of plans III and IV rail tariffs.” Id., at 330. In none of the plans was a rail carrier treated either as a hybrid, or as a motor carrier, during the truck segment of the intermodal movement. Presumably, in enacting § 10505, Congress was aware of the Commission’s consistent practice of regulating railroads as “rail carriers” even when they performed Plan II intermodal service. Second, the State’s interpretation of § 10521(b)(1) would make that section authorize state regulation of TOFC/COFC services in areas where it has already been rejected. The term “intrastate transportation provided by a motor carrier” must refer either to the intrastate motor portion of any TOFC/COFC movement or to the entire intrastate movement when a portion of it is performed by truck service. If the term refers only to the motor portion, the State’s reading of the statute would preserve the State’s power to regulate the intrastate motor portion of an interstate Plan II TOFC/ COFC shipment. But Texas acknowledges that it has no such power. Alternatively, if the term refers to every intrastate shipment that includes a motor segment, the railroad must be regarded as a “motor carrier” even during the rail portion of the intermodal movement, and the RCT would retain the power to regulate the entire intrastate movement. Again, Texas does not claim that authority. We think it clear that the only way to square the words of the statute with those aspects of the ICC’s jurisdiction that the State does accept is to hold that the ICC’s authority over intrastate transportation provided by an interstate rail carrier encompasses the entire movement, even when it includes a truck segment under Plan II. Third, the special statutory authority of the Commission to determine the proper interrelationship of different modes of transportation supports its interpretation of the Staggers Rail Act. The statute was a response to the concern that differing state and federal standards applying to the industry and excessive governmental regulation by both federal and state authorities had contributed to the financial difficulties of major railroads. In its statement of rail transportation policy, Congress unambiguously expressed its interest in allowing free competition, to the maximum extent possible, to govern the financial health of the railroad industry. The importance of that policy is confirmed by the fact that the statement of general transportation policy applicable to' all types of carriers, which generally prescribes the impartial regulation of all competing modes of transportation, is introduced by an exception providing that the special policy statement endorsing competition in railroad transportation shall prevail when transportation policy has an impact on rail carriers. Even if the question of the extent to which § 10521(b)(1) restricts the Commission’s power under § 10505 in these cases were in doubt, the statutory statement of policy priorities would lead us to agree with the ICC’s view that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of competition, rather than partial state regulation of Plan II TOFC/COFC service. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The petitions for certiorari include both TOFC and COFC service. Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-1222, p. I; Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-1267, p. i. A container, unlike a trailer, cannot itself be hauled on the highway by a tractor rig; it must first be placed on a suitable truck trailer. For the purposes of this opinion, however, there are no relevant differences between TOFC and COFC service. “TOFC service is inherently bimodal in that its basic characteristic is the combination of the inherent advantages of rail and motor transportation: the railroad’s ability to provide efficient line-haul transportation of huge volumes of freight for great distances at high speed; and the motor carrier’s ability to provide door-to-door, and if necessary job- or farm-site, pickup and delivery.” Ex parte No. 230, Substituted Service-Charges and Practices of For-Hire Carriers and Freight Forwarders (Piggyback Service), 322 I. C. C. 301, 329 (1964). See generally id., at 305-309 (describing growth of TOFC service). See 49 CFR § 1039.13 (1986). See also Improvement of TOFC/COFC Regulation, 364 I. C. C. 731, aff’d, American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, 656 F. 2d 1115 (CA5 1981). The exemption encompasses “[r]ailroad and truck transportation provided by a rail carrier as part of a continuous intermodal movement.” 49 CFR § 1039.13 (1986) (emphasis added). In some plans, the motor portion of an intermodal movement is performed by a trucking company, freight forwarder, or shipper. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 403 (1967). In such plans, the exemption applies only to the rail portion of the intermodal service. See 49 U. S. C. § 11501. At the time it issued the decision at issue in this case, the Railroad Commission of Texas had provisional certification to regulate intrastate transportation provided by a rail carrier. The Commission no longer has this statutory authority to regulate intrastate rail rates, classification, rules, and practices of interstate carriers because it was denied certification by the ICC in Ex parte No. 388 (Sub-No. 31), State Intrastate Rail Rate Authority — Texas, 11. C. C. 2d 26 (1984), aff’d, Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. United States, 246 U. S. App. D. C. 352, 765 F. 2d 221 (1985). See ICC No. 39627, Petition Under 49 U. S. C. 11501(c) by Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, et al., for Review of an Order of the Railroad Commission of Texas, decided Jan. 19, 1984 (Service Date Jan. 23,1984); ICC, No. 39704, Petition of Road-Rail Transportation Company, Inc., Under 49 U. S. C. 11501(c) for Review of an Order of the Railroad Commission of Texas, decided Apr. 11, 1984 (Service Date Apr. 13, 1984). Section 10505(f) provides: “The Commission may exercise its authority under this section to exempt transportation that is provided by a rail carrier as a part of a continuous intermodal movement.” Section 10521(b)(1) provides: “(b) This subtitle does not— “(1) except as provided in sections 10922(c)(2), 10935, and 11501(e) of this title, affect the power of a State to regulate intrastate transportation provided by a motor carrier.” Sections 10922, 10935, and 11501(e) are not relevant to the issue. The ICC found that the Railroad Commission of Texas’ refusal to apply the entire TOFC/COFC exemption violated federal standards and procedures binding upon the State Commission, and authorized the Railroads “to establish any rate, classification, rule, or practice pertaining to intrastate rail or motor transportation provided by a rail carrier as part of a continuous intermodal movement within the State of Texas, to the same extent and in the same manner that they establish rates, classifications, rules, or practices for similar interstate movements.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 85-1222, pp. 21a-22a. The Court of Appeals stated: “The thrust of the argument of the State of Texas is that the I. C. C. lacks jurisdiction over the trucking segment of the totally intrastate TOFC activities of the intrastate [sic] rail carriers. Without this jurisdiction, Texas maintains, the I. C. C. could not exempt the intrastate highway transportation from state regulation. We are constrained to agree.” Texas v. United States, 770 F. 2d 452, 453 (CA5 1985) (emphasis added). This quotation reveals an incompleteness in the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. If the rail carriers were “intrastate rail carriers,” the ICC would not have had jurisdiction over either the rail or the motor portion of their intrastate movements. But this conclusion does not necessarily extend to the rail and motor portions of intrastate movements by all other rail carriers, specifically those that operate across state boundaries. In fact, the Railroads in this proceeding are all interstate rail carriers, and the ICC has consistently exercised jurisdiction over their intrastate, as well as their interstate, movements. See n. 14, infra. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals did not err in its underlying conclusion that the ICC’s authority to grant an exemption from federal regulation coincides with its authority to grant an exemption from state regulation. In its argument in this case, the State of Texas also recognizes that the scope of the ICC’s authority over exemptions from state regulation is coextensive with its own jurisdiction either to impose federal regulation or to grant an exemption from federal regulation. Thus, although this case involves the ICC’s effort to grant exemptions from regulation, the same legal question would be presented if the ICC were trying to regulate the rates for an interstate rail carrier’s intrastate movements, and the carrier asserted that only the state commission had such power. See 49 U. S. C. §§ 10501 and 11501. The Commission does not assert jurisdiction over wholly intrastate carriers; nor does it assert the authority to exempt such carriers from state regulation. See n. 7, supra. Our holding that the ICC’s jurisdiction under § 10505(f) includes the intrastate portions of Plan II TOFC/COFC service applies whether or not a State has been certified under 49 U. S. C. § 11501. Because the Railroad Commission of Texas is not now certified to regulate railroads, the statute independently places the truck portion of intra-Texas TOFC/COFC service within the jurisdiction of the ICC: “Any intrastate transportation provided by a rail carrier in a State which may not exercise jurisdiction over an intrastate rate, classification, rule, or practice of that carrier due to a denial of certification under this subsection shall be deemed to be transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under [§ 10501 et seq.V’ 49 U. S. C. § 11501(b)(4)(B). And of course the Fifth Circuit so held in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, 656 F. 2d 1115 (1981). The reason why Texas does not have that power is that the statute plainly authorized the ICC either to regulate, or to exempt from regulation, such continuous interstate movements. We think it clear that the ICC’s authority over intrastate rail transportation by an interstate rail carrier encompasses the entire movement, even when it includes a truck segment. This conclusion was at least implicit in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, supra, at 1120: “[R]ail-owned truck TOFC/COFC service is ‘transportation that is provided by a rail carrier.’ Had Congress intended to limit the Commission’s exemption authority to rail transportation, it could easily have done so by using that language. Instead, it chose the broad ‘transportation-that-is-provided-by-a-rail-earrier’ language and presumably did so with knowledge that it previously had defined ‘transportation’ to include the movement of passengers or property by motor vehicle.” (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted.) The Court of Appeals based its conclusion that “transportation provided by a rail carrier” should be defined more narrowly for intrastate traffic than for interstate commerce on the “potential mischief” of exempting intrastate rail travel from regulation. The Court of Appeals focused on the hypothetical example of a small intrastate rail carrier that provides minimal rail service within a city and extensive truck service to convey goods to and from the city, and is exempt from state regulation. See 770 F. 2d, at 454-455. This scenario could only occur, however, if the ICC had authority to exempt such transportation from regulation. But because the hypothetical railroad is only an intrastate carrier, the ICC would not have any jurisdiction over it, and the speculative potential for mischief would not exist. In this case, by contrast, the Railroads are interstate carriers whose TOFC/COFC services include some segments entirely within Texas. See Guide to Piggyback Routes, Distribution 190, 196 (July 1982) (route diagrams for TOFC/COFC service). See also n. 9, supra. “[W]e cannot accept arguments based upon arguable inference from nonspecific statutory language, limiting the Commission’s power to adopt rules which, essentially, reflect its judgment in light of current facts as to the proper interrelationship of several modes of transportation with respect to an important new development.” American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S., at 410. The reading of the Act proposed by respondents impermissibly limits the ICC’s power to implement national transportation policy in the evolving area of intermodal transportation. See H. R. Rep. No. 96-1035, pp. 38, 61, 128-130 (1980); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1430, p. 79 (1980). Section 10101a “establishes a specific rail transportation policy to guide the Commission in its duties in regulation of the railroad industry.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1430, supra, at 80. Section 10101a provides, in part: “10101a. Rail transportation policy “In regulating the railroad industry, it is the policy of the United States Government— “(1) to allow, to the maximum extent possible, competition and the demand for services to establish reasonable rates for transportation by rail; “(4) to ensure the development and continuation of a sound rail transportation system with effective competition among rail carriers and with other modes, to meet the needs of the public and the national defense; “(5) to foster sound economic conditions in transportation and to ensure effective competition and coordination between rail carriers and other modes; “(7) to reduce regulatory barriers to entry into and exit from the industry.” Section 10101 provides in part: “(a) Except where policy has an impact on rail carriers, in which case the principles of section 10101a of this title shall govern, to ensure the development, coordination, and preservation of a transportation system that meets the transportation needs of the United States, including the United States Postal Service and national defense, it is the policy of the United States Government to provide for the impartial regulation of the modes of transportation . . .

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. BOUKNIGHT No. 88-1182. Argued November 7, 1989 Decided February 20, 1990 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 563. Ralph S. Tyler III argued the cause for petitioner in No. 88-1182. With him on the briefs were J. Joseph Cur-ran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, and Andrew H. Baida and Carmen M. Shepard, Assistant Attorneys General. Mitchell Y. Mirviss argued the cause for petitioner in No. 88-6651. With him on the briefs were Susan Dishler Shubin, Stuart R. Cohen, Kathi Grasso, and M. Gayle Hafner. George E. Bums, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Jose F. Anderson, George M. Lipman, Gary S. Offutt, Robin Parsons, and M. Christina Gutierrez. Together with No. 88-6651, Maurice M. v. Bouknight, also on certio-rari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by James M. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Judy G. Zeprun, Judith Fabricant, and Countess C. Williams, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Douglas B. Baily of Alaska, Robert A. Corbin of Arizona, John K. Van de Kamp of California, John J. Kelly of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III of Delaware, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Gordon Allen of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Brian McKay of Nevada, Jeffrey Howard of New Hampshire, Peter N. Perretti, Jr., of New Jersey, Hal Stratton of New Mexico, Nicholas Spaeth of North Dakota, Dave Frohnmayer of Oregon, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Roger A. Tellinghuisen of South Dakota, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, Charlie Brown of West Virginia, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; for Advocates for Children and Youth Inc. by Cheri Wyron Levin; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger; for the Juvenile Protective Association by Thomas H. Morsch; and for the U. S. Conference of Mayors et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Melvin Spaeth, and Donald 0. Beers. William L. Grimm filed a brief for Charles M. as amicus curiae. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In this action, we must decide whether a mother, the custodian of a child pursuant to a court order, may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to resist an order of the juvenile court to produce the child. We hold that she may not. I Petitioner Maurice M. is an abused child. When he was three months old, he was hospitalized with a fractured left femur, and examination revealed several partially healed bone fractures and other indications of severe physical abuse. In the hospital, respondent Bouknight, Maurice’s mother, was observed shaking Maurice, dropping him in his crib despite his spica cast, and otherwise handling him in a manner inconsistent with his recovery and continued health. Hospital personnel notified the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS), petitioner in No. 88-1182, of suspected child abuse. In February 1987, BCDSS secured a court order removing Maurice from Bouknight’s control and placing him in shelter care. Several months later, the shelter care order was inexplicably modified to return Maurice to Bouknight’s custody temporarily. Following a hearing held shortly thereafter, the juvenile court declared Maurice to be a “child in need of assistance,” thus asserting jurisdiction over Maurice and placing him under BCDSS’ continuing oversight. BCDSS agreed that Bouknight could continue as custodian of the child, but only pursuant to extensive conditions set forth in a court-approved protective supervision order. The order required Bouknight to “cooperate with BCDSS,” “continue in therapy,” participate in parental aid and training programs, and “refrain from physically punishing [Maurice].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a. The order’s terms were “all subject to the further Order of the Court.” Id., at 87a. Bouk-night’s attorney signed the order, and Bouknight in a separate form set forth her agreement to each term. Eight months later, fearing for Maurice’s safety, BCDSS returned to juvenile court. BCDSS caseworkers related that Bouknight would not cooperate with them and had in nearly every respect violated the terms of the protective order. BCDSS stated that Maurice’s father had recently died in a shooting incident and that Bouknight, in light of the results of a psychological examination and her history of drug use, could not provide adequate care for the child. App. 33-34. On April 20, 1988, the court granted BCDSS’ petition to remove Maurice from Bouknight’s control for placement in foster care. BCDSS officials also petitioned for judicial relief from Bouknight’s failure to produce Maurice or reveal where he could be found. Id., at 36-39. The petition recounted that on two recent visits by BCDSS officials to Bouknight’s home, she had refused to reveal the location of the child or had indicated that the child was with an aunt whom she would not identify. The petition further asserted that inquiries of Bouknight’s known relatives had revealed that none of them had recently seen Maurice and that BCDSS had prompted the police to issue a missing persons report and referred the case for investigation by the police homicide division. Also on April 20, the juvenile court, upon a hearing on the petition, cited Bouknight for violating the protective custody order and for failing to appear at the hearing. Bouknight had indicated to her attorney that she would appear with the child, but also expressed fear that if she appeared the State would “‘snatch the child.’” Id., at 42, 54. The court issued an order to show cause why Bouknight should not be held in civil contempt for failure to produce the child. Expressing concern that Maurice was endangered or perhaps dead, the court issued a bench warrant for Bouk-night’s appearance. Id., at 51-57. Maurice was not produced at subsequent hearings. At a hearing one week later, Bouknight claimed that Maurice was with a relative in Dallas. Investigation revealed that the relative had not seen Maurice. The next day, following another hearing at which Bouknight again declined to produce Maurice, the juvenile court found Bouknight in contempt for failure to produce the child as ordered. There was and has been no indication that she was unable to comply with the order. The court directed that Bouknight be imprisoned until she “purge[d] herself of contempt by either producing [Maurice] before the court or revealing to the court his exact whereabouts.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a. The juvenile court rejected Bouknight’s subsequent claim that the contempt order violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against self-incrimination. The court stated that the production of Maurice would purge the contempt and that “[t]he contempt is issued not because she refuse[d] to testify in any proceeding . . . [but] because she has failed to abide by the Order of this Court, mainly [for] the production of Maurice M.” App. 150. While that decision was being appealed, Bouknight was convicted of theft and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment in separate proceedings. The Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated the juvenile court’s judgment upholding the contempt order. In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 550 A. 2d 1135 (1988). The Court of Appeals found that the contempt order unconstitutionally compelled Bouknight to admit through the act of production “a measure of continuing control and dominion over Maurice’s person” in circumstances in which “Bouknight has a reasonable apprehension that she will be prosecuted.” Id., at 403-404, 550 A. 2d, at 1141. Chief Justice Rehnquist granted BCDSS’ application for a stay of the judgment and mandate of the Maryland Court of Appeals, pending disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari. 488 U. S. 1301 (1988) (in chambers). We granted certiorari, 490 U. S. 1003 (1989), and we now reverse. I — I I — I The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The Fifth Amendment’s protection “applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 408 (1976); see Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 207, 209-210, n. 8 (1988) (Doe II); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 761 (1966) (“[T]he privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature”). The juvenile court concluded that Bouknight could comply with the order through the unadorned act of producing the child, and we thus address that aspect of the order. When the government demands that an item be produced, “the only thing compelled is the act of producing the [item].” Fisher, supra, at 410, n. 11; see United States v. Doe, 465 U. S. 605, 612 (1984) (Doe I). The Fifth Amendment’s protection may nonetheless be implicated because the act of complying with the government’s demand testifies to the existence, possession, or authenticity of the things produced. See Doe II, supra, at 209; Doe I, supra, at 612-614, and n. 13; Fisher, supra, at 410-413. But a person may not claim the Amendment’s protections based upon the incrimination that may result from the contents or nature of the thing demanded. Doe I, 465 U. S., at 612, and n. 10; id., at 618 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Fisher, supra, at 408-410. Bouknight therefore cannot claim the privilege based upon anything that examination of Maurice might reveal, nor can she assert the privilege upon the theory that compliance would assert that the child produced is in fact Maurice (a fact the State could readily establish, rendering any testimony regarding existence or authenticity insufficiently incriminating, see Fisher, supra, at 411). Rather, Bouknight claims the benefit of the privilege because the act of production would amount to testimony regarding her control over, and possession of, Maurice. Although the State could readily introduce evidence of Bouknight’s continuing control over the child — e. g., the custody order, testimony of relatives, and Bouknight’s own statements to Maryland officials before invoking the privilege — her implicit communication of control over Maurice at the moment of production might aid the State in prosecuting Bouknight. The possibility that a production order will compel testimonial assertions that may prove incriminating does not, in all contexts, justify invoking the privilege to resist production. See infra, at 556-558. Even assuming that this limited testimonial assertion is sufficiently incriminating and “sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege,” Fisher, supra, at 411, Bouknight may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime. The Court has on several occasions recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws. In Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1 (1948), the Court considered an application of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and a regulation issued thereunder which required licensed businesses to maintain records and make them available for inspection by administrators. The Court indicated that no Fifth Amendment protection attached to production of the “required records,” which the “‘defendant was required to keep, not for his private uses, but for the benefit of the public, and for public inspection.’” Id., at 17-18 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 381 (1911)). The Court’s discussion of the constitutional implications of the scheme focused upon the relation between the Government’s regulatory objectives and the Government’s interest in gaining access to the records in Shapiro’s possession: “It may be assumed at the outset that there are limits which the Government cannot constitutionally exceed in requiring the keeping of records which may be inspected by an administrative agency and may be used in prosecuting statutory violations committed by the record-keeper himself. But no serious misgiving that those bounds have been overstepped would appear to be evoked when there is a sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the Government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally require the keeping of particular records, subject to inspection by the Administrator.” 335 U. S., at 32. See also In re Harris, 221 U. S. 274, 279 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (regarding a court order that a bankrupt produce account books, “[t]he question is not of testimony but of surrender— not of compelling the bankrupt to be a witness against himself in a criminal case, past or future, but of compelling him to yield possession of property that he no longer is entitled to keep”). The Court has since refined those limits to the government’s authority to gain access to items or information vested with this public character. The Court has noted that “the requirements at issue in Sha-piro were imposed in ‘an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry,”’ and that Shapiro’s reach is limited where requirements “are directed to a ‘selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.’” Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, 57 (1968) (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S. 70, 79 (1965)); see Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62, 68 (1968) (Shapiro inapplicable because “[h]ere, as in Marchetti, the statutory obligations are directed almost exclusively to individuals inherently suspect of criminal activities”); Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85, 98-99 (1968). California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424 (1971), confirms that the ability to invoke the privilege may be greatly diminished when invocation would interfere with the effective operation of a generally applicable, civil regulatory requirement. In Byers, the Court upheld enforcement of California’s statutory requirement that drivers of cars involved in accidents stop and provide their names and addresses. A plurality found the risk of incrimination too insubstantial to implicate the Fifth Amendment, id., at 427-428, and noted that the statute “was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities,” id., at 430, was “‘directed at the public at large,”’ ibid, (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, supra, at 79), and required disclosure of no inherently illegal activity. See also United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927) (rejecting Fifth Amendment objection to requirement to file income tax return). Justice Harlan, the author of Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes, concurred in the judgment. He distinguished those three cases as considering statutory schemes that “focused almost exclusively on conduct which was criminal,” 402 U. S., at 454. While acknowledging that in particular cases the California statute would compel incriminating testimony, he concluded that the noncriminal purpose and the general applicability of the reporting requirement demanded compliance even in such cases. Id., at 458. When a person assumes control over items that are the legitimate object of the government’s noncriminal regulatory powers, the ability to invoke the privilege is reduced. In Wilson v. United States, supra, the Court surveyed a range of cases involving the custody of public documents and records required by law to be kept because they related to “the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established.” Id., at 380. The principle the Court drew from these cases is: “[Wjhere, by virtue of their character and the rules of law applicable to them, the books and papers are held subject to examination by the demanding authority, the custodian has no privilege to refuse production although their contents tend to criminate him. In assuming their custody he has accepted the incident obligation to permit inspection.” Id., at 382. See also Braswell v. United States, 487 U. S. 99, 109-113 (1988); Curdo v. United States, 354 U. S. 118, 123-124 (1957) (“A custodian, by assuming the duties of his office, undertakes the obligation to produce the books of which he is custodian in response to a rightful exercise of the State’s visitorial powers”). In Shapiro, the Court interpreted this principle as extending well beyond the corporate context, 335 U. S., at 16-20, and emphasized that Shapiro had assumed and retained control over documents in which the Government had a direct and particular regulatory interest. Id., at 7-8, 14-15. Indeed, it was in part Shapiro’s custody over items having this public nature that allowed the Court in Marchetti, supra, at 57, Grosso, supra, at 69, and Haynes, supra, at 99, to distinguish the measures considered in those cases from the regulatory requirement at issue in Shapiro. These principles readily apply to this case. Once Maurice was adjudicated a child in need of assistance, his care and safety became the particular object of the State’s regulatory interests. See 314 Md., at 404, 550 A. 2d, at 1141; Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 3 — 801(e), 3-804(a) (Supp. 1989); see also App. 105 (“This court has jurisdiction to require at all times to know the whereabouts of the minor child. We asserted jurisdiction over that child in the spring of 1987 . . .”). Maryland first placed Maurice in shelter care, authorized placement in foster care, and then entrusted responsibility for Maurice’s care to Bouknight. By accepting care of Maurice subject to the custodial order’s conditions (including requirements that she cooperate with BCDSS, follow a prescribed training regime, and be subject to further court orders), Bouknight submitted to the routine operation of the regulatory system and agreed to hold Maurice in a manner consonant with the State’s regulatory interests and subject to inspection by BCDSS. Cf. Shapiro v. United States, supra. In assuming the obligations attending custody, Bouknight “has accepted the incident obligation to permit inspection.” Wilson, 221 U. S., at 382. The State imposes and enforces that obligation as part of a broadly directed, noncriminal regulatory regime governing children cared for pursuant to custodial orders. See Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §3-802(a) (1984) (setting forth child protective purposes of subtitle, including “providing] for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle”); see also Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§3-820(b), (c) (Supp. 1989); In re Jessica M., 312 Md. 93, 538 A. 2d 305 (1988). Persons who care for children pursuant to a custody order, and who may be subject to a request for access to the child, are hardly a “ ‘selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.’” Marchetti, supra, at 57 (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S., at 79). The juvenile court may place a child within its jurisdiction with social service officials or “under supervision in his own home or in the custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit person, upon terms the court deems appropriate.” Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-820(c)(l)(i) (Supp. 1989). Children may be placed, for example, in foster care, in homes of relatives, or in the care of state officials. See, e. g., In re Jessica M., supra; In re Arlene G., 301 Md. 355, 483 A. 2d 39 (1984); Maryland Dept, of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince George’s County Dept, of Social Services, 47 Md. App. 436, 423 A. 2d 589 (1980). Even when the court allows a parent to retain control of a child within the court’s jurisdiction, that parent is not one singled out for criminal conduct, but rather has been deemed to be, without the State’s assistance, simply “unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and his problems.” Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-801(e) (Supp. 1989); see In re Jertrude 0., 56 Md. App. 83, 466 A. 2d 885 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 309, 469 A. 2d 863 (1984). The provision that authorized the juvenile court’s efforts to gain production of Maurice reflects this broad applicability. See Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-814(c) (1984) (“If a parent, guardian, or custodian fails to bring the child before the court when requested, the court may issue a writ of attachment directing that the child be taken into custody and brought before the court. The court may proceed against the parent, guardian, or custodian for contempt”). This provision “fairly may be said to be directed at . . . parents, guardians, and custodians who accept placement of juveniles in custody.” 314 Md., at 418, 550 A. 2d, at 1148 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). Similarly, BCDSS’ efforts to gain access to children, as well as judicial efforts to the same effect, do not “focu[s] almost exclusively on conduct which was criminal.” Byers, 402 U. S., at 454 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Many orders will arise in circumstances entirely devoid of criminal conduct. Even when criminal conduct may exist, the court may properly request production and return of the child, and enforce that request through exercise of the contempt power, for reasons related entirely to the child’s well-being and through measures unrelated to criminal law enforcement or investigation. See Maryland Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-814(c) (1984). This case provides an illustration: concern for the child’s safety underlay the efforts to gain access to and then compel production of Maurice. See App. 33-39, 53-55, 150, 155-158; see also 314 Md., at 419, 550 A. 2d, at 1149 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). Finally, production in the vast majority of cases will embody no incriminating testimony, even if in particular cases the act of production may incriminate the custodian through an assertion of possession or the existence, or the identity, of the child. Cf. Byers, 402 U. S., at 430-431; id., at 458 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). These orders to produce children cannot be characterized as efforts to gain some testimonial component of the act of production. The government demands production of the very public charge entrusted to a custodian, and makes the demand for compelling reasons unrelated to criminal law enforcement and as part of a broadly applied regulatory regime. In these circumstances, Bouknight cannot invoke the privilege to resist the order to produce Maurice. We are not called upon to define the precise limitations that may exist upon the State’s ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight’s act of production in subsequent criminal proceedings. But we note that imposition of such limitations is not foreclosed. The same custodial role that limited the ability to resist the production order may give rise to corresponding limitations upon the direct and indirect use of that testimony. See Braswell, 487 U. S., at 118, and n. 11. The State’s regulatory requirement in the usual case may neither compel incriminating testimony nor aid a criminal prosecution, but the Fifth Amendment protections are not thereby necessarily unavailable to the person who complies with the regulatory requirement after invoking the privilege and subsequently faces prosecution. See Marchetti, 390 U. S., at 58-59 (the “attractive and apparently practical” course of subsequent use restriction is not appropriate where a significant element of the regulatory requirement is to aid law enforcement); see also Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 26-27 (1969); Haynes, 390 U. S., at 100; Grosso, 390 U. S., at 69; cf. Doe I, 465 U. S., at 617, n. 17 (scope of restriction). In a broad range of contexts, the Fifth Amendment limits prosecutors’ ability to use testimony that has been compelled. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 391-394 (1968) (no subsequent admission of testimony provided in suppression hearing); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U. S. 52, 75-76, 79 (1964) (Fifth Amendment bars use, in criminal processes, in other jurisdictions of testimony compelled pursuant to a grant of use immunity in one jurisdiction); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 474-475 (1975) (White, J., concurring in result); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179, 181 (1954) (“[A] witness does not need any statute to protect him from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is compelled to give over his objection. The Fifth Amendment takes care of that without a statute”); see also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450 (1979); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493, 500 (1967). But cf. Doe I, supra, at 616-617 (construing federal use immunity statute, 18 U. S. C. §§6001-6005); Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U. S. 248, 261-262 (1983) (declining to supplement previous grant of federal use immunity). Ill The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is reversed, and the cases are remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GENERAL AMERICAN INVESTORS CO., INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 114. Argued February 28, 1955. Decided March 28, 1955. Norris Darrell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was John F. Dooling, Jr. Solicitor General Sobeloff argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Holland, Charles F. Barber, Ellis N. Slack and Melva M. Graney. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole question presented by this case is whether a payment is taxable as gross income when received by a corporation pursuant to the “insider profits” provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940. Subject to exceptions not presently relevant, § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act provides that the profit realized from certain defined securities transactions undertaken by a director or major stockholder of the issuing corporation “shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer.” This provision is made applicable to investment companies by § 30 (f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. Under these provisions, petitioner, a registered closed-end investment company, received payments totalling $170,038.04. This sum represented the profits accruing to one of petitioner’s directors and a stockholder through dealings covered by § 16 (b); the money was paid over to petitioner on demand and without litigation. The payments were not reported as income on petitioner’s tax returns. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue allowed a $13,000 deduction for legal expenses incurred in recovering the amounts due but asserted á deficiency for the balance on the ground that the receipts constituted taxable gains under § 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Tax Court, 19 T. C. 581, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 211 F. 2d 522, sustained the Commissioner’s determination. We granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 812, because of an apparent similarity of issues here to those involved in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F. 2d 928 (C. A. 3d Cir.), and the possible conflict between that case and this. We have this day decided that the recovery of punitive damages for fraud or antitrust violation is reportable as gross income within the meaning of § 22 (a). Commissioner v. Clenshaw Glass Co., ante, p. 426. The reasons which dictated that result are equally compelling here. We see no significant difference in the nature of these receipts which might make that ruling inapplicable. As in Glenshaw, the taxpayer realized the money in question free of any restrictions as to use. The payments in controversy were neither capital contributions nor gifts. Cf. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 286 U. S. 285. There is no indication that Congress intended to exempt them from coverage. In accordance with the legislative design to reach all gain constitutionally taxable unless specifically excluded, we conclude that the petitioner is liable for the tax and the judgment is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 48 Stat. 881,15 U. S. C. § 78a. 54 Stat. 789,15 U. S. C. § 80a-l. 48 Stat. 896,15 U. S. C. § 78p. 54 Stat. 837, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-29. “SEC. 22. GROSS INCOME. “(a) General Definition. — ‘Gross income’ includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service ... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or ■profits and income derived from any source whatever. . . .” (Emphasis added.) 53 Stat. 9, 53 Stat. 574, 26 U.S. C. § 22 (a). There was, however, no disagreement among lower courts which faced the question of the taxability of a § 16 (b) recovery of “insider profits.” See Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 509, 107 F. Supp. 941; Noma Electric Corp., 12 T. C. M. 1 (CCH Tax Ct. Mem., Dec. 1953).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. PLASTERERS’ LOCAL UNION NO. 79, OPERATIVE PLASTERERS’ & CEMENT MASONS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSN., AFL-CIO, et al. No. 70-63. Argued October 13, 1971 Decided December 6, 1971 Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner in No. 70-63. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Richard B. Stone, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, and Marvin Roth. Wayne S. Bishop argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners in No. 70-65. Donald J. Capuano argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Martin F. O’Donoghue and Patrick C. O’Donoghue. Laurence Gold argued the cause for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief was Thomas E. Harris. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Joseph M. Stone, George L. Plumb, and Betty Southard Murphy for Associated General Contractors of America et al.; by Robert J. Connerton, Arthur M. Schiller, and Jules Bernstein for the Laborers’ International Union of North America, AFL-CIO; and by Albert E. Jenner, Jr., and Chester T. Kamin for the Scientific Apparatus Makers Assn. Louis Sherman and Elihu I. Leifer filed a brief for the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Together with No. 70-65, Texas State Tile & Terrazzo Co., Inc., et al. v. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 79, Operative Plasterers’ & Cement Masons' International Assn., AFL-CIO, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. When a charge is filed under § 8 (b) (4) (D) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the provision banning so-called jurisdictional disputes, the Board must under § 10 (k) “hear and determine the dispute out of which [the] unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless . . . the parties to such dispute” adjust or agree upon a method for the voluntary adjustment of the dispute. The issue here is whether an employer, picketed to force reassignment of work, is a “party” to the “dispute” for purposes of § 10 (k). When the two unions involved, but not the employer, have agreed upon a method of settlement, must the Board dismiss the § 10 (k) proceedings or must it proceed to determine the dispute with the employer being afforded a chance to participate? I Texas State Tile & Terrazzo Co. (Texas State) and Martini Tile & Terrazzo Co. (Martini) are contractors in Houston, Texas, engaged in the business of installing tile and terrazzo. Both have collective-bargaining agreements with the Tile, Terrazzo and Marble Setters Local Union No. 20 (Tile Setters) and have characteristically used members of the Tile Setters union for laying tile and also for work described in the collective-bargaining contract as applying “a coat or coats of mortar, prepared to proper tolerance to receive tile on floors, walls and ceiling regardless of whether the mortar coat is wet or dry at the time the tile is applied to it.” This case arose when Plasterers’ Local Union No. 79, Operative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ International Association of Houston, Texas (Plasterers), picketed the job sites of Texas State and Martini claiming that the work of applying the mortar to receive tile was the work of the Plasterers’ union and not of the Tile Setters. Neither Texas State nor Martini had a collective-bargaining contract with the Plasterers or regularly employed workers represented by that union. Before the Texas State picketing began, the Plasterers submitted their claim to the disputed work to the National Joint Board for Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes (Joint Board), a body established by the Building Trades Department, AFL-CIO, and by certain employer groups. Both the Plasterers’ and the Tile Setters’ locals were bound by Joint Board decisions because their international unions were members of the AFL-CIO’s Building Trades Department. Neither Texas State nor Martini had agreed to be bound by Joint Board procedures and decisions, however. The Joint Board found the work in dispute to be covered by an agreement of August 1917, between the two international unions, and awarded the work to the Plasterers. When Texas State and the Tile Setters refused to acquiesce in the Joint Board decision and change the work assignment, the Plasterers began the picketing of Texas State which formed the basis for the § 8 (b) (4) (D) charges. The Plasterers also picketed a jobsite where Martini employees, members of the Tile Setters, were installing tile, although this dispute had not been submitted to the Joint Board. Martini and Southwestern Construction Co., the general contractor that had hired Texas State, filed § 8 (b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice charges against the Plasterers, and the NLRB’s Regional Director noticed a consolidated § 10 (k) hearing to determine the dispute. Southwestern, Texas State, Martini, and the two unions participated in the hearing. A panel of the Board noted that the Tile Setters admitted being bound by Joint Board procedures, but deemed the Joint Board decision to lack controlling weight, and “after taking into account and balancing all relevant factors” awarded the work to the Tile Setters. When the Plasterers refused to indicate that they would abide by the Board’s award, a § 8 (b) (4) (D) complaint was issued against them, and they were found to have committed an unfair labor practice by picketing to force Texas State and Martini to assign the disputed work to them. In making both the § 10 (k) and § 8 (b) (4) (D) decisions, the Board rejected the Plasterers’ contention that even though the employer had not agreed to be bound by the Joint Board decision, the provisions of § 10 (k) precluded a subsequent Board decision because the competing unions had agreed upon a voluntary method of adjustment. On petition to review by the Plasterers and cross petition to enforce by the Board, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the Board. It held that: “It is not the employer but the rival unions (or other employee groups) who are the parties to the jurisdictional dispute contesting which employees are entitled to seek the work in question.” It concluded that the Board may not make a § 10 (k) determination of a jurisdictional dispute where the opposing unions have agreed to settle their differences through binding arbitration. Both the Board and the employers petitioned for certiorari, and we granted the petitions. II Section 8 (b) (4) (D) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to strike or threaten or coerce an employer or other person in order to force or require an employer to assign particular work to one group of employees rather than to another, unless the employer is refusing to honor a representation order of the Board. On its face, the section would appear to cover any union challenge to an employer work assignment where the prohibited means are employed. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, 364 U. S. 573, 576 (1961) (hereinafter CBS). As the charging or intervening party, the employer would normally be a party to any proceedings under that section. Section 8 (b) (4) (D), however, must be read in light of § 10 (k) with which it is interlocked. CBS, supra, at 576. When a § 8 (b) (4) (D) charge is filed and there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been committed, issuance of the complaint is withheld until the provisions of § 10 (k) have been satisfied. That section directs the Board to “hear and determine” the dispute out of which the alleged unfair labor practice arose; the Board is required to decide which union or group of employees is entitled to the disputed work in accordance with acceptable, Board-developed standards, unless the parties to the underlying dispute settle the case or agree upon a method for settlement. Whether the § 8 (b) (4) (D) charge will be sustained or dismissed is thus dependent on the outcome of the § 10 (k) proceeding. The Board allows an employer to fully participate in a § 10 (k) proceeding as a party. If the employer prefers the employees to whom he has assigned the work, his right to later relief against the other union’s picketing is conditioned upon his ability to convince the Board in the § 10 (k) proceeding that his original assignment is valid under the criteria employed by the Board. The alleged unfair labor practice in this- cause was the picketing of the jobsites by the Plasterers, and the dispute giving rise to this picketing was the disagreement over whether Plasterers or Tile Setters were to lay the final plaster coat. This dispute was a three-cornered one. The Plasterers made demands on both Texas State and the Tile Setters and on both Martini and the Tile Setters. In both cases, the employers’ refusal to accede to the Plasterers’ demands inevitably and inextricably involved them with the Tile Setters against the Plasterers. It was this triangular dispute that the § 10 (k) proceeding was intended to resolve. It may be that in some cases employers have no stake in how a jurisdictional dispute is settled and are interested only in prompt settlement. Other employers, as shown by this cause, are not neutral and have substantial economic interests in the outcome of the § 10 (k) proceeding. A change in work assignment may result in different terms or conditions of employment, a new union to bargain with, higher wages or costs, and lower efficiency or quality of work. In the construction industry, in particular, where employers frequently calculate bids on very narrow margins, small cost differences are likely to be extremely important. In the present cause, both employers had collective-bargaining contracts with the Tile Setters specifically covering the work at issue; neither had contracts with the Plasterers nor employed Plasterers regularly. Both employers determined it to be in their best interests to participate vigorously in the Board’s § 10 (k) proceeding. The employers contended it was more efficient and less costly to use the same craft for applying the last coat of plaster, putting on the bonding coat, and laying the tile and that it was more consistent with industry practice to use the Tile Setters as they did. Both companies claimed that their costs would be substantially increased if the award went to the Plasterers, and that without collective-bargaining contracts with the Plasterers, they would lose 30%-40% of their work to plastering contractors. It is obvious, therefore, that both Texas State and Martini had substantial stakes in the outcome of the § 10 (k) proceeding. The phrase “parties to the dispute” giving rise to the picketing must be given its commonsense meaning corresponding to the actual interests involved here. Cf. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 286 v. Scofield, 382 U. S. 205, 220 (1965). Section 10 (k) does not expressly or impliedly deny party status to an employer, and since the section’s adoption in 1947, the Board has regularly accorded party status to the employer and has refused to dismiss the proceeding when the unions, but not the employer, have agreed to settle. The Court of Appeals rejected this construction of § 10 (k). Its reasoning, which we find unpersuasive, was that because the employer is not bound by the § 10 (k) decision, he should have no right to insist upon participation. But the § 10 (k) decision standing alone, binds no one. No cease-and-desist order against either union or employer results from such a proceeding; the impact of the § 10 (k) decision is felt in the § 8 (b) (4) (D) hearing because for all practical purposes the Board’s award determines who will prevail in the unfair labor practice proceeding. If the picketing union persists in its conduct despite a § 10 (k) decision against it, a § 8 (b) (4) (D) complaint issues and the union will likely be found guilty of an unfair labor practice and be ordered to cease and desist. On the other hand, if that union wins the § 10 (k) decision and the employer does not comply, the employer’s § 8 (b) (4) (D) case evaporates and the charges he filed against the picketing union will be dismissed. Neither the employer nor the employees to whom he has assigned the work are legally bound to observe the § 10 (k) decision, but both will lose their § 8 (b) (4) (D) protection against the picketing which may, as it did here, shut down the job. The employer will be under intense pressure, practically, to conform to the Board’s decision. This is the design of the Act; Congress provided no other way to implement the Board’s § 10 (k) decision. We do not find that the legislative history of § 8 (b) (4) (D) and § 10 (k) requires a different conclusion. The Court of Appeals and the Plasterers rely upon various statements in the legislative history of the two sections, particularly the remarks of Senator Morse, referring to jurisdictional disputes as controversies between two labor unions, and a passage in the House Conference Report referring to § 10 (k) as directing the Board to "hear and determine disputes between unions giving rise to unfair labor practices under section 8 (b)(4)(D).” Nothing in these remarks or in the other relevant legislative documents indicates an affirmative intent to exclude an interested employer from participating in a § 10 (k) proceeding. The usual focus of the legislative debates was on ways of protecting the employer from the economic havoc of jurisdictional strikes. But it does not follow from statements condemning the economically deleterious effects of inter-union strife that Congress intended an employer to have no say in a decision that may, practically, affect his business in a radical way. Congress did not expressly focus on the non-neutral employer, but there is nothing in the legislative history that negatives employer standing; and in referring to the “parties to the dispute,” Congress used terminology that would ordinarily include the employer in cases such as these. The Court has frequently cautioned that “[i]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.” Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69 (1946); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U. S. 235, 241 (1970). It is clear that Congress intended to protect employers and the public from the detrimental economic impact of “indefensible” jurisdictional strikes. It would therefore be myopic to transform a procedure that was meant to protect employer interests into a device that could injure them. In the absence of an “unmistakable directive,” the Court has refused to construe legislation aimed to protect a certain class in a fashion that will run counter to the goals Congress clearly intended to effectuate. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). We conclude, therefore, that these sections were enacted to protect employers who are partisan in a jurisdictional dispute as well as those who are neutral. Nothing in CBS, supra, mandates a different conclusion. Until that case, the Board's practice had been to decide against the striking or picketing union unless it was entitled to the work pursuant to a Board certification or a collective-bargaining contract. The Court found the Board to have taken too narrow a view of its task and held that the Board, employing broader, more inclusive criteria with respect to entitlement, must make an affirmative award to one union or the other. In the course of its opinion, the Court referred to § 10 (k)’s phrase “the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen” as having “no other meaning except a jurisdictional dispute under § 8 (b) (4) (D) which is a dispute between two or more groups of employees over which is entitled to do certain work for an employer.” 364 U. S., at 579. Again, we have no quarrel with the view that § 10 (k) is designed to decide which union is entitled to the work. But the issue before us is whether the employer is also a party to that dispute and to the proceeding that decides that question. The Court in CBS did not have before it a case in which the employer was particularly interested in which union did the work, since it had collective-bargaining contracts with both unions and since both unions were able to do the disputed work with equal skill, expense, and efficiency. The Court recognized that there, “as in most instances” the quarrel was of “so little interest to the employer that he seems perfectly willing to assign work to either [union] if the other will just let him alone.” Ibid. (emphasis added). We have no doubt, therefore, that the Court had no intention of deciding the case now before us. If employers must be considered parties to the dispute that the Board must decide under § 10 (k), absent private agreement, they must also be deemed parties to the adjustment or agreement to settle that will abort the § 10 (k) proceedings. It is insisted that so holding will encourage employers to avoid private arbitration, whereas holding union agreement alone sufficient to foreclose Board action will pressure employers to become part of private settlement mechanisms productive of sound result and much swifter decision. The difficulties with this argument are several. First of all, if union agreements to arbitrate are sufficient to terminate § 10 (k) proceedings, there is no assurance that these private procedures will always be open to employer participation, that an employer will be afforded a meaningful chance to participate, or that all relevant factors will be properly considered. Second, the argument for regarding the employer as a dispensable neutral is reminiscent of the position taken by the Board and rejected by the Court in the CBS case. There, the Board sought to justify a narrow view of its function and its failure to make affirmative awards as generating pressure to settle or arbitrate privately. As § 10 (k) passed the Senate, it directed the Board to decide the dispute or to order arbitration, but the arbitration alternative was deleted in Conference, and the amended bill was passed by the Senate over the strenuous objections of Senator Morse and others. By this amendment, the Court in CBS held that Congress had expressed a clear preference for Board decision as compared with compelled arbitration, and that this policy preference must be respected. 364 U. S., at 581-582. Although this Court has frequently approved an expansive role for private arbitration in the settlement of labor disputes, this enforcement of arbitration agreements and settlements has been predicated on the view that the parties have voluntarily bound themselves to such a mechanism at the bargaining table. In both Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U. S. 261, 262 (1964) and Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U. S., at 238, the employers had acceded to binding arbitration as the terminal step of the grievance procedure. This concession is not present in the instant case; the employers here did not even have a collective-bargaining contract with the Plasterers. Section 10 (k) contemplates only a voluntary agreement as a bar to a Board decision. As in CBS, we decline to narrow the Board's powers under § 10 (k) so that employers are coerced to accept compulsory private arbitration when Congress has declined to adopt such a policy. There remains the matter of the so-called Safeway rule announced by the Board in 1962 and followed since. Under this rule, the Board has held that if one of the unions claiming work effectively renounces its claim, § 10 (k) proceedings are aborted despite legitimate interests an employer may have in securing a Board decision. It is urged that if union agreement prevents a § 10 (k) decision in such a situation, the employer cannot be considered a party to the § 10 (k) dispute when the unions but not the employer have agreed upon a method of settlement. As we understand the Safeway doctrine, however, when one union disclaims the work, § 10 (k) proceedings terminate, not because all “parties” to the dispute have settled or agreed to settle within the meaning of the statute, but on the ground that, in the words of the Board’s brief in this case, “the Board has power, under Section 10 (k), only to hear and determine the merits of a jurisdictional dispute and ... by definition, such a dispute cannot exist unless there are rival claims to the work. . . .” Concededly, an employer may be a third party to disputes over work assignments, but when the other two parties settle their differences and one union declines the work assigned to it, the inter-union conflict that §§ 8 (b) (4) (D) and 10 (k) were designed to eliminate disappears. A § 10 (k) hearing is a comparative proceeding aimed at determining which union is entitled to perform certain tasks. Its function evaporates when one of the unions renounces and refuses the work. Similarly, the applicability of § 8 (b) (4) (D) is premised on conflicting claims of unions or groups of employees for the same job; absent such an actual conflict, it would be futile to proceed under that section unless the employer replaces the disclaiming employees by a new third group of employees when they reject the work assignment, and the disfavored union resumes picketing. If union settlement followed by disclaimer ends the § 10 (k) case, some of the argument about the employer’s party status becomes academic; for whether the employer is a party or not, the two unions alone can prevent a Board decision. But recognizing the employer’s party status insures his right to participate when the unions do not agree and the Board must come to a decision. Further, the Board’s Safeway rule applies only where the inter-union conflict is effectively settled and the employer no longer faces conflicting claims to the work. As this case demonstrates, the Board does not apply the Safeway rule to unimplemented agreements to arbitrate between the unions alone, and it does not consider it applicable where employees continue on the job after their international union loses an arbitration proceeding and renounces the work. These de facto disputes are real, and they deserve Board resolution if the purposes of § 10 (k) are to be .achieved. Cf. CBS, supra, at 579-580. The Court of Appeals would extend the Safeway rule to foreclose Board decision where the two unions, but not the employer, have agreed to arbitrate; inter-union agreement was deemed equivalent to effective disclaimer by one of the unions. This view ignores the narrow view the Board has taken of the Safeway rule. It also fails to recognize the problem arising where a local union or group of employees continues to do work assigned by the employer despite agreement or disclaimer by their parent body. It makes little difference to the picketing union that there has been a “settlement” or an agreed-upon method of deciding the dispute as long as it is barred from enjoying the results of such a theoretical resolution. In the instant case, the Board held a § 10 (k) hearing for the simple reason that a live unresolved jurisdictional dispute between unions and employer in fact existed. Our conclusion evinces no hostility to voluntary settlement of disputes and is wholly consistent with federal policy with respect to voluntary arbitration. In other contexts, where challenged conduct poses an arbitrable dispute under a collective-bargaining contract but is also an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the Board, the Board will, as a matter of policy, defer to the arbitral settlement, although it is not bound to do so by the LMRA. See 29 U. S. C. § 160 (a); Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U. S., at 272; NLRB v. Strong, 393 U. S. 357, 360-361 (1969); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U. S. 432, 438 (1967). Although the Board is not statutorily required to honor arbitration awards in such situations, it often defers to them if the arbitrator has considered the alleged unfair labor practice. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N. L. R. B. 1080 (1955); International Harvester Co., 138 N. L. R. B. 923 (1962), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F. 2d 784 (CA7 1964). But again, such deference is in the context of voluntary arbitration. In the case before us, the LMRA requires that the Board defer only when all of the parties have agreed on a method of settlement; when there has been such an agreement, the Board cannot ignore or override the result of that settlement procedure. In the present cause, however, it is claimed the Board must defer when less than all the parties to the dispute have agreed to arbitrate. Reversed. 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq. Section 8 (b) (4) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents “(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is— “(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work.” 29 U. S. C. §158 (b)(4). Section 10 (k) provides: “Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of section 158 (b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (k). App. 20. This dispute grew out of a new method of applying tile that was developed in the mid-1950’s. R. 111, 123, 135. The National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes is an arbitration panel established by a 1948 agreement between the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, and the Associated General Contractors of America and several specialty contractors’ associations. The Joint Board consists of an equal number of representatives of employers and unions and a neutral chairman. An employer may become a party to a Joint Board proceeding by signing a stipulation agreeing to be bound by the results of the proceeding. Art. III, § 7, AFL-CIO, Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept., Plan for Settling Jurisdictional Disputes Nationally and Locally 10 (1970). Member unions of the AFL-CIO’s Building Trades Department do not have to agree formally to abide by Joint Board decisions, because they are bound by virtue of provisions contained in their constitutions. AFL-CIO, Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept., Procedural Rules and Regulations of the National Joint Board 2 (1970). See generally K. Strand, Jurisdictional Disputes in Construction: The Causes, the Joint Board, and the NLRB 89-104 (1961). In the cases here, both the Tile Setters and the Plasterers were members of the Building Trades Department. In the Texas State case, the Joint Board on November 9, 1966, awarded all of the disputed work to the Plasterers except “any coat to be applied wet the same day under tile.” App. 316. The Tile Setters refused to give up the work of laying the plaster undercoat to which the dry mortar was applied, claiming that the Joint Board decision gave this work to them. The Plasterers established a picket line on January 24, 1967; on March 15, 1967, the Joint Board issued a clarification of its decision, stating that the final smooth plaster coat was to be done by the Plasterers unless it was laid the same day as the tile and dry-set mortar were applied, in which case it was to be done by the Tile Setters. App. 341. The employer-subcontractor, Texas State, intervened as a party. App. 22. The NLRB considered the collective-bargaining agreements among the parties, industry and area practice, relative skills and efficiency of operation, past practices of the employers, agreements between the Plasterers and the Tile Setters, the Joint Board award (the NLRB refused to give this controlling weight because of its “ambiguous nature,” App. 22), and concluded: “Tile setters are at least as skilled in the performance of the work as plasterers, and both Texas Tile and Martini, which assigned them to the work, have been satisfied with both the quality of their work and the cost of employing them. Moreover, the instant assignments of the disputed work to tile setters are consistent with the explicit provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Tile Setters and Texas Tile and Martini, are consistent with the past practice of the Employers, and are not inconsistent with area or industry practice. . . .” App. 23. The Board’s decision in the § 10 (k) proceeding is reported at 167 N. L. R. B. 185 (1967) and its decision and order in the unfair labor practice proceeding are reported at 172 N. L. R. B. Nos. 70, 72 (1968). The § 10 (k) determination is not binding as such even on the striking union. If that union continues to picket despite an adverse § 10 (k) decision, the Board must prove the union guilty of a § 8 (b) (4) (D) violation before a cease-and-desist order can issue. The findings and conclusions in a § 10 (k) proceeding are not res judicata on the unfair labor practice issue in the later § 8 (b) (4) (D) determination. International Typographical Union, 125 N. L. R. B. 759, 761 (1959). Both parties may put in new evidence at the § 8 (b) (4) (D) stage, although often, as in the present cases, the parties agree to stipulate the record of the § 10 (k) hearing as a basis for the Board’s determination of the unfair labor practice. Finally, to exercise its powers under § 10 (k), the Board need only find that there is reasonable cause to believe that a § 8 (b) (4) (D) violation has occurred, while in the § 8 (b) (4) (D) proceeding itself the Board must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the picketing union has violated § 8 (b) (4) (D). International Typographical Union, supra, at 761 n. 5 (1959). 142 U. S. App. D. C. 146, 440 F. 2d 174 (1970). Id., at 152, 440 F. 2d, at 180. Although the dispute at the Martini worksite had not been submitted to the Joint Board, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that, because the two unions had agreed to be bound by the procedures and decisions of the Joint Board, the NLRB was precluded from hearing and determining the Martini dispute under § 10 (k). 401 U. S. 973 (1971). See 29 CFR §§ 102.8, 102.9, 102.109 (1971); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U. S. 205, 219-221 (1965). See Comment, The Employer as a Necessary Party to Voluntary Settlement of Work Assignment Disputes Under Section 10 (k) of the NLRA, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 389, 400 (1971). R. 96-97, 130-132, 141. R. 95, 129, 145-148. See, e. g., Lodge 68 of the Int’l Assn. of Machinists (Moore Drydock Co.), 81 N. L. R. B. 1108, 1113-1114, 1126-1128 (1949); Local 231, Int’l Hod Carriers (Middle States Telephone Co.), 91 N. L. R. B. 598, 604 (1950); United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 581 (Ora Collard), 98 N. L. R. B. 346, 348-349 (1952); United Assn. of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, 108 N. L. R. B. 186, 197 (1954); Bay Counties District Council of Carpenters, 115 N. L. R. B. 1757, 1766-1767 (1956); Local 173, Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers’ Int’l Union (Newark & Essex Plastering Co.), 121 N. L. R. B. 1094, 1103-1104 (1958); Int’l Union of Operating Engineers (Schwerman Co. of Pa., Inc.), 139 N. L. R. B. 1426, 1429 (1962); Carpenters District Council of Denver (J. O. Veteto & Son), 146 N. L. R. B. 1242, 1245 (1964); Electrical Workers, Local 26 (McCloskey & Co.), 147 N. L. R. B. 1498, 1501-1503 (1964); Operative Plasterers Int’l Assn. (Twin City Tile & Marble Co.), 152 N. L. R. B. 1609, 1611, 1615 (1965); Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 49 (Egan-McKay Electrical Contractors, Inc.), 164 N. L. R. B. 672, 673 (1967). The Board has reasserted this view since the Court of Appeals’ decision in the instant case, Lathers Local 104 (Blaine Petty Co.), 186 N. L. R. B. No. 70 (1970). Until now, courts of appeals have uniformly upheld the Board’s position; see, e. g., New Orleans Typographical Union No. 17 v. NLRB, 368 F. 2d 755, 763 (CA5 1966), NLRB v. Local 825, Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, 326 F. 2d 213, 216 (CA3 1964); Local 450, Int’l Union of Operating Engineers v. Elliott, 256 F. 2d 630, 636 (CA5 1958). See also Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U. S. 261, 264 (1964), citing Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int’l Union (Acoustical Contractors Assn.), 119 N. L. R. B. 1345, 1347 (1958). This dismissal will not be pursuant to the language of § 10 (k) directing dismissal upon “compliance by the parties . . . with the [Board’s] decision” but, rather, under § 8 (b) (4) (D) because the “employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work.” Apparently, the Board construes this language to include disregarding a § 10 (k) decision. Brief for the NLRB 23 n. 16, 28 n. 21. The Board’s regulations now provide that'“if the Board determination is that employees represented by a charged union are entitled to perform the work in dispute, the regional director shall dismiss the charge as to that union irrespective of whether the employer has complied with that determination.” 36 Fed. Reg. 9133 (1971). 93 Cong. Rec. 1845. Cf. also 93 Cong. Rec. 1824 (remarks of Sen. Morse). H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510 on H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 57 (1947). See, e. g., 93 Cong. Rec. A1222-A1223 (remarks of Cong. Landis); 93 Cong. Rec. 3424 (remarks of Cong. Hartley); 93 Cong. Rec. 3227-3228 (remarks of Sen. Lucas); 93 Cong. Rec. 4860-4862 (remarks of Sen. Aiken); 93 Cong. Rec. A2251-A2253 (remarks of Sen. Ball). Section 10 (k) protection was also extended to unorganized employees. In the Senate bill, § 8 (b) (4) (D) covered only eases where two unions claimed the same work, but the section was broadened in the Conference Committee to cover conflicts between organized and unorganized employees. See CBS, 364 U. S., at 584. In what is apparently the only time employer participation in the resolution of jurisdictional disputes was explicitly considered, Senator Taft indicated that the employer should be a party to the proceeding: “Mr. MoRREale [General Counsel, International Hodcarriers, Building, and Common Laborers of America]. ... I do not think [compulsory arbitration between the antagonistic unions] should be just by labor itself, but that it should be in combination with industry, because in all those matters, the employers are affected and interested, as well as is labor. I think that the procedure set up should provide for a joint procedure between management and labor. “The CHAIRMAN [Sen. Taft], ... I have no objection to giving both to labor and management the right to arbitrate or address themselves to arbitrating the question.” Hearings on S. 55 before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 1467 (1947). The arbitration provision in the Senate version of § 10 (k) was deleted without explanation in Conference. See n. 27, infra. In construing a statute, the Court has ruled that legislative materials, if “without probative value, or contradictory, or ambiguous,” should not be permitted to control the customary meaning of words. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 562 (1940). See also Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 260 (1945). The Court has previously had occasion to construe the term “party” in the National Labor Relations Act, and it has given it a broad and realistic definition. In Lewis v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 10 (1958), the issue was whether the Board’s General Counsel was a “party” who could apply to the Board for the issuance of a subpoena. The General Counsel had obtained subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum to both an employer and a union after an unfair labor practice complaint had been issued; at the hearing on the complaint, the employer and union had moved to revoke the subpoenas on the ground that the General Counsel was not a “party” for purposes of § 11 (1) of the Act which provides that: “The Board, or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party . . . forthwith issue . . . subpoenas . . . .” The Court noted that the Act does not define the term “party,” but it emphasized that the role of the General Counsel was a “major one” in unfair labor practice proceedings. 357 U. S., at 15. The General Counsel was held to be a party because he was “indispensable to the prosecution of the case” and because relegating him to a lesser status would “overlook the critical role he performs in enforcement of the Act.” 357 U. S., at 16. This description is equally applicable to an employer’s function in a § 8 (b) (4) (D) proceeding. In International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 288 v. Scofield, 382 U. S. 205 (1965), the Court went through a somewhat similar analysis of the substantive interests involved at the judicial enforcement stage of an unfair labor practice proceeding, and concluded that a successful “charged” or “charging” party before the Board had a right to intervene in the ensuing Court of Appeals action. Excluding the employer from participation as a party is inconsistent with the common-law rule that “all persons materially interested in the result of a suit ought to be made parties, so that the court may ... ‘do complete justice.’ ” Vetterlein v. Barnes, 124 U. S. 169, 170-171 (1888). Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. 359, 375 (1839). President Truman, 1947 State of the Union Message, 93 Cong. Rec. 136. The Board has stated its guidelines for resolving jurisdictional disputes: “The Board will consider all relevant factors in determining who is entitled to the work in dispute, e. g., the skills and work involved, certifications by the Board, company and industry practice, agreements between unions and between employers and unions, awards of arbitrators, joint boards, and the AEL-CIO in the same or related cases, the assignment made by the employer, and the efficient operation of the employer’s business. This list of factors is not meant to be exclusive, but is by way of illustration. . . . Every decision will have to be an act of judgment based on common sense and experience rather than on precedent.” Int’l Assn. of Machinists, Lodge 1748 (J. A. Jones Construction Co.), 135 N. L. R. B. 1402, 1410-1411 (1962). The Joint Board award in this case was based solely on the Joint Board’s interpretation of a 1917 agreement between the two international unions and a 1924 decision interpreting that agreement. R. 53, 69-70, 73-76. At the time of the dispute, the criteria used by the Joint Board in making awards were: “Decisions and agreements of record as set forth in the Green Book [the Building Trades Department’s book of precedents], valid agreements between affected International Unions attested by the Chairman of the Joint Board, established trade practice and prevailing practice in the locality.” Art. III, § 1 (a), AFL-CIO Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept., Plan for Settling Jurisdictional Disputes Nationally and Locally (1965). These criteria were broadened in 1970 by the addition of Art. III, § 1 (f), which provides: “Because efficiency, cost and good management are essential to the well-being of the industry, the Joint Board should not ignore the interests of the consumer in settling jurisdictional disputes.” AFL-CIO Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept., Plan for Settling Jurisdictional Disputes Nationally and Locally 8 (1970). 93 Cong. Rec. 6452-6453 ; 93 Cong. Rec. 6519 (remarks of Sen. Pepper). Highway Truckdrivers, Local 107 (Safeway Stores, Inc.), 134 N. L. R. B. 1320 (1961). Int’l Assn. of Bridge Workers, Local 678 (W. R. Aldrich & Co.), 145 N. L. R. B. 943 (1964); Carpet, Linoleum & Soft Tile Layers, Local 1905 (Butcher & Sweeney Construction Co.), 143 N. L. R. B. 251 (1963); Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union, Local 328 (Acoustics & Specialties, Inc.), 139 N. L. R. B. 598 (1962). Brief for NLRB 30 n. 23. In a case interpreting the Safeway doctrine, the Board stated that § 10 (k) is limited "to situations involving competing claims between rival groups of employees, and [was] not designed to require the Board to arbitrate a dispute between a union and an employer when no . . . competing claims [of another union] are involved." Carpet, Linoleum & Soft Tile Layers, Local 1905 (Butcher & Sweeney Construction Co.), 143 N. L. R. B. 251, 255-256 (1963) (emphasis in original). Carpenters Local 1849 v. C. J. Montag & Sons, Inc., 335 F. 2d 216, 221 (CA9 1964); Bldg. and Construction Trades Council of Las Vegas, Local 525 (Charles J. Dorfman), 173 N. L. R. B. 1339 (1968). The Board has also held that a union cannot avoid a § 10 (k) determination by a disclaimer of interest in presently representing the employees in question, United Mine Workers (Turman Construction Co.), 136 N. L. R. B. 1068 (1962), and it has ignored exphert disclaimers when it has questioned a representative’s authority to disclaim work, Millwrights’ Local 1113 (Brogdex Co.), 157 N. L. R. B. 996, 1002 (1966). See also Local 1291, Int’l Longshoremen’s Assn. (Pocahontas Steamship Co.), 152 N. L. R. B. 676 (1965), enforced, 368 F. 2d 107 (CA3 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 1033 (1967); Bricklayers’ Local 2, 152 N. L. R. B. 278, 282 (1965); Bldg. and Construction Trades Council of Las Vegas, Local 525 (Charles J. Dorfman), supra (1968).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO., successor in interest to AMOCO PRODUCTION CO., et al. v. BURTON, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, et al. No. 05-669. Argued October 4, 2006 Decided December 11, 2006 Auto, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Roberts, C. J., and Breyer, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Steven R. Hunsicker. Daryl Joseffer argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wooldridge, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William B. Lazarus, Martin J. Lalonde, and John A. Bryson Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Petroleum Institute by Jonathan A Hunter, Shannon S. Holtzman, and Harry M. Ng; and for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by William Perry Pendley. Jill Elise Grant, Harry R. Sachse, Thomas H. Shipps, Patricia A Madrid, Attorney General of New Mexico, Christopher D. Coppin, Martin Lobel, and Richard Chivaro filed a brief for the Jicarilla Apache Nation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Auto delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether administrative payment orders issued by the Department of the Interior’s Minerals Management Service (MMS) for the purpose of assessing royalty underpayments on oil and gas leases fall within 28 U. S. C. § 2415(a), which sets out a 6-year statute of limitations for Government contract actions. We hold that this provision does not apply to these administrative payment orders, and we therefore affirm. I A The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease public-domain lands to private parties for the production of oil and gas. 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 181 et seq. MLA lessees are obligated to pay a royalty of at least “12.5 percent in amount or value of the production removed or sold from the lease.” § 226(b)(1)(A). In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act (FOGRMA), 96 Stat. 2447, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq., to address the concern that the “system of accounting with respect to royalties and other payments due and owing on oil and gas produced from such lease sites [was] archaic and inadequate.” § 1701(a)(2). FOGRMA ordered the Secretary of the Interior to “audit and reconcile, to the extent practicable, all current and past lease accounts for leases of oil or gas and take appropriate actions to make additional collections or refunds as warranted.” § 1711(c)(1). The Secretary, in turn, has assigned these duties to MMS. 30 CFR §201.100 (2006). Under FOGRMA, lessees are responsible in the first instance for the accurate calculation and payment of royalties. 30 U. S. C. § 1712(a). MMS, in turn, is authorized to audit those payments to determine whether a royalty has been overpaid or underpaid. §§ 1711(a) and (c); 30 CFR §§ 206.150(c), 206.170(d). In the event that an audit suggests an underpayment, it is MMS’ practice to send the lessee a letter inquiring about the perceived deficiency. If, after reviewing the lessee’s response, MMS concludes that the lessee owes additional royalties, MMS issues an order requiring payment of the amount due. Failure to comply with such an order carries a stiff penalty: “Any person who — (1) knowingly or willfully fails to make any royalty payment by the date as specified by [an] order... shall be liable for a penalty of up to $10,000 per violation for each day such violation continues.” 30 U. S. C. § 1719(c). The Attorney General may enforce these orders in federal court. § 1722(a). An MMS payment order may be appealed, first to the Director of MMS and then to the Interior Board of Land Appeals or to an Assistant Secretary. 30 CFR §§290.105, 290.108. While filing an appeal does not generally stay the payment order, § 218.50(c), MMS will usually suspend the order’s effect after the lessee complies with applicable bonding or financial solvency requirements, § 243.8. Congress supplemented this scheme by enacting the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 1996 (FOGRSFA), 110 Stat. 1700, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. FOGRSFA adopted a prospective 7-year statute of limitations for any “judicial proceeding or demand” for royalties arising under a federal oil or gas lease. § 1724(b)(1). The parties agree that this provision applies both to judicial actions (“judicial proceeding[s]”) and to MMS’ administrative payment orders (“demand[s]”) arising on or after September 1, 1996. Ibid. This provision does not, however, apply to judicial proceedings or demands arising from leases of Indian land or underpayments of royalties on pre-September 1,1996, production. FOGRSFA §§ 9,11,110 Stat. 1717, notes following 30 U. S. C. § 1701. There is no dispute that a lawsuit in court to recover royalties owed to the Government on pre-September 1, 1996, production is covered by 28 U. S. C. § 2415(a), which sets out a general 6-year statute of limitations for Government contract actions. That section, which was enacted in 1966, provides in relevant part: “Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever is later.” (Emphasis added.) Whether this general 6-year statute of limitations also governs MMS administrative payment orders concerning preSeptember 1, 1996, production is the question that we must decide in this case. B Petitioner BP America Production Co. holds gas leases from the Federal Government for lands in New Mexico’s San Juan Basin. BP’s predecessor, Amoco Production Co., first entered into these leases nearly 50 years ago, and these leases require the payment of the minimum 12.5 percent royalty prescribed by 30 U. S. C. § 226(b)(1)(A). For years, Amoco calculated the royalty as a percentage of the value of the gas as of the moment it was produced at the well. In 1996, MMS sent lessees a letter directing that royalties should be calculated based not on the value of the gas at the well, but on the value of the gas after it was treated to meet the quality requirements for introduction into the Nation’s mainline pipelines. Consistent with this guidance, MMS in 1997 ordered Amoco to pay additional royalties for the period from January 1989 through December 1996 in order to cover the difference between the value of the treated gas and its lesser value at the well. Amoco appealed the order, disputing MMS’ interpretation of its royalty obligations and arguing that the payment order was in any event barred in part by the 6-year statute of limitations in 28 U. S. C. § 2415(a). The Assistant Secretary of the Interior denied the appeal and ruled that the statute of limitations was inapplicable. Amoco, together with petitioner Atlantic Richfield Co., sought review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which agreed with the Assistant Secretary that § 2415(a) did not govern the administrative order. Amoco Production Co. v. Baca, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21 (2003). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, Amoco Production Co. v. Watson, 410 F. 3d 722, 733 (2005), and we granted certiorari, 547 U. S. 1068 (2006), in order to resolve the conflict between that decision and the contrary holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in OXY USA, Inc. v. Babbitt, 268 F. 3d 1001, 1005 (2001) (en banc). We now affirm. II A We start, of course, with the statutory text. Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173 (1994). Unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979). Read in this way, the text of § 2415(a) is quite clear. The statute of limitations imposed by § 2415(a) applies when the Government commences any “action for money damages” by filing a “complaint” to enforce a contract, and the statute runs from the point when “the right of action accrues.” The key terms in this provision — “action” and “complaint” — are ordinarily used in connection with judicial, not administrative, proceedings. In 1966, when § 2415(a) was enacted, a commonly used legal dictionary defined the term “right of action” as “[t]he right to bring suit; a legal right to maintain an action,” with “suit” meaning “any proceeding ... in a court of justice.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1488, 1603 (4th ed. 1951) (hereinafter Black’s). Likewise, “complaint” was defined as “the first or initiatory pleading on the part of the plaintiff in a civil action.” Id., at 356. See also Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States, 345 U. S. 59, 66 (1953) (holding that filing a complaint, in the ordinary sense of the term, means filing a suit in court, not initiating an administrative proceeding: “Commencement of an action by the filing of a complaint has too familiar a history ... for us to assume that Congress did not mean to use the words in their ordinary sense”). The phrase “action for money damages” reinforces this reading because the term “damages” is generally used to mean “pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts.” Black’s 466 (emphasis added). Nothing in the language of § 2415(a) suggests that Congress intended these terms to apply more broadly to administrative proceedings. On the contrary, § 2415(a) distinguishes between judicial and administrative proceedings. Section 2415(a) provides that an “action” must commence “within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings.” Thus, Congress knew how to identify administrative proceedings and manifestly had two separate concepts in mind when it enacted § 2415(a). B In an effort to show that the term “action” is commonly used to refer to administrative, as well as judicial, proceedings, petitioners have cited numerous statutes and regulations that, petitioners claim, document this usage. These examples, however, actually undermine petitioners’ argument, since none of them uses the term “action” standing alone to refer to administrative proceedings. Rather, each example includes a modifier of some sort, referring to an “administrative action,” a “civil or administrative action,” or “administrative enforcement actions.” This pattern of usage buttresses the point that the term “action,” standing alone, ordinarily refers to a judicial proceeding. Petitioners contend that their broader interpretation of the statutory term “action” is supported by the reference to “every action for money damages” founded upon “any contract.” 28 U. S. C. § 2415(a) (emphasis added). But the broad terms “every” and “any” do not assist petitioners, as they do not broaden the ordinary meaning of the key term “action.” Petitioners argue that their interpretation is supported by Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546 (1986), and West v. Gibson, 527 U. S. 212 (1999), but this reliance is misplaced. In Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, we construed the attorney’s fee provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes a “court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, [to] award costs of litigation ... to any party.” 42 U. S. C. § 7604(d). We permitted the recovery of fees both for work done in court and in subsequent administrative proceedings. But the pertinent statutory provision in that case did not employ the key terms that appear in the statute at issue here. Specifically, the CWA provision referred to “litigation,” not to an “action” commenced by the filing of a “complaint.” Moreover, “the work done by counsel [in the administrative phase of the case] was as necessary to the attainment of adequate relief... as was all of their earlier work in the courtroom . . . obtaining the consent decree.” 478 U. S., at 558. And we expressly reserved judgment on the question “whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate . . . when there is no connected court action in which fees are recoverable.” Id., at 560, n. 5. West helps petitioners even less. There, we considered whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) could order a federal agency to pay compensatory damages in an administrative proceeding. Section 717(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U. S. C. §2000e-16(b), authorized the EEOC to employ “appropriate remedies,” but did not specifically authorize damages, and § 717(c) authorized a subsequent court action against an employer agency, 42 U. S. C. § 2Q00e-16(c). In 1991, Congress added Rev. Stat. § 1977A(a)(l), 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(l), which provided that “[i]n an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 . . . the complaining party may recover compensatory ... damages.” In West, the respondent employee argued that the enactment of § 1981a(a)(l) showed that Congress did not consider compensatory damages to be “appropriate remedies” in an EEOC proceeding, as opposed to an action brought by an aggrieved employee. If Congress had wished to authorize the award of compensatory damages in an EEOC proceeding, the respondent employee reasoned, Congress would have so provided in § 1981a(a)(l), by expressly cross-referencing § 717(c). We rejected this argument, but in doing so we did not hold that an EEOC proceeding is an “action” under § 1981a(a)(l). Rather, we simply concluded that the EEOC’s authorization under § 717(b) to award “appropriate remedies” was broad enough to encompass compensatory damages. 527 U. S., at 220-221. For these reasons, we are not persuaded by petitioners’ argument that the term “action” in § 2415(a) applies to the administrative proceedings that follow the issuance of an MMS payment order. C We similarly reject petitioners’ suggestion that an MMS letter or payment order constitutes a “complaint” within the meaning of § 2415(a). Petitioners point to examples of statutes and regulations that employ the term “complaint” in the administrative context. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 45(b) (requiring the Federal Trade Commission to serve a “complaint” on a party suspected of engaging in an unfair method of competition); 29 CFR § 102.15 (2006) (a “complaint” initiates unfair labor practice proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board). But the occasional use of the term to describe certain administrative filings does not alter its primary meaning, which concerns the initiation of “a civil action.” Black’s 356. Moreover, even if the distinction between administrative and judicial proceedings is put aside, an MMS payment order lacks the essential attributes of a complaint. While a complaint is a filing that commences a proceeding that may in the end result in a legally binding order providing relief, an MMS payment order in and of itself imposes a legal obligation on the party to which it is issued. As noted, the failure to comply with such an order can result in fines of up to $10,000 a day. An MMS payment order, therefore, plays an entirely different role from that of a “complaint.” D To the extent that any doubts remain regarding the meaning of § 2415(a), they are erased by the rule that statutes of limitations are construed narrowly against the government. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456 (1924). This canon is rooted in the traditional rule quod nullum tern-pus occurrit regi — time does not run against the King. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 132 (1938). A corollary of this rule is that when the sovereign elects to subject itself to a statute of limitations, the sovereign is given the benefit of the doubt if the scope of the statute is ambiguous. Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U. S. 346 (1927), cited by petitioners, is not to the contrary. There, as here, the issue was the scope of a statute of limitations. The provision in that case, however, provided that “ ‘[n]o suit or proceeding for the collection of any such taxes’ ” shall commence more than five years after the filing of the return. Id., at 348-349. The Government argued that the terms “proceeding” and “suit” were coterminous, and urged further that any ambiguity should be resolved in its favor. The Court recognized the canon, restating it much as we have above. Id., at 349. But the Court concluded that the canon had no application in that case because the text of the relevant statute, unlike § 2415(a), applied clearly and separately to “suits” and “proceedings,” and the Court saw no reason to give these different terms the same meaning. Id., at 349-350. E We come now to petitioners’ argument that interpreting § 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions would render subsection (i) of the same statute superfluous. Subsection (i) provides as follows: “The provisions of this section shall not prevent the United States or an officer or agency thereof from collecting any claim of the United States by means of administrative offset, in accordance with section 3716 of title 31.” 28U.S.C. §2415(i). An administrative offset is a mechanism by which the Government withholds payment of a debt that it owes another party in order to recoup a payment that this party owes the Government. 31 U. S. C. § 3701(a)(1). Thus, under subsection (i), the Government may recover a debt via an administrative offset even if the Government would be time barred under subsection (a) from pursuing the debt in court. Petitioners argue that, if § 2415(a) applies only to judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings, there is no need for § 2415(i)’s rule protecting a particular administrative mechanism (i. e., an administrative offset) from the statute of limitations set out in subsection (a). Invoking the canon against reading a statute in a way that makes part of the statute redundant, see, e. g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001), petitioners contend that subsection (i) shows that subsection (a) was meant to apply to administrative, as well as judicial, proceedings. We disagree. As the Court of Appeals noted, subsection (i) was not enacted at the same time as subsection (a) but rather was added 16 years later by the Debt Collection Act of 1982. 96 Stat. 1749. This enactment followed a dispute between the Office of the Comptroller General of the United States, head of the agency then named the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) over whether an administrative offset could be used to recoup a debt where a judicial recoupment action was already time barred. In 1978, in response to a question from the United States Civil Service Commission, OLC opined that an administrative offset could not be used to recoup a debt as to which a judicial action was already time barred. OLC reached this conclusion not because it believed that § 2415(a) reached administrative proceedings generally, but rather because of the particular purpose of an administrative offset. “Where [a] debt has not been reduced to judgment,” OLC stated, “an administrative offset is merely a pre-judgment attachment device.” Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, OLC, to Alan K. Campbell, Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commission Re: Effect of Statute of Limitations on Administrative Collection of United States Claims 3 (Sept. 29,1978), Joint Lodging. OLC opined that a prejudgment attachment device such as this exists only to preserve funds to satisfy any judgment the creditor subsequently obtains. Id., at 4 (citing cases). OLC therefore concluded that, where a lawsuit is already foreclosed by § 2415(a), an administrative offset that is the functional equivalent of a pretrial attachment is also unavailable. Id., at 3. GAO disagreed. See In re Collection of Debts — Statute of Limitations on Administrative Setojf, 58 Comp. Gen. 501, 504-505 (1979). In its view, the question was answered by “[t]he general rule ... that statutes of limitations applicable to suits for debts or money demands bar or run only against the remedy (the right 'to bring suit) to which they apply and do not discharge the debt or extinguish, or even impair, the right or obligation, either in law or in fact, and the creditor may avail himself of every other lawful means of realizing on the debt or obligation. See Mascot Oil Co. v. United States, 42 F. 2d 309 (Ct. Cl. 1930), affirmed 282 U. S. 434; and 33 Comp. Gen. 66 (1953). See also Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 390 (Ct. Cl. 1955).” Ibid. That Congress had time barred the judicial remedy, GAO reasoned, imposed no limit on the administrative remedy. The OLC-GAO dispute reveals that, even under the interpretation of subsection (a) — the one we are adopting — that considers it applicable only to court proceedings, subsection (i) is not mere surplusage. It clarifies that administrative offsets are not covered by subsection (a) even if they are viewed as an adjunct of a court action. To accept petitioners’ argument, on the other hand, we would have to hold either that § 2415(a) applied to administrative actions when it was enacted in 1966 or that it was extended to reach administrative actions when subsection (i) was added in 1982. The clear meaning of the text of § 2415(a), which has not been amended, refutes the first of these propositions, and accepting the latter would require us to conclude that in 1982 Congress elected to enlarge § 2415 to cover administrative proceedings by inserting text expressly excluding a single administrative vehicle from the statute’s reach. It is entirely unrealistic to suggest that Congress would proceed by such an oblique and cryptic route. Ill Petitioners contend that interpreting § 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions results in a statutory scheme with peculiarities that Congress could not have intended. For example, petitioners note that while they are required by statute to preserve their records regarding royalty obligations for only seven years, 30 U. S. C. § 1724(f), the interpretation of § 2415(a) adopted by the Court of Appeals permits MMS to issue payment orders that reach back much further. We are mindful of the fact that a statute should be read where possible as effecting a “‘symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,’” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133 (2000), but here petitioners’ alternative interpretation of § 2415(a) would itself result in disharmony. For instance, under FOGRSFA, MMS payment orders regarding oil and gas leases are now prospectively subject to a 7-year statute of limitations except with respect to obligations arising out of leases of Indian land. Consequently, if we agreed with petitioners that § 2415(a) applies generally to administrative proceedings, payment orders relating to oil and gas royalties owed under leases of Indian land would be subject to a shorter (¿ e., 6-year) statute of limitations than similar payment orders relating to leases of other public-domain lands (which would be governed by FOGRSFA’s new 7-year statute). Particularly in light of Congress’ exhortation that the Secretary of the Interior “aggressively carry out his trust responsibility in the administration of Indian oil and gas,” 30 U. S. C. § 1701(a)(4), it seems unlikely that Congress intended to impose a shorter statute of limitations for payment orders regarding Indian lands. Petitioners contend, finally, that interpreting § 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions would frustrate the statute’s purposes of providing repose, ensuring that actions are brought while evidence is fresh, lightening recordkeeping burdens, and pressuring federal agencies to assert federal rights promptly. These are certainly cogent policy arguments, but they must be viewed in perspective. For one thing, petitioners overstate the scope of the problem, since Congress of course can enact and has enacted specific statutes of limitations to govern specific administrative actions. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 5205(a)(1) (statute of limitations for an administrative action to recover payments made to state governments for disaster or emergency assistance). Indeed, in 1996, FOGRSFA imposed just such a limitation prospectively on all non-Indian land, oil, and gas lease claims. Second, and more fundamentally, the consequences of interpreting § 2415(a) as limited to court actions must be considered in light of the traditional rule exempting proceedings brought by the sovereign from any time bar. There are always policy arguments against affording the sovereign this special treatment, and therefore in a case like this, where the issue is how far Congress meant to go when it enacted a statute of limitations applicable to the Government, arguing that an expansive interpretation would serve the general purposes of statutes of limitations is somewhat beside the point. The relevant inquiry, instead, is simply how far Congress meant to go when it enacted the statute of limitations in question. Here prior to the enactment of § 2415(a) in 1966, contract actions brought by the Government were not subject to any statute of limitations. See Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U. S., at 132. Absent congressional action changing this rule, it remains the law, and the text of § 2415(a) betrays no intent to change this rule as it applies to administrative proceedings. In the final analysis, while we appreciate petitioners’ arguments, they are insufficient to overcome the plain meaning of the statutory text. We therefore hold that the 6-year statute of limitations in § 2415(a) applies only to court actions and not to the administrative proceedings involved in this case. * * * For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice and Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MMS is not always the auditing body, as MMS may delegate its authority to the host State or an Indian tribe. 30 U. S. C. §§ 1732,1735. MMS intended this letter to implement its regulations, which required lessees “to place gas in marketable condition at no cost to the Federal Government unless otherwise provided in the lease agreement.” 30 CFR §206.152® (1996). These primary definitions have not changed in substance since 1966. Black’s (8th ed. 2004) now defines “action” as “[a] civil or criminal judicial proceeding” and a “complaint” as “[t]he initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff’s claim, and the demand for relief.” Id., at 31,303. Moreover, it seems unlikely that Congress intended administrative proceedings to commence within one year after the conclusion of administrative proceedings. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 5205(a)(1) (statute of limitations for “administrative actionfs] to recover any payments] made to a State or local government for disaster or emergency assistance”); 12 U. S. C. § 1441a(b)(ll)(G) (requiring Resolution Trust Corporation to maintain staff to assist with certain “cases, civil claims, and administrative enforcement actions”); 15 U. S. C. § 78u(h)(9)(B) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provision noting that certain “[f]inancial records . . . may be disclosed or used only in an administrative, civil, or criminal action”). See also 7 CFR § 3018.400(c) (2006) (Department of Agriculture regulation regarding “administrative action [s] for the imposition of a civil penalty” for failure to file disclosure forms); 71 Fed. Reg. 7407 (2006) (to be codified in 12 CFR § 1412.2(1)(1)) (Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation regulation defining “prohibited indemnification payment” to include reimbursement for a civil money penalty of judgment resulting from any “administrative or civil action” instituted by the Farm Credit Administration); 10 CFR pt. 820, App. A, IX-b (2006) (“Administrative actions, such as determination of award fees where [Department of Energy] contracts provide for such determinations, will be considered separately from any civil penalties that may be imposed under this Enforcement Policy”). There was some question at oral argument whether MMS’ initial letter might constitute a “complaint” within the meaning of § 2415(a). Petitioners did not advance this argument, and recognized at oral argument that neither the statute nor the regulations require the issuance of such a letter. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-9. The Government, for its part, observed that all such a letter does is request information, as the agency has not yet decided whether to assert a claim. Id., at 28. This is not a complaint. Indeed, what emerges strikingly from OLC's 1978 opinion is that no one at the time — neither OLC nor GAO — even contemplated that § 2415(a) applied to administrative procedures in the first instance. Nor have petitioners pointed to any source demonstrating otherwise.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PORT OF PORTLAND et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 70-31. Argued October 20, 1971 Decided June 29, 1972 BlackmüN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Powell and RehNQüist, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Lofton L. Tatum argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Raymond K. Merrill, Warren H. Ploeger, Oglesby H. Young, W. Harney Wilson, James H. Pipkin, Jr., Lee Johnson, Attorney General of Oregon, Dale T. Crabtree, Assistant Attorney General, Samuel P. Delisi, and Brenda P. Murray. Messrs. Merrill and Ploeger filed a brief for appellant Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. Solicitor General Griswold, Acting Assistant Attorney General Comegys, and Howard E. Shapiro filed a brief for the United States in support of appellants. Fritz R. Kahn argued the cause for appellee the Interstate Commerce Commission. With him on the brief were Betty Jo Christian and Emmanuel H. Smith. Hugh L. Biggs, Roger J. Crosby, James Warren Cook, Richard Devers, Randall B. Kester, James H. Anderson, and John F. Weisser, Jr., filed a brief for appellees Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co. et al. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, issued under § 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 54 Stat. 905, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2), authorizing the joint acquisition of a heretofore independent switching railroad at Portland, Oregon, by two of the four line-haul railroads serving that city. Spokane, P. & S. R. Co. and Union Pacific R. Co., 334 I. C. C. 419 (1969). The switching railroad, Peninsula Terminal Co., is of current interest to the carriers because it provides an entrance route to the Rivergate Industrial District, a modern industrial and port complex being developed by the appellant, Port of Portland. The two railroads authorized to acquire Peninsula are the Union Pacific Railway Co. (UP) and the Great Northern Pacific & Burlington Lines, Inc. (Burlington Northern), through its subsidiary, the Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co. (SP&S). The two other line-haul carriers now serving Portland — -the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. (Milwaukee) and the Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (SP)— sought to be included as joint purchasers of Peninsula under §§ 5 (2)(b), (c), and (d) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §§5(2) (b), (c), and (d), and sought trackage rights linking their lines with Peninsula. This appeal arises out of the Commission’s denial — in disagreement with its hearing examiner’s recommendations- — of the petitions of Milwaukee and SP. Together with these two railroads, the Port of Portland and the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon appeal from the decision of the three-judge District Court affirming, without opinion, the Commission’s order. The United States joins the appellants in urging that the judgment below be reversed, while the Commission joins Burlington Northern and UP in urging affirmance. Probable, jurisdiction was noted. 401 U. S. 906 (1971). The question whether the Commission applied the correct legal standards is presented against the background of a complex factual situation — though this is not unusual in the case of railway mergers and acquisitions — and we find it necessary to go into detail concerning the facts and the proceedings prior to the submission of the case here. I A. The Rivergate Area and Peninsula’s Relation to It The developing Rivergate Industrial District occupies nearly 3,000 acres at the tip of the peninsula formed by the confluence of the Columbia and Willamette Rivers. ' Rivergate’s six miles of waterfront will provide docksites for direct deepwater access to the Pacific Ocean. The Port of Portland has expended more than five million dollars of public funds for planning, construction, and development, and it is estimated that ultimate pub-lie and private investment in industrial and port facilities at Rivergate will exceed 500 million dollars. As conceived by its public developers, the Rivergate complex will be served by a domestic transportation network capable of providing efficient and economical service to and from points throughout the Nation. To achieve this goal, the Port’s consultants recommended construction by the Port of an internal rail loop that would connect with existing carriers at the southwestern and eastern corners of Rivergate, thus providing River-gate industries with direct access to all line-haul carriers serving Portland. At full development — estimated to be 15 years in the future — rail traffic generated by these industries is expected to reach between 500 and 600 cars per day, with a projected annual volume of five million tons of freight. At present, eight industries occupy about one-tenth of the Rivergate area. Seven of these are located on the west, or Willamette River, side of Rivergate, and are served by tracks owned by the Port of Portland. Outside rail access to this part of Rivergate is provided by tracks extending from UP’s Barnes Yard (point 9 on the schematic map appended to this opinion) and connecting with the Port of Portland tracks. Over these éxternal tracks, jointly owned by UP and Burlington Northern, UP provides switching service to the line-haul carriers serving Portland. It is expected that this Barnes Yard route will remain the southwest entrance to Rivergate. The one other Rivergate industry — the poleyard of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation (Point E on the map) — is located at the easternmost edge of Rivergate, on the Columbia River. Outside rail access is presently provided by Peninsula, which serves, in addition, 13 industries located just southeast of the Rivergate boundary. Peninsula, organized in 1918 to serve a packinghouse facility long since closed, has a main track extending for only 8,000 feet along the Columbia River. At its easternmost end is the North Portland interchange (point 7 on the map), where Peninsula connects with lines owned by Burlington Northern and UP. Since the lines of these two line-haul carriers do not connect directly with Rivergate in this area, access to the eastern end of the Rivergate District is, at present, solely over Peninsula tracks. Whether Peninsula tracks will remain the sole access to the eastern end of Rivergate is by no means certain. Peninsula suffers from certain physical limitations — its tracks are laid upon sand, its clearances are- limited, and the main line is impeded by heavy curvature. Furthermore, the North Portland interchange tracks may have insufficient capacity for the expected Rivergate traffic. Accordingly, an alternate access route to the eastern end of Rivergate is under consideration, that is, a new spur leading directly to Rivergate from the Burlington Northern main north-south tracks. B. The Proposed Purchase of Peninsula All outstanding capital stock of Peninsula is owned by the United Stockyards Corporation. Stockyards R. Co. Control, 254 I. C. C. 207 (1943). United is not itself a carrier and has no interest in continuing to operate a railroad independent of its stockyard operation. It has been willing to sell Peninsula at the appraised value of its capital stock, and it has no preference as to the purchaser. On February 28, 1967, United entered into an agreement to sell Peninsula to SP&S and UP. By joint application filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission on July 25, 1967, SP&S and UP sought approval, under § 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, of their contracted purchase of Peninsula from United Stockyards. The application pointed out that the acquisition would enable the applicants to provide rail service to the adjacent Rivergate area over the Peninsula tracks. Peninsula, however, would continue to operate as a separate carrier. No major changes in traffic or revenues were anticipated in the immediate future, though it was anticipated that “within the foreseeable future substantial new traffic and revenues” would be derived from the developing Rivergate area. In response to the above application, Milwaukee and SP filed petitions seeking inclusion in the acquisition of Peninsula as joint and equal owners, pursuant to §§ 5 (2)(b), (c), and (d) of the Act; in addition, they sought the right to use tracks necessary to connect their own lines with Peninsula. The Commission’s action on these petitions is the subject of the present appeal. The competing contentions are closely related to the facts of the interconnections between the four line-haul carriers near Rivergate, and to these we now turn. C. Carrier Interconnections and Switching Arrangements (1) The North Portland Interchange At the North Portland interchange (point 7 on the map), where Peninsula connects with Burlington Northern and UP, are four interchange tracks. Two of these are jointly owned by Burlington Northern and UP; the remaining two are owned half by Peninsula, and the other half jointly by Burlington Northern and UP. Only one of these four tracks — one of the two jointly owned by Burlington Northern and UP — connects directly to the Burlington Northern double main-line tracks, running to the north across the Columbia River. In addition, the interchange tracks connect to a single UP track, which extends south through a mile-long tunnel to the UP’s Albina Yard (point 6 on the map), a distance of 5.2 miles. At the time of the hearing in this case, about 30 cars were handled daily at the North Portland interchange. About 61% of this traffic involved switching between the predecessors of Burlington Northern on the one hand and UP and its subsidiaries on the other. Only the remaining 39% involved switching cars designated to or from industries served by Peninsula. As the only two line-haul carriers connecting directly with Peninsula at North Portland, Burlington Northern and UP provide reciprocal switching to any other line-haul carrier whose cars are designated to or from industries served by Peninsula. (2) The Southern Pacific Connection Although SP is a line-haul carrier serving Portland, its tracks terminate in East Portland (point 5) and at the Hoyt Street Yard on the other side of the Willamette River (point 3). SP cars designated for industries served by Peninsula are generally switched to UP trains at the latter’s Albina Yard (point 6) and moved thence to the North Portland interchange, where they are switched by Peninsula itself to their ultimate destination. Alternatively, the cars may be switched to SP&S trains at the Hoyt Street Yard and moved to North Portland over the SP&S mainline. In either case, SP must pay a switching charge to Burlington Northern or to UP (whichever is the switching carrier), and then pay a “rate division” to Peninsula for its switching service. The Peninsula rate division is absorbed by any line-haul carrier subject to it and is thus not passed on to the shipper. The SP&S and UP switching charges may be absorbed by a line-haul carrier if a minimum line-haul revenue per car is exceeded, and SP has done so, except on certain low-rated noncompetitive traffic. SP shared in about 20% of Peninsula’s traffic in 1966, and in about 17% in 1967. (3) Milwaukee’s Presence in Portland Throughout the proceedings below, Milwaukee was not a line-haul carrier serving Portland. Its own tracks terminate at Longview, Washington, 46 miles north of Portland, and through arrangements with SP&S it shared in only one percent of Peninsula’s traffic in 1966 and 1967. However, a basic condition of the Commission’s approval of the merger of the Great Northern Railway Co., the Northern Pacific Railway Company, and their affiliates, including SP&S, was that Milwaukee be made an effectively competitive transcontinental carrier by being permitted to enter Portland over the lines of the new company, Burlington Northern. Condition 24(a) of the merger required that Burlington Northern “shall grant to the Milwaukee, upon such fair and reasonable terms as the parties may agree or as determined by this Commission in the event of their inability to agree, trackage rights to operate freight trains over [Burlington Northern] lines between Longview Junction and Portland, including the right to serve on an equal basis all present and future industries at Portland and intermediate points and the use of [Burlington Northern] facilities at Portland necessary for the switching of traffic to other railroads and industries. [Burlington Northern] shall maintain Portland as an open gateway on a reciprocal basis with the Milwaukee to the same extent as with other connecting carriers . . . 331 I. C. C. 228, 357. Pursuant to Condition 24(a), Milwaukee commenced service to Portland on March 22, 1971. Since that date, it has published rates reflecting single-line service to Portland industries, including those served by Peninsula, by absorbing the relevant switching charges. It has operated its own locomotives over Burlington Northern lines as far south as the Hoyt Street Yard on the western side of the Willamette River (point 3). If Milwaukee is not allowed to switch cars directly to Peninsula at the North Portland interchange, Milwaukee cars designated for industries on Peninsula will be switched to Burlington Northern trains at Vancouver, on the north side of the Columbia (point 8), at the Hoyt Street Yard (point 3), or at the Guild’s Lake Yard (point 2), and moved thence to Peninsula. D. Milwaukee and Southern Pacific Pleadings Before the Commission By petition filed August 23, 1967, Milwaukee sought inclusion in the proposed purchase of Peninsula by Burlington Northern (then SP&S) and UP. Section 5 (2) (d) of the Interstate Commerce Act authorizes the Commission to require such inclusion as a prerequisite to its approval of the purchase “upon a finding that such inclusion is consistent with the public interest.” After first setting out its impending access to Portland over SP&S lines because of the Northern Lines merger, Milwaukee alleged: “The instant transaction, if approved by the Commission without inclusion of Milwaukee upon the terms stated below, would have the effect of foreclosing Milwaukee direct service to all the industries now or in the future to be located on the lines of Peninsula Terminal Company. With fifty per cent of Peninsula Terminal Company stock in the hands of Union Pacific Railroad Company, not a party to the contract referred to above, Milwaukee will not have any right similar to that sought by applicants herein ... to operate over or obtain trackage rights in the lines of Peninsula Terminal Company. Industries on the lines of Peninsula Terminal Company will thus be denied the single-line service of Milwaukee to such points as [various western and midwestern rail centers served by Milwaukee], contrary to the public interest.” App. 165. Accordingly, the Milwaukee sought equal inclusion with SP&S and UP in the purchase of Peninsula and, in addition, asked “[t]hat Milwaukee be granted the right to acquire trackage rights over intervening connecting track-age jointly owned by applicants, from SP&S main line to Peninsula Terminal Company’s lines upon such reasonable terms and conditions, and for such considerations, as Milwaukee and applicants may negotiate, or, failing such negotiations, upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration as the Commission may find just and reasonable.” App. 166. On December 29, 1967, SP&S and the UP filed replies, arguing, inter alia: (1) that even if Condition 24 (a) were implemented, Milwaukee would still not connect with Peninsula because of the intervening North Portland interchange tracks, jointly owned by SP&S, UP, and Peninsula, and trackage rights over these tracks could not be granted to the Milwaukee in this proceeding; and (2) that joint ownership of Peninsula with the Milwaukee could “lead to a cumbersome, confused and divided management with resulting policy stalemates and serious deterioration of service.” Milwaukee thereupon filed a supplement to its petition for inclusion, stating that “in light of the replies of applicants herein to the Milwaukee’s petition for inclusion, the Milwaukee alleges that the joint application herein is for the purpose of bottling up the Milwaukee at Portland and impair [sic] its ability to provide a competitive service to industries served or to be served by Peninsula Terminal Company contrary to the public interest and the plain intent of the Commission’s [report and order in the Northern Lines Merger Case].” App. 182. Accordingly, the Milwaukee added to its earlier petition by requesting: “That applicants be required to grant Milwaukee trackage rights over intervening trackage at North Portland connecting with the yards of Peninsula Terminal Company, both as a condition to participation in ownership of Peninsula Terminal Company and also under Section 3 (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act” App. 183. (Emphasis added.) Whether intentionally or not, by requesting trackage rights under § 3 (5), the text of which appears in the margin, Milwaukee divorced the question of access to Peninsula from the question of inclusion in the ownership of Peninsula. Any trackage rights granted in connection with the petition for inclusion under § 5 (2) would be contingent upon SP&S’ and UP’s deciding to consummate the purchase; trackage rights granted under § 3 (5), however, would be independent of the purchase. In the meantime, by an amended petition filed November 29, 1967, SP joined with the Milwaukee in seeking inclusion under § 5 (2) (d) as an equal owner of Peninsula. It further requested that UP “be required to grant petitioner bridge trackage rights over [the Union Pacific] main line and terminal trackage between Peninsula Terminal Company and the Southern Pacific-Union Pacific track connection at East Portland, Ore.” App. 168. In response to replies that trackage rights to East Portland could not be granted in a § 5 (2) proceeding, SP, unlike Milwaukee, initiated separate proceedings under §3(5) (Dec. 19, 1967). It sought orders requiring SP&S and UP to allow the “common use of Peninsula Terminal Company,” together with bridge trackage rights over UP lines to East Portland; additionally (or, presumably, alternatively), it sought the “common use of the terminal facilities of Union Pacific between Peninsula Terminal Company and . . . East Portland, Oregon.” E. Proceedings Before the Hearing Examiner The applications, petitions, and replies of the four line-haul carriers were referred to an examiner for hearing upon a consolidated record. The Port of Portland, the Portland Commission of Public Docks, the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon, and Crown Zellerbach Corporation intervened in favor of Milwaukee and the SP. At the hearings in February and March of 1968, evidence was taken from five shippers in addition to Crown Zellerbach, as well as officers and consultants of the parties and intervenors. On September 9, 1968, nearly a year after the Commission had approved the Northern Lines merger, the hearing examiner issued his report. In the § 5 (2) proceeding, he recommended approval of the purchase of Peninsula by Burlington Northern and UP, on condition (1) that SP be included as an equal owner and (2) that Milwaukee be included as an equal owner upon consummation of the Northern Lines merger and upon Milwaukee’s commencing operations into Portland. The examiner further recommended that if the purchase were consummated on the above conditions, SP and Milwaukee be granted “the right of access ... to Peninsula Terminal Company trackage over intervening North Portland interchange tracks, at North Portland, Oreg., presently owned individually or jointly by [Peninsula, SP&S and Northern Pacific, and UP], upon such terms and compensation for use of such intervening trackage mutually agreeable to the interested carriers, or in the event of failure to agree, as the Commission may fix as just and reasonable, to be ascertained in accordance with the provisions of section 3 (5) . . . App. 128-129. The examiner found that this right of access “is practicable and would not substantially impair the ability of the owning carriers to handle their business.” App. 129. In the separate § 3 (5) proceedings initiated by SP, the examiner ordered common use by SP of the tracks and facilities of UP for operation between the connection at East Portland and the tracks of Peninsula at North Portland, conditioned, again, upon compensation to be agreed upon by the parties or “just and reasonable” as fixed by the Commission. In his discussion of the issues, the hearing examiner first announced that he would treat the entire area involved as “one transportation terminal entity.” On the subject of inclusion in the purchase of Peninsula, he announced: “Existing disparity in charges and treatment of traffic within the Portland switching area is convincing evidence that the greatest economic advantage for equality of shippers and carriers can be accomplished best by equal access and ownership. The most economical and functionally modern transportation facilities are essential to development of Rivergate and the Port of Portland. Limitation of direct access there to two railroads barring on-line solicitation and the direct development interests of the other railroads serving the Portland area is contrary to an environment of unencumbered development and the establishment of a sound transportation system. . . . [D]irect access to all the carriers will enable shippers to deal directly with originating carriers providing on-line service to many points in areas not served by the two initial applicants. Shippers would benefit from elimination of switching charges assessed on non-competitive traffic where one of the applicants now acts as a switching carrier.” App. 120-121. On the subject of the SP’s § 3 (5) applications, the examiner found that the evidence warranted a conclusion that common use by SP of UP trackage between the North Portland interchange and East Portland was “in the public interest, practicable, and would not substantially impair UP’s ability to handle its own business.” He noted the “almost incredible 30-hour average transit time required for car movements between Albina Yard and Peninsula, a round-trip distance of about 10.4 miles, including engine changes, car inspection, and car classification at Albina Yard.” With respect to the developing Rivergate complex, the examiner was convinced “that access thereto by other line-haul carriers will create greater incentive for improvement of railroad facilities and for elimination of present unsatisfactory conditions in the involved area.” App. 124. Nor did the examiner think that joint ownership and access by the four line-haul railroads in Peninsula and the proposed trackage rights to SP would curtail competition. “To the contrary, shippers in the involved area would be afforded free direct access to all the line-haul carriers’ services. Among other things, it would place traffic movements between the Portland area, on the one hand, and, on the other, on-line points of carriers in California and States east thereof, on a more competitive basis with movements between those points over the lines of UP and [Burlington Northern] .... Also, Milwaukee would become more competitive with UP and [Burlington Northern] and their connections in providing service to the north and east of Portland. The authorizations, generally, would result in improved competitive service and the fostering of sound transportation in the involved area.” App. 125. Finally, the examiner did not grant SP’s apparent application, pursuant to § 3 (5), for trackage rights over Peninsula itself. He concluded his discussion with the words: “In event the parties elect not to consummate the purchase [of Peninsula] recommended herein further petitions by these carriers requesting access to and operation over trackage of Peninsula pursuant to section 3 (5) of the Act may be filed. Jurisdiction will be retained for that purpose.” App. 127. F. The Decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission Burlington Northern and UP filed exceptions to the hearing examiner’s recommendations. They contended, inter alia, (1) that undue emphasis was placed on the future development of Rivergate, (2) that the hearing examiner erroneously held the Portland terminal area to constitute one terminal entity, (3) that the evidence does not support a four-way ownership of Peninsula, either from a general public or a shipper standpoint, (4) that Condition 24 (a) did not grant Milwaukee access to Peninsula, and (5) that neither use of the North Portland interchange tracks by Milwaukee and SP, nor common use by the SP of UP trackage between North Portland and East Portland, was in the public interest. On June 6, 1969, Division 3 of the Interstate Commerce Commission issued its opinion. 334 I. C. C. 419. Though it approved the acquisition of Peninsula by SP&S and UP, it otherwise rejected the hearing examiner’s recommendations and. denied the petitions and applications filed by Milwaukee and SP. The following conditions were imposed upon the acquisition, “to protect the present routings and interchanges” of Peninsula: “1. Under the control of SP&S and UP, Peninsula shall maintain and keep open all routes and channels of trade via existing junctions and gateways, unless and until otherwise authorized by the Commission; “2. The present neutrality of handling inbound and outbound traffic to and from Peninsula by SP&S and UP shall be continued so as to permit equal opportunity for service to and from all lines reaching Peninsula through SP&S and UP without discrimination as to routing or movement of traffic, and without discrimination in the arrangements of schedules or otherwise; “3. The present traffic and operating relationships existing between Peninsula, on the one hand, and, all lines reaching Peninsula through the lines of SP&S and UP, on the other, shall be continued insofar as such matters are within the control of SP&S and UP; “4. Peninsula, SP&S and/or UP shall accept, handle, and deliver all cars inbound, loaded and empty, without discrimination in promptness or frequency of service irrespective of destination or route of movement; “5. Peninsula, SP&S and/or UP shall not do anything to restrain or curtail the right of industries, now located on Peninsula, to route traffic over any and all existing routes and gateways; “6. Peninsula, SP&S and/or UP shall refrain from closing any existing route or channel of trade with SP or Milwaukee on account of the [authorized purchase of Peninsula], unless and until authorized by this Commission; “7. Consummation of [the authorized purchase of Peninsula] shall constitute assent by the corporate parents of SP&S, the members of their respective systems, and any carrier resulting from consummation of the Northern Lines case, to be bound by these conditions to the same extent that SP&S is bound by these conditions; and “8. Any party or person having an interest in the subject matter may at any future time make application for such modification of the above-stated conditions, or any of them, as may be required in the public interest, and jurisdiction will be retained to reopen the proceeding on our own motion for the same purpose.” 334 I. C. C., at 436-437. II A. “Direct Access” As a reading of Part I reveals, there seems to have been a certain amount of confusion below as to whether or not actual operation over the main tracks of Peninsula by any of the four line-haul carriers was at issue in this case. Early in the Commission’s discussion of the merits, for example, it said: “[W]e find that since neither SP nor Milwaukee now connect with Peninsula, and have never connected with it in the past, their direct service to Peninsula’s industries over the objections of SP&S and UP would constitute a new operation and an invasion of the joint applicant’s territory.” 334 I. C. C., at 433 (emphasis added). Laying aside the substantive policy involved in this statement, we do not see how the italicized words can refer to anything but physical operation over tracks wholly owned by Peninsula. Yet, as we have already seen supra, at 828-829, and n. 20, and 832 n. 21, the hearing examiner did not recommend the granting of such trackage rights to Milwaukee and SP; and neither of these two railroads filed exceptions to the hearing examiner’s report requesting such rights. As for Burlington Northern and UP, the third condition which the Commission imposed on their purchase of Peninsula (quoted supra, at 833) seems to acknowledge that Peninsula will continue to operate as a separate railroad, handling all the switching from industries located upon its lines to the North Portland interchange tracks. This matter was not resolved before this Court. The briefs filed by the appellants and by the United States contain many references to “direct access” by the line-haul carriers to Peninsula and Rivergate, again strongly suggesting physical operation over Peninsula tracks. The Commission argues that physical operation on the part of Burlington Northern and UP is not at issue, because ownership alone — all that these two railroads seek — gives no right to operate over the tracks of the purchased railroad. Brief for Interstate Commerce Commission 23 n. 15; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. Milwaukee denies that it ever sought “to switch cars to Peninsula industries with its own engines and crews,” Supplemental Brief for Appellant Milwaukee 34, but no similarly direct statement has been forthcoming from SP. We have set forth but one of the confusions — factual and procedural — that plague this case. Such confusions might have been resolved before the case reached us had the three-judge court that initially reviewed these orders written an opinion. B. The Petitions for Inclusion (1) Condition 24 (a) Milwaukee and the United States argued at length before this Court that Condition 24 (a) of the Northern Lines merger by itself requires that Milwaukee be included in the purchase of Peninsula. The Commission considered this point at the very start of its discussion of the merits and stated that Milwaukee’s petition for inclusion could not be viewed “as part of the general realignment of western railroad competition resulting from the Commission’s approval of the Northern Lines merger. Condition No. 24 ... is applicable only to Northern Lines trackage and territory. The condition is silent with respect to trackage and territory in which other carriers, such as UP, have a joint interest and the effect of the condition upon such joint trackage and territory was not presented to, nor considered by, the Commission. Furthermore, . . . the purchase of Peninsula by the joint applicants was not within the contemplation of the Commission at the time condition No. 24 was imposed. . . . Accordingly, we consider the petition of Milwaukee under the same public interest criteria as the petition and applications of SP, rather than as a petition to carry out the provisions of condition No. 24.10” 334 I. C. C., at 432. In its footnote 10, however, the Commission said: “Upon completion of litigation in the Northern Lines case and consummation of that merger, Milwaukee may wish to seek relief from the Commission in that proceeding to determine the relationship of condition No. 24, if any, to Peninsula’s tracks which would at that time be partially owned by the Northern Lines.” Ibid. This suggestion that the Commission might consider anew the effect of Condition 24 (a) upon jointly owned tracks leaves us in doubt whether at this point it has made a final determination on the applicability of the condition, or simply a determination that the question should be raised in a different proceeding. We do not find it necessary, however, to resolve this doubt and to rule upon the narrow question whether Condition 24 (a) alone requires that Milwaukee be included in the purchase of Peninsula. No one disputes that the condition had one clear meaning — that Milwaukee would be permitted to run its trains into Portland over Burlington Northern-SP&S tracks. The Commission took this as its starting point and went on to discuss the merits of both Milwaukee’s and SP’s petitions for inclusion. We find, for the reasons that will appear below, that the Commission took too narrow a view of the “public interest” and we are in disagreement with its § 5 (2) order. (2) Evaluating the Public Interest As an initial matter, the Commission limited its attention to Peninsula alone, rather than considering the “entire Portland area” as “one transportation terminal entity,” as the hearing examiner had. Appellants contend that this very first step was error, but we think it wiser to evaluate the Commission’s approach as a whole. A fair summary of the Commission’s analysis appears in the last paragraph of its discussion of the petitions for inclusion. There it concludes: “The adverse effect on SP&S and UP, and the shippers dependent upon them for service, of admitting SP and Milwaukee into ownership and control of Peninsula, would outweigh any advantage accruing to SP, Milwaukee, and the Rivergate industries of four-railroad ownership. We cannot find, therefore, that inclusion of SP and Milwaukee in the title proceeding would constitute a just and reasonable term, condition, or modification of the authority requested by the joint applicants.” 334 I. C. C., at 435. In the preceding paragraphs, the Commission had summarized the evidence presented by the three shippers located in Rivergate that had supported SP’s petition and application; it concluded that this evidence failed to establish that benefits would accrue from four-railroad ownership of Peninsula. No mention was made of evidence that tended to establish that “shippers dependent upon” SP&S and UP would suffer from such ownership. It is apparent, therefore, that the dominant factor in the Commission’s analysis, outweighing any advantage accruing to SP and Milwaukee from four-railroad ownership, was the “adverse effect on SP&S and UP”; we must examine now the manner in which the Commission characterized this “adverse effect.” First, the Commission said: “[W]e find that since neither SP nor Milwaukee now connect with Peninsula, and have never connected with it in the past, their direct service to Peninsula’s industries over the objections of SP&S and UP would constitute a new operation and an invasion of the joint applicant^’] territory.” Id., at 433. We have already observed that this passage suggests direct physical operation over the main track of Peninsula, a matter that appears not to be directly at issue in this case. But it may also refer to the trackage rights sought by Milwaukee and SP, as a condition to the purchase, which would permit them to connect directly with Peninsula, so the Commission’s further treatment of this point is relevant: “In the past, the Commission has usually held that sound economic conditions in the transportation industry require that a railroad now serving a particular territory should normally be accorded the right to transport all traffic therein which it can handle adequately, efficiently, and economically, before a new operation should be authorized. This conclusion is applicable not only with respect to existing traffic but also with respect to potential traffic .... See Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. Acquisition, 295 I. C. C. 787, 802 [1958], and cases cited therein.” Ibid. This passage appears to announce the principle that in considering petitions for inclusion in proposed purchases or mergers under § 5 (2), with accompanying trackage rights, the dominant policy is preservation of the market shares of the railroads already serving the location in question, so long as those railroads provide reasonably adequate switching service to other carriers in the area. Whatever doubts we might have, either as to the principle itself or its application to this case, are removed by the critical paragraph that immediately follows the sentences just quoted: “As shown in the appendix, SP shared, through connections and use of joint rates and routes, in only about 20 percent of Peninsula’s traffic during 1966, and only about 17 percent during 1967. Milwaukee’s share, also via connections and joint rates and routes, amounted to only 1 percent during those years. Permitting SP and Milwaukee to acquire access to, and equal ownership of, Peninsula and therefore participate in its existing traffic on a direct haul basis will, of course, allow those two railroads to increase their share of Peninsula’s declining traffic (3,640 loaded cars handled in 1966 and 2,748 handled in 1967). These increased shares of SP and Milwaukee could only be at the expense of the joint applicants and the railway employees whose jobs would be eliminated by the direct service planned by SP and Milwaukee.” Ibid, This discussion strikes us as initially misdirected because it ignores the prospective presence of Milwaukee in this area. In 1966 and 1967, Milwaukee trains were still running no closer to Portland than Longview, Washington, 46 miles away. All through the Commission proceedings, however, it was assumed by all concerned that pursuant to Condition 24 (a) of the Northern Lines merger, Milwaukee would soon be operating directly into Portland over Burlington Northern tracks, as it is today. Granted that Milwaukee had only 1 % of Peninsula’s traffic in 1966 and 1967, the Commission pointed to no evidence that the Milwaukee share would continue to be this small after affirmance of the Northern Lines merger. The next difficulty with the Commission’s approach relates to the potential growth of Peninsula traffic. The raison d’etre of this litigation has been the possibility that Peninsula would become the northern access to River-gate. As we have already noted, this possibility may be remote, given the physical limitations of Peninsula’s present facilities. But the Commission nowhere states that the possibility is too speculative to be considered in this litigation. The paragraph we have just quoted, then, reads strangely indeed; for if Peninsula becomes the northern route into Rivergate, the estimates we have been given indicate that daily traffic over its line would increase from the 1967 rate of 30 cars per day to over 300 cars per day, assuming that a roughly equal number of cars go out over each of the northern and southern routes from Rivergate. Yet according to the principle announced by the Commission, the public interest requires that Burlington Northern’s and UP’s 80% share of this potentially enormous traffic be protected. Such an approach seems to us to fly in the face of the well-settled principle that the Commission is obligated to consider the anticompetitive effects of any § 5 (2) transaction. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67, 83-87 (1944); Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U. S. 491, 511-516 (1970). It is not necessary to invoke the precise terms of Condition 24 (a) and decide their applicability to this case, to take cognizance of the fact that prior to the Northern Lines merger, Milwaukee was a weak carrier in the Northern Tier of States. Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U. S., at 504, 514-516. Condition 24 (a) was not intended to foreclose consideration of Milwaukee’s competitive position vis-a-vis. Burlington Northern in any other proceeding. Both Milwaukee and SP were entitled to explicit consideration of their economic positions as compared with that of Burlington Northern and UP or, at least, a clear statement why such an inquiry was not appropriate. Even the one case cited by the Commission in support of its general principle, Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. Acquisition, 295 I. C. C. 787, 802 (1958), undercuts the Commission’s reasoning. There, the Commission denied applications of other lines for permission to acquire tracks and to undertake new construction in territory traditionally served by the Chicago & North Western Railway Co.; the latter’s economic vulnerability made preservation of its exclusive territory important to the public interest. There is no indication in the present case that Burlington Northern and UP are economically vulnerable, or that they in any way need their present share of Peninsula traffic to serve the public interest. We are confronted with two railroads that already control one actual route into Rivergate (via Barnes Yard) and one potential route (any spur leading off the Burlington North ern-SP&S main-line tracks), and that now seek to acquire, for themselves alone, the one remaining route. The Commission’s entire discussion of the anticompetitive aspects of this acquisition can be summed up as follows: to the extent that SP and Milwaukee may gain by four-railroad ownership of Peninsula, Burlington Northern and UP will lose; therefore the petitions for inclusion are denied. We do not approve this approach to the case. Despite what we have said about the Commission’s apparent reasoning, it does not necessarily follow that the result it reached was incorrect. Given the uncertainty about the northern access to Rivergate, and given the apparent fact that physical operation over Peninsula and into Rivergate was not at issue, approval of the purchase by Burlington Northern and UP alone, with the eight attached conditions, may be the result most in the public interest at the present time. We note that the Commission retained jurisdiction over the proceedings. But it is not the role of this Court to arrive at its own determination of the public interest on the facts of this case. Our appellate function in administrative cases is limited to considering whether the announced grounds for the agency decision comport with the applicable legal principles. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87-88 (1943). In this proceeding — where the record is already confused by ambiguities over what was thought to be at issue — we cannot say that the grounds for the agency decision are consistent with the “public interest” standard found in the Interstate Commerce Act. We must reverse and remand for further proceedings. C. Southern Pacific’s § S (5) Applications We turn to SP’s applications for trackage rights which would permit it to run trains directly to Peninsula from East Portland. According to the Commission: “The intent of Congress in enacting section 3 (5) was to provide a method of avoiding the necessity for incurring unnecessary expense in duplicating existing terminal facilities by a railroad entitled to serve a particular territory.” 334 I. C. C., at 435. Since SP was “not entitled to serve Peninsula or River-gate,” it went on, “we need not reach the questions of whether common use of the facilities involved would be practicable or would substantially impair the ability of Peninsula and UP to handle their own business.” Id., at 436. According to the rule applied here, if a railroad is not “entitled to serve” a particular territory, the Commission conclusively presumes that granting § 3 (5) rights would not be in the “public interest.” Whether or not such a per se rule is permissible under § 3 (5) strikes us as a substantial question of statutory construction. For the following reasons, however, we decline to decide this question in the instant case and include these § 3 (5) proceedings in our remand to the Commission. Pirst, we note that the two cases cited by the Commission in support of its announced rule, Use of Northern Pacific Tracks at Seattle by Great Northern, 161 I. C. C. 699 (1930), and Seaboard Air Line R. Co. — Use of Terminal Facilities of Florida East Coast R. Co., 327 I. C. C. 1 (1965), do not directly present the question at issue, since in each case the Commission decided that the applying railroad was entitled to serve the area and went on to grant the requested trackage rights. Second, we note that the Commission’s brief now defends the ruling below on broader grounds than those that were announced. This leads us to doubt the extent to which the Commission’s announced rule is settled ICC law. Third, the question of § 3 (5) relief may become moot if the Commission, on remand of the § 5 (2) petitions for inclusion, reverses itself and requires trackage rights for SP as a condition for approval of the purchase of Peninsula, and if the purchase is then consummated. Fourth, the § 3 (5) applications were considered in close connection with the § 5 (2) petitions for inclusion by both the Commission and the hearing examiner. We cannot say with assurance that the Commission would approach the § 3 (5) applications in the same way after reconsidering the petitions for inclusion in light of Parts II (A) and (B) of this opinion. The judgment of the District Court is reversed. The case is remanded to the District Court with instructions that it remand to the Interstate Commerce Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [Schematic map follows this page.] SP&S was formerly owned by the Great Northern Railway Co. and the Northern Pacific Railway Co. These two roads merged to become Burlington Northern. See Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U. S. 491 (1970). SP&S now operates as an integral part of that railroad. Reference to Burlington Northern in this opinion will include its SP&S operation, but SP&S often will be referred to in connection with the proceedings below, where it was the named party. When the record closed below, the number of industries in River-gate was five, four of which were located on the Willamette River side of Rivergate. App. 81. By the time the ease had reached the Commission, another industry had located on the Willamette River side. According to the Brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission, p. 38, which no one has contradicted, two additional industries have now located on the Willamette River side. SP&S and UP had already provided for joint ownership of such a spur in their May 26, 1967, contract for the joint ownership of the line between Barnes Yard and the southwestern part of Rivergate. See Art. XI of this agreement, App. 313. The agreed purchase price is $299,405 for all outstanding shares of common stock of Peninsula plus the sum of $70,000 to reimburse United for two switch engines sold by United to Peninsula, and representing an unsecured account payable to United. Peninsula’s properties consist of 13.17 acres of land, none suitable for industrial development, and a total of 3.79 miles of main line and secondary and spur track laid on treated ties in sand with no rock ballast. Besides the two above-noted locomotives, including tools and parts for their operation and maintenance, Peninsula owns tools for track maintenance, a conveyance for workmen, a heated engine house for both locomotives, a yard office, and a sand house. Section 5 (2) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2), provides in pertinent part: “(a) It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission, as provided in subdivision (b) of this paragraph— “(i) for . . . two or more carriers jointly, to acquire control of another through ownership of its stock or otherwise .... “(b) Whenever a transaction is proposed under subdivision (a) of this paragraph, the carrier or carriers or person seeking authority therefor shall present an application to the Commission, and thereupon the Commission . . . shall afford reasonable opportunity for interested parties to be heard. . . . [A] public hearing shall be held in all cases where carriers by railroad are involved unless the Commission determines that a public hearing is not necessary in the public interest. If the Commission finds that, subject to such terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the proposed transaction is within the scope of subdivision (a) of this paragraph and will be consistent with the public interest, it shall enter an order approving and authorizing such transaction, upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications, so found to be just and reasonable .... “(c) In passing upon any proposed transaction under the provisions of this paragraph, the Commission shall give weight to the following considerations, among others: (1) The effect of the proposed transaction upon adequate transportation service to the public; (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to include, other railroads in the territory involved in the proposed transaction; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the interest of the carrier employees affected. “(d) The Commission shall have authority in the case of a proposed transaction under this paragraph involving a railroad or railroads, as a prerequisite to its approval of the proposed transaction, to require, upon equitable terms, the inclusion of another railroad or other railroads in the territory involved, upon petition by such railroad or railroads requesting such inclusion, and upon a finding that such inclusion is consistent with the public interest.” Although the map reproduced in the Appendix does not make this clear, trains coming north on the UP track from Albina Yard may enter directly upon the Burlington Northern double main-line tracks just south of North Portland, without passing through the North Portland interchange. These percentages are based on the figures for loaded or partly loaded cars interchanged at Peninsula during 1967: 2,748 cars designated to or from Peninsula industries; 4,300 interchanged between UP and the predecessors of Burlington Northern. It is not clear from the record how the total figure of 7,048 cars is translated into 30 cars per day — perhaps empty cars are included — but none of the parties disputed the daily or annual figures. In Switching Charges and Absorption Thereof at Shreveport, La., 339 I. C. C. 65, 70 (1971), the Commission has explained “reciprocal switching” as follows: “It has long been a common practice among the railroads to participate at commonly served terminal areas in what is called reciprocal switching. In practice this means that one line-haul carrier operating within the terminal area will act only as a switching carrier in placing cars at industries on its own trackage for loading or unloading, as an incident of the line-haul movement of those cars over another carrier whose trackage in that terminal area does not extend to the serviced industry. The carriers reciprocate in their roles as switching and line-haul carriers at this terminal in accordance with the flow of traific to and from industries on their respective trackage. In theory the carriers mutually exchange their switching services in these terminal areas, with the effect of extending the lines of each carrier to the other’s industries — even on traffic for which they may be directly competitive as line-haul carriers. The scope of these reciprocal switching services is, of course, defined in the carriers’ respective tariffs, either by definition of a specific area of trackage, or by identification of the particular industries for which reciprocal switching is held out. Frequently, the switching charges made applicable by each carrier for reciprocal switching are constructed without regard to the actual cost of the service, on the theory that these mutually incurred costs balance out each other. In many instances the line-haul carrier absorbs the reciprocal switching charge, thus placing the off-line industries within a given terminal area on an identical rate basis with its own on-line industries in that terminal area.” In other words, Peninsula is compensated for its switching service in these cases by a flat division of the line-haul rates. At the time of hearing below, the charge generally amounted to $29.25 per car when the ear revenue exceeded $60. App. 79. The Commission approved the merger on November 30, 1967. Great Northern Pacific & Burlington Line, Inc. — Merger, etc. — Great Northern R. Co. et al., 331 I. C. C. 228, modified Apr. 11, 1968, 331 I. C. C. 869. This Court ultimately affirmed. Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U. S. 491 (1970). Why direct access to Portland was critical to the Milwaukee is made clear by the following quotation from the three-judge District Court opinion in what became the Northern Lines Merger Cases: “Neither Great Northern nor Northern Pacific would interchange traffic with Milwaukee [at Longview, Washington] except in circumstances which gave Northern Lines the longest possible haul over their own roads. This privilege of Northern Lines not to 'shorthaul’ themselves means that traffic originating on the Milwaukee east of of the Twin Cities [and] destined for Portland or California was required to be turned over to one of the merging lines at the Twin Cities. As a consequence, Milwaukee was precluded from being a true transcontinental competitor and was unable to make full use of its extensive trackage ending only a few miles short of Portland. Moreover, Milwaukee was completely precluded from the extensive North-South traffic on the West Coast.” 296 F. Supp. 853, 865 (DC 1968). Since the instant case was litigated below on the express assumption that the Northern Lines merger, and the accompanying condition, would ultimately be affirmed, the Milwaukee’s current operation does not constitute a “change in circumstances” so much as a realization of the assumption. The briefs do not clearly reflect under what arrangements Milwaukee cars have been reaching Peninsula since March 22, 1971, though it is plain that Milwaukee trains have not been moving directly to the North Portland interchange. The contract here referred to is a 1966 agreement between Milwaukee and the Northern Lines, the terms of which were incorporated in large part into the Commission’s conditions accompanying the approval of the Northern Lines merger. In particular, the agreement provided that Milwaukee could operate over SP&S lines as far south as the Hoyt St. Yard, and that SP&S would provide switching of Milwaukee cars at Vancouver and Portland “to or from industries and connecting carriers to the extent such service is performed by [Burlington Northern] or SP&S for itself or any other carrier.” These provisions were the direct predecessors of the vaguer Condition 24 (a), quoted above. A source of confusion in this ease has been the extent to which various carriers either would possess or sought to possess trackage rights over Peninsula’s main track (as opposed to the interchange tracks at North Portland), so the reader is alerted to tread carefully through the descriptions of the pleadings and the opinions below. Section 3 (5) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 3 (5), provides in pertinent part: “If the Commission finds it to be in the public interest and to be practicable, without substantially impairing the ability of a common carrier by railroad owning or entitled to the enjoyment of terminal facilities to handle its own business, it shall have power by order to require the use of any such terminal facilities, including main-line track or tracks for a reasonable distance outside of such terminal, of any common carrier by railroad, by another such carrier or other such carriers, on such terms and for such compensation as the carriers affected may agree upon, or, in the event of a failure to agree, as the Commission may fix as just and reasonable for the use so required, to be ascertained on the principle controlling compensation in condemnation proceedings. . . .” We are told that “bridge trackage rights,” permitting SP only to haul cars from one end of the line to the other, are to be contrasted with “full user rights” or “common use,” which would permit SP to serve any industries located along the UP track. See Brief for Appellees SP&S and UP 27. Like Milwaukee, SP had mentioned § 3 (5) in connection with its § 5 (2) petition for inclusion, asking for “trackage rights between East Portland and the yards of Peninsula Terminal Company, both as a condition to participation in ownership of Peninsula Terminal Company, and also under section 3 (5) . .., independently of the request for participation in ownership.” App. 169. The hearing examiner and the Commission treated this § 3 (5) request as having been superseded by SP’s separate § 3 (5) proceedings, which, if anything, sought broader relief. We do likewise. Eight railway employee organizations opposed the petitions and applications of Milwaukee and SP. None of their contentions are before us now. In return for inclusion in the purchase of Peninsula, SP and Milwaukee were to be required to make equal contribution to the cost of the shares of capital stock and the locomotive equipment of Peninsula. Milwaukee's inclusion in the purchase was made contingent, not only on ultimate approval of the Northern Lines merger, but also upon Milwaukee’s filing a § 1 (18) request for a “certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing railroad operation between Long-view Junction, Wash., and Portland, Oreg.” Given Condition 24 (a), the Commission rejected the proposition that a § 1 (18) certificate would be necessary before Milwaukee could begin operating in Portland, and the question is not before us on appeal. Did this § 5 (2) order grant SP the trackage rights it sought from the Albina Yard? SP contended below that it did, arguing that the only individually owned track in the area that was relevant to the issue was the UP track from North Portland to the Albina Yard, and that the examiner did seem to have in mind all intervening tracks. To protect itself on this point, however, SP filed an exception to the hearing examiner’s recommendations, arguing that he should have granted the requested trackage rights under §5(2). As for Milwaukee’s apparent effort to claim a § 3 (5) right to trackage over the North Portland interchange tracks, see Milwaukee’s Supplement to Petition for Inclusion, quoted supra, we can only say that it was handled very ambiguously by the hearing examiner. The best explanation of his action is that he deemed it unnecessary to grant trackage rights to Milwaukee under § 3 (5), since he was granting them under § 5 (2). Alternatively, he may have thought that Condition 24 (a) gave Milwaukee trackage rights over the North Portland interchange. Milwaukee did not file an exception on this issue and has not pressed it on this appeal. Cf. Brief for Appellants 34. Whether or not SP had in fact sought, under § 3 (5), the right to operate over Peninsula’s main track was the subject of strenuous dispute before the hearing examiner. Counsel were unable to agree on the meaning of “common use,” so the result of the interchange is not perfectly clear, but SP’s counsel appeared to concede that his client sought no more than the right to operate to the North Portland interchange and to connect there with Peninsula (in addition, of course, to equal ownership in the stock of Peninsula). In any event, it is clear that the hearing examiner did not recommend granting any right to operate over the Peninsula main track, and we note that SP did not file an exception on this matter. SP&S and UP contended, in addition, that SP and Milwaukee are not “railroads in the territory involved” within the meaning of § 5 (2) (d), and that the Commission, accordingly, did not have jurisdiction to include these two lines in the purchase of Peninsula. The Commission squarely rejected this contention, and since SP&S and UP do not raise it in their briefs here, we assume that the Commission decided the question correctly and discuss it no further.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY v. HILL et al. No. 76-1701. Argued April 18, 1978 Decided June 15, 1978 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 195. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 211. Attorney General Bell argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Deputy Solicitor General Barnett, Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Richard A. Allen, Charles A. Wagner III, Thomas A. Pedersen, and Nicholas A. Della Volpe. Zygmunt J. B. Plater argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was W. P. Boone Dougherty Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert J. Pennington for Monroe County et ah; and by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Raymond M. Momboisse, Robert K. Best, Albert Ferri, Jr., Donald C. Simpson, and W. Hugh O’Riordan for the Pacific Legal Foundation. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Ben Oshel Bridgers for the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians; by William A. Butler for the Environmental Defense Fund et al.; and by Howell H. Sherrod, Jr., for the East Tennessee Valley Landowners’ Assn. Ben B. Blackburn and Wayne T. Elliott filed a brief for the Southeastern Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. The questions presented in this case are (a) whether the Endangered Species Act of 1973 requires a court to enjoin the operation of a virtually completed federal dam — which had been authorized prior to 1973 — when, pursuant to authority vested in him by Congress, the Secretary of the Interior has determined that operation of the dam would eradicate an endangered species; and (b) whether continued congressional appropriations for the dam after 1973 constituted an implied repeal of the Endangered Species Act, at least as to the particular dam. I The Little Tennessee River originates in the mountains of northern Georgia and flows through the national forest lands of North Carolina into Tennessee, where it converges with the Big Tennessee River near Knoxville. The lower 33 miles of the Little Tennessee takes the river’s clear, free-flowing waters through an area of great natural beauty. Among other environmental amenities, this stretch of river is said to contain abundant trout. Considerable historical importance attaches to the areas immediately adjacent to this portion of the Little Tennessee’s banks. To the south of the river’s edge lies Fort Loudon, established in 1756 as England’s southwestern outpost in the French and Indian War. Nearby are also the ancient sites of several native American villages, the archeological stores of which are to a large extent unexplored. These include the Cherokee towns of Echota and Tennase, the former being the sacred capital of the Cherokee Nation as early as the 16th century and the latter providing the linguistic basis from which the State of Tennessee derives its name. In this area of the Little Tennessee River the Tennessee Valley Authority, a wholly owned public corporation of the United States, began constructing the Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project in 1967, shortly after Congress appropriated initial funds for its development. Tellico is a multipurpose regional development project designed principally to stimulate shoreline development, generate sufficient electric current to heat 20,000 homes, and provide flatwater recreation and flood control, as well as improve economic conditions in “an area characterized by underutilization of human resources and outmigration of young people.” Hearings on Public Works for Power and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1977, before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, p. 261 (1976). Of particular relevance to this case is one aspect of the project, a dam which TVA determined to place on the Little Tennessee, a short distance from where the river’s waters meet with the Big Tennessee. When fully operational, the dam would impound water covering some 16,500 acres — much of which represents valuable and productive farmland — thereby converting the river’s shallow, fast-flowing waters into a deep reservoir over 30 miles in length. The Tellico Dam has never opened, however, despite the fact that construction has been virtually completed and the dam is essentially ready for operation. Although Congress has appropriated monies for Tellico every year since 1967, progress was delayed, and ultimately stopped, by a tangle of lawsuits and administrative proceedings. After unsuccessfully urging TYA to consider alternatives to damming the Little Tennessee, local citizens and national conservation groups brought suit in the District Court, claiming that the project did not conform to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seg. After finding TVA to be in violation of NEPA, the District Court enjoined the dam’s completion pending the filing of an appropriate environmental impact statement. Environmental Defense Fund v. TV A, 339 F. Supp. 806 (ED Tenn.), aff’d, 468 F. 2d 1164 (CA6 1972). The injunction remained in effect until late 1973, when the District Court concluded that TYA’s final environmental impact statement for Tellico was in compliance with the law. Environmental Defense Fund v. TV A, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (ED Tenn. 1973), aff’d, 492 F. 2d 466 (CA6 1974). A few months prior to the District Court’s decision dissolving the NEPA injunction, a discovery was made in the waters of the Little Tennessee which would profoundly affect the Tellico Project. Exploring the area around Coytee Springs, which is about seven miles from the mouth of the river, a University of Tennessee ichthyologist, Dr. David A. Etnier, found a previously unknown species of perch, the snail darter, or Percina (.Imostoma) tanasi. This three-inch, tannish-colored fish, whose numbers are estimated to be in the range of 10,000 to 15,000, would soon engage the attention of environmentalists, the TVA, the Department of the Interior, the Congress of the United States, and ultimately the federal courts, as a new and additional basis to halt construction of the dam. Until recently the finding of a new species of animal life would hardly generate a cause célebre. This is particularly so in the case of darters, of which there are approximately 130 known species, 8 to 10 of these having been identified only in the last five years. The moving force behind the snail darter’s sudden fame came some four months after its discovery, when the Congress passed the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (Act), 87 Stat. 884, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq. (1976 ed.). This legislation, among other things, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to declare species of animal life “endangered” and to identify the “critical habitat” of these creatures. When a species or its habitat is so listed, the following portion of the Act — relevant here — becomes effective: “The Secretary [of the Interior] shall review other programs administered by him and utilize such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. All other Federal departments and agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title and by taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species and threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with the affected States, to be critical.” 16 U. S. C. § 1536 (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). In January 1975, the respondents in this case and others petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to list the snail darter as an endangered species. After receiving comments from various interested parties, including TVA and the State of Tennessee, the Secretary formally listed the snail darter as an endangered species on October 8, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 47505-47506; see 50 CFR § 17.11 (i) (1976). In so acting, it was noted that “the snail darter is a living entity which is genetically distinct and reproductively isolated from other fishes.” 40 Fed. Reg. 47505. More important for the purposes of this case, the Secretary determined that the snail darter apparently lives only in that portion of the Little Tennessee River which would be completely inundated by the reservoir created as a consequence of the Tellico Dam’s completion. Id., at 47506. The Secretary went on to explain the significance of the dam to the habitat of the snail darter: “[T]he snail darter occurs only in the swifter portions of shoals over clean gravel substrate in cool, low-turbidity water. Food of the snail darter is almost exclusively snails which require a clean gravel substrate for their survival. The proposed impoundment of water behind the proposed Tellico Dam would result in total destruction of the snail darter’s habitat.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Subsequent to this determination, the Secretary declared the area of the Little Tennessee which would be affected by the Tellico Dam to be the “critical habitat” of the snail darter. 41 Fed. Reg. 13926-13928 (1976) (to be codified as 50 CFR § 17.81). Using these determinations as a predicate, and notwithstanding the near completion of the dam, the Secretary declared that pursuant to § 7 of the Act, “all Federal agencies must take such action as is necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not result in the destruction or modification of this critical habitat area.” 41 Fed. Reg. 13928 (1976) (to be codified as 50 CFR § 17.81 (b)). This notice, of course, was pointedly directed at TYA and clearly aimed at halting completion or operation of the dam. During the pendency of these administrative actions, other developments of relevance to the snail darter issue were transpiring. Communication was occurring between the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service and TVA with a view toward settling the issue informally. These negotiations were to no avail, however, since TVA consistently took the position that the only available alternative was to attempt relocating the snail darter population to another suitable location. To this end, TVA conducted a search of alternative sites which might sustain the fish, culminating in the experimental transplantation of a number of snail darters to the nearby Hiwassee River. However, the Secretary of the Interior was not satisfied with the results of these efforts, finding that TVA had presented “little evidence that they have carefully studied the Hiwassee to determine whether or not” there were “biological and other factors in this river that [would] negate a successful transplant.” 40 Fed. Reg. 47506 (1975). Meanwhile, Congress had also become involved in the fate of the snail darter. Appearing before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in April 1975 — some seven months before the snail darter was listed as endangered — TVA representatives described the discovery of the fish and the relevance of the Endangered Species Act to the Tellico Project. Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1976, before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, pp. 466-467 (1975); Hearings on H. R. 8122, Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976, before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, pp. 3775-3777 (1975). At that time TVA presented a position which it would advance in successive forums thereafter, namely, that the Act did not prohibit the completion of a project authorized, funded, and substantially constructed before the Act was passed. TVA also described its efforts to transplant the snail darter, but contended that the dam should be finished regardless of the experiment's success. Thereafter, the House Committee on Appropriations, in its June 20, 1975, Report, stated the following in the course of recommending that an additional $29 million be appropriated for Tellico: “The Committee directs that the project, for which an environmental impact statement has been completed and provided the Committee, should be completed as promptly as possible . . . H. R. Rep. No. 94-319, p. 76 (1975). (Emphasis added.) Congress then approved the TYA general budget, which contained funds for continued construction of the Tellico Project. In December 1975, one month after the snail darter was declared an endangered species, the President signed the bill into law. Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Act, 1976, 89 Stat. 1035, 1047. In February 1976, pursuant to § 11 (g) of the Endangered Species Act, 87 Stat. 900, 16 U. S. C. § 1540 (g) (1976 ed.), respondents filed the case now under review, seeking to enjoin completion of the dam and impoundment of the reservoir on the ground that those actions would violate the Act by directly causing the extinction of the species Percina (Imostoma) tanasi. The District Court denied respondents’ request for a preliminary injunction and set the matter for trial. Shortly thereafter the House and Senate held appropriations hearings which would include discussions of the Tellico budget. At these hearings, TVA Chairman Wagner reiterated the agency’s position that the Act did not apply to a project which was over 50% finished by the time the Act became effective and some 70% to 80% complete when the snail darter was officially listed as endangered. It also notified the Committees of the recently filed lawsuit’s status and reported that TYA’s efforts to transplant the snail darter had “been very encouraging.” Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1977, before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, pp. 261-262 (1976) ; Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977, before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, pp. 3096-3099 (1976). Trial was held in the District Court on April 29 and 30,1976, and on May 25, 1976, the court entered its memorandum opinion and order denying respondents their requested relief and dismissing the complaint. The District Court found that closure of the dam and the consequent impoundment of the reservoir would “result in the adverse modification, if not complete destruction, of the snail darter’s critical habitat,” making it “highly probable” that “the continued existence of the snail darter” would be “jeopardize^].” 419 F. Supp. 753, 757 (ED Tenn.). Despite these findings, the District Court declined to embrace the plaintiffs’ position on the merits: that once a federal project was shown to jeopardize an endangered species, a court of equity is compelled to issue an injunction restraining violation of the Endangered Species Act. In reaching this result, the District Court stressed that the entire project was then about 80% complete and, based on available evidence, “there [were] no alternatives to impoundment of the reservoir, short of scrapping the entire project.” Id., at 758. The District Court also found that if the Tellico' Project was permanently enjoined, “some $53 million would be lost in nonrecoverable obligations,” id., at 759, meaning that a large portion of the $78 million already expended would be wasted. The court also noted that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 was passed some seven years after construction on the dam commenced and that Congress had continued appropriations for Tellico, with full awareness of the snail darter problem. Assessing these various factors, the District Court concluded: “At some point in time a federal project becomes so near completion and so incapable of modification that a court of equity should not apply a statute enacted long after inception of the project to produce an unreasonable result. . . . Where there has been an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources by Congress to a project over a span of almost a decade, the Court should proceed with a great deal of circumspection.” Id., at 760. To accept the plaintiffs’ position, the District Court argued, would inexorably lead to what it characterized as the absurd result of requiring “a court to halt impoundment of water behind a fully completed dam if an endangered species were discovered in the river on the day before such impoundment was scheduled to take place. We cannot conceive that Congress intended such a result.” Id., at 763. Less than a month after the District Court decision, the Senate and House Appropriations Cominittees recommended the full budget request of $9 million fo,r continued work on Tellico. See S. Rep. No. &Y960, p, 96 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1223, p. 83 (1976). In its Report accompanying the appropriations bill, the Senate Committee stated: “During subcommittee hearings, TVA was questioned about the relationship between the Tellico project’s completion and the November 1975 listing of the snail darter (a small 3-inch fish which was discovered in 1973) as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act. TVA informed the Committee that it was continuing its efforts to preserve the darter, while working towards the scheduled 1977 completion date. TYA repeated its view that the Endangered Species Act did not prevent the completion of the Tellico project, which has been under construction for nearly a decade. The subcommittee brought this matter, as well as the recent U. S. District Court’s decision upholding TYA’s decision to complete the project, to the attention of the full Committee. The Committee does not view the Endangered Species Act as prohibiting the completion of the Tellico project at its advanced stage and directs that this project be completed as promptly as possible in the public interest.” S. Rep. No. 94-960, supra, at 96. (Emphasis added.) On June 29, 1976, both Houses of Congress passed TVA’s general budget, which included funds for Tellico; the President signed the bill on July 12, 1976. Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Act, 1977, 90 Stat. 889, 899. Thereafter, in the Court of Appeals, respondents argued that the District Court had abused its discretion by not issuing an injunction in the face of “a blatant statutory violation.” 549 F. 2d 1064, 1069 (CA6 1977). The Court of Appeals agreed, and on January 31, 1977, it reversed, remanding “with instructions that a permanent injunction issue halting all activities incident to the Tellico Project which may destroy or modify the critical habitat of the snail darter.” Id., at 1075. The Court of Appeals directed that the injunction “remain in effect until Congress, by appropriate legislation, exempts Tellico from compliance with the Act or the snail darter has been deleted from the list of endangered species or its critical habitat materially redefined.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court’s finding that closure of the dam would result in the known population of snail darters being “significantly reduced if not completely extirpated.” Id., at 1069. TVA, in fact, had conceded as much in the Court of Appeals, but argued that “closure of the Tellico Dam, as the last stage of a ten-year project, falls outside the legitimate purview of the Act if it is rationally construed.” Id., at 1070. Disagreeing, the Court of Appeals held that the record revealed a prima facie violation of § 7 of the Act, namely that TVA had failed to take “such action . . . necessary to insure” that its “actions” did not jeopardize the snail darter or its critical habitat. The reviewing court thus rejected TVA’s contention that the word “actions” in § 7 of the Act was not intended by Congress to encompass the terminal phases of ongoing projects. Not only could the court find no “positive reinforcement” for TVA’s argument in the Act’s legislative history, but also such an interpretation was seen as being “inimical to . . . its objectives.” 549 F. 2d, at 1070. By way of illustration, that court pointed out that “the detrimental impact of a project upon an endangered species may not always be clearly perceived before construction is' well underway.” Id., at 1071. Given such a likelihood, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that TVA’s position would require the District Court, sitting as a chancellor, to balance the worth of an endangered species against the value of an ongoing public works measure, a result which the appellate court was not willing to accept. Emphasizing the limits on judicial power in this setting, the court stated: “Current project status cannot be translated into a workable standard of judicial review. Whether a dam is 50% or 90% completed is irrelevant in calculating the social and scientific costs attributable to the disappearance of a unique form of life. Courts are ill-equipped to calculate how many dollars must be invested before the value of a dam exceeds that of the endangered species. Our responsibility under § 1540 (g)(1)(A) is merely to preserve the status quo where endangered species are threatened, thereby guaranteeing the legislative or executive branches sufficient opportunity to grapple with the alternatives.” Ibid. As far as the Court of Appeals was concerned, it made no difference that Congress had repeatedly approved appropriations for Tellico, referring to such legislative approval as an “advisory opinio [n]” concerning the proper application of an existing statute. In that court’s view, the only relevant legislation was the Act itself, “[t]he meaning and spirit” of which was “clear on its face.” Id., at 1072. Turning to the question of an appropriate remedy, the Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court had erred by not issuing an injunction. While recognizing the irretrievable loss of millions of dollars of public funds which would accompany injunctive relief, the court nonetheless decided that the Act explicitly commanded precisely that result: “It is conceivable that the welfare of an endangered species may weigh more heavily upon the public conscience, as expressed by the final will of Congress, than the writeoff of those millions of dollars already expended for Tellico in excess of its present salvageable value.” Id., at 1074. Following the issuance of the permanent injunction, members of TVA’s Board of Directors appeared before Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to testify in support of continued appropriations for Tellico. The Subcommittees were apprised of all aspects of Tellico’s status, including the Court of Appeals’ decision. TVA reported that the dam stood “ready for the gates to be closed and the reservoir filled,” Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1978, before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, p. 234 (1977), and requested funds for completion of certain ancillary parts of the project, such as public use areas, roads, and bridges. As to the snail darter itself, TVA commented optimistically on its transplantation efforts, expressing the opinion that the relocated fish were “doing well and ha[d] reproduced.” Id., at 235, 261-262. Both Appropriations Committees subsequently recommended the full amount requested for completion of the Tellico Project. In its June 2, 1977, Report, the House Appropriations Committee stated: “It is the Committee’s view that the Endangered Species Act was not intended to halt projects such as these in their advanced stage of completion, and [the Committee] strongly recommends that these projects not be stopped because of misuse of the Act.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-379, p. 104. (Emphasis added.) As a solution to the problem, the House Committee advised that TVA should cooperate with the Department of the Interior “to relocate the endangered species to another suitable habitat so as to permit the project to proceed as rapidly as possible.” Id., at 11. Toward this end, the Committee recommended a special appropriation of $2 million to facilitate relocation of the snail darter and other endangered species which threatened to delay or stop TVA projects. Much the same occurred on the Senate side, with its Appropriations Committee recommending both the amount requested to complete Tellieo and the special appropriation for transplantation of endangered species. Reporting to the Senate on these measures, the Appropriations Committee took a particularly strong stand on the snail darter issue: “This committee has not viewed the Endangered Species Act as preventing the completion and use of these projects which were well under way at the time the affected species were listed as endangered. If the act' has such an effect, which is contrary to the Committee’s understanding of the intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act, funds should be appropriated to allow these projects to be completed and their benefits realized in the public interest, the Endangered Species Act notwithstanding.” S. Rep. No. 95-301, p. 99 (1977). (Emphasis added.) TVA’s budget, including funds for completion of Tellieo and relocation of the snail darter, passed both Houses of Congress and was signed into law on August 7, 1977. Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Act, 1978, 91 Stat. 797. We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 954 (1977), to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 1 — 1 h-1 We begin with the premise that operation of the Tellieo Dam will either eradicate the known population of snail darters or destroy their critical habitat. Petitioner does not now seriously dispute this fact. In any event, under § 4 (a)(1) of the Act, 87 Stat. 886, 16 U. S. C. § 1533 (a)(1) (1976 ed.), the Secretary of the Interior is vested with exclusive authority to determine whether a species such as the snail darter is “endangered” or “threatened” and to ascertain the factors which have led to such a precarious existence. By § 4 (d) Congress has authorized — indeed commanded — the Secretary to “issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such species.” 16 U. S. C. § 1533 (d) (1976 ed.). As we have seen, the Secretary promulgated regulations which declared the snail darter an endangered species whose critical habitat would be destroyed by creation of the Tellico Reservoir. Doubtless petitioner would prefer not to have these regulations on the books, but there is no suggestion that the Secretary exceeded his authority or abused his discretion in issuing the regulations. Indeed, no judicial review of the Secretary’s determinations has ever been sought and hence the validity of his actions are not open to review in this Court. Starting from the above premise, two questions are presented: (a) would TVA be in violation of the Act if it completed and operated the Tellico Dam as planned? (b) if TVA’s actions would offend the Act, is an injunction the appropriate remedy for the violation? For the reasons stated hereinafter, we hold that both questions must be answered in the affirmative. (A) It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has expended more than $100 million. The paradox is not minimized by the fact that Congress continued to appropriate large sums of public money for the project, even after congressional Appropriations Committees were apprised of its apparent impact upon the survival of the snail darter. We conclude, however, that the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act require precisely that result. One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively command all federal agencies “to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence” of an endangered species or “result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species . . . .” 16 U. S. C. § 1536 (1976 ed.). (Emphasis added.) This language admits of no exception. Nonetheless, petitioner urges, as do the dissenters, that the Act cannot reasonably be interpreted as applying to a federal project which was well under way when Congress passed the Endangered Species Act of 1973. To sustain that position, however, we would be forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain language. It has not been shown, for example, how TVA can close the gates of the Tellico Dam without “carrying out” an action that has been “authorized” and “funded” by a federal agency. Nor can we understand how such action will “insure” that the snail darter’s habitat is not disrupted. Accepting the Secretary’s determinations, as we must, it is clear that TVA’s proposed operation of the dam will have precisely the opposite effect, namely the eradication of an endangered species. Concededly, this view of the Act will produce results requiring the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and of many millions of dollars in public funds. But examination of the language, history, and structure of the legislation under review here indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities. When Congress passed the Act in 1973, it was not legislating on a clean slate. The first major congressional concern for the preservation of the endangered species had come with passage of the Endangered Species Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 926, repealed, 87 Stat. 903. In that legislation Congress gave the Secretary power to identify “the names of the species of native fish and wildlife found to be threatened with extinction,” § 1 (c), 80 Stat. 926, as well as authorization to purchase land for the conservation, protection, restoration, and propagation of “selected species” of “native fish and wildlife” threatened with extinction. §§2(a)-(c), 80 Stat. 926-927. Declaring the preservation of endangered species a national policy, the 1966 Act directed all federal agencies both to protect these species and “insofar as is practicable and consistent with the [ir] primary purposes,” § 1 (b), 80 Stat. 926, “preserve the habitats of such threatened species on lands under their jurisdiction.” Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The 1966 statute was not a sweeping prohibition on the taking of endangered species, however, except on federal lands, § 4 (c), 80 Stat. 928, and even in those federal areas the Secretary was authorized to allow the hunting and fishing of endangered species. § 4 (d) (1), 80 Stat. 928. In 1969 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Conservation Act, 83 Stat. 275, repealed, 87 Stat. 903, which continued the provisions of the 1966 Act while at the same time broadening federal involvement in the preservation of endangered species. Under the 1969 legislation, the Secretary was empowered to list species “threatened with worldwide extinction,” §3 (a), 83 Stat. 275; in addition, the importation of any species so recognized into the United States was prohibited. § 2, 83 Stat. 275. An indirect approach to the taking of endangered species was also adopted in the Conservation Act by way of a ban on the transportation and sale of wildlife taken in violation of any federal, state, or foreign law. §§ 7 (a)-(b), 83 Stat. 279. Despite the fact that the 1966 and 1969 legislation represented “the most comprehensive of its type to be enacted by any nation” up to that time, Congress was soon persuaded that a more expansive approach was needed if the newly declared national policy of preserving endangered species was to be realized. By 1973, when Congress held hearings on what would later become the Endangered Species Act of 1973, it was informed that species were still being lost at the rate of about one per year, 1973 House Hearings 306 (statement of Stephen R. Seater, for Defenders of Wildlife), and “the pace of disappearance of species” appeared to be “accelerating.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 4 (1973). Moreover, Congress was also told that the primary cause of this trend was something other than the normal process of natural selection: “[M]an and his technology has [sic] continued at an ever-increasing rate to disrupt the natural ecosystem. This has resulted in a dramatic rise in the number and severity of the threats faced by the world's wildlife. The truth in this is apparent when one realizes that half of the recorded extinctions of mammals over the past 2,000 years have occurred in the most recent 50-year period.” 1973 House Hearings 202 (statement of Assistant Secretary of the Interior). That Congress did not view these developments lightly was stressed by one commentator: “The dominant theme pervading all Congressional discussion of the proposed [Endangered Species Act of 1973] was the overriding need to devote whatever effort and resources were necessary to avoid further diminution of national and worldwide wildlife resources. Much of the testimony at the hearings and much debate was devoted to the biological problem of extinction. Senators and Congressmen uniformly deplored the irreplaceable loss to aesthetics, science, ecology, and the national heritage should more species disappear.” Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N. D. L. Rev. 315, 321 (1975). (Emphasis added.) The legislative proceedings in 1973 are, in fact, replete with expressions of concern over the risk that might lie in the loss of any endangered species. Typifying these sentiments is the Report of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H. R. 37, a bill which contained the essential features of the subsequently enacted Act of 1973; in explaining the need for the legislation, the Report stated: “As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and animals evolved, and as we increase the pressure for products that they are in a position to supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten their — and our own — genetic heritage. “The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable. “From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations. The reason is simple: they are potential resources. They are keys to puzzles which we cannot solve, and may provide answers to questions which we have not yet learned to ask. “To take a homely, but apt, example: one of the critical chemicals in the regulation of ovulations in humans was- found in a common plant. Once discovered, and analyzed, humans could duplicate it synthetically, but had it never existed — or had it been driven out of existence before we knew its potentialities — we would never have tried to synthesize it in the first place. “Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? . . . Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious. “The institutionalization of that caution lies at the heart of H. R. 37 . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 93-412, pp. (1973). (Emphasis added.) As the examples cited here demonstrate, Congress was concerned about the unknown uses that endangered species might have and about the unforeseeable place such creatures may-have in the chain of life on this planet. In shaping legislation to deal with the problem thus presented, Congress started from the finding that “[t]he two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of natural habitat.” S. Rep. No. 93-307, p. 2 (1973). Of these twin threats, Congress was informed that the greatest was destruction of natural habitats; see 1973 House Hearings 236 (statement of Associate Deputy Chief for National Forest System, Dept, of Agriculture); id., at 241 (statement of Director of Mich. Dept, of Natural Resources); id., at 306 (statement of Stephen R. Seater, Defenders of Wildlife); Lachenmeier, The Endangered Species Act of 1973: Preservation or Pandemonium?, 5 Environ. Law 29, 31 (1974). Witnesses recommended, among other things, that Congress require all land-managing agencies “to avoid damaging critical habitat for endangered species and to take positive steps to improve such habitat.” 1973 House Hearings 241 (statement of Director of Mich. Dept, of Natural Resources). Virtually every bill introduced in Congress during the 1973 session responded to this concern by incorporating language similar, if not identical, to that found in the present § 7 of the Act. These provisions were designed, in the words of an administration witness, “for the first time [to] prohibit [a] federal agency from taking action which does jeopardize the status of endangered species,” Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 before the Subcommittee on Environment of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 68 (1973) (statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior) (emphasis added); furthermore, the proposed bills would “direc [£] all . . .Federal agencies to utilize their authorities for carrying out programs for the protection of endangered animals.” 1973 House Hearings 205 (statement of Assistant Secretary of the Interior).. (Emphasis added.) As it was finally passed, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 represented the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation. Its stated purposes were “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved,” and “to provide a program for the conservation of such . . . species . . . .” 16 U. S. C. § 1531 (b) (1976 ed.). In furtherance of these goals, Congress expressly stated in § 2 (c) that “all. Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species . . . .” 16 U. S. C. § 1531 (c) (1976 ed.). (Emphasis added.) Lest there be any ambiguity as to the meaning of this statutory directive, the Act specifically defined “conserve” as meaning “to use and the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary.” § 1532 (2). (Emphasis added.) Aside from § 7, other provisions indicated the seriousness with which Congress viewed this issue: Virtually all dealings with endangered species, including taking, possession, transportation, and sale, were prohibited, 16 U. S. C. § 1538 (1976 ed.), except in extremely narrow circumstances, see § 1539 (b). The Secretary was also given extensive power to develop regulations and programs for the preservation of endangered and threatened species.' § 1533 (d). Citizen involvement was encouraged by the Act, with provisions allowing interested persons to petition the Secretary to list a species as endangered or threatened, § 1533 (c)(2), see n. 11, supra, and bring civil suits in United States district courts to force compliance with any provision of the Act, §§ 1540 (c) and (g). Section 7 of the Act, which of course is relied upon by respondents in this case, provides a particularly good gauge of congressional intent. As we have seen, this provision had its genesis in the Endangered Species Act of 1966, but that legislation qualified the obligation of federal agencies by stating that they should seek to preserve endangered species only “insofar as is practicable and consistent with the[ir] primary purposes . . . Likewise, every bill introduced in 1973 contained a qualification similar to that found in the earlier statutes. Exemplary of these was the administration bill, H. R. 4758, which in § 2 (b) would direct federal agencies to use their authorities to further the ends of the Act “insofar as is practicable and consistent with the[ir] primary purposes . . . (Emphasis added.) Explaining the idea behind this language, an administration spokesman told Congress that it “would further signal to all . . . agencies of the Government that this is the first priority, consistent with their primary objectives.” 1973 House Hearings 213 (statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior). (Emphasis added.) This type of language did not go unnoticed by those advocating strong endangered species legislation. A representative of the Sierra Club, for example, attacked the use of the phrase “consistent with the primary purpose” in proposed H. R. 4758-, cautioning that the qualification “could be construed to be a declaration of congressional policy that other agency purposes are necessarily more important than protection of endangered species and would always prevail if conflict were to occur.” 1973 House Hearings 335 (statement of the chairman of the Sierra Club’s National Wildlife Committee); see id., at 251 (statement for the National Audubon Society). What is very significant in this sequence is that the final version of the 1973 Act carefully omitted all of the reservations described above. In the bill which the Senate initially approved (S. 1983), however, the version of the current § 7 merely required federal agencies to “carry out such programs as are practicable for the protection of species listed . . . .” S. 1983, §7 (a). (Emphasis added.) By way of contrast, the bill that originally passed the House, H. R. 37, contained a provision which was essentially a mirror image of the subsequently passed § 7 — indeed all phrases which might have qualified an agency’s responsibilities had been omitted from the bill. In explaining the expected impact of this provision in H. R. 37 on federal agencies, the House Committee’s Report states: “This subsection requires the Secretary and the heads of all other Federal departments and agencies to use their authorities in order to carry out programs for the protection. of endangered species, and it further requires that those agencies take the necessary action that will not jeopardize the continuing existence of endangered species or result in the destruction of critical habitat of those species.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 14 (1973). (Emphasis added.) Resolution of this difference in statutory language, as well as other variations between the House and Senate bills, was the task of a Conference Committee. See 119 Cong. Rec. 30174-30175, 31183 (1973). The Conference Report, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-740 (1973), basically adopted the Senate bill, S. 1983; but the conferees rejected the Senate version of § 7 and adopted the stringent, mandatory language in H. R. 37. While the Conference Report made no specific reference to this choice of provisions, the House manager of the bill, Representative Dingell, provided an interpretation of what the Conference bill would require, making it clear that the mandatory provisions of § 7 were not casually or inadvertently included: “[Section 7] substantially amplifie[s] the obligation of [federal agencies] to take steps within their power to carry out the purposes of this act. A recent article . . . illustrates the problem which might occur absent this new language in the bill. It appears that the whooping cranes of this country, perhaps the best known of our endangered species, are being threatened by Air Force bombing activities along the gulf coast of Texas. Under existing law, the Secretary of Defense has some discretion as to whether or not he will take the necessary action to see that this threat disappears .... [0]nce the bill is enacted, [the Secretary of Defense] would be required to take the proper steps. . . . “Another example . . . [has] to do with the continental population of grizzly bears which may or may not be endangered, but which is surely threatened. . . . Once this bill is enacted, the appropriate Secretary, whether of Interior, Agriculture or whatever, will have to take action to see that this situation is not permitted to worsen, and that these bears are not driven to extinction. The purposes of the bill included the conservation of the species and of the ecosystems upon which they depend, and every agency of government is committed to see that those purposes are carried out. . . . [T]he agencies of Government can no longer plead that they can do nothing about it. They can, and they must. The law is clear.” 119 Cong. Rec. 42913 (1973). (Emphasis added.) It is against this legislative background that we must measure TVA’s claim that the Act was not intended to stop operation of a project which, like Tellico Dam, was near completion when an endangered species was discovered in its path. While there is no discussion in the legislative history of precisely this problem, the totality of congressional action makes it abundantly clear that the result we reach today is wholly in accord with both the words of the statute and the intent of Congress. The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute. All persons, including federal agencies, are specifically instructed not to “take” endangered species, meaning that no one is “to harass, harm[] pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” such life forms. 16 U. S. C. §§ 1532 (14), 1538 (a)(1) (B) (1976 ed.). Agencies in particular are directed by §§2 (c) and 3 (2) of the Act to “use ... all methods and procedures which are necessary” to preserve endangered species. 16 IT. S. C. §§ 1531 (c), 1532 (2) (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). In addition, the legislative history undergirding § 7 reveals an explicit congressional decision to require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered species. The pointed omission of the type of qualifying language previously included in endangered species legislation reveals a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the “primary missions” of federal agencies. It is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated. In any event, we discern no hint in the deliberations of Congress relating to the 1973 Act that would compel a different result than we reach here. Indeed, the repeated expressions of congressional concern over what it saw as the potentially enormous danger presented by the eradication of any endangered species suggest how the balance would have been struck had the issue been presented to Congress in 1973. Furthermore, it is clear Congress foresaw that § 7 would, on occasion, require agencies to alter ongoing projects in order to fulfill the goals of the Act. Congressman Dingell’s discussion of Air Force practice bombing, for instance, obviously pinpoints a particular activity- — intimately related to the national defense — -which a major federal department would be obliged to alter in deference to the strictures of § 7. A similar example is provided by the House Committee Report: “Under the authority of [§ 7], the Director of the Park Service would be required to conform the practices of his agency to the need for protecting the rapidly dwindling stock of grizzly bears within Yellowstone Park. These bears, which may be endangered, and are undeniably threatened, should at least be protected by supplying them with carcasses from excess elk within the park, hy curtailing the destruction of habitat by clearcutting National Forests surrounding the Park, and by preventing hunting until their numbers have recovered sufficiently to withstand these pressures.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 14 (1973). (Emphasis added.) One might dispute the applicability of these examples to the Tellico Dam by saying that in this case the burden on the public through the loss of millions of unrecoverable dollars would greatly outweigh the loss of the snail darter. But neither the Endangered Species Act nor Art. Ill of the Constitution provides federal courts with authority to make such fine utilitarian calculations. On the contrary, the plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of endangered species as “incalculable.” Quite obviously, it would be difficult for a court to balance the loss of a sum certain — even $100 million — against a congressionally declared “incalculable” value, even assuming we had the power to engage in such a weighing process, which we emphatically do not. In passing the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Congress was also aware of certain instances in which exceptions to the statute’s broad sweep would be necessary. Thus, § 10, 16 U. S. C. § 1539 (1976 ed.), creates a number of limited “hardship exemptions,” none of which would, even remotely apply to the Tellico Project. In fact, there are no exemptions in the Endangered Species Act for federal agencies, meaning that under the maxim expressio unius est exdusio alterius, we must presume that these were the only “hardship cases” Congress intended to exempt. Cf. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458 (1974). Notwithstanding Congress’ expression of intent in 1973, we are urged to find that the continuing appropriations for Tellico Dam constitute an implied repeal of the 1973 Act, at least insofar as it applies to the Tellico Project. In support of this view, TVA points to the statements found in various House and Senate Appropriations Committees’ Reports; as described in Part I, supra, those Reports generally reflected the attitude of the Committees either that the Act did not apply to Tellico or that the dam should be completed regardless of the provisions of the Act. Since we are unwilling to assume that these latter Committee statements constituted advice to ignore the provisions of a duly enacted law, we assume that these Committees believed that the Act simply was not applicable in this situation. But even under this interpretation of the Committees’ actions, we are unable to conclude that the Act has been in any respect amended or repealed. There is nothing in the appropriations measures, as passed, which states that the Tellico Project was to be completed irrespective of the requirements of the Endangered Species Act. These appropriations, in fact, represented relatively minor components of the lump-sum amounts for the entire TVA budget. To find a repeal of the Endangered Species Act under these circumstances would surely do violence to the “ 'cardinal rule . . . that repeals by implication are not favored.’” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 549 (1974), quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). In Posadas this Court held, in no uncertain terms, that “the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.” Ibid. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 456-457 (1945) (“Only a clear repugnancy between the old . . . and the new [law] results hi the former giving way . . .”); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198-199 (1939) (“[I]ntention of the legislature to repeal 'must be clear and manifest’. . . . '[A] positive repugnancy [between the old and the new laws] ’ ”); Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363 (1842) (“[T]here must be a positive repugnancy , . .”). In practical terms, this “cardinal rule” means that “[i]n the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.” Mancari, supra, at 550. The doctrine disfavoring repeals by implication “applies with full vigor when . . . the subsequent legislation is an appropriations measure.” Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 149 U. S. App. D. C. 380, 382, 463 F. 2d 783, 785 (1971) (emphasis added); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F. 2d 346, 355 (CA8 1972). This is perhaps an understatement since it would be more accurate to say that the policy applies with even greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely on an Appropriations Act. We recognize that both substantive enactments and appropriations measures are “Acts of Congress,” but the latter have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs. When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. Without such an assurance, every appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering substantive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute which might prohibit the expenditure. Not only would this lead to the absurd result of requiring Members to review exhaustively the background of every authorization before voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the very rules the Congress carefully adopted to avoid this need. House Rule XXI (2), for instance, specifically provides: “No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized by law, unless in continuation of appropriations for such public works as are already in progress. Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment thereto changing existing law be in order.” (Emphasis added.) See also Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule 16.4. Thus, to sustain petitioner’s position, we would be obliged to assume that Congress meant to repeal pro tanto § 7 of the Act by means of a procedure expressly prohibited under the rules of Congress. Perhaps mindful of the fact that it is “swimming upstream” against a strong current of well-established precedent, TVA argues for an exception to the rule against implied repealers in a circumstance where, as here, Appropriations Committees have expressly stated their “understanding” that the earlier legislation would not prohibit the proposed expenditure. We cannot accept such a proposition. Expressions of committees dealing with requests for appropriations cannot be equated with statutes enacted by Congress, particularly not in the circumstances presented by this case. First, the Appropriations Committees had no jurisdiction over the subject of endangered species, much less did they conduct the type of extensive hearings which preceded passage of the earlier Endangered Species Acts, especially the 1973 Act. We venture to suggest that the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Senate Committee on Commerce would be somewhat surprised to learn that their careful work on the substantive legislation had been undone by the simple — and brief— insertion of some inconsistent language in Appropriations Committees’ Reports. Second, there is no indication that Congress as a whole was aware of TVA’s position, although the Appropriations Committees apparently agreed with petitioner’s views. Only recently, in SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103 (1978), we declined to presume general congressional acquiescence in a 34-year-old practice of the Securities and Exchange Commission, despite the fact that the Senate Committee having jurisdiction over the Commission’s activities had long expressed approval of the practice. Me. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, observed that we should be “extremely hesitant to presume general congressional awareness of the Commission’s construction based only upon a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative documents.” Id., at 121. A fortiori, we should not assume that petitioner’s views — and the Appropriations Committees’ acceptance of them — were any better known, especially when the TVA is not the agency with primary responsibility for administering the Endangered Species Act. Quite apart from the foregoing factors, we would still be unable to find that in this case “the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable,” Mancari, 417 U. S., at 550; here it is entirely possible “to regard each as effective.” Id., at 551. The starting point in this analysis must be the legislative proceedings leading to the 1977 appropriations since the earlier funding of the dam occurred prior to the listing of the snail darter as an endangered species. In all successive years, TVA confidently reported to the Appropriations Committees that efforts tO' transplant the snail darter appeared to be successful; this surely gave those Committees some basis for the impression that there was no direct conflict between the Tellico Project and the Endangered Species Act. Indeed, the special appropriation for 1978 of $2 million for transplantation of endangered species supports the view that the Committees saw such relocation as the means whereby collision between Tellico and the Endangered Species Act could be avoided. It should also be noted that the Reports issued by the Senate and House Appropriations Committees in 1976 came within a month of the District Court’s decision in this case, which hardly could have given the Members cause for concern over the possible applicability of the Act. This leaves only the 1978 appropriations, the Reports for which issued after the Court of Appeals’ decision now before us. At that point very little remained to be accomplished on the project; the Committees understandably advised TYA to cooperate with the Department of the Interior “to relocate the endangered species to another suitable habitat so as to permit the project to proceed as rapidly as possible.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-379, p. 11 (1977). It is true that the Committees repeated their earlier expressed “view” that the Act did not prevent completion of the Tellico Project. Considering these statements in context, however, it is evident that' they “ ‘represent only the personal views of these legislators,’ ” and “however explicit, [they] cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed before the Act’s passage.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 132 (1974). (B) Having determined that there is an irreconcilable conflict between operation of the Tellico Dam and the explicit provisions of § 7 of the Endangered Species Act, we must now consider what remedy, if any, is appropriate. It is correct,.of course, that a federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law. This Court made plain in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944), that “[a] grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances.” As a general matter it may be said that “[s]ince all or almost all equitable remedies are discretionary, the balancing of equities and hardships is appropriate in almost any case as a guide to the chancellor’s discretion.” D. Dobbs, Remedies 52 (1973). Thus, in Hecht Co. the Court refused to grant an injunction when it appeared from the District Court findings that' “the issuance of an injunction would have bio effect by way of insuring better compliance in the future’ and would [have been] 'unjust’ to [the] petitioner and not 'in the public interest.’ ” 321 U. S., at 326. But these principles take a court only so far. Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While “'[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is equally — and emphatically — the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought. Here we are urged to view the Endangered Species Act “reasonably,” and hence shape a remedy “that accords with some modicum of common sense and the public weal.” Post, at 196. But is that our function? We have no expert knowledge on the subject of endangered species, much less do we have a mandate from the people to strike a balance of equities on the side of the Tellico Dam. Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby adopting a policy which it described as “institutionalized caution.” Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto. The lines ascribed to Sir Thomas More by Robert Bolt are not without relevance here: “The law, Roper, the law. I know what’s legal, not what’s right. And I’ll stick to what’s legal. . . . I’m not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain-sailing, I can’t navigate, I’m no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I’m a forester. . . . What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? . . . And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you — where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being fiat? . . . This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast — Man’s laws, not God’s — and if you cut them down . . . d’you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow them? ... Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.” R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I, p. 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967). We agree with the Court of Appeals that in our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with “common sense and the public weal.” Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches. Affirmed. This description is taken from the opinion of the District Judge in the first litigation involving the Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 808 (ED Tenn. 1972). In his opinion, “all of these benefits of the present Little Tennessee River Valley will be destroyed by impoundment of the river Ibid. The District Judge noted that “[t]he free-flowing river is the likely habitat of one or more of. seven rare or endangered fish species.” Ibid. See Brief for the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians as Amicus Curiae 2. See also Mooney, Myths of the Cherokee, 19 Bureau of American Ethnology Ann. Rep. 11 (1900); H. Timberlake, Memoirs, 1756-.1765 (Watauga Press 1927); A. Brewer & C. Brewer, Valley So Wild: A Folk History (East Tenn. Historical Soc. 1975). Public Works Appropriation Act, 1967, 80 Stat. 1002, 1014. Tellico Dam itself will contain no electric generators; however, an interreservoir canal connecting Tellico Reservoir with a nearby hydroelectric plant will augment the latter’s capacity. The NEPA injunction was in effect some 21 months; when it was entered TVA had spent some $29 million on the project. Most of these funds have gone to purchase land, construct the concrete portions of the dam, and build a four-lane steel-span bridge to carry a state highway over the proposed reservoir. 339 F. Supp., at 808. The snail darter was scientifically described by Dr. Etnier in the Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington, Vol. 88, No. 44, pp. 469-488 (Jan. 22, 1976). The scientific merit and content of Dr. Etnier’s paper on the snail darter were cheeked by a panel from the Smithsonian Institution prior to publication. See App. 111. In Tennessee alone there are 85 to 90 species of darters, id., at 131, of which upward to 45 live in the Tennessee River system. Id., at 130. New species of darters are being constantly discovered and classified — at the rate of about one per year. Id., at 131. This is a difficult task for even trained ichthyologists since species of darters are often hard to differentiate from one another. Ibid. An “endangered species” is defined by the Act to mean “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.” 16 U. S. C. § 1532 (4) (1976 ed.). “ ‘The act covers every animal and plant species, subspecies, and population in the world needing protection. There are approximately 1.4 million full species of animals and 600,000 full species of plants in the world. Various authorities calculate as many as 10% of them — some 200,000 — may need to be listed as Endangered or Threatened. When one counts in subspecies, not to mention individual populations, the total could increase to three to five times that number.1 ” Keith Shreiner, Associate Director and Endangered Species Program Manager of the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, quoted in a letter from A. J. Wagner, Chairman, TVA, to Chairman, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, dated Apr. 25, 1977, quoted in Wood, On Protecting an Endangered Statute: The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 37 Federal B. J. 25, 27 (1978). The Act does not define “critical habitat,” but the Secretary of the Interior has administratively construed the term: “ ‘Critical habitat’ means any air, land, or water area (exclusive of those existing man-made structures or settlements which are not necessary to the survival and recovery of a listed species) and constituent elements thereof, the loss of which would appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a listed species or a distinct segment of its population. The constituent elements of critical habitat include, but are not limited to: physical structures and topography, biota, climate, human activity, and the quality and chemical content of land, water, and air. Critical habitat may represent any portion of the present habitat of a listed species and may include additional areas for reasonable population expansion.” 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978) (to be codified as 50 CFR § 402.02). Respondents are a regional association of biological scientists, a Tennessee conservation group, and individuals who are citizens or users of the Little Tennessee Valley area which would be affected by the Tellico Project. The Act authorizes “interested person [s]” to petition the Secretary of the Interior to list a species as endangered. 16 U. S. C. § 1533 (c) (2) (1976 ed.); see 5 U. S. C. § 553 (e) (1976 ed.). Searches by TVA in more than 60 watercourses have failed to find other populations of snail darters. App. 36, 410-412. The Secretary has noted that “more than 1,000 collections in recent years and additional earlier collections from central and east Tennessee have not revealed the presence of the snail darter outside the Little Tennessee River.” 40 Fed. Reg. 47505 (1975). It is estimated, however, that the snail darter’s range once extended throughout the upper main Tennessee River and the lower portions of its major tributaries above Chattanooga — all of which are now the sites of dam impoundments. See Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1978, before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, pp. 240-241 (1977) (statement of witness for TVA) ; Hearings on Endangered Species Act Oversight, before the Subcommittee on Resource Protection of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 291 (1977); App. 139. The Fish and Wildlife Service and Dr. Etnier have stated that it may take from 5 to 15 years for scientists to determine whether the snail darter can successfully survive and reproduce in this new environment. See General Accounting Office, The Tennessee Valley Authority’s Tellico Dam Project — Costs, Alternatives, and Benefits 4 (Oct. 14, 1977). In expressing doubt over the long-term future of the Hiwassee transplant, the Secretary noted: “That the snail darter does not already inhabit the Hiwassee River, despite the fact that the fish has had access to it in the past, is a strong indication that there may be biological and other factors in this river that negate a successful transplant.” 40 Fed. Reg. 47506 (1975). TVA projects generally are authorized by the Authority itself and are funded — without the need for specific congressional authorization — from lump-sum appropriations provided in yearly budget grants. See 16 U. S. C. §§ 831c (j) and 831z (1976 ed.). Section 11 (g) allows “any person” to commence a civil action in a United States District Court to, inter alia, “enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any provision” of the Act “or regulation issued under the authority thereof The District Court made the following findings with respect to the dam’s effect on the ecology of the snail darter: “The evidence introduced at trial showed that the snail darter requires for its survival a clear, gravel substrate, in a large-to-medium, flowing river. The snail darter has a fairly high requirement for oxygen and since it tends to exist in the bottom of the river, the flowing water provides the necessary oxygen at greater depths. Reservoirs, unlike flowing rivers, tend to have a low oxygen content at greater depths. “Reservoirs also tend to have more silt on the bottom than flowing rivers, and this factor, combined with the lower oxygen content, would make it highly probable that snail darter eggs would smother in such an environment. Furthermore, the adult snail darters would probably find this type of reservoir environment unsuitable for spawning. “Another factor that would tend to make a reservoir habitat unsuitable for snail darters is that their primary source of food, snails, probably would not survive in such an environment.” 419 F. Supp. 753, 756 (ED Tenn. 1976). The District Court findings are to the same effect and are unchallenged here. In dissent, Mr. Justice Powell argues that the meaning of “actions” in § 7 is “far from ‘plain/ ” and that “it seems evident that the ‘actions’ referred to are not all actions that an agency can ever take, but rather actions that the agency is deciding whether to authorize, to fund, or to carry out.” Post, at 205. Aside from this bare assertion, however, no explanation is given to support the proffered interpretation. This recalls Lewis Carroll’s classic advice on the construction of language: “ ‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what / choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’ ” Through the Looking Glass, in The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll 196 (1939). Aside from being unexplicated, the dissent’s reading of § 7 is flawed on several counts. First, under its view, the words “or carry out” in § 7 would be superfluous since all prospective actions of an agency remain to be “authorized” or “funded.” Second, the dissent’s position logically means that an agency would be obligated to comply with § 7 only when a project is in the planning stage. But if Congress had meant to so limit the Act, it surely would have used words to that effect, as it did in the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 4332 (2) (A), (C). The District Court determined that failure to complete the Tellico Dam would result in the loss of some $53 million in nonrecoverable obligations; see supra, at 166. Respondents dispute this figure, and point to a recent study by the General Accounting Office, which suggests that the figure could be considerably less. See GAO Study, n. 13, supra, at 5-14; see also Cook, Cook, & Gove, The Snail Darter & the Dam, 51 National Parks & Conservation Magazine 10 (1977); Conservation Foundation Letter 1-2 (Apr. 1978). The GAO study also concludes that TVA and Congress should explore alternatives to impoundment of the reservoir, such as the creation of a regional development program based on a free-flowing river. None of these considerations are relevant to our decision, however; they are properly addressed to the Executive and Congress. Prior federal involvement with endangered species had been quite limited. For example, the Lacey Act of 1900, 31 Stat. 187, partially codified in 16 U. S. C. §§ 667e and 701 (1976 ed.), and the Black Bass Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 576, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §851 et seq. (1976 ed.), prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of fish or wildlife taken in violation of national, state, or foreign law. The effect of both of these statutes was constrained, however, by the fact that prior to passage of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, there were few laws regulating these creatures. See Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N. D. L. Rev. 315, 317-318 (1975). The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, passed in 1918, 40 Stat. 755, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §703 et seq. (1976 ed.), was more extensive, giving the Secretary of the Interior power to adopt regulations for the protection of migratory birds. Other measures concentrated on establishing refuges for wildlife. See, e. g., Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 78 Stat. 897, 16 IJ. S. C. §4601-4 et seq. (1976 ed.). See generally Environmental Law Institute, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (1977). This approach to the problem of taking, of course, contained the same inherent limitations as the Lacey and Black Bass Acts, discussed, n. 20, supra. Hearings on Endangered Species before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 202 (1973) (statement of Assistant Secretary of the Interior) (hereinafter cited as 1973 House Hearings). See, e. g., 1973 House Hearings 280 (statement of Rep. Roe); id., at 281 (statement of Rep. Whitehurst); id., at 301 (statement of Friends of the Earth); id., at 306-307 (statement of Defenders of Wildlife). One statement, made by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, particularly deserves notice: “I have watched in my lifetime a vast array of mollusks in southern streams totally disappear as a result of damming, channelization, and pollution. It is often asked of me, ‘what is the importance of the mollusks for example in Alabama.’ I do not know, and I do not know whether any of us will ever have the insight to know exactly why these moEusks evolved over millions of years or what their importance is in the total ecosystem. However, I have great trouble being party to their destruction without ever having gained such knowledge.” Id., at 207. One member of the mollusk family existing in these southern rivers is the snail, see 12 Encyclopedia Britannica 326 (15th ed. 1974), which ironically enough provides the principal food for snail darters. See supra, at 162, 165-166, n. 16. For provisions in the House bills, see § 5 (d) of H. R. 37, 470, 471, 1511, 2669, 3696, and 3795; §3 (d) of H. R. 1461 and 4755; § 5 (d) of H. R. 2735; §3 (d) of H. R. 4758. For provisions in the Senate bills, see § 3 (d) of S. 1592; § 5 (d) of S. 1983. The House bills are collected in 1973 House Hearings 87-185; the Senate bills are found in the Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 before the Subcommittee on Environment of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 3-49 (1973). A further indication of the comprehensive scope of the 1973 Act lies in Congress’ inclusion of “threatened species” as a class deserving federal protection. Threatened species are defined as those which are “likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of [their] range.” 16 U. S. C. § 1532 (15) (1976 ed.). For provisions in the House bills, see §§ 2 (e) and 5 (d) of H. R. 37, 470," 471, 1511, 2669, 3310, 3696, and 3795; §3 (d) of H. R. 1461 and 4755; § 5 (d) of H. R. 2735; § 2 (b) of H. R. 4758; one other House bill, H. R. 2169, imposed no requirements on federal agencies. For provisions in the Senate bills, see §2 (b) of S. 1592; §§2 (b), and 5 (d) of S. 1983. We note, however, that in the version of S. 1983 which was sent to the floor of the Senate by the Senate Committee on Commerce, the qualifying language “wherever practicable” had been omitted from one part of the bill, that being §2 (b). See 119 Cong. Rec. 25663 (1973). Section 2 (b) was the portion of S. 1983 that stated the “purposes and policy” of Congress. But the Committee’s version of S. 1983 — which was reported to the full Senate — retained the limitation on § 7 that we note here. 119 Cong. Rec. 25664 (1973). See id., at 30157-30162. When confronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its meaning. Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1949), and cases, cited therein. Here it is not necessary to look beyond the words of the statute. We have undertaken such an analysis only to meet Mr. Justice Powell’s suggestion that the “absurd” result reached in this case, post, at 196, is not in accord with congressional intent. We do not understand how TVA intends to operate Tellico Dam without “harming” the snail darter. The Secretary of the Interior has defined the term “harm” to mean “an act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering; significant environmental modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning of ‘harm.’ ” 50 CFR § 17.3 (1976) (emphasis added); see S. Rep. No. Ó3-307, p. 7 (1973). The only portion of the legislative history which petitioner cites as being favorable to its position consists of certain statements made by Senator Tunney on the floor of the Senate during debates on S. 1983; see 119 Cong. Rec. 25691-25692 (1973). Senator Tunney was asked whether the proposed bill would affect the Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to build a road through a particular area of Kentucky. Responding, to this question, Senator Tunney opined that § 7 of S. 1983 would require consultation among the agencies involved, but that the Corps of Engineers “would not be prohibited from building such a road if they deemed it necessary to do so.” 119 Cong. Rec. 25689 (1973). Petitioner interprets these remarks to mean that an agency, after balancing the respective interests involved, could decide to take action which would extirparte an endangered species. If that is what Senator Tunney meant, his views are in distinct contrast to every other expression in the legislative history as to the meaning of § 7. For example, when the Kentucky example was brought up in the Senate hearings, an administration spokesman interpreted an analogous provision in S. 1592 as “prohibit[ing] [a] federal agency from taking action which does jeopardize the status of endangered species.” Supra, at 179. Moreover, we note that the version of S. 1983 being discussed by Senator Tunney contained the “as practicable” limitation in § 7 (a) which we have previously mentioned. See supra, at 182. Senator Tunney’s remarles perhaps explain why the Conference Committee subsequently deleted all such qualifying expressions. We construe the Senator’s remarks as simply meaning that under the 1973 Act the agency responsible for the project would have the “final decision,” 119 Cong. Rec. 256.90 (1973), as to whether the action should proceed, notwithstanding contrary advice from the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary’s recourse would be to either appeal to higher authority in the administration, or proceed to federal court under the relevant provisions of the Act; citizens may likewise seek enforcement under 16 U. S. C. § 1540 (g) (1976 ed.), as has been done in this case. Mr. Justice Powell characterizes the result reached here as giving “retroactive” effect to the Endangered Species Act of 1973. We cannot accept that contention. Our holding merely gives effect to the plain words of the statute, namely, that § 7 affects all projects which remain to be authorized, funded, or carried out. Indeed, under the Act there could be no “retroactive” application since, by definition, any prior action of a federal agency which would have come under the scope of the Act must have already resulted in the destruction of an endangered species or its critical habitat. In that circumstance the species would have already been extirpated or its habitat destroyed; the Act would then have no subject matter to which it might apply. Mr. Justice Powell’s dissent places great reliance on Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892), post, at 204, to support his view of the 1973 Act’s legislative history. This Court, however, later explained Holy Trinity as applying only in “rare and exceptional circumstances. . . . And there must be something to make plain the intent of Congress that the letter of the statute is not to prevail.” Crooks v. Harrélson, 282 U. S. 55, 60 (1930). As we have seen from our explication of the structure and history of the 1973 Act,, there is nothing to support the assertion that the literal meaning of § 7 should not apply in this case. Mr. Justice Powell’s dissent relies On cases decided under the National Environmental Policy Act to support its position that the 1973 Act should only apply to prospective actions of an agency. Post, at 205-206. The NEPA decisions, however, are completely inapposite. First, the two statutes serve different purposes. NEPA essentially imposes a procedural requirement on agencies, requiring them to engage in an extensive inquiry as to the effect of federal actions on the environment; by way of contrast, the 1973 Act is substantive in effect, designed to prevent the loss of any endangered species, regardless of the cost. Thus, it would make sense to hold NEPA inapplicable at some point in the life of a project, because the agency would no longer have a meaningful opportunity to weigh the benefits of the project versus the detrimental effects on the environment. Section 7, on the other hand, compels agencies not only to consider the effect of their projects on endangered species, but to take such actions as are necessary to insure that species are not extirpated as a result of federal activities. Second, even the NEPA cases have generally required agencies to file environmental impact statements when the remaining governmental action would be environmentally “significant.” See, e. g., Environmental Defense Fund v. TV A, 468 F. 2d 1164, 1177 (CA6 1972). Under §7, the loss of any endangered species has been determined by Congress to be environmentally “significant.” See supra, at 177-179. The Appropriations Acts did not themselves identify the projects for which the sums had been appropriated; identification of these projects requires reference to the legislative history. See n. 14, supra. Thus, unless a Member scrutinized in detail the Committee proceedings concerning the appropriations, he would have no knowledge of the possible conflict between the continued funding and the Endangered Species Act.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. OREGON et al. No. 367. Argued March 2-3, 1955. Decided June 6, 1955. Willard W. Gatchell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Rankin, Oscar H. Davis, William H. Veeder, John C. Mason and Louis C. Kaplan. Arthur G. Higgs, Assistant Attorney General of Oregon, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, and E. G. Foxley, Deputy Attorney General. Rollin E. Bowles argued the cause for the Oregon Division of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc., as amicus curiae, supporting respondents. With him on the brief was L. C. Binjord. Motions to appear as amici curiae and adopt the brief of respondents were filed by the States of Indiana, by Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General; Louisiana, by Fred S. LeBlanc, Attorney General; Michigan, by Thomas M. Kavanagh, Attorney General, Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General, and Daniel J. O’Hara, Assistant Attorney General; Minnesota, by Miles Lord, Attorney General, and Perry G. Voidness, Special Assistant Attorney General; Montana, by Arnold H. Olsen, Attorney General, and Charles W. Leaphart, Assistant Attorney General; Nebraska, by Clarence S. Beck, Attorney General, and Robert V. Hoagland, Assistant Attorney General; Nevada, by Harvey Dickerson, Attorney General, and W. T. Mathews, Special Assistant Attorney General; North Dakota, by Leslie R. Bur gum, Attorney General; Pennsylvania, by Herbert B. Cohen, Attorney General, and Lois G. Forer, Deputy Attorney General; Texas, by John Ben Shepperd, Attorney General; Utah, by E. R. Callister, Attorney General, and Robert B. Porter, Assistant Attorney General; and Washington, by Don Eastvold, Attorney General, and Joseph T. Mijich and Richard F. Broz, Assistant Attorneys General. Me. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. As in First Iowa Coop. v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152, this case illustrates the integration of the federal and state jurisdictions in licensing water power projects under the Federal Power Act. In the First Iowa case we sustained the authority of the Commission to license a power project to use navigable waters of the United States located in Iowa. Here, without finding that the waters are navigable, the Commission has issued a comparable license for a power project to use waters on lands constituting reservations of the United States located in Oregon. The State of Oregon questions the authority of the Commission to do this and the adequacy of the provisions approved by the Commission for the conservation of anadromous fish. For the reasons hereafter stated, we sustain the Commission. In 1949, the Northwest Power Supply Company of Portland, Oregon, applied to the Federal Power Commission for a license to construct, operate and maintain a hydroelectric plant, constituting Pelton Project No. 2030, on reserved lands of the United States on the Deschutes River in Oregon, and, in 1951, the Portland General Electric Company of Portland, Oregon, succeeded to a supplementary application for that license. The Pelton Project is designed to include a concrete dam 205 feet high and a powerhouse containing three 36,000-kilowatt generators. It is to be built across the Deschutes River on reserved lands of the United States located below the junction of its Metolius and Crooked River tributaries. The western terminus of the dam is to occupy lands, within the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, which have been reserved by the United States for power purposes since 1910 and 1913. The eastern terminus of the dam is to be on lands of the United States which, at least since 1909, have been withdrawn from entry under the public land laws and reserved for power purposes. The project calls for no permanent diversion of water as the entire flow of the river will run through or over the dam into the natural bed of the stream. This dam will make available the head and volume of water required for the project and the water impounded by it will create a narrow reservoir, submerging lands the title to which is or will be in the United States. Variations and interruptions in the flow of the stream, caused by temporary storage or use of water for power purposes, are to be controlled by a “reregulating dam” approved by the Commission and located on private property, to be acquired, about three miles below the power dam. No objection is made to the reregulating dam. To the extent that access to existing spawning grounds for anadromous fish is cut off by the power dam, other facilities on private property, to be acquired, are to be constructed and maintained on terms approved by the Commission and designed to develop an equal or greater fish population. Opportunities for recreational uses of the area are to be enhanced and no issue as to water pollution is before us. The State of Oregon, the Fish Commission of Oregon, the Oregon State Game Commission and the Oregon Division of the Izaak Walton League intervened before the Commission and each filed objections to the granting of the license. Some of their objections related to the authority of the Commission to grant the license and others to the suitability of the proposed fish conservation facilities. Following extended hearings, the Commission’s presiding examiner recommended the license. After exceptions to that recommendation the Commission issued its opinion and an order granting the license. 10 F. P. C. 445, 450, 92 P. U. R. (N. S.) 247. The Commission found that a public need exists for the early completion of the project to meet a severe power shortage in the Pacific Northwest. It found also that the project is in the public interest, will provide for comprehensive development of the affected stretch of the Deschutes River, and will be consistent with further comprehensive development of that stream and of the Columbia Basin. It held that the improvements will contribute valuable public benefits which will not be available if the river is maintained in its present natural condition. The Commission stated that the project will be subject to all existing rights to the use of the waters of the river, whether perfected or not. It prescribed temporary measures to be taken to meet the needs of the anadromous fish during the construction of the project and approved certain permanent facilities, practices and expenditures in relation to such fish. The opinion stated “that no substantial evidence has been brought forward to show that the facilities proposed for conserving the fish will not maintain existing runs. Moreover, there are indications that the runs can be increased.” 10 F. P. C., at 450, 92 P. U. R. (N. S.), at 252. A rehearing being denied, the State and its agencies sought a review by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Portland General Electric Company intervened. That court, with one judge dissenting, set aside the Commission’s order. 211 F. 2d 347. It recognized the necessity of a license from the Federal Power Commission but held that Congress, by its public lands legislation, long ago had transferred to the State of Oregon such control over the use of nonnavigable waters that the sponsor of the Pelton Project must secure also the permission prescribed by the State. We granted certio-rari because of the public significance of the issues but denied leave to the Portland General Electric Company to intervene here. 348 U. S. 868. 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (1); 49 Stat. 860-861, 16 U. S. C. § 825l (b). Several States filed briefs as amici curiae, usually adopting as their own the brief filed by respondents. We divide our consideration of the issues into three parts. I. Applicability op the Federal Power Act. On its face, the Federal Power Act applies to this license as specifically as it did to the license in the First Iowa case. There the jurisdiction of the Commission turned almost entirely upon the navigability of the waters of the United States to which the license applied. Here the jurisdiction turns upon the ownership or control by the United States of the reserved lands on which the licensed project is to be located. The authority to issue licenses in relation to navigable waters of the United States springs from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The authority to do so in relation to public lands and reservations of the United States springs from the Property Clause — “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .” Art. IV, § 3. In the instant case the project is to occupy lands which come within the term “reservations,” as distinguished from “public lands.” In the Federal Power Act, each has its established meaning. “Public lands” are lands subject to private appropriation and disposal under public land laws. “Reservations” are not so subject. The title to the lands upon which the eastern terminus of the dam is to rest has been in the United States since the cession by Great Britain of the area now comprising the State of Oregon. Even if formerly they may have been open to private appropriation as “public lands,” they were withdrawn from such availability before any vested interests conflicting with the Pelton Project were acquired. Title to the bed of the Deschutes River is also in the United States. Since the Indian Treaty of 1855, the lands within the Indian reservation, upon which the western end of the dam will rest, have been reserved for the use of the Indians. More recently they were reserved for power purposes and the Indians have given their consent to the project before us. Accordingly, there is no issue here as to whether or not the title to the tribal lands is in the United States. There thus remains no question as to the constitutional and statutory authority of the Federal Power Commission to grant a valid license for a power project on reserved lands of the United States, provided that, as required by the Act, the use of the water does not conflict with vested rights of others. To allow Oregon to veto such use, by requiring the State’s additional permission, would result in the very duplication of regulatory control precluded by the First Iowa decision. 328 U. S. 152, 177-179. No such duplication of authority is called for by the Act. The Court of Appeals in the instant case agrees. 211 F. 2d, at 351. And see Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Commission, 207 F. 2d 391, 395-396. Authorization of this project, therefore, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, unless that jurisdiction is modified by other federal legislation. See United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 703; Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land Co., 188 U. S. 545, 554. II. Inapplicability of the Desert Land Act of 1877 and Related Acts. The State of Oregon argues that the Acts of July 26, 1866, July 9, 1870, and the Desert Land Act of 1877 constitute an express congressional delegation or conveyance to the State of the power to regulate the use of these waters. The argument is that these Acts preclude or restrict the scope of the jurisdiction, otherwise apparent on the face of the Federal Power Act, and require the consent of the State to a project such as the one before us. The nature and effect of these Acts have been discussed previously by this Court. The purpose of the Acts of 1866 and 1870 was governmental recognition and sanction of possessory rights on public lands asserted under local laws and customs. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453. The Desert Land Act severed, for purposes of private acquisition, soil and water rights on public lands, and provided that such water rights were to be acquired in the manner provided by the law of the State of location. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142. See also, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 611-616. It is not necessary for us, in the instant case, to pass upon the question whether this legislation constitutes the express delegation or conveyance of power that is claimed by the State, because these Acts are not applicable to the reserved lands and waters here involved. The Desert Land Act covers “sources of water supply upon the public lands . . . .” The lands before us in this case are not “public lands” but “reservations.” Even without that express restriction of the Desert Land Act to sources of water supply on public lands, these Acts would not apply to reserved lands. “It is a familiar principle of public land law that statutes providing generally for disposal of the public domain are inapplicable to lands which are not unqualifiedly subject to sale and disposition because they have been appropriated to some other purpose.” United States v. O’Donnell, 303 U. S. 501, 510. See also, United States v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181, 206. The instant lands certainly “are not unqualifiedly subject to sale and disposition . . . .” Accordingly, it is enough, for the instant case, to recognize that these Acts do not apply to this license, which relates only to the use of waters on reservations of the United States. III. Application op the Federal Power Act to This Project. Finally, respondents question the discretion used by the Commission in granting the license. They point to the consequences which the project will have beyond the limits of the reserved lands on which it will be located. The first consequence is the inevitable variation in, or the temporary interruption of, the flow of the stream. The Commission is satisfied that it has overcome this objection by its provision for a reregulating dam. It has approved the technical features involved and the site for that dam will be acquired in accordance with the property laws of Oregon. In this reregulation of the flow of the stream, the Commission acts on behalf of the people of Oregon, as well as all others, in seeing to it that the interests of all concerned are adequately protected. There remains the effect of the project upon anadro-mous fish which use these waters as spawning grounds. All agree that the 205-foot dam will cut off access of some fish to their natural spawning grounds above the dam and that such interruption cannot be overcome by fish ladders. However, the State does not flatly prohibit the construction of dams that cut off anadromous fish from their spawning or breeding grounds. One alternative, thus recognized, is the supplying of new breeding pools to which the fish can be removed at appropriate times. The Fish Commission of Oregon has denied a permit to the Portland General Electric Company to carry out its present proposal but there appears to be no disagreement as to the underlying principle involved. hereby authorized to grant such permit in its discretion, upon the condition that the person so applying for such permit shall convey to the state of Oregon a site of the size and dimensions satisfactory to the commission, at such place as may be selected by the commission, and erect thereon a hatchery and hatchery residence, according to plans and specifications to be furnished by the commission, and enter into an agreement with the commission, secured by a good and sufficient bond, to furnish all water and’ light, without expense, to operate said proposed hatchery; and no permit for the construction of any such dam shall be given by the commission until the person applying for such permit shall have actually conveyed said land to the state and erected said hatchery and hatchery residence in accordance with the said plans and specifications. . . .” (Italics supplied.) Ore. Comp. Laws, 1940, § 83-316. The applicant has agreed to provide facilities for conserving the runs of anadromous fish in accordance with plans approved by the Federal Power Commission. The capital cost of these facilities and of the reregulating dam, to be borne by the applicant, is estimated at $4,430,000. The total annual cost due to these facilities is estimated at $795,000. The Commission has found each of these estimates to be reasonable. Of the $795,000 annual cost, the applicant will bear $410,000 (cost of borrowed money, depreciation and taxes on the capital investment), and the $10,000 maintenance cost of the reregulating dam. In addition, it has offered to contribute $100,000 annually toward the estimated $375,000 cost of operation and maintenance of the fish conservation facilities, and the Commission has retained the power to fix the amount of the applicant’s contribution if a sum is not agreed upon. The care given to the preparation of this conservation program and the large investment to be made in it are impressive. It also is of interest that the Fish Commission of Oregon already is operating somewhat comparable but smaller facilities of this kind on the Metolius River. One argument against the project goes beyond the need to conserve the existing fish population. It is argued that the project will preclude the carrying out of certain plans for the Columbia River Basin which contemplate greatly enlarging the fish population in the Deschutes River area, by concentrating there other runs of fish not now using that river. While such an argument may properly be directed to the Federal Power Commission or to Congress, it is not one for us to answer upon the basis of existing legal rights. We conclude, therefore, that, on the facts here presented, the Federal Power Act is applicable in accordance with its terms, and that the Federal Power Commission has acted within its powers and its discretion in granting the license now before us. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is Reversed. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. §§ 791a-825r. Fish ascending rivers from the sea for breeding purposes. In this instance, especially salmon and steelhead trout. For an outline of the general problem presented, see Schwartz, Federalism and Anadromous Fish, 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 535. In 1924, the Columbia Valley Power Company, Inc., had applied to the Federal Power Commission for a license to develop Pelton Project No. 57 at substantially the same site. That license was issued but, due to the licensee’s failure to proceed with construction as required by the Commission, it was canceled in 1936. The Deschutes River is entirely within the State of Oregon. It drains the eastern slope of the Cascade Range and flows northward, across the lands of the United States here involved, to the Columbia River, which it meets about 15 miles above The Dalles. The Commission has made no findings as to its navigability or as to the relation between its flow and the navigability of other streams. Throughout its lower 130 miles, which include the project site, it flows in a narrow canyon with an average fall of 17.6 feet per mile and, apparently, it is generally recognized as incapable of sustaining navigation. Accordingly, throughout this litigation, the river has been treated by all concerned as not constituting “navigable waters” of the United States as defined in § 3 (8) of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. § 796 (8). We do not pass either upon that question or upon the relationship to interstate commerce of the proposed use of the waters of the river. The Warm Springs Indian Reservation was established by the Treaty of June 25, 1855, with the Indians in Middle Oregon. Ratified by the Senate March 8, 1859, and proclaimed by the President April 18, 1859, it secured to the Indians “the exclusive right of taking fish in the streams running through and bordering said reservation . . . .” 12 Stat. 963, 964. Oregon has recognized that it is bound by this Treaty. Anthony v. Veatch, 189 Ore. 462, 483-485, 220 P. 2d 493, 502-503. See also, United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371. Indian Power Site Reserve No. 2 was created November 1, 1910, and Indian Power Site Reserve No. 294 was created October 8, 1913, both by the Secretary of the Interior under an Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 855, 858. Power Site Reserve No. 66 was created December 30, 1909, by the Secretary of the Interior and made permanent by an Executive Order of July 2, 1910, under an Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 847. In addition, a reservation occurred in connection with the application made to the Federal Power Commission, in 1924, for a license for Pelton Project No. 57. Comparable withdrawals were made in 1949 and 1951 in connection with the present application. See § 24 of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1075-1076, and amendments, 16 U. S. C. § 818. “(44) Under present circumstances and conditions, and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter provided in the license, the project is best adapted to a comprehensive plan for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, for the conservation and preservation of the fish and wildlife resources, and for other beneficial public uses including recreational purposes. “(45) The Portland General Electric Co. is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Oregon and has submitted satisfactory evidence of compliance with the requirements of all applicable state laws insofar as necessary to effect the purposes of a license for the project.” 10 F. P. C., at 456. And see §§ 9 (b) and 10 (a) of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 802 (b), and 49 Stat. 842, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (a). “Sec. 4. The Commission is hereby authorized and empowered— “(e) To issue licenses ... to any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or any State thereof ... for the purpose of constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits, reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines, or other project works necessary or convenient for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or upon any part of the public lands and reservations of the United States . . . : Provided, That licenses shall be issued within any reservation only after a finding by the Commission that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired, and shall be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of the department under whose supervision such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the adequate protection and utilization of such reservation: .... “Sec. 23. . . . “(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, State, or municipality, for the purpose of developing electric power, to construct, operate, or maintain any dam, water conduit, reservoir, power house, or other works incidental thereto across, along, or in any of the navigable waters of the United States, or upon any part of the public lands or reservations of the United States (including the Territories), or utilize the surplus water or water power from any Government dam, except under and in accordance with the terms of a permit or valid existing right-of-way granted prior to June 10, 1920, or a license granted pursuant to this Act. Any person, association, corporation, State, or municipality intending to construct a dam or other project works across, along, over, or in any stream or part thereof, other than those defined herein as navigable waters, and over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States shall before such construction file declaration of such intention with the Commission, whereupon the Commission shall cause immediate investigation of such proposed construction to be made, and if upon investigation it shall find that the interests of interstate or foreign commerce would be affected by such proposed construction, such person, association, corporation, State, or municipality shall not construct, maintain, or operate such dam or other project works until it shall have applied for and shall have received a license under the provisions of this Act. If the Commission shall not so find, and if no public lands or reservations are affected, permission is hereby granted to construct such dam or other project works in such stream upon compliance with State laws.” (Italics supplied except for the initial word of the proviso.) 49 Stat. 839, 840, 846, 16 U. S. C. §§ 797 (e), 817. In what is somewhat of a companion case to the one before us, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized that, despite contentions as to state control of the use of water and the conservancy of fish within the Columbia River Basin, the Federal Power Commission has the authority to make effective a license and to provide facilities for anadromous fish much as is here proposed, when the waters involved are navigable waters of the United States. Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Commission, 207 F. 2d 391. We denied certiorari April 5, 1954. 347 U. S. 936. "Sec. 3. The words defined in this section shall have the following meanings for purposes of this Act, to wit: “(1) 'public lands’ means such lands and interest in lands owned by the United States as are subject to private appropriation and disposal under public land laws. It shall not include ‘reservations’, as hereinafter defined; “(2) ‘reservations’ means national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands and interests in lands owned by the United States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws; also lands and interests in lands acquired and held for any public purposes; but shall not include national monuments or national parks; . . . .” 49 Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. § 796 (1) and (2). See note 6, supra. See United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 75. See note 5, supra. See Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U. S. 86, 103-104; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386. “Sec. 27. That nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.” 41 Stat. 1077, 16 U. S. C. § 821. “To require the petitioner to secure the actual grant to it of a state permit ... as a condition precedent to securing a federal license for the same project under the Federal Power Act would vest in the Executive Council of Iowa a veto power over the federal project. Such a veto power easily could destroy the effectiveness of the Federal Act. It would subordinate to the control of the State the ‘comprehensive’ planning which the Act provides shall depend upon the judgment of the Federal Power Commission or other representatives of the Federal Government. “In the Federal Power Act there is a separation of those subjects which remain under the jurisdiction of the States from those subjects which the Constitution delegates to the United States and over which Congress vests the Federal Power Commission with authority to act. To the extent of this separation, the Act establishes a dual system of control. The duality of control consists merely of the division of the common enterprise between two cooperating agencies of government, each with final authority in its own jurisdiction. The duality does not require two agencies to share in the final decision of the same issue. Where the Federal Government supersedes the state government there is no suggestion that the two agencies both shall have final authority. . . . “The Act leaves to the States their traditional jurisdiction subject to the admittedly superior right of the Federal Government, through Congress, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, administer the public lands and reservations of the United States and, in certain cases, exercise authority under the treaties of the United States.” First Iowa Coop. v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152, 164, 167-168, 171. “Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same; and the right of way for the construction of ditches and canals for the purposes aforesaid is hereby acknowledged and confirmed: Provided, however, That whenever, after the passage of this act, any person or persons shall, in the construction of any ditch or canal, injure or damage the possession of any settler on the public domain, the party committing such injury or damage shall be liable to the party injured for such injury or damage.” (Italics supplied except for the initial words of the enacting clause and the proviso.) 14 Stat. 253, see 43 U. S. C. § 661. “Sec. 17. . . . all patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water rights, as may have been acquired under or recognized by the ninth section of the act [14 Stat. 253, supra] of which this act is amenda-tory. . . .” (Italics supplied.) 16 Stat. 218, see 43 U. S. C. § 661. “. . . it shall be lawful for any citizen of the United States, or any person of requisite age ‘who may be entitled to become a citizen, and who has filed his declaration to become such’ and upon payment of twenty five cents per acre — to file a declaration under oath with the register and the receiver of the land district in which any desert land is situated, that he intends to reclaim a tract of desert land not exceeding one section, by conducting water upon the same, within the period of three years thereafter, Provided however that the right to the use of water by the person so conducting the same, on or to any tract of desert land of six hundred and forty acres shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation: and such right shall not exceed the amount of water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for the purpose of irrigation and reclamation: and all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all, lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights. Said declaration shall describe particularly said section of land if surveyed, and, if unsur-veyed, shall describe the same as nearly as possible without a survey. At any time within the period of three years after filing said declaration, upon making satisfactory proof to the register and receiver of the reclamation of said tract of land in the manner aforesaid, and upon the payment to the receiver of the additional sum of one dollar per acre for a tract of land not exceeding six hundred and forty acres to any one person, a patent for the same shall be issued to him. Provided, that no person shall be permitted to enter more than one tract of land and not to exceed six hundred and forty acres which shall be in compact form.” (Italics supplied except for the initial words of the provisos.) 19 Stat. 377, 43 U. S. C. § 321. While the final approval of the engineering requirements of this feature rests with the Commission, there is no reason why the Commission and the State of Oregon, which also desires appropriate reregulation of the flow of the stream, should not seek a mutually satisfactory solution. In fact, the applicant for the federal license did submit its proposals for reregulation to the state authorities. The Oregon Fish Commission made a rough estimate of the annual runs of spring chinook and salmon passing the Pelton site, en route upstream, at 2,500 and of summer steelhead trout at 5,000. On the basis of this escapement past the project, the Fish Commission estimated the annual value of the Deschutes salmon and steel-head fishery attributable to the river above the Pelton site to be $177,375. 10 F. P. G, at 449, 92 P. U. R. (N. S.), at 252. “. . .In the event that any person desires to construct a dam in any of the streams of this state to a height that will make a fish ladder or fishway thereover impracticable, in the opinion of the [Fish] commission, then such person may make an application to the commission for a permit to construct such dam, and the commission is The Federal Power Commission here found that: “(29) There is nothing novel, unusual or out of the ordinary with respect to the fishery conservation facilities proposed by applicant. “(30) The applicant proposes to operate or arrange for the operation of the fish conservation facilities in accordance with approved methods. “(31) Construction, or operation and maintenance of the Pelton project will not be detrimental to the fishery resources below the reregulating dam. “(32) There is no substantial evidence in the record to show that the fishery facilities proposed by the applicant in accordance with the plans prepared by the Fish Commission of Oregon will not maintain existing runs, and there is a possibility that the run can be increased.” 10 F. P. C., at 455. In addition to its application to the Federal Power Commission, the Portland General Electric Company also sought approval of the Pelton Project by the Oregon Hydroelectric Commission. While we hold that such approval is not necessary, there is no reason why the company should not thus seek state as well as federal approval of the project. In its application for the Federal Power Commission license, the company referred to these simultaneous state proceedings, which did not reach a conclusion until shortly before the granting of the federal license. The license from the Hydroelectric Commission was denied because of the applicant's failure to secure the permit from the Fish Commission of Oregon which it had sought. The pertinent Oregon provisions are as follows: “From and after the taking effect of this act, no water-power project involving the use of the waters of any of the lakes, rivers, streams or other bodies of water within the state of Oregon, including waters over which this state has concurrent jurisdiction, for the generation of electricity, shall be begun or constructed except in conformity with the provisions hereof. “The [Oregon Hydroelectric] commission shall have power: . . . . “(b) To issue licenses, as hereinafter provided, to citizens of the United States, associations of citizens, private corporations organized under the laws of the United States or any state thereof, to appropriate, initiate, perfect, acquire and' hold the right to the use of the waters within the state, including the waters over which the state has concurrent jurisdiction, and to construct, operate and maintain dams, reservoirs, power houses, conduits, transmission lines, and all other works and structures necessary or convenient for the use of such waters in the generation and utilization of electricity.” Ore. Comp. Laws, 1940, §§ 119-103,119-106. See also, “The provisions of this act shall not apply to any waterpower project or development constructed by the government of the United States.” Id., § 119-101.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CLARK, FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, SEATTLE, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al. v. MARTINEZ No. 03-878. Argued October 13, 2004 Decided January 12, 2005 Scaua, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 387. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquiéjt, C. J., joined as to Part I-A, post, p. 388. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners in No. 03-878 and respondent in No. 03-7434. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Clement, former Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Patricia A. Millett, and Donald E. Keener. Christine Stebbins Dahl, by appointment of the Court, 541 U. S. 986, argued. the cause for respondent in No. 03-878. With her on the brief was Stephen R. Sady. John S. Mills, by appointment of the Court, 541 U. S. 1084, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 03-7434. With him on the briefs were Tracy S. Carlin and Rebecca B. Creed Together with No. 03-7434, Benitez v. Rozos, Field Office Director, Miami, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 03-7484 were filed for the American Bar Association by Dennis W. Archer, John J. Gibbons, Lawrence S. Lustberg, Jonathan L. Hafetz, and Philip G. Gallagher; for the American Civil Liberties Union by Judy Rabinovitz, Lucas Guttentag, Steven R. Shapiro, Paul A Engelmayer, and David Sapir Lesser; for the American Immigration Law Foundation Legal Action Center et al. by George E. Quillin, G. Michael Halfenger, and Michael D. Lejfel; for the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center et al. by Stephen F. Hanlon; for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights et al. by Steven E. Fineman, Bill Lann Lee, and Deborah Pearlstein; for Legal and Service Organizations by Joseph F. Tringali; for the North Carolina Justice and Community Development Center by James E. Coleman, Jr.; and for Regina Germain et al. by David J. Bodney. Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 03-7434 and reversal in No. 03-878. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 03-878 were filed for the Cuban American Bar Association et al. by Catherine E. Stetson^ William H. Johnson, and Gilbert Paul Carrasco; for National Refugee Resettlement and Advocacy Organizations by Peter M. Friedman; for Religious Organizations by Isabelle M. Carrillo; and for Stuart E. Eizenstat et al. by David H. Remes. Jonathan J. Ross and Melford O. Cleveland filed a brief for Law Professors as amici curiae in No. 03-7434. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. An alien arriving in the United States must be inspected by an immigration official, 66 Stat. 198, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1225(a)(3), and, unless he is found “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” must generally undergo removal proceedings to determine admissibility, § 1225(b) (2)(A). Meanwhile the alien may be detained, subject to the Secretary’s discretionary authority to parole him into the country. See § 1182(d)(5); 8 CFR § 212.5 (2004). If, at the conclusion of removal proceedings, the alien is determined to be inadmissible and ordered removed, the law provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days,” 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). These cases concern the Secretary’s authority to continue to detain an inadmissible alien subject to a removal order after the 90-day removal period has elapsed. I Sergio Suarez Martinez, (respondent in No. 03-878) and Daniel Benitez (petitioner in No. 03-7434) arrived in the United States from Cuba in June 1980 as part of the Mariel boatlift, see Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F. 2d 100, 101 (CA4 1982) (describing circumstances of Mariel boatlift), and were paroled into the country pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority under 8 U. S. C. § 1182(d)(5). See Pet. for Cert, in No. 03-878, p. 7; Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F. 3d 1289, 1290 (CA11 2003). Until 1996, federal law permitted Cubans who were paroled into the United States to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent resident after one year. See Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, 80 Stat. 1161, as amended, notes following 8 U. S. C. § 1255. Neither Martinez nor Benitez qualified for this adjustment, however, because, by the time they applied, both men had become inadmissible because of prior criminal convictions in the United States. When Martinez sought adjustment in 1991, he had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in Rhode Island and burglary in California, Pet. for Cert. in No. 03-878, at 7; when Benitez sought adjustment in 1985, he had been convicted of grand theft in Florida, 337 F. 3d, at 1290. Both men were convicted of additional felonies after their adjustment applications were denied: Martinez of petty theft with a prior conviction (1996), assault with a deadly weapon (1998), and attempted oral copulation by force (1999), see Pet. for Cert, in No. 03-878, at 7-8; Benitez of two counts of armed robbery, armed burglary of a conveyance, armed burglary of a structure, aggravated battery, carrying a concealed firearm, unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense, and unlawful possession, sale, or delivery of a firearm with an altered serial number (1993), see 337 F. 3d, at 1290-1291. The Attorney General revoked Martinez’s parole in December 2000. Martinez was taken into custody by the INS, and removal proceedings were commenced against him. Pet. for Cert, in No. 03-878, at 8. An Immigration Judge found him inadmissible by reason of his prior convictions, § 1182(a)(2)(B), and lack of sufficient documentation, § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), and ordered him removed to Cuba. Martinez did not appeal. Pet. for Cert, in No. 03-878, at 8. The INS continued to detain him after expiration of the 90-day removal period, and he remained in custody until he was released pursuant to the District Court order that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals’ decision on review here. Id., at 9. Benitez’s parole was revoked in 1993 (shortly after he was imprisoned for his convictions of that year), and the INS immediately initiated removal proceedings against him. In December 1994, an Immigration Judge determined Beni-tez to be excludable and ordered him deported under §§ 1182(a)(2)(B) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). 337 F. 3d, at 1291. Benitez did not seek further review. At the completion of his state prison term, the INS took him into custody for removal, and he continued in custody after expiration of the 90-day removal period. Ibid. In September 2003, Benitez received notification that he was eligible for parole, contingent on his completion of a drug-abuse treatment program. Letter from Paul D. Clement, Acting Solicitor General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of Court, 1 (Nov. 3, 2004). Benitez completed the program while his case was pending before this Court, and shortly after completion was paroled for a period ,of one year. Ibid. On October 15, 2004, two days after argument in this Court, Benitez was released from custody to sponsoring family members. Id., at 2. Both aliens filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2241 to challenge their detention beyond the 90-day removal period. In Martinez’s case, the District Court for the District of Oregon accepted that removal was not reasonably foreseeable, and ordered the INS to release Martinez under conditions that the INS believed appropriate. Martinez v. Smith, No. CV 02-972-PA (Oct. 30, 2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 03-878, p. 2a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed, citing its decision in Xi v. INS, 298 F. 3d 832 (2002). Martinez v. Ashcroft, No. 03-35053 (Aug. 18, 2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 03-878, at la. In Benitez’s case, the District Court for the Northern District of Florida also concluded that removal would not occur in the “foreseeable future,” but nonetheless denied the petition. Benitez v. Wallis, Case No. 5:02cv19 MMP (July 11, 2002), pp. 2, 4, App. in No. 03-7434, pp. 45, 48. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the dissent in Xi. 337 F. 3d 1289 (2003). We granted certiorari in both cases. Benitez v. Mata, 540 U. S. 1147 (2004); Crawford v. Martinez, 540 U. S. 1217 (2004). II Title 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(6) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has beén determined by the [Secretary] to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).” By its terms, this provision applies to three categories of aliens: (1) those ordered removed who are inadmissible under § 1182, (2) those ordered removed who are removable under § 1227(a)(1)(C), § 1227(a)(2), or § 1227(a)(4), and (3) those'ordered removed whom the Secretary determines to be either a risk to the community or a flight risk. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001), the Court interpreted this provision to authorize the Attorney General (now the Secretary) to detain aliens in the second category only as long as “reasonably necessary” to remove them from the country. Id., at 689, 699. . The statute’s use of “may,” the Court said, “suggests discretion,” but “not necessarily . . . unlimited discretion. In that respect the word 'may’ is ambiguous.” Id., at 697. In light of that perceived ambiguity and the “serious constitutional threat” the Court believed to be posed by indefinite detention of aliens who had been admitted to the country, id., at 699, the Court interpreted the statute to permit only detention that is related to the statute’s “basic purpose [of] effectuating an alien’s removal,” id., at 696-699. “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized.” Id., at 699. The Court further held that the presumptive period during which the detention of an alien is reasonably necessary to effectuate his removal is six months; after that, the alien is eligible for conditional release if he can demonstrate that there is “no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id., at 701. The question presented by these cases, and the question that evoked contradictory answers from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, is whether this construction of § 1231(a)(6) that we applied to the second category of aliens covered by the statute applies as well to the first — that is, to the category of aliens “ordered removed who [are] inadmissible under [§]1182.” We think the answer must be yes. The operative language of § 1231(a)(6), “may be detained beyond the removal period,” applies without differentiation to all three categories of aliens that are its subject. To give these same words a different meaning for each category would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one. As the Court in Zadvydas recognized, the statute can be construed “literally” to authorize indefinite detention, id., at 689, or (as the Court ultimately held) it can be read to “suggest [less than] unlimited discretion” to detain, id., at 697. It cannot, however, be interpreted to do both at the same time. The dissent’s belief that Zadvydas compels this result rests primarily on that case’s statement that “[a]liens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different question,” id., at 682. See post, at 390, 393 (opinion of Thomas, J.). This mistakes the reservation of a question with its answer. Neither the opinion of the Court nor the dissent in Zadvydas so much as hints that the Court adopted the novel interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) proposed by today’s dissent. The opinion in that case considered whether § 1231(a)(6) permitted the Government to detain removable aliens indefinitely; relying on ambiguities in the statutory text and the canon that statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional doubts, the opinion held that it did not. Despite the dissent’s repeated claims that § 1231(a)(6) could not be given a different reading for inadmissible aliens, see Zadvydas, supra, at 710, 716-717 (opinion of Kennedy, J.), the Court refused to decide that question— the question we answer today. It is indeed different from the question decided in Zadvydas, but because the statutory text provides for no distinction between admitted and nonad-mitted aliens, we find that it results in the same answer. The dissent’s contention that our reading of Zadvydas is “implausible,” post, at 389, is hard to reconcile with the fact that it is the identical reading espoused by the Zadvydas dissenters, who included the author of today’s dissent. Worse still, what the Zadvydas dissent did find “not . . . plausible” was precisely the reading adopted by today’s dissent: “[T]he majority’s logic might be that inadmissible and removable aliens can be treated differently. Yet it is not a plausible construction of § 1231(a)(6) to imply a time limit as to one class but not to another. The text does not admit of this possibility. As a result, it is difficult to see why ‘[a]liens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different question.’” 533 U. S., at 710-711 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). The Zadvydas dissent later concluded that the release of “Mariel Cubans and other illegal, inadmissible aliens . . . would seem a necessary consequence of the majority’s construction of the statute.” Id., at 717 (emphasis added). Tellingly, the Zadvydas majority did not negate either charge. The Government, joined by the dissent, argues that the statutory purpose and the constitutional concerns that influenced our statutory construction in Zadvydas are not present for aliens, such as Martinez and Benitez, who have not been ¿dmitted to the United States. Be that as it may, it cannot justify giving the same detention provision a different meaning when such aliens are involved. It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by one of the statute’s applications, even though other of the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the same limitation. The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern. See, e. g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, ante, at 11-12, n. 8 (explaining that, if a statute has criminal applications, “the rule of lenity applies" to the Court’s interpretation of the statute even in immigration cases “[bjecause we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context”); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U. S. 505, 517-518, and n. 10 (1992) (plurality opinion) (employing the rule of lenity to interpret “a tax statute ... in a civil setting” because the statute “has criminal applications”); id., at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (also invoking the rule of lenity). In other words, when deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail — whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the Court. The dissent takes issue with this maxim of statutory construction on the ground that it allows litigants to “attack, statutes as constitutionally invalid based on constitutional doubts concerning other litigants or factual circumstances” and thereby to effect an “end run around black-letter constitutional doctrine governing facial and as-applied constitutional challenges.” Post, at 396. This accusation misconceives — and fundamentally so — the role played by the canon of constitutional avoidance in statutory interpretation. The canon is not a method of adjudicating constitutional questions by other means. See, e. g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 502 (1979) (refusing to engage in extended analysis in the process of applying the avoidance canon “as we would were we considering the constitutional issue”); see also Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L. J. 1945, 1960-1961 (1997) (providing examples of cases where the Court construed a statute narrowly to avoid a constitutional question ultimately resolved in favor of the broader reading). Indeed, one of the canon’s chief justifications is that it allows courts to avoid the decision of constitutional questions. It is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 191 (1991); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). The canon is thus a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it. And when a litigant invokes the canon of avoidance, he is not attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of others, as the dissent believes; he seeks to vindicate his own statutory rights. We find little to recommend the novel interpretive approach advocated by the dissent, which would render every statute a chameleon, its meaning subject to change depending on the presence or absence of constitutional concerns in each individual case. Cf. Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545, 556 (2002) (rejecting “a dynamic view of statutory interpretation, under which the text might mean one thing when enacted yet another if the prevailing view of the Constitution later changed”). In support of its contention that we can give § 1231(a)(6) a different meaning when it is applied to nonadmitted aliens, the Government relies most prominently upon our decision in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). Brief for Petitioners in No. 03-878, p. 29; Brief for Respondent in No. 03-7434, p. 29. That case involved a statutory provision that gave the Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission “Tull power and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect of’ ” claims under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 285 U. S., at 62. The question presented was whether this provision precluded review of the Deputy Commissioner’s determination that the claimant was an employee, and hence covered by the Act. The Court held that, although the statute could be read to bar judicial review altogether, it was also susceptible of a narrower reading that permitted judicial review of the fact of employment, which was an “essential condition precedent to the right to make the claim.” Ibid. The Court adopted the latter construction in order to avoid serious constitutional questions that it believed would be raised by total preclusion of judicial review. Ibid. This holding does not produce a statute that bears two different meanings, depending on the presence or absence of a constitutional question. Always, and as applied to all claimants, it permits judicial review of the employment finding. What corresponds to Crowell v. Benson’s holding that the fact of employment is judicially reviewable is Zadvydas’s holding that detention cannot be continued once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable — and like the one, the other applies in all cases. The dissent, on the other hand, relies on our recent cases interpreting 28 U. S. C. § 1367(d). Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533 (2002), held that this provision does not include, in its tolling of limitations periods, claims against States that have not waived their immunity from suit in federal court because the statutory language fails to make “ ‘ “unmistakably clear,” ’ ” as it must in provisions subjecting States to suit, that such States were covered. Id., at 543-546. A subsequent decision, Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U. S. 456 (2003), held that the tolling provision does apply to claims against political subdivisions of States, since the requirement of the unmistakably clear statement did not apply to those entities. Id., at 466. This progression of decisions does not remotely establish that § 1367(d) has two different meanings, equivalent to the unlimited-detention/ limited-detention meanings of § 1231(a)(6) urged upon us here. They hold that the single and unchanging disposition of § 1367(d) (the tolling of limitations periods) does not apply to claims against States that have not consented to be sued in federal court. We also reject the Government’s argument that, under Zadvydas, § 1231(a)(6) “authorizes detention until it approaches constitutional limits.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 03-878, at 27-28; Brief for Respondent in No. 03-7434, at 27-28. The Government provides no citation to support that description of the case — and none exists. Zadvydas did not hold that the statute authorizes detention until it approaches constitutional limits; it held that, since interpreting the statute to authorize indefinite detention (one plausible reading) would approach constitutional limits, the statute should be read (in line with the other plausible reading) to authorize detention only for a period consistent with the purpose of effectuating removal. 533 U. S., at 697-699. If we were, as the Government seems to believe, free to “interpret” statutes as becoming inoperative when they “approach constitutional limits,” we would be able to spare ourselves the necessity of ever finding a statute unconstitutional as applied. And the doctrine that statutes should be construed to contain substantive dispositions that do not raise constitutional difficulty would be a thing of the past; no need for such caution, since — whatever the substantive dispositions are— they become inoperative when constitutional limits are “approached.” That is not the legal world we live in. The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing between them. See, e. g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 237-238 (1998); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909). In Zadvydas, it was the statute’s text read in light of its purpose, not some implicit statutory command to avoid approaching constitutional limits, which produced the rule that the Secretary may detain aliens only for the period reasonably necessary to bring about their removal. See 533 U. S., at 697-699. In passing in its briefs, but more intensively at oral argument, the Government sought to justify its continued detention of these aliens on the authority of § 1182(d)(5)(A). Even assuming that an alien who is subject to a final order of removal is an “alien applying for admission” and therefore eligible for parole under this provision, we find nothing in this text that affirmatively authorizes detention, much less indefinite detention. To the contrary, it provides that, when parole is revoked, “the alien shall ... be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The manner in which the case of any other applicant would be “dealt with” beyond the 90-day removal period is prescribed by § 1231(a)(6), which we interpreted in Zadvydas and have interpreted above. * * * The Government fears that the security of our borders will be compromised if it must release into the country inadmissible aliens who cannot be removed. If that is so, Congress can attend to it. But for this Court to sanction indefinite detention in the face of Zadvydas would establish within our jurisprudence, beyond the power of Congress to remedy, the dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases. Since the Government has suggested no reason why the period of time reasonably necessary to effect removal is longer for an inadmissible alien, the 6-month presumptive detention period we prescribed in Zadvydas applies. See 533 U. S., at 699-701. Both Martinez and Benitez were detained well beyond six months after their removal orders became final. The Government having brought forward nothing to indicate that a substantial likelihood of removal subsists despite the passage of six months (indeed, it concedes that it is no longer even involved in repatriation negotiations with Cuba); and the District Court in each case having determined that removal to Cuba is not reasonably foreseeable; the petitions for habeas corpus should have been granted. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, and remand both cases for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The authorities described herein as having been exercised by the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) now reside in the Secretary of Homeland Security (hereinafter Secretary) and divisions of his Department (Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, §§ 441(2), 442(a)(3), 451(b), 116 Stat. 2192, 2193, 2196, 6 U. S. C. §§ 251(2), 252(a)(3), 271(b) (2000 ed., Supp. II). Before the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, aliens ineligible to enter the country were denominated “excludable” and ordered “deported.” 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a), 1251(a)(1)(A) (1994 ed.); see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U. S. 21, 25-26 (1982).. Post-IIRIRA, such aliens are said to be “inadmissible” and held to be “removable.” 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a), 1229a(e)(2) (2000 ed.). Despite Benitez’s release on a 1-year parole, this case continues to present a live case or controversy. If Benitez is correct, as his suit contends, that the Government lacks the authority to continue to detain him, he would have to be released, and could not be taken back into custody unless he violated the conditions of release (in which case detention would be authorized by § 1253), or his detention became necessary to effectuate his removal (in which case detention would once again be authorized by § 1231(a)(6)). His current release, however, is not only limited to one year, but subject to the Secretary’s discretionary authority to terminate. See 8 CFR § 212.12(h) (2004) (preserving discretion to revoke parole). Thus, Benitez “continuéis] to have a personal stake in the.outcome” of his petition. Lewis v. Continental Bank. Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477-478 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissent is quite wrong in saying, post, at 390, that the Zadvydas Court’s belief that § 1231(a)(6) did not apply to all aliens is evidenced by its statement that it did not “consider terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention,” 533 U. S., at 696. The Court’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) did not affect the detention of alien terrorists for the simple reason that sustained detention of alien terrorists is a “special arrangement” authorized by a different statutory provision, 8 U. S. C. § 1537(b)(2)(C). See Zadvydas, supra, at 697. Contrary to the dissent’s contentions, post, at 394, our decision in Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52 (1997), is perfectly consistent with this principle of construction. In Salinas, the Court rejected the petitioner’s invocation of the avoidance canon because the text of the statute was “unambiguous on the point under consideration.” Id., at 60. For this reason, the Court squarely addressed and rejected any argument that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the petitioner. Id., at 61 (holding that, under the construction adopted by the Court, “the statute is constitutional as applied in this case”). The dissent concedes this is so but argues, post, at 393-394, that, because the Court reached this conclusion “only after analyzing whether the constitutional doubts at issue in Raygor applied to the county defendant” in Jinks, post, at 394, we must engage in the same quasi-constitutional analysis here before applying the construction adopted in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001), to the aliens in these cases. This overlooks a critical distinction between the question before the Court in Jinks and the one before us today. In Jinks, the county could not claim the aid of Raygor itself because Raygor held only that § 1367(d) did not include suits against nonconsenting States; instead, the county argued by analogy to Raygor that, absent a clear statement of congressional intent, § 1367(d) should be construed not to include suits against political subdivisions of States. And thus the Court in Jinks considered not whether Raygor’s interpretation of § 1367(d) was directly controlling but whether the constitutional concerns that justified the requirement of a clear statement in Raygor applied as well in the case of counties. In the present cases, by contrast, the aliens ask simply that the interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) announced in Zadvydas be applied to them. This question does not compel us to compare analogous constitutional doubts; it simply requires that we determine whether the statute construed by Zadvydas permits any distinction to be drawn between aliens who have been admitted and aliens who have not. Section 1182(d)(5)(A) reads as follows: “The [Secretary] may ... in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the [Secretary], have been ■ served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” That Congress has the capacity to do so is demonstrated by its reaction to our decision in Zadvydas. Less than four months after the release of our opinion, Congress enacted a statute which expressly authorized continued detention, for a period of six months beyond the removal period (and renewable indefinitely), of any alien (1) whose removal is not reasonably foreseeable and (2) who presents a national security threat or has been involved in terrorist activities. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), § 412(a), 115 Stat. 350 (enacted Oct. 26, 2001) (codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1226a(a)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. II)).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. HENRY BROCH & CO. No. 61. Argued January 14, 18, 1960. Decided June 6, 1960. Daniel M. Friedma/n argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Daniel J. McCauley, Jr. and Alan B. Hobbes. Frederick M. Rowe argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Joseph DuCoeur and Harold Orlinsky. Henry J. Bison, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for the National Association of Retail Grocers of the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. ■ Section 2 (c) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, makes it unlawful for “any person” to make an allowance in lieu of “brokerage” to the “other party to such transaction.” The question is whether that prohibition is applicable to the following transactions by respondent. Respondent is a broker or sales representative for a number of principals who sell food products. One of the principals is Canada Foods Ltd., a processor of apple concentrate and other products. Respondent agreed to act for the Canada Foods for a 5% commission. Other brokers working for the same principal were promised a 4% commission. Respondent’s commission was higher because it stocked merchandise in advance of sales. Canada Foods established a price for its 1954 pack of apple concentrate at $1.30 per gallon in 50-gallon drums and authorized its brokers to negotiate sales at that price. The J. M. Smucker Co., a buyer, negotiated with another broker, Phipps, also working for Canada Foods, for apple concentrate. Smucker wanted a lower price than $1.30 but Canada Foods would not agree. Smucker finally offered $1.25 for a 500-gallon purchase. That was turned down by Canada Foods, acting through Phipps. Canada Foods took the position that the only way the price could be lowered would be through reduction in brokerage. About the same time respondent was negotiating with Smucker. Canada Foods told respondent what it had told Phipps, that the price to the buyer could be reduced only if the brokerage were cut; and it added that it would make the sale at $1.25 — the buyer’s bid — if respondent would agree to reduce its brokerage from 5% to 3%. Respondent agreed and the sale was consummated at that price and for that brokerage. The reduced price of $1.25 was thereafter granted Smucker on subsequent sales. But on sales to all other customers, whether through respondent or other brokers, the price continued to be $1.30 and in each instance respondent received the full 5% commission. Only on sales through respondent to Smucker were the selling price and the brokerage reduced. The customary brokerage fee of 5% to respondent would have been $2,036.84. The actual brokerage of 3% received by respondent was $1,222.11. The reduction of brokerage was $814.73 which is 50% of the total price reduction of $1,629.47 granted by Canada Foods to Smucker. The Commission charged respondent with violating § 2 (c) of the Act, and after a hearing and the making of findings entered a cease-and-desist order against respondent. The Court of Appeals, while not questioning the findings of fact of the Commission, reversed. 261 F. 2d 725. The case is here on writ of certiorari, 360 U. S. 908. The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power. A lengthy investigation revealed that large chain buyers were obtaining competitive advantages in several ways other than direct price concessions and were thus avoiding the impact of the Clayton Act. One of the favorite means of obtaining an indirect price concession was by setting up “dummy” brokers who were employed by the buyer and who, in many cases, rendered no services. The large buyers demanded that the seller pay “brokerage” to these fictitious brokers who then turned it over to their employer. This practice was one of the chief targets of § 2 (c) of the Act. But it was not the only means by which the brokerage function was abused and Congress in its wisdom phrased § 2 (c) broadly, not only to cover the other methods then in existence but all other means by which brokerage could be used to effect price discrimination. The particular evil at which § 2 (c) is aimed can be as easily perpetrated by a seller’s broker as by the seller himself. The seller and his broker can of course agree on any brokerage fee that they wish. Yet when they agree upon one, only to reduce it when necessary to meet the demands of a favored buyer, they use the reduction in brokerage to undermine the policy of § 2 (c). The seller’s broker is clearly “any person” as the words are used in § 2 (c) — as clearly such as a buyer’s broker. It is urged that the seller is free to pass on to the buyer in the form of a price reduction any differential between his ordinary brokerage expense and the brokerage commission which he pays on a particular sale because § 2 (a) of the Act permits price differentials based on savings in selling costs resulting from differing methods of distribution. From this premise it is reasoned that a seller’s broker should not be held to have violated § 2 (c) for having done that which is permitted under § 2 (a). We need not decide the validity of that premise, because the fact that a transaction may not violate one section of the Act does not answer the question whether another section has been violated. Section 2 (c), with which we are here concerned, is independent of § 2 (a) and was enacted by Congress because § 2 (a) was not considered adequate to deal with abuses of the brokerage function. Before the Act was passed the large buyers, who maintained their own elaborate purchasing departments and therefore did not need the services of a seller’s broker because they bought their merchandise directly from the seller, demanded and received allowances reflecting these savings in the cost of distribution. In many cases they required that "brokerage” be paid to their own purchasing agents. After the Act was passed they discarded the fagade of “brokerage” and merely received a price reduction equivalent to the seller’s ordinary brokerage expenses in sales to other customers. When haled before the Commission, they protested that the transaction was not.covered by § 2 (c) but, since it was a price reduction, was governed by §2 (a). They also argued that because no brokerage services were needed or used in sales to them, they were entitled to a price differential reflecting this cost saving. Congress had anticipated such a contention by the “in lieu thereof” provision. Accordingly, the Commission and the courts early rejected the contention that such a price reduction was lawful because the buyer’s purchasing organization had saved the seller the amount of his ordinary brokerage expense. In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 106 F. 2d 667 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1939), a buyer sought to evade § 2 (c) by accepting price reductions equivalent to the seller’s normal brokerage payments. The court upheld the Commission’s view that the price reduction was an allowance in lieu of brokerage under § 2 (c) and was prohibited even though, in fact, the seller had “saved” his brokerage expense by dealing directly with the select buyer. The buyer also sought to justify its price reduction on the ground that it had rendered valuable services to the seller. The court rejected this argument also. Although that court’s interpretation of the “services rendered” exception in § 2 (c) has been criticized/ its conclusion that the price reduction was an allowance in lieu of brokerage within the meaning of § 2 (c) has been followed and accepted. We are asked to distinguish these precedents on the ground that there is no claim by the present buyer that the price reduction, concededly based in part on a saving to the seller of part of his regular brokerage cost on the particular sale, was justified by the elimination of services normally performed by the seller or his broker. There is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the seller or to the respondent nor that anything in its method of dealing justified its getting a discriminatory price by means of a reduced brokerage charge. We would have quite a different case if there were such evidence and we need not explore the applicability of § 2 (c) to such circumstances. One thing is clear — the absence of such evidence and the absence of a claim that the rendition of services or savings in distribution costs justified the allowance does not support the view that § 2 (c) has not been violated. The fact that the buyer was not aware that its favored price was based in part on a discriminatory reduction in respondent’s brokerage commission is immaterial. The Act is aimed at price discrimination, not conspiracy. The buyer’s intent might be relevant were he charged with receiving an allowance in violation of § 2 (c). But certainly it has no bearing on whether the respondent has violated the law. The powerful buyer who demands a price concession is concerned only with getting it. He does not care whether it comes from the seller, the seller’s broker, or both. Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act to prevent sellers and sellers’ brokers from yielding to the economic pressures of a large buying organization by granting unfair preferences in connection with the sale of.goods. The form in which the buyer pressure is exerted is immaterial and proof of its existence is not required. It is rare that the motive in yielding to a buyer’s demands is not the “necessity” for making the sale. An “independent” broker is not likely to be independent of the buyer’s coercive .bargaining power. He, like the seller, is constrained to favor the buyers with the most purchasing power. If respondent merely paid over part of his commission to the buyer, he clearly would have violated the Act. We see no distinction of substance between the two transactions. In each case the seller and his broker make a concession to the buyer as a consequence of his economic power. In both cases the result is that the buyer has received a discriminatory price. In both cases the seller’s broker reduces his usual brokerage fee to get a particular contract. There is no difference in economic effect between the seller’s broker splitting his brokerage commission with the buyer and his yielding part of the brokerage to the seller to be passed on to the buyer in the form of a lower price. We conclude that the statute clearly applies to payments or allowances by a seller’s broker to the buyer, whether made directly to the buyer, or indirectly, through the seller. The allowances proscribed by § 2 (c) are those made by “any person” which, as we have said, clearly encompasses a seller’s broker. The respondent was a necessary party to the price reduction granted the buyer. His yielding of part of his brokerage to be passed on to the buyer was a sine qua non of the price reduction. This is not to say that every reduction in price, coupled with a reduction in brokerage, automatically compels the conclusion that an allowance “in lieu” of brokerage has been granted. As the Commission itself has made clear, whether such a reduction is tantamount to a discriminatory payment of brokerage depends on the circumstances of each case. Main Fish Co., Inc., 53 F. T. C. 88. Nor does this “fuse” provisions of § 2 (a), which permits the defense of cost justification, with those of § 2 (c) which does not; it but realistically interprets the prohibitions of § 2 (c) as including an independent broker’s allowance of a reduced brokerage to obtain a particular order. It is suggested that reversal of this case would establish an irrevocable floor under commission rates. We think that view has no foundation in fact or in law. Both before and after the sales to Smucker, respondent continued to charge the usual 5% on sales to other buyers. There is nothing in the Act, nor is there anything in this case, to require him to continue to charge 5% on sales to all customers. A price reduction based upon alleged savings in brokerage expenses is an “allowance in lieu of brokerage” when given only to favored customers. Had respondent, for example, agreed to accept a 3% commission on all sales to all buyers there plainly would be no room for finding that the price reductions were violations of § 2 (c). Neither the legislative history nor the purposes of the Act would require such an absurd result, and neither the Commission nor the courts have ever suggested it. Here, however, the reduction in brokerage was made to obtain this particular order and this order only and therefore was clearly discriminatory. The applicability of § 2 (e) to sellers’ brokers under circumstances not distinguishable in principle from the present case is supported by a 20-year-old administrative interpretation. Beginning in 1940, four years after the Act was passed, the Commission restrained the practice of brokers who, whether buying and selling on their own account or acting on behalf of the seller, sold goods to purchasers who bought through them direct at a reduced price reflecting the savings made by the elimination of the services of a local broker. This practice was held to be a violation of § 2 (c), not § 2 (a). If we held that § 2 (c) is not applicable here, we would disregard the history which we have delineated, overturn a settled administrative practice, and approve a construction that is hostile to the statutory scheme — one that would leave a large loophole in the Act. Any doubts as to the wisdom of the economic theory embodied in the statute are questions for Congress to resolve. Reversed. Section 2 (c) makes it unlawful for “any person ... to pay or grant . . . anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods . . . either to the other party to such transaction or to an . . . intermediary therein . . . (Emphasis supplied.) 49 Stat. 1527. See Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). Section 2 of the Clayton Act as originally enacted in 1914 (38 Stat. 730) applied only to price discriminations the effect of which was to “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.” This section was modified and retained in § 2 (a) as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. See note 7, infra. See S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7; H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 14-15; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U. S. 55, 69. In the Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, note 2, supra, Congress had before it examples not only of large buyers demanding the payment of brokerage to their agents but also instances where buyers demanded discounts, allowances, or outright price reductions based on the theory that fewer brokerage services were needed in sales to these particular buyers, or that no brokerage services were necessary at all. Id., at 25, 63. These transactions were described in the report as the giving of “allowances in lieu of brokerage” (id., at 62) or “discount [s] in lieu of brokerage,” Id., at 27. The Report of the House Judiciary Committee described the brokerage provision as dealing “with the abuse of the brokerage function for purposes of oppressive discrimination.” H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 14. And although not mentioned in the Committee Reports, the debates on the bill show clearly that § 2 (c) was intended to proscribe other practices such as the “bribing” of a seller’s broker by the buyer. See 80 Cong. Rec. 7759-7760, 8111-8112. Section 2 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a), provides, in relevant part: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly ... or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing . . . shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are . . . sold or delivered.” The bill as reported from the Senate Committee excepted savings in brokerage from the cost proviso in § 2 (a). S. E,ep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5. Yet when the bill was finally passed, the reference to brokerage in § 2 (a) had been deleted. This was done, according to the Conference Report, “for the reason that the matter of brokerage is dealt with in a subsequent subsection of the bill.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6. By striking the words “other than brokerage” from § 2 (a) we think Congress showed both an intention that “legitimacy” of brokerage be governed entirely by § 2 (c) and an understanding that the language of § 2 (c) was sufficiently broad to cover allowances to buyers in the form of price concessions which reflect a differential in brokerage costs. The legislative history is barren of any indication that a change in substance was intended by this deletion. Indeed, the Conference Report clearly precludes any other inference. The brokerage clause in the bill was originally directed only at outright commission payments by sellers to buyers’ agents. The Senate added the phrases “or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof,” and “either to the other party to such transaction [or his intermediary].” S. Rep. No. 15,02, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7. “This phrasing of the law was obviously designed to prevent evasion of the restriction through a mere modification of the form of the sales contract. It was assumed that large buyers would seek to convert the brokerage which they had hitherto received into an outright price reduction.” Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price Laws (1937), 219. The Commission has held that a price reduction to favored buyers, who bought direct without the intervention of a broker, which was equivalent to brokerage currently paid by the seller to its brokers for sales to other customers was a violation of § 2 (c). It has issued cease-and-desist orders against buyers in, e. g., The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 26 F. T. C. 486 (1938), aff’d 106 F. 2d 667 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1939); General Grocer Co., 33 F. T. C. 377 (1941); Giant Tiger Corporation, 33 F. T. C. 830 (1941); UCO Food Corporation, 33 F. T. C. 924 (1941); R. C. Williams & Co., 33 F. T. C. 1182 (1941); A. Krasne, Inc., 34 F. T. C. 121 (1941); and against sellers in Ramsdell Packing Co., 32 F. T. C. 1187 (1941); The Union Malleable Mfg. Co., 52 F. T. C. 408 (1955). See also several memorandum decisions reported in 32 F. T. C. 1192, 1193 (1941). Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 106 F. 2d 667 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1939); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 150 F. 2d 607 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1945) (buyer’s broker buying and selling on his own behalf). See Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955) 192, 193; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1139, 1207, n. 178; Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 Yale L. J. 929, 957-958. Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra, note 11. See also cases cited, note 10, supra. In speaking of these interpretations of § 2 (c), a leading authority said: "Here too the Commission and the court have applied the Congressional intent with precision. If Congress envisaged the evil as the transmission of brokerage commissions to the buyer, then to permit the buyer to get the same thing under 2 (a) in another form and name would deprive 2 (c) of all substance.” Oppenheim, Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 511, 535. See Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 102 F. 2d 763, 770 (C. A. 4th Cir.). The Conference Report states that § 2 (c) “prohibits the direct or indirect payment of brokerage except for such services rendered.” (Italics supplied.) H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7. Several writers, including one of the coauthors of the Act, have viewed § 2 (c) as covering payments or allowances by sellers’ brokers for the benefit of particular buyers. See Patman, The Robinson-Pat-man Act (1938), 102, 108; Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act, Am. L. Inst. (rev. ed. 1953), 108. (See also 2d rev. ed., 1959, 116); Oppenheim, Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 511, 544 (1940); Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law (1959), 104. As Patman, op. cit., supra, at 102, states respecting seller’s brokerage, “To waive the cost of the brokerage or commission to one purchaser and assess it against another represents an unfair discrimination between the purchasers, is an attempt to divorce one item of cost from the rest when, in fact, they all make up the whole, and permits a practice to gain foothold which may increase in such proportions as to demoralize the industry of which it is a part.” Cf. Robinson v. Stanley Home Products, Inc., 272 F. 2d 601 (C. A. 1st Cir.), where it was held that § 2 (c) was not violated by a seller who eliminated the services of a broker entirely, converted to direct selling, and thereafter reduced his prices. See Albert W. Sisk & Son, 31 F. T. C. 1543 (1940); C. F. Unruh Brokerage Co., 31 F. T. C. 1557 (1940); C. G. Reaburn & Co., 31 F. T. C. 1565 (1940); William Silver & Co., 31 F. T. C. 1589 (1940); H. M. Ruff & Son, 31 F. T. C. 1573 (1940); Thomas Roberts & Co., 31 F. T. C. 1551 (1940); American Brokerage Co., 31 F. T. C. 1581 (1940); W. E. Robinson & Co., 32 F. T. C. 370 (1941); Custom House Packing Corp., 43 F. T. C. 164 (1946). We need not view this administrative practice as laying down an absolute rule that § 2 (c) is violated by the passing on of savings in broker’s commissions to direct buyers, for here, as we have emphasized, the “savings” in brokerage were passed on to a single buyer who was not shown in any way to have deserved favored treatment.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. GILLETTE MOTOR TRANSPORT, INC. No. 359. Argued April 21, 1960. Decided June 27, 1960. Wayne G. Barnett argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and Melvin L. Lebow. Joseph A. Maun argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John A. Murray. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether a sum received by respondent from the United States as compensation for the temporary taking by the Government of its business facilities during World War II represented ordinary income or a capital gain. The issue involves the construction and application of § 117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. In 1944, respondent was a common carrier of commodities by motor vehicle. On August 4, 1944, respondent’s drivers struck, and it completely ceased to operate. Shortly thereafter, because of the need for respondent’s facilities in the transportation of war materiel, the President ordered the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to “take possession and assume control of” them. The Director assumed possession and control as of August 12, and appointed a Federal Manager, who ordered respondent to resume normal operations. The Federal Manager also announced his intention to leave title to the properties in respondent and to interfere as little as possible in the management of them. Subject to certain orders given by the Federal Manager from time to time, respondent resumed normal operations and continued so to function until the termination of all possession and control by the Government on June 16, 1945. Pursuant to an Act of Congress creating a Motor Carrier Claims Commission, 62 Stat. 1222, respondent presented its claim for just compensation. The Government contended that there had been no “taking” of respondent’s property but only a regulation of it. The Commission, however, determined that by assuming actual possession and control of respondent’s facilities, the United States had deprived respondent of the valuable right to determine freely what use was to be made of them. In ascertaining the fair market value of that right, the Commission found that one use to which respondent’s facilities could have been put was to rent them out, and that therefore their rental value represented a fair measure of respondent’s pecuniary loss. The Commission noted that in other cases of temporary takings, it has typically been held that the market value of what is taken is the sum which would be arrived at by a willing lessor and a willing lessee. Accordingly, it awarded, and the respondent received in 1952, the sum of $122,926.21, representing the fair rental value of its facilities from August 12, 1944, until June 16, 1945, plus $34,917.78, representing interest on the former sum, or a total of $157,843.99. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue asserted that the total compensation award represented ordinary income to respondent in 1952. Respondent contended that it constituted an amount received upon an “involuntary conversion” of property used in its trade or business and was therefore taxable as long-term capital gain pursuant to § 117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Tax Court, adopting its opinion in Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 27 T. C. 167, aff’d, 251 F. 2d 405 (C. A. 8th Cir.), which involved substantially identical facts, held that the award represented ordinary income. The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, in this instance reversed. 265 F. 2d 648. We granted certiorari because of the conflict between the decisions of the two Circuits. 361 U. S. 881. Respondent stresses that the Motor Carrier Claims Commission, rejecting the Government’s contention that only a regulation, rather than a 'taking, of its facilities had occurred, found that respondent had been deprived of property, and awarded compensation therefor. That is indeed true. But the fact that something taken by the Government is property compensable under the Fifth Amendment does not answer the entirely different question whether that thing comes within the capital-gains provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather, it is necessary to determine the precise nature of the property taken. Here the Commission determined that what respondent had been deprived of, and what the Government was obligated to pay for, was the right to determine freely what use to make of its transportation facilities. The measure of compensation adopted reflected the nature of that property right. Given these facts, we turn to the statute. Section 117 (j), under which respondent claims, is an integral part of the statute’s comprehensive treatment of capital gains and losses. Long-established principles govern the application of the more favorable tax rates to long-term capital gains: (1) There must be first, a “capital asset,” and second, a “sale or exchange” of that asset (§117 (a)); (2) “capital asset” is defined as “property held by the taxpayer,” with certain exceptions not here relevant (§ 117 (a) (1)); and (3) for purposes of calculating gain, the cost or other basis of the property (§113 (b)) must be subtracted from the amount realized on the sale or exchange (§ 111 (a)). Section 117 (j), added by the Revenue Act of 1942, effects no change in the nature of a capital asset. It accomplishes only two main objectives. First, it extends capital-gains treatment to real and depreciable personal property used in the trade or business, the type of property involved in this case. Second, it accords such treatment to involuntary conversions of both capital assets, strictly defined, and property used in the trade or business. Since the net effect of the first change is merely to remove one of the exclusions made to the definition of capital assets in § 117 (a)(1), it seems evident that "property used in the trade or business,” to be eligible for capital-gains treatment, must satisfy the same general criteria as govern the definition of capital assets. The second change was apparently required by the fact that this Court had given a narrow construction to the term “sale or exchange.” See Helvering v. Flaccus Leather Co., 313 U. S. 247. But that change similarly had no effect on the basic notion of what constitutes a capital asset. While a capital asset is defined in §117 (a)(1) as “property held by the taxpayer,” it is evident that not everything which can be called property in the ordinary sense and which is outside the statutory exclusions qualifies as a capital asset. This Court has long held that the term “capital asset” is to be construed narrowly in accordance with the purpose of Congress to afford capital-gains treatment only in situations typically involving the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time, and thus to ameliorate the hardship of taxation of the entire gain in one year. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 106. Thus the Court has held that an unexpired lease, Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U. S. 28, corn futures, Corn Products Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U. S. 46, and oil payment rights, Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U. S. 260, are not capital assets even though they are concededly “property” interests in the ordinary sense. And see Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 985, 987-989 and Note 7. In the present case, respondent’s right to use its transportation facilities was held to be a valuable property right compensable under the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. However, that right was not a capital asset within the meaning of §§ 117 (a)(1) and 117 (j). To be sure, respondent’s facilities were themselves property embraceable as capital assets under § 117 (j). Had the Government taken a fee in those facilities, or damaged them physically beyond the ordinary wear and tear incident to normal use, the resulting compensation would no doubt have been treated as gain from the involuntary conversion of capital assets. See, e. g., Waggoner, 15 T. C. 496; Henshaw, 23 T. C. 176. But here the Government took only the right to determine the use to which those facilities were to be put. That right is not something in which respondent had any investment, separate and apart from its investment in the physical assets themselves. Respondent suggests no method by which a cost basis could be assigned to the right; yet it is necessary, in determining the amount of gain realized for purposes of § 117, to deduct the basis of the property sold, exchanged, or involuntarily converted from the amount received. § 111 (a). Further, the right is manifestly not of the type which gives rise to the hardship of the realization in one year of an advance in value over cost built up in several years, which is what Congress sought to ameliorate by the capital-gains provisions. See cases cited, ante, p. 134. In short, the right to use is not a capital asset, but is simply an incident of the underlying physical property, the recompense for which is commonly regarded as rent. That is precisely the situation here, and the fact that- the transaction was involuntary on respondent’s part does not change the nature of the case. Respondent lays stress on the use of the terms “seizure” and “requisition” in § 117 (j). More specifically, the section refers to the “involuntary conversion (as a result of destruction in whole or in part, theft or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation or the threat or imminence thereof) of property used in the trade or business <md capital assets . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It is contended that the Government’s action in the present case is perhaps the most typical example of a seizure or requisition, and that, therefore, Congress must have intended to treat it as a capital transaction. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the seizure or requisition must be “of property used in the trade or business [or] capital assets.” We have already shown that § 117 (j) does not change the long-standing meaning of those terms and that the property taken by the Government in the present case does not come within them. The words “seizure” and “requisition” are not thereby deprived of effect, since they equally cover instances in which the Government takes a fee or damages or otherwise impairs the value of physical property. We conclude that the amount paid to respondent as the fair rental value of its facilities from August 12, 1944, to June 16, 1945, represented ordinary income to it. A fortiori, the interest on that sum is ordinary income. Kieselbach v. Commissioner, 317 U. S. 399. Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. Section 117 (j) provides as follows: “Gains and losses from involuntary conversion and from the sale or exchange of certain property used in the trade or business— (1) Definition of property used in the trade or business. “For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'property used in the trade or business’ means property used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (l), held for more than 6 months, and real property used in the trade or business, held for more than 6 months, which is not (A) property of a kind which would properly be includible in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or (B) property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business .... “(2) General rule. “If, during the taxable year, the recognized gains upon sales or exchanges of property used in the trade or business, plus the recognized gains from the compulsory or involuntary conversion (as a result of destruction in whole or in part, theft or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation or the threat or imminence thereof) of property used in the trade or business and capital assets held for more than 6 months into other property or money, exceed the recognized losses from such sales, exchanges, and conversions, such gains and losses shall be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than 6 months. . .

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. CURTIN MATHESON SCIENTIFIC, INC. No. 88-1685. Argued December 4, 1989 Decided April 17, 1990 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 797. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 798. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 801. Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Lawrence S. Robbins, Joseph E. DeSio, Robert E. Allen, Norton J. Come, Linda Slier, and Peter Winkler. James V. Carroll III argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Mark Schivartz, John B. Thomas, and Holly H. Williamson. Marsha S. Berzon, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by John S. Irving and Stephen A. Bokat; and for the Manville Corporation by William J. Rodgers. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), in evaluating an employer’s claim that it had a reasonable basis for doubting a union’s majority support, must presume that striker replacements oppose the union. We hold that the Board acted within its discretion in refusing to adopt a presumption of replacement opposition to the union and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I Upon certification by the NLRB as the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of employees, a union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority support for one year. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U. S. 27, 37 (1987). During that time, an employer’s refusal to bargain with the union is per se an unfair labor practice under §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5). See Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N. L. R. B. 664, 672 (1951); R. Gorman, Labor Law, Unionization and Collective Bargaining 109 (1976). After the first year, the presumption continues but is rebuttable. Fall River, supra, at 38. Under the Board’s longstanding approach, an employer may rebut that presumption by showing that, at the time of the refusal to bargain, either (1) the union did not in fact enjoy majority support, or (2) the employer had a “good-faith” doubt, founded on a sufficient objective basis, of the union’s majority support. Station KKHI, 284 N. L. R. B. 1339 (1987), enf’d, 891 F. 2d. 230 (CA9 1989). The question presented in this case is whether the Board must, in determining whether an employer has presented sufficient objective evidence of a good-faith doubt, presume that striker replacements oppose the union. The Board has long presumed that new employees hired in nonstrike circumstances support the incumbent union in the same proportion as the employees they replace. See, e. g., National Plastic Products Co., 78 N. L. R. B. 699, 706 (1948). The Board’s approach to evaluating the union sentiments of employees hired to replace strikers, however, has not been so consistent. Initially, the Board appeared to assume that replacements did not support the union. See, e. g., Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N. L. R. B. 1440, 1444 (1959) (stating that it was not “unreasonable [for the employer] to assume that none of the . . . permanent replacements were union adherents”); Jackson Mfg. Co., 129 N. L. R. B. 460, 478 (1960) (stating that it was “most improbable” that replacements desired representation by the strikers’ union); Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N. L. R. B. 196, 215 (1962) (finding that employer had “good cause to doubt the Union’s majority” because “no evidence that any of the replacements had authorized the Union to represent them” had been presented); S & M Mfg. Co., 172 N. L. R. B. 1008, 1009 (1968) (same). A1974 decision, Peoples Gas System, Inc., 214 N. L. R. B. 944 (1974), rev’d and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Teamsters Local Union 769 v. NLRB, 174 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 316, 532 F. 2d 1385, 1391 (1976), signalled a shift in the Board’s approach. The Board recognized that “it is of course possible that the replacements, who had chosen not to engage in the strike activity, might nevertheless have favored union representation.” 214 N. L. R. B., at 947. Still, the Board held that “it was not unreasonable for [the employer] to infer that the degree of union support among these employees who had chosen to ignore a Union-sponsored picket line might well be somewhat weaker than the support offered by those who had vigorously engaged in concerted activity on behalf on [sic] Union-sponsored objectives.” Ibid. A year later, in Cutten Supermarket, 220 N. L. R. B. 507 (1975), the Board reversed course completely, stating that striker replacements, like new employees generally, are presumed to support the union in the same ratio as the strikers they replaced. Id., at 509. The Board’s initial adherence to this new approach, however, was equivocal. In Arkay Packaging Corp., 227 N. L. R. B. 397 (1976), review denied sub nom. New York Printing Pressmen & Offset Workers Union, No. 51 v. NLRB, 575 F. 2d 1045 (CA2 1978), the Board stated that “it would be wholly unwarranted and unrealistic to presume as a matter of law that, when hired, the replacements for the union employees who had gone out on strike favored representation by the Unions to the same extent as the strikers.” 227 N. L. R. B., at 397-398. See also Beacon Upholstery Co., 226 N. L. R. B. 1360, 1368 (1976) (distinguishing Cutten Supermarket on the ground that the strikers in Beacon Upholstery had been lawfully discharged, so there were no striking employees in the bargaining unit). Nevertheless, in Windham Community Memorial Hospital, 230 N. L. R. B. 1070 (1977), enf’d, 577 F. 2d 805 (CA2 1978), the Board explicitly reaffirmed Cutten Supermarket, stating that “[t]he general rule ... is that new employees, including striker replacements, are presumed to support the union in the same ratio as those whom they have replaced.” 230 N. L. R. B., at 1070. The Board distinguished Arkay Packaging as a “limited exception” to this rule based on “the unique circumstance that the union had apparently abandoned the bargaining unit.” 230 N. L. R. B., at 1070. Finally, in 1980, the Board reiterated that the presumption that new employees support the union applies equally to striker replacements. Pennco, Inc., 250 N. L. R. B. 716, 717-718 (1980), enf’d, 684 F. 2d 340 (CA6), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 994 (1982). In 1987, after several Courts of Appeals rejected the Board’s approach, the Board determined that no universal generalizations could be made about replacements’ union sentiments that would justify a presumption either of support for or of opposition to the union. Station KKHI, 284 N. L. R. B. 1339 (1987). On the one hand, the Board found that the prounion presumption lacked empirical foundation because “incumbent unions and strikers sometimes have shown hostility toward the permanent replacements,” and “replacements are typically aware of the union’s primary concern for the striker’s welfare, rather than that of the replacements.” Id., at 1344. On the other hand, the Board found that an antiunion presumption was “equally unsupportable” factually. Ibid. The Board observed that a striker replacement “may be forced to work for financial reasons, or may disapprove of the strike in question but still desire union representation and would support other union initiatives.” Ibid. Moreover, the Board found as a matter of policy that adoption of an antiunion presumption would “substantially impair the employees’ right to strike by adding to the risk of replacement the risk of loss of the bargaining representative as soon as replacements equal in number to the strikers are willing to cross the picket line. ” Ibid. See also Pennco, Inc., 250 N. L. R. B., at 717. Accordingly, the Board held that it would not apply any presumption regarding striker replace-merits’ union sentiments, but would determine their views on a case-by-case basis. 284 N. L. R. B., at 1344-1345. II We now turn to the Board’s application of its Station KKHI no-presumption approach in this case. Respondent Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., buys and sells laboratory instruments and supplies. In 1970, the Board certified Teamsters Local 968, General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers (hereinafter Union) as the collective-bargaining agent for respondent’s production and maintenance employees. On May 21, 1979, the most recent bargaining agreement between respondent and the Union expired. Respondent made its final offer for a new agreement on May 25, but the Union rejected that offer. Respondent then locked out the 27 bargaining-unit employees. On June 12, respondent renewed its May 25 offer, but the Union again rejected it. The Union then commenced an economic strike. The record contains no evidence of any strike-related violence or threats of violence. Five employees immediately crossed the picket line and reported for work. On June 25, while the strike was still in effect, respondent hired 29 permanent replacement employees to replace the 22 strikers. The Union ended its strike on July 16, offering to accept unconditionally respondent’s May 25 contract offer. On July 20, respondent informed the Union that the May 25 offer was no longer available. In addition, respondent withdrew recognition from the Union and refused to bargain further, stating that it doubted that the Union was supported by a majority of the employees in the unit. Respondent subsequently refused to provide the Union with information it had requested concerning the total number of bargaining-unit employees on the payroll, and the job classification and seniority of each employee. As of July 20, the bargaining unit consisted of 19 strikers, 25 permanent replacements, and the 5 employees who had crossed the picket line at the strike’s inception. On July 30, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. Following an investigation, the General Counsel issued a complaint, alleging that respondent’s withdrawal of recognition, refusal to execute a contract embodying the terms of the May 25 offer, and failure to provide the requested information violated §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5). In its defense to the charge, respondent claimed that it had a reasonably based, good-faith doubt of the Union’s majority status. The Administrative Law Judge agreed with respondent and dismissed the complaint. The Board, however, reversed, holding that respondent lacked sufficient objective basis to doubt the Union’s majority support. 287 N. L. R. B. 350 (1987). First, the Board noted that the crossover of 5 of the original 27 employees did not in itself support an inference that the 5 had repudiated the Union, because their failure to join the strike may have “indicate® their economic concerns rather than a lack of support for the union.” 287 N. L. R. B., at 352. Second, the Board found that the resignation from their jobs of two of the original bargaining-unit employees, including the chief shop steward, after the commencement of the strike did not indicate opposition to the Union, but merely served to reduce the size of the bargaining unit as of the date of respondent’s withdrawal of recognition. Ibid. Third, the Board discounted statements made by six employees to a representative of respondent during the strike. Although some of these statements may have indicated rejection of the Union as the bargaining representative, the Board noted, others “appealed] ambiguous at best.” Id., at 353. Moreover, the Board stated, “[e]ven attributing to them the meaning most favorable to the Respondent, it would merely signify that 6 employees of a total bargaining unit of approximately 50 did not desire to keep the Union as the collective-bargaining representative.” Ibid Finally, regarding respondent’s hiring of striker replacements, the Board stated that, in acccordance with the Station KKHI approach, it would “not use any presumptions with respect to [the replacements’] union sentiments,” but would instead “take a case-by-case approach [and] require additional evidence of a lack of union support on the replacements’ part in evaluating the significance of this factor in the employer’s showing of good-faith doubt.” 287 N. L. R. B., at 352. The Board noted that respondent’s only evidence of the replacements’ attitudes toward the Union was its employee relations director’s account of a conversation with one of the replacements. The replacement employee reportedly told her that he had worked in union and nonunion workplaces and did not see any need for a union as long as the company treated him well; in addition, he said that he did not think the Union in this case represented the employees. Id., at 351; see n. 4, supra. The Board did not determine whether this statement indicated the replacement employee’s repudiation of the Union, but found that the statement was, in any event, an insufficient basis for “inferring the union sentiments of the replacement employees as a group.” 287 N. L. R. B., at 353. The Board therefore concluded that “the evidence [was] insufficient to rebut the presumption of the Union’s continuing majority status.” Ibid. Accordingly, the Board held that respondent had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) by withdrawing recognition from the Union, failing to furnish the requested information, and refusing to execute a contract embodying the terms respondent had offered on May 25, 1979. The Board ordered respondent to bargain with the Union on request, provide the requisite information, execute an agreement, and make the bargaining-unit employees whole for whatever losses they had suffered from respondent’s failure to execute a contract. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, refused to enforce the Board’s order, holding that respondent was justified in doubting the Union’s majority support. 859 F. 2d 362 (CA5 1988). Specifically, the court rejected the Board’s decision not to apply any presumption in evaluating striker replacements’ union sentiments and endorsed the so-called “Gorman presumption” that striker replacements oppose the union. We granted certiorari, 492 U. S. 905 (1989), to resolve a Circuit split on the question whether the Board must presume that striker replacements oppose the union. Ill A This Court has emphasized often that the NLRB has the primary responsibility for developing and applying national labor policy. See, e. g., Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 500-501 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S. 87, 96 (1957). “Because it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the task of ‘applying the Act’s general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its terms,’ that body, if it is to accomplish the task which Congress set for it, necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions.” Beth Israel Hospital, supra, at 500-501 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793, 798 (1945)). This Court therefore has accorded Board rules considerable deference. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U. S., at 42; NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 350 (1978). We will uphold a Board rule as long as it is rational and consistent with the Act, Fall River, supra, at 42, even if we would have formulated a different rule had we sat on the Board, Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U. S. 404, 413, 418 (1982). Furthermore, a Board rule is entitled to deference even if it represents a departure from the Board’s prior policy. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 265-266 (1975) (“The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board’s earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of the national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking”). Accord, Iron Workers, supra, at 351. B Before assessing the Board’s justification for rejecting the antiunion presumption, we will make clear precisely how that presumption would differ in operation from the Board’s current approach. As noted above, see supra, at 777-778, the starting point for the Board’s analysis is the basic presumption that the union is supported by a majority of bargaining-unit employees. The employer bears the burden of rebutting that presumption, after the certification year, either by showing that the union in fact lacks majority support or by demonstrating a sufficient objective basis for doubting the union’s majority status. Respondent here urges that in evaluating an employer’s claim of a good-faith doubt, the Board must adopt a second, subsidiary presumption — that replacement employees oppose the union. Under this approach, if a majority of employees in the bargaining unit were striker replacements, the employer would not need to offer any objective evidence of the employees’ union sentiments to rebut the presumption of the union’s continuing majority status. The presumption of the replacements’ opposition to the union would, in effect, override the presumption of continuing majority status. In contrast, under its no-presumption approach, the Board “take[s] into account the particular circumstances surrounding each strike and the hiring of replacements, while retaining the long-standing requirement that the employer must come forth with some objective evidence to substantiate his doubt of continuing maj ority status. ” 859 F. 2d, at 370 (Williams, J., dissenting). C We find the Board’s no-presumption' approach rational as an empirical matter. Presumptions normally arise when proof of one fact renders the existence of another fact “so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of [the inferred] fact. . . until the adversary disproves it.” E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence §343, p. 969 (3d ed. 1984). Although replacements often may not favor the incumbent union, the Board reasonably concluded, in light of its long experience in addressing these issues, that replacements may in some circumstances desire union representation despite their willingness to cross the picket line. Economic concerns, for instance, may force a replacement employee to work for a struck employer even though he otherwise supports the union and wants the benefits of union representation. In this sense the replacement worker is no different from a striker who, feeling the financial heat of the strike on himself and his family, is forced to abandon the picket line and go back to work. Cf. Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S. 360, 371 (1988) (recognizing that “a striking individual faces an immediate and often total drop in income during a strike”). In addition, a replacement, like a nonstriker or a strike crossover, may disagree with the purpose or strategy of the particular strike and refuse to support that strike, while still wanting that union’s representation at the bargaining table. Respondent insists that the interests of strikers and replacements are diametrically opposed and that unions inevitably side with the strikers. For instance, respondent argues, picket-line violence often stems directly from the hiring of replacements. Furthermore, unions often negotiate with employers for strike settlements that would return the strikers to their jobs, thereby displacing some or all of the replacements. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U. S. 491, 513-514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Respondent asserts that replacements, aware of the union’s loyalty to the strikers, most likely would not support the union. See, e. g., Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218 N. L. R. B. 1344, 1350 (1975) (“Strike replacements can reasonably foresee that, if the union is successful, the strikers will return to work and the strike replacements will be out of a job”). In a related argument, respondent contends that the Board’s no-presumption approach is irreconcilable with the Board’s decisions holding that employers have no duty to bargain with a striking union over replacements’ employment terms because the “inherent conflict” between strikers and replacements renders the union incapable of “bargaining] simultaneously in the best interests of both strikers and their replacements.” Service Electric Co., 281 N. L. R. B. 633, 641 (1986); see also Leveld Wholesale, supra, at 1350. These arguments do not persuade us that the Board’s position is irrational. Unions do not inevitably demand displacement of all strike replacements. In Dold Foods, Inc., 289 N. L. R. B. 1323 (1988), the Board based its refusal to presume that the replacements opposed the union in part on this ground: “[U]nions often demand, at least in the first instance, that the replacements be discharged and the strikers rehired. Frequently, as in the instant case, the union’s position may be modified in the course of the negotiations on the issues underlying the strike. Indeed, in the instant case, as the strike wore on, the Union took a progressively weaker position until... it requested only that the Respondent discharge those replacements (about 32 out of 201 total replacements) who had not yet completed the probationary period.” Ibid, (citation omitted). The extent to which a union demands displacement of permanent replacement workers logically will depend on the union’s bargaining power. Under this Court’s decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938), an employer is not required to discharge permanent replacements at the conclusion of an economic strike to make room for returning strikers; rather, the employer must only reinstate strikers as vacancies arise. The strikers’ only chance for immediate reinstatement, then, lies in the union’s ability to force the employer to discharge the replacements as a condition for the union’s ending the strike. Unions’ leverage to compel such a strike settlement will vary greatly from strike to strike. If, for example, the jobs at issue do not require highly trained workers and the replacements perform as well as the strikers did, the employer will have little incentive to hire back the strikers and fire the replacements; consequently, the union will have little bargaining power. Consumers’ reaction to a strike will also determine the union’s bargaining position. If the employer’s customers have no reluctance to cross the picket line and deal with the employer, the union will be in a poor position to bargain for a favorable settlement. Thus, a union’s demands will inevitably turn on the strength of the union’s hand in negotiations. A union with little bargaining leverage is unlikely to press the employer — at least not very forcefully or for very long — to discharge the replacements and reinstate all the strikers. Cognizant of the union’s weak position, many if not all of the replacements justifiably may not fear that they will lose their jobs at the end of the strike. They may still want that union’s representation after the strike, though, despite the union’s lack of bargaining strength during the strike, because of the union’s role in processing grievances, monitoring the employer’s actions, and performing other nonstrike roles. Because the circumstances of each strike and the leverage of each union will vary greatly, it was not irrational for the Board to reject the antiunion presumption and adopt a case-by-case approach in determining replacements’ union sentiments. Moreover, even if the interests of strikers and replacements conflict during the strike, those interests may converge after the strike, once job rights have been resolved. Thus, while the strike continues, a replacement worker whose job appears relatively secure might well want the union to continue to represent the unit regardless of the union’s bargaining posture during the strike. Surely replacement workers are capable of looking past the strike in considering whether or not they desire representation by the union. For these reasons, the Board’s refusal to adopt an antiunion presumption is not irreconcilable with its position in Service Electric, supra, and Leveld Wholesale, 218 N. L. R. B. 1344 (1975), regarding an employer’s obligation to bargain with a striking union over replacements’ employment terms. Furthermore, the Board has not deemed picket-line violence or a union’s demand that replacements be terminated irrelevant to its evaluation of replacements’ attitudes toward the union. The Board’s position, rather, is that “the hiring of permanent replacements who cross a picket line, in itself, does not support an inference that the replacements repudiate the union as collective-bargaining representative.” Station KKHI, 284 N. L. R. B., at 1344 (emphasis added). In both Station KKHI and this case, the Board noted that the picket line was peaceful, id., at 1345; 287 N. L. R. B., at 352; and in neither case did the employer present evidence that the union was actively negotiating for ouster of the replacements. To the extent that the Board regards evidence of these factors relevant to its evaluation of replacements’ union sentiments, then, respondent’s contentions ring hollow. Cf. Stormor, Inc., 268 N. L. R. B. 860, 866-867 (1984) (concluding that replacements’ crossing of picket line in face of continued violence, together with other evidence, overcame Board’s former presumption that replacements favored the union); IT Services, 263 N. L. R. B. 1183, 1185-1188 (1982) (holding that picket line violence and union’s adamant demand that replacements be terminated, together with anti-union statements by most of replacements, overcame pro-union presumption). In sum, the Board recognized that the circumstances surrounding each strike and replacements’ reasons for crossing a picket line vary greatly. Even if replacements often do not support the union, then, it was not irrational for the Board to conclude that the probability of replacement opposition to the union is insufficient to justify an antiunion presumption. D The Board’s refusal to adopt an antiunion presumption is also consistent with the Act’s “overriding policy” of achieving “‘industrial peace.’” Fall River, 482 U. S., at 38 (quoting Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96, 103 (1954)). In Fall River, the Court held that the presumption of continuing majority support for a union “further[s] this policy by ‘promoting] stability in collective-bargaining relationships, without impairing the free choice of employees.’” 482 U. S., at 38 (citation omitted). The Court reasoned that this presumption “enable[s] a union to concentrate on obtaining and fairly administering a collective-bargaining agreement without worrying that, unless it produces immediate results, it will lose majority support.” Ibid, (citing Brooks v. NLRB, supra, at 100). In addition, this presumption “remove[s] any temptation on the part of the employer to avoid good-faith bargaining in the hope that, by delaying, it will undermine the union’s support among the employees.” 482 U. S., at 38. The Board’s approach to determining the union views of strike replacements is directed at this same goal because it limits employers’ ability to oust a union without adducing any evidence of the employees’ union sentiments and encourages negotiated solutions to strikes. It was reasonable for the Board to conclude that the antiunion presumption, in contrast, could allow an employer to eliminate the union merely by hiring a sufficient number of replacement employees. That rule thus might encourage the employer to avoid good-faith bargaining over a strike settlement, and instead to use the strike as a means of removing the union altogether. Cf. id., at 40 (“Without the presumptions of majority support ... , an employer could use a successor enterprise as a way of getting rid of a labor contract and of . . . eliminating the union’s] continuing presence”). Restricting an employer’s ability to use a strike as a means of terminating the bargaining relationship serves the policies of promoting industrial stability and negotiated settlements. Cf. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 233-234 (1963) (“[The Act’s] repeated solicitude for the right to strike is predicated upon the conclusion that a strike when legitimately employed is an economic weapon which in great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining system”). Furthermore, it was reasonable for the Board to decide that the antiunion presumption might chill employees’ exercise of their statutory right to engage in “concerted activities,” including the right to strike. See 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right ... to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”). If an employer could remove a union merely by hiring a sufficient number of replacements, employees considering a strike would face not only the prospect of being permanently replaced, but also a greater risk that they would lose their bargaining representative, thereby diminishing their chance of obtaining reinstatement through a strike settlement. It was rational for the Board to conclude, then, that adoption of the antiunion presumption could chill employees’ exercise of their right to strike. Although the Board generally may not act “as an arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use,” NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 497 (1960), it may adopt rules restricting conduct that threatens to destroy the collective-bargaining relationship or that may impair employees’ right to engage in concerted activity. See, e. g., Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service v. NLRB, 454 U. S., at 412, 418-419 (upholding Board rule prohibiting employer’s unilateral withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining unit during impasse, “although it may deny an employer a particular economic weapon,” because rule advanced “pre-eminent goal” of stability in bargaining process); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, at 230-237 (upholding Board decision prohibiting employers from granting superseniority to strike replacements and strike crossovers because of damage superseniority would do to concerted activity and to future bargaining relationship); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U. S. 26, 34-35 (1967) (upholding Board decision that employer’s payment of vacation benefits to replacements, crossovers, and nonstrikers but not to strikers violated Act because of its destructive effect on concerted activity). The Board’s no-presumption approach is rationally directed at protecting the bargaining process and preserving employees’ right to engage in concerted activity. We therefore find, in light of the considerable deference we accord Board rules, see supra, at 786-787, that the Board’s approach is consistent with the Act. IV We hold that the Board’s refusal to adopt a presumption that striker replacements oppose the Union is rational and consistent with the Act. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act provides, in pertinent part: “(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; “(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.” 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5). Justice Scalia’s assertion, post, at 801, 807 (dissenting opinion), that the question presented is whether “substantial evidence” supported the Board’s “factual finding” that a good-faith doubt was not established in this case misconstrues the issue. The question on which we granted the Board’s petition for certiorari is whether, in assessing whether a particular employer possessed a good-faith doubt, the Board must adopt a general presumption of replacement opposition to the union. See Pet. for Cert. I (“Whether, in assessing the reasonableness of an employer’s asserted doubt that an incumbent union enjoys continued majority support, the Board may refuse to apply any presumption regarding the extent of union support among replacements for striking employees”). Accord, Brief for Petitioner I. Whether the Board permissibly refused to adopt a general presumption applicable to all cases of this type is not an evidentiary question concerning the facts of this particular ease. The substantial evidence standard is therefore inapplicable to the issue before us. Rather, we must determine whether the Board’s refusal to adopt the presumption is rational and consistent with the Act. NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U. S. 773, 787 (1979) (“[T]he courts have the duty to review the Board’s presumptions both ‘for consistency with the Act, and for rationality’ ”) (quoting Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 501 (1978)). Whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that respondent did not possess an objectively reasonable doubt is a question for the Court of Appeals to consider, without applying any presumption about replacements’ views, on remand. See n. 7, infra. The Board also found that statements made by chief shop steward Shady Goodson before his resignation did not indicate his lack of support for the Union. Goodson reportedly told respondent’s employee relations director that he was in the middle of an uncomfortable situation in that the employees did not want the strike, that he was having difficulty staffing the picket line, and that the Union was not providing sufficient assistance in maintaining the picket line. The Board found that these statements “conveyed only a disapproval of the Union’s conduct of the strike,” and could not be “reasonably interpreted as a repudiation of the Union as the employees’ representative.” 287 N. L. R. B., at 352. According to respondent’s director of employee relations, Elizabeth Price, two of the crossover employees, Tony Lopez and Bill Lee, told her that the Union had done nothing for the employees and that they would not pay their union dues because they would not support the Union. Price also stated that striker J. R. Blackshire expressed his anger over the Union’s handling of strike payments and requested reinstatement. Black-shire also reportedly said that “there was no union[,] that people were not supporting it[, and] that there were other striking employees who wanted to return to work.” 287N. L. R. B.,at351. Price also stated that striker Clint Waller told her that he was not walking the picket line because he felt that the Union was not representing the employees, and that he wanted the strike to end. Waller later resigned from the Union. Striker Raymond Brunner reportedly told Price that he had thought about retiring because he no longer wanted to work with the Union. Price stated that striker replacement David Schneider told her that he did not think that the Union supported the employees and did not see any need for a union as long as the employer treated him well. Ibid. The “Gorman presumption” derives its name from Professor Robert Gorman’s statement in his labor law treatise that “if a new hire agrees to serve as a replacement for a striker (in union parlance, as a strikebreaker, or worse), it is generally assumed that he does not support the union and that he ought not be counted toward a union majority.” R. Gorman, Labor Law, Unionization and Collective Bargaining 112 (1976). In context, however, this statement does not appear to endorse a presumption, but seems merely to describe the Board’s former approach to evaluating replacements’ union sentiments. Id., at 112-113 (citing Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N. L. R. B. 196 (1962)). In addition to the Fifth Circuit in this case, the First and Eighth Circuits have endorsed the presumption that striker replacements oppose the union, albeit in cases in which the Board had applied the contrary presumption rather than its present no-presumption approach. Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F. 2d 1055, 1110 (CA1 1981); National Car Rental System, Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F. 2d 1203, 1206 (CA8 1979). The Second and Sixth Circuits, however, have rejected the antiunion presumption in cases in which the Board had applied its prounion presumption. NLRB v. Windham Community Hospital, 577 F. 2d 805, 813 (CA2 1978); NLRB v. Pennco, Inc., 684 F. 2d 340 (CA6), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 994 (1982). The Ninth Circuit has not expressly rejected the antiunion presumption but has approved the Board’s no-presumption approach. See NLRB v. Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 891 F. 2d 230, 233-234 (1989). Contrary to respondent’s assertion, the Board’s no-presumption approach does not constitute an unexplained abandonment of the good-faith doubt defense to a refusal to bargain charge. The Board’s requirement of some objective evidence indicating replacements’ opposition to the union does not amount to a requirement that the employer prove that the union in fact lacks majority status. To show a good-faith doubt, an employer may rely on circumstantial evidence; to show an actual lack of majority support, however, the employer must make a numerical showing that a majority of employees in fact oppose the union. See, e. g., Stormor, Inc., 268 N. L. R. B. 860, 866-867 (1984) (noting that employer need not show actual loss of majority support to prove good-faith doubt). There is no basis for assuming, then, that the Board has, sub silentio, forsaken the good-faith doubt standard. The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urges us to reject the good-faith doubt standard and hold that an employer, before withdrawing recognition of the union, must show actual loss of majority status through a Board-conducted election. See also Flynn, íhe Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the “Union Sentiments” of Permanent Replacements, 61 Temple L. Rev. 691, 720 (1988). This Court has never expressly considered the validity of the good-faith doubt standard. Cf. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U. S. 27, 41, n. 8 (1987) (citing Board’s good-faith doubt standard without passing ofi its validity). We decline to address that issue here, as both parties assume the validity of the standard, and resolution of the issue is not necessary to our decision. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2 (1981). Justice Scalia characterizes this view as “embarrassingly wide of the mark” and asserts, without any factual support, that unions “almost certainly]” demand displacement of striker replacements. Post, at 808 (dissenting opinion). We are confident that the Board, with its vast reservoir of experience in resolving labor disputes, is better situated than members of this Court to determine the frequency with which unions demand displacement of striker replacements. Furthermore, the facts of this ease belie Justice Scalia’s sweeping characterization of the inevitability of such demands, as the Union did not negotiate for the discharge of replacements as a condition for settling the strike. See infra, at 793. Contrary to Justice Scalia’s assertion, post, at 809, an unconditional offer to return to work is hardly the same thing as a demand that the employer discharge all the replacements and rehire the strikers as a condition for ending the strike. Here, at the time of respondent’s withdrawal of recognition from the Union, there were only 19 strikers and 25 replacements. Thus, it is unlikely that all the replacements would have lost their jobs even if all the strikers were reinstated. Depending on their particular jobs and skills, some replacements might not have felt threatened by the Union’s offer to have the strikers return to work. More importantly, a union’s offer turns into a demand only if the union can back up its position with a credible show of economic force. As explained above, supra, at 790-791, a union with little bargaining power is unlikely to be able to pressure the employer to reinstate the strikers. Absent record evidence to the contrary, then, we have no basis for questioning the Board’s factual finding that the Union was not pressing for discharge of the replacements in this case. Justice Scalia appears to misunderstand our position. See post, at 810-811 (dissenting opinion). We do not mean that the replacements’ attitudes toward the union after the strike are relevant to the Board’s determination. Rather, we mean only that during the strike a replacement may foresee that his interests favor representation by the union after the strike. Thus, even if he opposes the strike itself, he may nevertheless want the union to continue to represent the unit because of the benefits that will accrue to him from representation after the strike. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that Justice Scalia’s supposition, post, at 808 (dissenting opinion), that unions “almost certain[ly]” demand displacement of all strike replacements is true, such demands will be a factor in the Board’s analysis in most cases. There is no reason, however, to force the Board to apply a presumption based on the premise that unions always make such demands when cases such as the one before us demonstrate that this premise is false. We do not mean to imply that adoption of the antiunion presumption would be inconsistent with the Act’s policy. That question is not before us. Justice Scalia entirely ignores the Board’s policy considerations, apparently on the rationale that policy is an illegitimate factor in the Board’s decision. See post, at 812-813 (dissenting opinion). This argument is founded on the premise that the issue before us is the factual question whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that respondent lacked a good-faith doubt. As stated earlier, however, see supra at 778-779, n. 2, the real question is whether the Board must, in assessing the objective reasonableness of an employer’s doubt, adopt a particular presumption. Certainly the Board is entitled to consider both whether the presumption is factually justified and whether that presumption would dis-serve the Act’s policies. See Baptist Hospital, 442 U. S., at 787. We need not determine whether the Board’s policy considerations alone would justify its refusal to adopt the presumption urged by respondent because we find the Board's decision not irrational as a factual matter. See supra, at 788-793.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DANN, COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS v. JOHNSTON No. 74-1033. Argued December 9, 1975 Decided March 31, 1976 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Howard E. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Gerald P. Norton, Richard H. Stern, and Karl E. Bakke. Morton C. Jacobs argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. John 8. Voorhees and Kenneth E. Krosin filed a brief for the Computer & Business Equipment Manufacturers Assn, as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Carol A. Cohen for Applied Data Research, Inc.; by David Cohen for the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Software Industry Assn.; and by Charles Winn Sims and Francis Noel Garten for Universal Software, Inc. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Richard E. Kurtz, Jack C. Goldstein, and Arthur R. Whale for the American Patent Law Assn.; by Reed C. Lawlor, Theodore H. Lassagne, David E. Lovejoy, and John P. Sutton for the California Patent Law Assn.; by James W. Oeriak and John C. Dorfman for the Los Angeles and Philadelphia Patent Law Assns.; and by Mr. Lawlor for Software Associates, Inc. MR. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent has applied for a patent on what is described in his patent application as a “machine system for automatic record-keeping of bank checks and deposits.” The system permits a bank to furnish a customer with subtotals of various categories of transactions completed in connection with the customer’s single account, thus saving the customer the time and/or expense of conducting this bookkeeping himself. As respondent has noted, the “invention is being sold as a computer program to banks and to other data processing companies so that they can perform these data processing services for depositors.” Brief for Respondent 19A; Application of Johnston, 502 F. 2d 765 (CCPA 1974). Petitioner and respondent, as well as various amici, have presented lengthy arguments addressed to the question of the general patentability of computer programs. Cf. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972). We find no need to treat that question in this case, however, because we conclude that in any event respondent’s system is unpatentable on grounds of obviousness. 35 U. S. C. § 103. Since the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) found respondent’s system to be patentable, Application of Johnston, supra, the decision of that court is accordingly reversed. I While respondent’s patent application pertains to the highly esoteric field of computer technology, the basic functioning of his invention is not difficult to comprehend. Under respondent’s system a bank customer labels each check that he writes with a numerical category code corresponding to the purpose for which the funds are being expended. For instance, “food expenditures” might be a category coded “123,” “fuel expenditures” a category coded “124,” and “rent” still another category coded “125.” Similarly, on each deposit slip, the customer, again through a category code, indicates the source of the funds that he is depositing. When the checks and deposit slips are processed by the bank, the category codes are entered upon them in magnetic ink characters, just as, under existing procedures, the amount of the check or deposit is entered in such characters. Entries in magnetic ink allow the information associated with them to be “read” by special document-reading devices and then processed by data processors. On being read by such a device, the coded records of the customer’s transactions are electronically stored in what respondent terms a “transaction file.” Respondent’s application describes the steps from this point as follows: “To process the transaction file, the . . . system employs a data processor, such as a programmable electronic digital computer, having certain data storage files and a control system. In addition to the transaction file, a master record-keeping file is used to store all of the records required for each customer in accordance with the customer’s own chart of accounts. The latter is individually designed to the customer’s needs and also constructed to cooperate with the control system in the processing of the customer’s transactions. The control system directs the generation of periodic output reports for the customer which present the customer’s transaction records in accordance with his own chart of accounts and desired accounting procedures.” Pet. for Cert. 4A-5A. Thus, when the time comes for the bank customer’s regular periodic statement to be rendered, the programmed computer sorts out the entries in the various categories and produces a statement which groups the entries according to category and which gives subtotals for each category. The customer can then quickly see how much he spent or received in any given category during the period in question. Moreover, according to respondent, the system can “[adapt] to whatever variations in ledger format a user may specify.” Brief for Respondent 66. In further description of the control system that is used in the invention, respondent’s application recites that it is made up of a general control and a master control. The general control directs the processing operations common to most customers and is in the form of a software computer program, i. e., a program that is meant to be used in a general-purpose digital computer. The master control, directing the operations that vary on an individual basis with each customer, is in the form of a separate sequence of records for each customer containing suitable machine-instruction mechanisms along with the customer’s financial data. Respondent’s application sets out a flow chart of a program compatible with an IBM 1400 computer which would effectuate his system. Under respondent’s invention, then, a general purpose computer is programmed to provide bank customers with an individualized and categorized breakdown of their transactions during the period in question. II After reviewing respondent’s patent application, the patent examiner rejected all the claims therein. He found that respondent’s claims were invalid as being anticipated by the prior art, 35 U. S. C. § 102, and as not “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming” what respondent was urging to be his invention. § 112. Respondent appealed to the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. The Board rejected respondent’s application on several grounds. It found first that under § 112, the application was indefinite and did not distinctly enough claim what respondent was urging to be his invention. It also concluded that respondent’s claims were invalid under § 101 because they claimed nonstatutory subject matter. According to the Board, computer-related inventions which extend “beyond the field of technology . . . are nonstatutory,” Pet. for Cert. 31 A. See Application of Foster, 58 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1001, 1004, 438 F. 2d 1011, 1015 (1971); Application of Musgrave, 57 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1352, 431 F. 2d 882 (1970), and respondent’s claims were viewed to be “non-technological.” Finally, respondent’s claims were rejected on grounds of obviousness. 35 U. S. C. § 103. The Board found that respondent’s claims were obvious variations of established uses of digital computers in banking and obvious variations of an invention, developed for use in business organizations, that had already been patented. Dirks, U. S. Patent No. 3,343,133. The CCPA, in a 3-2 ruling, reversed the decision of the Board and held respondent’s invention to be patentable. The court began by distinguishing its view of respondent’s invention as a “ ‘record-keeping machine system for financial accounts’ ” from the Board’s rather negative view of the claims as going solely to the “ ‘relationship of a bank and its customers.' ” 502 F. 2d, at 770 (emphasis in CCPA opinion). As such, the CCPA held, respondent’s system was “clearly within the 'technological arts,’ ” id., at 771, and was therefore statutory subject matter under 35 U. S. C. § 101. Moreover, the court held that respondent’s claims were narrowly enough drawn and sufficiently detailed to pass muster under the definiteness requirements of § 112. Dealing with the final area of the Board’s rejection, the CCPA found that neither established banking practice nor the Dirks patent rendered respondent’s system “obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art who did not have [respondent’s] specification before him.” 502 F. 2d, at 772. In order to hold respondent’s invention to be patentable, the CCPA also found it necessary to distinguish this Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972), handed down some 13 months subsequent to the Board’s ruling in the instant case. In Benson, the respondent sought to patent as a “new and useful process,” 35 U. S. C. § 101, “a method of programming a general-purpose digital computer to convert signals from binary-coded decimal form into pure binary form.” 409 U. S., at 65. As we observed: “The claims were not limited to any particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use.” Id., at 64. Our limited holding, id., at 71, was that respondent’s method was not a patentable “process” as that term is defined in 35 U. S. C. § 100 (b). The Solicitor of the Patent Office argued before the CCPA that Benson’s holding of nonpatentability as to the computer program in that case was controlling here. However, the CCPA concluded that while Benson involved a claim as to the patentability of a “process,” respondent in this case was advancing claims as to the patentability of an “apparatus” or “machine” which did not involve discoveries so abstract as to be unpatentable: “ “The issue considered by the Supreme Court in Benson was a narrow one, namely, is a formula for converting binary coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals by a series of mathematical calculations a patentable process?’ (Emphasis added.) [Quoting In re Christensen, 478 F. 2d 1392, 1394 (CCPA 1973).] “[T]he instant claims in apparatus form do not claim or encompass a law of nature, a mathematical formula, or an algorithm.” 502 F. 2d, at 771 (emphasis in CCPA opinion). Having disposed of the Board’s rejections and having distinguished Benson to its satisfaction, the court held respondent’s invention to be patentable. The Commissioner of Patents sought review in this Court and we granted certiorari. 421 U. S. 962 (1975). We hold that respondent’s invention was obvious under 35 U. S. C. § 103 and therefore reverse. Ill As a judicial test, “invention” — i. e., “an exercise of the inventive faculty,” McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419, 427 (1891) — has long been regarded as an absolute prerequisite to patentability. See, e. g., Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Engineering Corp., 294 U. S. 42 (1935); Sharp v. Stamping Co., 103 U. S. 250 (1880); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248 (1851). However, it was only in 1952 that Congress, in the interest of “uniformity and definiteness,” articulated the requirement in a statute, framing it as a requirement of “nonobviousness.” Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U. S. C. § 103, provides in full: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” This Court treated the scope of § 103 in detail in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1 (1966). There, we held that § 103 “was not intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable invention,” but was meant “merely as a codification of judicial precedents . . . with congressional directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability.” Id., at 17. While recognizing the inevitability of difficulty in making the determination in some cases, we also set out in Graham, supra, the central factors relevant to any inquiry into obviousness: “the scope and content of the prior art,” the “differences between the prior art and the claims at issue,” and “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” Ibid. Guided by these factors, we proceed to an inquiry into the obviousness of respondent’s system. As noted, supra, at 223, the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals relied on two elements in the prior art in reaching its conclusion that respondent’s system was obvious. We find both to be highly significant. The first was the nature of the current use of data processing equipment and computer programs in the banking industry. As respondent's application itself observes, that use is extensive: “Automatic data processing equipments employing digital computers have been developed for the handling of much of the record-keeping operations involved in a banking system. The checks and deposit slips are automatically processed by forming those items as machine-readable records .... With such machine systems, most of the extensive data handling required in a bank can be performed automatically." Pet. for Cert. 3A. It is through the use of such data processing equipment that periodic statements are ordinarily given to a bank customer on each of the several accounts that he may have at a given bank. Under respondent's system, what might previously have been separate accounts are treated as a single account, and the customer can see on a single statement the status and progress of each of his “sub-accounts.” Respondent's “category code" scheme, see supra, at 221, is, we think, closely analogous to a bank's offering its customers multiple accounts from which to choose for making a deposit or writing a check. Indeed, as noted by the Board, the addition of a category number, varying with the nature of the transaction, to the end of a bank customer’s regular account number, creates “in effect, a series of different and distinct account numbers Pet. for Cert. 34A. Moreover, we note that banks have long segregated debits attributable to service charges within any given separate account and have rendered their customers subtotals for those charges. The utilization of automatic data processing equipment in the traditional separate account system is, of course, somewhat different from the system encompassed by respondent’s invention. As the CCPA noted, respondent’s invention does something other than “provide a customer with ... a summary sheet consisting of net totals of plural separate accounts which a customer may have at a bank.” 502 F. 2d, at 771. However, it must be remembered that the “obviousness” test of § 103 is not one which turns on whether an invention is equivalent to some element in the prior art but rather whether the difference between the prior art and the subject matter in question “is a difference sufficient to render the claimed subject matter unobvious to one skilled in the applicable art. . . .” Id., at 772 (Markey, C. J., dissenting). There is no need to make the obviousness determination in this case turn solely on the nature of the current use of data processing and computer programming in the banking industry. For, as noted, the Board pointed to a second factor — a patent issued to Gerhard Dirks — which also supports a conclusion of obviousness. The Dirks patent discloses a complex automatic data processing system using a programmed digital computer for use in a large business organization. Under the system transaction and balance files can be kept and updated for each department of the organization. The Dirks system allows a breakdown within each department of various areas, e. g., of different types of expenses. Moreover, the system is sufficiently flexible to provide additional ^ breakdowns of “sub-areas” within the areas and can record and store specially designated information regarding each of any department’s transactions. Thus, for instance, under the Dirks system the disbursing office of a corporation can continually be kept apprised of the precise level and nature of the corporation’s disbursements within various areas or, as the Dirks patent terms them, “Item Groups.” Again, as was the case with the prior art within the banking industry the Dirks invention is not equivalent to respondent’s system. However, the departments of the business organization and the areas-or “Item Groups” under the Dirks system are closely analogous to the bank customers and category number designations respectively under respondent’s system. And each shares a similar capacity to provide breakdowns within its “Item Groups” or category numbers. While the Dirks invention is not designed specifically for application to the banking industry many of its characteristics and capabilities are similar to those of respondent’s system. Cf. Graham, 383 U. S., at 35. In making the determination of “obviousness,” it is important to remember that the criterion is measured not in terms of what would be obvious to a layman, but rather what would be obvious to one “reasonably skilled in [the applicable] art.” Id., at 37. In the context of the subject matter of the instant case, it can be assumed that such a hypothetical person would have been aware both of the nature of the extensive use of data processing systems in the banking industry and of the system encompassed in the Dirks patent. While computer technology is an exploding one, “[i]t is but an evenhanded application to require that those persons granted the benefit of a patent monopoly be charged with an awareness” of that technology. Id., at 19. Assuming such an awareness, respondent’s system would, we think, have been obvious to one “reasonably skilled in [the applicable] art.” There may be differences between respondent’s invention and the state of the prior art. Respondent makes much of his system’s ability to allow “a large number of small users to get the benefit of large-scale electronic computer equipment and still continue to use their individual ledger format and bookkeeping methods.” Brief for Respondent 65. It may be that that ability is not possessed to the same extent either by existing machine systems in the banking industry or by the Dirks system. But the mere existence of differences between the prior art and an invention does not establish the invention’s nonobviousness. The gap between the prior art and respondent’s system is simply not so great as to render the system nonobvious to one reasonably skilled in the art. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and remand this case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. "The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” 35 U. S. C. § 100 (b). S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1952). The Dirks patent does allow “the departments or other organizational users [t e., the analogues to bank customers under respondent’s invention, to] retain their authority over operative file systems” and indicates that "[programming is very easy and different programs are very easily coordinated.” While “commercial success without invention will not make patentability,” A&P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 153 (1950), we did indicate in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1 (1966), that "secondary considerations [such] as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others” may be relevant in a determination of obviousness. Id., at 17. Respondent does not contend nor can we conclude that any of these secondary considerations offer any substantial support for his claims of nonobviousness.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McGRATH, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. KRISTENSEN. No. 34. Argued October 19-20, 1950. Decided December 11, 1950. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, L. Paul Winings and Charles Gordon. David W. Louisell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Samuel Spencer. Jack Wasserman filed a brief for Rasmussen et al., as amici curiae, supporting respondent. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. Review was granted by this Court to determine whether the Attorney General was justified in refusing to suspend deportation of an alien under § 19 (c), as amended, 62 Stat. 1206, of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874, 889, 8 U. S. C. §§ 101, 155 (c), on the sole ground that the alien was ineligible for naturalization. The alien’s eligibility for naturalization, the substantive question in this case, depends upon whether the alien was “residing” in the United States and therefore liable for military service under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, when he made application to be relieved from the liability. Section 3 (a) of that Act as amended, the applicable section, provides that “any person who makes such application shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United States.” The grant of certiorari also covered a procedural question: whether the Attorney General’s refusal on the ground stated to grant suspension of deportation was subject to judicial review otherwise than by habeas corpus. The allegations of the alien’s complaint have not been controverted. Kristensen, a Danish citizen, entered the United States on August 17, 1939, as a temporary visitor for sixty days, to attend the New York World’s Fair and visit relatives. The outbreak of World War II prevented his return to Denmark. Successive extensions of stay were applied for and granted, but eventually economic necessity compelled Kristensen to become employed and thereby violate his visitor’s status. The process of deportation on the ground of violation of his visitor’s status was begun in May 1940, stayed for the duration of World War II, and reopened in 1946. A warrant of deportation was issued in 1941 but was withdrawn on June 10, 1946, to permit the alien to submit an application for suspension of deportation under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act, supra, which allows such suspension when deportation would result in serious economic detriment to the United States citizen wife of an alien. This relief was refused on the sole ground of Kristensen’s asserted ineligibility for citizenship resulting from his having filed with his Selective Service Board on March 30, 1942, after registration, an application for relief from service under § 3 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act, supra. Eligibility is a statutory prerequisite to the Attorney General’s exercise of his discretion to suspend deportation in this case. Respondent, not then nor thereafter in custody, sought a declaratory judgment that the Attorney General and other immigration and naturalization officials must, in passing upon his application for suspension of deportation, decide on the basis that he is eligible for naturalization in the United States. He also sought to enjoin the Attorney General and other officials from exercising their authority under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act on the assumption of respondent’s ineligibility. The District Court dismissed the complaint without opinion, apparently for failure to state a ground for relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed on the ground that, under the facts alleged, Kristensen could not have been subject to the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 at the time he made his claim for exemption, and therefore the claim was without effect and did not render him ineligible for naturalization. 86 U. S. App. D. C. 48, 179 F. 2d 796. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, applied only to aliens “residing in the United States” and “absent any showing of acts or declarations indicating an intention to remain at the time the form was filed, the immigration authorities erroneously construed 'residing in the United States’ when they held it applicable to an alien in this country under a temporary visitor’s visa whose deportation had been ordered and then stayed because of war.” We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question in the administration of the immigration and naturalization laws. The principle of the decision below is in conflict with that applied in Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F. 2d 952. An important procedural question also exists in view of the Government’s insistence that habeas corpus is the only available judicial remedy for aliens in deportation proceedings. Before we consider these questions, however, we turn to a jurisdictional problem. Federal Jurisdiction. — The Government properly presents for our consideration an issue of federal jurisdiction not heretofore raised. The quaere is whether this proceeding involves a justiciable question under Article III of the Constitution. It is said the Attorney General’s suspension of deportation is merely a recommendation to Congress, and that federal courts cannot intervene because at this point a court order does not finally control the deportation of the alien. This argument is founded on § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act which provides that, if deportation is suspended longer than six months, a detailed report must be made to Congress, and, if Congress fails to approve the suspension before the termination of the session next following the session in which the case is reported, the Attorney General must thereupon proceed with the deportation. While such a jurisdictional point may be raised at any time, we do not think there is basis for the objection here. The statute gives the Attorney General the power to suspend deportation for a minimum of six months and until Congress acts or the time for action elapses. The Attorney General’s power is final for such deferment of deportation. That other forces may come into play later with authority to take other steps does not detract from that finality. The United States relies particularly on Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103. The congressional power here is quite distinct from the Presidential power concerning overseas licensing in the Chicago & Southern case. The license in question there was ineffective until the President acted. The delay here is effective despite subsequent congressional action. This litigation, whatever its ultimate effect, is aimed only at the delay. The judgment sought in this proceeding would be binding and conclusive on the parties if entered and the question is justiciable. Declaratory Judgment. — The United States does not challenge finality for purpose of review. However, the Government does contend that the Immigration Act provision, § 19 (a), making the Attorney General’s decision on deportation “final” precludes judicial review except by habeas corpus of his refusal to grant suspension of deportation. The procedural question as thus narrowed is whether an administrative decision against a requested suspension of deportation under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act can be challenged by an alien free from custody through a declaratory judgment or whether, to secure redress, he must await the traditional remedy of habeas corpus after his arrest for deportation. The Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 165 (a), authorized the deportation of any alien found in the United States in violation of the immigration laws, and always provided that administrative decision as to deportation “shall be final.” The end of that administrative proceeding creates a situation which is subject to test on constitutional grounds through habeas corpus by one in custody. We do not find it necessary to consider the applicability of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243, to this proceeding. Where an official’s authority to act depends upon the status of the person affected, in this case eligibility for citizenship, that status, when in dispute, may be determined by a declaratory judgment proceeding after the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act the exercise of the Attorney General’s appropriate discretion in suspending deportation is prohibited in the case of aliens ineligible for citizenship. The alien is determined to have a proscribed status by this administrative ruling of ineligibility. Since the administrative determination is final, the alien can remove the bar to consideration of suspension only by a judicial determination of his eligibility for citizenship. This is an actual controversy between the alien and immigration officials over the legal right of the alien to be considered for suspension. As such a controversy over federal laws, it is within the jurisdiction of federal courts, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, and the terms of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201. It was so held in Perkins v. Big, 307 U. S. 325, where a declaratory judgment action was brought against the Secretary of Labor, then the executive official in charge of deportation of aliens, the Secretary of State, and the Commissioner of Immigration, to settle citizenship status. The Department of Labor had notified Miss Elg, who was not in custody, that she was not a citizen and was illegally remaining in the United States, and the Department of State had refused her a passport “solely on the ground that she had lost her native born American citizenship.” The District Court sustained a motion to dismiss the proceeding against the Secretary of State because his function as to passports was discretionary, but declared against the contention of the Secretary of Labor and held that Miss Elg had not lost her American citizenship. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed both the dismissal of the Secretary of State from the proceeding and the holding that Miss Elg was a citizen, and also determined that the case was properly brought within the Declaratory Judgment Act. Perkins v. Elg, 69 App. D. C. 175, 99 F. 2d 408. The United States raised no question on its petition for certiorari as to the propriety of the declaratory judgment action. Miss Elg, however, obtained certiorari from the dismissal of the proceeding against the Secretary of State, and the United States defended the judgment of dismissal on the ground that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not add to federal court jurisdiction but merely gave an additional remedy. In the Government’s brief it was said judicial jurisdiction would be expanded without warrant “by permitting the court to substitute its discretion for that of the executive departments in a matter belonging to the proper jurisdiction of the latter.” We rejected that contention and reversed the Court of Appeals on this point, saying, “The court below, properly recognizing the existence of an actual controversy with the defendants (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227), declared Miss Elg To be a natural born citizen of the United States,’ and we think that the decree should include the Secretary of State as well as the other defendants. The decree in that sense would in no way interfere with the exercise of the Secretary’s discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude the denial of a passport on the sole ground that Miss Elg had lost her American citizenship.” 307 U. S. 349-350. So here a determination that Kristensen is not barred from citizenship by § 3 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 only declares that he has such status as entitles him to consideration under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act. We think that the present proceeding is proper. Eligibility for Naturalization. — Under § 3 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Kristensen was liable for service if “residing” in the United States within the meaning of the Act. Section 3 (a) also provided that if he applied “to be relieved from such liability” as a subject of a neutral country he would be excused from service but would thereafter be debarred from our citizenship. If Kristensen was not “residing” at the time of his application for relief, he could not then have had “such liability” for service. If there was no “liability” for service, the disqualification for citizenship under the penalty clause could not arise because the applicant had not made the “application” referred to in the statute as “such application.” “Such application” refers to an application to be relieved from “such liability.” As there was no “liability” for service, his act in applying for relief from a nonexistent duty could not create the bar against naturalization. By the terms of the statute, that bar only comes into existence when an alien resident liable for service asks to be relieved. The question, then, is whether Kristensen was “residing,” within the meaning of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and regulations issued thereunder, at the time of his application, March 30, 1942. As we conclude that he was not a resident under the Act at the time of his application for relief from military service, we do not decide whether Denmark was a neutral country. Nor need we determine whether the bar against citizenship has been removed by the termination of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. The phrase of § 3 (a), “every other male person residing in the United States,” when used as it is, in juxtaposition with “every male citizen,” falls short of saying that every person in the United States is subject to military service. But the Act did not define who was a “male person residing in the United States,” liable for training and service after December 20,1941. 55 Stat. 845. Such preeisiveness was left for administrative regulation. Section 10 (a) and (b), 54 Stat. 893, 894, authorized the President to prescribe rules and regulations for the Act with power of delegation. The President prescribed the first regulations on September 23, 1940, and authorized the Director to prescribe amendments. Exec. Order 8545, 3 CFR, 1943 Cum. Supp., 719, 722. Amendments promulgating the regulations here applicable were issued, effective February 7,1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 855. They are set out below. Under these regulations it would seem that Kristensen, who never declared an intention to become a citizen of the United States and who entered the United States in August 1939, was not classified as a resident neutral alien until May 16, 1942. Otherwise, there would have been no occasion for § 611.13 (b), which declares the male alien who remains in the United States after May 16, 1942, to be a resident. Until that date he was in the same category as the newly arrived nondeclarant alien who, under the regulations and the Act, did not become a resident for three months. The application for relief from service was made on March 30, 1942. The regulations, quoted above, either made an alien in Kristensen’s situation a nonresident of the United States for the purpose of the Selective Training and Service Act, between February 7 and May 17, 1942, or they were nondeterminative of status in that period. In the absence of a determinative regulation, the meaning of the word “residing” in § 3 (a) requires examination. The meaning of that word, of course, depends upon the meaning of “residence.” “Residence” sometimes equals domicile, as in voting. Again, as in taxation, one who is not a mere transient or sojourner is a “resident.” § 29.211-2, Income Tax Regulations. The definition varies with the statute. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), § 9, comment e. See Carroll v. United States, 133 F. 2d 690, 693. In a naturalization case where eligibility depended upon the required residence in the United States, it was held that an enforced service in the German army 1914^1918 and subsequent foreign residence until 1921 on account of lack of means and inability to obtain a passport did not break the continuity of American residence. The court there said, “We shall not try to define what is the necessary attitude of mind to create or retain a residence under this statute, and how it differs from the choice of a 'home/ which is the test of domicile. Frankly it is doubtful whether courts have as yet come to any agreement on the question. But there is substantial unanimity that, however construed in a statute, residence involves some choice, again like domicile, and that presence elsewhere through constraint has no effect upon it.” When we consider that § 3 (a) was obviously intended to require military service from all who sought the advantages of our life and the protection of our flag, we cannot conclude, without regulations so defining residence, that a sojourn within our borders made necessary by the conditions of the times was residence within the meaning of the statute. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the judgment of the Court. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from the holding of the Court that respondent was not “residing” in the United States within the meaning of § 3 (a) of the Act. See the opinion of Judge Frank in Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F. 2d 952. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “(c) In the case of any alien . . . who is deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years, the Attorney General may ... (2) suspend deportation of such alien if he is not ineligible for naturalization or if ineligible, such ineligibility is solely by reason of his race, if he finds (a) that such deportation would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien; . . . . If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection for more than six months, a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. These reports shall be submitted on the 1st and 15th day of each calendar month in which Congress is in session. If during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a ease is reported, the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it favors the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings. If prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, the Congress does not pass such a concurrent resolution, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien in the manner provided by law.” Section 3 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, as amended, 55 Stat. 845, provides in part: “Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United States . . . shall be liable for training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States: Provided, That any citizen or subject of a neutral country shall be relieved from liability for training and service under this Act if, prior to his induction into the land or naval forces, he has made application to be relieved from such liability in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the President, but any person who makes such application shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United States . . . .” See note 1. While respondent alleged that his application for deferment was filed because of erroneous advice received from a member of the local Selective Service Board, it sufficiently, though inartistically, appears from the complaint that its true gravamen is the ineffectiveness of the application for relief from service to bar the alien’s naturalization because he was not “residing” in the United States within the meaning of the Selective Training and Service Act at the time the application was filed. This construction was put upon the complaint by the Court of Appeals and has been adopted by the United States in its presentation here. 86 U. S. App. D. C. 48, 56, 179 F. 2d 796, 804. Federal constitutional courts act only on cases and controversies and do not give advisory opinions. Rayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346; Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 113-14. Cf. Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697, 702; United States v. Jefferson Electric Co., 291 U. S. 386, 400-401; Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., supra. See note 1. King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 225, 226; United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435, 440. We think the Attorney General’s refusal to suspend deportation for the reason of ineligibility for citizenship has administrative finality. Administrative remedies are exhausted. Compare Levers v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 219. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 43; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33. Cf. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128; Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 122. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240; United States v. West Virginia, 295 U. S. 463, 475; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. 2d 321, 324, were cited. 8 U. S. C. § 903 has since been enacted, providing in part: “If any person who claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States is denied such right or privilege by any Department or agency, or executive official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States, such person, regardless of whether he is within the United States or abroad, may institute an action against the head of such Department or agency in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia or in the district court of the United States for the district in which such person claims a permanent residence for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States.” Cf. Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F. 2d 952. See note 2. See § 16 (b), 54 Stat. 897, as amended, 59 Stat. 166, 60 Stat. 181, 342; Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F. 2d 952, 956. See note 2. The original version of the Act required every male alien residing in the United States to register, but subjected only aliens who had declared their intention to become citizens to liability for service. 54 Stat. 885. The Attorney General construed the words “male alien residing in the United States,” the earlier phrase defining those subject to registration, to include “every alien . . . who lives or has a place of residence or abode in the United States, temporary or otherwise, or for whatever purpose taken or established, . . . .” 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 504, 505. “§ 611.12 When a nondeclarant alien is residing in the United States. Every male alien who is now in or hereafter enters the United States who has not declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, unless he is in one of the categories specifically excepted by the provisions of § 611.13, is 'a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 and section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended. “§ 611.13 When a nondeclarant alien is not redding in the United States, (a) A male alien who is now in or hereafter enters the United States who has not declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States is not ‘a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended: “(6) If he has entered or hereafter enters the United States in a manner prescribed by its laws and does not remain in the United States after May 16, 1942, or for more than 3 months following the date of his entry, whichever is the later. “(b) When a male alien who has not declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States has entered or hereafter enters the United States in a manner prescribed by its laws and remains in the United States after May 16, 1942, or for more than 3 months following the date of his entry, whichever is the later, he is 'a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 and section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, unless he has filed an Alien’s Application for Determination of Residence (Form 302) in the manner provided in § 611.21 and such application is either (1) pending or (2) has resulted in a determination that he is not ‘a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, in either of which events he shall not be considered as ‘a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, during the period when such application is pending or during the period covered by the Alien’s Certificate of Nonresidence (Form 303) issued to him as a result of the determination that he is not ‘a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended. (54 Stat. 885; 50 U. S. C., Sup. 301-318, inclusive; E. O. No. 8545, 5 F. R. 3779)” Apparently the regulations intended to give aliens time to enable them to file the Alien’s Application for Determination of Residence, see 7 Fed. Reg. 2084, § 611.21 (b) (1), or to leave the country before their status as “residents,” resulting in liability for military service, was fixed. Neuberger v. United States, 13 F. 2d 541, 542. Cf. Stadtmuller v. Miller, 11 F. 2d 732, 738.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BLACKMAR v. GUERRE, REGIONAL MANAGER, VETERANS’ ADMINISTRATION, et al. No. 361. Argued January 30-31, 1952. Decided March 3, 1952. René R. Nicaud argued the cause for petitioner. . With him on the brief was Conrad Meyer, III. Benjamin Forman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baldridge and Samuel D. Slade. Mr. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, a veteran employed as authorization officer in the Regional Office of the Veterans’ Administration in New Orleans, was removed from his position. He appealed under § 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 (5 U. S. C. (Sppp. IV) § 863) to the Tenth Regional Office of the United States Civil Service Commission in New Orleans. The Regional Board found that his discharge was not warranted and recommended that he be reinstated to his position. The Veterans’ Administration appealed to the Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission in Washington. The Commission reversed the Tenth Regional Board and so notified petitioner. Petitioner then instituted this suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, naming as defendants Guerre, the Regional Manager of the Veterans’ Administration, who had first discharged him, and the United States Civil Service Commission. Guerre was served personally. Service on the Commission was sought through personal service on Weinstein, the United States District Attorney, and on Leach, the Regional Director of the Tenth United States Civil Service Region. Both Weinstein and Leach resided within the Eastern District of Louisiana. Service by r gistered mail was made in the District of Columbia up* i the Attorney General of the • United States and thé United States Civil Service Commission. Petitioner prayed for a judgment of the District Court setting aside and annulling his discharge by Guerre and the action of the Civil Service Commission confirming Guerre’s action, and declaring that “plaintiff is entitled to an order from the United States Civil Service Commission directing . . . Guerre ... to restore plaintiff to his aforesaid position” with back pay. Respondents appeared and filed a motion to dismiss because of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. After this motion was overruled, respondents filed an answer raising, among other things, the same issues. On motions of both parties for summary judgment, the court sustained that of respondents, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the persons of the Commissioners, who were not residents of the Eastern District of Louisiana and who were indispensable parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that there was no venue in the District Court, without prejudice to further proceedings by petitioner in the proper venue. 190 F. 2d 427. We granted certiorari. 342 U. S. 884. We do not reach the merits in this proceeding. We are met at the threshold with a challenge by motion and answer as to the venue and jurisdiction of the District Court of Louisiana to entertain this action. These defenses as to law and fact were properly presented in this manner. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 12 (b). If the Commission could be sued eo nomine, we would be confronted with the question of whether service as here, made would be sufficient to bring the Commission into court; but Congress has not constituted the Commission a body corporate or authorized it to be sued eo nomine. It is suggested that such authorization is given by the Hatch Act. Not so. While § 118k (c) of 5 U. S. C. does provide that a state officer or employee found to have violated § 118k (b) may obtain review in the District Court . of the district in which he resides, this is not authorization for a new proceeding against the Civil Service Commission. It is authorization only for a transfer of the ease from the Commission to the District Court — -a continuation of the same proceeding before another tribunal. Review is instituted by petition and notice to the Commission, which is directed by the Act to file a transcript of the record in the case in the District Court. The court reviews the case on the old /record, with the right to hear further evidence. Even this limited review is not afforded federal employees found to have violated § 118 (i). Thus, by no stretch of the imagination can the limited review granted state employees by the Hatch Act be deemed an authorization by Congress for the present suit against the Commission. When Congress authorizes one of its agencies to be sued eo nomine, it does so in explicit language, or impliedly because the agency is the offspring of such a suable entity. See Keifer & Keifer v. R. F. C., 306 U. S. 381, 390. Since the Civil Service Commission is not a corporate entity which Congress has authorized to be sued, a suit involving the action of the Commission generally must be brought against the individual Commissioners as members of the United States Civil Service Commission. No such suit was brought here, and no service, was had upon the individuals comprising the Civil Service Commission. Therefore, neither the individuals comprising the Civil Service Commission nor the Commission as a suable entity was before the District Court. We do not have a question of venue as to defendants until we' have defendant's before the court. The only.defendant before the court was Guerre. The venue as to him was all right, but it is obvious no relief can be granted against him. It is further suggested that judicial review is authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. Certainly there is no specific authorization in that Act for suit against the Commission as an entity. Still less is the Act to be deemed an implied waiver of all governmental immunity from suit. If the Commission’s action is reviewable under § 1009, it is reviewable only in a court of “competent jurisdiction.” Assuming, without deciding, that Commission action is reviewable by court action under § 1009, it must follow that review must be in that district where the Commissioners can be served. Since we have held that the Civil Service Commission is not an entity that may be sued anywhere it may be functioning but only the Commissioners may be sued where they can be served, § 1009 does not aid petitioner in an action brought in Louisiana. The courts of the District of Columbia are the only courts of “competent jurisdiction” to reach the members of the Civil Service Commission. Since the members of the Civil Service Commission were never served, and could not be served, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and the Civil Service Commission is not a corporate entity, it follows that the only defendant before the court was Guerre, and, as we have pointed out, no relief could possibly be granted against him in these proceedings, the judgment is Affirmed. Me. Justice Black dissents. 53 Stat. 1147, as amended, 54 Stat. 767, § 12 (c), 5 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 118k (c). “§ 1009. Judicial review of agency action. “Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion— “(a) Right of review. “Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof. “ (b) Form and venue of proceedings. “The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action ... in. any court of competent jurisdiction. . .

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING & DRY DOCK CO. et al. No. 93-1783. Argued January 9, 1995 Decided March 21, 1995 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 136. Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Allen H. Feldman, Steven J. Mandel, and Mark S. Flynn. Lawrence P. Postol argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was James M. Mesnard. Charles T. Carroll, Jr., Thomas D. Wilcox, and Dennis J. Lindsay filed a brief for the National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before us in this case is whether the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs in the United States Department of Labor has standing under § 21(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., to seek judicial review of decisions by the Benefits Review Board that in the Director’s view deny claimants compensation to which they are entitled. I On October 24, 1984, Jackie Harcum, an employee of respondent Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., was working in the bilge of a steam barge when a piece of metal grating fell and struck him in the lower back. His injury required surgery to remove a herniated disc, and caused prolonged disability. Respondent paid Harcum benefits under the LHWCA until he returned to light-duty work in April 1987. In November 1987, Harcum returned to his regular department under medical restrictions. He proved unable to perform essential tasks, however, and the company terminated his employment in May 1988. Harcum ultimately found work elsewhere, and started his new job in February 1989. Harcum filed a claim for further benefits under the LHWCA. Respondent contested the claim, and the dispute was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). One of the issues was whether Harcum was entitled to benefits for total disability, or instead only for partial disability, from the date he stopped work for respondent until he began his new job. “Disability” under the LHWCA means “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” 33 U. S. C. § 902(10). After a hearing on October 20, 1989, the AU determined that Harcum was partially, rather than totally, disabled when he left respondent’s employ, and that he was therefore owed only partial-disability benefits for the interval of his unemployment. On appeal, the Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s judgment, and also ruled that under 33 U. S. C. § 908(f), the company was entitled to cease payments to Harcum after 104 weeks, after which time the LHWCA special fund would be liable for disbursements pursuant to § 944. The Director petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of both aspects of the Board’s ruling. Harcum did not seek review and, while not opposing the Director’s pursuit of the action, expressly declined to intervene on his own behalf in response to an inquiry by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the question whether the Director had standing to appeal the Board’s order. 8 F. 3d 175 (1993). It concluded that she did not have standing with regard to that aspect of the order denying Harcum’s claim for full-disability compensation, since she was not “adversely affected or aggrieved” by that decision within the meaning of § 21(c) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 921(c). We granted the Director’s petition for certiorari. 512 U. S. 1287 (1994). II The LHWCA provides for compensation of workers injured or killed while employed on the navigable waters or adjoining, shipping-related land areas of the United States. 33 U. S. C. § 903. With the exception of those duties imposed by §§ 919(d), 921(b), and 941, the Secretary of Labor has delegated all responsibilities of the Department with respect to administration of the LHWCA to the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 20 CFR §§ 701.201 and 701.202 (1994); 52 Fed. Reg. 48466 (1987). For ease of exposition, the Director will hereinafter be referred to as the statutory recipient of those responsibilities. A worker seeking compensation under the Act must file a claim with an OWCP district director. 33 U. S. C. § 919(a); 20 CFR §§ 701.301(a) and 702.105 (1994). If the district director cannot resolve the claim informally, 20 CFR § 702.311, it is referred to an ALJ authorized to issue a compensation order, § 702.316; 33 U. S. C. § 919(d). The ALJ’s decision is reviewable by the Benefits Review Board, whose members are appointed by the Secretary. § 921(b)(1). The Board’s decision is in turn appealable to a United States court of appeals, at the instance of “[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by” the Board’s order. § 921(c). With regard to claims that proceed to ALJ hearings, the Act does not by its terms make the Director a party to the proceedings, or grant her authority to prosecute appeals to the Board, or thence to the federal courts of appeals. The Director argues that she nonetheless had standing to petition the Fourth Circuit for review of the Board’s order, because she is a “person adversely affected or aggrieved” under § 921(c). Specifically, she contends the Board’s decision injures her because it impairs her ability to achieve the Act’s purposes and to perform the administrative duties the Act prescribes. The phrase “person adversely affected or aggrieved” is a term of art used in many statutes to designate those who have standing to challenge or appeal an agency decision, within the agency or before the courts. See, e. g., federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. § 402(b)(6); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 660(a); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 816. The terms “adversely affected” and “aggrieved,” alone or in combination, have a long history in federal administrative law, dating back at least to the federal Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2) (codified, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 402(b)(6)). They were already familiar terms in 1946, when they were embodied within the judicial review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 702, which entitles “[a] person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute” to judicial review. In that provision, the qualification “within the meaning of a relevant statute” is not an addition to what “adversely affected or aggrieved” alone conveys; but is rather an acknowledgment of the fact that what constitutes adverse effect or aggrievement varies from statute to statute. As the United States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) put it, “The determination of who is ‘adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of any relevant statute’ has ‘been marked out largely by the gradual judicial process of inclusion and exclusion, aided at times by the courts’ judgment as to the probable legislative intent derived from the spirit of the statutory scheme.’ ” Id., at 96 (citation omitted). We have thus interpreted § 702 as requiring a litigant to show, at the outset of the case, that he is injured in fact by agency action and that the interest he seeks to vindicate is arguably within the “zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute” in question. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970); see also Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 395-396 (1987). Given the long lineage of the text in question, it is significant that counsel have cited to us no case, neither in this Court nor in the courts of appeals, neither under the APA nor under individual statutory-review provisions such as the present one, which holds that, without benefit of specific authorization to appeal, an agency, in its regulatory or policy-making capacity, is “adversely affected” or “aggrieved.” Cf. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 302-305 (1983) (noting the issue of whether the Director has standing under § 921(c), but finding it unnecessary to reach the question). There are cases in which an agency has been held to be adversely affected or aggrieved in what might be called its nongovernmental capacity — that is, in its capacity as a member of the market group that the statute was meant to protect. For example, in United States v. ICC, 337 U. S. 426 (1949), we held that the United States had standing to sue the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in federal court to overturn a Commission order that denied the Government recovery of damages for an allegedly unlawful railroad rate. The Government, we said, “is not less entitled than any other shipper to invoke administrative and judicial protection.” Id., at 430. But the status of the Government as a statutory beneficiary or market participant must be sharply distinguished from the status of the Government as regulator or administrator. The latter status would be at issue if — to use an example that continues the ICC analogy — the Environmental Protection Agency sued to overturn an ICC order establishing high tariffs for the transportation of recyclable materials. Cf. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669 (1973). Or if the Department of Transportation, to further a policy of encouraging so-called “telecommuting” in order to reduce traffic congestion, sued as a “party aggrieved” under 28 U. S. C. § 2344, to reverse the Federal Communications Commission’s approval of rate increases on second phone lines used for modems. We are aware of no case in which such a “policy interest” by an agency has sufficed to confer standing under an “adversely affected or aggrieved” statute or any other general review provision. To acknowledge the general adequacy of such an interest would put the federal courts into the regular business of deciding intrabranch and intraagency policy disputes — a role that would be most inappropriate. That an agency in its governmental capacity is not “adversely affected or aggrieved” is strongly suggested, as well, by two aspects of the United States Code: First, the fact that the Code’s general judicial review provision, contained in the APA, does not include agencies within the category of “person adversely affected or aggrieved.” See 5 U. S. C. § 551(2) (excepting agencies from the definition of “person”). Since, as we suggested in United States v. ICC, the APA provision reflects “the general legislative pattern of administrative and judicial relationships,” 337 U. S., at 433-434, it indicates that even under specific “adversely affected or aggrieved” statutes (there were a number extant when the APA was adopted) agencies as such normally do not have standing. And second, the United States Code displays throughout that when an agency in its governmental capacity is meant to have standing, Congress says so. The LHWCA’s silence regarding the Secretary’s ability to take an appeal is significant when laid beside other provisions of law. See, e. g., Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U. S. C. § 932(k) (“The Secretary shall be a party in any proceeding relative to [a] claim for benefits”); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (authorizing the Attorney General to initiate civil actions against private employers) and § 2000e-4(g)(6) (authorizing the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission to “intervene in a civil action brought ... by an aggrieved party . . .”); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(2) (granting Secretary power to initiate various civil actions under the Act). It is particularly illuminating to compare the LHWCA with the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U. S. C. § 651 et seq. Section 660(a) of OSHA is virtually identical to § 921(c): It allows “[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved” by an order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (a body distinct from the Secretary, as the Benefits Review Board is) to petition for review in the courts of appeals. OSHA, however, further contains a § 660(b), which expressly grants such petitioning authority to the Secretary — suggesting, of course, that the Secretary would not be considered “adversely affected or aggrieved” under § 660(a), and should not be considered so under § 921(c). All of the foregoing indicates that the phrase “person adversely affected or aggrieved” does not refer to an agency acting in its governmental capacity. Of course the text of a particular statute could make clear that the phrase is being used in a peculiar sense. But the Director points to no such text in the LHWCA, and relies solely upon the mere existence and impairment of her governmental interest. If that alone could ever suffice to contradict the normal meaning of the phrase (which is doubtful), it would have to be an interest of an extraordinary nature, extraordinarily impaired. As we proceed to discuss, that is not present here. Ill The LHWCA assigns four broad areas of responsibility to the Director: (1) supervising, administering, and making rules and regulations for calculation of benefits and processing of claims, 33 U. S. C. §§ 906, 908-910, 914, 919, 930, and 939; (2) supervising, administering, and making rules and regulations for provision of medical care to covered workers, §907; (3) assisting claimants with processing claims and receiving medical and vocational rehabilitation, § 939(c); and (4) enforcing compensation orders and administering payments to and disbursements from the special fund established by the Act for the payment of certain benefits, §§ 921(d) and 944. The Director does not assert that the Board’s decision hampers her performance of these express statutory responsibilities. She claims only two categories of interest that are affected, neither of which remotely suggests that she has authority to appeal Board determinations. • First, the Director claims that because the LHWCA “has many of the elements of social insurance, and as such is designed to promote the public interest,” Brief for Petitioner 17, she has standing to “advance in federal court the public interest in ensuring adequate compensation payments to claimants,” id., at 18. It is doubtful, to begin with, that the goal of the LHWCA is simply the support of disabled workers. In fact, we have said that, because “the LHWCA represents a compromise between the competing interests of disabled laborers and their employers,” it “is not correct to interpret the Act as guaranteeing a completely adequate remedy for all covered disabilities.” Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 449 U. S. 268, 282 (1980). The LHWCA is a scheme for fair and efficient resolution of a class of private disputes, managed and arbitered by the Government. It represents a “quid pro quo between employer and employee. Employers relinquish certain legal rights which the law affords to them and so, in turn, do the employees.” 1 M. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries §4.1, p. 106 (4th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). But even assuming the single-minded, compensate-the-employee goal that the Director posits, there is nothing to suggest that the Director has been given authority to pursue that goal in the courts. Agencies do not automatically have standing to sue for actions that frustrate the purposes of their statutes. The Interior Department, being charged with the duty to “protect persons and property within areas of the National Park System,” 16 U. S. C. § 1a-6(a), does not thereby have authority to intervene in suits for assault brought by campers; or (more precisely) to bring a suit for assault when the camper declines to do so. What the Director must establish here is such a clear and distinctive responsibility for employee compensation as to overcome the universal assumption that “person adversely affected or aggrieved” leaves private interests (even those favored by public policy) to be litigated by private parties. That we are unable to find. The Director is not the designated champion of employees within this statutory scheme. To the contrary, one of her principal roles is to serve as the broker of informal settlements between employers and employees. 33 U. S. C. § 914(h). She is charged, moreover, with providing “information and assistance” regarding the program to all persons covered by the Act, including employers. §§ 902(1), 939(c). To be sure, she has discretion under § 939(c) to provide “legal assistance in processing a claim” if it is requested (a provision that is perhaps of little consequence, since the Act provides attorney’s fees to successful claimants, see § 928); but that authority, which is discretionary with her and contingent upon a request by the claimant, does not evidence the duty and power, when the claimant is satisfied with his award, to contest the award on her own. The Director argues that her standing to pursue the public’s interest in adequate compensation of claimants is supported by our decisions in Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912), Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), Pasa dena City Bd. of Ed. v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976), and General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318 (1980). Brief for Petitioner 18. None of those cases is apposite. Heckman and Moe pertain to the United States’ standing to represent the interests of Indians; the former holds, see 224 U. S., at 437, and the latter indicates in dictum, see 425 U. S., at 474, n. 13, that the Government’s status as guardian confers standing. The third case, Spangler, supra, at 427, based standing of the United States upon an explicit provision of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizing suit, 42 U. S. C. § 2000h-2, and the last, General Telephone Co., supra, at 325, based standing of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) upon a specific provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizing suit, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Those two cases certainly establish that Congress could have conferred standing upon the Director without infringing Article III of the Constitution; but they do not at all establish that Congress did so. In fact, General Telephone Co. suggests just the opposite, since it describes how, prior to the 1972 amendment specifically giving the EEOC authority to sue, only the “aggrieved person” could bring suit, even though the EEOC was authorized to use “ ‘informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion’” to eliminate unlawful employment practices, 446 U. S., at 325 — an authority similar to the Director’s informal settlement authority here. The second category of interest claimed to be affected by erroneous Board rulings is the Director’s ability to fulfill “important administrative and enforcement responsibilities.” Brief for Petitioner 18. The Director fails, however, to identify any specific statutory duties that an erroneous Board ruling interferes with, reciting instead conjectural harms to abstract and remote concerns. She contends, for example, that “incorrect claim determinations by the Board frustrate [her] duty to administer and enforce the statutory scheme in a uniform manner.” Id., at 18-19. But it is impossible to understand how a duty of uniform administration and enforcement by the Director (presumably arising out of the prohibition of arbitrary action reflected in 5 U. S. C. § 706) hinges upon correct adjudication by someone else. The Director does not (and we think cannot) explain, for example, how an erroneous decision by the Board affects her ability to process the underlying claim, §919, provide information and assistance regarding coverage, compensation, and procedures, § 939(c), enforce the final award, § 921(d), or perform any other required task in a “uniform” manner. If the correctness of adjudications were essential to the Director’s performance of her assigned duties, Congress would presumably have done what it has done with many other agencies: made adjudication her responsibility. In fact, however, it has taken pains to remove adjudication from her realm. The LHWCA Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1251, assigned administration to the Director, 33 U. S. C. § 939(a); assigned initial adjudication to ALJ’s, § 919(d); and created the Board to consider appeals from ALJ decisions, § 921. The assertion that proper adjudication is essential to proper performance of the Director’s functions is quite simply contrary to the whole structure of the Act. To make an implausible argument even worse, the Director must acknowledge that her lack of control over the adjudicative process does not even deprive her of the power to resolve legal ambiguities in the statute. She retains the rulemaking power, see § 939(a), which means that if her problem with the present decision of the Board is that it has established an erroneous rule of law, see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), she has full power to alter that rule. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476 (1992) (“[T]he [Board] is not entitled to any special deference”). Her only possible complaint, then, is that she does not agree with the outcome of this particular case. The Director also claims that precluding her from seeking review of erroneous Board rulings “would reduce the incentive for employers to view the Director’s informal resolution efforts as authoritative, because the employer could proceed to a higher level of review from which the Director could not appeal.” Brief for Petitioner 19. This argument assumes that her informal resolution efforts are supposed to be “authoritative.” We doubt that. The structure of the statute suggests that they are supposed to be facilitative — a service to both parties, rather than an imposition upon either of them. But even if the opposite were true, we doubt that the unlikely prospect that the Director will appeal when the claimant does not will have much of an impact upon whether the employer chooses to spurn the Director’s settlement proposal and roll the dice before the Board. The statutory requirement of adverse effect or aggrievement must be based upon “something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.” United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 688. The Director seeks to derive support for her position from Congress’ later enactment of the BLBA in 1978, but it seems to us that the BLBA militates precisely against her position. The BLBA expressly provides that “[t]he Secretary shall be a party in any proceeding relative to a claim for benefits under this part.” 30 U. S. C. § 932(k). The Director argues that since the Secretary is explicitly made a party under the BLBA, she must be meant to be a party under the LHWCA as well. That is not a form of reasoning we are familiar with. The normal conclusion one would derive from putting these statutes side by side is this: When, in a legislative scheme of this sort, Congress wants the Secretary to have standing, it says so. Finally, the Director retreats to that last redoubt of losing causes, the proposition that the statute at hand should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes, see, e. g., Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249, 268 (1977). That principle may be invoked, in case of ambiguity, to find present rather than absent elements that are essential to operation of a legislative scheme; but it does not add features that will achieve the statutory “purposes” more effectively. Every statute purposes, not only to achieve certain ends, but also to achieve them by particular means — and there is often a considerable legislative battle over what those means ought to be. The withholding of agency authority is as significant as the granting of it, and we have no right to play favorites between the two. Construing the LHWCA as liberally as can be, we cannot find that the Director is “adversely affected or aggrieved” within the meaning of § 921(c). * * * For these reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed. So ordered. The court found that, as administrator of the §944 special fund, the Director did have standing to appeal the Board’s decision to grant respondent relief under § 908(f). That ruling is not before us, and we express no view upon it. In addition to not reaching the § 921(c) question, Perini also took as a given (because it had been conceded below) the answer to another question: whether the Director (rather than the Benefits Review Board) is the proper party respondent to an appeal from the Board’s determination. See 459 U. S., at 304, n. 13. Obviously, an agency’s entitlement to party respondent status does not necessarily imply that agency’s standing to appeal: The National Labor Relations Board, for example, is always the party respondent to an employer or employee appeal, but cannot initiate an appeal from its own determination. 29 U. S. C. §§ 152(1), 160(f). Indeed, it can be argued, as amici in this case have done, that if the Director is the proper party respondent in the court of appeals (as her regulations assert, see 20 CFR § 802.410 (1994)), in initiating an appeal she would end up on both sides of the ease. See Brief for National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. as Amici Curiae 17, n. 14. Our opinion today intimates no view on the party-respondent question. United States v. ICC accorded the United States standing despite the facts that (1) the Interstate Commerce Act contained no specific judicial review provision, and (2) the APA’s general judicial review provision (“person adversely affected or aggrieved”) excludes agencies from the definition of “person.” See infra, at 129. It would thus appear that an agency suing in what might be termed a nongovernmental capacity escapes that definitional limitation. The LHWCA likewise contains a definition of “person” that does not specifically include agencies. 33 U. S. C. § 902(1). We chose not to rely upon that provision in this opinion because it seemed more likely to sweep in the question of the Director’s authority to appeal Board rulings that are adverse to the § 944 special fund, which deserves separate attention. It is possible that the Director’s status as manager of the privately financed fund removes her from the “person” limitation, just as it may remove her from the more general limitation that agencies qua agencies are not “adversely affected or aggrieved.” We leave those issues to be resolved in a case where the Director’s relationship to the fund is immediately before us.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?