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LECHMERE, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD No. 90-970. Argued November 12, 1991 Decided January 27, 1992 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’ConnoR, Scalia, Kennedy, and SouteR, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 541. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 548. Robert P. Joy argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Keith H. McCown and Benjamin Smith. Michael R. Dreeben argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Wright, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by John S. Irving, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robert J. Verdisco; for the Council on Labor Law Equality by Gerard C. Smetana and Michael E. Avakian; for the Food Marketing Institute by Eugene D. Ulterino; for the International Council of Shopping Centers, Inc., by Stephanie McEvily and Edward J. Sack; and for the National Retail Federation by John W. Noble, Jr., and Edward B. Miller. J. William Gagne, George R. Murphy, Peter J. Ford, David Silberman, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to clarify the relationship between the rights of employees under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and the property rights of their employers. I This case stems from the efforts of Local 919 of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO, to organize employees at a retail store in Newington, Connecticut, owned and operated by petitioner Lechmere, Inc. The store is located in the Lechmere Shopping Plaza, which occupies a roughly rectangular tract measuring approximately 880 feet from north to south and 740 feet from east to west. Lech-mere's store is situated at the Plaza's south end, with the main parking lot to its north. A strip of 13 smaller "satellite stores" not owned by Lechmere runs along the west side of the Plaza, facing the parking lot. To the Plaza's east (where the main entrance is located) runs the Berlin Turnpike, a four-lane divided highway. The parking 1st, however, does not abut the Turnpike; they are separated by a 46-foot-wide grassy strip, broken only by the Plaza's entrance. The parking lot is owned jointly by Lechmere ~nd the developer of the satellite stores. The grassy strip is public property (except for a 4-foot-wide band adjoining the parking lot, which belongs to Lechmere). The union began its campaign to organize the store's 200 employees, none of whom was represented by a union, in June 1987. After a full-page advertisement in a local newspaper drew little response, nonemployee union organizers entered Lechmere's parking 1~t and began placing handbills on the windshields of cars parked in a corner of the lot used mostly by employees. Lechmere's manager immediately confronted the organizers, informed them that Lechmere prohibited solicitation or handbill distribution of any kind on its property, and asked them to leave. They did so, and Lechmere personnel removed the handbills. The union organizers renewed this handbilling effort in the parking lot on several subsequent occasions; each time they were asked to leave and the handbills were removed. The organizers then relocated to the public grassy strip, from where they attempted to pass out handbills to cars entering the lot during hours (before opening and after closing) when the drivers were assumed to be primarily store employees. For one month, the union organizers returned daily to the grassy strip to picket Lechmere; after that, they picketed intermittently for another six months. They also recorded the license plate numbers of cars parked in the employee parking area; with the cooperation of the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles, they thus secured the names and addresses of some 41 nonsupervisory employees (roughly 20% of the store’s total). The union sent four mailings to these employees; it also made some attempts to contact them by phone or home visits. These mailings and visits resulted in one signed union authorization card. Alleging that Lechmere had violated the NLRA by barring the nonemployee organizers from its property, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with respondent National Labor Relations Board (Board). Applying the criteria set forth by the Board in Fairmont Hotel Co., 282 N. L. R. B. 139 (1986), an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in the union’s favor. Lechmere, Inc., 295 N. L. R. B. 94 (1988). He recommended that Lechmere be ordered, among other things, to cease and desist from barring the union organizers from the parking lot and to post in conspicuous places in the store signs proclaiming in part: “WE WILL NOT prohibit representatives of Local 919, United Food and Commercial Workers, AFL-CIO (‘the Union’) or any other labor organization, from distributing union literature to our employees in the parking lot adjacent to our store in Newington, Connecticut, nor will we attempt to cause them to be removed from our parking lot for attempting to do so.” Ibid. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s judgment and adopted the recommended order, applying the analysis set forth in its opinion in Jean Country, 291 N. L. R. B. 11 (1988), which had by then replaced the short-lived Fairmont Hotel approach. 295 N. L. R. B. 92 (1989). A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied Lech-mere’s petition for review and enforced the Board’s order. 914 F. 2d 313 (1990). This Court granted certiorari, 499 U. S. 918 (1991). II A Section 7 of the NLRA provides in relevant part that “[ejmployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations.” 29 U. S. C. § 157. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, in turn, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [§7].” 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1). By its plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956), however, we recognized that insofar as the employees’ “right of self-organization depends in some measure on [their] ability... to learn the advantages of self-organization from others,” id., at 113, § 7 of the NLRA may, in certain limited circumstances, restrict an employer’s right to exclude nonemployee union organizers from his property. It is the nature of those circumstances that we explore today. Babcock arose out of union attempts to organize employees at a factory located on an isolated 100-acre tract. The company had a policy against solicitation and distribution of literature on its property, which it enforced against all groups. About 40% of the company’s employees lived in a town of some 21,000 persons near the factory; the remainder were scattered over a 30-mile radius. Almost all employees drove to work in private cars and parked in a company lot that adjoined the fenced-in plant area. The parking lot could be reached only by a 100-yard-long driveway connecting it to a public highway. This driveway was mostly on company-owned land, except where it crossed a 31-foot-wide public right-of-way adjoining the highway. Union organizers attempted to distribute literature from this right-of-way. The union also secured the names and addresses of some 100 employees (20% of the total) and sent them three mailings. Still other employees were contacted by telephone or home visit. The union successfully challenged the company’s refusal to allow nonemployee organizers onto its property before the Board. While acknowledging that there were alternative, nontrespassory means whereby the union could communicate with employees, the Board held that contact at the workplace was preferable. The Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N. L. R. B. 485, 493-494 (1954). “[T]he right to distribute is not absolute, but must be accommodated to the circumstances. Where it is impossible or unreasonably difficult for a union to distribute organizational literature to employees entirely off of the employer’s premises, distribution on a nonworking area, such as the parking lot and the walkways between the parking lot and the gate, may be warranted.” Id., at 493. Concluding that traffic on the highway made it unsafe for the union organizers to distribute leaflets from the right-of-way and that contacts through the mails, on the streets, at employees’ homes, and over the telephone would be ineffective, the Board ordered the company to allow the organizers to distribute literature on the company’s parking lot and exterior walkways. Id., at 486-487. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s order, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F. 2d 316 (1955), and this Court affirmed. While recognizing that “the Board has the responsibility of ‘applying the Act’s general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its terms,’” 351 U. S., at 111-112 (quoting NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U. S. 226, 231 (1949)), we explained that the Board had erred by failing to make the critical distinction between the organizing activities of employees (to whom § 7 guarantees the right of self-organization) and nonemploy-ees (to whom §7 applies only derivatively). Thus, while “[n]o restriction may be placed on the employees’ right to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production or discipline,” 351 U. S., at 113 (emphasis added) (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793, 803 (1945)), “no such obligation is owed nonem-ployee organizers,” 351 U. S., at 113. As a rule, then, an employer cannot be compelled to allow distribution of union literature by nonemployee organizers on his property. As with many other rules, however, we recognized an exception. Where “the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them,” ibid., employers’ property rights may be “required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to organize,” id., at 112. Although we have not had occasion to apply Babcock’s analysis in the ensuing decades, we have described it in cases arising in related contexts. Two such cases, Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U. S. 539 (1972), and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507 (1976), involved activity by union supporters on employer-owned property. The principal issue in both cases was whether, based upon Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U. S. 308 (1968), the First Amendment protected such activities. In both cases we rejected the First Amendment claims, and in Hudgens we made it clear that Logan Valley was overruled. Having decided the cases on constitutional grounds, we remanded them to the Board for consideration of the union supporters’ §7 claims under Babcock. In both cases, we quoted approvingly Babcock’s admonition that accommodation between employees’ § 7 rights and employers’ property rights “must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other,” 351 U. S., at 112. See Central Hardware, supra, at 544; Hudgens, supra, at 521, 522. There is no hint in Hudgens and Central Hardware, however, that our invocation of Babcock’s language of “accommodation” was intended to repudiate or modify Bab-cock’s holding that an employer need not accommodate non-employee organizers unless the employees are otherwise inaccessible. Indeed, in Central Hardware we expressly noted that nonemployee organizers cannot claim even a limited right of access to a nonconsenting employer’s property until “[a]fter the requisite need for access to the employer’s property has been shown.” 407 U. S., at 545. If there was any question whether Central Hardware and Hudgens changed § 7 law, it should have been laid to rest by Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180 (1978). As in Central Hardware and Hudgens, the substantive § 7 issue in Sears was a subsidiary one; the case’s primary focus was on the circumstances under which the NLRA pre-empts state law. Among other things, we held in Sears that arguable § 7 claims do not pre-empt state trespass law, in large part because the trespasses of nonemployee union organizers are “far more likely to be unprotected than protected,” 436 U. S., at 205; permitting state courts to evaluate such claims, therefore, does not “create an unacceptable risk of interference with conduct which the Board, and a court reviewing the Board’s decision, would find protected,” ibid. This holding was based upon the following interpretation of Babcock: “While Babcock indicates that an employer may not always bar nonemployee union organizers from his property, his right to do so remains the general rule. To gain access, the union has the burden of showing that no other reasonable means of communicating its organizational message to the employees exists or that the employer’s access rules discriminate against union solicitation. That the burden imposed on the union is a heavy one is evidenced by the fact that the balance struck by the Board and the courts under the Babcock accommodation principle has rarely been in favor of trespassory organizational activity.” 436 U. S., at 205 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). We further noted that, in practice, nonemployee organizational trespassing had generally been prohibited except where “unique obstacles” prevented nontrespassory methods of communication with the employees. Id., at 205-206, n. 41. B Jean Country, as noted above, represents the Board’s latest attempt to implement the rights guaranteed by §7. It sets forth a three-factor balancing test: “[I]n all access cases our essential concern will be [1] the degree of impairment of the Section 7 right if access should be denied, as it balances against [2] the degree of impairment of the private property right if access should be granted. We view the consideration of [3] the availability of reasonably effective alternative means as especially significant in this balancing process.” 291 N. L. R. B., at 14. The Board conceded that this analysis was unlikely to foster certainty and predictability in this corner of the law, but declared that “as with other legal questions involving multiple factors, the ‘nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations, inevitably involves an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive formula as a comprehensive answer.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 667, 674 (1961)). Citing its role “as the agency with responsibility for implementing national labor policy,” the Board maintains in this case that Jean Country is a reasonable interpretation of the NLRA entitled to judicial deference. Brief for Respondent 18, and n. 8; Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. It is certainly true, and we have long recognized, that the Board has the “special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.” NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963); see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 196-197 (1941). Like other administrative agencies, the NLRB is entitled to judicial deference when it interprets an ambiguous provision of a statute that it administers. See, e.g., NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U. S. 112, 123 (1987); cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). Before we reach any issue of deference to the Board, however, we must first determine whether Jean Country — at least as applied to nonemployee organizational trespassing— is consistent with our past interpretation of § 7. “Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute’s meaning.” Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 131 (1990). In Babcock, as explained above, we held that the Act drew a distinction “of substance,” 351 U. S., at 113, between the union activities of employees and nonemployees. In cases involving employee activities, we noted with approval, the Board “balanced the conflicting interests of employees to receive information on self-organization on the company’s property from fellow employees during nonworking time, with the employer’s right to control the use of his property.” Id., at 109-110. In cases involving nonemployee activities (like those at issue in Babcock itself), however, the Board was not permitted to engage in that same balancing (and we reversed the Board for having done so). By reversing the Board’s interpretation of the statute for failing to distinguish between the organizing activities of employees and nonemploy-ees, we were saying, in Chevron terms, that §7 speaks to the issue of nonemployee access to an employer’s property. Babcock’s teaching is straightforward: §7 simply does not protect nonemployee union organizers except in the rare case where “the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels,” 351 U. S., at 112. Our reference to “reasonable” attempts was nothing more than a commonsense recognition that unions need not engage in extraordinary feats to communicate with inaccessible employees — not an endorsement of the view (which we expressly rejected) that the Act protects “reasonable” trespasses. Where reasonable alternative means of access exist, § 7’s guarantees do not authorize trespasses by nonemployee organizers, even (as we noted in Babcock, ibid.) “under . . . reasonable regulations” established by the Board. Jean Country, which applies broadly to “all access cases,” 291 N. L. R. B., at 14, misapprehends this critical point. Its principal inspiration derives not from Babcock, but from the following sentence in Hudgens: “[T]he locus of th[e] accommodation [between §7 rights and private property rights] may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given context.” 424 U. S., at 522. From this sentence the Board concluded that it was appropriate to approach every case by balancing §7 rights against property rights, with alternative means of access thrown in as nothing more than an “especially significant” consideration. As explained above, however, Hud-gens did not purport to modify Babcock, much less to alter it fundamentally in the way Jean Country suggests. To say that our cases require accommodation between employees’ and employers’ rights is a true but incomplete statement, for the cases also go far in establishing the locus of that accommodation where nonemployee organizing is at issue. So long as nonemployee union organizers have reasonable access to employees outside an employer’s property, the requisite accommodation has taken place. It is only where such access is infeasible that it becomes necessary and proper to take the accommodation inquiry to a second level, balancing the employees’ and employers’ rights as described in the Hudgens dictum. See Sears, 436 U. S., at 205; Central Hardware, 407 U. S., at 545. At least as applied to nonem-ployees, Jean Country impermissibly conflates these two stages of the inquiry — thereby significantly eroding Bab-cock’s general rule that “an employer may validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of union literature,” 351 U. S., at 112. We reaffirm that general rule today, and reject the Board’s attempt to recast it as a multifactor balancing test. c The threshold inquiry in this case, then, is whether the facts here justify application of Babcock’s inaccessibility exception. The ALJ below observed that “the facts herein convince me that reasonable alternative means [of communicating with Lechmere’s employees] were available to the Union,” 295 N. L. R. B., at 99 (emphasis added). Reviewing the ALJ’s decision under Jean Country, however, the Board reached a different conclusion on this point, asserting that “there was no reasonable, effective alternative means available for the Union to communicate its message to [Lech-mere’s] employees.” Id., at 93. We cannot accept the Board’s conclusion, because it “rest[s] on erroneous legal foundations,” Babcock, supra, at 112; see also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 290-292 (1965). As we have explained, the exception to Babcock’s rule is a narrow one.' It does not apply wherever nontrespassory access to employees may be cumbersome or less-than-ideally effective, but only where “the location of a plant 'and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them,” 351 U. S., at 113 (emphasis added). Classic examples include logging camps, see NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F. 2d 147 (CA6 1948); mining camps, see Alaska Barite Co., 197 N. L. R. B. 1023 (1972), enforced mem., 83 LRRM 2992 (CA9), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1025 (1973); and mountain resort hotels, see NLRB v.S&H Grossinger’s Inc., 372 F. 2d 26 (CA2 1967). Babcock’s exception was crafted precisely to protect the § 7 rights of those employees who, by virtue of their employment, are isolated from the ordinary flow of information that characterizes our society. The union’s burden of establishing such isolation is, as we have explained, “a heavy one,” Sears, supra, at 205, and one not satisfied by mere conjecture or the expression of doubts concerning the effectiveness of nontrespassory means of communication. The Board’s conclusion in this case that the union had no reasonable means short of trespass to make Lechmere’s employees aware of its organizational efforts is based on a misunderstanding of the limited scope of this exception. Because the employees do not reside on Lechmere’s property, they are presumptively not “beyond the reach,” Babcock, 351 U. S., at 113, of the union’s message. Although the employees live in a large metropolitan area (Greater Hartford), that fact does not in itself render them “inaccessible” in the sense contemplated by Babcock. See Monogram Models, Inc., 192 N. L. R. B. 705, 706 (1971). Their accessibility is suggested by the union’s success in contacting a substantial percentage of them directly, via mailings, phone calls, and home visits. Such direct contact, of course, is not a necessary element of “reasonably effective” communication; signs or advertising also may suffice. In this case, the union tried advertising in local newspapers; the Board said that this was not reasonably effective because it was expensive and might not reach the employees. 295 N. L. R. B., at 93. Whatever the merits of that conclusion, other alternative means of communication were readily available. Thus, signs (displayed, for example, from the public grassy strip adjoining Lechmere’s parking lot) would have informed the employees about the union’s organizational efforts. (Indeed, union organizers picketed the shopping center’s main entrance for months as employees came and went every day.) Access to employees, not success in winning them over,, is: the critical issue — although success, or lack thereof, may be relevant in determining whether reasonable access exists. Because the union in this case failed to establish the existence of any “unique obstacles,” Sears, 436 U. S., at 205-206, n. 41, that frustrated access to Lechmere’s employees, the Board erred in concluding that Lechmere committed an unfair labor practice by barring the nonemployee organizers from its property. The judgment of the First Circuit is therefore reversed, and enforcement of the Board’s order is denied. It is so ordered. Lechmere had established this policy several years prior to the union’s organizing efforts. The store’s official policy statement provided, in relevant part: “Non-associates [i. e., nonemployees] are prohibited from soliciting and distributing literature at all times anywhere on Company property, including parking lots. Non-associates have no right of access to the non-working areas and only to the public and selling areas of the store in connection with its public use.” Brief for Petitioner 7. On each door to the store Lechmere had posted a 6- by 8-inch sign reading: “TO THE PUBLIC. No Soliciting, Canvassing, Distribution of Literature or Trespassing by Non-Employees in or on Premises.” App. 115— 116. Lechmere consistently enforced this policy inside the store as well as on the parking lot (against, among.Qthers, the Salvation Army and the Girl Scouts). Under the (pre-Jean Country) Fairmont Hotel analysis applied by the ALJ, it was only where the employees’ § 7 rights and an employer’s property rights were deemed “relatively equal in strength,” Fairmont Hotel Co., 282 N. L. R. B. 139, 142 (1986), that the adequacy of nontrespassory means of communication became relevant. Because the ALJ found that the §7 rights involved here outweighed Lechmere’s property rights, he had no need to address the latter issue. He did so, he explained, only because of the possibility that his evaluation of the relative weights of the rights might not be upheld. 295 N. L. R. B. 94, 99 (1988).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS et al. v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE et al. No. 06-340. Argued April 17, 2007 Decided June 25, 2007 Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 673. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 698. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioner Environmental Protection Agency were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General McKeown, Malcolm L. Stewart, Andrew C. Mergen, and David C. Shilton. Norman D. James, Duane J. Desiderio, Thomas J. Ward, and Russell S. Frye filed briefs for petitioners National Association of Home Builders et al. in No. 06-340. Terry Goddard, Attorney General of Arizona, Mary O’Grady, Solicitor General, Paula Bickett, Chief Counsel, and James T. Skardon, Assistant Attorney General, filed briefs for the State of Arizona as respondent under this Court's Rule 12.6, in support of petitioners. Eric R. Glitzenstein argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Katherine A. Meyer and Michael P. Senatore. Together with No. 06-549, Environmental Protection Agency v. Defenders of Wildlife et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the State of Nebraska et al. by Jon C. Bruning, Attorney General of Nebraska, David D. Cookson, Assistant Attorney General, and Donald G. Blankenau and Thomas R. Wilmoth, Special Assistant Attorneys General, by Roberto J. Sdnchez-Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General and other officials for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Gary K King of New Mexico, and Stephen R. Farris and Frances C. Bassett, Assistant Attorneys General of New Mexico, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; for the American Farm Bureau Federation by Ellen Steen and Thomas R. Intndquist; for the American Road and Transportation Builders Association et al. by Lawrence R. Liebesman and Nick Gold-stein; for the Arizona Power Authority et al. by Virginia S. Albrecht, Karma B. Brown, and Kathy Robb; for the Association of California Water Agencies et al. by Roderick E. Walston, Karen L. Tachiki, John C. Clair-day, Linus Masouredis, Daniel O’Hanlon, Christopher Onstott, Daniel S. Hentschke, Peter D. Nichols, Robert V. Trout, and Peggy E. Montano; for CropLife America by Douglas T. Nelson, Steven P. Quarles, and J. Mi chael Klise; for the Federal Water Quality Coalition by Daniel P. Albers; for High Production Homebuilders by Carter G. Phillips, Stephen M. Nickelsburg, and Eric A Shumsky; for the National Hydropower Association et al. by Sam Kalen and Michael A Swiger; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A Samp; and for the Western Urban Water Coalition by Benjamin S. Sharp and Guy R. Martin. M. Reed Hopper filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 06-340. Roger J. Marzulla and Nancie G. Marzulla filed a brief for the Kern County Water Agency et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in No. 06-549. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the American Bird Conservancy et al. by Michael J. Bean; and for Jared M. Diamond et al. by Daniel J. Rohlf. Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both cases for the American Fisheries Society et al. by Jan E. Hasselman, Patti A Goldman, John F. Kostyack, and Mary Randolph Sargent; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by William Perry Pendley; and for the National Association of Clean Water Agencies by William A Anderson II, Sean M. Sullivan, D. Cameron Prell, and Alexandra D. Dunn. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases concern the interplay between two federal environmental statutes. Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act requires that the Environmental Protection Agency transfer certain permitting powers to state authorities upon an application and a showing that nine specified criteria have been met. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 provides that a federal agency must consult with agencies designated by the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior in order to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.” The question presented is whether §7(a)(2) effectively operates as a tenth criterion on which the transfer of permitting power under the first statute must be conditioned. We conclude that it does not. The transfer of permitting authority to state authorities — who will exercise that authority under continuing federal oversight to ensure compliance with relevant mandates of the Endangered Species Act and other federal environmental protection statutes — was proper. We therefore reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I A 1 The Clean Water Act (CWA), 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., established a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) that is designed to prevent harmful discharges into the Nation’s waters. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency) initially administers the NPDES permitting system for each State, but a State may apply for a transfer of permitting authority to state officials. See 33 U. S. C. § 1342; see also § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of Congress that the Stat[e]... implement the permit progra[m] under sectio[n] 1342 ... of this title”). If authority is transferred, then state officials — not the federal EPA — have the primary responsibility for reviewing and approving NPDES discharge permits, albeit with continuing EPA oversight. Under § 402(b) of the CWA, “the Governor of each State desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction may submit to [the EPA] a foil and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact,” as well as a certification “that the laws of such State . . . provide adequate authority to carry out the described program.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). The same section provides that the EPA “shall approve each submitted program” for transfer of permitting authority to a State “unless [it] determines that adequate authority does not exist” to ensure that nine specified criteria are satisfied. Ibid. These criteria all relate to whether the state agency that will be responsible for permitting has the requisite authority under state law to administer the NPDES program. 2 If the criteria are met, the transfer must be approved. 2 The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., is intended to protect and conserve endangered and threatened species and their habitats. Section 4 of the ESA directs the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior to list threatened and endangered species and to designate their critical habitats. §1533. The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) administers the ESA with respect to species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, while the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) administers the ESA with respect to species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce. See 50 CFR §§17.11, 222.101(a), 223.102, 402.01(b) (2006). Section 7 of the ESA prescribes the steps that federal agencies must take to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize endangered wildlife and flora. Section 7(a)(2) provides that “[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of Commerce or the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an ‘agency action’) is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.” 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2). Once the consultation process contemplated by § 7(a)(2) has been completed, the Secretary is required to give the agency a written biological opinion “setting forth the Secretary’s opinion, and a summary of the information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the species or its critical habitat.” § 1536(b)(3)(A); see also 50 CFR §402.14(h). If the Secretary concludes that the agency action would place the listed species in jeopardy or adversely modify its critical habitat, “the Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives which he believes would not violate [§ 7(a)(2)] and can be taken by the Federal agency ... in implementing the agency action.” 16 U. S. C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); see also 50 CFR § 402.14(h)(3). Regulations promulgated jointly by the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior provide that, in order to qualify as a “reasonable and prudent alternative,” an alternative course of action must be able to be implemented in a way “consistent with the scope of the Federal agency’s legal authority and jurisdiction.” §402.02. Following the issuance of a “jeopardy” opinion, the agency must either terminate the action, implement the proposed alternative, or seek an exemption from the Cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee pursuant to 16 U. S. C. § 1536(e). The regulations also provide that “Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.” 50 CFR § 402.03. B 1 In February 2002, Arizona officials applied for EPA authorization to administer that State’s NPDES program. The EPA initiated consultation with the FWS to determine whether the transfer of permitting authority would adversely affect any listed species. The FWS regional office concluded that the transfer of authority would not cause any direct impact on water quality that would adversely affect listed species. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, p. 564. However, the FWS office was concerned that the transfer could result in the issuance of more discharge permits, which would lead to more development, which in turn could have an indirect adverse effect on the habitat of certain upland species, such as the cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl and the Pima pineapple cactus. Specifically, the FWS feared that, because § 7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement does not apply to permitting decisions by state authorities, the transfer of authority would empower Arizona officials to issue individual permits without considering and mitigating their indirect impact on these upland species. Id., at 565-566. The FWS regional office therefore urged that, in considering the proposed transfer of permitting authority, those involved in the consultation process should take these potential indirect impacts into account. The EPA disagreed, maintaining that “its approval action, which is an administrative transfer of authority, [would not be] the cause of future non-discharge-related impacts on endangered species from projects requiring State NPDES permits.” Id., at 564. As a factual matter, the EPA believed that the link between the transfer of permitting authority and the potential harm that could result from increased development was too attenuated. Ibid. And as a legal matter, the EPA concluded that the mandatory nature of CWA § 402(b) — which directs that the EPA “shall approve” a transfer request if that section’s nine statutory criteria are met — stripped it of authority to disapprove a transfer based on any other considerations. Id., at 564-565. Pursuant to procedures set forth in a memorandum of understanding between the agencies, the dispute was referred to the agencies’ national offices for resolution. In December 2002, the FWS issued its biological opinion, which concluded that the requested transfer would not cause jeopardy to listed species. The opinion reasoned that “the loss of section 7-related conservation benefits ... is not an indirect effect of the authorization action,” id., at 117, because “loss of any conservation benefit is not caused by EPA’s decision to approve the State of Arizona’s program. Rather, the absence of the section 7 process that exists with respect to Federal NPDES permits reflects Congress’ decision to grant States the right to administer these programs under state law provided the State’s program meets the requirements of [section] 402(b) of the Clean Water Act.” Id., at 114. In addition, the FWS opined that the EPA’s continuing oversight of Arizona’s permitting program, along with other statutory protections, would adequately protect listed species and their habitats following the transfer. Id., at 101-107. The EPA concluded that Arizona had met each of the nine statutory criteria listed in § 402(b) and approved the transfer of permitting authority. In the notice announcing the approval of the transfer, the EPA noted that the issuance of the FWS’ biological opinion had “conclude[d] the consultation process required by ESA section 7(a)(2) and reflects the [FWS’] agreement with EPA that the approval of the State program meets the substantive requirements of the ESA.” Id., at 78. 2 On April 2,2003, respondents filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seeking review of the transfer pursuant to 33 U. S. C. § 1369(b)(1)(D), which allows private parties to seek direct review of the EPA’s determinations regarding state permitting programs in the federal courts of appeals. The court granted petitioner National Association of Home Builders leave to intervene as a respondent in that case. Respondent Defenders of Wildlife also filed a separate action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging, among other things, that the biological opinion issued by the FWS in support of the proposed transfer did not comply with the ESA’s standards. The District Court severed that claim and transferred it to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which consolidated the case with the suit challenging the EPA transfer. See 420 F. 3d 946 (2005). A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA’s approval of the transfer was arbitrary and capricious because the EPA “relied during the administrative proceedings on legally contradictory positions regarding its section 7 obligations.” Id., at 959. The court concluded that the EPA “fail[ed] to understand its own authority under section 7(a)(2) to act on behalf of listed species and their habitat,” id., at 977, because “the two propositions that underlie the EPA’s action — that (1) it must, under the [ESA], consult concerning transfers of CWA permitting authority, but (2) it is not permitted, as a matter of law, to take into account the impact on listed species in making the transfer decision — cannot both be true,” id., at 961. The court therefore concluded that it was required to “remand to the agency for a plausible explanation of its decision, based on a single, coherent interpretation of the statute.” Id., at 962. The panel majority, however, did not follow this course of action. Rather, the panel went on to review the EPA's substantive construction of the statutes at issue and held that the ESA granted the EPA both the power and the duty to determine whether its transfer decision would jeopardize threatened or endangered species. The panel did not dispute that Arizona had met the nine criteria set forth in § 402(b) of the CWA, but the panel nevertheless concluded that § 7(a)(2) of the ESA provided an “affirmative grant of authority to attend to [the] protection of listed species,” id., at 965, in effect adding a tenth criterion to those specified in § 402(b). The panel dismissed the argument that the EPA’s approval of the transfer application was not subject to § 7(a)(2) because it was not a “discretionary action” within the meaning of 50 CFR §402.03 (interpreting § 7(a)(2) to apply only to agency actions “in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control”). 420 F. 3d, at 967-969. It viewed the FWS’ regulation as merely “coterminous” with the express statutory language encompassing all agency actions that are “ ‘authorized, funded, or carried out’ ” by the agency. Id., at 969 (quoting 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2)). On these grounds, the court granted the petition and vacated the EPA’s transfer decision. In dissent, Judge Thompson explained that the transfer decision was not a “discretionary action” under 50 CFR §402.03 because “[t]he Clean Water Act, by its very terms, permits the EPA to consider only the nine specified factors. If a state’s proposed permitting program meets the enumerated requirements,” he reasoned, “the EPA administrator ‘shall approve’ the program. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). This [congressional directive does not permit the EPA to impose additional conditions.” 420 F. 3d, at 980. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc. 450 F. 3d 394 (2006). Writing for the six judges who dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski disagreed with the panel’s conclusion that the EPA’s analysis was so internally inconsistent as to be arbitrary and capricious. He further noted that, if the panel was correct on this point, the proper resolution would have been to remand to the EPA for further explanation. Id., at 396-398. On the statutory question, Judge Kozinski echoed Judge Thompson’s conclusion that once the nine criteria set forth in § 402(b) of the CWA are satisfied, a transfer is mandatory and nondiscretionary. Id., at 397-399. He rejected the panel majority’s broad construction of ESA § 7(a)(2), concluding that “[i]f the ESA were as powerful as the majority contends, it would modify not only the EPA’s obligation under the CWA, but every categorical mandate applicable to every federal agency.” Id., at 399, n. 4. The Ninth Circuit’s construction of § 7(a)(2) is at odds with that of other Courts of Appeals. Compare 420 F. 3d 946 (case below) with Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 962 F. 2d 27, 33-34 (CADC 1992), and American Forest & Paper Assn. v. EPA, 137 F. 3d 291, 298-299 (CA5 1998). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 549 U. S. 1105 (2007), and we now reverse. II Before addressing this question of statutory interpretation, however, we first consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the EPA’s transfer decision was arbitrary and capricious because, in that court’s words, the agencies involved in the decision “relied... on legally contradictory positions regarding [their] section 7 obligations.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, at 23. As an initial matter, we note that if the EPA’s action was arbitrary and capricious, as the Ninth Circuit held, the proper course would have been to remand to the Agency for clarification of its reasons. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U. S. 183 (2006) (per curiam). Indeed, the court below expressly recognized that this finding required it to “remand to the Agency for a plausible explanation of its decision, based on a single, coherent interpretation of the statute.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, at 28. But the Ninth Circuit did not take this course; instead, it jumped ahead to resolve the merits of the dispute. In so doing, it erroneously deprived the Agency of its usual administrative avenue for explaining and reconciling the arguably contradictory rationales that sometimes appear in the course of lengthy and complex administrative decisions. We need not examine this question further, however, because we conclude that the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the EPA’s action was arbitrary and capricious is not fairly supported by the record. Review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential; we will not vacate an agency’s decision unless it “has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). ‘We will, however, ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Ibid. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 286 (1974)). The Court of Appeals concluded that the EPA’s decision was “internally inconsistent” because, in its view, the Agency stated — both during preliminary review of Arizona’s transfer application and in the Federal Register notice memorializing its final action — “that section 7 requires consultation regarding the effect of a permitting transfer on listed species.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, at 23. With regard to the various statements made by the involved agencies’ regional offices during the early stages of consideration, the only “inconsistency” respondents can point to is the fact that the agencies changed their minds — something that, as long as the proper procedures were followed, they were fully entitled to do. The federal courts ordinarily are empowered to review only an agency’s final action, see 5 U. S. C. § 704, and the fact that a preliminary determination by a local agency representative is later overruled at a higher level within the agency does not render the decision-making process arbitrary and capricious. Respondents also point to the final Federal Register notice memorializing the EPA’s approval of Arizona’s transfer application. This notice stated that the FWS’ issuance of its biological opinion had “concludefd] the consultation process required by ESA section 7(a)(2).” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, at 73. Respondents contend that this statement is inconsistent with the EPA’s previously expressed position — and their position throughout this litigation — that §7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement is not triggered by a transfer application under § 402 of the CWA. We are not persuaded that this statement constitutes the type of error that requires a remand. By the time the Federal Register statement was issued, the EPA had already consulted with the FWS about the Arizona application, and the question whether that consultation had been required, as opposed to voluntarily undertaken by the Agency, was simply not germane to the final agency transfer decision. The Federal Register statement, in short, was dictum, and it had no bearing on the final agency action that respondents challenge. Mindful of Congress’ admonition that in reviewing agency action, “due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error,” 5 U. S. C. § 706, we do not believe that this stray statement, which could have had no effect on the underlying agency action being challenged, requires that we further delay the transfer of permitting authority to Arizona by remanding to the Agency for clarification. See also PDK Labs. Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F. 3d 786, 799 (CADC 2004) (“In administrative law, as in federal civil and criminal litigation, there is a harmless error rule”). We further disagree with respondents’ suggestion that, by allegedly altering its legal position while the Arizona transfer decision and its associated litigation was pending, the “EPA is effectively nullifying respondents’ rights to participate in administrative proceedings concerning Arizona’s application, and particularly respondents’ rights under EPA’s own regulations to comment on NPDES transfer applications.” Brief for Respondents 28 (citing 40 CFR § 123.61(b); emphasis deleted). Consistent with EPA regulations, the Agency made available “a comment period of not less than 45 days during which interested members of the public [could] express their views on the State program.” § 123.61(a)(1). Respondents do not suggest that they were deprived of their right to comment during this period. Respondents also contend that if the case were remanded to the EPA, they would raise additional challenges — including, for example, a challenge to the EPA’s provision of financial assistance to Arizona for the administration of its NPDES program. However, as explained below, any such agency action is separate and independent of the agency’s decision to authorize the transfer of permitting authority pursuant to § 402(b). See n. 11, infra. We express no opinion as to the viability of a separate administrative or legal challenge to such actions. III A We turn now to the substantive statutory question raised by the petitions, a question that requires us to mediate a clash of seemingly categorical — and, at first glance, irreconcilable — legislative commands. Section 402(b) of the CWA provides, without qualification, that the EPA “shall approve” a transfer application unless it determines that the State lacks adequate authority to perform the nine functions specified in the section. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). By its terms, the statutory language is mandatory and the list exclusive; if the nine specified criteria are satisfied, the EPA does not have the discretion to deny a transfer application. Cf. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U. S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress’ “use of a mandatory ‘shall’ ... to impose discretionless obligations”); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion”); Association of Civil Technicians v. FLRA, 22 F. 3d 1150, 1153 (CADC 1994) (“The word ‘shall’ generally indicates a command that admits of no discretion on the part of the person instructed to carry out the directive”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (“As used in statutes ... this word is generally imperative or mandatory”). Neither respondents nor the Ninth Circuit has ever disputed that Arizona satisfied each of these nine criteria. See 420 F. 3d, at 963, n. 11; Brief for Respondents 19, n. 8. The language of § 7(a)(2) of the ESA is similarly imperative: It provides that “[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any aetion authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize” endangered or threatened species or their habitats. 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2). This mandate is to be carried out through consultation and may require the agency to adopt an alternative course of action. As the author of the panel opinion below recognized, applying this language literally would “ad[dJ one [additional] requirement to the list of considerations under the Clean Water Act permitting transfer provision.” 450 F. 3d, at 404, n. 2 (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis in original). That is, it would effectively repeal the mandatory and exclusive list of criteria set forth in § 402(b), and replace it with a new, expanded list that includes §7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy requirement. B While a later enacted statute (such as the ESA),can sometimes operate to amend or even repeal an earlier statutory provision (such as the CWA), “repeals by implication are not favored” and will not be presumed unless the “intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 267 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will not infer a statutory repeal “unless the later statute ‘“expressly contradices] the original act”’ or unless such a construction ‘“is absolutely necessary ... in order that [the] words [of the later statute] shall have any meaning at all.” ’ ” Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U. S. 535, 548 (1988) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 158 (1976), in turn quoting T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 98 (2d ed. 1874)); see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (“An implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable conflict/ or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute’”); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936) (“[T]he intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest”). Outside these limited circumstances, “a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower, supra, at 153. Here, reading § 7(a)(2) as the Court of Appeals did would effectively repeal §402(b)’s statutory mandate by engrafting . a tenth criterion onto the CWA. Section 402(b) of the CWA commands that the EPA “shall” issue a permit whenever all nine exclusive statutory prerequisites are met. Thus, § 402(b) does not just set forth minimum requirements for the transfer of permitting authority; it affirmatively mandates that the transfer “shall” be approved if the specified criteria are met. The provision operates as a ceiling as well as a floor. By adding an additional criterion, the Ninth Circuit’s construction of § 7(a)(2) raises that floor and alters §402(b)’s statutory command. The Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 7(a)(2) would not only abrogate §402(b)’s statutory mandate, but also result in the implicit repeal of many additional otherwise categorical statutory commands. Section 7(a)(2) by its terms applies to “any action authorized, funded, or carried out by” a federal agency — covering, in effect, almost anything that an agency might do. Reading the provision broadly would thus partially override every federal statute mandating agency action by subjecting such action to the further condition that it pose no jeopardy to endangered species. See, e. g., Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 962 F. 2d, at 33-34 (considering whether § 7(a)(2) overrides the Federal Power Act’s prohibition on amending annual power licenses). While the language of § 7(a)(2) does not explicitly repeal any provision of the CWA (or any other statute), reading it for all that it might be worth runs foursquare into our presumption against implied repeals. C 1 The agencies charged with implementing the ESA have attempted to resolve this tension through regulations implemeriting § 7(a)(2). The NMFS and the FWS, acting jointly on behalf of the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior and following notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, have promulgated a regulation stating that “Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.” 50 CFR §402.03 (emphasis added). Pursuant to this regulation, § 7(a)(2) would not be read as impliedly repealing non-discretionary statutory mandates, even when they might result in some agency action. Rather, the ESA’s requirements would come into play only when an action results from the exercise of agency discretion. This interpretation harmonizes the statutes by giving effect to the ESA’s no-jeopardy mandate whenever an agency has discretion to do so, but not when the agency is prohibited from considering such extra-statutory factors. We have recognized that “[t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation” of the statutory scheme. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 703 (1995). But such deference is appropriate only where “Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue” through the statutory text. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984). “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. ... [However,] if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., at 842-843. In making the threshold determination under Chevron, “a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132 (2000). Rather, “[t]he meaning — or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.... It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’ ” Id., at 182-133 (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989)). We must therefore read § 7(a)(2) of the ESA against the statutory backdrop of the many mandatory agency directives whose operation it would implicitly abrogate or repeal if it were construed as broadly as the Ninth Circuit did below. When § 7(a)(2) is read this way, we are left with a fundamental ambiguity that is not resolved by the statutory text. An agency cannot simultaneously obey the differing mandates set forth in § 7(a)(2) of the ESA and § 402(b) of the CWA, and consequently the statutory language — read in light of the canon against implied repeals — does not itself provide clear guidance as to which command must give way. In this situation, it is appropriate to look to the implementing agency’s expert interpretation, which cabins §7(a)(2)’s application to “actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.” 50 CFR §402.03. This reading harmonizes the statutes by applying § 7(a)(2) to guide agencies’ existing discretionary authority, but not reading it to override express statutory mandates. 2 We conclude that this interpretation is reasonable in light of the statute’s text and the overall statutory scheme, and that it is therefore entitled to deference under Chevron. Section 7(a)(2) requires that an agency “insure” that the actions it authorizes, funds, or carries out are not likely to jeopardize listed species or their habitats. To “insure” something — as the court below recognized — means “ '[t]o make certain, to secure, to guarantee (some thing, event, etc.).’” 420 F. 3d, at 963 (quoting 7 Oxford English Dictionary 1059 (2d ed. 1989)). The regulation’s focus on “discretionary” actions accords with the commonsense conclusion that, when an agency is required to do something by statute, it simply lacks the power to “insure” that such action will not jeopardize endangered species. This reasoning is supported by our decision in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752 (2004). That case concerned safety regulations that were promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and had the effect of triggering a Presidential directive allowing Mexican trucks to ply their trade on United States roads. The Court held that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) did not require the agency to assess the environmental effects of allowing the trucks entry because “the legally relevant cause of the entry of the Mexican trucks is not FMCSA’s action, but instead the actions of the President in lifting the moratorium and those of Congress in granting the President this authority while simultaneously limiting FMCSA’s discretion.” Id., at 769 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that “where an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of the effect.” Id., at 770. We do not suggest that Public Citizen controls the outcome here; § 7(a)(2), unlike NEPA, imposes a substantive (and not just a procedural) statutory requirement, and these cases involve agency action more directly related to environmental concerns than the FMCSA’s truck safety regulations. But the basic principle announced in Public Citizen — that an agency cannot be considered the legal “cause” of an action that it has no statutory discretion not to take — supports the reasonableness of the FWS’ interpretation of § 7(a)(2) as reaching only discretionary agency actions. See also California v. United States, 438 U. S. 645, 668, n. 21 (1978) (holding that a statutory requirement that federal operating agencies conform to state water usage rules applied only to the extent that it was not “inconsistent with other congressional directives”). 3 The court below simply disregarded §402.03’s interpretation of the ESA’s reach, dismissing “the regulation’s reference to ‘discretionary ... involvement’ ” as merely “congruent with the statutory reference to actions ‘authorized, funded, or carried out’ by the agency.” 420 F. 3d, at 968. But this reading cannot be right. Agency discretion presumes that an agency can exercise “judgment” in connection with a particular action. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 415-416 (1971); see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 411 (unabridged ed. 1967) (“discretion” defined as “the power or right to decide or act according to one’s own judgment; freedom of judgment or choice”). As the mandatory language of § 402(b) itself illustrates, not every action authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal agency is a product of that agency’s exercise of discretion. The dissent’s interpretation of §402.03 is similarly implausible. The dissent would read the regulation as simply clarifying that discretionary agency actions are included within the scope of § 7(a)(2), but not confining the statute’s reach to such actions. See post, at 679-682. But this reading would render the regulation entirely superfluous. Nothing in either § 7(a)(2) or the other agency regulations interpreting that section, see § 402.02, suggests that discretionary actions are excluded from the scope of the ESA, and there is thus no need for a separate regulation to bring them within the statute’s scope. On the dissent’s reading, §402.03’s reference to “discretionary” federal involvement is mere surplus-age, and we have cautioned against reading a text in a way that makes part of it redundant. See, e. g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001). This history of the regulation also supports the reading to which we defer today. As the dissent itself points out, the proposed version of §402.03 initially stated that “Section 7 and the requirements of this Part apply to all actions in which there is Federal involvement or control,” 48 Fed. Reg. 29999 (1983) (emphasis added); the Secretary of the Interior modified this language to provide (as adopted in the final rule now at issue) that the statuory requirements apply to “all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control,” 51 Fed. Reg. 19958 (1986) (emphasis added). The dissent’s reading would rob the word “discretionary” of any effect, and substitute the earlier, proposed version of the regulation for the text that was actually adopted. In short, we read §402.03 to mean what it says: that § 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy duty covers only discretionary agency actions and does not attach to actions (like the NPDES permitting transfer authorization) that an agency is required by statute to undertake once certain specified triggering events have occurred. This reading not only is reasonable, inasmuch as it gives effect to the ESA’s provision, but also comports with the canon against implied repeals because it stays §7(a)(2)’s mandate where it would effectively override otherwise mandatory statutory duties. D Respondents argue that our opinion in TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978), supports their contrary position. In that case, we held that the ESA prohibited the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from putting into operation the Tellico Dam — despite the fact that the agency had already spent over $100 million on the nearly completed project — because doing so would have threatened the critical habitat of the endangered snail darter. In language on which respondents rely, the Court concluded that “the ordinary meaning” of §7 of the ESA contained “no exemptions” and reflected “a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the ‘primary missions’ of federal agencies.” Id., at 173, 185, 188. TVA v. Hill, however, had no occasion to answer the question presented in these cases. That case was decided almost a decade before the adoption in 1986 of the regulations contained in 50 CFR § 402.03. And in any event, the construction project at issue in TVA v. Hill, while expensive, was also discretionary. The TVA argued that by continuing to make lump-sum appropriations to the TVA, some of which were informally earmarked for the Tellico Dam project, Congress had implicitly repealed §7’s no-jeopardy requirement as it applied to that project. See 437 U. S., at 189-193. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that “[t]he Appropriations Acts did not themselves identify the projects for which the sums had been appropriated” and that reports by congressional committees allegedly directing the TVA to complete the project lacked the force of law. Id., at 189, n. 35. Central to the Court’s decision was the conclusion that Congress did not mandate that the TVA put the dam into operation; there was no statutory command to that effect; and there was therefore no basis for contending that applying the ESA’s no-jeopardy requirement would implicitly repeal another affirmative congressional directive. TVA v. Hill thus supports the position, expressed in §402.03, that the ESA’s no-jeopardy mandate applies to every discretionary agency action — regardless of the expense or burden its application might impose. But that case did not speak to the question whether § 7(a)(2) applies to wow-discretionary actions, like the one at issue here. The regulation set forth in 50 CFR §402.03 addressed that question, and we defer to its reasonable interpretation. IV Finally, respondents and their amici argue that, even if § 7(a)(2) is read to apply only to “discretionary” agency actions, the decision to transfer NPDES permitting authority to Arizona represented such an exercise of discretion. They contend that the EPA’s decision to authorize a transfer is not entirely mechanical; that it involves some exercise of judgment as to whether a State has met the criteria set forth in § 402(b); and that these criteria incorporate references to wildlife conservation that bring consideration of §7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy mandate properly within the Agency’s discretion. The argument is unavailing. While the EPA may exercise some judgment in determining whether a State has demonstrated that it has the authority to carry out §4Q2(b)’s enumerated statutory criteria, the statute clearly does not grant it the discretion to add another entirely separate prerequisite to that list. Nothing in the text of § 402(b) authorizes the EPA to consider the protection of threatened or endangered species as an end in itself when evaluating a transfer application. And to the extent that some of the § 402(b) criteria may result in environmental benefits to marine species, there is no dispute that Arizona has satisfied each of those statutory criteria. Respondents’ argument has been disclaimed not only by the EPA, but also by the FWS and the NMFS, the two agencies primarily charged with administering § 7(a)(2) and the drafters of the regulations implementing that section. Each agency recently issued a formal letter concluding that the authorization of an NPDES permitting transfer is not the kind of discretionary agency action that is covered by § 402.03. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-549, at 103a-116a. An agency’s interpretation of the meaning of its own regulations is entitled to deference “unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that deferential standard is plainly met here. 11 * * * Applying Chevron, we defer to the Agency’s reasonable interpretation of ESA § 7(a)(2) as applying only to “actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.” 50 CFR § 402.03. Since the transfer of NPDES permitting authority is not discretionary, but rather is mandated once a State has met the criteria set forth in § 402(b) of the CWA, it follows that a transfer of NPDES permitting authority does not trigger §7(a)(2)’s consultation and no-jeopardy requirements. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The State must advise the EPA of each permit it proposes to issue, and the EPA may object to any permit. 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342(d)(1), (2); see also 40 CFR § 123.44(c) (2006). If the State cannot address the EPA’s concerns, authority over the permit reverts to the EPA. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(d)(4). The State must demonstrate that it has the ability: (1) to issue fixed-term permits that apply and ensure compliance with the CWA’s substantive requirements and which are revocable for cause; (2) to inspect, monitor, and enter facilities and to require reports to the extent required by the CWA; (3) to provide for public notice and public hearings; (4) to ensure that the EPA receives notice of each permit application; (5) to ensure that any other State whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written recommendations and that written reasons be provided if such recommendations are not accepted; (6) to ensure that no permit is issued if the Army Corps of Engineers concludes that it would substantially impair the anchoring and navigation of navigable waters; (7) to abate violations of permits or the permit program, including through civil and criminal penalties; (8) to ensure that any permit for a discharge from a publicly owned treatment works includes conditions requiring the identification of the type and volume of certain pollutants; and (9) to ensure that any industrial user of any publicly owned treatment works will comply with certain of the GWA’s substantive provisions. §§ 1342(b)(1) — (9). At the time when Arizona applied, the EPA had already transferred permitting authority to local authorities in 44 other States and several United States Territories. By its terms, §7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement applies only to “action[s] authorized, funded, or carried out” by “Federal agencies].” We also note that the agencies involved have resolved any ambiguity in their positions going forward. Following the issuance of the panel’s opinion below, the EPA — in connection with the State of Alaska’s pending application for transfer of NPDES permitting authority — requested confirmation from the FWS and the NMFS of the EPA’s position that “the no-jeopardy and consultation duties of ESA Section 7(a)(2) do not apply to approval of a State’s application to administer the NPDES program,” in the apparent hope that obtaining those agencies’ views “in advance of processing Alaska’s application may avoid a repetition of” the confusion that occurred during the Arizona permitting process. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-549, pp. 96a, 95a. In response, both the FWS and the NMFS confirmed their understanding that “there is no need to conduct Section 7 consultations on proposed actions to approve State NPDES programs because such actions are not the cause of any impact on listed species and do not constitute discretionary federal agency actions to which Section 7 applies.” Id., at 107a; see also id., at 116a (NMFS “concur[s] with EPA’s conclusion that EPA is not required to engage in section 7 consultation on applications to approve State programs in situations under Section 402(b) of the CWA”). Nor is there any independent right to public comment with regard to consultations conducted under § 7(a)(2) — a consultation process that we conclude, in any case, was not required here. See 51 Fed. Reg. 19928 (1986) (“Nothing in section 7 authorizes or requires the Service to provide for public involvement (other than that of the applicant) in the ‘inter-agency’ consultation process”). Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion (hereinafter dissent) attempts to paper over this conflict by suggesting that the EPA and the agencies designated by the Secretary of the Interior could reconcile the commands of the CWA and the ESA by “generating] an alternative course of action whereby the transfer could still take place . . . but in such a way that would honor the mandatory requirements of § 7(a)(2).” Post, at 687. For example, it suggests that the EPA could condition transfers of permitting authority on the State’s acceptance of additional continuing oversight by the EPA (presumably beyond that oversight already contemplated by the CWA’s statutory language). Post, at 688-690. But such a take-it-or-leave-it approach, no less than a straightforward rejection of a transfer application, would impose conditions on an NPDES transfer beyond those set forth in § 402(b), and thus alter the CWA’s statutory command. It does not matter whether this alteration is characterized as an amendment or a partial repeal. Every amendment of a statute effects a partial repeal to the extent that the new statutory command displaces earlier, inconsistent commands, and we have repeatedly recognized that implied amendments are no more favored than implied repeals. See, e. g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 134 (1974) (‘“A new statute will not be read as wholly or even partially amending a prior one unless there exists a “positive repugnancy” between the provisions of the new and those of the old that cannot be reconciled’ ” (quoting In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 943 (Sp. Ct. R. R. R. A. 1974))); United States v. Welden, 377 U. S. 95, 103, n. 12 (1964) (“Amendments by implication ... are not favored”); United States v. Madigan, 300 U. S. 500, 506 (1937) (“[T]he modification by implication of the settled construction of an earlier and different section is not favored”). The dissent is incorrect in suggesting that “if the Secretary of the Interior had not declared the snail darter an endangered species . .. the TVA surely would have been obligated to spend the additional funds that Congress appropriated to complete the project.” Post, at 676. To the contrary, the Court in TVA v. Hill found that there was no clear repugnancy between the ESA and the Acts appropriating funds to the TVA because the latter simply did not require the agency to use any of the generally appropriated fluids to complete the Tellico Dam project. 437 U. S., at 189-193. For example, § 402(b) requires the EPA to consider whether the State has the legal authority to enforce applicable water quality standards— some of which, in turn, are informed by the “judgment” of the EPA’s Administrator. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b)(1)(A); see also, e. g., § 1312. But the permit transfer process does not itself require scrutiny of the underlying standards or of their effect on marine or wildlife — only of the state applicant’s “authority... [t]o issue permits which... apply, and insure compliance with,” the applicable standards. § 1342(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). In any event, respondents do not dispute that, as both the EPA and the FWS determined, the transfer of permitting authority to Arizona officials would have no adverse water quality related impact on any listed species. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 06-340, at 562-563, 615-617. Respondents also contend that the EPA has taken, or will take, other discretionary actions apart from the transfer authorization that implicate the ESA. For example, they argue that the EPA’s alleged provision of funding to Arizona for the administration of its clean water programs is the kind of discretionary agency action that is subject to § 7(a)(2). However, assuming this is true, any such funding decision is a separate agency action that is outside the scope of this lawsuit. Respondents also point to the fact that, following the transfer of permitting authority, the EPA will retain oversight authority over the state permitting process, including the power to object to proposed permits. But the fact that the EPA may exercise discretionary oversight authority — which may trigger § 7(a)(2)’s consultation and no-jeopardy obligations — after the transfer does not mean that the decision authorizing the transfer is itself discretionary.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

IBANEZ v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY No. 93-639. Argued April 19, 1994 Decided June 13, 1994 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II-B, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-C, in which Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 149. Silvia Safille Ibanez, pro se, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were J. Lofton Westmoreland and Robert J. Shapiro. Lisa S. Nelson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Alliance of Practicing Certified Public Accountants et al. by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., David W. DeBruin, and Maureen F. Del Duca; for the American Association of Attorney-Certified Public Accountants, Inc., by David Ostrove, Sydney S. Traum, and Philip D. Brent; for the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards et al. by Peter E. Zwanzig; and for the Florida Bar by Steven E. Stark and Scott D. Makar. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants by Louis A Craco, Richard I. Miller, Michael R. Young, and Kelly M. Hnatt; and for the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants by Kenneth R. Hart and Steven P. Seymoe. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Silvia Safille Ibanez, a member of the Florida Bar since 1983, practices law in Winter Haven, Florida. She is also a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), licensed by respondent Florida Board of Accountancy (Board) to “practice public accounting.” In addition, she is authorized by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, a private organization, to use the trademarked designation “Certified Financial Planner” (CFP). Ibanez referred to these credentials in her advertising and other communication with the public. She placed CPA and CFP next to her name in her yellow pages listing (under “Attorneys”) and on her business card. She also used those designations at the left side of her “Law .Offices” stationery. Notwithstanding the apparently truthful nature of her communication — it is undisputed that neither her CPA license nor her CFP certification has been revoked — the Board reprimanded her for engaging in “false, deceptive, and misleading” advertising. Final Order of the Board of Accountancy (May 12,1992) (hereinafter Final Order), App. 178, 194. The record reveals that the Board has not shouldered the burden it must carry in matters of this order. It has not demonstrated with sufficient specificity that any member of the public could have been misled by Ibanez’ constitutionally protected speech or that any harm could have resulted from allowing that speech to reach the public’s eyes. We therefore hold that the Board’s decision censuring Ibanez is incompatible with First Amendment restraints on official action. I Under Florida’s Public Accountancy Act, only licensed CPA’s may “[a]ttest as an expert in accountancy to the reliability or fairness of presentation of financial information,” Fla. Stat. § 473.322(l)(c) (1991), or use the title “CPA” or other title “tending to indicate that such person holds an active license” under Florida law. § 473.322(l)(b). Furthermore, only licensed CPA’s may “[practice public accounting.” §473.322(l)(a). “Practicing public accounting” is defined as an “offe[r] to perform . . . one or more types of services involving the use of accounting skills, or... management advisory or consulting services,” Fla. Stat. §473.302(5) (Supp. 1992), made by one who either is, §473.302(5)(a), or “hold[s] himself... out as,” § 473.302(5)(b) (emphasis added), a certified public accountant. The Board learned of Ibanez’ use of the designations CPA and CFP when a copy of Ibanez’ yellow pages listing was mailed, anonymously, to the Board’s offices; it thereupon commenced an investigation and, subsequently, issued a complaint against her. The Board charged Ibanez with (1) “practicing public accounting” in an unlicensed firm, in violation of §473.3101 of the Public Accountancy Act; (2) using a “specialty designation” — CFP—that had not been approved by the Board, in violation of Board Rule 24.001(l)(g), Fla. Admin. Code §61Hl-24.001(l)(g) (1994); and (3) appending the CPA designation after her name, thereby “implying] that she abides by the provisions of [the Public Accountancy Act],” in violation of Rule 24.001(l)’s ban on “fraudulent, false, deceptive, or misleading” advertising. Amended Administrative Complaint (filed June 30,1991), 1 Record 32-35. At the ensuing disciplinary hearing, Ibanez argued that she was practicing law, not “public accounting,” and was therefore not subject to the Board’s regulatory jurisdiction. Response to Amended Administrative Complaint (filed Aug. 26, 1991), ¶ 25, id., at 108. Her use of the CPA and CFP designations, she argued further, constituted “nonmisleading, truthful, commercial speech” for which she could not be sanctioned. ¶ 24, ibid. Prior to the close of proceedings before the hearing officer, the Board dropped the charge that Ibanez was practicing public accounting in an unlicensed firm. Order on Reconsideration (filed Aug. 22,1991), ¶ 2, id., at 103-104. The hearing officer subsequently found in Ibanez’ favor on all counts, and recommended to the Board that, for want of the requisite proof, all charges against Ibanez be dismissed. Recommended Order (filed Jan. 15, 1992), App. 147. The Board rejected the hearing officer’s recommendation, and declared Ibanez guilty of “false, deceptive and misleading” advertising. Final Order, id., at 194. The Board reasoned, first, that Ibanez was “practicing public accounting” by virtue of her use of the CPA designation and was thus subject to the Board’s disciplinary jurisdiction. Id., at 183. Because Ibanez had insisted that her law practice was outside the Board’s regulatory jurisdiction, she had, in the Board’s judgment, rendered her use of the CPA designation misleading: “[Ibanez] advertises the fact that she is a CPA, while performing the same ‘accounting’ activities she performed when she worked for licensed CPA firms, but she does not concede that she is engaged in the practice of public accounting so as to bring herself within the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy for any negligence or errors [of which] she may be guilty when delivering her services to her clients. “[Ibanez] is unwilling to acquiesce in the requirements of [the Public Accountancy Act] and [the Board’s rules] by complying with those requirements. She does not license her firm as a CPA firm; forego certain forms of remuneration denied to individuals who are practicing public accountancy; or limit the ownership of her firm to other CPAs.... [She] has, in effect, told the public that she is subject to the provisions of [the Public Accountancy Act] and the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy when she believes and acts as though she is not.” Id., at 184-185. Next, the Board addressed Ibanez’ use of the CFP designation. On that matter, the Board stated that any designation using the term “certified” to refer to a certifying organization other than the Board itself (or an organization approved by the Board) “inherently mislead[s] the public into believing that state approval and recognition exists.” Id., at 193-194. Ibanez appealed to the District Court of Appeal, First District, which affirmed the Board’s final order per curiam without opinion. Id., at 196, judgt. order reported at 621 So. 2d 435 (1993). As a result, Ibanez had no right of review in the Florida Supreme Court. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1067 (1994), and now reverse. II A The Board correctly acknowledged that Ibanez’ use of the CPA and CFP designations was “commercial speech.” Final Order, App. 186. Because “disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a positive contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of such information,” Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U. S. 91, 108 (1990), only false, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech may be banned. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, 638 (1985), citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1 (1979); see also In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191, 203 (1982) (“Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. . . . Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.”). Commercial speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading can be restricted, but only if the State shows that the restriction directly and materially advances a substantial state interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980); see also id., at 564 (regulation will not be sustained if it “provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose”); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 767 (1993) (regulation must advance substantial state interest in a “direct and material way” and be in “reasonable proportion to the interests served”); In re R. M. J, 455 U. S., at 203 (State can regulate commercial speech if it shows that it has “a substantial interest” and that the interference with speech is “in proportion to the interest served”). The State’s burden is not slight; the “free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.” Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 646. “[M]ere speculation or conjecture” will not suffice; rather the State “must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.” Edenfield, 507 U. S., at 770, 771; see also Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 648-649 (State’s “unsupported assertions” insufficient to justify prohibition on attorney advertising; “broad prophylactic rules may not be so lightly justified if the protections afforded commercial speech are to retain their force”). Measured against these standards, the order reprimanding Ibanez cannot stand. B We turn first to Ibanez’ use of the CPA designation in her commercial communications. On that matter, the Board’s position is entirely insubstantial. To reiterate, Ibanez holds a currently active CPA license which the Board has never sought to revoke. The Board asserts that her truthful communication is nonetheless misleading because it “[tells] the public that she is subject to the provisions of [the Accountancy Act] and the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy when she believes and acts as though she is not.” Final Order, App. 185; see also Brief for Respondent 20 (“[T]he use of the CPA designation . . . where the licensee is unwilling to comply with the provisions of the [statute] under which the license was granted, is inherently misleading and may be prohibited.”). Ibanez no longer contests the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction, see Brief for Petitioner 28 (Ibanez “is, in fact, a licensee subject to the rules of the Board”), and in any event, what she “believes” regarding the reach of the Board’s authority is not sanctionable. See Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U. S. 1, 6 (1971) (First Amendment “prohibits a State from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him solely because ... he holds certain beliefs”). Nor can the Board rest on a bare assertion that Ibanez is “unwilling to comply” with its regulation. To survive constitutional review, the Board must build its case on specific evidence of noncompliance. Ibanez has neither been charged with, nor found guilty of, any professional activity or practice out of compliance with the governing statutory or regulatory standards. And as long as Ibanez holds an active CPA license from the Board we cannot imagine how consumers can be misled by her truthful representation to that effect. C The Board’s justifications for disciplining Ibanez for using the CFP designation are scarcely more persuasive. The Board concluded that the words used in the designation— particularly, the word “certified” — so closely resemble “the terms protected by state licensure itself, that their use, when not approved by the Board, inherently mislead[s] the public into believing that state approval and recognition exists.” Final Order, App. 193-194. This conclusion is difficult to maintain in light of Peel. We held in Peel that an attorney’s use of the designation “Certified Civil Trial Specialist By the National Board of Trial Advocacy” was neither actually nor inherently misleading. See 496 U. S., at 106 (rejecting contention that use of National Board of Trial Advocacy certification on attorney’s letterhead was “actually misleading”); id., at 110 (“State may not . . . completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading, such as certification as a specialist by bona fide organizations such as NBTA”); id., at 111 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing that attorney’s letterhead was “neither actually nor inherently misleading”). The Board offers nothing to support a different conclusion with respect to the CFP designation. Given “the complete absence of any evidence of deception,” id., at 106, the Board’s “concern about the possibility of deception in hypothetical cases is not sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over concealment,” id., at 111. The Board alternatively contends that Ibanez' use of the CFP designation is “potentially misleading,” entitling the Board to “enact measures short of a total ban to prevent deception or confusion.” Brief for Respondent 33, citing Peel, 496 U. S., at 116 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). If the “protections afforded commercial speech are to retain their force,” Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 648-649, we cannot allow rote invocation of the words “potentially misleading” to supplant the Board’s burden to “demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.” Edenfield, 507 U. S., at 771. The Board points to Rule 24.001(l)(j), Fla. Admin. Code § 61Hl-24.001(l)(j) (1994), which prohibits use of any “specialist” designation unless accompanied by a disclaimer, made “in the immediate proximity of the statement that implies formal recognition as a specialist”; the disclaimer must “stat[e] that the recognizing agency is not affiliated with or sanctioned by the state or federal government,” and it must set out the recognizing agency’s “requirements for recognition, including, but not limited to, educatio[n], experience^ and testing.” See Brief for Respondent 33-35. Given the state of this record — the failure of the Board to point to any harm that is potentially real, not purely hypothetical — we are satisfied that the Board’s action is unjustified. We express no opinion whether, in other situations or on a different record, the Board’s insistence on a disclaimer might serve as an appropriately tailored check against deception or confusion, rather than one imposing “unduly burdensome disclosure requirements [that] offend the First Amendment.” Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 651. This much is plain, however: The detail required in the disclaimer currently described by the Board effectively rules out notation ,of the “specialist” designation on a business card or letterhead, or in a yellow pages listing. The concurring Justices, on whom the Board relies, did indeed find the “[NBTA] Certified Civil Trial Specialist” statement on a lawyer’s letterhead “potentially misleading,” but they stated no categorical rule applicable to all specialty designations. Thus, they recognized that “[t]he potential for misunderstanding might be less if the NBTA were a commonly recognized organization and the public had a general understanding of its requirements.” Peel, 496 U. S., at 115. In this regard, we stress again the failure of the Board to back up its alleged concern that the designation CFP would mislead rather than inform. The Board never adverted to the prospect that the public potentially in need of a civil trial specialist, see Peel, supra, is wider, and perhaps less sophisticated, than the public with financial resources warranting the services of a planner. Noteworthy in this connection, “Certified Financial Planner” and “CFP” are well-established, protected federal trademarks that have been described as “the most recognized designation^] in the planning field.” Financial Planners: Report of Staff of United States Securities and Exchange Commission to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance 53 (1988), reprinted in Financial Planners and Investment Advisors, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 (1988). Approximately 27,000 persons have qualified for the designation nationwide. Brief for Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 3. Over 50 accredited universities and colleges have established courses of study in financial planning approved by the CFP Board of Standards, and standards for licensure include satisfaction of certain core educational requirements, a passing score on a certification examination “similar in concept to the Bar or CPA examinations,” completion of a planning-related work experience requirement, agreement to abide by the CFP Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and an annual continuing education requirement. Id., at 10-15. Ibanez, it bears emphasis, is engaged in the practice of law and so represents her offices to the public. Indeed, she performs work reserved for lawyers but nothing that only CPA’s may do. See supra, at 139, n. 3. It is therefore significant that her use of the designation CFP is considered in all respects appropriate by the Florida Bar. See Brief for Florida Bar as Amicus Curiae 9-10 (noting that Florida Bar, Rules of Professional Conduct, and particularly Rule 4-7.3, “specifically allo[w] Ibanez to disclose her CPA and CFP credentials [and] contemplate that Ibanez must provide this information to prospective clients (if relevant)”). Beyond question, this case does not fall within the caveat noted in Peel covering certifications issued by organizations that “had made no inquiry into petitioner’s fitness,” or had “issued certificates indiscriminately for a price”; statements made in such certifications, “even if true, could be misleading.” 496 U. S., at 102. We have never sustained restrictions on constitutionally protected speech based on a record so bare as the one on which the Board relies here. See Edenfield, 507 U. S., at 771 (striking down Florida ban on CPA solicitation where Board “presents no studies that suggest personal solicitation . . . creates the dangers ... the Board claims to fear” nor even “anecdotal evidence .. . that validates the Board’s suppositions”); Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 648-649 (striking down restrictions on attorney advertising where “State’s arguments amount to little more than unsupported assertions” without “evidence or authority of any kind”). To approve the Board’s reprimand of Ibanez would be to risk toleration of commercial speech restraints “in the service of . . . objectives that could not themselves justify a burden on commercial expression.” Edenfield, 507 U. S., at 171. Accordingly, the judgment of the Florida District Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Board of Accountancy, created by the Florida Legislature, Fla. Stat. §473.303 (1991), is authorized to “adopt all rules necessary to administer” the Public Accountancy Act (chapter 473 of the Florida' Statutes). Fla. Stat. §473.304 (Supp. 1992). The Board is responsible for licensing CPA’s, see Fla. Stat. §473.308 (1991), and every licensee is subject to the governance of the Act and the rules adopted by the Board. Fla. Stat. §473.304 (Supp. 1992). This “attest” function is more commonly referred to as “auditing.” Florida’s Public Accountancy Act is known as a “Title Act” because, with the exception of the “attest” function, activities performed by CPA’s can lawfully be performed by non-CPA’s. See Brief for Respondent 11-12. The Act contains additional restrictions on the conduct of licensed CPA’s. For example, a partnership or corporation cannot “practice public accounting” unless all partners or shareholders are CPA’s, Fla. Stat. §473.309 (1991), nor may licensees “engaged in the practice of public accounting” pay or accept referral fees, §473.3205, or accept contingency fees, §473.319. Florida Stat. §473.3101 (Supp. 1994) requires that “[e]ach partnership, corporation, or limited liability company seeking to engage in the practice of public accounting” apply for a license from the Board, and § 473.309 requires that each such partnership or corporation hold a current license. Rule 24.001(1) states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o licensee shall disseminate ... any ... advertising which is in any way fraudulent, false, deceptive, or misleading, if it ... (g) [s]tates or implies that the licensee has received formal recognition as a specialist in any aspect of the practice of public accountancy unless ... [the] recognizing agency is approved by the Board.” Fla. Admin. Code §61H1-24.001(1) (1994). The CFP Board of Standards, the “recognizing agency” in regard to Ibanez’ CFP designation, has not been approved by the Board. Ibanez pointed out that she does not perform the “attest” function in her law practice, and that no service she performs requires a CPA license. See supra, at 139, n. 3. “It is well established that ‘[t]he party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it.’ ” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 770 (1993), quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 71, n. 20 (1983). Notably, the Board itself withdrew the only charge against Ibanez of this kind, viz., the allegation that she practiced public accounting in an unlicensed firm. See supra, at 140. Justice O’Connor writes that “[t]he average consumer has no way to verify the accuracy or value of [Ibanez’] use of the CFP designation” because her advertising, “[u]nlike the advertisement in Peel, ... did not identify the organization that had conferred the certification.” Post, at 150. We do not agree that the consumer of financial planning services is thus disarmed. To verify Ibanez’ CFP credential, a consumer could call the CFP Board of Standards. The Board that reprimanded Ibanez never suggested that such a call would be significantly more difficult to make than one to the certifying organization in Peel, the National Board of Trial Advocacy. We note in this regard that the attorney’s letterhead in Peel supplied no address or telephone number for the certifying agency. Most instructive on this matter, we think, is the requirement of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Florida Bar, to which attorney Ibanez is subject, that she provide “written information setting forth the factual details of [her] experience, expertise, background, and training” to anyone who so inquires. See Florida Bar, Rule of Professional Conduct 4-7.3(a)(2). The Board called only three witnesses at the proceeding against Ibanez, all of whom were employees or former employees of the Department of Professional Regulation. Neither the witnesses, nor the Board in its submissions to this Court, offered evidence that any member of the public has been misled by the use of the CFP designation. See Peel, 496 U. S., at 100-101 (noting that there was “no contention that any potential client or person was actually misled or deceived,” nor “any factual finding of actual deception or misunderstanding”). Under the Board’s regulations, moreover, it appears that even a disclaimer of the kind described would not have saved Ibanez from censure. Rule 24.001(i) flatly bans “[s]tat[ing] a form of recognition by any entity other than the Board that uses the ter[m] ‘certified.’ ” Separate and distinct from that absolute prohibition, the regulations further proscribe “[s]tat[ing] or implfying] that the licensee has received formal recognition as a specialist in any aspect of the practice of public accounting, unless the statement contains” a copiously detailed disclaimer. Rule 24.001(j).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. KORAY No. 94-790. Argued April 24, 1995 Decided June 5, 1995 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-noe, Scalia, Kennedy, Soutee, Thomas, Ginsbueg, and Beeyee, JJ., joined. Ginsbueg, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 65. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 66. Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Joseph Douglas Wilson. Irwin Rochman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Charles D. Weisselberg, Michael J. Brennan, and Dennis E. Curtis filed a brief for the University of Southern California Law Center’s Post-Conviction Justice Project as amicus curiae. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Title 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b) provides that a defendant generally must “be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences.” Before the commencement of respondent’s federal sentence, a Federal Magistrate Judge “released” him on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and ordered him confined to a community treatment center. The question presented is whether respondent was in “official detention,” and thus entitled to a sentence credit under § 3585(b), during the time he spent at the treatment center. We hold that he was not. On April 23, 1991, respondent Ziya Koray was arrested for laundering monetary instruments in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(1). On June 18, 1991, he pleaded guilty to that charge in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. One week later, on June 25, 1991, a Federal Magistrate Judge entered a “release order” pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3142(c), ordering respondent released on bail, pending sentencing, into the custody of the Pretrial Services Agency. The order required that he be “confined to [the] premises” of a Volunteers of America community treatment center without “authoriz[ation] to leave for any reason unless accompanied” by a Government special agent. On October 22, 1991, the District Court sentenced respondent to 41 months’ imprisonment. Respondent remained at the Volunteers of America facility until November 25, 1991, the day he reported to the Allenwood Federal Prison Camp to serve his sentence. Respondent requested the Bureau of Prisons (BOP or Bureau) to credit toward his sentence of imprisonment the approximately 150 days he spent at the Volunteers of America community treatment center between June 25 and November 25, 1991. Relying on its established policy, BOP refused to grant the requested credit. After exhausting his administrative remedies, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking credit under 18 U. S. C. § 3585 for the time he spent at the community treatment center. The District Court denied the petition, finding that respondent’s stay at the center did not constitute “official detention” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 21 F. 3d 558 (1994). It acknowledged that the overwhelming majority of the Courts of Appeals “have concluded that section 3585 . . . does not require the Bureau to credit presen-tenced defendants whose bail conditions allowed them to be confined outside of Bureau of Prison[s] facilities.” Id., at 561. The court declined, however, to defer to the Bureau’s view — that time spent under highly restrictive conditions while “released” on bail is not “‘official detention’” under § 3585(b) because a “ ‘released’ ” defendant is not subject to the Bureau’s control. Id., at 562-565. Instead, the court reasoned that § 3585(b)’s “ ‘official detention’ ” language need not be read “as if it provided ‘official detention by the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons, ’ ” since “there is nothing in the statute which requires or suggests that a defendant must be under the detention of the Bureau,” and since “[a] court may ‘detain’ a person as ‘offlcial[ly]’ as the Attorney General.” Id., at 563-564. Concluding that “‘official detention’ for purposes of credit under 18 U. S. C. § 3585 includes time spent under conditions of jail-type confinement,” id., at 567, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination whether respondent was in “jail-type confinement” during his stay at the Volunteers of America community treatment center. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether a federal prisoner is entitled to credit against his sentence under § 3585(b) for time when he was “released” on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 513 U. S. 1106 (1995). We now reverse. Title 18 U. S. C. § 3585 determines when a federal sentence of imprisonment commences and whether credit against that sentence must be granted for time spent in “official detention” before the sentence began. It states: “Calculation of a term of imprisonment “(a) Commencement of Sentence. — A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served. “(b) Credit for Prior Custody — A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences— “(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or “(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; “that has not been credited against another sentence.” 18 U. S. C. § 3585 (emphasis added). In United States v. Wilson, 503 U. S. 329, 337 (1992), we specifically noted Congress’ use of the term “ ‘official detention’ ” in § 3585(b), but we had no occasion to rule on the meaning of that term. We must do so today. The Government contends that the phrase “official detention” in § 3585(b) refers to a court order detaining a defendant and committing him to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the phrase “official detention” includes the restrictive conditions of his release on bail because the Federal Magistrate’s bail order was “official” and significantly curtailed his liberty. Viewing the phrase in isolation, it may be said that either reading is plausible. But it is a “fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.” Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993). After examining the phrase “official detention” in this light, we believe the Government’s interpretation is the correct one. Section 3585(b) provides credit for time “spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences,” 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b) (emphasis added), thus making clear that credit is awarded only for presentence restraints on liberty. Because the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. § 3141 et seq., is the body of law that authorizes federal courts to place presentence restraints on a defendant’s liberty, see § 3142(a) (authorizing courts to impose restraints on the defendant “pending trial”); § 3143(a) (authorizing courts to impose restraints while the defendant “is waiting imposition or execution of sentence”), the “official detention” language of § 3585(b) must be construed in conjunction with that Act. This is especially so because the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was enacted in the same statute as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, of which § 3585 is a part. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 407-408 (1991) (“It is not uncommon to refer to other, related legislative enactments when interpreting specialized statutory terms,” since Congress is presumed to have “legislated with reference to” those terms). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a federal court with two choices when dealing with a criminal defendant who has been “charged with an offense” and is awaiting trial, 18 U. S. C. § 3142(a), or who “has been found guilty of an offense and ... is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence,” 18 U. S. C. § 3143(a)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The court may either (1) “release” the defendant on bail or (2) order him “detained” without bail. A court may “release” a defendant subject to a variety of restrictive conditions, including residence in a community treatment center. See §§ 3142(c) (1)(B)(i), (x), and (xiv). If, however, the court “finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community,” § 3142(e), the court “shall order the detention of the person,” ibid., by issuing a “detention order” “direct[ing] that the person be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement in a corrections facility,” § 3142(i)(2). Thus, under the language of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant suffers “detention” only when committed to the custody of the Attorney General; a defendant admitted to bail on restrictive conditions, as respondent was, is “released.” See Dawson v. Scott, 50 F. 3d 884, 889-890, and nn. 11-12 (CA11 1995); Moreland v. United States, 968 F. 2d 655, 659-660 (CA8), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1028 (1992); 968 F. 2d, at 661-663 (Loken, J., concurring); United States v. Becak, 954 F. 2d 386, 388 (CA6), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 945 (1992). Section 3585(a) and related sentencing provisions confirm this interpretation. Section 3585(a) provides that a federal sentence “commences” when the defendant is received for transportation to or arrives at “the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” Title 18 U. S. C. §3621, in turn, provides that the sentenced defendant “shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons,” § 3621(a), which “may designate any available penal or correctional facility . . . , whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise . . . , that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable,” § 3621(b) (emphasis added). The phrase “official detention facility” in § 3585(a) therefore must refer to a correctional facility designated by the Bureau for the service of federal sentences, where the Bureau retains the discretion to “direct the transfer of a prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to another.” § 3621(b). This reading of § 3585(a) is reinforced by other provisions governing the administration of federal sentences. For example, §3622 gives the Bureau authority to release a prisoner from the place of his imprisonment for a limited period to “participate in a training or educational program in the community while continuing in official detention at the prison facility,” § 3622(b), or to “work at paid employment in the community while continuing in official detention at the penal or correctional facility,” § 3622(c). Because the words “official detention” should bear the same meaning in subsections (a) and (b) of §3585 as they do in the above related sentencing statutes, see Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 479 (1992) (“[T]he basic canon of statutory construction [is] that identical terms within an Act bear the same meaning”), credit for time spent in “official detention” under § 3585(b) is available only to those defendants who were detained in a “penal or correctional facility,” § 3621(b), and who were subject to BOP’s control. The context and history of § 3585(b) also support this view. As for context, § 3585(b) reduces a defendant’s “imprisonment” by the amount of time spent in “official detention” before his sentence, strongly suggesting that the period of presentence “detention” must be equivalent to the “imprisonment” itself. It would be anomalous to interpret § 3585(b) to require sentence credit for time spent confined in a community treatment center where the defendant is not subject to BOP’s control, since Congress generally views such a restriction on liberty as part of a sentence of “probation,” see 18 U. S. C. §§ 3563(b)(10), (12), and (14), or “supervised release,” see § 3583(d), rather than part of a sentence of “imprisonment.” See United States v. Zackular, 945 F. 2d 423, 425 (CA1 1991). With respect to history, § 3585(b)’s predecessor, 18 U. S. C. §3568 (1982 ed.) (repealed), required the Attorney General to award sentence credit for “any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.” (Emphasis added.) The Courts of Appeals uniformly held that the phrase “in custody” did not allow sentence credit because of restrictions placed on a defendant’s liberty as a condition of release on bail. See Polakoff v. United States, 489 F. 2d 727, 730 (CA5 1974) (time spent on “highly restricted bond” not creditable as “‘custody’”); United States v. Robles, 563 F. 2d 1308, 1309 (CA9 1977) (“[T]ime spent on bail or on bond pending appeal is not time served ‘in custody’”), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 925 (1978); Ortega v. United States, 510 F. 2d 412, 413 (CA10 1975) (“‘custody’” refers to “actual custodial incarceration,” not “the time a criminal defendant is free on bond”); United States v. Peterson, 507 F. 2d 1191, 1192 (CADC 1974) (“ ‘in custody’ ” does “not refer to the stipulations imposed when a defendant is at large on conditional release”). In 1984, Congress enacted § 3585(b) and altered §3568 by, inter alia, “replac[ing] the term ‘custody’ with the term ‘official detention.’ ” Wilson, 503 U. S., at 337; see also 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b). In thus rewording the credit statute, however, nothing suggests that Congress disagreed with the Courts of Appeals’ rule denying credit to defendants who had been released on bail. To the contrary, Congress presumably made the change to conform the credit statute to the nomenclature used in related sentencing provisions, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 3585(a) and 3622, and in the Bail Reform Act of 1984. See Moreland, 968 F. 2d, at 662, and n. 5 (Loken, J., concurring). The Bureau, as the agency charged with administering the credit statute, see Wilson, supra, at 334-335, likewise has interpreted § 3585(b)’s “official detention” language to require credit for time spent by a defendant under a § 3142(e) “detention order,” but not for time spent under a § 3142(c) “release order,” ho matter how restrictive the conditions. As we have explained, see supra, at 56-60, the Bureau’s interpretation is the most natural and reasonable reading of § 3585(b)’s “official detention” language. It is true that the Bureau’s interpretation appears only in a “Program Statement] ” — an internal agency guideline — rather than in “published regulations subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedure] Act, including public notice and comment.” 21 F. 3d, at 562. But BOP’s internal agency guideline, which is akin to an “interpretive rule” that “do[es] not require notice and comment,” Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. 87, 99 (1995), is still entitled to some deference, cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 157 (1991), since it is a “permissible construction of the statute,” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984). Respondent, as we have indicated, disagrees with the above interpretation of § 3585(b). He contends that the “plain meaning” of the phrase “official detention” includes the restrictive conditions of his confinement, even though he was released on bail. This contention is a plausible one if the phrase is read in isolation: respondent was subjected to restrictive conditions when released on bail, these conditions were imposed by a court order, and his sojourn in the community treatment center therefore amounted to “official detention.” But even without reference to the context of the language and the history of the statute, respondent’s is not the only plausible interpretation of the language; it would be too much to say that the statute “cannot bear the interpretation adopted by” the Bureau. Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83, 91-92 (1990). And in light of the foregoing textual and historical analysis, the initial plausibility of respondent’s reading simply does not carry the day. Respondent also argues it is improper to focus on the release/detention dichotomy of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to construe §3585(b)’s “official detention” language because a defendant “released” on bail may be subjected to conditions (under 18 U. S. C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv)) that are just as onerous as those faced by “detained” defendants. In addition, he asserts that his confinement as a “released” defendant in the Volunteers of America community treatment center constituted “official detention” because “sentenced” prisoners are deemed to be in “official detention” when BOP authorizes them to serve the last part of their sentences in a community treatment center, see U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons Program Statement No. 7310.02 (Oct. 19, 1993) (interpreting 18 U. S. C. § 3624(c) to allow BOP to place sentenced prisoners in community corrections centers, since such centers meet 18 U. S. C. § 3621(b)’s definition of a “penal or correctional facility”), or to serve their sentences on educational or work release, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 3622(b) and (c). It is quite true that under the Government’s theory a defendant “released” to a community treatment center could be subject to restraints which do not materially differ from those imposed on a “detained” defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General, and thence assigned to a treatment center. But this fact does not undercut the remaining distinction that exists between all defendants committed to the custody of the Attorney General on the one hand, and all defendants released on bail on the other. Unlike defendants “released” on bail, defendants who are “detained” or “sentenced” always remain subject to the control of the Bureau. See Randall v. Whelan, 938 F. 2d 522, 525 (CA4 1991). This is an important distinction, as the identity of the custodian has both legal and practical significance. A defendant who is “released” is not in BOP’s custody, and he cannot be summarily reassigned to a different place of confinement unless a judicial officer revokes his release, see 18 U. S. C. § 3148(b), or modifies the conditions of his release, see § 3142(c)(3). A defendant who is “detained,” however, is completely subject to BOP’s control. And “[t]hat single factor encompasses a wide variety of restrictions.” Randall, supra, at 525. “Detained” defendants are subject to BOP’s disciplinary procedures; they are subject to summary reassignment to any other penal or correctional facility within the system, cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 224-229 (1976); and, being in the legal custody of BOP, the Bureau has full discretion to control many conditions of their confinement. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 544-548 (1979). It may seem unwise policy to treat defendants differently for purposes of sentence credit under § 3585(b) when they are similarly situated in fact — the one is confined to a community treatment center after having been “detained” and committed to the Bureau’s custody, while the other is “released” to such a center on bail. But the alternative construction adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case has its own grave difficulties. To determine in each case whether a defendant “released” on bail was subjected to “jail-type confinement” would require a fact-intensive inquiry into the circumstances of confinement, an inquiry based on information in the hands of private entities not available to the Bureau as a matter of right. Even were such information more readily available, it seems certain that the phrase “jail-type confinement” would remain sufficiently vague and amorphous so that much the same kind of disparity in treatment for similarly situated defendants would arise. The Government’s construction of § 3585(b), on the other hand, provides both it and the defendant with clear notice of the consequences of a § 3142 “release” or “detention” order. Respondent finally suggests that the rule of lenity requires adoption of the “jail-type confinement” test for purposes of calculating credit under § 3585(b) because “there is a split of authority in the Circuits concerning the reach of ‘official detention,’” Brief for Respondent 34, n. 13, and because there is ambiguity as to which forms of custody fall within the meaning of “‘official detention.’” See id., at 34. Respondent misconstrues the doctrine. A statute is not “ ‘ambiguous’ for purposes of lenity merely because” there is “a division of judicial authority” over its proper construction. Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990). The rule of lenity applies only if, “after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,” Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239 (1993) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), we can make “no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958). That is not this case. We hold that the time respondent spent at the Volunteers of America community treatment center while “released” on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was not “official detention” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b). Respondent therefore was not entitled to a credit against his sentence of imprisonment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Compare Dawson v. Scott, 50 F. 3d 884, 887-888 (CA11 1995) (time spent in halfway house and safe house while released on bond not creditable toward sentence); Moreland v. United States, 968 F. 2d 655, 657-660 (CA8) (en banc) (time spent in halfway house while released on bond not creditable toward sentence), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1028 (1992); United States v. Edwards, 960 F. 2d 278, 282-283 (CA2 1992) (time spent in home confinement under electronic monitoring while released on bond not creditable toward sentence); Pinedo v. United States, 955 F. 2d 12, 14 (CA5 1992) (per curiam) (time spent on bail prior to trial not creditable toward sentence); United States v. Becak, 954 F. 2d 386, 387-388 (CA6) (time spent at mother’s house under conditions of release while released on bond not creditable toward sentence), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 945 (1992); United States v. Zackular, 945 F. 2d 423, 425 (CA1 1991) (time spent in home confinement prior to sentencing not creditable toward sentence); United States v. Insley, 927 F. 2d 185, 186 (CA4 1991) (time spent in home confinement while released on appeal bond not creditable toward sentence); United States v. Woods, 888 F. 2d 653, 655-656 (CA10 1989) (time spent at halfway house while released on bond not creditable toward sentence), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1006 (1990), with Mills v. Taylor, 967 F. 2d 1397, 1400 (CA9 1992) (time spent in community treatment center while released on bail creditable toward sentence where “conditions of release approached] those of incarceration”). Our task is strictly one of statutory interpretation. Respondent argued in the District Court that §3585 violated equal protection principles by treating pretrial defendants differently than postsentenced defendants. App. 23. The District Court rejected this argument. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-28. Respondent waived his equal protection argument in the Third Circuit, see 21 F. 3d 558, 559, n. 1 (1994), and he has not renewed it here. In an amicus curiae brief filed with this Court, University of Southern California Law Center’s Post-Conviction Justice Project raises a similar equal protection argument, see Brief for USC Law Center’s Post-Conviction Justice Project as Amicus Curiae 20-23, but that argument is not properly before the Court. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2 (1981) (noting that this Court does not decide issues raised by amici that were not decided by the court of appeals or argued by the.interested party); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 531, n. 13 (1979) (same). See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976. The provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 relating to bail are known as the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, ch. 1,98 Stat. 1976. The provisions relating to sentencing, including the credit provision of § 3585(b), are known as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987. The Bureau’s view of § 3685(b) is explained in U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons Program Statement No. 5880.28(c) (July 29, 1994), which reads as follows: “Prior Custody Time Credit. The [Sentencing Reform Act] includes a new statutory provision, 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b), that pertains to ‘credit for prior custody’ and is controlling for making time credit determinations for sentences imposed under the SR A ... “Definitions: “Official detention. ‘Official detention’ is defined, for purposes of this policy, as time spent under a federal detention order. This also includes time spent under a detention order when the court has recommended placement in a less secure environment or in a community based program as a condition of presentence detention. A person under these circumstances remains in ‘official detention,’ subject to the discretion of the Attorney General and the U. S. Marshals Service with respect to the place of detention. Those defendants placed in a program and/or residence as a condition of detention are subject to removal and return to a more secure environment at the discretion of the Attorney General and the U. S. Marshals Service, and further, remain subject to prosecution for escape from detention for any unauthorized absence from the program/residence. Such a person is not similarly situated with persons conditionally released from detention with a requirement of program participation and/or residence. “A defendant is not eligible for any credits while released from detention. Time spent in residence in a community corrections center as a result of the Pretrial Services Act of 1982 (18 U. S. C. § 3152-3164), or as a result of a condition of bail or bond (18 U. S. C. §3141-3143), is not creditable as presentence time. A condition of bail or bond which is ‘highly restrictive,’ and that includes ‘house arrest’, ‘electronic monitoring’ or ‘home confinement’; or such as requiring the defendant to report daily to the U. S. Marshal, U. S. Probation Service, or other person; is not considered as time in official detention. Such a defendant is not subject to the discretion of the U. S. Attorney General, the Bureau of Prisons, or the U. S. Marshals Service, regarding participation, placement, or subsequent return to a more secure environment, and therefore is not in a status which would indicate an award of credit is appropriate (see Randall v. Whelan, 938 F. 2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991) and U. S. v. Insley, 927 F. 2d 186 (4th Cir. 1991). Further, the government may not prosecute for escape in the case of an unauthorized absence in such cases, as the person has been lawfully released from ‘official detention.’” (Emphasis in original.) In some cases, a defendant will be arrested, denied bail, and held in custody pursuant to state law, being turned over later to the Federal Government for prosecution. In these situations, BOP often grants credit under § 3585(b) for time spent in state custody, see, e.g., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Operations Memorandum (Oct. 23, 1989); U. S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Sentence Computation Manual CCCA (1992 and Supp. 1994), even though the defendant was not subject to the control of BOP. These situations obviously are not governed by reference to a § 3142 “release” or “detention” order. But because the only question before us is whether a defendant is in “official detention” under § 3585(b) during the time he is “released” on bail pursu ant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984., we need not and do not rule here on the propriety of BOP’s decision to grant credit under § 3585(b) to a defendant who is denied bail pursuant to state law and held in the custody of state authorities. Thus, the dissent is simply wrong when it states that we have “adopt[ed] an interpretation that the Bureau of Prisons itself has rejected” by not allowing any ‘“credit for time spent in state custody.’” Post, at 67, 68.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. DREXEL & CO. No. 153. Argued February 9, 1955. Decided February 28, 1955. William H. Timbers argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobelofj, Myron S. Isaacs and Elizabeth B. A. Rogers. Arthur H. Dean argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Henry S. Drinker, Thomas Reath and John Muljord. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in the case is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission has jurisdiction to pass on a fee to be paid by Electric Bond & Share Co. to Drexel & Co. in connection with a reorganization plan filed by its subsidiary, Electric Power & Light Corp., under § 11 (e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U. S. C. § 79a et seq. We hold that the Commission does have jurisdiction. The problem arises out of the unraveling and reorganization of the vast empire of Bond & Share, pursuant to the command of the Act. The present case is one of several phases of the various reorganization plans adopted to bring the system into compliance. The instant phase of this system’s reorganization grew out of the filing of a voluntary plan of reorganization under § 11 (e) by Electric. Electric owned operating subsidiaries in several States and in Mexico. The plan provided that (1) Electric would transfer to a new holding company, Middle South Utilities, Inc., its holdings in those operating subsidiaries, as well as certain other assets; (2) preferred stocks of Electric would be retired by distributing to those security holders shares of Middle South and shares of another subsidiary of Electric; (3) the remaining shares of Middle South and the other subsidiary would be distributed to the holders of the common stock and of the warrants of Electric; and (4) Bond & Share would pay Electric $2,200,000 in settlement of intrasystem claims. The plan filed by Electric under § 11 (e) required Bond & Share to do three things: first, sell or exchange its holdings of Electric stock; second, acquire in exchange the shares of Middle South and the other subsidiary; and third, pay the cash amount in settlement of the intrasys-tem claims. It was not sufficient for Bond & Share that Electric get approval for its plan under § 11 (e). It was also necessary by the terms of the Act that Bond & Share also get the Commission’s approval of the steps required of it. Bond & Share’s exchange of its securities for the new securities was a “sale” under the Act, for “sale” includes “exchange.” § 2 (a) (23). Bond & Share is a registered holding company. No “sale” of securities can be made by a registered holding company without Commission approval. That is the command of § 12 of the Act. That approval is obtained, as § 12 shows, by a procedure which submits the fees in connection with the sale to the scrutiny and approval of the Commission. Bond & Share’s receipt of the new securities was an “acquisition” within the meaning of the Act. § 2 (a) (22). That “acquisition” was made subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission by § 9 (a). That approval could be had only by submitting the “acquisition” to the Commission’s scrutiny pursuant to § 10 of the Act, a scrutiny that includes supervision of the fees paid by the holding company in connection with the “acquisition.” Bond & Share’s cash payment in settlement of the intra-system claim was incident to the “sale” under § 12 and the “acquisition” under § 10. And, as noted, all three transactions by Bond & Share were parts of the plan filed by Electric under § 11 (e). Bond & Share, therefore, filed an application pursuant to §§ 10, 11, and 12 of the Act, asking for the Commission’s approval of the transactions which the plan required of it. The Commission consolidated the proceedings involving Electric’s plan and Bond & Share’s application and heard them together, and on March 7, 1949, entered one order in the consolidated proceedings, approving both. As respects Bond & Share the order said, “It Is Further Ordered that the application-declaration of Bond and Share referred to above be and it is hereby granted and permitted to become effective.” As respects the plan of Electric, the Commission in the same order gave its approval, subject to additional terms and conditions, the second of which reads: “That jurisdiction be and hereby is specifically reserved to determine the reasonableness and appropriate allocation of all fees and expenses and other remuneration incurred or to be incurred in connection with the said Plan, as amended, and the transactions incident thereto, other than the fairness and reasonableness of the fees and expenses incident to the stockholders’ actions enumerated in Part II of the Plan, as amended.” It is said, however, that that reservation was “the reservation regarding . . . the fees in connection with Electric’s plan under §11, and cannot be made to supply the failure to fix or to reserve the matter of fees in the proceedings under §§10 and 12 in relation to which they were incurred.” There are two answers to that argument. First, the reservation was made in the § 10 and § 12 proceedings, for they were consolidated with the § 11 proceedings and one order entered in all three. Second, the order in the consolidated proceedings reserved jurisdiction over the fees and expenses incurred not only “in connection with the said Plan” but also in connection with “the transactions incident thereto.” The latter obviously included the matters under § 10 and § 12, for they were the chief collateral ones before the Commission at the time. The parties so understood it, for Bond & Share and Drexel filed petitions for approval of the Drexel fee, invoking the reserved jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission held hearings and fixed a fee for Drexel which neither Drexel nor Bond & Share thought adequate. The Commission applied to the District Court for approval of this and other fee and expense orders. The District Court approved. The Court of Appeals affirmed, except for the order as to Drexel; and. as to that it reversed “for lack of jurisdiction in the Commission.” 210 F. 2d 585, 592. We see no such infirmity in the Commission’s order. The Commission plainly has power under § 10 and under § 12 to fix the fees payable by Bond & Share. To be sure, the Commission did not fix any fee, when on March 7, 1949, it entered the consolidated order approving the applications under §§ 10, 11, and 12. That order merely reserved jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the fees. There is a suggestion that no reservation of jurisdiction over the fees is possible, at least so far as § 10 is concerned, since § 10 directs the Commission to approve the plan unless it finds the fees unreasonable. But the reservation by the Commission of jurisdiction over the fees is merely a means of assuring that they will not be unreasonable. Certainly, the Commission need not hold an entire plan in abeyance until it completes hearings on the fees to be paid in connection with one phase of it. We see no reason why the Commission, in the interest of orderly administration, cannot defer consideration of all the fees, until it has time to view the entire matter in perspective and evaluate the worth of each contribution. We would have to read the Act with an extremely hostile eye to deny the Commission that administrative leeway. The error of the Court of Appeals was in overlooking the essential and critical role that §§10 and 12 play in the case and in relying on § 11 (e) alone. The contrast between §§ 11 (e) and 11 (f) is plain, so far as jurisdiction over fees is concerned. Section 11 (f) contains an express provision concerning fees. The subsection, applicable to court proceedings where a receiver or trustee has been appointed, makes all fees “to whomsoever paid” subject to the approval of the Commission. Cf. Leiman v. Guttman, 336 U. S. 1. Section 11 (e) contains no such provision. It merely directs the Commission to approve the plan, if it finds the plan “fair and equitable to the persons affected.” The amount of fees to be paid by Electric plainly would be relevant to the question whether the plan was fair and equitable. See In re Public Service Corp. of New Jersey, 211 F. 2d 231, 232. Payment of excessive fees was one of the historic abuses of the reorganization procedure whereby utility companies were milked, an abuse the Public Utility Holding Company Act sought to correct. 79 Cong. Rec. 4607; S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 33. Questions of fees payable by and to protective committees present special considerations irrelevant here and we put them aside. Cf. Leiman v. Guttman, supra. Different considerations come into play when fees payable by individual security holders to their own counsel are involved. It would seem, for example, that the amount which a stockholder, say, agreed to pay hi's lawyer for representing him in a § 11 (e) proceeding would be no business of the Commission. The amount of that fee would seem to have no direct bearing on the fairness of the plan. But the fees payable by the registered holding company in connection with the reorganization of its subsidiary or affiliate are, or may be, different. At least Congress thought so, for Congress was explicit in making the fees payable by them, in connection with the transactions covered by § 10 and by § 12, subject to Commission approval. Congress had before it the detailed record of holding company activities and knew that many of them had a proclivity for predatory practices. The fees were not only large; they were often loaded on affiliated companies and concealed in intrasystem accounts. Congress decided to put an end to the worst of these practices and control the critical ones. When it came to the intricacies of holding company finance, Congress expressed the desire to have the amount of the fees paid brought to light and to have the Commission decide who pays them and what amounts are reasonable. We cannot be faithful to that statutory design without granting the Commission the jurisdiction asserted here. Reversed. For various phases of the reorganization of this holding company system, see: (1) Electric Bond & Share Co., 9 S. E. C. 978; id., 12 S. E. C. 392; id., 20 S. E. C. 615; id., 21 S. E. C. 143; id., 22 S. E. C. 866; (2) Electric Bond & Share Co., 11 S. E. C. 1146, aff’d sub nom. American Power & Light Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 141 F. 2d-606, 329 U. S. 90; American Power & Light Co., 21 S. E. C. 191; (3) United Gas Corp., 16 S. E. C. 531, aff'd sub nom. In re United Gas Corp., 58 F. Supp. 501, 162 F. 2d 409; and (4) Electric Bond & Share Co., 20 S. E. C. 786. Section 12 (d) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any registered holding company, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise, to sell any security which it owns of any public-utility company, or any utility assets, in contravention of such rules and regulations or orders regarding the consideration to be received for such sale, maintenance of competitive conditions, fees and commissions, accounts, disclosure of interest, and similar matters as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers or to prevent the circumvention of the provisions of this title or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder.” Supra, note 2. Section 9 (a) provides in relevant part: “Unless the acquisition has been approved by the Commission under section 10, it shall be unlawful— “(1) for any registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise, to acquire, directly or indirectly, any securities or utility assets or any other interest in any business.” Section 10 (b) provides in relevant part: “If the requirements of subsection (f) are satisfied, the Commission shall approve the acquisition unless the Commission finds that— “(2) in case of the acquisition of securities or utility assets, the consideration, including all fees, commissions, and other remuneration, to whomsoever paid, to be given, directly or indirectly, in connection with such acquisition is not reasonable or does not bear a fair relation to the sums invested in or the earning capacity of the utility assets to be acquired or the utility assets underlying the securities to be acquired; . . . .” A petition for rehearing states that Electric is not a “public utility company” within the meaning of the Act and therefore § 12 (d) is inapplicable. We do not prejudice that position by this opinion, for whether or not Electric is a “public utility company," § 12 of the Act is concededly applicable. Section 12 (c) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise, to declare or pay any dividend on any security of such company or to acquire, retire, or redeem any security of such company, in contravention of such rules and regulations or orders as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to protect the financial integrity of companies in holding-company systems, to safeguard the working capital of public-utility companies, to prevent the payment of dividends out of capital or unearned surplus, or to prevent the circumvention of the provisions of this title or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder.” Section 12 (f) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any registered holding company or subsidiary company thereof, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise, to negotiate, enter into, or take any step in the performance of any transaction not otherwise unlawful under this title, with any company in the same holding-company system or with any affiliate of a company in such holding-company system in contravention of such rules and regulations or orders regarding reports, accounts, costs, maintenance of competitive conditions, disclosure of interest, duration of contracts, and similar matters as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers or to prevent the circumvention of the provisions of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder.” The broad powers granted the Commission under these provisions are plainly adequate to give it the control it reserved in this case over the fees incident to the exchange of the old securities. Bond & Share asked that it be reimbursed by Electric for this fee. The Commission denied reimbursement, saying that Bond & Share’s services in the proceedings “were not services merely designated to bring Electric into compliance with the Commission’s order but were additionally, if not primarily, steps designed to simplify the Bond and Share system and Bond and Share itself at the apex of that system. . . . Any plan for the compliance of the subholding companies must necessarily have been as a step toward the ultimate resolution of Bond and Share’s overall Section 11 problems which were its primary concern.” Bond & Share took no step to contest that action. Bond & Share asked $100,000 for Drexel. The Commission awarded $50,000. When Bond & Share asked that Electric reimburse it for the fees paid Drexel (see note 7, supra), it was following a traditional holding company practice of using the affiliated companies as convenient pocketbooks of the system.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al. v. PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA et al. No. 85-289. Argued March 26, 1986 Decided June 27, 1986 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 613. Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Disler, Kathryn A. Oberly, and Miriam R. Eisenstein. Douglas L. Parker argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Arlene Battis and Karen Peltz Strauss. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Air Transport Association of America by James E. Landry; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and William S. Franklin; and for the International Air Transport Association by Gordon Dean Booth, Jr., and Robert Glasser. William C. Gleisner III filed a brief for the National Federation of the Blind as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. The United States provides financial assistance to airport operators through grants from a Trust Fund created by the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970. The Government also operates a nationwide air traffic control system. This case presents the question whether, by virtue of such federal assistance, §504 is applicable to commercial airlines. I Respondents successfully challenged regulations promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to implement §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 390, as amended; 29 U. S. C. § 790 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II). To understand respondents’ arguments, it is necessary to review the process by which the regulations were promulgated. A. The Rulemaking Process Section 504 provides: “No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-ance_” 29 U. S. C. §794. The statute did not specifically provide for administrative implementation. In 1976, however, the President issued Executive Order No. 11914, 3 CFR 117 (1976-1980), calling on the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to coordinate rulemaking under § 504 by all federal agencies. At that time two federal agencies were principally concerned with aviation: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is primarily concerned with the Air Traffic Control System and the safety of airline operations, including airports, and CAB, which was primarily concerned with economic regulation of the airline industry. Because § 504 had been modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq., both FAA and CAB patterned their proposed rules after the regulations issued to implement Title VI. 1. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Under §504 CAB issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on June 6, 1979. CAB concluded that its authority under §504 was limited to those few airlines that receive a subsidy under § 406(b) or §419 of the Federal Aviation Act. CAB announced its intention, however, to go beyond its § 504 jurisdiction in order to regulate the activities of all commercial airlines. CAB relied on its authority under § 404 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1374. Section 404 contains two provisions relevant here: § 404(a)(1), requiring all air carriers to “provide safe and adequate service, equipment, and facilities,” and § 404(b), prohibiting carriers from “subjecting any particular person ... to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.” CAB explained that “the proposed rules would emphasize that the handicapped are protected by the adequacy of service and antidiscrimination provisions of Section 404 . . . which are applicable to all air carriers, whether or not receiving Federal financial assistance.” 44 Fed. Reg. 32401-32402 (1979). Somewhat inexplicably, CAB relied on both provisions of § 404 taken together to support its regulatory authority over the on-board activities of air carriers, even though it was aware that, under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the antidiscrimination provision of § 404(b) would lapse as of January 1,1983, and only § 404(a)(1), requiring “safe and adequate service,” would remain in effect. 2. The Final Regulations CAB received public comment on the proposed regulations. Several airlines and the Air Transport Association challenged CAB’s regulatory jurisdiction over the airlines. In the interim, Executive Order No. 12250, 3 CFR 298 (1981), transferred responsibility for coordinating the administration of various civil rights statutes, including § 504, from the Secretary of Health and Human Services to the Attorney General. After public comment and consultation with the Attorney General, CAB issued final regulations. 14 CFR pt. 382 (1986), 47 Fed. Reg. 25948 et seq. (1982). The regulations have three subparts. Subpart A prohibits discrimination in air transportation against qualified handicapped persons. Subpart B contains specific, detailed requirements that must be followed by all air carriers in providing service to the handicapped. Subpart C sets forth compliance and enforcement mechanisms. As to all three subparts, CAB adhered to its original position that § 504 supported regulatory jurisdiction only over those carriers that receive funds under § 406 or § 419. CAB concluded, however, that the surviving portion of §404 — the “safe and adequate service” clause of § 404(a)(1) — did not support imposition of the specific provisions of subparts B and C on nonsubsidized carriers. Thus, those subparts would apply only to the extent authorized by § 504, that is, to carriers receiving subsidies under §406 or §419. CAB concluded, however, that it had authority to extend the reach of subpart A to all air carriers by virtue of § 404(a)(l)’s “safe and adequate service” clause. The Attorney General approved these regulations. B. The Court of Appeals Decision Respondents Paralyzed Veterans of America and two other organizations representing handicapped individuals (collectively PVA) brought this action in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. PVA challenged the substance of some of the regulations, as well as CAB’s conclusion regarding its rulemaking authority under §504. Only the latter claim is before us. On that issue, PVA contended that CAB’s interpretation of the scope of its rule-making authority under § 504 was inconsistent with congressional intent and controlling legal precedent. The Court of Appeals agreed with PVA’s position. Paralyzed Veterans of America v. CAB, 243 U. S. App. D. C. 237, 752 F. 2d 694 (1985). In the court’s view, § 504 gave CAB jurisdiction over all air carriers by virtue of the extensive program of federal financial assistance to airports under the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U. S. C. §1714, as amended (1976 ed., Supp. V). The Court of Appeals found an additional source of financial assistance to airlines in the form of the air traffic control system in place at all major airports. The court vacated the regulations to the extent that their application was limited to carriers receiving funds under § 406 or § 419. It instructed DOT — CAB’s successor agency after CAB was disbanded— to issue new regulations that would apply to all commercial airlines. We granted certiorari to resolve the question of the scope of DOT’s regulatory jurisdiction under § 504. 474 U. S. 918 (1985). We now reverse. II It may be helpful briefly to explain the limited nature of the question before us. This case does not present any challenge to CAB’s interpretation of the scope of its regulatory jurisdiction under § 504. Nor is there any challenge to the application of subpart A — the general antidiscrimination regulation — to all commercial airlines. The only issue before us is the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that § 504 applies to commercial airlines as recipients of federal financial assistance. Section 504 prohibits discrimination against any qualified handicapped individual under “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” We examine first the grants of federal funds to airport operators, which clearly are federal financial assistance, to determine whether it fairly can be said that commercial airlines “receive” these grants. A The starting point of any inquiry into the application of a statute is the language of the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). By its terms § 504 limits its coverage to the “program or activity” that “receives]” federal financial assistance. At the outset, therefore, § 504 requires us to identify the recipient of the federal assistance. We look to the terms of the underlying grant statute. The grant statutes relied on by the Court of Appeals are the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (1982 Act), 49 U. S. C. App. § 2201 et seq., and its predecessor statutes, particularly the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 (1970 Act), Pub. L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 et seq. (formerly codified at 49 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. (1976 ed.)). The 1970 Act established the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, appropriations from which are used to fund airport development. The purpose of disbursements from the Trust Fund is to establish “a nationwide system of public airports adequate to meet the present and future needs of civil aeronautics.” 84 Stat. 224. Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a national airport system plan, id., at 221, and required airport project applications to be consistent with that plan. Id., at 226. In the 1982 Act Congress authorized disbursements from the Trust Fund for the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). Under AIP airport operators submit project grant applications for “airport development or airport planning.” 49 U. S. C. App. § 2201(a). Funds are disbursed for a variety of airport construction projects: e. g., land acquisition, 14 CFR §151.73 (1986); runway paving, § 151.77; and buildings, sidewalks, and parking, § 151.93. The use of the Trust Fund is strictly limited to projects that concern airports. See, e. g., § 151.89 (authorizing road construction) (“Only those airport entrance roads that are definitely needed and are intended only as a way in and out of the airport are eligible”). It is not difficult to identify the recipient of federal financial assistance under these Acts: Congress has made it explicitly clear that these funds are to go to airport operators. Not a single penny of the money is given to the airlines. Thus, the recipient for purposes of § 504 is the operator of the airport and not its users. Congress limited the scope of § 504 to those who actually “receive” federal financial assistance because it sought to impose § 504 coverage as a form of contractual cost of the recipient’s agreement to accept the federal funds. “Congress apparently determined that it would require contractors and grantees to bear the costs of providing employment for the handicapped as a quid pro quo for the receipt of federal funds.” Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 465 U. S. 624, 633, n. 13 (1984). We relied on this same rationale in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555 (1984), where we noted that the recipient of the federal assistance — the college — was free to terminate its participation in the federal grant program and thus avoid the requirements of Title IX. Id., at 565, n. 13. Under the program-specific statutes, Title VI, Title IX, and § 504, Congress enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with the recipients of the funds: the recipient’s acceptance of the funds triggers coverage under the nondiscrimination provision. See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F. 2d 36, 41 (CA2 1983) (“This emphasis upon the contractual nature of the receipt of federal moneys in exchange for a promise not to discriminate is still another reason to conclude that Title VI does not cover direct benefit programs since these programs do not entail any such contractual relationship”), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 929 (1984). By limiting coverage to recipients, Congress imposes the obligations of § 504 upon those who are in a position to accept or reject those obligations as a part of the decision whether or not to “receive” federal funds. In this case, the only parties in that position are the airport operators. B Respondents attempt to avoid the straightforward conclusion that airlines are not recipients within the meaning of § 504 by arguing that airlines are “indirect recipients” of the aid to airports. They contend that the money given to airports is simply converted by the airports into nonmoney grants to airlines. Under this reasoning, federal assistance is disbursed to airport operators in the form of cash. The airport operators convert the cash into runways and give the federal assistance — now in the form of a runway — to the airlines. In support of this position, respondents point to the fact that many of the structures constructed at airports with aid from the Trust Fund are particularly beneficial to airlines, e. g., runways, taxiways, and ramps. They also find support for their position in Grove City’s recognition that federal financial assistance could be either direct or indirect. This argument confuses intended beneficiaries with intended recipients. While we observed in Grove City that there is no “distinction between direct and indirect aid” and that “[t]here is no basis in the statute for the view that only institutions that themselves apply for federal aid or receive checks directly from the Federal Government are subject to regulation,” we made these statements in the context of determining whom Congress intended to receive the federal money, and thereby be covered by Title IX. 465 U. S., at 564. It was clear in Grove City that Congress’ intended recipient was the college, not the individual students to whom the checks were sent from the Government. It was this unusual disbursement pattern of money from the Government through an intermediary (the students) to the intended recipient that caused us to recognize that federal financial assistance could be received indirectly. While Grove City stands for the proposition that Title IX coverage extends to Congress’ intended recipient, whether receiving the aid directly or indirectly, it does not stand for the proposition that federal coverage follows the aid past the recipient to those who merely benefit from the aid. In this case, it is clear that the airlines do not actually receive the aid; they only benefit from the airports’ use of the aid. Respondents do not contend that airlines actually receive or are intended to receive money from the Trust Fund. Nor can they argue that the airport operators are, like the students in Grove City, mere conduits of the aid to its intended recipient, since, unlike the students, the airports are the intended recipients of the funds. Rather, respondents assert that the economic benefit to airlines from the aid to airports is a form of federal financial assistance. This position ignores the very distinction made by Congress in §504, and recognized in Grove City: The statute covers those who receive the aid, but does not extend as far as those who benefit from it. In Grove City we recognized that most federal assistance has “economic ripple effects.” We rejected the argument that those indirect economic benefits can trigger statutory coverage. Id., at 572. Congress tied the regulatory authority to those programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance; the key is to identify the recipient of that assistance. In this case, it is clear that the recipients of the financial assistance extended by Congress under the Trust Fund are the airport operators. c By tying the scope of §504 to economic benefit derived from Trust Fund expenditures, respondents would give § 504 almost limitless coverage. Congress’ purpose in passing the Acts and establishing the Trust Fund was to confer economic benefits on a large number of persons and businesses. As the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce explained: “In addition to the actual users of the airport and airway system — such as airline passengers, general aviation, including private and business aviation operations, air freight forwarders, individual corporate and private shippers, etc. — there are others who benefit substantially from aviation; primarily, perhaps, the military should be considered. From a civilian standpoint those who benefit indirectly include the aircraft manufacturers and all of those whose employment is directly or indirectly related to aviation. To illustrate, an aircraft or aircraft component manufacturer may employ thousands of persons who never fly, yet those persons’ economic lives depend entirely on aviation. More indirectly, but still to be considered, are those who make their livelihood by providing services for the manufacturers’ employees. The employees of such corporations indirectly support such nonaviation interests such as real estate brokers and builders, doctors, dentists, school teachers, etc. This is brought forth here to establish the fact that air transportation in a true sense touches every American home, whether those in the home ever fly or not.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-601, p. 6 (1969). Even if the reach of § 504 were limited to those whom Congress specifically intended to benefit, the scope of the statute would be broad indeed, covering whole classes of persons and businesses with only an indirect relation to aviation. The statutory “limitation” on § 504’s coverage would virtually disappear, a result Congress surely did not intend. Respondents contend that distinctions can be drawn among classes of beneficiaries under the 1982 and 1970 Acts. In particular, they assert that the ultimate beneficiaries under the Acts are the passengers, while the economic benefit derived by the airlines is intended to aid the airlines in benefiting the passengers. Section 504 provides no basis for this distinction. Nor can we find a basis in the Trust Fund Acts for preferring passengers over other beneficiaries. Nowhere has Congress expressed a special intent to benefit passengers. Nor has it indicated that the economic benefit to airlines, either because it was more direct or for any other reason, makes them a recipient of federal financial assistance. Rather, Congress recognized a need to improve airports in order to benefit a wide variety of persons and entities, all of them classified together as beneficiaries. Congress did not set up a system where passengers were the primary or direct beneficiaries, and all others benefited by the Acts are indirect recipients of the financial assistance to airports. In almost any major federal program, Congress may intend to benefit a large class of persons, yet it may do so by funding — that is, extending federal financial assistance to — a limited class of recipients. Section 504, like Title IX in Grove City, draws the line of federal regulatory coverage between the recipient and the beneficiary. I — I I — I HH The Court of Appeals found that airports and airlines are “inextricably intertwined” and that the “indissoluble nexus between them is the provision of commercial air transportation.” 243 U. S. App. D. C., at 257, 752 F. 2d, at 714. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals concluded that commercial airlines are part of a federally assisted program of “commercial air transportation” because they make use of airports that accept federal funds, and because airports are “indispensable” to air travel. We find this reasoning overbroad and unpersuasive. The Court of Appeals defined “program or activity” in part by reference to who is benefited by the financial assistance to airports. See id., at 257-258, 752 F. 2d, at 714-715. As shown above, regulatory coverage tied to the scope of the intended benefits of the Trust Fund Acts is inconsistent with congressional intent in passing § 504. We recognized in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 299 (1985), that “[a]ny interpretation of §504 must ... be responsive to two powerful but countervailing considerations — the need to give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep § 504 within manageable bounds.” The Court of Appeals’ reasoning extends § 504 beyond its bounds. Under the Court of Appeals’ view various industries and institutions would become part of a federally assisted program or activity, not because they had received federal financial assistance, but because they are “inextricably intertwined” with an institution that has. For example, Congress, with the assistance of the States, has engaged in a mammoth program of interstate highway construction and maintenance. See the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. 627, 70 Stat. 374. Congress in this program used a Trust Fund approach similar to the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970. If we accepted the Court of Appeals’ construction of “program or activity,” we would also be compelled to conclude that industries that depend on the federally funded highways for their existence, such as trucking firms and delivery services, are part of a program or activity of national highway transportation. The same could be said of federally supported port facilities. This interpretation of § 504 would give it a scope broader than its language implies, and one never intended by Congress. The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Grove City in support of its definition of the relevant program or activity is misplaced. In Grove City, despite the arguably “indissoluble nexus” among the various departments of a small college, we concluded that only the financial aid program could be subjected to Title IX. In any analogy between Grove City and this case, airport operators would be placed in the position of the college. It is readily apparent that our conclusion in Grove City that only a portion of the college was covered by Title IX cannot support the conclusion that commercial air transportation — a concept much larger than the airports — is the program or activity covered by § 504. The Court of Appeals’ attempt to fuse airports and airlines into a single program or activity is unavailing. It is by reference to the grant statute, and not to hypothetical collective concepts like commercial aviation or interstate highway transportation, that the relevant program or activity is determined. <1 The Court of Appeals also held that the federally provided air traffic control system is a form of federal financial assistance to airlines. The Federal Government spends some $2 billion annually to run this system 24 hours a day nationwide and in various spots around the world. The air traffic controllers are federal employees, and the Federal Government finances operation of the terminal control facilities. In short, the air traffic control system is “owned and operated” by the United States. For that reason, the air traffic control system is not “federal financial assistance” at all. Rather, it is a federally conducted program that has many beneficiaries but no recipients. The legislative history of Title VI makes clear that such programs do not constitute federal financial assistance to anyone. As then-Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach explained: “Activities wholly carried out by the United States with Federal funds, such as river and harbor improvements and other public works, defense installations, veterans’ hospitals, mail service, etc., are not included in the list [of federally assisted programs]. Such activities, being wholly owned by, and operated by or for, the United States, cannot fairly be described as receiving Federal ‘assistance.’ While they may result in general economic benefit to neighboring communities, such benefit is not considered to be financial assistance to a program or activity within the meaning of title VI.” 110 Cong. Rec. 13380 (1964). That reasoning, of course, applies with equal force to § 504. The federal air traffic control system is a public program that does not involve “financial assistance” to anyone. V The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. As used herein, the term “airport operator” refers to the various entities that own or manage airports and that have authority to apply for planning or development grants from the Trust Fund. “Commercial airlines” refers to all passenger carriers formerly certificated by the Civil Aeronautics Board. This responsibility later was transferred to the Secretary of Health and Human Services when the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was divided into the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services. See The Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 96-88, 93 Stat. 669, codified at 20 U. S. C. § 3401 et seq. The FAA became part of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1966. CAB later was disbanded and its functions largely transferred to DOT under the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 et seq. Title VI is the congressional model for subsequently enacted statutes prohibiting discrimination in federally assisted programs or activities. We have relied on case law interpreting Title VI as generally applicable to later statutes. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555, 566 (1984); see also S. Rep. No. 93-1297, p. 39 (1974). Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Part 382, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 44 Fed. Reg. 32 401 (1979). 49 U. S. C. App. §§ 1376(b) and 1389 (1982 ed. and Supp. II). Section 406 created a program designed to guarantee the air service necessary to transport mail to small communities. That program was terminated in 1982. In 1978, CAB began operating the “section 419 program” in order to subsidize small community and other essential air service that would not otherwise be provided. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, § 33, 92 Stat. 1732. This program will operate through 1988. CAB’s decision not to regulate the on-board activities of commercial airlines was consistent with administrative practice under Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. None of the agencies concerned with aviation attempted to regulate the on-board activities of commercial airlines under Title VI. Thus, the consistent administrative interpretation of the program-specific language of Title VI and § 504 has been that it does not cover commercial airlines, unless the airline itself received subsidies from CAB. See 14 CFR § 379.2 (1965), 29 Fed. Reg. 19287 (1964) (CAB); 14 CFR § 15.5(c) (1965), 29 Fed. Reg. 19283 (1964) (FAA). . That interpretation of the statutes by the agencies charged with their enforcement in the area of aviation is entitled to deference. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555, 566 (1980). Pub. L. 95-504, § 40(a), 92 Stat. 1705, 1744 (codified at 49 U. S. C. App. §1551 (a)(2)(B)). The other respondents are the American Council of the Blind and the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities. The 1970 Act has been replaced with the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U. S. C. App. § 2201 et seq. See n. 3, supra. This is not to say that Congress could not give federal financial assistance in the form of property improvements, such as a runway. Although the word “financial” usually indicates “money,” federal financial assistance may take nonmoney form. Cf. Grove City, 465 U. S., at 564-565. Again, the relevant starting point is the grant statute. If it extends money, then the recipient for the purposes of § 504 is the entity that receives the money. If the grant statute extends something other than money, then the recipient is the entity that receives whatever thing of value is extended by the grant statute. For example, Congress recognized that improved airports would not only satisfy the growing needs of commercial aviation, but also would help foster the significant growth that other areas of civil aviation were experiencing, including air carriers and passengers, air cargo carriers, air taxis, private business flying, and private recreational flying. H. R. Rep. No. 91-601, p. 5 (1969). In short, Congress intended to benefit interstate commerce in general through the means of aiding airports. In the 1970 Act, for example, Congress justified the expenditure because “substantial expansion and improvement of the airport and airway system is [sic] required to meet the demands of interstate commerce, the postal service, and the national defense.” 84 Stat. 219. The 1982 Act contains a similar statement of purpose. 49 U. S. C. App. § 2201(a)(2). The Court of Appeals concluded that the air traffic control system constituted federal financial assistance, without specifically concluding that the on-board activities of commercial airlines are a program or activity receiving that assistance. Respondents have suggested that we do not need to reach the question whether the air traffic control system is federal financial assistance. We disagree. If we did not reach the issue, then on remand DOT would be required to formulate its policies in accordance with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the air traffic control system constitutes federal financial assistance because the Federal Government is providing the airlines the services of federal personnel. That reasoning is inconsistent with the longstanding and consistent interpretation of the relevant agencies. FAA, like other agencies, originally promulgated regulations implementing Title VI that defined federal financial assist-anee in a way that allowed for nonmoney assistance. In its definition section, FAA included among possible forms of federal assistance the “detail of Federal personnel.” 14 CFR § 15.23(3) (1965), 29 Fed. Reg. 19286 (1964). DOT’s current Title VI regulations use the same phrase. 49 CFR § 21.23(e)(3) (1985). The air traffic control system does not involve the “detail” of federal personnel; there is, in fact, no other air traffic control entity to which federal personnel can be “detailed” — the system is self-contained. In 1978, pursuant to its responsibility to coordinate the implementation of regulations under § 504 by federal agencies, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) published guidelines that substituted the word “services” for “detail.” 43 Fed. Reg. 2137. But at the same time HEW explained that it did not intend any substantive change in the definitions: “Despite some difference in the wording of the definitions of federal financial assistance in the regulations implementing section 504 and title VI, the substance of the two definitions does not differ.” Id., at 2132. Later, the Department of Justice was given the task of coordinating the regulations under various civil rights laws, including § 504. Exec. Order No. 12250, 3 CFR 298 (1980). It retained the HEW definition of federal financial assistance that included “[sjervices of Federal personnel.” 28 CFR § 41.3(e)(2) (1985). Since the first regulations under Title VI, the interpretation of federal financial assistance has been that the detail, or loan, of federal personnel can constitute federal assistance. “Services” in this context means “detail.” No such selection of federal personnel for a particular duty is involved here. The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring this longstanding administrative interpretation. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984). We note that any other interpretation would give almost limitless meaning to the term “federal financial assistance.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HUFFMAN et al. v. WESTERN NUCLEAR, INC., et al. No. 87-645. Argued April 27, 1988 Decided June 15, 1988 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Merrill argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Spears, John Harrison, Leonard Schaitman, Richard A. Olderman, Eric J. Fygi, Marc Johnston, and Acting Solicitor General Wallace. Peter J. Nickles argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were William H. Allen, Elliott Schulder, Alan A. Pemberton, Harley W. Shaver, and John H. Licht. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Government of Australia by Mark R. Joelson and Joseph P. Griffin; for the Government of Canada by Douglas E. Rosenthal; for Eldorado Nuclear Limited et al. by Robert E. Herzstein; and for Electric Utility Companies by Harry H. Voigt and Paul H. Falon. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for United States Senators Jeff Bingaman et al. by Senator Pete V. Domenici; and for the State of Arizona et al. by Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming, and Mary B. Guthrie, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Duane Woodard of Colorado, Hal Stratton of New Mexico, Brian McKay of Nevada, and David L. Wilkerson of Utah. Charles H. Montange filed a brief for the Nátional Taxpayers Union as amicus curiae. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 161(v) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 78 Stat. 606, 42 U. S. C. §2201(v), provides that the Department of Energy (DOE) shall restrict its enrichment of foreign-source uranium intended for use in domestic facilities “to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry.” DOE has determined that the domestic uranium industry has not been “viable” since 1983, and that the imposition of restrictions on the enrichment of foreign uranium would not assure viability. In this case we consider whether § 161(v) requires DOE to restrict the enrichment of foreign uranium, irrespective of whether such restriction would make the domestic industry viable. We conclude that it does not. I — I In 1964, as part of its efforts to move the nuclear-power industry into the private sector, Congress enacted the Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act (Act), Pub. L. 88-489, 78 Stat. 602, which amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to permit privately owned utilities operating nuclear reactors also to own, for the first time, the uranium used for fuel in their reactors. At the time of the statute’s enactment, DOE’s predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), was the only entity in the world with the facilities to convert natural uranium into the enriched uranium used for fuel in commercial reactors. In § 161(v), Congress accounted for this defacto monopoly by authorizing the AEC to offer “toll enrichment” services whereby utilities could obtain unenriched uranium on the open market and have it enriched by the AEC for a fee. It ’was to protect the uranium mining and milling industry from foreign, competition during the period of transition from a Government-controlled market to an open one, that Congress included in § 161(v) the requirement that the AEC, in written “criteria,” restrict its enrichment of foreign-source uranium for domestic use “to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry.” The criteria initially established by the AEC provided that it would enrich no foreign-source uranium for domestic use. See 31 Fed. Reg. 16479 (1966). In 1974, expecting an increase in the demand for uranium to match the anticipated expansion in the commercial use of nuclear power, the AEC amended the criteria and provided for the gradual elimination by the end of 1983 of restrictions on its enrichment of foreign-source uranium for domestic use. See 39 Fed. Reg. 38016 (1974). The phase-out took place according to schedule, and DOE, which has replaced AEC for these purposes, has not reimposed restrictions on the enrichment of foreign uranium. The early optimistic forecast for the commercial use of nuclear power turned gloomy in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, and the economic condition of the domestic uranium industry deteriorated. Cancellations and delays in the construction of nuclear reactors led to a drop in the demand for uranium, which, in turn, brought about a precipitous decline in the price of uranium ore. The decline of the domestic uranium industry has also been attributed to other developments in the national and international markets. DOE lost its enrichment monopoly when two European consortia and the Soviet Union began to supply enriched uranium produced from foreign-source ore. See 51 Fed. Reg. 3625 (1986). This allowed foreign uranium suppliers, who offered lower prices, to compete successfully with domestic suppliers for the business of the domestic utilities.' Another competitive alternative was the emergence of a secondary market in which domestic utilities, bound by long-term contracts to purchase enrichment services in excess of their needs, sold their enriched uranium to other utilities at substantial discounts. Ibid. In 1983, § 170B was added to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to improve Congress’ ability to monitor the domestic uranium industry’s condition. 96 Stat. 2081, 42 U. S. C. § 2210b. This new provision required the Secretary of Energy to promulgate criteria for assessing the viability of the industry and to report to the President and the Congress annually on the industry’s viability. DOE accordingly issued criteria, still in effect, see 10 CFR pt. 761 (1988), which define viability largely in terms of “the extent to which the domestic mining and milling uranium industry will be capable, at any particular time, of supplying the needs of the domestic nuclear power industry under a variety of hypothetical conditions.” 48 Fed. Reg. 45747 (1983). Applying these criteria, DOE reported that the industry was viable in 1983, but that one year later it was no longer viable. See S. Rep. No. 100-214, p. 9 (1987) (noting no change in viability in 1985 and no change in prospect for industry’s viability in 1986). Shortly after the Secretary first reported that the industry was not viable, he initiated a rulemaking to consider revising the criteria governing DOE’s restriction of enrichment services. 51 Fed. Reg. 3624-3632 (1986). In his notice of proposed rulemaking, the Secretary specifically stated that, despite the depressed condition of the domestic industry, he proposed not to restrict the enrichment of foreign uranium because “[ijmport restrictions on foreign uranium would not assure the viability of the.domestic mining and milling industry.” Id., at 3627. After receiving extensive comments, the Secretary adopted final revised criteria that again did not include any restrictions on enrichment. See 10 CFR pt. 762 (1988). In response to critical comments from the domestic uranium industry, the Secretary explained: “The plain language of the statute makes clear that restrictions are not to be imposed automatically if the domestic industry is non-viable, but only if they are needed to, and in fact, will assure the. maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry.” 51 Fed. Reg. 27134 (1986). Finding that the domestic industry’s problems were due to “[structural weaknesses,” particularly the collapse in demand and the consequent inability of the market to sustain a price for uranium that enabled the industry to recover its cost of production, the Secretary concluded that restrictions on enrichment would do nothing to cure those ills. Id., at 27135. Moreover, the Secretary found that, because DOE had no market power with respect to the provision of enrichment services, it could not force its enrichment customers to use domestic uranium. Id., at 27138. The ‘Secretary repeated his earlier conclusion that restrictions on enrichment services “would not assure the viability of the domestic mining and milling industry,” id., at 27135, and, if anything, would be “counterproductive,” because such restrictions would send some customers away, requiring DOE to impose heavier costs on the remaining domestic suppliers. Id., at 27136. Before the Secretary had concluded that the industry was not viable, and before he had initiated this latest rulemaking, respondents, three domestic uranium mining and milling companies, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against DOE and some of its officers and employees, petitioners here. Respondents alleged, among other things, that DOE’s failure to impose restrictions on the enrichment of foreign uranium for use in domestic facilities constituted a violation of §161(v). App. 10-15. Respondents moved for summary judgment based on this claim, arguing that two facts — that the domestic industry was not viable and that DOE imposed no restrictions on enrichment of foreign uranium — sufficed'.to establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law under § 161(v). App. 27-28. Accepting respondents’ two facts, DOE submitted a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that § 161(v) did not require restrictions when those restrictions would not serve the statutory goal of assuring the maintenance of a viable domestic industry. App. 39. The District Court entered summary judgment for respondents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. According to the court, the statute gave DOE no discretion to determine not to impose restrictions if the domestic industry was not viable. In view of its determination that immediate injunctive relief was necessary to remedy DOE’s “continuing refusal to recognize its obligations under 42 U. S. C. §2201(v),” id., at 22a-23a, the District Court entered an order requiring DOE to limit its enrichment of foreign uranium for domestic use to 25% of all material enriched between June 6 and December 31, 1986; imposing a total ban on enrichment of foreign uranium beginning January 1, 1987, and “continuing until the viability of the domestic uranium industry is assured”; and calling for a rulemaking to be commenced to determine whether “criteria less restrictive than those imposed by this order would assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry.” Id., at 23a. DOE appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. That court affirmed the District Court’s judgment in relevant part. 825 F. 2d 1430 (1987). The Court of Appeals found the language of § 161(v) unambiguous: The term “shall” indicated that the restrictions were mandatory, and the phrase “to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry” indicated that DOE had discretion to “determine how much restriction is required to assure viability, but it cannot decide not to impose restrictions when the industry is not viable.” 825 F. 2d, at 1439. According to the Court of Appeals, the statute clearly instructs that “when domestic nonviability is determined, restrictions on enrichment of foreign-source uranium must be imposed and must become increasingly aggressive, to the point of 100% restriction, until the domestic industry is rejuvenated and becomes viable.” Ibid. At DOE’s request, the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate pending this Court’s final disposition of DOE’s petition for certiorari. App. 4. We granted the writ. 484 U. S. 1003 (1988). II We begin by emphasizing that the question presented here is a narrow one which comes to us as a challenge to the entry of summary judgment. That judgment rests on a legal conclusion drawn from two uncontested facts: that the domestic uranium industry was not viable, and that DOE was imposing no restrictions on the enrichment of foreign-source uranium for use in domestic facilities. On the basis of these facts alone, the courts below determined that DOE was violating the law, for they read § 161 (v) “to require the DOE to restrict enrichment of foreign uranium whenever the domestic industry is not viable — whether or not such restriction would result in successful resuscitation of the uranium industry.” 825 F. 2d, at 1437. Therefore, neither DOE’s underlying assessment that the industry was not viable, nor its assessment that no amount of restriction would assure the industry’s viability, nor, indeed, what it means to “assure the maintenance of a viable . . . industry” are before us at this time for review. The only question presented is whether, regardless of the effects restrictions would have on the viability of the domestic industry, DOE must impose restrictions on the enrichment of foreign-source uranium whenever the domestic industry is determined not to be viable. In considering this narrow question of statutory interpretation, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the relevant language in § 161(v) is unambiguous. While respondents’ reading of the statute is not implausible, it is by no means the only reading the language can bear. The statute requires DOE to impose restrictions “to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry.” If some amount of restriction would assure a viable domestic industry, there can be no doubt that DOE is required to impose restrictions. The term “shall” makes clear that, in such circumstances, DOE has no discretion to decline to impose restrictions. But whether that mandate applies when restrictions would not assure viability is not directly addressed by the language of the statute. Indeed, we well might infer from the language that the particular issue presented by this case was not the focus of Congress’ concern at the time the relevant provision was enacted. We therefore look to Congress’ express purpose in imposing restriction requirements to determine whether they apply here. The purpose of the relevant provision could not be articulated more clearly in the statutory language. See United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543 (1940) (“There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes”). Congress imposed'restriction obligations on DOE to satisfy a single goal: “to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry.” Both parties agree that this is the clear purpose behind the provision, but they put it to different uses. Respondents contend that the statute reveals that Congress made a policy determination that imposing restrictions on the enrichment of foreign-source uranium could always assure the viability of the domestic industry and therefore commanded DOE to impose some restrictions whenever the industry’s viability was threatened or destroyed. Respondents suggest that DOE’s refusal to impose restrictions under the circumstances presented in this case simply reflects DOE’s disagreement with Congress’ policy judgment. See also 825 F. 2d, at 1439 (“DOE’s argument that this policy is not wise in the present uranium market should be made to Congress and not to the courts”). DOE, in contrast, asserts that the clear congressional purpose defines the proper limit of DOE’s obligation: DOE is required to impose restrictions to the extent necessary to serve a particular goal, and if no extent will serve that goal, then DOE does not violate the statute by declining to impose restrictions. Indeed, DOE suggests, to impose restrictions it knew were incapable of serving the statutory goal would, in fact, be to act outside its authority. DOE’s reading strikes us as the more natural one. While the parties, on remand, can argue over whether DOE properly determined that no amount of restriction would assure viability, and, indeed, what it means to assure viability, it seems strained to assert that, even if DOE properly determined that no amount of restriction would assure the viability of the industry, Congress nevertheless intended DOE to impose restrictions that were somehow calculated to serve that unattainable goal. Indeed, it is impossible to ascertain from the statute how DOE would calculate the extent of restriction to be imposed under respondents’ interpretation of the statute. The only guidepost DOE has is the amount necessary to assure the viability of the domestic industry. See 825 F. 2d, at 1438 (interpreting the phrase “to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic industry” as “informing] the DOE of the amount of restriction required”) (emphasis in original). Where DOE determines that no such amount exists, it is without guidance in setting restrictions. The determination of the courts below that DOE was barred from enriching any foreign-source uranium rests on the assumption that the greater the restrictions, the more assured is the domestic industry’s viability. This assumption cannot be grounded in the statutory language and, indeed, for the purpose of this case’s summary judgment status, we must accept DOE’s assertion that the .assumption is false. Ill Because we conclude that Congress did not intend to force DOE to impose enrichment restrictions where such restrictions would not achieve the statutory goal they were intended to achieve, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. A purist might regard the word “viable” as misused in this context. It nevertheless appears in the statute and therefore, inescapably, it and its variants are used throughout this opinion. See H. Fowler, Modern English Usage 679 (2d ed. 1965); W. Follett, Modern American Usage 344-345 (1966). “Enrichment,” in this context, refers to the process whereby the proportion of the fissionable isotope U-235 is increased from approximately 1% to approximately 3%. Natural, unenriehed, uranium cannot be used to produce commercial electric power. The relevant portion of § 161(v) states that the AEC is authorized to offer toll enrichment services provided: “That the Commission, to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry, shall not offer such services for source or special nuclear materials of foreign origin intended for use in a utilization facility within or under the jurisdiction of the United States. The Commission shall establish criteria in writing setting forth the terms and conditions under which services provided under this subsection shall be made available including the extent to which such services will be made available for source or special nuclear material of foreign origin intended for use in a utilization facility within or under the jurisdiction of the United States: Provided, That before the Commission establishes such criteria, the proposed criteria shall be submitted to the Joint Committee [on Atomic Energy], and a period of forty-five days shall elapse while Congress is in session . . . unless the Joint Committee by resolution in writing waives the conditions of, or all or any portion of, such forty-five-day period.” 42 U. S. C. §2201(v). In 1974, Congress enacted the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1233, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §5801 et seq.,- which abolished the AEC. See § 5814(a). The functions of the AEC were divided between two regulatory bodies. Its “licensing and related regulatory functions” were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. § 5841(f). All other functions, including the enrichment-services program, were transferred to the Energy and Research and Development Administration, § 5814(e), which later became DOE, see §§301 and 703 of Department of Energy Organization Act, 91 Stat. 577, 606, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7151(a) and 7293. Between 1979 and 1986, the market price of uranium dropped from $43.25 per pound to $17.00 per pound, which an industry report suggests is well below the conventional United States producers’ average cost of production. See Status of the Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling Industry: The Effects of Imports, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 148 (1981) (statement of Edison Electric Institute reporting drop from 1979 to 1981); 51 Fed. Reg. 27136, n. 12 (1986) (reporting 1986 price). Apparently the market price has remained low. See Weekly Metals Prices, Financial Times, June 8,1988, p. 34, col. 1 (London ed.) (reporting price of $15.75 per pound). Petitioners are John S. Herrington, the Secretary of Energy; F. Clark Huffman, Sherry E. Peske, Philip G. Sewell, James W. Vaughn, and Joseph F. Salgado, officers or employees of DOE sued in their official capacities; and DOE itself. For convenience, petitioners are referred to collectively as DOE. In this motion, respondents also sought summary judgment on their claim that the criteria that DOE promulgated pursuant to § 170B to assess viability were “fatally flawed.” App. 27. Respondents later sought leave to withdraw this portion of their motion without prejudice. This request was granted by the District Court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. While the appeal was pending, Congress adopted a joint resolution for continuing appropriations to provide funding for DOE and other agencies. 100 Stat. 1783. Section 305 of the resolution expressly authorizes DOE to enrich foreign uranium until the present litigation is brought to final judgment. 100 Stat. 1783-210. In addition to arguing that its interpretation of § 161(v) is more reasonable, DOE maintains that, even if the two interpretations are equally reasonable, its interpretation is entitled to deference as a “permissible construction” of a statute by the agency charged with the statute’s administration. See Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U. S. 974, 980 (1986), quoting Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984). Although respondents contend that DOE’s interpretation of § 161(v) has not been consistent over the years and is therefore not entitled to deference, see Brief for Respondents 34, it is unclear whether DOE articulated, in advance of this litigation, any interpretation of the statute’s application to the facts presented here. On July 29, 1986, more than one month after the District Court had issued its order granting summary judgment, DOE issued a final rulemaking, stating that it would continue to refuse to impose enrichment restrictions “in order [in part] to formally record DOE’s interpretation of section 161(v).” 51 Fed. Reg. 27134, n. 4 (1986). Because we agree that DOE’s reading of § 161(v) is the more plausible one, we need not consider whether the manner in which DOE has articulated its interpretation should affect the degree of deference it warrants. Cf. Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Governors, FRS, 468 U. S. 137, 143-144 (1984) (Board counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action entitled to little deference). Of course, DOE would be in a different position if Congress expressly had required that restrictions be imposed whenever the industry was not viable without tying the extent of restrictions to be imposed to the achievement of a stated purpose. Were DOE governed by such a statute, its disagreement with the wisdom of the requirement would not give DOE the discretion to ignore it. While DOE styled its response to respondents’ motion for summary judgment as a cross-motion for summary judgment as well as a memorandum in opposition, see App. 39, DOE’s successful opposition to respondents’ motion is insufficient to establish that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. All we have resolved here is that the industry’s nonviability does not necessarily trigger an obligation to impose enrichment restrictions. Whether DOE, in fact, has violated § 161(v) by failing to impose restrictions is a question to be addressed, in the first instance, on remand after an opportunity for presentation of further evidence and further briefing.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LYNG, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. v. PAYNE et al. No. 84-1948. Argued March 24, 1986 Decided June 17, 1986 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 943. Bruce N. Kuhlik argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Robert E. Kopp, and Richard A. Olderman. Theodore L. Tripp, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal law vests in the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to make emergency loans to farmers who suffer economic losses as a result of a natural disaster. See Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act (Act), §§321-330, 75 Stat. 311, as amended, 7 U. S. C. §§1961-1971. Pursuant to an agency rule, the Secretary required loan applicants suffering from disasters occurring between December 26, 1972, and April 20, 1973, to file their applications by April 2, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 7569 (1974) (later codified at 7 CFR § 1832.82(a) (1975)). That rule embodied a statutory command to keep the loan program open at least until that date. Pub. L. 93-237, 87 Stat. 1025. The question presented is whether a federal court has the remedial authority to reopen this long-terminated loan program on the basis of its finding that the Secretary, in alleged violation of another rule, failed adequately to notify affected farmers of the program’s availability and terms. M In early April 1973 torrential rams struck 13 counties m the northern part of Florida. Initial estimates, which were later sharply reduced, projected that resulting crop and property losses would be in excess of $3 million. In light of the scope of these anticipated losses, on May 26, 1973, President Nixon declared the region a major disaster area. 38 Fed. Reg. 14800 (1973). See Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744 (repealed or transferred 1974). As a result of this declaration, the Secretary of Agriculture came under a statutory obligation to “make loans” to qualifying individuals in the region. 7 U. S. C. § 1961(b) (1970 ed., Supp. III). At the time of the declaration, the federal disaster relief program, like much of the rest of the Federal Government, had become embroiled in a budgetary dispute between the Executive and Legislative Branches. In 1972, Congress had passed Pub. L. 92-385, 86 Stat. 554, which authorized emergency loans under terms far more generous than those available under later versions of the Act. Under the 1972 law as implemented by the Secretary, loans carried a 1% interest rate and were not conditioned upon the unavailability of alternative sources of credit. In addition, the Secretary was directed to forgive outright up to $5,000 of the principal of the loan. On December 27, 1972, as part of a larger, administrationwide effort to control what were viewed as excessive congressional appropriations, the Secretary directed that regional Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) officials effectively cease processing loan applications. See generally Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (Minn. 1973); Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: Joint Hearings before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Impoundment of Funds of the Senate Committee on Government Operations of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 532 (1973). Aware that the “forgiveness features and low interest rates provided for by Public Law 92-385” had contributed to the unilateral executive decision to curtail the program, Congress attempted to resolve the crisis by repealing those provisions. S. Rep. No. 93-85, p. 1 (1973). Public Law 93-24, 87 Stat. 24, which became effective on April 20, 1973, set the interest rate on emergency loans at 5%, limited the availability of loans to those unable to obtain credit from other sources, and eliminated entirely the provision that had previously allowed for cancellation of a portion of the principal. A grandfather clause provided that the terms of the earlier act, Pub. L. 92-385, would remain applicable to disasters designated between January 1 and December 27, 1972. Left unclear, however, was the status of disasters occurring during the 4-month period between December 27, 1972, and April 20,1973, the effective date of Pub. L. 93-24. Congress resolved this uncertainty by passing Pub. L. 93-237, the provision at the center of this case. Section 4 of the new Act provided that, “[notwithstanding the provisions of Public Law 93-24,” loans “with respect to natural disasters which occurred” during this interim period would be governed by the more generous terms of Pub. L. 92-385. In addition, § 10(c) provided that the deadline for applying for a loan would be extended 90 days beyond the date of the enactment of Pub. L. 93-237. This 90-day extension supplanted the established regulatory policy of the Secretary to accept loan applications for crop losses only if filed within nine months of the formal disaster declaration. (For physical losses the deadline was 60 days.) According to the Conference Report, the purpose of the extension was to make sure that the FmHA’s “administratively set deadlines” took into account the confusion among farmers concerning the numerous changes in federal disaster relief law in the recent past. S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-363, p. 6 (1973). The bill was signed into law on January 2,1974. Thus, the congressionally mandated 90-day period for loans under Pub. L. 93-237 expired on April 2, 1974. The Florida flood coincided with this period of confusion in the administration of federal disaster relief. Between May 26, 1973 (the date the disaster was declared), and January 2, 1974 (the date Pub. L. 93-237 became law), the loan program was administered pursuant to the terms of Pub. L. 93-24. Accordingly, during this initial loan period, farmers had nine months, or until February 26,1974, to submit applications for emergency loans. At the time of the May 26, 1973, Presidential disaster declaration, and throughout the initial loan period, FmHA rules required the agency to follow certain procedures designed to notify potential borrowers of the availability of disaster relief. 7 CFR § 1832.3(a)(1) (1973). In addition to a general obligation to “make such public announcements as appear appropriate,” the regulations required the FmHA County Supervisor to inform various local officials and “agricultural lenders” of “the assistance available under [the] program.” Ibid,. It is undisputed that during the initial loan period no applications were filed. On February 15, 1974, approximately six weeks after the enactment of Pub. L. 93-237, the FmHA issued instructions to its staff concerning the implementation of the new emergency loan program. App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary published these instructions without material change in the Federal Register. 39 Fed. Reg. 7569 (1974) (later codified at 7 CFR §§ 1832.81-1832.92 (1975)). The Federal Register publication set out in detail the terms and conditions of the new program, including the 1% interest rate, the $5,000 forgiveness provision, and the absence of any requirement that the applicant demonstrate the unavailability of other credit. 39 Fed. Reg. 7571 (1974). The regulation also specified that “the termination date for acceptance of applications . . . will be April 2, 1974.” Id., at 7570. Also included in the staff instructions were directions that “State Directors and County Supervisors . . . inform the news media, including newspapers, radio, and television in the affected counties of the provisions of P. L. 93-237.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a (later published as § 1832.82(a) of the “Special Emergency Loan Policies . . . Implementing Applicable Provisions of Public Law 93-237,” 39 Fed. Reg. 7569 (1974)). Attached to the instructions was a suggested news release. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a-51a. The release explained that farmers who had not yet received an emergency loan could apply for such a loan at the local FmHA office. Although not setting out the details of the new program, the model release did state that “loan applications will be taken under the terms of a new law (P. L. 93-237) enacted January 2, 1974.” Id., at 51a. Consistent with these instructions, the State FmHA director forwarded the sample news release to local agency offices. Those offices in turn sent copies to the local media, and, on at least two occasions, the releases were carried in newspapers in the north Florida disaster area. Record, Defendants’ Exhibits 10-12. During this second loan period, that is, the period between the enactment of Pub. L. 93-237 and the expiration of the 90-day deadline on April 2, 1974, no more than four farmers from the Florida disaster area applied for emergency loans. On August 19, 1976, respondent Payne, a north Florida farmer, instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Although he had received actual notice of the special 1974 emergency loan program, he sought to represent a class of approximately 2,500 farmers who had been eligible for loans under that program but, because of lack of notice, had not been aware of their eligibility. Contending that the FmHA’s failure to publicize the program more fully violated the agency’s own regulations and deprived them of property without due process of law, respondents sought an injunction directing the FmHA to reopen the loan program under the terms prevailing during the period “up to and including April 2, 1974.” Complaint 6. The District Court certified the class and granted the requested relief. In a variety of different ways, the court found, the FmHA had failed to give adequate notice of the availability of loans. Most of the notice deficiencies specifically found by the court occurred during the initial loan period. It found, for example, that a number of farmers had left a June 1973 meeting with the incorrect impression that they were ineligible for loans, that FmHA officials knew of this misimpression, and that they failed to correct it. The court also found that press releases describing the terms of both the initial and new loan programs were incomplete. Finally, the court determined that, in violation of the specific requirements of 7 CFR § 1832.3(a)(1) (1973), the FmHA had failed to notify various state and county officials of the availability of emergency loans. The District Court did not allude to the specific notice requirements promulgated by the agency in connection with the implementation of Pub. L. 93-237. See 39 Fed. Reg. 7569 (1974) (§ 1832.82(a)). Apparently assuming, however, that the earlier notice requirements contained in 7 CFR § 1832.3(a)(1) (1973) continued to apply during the new loan period, the court held that the agency’s failure to adhere to these requirements required it to reopen the new loan program for a 60-day period extending from April 15, 1981, to June 15, 1981. In particular, the court premised the remedy on the FmHA’s failure “to make such public announcements as appear appropriate.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. Payne v. Block, 714 F. 2d 1510 (1983). It accepted the District Court’s various findings concerning the FmHA’s failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in 7 CFR § 1832.3(a)(1) (1973). Those findings, however, “pertain[ed] only peripherally” to its decision to affirm. 714 F. 2d, at 1519. Regardless of any violations of 7 CFR § 1832.3(a)(1), the court concluded, the FmHA had failed to comply with its self-imposed obligation to notify the public of the new loan program. The agency had announced in the Federal Register that it would “inform the news media ... of the provisions of P. L. 93-237.” 39 Fed. Reg. 7570 (1974) (§ 1832.82(a)). This it had not done, the court believed, because the news releases announcing the new loan program had failed to explain its generous terms. In view of the established proposition that agencies are duty bound to adhere to their own procedures, the court held, the most appropriate remedy for the violation was an injunction directing the agency to reopen the loan program. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s argument that the April 2, 1974, application deadline was required by an Act of Congress and, therefore, beyond the authority of the District Court to expand. In the court’s view, Pub. L. 93-237 had merely required the FmHA to extend its administratively set deadline for 90 days. Nothing in the Act, however, divested the agency of discretion to extend it further. The Secretary sought review in this Court, and we granted the petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment below, and remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U. S. 51 (1984). Block v. Payne, 469 U. S. 807 (1984). In Community Health Services, the Court held that, even assuming that principles of equitable estoppel ever applied against the Government, “a private party surely cannot prevail [on that theory] without at least demonstrating that the traditional elements of estoppel are present.” 467 U. S., at 61. The Court of Appeals, observing that petitioners’ liability was premised not on a theory of equitable estoppel but on the agency’s failure to follow its own regulations, adhered to its prior views and reinstated its decision. Block v. Payne, 751 F. 2d 1191 (1985). Because the decision below exposes the Federal Government to substantial potential liability and because its reasoning implicates important questions about a federal court’s remedial powers, we again granted certiorari. Block v. Payne, 474 U. S. 815 (1985). We now reverse. 1 — 1 1 — 1 The Secretary s principal argument in this Court is that the remedy granted below shares all of the essential characteristics of an equitable estoppel against the Government and, accordingly, should be analyzed on those terms. We acknowledge that the practical effect of the injunction requiring the reopening of the loan program is to estop the FmHA from relying on the validly promulgated regulatory deadline as a basis for refusing to process further loan applications. And we readily agree that, had respondents sought relief on an equitable estoppel theory, they could not prevail. As we observed only recently, even assuming that the Government is ever subject to estoppel, a “private party surely cannot prevail without at least demonstrating that the traditional elements of an estoppel are present.” Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U. S., at 61. An essential element of any estoppel is detrimental reliance on the adverse party’s misrepresentations, id., at 69 (citing 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 805, p. 192 (S. Symons ed. 1941)); and neither the named plaintiffs, much less the 2,500 members of the class they represent, have sought to demonstrate such reliance. Moreover, the only misconduct specifically found by the District Court was the failure to give effective notice of information that, at least with respect to the second loan period, was concededly published in the Federal Register. Our cases leave no doubt that “failure to fully publicize the rights . . . accorded” by an Act of Congress does not “give rise to an estoppel against the Government.” INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5, 8-9 (1973) (per curiam). See also Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., supra, at 63 (“[T]hose who deal with the Government are expected to know the law”); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 384 (1947). As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, however, respondents’ inability to satisfy the stringent requirements of common-law estoppel does not independently decide the case. Indeed, beginning with their initial complaint and throughout the course of the litigation, respondents have never sought to rely on estoppel as a basis for recovery. Their theory instead, and the theory on which the lower courts granted the injunction, is that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq., authorizes this kind of relief to remedy the FmHA’s alleged failure to comply with its duly promulgated notice regulations. It may well be that some of the same concerns that limit the application of equitable estoppel against the Government bear on the appropriateness of awarding other remedies that have a close substantive resemblance to an estoppel. We reject, however, petitioners’ suggestion that any remedy that can be analogized to an equitable estoppel is necessarily invalid, regardless of the source of the cause of action, unless the plaintiff succeeds in proving all the elements of common-law estoppel. Cf. Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 494-495 (1967). Indeed, any other rule has the potential for divesting the courts of the remedial authority specifically envisioned by Congress under the APA. If, for example, a farmer had filed a loan application prior to the expiration of the loan deadline and a court determined that the denial of the application after the deadline’s expiration was “arbitrary, capricious [and] not in accordance with law,” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A), the appropriate remedy under the APA would be to direct that the application be granted or reconsidered. Although this would, in a sense, estop the Government from applying the deadline, we have never suggested that the applicant would be under an obligation to satisfy the requirements of proving an equitable estoppel to obtain the relief specifically available under the APA. The question before us then is not whether the Secretary should be estopped from applying the deadline, but whether the relief afforded by the District Court was appropriate under the APA. Respondents contend that the notice regulations, having been promulgated pursuant to the Secretary’s delegated rulemaking authority, had the force and effect of law and therefore were binding on the agency. To remedy this noncompliance, they suggest, the District Court had the authority under 5 U. S. C. § 706 to “compe[l] ‘action unlawfully withheld’ [notice] and ‘set aside agency action’ [application of the deadline] found to be ‘without observance of procedures required by law.’” Brief for Respondents 21 (quoting 5 U. S. C. §706) (bracketed material in original). To prevail on this theory, respondents must clear at least three substantial hurdles. At the outset, not all agency publications are of binding force, Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S. 785, 789 (1981); and it remains to be shown that the notice provisions, which began life as unpublished staff instructions, are the kind of agency law the violation of which is remediable at all. Second, an agency’s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress. Thus, even assuming that Pub. L. 93-237 left the Secretary some discretion to extend the 90-day deadline beyond April 2, 1974, it would hardly be an abuse of that discretion to refuse to do so many years after the disaster had receded if such an extension would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress. Finally, the “agency action” respondents seek to have set aside is the “application of the deadline.” Yet, with the exception of respondent Payne, who clearly has no standing, there is no allegation that any member of the class has ever applied for a loan. Although the APA includes “failure to act” in its definition of reviewable agency action, 5 U. S. C. § 551(13), it is far from clear that relief under the APA is appropriate when the allegedly aggrieved party has failed entirely to present its claim to the agency. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 328 (1976). We need not, however, definitively resolve any of these issues. Nor need we confront the Secretary’s broader contention that it is in all instances inappropriate for a court, reviewing for agency compliance with the APA, to set aside one validly promulgated regulation to remedy an alleged violation of another entirely independent one. An essential predicate of the relief granted below is that the FmHA in fact failed to comply with its own rules. As we now explain, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the FmHA violated its self-imposed obligation to give notice of the loan program is insupportable. The Court of Appeals relied exclusively on the FmHA’s purported violation of § 1832.82(a), the'new notice provision, to uphold the injunction directing the Secretary to reopen the loan program. Although the agency did issue press releases, the court reasoned, its failure to describe the generous terms of the new program breached its regulatory obligation to “‘inform the news media ... of the provisions of P. L. No. 93-237.’” 714 F. 2d, at 1520, quoting 39 Fed. Reg. 7570 (1974) (emphasis supplied by Court of Appeals). This reasoning is demonstrably incorrect. Public Law 93-237 itself said nothing at all about the availability of a reduced interest rate, the possibility of partial forgiveness of the loan principal, or the elimination of the requirement that credit be unavailable from other sources. It merely stated that “[notwithstanding the provisions of Public Law 93-24,” loans with respect to disasters occurring prior to April 20, 1973, would be administered under Pub. L. 92-385. Thus, the statement in the news release that “loan applications will be taken under the terms of a new law (P. L. 93-237) enacted January 2, 1974,” though not a model of clarity, was no less informative than were the “provisions” of the Act the release was endeavoring to describe. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; 7 CFR § 1832.82(a) (1975). Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ holding runs roughshod over the established proposition that an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference. United States v. Larionoff, 431 U. S. 864, 872 (1977); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965). The publicity directive that was later codified at 7 CFR § 1832.82(a) (1975) was originally issued as a staff instruction designed to describe the procedures for implementing Pub. L. 93-237. App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a-49a. Accompanying the instruction was a sample press release identical in all pertinent respects to those sent to the media in the area of the Florida disaster. Id., at 50a-51a. Because the suggested release obviously reflected the agency’s contemporaneous understanding of the scope of the publicity directive, it is logically untenable to suggest that the agency violated the directive by issuing press releases modeled explicitly on the sample. The Court of Appeals specifically disclaimed any reliance on 7 CFR § 1832.3(a)(1) (1973), the Secretary’s previous publicity directive, to support its affirmance of the District Court’s judgment. As they are entitled to do, however, respondents now defend that judgment on the alternative theory that the agency’s violation of this earlier notice provision warranted the remedy of an injunction reopening the loan program. We find this theory no more supportable than that relied on by the Court of Appeals. As an initial matter, any violations of this regulation that occurred during the first loan period are plainly irrelevant. Starting with their complaint, and throughout the course of this lengthy litigation, respondents have sought to have the loan program reopened under the more generous terms available under Pub. L. 93-237: And such was the relief granted by the District Court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a. As a simple matter of causation, any failure to inform respondents about the old loan program cannot support the remedy of requiring the FmHA to process loan applications under the “terms and benefits” available under the new one. Ibid. Nor do we believe that any noncompliance with the terms of 7 CFR § 1832.3 during the second loan period would justify the District Court’s remedy. Although the District Court did find that this provision had been violated during the initial loan period, it is far from clear from the face of its opinion that it found any such violations during the second period. Even assuming such findings, however, we agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the notice provisions of 7 CFR § 1832.3 were no longer applicable during the period after the enactment of Pub. L. 93-237, at least with respect to disasters declared prior to the date the new law came into force. See Emergency Disaster Loan Assn., Inc. v. Block, 653 F. 2d 1267, 1270 (1981). By its terms, § 1832.3(a) requires only notice of the loan program in place at the time of the Presidential disaster declaration. See also §1832.92 (1975) (describing §1832.3 as setting out procedures for reporting natural disaster designations). Accordingly, its plain language casts serious doubt on respondents’ assumption that it was also intended to serve as a means of giving notice of midcourse changes in the terms of the loan program long after the disaster had been declared. Any ambiguity about the regulation’s reach is dispelled by the history of Pub. L. 93-237 itself. As the Court of Appeals recognized, Congress was acutely aware of confusion in the administration of the Nation’s disaster relief laws when it enacted Pub. L. 93-237. 714 F. 2d, at 1516-1517. S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-363, p. 6 (1973). A central objective of the new Act was to correct this confusion by clarifying the credit terms available during this period and by requiring the Secretary to extend the application deadline to compensate for prior “uncertainties]” in the law. Ibid. Consistent with that objective, the Secretary announced in the Federal Register the new procedures the agency would follow to “implement] applicable provisions of Public Law 93-237.” 39 Fed. Reg. 7569 (1974). These procedures, which included the notice provision later codified at 7 CFR § 1832.82(a), were designed to “supplement] and modif[y]” the procedures that had been in place under the old regime, including 7 CFR § 1832.3(a). While this language is ambiguous, the regulatory history strongly suggests that in adopting notice procedures specifically geared to the new law, the Secretary intended for those procedures to be the principal mechanism for spreading the word about Pub. L. 93-237 in areas in which a disaster had already been declared. Aware of Congress’ belief that prior efforts to implement the old program had failed, this history suggests, the Secretary sought to take a different tack to assure effective implementation of the new one — notification of the media pursuant to § 1832.82. This interpretation is confirmed by § 1832.92, also adopted as part of the FmHA’s efforts to implement Pub. L. 93-237. 39 Fed. Reg. 7575 (1974). There, the Secretary specifically provided that for any “new” disaster designations, notice should be given pursuant to § 1832.3. There is no mention whatever of § 1832.3 in the balance of the regulations dealing with disasters that had already been declared at the time the regulation was published. A fair inference from this omission is that for disasters, such as the Florida flood, that had already been declared at the time of the enactment of Pub. L. 93-237, the Secretary intended that § 1832.82(a), rather than § 1832.3, provide the appropriate mechanism for notifying affected farmers about the new loan program. Accordingly, any failure to follow the old notice provisions during the second loan period was entirely consistent with the Secretary’s intended approach and provides no permissible basis for ordering the new program reopened. HH HH I — I We conclude, therefore, that the lower courts erred m holding that the Secretary’s conduct violated the only notice procedures relevant to the implementation of Pub. L. 93-237. Accordingly, even assuming, arguendo, that reopening the loan program would have been an appropriate remedy had the relevant regulations been violated, awarding that relief was clearly improper in light of the FmHA’s compliance with its own procedures. Nor can the relief be supported on the theory, not addressed by either court below, that inadequate notice of the loan program deprived respondents of property without due process of law. We have never held that applicants for benefits, as distinct from those already receiving them, have a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 320, n. 8 (1985). Even on the assumption that they do, however, the notice published in the Federal Register, as well as that afforded by the Secretary in full compliance with his own procedures, was more than ample to satisfy any due process concerns. See 44 U. S. C. §1507 (Publication in Federal Register “is sufficient to give notice of the contents of the document to a person subject to or affected by it”). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Title 7 CFR § 1832.3 (1973) provides in pertinent part: “(a) [W]here there is a Presidential major disaster declaration, the National Office will notify the State Director and the Finance Office of the name of the counties . . . eligible for Federal assistance under the declaration, and the period during which [emergency] loans will be made based on the major disaster. The State Director will notify the appropriate County Supervisors immediately, and instruct them to make [emergency] loans available .... The State Director will also notify the State USDA Defense Board Chairman and will make such public announcements as appear appropriate. “(1) Immediately upon receiving notice about counties under his jurisdiction, the County Supervisor will notify the appropriate County USDA Defense Board Chairman and make such public announcements as appear appropriate about the availability of [loans]. Also, the County Supervisor will explain to other agricultural lenders in the area the assistance available under this program.” Pursuant to 6 U. S. C. §§553(b)(B) and (d)(3), the agency dispensed with notice and comment, explaining that any delay in implementing the provisions of Pub. L. 93-237 would be contrary to the public interest. 39 Fed. Reg. 7569 (1974). The publicity directions, but not the model news release, were later published in the Federal Register, id., at 7570, and the Code of Federal Regulations, 7 CFR § 1832.82(a) (1975). The District Court also directed the FmHA to give appropriate notice of the loan program. The Secretary concedes that compelling notice was within the remedial authority of the court if, in fact, adequate notice had not been given previously. The issue is, in any event, moot since all members of respondent class now clearly have notice of the provisions of Pub. L. 93-237. The Secretary has abandoned his claim that the statute itself expressly disabled the Secretary from extending the deadline beyond April 2, 1974. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-363, p. 6 (1973) (describing Pub. L. No. 93-237 as requiring the Secretary to “extend” the “administratively set deadlin[e]” by 90 days). Because Payne had actual notice of the new loan program and actually applied for a loan, the Secretary argued in the Court of Appeals that Payne lacked standing to complain that the publicity was inadequate. The Court of Appeals granted a limited remand, and the District Court entered an amended final judgment naming as class representative another class member who allegedly had not received notice of the program. App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a-47a. Justice Stevens makes much of the fact that the new regulation was not issued until February 27, 1974, several weeks after Pub. L. 93-237 was signed into law. In his view, this delay violated the command of § 1832.3(a) to provide notice “immediately.” This reasoning is flawed in several respects. First, it entirely ignores our conclusion that, by its terms, § 1832.3 was simply inapplicable to the new loan program. Second, even if somehow applicable, § 1832.3 requires the State Director to provide “immediat[e]” notification to County Supervisors only after he himself has received notice from the “National Office”; and it is undisputed that the Secretary did not issue staff instructions until February 15, 1974. Finally, it is far from clear that a time lag of a mere few weeks between the enactment of a new law and the issuance of implementing regulations fails to qualify as “immediate” action within the meaning of the pertinent regulation.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EAGLES, POST COMMANDING OFFICER, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. HOROWITZ. No. 58. Argued November 21, 1946. Decided December 23, 1946. Irving S. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath and Robert S. Erdahl. Meyer Kreeger argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a companion case to Eagles v. Samuels, No. 59, decided this day, ante p. 304. Certiorari also brings it here from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. That court followed the same procedure here as it did in Samuels’ case; it reversed the District Court which had dismissed the writ of habeas corpus brought on behalf of Horowitz, and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to discharge him from military custody. 151 F. 2d 801. It appears that after the remand Horowitz was enlarged upon a recognizance as permitted under our rules. Rule 45. The suggestion that the case is therefore moot is without merit for the reasons stated in Samuels’ case. Horowitz registered pursuant to the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, early in 1941 and filed a questionnaire stating he was a college student preparing for a career as a psychiatric social worker. At the time, he asked for a deferment in induction until February, 1943, saying that “if you take me now, you practically negate my possibilities to attain the position I seek in life, namely, a psychiatric social worker.” Shortly after he was physically examined and found qualified for military service, he advised the local board that he had been enrolled in the Rabbinical Seminary of America, a recognized theological school. On July 1, 1941, he was classified I-A. The board of appeal likewise gave him that classification in August, 1941. Meanwhile, he claimed exemption under § 5 (d) of the Act. The basis of his claim was the representation that he was a student in a recognized theological school for rabbis and was preparing for the rabbinate. In an affidavit he stated that he had not disclosed his intention to become a rabbi because he had no “concrete facts” to present, only “hopes.” In November, 1941, the local board classified him IY-D, which classification he retained until May, 1944. In 1942 he filed an occupational questionnaire with the local board, stating that he was taking a course in rabbinical studies at the seminary and also a bachelor of social science course at another institution which he hoped to complete in 1944. He listed himself as a social worker. In April, 1944, the city director of Selective Service reviewed the file and requested Horowitz to appear before an advisory theological panel. He appeared before a panel and there was a hearing. The panel stated that all students in this seminary were not necessarily preparing for the ministry and that each individual case should be separately appraised. It concluded that his attendance at the seminary had been motivated by a desire to secure a basis for exemption under the Act. This was based on his declared intention early in 1941 to be a social worker, inconsistencies in his explanation of his failure to refer to the rabbinate at that time, his indifferent and unsystematic manner in preparing for that professed objective, and an appraisal of his reliability and candor. The transcript of proceedings before the panel and later the report were transmitted to the local board by the office of the city director of Selective Service with a request to the board to reopen and reconsider his classification. The report made by the panel was not signed. Moreover, the report was headed “Confidential Statement for the Record.” The local board was advised by the city director’s office that, while it should give careful consideration to the recommendation of the panel, determination of the classification must be made by the board itself or by an appeal agency. Horowitz was immediately reclassified as I-A. He asked for a hearing which was granted. It appears that the panel which interviewed him and rendered the report was composed of three prominent Jewish laymen but no rabbi. Whether that was the cause does not appear, but the board, as a result of the hearing, referred the file to a rabbi for another advisory recommendation. The rabbi recommended that Horowitz be classified IV-D. The local board gave him that classification in June, 1944. In August, 1944, the local board held another hearing. Horowitz was present and was examined. The board concluded that he should be in I-A and so classified him, stating as its reason that he became a student in the rabbinical school after he had registered under the Act. He requested and was granted another hearing, at which he submitted additional evidence. The local board refused to change the classification. On appeal the board of appeal classified him as I-A. On two subsequent occasions Horowitz asked that his classification be reopened and submitted additional evidence. The board was unpersuaded and refused to ré-open the classification. The office of the city director advised the boards that the panel which interviewed Horowitz was composed solely of laymen and that, if by virtue of that fact the board of appeal desired to reconsider the case, to inform the office. Both the local board and the board of appeal replied that there was no occasion for reopening the classification. The board of appeal stated that it had “once again unanimously agreed that the registrant’s status does not warrant a IV-D classification.” Early in 1945 Horowitz was inducted into the Army. Horowitz relies upon affidavits and statements from various people concerning the bona fides of his professed desire to become a rabbi, on a statement made when he graduated from the public schools in 1932 that that was his ambition in life, on the fact that he stated in 1936 that his first vocational choice was the rabbinate, and on all of his subsequent activities which, he asserted, fitted into that pattern. On the other hand, it does appear that in 1937 his first vocational choice was teaching, his second the rabbinate. Furthermore, as already noted, his professed objective stated to the local board early in 1941 was social work. And he in fact entered the seminary shortly after he had passed his physical examination and qualified for military service. These circumstances alone make his claim to exemption colorable. Certainly we cannot say that the action of the board of appeal in finally classifying him as I-A was without any support in the evidence. The question remains whether there was anything in the administrative procedure which vitiated Horowitz’ classification. What we have said about the use of a theological panel and the range of its inquiry in Eagles v. Sam-uels, supra, need not be repeated here. There is nothing in the present case which makes for a different result. We can no more conclude here, than in Samuels’ case, that the board abdicated its function. It first followed the panel’s recommendation. But its mind was not closed, as evidenced by the fact that it later sought the advice of a rabbi and followed his recommendation. And when it returned to its earlier position, it proceeded on the ground that the basic defect in Horowitz’ case was the shift in his position in 1941 after he had registered. The record shows indecision by the board but no subservience to the panel. As respects the fact that the panel’s report was unsigned, only a word need be added. Horowitz, like Samuels, appeared in person before the panel and saw its members face to face. At no time does it appear that he sought the identity of the members and was refused the information. The essential procedural differences between this case and Samuels’ are two — it appears that this panel was composed entirely of laymen; and its report was not only unsigned but marked confidential for the file. The first objection carries little weight. These laymen were prominent citizens of the Jewish faith. There is no showing that they were of a sect hostile to Horowitz. There is nothing to impeach their integrity or to suggest that they were not qualified to serve in the expert role assigned to them. The fact that their report was marked confidential is given great emphasis. It is argued that although the use of a theological panel may be authorized, there is no warrant for clothing its action in such secrecy. The regulations, indeed, prescribe that no information in a registrant’s file shall be confidential as to him or any one having written authority from him. Section 605.32 (a), 8 Fed. Reg. 2641, 9 Fed. Reg. 9190. But the difficulty here is that it is not shown that the panel’s report was in fact treated as confidential by the local board. It is not shown that Horowitz sought and was denied access to the report. Nor is it shown that when Horowitz examined the file the report was not made available to him. If those were the facts, we do not doubt that Horowitz’ counsel would have established them at the habeas corpus hearing. We find no command to the local board to keep the report confidential. We cannot presume that the board violated the regulations. Yet that is in effect what we are asked to hold. Horowitz, like Samuels, points to possibilities of abuse in the use of the panél. But like Samuels he fails to establish prejudice in his case. The judgment below must therefore be Reversed. The approach of the panel to the question is shown as follows in its statement: “Orthodox tradition has always encouraged advanced study of talmudic' literature, both privately and at academies instituted for that purpose, irrespective of the specific occupational objectives of those engaged in such study, and all courses offered by these academies are open to qualified students without regard to the individual student’s specific intention to prepare for a career of service in the rabbinate. “Thus, a student ultimately intending to enter business or a profession, or some non-rabbinic activity in the field of religion, may be enrolled in the same courses attended by other students who are specifically concerned with preparation for the rabbinate. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of Selective Service classification to determine in each individual case the purpose which the registrant has in mind in pursuing his course of study. “Moreover, the fact that the religious tradition in question does not attempt to distinguish between the serious student of talmudic literature and the student preparing for a professional career in the rabbinate, tends to make it extremely difficult for school ofi-ciáis, ministers, and others identified with that tradition, to have and express an objective judgment in such matters. “To the extent that the distinction is understood, there is a tendency to accept at face value assertions made by the registrant and members of his family and to resolve any doubt in his favor, where it is at least apparent that he is a serious and pious talmudic student.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UDALL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. TALLMAN et al. No. 34. Argued October 22, 26, 1964. Decided March 1, 1965. Wayne G. Barnett argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Roger P. Marquis and Edmund B. Clark. Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Robert L. McCarty. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Clayton L. Orn, Marvin J. Sonosky, Oscar L. Chapman, Martin L. Friedman and Marion B. Plant for Marathon Oil Company et al., and by Abe Fortas, Joseph A. Ball, Gordon A. Goodwin, Francis R. Kirkham, Turner H. McBaine and Clark M. Clifford for Richfield Oil Corporation et al. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this case is the effect of Executive Order No. 8979 and Public Land Order No. 487 upon the Secretary of the Interior’s authority to issue oil and gas leases. Between October 15, 1954, and January 28, 1955, D. J. Griffin and other persons — hereinafter collectively referred to as the Griffin lessees — filed applications for oil and gas leases on approximately 25,000 acres located in the Kenai National Moose Range in Alaska. On August 14, 1958, the respondents filed offers to lease the same lands. Section 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 provides, in relevant part, that “the person first making application for the lease who is qualified to hold a lease . . . shall be entitled to a lease of such lands without competitive bidding. . . .” 41 Stat. 443 (1920), as amended by 60 Stat. 951 (1946), 30 U. S. C. § 226 (1958 ed.). The Bureau of Land Management of the .Department of the Interior determined that the Griffin lessees were the persons who had applied first, and issued to them leases on the tracts, effective September 1, 1958. Respondents’ applications were reached for processing in October 1959, and were rejected on the ground that the lands had been leased to prior applicants. From the rejection of their applications, respondents appealed to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management and then to the Secretary of the Interior, both of whom affirmed the decision. 68 I. D. 256 (1961). Respondents then brought an action in the nature of mandamus, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, to compel the Secretary to issue oil and gas leases to them. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Executive Order No. 8979, the order creating the Moose Range in 1941, and Public Land Order No. 487, issued by the Secretary in 1948, had withdrawn the lands in controversy from availability for leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act, and that the lands remained closed to leasing until they were reopened by a revised departmental regulation on August 14, 1958. The court therefore held that the Griffin applications, filed while the land was closed, were ineffective, rendering the leases issued on them nullities; the respondents, as the persons first making application after the promulgation of the 1958 regulation, were held to be entitled to the leases. 116 U. S. App. D. C. 379, 324 F. 2d 411 (1963). We granted certiorari, 376 U. S. 961. We conclude that the District Court correctly refused to issue a writ of mandamus, and accordingly reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Since their promulgation, the Secretary has consistently construed both orders not to bar oil and gas leases; moreover, this interpretation has been made a repeated matter of public record. While the Griffin leases and others located in the Moose Range have been developed in reliance upon the Secretary’s interpretation, respondents do not claim to have relied to their detriment upon a contrary construction. The Secretary’s interpretation may not be the only one permitted by the language of the orders, but it is quite clearly a reasonable interpretation; courts must therefore respect it. McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U. S. 477, 481; Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410, 413-414. I. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. § 181 et seq. (1958 ed.), gave the Secretary of the Interior broad power to issue oil and gas leases on public lands not within any known geological structure of a producing oil and gas field. Although the Act directed that if a lease was issued on such a tract, it had to be issued to the first qualified applicant, it left the Secretary discretion to refuse to issue any lease at all on a given tract. United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U. S. 414. The Act excluded from its application certain designated lands, but did not exclude lands within wildlife refuge areas. The Kenai National Moose Range was created in 1941 by Executive Order No. 8979, 6 Fed. Reg. 6471, by which approximately two million acres of the public domain were set aside "as a refuge and breeding ground for moose.” The order provided that “[n]one of the above-described lands excepting [a defined area] shall be subject to settlement, location, sale, or entry, or other disposition (except for fish trap sites) under any of the public-land laws applicable to Alaska . . . .” On November 8, 1947, the Secretary promulgated the first general regulation dealing with the issuance of oil and gas leases within wildlife refuges. It provided simply that such leases had to be subjected to an approved unit plan and contain a provision prohibiting drilling or prospecting without the advance consent of the Secretary. 12 Fed. Reg. 7334. On June 16, 1948, the Secretary issued Public Land Order No. 487, 13 Fed. Reg. 3462: “[T]he public lands within the following-described areas in Alaska [including most of that portion of the Moose Range which had been excepted from Executive Order No. 8979] are hereby temporarily withdrawn from settlement, location, sale or entry, for classification and examination, and in aid of proposed legislation: "This order shall take precedence over, but shall not modify . . . the reservation for the Kenai National Moose Range made by Executive Order No. 8979 of December 16, 1941 . . . .” Thus neither Executive Order No. 8979 nor Public Land Order No. 487 expressly withdrew the lands to which it applied from oil and gas leasing. In 1951, however, the Secretary set aside, for uses inconsistent with mineral leasing, minor portions of the lands covered by Public Land Order No. 487: “[T]he following-described public lands in Alaska are hereby withdrawn from all forms of appropriation under the public-land laws, including the mining laws and the mineral-leasing laws . ...” Had the Secretary thought that Public Land Order No. 487 had already withdrawn the lands covered by it from appropriation under the mineral-leasing laws, his reference to such laws in the 1951 orders would have been superfluous. By an intra-agency memorandum dated August 31, 1953, the Director of the Bureau of Land Management advised the Regional Administrators of the Bureau and managers of the local land offices that “a possible revision of policy and regulations” on leasing in wildlife refuges was being studied, and directed them that “[p]ending the completion of this study and the possible revision of existing regulations, you will suspend action on all pending oil and gas lease offers and applications for lands within such refuges.” It is not disputed, and subsequent memoranda make clear, that the 1953 memorandum did not purport to prevent either the issuance of leases with the approval of the national office or the continued filing of lease offers. During late 1954 and early 1955, a number of individuals filed applications for oil and gas leases in the northern half of the Moose Range; among these applications were those of the Griffin lessees. Action on them was suspended in accordance with the 1953 directive, but none was rejected on the ground that the land in question was closed to leasing. On September 9, 1955, the Secretary issued Public Land Order No. 1212, 20 Fed. Reg. 6795, revoking in its entirety Public Land Order No. 487. After granting certain preferences, it provided: “6. Any of the lands described in paragraphs 4 (a), 4 (b) or 4 (d) of this order then remaining unappropriated, shall become subject to such application, petition, selection, or other form of appropriation by the public generally as may be authorized by the public-land laws, including the mineral-leasing laws .... “7. Commencing at 10:00 a. m. on the 182nd day after the date of this order, any of the unsurveyed lands described in paragraph 4 (c) not settled upon by veterans or other persons entitled to credit for service shall become subject to settlement and other forms of appropriation by the public generally, including leasing under the mineral-leasing laws . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Respondents make much of the italicized language, which does appear to be inconsistent with the Department’s prior interpretation of Public Land Order No. 487 and its actual leasing practices. However, on October 14, 1955 — 35 days after it was promulgated but before it went into effect, and years before the respondents entered the picture — Public Land Order No. 1212 was amended to delete the references to the mineral-leasing laws. 20 Fed. Reg. 7904. On December 8, 1955, the anticipated revision of the 1947 refuge-leasing regulation was promulgated. 20 Fed. Reg. 9009. It was more restrictive than the old regulation, and gave increased power to the Fish and Wildlife Service to approve or disapprove oil and gas development of refuges. It listed in an Appendix A a number of refuges (not including Kenai) in which, because of their importance to the preservation of rare species of plant and animal life, no leasing at all would be permitted. In Appendix B it listed certain areas (including a small part of the Moose Range not involved here) “with respect to which the Fish and Wildlife Service reports that oil and gas development might seriously impair or destroy the usefulness of the lands for wildlife conservation purposes . . . .” In such Appendix B areas, leasing was to be permitted only upon the approval by the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service of “a complete and detailed operating program for the area.” In all other wildlife areas the regulation provided that “[o]il and gas leases may be issued” provided they contain specified conditions requiring approval by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the type of prospecting to be conducted, and adoption by the lessee of a unit plan approved by the Service. Respondents argue that even if it be assumed that (as is clearly the case) the 1955 regulation treated the lands in controversy as open to leasing, the regulation is not probative of the availability of the lands for leasing prior to 1955, and is therefore no evidence that the Secretary viewed the lands as open to leasing at the time the Griffin applications were filed. We think, however, that if the Secretary had been of the opinion that he was changing the status of that part of the Moose Range not covered by Appendix B, rather than merely imposing additional restrictions on leasing therein, he would have done so in terms more express than those used in the 1955 regulation. He did not refer to the Range as a whole; the only reference by name was to those parts of the Range which were specified in order to except them from the general provision that “[o]il and gas leases may be issued” in wildlife refuges. Though this specification supports the inference that the regulation was drafted on the assumption that the remainder of the Range was open to leasing, such indirect implication — however clearly it confirms the preexisting availability of the Range — would have been a technique inappropriate for effecting a change of the Range’s status. Moreover, the President’s 1952 delegation to the Secretary of power to make or modify withdrawals had directed that “[a] 11 orders issued by the Secretary of the Interior under the authority of this order shall be designated as public land orders and shall be submitted . . . for filing and for publication in the Federal Register.” Executive Order No. 10355, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831 (emphasis added). It may be that a document not labeled a public land order could in legal effect constitute an exercise of that power; however, if the Secretary had meant to exercise such power, it is likely that he would have done so in the manner directed by the President’s delegation. When bills were introduced in Congress early in 1956 to restrict oil and gas leasing in wildlife refuges, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held extensive hearings thereon. The bills as introduced only forbade the Secretary to “dispose of” lands in wildlife refuges, and the question arose during the hearings whether that language would apply to the issuance of oil and gas leases. A representative of the Department asserted, without contradiction, that the granting of an oil and gas lease was not a “disposition” and would not be affected by the language as proposed. Hearings before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H. R. 5306, etc., 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 98. An amendment was accordingly proposed specifically restricting oil and gas leasing. Neither committee reported favorably on the bills. However, the House Committee submitted a report stating that it had been decided to try, for an experimental period of time, an arrangement whereby each proposed alienation or relinquishment of any interest the Fish and Wildlife Service had in lands under its jurisdiction would be submitted to the Committee, which would within 60 days approve or disapprove the action contemplated. H. R. Rep. No. 1941, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 12-13. This resolution of the issue suggests that the Committee accepted the Department’s view that the Secretary had pre-existing authority to grant oil and gas leases in the Moose Range, and was concerned only with the way in which he exercised his discretion. Pursuant to the agreement, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries held public hearings on July 20 and 25, 1956, on a proposal from the Fish and Wildlife Service for the issuance of 30 oil and gas leases on 71,680 acres in the northern half of the Moose Range— located within the area encompassed by Executive Order No. 8979 — for which lease applications had been filed in 1954 by amicus curiae Richfield Oil Corporation and others. The proposal contemplated that the leases would be subject to the Swanson River Unit plan of operation, which had been approved by the Bureau of Land Management, the Geological Survey and the Fish and Wildlife Service, all branches of the Department of the Interior. At the hearing on the proposal a spokesman for the National Wildlife Federation urged that Executive Order No. 8979 precluded the issuance of the leases. Transcript of Hearings before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, July 20 and 25, 1956, Lease of Portions of Kenai National Moose Range, pp. 17, 19, 24-26. But see id., pp. 35-36; letter, July 24, 1956, Deputy Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to Hon. E. L. Bartlett, Delegate to Congress from Alaska, following id., p. 30. On July 25,1956, however, the Committee’s Chairman advised the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service that the Committee unanimously had concluded that issuance of the leases would not be detrimental to the wildlife values of the Moose Range, and had concurred in the proposal to issue the leases. Following the Committee’s approval the leases were issued, an exploratory well was drilled and oil was discovered in commercial quantities in July 1957. See Rep. Alaska Gov. 88 (1957); Rep. Secy. Int. 356 (1957); Rep. Secy. Int. 104, 199, 258, 356 (1958). The Swanson River leases soon became again a subject of congressional concern, when the Secretary of the Interior — realizing that although he had authority to issue leases on dry land, he lacked such authority with respect to lands beneath Alaskan inland navigable waters — asked Congress for authority to issue leases on Alaskan water bottoms, and to add to the leases already issued in Alaska and to applications pending there the water bottoms within their boundaries. The Senate Committee reported favorably on the proposed bill, saying: “In Alaska, there is at the present time only one area which is now subject to the Mineral Leasing Act where oil and gas is known to exist in paying quantities, this being on the Kenai Peninsula as previously described. If prior to the effective date of this act, the producing structure on the Kenai is defined, then the holders of upland leases in such areas might be forced to compete for areas beneath adjacent lakes and streams. The committee felt that this result would work to the disadvantage of those lessees and developers who have gone ahead and developed this area . . . .” S. Rep. No. 1720, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5. The bill was subsequently enacted into law. 72 Stat. 322 (1958), 48 U. S. C. § 456 and 30 U. S. C. § 251 (1958 ed.). Meanwhile, the controversy over the leasing policies to be followed in wildlife refuges was resolved by the adoption, on January 8, 1958, of another complete revision of the regulation. 23 Fed. Reg. 227, 43 CFR § 192.9. The revision represented a near-total victory for the conservationists. It altogether prohibited oil and gas leasing, unless necessary to prevent draining, in wildlife refuges — with two exceptions: lands withdrawn for a dual purpose, and wildlife refuges located in Alaska. As to lands falling within these two excepted categories, the Bureau of Land Management and the Fish and Wildlife Service were to reach agreements specifying the lands which “shall not be subject to oil and gas leasing” and to decide on provisions to be required in leases issued on the remaining lands. The agreements were to become effective upon approval by the Secretary and publication in the Federal Register. The regulation further provided that “[a] 11 pending offers or applications heretofore filed for oil and gas leases covering game ranges, coordination lands, and Alaska wildlife areas, will continue to be suspended until the agreements referred to . . . shall have been completed,” and that no new lease applications would “be accepted for fifing until the tenth day after the agreements . . . are noted on the land office records.” Pursuant to the regulation, there was published in the Federal Register on August 2,1958, an order of the Secretary announcing the agreement reached with respect to the Moose Range. 23 Fed. Reg. 5883. The order decreed that certain lands within the Range (essentially the southern half) “are hereby closed to oil and gas leasing because such activities would be incompatible with management thereof for wildlife purposes.” It then provided: “The balance of the lands within the Kenai National Moose Range are subject to the fifing of oil and gas lease offers .... Offers to lease covering any of these lands which have been pending and upon which action was suspended in accordance with the regulation 43 CFR 192.9 (d) will now be acted upon and adjudicated in accordance with the regulations. . . [L] ease offers for lands which have not been excluded from leasing will not be accepted for filing until the tenth day after the agreement and map are noted on the records of the land office . . . The agreement was noted in the Anchorage land office on August 4, 1958, and 10 days later respondents filed their applications. Soon after the issuance of the regulation and the implementing order, the pending applications were acted upon; within the next two months, 294 leases covering 621,234 acres were issued in the area subject to Executive Order No. 8979, in response to applications (including those of the Griffin lessees) filed in 1954 and 1955. When these figures are added to those covering leases issued prior to 1958 (primarily those in the Swanson River area), it appears that in the area subject to Executive Order No. 8979, the Secretary issued a total of 331 leases covering 696,680 acres on applications filed during the period the Court of Appeals held that the area was closed to leasing. Thus, prior to the commencement of the instant suit, the Secretary had leased substantially the entire area in controversy; the Solicitor General further assures us that the lessees and their assignees had, in turn, expended tens of millions of dollars in the development of the leases. II. When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration. “To sustain the Commission’s application of this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.” Unemployment Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153. See also, e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402; Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 580, 583. “Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake 'involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.’ ” Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408. When the construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in order. “Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . . [T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410, 413-414. In the instant case, there is no statutory limitation involved. While Executive Order No. 8979 was issued by the President, he soon delegated to the Secretary full power to withdraw lands or to modify or revoke any existing withdrawals. See Executive Order No. 9146, 7 Fed. Reg. 3067; Executive Order No. 9337, 8 Fed. Reg. 5516; Executive Order No. 10355, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831. Public Land Order No. 487 was issued by the Secretary himself. Moreover, as the discussion in Section I of this opinion demonstrates, the Secretary has consistently construed Executive Order No. 8979 and Public Land Order No. 487 not to bar oil and gas leases. “It may be argued that while these facts and rulings prove a usage they do not establish its validity. But government is a practical affair intended for practical men. Both officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive Department — on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself — even when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.” United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 472-473. The Secretary’s interpretation had, long prior to respondents’ applications, been a matter of public record and discussion. The agreement worked out with the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in 1956, and the approval of the Swanson River leases pursuant thereto, though probably constituting no “legislative ratification” in any formal sense, serve to demonstrate the notoriety of the Secretary’s construction, and thereby defeat any possible claim of detrimental reliance upon another interpretation. Finally, almost the entire area covered by the orders in issue has been developed, at very great expense, in reliance upon the Secretary’s interpretation. In McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U. S. 477, 480-481, it was held: “In the practical administration of the act the officers of the land department have adopted and given effect to the latter view. They adopted it before the present controversy arose or was thought of, and, except for a departure soon reconsidered and corrected, they have adhered to and followed it ever since. Many outstanding titles are based upon it and much can be said in support of it. If not the only reasonable construction of the act, it is at least an admissible one. It therefore comes within the rule that the practical construction given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different constructions, by those charged with the duty of executing it is entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a number of years, will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.” If, therefore, the Secretary’s interpretation is not unreasonable, if the language of the orders bears his construction, we must reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. III. Executive Order No. 8979, 6 Fed. Reg. 6471, provided: “None of the above-described lands excepting [a described area] shall be subject to settlement, location, sale, or entry, or other disposition (except for fish trap sites) under any of the public-land laws applicable to Alaska, or to classification and lease under the provisions of the act of July 3, 1926, entitled ‘An Act to provide for the leasing of public lands in Alaska for fur farming, and for other purposes’, 44 Stat. 821, U. S. C., title 48, secs. 360-361, or the act of March 4, 1927, entitled ‘An Act to provide for the protection, development, and utilization of the public lands in Alaska by establishing an adequate system for grazing livestock thereon’, 44 Stat. 1452, U. S. C., title 48, secs. 471-471o “Settlement,” “location,” “sale” and “entry” are all terms contemplating transfer of title to the lands in question. It was therefore reasonable for the Secretary to construe “or other disposition” to encompass only dispositions which, like the four enumerated, convey or lead to the conveyance of the title of the United States — for example, “grants” and “allotments.” Cf. Opinion of the Solicitor, 48 I. D. 459 (1921). An oil and gas lease does not vest title to the lands in the lessee. See Boesche v. Udall, 373 U. S. 472, 477-478. Moreover, the term “public-land laws” is ordinarily used to refer to statutes governing the alienation of public land, and generally is distinguished from both “mining laws,” referring to statutes governing the mining of hard minerals on public lands, and “mineral leasing laws,” a term used to designate that group of statutes governing the leasing of public lands for gas and oil. Compare Title 43 U. S. C., Public Lands, with Title 30 U. S. C., Mineral Lands and Mining. The reference in Executive Order No. 8979 to the 1926 and 1927 statutes also lends support to the Secretary’s interpretation. For both statutes relate to leasing rather than alienation of title; it would be reasonable to infer from their specific addition that “disposition” was not intended to encompass leasing. The Secretary also might reasonably have been influenced by a belief that in view of his overriding discretionary authority to refuse to issue an oil and gas lease on a given tract whenever he thought that granting a lease would undercut the purposes of the withdrawal, inclusion of such leases in the withdrawal order would have been unnecessary. Cf. Haley v. Seaton, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 257, 281 F. 2d 620 (1960). Respondents’ reliance upon Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Barton, 60 App. D. C. 11, 46 F. 2d 217 (1930), aff’d sub nom. United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U. S. 414, is misplaced. Involved in Wilbur was the meaning of language contained in the Pickett Act, 36 Stat. 847 (1910), 43 U. S. C. § 141 (1958 ed.). “[T]he President may, at any time in his discretion, temporarily withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States including the District of Alaska . . . It is true that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit squarely held this language to be sufficient to authorize withdrawals from oil and gas leasing. Moreover, this Court affirmed, albeit on an alternative theory: that the Mineral Leasing Act merely authorized and did not compel the issuance of prospecting permits. 283 U. S., at 419. However, a word of history will place Wilbur in context and thereby demonstrate its irrelevance to the problem here. Prior to 1920, oil and gas rights in public lands were acquired in the same way as rights in other minerals — by a form of “location.” One staked out a location and prospected for oil or other minerals; upon making a discovery, he became entitled to a patent to the land as well as the minerals. In 1909, responding to rapid reserve depletion in certain areas, the Interior Department issued an order pursuant to Presidential authorization: “In aid of proposed legislation affecting the use and disposition of the petroleum deposits on the public domain, all public lands in [a defined area of over 3 million acres in California and Wyoming] are hereby temporarily withdrawn from all forms of location, settlement, selection, filing, entry, or disposal under the mineral or nonmineral public land laws. . . U. S. Geological Survey, Bull. 623, H. R. Doc. No. 868, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 135 (1916); quoted, 236 U. S., at 467. The power of the executive to make the withdrawal was upheld by this Court in 1915 in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459. In the meantime, however, Congress had, pursuant to the President’s request, sought to remove all doubts about the legality of such orders by granting to him, in the Pickett Act, discretionary authority to withdraw public lands from “settlement, location, sale, or entry.” The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 changed the procedure for acquiring oil and gas rights in public lands: the Secretary was empowered to issue prospecting permits and required, in the event a discovery was made under the permit, to issue a lease which entitled the lessee to extract the mineral, but gave him no right in the land itself. Prom 1920 on, therefore, the language of the Pickett Act no longer technically encompassed leasing. Nonetheless, it was clear that the Act had been specifically designed to legitimize orders like the 1909 withdrawal order. The Court of Appeals reasonably concluded in Wilbur that the fact that Congress had in 1920 changed the procedure— from “location” to “leasing” — for acquisition of oil and gas rights afforded no reason for concluding that they had thereby intended to cut back the power granted in 1910. 60 App. D. C., at 14-15, 46 F. 2d, at 220-221. Thus neither that holding by the Court of Appeals nor this Court’s affirmance in any way casts doubt upon the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation of the orders at bar, which were drafted long after the Mineral Leasing Act had done away with location as a means of acquiring oil and gas rights. The placement of the fish trap exception — “(except for fish trap sites)” — a phrase admittedly not relating to alienation of title to land, does tend to cut against the Secretary’s interpretation of Executive Order No. 8979. However, it appears that the exception was designed to assure the Alaskans, whose livelihood is largely dependent on the salmon catch, that they could continue — despite the order — to use fish traps. Cf. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60. Since it was a reassurance not technically necessary and therefore not functionally related to- any part of the regulation, it is no surprise to find it carelessly placed. Compare Executive Order No. 8857, 6 Fed. Reg. 4287, establishing the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge. We do not think the position of the fish trap exception is sufficient to justify a court’s overturning the Secretary’s construction as unreasonable. Public Land Order No. 487 withdrew the lands it covered from “settlement, location, sale or entry,” but contained no reference to “other disposition.” Nor did it contain anything analogous to the fish trap exception. The reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation of Public Land Order No. 487 therefore follows a fortiori from the reasonableness of his construction of Executive Order No. 8979. Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the decision of this case. Lease offers are processed in the order of filing and a lease on a given tract is' issued as soon as an acceptable offer is reached. In the instant case, the Secretary’s order of August 2, 1958, 23 Fed. Reg. 5883, directed that all lease offers filed within 10 days of August 14, 1958, would be treated as simultaneously filed, and that a public drawing would be held to determine the priorities among them. See 43 CFR §295.8 (1964). The drawing was held on September 4, 1959, and respondents prevailed. Thus their offers were processed before all other offers filed between August 14 and August 24, 1958; upon processing, however, it was discovered that the land was already covered by the leases issued to the Griffin lessees. Public Land Order No. 487 encompassed the land for which respondent Coyle applied; the land for which the other nine respondents filed is covered by Executive Order No. 8979. Section 1 of the Act excludes “lands acquired under the Act known as the Appalachian Forest Act, approved March 1, 1911 (36 Stat. 961), and those in incorporated cities, towns, and villages and in national parks and monuments, those acquired under other Acts subsequent to February 25, 1920, and lands within the naval petroleum and oil-shale reserves, except as hereinafter provided . . . 41 Stat. 437-438 (1920), as amended, 60 Stat. 950 (1946), 30 U. S. C. §181 (1958 ed.). See Public Land Order No. 751 of August 29, 1951, 16 Fed. Reg. 9044, which withdrew 160 acres for the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and 88.86 acres for townsite purposes, and Public Land Order No. 778 of December 29, 1951, 17 Fed. Reg. 159, which withdrew a number of tracts, aggregating 4,280 acres, for the use of the Army. See memorandum, February 15, 1954, Director, Bureau of Land Management, to Assistant Secretary of the Interior; memorandum, August 12, 1955, Director, Bureau of Land Management, to Area Administrator, Area 4 (Alaska); 102 Cong. Rec. A6582. In his report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955, the Governor of Alaska stated: “Residents of Alaska and major oil companies have continued to file lease applications and send exploratory parties into various parts of the Territory. The Kenai Moose Reserve on the Kenai Peninsula is covered with 325 lease applications awaiting decision of the Secretary of the Interior as to what stipulations for the protection of wildlife should be inserted in leases, if they are issued.” Rep. Alaska Gov. 60-61 (1955); see also Rep. Secy. Int. 65 (1953). It appears that the Bureau regarded the amended regulations as automatically vacating the 1953 suspension order; however, upon the almost immediate introduction in Congress of bills further to restrict leasing in wildlife refuges, the field offices were directed once again to withhold final action on lease applications. See Richard K. Todd et al., 68 I. D. 291, 298 (1961). In further support of the claim that the 1955 regulation is worthless as an indication of the pre-existing status of the lands covered thereby, respondents urge that Appendix B listed “wildlife refuges which were closed by the terms of the orders creating them.” However, of the 176 refuges listed in Appendix B, respondents point to only one: the Salt Plains in Oklahoma. Moreover, only a small part of the Salt Plains (543 acres out of over 30,000) was specifically withdrawn from appropriation under the mining and mineral-leasing laws. Public Land Order No. 144, 8 Fed. Reg. 9430. It is therefore doubtful that a simple listing in Appendix B of the “Salt Plains,” large parts of which were admittedly open to leasing prior to 1955, was intended to open the small area closed by Public Land Order No. 144. Respondents seek to capitalize on the fact that although the Swanson River Unit was not located in any of the areas designated in Appendix B of the 1955 regulation, the applicants submitted, and obtained Service approval of, a detailed operating program for the unit. There are at least two possible explanations for the submission of the plan. First, the Fish and Wildlife Service could at any time designate areas not listed in Appendix B in which leasing “might seriously impair or destroy” conservation purposes and accordingly require advance approval of operating programs for them. Submission of a plan as to the Swanson River Unit might have been regarded as a means of insuring that the Service would not so designate the area. Second, the Secretary had directed his subordinates to withhold final action on lease applications pending a further revision of the regulations. The applicants may have submitted the plan in order to persuade the Department and the House Committee that the proposed leasing was consistent not only with existing regulations but also with any that were likely to be adopted. In tlie hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on the proposed bill, Mr. Gordon Goodwin, attorney for amicus curiae Richfield Oil Corporation, testified: “Well, we have pending, and have had for 2 or 3 or more years, applications for leases in the Kenai moose range, and a few leases were issued in there, and that is where the discovery was made. But, shortly after that time, the Secretary suspended all leasing in the moose range . . . and he has never lifted it yet .... So we have not been able to do much business up there except to a very limited extent.” Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on H. R. 8054,85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 77. In announcing the order, the Secretary warned that there would be little land available to new applicants: “Most of these lands are now covered by applications that will be adjudicated under the regulations of the Department.” Department of the Interior Press Release, July 25, 1958. Respondents point to the fact that in a Press Release dated January 29, 1958, announcing the forthcoming (August) order, the Secretary had indicated that he was “opening” a part of the Moose Range to leasing. The choice of this term is wholly understandable in view of the facts that general instructions to local offices not to take final action on lease applications had been outstanding since 1953, and that the regulations of January 8, 1958, had provided that no new applications would be accepted for filing until a subsequent order was issued specifying the lands which would not be subject to leasing. Therefore, the order of August 2, 1958, did, in these two senses, “open” the Range to leasing. In the area excepted from Executive Order No. 8979 but encompassed by Public Land Order No. 487, the total number of leases issued on applications filed before the revocation of the latter order was 74 covering 116,878 acres. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 303, n. 24; Boesche v. Udall, 373 U. S. 472, 482-483; cf. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 345; but cf. Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U. S. 354, 360-361. The failure of the court below to attach proper significance to the administrative practice seems to be attributable to the fact that it was misinformed concerning that practice. The respondents’ brief in the Court of Appeals stated that “[n]o leases issued for any lands within the Kenai Range between 1941 and 1958” (p. 30), and that “[t]he discovery as well as the increased activity were in areas of the Peninsula outside of the Kenai National Moose Range” (p. 40). This view is taken in Hoffman, Oil and Gas Leasing on the Public Domain, p. 33 (1951). Reference to the language of other withdrawal orders is not very fruitful. Amici curiae list 173 Executive and Public Land Orders issued between 1940 and 1952 which contained language expressly barring mineral leasing. Brief for Marathon Oil Co. and Union Oil Co. of California as amici curiae, pp. 6A-7A. However, respondents list 146 orders issued between 1936 and 1959 expressly permitting mineral leasing. Brief for Respondents, pp. 7a-10a. The Court of Appeals sought to explain the reference to the 1926 and 1927 Acts by construing the phrase “any of the public-land laws applicable to Alaska” to mean laws applicable both throughout the country and in Alaska, and opined that the 1926 and 1927 Acts were specifically added because they had application only in Alaska. However, the Secretary’s interpretation of “any of the public-land laws applicable to Alaska” (as including, inter alia, laws relating to public lands located only in Alaska) is at least as natural as the Court of Appeals’ interpretation (limiting the phrase to laws applicable throughout the country) and is beyond cavil a “reasonable” interpretation, which is the test the Court of Appeals should have been applying. Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that “disposition” was meant to include leasing renders the words “or to classification and lease,” initiating the reference to the Acts of 1926 and 1927, superfluous. In 1935, the prospecting permit procedure was eliminated and the present direct leasing procedure substituted. Act of August 21, 1935, 49 Stat. 676-677, 30 IT. S. C. §§ 223, 226 (1958 ed.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE No. 06-1595. Argued October 8, 2008 Decided January 26, 2009 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 280. Eric Schnapper argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Ann Buntin Steiner. Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With her on the brief were former Solicitor General Clement, Solicitor General Garre, Acting Assistant Attorney General Becker, Dennis J. Dimsey, Angela M. Miller, Ronald S. Cooper, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Jennifer S. Goldstein. Francis H. Young argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was James L. Charles. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Marc Dann, Attorney General of Ohio, William P. Marshall, Solicitor General, Benjamin C. Mizer and Kimberly A. Olson, Deputy Solicitors, and Susan A Choe, Patrick M. Dull, and Duffy W. Jamieson, Assistant Attorneys General, by Roberto J. Sdnchez-Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Beau Biden of Delaware, Bill McCollum of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Jack Conway of Kentucky, Martha Coakley of Massachusetts, Michael A Cox of Michigan, Mike McGrath of Montana, Anne Mil-gram of New Jersey, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Andrew M. Cuomo of New York, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights et al. by Michael L. Foreman and Michael B. de Leeuw; for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Bruce B. Elfvin, Christina M. Royer, Mary L. Heen, Adele P. Kimmel, and Catherine K. Ruckelshaus; for the National Women’s Law Center et al. by Melissa Hart, Marcia D. Greenberger, Jocelyn F. Samuels, and Dina R. Lassow; and for the Tennessee Education Association et al. by Richard L. Colbert and Courtney L. Wilbert. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Catherine E. Stetson, Jessica L. Ellsworth, Robin S. Conrad, and Shane Brennan; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Rae T. Vann, Alexandra Tsiros, Karen R. Harried, and Elizabeth G. Milito; and for the National School Boards Association by Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., Lisa E. Soronen, F. Damon Kitchen, Jack R. Wallace, and Robert J. Sniffen. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), forbids retaliation by employers against employees who report workplace race or gender discrimination. The question here is whether this protection extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation. We hold that it does. I In 2002, respondent Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (Metro), began looking into rumors of sexual harassment by the Metro School District’s employee relations director, Gene Hughes. 211 Fed. Appx. 373, 374 (CA6 2006). When Veronica Frazier, a Metro human resources officer, asked petitioner Vicky Crawford, a 30-year Metro employee, whether she had witnessed “inappropriate behavior” on the part of Hughes, id., at 374-375, Crawford described several instances of sexually harassing behavior: once, Hughes had answered her greeting, “‘Hey Dr. Hughes, [wjhat’s up?/ ” by grabbing his crotch and saying “ ‘[Y]ou know what’s up’ he had repeatedly “ ‘put his crotch up to [her] window’ and on one occasion he had entered her office and “ ‘grabbed her head and pulled it to his crotch/ ” id., at 375, and n. 1. Two other employees also reported being sexually harassed by Hughes. Id., at 375. Although Metro took no action against Hughes, it did fire Crawford and the two other accusers soon after finishing the investigation, saying in Crawford’s case that it was for embezzlement. Ibid. Crawford claimed Metro was retaliating for her report of Hughes’s behavior and filed a charge of a Title VII violation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), followed by this suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Ibid. The Title VII antiretaliation provision has two clauses, making it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... [1] because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a). The one is known as the “opposition clause,” the other as the “participation clause,” and Crawford accused Metro of violating both. The District Court granted summary judgment for Metro. It held that Crawford could not satisfy the opposition clause because she had not “instigated or initiated any complaint,” but had “merely answered questions by investigators in an already-pending internal investigation, initiated by someone else.” Memorandum Opinion, No. 3:03-cv-0996 (MD Tenn., Jan. 6,2005), App. C to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. It concluded that her claim also failed under the participation clause, which Sixth Circuit precedent confined to protecting “'an employee’s participation in an employer’s internal investigation . . . where that investigation occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC charge’ ” (not the case here). Id., at 15a (emphasis deleted) (quoting Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F. 3d 537, 543 (CA6 2003)). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds, holding that the opposition clause “'demands active, consistent “opposing” activities to warrant... protection against retaliation,’” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. Appx. 607, 610 (CA6 2004)), whereas Crawford did “not claim to have instigated or initiated any complaint prior to her participation in the investigation, nor did she take any further action following the investigation and prior to her firing,” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376. Again like the trial judge, the Court of Appeals understood that Crawford could show no violation of the participation clause because her “ ‘employer’s internal investigation’ ” was not conducted “‘pursuant to a pending EEOC charge.’” Ibid, (quoting Abbott, supra, at 543). Because the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with those of other Circuits, particularly as to the opposition clause, see, e. g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F. 3d 256, 262 (CA7 1996), we granted Crawford’s petition for certiorari. 552 U. S. 1162 (2008). We now reverse and remand for further proceedings. II The opposition clause makes it “unlawful ... for an employer to discriminate against any... employe[e]... because he has opposed any practice made . . . unlawful ... by this subchapter.” §2000e-3(a). The term “oppose,” being left undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning, Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979): “[t]o resist or antagonize ...; to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand,” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed. 1957). Although these actions entail varying expenditures of energy, “resist frequently implies more active striving than OPPOSE.” Ibid.; see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1359 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “oppose” as “to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion”). The statement Crawford says she gave to Frazier is thus covered by the opposition clause, as an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious behavior toward her by a fellow employee, an answer she says antagonized her employer to the point of sacking her on a false pretense. Crawford’s description of the louche goings-on would certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as “resist[ant]” or “antagonistic]” to Hughes’s treatment, if for no other reason than the point argued by the Government and explained by an EEOC guideline: “When an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that communication” virtually always “constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9 (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §§8-II-B(l), (2), p. 614:0003 (Mar. 2003)); see also Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U. S. 389, 399 (2008) (explaining that EEOC compliance manuals “reflect ‘a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance’ ” (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 642 (1998))). It is true that one can imagine exceptions, like an employee’s description of a supervisor’s racist joke as hilarious, but these will be eccentric cases, and this is not one of them. The Sixth Circuit thought answering questions fell short of opposition, taking the view that the clause “ ‘demands active, consistent “opposing” activities to warrant. . . protection against retaliation/” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell, supra, at 610), and that an employee must “instigat[e] or initiat[e]” a complaint to be covered, 211 Fed. Appx., at 376. But though these requirements obviously exemplify opposition as commonly understood, they are not limits of it. “Oppose” goes beyond “active, consistent” behavior in ordinary discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it. Countless people were known to “oppose” slavery before Emancipation, or are said to “oppose” capital punishment today, without writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government. And we would call it “opposition” if an employee took a stand against an employer’s discriminatory practices not by “instigating” action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor’s order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory reasons. Cf. McDonnell, supra, at 262 (finding employee covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 where his employer retaliated against him for failing to prevent his subordinate from filing an EEOC charge). There is, then, no reason to doubt that a person can “oppose” by responding to someone else’s question just as surely as by provoking the discussion, and nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question. Metro and its amici support the Circuit panel’s insistence on “active” and “consistent” opposition by arguing that the lower the bar for retaliation claims, the less likely it is that employers will look into what may be happening outside the executive suite. As they see it, if retaliation is an easy charge when things go bad for an employee who responded to enquiries, employers will avoid the headache by refusing to raise questions about possible discrimination. The argument is unconvincing, for we think it underestimates the incentive to enquire that follows from our decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998). Ellerth and Faragher hold “[a]n employer . . . subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with ... authority over the employee.” Ellerth, supra, at 765; Faragher, supra, at 807. Although there is no affirmative defense if the hostile environment “culminates in a tangible employment action” against the employee, Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765, an employer does have a defense “[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken” if it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any” discriminatory conduct and “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise,” ibid. Employers are thus subject to a strong inducement to ferret out and put a stop to any discriminatory activity in their operations as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability. Ibid.; see also Brief for Petitioner 24-28, and nn. 31-35 (citing studies demonstrating that Ellerth and Faragher have prompted many employers to adopt or strengthen procedures for investigating, preventing, and correcting discriminatory conduct). The possibility that an employer might someday want to fire someone who might charge discrimination traceable to an internal investigation does not strike us as likely to diminish the attraction of an Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense. That aside, we find it hard to see why the Sixth Circuit’s rule would not itself largely undermine the Ellerth-Faragher scheme, along with the statute’s “‘primary objective’” of “avoiding] harm” to employees. Faragher, supra, at 806 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417 (1975)). If it were clear law that an employee who reported discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses against themselves or against others. This is no imaginary horrible given the documented indications that “[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination.” Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 20 (2005); see also id., at 37, and n. 58 (compiling studies). The appeals court’s rule would thus create a real dilemma for any knowledgeable employee in a hostile work environment if the boss took steps to assure a defense under our cases. If the employee reported discrimination in response to the enquiries, the employer might well be free to penalize her for speaking up. But if she kept quiet about the discrimination and later filed a Title VII claim, the employer might well escape liability, arguing that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct [any discrimination] promptly” but “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of . . . preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.” Ellerth, supra, at 765. Nothing in the statute’s text or our precedent supports this catch-22. Because Crawford’s conduct is covered by the opposition clause, we do not reach her argument that the Sixth Circuit misread the participation clause as well. But that does not mean the end of this case, for Metro’s motion for summary judgment raised several defenses to the retaliation charge besides the scope of the two clauses; the District Court never reached these others owing to its ruling on the elements of retaliation, and they remain open on remand. Ill The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Because this case arises out of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for Metro, “we are required to view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, [Crawford].” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 195, n. 2 (2004) (per curiam). Metro suggests in passing that it was unclear whether Crawford actually opposed Hughes’s behavior because some of her defensive responses were “inappropriate,” such as telling Hughes to “bite me” and “flip[ping] him a bird.” Brief for Respondent 1-2 (internal quotation marks omitted). This argument fails not only because at the summary judgment stage we must “view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in [Crawford’s] favor,” Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 195, n. 2, but also because Crawford gave no indication that Hughes’s gross clowning was anything but offensive to her. Metro also argues that “[Requiring the employee to actually initiate a complaint. .. conforms with the employee’s ‘obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm’ articulated in Faragher and Ellerth.” Brief for Respondent 28 (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 807 (1998)). But that mitigation requirement only applies to employees who are suffering discrimination and have the opportunity to fix it by “tak[ing] advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer,” 524 U. S., at 807; it is based on the general principle “that a victim has a duty ‘to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize . . . damages,’ ” id,., at 806 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 231, n. 15 (1982)). We have never suggested that employees have a legal obligation to report discrimination against others to their employer on their own initiative, let alone lose statutory protection by failing to speak. Extending the mitigation requirement so far would make no sense; employees will often face retaliation not for opposing discrimination they themselves face, but for reporting discrimination suffered by others. Thus, they are not “victims” of anything until they are retaliated against, and it would be absurd to require them to “mitigate” damages they may be unaware they will suffer.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM v. FIRST LINCOLNWOOD CORP. No. 77-832. Argued October 11, 1978 Decided December 11, 1978 Marshall, J,, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, Stewart, White, BlackmuN, and Powell, JJ., joined. SteveNs, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which RehNQUist, J., joined, post, p. 254. Stephen M. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Babcock, Harriet S, Shapiro, Ronald R. Glancs, Neal L. Petersen, and J. Virgil Mattingly. George B. Collins argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Horace R. Hansen and Wayne P. Dordell filed a brief for the Independent Bankers Association of America urging affirmance. Me. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 3 (a) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (a), prohibits any company from acquiring control of a bank without prior approval by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board). Under §3 (c)(1) of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (c)(1), the Board may not approve a transaction that would create a monopoly or further an attempt to monopolize the business of banking. In addition, it must disapprove a transaction that would generate anticompetitive effects not clearly outweighed by beneficial effects upon the bank’s ability to serve the community. § 1842 (c) (2). The final sentence of § 3 (c) directs that “[i]n every case, the Board shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or companies and the banks concerned, and the convenience and needs of the community to be served.” The threshold question before us is whether this final sentence authorizes the Board to disapprove a transaction on grounds of financial unsoundness in the absence of any anticompeti-tive impact. If so, we must decide whether the Board can only exercise that authority when the transaction would cause or exacerbate the financial unsoundness of the holding company or a subsidiary bank. I The First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Ill., is controlled by four individuals who hold 86% of its stock in a voting trust. These individuals organized respondent, the First Lincoln-wood Corp., to serve as a bank holding company. They planned to exchange their shares in the bank for shares of respondent and, in addition, to have respondent assume a $3.7 million debt they had incurred in acquiring control of the bank. Respondent intended to use the dividends it would receive on the bank’s shares to retire this debt over a 12-year period. Further, in order to augment the bank’s capital, respondent would issue $1.5 million in capital notes and then use the proceeds to purchase new shares issued by the bank. The purpose of restructuring ownership interests in this fashion was to enable the holding company and the bank to file a consolidated tax return and thereby realize substantial tax savings. Because under the proposed transaction respondent would become a bank holding company, § 3 (a) of the Act required that the proposal be submitted for the Board’s approval. See n. 1, supra. Respondent filed its application with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, as specified by Board regulations. The Chicago Reserve Bank concluded that the Lincolnwood bank’s capital position — in essence, the difference between its assets and its liabilities — was inadequate and, under respondent’s proposal, was unlikely to improve enough to attain the minimum level the Board had determined necessary to protect the bank’s depositors. Nonetheless, the Lincolnwood bank’s favorable earnings prospects and strong management led the Chicago Reserve Bank to recommend that the transaction be approved. The Comptroller of the Currency, however, independently reviewed respondent’s application and concluded that it should be denied unless the bank’s capital position was strengthened. Respondent thereupon modified its proposal to accommodate the Comptroller’s objections. Instead of issuing $1.5 million in capital notes and using the proceeds to purchase new bank stock, respondent proposed that the bank itself sell $1 million in long-term capital notes and $1.1 million in new common stock. In addition, respondent proposed a substantial reduction in the dividends to be paid on the bank stock. Upon review of the modified proposal, the Chicago Reserve Bank adhered to its original recommendation, finding the modification salutary insofar as it increased the total addition to the bank’s capital, though “slightly unfavorable” insofar as it decreased the addition to the bank’s equity capital from $1.5 to $1.1 million. The Comptroller considered the revised plan superior to the original proposal; therefore, he, too, recommended approval. The Board staff independently evaluated the application and determined that the bank’s projected capital position would fall below the Board’s requirements. The staff also found that respondent had not established its ability to raise the additional capital without the individual shareholders’ incurring more debt. Although acknowledging that the bank’s management was capable, the staff concluded that “it would appear desirable that Bank’s overall capital position should be materially improved and that financing arrangements for the proposed capital injections into Bank [should] be made more definite.” App. 54 — 55. The Board concurred. It reviewed each of the elements enumerated in §3(c), determining first that the proposal had no anticompetitive impact because the transaction merely transferred control of the bank “from individuals to a corporation owned by the same individuals.” First Lincolnwood Corp., 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 153 (1976). Similiarly, the Board found that the proposal would effect no significant changes in the services offered by the bank to customers, so factors relating to the convenience and needs of the community militated neither for nor against approval. Id., at 154. Thus, the financial and managerial considerations specified in the final sentence of § 3 (c) were dispositive of respondent’s application. Addressing these considerations, the Board ruled that a bank holding company “should provide a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary bank(s).” 62 Fed. Res. Bull., at 153. Here, the Board found, even if the bank’s optimistic earnings projections were realized, respondent would lack the financial flexibility necessary both to service its debt and to maintain adequate capital at the bank. This, as well as the uncertainty regarding the proposed source of the capital injections, raised serious doubts as to respondent’s financial' ability to resolve unforeseen problems that could arise at the bank. The Board therefore concluded that “it would not be in the public interest to approve the formation of a bank holding company with an initial debt structure that could result in the weakening of Bank’s overall financial condition.” Id., at 154. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, the majority finding substantial evidence to support the denial of respondent’s application. 546 F. 2d 718, 720-721 (1976). On rehearing en banc, the court unanimously set aside the Board’s order. The court recognized that Congress had empowered the Board “to deny approval of a bank acquisition upon finding it not to be in the public interest for reasons other than an anticompetitive tendency.” 560 F. 2d 258, 261 (1977). However, in the court’s view, § 3 (c) of the Act did not permit the Board to withhold approval because of financial or managerial deficiencies unless those deficiencies were “caused or enhanced by the proposed transaction.” 560 F. 2d, at 262. This transaction, the court observed, merely reshuffled ownership interests in the bank. Apart from the proposed addition to capital and the tax advantage, which could accelerate reduction of the $3.7 million debt, respondent’s proposal was without financial consequence. The court therefore held that the Board had overstepped its authority under § 3 (c) in denying respondent’s application. 560 F. 2d, at 262-263. We granted certiorari because of the impact of this holding on the Board’s ability to fulfill its regulatory responsibilities under the Bank Holding Company Act. 434 U. S. 1061 (.1978). We conclude that the court below improperly restricted the Board’s authority, and, accordingly, we reverse. II Respondent contends that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act in sustaining the Board’s authority to deny applications for holding-company status solely on grounds of financial or managerial unsoundness. As respondent reads the legislative history, Congress’ only concern in passing the Act was with the anticompetitive potential in the concentration of banking resources and the combination of banking and nonbanking enterprises. See S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1955); S. Rep. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966). This focus on competitive considerations was reflected in the amendment of the Act in 1966 to conform § 3 (c) with the standards enunciated in the Bank Merger Act amendments of the same year. See 80 Stat. 8, 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(5). The amended standards in the Bank Merger Act were intended to provide an exception to the antitrust laws for those bank mergers in which the benefits to the community outweighed the anticompetitive impact. See United States v. Third Nat. Bank, 390 U. S. 171 (1968). By incorporating these same standards into the Bank Holding Company Act, respondent infers, Congress intended to authorize the Board to consider financial and managerial resources only as counterweights to a transaction’s anticompetitive impact. We do not agree that the Board’s authority under the Bank Holding Company Act is so limited. The language of the statute supports the Board’s interpretation of § 3 (c) as an authorization to deny applications on grounds of financial and managerial unsoundness even in the absence of any anticompetitive impact. Section 3 (c) directs the Board to consider the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the applicants and banks concerned “[i]n every case,” not just in cases in which the Board finds that the transaction will have an anticompetitive effect. Moreover, the Board’s interpretation of § 3 (c) draws support from the legislative history. Section 19 of the original version of the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 186, authorized the Board to regulate the financial and managerial soundness of bank holding companies and their banking subsidiaries. Holding companies were required to obtain a permit from the Board before voting the shares of a national bank. Section 19 directed the Board to consider, in acting upon an application for a voting permit, the financial condition of the company and the general character of its management. 48 Stat. 186. In addition, an applicant had to submit to financial examination by the Board and to maintain a prescribed reserve of liquid assets. 48 Stat. 187. However, the voting-permit provisions applied only if the bank was a member of the Federal Reserve System and the holding company sought to exercise control by actually voting the bank shares. Because of this limitation, § 19 ultimately proved of little value in ensuring the financial responsibility of bank holding companies and their subsidiaries. See H. R. Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1955). To ameliorate this deficiency, Congress expanded the Board's authority by enacting the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Section 3 (c) of the Act enumerated five factors for the Board to consider whenever a company sought to acquire control of a bank: “(1) the financial history and condition of the company or companies and the banks concerned; (2) their prospects; (3) the character of their management; (4) the convenience, needs, and welfare of the communities and the area concerned; and (5) whether or not the effect of such acquisition or merger or consolidation would be to expand the size or extent of the bank holding company system involved beyond limits consistent with adequate and sound banking, the public interest, and the preservation of competition in the field of banking.” 70 Stat. 135. The House Report on the Act noted the similarity between these factors and those specified in other banking statutes as the basis for admitting state banks to membership in the Federal Reserve System and for granting federal deposit-insurance coverage. H. R. Rep. No. 609, supra, at 15. In both instances, the adequacy of the bank’s capital is an important factor to be considered by the reviewing agency. See 12 TJ. S. C. §§ 329, 1816. In amending § 3 (c) to conform to the language of the Bank Merger Act in 1966, see supra, at 243, Congress did not intend to confine the Board’s consideration of financial and managerial soundness only to transactions that would have an anticompetitive impact. The sole reason given for the change was “the interests of uniform standards” in regulating both mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry. S. Rep. No. 1179, supra, at 9. Regardless of whether Congress intended to limit the inquiry under the Bank Merger Act, there is no indication that it intended to incorporate that limitation into the Bank Holding Company Act. Indeed, in 1966 Congress repealed the voting-permit provisions of the 1933 Act, which had been left intact in 1956, because it believed that the Board retained authority under § 3 (c), even as amended, to ensure the financial and managerial soundness of holding companies and their subsidiary banks. The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated: “Since the Bank Holding Company Act makes it necessary for any bank holding company to obtain the Board's prior approval before acquiring the stock of any bank (whether member or nonmember) and since, in granting that approval, the Board must consider the financial condition and management of the holding company, the voting permit procedure . . . serves no substantial purpose.” S. Rep. No. 1179, supra, at 12. In 1970, Congress amended the Bank Holding Company Act to extend its coverage to holding companies that controlled only one bank. 84 Stat. 1760, 12 U. S. C. § 1841 (a). Previously, the Act had applied only to multibank holding-companies. The principal purpose of this change was to prevent one-bank holding companies from entering businesses not related to banking. S. Rep. No. 91-1084, pp. 2-4 (1970). Nothing in the legislative history of the 1970 amendments suggests that in extending the Act, Congress intended to depart from its prior understanding of the Board’s authority or to establish a different rule for one-bank holding companies. Our conclusion as to the scope of the Board's authority is bolstered by reference to the principle that an agency’s longstanding construction of its statutory mandate is entitled to great respect, “especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). The Board has regularly treated deficiencies in the financial and managerial resources of holding companies and their banking subsidiaries as sufficient grounds for denying an application. Clayton Bancshares Corp., 50 Fed. Res. Bull. 1261, 1264-1265 (1964); Mid-Continent Bancorporation, 52 Fed. Res. Bull. 198, 200-201 (1966); Midwest Bancorporation, Inc., 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 948, 950 (1970); Citizens Bancorp, 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 806 (1975); Bankshares of Hawley, Inc., 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 610 (1976); see 12 CFR § 265.2 (f) (22) (vii) (1978). Moreover, Congress has been made aware of this practice, yet four times has “revisited the Act and left the practice untouched.” Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974). See 80 Stat. 236; 84 Stat. 1760; 91 Stat. 1388; 92 Stat. 3641. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that the Board can disapprove formation of a bank holding company solely on grounds of financial or managerial unsoundness. III While the Court of Appeals recognized the Board’s authority to treat financial or managerial unsoundness as a dispositive consideration, it held that this authority was limited to instances in which the unsoundness was caused or exacerbated by the proposed transaction. The Court of Appeals rejected the Board’s argument that permission to form a holding company is “a reward which it may withhold until the applicant’s financial status fulfills the Board’s standard of desirability.” 560 F. 2d, at 262. The legislative history, the court held, revealed nothing that would allow the Board to disapprove formation of a bank holding company where the transaction would not weaken a subsidiary bank’s financial condition. In addition, the already extensive regulation of the financial integrity of banks by the Comptroller of the Currency and state regulatory agencies persuaded the court that Congress could not have intended to extend identical authority to the Federal Reserve Board. Id., at 262-263. We perceive no basis for the limitation the Court of Appeals imposed. Certainly, it is not compelled by the language of the statute. By its terms, § 3 (c) requires the Board to consider financial and managerial factors in “every case.” Just as we observed earlier that this language encompasses cases in which the proposed transaction would have no anti-competitive effect, supra, at 243, so, too, it encompasses cases in which the transaction would not weaken the bank or the bank holding company. Indeed, the Court of Appeals’ construction of the statute would require the Board to approve formation of a bank holding company with corrupt management simply because management would become no more corrupt by virtue of the transaction. We hesitate to adopt a construction that would yield such an anomalous result. Furthermore, the legislative record does provide support for the Board’s actions. In deliberations on the Bank Holding Company Act, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 4r-5 (1955); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1383, p. 19 (1978), and in subsequent inquiries into banking regulation, see, e. g., Hearing on Problem Banks, supra, n. 6; Hearings on the Safe Banking Act of 1977, pts. 1-4, supra, n. 13, Congress has evinced substantial concern for the financial soundess of the banking system. And Congress has long regarded capital adequacy as a measure of bank safety. See, e. g., 12 U. S. C. § 329 (Federal Reserve Act), § 1816 (Federal Deposit Insurance Act); S. Rep. No. 133, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 11 (1913); S. Rep. No. 1623, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1952). To rule that the Board could not require applicants for holding-company status and their subsidiary banks to meet minimum capital-adequacy requirements would be inconsistent with this general legislative mandate. Nor can we accept the conclusion that Congress intended to reserve questions of bank safety to the Comptroller or state agencies except where a transaction would harm the financial condition of an applicant or the bank. The history of the Bank Holding Company Act nowhere suggests that Congress sought to delineate such a jurisdictional boundary. Indeed, our decision in Whitney Nat. Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411 (1965), indicates that the Board’s jurisdiction is paramount. We ruled there that the Comptroller could not deny a new bank a license to do business — a decision normally within his competence, see 12 U. S. C. §§26, 27— once the Board approved a bank holding company transaction that entailed formation of the new bank. 379 U. S., at 419, 423. It follows that the Federal Reserve Board's actions here are not invalid merely because the powers exercised duplicate those of other regulators. Again, our conclusion is influenced by the principle that courts should defer to an agency’s construction of its own statutory mandate, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 381; Commissioner v. Sternberger’s Estate, 348 U. S. 187, 199 (1955), particularly when that construction accords with well-established congressional goals. The Board has frequently reiterated that holding companies should be a source of strength to subsidiary financial institutions. See, e. g., Northern States Financial Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 827, 828 (1972); Citizens Bancorp, 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 806 (1975); Downs Bancshares, Inc., 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 673 (1975). It has used the substantial advantages of bank holding-company status to induce applicants to improve their own and their subsidiaries’ capital positions. See P. Heller, Handbook of Federal Bank Holding Company Law 127, and n. 195 (1976); The Bank Holding Company — 1973, pp. 35, 83 (R. Johnson ed. 1973). In fact, between 1970 and 1975, the Board convinced 397 applicants to provide additional capital totaling $788 million and indirectly prompted the infusion of even more capital. Hearings on Financial Institutions and the Nation’s Economy, supra n. 13, at 2403 (testimony of Philip Coldwell, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Congress has been apprised of this consistent administrative practice, ibid.; Compendium of Major Issues in Bank Regulation, supra n. 13, at 379, and has not undertaken to change it. Indeed, a Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in 1977 echoed the exact language of the Board’s standard. S. Rep. No. 95-323, p. 11 (“Holding companies are supposed to be a source of strength to subsidiary financial institutions”). We hold that the Board may deny applications for holding-company status solely on grounds of financial or managerial unsoundness, regardless of whether that unsoundness would be caused or exacerbated by the proposed transaction. IV Respondent contends that the Board’s denial of its application was arbitrary and capricious. We have already determined that the Board’s “source of strength” requirement is consistent with the language, purpose, and legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act. Our only remaining inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that respondent fell short of this standard. 12 U. S. C. § 1848. The Court of Appeals panel had “no difficulty” in finding substantial evidence to sustain the Board’s decision, 546 F. 2d, at 720, and respondent did not press this issue in its petition for rehearing en banc. We, too, find in this record more than the amount of evidence “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the Board’s] conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938); accord, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 401 (1971); Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607, 619-620 (1966). The application failed to establish that respondent could raise the $2.1 million in additional capital in the manner proposed. Moreover, it revealed that even with this infusion, the bank’s capital would have been well below the level the Board had determined necessary to sustain the financial soundness of the enterprise. Thus, the Board was entitled to conclude that respondent would not be a sufficient source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary bank. Having so determined, the Board was entitled to deny the application. We hold that the Board’s actions were within the authority-conferred by Congress and were supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the judgment is Reversed. More specifically, §3 (a), 70 Stat. 134, as amended, 80 Stat. 237, 12 U, S. C. § 1842 (a), provides in pertinent part: “It shall be unlawful, except with the prior approval of the Board, (1) for any action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank holding company; (2) for any action to be taken that causes a bank to become a subsidiary of a bank holding company; (3) for any bank holding company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any bank if, after such acquisition, such company will directly or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting shares of such bank; (4) for any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof, other than a bank, to acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a bank; or (5) for any bank holding company to merge or consolidate with any other bank holding company.” Section 2 (a) (1) of the Act, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 84 Stat. 1760, 12 U. S. C. § 1841 (a)(1), defines a “bank holding company” as “any company which has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this Act.” A company has “control” over a bank or over any company if “(A) the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of voting securities of the bank or company; “(B) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or “(C) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of the bank or company.” § 2 (a) (2) of the Act, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 84 Stat. 1760, 12 U. S. C. § 1841 (a) (2). In its entirety, § 3 (c) provides: “The Board shall not approve— “(1) any acquisition or merger or consolidation under this section which would result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monop[o]lize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the United States, or “(2) any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation under this section whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint or [sic] trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served. “In every case, the Board shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or companies and the banks concerned, and. the convenience and needs of the community to be served.” 70 Stat. 135, as amended, 80 Stat. 237, 12 U. S. C. § 1842(c). The four individuals incurred part of this $3.7 million debt in order to buy out the shares of a former chairman and president of the bank, who had been indicted for securities fraud. See 546 F. 2d 718, 723-724,. n. 1 (CA7 1976) (Fairchild, C. J., dissenting from the panel opinion). The entire $3.7 million debt was secured by the bank stock they had acquired in this and previous transactions. While the proposed transaction with respondent would relieve the individual shareholders of their primary obligations under the loans, these shareholders would remain secondarily liable if respondent defaulted and its obligations exceeded the value of the bank’s stock. See App. 24, 29-30, 42, 55-56. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954,26 U. S. C. § 1501, permits an affiliated group of corporations to file a consolidated income tax return. Respondent and the bank would be affiliated by virtue of respondent’s ownership of at least 80% of the bank’s stock. 26 U. S. C. § 1504. Filing a consolidated return would permit the group to deduct the interest on the $3.7 million debt from the bank’s gross income when determining the taxable income of the consolidated entity. 26 CFR § 1.1502-11 (a) (1) (1977); 26 U. S. C. § 163. The tax savings from this deduction could then be transferred to respondent as a tax-free intercorporate dividend and used to retire the acquisition debt. 26 CFR § 1.1501-14 (a) (1) (1977). Although in the absence of this transaction, the individual shareholders presumably can deduct from personal income their interest payments on the debt, see 26 U. S. C. § 163, respondent contends that approval of the transaction would have saved the bank and holding company approximately $142,000 in taxes in the first year alone. Brief for Respondent 5-6, n. 2. These tax’ savings would have diminished as interest payments on the outstanding debt declined. A company seeking to acquire a bank must submit an application to the Federal Reserve bank of the district in which the applicant is located. 12 CFR §§225.3 (a)-(b), 262.3 (b) (1978). The Reserve bank evaluates the application against the Board’s standards and makes a recommendation to the Board. §262.3 (c). At the “appropriate” time, the Reserve bank forwards the application to the Board so that the Board staff can undertake an independent evaluation. Ibid. After the application is forwarded, the Board must notify the Comptroller of the Currency if a national bank is involved, or state supervisory authorities if a state bank is involved, and in most cases must allow the agency 30 days to submit a recommendation. 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (b). See n. 12, infra. If the Comptroller or state supervisory authority recommends that the application be denied, the Board must notify the applicant and conduct a hearing. 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (b). On the other hand, if the Comptroller or state authority recommends approval of the transaction or declines to submit a timely recommendation, several Courts of Appeals have held that the Board need not provide a hearing before making its decision, see, e. g., Kirsch v. Board of Governors, 353 F. 2d 353, 356 (CA6 1965); Northwest Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 303 F. 2d 832, 842-844 (CA8 1962), though it may choose to provide one. See 12 CFR §§262.3 (g)(2), (3) (1978). In neither case is the Board bound by the recommendation of these agencies. See Whitney Nat. Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411, 419-420, 423 (1965). For a more complete explication of the Board’s procedures, see P. Heller, Handbook of Federal Bank Holding Company Law 317-363 (1976). The Board uses several measures of capital adequacy. One is the ratio of equity capital to total liabilities less cash on hand, known as the invested-asset ratio. Another is the ratio of total capital (debt and equity) to total assets, known as the capital-asset ratio. See Heller, supra n. 5, at 131-132; Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 Yale L. J. 1, 63 (1976). The Board regards an invested-asset ratio of 9%, see App. 52-53 (Board staff memorandum), and a capital-asset ratio of 8%, see Hearing on Problem Banks before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 137 (1976), as the minimal levels of capital necessary to maintain financial soundness. Respondent has not specifically challenged the validity of these standards as measures of bank safety. While the Board considers capital notes that are subordinated to depositors’ demands to be part of a bank’s overall capital, it regards them as a less desirable financial cushion than equity. See Heller, supra n. 5, at 130-131, n. 209; see, e. g., Clayton Bancshares Corp., 50 Fed. Res. Bull. 1261, 1264 (1964); Mid-Continent Bancorporation, 52 Fed. Res. Bull. 198, 200 (1966). The bank’s invested-asset ratio was 5.3% in 1975. The Board staff estimated that an infusion of $2.5 million in equity capital would be necessary to bring the bank up to the Board’s minimum standard of 9%. The respondent’s proposed addition of $1.1 million in equity and $1 million in debt would have raised the bank’s invested-asset ratio to only 6.8%, $1.5 million short of the minimum 9%. The additional $2.1 million in total capital would have raised the bank’s capital-asset ratio for 1975 from 5.2% to 7.4%. However, amortization of the $3.7 million acquisition debt and the $1 million in capital notes would have caused the ratio to dwindle to 5.2% by 1987, well short of the Board’s 8% minimum. App. 52-54. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the Board’s order pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1848. Section 329 provides that no state bank may be admitted to membership in the Federal Reserve System unless “it possesses capital stock and surplus which, in the judgment of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, are adequate in relation to the character and condition of its assets and to its existing and prospective deposit liabilities and other corporate responsibilities.” 38 Stat. 258, as amended, 12 TJ. S. C. §329. Section 1816 enumerates the factors to be considered in the determination whether to grant a bank federal deposit insurance coverage: “The financial history and condition of the bank, the adequacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general character of its management, the convenience and needs of the community to be served by the bank, and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of this Act.” 64 Stat. 876, 12 U. S. C. § 1816. Respondent’s argument that Congress circumscribed the role of banking factors in the Board’s inquiry under § 3 by borrowing the language of the Bank Merger Act assumes that supervisory agencies applying that Act can consider such factors only as they bear upon competitive considerations. This assumption may be unwarranted. The House Report on the 1966 amendments to the Bank Merger Act is somewhat ambiguous regarding the weight that may be assigned to financial and managerial factors, but it does not appear to preclude consideration of those factors as independent bases for disapproval of a merger: “Of course, the expression of these factors in the statute would not preclude the banking agencies, charged as they are with general supervisory responsibility, from considering in any particular case such other factors as they might deem relevant. However, only the convenience and needs of the community to be served can be weighed against anticompetitive effects, with financial and managerial resources being considered only as they throw light on the capacity of the existing and proposed institutions to serve the community.” H. R. Rep. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1966). This language speaks only to the role of financial and managerial factors in determining under 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(5)(B) whether the anticom-petitive effects of a merger outweigh its benefits to the community. In this specific determination, financial and managerial resources are relevant only as they affect the assessment of those benefits. But the House Report says nothing about a situation where, as here, the merger has no anticom-petitive impact. This situation was addressed by Senator Robertson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, which was responsible for the Bank Merger Act amendments: “Of course, if there are no substantial anticompetitive effects and no tendency to create a monopoly and no suggestion of restraint of trade, the banking agency will proceed to consider the merger on the basis of the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions and the convenience and needs of the community to be served. The banking agency may approve the merger if it thinks the merger will be beneficial from these points of view, or it can turn the merger down if it thinks the merger undesirable or objectionable in any respects from these points of view.” 112 Cong. Rec. 2656 (1966) (prepared statement). See also id., at 2457, 2460 (“[Supervisory agencies must use the banking factors to evaluate whether or not a merger will result in a solvent and viable institution, and . . . they should not allow a merger unless this prerequisite is met”) (Rep. Todd). Congress has amended the Bank Holding Company Act twice since 1970, but those amendments do not affect the disposition of this case. In 1977, Congress made essentially technical refinements in the Bank Holding Company Act. These amendments permit the Board to extend further the time for a bank or a bank holding company to divest itself of bank stock acquired in the course of collecting or securing a debt. The amendments also empower the Board to dispense with the requirement that the Comptroller or state authority be given 30 days’ notice before the Board acts on an application, if more rapid action is necessary to prevent the failure of the bank to be acquired. §§ 301, 302, 91 Stat. 1388-1390, amending 12 U. S. C. §§ 1842 (a), (b). See H. R. Rep. No. 95-774, pp. 7-8 (1977). In 1978, Congress strengthened the Board’s regulatory powers principally by permitting the assessment of civil penalties for certain violations of the Bank Holding Company Act. § 106, 92 Stat. 3647, amending 12 U. S. C. § 1847. The 1978 amendments also authorize the Board to require a holding company to divest itself of nonbank subsidiaries whenever necessary to avoid “serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability of a bank holding company subsidiary bank” or to be consistent with sound banking principles. § 105, amending 12 U. S. C. § 1844. These amendments, in particular, reflect Congress’ intent to vest the Board with authority to ensure the financial soundness of bank holding companies and their subsidiaries, a purpose entirely consonant with our interpretation of the Board's authority under § 3 (c). See Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Compendium of Major Issues in Bank Regulation, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 379, 411 (Comm. Print 1975); Hearings on Financial Institutions and the Nation’s Economy before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pt. 3, p. 2403 (1976); Hearings on the Safe Banking Act of 1977 before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 1321, 1439 (1977). See n. 12, supra. The Board contends that the transaction would in fact weaken the capital position of the bank. Reply Brief for Petitioner 2 n. 2. The Court of Appeals found otherwise, relying on the Board’s concession during oral argument before the original panel that operation of the bank through a holding company “might in fact be financially sounder” as a result of the tax advantage. 560 F. 2d, at 263 n. 3. Because we conclude that the Board had authority to deny respondent’s application regardless of whether the transaction would weaken the bank’s capital position, we need express no opinion on this dispute. Among these advantages are a bank holding company’s ability to expand into banking-related activities with the Board’s approval, 12 U. S. C. § 1843 (c) (8), to avoid some state-law restrictions against branch banking, see Whitney Nat. Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S., at 413, and to realize substantial tax savings. See n. 4, supra. Given the applicable state law, Ill. Const., Art. 13, §8; Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 16%, § 106 (1975), and the nature of respondent’s proposed transaction, only the last of these advantages afforded the Board leverage in this case. The Senate Report accompanied the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act Amendments of 1977, S. 71, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). These amendments were passed by the Senate but were not brought before the House. In the next session, Congress enacted a subsequent version of these amendments as the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, supra, n. 12. The dissent argues that because the proposed transaction would not exacerbate the financial difficulties of the bank, the Board’s disapproval rests not on the effects of the transaction, but on “pre-existing or unrelated conditions.” Post, at 255. In the dissent’s view, the Board, by looking beyond the transaction before it, attempted to exercise the day-to-day regulatory authority over banks which Congress denied to it and conferred on the Comptroller. We disagree with the basic premise of the dissent’s argument. As the Board found, the effect of this transaction would have been the formation of a financially unsound bank holding company. Thus, the Board’s attempt to prevent this effect and to induce respondent to form an enterprise that met the Board’s standards of financial soundness was entirely consistent with the language the dissent cites. Moreover, congressional concern with financial soundness and capital adequacy is by no means “irrelevant,” post, at 257, to whether the Board’s attempt exceeded its authority. Section 9 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 70 Stat. 138, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1848, provides that “[t]he findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” We also find substantial evidence to sustain the Board’s determination that considerations involving the convenience and needs of the community do not support respondent’s application. Indeed, the Board previously has recognized the connection between the needs of the community and the financial well-being of a bank, holding that an applicant’s financial inability to resolve unforeseen problems could “impair [the bank’s] overall ability to continue to serve the community as a viable banking organization.” Citizens Bancorp, 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 806 (1975); accord, Downs Bancshares, Inc., 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 673, 674 (1975).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF PENNSYLVANIA et al. v. INSTITUTIONALIZED JUVENILES et al. No. 77-1715. Argued October 10, 1978 — Decided June 20, 1979 BurgeR, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, BlacemuN, Powell, and RehNQUist, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment, post, p. 650. BreNNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall and SteveNS, JJ., joined, post, p. 650. Norman J. Watkins, Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Robert B. Hoffman, Deputy Attorney General, and Gerald Gornish, Acting Attorney General. David Ferleger argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by S. Shepherd Tate, John H. Lashly, Russell E. Webb, and Joseph F. Vargyas for the American Bar Association; and by Ronald M. Soskin for the National Center for Law and the Handicapped et al. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal raises issues similar to those decided in Parham v. J. R., ante, p. 584, as to what process is due when the parents or guardian of a child seek state institutional mental health care. I This is the second time we have reviewed a District Court’s judgment that Pennsylvania’s procedures for the voluntary admission of mentally ill and mentally retarded children to a state hospital are unconstitutional. In the earlier suit, five children who were between the ages of 15 and 18 challenged the 1966 statute pursuant to which they had been admitted to Haverford State Hospital. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4402, 4403 (Purdon 1969). After a three-judge District Court, with one judge dissenting, declared the statute unconstitutional, Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (ED Pa. 1975), the Pennsylvania Legislature amended its mental health code with regard to the mentally ill. The amendments placed adolescents over the age of 14 in essentially the same position as adults for purposes of a voluntary admission. Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976, § 201, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 7201 (Purdon Supp. 1978). Under the new statute, the named plaintiffs could obtain their requested releases from the state hospitals independently of the constitutionality of the 1966 statute, and we therefore held that the claims of the named plaintiffs were moot. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129 (1977). We then remanded the case to the District Court for “reconsideration of the class definition, exclusion of those whose claims are moot, and substitution of class representatives with live claims.” Id., at 135. On remand, 12 new plaintiffs, appellees here, were named to represent classes of mentally ill and mentally retarded children. Nine of the children were younger than 14 and constituted all of those who had been admitted to the State’s hospitals for the mentally ill in accordance with the 1976 Act at the time the suit was brought; three other children represented a class of patients who were 18 and younger and who had been or would be admitted to a state hospital for the mentally retarded under the 1966 Act and 1973 regulations implementing that Act. All 12 children had been admitted on the application of parents or someone standing in loco parentis with state approval after an independent medical examination. The suit was filed against several named defendants, the Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Welfare and the directors of three state owned and operated facilities. The District Court, however, certified a defendant class that consisted of “ 'directors of all mental health and mental retardation facilities in Pennsylvania which are subject to regulation by the defendant Secretary of Public Welfare.’ ” 459 F. Supp. 30, 40 n. 37 (ED Pa. 1978). Representatives of the nine mentally ill children sought a declaration that the admission procedures embodied in § 201 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 7201 (Purdon Supp. 1978), which subsequently have been expanded by regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Public Welfare, 8 Pa. Bull. 2432 et seq. (1978), violated their procedural due process rights and requested the court to issue an injunction against the statute’s future enforcement. The three mentally retarded children presented the same claims as to §§ 402 and 403 of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4402 and 4403 (Purdon 1969), and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The District Court certified two subclasses of plaintiffs under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 and held that the statutes challenged by each subclass were unconstitutional. It held that the State’s procedures were insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court’s analysis in this case was similar to that used by the District Court in J. L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (MD Ga. 1976), reversed and remanded sub nom. Parham v. J. R., ante, p. 584. The court in this case concluded that these children had a constitutionally protected liberty interest that could not be “waived” by their parents. This conclusion, coupled with the perceived fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, led the court to hold that only a formal adversary hearing could suffice to protect the children in appellees’ class from being needlessly confined in mental hospitals. To further protect the children’s interests, the court concluded that the following procedures were required before any child could be admitted voluntarily to a mental hospital: 1) 48-hour notice prior to any hearing; 2) legal counsel “during all significant stages of the commitment process”; 3) the child’s presence at all commitment hearings; 4) a finding by an impartial tribunal based on clear and convincing evidence that the child required institutional treatment; 5) a probable-cause determination within 72 hours after admission to a hospital; 6) a full hearing, including the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, within two weeks from the date of the initial admission. App. 1097a-1098a. Appellants, all of the defendants before the District Court, appealed the judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction, and consolidated the case with Parham v. J. R., ante, p. 584. 437 U. S. 902. II (a) Much of what we .said in Parham v. J. R. applies with equal force to this case. The liberty rights and interests of the appellee children, the prerogatives, responsibilities, and interests of the parents, and the obligations and interests of the State are the same. Our holding as to what process is due in Parham controls here, particularly: “We conclude .that the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized for mental health care is sufficiently great that some kind of inquiry should be made by a ‘neutral factfinder’ to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission are satisfied. . . . That inquiry must carefully probe the child’s background using all available sources, including, but not limited to, parents, schools, and other social agencies. Of course, the review must also include an interview with the child. It is necessary that the decision-maker have the authority to refuse to admit any child who does not satisfy the medical standards for admission. Finally, it is necessary that the child’s continuing need for commitment be reviewed periodically by a similarly independent procedure.” Parham v. J. R., ante, at 606-607. The only issue is whether Pennsylvania’s procedures for the voluntary commitment of children comply with these requirements. (b) Unlike in Parham v. J. R., where the statute being challenged was general and thus the procedures for admission were evaluated hospital by hospital, the statute and regulations in Pennsylvania are specific. Our focus here is on the codified procedures declared unconstitutional by the District Court. The Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 and regulations promulgated by the Secretary describe the procedures for the voluntary admission for inpatient treatment of mentally ill children. Section 201 of the Act provides that “a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to a child less than 14 years of age” may apply for a voluntary examination and treatment for the child. After the child receives an examination and is provided with temporary treatment, the hospital must formulate “an individualized treatment plan ... by a treatment team.” Within 72 hours the treatment team is required to determine whether inpatient treatment is “necessary” and why. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 7205 (Purdon Supp. 1978). The hospital must inform the child and his parents both of the necessity for institutional treatment and of the nature of the proposed treatment. Ibid. Regulations promulgated under the 1976 Act provide that each child shall be' re-examined and his or her treatment plan reviewed not less than once every 30 days. See § 7100.108 (a), 8 Pa. Bull. 2436 (1978). The regulations also permit a child to object to the treatment plan and thereby obtain a review by a mental health professional independent of the treatment team. The findings of this person are reported directly to the director of the hospital who has the power and the obligation to release any child who no longer needs institutional treatment. The statute indeed provides three methods for release of a child under the age of 14 from a mental hospital. First, the child’s parents or guardian may effect his release at will. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 7206 (b) (Purdon Supp. 1978). Second, “any responsible party” may petition the juvenile court if the person believes that treatment in a less restrictive setting would be in the best interests of the child. Ibid. If such a petition is filed, an attorney is appointed to represent the child’s interests and a hearing is held within 10 days to determine “what inpatient treatment, if any, is in the minor’s best interest.” Ibid. Finally, the director of the hospital may release any child whenever institutional treatment is no longer medically indicated. § 7206 (c). The Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 regulates the voluntary admission for inpatient hospital habilitation of the mentally retarded. The admission process has been expanded significantly by regulations promulgated in 1973 by Pennsylvania’s Secretary of Public Welfare. 3 Pa. Bull. 1840 (1973). Unlike the procedure for the mentally ill, a hospital is not permitted to admit a mentally retarded child based solely on the application of a parent or guardian. All children must be referred by a physician and each referral must be accompanied by a medical or psychological evalution. In addition, the director of the institution must make an independent examination of each child, and if he disagrees with the recommendation of the referring physician as to whether hospital care is “required,” the child must be discharged. Mentally retarded children or anyone acting on their behalf may petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the sufficiency or legality of the “proceedings leading to commitment.” Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 4426 (Purdon 1969). Any child older than 13 who is admitted to a hospital must have his rights explained to him and must be informed that a status report on his condition will be provided periodically. The older child is also permitted to object, either orally or in writing, to his hospitalization. After such objection, the director of the facility, if he feels that hospitalization is still necessary, must institute an involuntary commitment proceeding under § 406 of the Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §4406 (Purdon 1969). What the statute and regulations do not make clear is how the hospital staff decides that inpatient care is required for a child. The director of Haverford State Hospital for the mentally ill was the sole witness called by either side to testify about the decisionmaking process at a state hospital. She described the process as follows: “[T]here is an initial examination made by the psychiatrist, and is so designated as an admission note on the hospital record. Subsequently, for all adolescents on the Adolescent Service at Haverford State Hospital, there are routine studies done, such as an electroencephalogram, a neurological examination, a medical examination, and a complete battery of psychological tests and school evaluation, as well as a psychiatric evaluation. When all their data has been compiled, an entire staff conference is held, which is called a new case conference, at which point the complete case is re-examined and it is decided whether or not the child needs hospitalization, and at that same time, as well, an adequate treatment course is planned.” App. 112a. In addition to the physical and mental examinations that are conducted for each child within the institutions, the staff compiles a substantial “pre-admission background information” file on each child. After the child is admitted, there is a periodic review of the child’s condition by the staff. His status is reviewed by a different social worker at least every 30 days. Since the State .places a great deal of emphasis on family therapy, the parents or guardians are met with weekly to discuss the child’s case. Id., at 113a. We are satisfied that these procedures comport with the due process requirements set out earlier. No child is admitted without at least one and often more psychiatric examinations by an independent team of mental health professionals whose sole concern under the statute is whether the child needs and can benefit from institutional care. The treatment team not only interviews the child and parents but also compiles a full background history from all available sources. If the treatment team concludes that institutional care is not in the child’s best interest, it must refuse the child’s admission. Finally, every child’s condition is reviewed at least every 30 days. This program meets the criteria of our holding in Parham. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court that Pennsylvania’s statutes and regulations are unconstitutional is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. For the reasons stated in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Parham v. J. R., ante, p. 621, Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the judgment. Appellants argue that the State’s regulation of admission to private hospitals is insufficient to constitute state action for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They, however, did not contest the District Court’s definition of the defendant class, which included directors of both public and private facilities. In light of our holding that Pennsylvania’s procedures comport with due process, we do not decide whether the District Court correctly found state action. Section 201 provides in part: “A parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to a child less than 14 years of age may subject such child to examination and treatment under this act, and in so doing shall be deemed to be acting for the child.” Section 402 provides: “(a) Application for voluntary admission to a facility for examination, treatment and care may be made by: “(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person to be admitted, if such person is eighteen years of age or younger. “ (b) When an application is made, the director of the facility shall cause an examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named in the application is in need of care or observation, he may be admitted.” Section 403 provides: “(a) Application for voluntary commitment to a facility for examination, treatment and care may be made by: “(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person to be admitted, if such person is eighteen years of age or younger. “(b) The application shall be in writing, signed by the applicant in the presence of at least one witness. When an application is made, the director of the facility shall causé an examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named in the application is in need of care or observation, he shall be committed for a period not to exceed thirty days.” The 1973 regulations provide in part: “1. . . . [M]entally retarded juveniles may be referred by either a pediatrician, or general physician or psychologist; “2. This referral must be accomplished by a psychiatric evaluation and that report must indicate with specificity the reasons that the person requires institutional care; however, a medical or psychological evaluation may accompany the referral of a mentally retarded juvenile; “3. The Director of the Institution . . . shall have conducted an independent examination of the proposed juvenile, and if his results disagree with the professional’s opinion, the Director . . . shall discharge the juvenile; “5. Within 24 hours after the juvenile’s admission, every youth who is at least 13 years of age must receive written notification (which he signs) explaining his rights indicating that he will be given a status report periodically of his condition; that he can contact by telephone or by mail his parents or the person who requested his admission; and that he will be furnished with the number of counsel . . . that he can call for representation . . . ; “6. In the event that a juvenile whose chronological age is 13 or older objects (either orally or in writing) to remaining in the Institution, the Director . . . if he feels it is necessary for the youth to remain, may continue the institutionalization for two business days during which time he shall notify the applicant and the referral unit so that either party may institute a 460 [involuntary commitment] proceeding. ...” 3 Pa. Bull. 1840 (1973). One subclass consisted of “all juveniles under the age of fourteen who are subject to inpatient treatment under Article II of the 1976 Act.” 459 F. Supp., at 41. The other subclass was “mentally retarded juveniles age eighteen or younger.” Id., at 42. Appellants argue that the District Court failed to heed our admonition in remanding this case previously that it should “ ‘stop, look, and listen’ before certifying a class in order to adjudicate constitutional claims.” Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 135 (1977). Given our disposition of the merits of this appeal, we need not decide whether these subclasses satisfy the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23. Judge Broderick dissented from the judgment of the majority. In his view, the majority “has prescribed ‘an overdose’ of due process.” 459 F. Supp., at 53. Appellees argue that not much weight should be accorded to these files because the record does not make clear whether they were used in making the admission decision. The District Court, however, found that “virtually all of the information was received by the admitting facilities prior to admission.” 459 F. Supp., at 36 n. 15. The court did acknowledge that it was not -clear to what extent the information was used, but nonetheless admitted all of the records into evidence. Since it was available, we, like the District Court, assume the information served as a factual basis for some portions of the diagnoses of the children at the time of their admission to the hospitals. Although the District Court briefly described the situation of each of the children in appellees' class, it did not indicate the process for each of their admissions. We cannot determine on the record before us whether each child’s admission conformed to our due process standards. Just as in Parham, individual members of appellees’ class are free to argue on remand that their particular commitments violated those standards. Also, we note that as in Parham we are faced only with the issue of what process is due at the initial admission, and thus we are not deciding what postadmission procedures are constitutionally adequate to continue a voluntary commitment. The District Court had no reason to consider that issue, and indeed from our reading of appellees’ complaint there does not appear to be any specific challenge to the State’s review procedures. However, we leave it to the District Court on remand to determine what further proceedings are necessary.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ZABLOCKI, MILWAUKEE COUNTY CLERK v. REDHAIL No. 76-879. Argued October 4, 1977 Decided January 18, 1978 Ward L. Johnson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Wis:-consin, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General, Robert P. Russell, and John R. Devitt. Robert H. Blondis argued the cause and filed briefs for appellee. Terry W. Rose filed a brief for the Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this case is the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute, Wis. Stat. §§245.10 (1), (4), (5) (1973), which provides that members of a certain class of Wisconsin residents may not marry, within the State or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry. The class is defined by the statute to include any “Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment.” The statute specifies that court permission cannot be granted unless the marriage applicant submits proof of compliance with the support obligation and, in addition, - demonstrates that the children covered by the support order “are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges.” No marriage license may lawfully be issued in Wisconsin to a person covered by the statute, except upon court order; any marriage entered into without compliance with § 245.10 is declared void; and persons acquiring marriage licenses in violation of the section are subject to criminal penalties. After being denied a marriage license because of his failure to comply with § 245.10, appellee brought this class action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, challenging the statute as violative of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined its enforcement. 418 F. Supp. 1061 (1976). We noted probable jurisdiction, 429 U. S. 1089 (1977), and we now affirm. I Appellee Redhail is a Wisconsin resident who, under the terms of § 245.10, is unable to enter into a lawful marriage in Wisconsin or elsewhere so long as he maintains his Wisconsin residency. The facts, according to the stipulation filed by the parties in the District Court, are as follows. In January 1972, when appellee was a minor and a high school student, a paternity action was instituted against him in Milwaukee County Court, alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock on July 5, 1971. After lie appeared and admitted that he was the child's father, the court entered an order on May 12, 1972, adjudging appellee the father and ordering him to pay $109 per month as support for the child until she reached 18 years of age. From May 1972 until August 1974, appellee was unemployed and indigent, and consequently was unable to make any support payments. On September 27, 1974, appellee filed an application for a marriage license with appellant Zablocki, the County Clerk of Milwaukee County, and a few days later the application was denied on the sole ground that appellee had not obtained a court order granting him permission to marry, as required by § 245.10. Although appellee did not petition a state court thereafter, it is stipulated that he would not have been able to satisfy either of the statutory prerequisites for an order granting permission to marry. First, he had not satisfied his support obligations to his illegitimate child, and as of December 1974 there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700. Second, the child had been a public charge since her birth, receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. It is stipulated that the child's benefit payments were such that she would have been a public charge even if appellee had been current in his support payments. On December 24, 1974, appellee filed his complaint in the District Court, on behalf of himself and the class of all Wisconsin residents who had been refused a marriage license pursuant to § 245.10 (1) by one of the county clerks in Wisconsin. Zablocki was named as the defendant, individually and as representative of a class consisting of all county clerks in the State. The complaint alleged, among other things, that appellee and the woman he desired to marry were expecting a child in March 1975 and wished to be lawfully married before that time. The statute was attacked on the grounds that it deprived appellee, and the class he sought to represent, of equal protection and due process rights secured by the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. Appellee moved for certification of the plaintiff and defendant classes named in his complaint, and by order dated February 20, 1975, the plaintiff class was certified under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(2). After the parties filed the stipulation of facts, and briefs on the merits, oral argument was heard in the District Court on June 23, 1975, with a representative from the Wisconsin Attorney General’s office participating in addition to counsel for the parties. The three-judge court handed down a unanimous decision on August 31, 1976. The court ruled, first, that it was not required to abstain from decision under the principles set forth in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), since there was no pending state-court proceeding that could be frustrated by the declaratory and injunctive relief requested: Second, the court held that the class of all county clerks in Wisconsin was a proper defendant class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(2), and that neither Rule 23 nor due process required prejudgment notice to the members of the plaintiff or the defendant class. On the merits, the three-judge panel analyzed the challenged statute under the Equal Protection Clause and concluded that “strict scrutiny” was required because the classification created by the statute infringed upon a fundamental right, the right to marry. The court then proceeded to evaluate the interests advanced by the State to justify the statute, and, finding that the classification was not necessary for the achievement of those interests, the court held the statute invalid and enjoined the county clerks from enforcing it. Appellant brought this direct appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253, claiming that the three-judge court erred in finding §§ 245.10 (1), (4), (5) invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. Appellee defends the lower court’s equal protection holding and, in the alternative, urges affirmance of the District Court’s judgment on the ground that the statute does not satisfy the requirements of substantive due process. We agree with the District Court that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. II In evaluating §§ 245.10 (1), (4), (5) under the Equal Protection Clause, “we must first determine what burden of justification the classification created thereby must meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and the individual interests affected.” Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 253 (1974). Since our past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that “critical examination” of the state interests advanced in support of the classification is required. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); see, e. g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 17 (1973). The leading decision of this Court on the right to marry is Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967). In that case, an interracial couple who had been convicted of violating Virginia’s miscegenation laws challenged the statutory scheme on both equal protection and due process grounds. The Court’s opinion could have rested solely on the ground that the statutes discriminated on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause'. Id., at 11-12. But the Court went on to hold that the laws arbitrarily deprived the couple of a fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry. The Court’s language on the latter point bears repeating: “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. “Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” Id., at 12, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942). Although Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals. Long ago, in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888), the Court characterized marriage as “the most important relation in life,” id., at 205, and as “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress,” id., at 211. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), the Court recognized that the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, id., at 399, and in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, supra, marriage was described as “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,” 316 U. S., at 541. More recent decisions have established that the right to marry is part of the fundamental “right of privacy” implicit in. the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), the Court observed: “We deal with a right’ of privacy older than the Bill of Rights — older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.” Id., at 486. See also id., at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id., at 502-503 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Cases subsequent to Griswold and Loving have routinely categorized the decision to marry as among the personal decisions protected by the right of privacy. See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 598-600, and nn. 23-26 (1977). For example, last Term in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), we declared: “While the outer limits of [the right of personal privacy] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions 'relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 536, 541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S., at 453-454; id., at 460, 463-465 (White, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, [262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923)].’ ” Id., at 684-685, quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 152-153 (1973). See also Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 499 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 713 (1976). It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. As the facts of this case illustrate, it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society. The woman whom appellee desired to marry had a fundamental right to seek an abortion of their expected child, see Roe v. Wade, supra, or to bring the child into life to suffer the myriad social, if not economic, disabilities that the status of illegitimacy brings, see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 768-770, and n. 13 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175-176 (1972). Surely, a decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional family setting must receive equivalent protection. And, if appellee’s right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place. By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed. See Califano v. Jobst, ante, p. 47; n. 12, infra. The statutory classification at issue here, however, clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry. Under the challenged statute, no Wisconsin resident in the affected class may marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere without a court order, and marriages contracted in violation of the statute are both void and punishable as criminal offenses. Some of those in the affected class, like appellee, will never be able to obtain the necessary court order, because they either lack the financial means to meet their support obligations or cannot prove that their children will not become public-charges. These persons are absolutely prevented from getting married. Many others, able in theory to satisfy the statute’s requirements, will be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that they will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry. And even those who can be persuaded to meet the statute’s requirements suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be fundamental. Ill When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. See, e. g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S., at 686; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S., at 262-263; San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 16-17; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 144 (1972). Appellant asserts that two interests are served by the challenged statute: the permission-to-marry proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the necessity of fulfilling his prior support obligations; and the welfare of the out-of-custody children is protected. We may accept for present purposes that these are legitimate and substantial interests, but, since the means selected by the State for achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry, the statute cannot be sustained. There is evidence that the challenged statute, as originally introduced in the Wisconsin Legislature, was intended merely to establish a mechanism whereby persons with support obligations to children from prior marriages could be counseled before they entered into new marital relationships and incurred further support obligations. Court permission to marry was to be required, but apparently permission was automatically to be granted after counseling was completed. The statute actually enacted, however, does not expressly require or provide for any counseling whatsoever, nor for any automatic granting of permission to marry by the court, and thus it can hardly be justified as a means for ensuring counseling of the persons within its coverage. Even assuming that counseling-does take place — a fact as to which there is no evidence in the record — this interest obviously cannot support the withholding of court permission to marry once counseling is completed. With regard to safeguarding the welfare of the out-of-custody children, appellant’s brief does not make clear the connection between the State’s interest and the statute’s requirements. At .argument, appellant’s counsel suggested that, since permission to marry cannot be granted unless the applicant shows that he has satisfied his court-determined support obligations to the prior children and that those children will not become public charges, the statute provides incentive for the applicant to make support payments to his children. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-20. This “collection device” rationale cannot justify the statute’s broad infringement on the right to marry. First, with respect to individuals who are unable to meet the .statutory requirements, the statute merely prevents the applicant from getting married, without delivering any money at all into the hands of the applicant’s prior children. More importantly, regardless of the applicant’s ability or willingness to meet the statutory requirements, the State already has numerous other means for exacting compliance with support obligations, means that are at least as effective as the instant statute’s and yet do not impinge upon the right to marry. Under Wisconsin law, whether the children are from a prior marriage or were born out of wedlock, court-determined support obligations may be enforced directly via wage assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties. And, if the State believes that parents of children out of their custody should be responsible for ensuring that those children do not become public charges, this interest can be achieved by adjusting the criteria used for determining the amounts to be paid under their support orders. There is also some suggestion that § 245.10 protects the ability of marriage applicants to meet support obligations to prior children by preventing the applicants from incurring new support obligations. But the challenged provisions of § 245.10 are grossly underinclusive with respect to this purpose, since they do not limit in any way new financial commitments by the applicant other than those arising out of the contemplated marriage. The statutory classification is substantially over-inclusive as well: Given the possibility that the new .spouse will actually better the applicant’s financial situation, by contributing income from a job or otherwise, the statute in. many cases may prevent affected individuals from improving their ability to satisfy their prior support obligations. And, although it is true that the applicant will incur support obligations to any children born during the contemplated marriage, preventing the marriage may only result in the children being born out of wedlock, as in fact occurred in appellee’s case. Since the support obligation is the same whether the child is born in or out of wedlock, the net result of preventing the marriage is simply more illegitimate children. The statutory classification created by §§245.10(1), (4), (5) thus cannot be justified by the interests advanced in support of it. The judgment of the District Court is, accordingly, Affirmed. Wisconsin Stat. § 245.10 provides in pertinent part: “(1) No Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment, may marry in this state or elsewhere, without the order of either the court of this state which granted such judgment or support order, or the court having divorce jurisdiction in the county of this state where such minor issue resides or where the marriage license application is made. No marriage license shall be issued to any such person except upon court order. The court, within 5 days after such permission is sought by verified petition in a special proceeding, shall direct a court hearing to be held in the matter to allow said person to submit proof of his compliance with such prior court obligation. No such order shall be granted, or hearing held, unless both parties to the intended marriage appear, and unless the person, agency, institution, welfare department or other entity having the legal or actual custody of such minor issue is given notice of such proceeding by personal service of a copy of the petition at least 5 days prior to the hearing, except that such appearance or notice may be waived by the court upon good cause shown, and, if the minor issue were of a prior marriage, unless a 5-day notice thereof is given to the family court com-' missioner of the county where such permission is sought, who shall attend such hearing, and to the family court commissioner of the court which granted such divorce judgment. If the divorce judgment was granted in a foreign court, service shall be made on the clerk of that court. Upon the hearing, if said person submits such proof and makes a showing that such children are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges, the court shall grant such order, a copy of which shall be filed in any prior proceeding ... or divorce action of such person in this state affected thereby; otherwise permission for a license shall be withheld until such proof is submitted and such showing is made, but any court order withholding such permission is an appealable order. Any hearing under this section may be waived by the court if the court is satisfied from an examination of the court records in the case and the family support records in the office of the clerk of court as well as from disclosure by said person of his financial resources that the latter has complied with prior court orders or judgments affecting his minor children, and also has shown that such children are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges. No county clerk in this state shall issue such license to any person required to comply with this section unless a certified copy of a court order permitting such marriage is filed with said county clerk. “ (4) If a Wisconsin resident having such support obligations of a minor, as stated in sub. (1), wishes to marry in another state, he must, prior to such marriage, obtain permission of the court under sub. (1), except that in a hearing ordered or held by the court, the other party to the proposed marriage, if domiciled in another state, need not be present at the hearing. If such other party is not present at the hearing, the judge shall within 5 days send a copy of the order of permission to marry, stating the obligations of support, to such party not present. “(5) This section shall have extraterritorial effect outside the state; and s. 245.04 (1) and (2) [providing that out-of-state marriages to circumvent Wisconsin law are void] are applicable hereto. Any marriage contracted without compliance with this section, where such compliance is required, shall be void, whether entered into in this state or elsewhere.” The criminal penalties for violation of § 245.10 are set forth in Wis. Stat. §245.30 (1) (f) (1973). See State v. Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d 387, 171 N. W. 2d 414 (1969) (upholding criminal prosecution for failure to comply with §245.10). The record does not indicate whether appellee obtained employment subsequent to August 1974. Under Wisconsin law, “[m]arriage may be validly solemnized and contracted [within the] state only after a license has been issued therefor,” Wis. Stat. § 245.16 (1973), and (with an exception not relevant here) the license must be obtained from “the county clerk of the county in which one of the parties has resided for at least 30 days immediately prior to making application therefor,” § 245.05. The order defined the plaintiff class as follows: “All Wisconsin residents who have minor issue not in their custody and who are under an obligation to support such minor issue by any court order or judgment and to whom the county clerk has refused to issue a marriage license without a court order, pursuant to §245.10 (1), Wis. Stats. (1971).” The order also established a briefing schedule on appellee’s motion for certification of a defendant class. Although appellee thereafter filed a brief in support of the motion, appellant never submitted a brief in opposition. 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1064-1065. The possibility that abstention might be required under our decision in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., was raised by the District Court, sua sponte, at argument before that court. Appellee subsequently filed a memorandum contending that abstention was not required; appellant did not submit a response. Appellant now argues, on this appeal/ that the District Court failed to consider the “doctrine of federalism” set forth in Younger and Huffman. According to appellant, proper consideration of this doctrine would have led the District Court to require appellee to bring suit first in the state courts, in order to give those courts the initial opportunity to pass on his constitutional attack against § 245.10. We cannot agree. First, the District Court was correct in finding Huffman and Younger inapplicable, since there was no pending state-court proceeding in which appellee could have challenged the statute. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 710-711 (1977). Second, there are no ambiguities in the statute for the state courts to resolve, and — absent issues of state law that might affect the posture of the federal constitutional claims — this Court has uniformly held that individuals seeking relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 need not present their federal constitutional claims in state court before coming to a federal forum. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437-439 (1971); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 245-252 (1967). See also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S., at 609-610, n. 21. Appellant also contends on this appeal, for the first time, that the District Court should have abstained out of “regard for the independence of state governments in carrying out their domestic policy.” Brief for Appellant 16, citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 317-318 (1943). Unlike Burford, however, this case does not involve complex issues of state law, resolution of which would be “disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 814-815 (1976). And there is, of course, no doctrine requiring abstention merely because resolution of a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy. 418 F. Supp., at 1065-1068. Appellant has not appealed the District Court’s finding that the defendant class satisfied the requirements of Rules 23 (a) and (b)(2), the court’s definition of the class to include all county clerks in Wisconsin, or the requirement that appellant send a copy of the judgment to each of the county clerks, and those issues are therefore not before us. Appellant does claim on this appeal that due process required prejudgment notice to the members of the defendant class if the judgment was to be binding on them. As this issue has been framed, however, we cannot perceive appellant’s “personal stake in the outcome,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), and we therefore hold that appellant lacks standing to raise the claim. Appellant would be bound, regardless of what we concluded as to the judgment’s binding effect on absent members of the defendant class, and appellant has not asserted that he was injured in any way by the maintenance of this suit as a defendant class action. Indeed, appellant never filed a brief in the District Court in opposition to the defendant class, despite being invited to do so, see n. 4, supra, and the notice issue was briefed for the first time on this appeal, after the Wisconsin Attorney General took over as lead counsel for appellant. In these circumstances, the absent class members must be content to assert their due process rights for themselves, through collateral attack or otherwise. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 (1940); Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 7768, citing Restatement of Judgments §86, Comment (h), § 116 (1942). We note, in any event, that in light of our disposition of this case and the recent revision of Wisconsin’s Family Code, see n. 9, infra, the question of binding effect on the absent members may be wholly academic. 418 F. Supp., at 1068-1071. The court found an additional justification for applying strict scrutiny in the fact that the statute discriminates on the basis of wealth, absolutely denying individuals the opportunity to marry if they lack sufficient financial resources to make the showing required by the statute. Id., at 1070, citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 20 (1973). 418 F. Supp., at 1071-1073. Counsel for appellee informed us at oral argument that appellee was married in Illinois some time after argument on the merits in the District Court, but prior to judgment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23, 30-31. This development in no way moots the issues before us. First, appellee’s individual claim is unaffected, since he is still a Wisconsin resident and the Illinois marriage is consequently void under the provisions of §§245.10 (1), (4), (5). See State v. Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d 387, 171 N. W. 2d 414 (1969) (§245.10 has extraterritorial effect with respect to Wisconsin residents). Second, regardless of the current status of appellee’s individual claim, the dispute over the statute’s constitutionality remains live with respect to members of the class appellee represents, and the Illinois marriage took place well after the class was certified. See Franks v. Bowman Transp, Co., 424 U. S. 747, 752-757 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 397-403 (1975). After argument in this Court, the Acting Governor of Wisconsin signed into law a comprehensive revision of the State’s marriage laws, effective February 1, 1978. 1977 Wis. Laws, ch. 105, Wis. Legis. Serv. (West 1977). The revision added a new section (§ 245.105) which appears to be a somewhat narrower version of § 245.10. Enactment of this new provision also does not moot our inquiry into the constitutionality of § 245.10. By its terms, the new section “shall be enforced only when the provisions of § 245.10 and utilization of the procedures thereunder are stayed or enjoined by the order of any court.” § 245.105 (8). As we read this somewhat unusual proviso, and as it was explained to us at argument by the representative of the Wisconsin Attorney General, Tr. of Oral Arg. 4^10, the new section is meant only to serve as a stopgap during such time as enforcement of § 245.10 is barred by court order. Were we to vacate the District Court’s injunction on this appeal, § 245.10 would go back into full force and effect; accordingly, the dispute over its validity is quite live. We express no judgment on the constitutionality of the new section. Further support for the fundamental importance of marriage is found in our decisions dealing with rights of access to courts in civil cases. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), we wrote that “marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society,” id., at 376, and held that filing fees for divorce actions violated the due process rights of indigents unable to pay the fees. Two years later, in United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973), the Court concluded that filing fees in bankruptcy actions did not deprive indigents of due process or equal protection. Boddie was distinguished on several grounds, including the following: “The denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie touched directly . . . on the marital relationship and on the associational interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of that relationship. On many occasions we have recognized the fundamental importance of these interests under our Constitution. See, for example, Loving v. Virginia . . . 409 U. S., at 444. See also id., at 446 (“Bankruptcy is hardly akin to free speech or marriage ...[,] rights ! . . that the Court has come to regard as fundamental”). Wisconsin punishes fornication as a criminal offense: “Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person not his spouse may be fined not more than $200 or imprisoned not more than 6 months or both.” Wis. Stat. §944.15 (1973). The directness and substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry distinguish the instant case from Califano v. Jobst, ante, p. 47. In Jobst, we upheld sections of the Social Security Act providing, inter alia, for termination of a dependent child's benefits upon marriage to an individual not entitled to benefits under the Act. As the opinion for the Court expressly noted, the rule terminating benefits upon marriage was not “an attempt to interfere with the individual’s freedom to make a decision as important as marriage.” Ante, at 54. The Social Security provisions placed no direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married, and — notwithstanding our Brother Rehnquist’s imaginative recasting of the case, see dissenting opinion, post, at 408 — there was no .evidence that the laws significantly discouraged, let alone made “practically impossible,” any marriages. Indeed, the provisions had not deterred the individual who challenged the statute from getting married, even though, he and his wife were both disabled. See Califano v. Jobst, ante, at 48. See also ante, at 57 n.. 17 (because of availability of other federal benefits, total .payments to the Jobsts after marriage were only $20 per month less than they would have been had Mr. Jobst’s child benefits not been terminated). See Wisconsin Legislative Council Notes, 1959, reprinted following Wis. Stat. Ann. § 245.10 (Supp. 1977-1978); 5 Wisconsin Legislative Council, General Report 68 (1959). See ibid. Although the statute as originally enacted in 1959 did not provide for automatic granting of permission, it did allow the court to grant permission if it found “good cause” for doing so, even in the absence of a showing that support obligations were being met. 1959 Wis. Laws,, ch. 595, § 17. In 1961, the good-cause provision was deleted, and the requirement of a showing that the out-of-custody children are not and will not become public charges was added. 1961 Wis. Laws, ch. 505, § 11. Wisconsin statutory provisions for civil enforcement of support obligations to' children from a prior marriage include §§ 247.232 (wage assignment), 247.265 (same), and 295.03 (civil contempt). Support obligations arising out of paternity actions may be civilly enforced under §§ 52.21 (2) (wage assignment) and 52.40 (civil contempt). See also §52.39. In addition, failure to meet support obligations may result in conviction of the felony offense of abandonment of a minor child, § 52.05, or the misdemeanor of failure to support a minor child, § 52.055.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Bassam Yacoub SALMAN, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES. No. 15-628. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Oct. 5, 2016. Decided Dec. 6, 2016. Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, New York, NY, for petitioner. Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, DC, for the respondent. Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Daniel J. O'Neill, Shapiro Arato LLP, New York, NY, John D. Cline, Law Office of John D. Cline, San Francisco, CA, for petitioner. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Ross C. Goldman, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the United States in Opposition. Anne K. Small, General Counsel, Sanket J. Bulsara, Deputy General Counsel, Michael A. Conley, Solicitor, Jacob H. Stillman, Senior Advisor to the Solicitor, David D. Lisitza, Senior Litigation Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Elaine J. Goldenberg, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Ross B. Goldman, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the Respondent. Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5 prohibit undisclosed trading on inside corporate information by individuals who are under a duty of trust and confidence that prohibits them from secretly using such information for their personal advantage. 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (prohibiting the use, "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) (forbidding the use, "in connection with the sale or purchase of any security," of "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud," or any "act, practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit"); see United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650-652, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 (1997). Individuals under this duty may face criminal and civil liability for trading on inside information (unless they make appropriate disclosures ahead of time). These persons also may not tip inside information to others for trading. The tippee acquires the tipper's duty to disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows the information was disclosed in breach of the tipper's duty, and the tippee may commit securities fraud by trading in disregard of that knowledge. In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983), this Court explained that a tippee's liability for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information. A tipper breaches such a fiduciary duty, we held, when the tipper discloses the inside information for a personal benefit. And, we went on to say, a jury can infer a personal benefit-and thus a breach of the tipper's duty-where the tipper receives something of value in exchange for the tip or "makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend." Id., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255. Petitioner Bassam Salman challenges his convictions for conspiracy and insider trading. Salman received lucrative trading tips from an extended family member, who had received the information from Salman's brother-in-law. Salman then traded on the information. He argues that he cannot be held liable as a tippee because the tipper (his brother-in-law) did not personally receive money or property in exchange for the tips and thus did not personally benefit from them. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Dirks allowed the jury to infer that the tipper here breached a duty because he made a " 'gift of confidential information to a trading relative.' " 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (C.A.9 2015) (quoting Dirks, supra, at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 ). Because the Court of Appeals properly applied Dirks, we affirm the judgment below. I Maher Kara was an investment banker in Citigroup's healthcare investment banking group. He dealt with highly confidential information about mergers and acquisitions involving Citigroup's clients. Maher enjoyed a close relationship with his older brother, Mounir Kara (known as Michael). After Maher started at Citigroup, he began discussing aspects of his job with Michael. At first he relied on Michael's chemistry background to help him grasp scientific concepts relevant to his new job. Then, while their father was battling cancer, the brothers discussed companies that dealt with innovative cancer treatment and pain management techniques. Michael began to trade on the information Maher shared with him. At first, Maher was unaware of his brother's trading activity, but eventually he began to suspect that it was taking place. Ultimately, Maher began to assist Michael's trading by sharing inside information with his brother about pending mergers and acquisitions. Maher sometimes used code words to communicate corporate information to his brother. Other times, he shared inside information about deals he was not working on in order to avoid detection. See, e.g., App. 118, 124-125. Without his younger brother's knowledge, Michael fed the information to others-including Salman, Michael's friend and Maher's brother-in-law. By the time the authorities caught on, Salman had made over $1.5 million in profits that he split with another relative who executed trades via a brokerage account on Salman's behalf. Salman was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 371, and four counts of securities fraud, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff ; 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Facing charges of their own, both Maher and Michael pleaded guilty and testified at Salman's trial. The evidence at trial established that Maher and Michael enjoyed a "very close relationship." App. 215. Maher "love[d] [his] brother very much," Michael was like "a second father to Maher," and Michael was the best man at Maher's wedding to Salman's sister. Id ., at 158, 195, 104-107. Maher testified that he shared inside information with his brother to benefit him and with the expectation that his brother would trade on it. While Maher explained that he disclosed the information in large part to appease Michael (who pestered him incessantly for it), he also testified that he tipped his brother to "help him" and to "fulfil[l] whatever needs he had." Id ., at 118, 82. For instance, Michael once called Maher and told him that "he needed a favor." Id., at 124. Maher offered his brother money but Michael asked for information instead. Maher then disclosed an upcoming acquisition. Ibid. Although he instantly regretted the tip and called his brother back to implore him not to trade, Maher expected his brother to do so anyway. Id., at 125. For his part, Michael told the jury that his brother's tips gave him "timely information that the average person does not have access to" and "access to stocks, options, and what have you, that I can capitalize on, that the average person would never have or dream of." Id., at 251. Michael testified that he became friends with Salman when Maher was courting Salman's sister and later began sharing Maher's tips with Salman. As he explained at trial, "any time a major deal came in, [Salman] was the first on my phone list." Id ., at 258. Michael also testified that he told Salman that the information was coming from Maher. See, e.g., id ., at 286 (" 'Maher is the source of all this information' "). After a jury trial in the Northern District of California, Salman was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and over $730,000 in restitution. After his motion for a new trial was denied, Salman appealed to the Ninth Circuit. While his appeal was pending, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2014), cert. denied, 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 242, 193 L.Ed.2d 133 (2015). There, the Second Circuit reversed the convictions of two portfolio managers who traded on inside information. The Newman defendants were "several steps removed from the corporate insiders" and the court found that "there was no evidence that either was aware of the source of the inside information." 773 F.3d, at 443. The court acknowledged that Dirks and Second Circuit case law allow a factfinder to infer a personal benefit to the tipper from a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. 773 F.3d, at 452. But the court concluded that, "[t]o the extent" Dirks permits "such an inference," the inference "is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature." 773 F.3d, at 452. Pointing to Newman, Salman argued that his conviction should be reversed. While the evidence established that Maher made a gift of trading information to Michael and that Salman knew it, there was no evidence that Maher received anything of "a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature" in exchange-or that Salman knew of any such benefit. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed Salman's conviction. 792 F.3d 1087. The court reasoned that the case was governed by Dirks 's holding that a tipper benefits personally by making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. Indeed, Maher's disclosures to Michael were "precisely the gift of confidential information to a trading relative that Dirks envisioned." 792 F.3d, at 1092 (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent Newman went further and required additional gain to the tipper in cases involving gifts of confidential information to family and friends, the Ninth Circuit "decline [d] to follow it." 792 F.3d, at 1093. We granted certiorari to resolve the tension between the Second Circuit's Newman decision and the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case. 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 899, 193 L.Ed.2d 788 (2016). II A In this case, Salman contends that an insider's "gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend," Dirks, 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 is not enough to establish securities fraud. Instead, Salman argues, a tipper does not personally benefit unless the tipper's goal in disclosing inside information is to obtain money, property, or something of tangible value. He claims that our insider-trading precedents, and the cases those precedents cite, involve situations in which the insider exploited confidential information for the insider's own "tangible monetary profit." Brief for Petitioner 31. He suggests that his position is reinforced by our criminal-fraud precedents outside of the insider-trading context, because those cases confirm that a fraudster must personally obtain money or property. Id ., at 33-34. More broadly, Salman urges that defining a gift as a personal benefit renders the insider-trading offense indeterminate and overbroad: indeterminate, because liability may turn on facts such as the closeness of the relationship between tipper and tippee and the tipper's purpose for disclosure; and overbroad, because the Government may avoid having to prove a concrete personal benefit by simply arguing that the tipper meant to give a gift to the tippee. He also argues that we should interpret Dirks 's standard narrowly so as to avoid constitutional concerns. Brief for Petitioner 36-37. Finally, Salman contends that gift situations create especially troubling problems for remote tippees-that is, tippees who receive inside information from another tippee, rather than the tipper-who may have no knowledge of the relationship between the original tipper and tippee and thus may not know why the tipper made the disclosure. Id ., at 43, 48, 50. The Government disagrees and argues that a gift of confidential information to anyone, not just a "trading relative or friend," is enough to prove securities fraud. See Brief for United States 27 ("Dirks 's personal-benefit test encompasses a gift to any person with the expectation that the information will be used for trading, not just to 'a trading relative or friend' " (quoting 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 ; emphasis in original)). Under the Government's view, a tipper personally benefits whenever the tipper discloses confidential trading information for a noncorporate purpose. Accordingly, a gift to a friend, a family member, or anyone else would support the inference that the tipper exploited the trading value of inside information for personal purposes and thus personally benefited from the disclosure. The Government claims to find support for this reading in Dirks and the precedents on which Dirks relied. See, e.g., id., at 654, 103 S.Ct. 3255 ("fraud" in an insider-trading case "derives 'from the inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage' of 'information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone' " (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968) )). The Government also argues that Salman's concerns about unlimited and indeterminate liability for remote tippees are significantly alleviated by other statutory elements that prosecutors must satisfy to convict a tippee for insider trading. The Government observes that, in order to establish a defendant's criminal liability as a tippee, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tipper expected that the information being disclosed would be used in securities trading. Brief for United States 23-24; Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Government also notes that, to establish a defendant's criminal liability as a tippee, it must prove that the tippee knew that the tipper breached a duty-in other words, that the tippee knew that the tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit and that the tipper expected trading to ensue. Brief for United States 43; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-37, 39. B We adhere to Dirks, which easily resolves the narrow issue presented here. In Dirks, we explained that a tippee is exposed to liability for trading on inside information only if the tippee participates in a breach of the tipper's fiduciary duty. Whether the tipper breached that duty depends "in large part on the purpose of the disclosure" to the tippee. 463 U.S., at 662, 103 S.Ct. 3255. "[T]he test," we explained, "is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Ibid. Thus, the disclosure of confidential information without personal benefit is not enough. In determining whether a tipper derived a personal benefit, we instructed courts to "focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings." Id., at 663, 103 S.Ct. 3255. This personal benefit can "often" be inferred "from objective facts and circumstances," we explained, such as "a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient." Id., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255. In particular, we held that "[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend ." Ibid. (emphasis added). In such cases, "[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient." Ibid. We then applied this gift-giving principle to resolve Dirks itself, finding it dispositive that the tippers "received no monetary or personal benefit" from their tips to Dirks, "nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks ." Id., at 667, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (emphasis added). Our discussion of gift giving resolves this case. Maher, the tipper, provided inside information to a close relative, his brother Michael. Dirks makes clear that a tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential information to "a trading relative," and that rule is sufficient to resolve the case at hand. As Salman's counsel acknowledged at oral argument, Maher would have breached his duty had he personally traded on the information here himself then given the proceeds as a gift to his brother. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3-4. It is obvious that Maher would personally benefit in that situation. But Maher effectively achieved the same result by disclosing the information to Michael, and allowing him to trade on it. Dirks appropriately prohibits that approach, as well. Cf. 463 U.S., at 659, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (holding that "insiders [are] forbidden" both "from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage" and from "giv[ing] such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain"). Dirks specifies that when a tipper gives inside information to "a trading relative or friend," the jury can infer that the tipper meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift. In such situations, the tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information is the same thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds. Here, by disclosing confidential information as a gift to his brother with the expectation that he would trade on it, Maher breached his duty of trust and confidence to Citigroup and its clients-a duty Salman acquired, and breached himself, by trading on the information with full knowledge that it had been improperly disclosed. To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a "pecuniary or similarly valuable nature" in exchange for a gift to family or friends, Newman, 773 F.3d, at 452, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks . C Salman points out that many insider-trading cases-including several that Dirks cited-involved insiders who personally profited through the misuse of trading information. But this observation does not undermine the test Dirks articulated and applied. Salman also cites a sampling of our criminal-fraud decisions construing other federal fraud statutes, suggesting that they stand for the proposition that fraud is not consummated unless the defendant obtains money or property. Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2720, 186 L.Ed.2d 794 (2013) (Hobbs Act); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (honest-services mail and wire fraud); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 121 S.Ct. 365, 148 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000) (wire fraud); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987) (mail fraud). Assuming that these cases are relevant to our construction of § 10(b) (a proposition the Government forcefully disputes), nothing in them undermines the commonsense point we made in Dirks. Making a gift of inside information to a relative like Michael is little different from trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out to the trading relative. The tipper benefits either way. The facts of this case illustrate the point: In one of their tipper-tippee interactions, Michael asked Maher for a favor, declined Maher's offer of money, and instead requested and received lucrative trading information. We reject Salman's argument that Dirks 's gift-giving standard is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case. Dirks created a simple and clear "guiding principle" for determining tippee liability, 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 and Salman has not demonstrated that either § 10(b) itself or the Dirks gift-giving standard "leav[e] grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime" or are plagued by "hopeless indeterminacy," Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ----, ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2557, 2558, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). At most, Salman shows that in some factual circumstances assessing liability for gift-giving will be difficult. That alone cannot render "shapeless" a federal criminal prohibition, for even clear rules "produce close cases." Id., at ----, ----, 135 S.Ct., at 2560. We also reject Salman's appeal to the rule of lenity, as he has shown "no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty that would trigger the rule's application." Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 492, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 177 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, Salman's conduct is in the heartland of Dirks 's rule concerning gifts. It remains the case that "[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts." 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255. But there is no need for us to address those difficult cases today, because this case involves "precisely the 'gift of confidential information to a trading relative' that Dirks envisioned." 792 F.3d, at 1092 (quoting 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 ). III Salman's jury was properly instructed that a personal benefit includes "the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative." App. 398-399. As the Court of Appeals noted, "the Government presented direct evidence that the disclosure was intended as a gift of market-sensitive information." 792 F.3d, at 1094. And, as Salman conceded below, this evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction under our reading of Dirks . Appellant's Supplemental Brief in No. 14-10204(CA9), p. 6 ("Maher made a gift of confidential information to a trading relative [Michael] ... and, if [Michael's] testimony is accepted as true (as it must be for purposes of sufficiency review), Salman knew that Maher had made such a gift" (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit's judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. The Second Circuit also reversed the Newman defendants' convictions because the Government introduced no evidence that the defendants knew the information they traded on came from insiders or that the insiders received a personal benefit in exchange for the tips. 773 F.3d, at 453-454. This case does not implicate those issues. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983), established the personal-benefit framework in a case brought under the classical theory of insider-trading liability, which applies "when a corporate insider" or his tippee "trades in the securities of [the tipper's] corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information." United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-652, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 (1997). In such a case, the defendant breaches a duty to, and takes advantage of, the shareholders of his corporation. By contrast, the misappropriation theory holds that a person commits securities fraud "when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information" such as an employer or client. Id., at 652, 117 S.Ct. 2199. In such a case, the defendant breaches a duty to, and defrauds, the source of the information, as opposed to the shareholders of his corporation. The Court of Appeals observed that this is a misappropriation case, 792 F.3d, 1087, 1092, n. 4 (C.A.9 2015), while the Government represents that both theories apply on the facts of this case, Brief for United States 15, n. 1. We need not resolve the question. The parties do not dispute that Dirks 's personal-benefit analysis applies in both classical and misappropriation cases, so we will proceed on the assumption that it does.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY CO. et al. v. AMERICAN TRAIN DISPATCHERS’ ASSOCIATION et al. No. 89-1027. Argued December 3, 1990 Decided March 19, 1991 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 134. Jeffrey S. Berlin argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners in No. 89-1027 were Mark E. Martin and William P. Stallsmith, Jr. James S. Whitehead, Nicholas S. Yovanovic, and James D. Tomola filed briefs for petitioner in No. 89-1028. Jeffrey S. Minear argued the cause for the federal respondents in support of petitioners in both cases pursuant to this Court’s Rule 12.4. On the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Roberts, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, Lawrence S. Robbins, RobeH S. Burk, Henri F. Rush, and John J. McCarthy, Jr. William G. Mahoney argued the cause for the union respondents in both cases. With him on the brief was John O’B. Clarke, Jr. Together with No. 89-1028, CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Richard T. Comvay, Ralph J. Moore, Jr., D. Eugenia Langan, and David P. Lee filed a brief for the National Railway Labor Conference as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The Interstate Commerce Commission has the authority to approve rail carrier consolidations under certain conditions. 49 U. S. C. § 11301 et seq. A carrier in an approved consolidation “is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other law, including State and municipal law, as necessary to let [it] carry out the transaction . . . § 11341(a). These cases require us to decide whether the carrier’s exemption under § 11341(a) “from all other law” extends to its legal obligations under a collective-bargaining agreement. We hold that it does. I A “Prior to 1920, competition was the desideratum of our railroad economy.” St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 347 U. S. 298, 315 (1954). Following a period of Government ownership during World War I, however,“many of the railroads were in very weak condition and their continued survival was in jeopardy.” Ibid. At that time, the Nation made a commitment to railroad carrier consolidation as a means of promoting the health and efficiency of the railroad industry. Beginning with the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, “consolidation of the railroads of the country, in the interest of economy and efficiency, became an established national policy ... so intimately related to the maintenance of an adequate and efficient rail transportation system that the ‘public interest’ in the one cannot be dissociated from that in the other.” United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225, 232 (1939). See generally St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, at 315-321. Chapter 113 of the Interstate Commerce Act, recodified in 1978 at 49 U. S. C. § 11301 et seq., contains the current statement of this national policy. The Act grants the Interstate Commerce Commission exclusive authority to examine, condition, and approve proposed mergers and consolidations of transportation carriers within its jurisdiction. § 11343(a)(1). The Act requires the Commission to “approve and authorize” the transactions when they are “consistent with the public interest.” § 11344(c). Among the factors the Commission must consider in making its public interest determination are “the interests of carrier employees affected by the proposed transaction.” § 11344(b)(1)(D). In authorizing a merger or consolidation, the Commission “may impose conditions governing the transaction.” § 11344(c). Once the Commission approves a transaction, a carrier is “exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other law, including State and municipal law, as necessary to let [it] carry out the transaction.” § 11341(a). When a proposed merger involves rail carriers, the Act requires the Commission to impose labor-protective conditions on the transaction to safeguard the interests of adversely affected railroad employees. § 11347. In New York Dock Railway—Control—Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 360 I. C. C. 60, 84-90, aff’d sub nom. New York Dock Railway v. United States, 609 F. 2d 83 (CA2 1979), the Commission announced a comprehensive set of conditions and procedures designed to meet its obligations under §11347. Section 2 of the New York Dock conditions provides that the “rates of pay, rules, working conditions and all collective bargaining and other rights, privileges and benefits . . . under applicable laws and/or existing collective bargaining agreements . . . shall be preserved unless changed by future collective bargaining agreements.” 360 I. C. C., at 84. Section 4 sets forth negotiation and arbitration procedures for resolution of labor disputes arising from an approved railroad merger. Id., at 85. Under §4, a merged or consolidated railroad which plans an operational change that may cause dismissal or displacement of any employee must provide the employee and his union 90 days’ written notice. Ibid. If the carrier and union cannot agree on terms and conditions within 30 days, each party may submit the dispute for an expedited “final, binding and conclusive” determination by a neutral arbitrator. Ibid. Finally, the New York Dock conditions provide affected employees with up to six years of income protection, as well as reimbursements for moving costs and losses from the sale of a home. See id., at 86-89 (§§5-9, 12). B The two cases before us today involve separate ICC orders exempting parties to approved railway mergers from the provisions of collective-bargaining agreements. 1. In No. 89-1027, the Commission approved an application by NWS Enterprises, Inc., to acquire control of two previously separate rail carriers, petitioners Norfolk and Western Railway Company (N&W) and Southern Railway Company (Southern). See Norfolk Southern Corp.—Control—Norfolk & W. R. Co. and Southern R. Co., 366 I. C. C. 173 (1982). In its order approving control, the Commission imposed the standard Neto York Dock labor-protective conditions and noted the possibility that “further displacement [of employees] may arise as additional coordinations occur.” 366 I. C. C., at 230-231. In September 1986, this possibility became a reality. The carriers notified the American Train Dispatchers’ Association, the bargaining representative for certain N&W employees, that they proposed to consolidate all “power distribution” — the assignment of locomotives to particular trains and facilities — for the N&W-Southern operation. To effect the efficiency move, the carriers informed the union that they would transfer work performed at the N&W power distribution center in Roanoke, Virginia, to the Southern center in Atlanta, Georgia. The carriers proposed an implementing agreement in which affected N&W employees would be made management supervisors in Atlanta, and would receive increases in wages and benefits in addition to the relocation expenses and wage protections guaranteed by the New York Dock conditions. The union contended that this proposal involved a change in the existing collective-bargaining agreement that was subject to mandatory bargaining under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The union also maintained that the carriers were required to preserve the affected employees’ collective-bargaining rights, as well as their right to union representation under the RLA. Pursuant to § 4 of the New York Dock procedures, the parties negotiated concerning the terms of the implementing agreement, but they failed to resolve their differences. As a result, the carriers invoked the New York Dock arbitration procedures. After a hearing, the arbitration committee ruled in the carriers’ favor. The committee noted that the transfer of work to Atlanta was an incident of the control transaction approved by the ICC, and that it formed part of the “additional coordinations” the ICC predicted would be necessary to achieve “greater efficiencies.” The committee also held it had the authority to abrogate the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement and of the RLA as necessary to implement the merger. Finally, it held that because the application of the N&W bargaining agreement would impede the transfer, the transferred employees did not retain their collective-bargaining rights. The union appealed to the Commission, which affirmed by a divided vote. It explained that “[i]t has long been the Commission’s view that private collective bargaining agreements and [Railway Labor Act] provisions must give way to the Commission-mandated procedures of section 4 [of the New York Dock conditions] when parties are unable to agree on changes in working conditions required to implement a transaction authorized by the Commission.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 89-1027, p. 33a. Accordingly, the Commission upheld the arbitration committee’s determination that the “compulsory, binding arbitration required by Article I, section 4 of New York Dock, took precedence over RLA procedures whether asserted independently or based on existing collective bargaining agreements.” Id., at 35a. The Commission also held that because the work transfer was incident to the approved merger, it was “immunized from conflicting laws by section 11341(a).” Ibid. Noting that “Composition of the collective bargaining agreement would jeopardize the transaction because the work rules it mandates are inconsistent with the carriers’ underlying purpose of integrating the power distribution function,” the Commission upheld the decision to override the collective-bargaining agreement and RLA provisions. Id., at 37a. 2. In No. 89-1028, the Commission approved an application by CSX Corporation to acquire control of the Chessie System, Inc., and Seaboard Coastline Industries, Inc. CSX Corp. —Control—Chessie System, Inc., and Seaboard Coastline Industries, Inc., 363 I. C. C. 521 (1980). Chessie was the parent of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company and the Baltimore and Ohio Railway Company; Seaboard was the parent of the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company. In approving the control acquisition, the Commission imposed the New York Dock conditions and recognized that “additional coordinations may occur that could lead to further employee displacements.” 363 I. C. C., at 589. In August 1986, the consolidated carrier notified respondent Brotherhood of Railway Carmen that it planned to close Seaboard’s heavy freight car repair shop at Waycross, Georgia, and transfer the Waycross employees to Chessie’s similar shop in Raceland, Kentucky. The carrier informed the Brotherhood that the proposed transfer would result in a net decrease of jobs at the two shops. Pursuant to New York Dock, the carrier and the union negotiated concerning the terms of an agreement to implement the transfer. The sticking point in the negotiations involved a 1966 collective-bargaining agreement between the union and Seaboard known as the “Orange Book.” The Orange Book provided that the carrier would employ each covered employee and maintain each employee’s work conditions and benefits for the remainder of the employee’s working life. The Brotherhood contended that the Orange Book prevented CSX from moving work or covered employees from Waycross to Raceland. When negotiations broke down, both the union and the carrier invoked the arbitration procedures under §4 of New York Dock. The arbitration committee ruled for the carrier. It agreed with the union that the Orange Book prohibited the proposed transfer of work and employees. It determined, however, that it could override any Orange Book or RLA provision that impeded an operational change authorized or required by the ICC’s decision approving the original merger. The committee then held that the carrier could transfer the heavy repair work, which it found necessary to the original control acquisition, but could not transfer employees protected by the Orange Book, which it found would only slightly impair the original control acquisition. Both parties appealed the award to the Commission. A divided Commission affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Commission agreed the committee possessed authority to override collective-bargaining rights and RLA rights that prevent implementation of a proposed transaction. It reasoned, however, that “[ijmposition of an Orange Book employee exception would effectively prevent implementation of the proposed transaction.” CSX Corp.—Control—Chessie System, Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line Industries, Inc., 4 I. C. C. 2d 641, 650 (1988). The Commission thus affirmed the arbitration committee’s order permitting the transfer of work but reversed the holding that the carriers could not transfer Orange Book employees. 3. The unions appealed both cases to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals considered the cases together and reversed and remanded to the Commission. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen v. ICC, 279 U. S. App. D. C. 239, 880 F. 2d 562 (1989). The court held that § 11341(a) does not authorize the Commission to relieve a party of collective-bargaining agreement obligations that impede implementation of an approved transaction. The court stated various grounds for its conclusion. First, because the court did not read the phrase “all other law” in § 11341(a) to include “all legal obstacles,” it found “no support in the language of the statute” to apply the statute to obligations imposed by collective-bargaining agreements. Id., at 244, 880 F. 2d, at 567. Second, the court analyzed the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, §407, 41 Stat. 482, which contained a predecessor to § 11341(a), and found that Congress “did not intend, when it enacted the immunity provision, to override contracts.” 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 247, 880 F. 2d, at 570. The court noted that Congress had “focused nearly exclusively ... on specific types of laws it intended to eliminate — all of which were positive enactments, not common law rules of liability, as on a contract.” Ibid. The court further noted that Congress had often revisited the immunity provision without making it clear that it included contracts or collective-bargaining agreements. Ibid. Finally, the court did not defer to the ICC’s interpretation of the Act, presumably because it determined that the Commission’s interpretation was belied by the contrary “ ‘unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,’” id., at 244, 880 F. 2d, at 567 (quoting Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984)). In ruling that § 11341(a) did not apply to collective-bargaining agreements, the court “decline[d] to address the question” whether the section could operate to override provisions of the RLA. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, supra, at 247-250, 880 F. 2d, at 570-573. It also declined to consider whether the labor-protective conditions required by § 11347 are exclusive, or whether §4 of the New York Dock conditions gives an arbitration committee the right to override provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement. 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 250, 880 F. 2d, at 573. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a determination on these issues. After the Court of Appeals denied the carriers’ petitions for rehearing, the carriers in the consolidated cases filed petitions for certiorari, which we granted on March 26, 1990. 494 U. S. 1055. We now reverse. HH Title 49 U. S. C. § 11341(a) provides: "... A carrier, corporation, or person participating in that approved or exempted transaction is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other law, including State and municipal law, as necessary to let that person carry out the transaction, hold, maintain, and operate property, and exercise control or franchises acquired through the transaction. ...” We address the narrow question whether the exemption in § 11341(a) from “all other law” includes a carrier’s legal obligations under a collective-bargaining agreement. By its terms, the exemption applies only when necessary to carry out an approved transaction. These predicates, however, are not at issue here, for the Court of Appeals did not pass on them and the parties do not challenge them. For purposes of this decision, we assume, without deciding, that the Commission properly considered the public interest factors of § 11344(b)(1) in approving the original transaction, that its decision to override the carriers’ obligations is consistent with the labor-protective requirements of § 11347, and that the override was necessary to the implementation of the transaction within the meaning of § 11341(a). Under these assumptions, we hold that the exemption from “all other law” in § 11341(a) includes the obligations imposed by the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. As always, we begin with the language of the statute and ask whether Congress has spoken on the subject before us. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842-843. The contested language in § 11341(a), exempting carriers from “the antitrust laws and all other law, including State and municipal law,” is clear, broad, and unqualified. It does not admit of the distinction the Court of Appeals drew, based on its analysis of legislative history, between positive enactments and common-law rules of liability. Nor does it support the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Congress did not intend the immunity clause to apply to contractual obligations. By itself, the phrase “all other law” indicates no limitation. The circumstance that the phrase “all other law” is in addition to coverage for “the antitrust laws” does not detract from this breadth. There is a canon of statutory construction which, on first impression, might seem to dictate a different result. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration. See Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U. S. 73, 84-85 (1990). The canon does not control, however, when the whole context dictates a different conclusion. Here, there are several reasons the immunity provision cannot be interpreted to apply only to antitrust laws and similar statutes. First, because “[rjepeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored,” United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350 (1963), Congress may have determined that it should make a clear and separate statement to include antitrust laws within the general exemption of § 11341(a). Second, the otherwise general term “all other law” “includes]” (but is not limited to) “State and municipal law.” This shows that “all other law” refers to more than laws related to antitrust. Also, the fact that “all other law” entails more than “the antitrust laws,” but is not limited to “State and municipal law,” reinforces the conclusion, inherent in the word “all,” that the phrase “all other law” includes federal law other than the antitrust laws. In short, the immunity provision in § 11341 means what it says: A carrier is exempt from all law as necessary to carry out an ICC-approved transaction. The exemption is broad enough to include laws that govern the obligations imposed by contract. “The obligation of a contract is ‘the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement.’” Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 429 (1934) (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 197 (1819)). A contract depends on a regime of common and statutory law for its effectiveness and enforcement. “Laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as fully as if they had been expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This principle embraces alike those laws which affect its construction and those which affect its enforcement or discharge.” Farmers and Merchants Bank of Monroe v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 262 U. S. 649, 660 (1923). A contract has no legal force apart from the law that acknowledges its binding character. As a result, the exemption in § 11341(a) from “all other law” effects an override of contractual obligations, as necessary to carry out an approved transaction, by suspending application of the law that makes the contract binding. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182 (1948), which construed the immediate precursor of § 11341(a), §5(11) of the Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, §7, 54 Stat. 908-909, supports this conclusion. In Schwabacher, minority stockholders in a carrier involved in an ICC-approved merger complained that the terms of the merger diminished the value of their shares as guaranteed by the corporate charter and thus “deprived [them] of contract rights under Michigan law . . . 334 U. S., at 188. We explained that the Commission was charged under the Act with passing upon and approving all capital liabilities assumed or discharged by the merged company, and that once the Commission approved a merger in the public interest and on just and reasonable terms, the immunity provision relieved the parties to the merger of “restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal,” as necessary to carry out the transaction. Id., at 194-195, 198. We noted that before approving the merger, the Commission had a duty “to see that minority interests are protected,” and emphasized that any such minority rights were, “as a matter of federal law, accorded recognition in the obligation of the Commission not to approve any plan which is not just and reasonable.” Id., at 201. Once these interests were accounted for, however, “[i]t would be inconsistent to allow state law to apply a liquidation basis [for valuation] to what federal law designates as a basis for continued public service.” Id., at 200. Relying in part on the immunity provision, we held the contract rights protected by state law did not survive the merger agreement found by the Commission to be in the public interest. Id., at 194-195, 200-201. Because the Commission had disclaimed jurisdiction to settle the shareholders’ complaints, we remanded the case to the Commission to ensure that the terms of the merger were just and reasonable. Id., at 202. Just as the obligations imposed by state contract law did not survive the merger at issue in Schwabacher, the obligations imposed by the law that gives force to the carriers’ collective-bargaining agreements, the RLA, do not survive the merger in this case. The RLA governs the formation, construction, and enforcement of the labor-management contracts in issue here. It requires carriers and employees to make reasonable efforts “to make and maintain” collective-bargaining agreements, 45 U. S. C. § 152 First, and to refrain from making changes in existing agreements except in accordance with RLA procedures, 45 U. S. C. §§152 Seventh, 156. The Act “extends both to disputes concerning the making of collective agreements and to grievances arising under existing agreements.” Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239, 242 (1950). As the law which gives “legal and binding effect to collective agreements,” Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142, 156 (1969), the RLA is the law that, under § 11341(a), is superseded when an ICC-approved transaction requires abrogation of collective-bargaining obligations. See ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 287 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Boston & Maine Corp., 788 F. 2d 794, 801 (CA1 1986); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 782 F. 2d 107, 111 (CA8 1986); Burlington Northern, Inc. v. American Railway Supervisors Assn., 503 F. 2d 58, 62-63 (CA7 1974); Bundy v. Penn Central Co., 455 F. 2d 277, 279-280 (CA6 1972); Nemitz v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 436 F. 2d 841, 845 (CA6), aff’d, 404 U. S. 37 (1971); Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 314 F. 2d 424 (CA8 1963); Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 307 F. 2d 151, 161-162 (CA5 1962); Railway Labor Executives Assn. v. Guilford Transp. Industries, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 29, 35 (Me. 1987), aff’d, 843 F. 2d 1383 (CA1 1988). Our determination that § 11341(a) supersedes collective-bargaining obligations via the RLA as necessary to carry out an ICC-approved transaction makes sense of the consolidation provisions of the Act, which were designed to promote “economy and efficiency in interstate transportation by the removal of the burdens of excessive expenditure.” Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522, 534-535 (1934). The Act requires the Commission to approve consolidations in the public interest. 49 U. S. C. § 11343(a)(1). Recognizing that consolidations in the public interest will “result in wholesale dismissals and extensive transfers, involving expense to transferred employees” as well as “the loss of seniority rights,” United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225, 233 (1939), the Act imposes a number of labor-protecting requirements to ensure that the Commission accommodates the interests of affected parties to the greatest extent possible. 49 U. S. C. §§ 11344(b)(1)(D), 11347; see also New York Dock Railway-Control—Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 360 I. C. C. 60 (1979). Section 11341(a) guarantees that once these interests are accounted for and once the consolidation is approved, obligations imposed by laws such as the RLA will not prevent the efficiencies of consolidation from being achieved. If § 11341(a) did not apply to bargaining agreements enforceable under the RLA, rail carrier consolidations would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. The resolution process for major disputes under the RLA would so delay the proposed transfer of operations that any efficiencies the carriers sought would be defeated. See, e. g., Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U. S. 429, 444 (1987) (resolution procedures for major disputes “virtually endless”); Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142, 149 (1969) (dispute resolution under RLA involves “an almost interminable process”); Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966) (RLA procedures are “purposely long and drawn out”). The immunity provision of § 11341(a) is designed to avoid this result. We hold that, as necessary to carry out a transaction approved by the Commission, the term “all other law” in § 11341(a) includes any obstacle imposed by law. In this case, the term “all other law” in § 11341(a) applies to the substantive and remedial laws respecting enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements. Our construction of the clear statutory command confirms the interpretation of the agency charged with its administration and expert in the field of railroad mergers. We affirm the Commission’s interpretation of § 11341(a), not out of deference in the face of an ambiguous statute, but rather because the Commission’s interpretation is the correct one. This reading of § 11341(a) will not, as the Court of Appeals feared, lead to bizarre results. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen v. ICC, 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 244, 880 F. 2d, at 567. The immunity provision does not exempt carriers from all law, but rather from all law necessary to carry out an approved transaction. We reiterate that neither the conditions of approval, nor the standard for necessity, is before us today. It may be, as the Commission held on remand from the Court of Appeals, that the scope of the immunity provision is limited by § 11347, which conditions approval of a transaction on satisfaction of certain labor-protective conditions. See n. 2, supra. It also might be true that “[t]he breadth of the exemption [in § 11341(a)] is defined by the scope of the approved transaction . . . .” ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, supra, at 298 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). We express no view on these matters, as they are not before us here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting. The statutory exemption that the Court construes today had its source in § 407 of the Transportation Act of 1920 (1920 Act). 41 Stat. 482. Its wording was slightly changed in 1940, 54 Stat. 908-909, and again in 1978, 92 Stat. 1434. There is, however, no claim that either of those amendments modified the coverage of the exemption in any way. It is therefore appropriate to begin with a consideration of the purpose and the text of the 1920 Act. Before the First World War, the railroad industry had been the prime target of antitrust enforcement. In 1920, however, Congress adopted a new national transportation policy that expressly favored the consolidation of railroads. The policy of consolidation embodied in the 1920 Act would obviously have been frustrated by the federal antitrust laws had Congress not chosen to exempt explicitly all approved mergers from these laws. Section 407 of that Act provided, in part: “The carriers affected by any order made under the foregoing provisions of this section . . . shall be, and they are hereby, relieved from the operation of the ‘antitrust laws,’. . . and of all other restraints or prohibitions by law, State or Federal, in so far as may be necessary to enable them to do anything authorized or required by any order made under and pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section.” 41 Stat. 482. Both the background and the text of §407 make it absolutely clear that its primary focus was on federal antitrust laws. Sensibly, however, Congress wrote that section using language broad enough to cover any other federal or state law that might otherwise forbid the consummation of any approved merger or prevent the immediate operation of its properties under a new corporate owner. Not a word in the statute, or in its legislative history, contains any hint that the approval of a merger by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) would impair the obligations of valid and otherwise enforceable private contracts. Given the present plight of our Nation’s railroads, it may be wise policy to give the ICC a power akin to, albeit greater than, that of a bankruptcy court to approve a trustee’s rejection of a debtor’s executory private contracts. Through nothing short of a tour de force, however, can one find any such power in 49 U. S. C. § 11341, or in either of its predecessors. Obviously, consolidated carriers would find it useful to have the ability to disavow disadvantageous long-term leases on obsolete car repair facilities, employment contracts with high salaried executives whose services are no longer needed, as well as collective-bargaining agreements that provide costly job security to a shrinking work force. If Congress had intended to give the ICC such broad ranging power to impair contracts, it would have done so in language much clearer than anything that can be found in the present Act. The Court’s contrary conclusion rests on its reading of the “plain meaning” of the present statutory text and our decision in Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182 (1948). Neither of these reasons is sufficient. Moreover, the Court’s reading is inconsistent with other unambiguous provisions in the statute. I With or without the ejusdem generis canon, I believe that the normal reader would assume that the text of § 11341 encompasses the antitrust laws, as well as other federal or state laws, that would otherwise prohibit rail carriers from consummating approved mergers, and nothing more. See ante, at 128. That text contains no suggestion that whenever a criminal law, tort law, or any regulatory measure impedes the efficient operation of a new merged carrier, the carrier can avoid such a restriction by virtue of the ICC approval of that merger. Nor does the text of § 11341 contain any sug-gestión that such an approval would impair the obligation of private contracts. Rather, as both an application of the ejusdem generis canon and an examination of the legislative history show, the purpose of the exemption was to relieve the carriers “from the operation of the antitrust and other restrictive or prohibitory laws.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 650, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 64 (1920) (emphasis added). The Court speculates that the reason the 1920 Congress explicitly referred to the antitrust laws was simply to avoid the force of the rule that repeals of the antitrust laws by implication are not favored, citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350 (1963). In that case, however, the rule was announced in the context of the industry’s argument that federal regulatory approval of a transaction exempted the transaction from the antitrust laws even though the regulatory statute was entirely silent on the subject of exemption. Ibid. The authority cited in the Phila delphia decision to support this rule sheds no light on the question whether a statute creating a broad exemption for mergers would naturally be read to include all statutes that otherwise would have prohibited the consummation of a merger of large rail carriers. Of greater importance, however, is the Court’s rather remarkable assumption that an exemption “from ‘all other law’ ” should be read to encompass the restraints created by-private contract. Ante, at 129-130. Even if the text of the present Act could bear that reading, it is flatly inconsistent with the text of the 1920 Act, which relieved the participating carriers “from the operation of the ‘antitrust laws’. . . and of all other restraints or prohibitions by law, State or federal . . . .” 41 Stat. 482. Moreover, given the respect that our legal system has always paid to the enforceability of private contracts — a respect that is evidenced by express language in the Constitution itself’ — there should be a powerful presumption against finding an implied authority to impair contracts in a statute that was enacted to alleviate a legitimate concern about the antitrust laws. Had Congress intended to convey the message the Court finds in § 11341, it surely would have said expressly that the exemption was from all restraints imposed by law or by private contract. HH i — i In my opinion, the Court’s reliance on the decision in Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182 (1948), is misplaced. In that case, the owners of two percent of the outstanding preferred stock of the Pere Marquette Railway brought suit in the United States District Court to set aside an ICC order approving a merger between that corporation and the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Corporation. In approving the merger, the ICC had found that the market value of plaintiffs’ preferred shares ranged, at different times, from $87 to $99 per share, and that the stock that they received in exchange pursuant to the merger agreement would have realized about $90 and $111 on the same dates. Thus, the terms of the merger, as applied to the plaintiffs’ class, were just and reasonable. Plaintiffs contended, however, that the exchange value of their shares amounted to $172.50 per share because the merger was a “liquidation” as a matter of Michigan law, and the Pere Marquette Charter provided that in the event of liquidation or dissolution, the preferred shareholders were entitled to receive full payment of par value plus all accrued unpaid dividends. The ICC order approving the merger did not resolve the Michigan law question. The ICC considered the issue too insignificant to affect the validity of the entire transaction, and left the matter for resolution by negotiation or later litigation. On appeal from the District Court’s judgment sustaining the ICC order, this Court held that the ICC’s finding that the exchange value was just and reasonable foreclosed any other claim that the dissenting shareholders might assert concerning the value of their shares. Whatever Michigan law might provide for the preferred shareholders in the event of a winding-up or liquidation could not determine the just and reasonable value of shares in the continuing enterprise. The essence of the Court’s holding is set forth in this passage: “Since the federal law clearly contemplates merger as a step in continuing the enterprise, it follows that what Michigan law might give these dissenters on a winding-up or liquidation is irrelevant, except insofar as it may be reflected in current values for which they are entitled to an equivalent. It would be inconsistent to allow state law to apply a liquidation basis to what federal law designates as a basis for continued public service. . . . “We therefore hold that no rights alleged to have been granted to dissenting stockholders by state law provision concerning liquidation survive the merger agreement approved by the requisite number of stockholders and approved by the Commission as just and reasonable. Any such rights are, as a matter of federal law, accorded recognition in the obligation of the Commission not to approve any plan which is not just and reasonable.” Id., at 200-201. It is true that the effect of the Schwabacher decision was to extinguish whatever contractual rights the dissenting shareholders possessed as a matter of Michigan law. But the Court did require the ICC, on remand, to consider whatever value the Michigan law claims might have in connection with its final conclusion that the merger plan was “just and reasonable.” A fair reading of the entire opinion makes it clear that the holding was based more on the ICC’s “complete control of the capital structure to result from a merger,” id., at 195, than on the exemption at issue in these cases. Schioa-bacher cannot fairly be read as authorizing carriers to renounce private contracts that limit the benefits achievable through the merger. Ill There is tension between the Court’s interpretation of the exemption that is now codified in 49 U. S. C. § 11341(a) and the labor-protection conditions set forth in 49 U. S. C. § 11347. The latter section requires an ICC order approving a railroad merger to impose conditions that are “no less protective” of the employees than those established pursuant to the Rail Passenger Service Act, 84 Stat. 1337, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 565. One of the conditions established by the Secretary of Labor under the latter Act was essentially the same as § 2 of the New York Dock conditions described by the Court, ante, at 120-121. As the Court notes, that condition provides that the benefits protected “‘under applicable laws and/or existing collective bargaining agreements . . . shall be preserved unless changed by future collective bargaining agreements.’” Id., at 121 (citation omitted). This provision unambiguously indicates that Congress intended and expected that collective-bargaining agreements would survive any ICC approved merger. As I noted in my separate opinion in ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 298 (1987), the statutory immunity provision in § 11341 is self-executing and becomes effective at the time of the ICC approval. “The breadth of the exemption is defined by the scope of the approved transaction, and no explicit announcement of exemption is required to make the statute applicable.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). In neither of the cases before the Court today did the ICC approval of the merger purport to modify or terminate any collective-bargaining agreement. The ICC approval orders were entered in 1980 and 1982 and contained no mention of either of the proposed transfers of personnel that are now at issue and about which the union was first notified several years after the ICC orders were entered “These savings will spring from common-point coordination projects, mechanical and engineering department coordinations, locomotive and car utilization improvements, and internal rerouting efficiencies. Each of these projects is discussed separately below.” Ibid. In the discussion that followed, the ICC did discuss plans to expand the car production facilities at Raceland, Kentucky, in order to make ears for a member line that had been buying its cars from an independent manufacturer. The ICC found that the applicants had failed to show that the public would derive any benefit from this plan. There was no discussion of the consolidation of that facility by closing Seaboard’s car repair shop in Way-cross, Georgia. Nor did the ICC discuss the consolidation of locomotive works in Norfolk Southern Corp.—Control—Norfolk & W. R. Co. and Southern R. Co., 366 I. C. C. 173 (1982). I cannot subscribe to a late-blooming interpretation of a 71-year-old immunity statute that gives the Commission a roving power — exercisable years after a merger has been approved and consummated — to impair the obligations of private contracts that may “prevent the efficiencies of consolidation from being achieved.” Ante, at 133. The Court’s decision may represent a “better” policy choice than the one Congress actually made in 1920, cf. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, ante, at 100-101, but it is neither an accurate reading of the command that Congress issued in 1920, nor is it a just disposition of claims based on valid private contracts. I respectfully dissent. Section 11344(b)(1) provides: “In a proceeding under this section which involves the merger or control of at least two class I railroads, as defined by the Commission, the Commission shall consider at least the following: “(A) the effect of the proposed transaction on the adequacy of transportation to the public. “(B) the effect on the public interest of including, or failing to include, other rail carriers in the area involved in the proposed transaction. “(C) the total fixed charges that result from the proposed transaction. “(D) the interest of carrier employees affected by the proposed transaction. “(E) whether the proposed transaction would have an adverse effect on competition among rail carriers in the affected region.” On September 9, 1989, the Commission also filed a petition for rehearing, and requested the court to refrain from ruling on the petition until the Commission could issue a comprehensive decision on remand addressing issues that the Court of Appeals left open for resolution. On September 29, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued an order stating that the Commission’s petition for rehearing would be “deferred pending release of the ICC’s decision on remand.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 89-1027, p. 54a. On January 4, 1990, the Commission reopened proceedings in the case remanded to it. On May 21, 1990, two months after we granted the carriers’ petitions for certiorari, the Commission issued its remand decision. CSX Corp.—Control—Chessie System, Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line Industries, Inc., 6 I. C. C. 2d 715. In its decision, the Commission adhered to the Court of Appeals’ ruling that § 11341(a) did not authorize it to override provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement. The Commission held, however, that § 11341(a) authorized it to foreclose resort to RLA remedies for modification and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements “at least to the extent of [its] authority” to impose labor-protective conditions under § 11347. Id., at 754. The Commission explained that the § 11347 limit on its § 11341(a) authority “reflects the consistency of the overall statutory scheme for dealing with CBA modifications required to implement Commission-approved mergers and consolidations.” Id., at 722. The Commission remanded its decision to the parties for further negotiation or arbitration. On December 4,1990, the union respondents petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the Commission’s remand decision. The petition raises three issues: (1) whether § 11341(a) authorizes the ICC to foreclose employee resort to the RLA; (2) whether § 11347 authorizes the ICC to compel employees to arbitrate changes in collective-bargaining agreements; and (3) whether abrogation of employee contract rights effected a taking in violation of the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. On May 23, 1990, and again on September 19, 1990, the union respondents filed motions to dismiss the case as moot. They argued that in light of the alternative ground for decision offered by the ICC on remand from the Court of Appeals, see n. 2, supra, the meaning and scope of § 11341(a) was no longer material to the dispute. The union respondents reassert their mootness argument in their brief on the merits. Brief for Respondent Unions 18. We disagree. The Commission predicated the analysis in its remand order on the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 11341(a). Thus, our definitive interpretation of § 11341(a) may affect the Commission’s remand order. Agency compliance with the Court of Appeals’ mandate does not moot the issue of the correctness of the court’s decision. See, e. g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 791, n. 1 (1985); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 42, n. 12 (1981); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 468-469, n. 4 (1977). In addition, the alternative basis offered by the Commission on remand does not end the controversy between the parties. The parties retain an interest in the validity of the ICC’s original order because the Court of Appeals may again disagree with the Commission’s interpretation of the Act in its review of the remand order. Section 5(11) of the Transportation Act of 1940 provided: “[A]ny carriers or other corporations, and their officers and employees and any other persons, participating in a transaction approved or authorized under the provisions of this section shall be and they are hereby relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws and all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission. ...” The recodification of this language in § 11341(a) effected no substantive change. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1395, pp. 158-160 (1978). See also ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 299, n. 12 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505 (1898); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904); United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 224 U. S. 383 (1912); United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U. S. 61 (1912); United States v. Pacific & Arctic R. & Nav. Co., 228 U. S. 87 (1913). Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U, S. C. §365, allows a trustee to assume or reject a debtor’s executory contracts and unexpired leases subject to the subsequent approval of the bankruptcy court. Collective-bargaining agreements can be rejected only if the additional requirements of 11 U. S. C. § 1113 are met. As Judge D. H. Ginsburg, writing for the Court of Appeals, noted: “We cannot sustain the ICC’s position that this provision empowers it to override a [collective-bargaining agreement (CBA)]. First, and most important, the ICC’s position finds no support in the language of the statute. By its terms, § 11341(a) contemplates exemption only from ‘the antitrust laws and from all other law’ to the extent necessary to carry out the transaction. Nowhere does it say that the ICC may also override contracts, nor has it ever, in any of the various iterations since its initial enactment in 1920, included even a general reference to ‘contracts,’ much less any specific reference to CBAs. Nor has the ICC explained how we can read the term ‘other law,’ as it has done, to mean ‘all legal obstacles.’ Dispatchers, J. A. 207. None of the Supreme Court decisions, discussed below, authorizing the ICC to abrogate an ‘other law’ even suggests that the term means ‘all legal obstacles.’ The ICC itself, prior to its 1983 decision in DRGW, recognized as much. See Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co.—Abandonment, 282 I. C. C. 311, 335 (1952) (‘None of the decisions in the [Supreme Court] cases . . . relates to private contractual rights, but refers [sic] to State laws which prohibit in some way the carrying out of the transaction authorized.’).” Brotherhood of Railway Carmen v. ICC, 279 U. S. App. D. C. 239, 244, 880 F. 2d 562, 567 (1989). All but two of the cases that the Court cited in the Philadelphia decision to support the rule against implicit repeals of the antitrust statutes arose under a regulatory framework in which there was no mention of exemption. United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350, n. 28 (1963). See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S., at 314-315; United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505 (1898); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S., at 343, 374-376 (plurality and dissenting opinions); United States v. Pacific & Arctic R. & Nav. Co., 228 U. S., at 105, 107; Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 161-162 (1922); Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal Railway Assn. of St. Louis, 288 U. S. 469, 474-475 (1933); Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 297 U. S. 500, 513-515 (1936); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 197-206 (1939); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 226-228 (1940); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 456-457 (1945); United States Alkali Export Assn., Inc. v. United States, 325 U. S. 196, 205-206 (1945); Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797, 809-810 (1945); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 9 (1958); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U. S. 334 (1959); California v. FPC, 369 U. S. 482 (1962); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341 (1963). The other two cases involve regulations with explicit exemptions from the antitrust laws, but do not support the position taken by the Court in this case. In Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 362 U. S. 458 (1960), this Court held that § 6 of the Clayton Act’s exemption of agricultural cooperatives from the antitrust law only protected the formation of those associations; once formed they could not engage in any further conduct that would violate the antitrust laws. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 296 (1963), the Court held that the exemption relieving airlines from the operation of the antitrust laws when certain transactions were approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board did not exempt the airlines from all antitrust violations, but only exempted them from violations stemming from activity explicitly governed by the regulatory scheme. Again Judge Ginsburg’s observation is pertinent: “Moreover, the ICC’s proposed insertion of ‘all legal obstacles’ into the statutory language would lead to most bizarre results. Under the ICC’s reading, it could set to naught, in order to facilitate a merger, a carrier’s solemn undertaking, in a bond indenture or a bank loan, to refrain from entering into any such transaction without the consent of its creditors. Cf. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio, 282 I. C. C. at 331-35 (declaring itself without power, in an abandonment context, to relieve a carrier from its ‘contractual obligations for the payment of rent’). We do not think it likely that Congress would grant the ICC a power with so much potential to destabilize the railroad industry; we are confident, however, that it would not do so without so much as a word to that effect in the statute itself. Never, either in its decisions here under review or in prior cases, has the ICC offered any justification for this most unlikely reading of the Act.” 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 244-245, 880 F. 2d, at 567-568. “No State shall. . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .” U. S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. 1. After reviewing the legislative history, Judge Ginsburg concluded: “From our review of this history, we are confident that Congress did not intend, when it enacted the immunity provision, to override contracts. First, Congress focused nearly exclusively, in the hearings and debates on the 1920 Act, on specific types of laws it intended to eliminate — all of which were positive enactments, not common law rules of liability, as on a contract. Cf. Association of Flight Attendants v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 879 F. 2d 906, 917 (D. C. Cir. 1989). Indeed, Commissioner Clark, who presented the immunity idea to the House and Senate Commerce Committees in the hearings cited above, did not once suggest, over the course of several days and several hundred pages, that the proposed immunity might relieve a carrier of its obligations under negotiated agreements with third parties.” 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 247, 880 F. 2d, at 570. In the ICC order approving the merger of Chessie System, Inc., and Seaboard Coastline Industries, Inc., the ICC discussed how the coordination of facilities would generate significant cost reductions and improved economic efficiency. CSX Corp.—Control—Chessie System, Inc., and Seaboard Coastline Industries, Inc., 363 I. C. C. 521, 556 (1980). The ICC noted:

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HERNANDEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 87-963. Argued November 28, 1988 Decided June 5, 1989 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmon, and Stevens, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 704. Brennan and Kennedy, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Michael J. Graetz argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners in both cases. Deputy Solicitor General Merrill argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Rose, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Alan I. Horoioitz, and Robert S. Pomerance. Together with No. 87-1616, Graham et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Walter J. Rockier, Julian Greimuait, Paul S. Berger, and Marc D. Stem; and for the Council on Religious Freedom by Lee Booth by. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), 26 U. S. C. § 170, permits a taxpayer to deduct from gross income the amount of a “charitable contribution.” The Code defines that term as a “contribution or gift” to certain eligible donees, including entities organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes. We granted certiorari to determine whether taxpayers may deduct as charitable contributions payments made to branch churches of the Church of Scientology (Church) in order to receive services known as “auditing” and “training.” We hold that such payments are not deductible. I Scientology was founded in the 1950’s by L. Ron Hubbard. It is propagated today by a “mother church” in California and by numerous branch churches around the world. The mother Church instructs laity, trains and ordains ministers, and creates new congregations. Branch churches, known as “franchises” or “missions,” provide Scientology services at the local level, under the supervision of the mother Church. Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 823 F. 2d 1310, 1313 (CA9 1987), cert. denied, 486 U. S. 1015 (1988). Scientologists believe that an immortal spiritual being exists in every person. A person becomes aware of this spiritual dimension through a process known as “auditing.” Auditing involves a one-to-one encounter between a participant (known as a “preclear”) and a Church official (known as an “auditor”). An electronic device, the E-meter, helps the auditor identify the preclear’s areas of spiritual difficulty by measuring skin responses during a question and answer session. Although auditing sessions are conducted one on one, the content of each session is not individually tailored. The preclear gains spiritual awareness by progressing through sequential levels of auditing, provided in short blocks of time known as “intensives.” 83 T. C. 575, 577 (1984), aff’d, 822 F. 2d 844 (CA9 1987). The Church also offers members doctrinal courses known as “training.” Participants in these sessions study the tenets of Scientology and seek to attain the qualifications necessary to serve as auditors. Training courses, like auditing sessions, are provided in sequential levels. Scientologists are taught that spiritual gains result from participation in such courses. 83 T. C., at 577. The Church charges a “fixed donation,” also known as a “price” or a “fixed contribution,” for participants to gain access to auditing and training sessions. These charges are set forth in schedules, and prices vary with a session’s length and level of sophistication. In 1972, for example, the general rates for auditing ranged from $625 for a 12V2-hour auditing intensive, the shortest available, to $4,250 for a 100-hour intensive, the longest available. Specialized types of auditing required higher fixed donations: a 12/4-hour “Integrity Processing” auditing intensive cost $750; a 12/4-hour “Expanded Dianetics” auditing intensive cost $950. This system of mandatory fixed charges is based on a central tenet of Scientology known as the “doctrine of exchange,” according to which any time a person receives something he must pay something back. Id., at 577-578. In so doing, a Scientologist maintains “inflow” and “outflow” and avoids spiritual decline. 819 F. 2d 1212, 1222 (CA1 1987). The proceeds generated from auditing and training sessions are the Church’s primary source of income. The Church promotes these sessions not only through newspaper, magazine, and radio advertisements, but also through free lectures, free personality tests, and leaflets. The Church also encourages, and indeed rewards with a 5% discount, advance payment for these sessions. 822 F. 2d, at 847. The Church often refunds unused portions of prepaid auditing or training fees, less an administrative charge. Petitioners in these consolidated cases each made payments to a branch church for auditing or training sessions. They sought to deduct these payments on their federal income tax returns as charitable contributions under §170. Respondent Commissioner, the head of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), disallowed these deductions, finding that the payments were not charitable contributions within the meaning of § 170. Petitioners sought review of these determinations in the Tax Court. That court consolidated for trial the cases of the three petitioners in No. 87-1616: Katherine Jean Graham, Richard M. Hermann, and David Forbes Maynard. The petitioner in No. 87-963, Robert L. Hernandez, agreed to be bound by the findings in the consolidated Graham trial, reserving his right to a separate appeal. Before trial, the Commissioner stipulated that the branch churches of Scientology are religious organizations entitled to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions under the relevant sections of the Code. This stipulation isolated as the sole statutory issue whether payments for auditing or training sessions constitute “contribution[s] or gift[s]” under § 170. The Tax Court held a 3-day bench trial during which the taxpayers and others testified and submitted documentary exhibits describing the terms under which the Church promotes and provides auditing and training sessions. Based on this record, the court upheld the Commissioner’s decision. 83 T. C. 575 (1984). It observed first that the term “charitable contribution” in § 170 is synonymous with the word “gift,” which case law had defined “as a voluntary transfer of property by the owner to another without consideration therefor.” Id., at 580, quoting DeJong v. Commissioner, 36 T. C. 896, 899 (1961) (emphasis in original), aff’d, 309 F. 2d 373 (CA9 1962). It then determined that petitioners had received consideration for their payments, namely, “the benefit of various religious services provided by the Church of Scientology.” 83 T. C., at 580. The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayers’ constitutional challenges based on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit in petitioner Hernandez’s case, and for the Ninth Circuit in Graham, Hermann, and Maynard’s case, affirmed. The First Circuit rejected Hernandez’s argument that under § 170, the IRS’ ordinary inquiry into whether the taxpayer received consideration for his payment should not apply to “the return of a commensurate religious benefit, as opposed to an economic or financial benefit.” 819 F. 2d, at 1217 (emphasis in original). The court found “no indication that Congress intended to distinguish the religious benefits sought by Hernandez from the medical, educational, scientific, literary, or other benefits that could likewise provide the quid for the quo of a nondeductible payment to a charitable organization.” Ibid. The court also rejected Hernandez’s argument that it was impracticable to put a value on the services he had purchased, noting that the Church itself had “established and advertised monetary prices” for auditing and training sessions, and that Hernandez had not claimed that these prices misstated the cost of providing these sessions. Id., at 1218. Hernandez’s constitutional claims also failed. Because § 170 created no denominational preference on its face, Hernandez had shown no Establishment Clause violation. Id., at 1218-1221. As for the Free Exercise Clause challenge, the court determined that denying the deduction did not prevent Hernandez from paying for auditing and training sessions and thereby observing Scientology’s doctrine of exchange. Moreover, granting a tax exemption would compromise the integrity and fairness of the tax system. Id., at 1221-1225. The Ninth Circuit also found that the taxpayers had received a “measurable, specific return ... as a quid pro quo for the donation” they had made to the branch churches. 822 F. 2d, at 848. The court reached this result by focusing on “the external features” of the auditing and training transactions, an analytic technique which “serves as an expedient for any more intrusive inquiry into the motives of the payor.” Ibid. Whether a particular exchange generated secular or religious benefits to the taxpayer was irrelevant, for under § 170 “[i]t is the structure of the transaction, and not the type of benefit received, that controls.” Id., at 849. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the taxpayers’ constitutional arguments. The tax deduction provision did not violate the Establishment Clause because § 170 is “neutral in its design” and reflects no intent “to visit a disability on a par-tic'ular religion.” Id., at 853. Furthermore, that the taxpayers would “have less money to pay to the Church, or that the Church [would] receive less money, [did] not rise to the level of a burden on appellants’ ability to exercise their religious beliefs.” Id., at 851. Indeed, because the taxpayers could still make charitable donations to the branch church, they were “not put to the choice of abandoning the doctrine of exchange or losing the government benefit, for they may have both.” Ibid. Finally, the court noted that the compelling governmental interest in “the maintenance of a sound and uniform tax system” counseled against granting a free exercise exemption. Id., at 852-853. We granted certiorari, 485 U. S. 1005 (1988); 486 U. S. 1022 (1988), to resolve a Circuit conflict concerning the validity of charitable deductions for auditing and training payments. We now affirm. II For over 70 years, federal taxpayers have been allowed to deduct the amount of contributions or gifts to charitable, religious, and other eleemosynary institutions. See 2 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 35.1.1 (1981) (tracing history of charitable deduction). Section 170, the present provision, was enacted in 1954; it requires a taxpayer claiming the deduction to satisfy a number of conditions. The Commissioner’s stipulation in this case, however, has narrowed the statutory inquiry to one such condition: whether petitioners’ payments for auditing and training sessions are “contribution[s] or gift[s]” within the meaning of § 170. The legislative history of the “contribution or gift” limitation, though sparse, reveals that Congress intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and payments made to such recipients in return for goods or services. Only the former were deemed deductible. The House and Senate Reports on the 1954 tax bill, for example, both define “gifts” as payments “made with no expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift.” S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 196 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A44 (1954). Using payments to hospitals as an example, both Reports state that the gift characterization should not apply to “a payment by an individual to a hospital in consideration of a binding obligation to provide medical treatment for the individual’s employees. It would apply only if there were no expectation of any quid pro quo from the hospital. ” S. Rep. No. 1622, supra, at 196 (emphasis added); H. Rep. No. 1337, supra, at A44 (emphasis added). In ascertaining whether a given payment was made with “the expectation of any quid pro quo,” S. Rep. No. 1622, supra, at 196; H. Rep. No. 1337, supra, at A44, the IRS has customarily examined the external features of the transaction in question. This practice has the advantage of obviating the need for the IRS to conduct imprecise inquiries into the motivations of individual taxpayers. The lower courts have generally embraced this structural analysis. See, e. g., Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F. 2d 413, 422-423 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (applying this approach and collecting cases), cited in United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U. S. 105, 117 (1986); see also 2 B. Bittker, supra, at ¶ 35.1.3 (collecting cases). We likewise focused on external features in United States v. American Bar Endoivment, stipra, to resolve the taxpayers’ claims that they were entitled to partial deductions for premiums paid to a charitable organization for insurance coverage; the taxpayers contended that they had paid unusually high premiums in an effort to make a contribution along with their purchase of insurance. We upheld the Commissioner’s disallowance of the partial deductions because the taxpayers had failed to demonstrate, at a minimum, the existence of comparable insurance policies with prices lower than those of the policy they had each purchased. In so doing, we stressed that “[t]he sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration.” Id., at 118 (emphasis added in part). In light of this understanding of § 170, it is readily apparent that petitioners’ payments to the Church do not qualify as “contributionfs] or gift[s].” As the Tax Court found, these payments were part of a quintessential quid pro quo exchange: in return for their money, petitioners received an identifiable benefit, namely, auditing and training sessions. The Church established fixed price schedules for auditing and training sessions in each branch church; it calibrated particular prices to auditing or training sessions of particular lengths and levels of sophistication; it returned a refund if auditing and training services went unperformed; it distributed “account cards” on which persons who had paid money to the Church could monitor what prepaid services they had not yet claimed; and it categorically barred provision of auditing or training sessions for free. Each of these practices reveals the inherently reciprocal nature of the exchange. Petitioners do not argue that such a structural analysis is inappropriate under § 170, or that the external features of the auditing and training transactions do not strongly suggest a quid pro quo exchange. Indeed, the petitioners in the consolidated Graham case conceded at trial that they expected to receive specific amounts of auditing and training in return for their payments. 822 F. 2d, at 850. Petitioners argue instead that they are entitled to deductions because a quid pro quo analysis is inappropriate under § 170 when the benefit a taxpayer receives is purely religious in nature. Along the same lines, petitioners claim that payments made for the right to participate in a religious service should be automatically deductible under § 170. We cannot accept this statutory argument for several reasons. First, it finds no support in the language of § 170. Whether or not Congress could, consistent with the Establishment Clause, provide for the automatic deductibility of a payment made to a church' that either generates religious benefits or guarantees access to a religious service, that is a choice Congress has thus far declined to make. Instead, Congress has specified that a payment to an organization operated exclusively for religious (or other eleemosynary) purposes is deductible only if such a payment is a “contribution or gift.” 26 U. S. C. § 170(c). The Code makes no special preference for payments made in the expectation of gaining religious benefits or access to a religious service. Foley v. Commissioner, 844 F. 2d 94, 98 (CA2 1988) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert, pending, No. 88-102. The House and Senate Reports on § 170, and the other legislative history of that provision, offer no indication that Congress’ failure to enact such a preference was an oversight. Second, petitioners’ deductibility proposal would expand the charitable contribution deduction far beyond what Congress has provided. Numerous forms of payments to eligible donees plausibly could be categorized as providing a religious benefit or as securing access to a religious service. For example, some taxpayers might regard their tuition payments to parochial schools as generating a religious benefit or as securing access to a religious service; such payments, however, have long been held not to be charitable contributions under § 170. Foley, supra, at 98, citing Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F. 2d 778 (CA2 1972); see id., at 781 (noting Congress’ refusal to enact legislation permitting taxpayers to deduct parochial school tuition payments). Taxpayers might make similar claims about payments for church-sponsored counseling sessions or for medical care at church-affiliated hospitals that otherwise might not be deductible. Given that, under the First Amendment, the IRS can reject otherwise valid claims of religious benefit only on the ground that a taxpayers’ alleged beliefs are not sincerely held, but not on the ground that such beliefs are inherently irreligious, see United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 (1944), the resulting tax deductions would likely expand the charitable contribution provision far beyond its present size. We are loath to effect this result in the absence of supportive congressional intent. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 259-261 (1982). Finally, the deduction petitioners seek might raise problems of entanglement between church and state. If framed as a deduction for those payments generating benefits of a religious nature for the payor, petitioners’ proposal would inexorably force the IRS and reviewing courts to differentiate “religious” benefits from “secular” ones. If framed as a deduction for those payments made in connection with a religious service, petitioners’ proposal would force the IRS and the judiciary into differentiating “religious” services from “secular” ones. We need pass no judgment now on the constitutionality of such hypothetical inquiries, but we do note that “pervasive monitoring” for “the subtle or overt presence of religious matter” is a central danger against which we have held the Establishment Clause guards. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402, 413 (1985); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 272, n. 11 (1981) (“LT]he University would risk greater ‘entanglement’ by attempting to enforce its exclusion of ‘religious worship’ and ‘religious speech’ ” than by opening its forum to religious as well as nonreligious speakers); cf. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 716 (1981). Accordingly, we conclude that petitioners’ payments to the Church for auditing and training sessions are not “contribution[s] or gift[s]” within the meaning of that statutory expression. Ill We turn now to petitioners’ constitutional claims based on the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. A Petitioners argue that denying their requested deduction violates the Establishment Clause in two respects. First, §170 is said to create an unconstitutional denominational preference by according disproportionately harsh tax status to those religions that raise funds by imposing fixed costs for participation in certain religious practices. Second, § 170 allegedly threatens governmental entanglement with religion because it requires the IRS to entangle itself with religion by engaging in “supervision of religious beliefs and practices” and “valuation of religious services.” Brief for Petitioners 44. Our decision in Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982), supplies the analytic framework for evaluating petitioners’ contentions. Larson teaches that, when it is claimed that a denominational preference exists, the initial inquiry is whether the law facially differentiates among religions. If no such facial preference exists, we proceed to apply the customary three-pronged Establishment Clause inquiry derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Thus analyzed, § 170 easily passes constitutional muster. The line which § 170 draws between deductible and nondeductible payments to statutorily qualified organizations does not differentiate among sects. Unlike the Minnesota statute at issue in Larson, which facially exempted from state registration and reporting requirements only those religious organizations that derived more than half their funds from members, § 170 makes no “explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations,” 456 U. S., at 246-247, n. 23, applying instead to all religious entities. Section 170 also comports with the Lemon test. First, there is no allegation that § 170 was born of animus to religion in general or Scientology in particular. Cf. Larson, supra, at 254-255 (history of Minnesota restriction reveals hostility to “Moonies” and intent to “get at . . . people that are running around airports”). The provision is neutral both in design and purpose. Second, the primary effect of § 170 — encouraging gifts to charitable entities, including but not limited to religious organizations — is neither to advance nor inhibit religion. It is not alleged here that § 170 involves “[d]irect government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 69 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). It may be that a consequence of the quid pro quo orientation of the “contribution or gift” requirement is to impose a disparate burden on those charitable and religious groups that rely on sales of commodities or services as a means of fundraising, relative to those groups that raise funds primarily by soliciting unilateral donations. But a statute primarily having a secular effect does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it “happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961); see also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 604, n. 30 (1983). Third, § 170 threatens no excessive entanglement between church and state. To be sure, ascertaining whether a payment to a religious institution is part of a quid pro quo transaction may require the IRS to ascertain from the institution the prices of its services and commodities, the regularity with which payments for such services and commodities are waived, and other pertinent information about the transaction. But routine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine, see Presbyterian Church in U. S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U. S. 440, 451 (1969), no delegation of state power to a religious body, see Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 (1982), and no “detailed monitoring and close administrative contact” between secular and religious bodies, see Aguilar, 473 U. S., at 414, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command. See Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U. S. 290, 305-306 (1985) (stating that nonentanglement principle “does not exempt religious organizations from such secular governmental activity as fire inspections and building and zoning regulations” or the recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act) (citation omitted). As we have observed, supra, at 694, it is petitioners’ interpretation of § 170, requiring the Government to distinguish between “secular” and “religious” benefits or services, which may be “fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids.” Lemon, supra, at 620. Nor does the application of § 170 to religious practices require the Government to place a monetary value on particular religious benefits. As an initial matter, petitioners’ claim here raises no need for valuation, for they have alleged only that their payments are fully exempt from a quid pro quo analysis — not that some portion of these payments is deductible because it exceeds the value of the acquired service. Cf. American Bar Endowment, 477 U. S., at 117 (describing “dual character” payments) (citing, inter alia, Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 104, 105); see n. 10, supra. In any event, the need to ascertain what portion of a payment was a purchase and what portion was a contribution does not ineluctably create entanglement problems by forcing the Government to place a monetary value on a religious benefit. In cases where the economic value of a good or service is elusive — where, for example, no comparable good or service is sold in the marketplace — the IRS has eschewed benefit-focused valuation. Instead, it has often employed as an alternative method of valuation an inquiry into the cost (if any) to the donee of providing the good or service. See, e. g., Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F. 2d 1000, 1002 (CA1 1972) (cost of providing a “religiously-oriented” education); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F. 2d 778 (CA2 1972) (same); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F. 2d 373 (CA9 1962) (same). This valuation method, while requiring qualified religious institutions to disclose relevant information about church costs to the IRS, involves administrative inquiries that, as a general matter, “bear no resemblance to the kind of government surveillance the Court has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government entanglement with religion.” Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, supra, at 305; cf. Lemon, 403 U. S., at 621-622 (school-aid statute authorizing government inspection of parochial school records created impermissible “intimate and continuing relationship between church and state” because it required State “to determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular”). B Petitioners also contend that disallowance of their § 170 deductions violates their right to the free exercise of religion by “placing] a heavy burden on the central practice of Scientology.” Brief for Petitioners 47. The precise nature of this claimed burden is unclear, but it appears to operate in two ways. First, the deduction disallowance is said to deter adherents from engaging in auditing and training sessions. Second, the deduction disallowance is said to interfere with observance of the doctrine of exchange, which mandates equality of an adherent’s “outflow” and “inflow.” The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 141-142 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S., at 717-719; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 220-221 (1972). It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds. Thomas, supra, at 716. We do, however, have doubts whether the alleged burden imposed by the deduction disallowance on the Scientologists’ practices is a substantial one. Neither the payment nor the receipt of taxes is forbidden by the Scientology faith generally, and Scientology does not proscribe the payment of taxes in connection with auditing or training sessions specifically. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U. S., at 257. Any burden imposed on auditing or training therefore derives solely from the fact that, as a result of the deduction denial, adherents have less money available to gain access to such sessions. This burden is no different from that imposed by any public tax or fee; indeed, the burden imposed by the denial of the “contribution or gift” deduction would seem to pale by comparison to the overall federal income tax burden on an adherent. Likewise, it is unclear why the doctrine of exchange would be violated by a deduction disallowance so long as an adherent is free to equalize “outflow” with “inflow” by paying for as many auditing and training sessions as he wishes. See 822 F. 2d, at 850-853 (questioning substantiality of burden on Scientologists); 819 F. 2d, at 1222-1225 (same). In any event, we need not decide whether the burden of disallowing the § 170 deduction is a substantial one, for our decision in Lee establishes that even a substantial burden would be justified by the “broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system,” free of “myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.” 455 U. S., at 260. In Lee, we rejected an Amish taxpayer’s claim that the Free Exercise Clause commanded his exemption from Social Security tax obligations, noting that “[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system” on the ground that it operated “in a manner that violates their religious belief.” Ibid. That these cases involve federal income taxes, not the Social Security system, is of no consequence. Ibid. The fact that Congress has already crafted some deductions and exemptions in the Code also is of no consequence, for the guiding principle is that a tax “must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise.” Id., at 261 (emphasis added). Indeed, in one respect, the Government’s interest in avoiding an exemption is more powerful here than in Lee; the claimed exemption in Lee stemmed from a specific doctrinal obligation not to pay taxes, whereas petitioners’ claimed exemption stems from the contention that an incrementally larger tax burden interferes with their religious activities. This argument knows no limitation. We accordingly hold that petitioners’ free exercise challenge is without merit. IV We turn, finally, to petitioners’ assertion that disallowing their claimed deduction is at odds with the IRS’ longstanding practice of permitting taxpayers to deduct payments made to other religious institutions in connection with certain religious practices. Through the appellate stages of this litigation, this claim was framed essentially as one of selective prosecution. The Courts of Appeals for the First and Ninth Circuits summarily rejected this claim, finding no evidence of the intentional governmental discrimination necessary to support such a claim. 822 F. 2d, at 853 (no showing of “the type of hostility to a target of law enforcement that would support a claim of selective enforcement”); 819 F. 2d, at 1223 (no “discriminatory intent” proved). In their arguments to this Court, petitioners have shifted emphasis. They now make two closely related claims. First, the IRS has accorded payments for auditing and training disparately harsh treatment compared to payments to other churches and synagogues for their religious services: Recognition of a comparable deduction for auditing and training payments is necessary to cure this administrative inconsistency. Second, Congress, in modifying § 170 over the years, has impliedly acquiesced in the deductibility of payments to these other faiths; because payments for auditing and training are indistinguishable from these other payments, they fall within the principle acquiesced in by Congress that payments for religious services are deductible under § 170. Although the Commissioner demurred at oral argument as to whether the IRS, in fact, permits taxpayers to deduct payments made to purchase services from other churches and synagogues, Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31, the Commissioner’s periodic revenue rulings have stated the IRS’ position rather clearly. A 1971 ruling, still in effect, states: “Pew rents, building fund assessments, and periodic dues paid to a church . . . are all methods of making contributions to the church, and such payments are deductible as charitable contributions within the limitations set out in section 170 of the Code.” Rev. Rui. 70-47, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 49 (superseding A. R.M. 2, Cum. Bull. 150 (1919)). We also assume for purposes of argument that the IRS also allows taxpayers to deduct “specified payments for attendance at High Holy Day services, for tithes, for torah readings and for memorial plaques.” Foley v. Commissioner, 844 F. 2d, at 94, 96. The development of the present litigation, however, makes it impossible for us to resolve petitioners’ claim that they have received unjustifiably harsh treatment compared to adherents of other religions. The relevant inquiry in determining whether a payment is a “contribution or gift” under § 170 is, as we have noted, not whether the payment secures religious benefits or access to religious services, but whether the transaction in which the payment is involved is structured as a quid pro qtto exchange. To make such a determination in this case, the Tax Court heard testimony and received documentary proof as to the terms and structure of the auditing and training transactions; from this evidence it made factual findings upon which it based its conclusion of nondeductibility, a conclusion we have held consonant with § 170 and with the First Amendment. Perhaps because the theory of administrative inconsistency emerged only on appeal, petitioners did not endeavor at trial to adduce from the IRS or other sources any specific evidence about other religious faiths’ transactions. The IRS’ revenue rulings, which merely state the agency’s conclusions as to deductibility and which have apparently never been reviewed by the Tax Court or any other judicial body, also provide no specific facts about the nature of these other faiths’ transactions. In the absence of such facts, we simply have no way (other than the wholly illegitimate one of relying on our personal experiences and observations) to appraise accurately whether the IRS’ revenue rulings have correctly applied a quid pro quo analysis with respect to any or all of the religious practices in question. We do not know, for example, whether payments for other faiths’ services are truly obligatory or whether any or all of these services are generally provided whether or not the encouraged “mandatory” payment is made. The IRS’ application of the “contribution or gift” standard may be right or wrong with respect to these other faiths, or it may be right with respect to some religious practices and wrong with respect to others. It may also be that some of these payments are appropriately classified as partially deductible “dual payments.” With respect to those religions where the structure of transactions involving religious services is established not centrally but by individual congregations, the proper point of reference for a quid pro quo analysis might be the individual congregation, not the religion as a whole. Only upon a proper factual record could we make these determinations. Absent such a record, we must reject petitioners’ administrative consistency argument. Petitioners’ congressional acquiescence claim fails for similar reasons. Even if one assumes that Congress has acquiesced in the IRS’ ruling with respect to “[p]ew rents, building fund assessments, and periodic dues,” Rev. Rui. 70-47, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 49, the fact is that the IRS’ 1971 ruling articulates no broad principle of deductibility, but instead merely identifies as deductible three discrete types of payments. Having before us no information about the nature or structure of these three payments, we have no way of discerning any possible unifying principle, let alone whether such a principle would embrace payments for auditing and training sessions. V For the reasons stated herein, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals are hereby Affirmed. Justice Brennan and Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Section 170 provides in pertinent part: “(a) Allowance of deduction “(1) General Rule “There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. “(c) Charitable contribution defined “For purposes of this section, the term “charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of— “(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation— “(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States; “(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; “(C) no part of the nej; earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and “(D) which is not- disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. ...” Auditing is also known as “processing,” “counseling,” and “pastoral counseling.” 83 T. C. 575, 577 (1984), aff’d, 822 F. 2d 844 (CA9 1987). The petitioner in No. 87-963, Robert L. Hernandez, was denied a deduction of $7,338 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $2,245 for 1981. 819 F. 2d 1212, 1215 (CA1 1987). Of the petitioners in No. 87-1616, Katherine Jean Graham was denied a deduction of $1,682 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $316.24 for 1972; Richard M. Hermann was denied a tax deduction of $3,922 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $803 for 1975; and David Forbes Maynard was denied a deduction of $5,000 (including a carryover of $2,385 for contributions made in 1976) and was assessed a tax deficiency of $643 for 1977. 83 T. C., at 575-579. The stipulation allowed the Tax Court to avoid having to decide whether the particular branches to which payments were made in these eases qualified under § 170(c)(2) and § 501(c)(3) of the Code as tax-exempt organizations entitled to receive charitable contributions. In a separate case decided during the pendency of this litigation, the Tax Court held that the mother Church in California did not qualify as a tax-exempt organization under § 501(c)(3) for the years 1970 through 1972 because it had diverted profits to its founder and others, had conspired to impede collection of its taxes, and had conducted almost all activities for a commercial purpose. Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 83 T. C. 381 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, basing its decision solely on the ground that the Church had diverted profits for the use of private individuals. It did not address the other bases of the Tax Court's decision. Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 823 F. 2d 1310 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U. S. 1015 (1988). Compare Christiansen v. Commissioner, 843 F. 2d 418 (CA10 1988) (holding payments; not deductible), cert. pending, No. 87-2023; Miller v. IRS, 829 F. 2d 500 (CA4 1987) (same), cert. pending, No. 87-1449, with Neher v. Commissioner, 852 F. 2d 848 (CA6 1988) (holding payments deductible); Foley v. Commissioner, 844 F. 2d 94 (CA2 1988) (same), cert. pending, No. 88-102; Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F. 2d 1324 (CA8 1987) (same), cert. pending, No. 87-1382. The rulings for the taxpayer in the Neher, Foley, and Staples cases rested on statutory, not constitutional, grounds. The charitable transfer must be made to a qualified recipient, § 170(c), within the taxable year, § 170(a)(1), and consist of cash or qualified property, 26 U. S. C. §§ 170(e)-(h) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), not exceeding a specified percentage of the taxpayer’s income in the year of payment or (where a carryover is permitted) in subsequent years. 26 U. S. C. §§ 170(b), 170(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The portions of these Reports explicating the term “gifts" actually address a closely related provision of the Code, § 162(b), which refers specifically to S 170. Section 162(b) provides, in pertinent part, that a taxpayer may not deduct as a trade or business expense a “contribution or gift” which would have been deductible under S 170 were it not for the fact that the taxpayer had already met the maximum amount (measured as a percentage of income) which § 170(b) permits to be deducted. The sole taxpayer in American Bar Endowment who had demonstrated the existence of a lower premium insurance program failed to show that he was aware of this less expensive option at the time he purchased his insurance. 477 U. S., at 118. The Tax Court referred to a Church policy directive which stated: “Price cuts are forbidden under any guise. “1. PROCESSING MAY NEVER BE GIVEN AWAY BY AN ORG. Processing is too expensive to deliver. “9. ONLY FULLY CONTRACTED STAFF IS AWARDED FREE SERVICE, AND THIS IS DONE BY INVOICE AND LEGAL NOTE WHICH BECOMES DUE AND PAYABLE IF THE CONTRACT IS BROKEN.” 83 T. C., at 577-578, n. 5. Petitioners have not argued here that their payments qualify as “dual payments” under IRS regulations and that they are therefore entitled to a partial deduction to the extent their payments exceeded the value of the benefit received. See American Bar Endowment, 477 U. S., at 117 (citing Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 104). We thus have no occasion to decide this issue. “ ‘First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.” Walz [v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)].’” Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U. S., at 612-613, quoted in Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S., at 252. We do not rule out the possibility that, under the circumstances of a particular case, an IRS inquiry under § 170 into a religious institution’s expenses might raise entanglement problems. Because petitioners’ claim necessitates no valuation inquiry, however, we need only decide here that such inquiries into cost under § 170 generally pose no constitutional problem. Petitioners argue that an unofficial “question and answer guidance package” recently issued by an IRS official requires deductibility of payments for auditing and training sessions. Referring to the revenue ruling on pew rents, the brochure states that “fixed payments for similar religious services” are fully deductible. See IRS Official Explains New Examination-Education Program on Charitable Contributions to Tax-Exempt Organizations, BNA Daily Report for Executives, Special Report No. 186, J — 1, J-3 (Sept. 26, 1988) (cited in Reply Brief for Petitioners 6). In ascertaining the IRS’ justifications for its administrative practice, however, our practice is to rely on the agency’s official rulings, not on the unofficial interpretations of particular IRS officials. In any event, the brochure on which petitioners rely was not included in the record before the Tax Court or the Courts of Appeals in these cases, and, in fact, was issued months after we granted certiorari.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE POUR PARTICIPATIONS INDUSTRIELLES ET COMMERCIALES, S. A., v. ROGERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUCCESSOR TO THE ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN, et al. No. 348. Argued May 1, 1958. Decided June 16, 1958. John J. Wilson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Roger J. Whiteford and Hubert A. Schneider. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Townsend, David Schwartz, Sidney B. Jacoby, Paul E. McGraw and Ernest S. Carsten. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before us is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the District Court erred in dismissing, with prejudice, a complaint in a civil action as to a plaintiff that had failed to comply fully with a pretrial production order. This issue comes to us in the context of an intricate litigation. Section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 415, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 5 (b), sets forth the conditions under which the United States during a period of war or national emergency may seize “. . . any property or interest of any foreign country or national . . . Acting under this section, the Alien Property Custodian during World War II assumed control of assets which were found by the Custodian to be “owned by or held for the benefit of” I. G. Farbenindus-trie, a German firm and a then enemy national. These assets, valued at more than $100,000,000, consisted of cash in American banks and approximately 90% of the capital stock of General Aniline & Film Corporation, a Delaware corporation. In 1948 petitioner, a Swiss holding company also known as I. G. Chemie or Interhandel, brought suit under § 9 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 419, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 9 (a), against the Attorney General, as successor to the Alien Property Custodian, and the Treasurer of the United States, to recover these assets. This section authorizes recovery of seized assets by “[a]ny person not an enemy or ally of enemy” to the extent of such person’s interest in the assets. Petitioner claimed that it had owned the General Aniline stock and cash at the time of vesting and hence, as the national of a neutral power, was entitled under § 9 (a) to recovery. The Government both challenged petitioner’s claim of ownership and asserted that in any event petitioner was an “enemy” within the meaning of the Act since it was intimately connected with I. G. Farben and hence was affected with “enemy taint” despite its “neutral” incorporation. See Uebersee Finanz-Korp. v. McGrath, 343 U. S. 205. More particularly, the Government alleged that from the time of its incorporation in 1928, petitioner had conspired with I. G. Farben, H. Sturzenegger & Cie, a Swiss banking firm, and others “[t]o conceal, camouflage and cloak the ownership, control and domination by I. G. Farben of properties and interests located in countries, including the United States, other than Germany, in order to avoid seizure and confiscation in the event of war between such countries and Germany.” At an early stage of the litigation the Government moved under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an order requiring petitioner to make available for inspection and copying a large number of the banking records of Sturzenegger & Cie. Rule 34, in conjunction with Rule 26 (b), provides that upon a motion “showing good cause therefor,” a court may order a party to produce for inspection nonprivileged documents relevant to the subject matter of pending litigation “. . . which are in his possession, custody, or control . . . .” In support of its motion the Government alleged that the records sought were relevant to showing the true ownership of the General Aniline stock and that they were within petitioner’s control because petitioner and Sturzenegger were substantially identical. Petitioner did not dispute the general relevancy of the Sturzenegger documents but denied that it controlled them. The District Court granted the Government’s motion, holding, among other things, that petitioner’s “control” over the records had been prima facie established. Thereafter followed a number of motions by petitioner , to be relieved of production on the ground that disclosure of the required bank records would violate Swiss penal laws and consequently might lead to imposition of criminal sanctions, including fine and imprisonment, on those responsible for disclosure. The Government in turn moved under Rule 37 (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint because of petitioner’s noncompliance with the production order. During this period the Swiss Federal Attorney, deeming that disclosure of these records in accordance with the production order would constitute a violation of Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code, prohibiting economic espionage, and Article 47 of the Swiss Bank Law, relating to secrecy of banking records, “confiscated” the Sturzenegger records. This “confiscation” left possession of the records in Sturzenegger and amounted to an interdiction on Sturzenegger’s transmission of the records to third persons. The upshot of all this was that the District Court, before finally ruling on petitioner’s motion for relief from the production order and on the Government’s motion to dismiss the complaint, referred the matter to a Special Master for findings as to the nature of the Swiss laws claimed by petitioner to block production and as to petitioner’s good faith in seeking to achieve compliance with the court’s order. The Report of the Master bears importantly on our disposition of this case. It concluded that the Swiss Government had acted in accordance with its own established doctrines in exercising preventive police power by constructive seizure of the Sturzenegger records, and found that there was “. . . no proof, or any evidence at all of collusion between plaintiff and the Swiss Government in the seizure of the papers herein.” Noting that the burden was on petitioner to show good faith in its efforts to comply with the production order, and taking as the test of good faith whether petitioner had attempted all which a reasonable man would have undertaken in the circumstances to comply with the order, the Master found that “. . . the plaintiff has sustained the burden of proof placed upon it and has shown good faith in its efforts [to comply with the production order] in accordance with the foregoing test.” These findings of the Master were confirmed by the District Court. Nevertheless the court, in February 1953, granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the complaint and filed an opinion wherein it concluded that: (1) apart from considerations of Swiss law petitioner had control over the Sturzenegger records; (2) such records might prove to be crucial in the outcome of this litigation; (3) Swiss law did not furnish an adequate excuse for petitioner’s failure to comply with the production order, since petitioner could not invoke foreign laws to justify disobedience to orders entered under the laws of the forum; and (4) that the court in these circumstances had power under Rule 37 (b) (2), as well as inherent power, to dismiss the complaint. 111 F. Supp. 435. However, in view of statements by the Swiss Government, following petitioner’s intercession, that certain records not deemed to violate the Swiss laws would be released, and in view of efforts by petitioner to secure waivers from those persons banking with the Sturzenegger firm who were protected by the Swiss secrecy laws, and hence whose waivers might lead the Swiss Government to permit production, the court suspended the effective date of its dismissal order for a limited period in order to permit petitioner to continue efforts to obtain waivers and Swiss consent for production. By October 1953, some 63,000 documents had been released by this process and tendered the Government for inspection. None of the books of account of Sturzeneg-ger were submitted, though petitioner was prepared to offer plans to the Swiss Government which here too might have permitted at least partial compliance. However, since full production appeared impossible, the District Court in November 1953 entered a final dismissal order. This order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which accepted the findings of the District Court as to the relevancy of the documents, control of them by petitioner, and petitioner’s good-faith efforts to comply with the production order. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether Rule 37 authorized dismissal under these circumstances since it ruled that the District Court was empowered to dismiss both by Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and under its own “inherent power.” It did, however, modify the dismissal order to allow petitioner an additional six months in which to continue its efforts. 96 U. S. App. D. C. 232, 225 F. 2d 532. We denied certiorari. 350 U. S. 937. During this further period of grace, additional documents, with the consent of the Swiss Government and through waivers, were released and tendered for inspection, so that by July of 1956, over 190,000 documents had been procured. Record books of Sturzenegger were offered for examination in Switzerland, subject to the expected approval of the Swiss Government, to the extent that material within them was covered by waivers. Finally, petitioner presented the District Court with a plan, already approved by the Swiss Government, which was designed to achieve maximum compliance with the production order: A “neutral” expert, who might be an American, would be appointed as investigator with the consent of the parties, District Court, and Swiss authorities. After inspection of the Sturzenegger files, this investigator would submit a report to the parties identifying documents, without violating secrecy regulations, which he deemed to be relevant to the litigation. Petitioner could then seek to obtain further waivers or secure such documents by letters rogatory or arbitration proceedings in Swiss courts. The District Court, however, refused to entertain this plan or to inspect the documents tendered in order to determine whether there had been substantial compliance with the production order. It directed final dismissal of the action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but at the same time observed: “That [petitioner] and its counsel patiently and diligently sought to achieve compliance . . . is not to be doubted.” 100 U. S. App. D. C. 148, 149, 243 F. 2d 254, 255. Because this decision raised important questions as to the proper application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we granted certiorari. 355 U. S. 812. I. We consider first petitioner’s contention that the District Court erred in issuing the production order because the requirement of Rule 34, that a party ordered to produce documents must be in “control” of them, was not here satisfied. Without intimating any view upon the merits of the litigation, we accept as amply supported by the evidence the findings of the two courts below that, apart from the effect of Swiss law, the Sturzenegger documents are within petitioner’s control. The question then becomes: Do the interdictions of Swiss law bar a conclusion that petitioner had “control” of these documents within the meaning of Rule 34? We approach this question in light of the findings below that the Swiss penal laws did in fact limit petitioner’s ability to satisfy the production order because of the criminal sanctions to which those producing the records would have been exposed. Still we do not view this situation as fully analogous to one where documents required by a production order have ceased to exist or have been taken into the actual possession of a third person not controlled by the party ordered to produce, and without that party’s complicity. The “confiscation” of these records by the Swiss authorities adds nothing to the dimensions of the problem under consideration, for possession of the records stayed where it was and the possibility of criminal prosecution for disclosure was of course present before the confiscation order was issued. In its broader scope, the problem before us requires consideration of the policies underlying the Trading with the Enemy Act. If petitioner can prove its record title to General Aniline stock, it certainly is open to the Government to show that petitioner itself is the captive of interests whose direct ownership would bar recovery. This possibility of enemy taint of nationals of neutral powers, particularly of holding companies with intricate financial structures, which asserted rights to American assets was of deep concern to the Congress when it broadened the Trading with the Enemy Act in 1941 “. . . to reach enemy interests which masqueraded under those innocent fronts.” Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U. S. 480, 485. See Administration of the Wartime Financial and Property Controls of the United States Government, Treasury Department (1942), pp. 29-30; H. R. Rep. No. 2398, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3. In view of these considerations, to hold broadly that petitioner’s failure to produce the Sturzenegger records because of fear of punishment under the laws of its sovereign precludes a court from finding that petitioner had “control” over them, and thereby from ordering their production, would undermine congressional policies made explicit in the 1941 amendments, and invite efforts to place ownership of American assets in persons or firms whose sovereign assures secrecy of records. The District Court here concluded that the Sturzenegger records might have a vital influence upon this litigation insofar as they shed light upon petitioner’s confused background. Petitioner is in a most advantageous position to plead with its own sovereign for relaxation of penal laws or for adoption of plans which will at the least achieve a significant measure of compliance with the production order, and indeed to that end it has already made significant progress. United States courts should be free to require claimants of seized assets who face legal obstacles under the laws of their own countries to make all such efforts to the maximum of their ability where the requested records promise to bear out or dispel any doubt the Government may introduce as to true ownership of the assets. We do not say that this ruling would apply to every situation where a party is restricted by law from producing documents over which it is otherwise shown to have control. Rule 34 is sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the exigencies of particular litigation. The propriety of the use to which it is put depends upon the circumstances of a given case, and we hold only that accommodation of the Rule in this instance to the policies underlying the Trading with the Enemy Act justified the action of the District Court in issuing this production order. II. We consider next the source of the authority of a District Court to dismiss a complaint for failure of a plaintiff to comply with a production order. The District Court found power to dismiss under Rule 37 (b) (2) (iii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as in the general equity powers of a federal court. The Court of Appeals chose not to rely upon Rule 37, but rested such power on Rule 41 (b) and on the District Court’s inherent power. Rule 37 describes the consequences of a refusal to make discovery. Subsection (b), which is entitled “Failure to Comply With Order,” provides in pertinent part: “(2) ... If any party . . . refuses to obey . . . an order made under Rule 34 to produce any document or other thing for inspection . . . , the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following: “(iii) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof ... , or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof . . . .” Rule 41 (b) is concerned with involuntary dismissals and reads in part: “For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.” In our opinion, whether a court has power to dismiss a complaint because of noncompliance with a production order depends exclusively upon Rule .37, which addresses itself with particularity to the consequences of a failure to make discovery by listing a variety of remedies which a court may employ as well as by authorizing any order which is “just.” There is no need to resort to Rule 41 (b), which appears in that part of the Rules concerned with trials and which lacks such specific references to discovery. Further, that Rule is on its face appropriate only as a defendant’s remedy, while Rule 37 provides more expansive coverage by comprehending disobedience of production orders by any party. Reliance upon Rule 41, which cannot easily be interpreted to afford a court more expansive powers than does Rule 37, or upon “inherent power,” can only obscure analysis of the problem before us. See generally Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Col. L. Rev. 480. It may be that the Court of Appeals invoked Rule 41 (b), which uses the word “failure,” and hesitated to draw upon Rule 37 (b) because of doubt that Rule 37 would cover this situation since it applies only where a party “refuses to obey.” (Italics added.) Petitioner has urged that the word “refuses” implies willfulness and that it simply failed and did not refuse to obey since it was not in willful disobedience. But this argument turns on too fine a literalism and unduly accents certain distinctions found in the language of the various subsections of Rule 37. Indeed subsection (b), as noted above, is itself entitled “Failure to Comply With Order.” (Italics added.) For purposes of subdivision (b) (2) of Rule 37, we think that a party “refuses to obey” simply by failing to comply with an order. So construed the Rule allows a court all the flexibility it might need in framing an order appropriate to a particular situation. Whatever its reasons, petitioner did not comply with the production order. Such reasons, and the willfulness or good faith of petitioner, can hardly affect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant only to the path which the District Court might follow in dealing with petitioner’s failure to comply. III. We turn to the remaining question, whether the District Court properly exercised its powers under Rule 37 (b) by dismissing this complaint despite the findings that petitioner had not been in collusion with the Swiss authorities to block inspection of the Sturzenegger records, and had in good faith made diligent efforts to execute the production order. We must discard at the outset the strongly urged contention of the Government that dismissal of this action was justified because petitioner conspired with I. G. Farben, Sturzenegger & Cie, and others to transfer ownership of General Aniline to it prior to 1941 so that seizure would be avoided and advantage taken of Swiss secrecy laws. In other words, the Government suggests that petitioner stands in the position of one who deliberately courted legal impediments to production of the Sturzenegger records, and who thus cannot now be heard to assert its good faith after this expectation was realized. Certainly these contentions, if supported by the facts, would have a vital bearing on justification for dismissal of the action, but they are not open to the Government here. The findings below reach no such conclusions; indeed, it is not even apparent from them whether this particular charge was ever passed upon below. Although we do not mean to preclude the Government from seeking to establish such facts before the District Court upon remand, or any other facts relevant to justification for dismissal of the complaint, we must dispose of this case on the basis of the findings of good faith made by the Special Master, adopted by the District Court, and approved by the Court of Appeals. The provisions of Rule 37 which are here involved must be read in light of the provisions of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, and more particularly against the opinions of this Court in Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, and Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322. These decisions establish that there are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause. The authors of Rule 37 were well aware of these constitutional considerations. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Rule 37, 28 U. S. C. (1952 ed.), p. 4325. In Hovey v. Elliott, supra, it was held that due process was denied a defendant whose answer was struck, thereby leading to a decree pro confesso without a hearing on the merits, because of his refusal to obey a court order pertinent to the suit. This holding was substantially modified by Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, supra, where the Court ruled that a state court, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, could strike the answer of and render a default judgment against a defendant who refused to produce documents in accordance with a pretrial order. The Hovey case was distinguished on grounds that the defendant there was denied his right to defend “as a mere punishment”; due process was found preserved in Hammond on the reasoning that the State simply utilized a permissible presumption that the refusal to produce material evidence “. . . was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense.” 212 U. S., at 350-351. But the Court took care to emphasize that the defendant had not been penalized “. . . for a failure to do that which it may not have been in its power .to do.” All the State had required “was a bona fide effort to comply with an order . . . , and therefore any reasonable showing of an inability to comply would have satisfied the requirements . . .” of the order. 212 U. S., at 347. These two decisions leave open the question whether Fifth Amendment due process is violated by the striking of a complaint because of a plaintiff’s inability, despite good-faith efforts, to comply with a pretrial production order. The presumption utilized by the Court in the Hammond case might well falter under such circumstances. Cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463. Certainly substantial constitutional questions are provoked by such action. Their gravity is accented in the present case where petitioner, though cast in the role of plaintiff, cannot be deemed to be in the customary role of a party invoking the aid of a court to vindicate rights asserted against another. Rather petitioner’s position is more analogous to that of a defendant, for it belatedly challenges the Government’s action by now protesting against a seizure and seeking the recovery of assets which were summarily possessed by the Alien Property Custodian without the opportunity for protest by any party claiming that seizure was unjustified under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Past decisions of this Court emphasize that this summary power to seize property which is believed to be enemy-owned is rescued from constitutional invalidity under the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses of the Fifth Amendment only by those provisions of the Act which afford a nonenemy claimant a later judicial hearing as to the propriety of the seizure. See Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 245-246; Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U. S. 308, 318; cf. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481, 489. The findings below, and what has been shown as to petitioner’s extensive efforts at compliance, compel the conclusion on this record that petitioner’s failure to satisfy fully the requirements of this production order was due to inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by circumstances within its control. It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign. Of course this situation should be distinguished from one where a party claims that compliance with a court’s order will reveal facts which may provide the basis for criminal prosecution of that party under the penal laws of a foreign sovereign thereby shown to have been violated. Cf. United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 149. Here the findings below establish that the very fact of compliance by disclosure of banking records will itself constitute the initial violation of Swiss laws. In our view, petitioner stands in the position of an American plaintiff subject to criminal sanctions in Switzerland because production of documents in Switzerland pursuant to the order of a United States court might violate Swiss laws. Petitioner has sought no privileges because of its foreign citizenship which are not accorded domestic litigants in United States courts. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 133-135. It does not claim that Swiss laws protecting banking records should here be enforced. It explicitly recognizes that it is subject to procedural rules of United States courts in this litigation and has made full efforts to follow these rules. It asserts no immunity from them. It asserts only its inability to comply because of foreign law. In view of the findings in this case, the position in which petitioner stands in this litigation, and the serious constitutional questions we have noted, we think that Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner. This is not to say that petitioner will profit through its inability to tender the records called for. In seeking recovery of the General Aniline stock and other assets, petitioner recognizes that it carries the ultimate burden of proof of showing itself not to be an “enemy” within the meaning of the Trading with the Enemy Act. The Government already has disputed its right to recovery by relying on information obtained through seized records of I. G. Farben, documents obtained through petitioner, and depositions taken of persons affiliated with petitioner. It may be that in a trial on the merits, petitioner's inability to produce specific information will prove a serious handicap in dispelling doubt the Government might be able to inject into the case. It may be that in the absence of complete disclosure by petitioner, the District Court would be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner as to particular events. So much indeed petitioner concedes. But these problems go to the adequacy of petitioner’s proof and should not on this record preclude petitioner from being able to contest on the merits. On remand, the District Court possesses wide discretion to proceed in whatever manner it deems most effective. It may desire to afford the Government additional opportunity to challenge petitioner’s good faith. It may wish to explore plans looking towards fuller compliance. Or it may decide to commence at once trial on the merits. We decide only that on this record dismissal of the complaint with prejudice was not justified. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Rule 37 is entitled: “Refusal to Make Discovery: Consequences.” Different subsections refer to “Refusal to Answer” (a), “Expenses on Refusal to Admit” (c), “Failure of Party to Attend or Serve Answers” (d), and “Failure to Respond to Letters Rogatory” (e). We find no design in the Rules evidenced by this pattern of words to establish the clear distinction petitioner detects between mere failure and willful refusal insofar as Rule 37 (b) is concerned. The word "refusal,” by way of example, clearly refers in several instances in subsection (a) of the Rule to noncompliance for any reason. And Rule 41 (b) in turn, discussed above in text, refers simply to “failure ... to comply” but might as applied to a particular situation require a showing of willfulness to justify dismissal. (Italics added throughout.) The words “refusal” and “failure” cannot be deemed to bear a fixed meaning common to their use in all sections but must be read in the context of a particular subsection. The Government relies in part upon a number of British prize cases in support of its position that dismissal without adjudication on the merits is justified where a party is prevented by foreign laws from satisfying a court order. However these cases are to be interpreted, they are not persuasive authority on the issue before us. We are here concerned with the interpretation to be accorded rules governing procedure in the federal courts and with constitutional doctrine underlying these rules.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GREYHOUND CORP. et al. v. MT. HOOD STAGES, INC., dba PACIFIC TRAILWAYS No. 77-598. Argued April 24, 1978 Decided June 19, 1978 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 337. John R. Reese argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Richard C. Brautigam, James H. Clarke, and Keith A. Jenkins. Eugene C. Crew argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael N. Khourie, Bruce M. Hall, and Donald A. Schafer. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the issue whether § 5 (i) of the Clayton Act, as amended, 88 Stat. 1706, 90 Stat. 1396, 15 U. S. C. § 16 (i) (1976 ed.), operates to toll the running of the Act’s statute of limitations from the date on which the United States filed a petition for leave to intervene in an Interstate Commerce Commission proceeding previously instituted by the plaintiff. I Petitioner Greyhound and respondent Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. (doing business as Pacific Trailways), are motor common carriers of passengers and package express and are subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Greyhound is the largest common carrier by bus in the United States. Mt. Hood is one of Greyhound’s comparatively small competitors; it operates over routes in Oregon, Idaho, and Utah. Its principal routes are between Portland, Eugene, and Albany, Ore., in the west, and Salt Lake City, in the east, and between Klamath Falls, Ore., in the south, and Biggs and The Dalles, Ore., in the north. Greyhound’s route authority surrounds that of Mt. Hood. During the period from 1947 to 1956, Greyhound acquired control of eight bus companies operating in the Western United States. See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 104 M. C. C. 449, 450, and n. 1 (1968). In the proceedings before the ICC, Mt. Hood opposed four of those acquisitions, alleging that, if the acquisitions were approved, Greyhound could route traffic around Mt. Hood’s operations and thereby deprive the public of the most convenient service and jeopardize Mt. Hood’s continued existence. Greyhound successfully contended, however, that the acquisitions were not intended to, and would not, have such consequences. Greyhound represented to the ICC that the acquisitions “would not adversely affect connecting carriers; that arrangements with such carriers, including interchange of traffic and open gateways, would be maintained; that it was not the policy of Greyhound to route passengers over circuitous routes; that its agents were instructed to quote the direct route as well as the Greyhound route and give passengers their choice; and that Greyhound had always carried MH’s schedules in its folders and cooperated in every way to acquaint the public with its service and thus promote additional traffic and business for their lines.” Greyhound also represented to the Commission that it would continue the joint through-bus arrangement with Mt. Hood. As Greyhound had anticipated, the ICC relied on these representations in determining that the proposed acquisitions were in the public interest. Id., at 454-457, 461. In July 1964, Greyhound terminated the through-bus arrangement with Mt. Hood. On October 7 of that year, Mt. Hood filed a petition with the Commission, pursuant to § 5 (10) (formerly § 5 (9)) of the Interstate Commerce Act, alleging that Greyhound had not lived up to various representations it had made to the ICC and asking the Commission to reopen the acquisition proceedings “for further hearing to consider the necessity of attaching certain terms, conditions and limitations to the privileges therein granted” or, in the alternative, to order Greyhound to divest itself of operations acquired in those proceedings. App. 4. The allegations in Mt. Hood’s petition to the Commission were essentially the same as those Mt. Hood made later in this antitrust suit, that is, that Greyhound had canceled the through-bus connection, had scheduled connecting service so as to preclude reasonable connections with Mt. Hood, had directed Greyhound’s agents and independent joint ticket agents to send traffic around Mt. Hood’s routes through use of longer all-Greyhound routes, and had interfered in various ways with the distribution of Mt. Hood’s schedules and the quotation of Mt. Hood’s rates and services, all with the intent of injuring Mt. Hood. Id., at 10-11. Slightly more than two months later, on December 14, 1964, the United States petitioned for leave to intervene in the ICC proceeding. Id., at 36. In its petition, the United States stated it had an interest in the proceeding and it urged that the Commission hold a hearing on Mt. Hood’s allegations. The Government’s petition observed that Mt. Hood’s allegations “make a serious charge,” id., at 37, but added.: “We have no way of knowing whether those of Mt. Hood’s allegations which Greyhound denies are true or false; resolution of such controversies is a typical function of a hearing.” Id., at 37-38. On May 27,1965, the United States and others were granted permission to intervene in the ICC proceeding. Id., at 43. Such permission, however, was on condition that it “shall not be construed to allow intervenors to introduce evidence which will unduly broaden the issues raised in this proceeding.” Ibid. After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the examiner resolved all factual issues against Greyhound and recommended entry of an order requiring Greyhound to abide by the representations it had made in the acquisition proceedings. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 104 M. C. C., at 464-496. On April 5, 1968, Division 3 of the ICC sustained the examiner’s findings but deferred entry of a supplemental order to allow voluntary negotiations between the parties. Id., at 462-463. On July 5, 1968, Mt. Hood filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon for damages and injunctive relief, alleging violations of the antitrust laws and common-law and statutory unfair competition. App. 46. Mt. Hood’s complaint alleged, as to the antitrust violations, that, beginning before 1947 and continuing to the date of the complaint, Greyhound had restrained and monopolized commerce in the carriage by motorcoach of passengers and their luggage between points in the Western United States, including Oregon, Idaho, and Utah, by means essentially the same as those that were the subject of the ICC proceeding. Id., at 49-52. In the Commission proceeding, meanwhile, the efforts of the parties to agree upon an order failed. The entire Commission therefore entered an order requiring Greyhound to restore the practices and traffic patterns existing when the acquisitions at issue were authorized and, specifically, to eliminate the anti-competitive practices of which Mt. Hood had complained. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (ND Ill. 1970), A three-judge United States District Court denied Greyhound’s motion to set aside the Commission’s order and granted the counterclaim of the United States and the ICC by the issuance of its own order in similar terms, thus granting injunctive relief. Id., at 1040-1041. Following entry of the District Court’s order enforcing the ICC decision, Mt. Hood amended its complaint in this antitrust suit to eliminate its prayer for injunctive relief. App. 57. In the present action, interrogatories were submitted to the jury. By its special verdict returned in May 1973, the jury found that, as alleged by Mt. Hood, Greyhound had violated both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act; that Greyhound had fraudulently concealed these antitrust violations during the period from January 1, 1953, to July 4, 1964; but that Mt. Hood knew or should have known of the violation on December 14, 1960. App. 82. The trial court held that the Government’s petition to intervene in the ICC modification proceeding on December 14, 1964, served to toll the statute of limitations under § 5 (i) of the Clayton Act. App. 80. The result was that the Act’s four-year period of limitations extended back to December 14, 1960, where it was combined with the fraudulent concealment to create a 20-year damages period. Damages of $13,146,090 (after trebling) were awarded Mt. Hood, plus attorneys’ fees of $1,250,000 and costs. Id., at 83, 104, 106. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 555 F. 2d 687 (1977). We granted certio-rari limited to the issue of the correctness of the interpretation of § 5 (i) by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. 434 U.S. 1008 (1978). II In holding that the United States’ intervention in the ICC proceeding served to toll, by reason of § 5 (i), the Clayton Act’s period of limitations, the Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he literal wording of section [5 (i)] is not controlling.” 555 F. 2d, at 699. The court, therefore, sought to identify the congressional purpose behind § 5 (i) and to effectuate that purpose. 555 F. 2d, at 699. In the court’s view, the purpose of § 5 (i) “is to further effective enforcement of the antitrust laws by permitting private litigants to have the benefits that may flow from governmental antitrust enforcement efforts.” 555 F. 2d, at 699. The Court of Appeals, quoting the District Court (App. 80), declared that this purpose would be advanced by “ ‘treating intervention by Antitrust Division lawyers as the functional equivalent of a direct action by them.’ ” 555 F. 2d, at 700. We find this reasoning unpersuasive. In particular, we are unable to agree that the language of § 5 (i) is so unhelpful. Neither do we agree that the congressional purpose behind § 5 (i) is advanced by the holdings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals. A Logic and precedent dictate that “ ‘[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.’ ” Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472 (1977), and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 (1976), each quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). Examination of the language of § 5 (i) prevents acceptance of respondent’s position. Section 5 (i) begins: “Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The ICC proceeding at issue here plainly was not one instituted by the United States. As the foregoing statement of facts demonstrates, and as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, “Mt. Hood rather than the United States instituted the proceedings.” 555 F. 2d, at 699. It strains accepted usage to argue that a party who intervenes in a proceeding instituted by someone else has also “instituted” that proceeding. This Court has observed: “When the term [to intervene] is used in reference to legal proceedings, it covers the right of one to interpose in, or become a party to, a proceeding already instituted..." Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U. S. 317, 330 (1912) (emphasis added). In truth, the United States not only did not institute the proceeding, but also was not in a position to do so. As its petition to intervene stated, the Government had “no way of knowing” whether Mt. Hood’s allegations, which Greyhound denied, were “true or false,” and thus it could not in good faith have made the charging allegations necessary to institute the proceeding. At least in this case, therefore, the question is not primarily one of form, that is, who reached the ICC first; it is one of substance, that is, who investigated the facts enabling it to make charging allegations and seek relief and thereby to “institute” the proceeding. Just as the United States cannot be said to have “instituted” the ICC proceeding, neither had it “complained of,” within the meaning of § 5 (i), anything on which the present action is based. The cases in which the applicability of § 5 (i) has been considered establish that the determination of whether a private action is based on matters “complained of” in a prior Government action “[i]n general . . . must be limited to a comparison of the two complaints on their face.” Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U. S. 54, 65 (1965); accord, Luria Steel & Trading Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 484 F. 2d 1016, 1022 (CA3 1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1158 (1974); Rader v. Balfour, 440 F. 2d 469, 473 (CA7), cert. denied sub nom. Alpha Chi Omega v. Rader, 404 U. S. 983 (1971). In the ICC proceeding here in question, the United States’ petition for leave to intervene charged Greyhound "with no wrongdoing, took no position on the merits, sought no relief, and, indeed, disclaimed any knowledge of the relevant facts. It sought only an opportunity for Mt. Hood to establish its allegations. This case, therefore, simply cannot be viewed as one based on any matter “complained of” by the United States. B Moreover, the language of § 5 (i) that we rely upon accurately manifests Congress’ intent in enacting the section. As the Court previously has noted, the original § 5 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, was adopted in response to the request of President Wilson and consisted of material that now constitutes §§.5 (a) and 5 (i). In a speech to Congress on January 20,1914, the President urged that a statute be enacted that would permit victims of antitrust violations to have “redress upon the facts and judgments proved and entered in suits by the Government” and that “the statute of limitations shall be suffered to run against such litigants only from the date of the conclusion of the Government’s action. It is not fair that the private litigant should be obliged to set up and establish again the facts which the Government has proved.” 51 Cong. Rec. 1964 (1914). This very language of the President was quoted in part in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U. S. 311, 318 (1965). Congress acceded to the President’s request. What is now § 5 (i) was enacted to ensure that private litigants would have the benefit of prior Government antitrust enforcement efforts. 381 U. S., at 317. Here, however, as already has been pointed out, Mt. Hood is seeking to benefit not from a Government antitrust action but from an ICC proceeding that Mt. Hood itself initiated. Accordingly, construing § 5 (i) as applicable to the facts of this case would not serve Congress’ most obvious purpose. It would also fail to give any weight to another related and important congressional purpose. A Ninth Circuit panel very recently emphasized: “Although the plaintiff is correct in asserting that [ § 5 (i) ] serves the broad and beneficent purpose of aiding private antitrust litigants ... it is also true that it is a statute of repose.” Dungan v. Morgan Drive-Away, Inc., 570 F. 2d 867, 869 (1978). This is clear upon examination of the 1955 amendments to the Clayton Act. 69 Stat. 282. Before the§e amendments, the period of limitations under the Clayton Act was determined by state law. This bred confusion in the computation of the period within which a private suit was required to be brought, especially when the Act’s tolling provision (what is now § 5 (i)) came into play. In order to eliminate this confusion, the amendments established a uniform period of limitations of four years and declared that the suspension of the statute would extend “during the pendency” of the federal proceeding and “for one year thereafter.” Finally, the amendments mandated, in what is now the proviso to § 5 (i), that, in the event the statute of limitations is tolled, any private right of action based on the matter complained of in the action by the Government “shall be forever barred unless commenced . . . within four years after the cause of action accrued.” The Senate Report accompanying the 1955 amendments reflects congressional policy against “undue prolongation of [antitrust] proceedings” by extending the limitations period. It noted: “While the committee believes it important to safeguard the rights of plaintiffs by tolling the statute during the pendency of Government antitrust actions, it recognizes that in many instances the long duration of such proceedings taken in conjunction with a lengthy statute of limitations may tend to prolong stale claims, unduly impair efficient business operations, and overburden the calendars of courts. The committee believes the provision of this bill will tend to shorten the period over which private treble-damage actions will extend by requiring that the plaintiff bring his suit within 4 years after it accrued or within 1 year after the Government's case has been concluded. “While the committee considers it highly desirable to toll the statute of limitations during a Government antitrust action and to grant plaintiff a reasonable time thereafter in which to bring suit, it does not believe that the undue prolongation of proceedings is conducive to effective and efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws.” S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1955). In view of the congressional emphasis on certainty and predictability in the application of § 5 (i), the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the United States’ petition to intervene should be treated as the “functional equivalent of a direct action” by the United States, 555 F. 2d, at 700, is unacceptable. A functional-equivalence standard, applied this loosely, resurrects the very confusion and uncertainty concerning the application of the statute of limitations that Congress sought to eliminate in the 1955 amendments. In a case such as this, in which the Government took no position in its initial petition, a functional-equivalence test would require a detailed review of the record in each proceeding to see what position the Government ultimately took and whether its participation was or was not the “functional equivalent of a direct action.” The Government, of course, may well change its position. For example, in Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States, 387 U. S. 485 (1967), the Government intervened in an ICC proceeding with one position, adopted another in the District Court, and then “completely reversed” itself in this Court. Id., at 490-492. Thus, endorsement of the suggested functional-equivalence test would mean that it might be impossible to determine whether Government proceedings would toll the statute until those proceedings were finally resolved. As the Court of Appeals seems to have acknowledged, such an approach would lead to serious problems. 555 F. 2d, at 699 n. 31. See also Dungan v. Morgan Drive-Away, Inc., 570 F. 2d, at 870-871; cf. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U. S., at 65. To be sure, one way around these problems would be to say that the statute is tolled anytime the United States participates in any regulatory proceeding, regardless of what it contends or does in that proceeding. Even respondent, however, appears to recognize the undesirability of this result, and that such an interpretation has no support in the language or history of the statute. Ill We conclude, in sum, that the Clayton Act’s statute of limitations was not tolled, under § 5 (i), by the filing of the Government’s petition to intervene in the ICC proceeding. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 5 (i), as set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 16 (i) (1976 ed.), provides: “Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not including an action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute of limitations in respect to every private or State right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided, however, That whenever the running of the statute of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under section 15 or 15c of this title is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued.” Section 4B, 69 Stat. 283, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 15b (1976 ed.). It provides: “Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections 15, 15a, or 15c of this title shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued. No cause of action barred under existing law on the effective date of this Act shall be revived by this Act.” Petitioner The Greyhound Corporation is a Delaware corporation that now is a diversified holding company owning, among other assets, all the issued and outstanding capital stock of petitioner Greyhound Lines, Inc., a California corporation. On December 31, 1963, The Greyhound Corporation discontinued its operation of scheduled common carrier bus service and transferred its motor carrier operating rights and properties to Greyhound Lines, Inc., App. 68; cf. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 104 M. C. C. 449, 465 (1968). For convenience, we refer to the two corporations collectively as “Greyhound.” The formal transfer of rights and properties at the end of 1963 has no significance for purposes of this litigation. Mt. Hood, however, withdrew its opposition to one of these. See id., at 452. See 555 F. 2d 687, 689 (CA9 1977). This quoted material is from the opinion in the subsequent ICC proceeding instituted by Mt. Hood to reopen the eight acquisition proceedings. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 104 M. C. C., at 452. Greyhound's representations in those eight proceedings were so summarized. This arrangement, initiated in 1949, provided for a through bus from San Francisco to Spokane, using Mt. Hood's bridge route between Klamath Falls and Biggs. The route was shorter by 110 miles and several hours than the all-Greyhound route via Portland. It provided better service to travelers and was profitable for both companies. 555 F. 2d, at 689 n. 3. Section 5 (10) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 90 Stat. 63, 66, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (10) (1976 ed.), provides: “The Commission may from time to time, for good cause shown, make such orders, supplemental to any order made under paragraph (1), (2), or (8), of this section, as it may deem necessary or appropriate.'' Reiterating this point, the United States’ petition, stated: “Mt. Hood’s grave allegations, whether true or false, as well' as Greyhound’s answer raise issues too serious and important to be disposed of summarily without a full adversary hearing in which allegation and denial can be put to the test of proof and cross-examination.” App. 38. Greyhound thereafter disobeyed the three-judge District Court’s order and was adjudged in criminal contempt. Certain of its officers were adjudged in civil contempt. Eines aggregating $600,000 were imposed. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 E. Supp. 525 (ND Ill. 1973), and 370 F. Supp. 881 (ND Ill. 1974), aff’d, 508 F. 2d 529 (CA7 1974). The four-year period of limitations, as already noted, n. 2, swpra, is contained in § 4B of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15b (1976 ed.). Tolling of the statute was essential to the award of all damages beyond the normal four-year period, that is, back beyond July 5, 1964, the date four years prior to the date of filing of the antitrust complaint. The sum of $5,194,617, after trebling, is involved in the tolling issue. Other issues advanced by Greyhound in its petition for certiorari, review of which was not granted, were (a) whether § 5 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (12), and applicable antitrust principles permitted the treble-damages award by the jury’s application of antitrust standards to acquisitions approved by the ICC and to the manner of operation of the acquired companies which is subject to the Commission’s “exclusive and plenary” regulatory authority; (b) whether § 5 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 16 (a) (1976 ed.), permitted the jury to base a finding of violation of the Sherman Act on consent decrees that expressly denied any antitrust violation and were entered before any testimony was taken; and (c) whether §4B of the Clayton Act was tolled by fraudulent concealment. The Government's petition to intervene is clearly distinguishable from the Federal Trade Commission’s complaint that this Court, in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U. S. 311 (1965), held to have tolled the Clayton Act’s period of limitations under the predecessor of § 5 (i), 15 U. S. C. § 16 (b) (1964 ed.). There the FTC had filed a proceeding against the subsequent antitrust defendant under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1964 ed.). It was clear that the Government had actually charged the defendant with violations of the antitrust laws. The subsequent private antitrust action was directly based on the Government’s allegations (which had resulted in a consent order). 381 U. S., at 313, 322-323. The petition to intervene in question here is also distinguishable from eases (the correctness of which we do not address) holding the Clayton Act’s period of limitations to have been tolled by § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. §45 (1976 ed.). See, e. g., Luria Steel & Trading Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 484 F. 2d 1016 (CA3 1973), cert denied, 414 U. S. 1158 (1974); Rader v. Balfour, 440 F. 2d 469 (CA7), cert. denied sub nom. Alpha Chi Omega v. Bader, 404 U. S. 983 (1971); Lippa’s, Inc. v. Lenox, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 182 (Vt. 1969). In each of these cases the Government actually had charged the defendant with, and sought the prevention or punishment of, specific anticompetitive conduct or antitrust violations, and a comparison of the Government’s charges with the private litigant’s complaint showed that the private action was based on the matter complained of by the Government. 15 U. S. C. § 16 (a) (1976 ecL). This section, provides: “A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or c[r]iminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15a of this title, as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15a of this title.” The original version of what is now § 5 (i) provided: “Whenever any suit or proceeding in equity or criminal prosecution is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of each and every private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said suit or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof.” 38 Stat. 731. President Wilson’s message was quoted frequently during the course of the congressional debates to explain the purpose of the amendments. See, e. g., 51 Cong. Rec. 9090, 9488 (1914). 69 Stat. 283, now § 4B of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 15b (1976 ed.). 69 Stat. 283. See also H. R. Rep. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1955). We do not mean to suggest that no rational distinctions concerning the Government’s participation in regulatory proceedings can be drawn. It may be appropriate, in a given case, to apply § 5 (i) where the Government’s petition to intervene in fact charged a violation of the antitrust laws and demanded relief to prevent, restrain, or enjoin that violation. That, however, is not this case, and we expressly decline to offer any view as to the applicability vel non of § 6 (i) in such a context. As already stated, supra, at 329, we limited our grant of certiorari to the issue of the applicability of § 5 (i). Respondent nevertheless argues that even if § 5 (i) is not applicable, the Clayton Act’s statute of limitations was tolled under equitable principles. Pursuant to the terms of our grant of certiorari, we see no compulsion — indeed, no justification — for our reaching this distinct issue. It will be for the Court of Appeals, on remand, to determine whether respondent may argue this point and, if so, its merits. Similarly, we express no view on what other issues may be raised on remand.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. UTAH No. 78-1522. Argued December 5, 1979 Decided May 19, 1980 SteveNS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BrenNAN, Stewart, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and BlackmuN and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 520. Peter Buscemi argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moorman, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, and Carl Strass. Richard L. Dewsnup, Assistant Attorney General of Utah, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General, and Dallin W. Jensen, Michael M. Quealy, and Paul E. Reimann, Assistant Attorneys General. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by George Deukme-jian, Attorney General of California, N. Gregory Taylor and Jan S. Stevens, Assistant Attorneys General, and Stephen H. Mills, Deputy Attorney General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, John F. North, Special Assistant Attorney General of Montana, Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General of Nevada, Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General of New Mexico, and William 0. Jordan, Special Assistant Attorney General, James A. Redden, Attorney General of Oregon, and Peter S. Herman, Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, and Theodore 0. Tone and J. Lawrence Coniff, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, and John D. Troughton, Attorney General of Wyoming, for the State of California et al.; and by David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, and W. Hugh O’Riordan, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of Idaho. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Richard C. Cahoon for Justheim Petroleum Co.; and by Stephen G. Boy den and Scott C. Pugsley for the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of Utah claims the right to select extremely valuable oil shale lands located within federal grazing districts in lieu of and as indemnification for original school land grants of significantly lesser value that were frustrated by federal pre-emption, or private entry, prior to survey. The question presented is whether the Secretary of the Interior is obliged to accept Utah’s selections of substitute tracts of the same size as the originally designated sections even though there is a gross disparity between the value of the original grants and the selected substitutes. We hold that the Secretary’s “grossly disparate value” policy is a lawful exercise of the broad discretion vested in him by § 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1272, as amended in 1936, 49 Stat. 1976, 43 U. S. C. § 315f, and is a valid ground for refusing to accept Utah’s selections. Utah became a State in 1896. In the Utah Enabling Act of 1894, Congress granted Utah, upon admission, four numbered sections in each township for the support of public schools. The statute provided that if the designated sections had already “been sold or otherwise disposed of” pursuant to another Act of Congress, “other lands equivalent thereto . . . are hereby granted.” The substitute grants, denominated “indemnity lands” were “to be selected within the State in such manner as [its] legislature may provide with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.” Because much of the State was not surveyed until long-after its admission to the Union, its indemnity or “in lieu” selections were not made promptly. On September 10, 1965, Utah filed the first of 194 selection lists with the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior covering the land in dispute in this litigation. The 194 indemnity-selections include 157,255.90 acres in Uintah County, Utah, all of which are located within federal grazing districts created pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act. In January 1974, before Utah’s selection lists had been approved or disapproved, the Governor of Utah agreed that the Secretary of the Interior could include two tracts comprising 10,240 acres of selected indemnity lands in an oil shale leasing program, on the understanding that the rental proceeds would ultimately be paid to the State if its selections were approved. The proceeds of the leases are of substantial value. In February 1974, the Secretary advised the Governor that he would not approve any indemnity applications that involved “grossly disparate values.” He wrote: “As you know, the Department of the Interior has not as yet acted upon the State’s [indemnity] applications. The principal question presented by the applications is whether pursuant to Section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1272 (1934), as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 315f (1972), the Department may refuse to convey applied-for lands to a State where the value of those lands greatly exceeds the value of the lost school lands for which the State seeks indemnity. In January 1967, the then Secretary of the Interior adopted the policy that in the exercise of his discretion under, inter alia, Section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act, he would refuse to approve indemnity applications that involve grossly disparate values. That policy remains in effect. “In the present case, although the land values are not precisely determined, it appears that the selections involve lands of grossly disparate values, within the meaning of the Department’s policy. While the Department is not yet prepared to adjudicate the State’s applications, I feel it is appropriate at this time to advise you that we will apply the above-mentioned policy in that adjudication.” The State promptly filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The facts were stipulated, and Judge Ritter entered summary judgment in favor of the State. He held that if Utah’s selections satisfy all of the statutory criteria governing indemnity selections when filed, the Secretary has no discretion to refuse them pursuant to a “grossly disparate value” policy. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, Utah v. Kleppe, 586 F. 2d 756 (1978), holding that § 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act gave the Secretary no authority to classify land as eligible for selection and that the State had a right to select indemnity land of equal acreage without regard to the relative values of the original grants and the indemnity selections. Because the dispute between the parties involves a significant issue regarding the disposition of vast amounts of public lands, we granted certiorari. 442 U. S. 928. We believe that the Court of Appeals and the District Court failed to give proper effect to the congressional policy underlying the provision for indemnity selection, and specifically misconstrued § 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act as amended in 1936. We therefore reverse. I The Enabling Act of each of the public-land States admitted into the Union since 1802 has included grants of designated sections of federal lands for the purpose of supporting public schools. Whether the Enabling Act contained words of present or future grant, title to the numbered sections did not vest in the State until completion of an official survey. Prior to survey, the Federal Government remained free to dispose of the designated lands “in any manner and for any purpose consistent with applicable federal statutes.” In recognition of the fact that the essentially random grants in place might therefore be unavailable at the time of survey for a variety of reasons, Congress authorized grants of indemnity or “lieu” lands of equal acreage. As Utah correctly emphasizes, the school land grant was a “solemn agreement” which in some ways may be analogized to a contract between private parties. The United States agreed to cede some of its land to the State in exchange for a commitment by the State to use the revenues derived from the land to educate the citizenry. The State’s right to select indemnity lands may be viewed as the remedy stipulated by the parties for the Federal Government’s failure to perform entirely its promise to grant the specific numbered sections. The fact that the Utah Enabling Act used the phrase “lands equivalent thereto” and described the substituted lands as “indemnity lands” implies that the purpose of the substitute selections was to provide the State with roughly the same resources with which to support its schools as it would have had had it actually received all of the granted sections in place. Thus, as is typical of private contract remedies, the purpose of the right to make indemnity selections was to give the State the benefit of the bargain. The history of the general statutes relating to land grants for school purposes confirms this view. ■ Thus, for example, in 1859, when confronted with the fact that many settlers had occupied unsurveyed lands that had been included in school grants, Congress confirmed the settlers’ claims and granted to the States “other lands of like quantity.” Ch. 58, 11 Stat. 385. The substitution of an equal quantity of land provided the States a rough measure of equal value. The school land grants gave the States a random selection of public lands subject, however, to one important exception. The original school land grants in general, and Utah’s in particular, did not include any numbered sections known to be mineral in character by the time of survey. United States v. Sweet, 245 U. S. 563. This Court so held even though the Utah Enabling Act “neither expressly includes mineral lands nor expressly excludes them.” Id., at 567. The Court’s opinion stressed “the practice of Congress to make a distinction between mineral lands and other lands, to deal with them along different lines, and to withhold mineral lands from disposal save under laws specially including them.” Ibid. Mineral lands were thus excluded not only from the original grants in place but also from the indemnity selections. Since mineral resources provide both the most significant potential source of value and the greatest potential for variation in value in the generally arid western lands, the total exclusion of mineral lands from the school land grants is consistent with an intent that the States’ indemnity selections of equal acreage approximate the value of the numbered sections lost. In 1927, some nine years after the decision in United States v. Sweet, supra, Congress changed its policy to allow grants of school lands to embrace numbered sections that were mineral in character. But the 1927 statute did not expand the kinds of land available for indemnity selections. Thus, after 1927 even if the lost school lands were mineral in character, a State was prohibited from selecting mineral lands as indemnity. It was not until 1958 that Congress gave the States the right to select mineral lands to replace lost school lands, and that right was expressly conditioned on a determination that the lost lands were also mineral in character. 72 Stat. 928, 43 U. S. C. § 852. See n. 5, supra. For 30 years, then, States were not even permitted to select lands roughly equivalent in value to replace lost mineral lands. The condition in the 1958 statute, that the lost lands be mineral in character before mineral lands could be selected as indemnity, rather clearly reflects an intention to restore the character of the indemnity selection as a substitute of roughly equal value. Throughout the history of congressional consideration of school land grants and related subjects — a history discussed at great length in the voluminous briefs submitted to us — we find no evidence whatever of any congressional desire to have the right to select indemnity lands do anything more than make the States whole for the loss of value resulting from the unavailability of the originally designated cross section of lands within the State. There is certainly no suggestion of a purpose at any time, including 1958, to allow the States to obtain substantially greater values through the process of selecting indemnity land. Thus, viewing the program in this broad historical perspective, it is difficult to identify any sensible justification for Utah’s position that it is entitled to select any mineral lands it chooses regardless of the value of the school sections lost. Nevertheless, Utah is quite correct in arguing that the Secretary has no power to reject its selections unless Congress has given it to him. We have no doubt that it has. II Prior to the 1930’s, cases in this Court had made it perfectly clear that the Federal Government retained the power to appropriate public lands embraced within school grants for other purposes if it acted in a timely fashion. On the other hand, it was equally clear that the States’ title to unappropriated land in designated sections could not be defeated after survey, and that their right to indemnity selections could not be rejected if they satisfied the statutory criteria when made, and if the selections were filed before the lands were appropriated for other purposes. The authority of the Secretary of the Interior was limited to determining whether the States’ indemnity selections met the relevant statutory criteria. See Wyoming v. United States, 255 U. S. 489; Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U. S. 367, 371. In the 1930’s, however, dissatisfaction with the rather loose regime governing use and disposition of unappropriated federal lands, prompted mostly by the waste caused by unregulated stock grazing, led to a series of congressional and executive actions that are critical to this case. By means of these actions, all unappropriated federal lands were withdrawn from every form of entry or selection. The withdrawal did not affect the original school land grants in place, whether or not surveyed, but did include all lands then available for school indemnity selections. The lands thus withdrawn were thereafter available for indemnity selections only as permitted by the Secretary of the Interior in the exercise of his discretion. The sequence of events was as follows. In 1934, Congress enacted the Taylor Grazing Act “[t]o stop injury to the public grazing lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration, to provide for their orderly use, improvement, and development, to stabilize the livestock industry dependent upon the public range, and for other purposes.” 48 Stat. 1269. Section 1 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to establish grazing districts in up to 80 million acres of unappropriated federal lands; the establishment of such a district had the effect of withdrawing all lands within its boundaries “from all forms of entry of settlement.” That section also expressly provided that “Nothing in this Act shall be construed in any way ... to affect any land heretofore or hereafter surveyed which, except for the provisions of this Act, would be a part of any grant to any State. . . Thus, § 1 preserved the original school land grants, whether or not the designated sections had already been identified by survey, but the statute made no provision for school indemnity selections. Because the Taylor Grazing Act as originally passed in 1934 applied to less than half of the federal lands in need of more orderly regulation, President Roosevelt promptly issued Executive Order No. 6910 withdrawing all of the unappropriated and unreserved public lands in 12 Western States, including Utah, from “settlement, location, sale or entry” pending a determination of the best use of the land. The withdrawal affected the land covered by the Taylor Grazing Act as well as land not covered by the statute. The President’s authority to issue Executive Order No. 6910 was expressly conferred by the Pickett Act. Congress responded to Executive Order No. 6910 by amending the Taylor Grazing Act in 1936 in two respects that are relevant to this case. First, it expanded the acreage subject to the Act, see n. 18, supra. Second, it revised § 7 of the Act, see n. 17, supra, to give the Secretary the authority, in his discretion, to classify both lands within grazing districts and lands withdrawn by the recent Executive Order as proper not only for homesteading, but also, for the first time, for satisfaction of any outstanding “lieu” rights, and to open such lands to “selection.” The section, thus amended, provided in pertinent part: “The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to examine and classify any lands withdrawn or reserved by Executive order ... or within a grazing district, which are . . . proper for acquisition in satisfaction of any outstanding lieu, exchange or script rights or land grant, and to open such lands to entry, selection, or location for disposal in accordance with such classification under applicable public-land laws. . . . Such lands shall not he subject to disposition . . . until after the same have been classified. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The changes in this section were apparently prompted in part by the fact that while the Taylor Grazing Act withdrawal preserved the States’ school grants in place, no provision had been made in the 1934 version for the States’ indemnity selections from land within grazing districts even though the States had expressed the concern that “the establishment of a grazing district would restrict the State in its indemnity selections.” While this omission may not have been critical in 1934 when the Act was passed — since only about half of the unappropriated federal land was then affected — by 1936, as a consequence of Executive Order No. 6910, no land at all was available in the public domain for indemnity selections. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the amendments to § 7 were at least in part a response to the complaint expressed in congressional hearings in 1935, that there was no land available under current law for indemnity-selections. The 1936 amendment to § 7 rectified that problem, but did not give the States a completely free choice in making indemnity selections. Rather, Congress decided to route the States’ selections through § 7, and thereby to condition their acceptance on the Secretary’s discretion. That decision was consistent with the dominant purpose of both the Act and Executive Order No. 6910 to exert firm control over the Nation’s land resources through the Department of the Interior. In sum, the Taylor Grazing Act, coupled with the withdrawals by Executive Order, “locked up” all of the federal lands in the Western States pending further action by Congress or the President, except as otherwise permitted in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior for the limited purposes specified in § 7. This was Congress’ understanding of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1958 when it amended the school land indemnity selection statute to permit selection of mineral lands. Both the House and Senate Reports specifically noted and adopted the Department of the Interior’s assumption “ 'that nothing in this bill is intended to affect the rights or duties of States under other laws’ and, in particular, 'that no change is intended to be made in section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act, as amended (43 U. S. C., sec. 315f).’ ” H. R. Rep. No. 2347, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1958). Since Congress was specifically dealing with school indemnity selections, the Reports make it perfectly clear that Congress deemed school indemnity selections to be subject to § 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act. And since the congressional decision in 1958 to allow school land indemnity selections to embrace mineral lands was expressly conditioned on a determination that the lost school lands were also mineral in character, it is manifest that Congress did not intend to grant the States any windfall. It only intended to restore to the States a rough approximation of what was lost. See n. 14, supra. We therefore hold that the 1936 amendment to the Taylor Grazing Act conferred on the Secretary the authority in his discretion to classify lands within a federal grazing district as proper for school indemnity selection. And we find no merit in the argument that the Secretary’s “grossly disparate value” policy constitutes an abuse of the broad discretion thus conferred. On the contrary, that policy is wholly faithful to Congress’ consistent purpose in providing for indemnity selections, to give the States a rough equivalent of the school land grants in place that were lost through pre-emption or private entry prior to survey. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. “That upon the admission of said State [Utah] into the Union, sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-six in every township of said proposed State, and where such sections or any parts thereof have been sold or otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any Act of Congress other lands equivalent thereto, in legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter section and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said State for the support of common schools, such indemnity lands to be selected within said State in such manner as the legislature may provide, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior: Provided, That the second, sixteenth, thirty-second, and thirty-sixth sections embraced in permanent reservations for national purposes shall not, at any time, be subject to the grants nor to the indemnity provisions of this Act, nor shall any lands embraced in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character be subject to the grants or to the indemnity provisions of this Act until the reservation shall have been extinguished and such lands be restored to and become a part of the public domain.” 28 Stat. 109 (emphasis added). The District Court found that as of May 25, 1976, $48,291,840 had been accumulated. App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. It should be noted that these proceeds were derived from only 10,240 acres out of the total area selected comprising over 157,000 acres. Suggested guidelines of the Department of the Interior provide that the policy will not be applied unless the estimated value of the selected lands exceeds that of the base lands by more than $100 per acre or 25% whichever is greater. If the values are grossly disparate using those criteria, the case will be submitted to the Washington office for evaluation of all the circumstances. App. 44-45. Letter of February 14, 1974, from Rogers Morton, Secretary of the Interior, to Calvin Rampton, Governor of the State of Utah. Id., at 61. The statute provides, in part: “§ 851. Deficiencies in grants to State by reason of settlements, etc., on designated sections generally “Where settlements with a view to preemption or homestead have been, or shall hereafter be made, before the survey of the lands in the field, which are found to have been made on sections sixteen or thirty-six, those sections shall be subject to the claims of such settlers; and if such sections or either of them have been or shall be granted, reserved, or pledged for the use of schools or colleges in the State in which they lie, other lands of equal acreage are hereby appropriated and granted, and may be selected, in accordance with the provisions of section 852 of this title, by said State, in lieu of such as may be thus taken by preemption or homestead settlers. And other lands of equal acreage are also hereby appropriated and granted and may be selected, in accordance with the provisions of section 852 of this title, by said State where sections sixteen or thirty-six are, before title could pass to the State, included within any Indian, military, or other reservation, or are, before title could pass to the State, otherwise disposed of by the United States: Provided, That the selection of any lands under this section in lieu of sections granted or reserved to a State shall be a waiver by the State of its right to the granted or reserved sections. And other lands of equal acreage are also appropriated and granted, and may be selected, in accordance with the provisions of section 852 of this title, by said State to compensate deficiencies for school purposes, where sections sixteen or thirty-six are fractional in quantity, or where one or both are wanting by reason of the township being fractional, or from any natural cause whatever. And it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior, without awaiting the extension of the public surveys, to ascertain and determine, by protraction or otherwise, the number of townships that will be included within such Indian, military, or other reservations, and thereupon the State shall be entitled to select indemnity lands to the extent of section for section in lieu of sections therein which have been or shall be granted, reserved, or pledged; but such selections may not be made within the boundaries of said reservation: Provided, however, That nothing in this section contained shall prevent any State from awaiting the extinguishment of any such military, Indian, or other reservation and the restoration of the lands therein embraced to the public domain and then taking the sections sixteen and thirty-six in place therein.” 43 U. S. C. § 851. “§ 852. Selections to supply deficiencies of school lands “(a) Restrictions “The lands appropriated by section 851 of this title shall be selected from any unappropriated, surveyed or unsurveyed public lands within the State where such losses or deficiencies occur subject to the following restrictions: “(1) No lands mineral in character may be selected by a State except to the extent that the selection is being made as indemnity for mineral lands lost to the State because of appropriation before title could pass to the State; “(2) No lands on a known geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field may be selected except to the extent that the selection is being made as indemnity for lands on such a structure lost to the State because of appropriation before title could pass to the State; and “(3) Land subject to a mineral lease or permit may be selected if none of the land subject to that lease or permit is in a producing or producible status, subject, however, to the restrictions and conditions of the preceding and following paragraphs of this subsection.” 43 U. S. C. §852 (a). Title 43 U. S. C. § 853 provides that in applying this statute to Utah, the words “sections sixteen and thirty-six” also include sections,two and thirty-two. “Because the western states are the ones most recently admitted to the Union and because Utah and Arizona are two of the three states that received particularly large grants, the remaining indemnity selection rights are concentrated in seven western states. Utah and Arizona alone hold nearly 70% of the outstanding indemnity rights. The approximate number of acres still to be selected in each state (and thus the approximate number of acres potentially affected by this lawsuit) is as follows: Arizona, 170,000 acres; California, 108,000 acres; Colorado, 17,000 acres; Idaho, 27,000 acres; Montana, 22,900 acres; Utah, 225,000 acres; and Wyoming, 1,100 acres.” Brief for Petitioner 4-5, n. 2. “The first enactment for the sale of public lands in the western territory provided for setting apart section sixteen of every township for the maintenance of public schools (Ordinance of 1785; Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173, 177); and, in carrying out this policy, grants were made for common school purposes to each of the public-land States admitted to the Union. Between the years 1802 and 1846 the grants were of every section sixteen, and, thereafter, of sections sixteen and thirty-six. In some instances, additional sections have been granted.” United States v. Morrison, 240 U. S. 192, 198 (footnotes omitted). “It has consistently been held that under the terms of the grants hitherto considered by this Court, title to unsurveyed sections of the public lands which have been designated as school lands does not pass to the State upon its admission into the Union, but remains in the Federal Government until the land is surveyed. Prior to survey, those sections are a part of the public lands of the United States and may be disposed of by the Government in any manner and for any purpose consistent with applicable federal statutes. If upon survey it is found that the Federal Government has made a previous disposition of the section, the State is then entitled to select lieu lands as indemnity in accordance with provisions incorporated into each of the school-land grants. The interest of the State vests at the date of its admission into the Union only as to those sections which are surveyed at that time and which previously have not been disposed of by the Federal Government.” United States v. Wyoming, 331 U. S. 440, 443-444 (footnote omitted). These include the establishment of reservations for Indians or federal military purposes, and entries by individuals under the homestead laws. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Lane, 245 U. S. 427, 432-433. See Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold & Silver Mining Co., 93 U. S. 634, 639-640: “Until the status of the lands was fixed by a survey, and they were capable of identification, Congress reserved absolute power over them; and if in exercising it the whole or any part of a 16th or 36th section had been disposed of, the State was to be compensated by other lands equal in quantity, and as near as may be in quality.” (Emphasis added.) Under the 1891 general indemnity selection statute then in effect, selections were limited to “unappropriated, surveyed public lands, not mineral in character.” 26 Stat. 796-797. The Act of January 25, 1927, 44 Stat. 1026-1027, provided that “the several grants to the States of numbered sections in place for the support or in aid of common or public schools be, and they are hereby, extended to embrace numbered school sections mineral in character.” See 43 U. S. C. § 870. “[T]his Act shall not apply to indemnity or lieu selections or exchanges or the right hereafter to select indemnity for numbered school sections in place lost to the State under the provisions of this or other Acts, and all existing laws governing such grants and indemnity or lieu selections and exchanges are hereby continued in full force and effect.” 44 Stat. 1027, 43 U. S. C. § 871. “Under present law the States are restricted to selecting non-mineral lands to replace forfeited school sections even when these sections are mineralized. There appears to be little equity in this situation.” H. R. Rep. No. 2347, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1958). “The objective of this legislation is merely to make whole the States which have pending in lieu selections of lands for preempted school sections.” Remarks of Senator Watkins of Utah, 104 Cong. Rec. 11921 (1958). See H. R. Rep. No. 903, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 11139 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Adams of Colorado). “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in order to promote the highest use of the public lands pending its final disposal, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, by order to establish grazing districts or additions thereto and/or to modify the boundaries thereof, not exceeding in the aggregate an area of eighty million acres of vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved lands from any part of the public domain of the United States (exclusive of Alaska), which are not in national forests, national parks and monuments, Indian reservations, re-vested Oregon and California Railroad grant lands, or revested Coos Bay Wagon Road grant lands, and which in his opinion are chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops: Provided, That no lands withdrawn or reserved for any other purpose shall be included in any such district except with the approval of the head of the department having jurisdiction thereof. Nothing in this Act shall be construed in any way to diminish, restrict, or impair any right which has been heretofore or may be hereafter initiated under existing law validly affecting the public lands, and which is maintained pursuant to such law except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, nor to affect any land heretofore or hereafter surveyed which, except for the provisions of this Act, would be a part of any grant to any State, nor as limiting or restricting the power or authority of any State as to matters within its jurisdiction. Whenever any grazing district is established pursuant to this Act, the Secretary shall grant to owners of land adjacent to such district, upon application of any such owner, such rights-of-way over the lands included in such district for stock-driving purposes as may be necessary for the convenient access by any such owner to marketing facilities or to lands not within such district owned by such person or upon which such person has stock-grazing rights. Neither this Act nor the Act of December 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 862; U. S. C., title 43, secs. 291 and following), commonly known as the 'Stock Raising Homestead Act’, shall bei construed as limiting the authority or policy of Congress or the President to include in national forests public lands of the character described in section 24 of the Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1103; U. S. C., title 16, sec. 471), as amended, for the purposes set forth in the Act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat. 35; U. S. C., title 16, sec. 475), or such other purposes as Congress may specify. Before grazing districts are created in any State as herein provided, a hearing shall be held in the State, after public notice thereof shall have been given, at such location convenient for the attendance of State officials, and the settlers, residents, and livestock owners of the vicinity, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior. No such district shall be established until the expiration of ninety days after such notice shall have been given, nor until twenty days after such hearing shall be held: Provided, however, That the publication of such notice shall have the effect of withdrawing all public lands within the exterior boundary of such proposed grazing districts from all forms of entry of settlement. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as in any way altering or restricting the right to hunt or fish within a grazing district in accordance with the laws of the United States or of any State, or as vesting in any permittee any right whatsoever to interfere with hunting or fishing within a grazing district.” 48 Stat. 1269-1270. Section 7 of the Act authorized the Secretary “. . .in his discretion, to examine and classify any lands within such grazing districts which are more valuable and suitable for the production of agricultural crops than native grasses and forage plants, and to open such lands to homestead entry in tracts not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres in area. Such lands shall not be subject to settlement or occupation as homesteads until after same have been classified and opened to entry after notice to the permittee by the Secretary of the Interior, and the lands shall remain a part of the grazing district until patents are issued therefor, the homesteader to be, after his entry is allowed, entitled to the possession and use thereof: Provided, That upon the application of any person qualified to make homestead entry under the public-land laws, filed in the land office of the proper district, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause any tract not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres in any grazing district to be classified, and such application shall entitle the applicant to a preference right to enter such lands when opened to entry as herein provided.” 48 Stat. 1272. The bill originally introduced by Congressman Taylor in 1934 (H. R. 6462, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.) purported to authorize the protection of 173 million acres of public range lands by including them within grazing districts. As enacted, however, the statute covered a maximum of 80 million acres. This figure was increased to 142 million acres in 1936, 49 Stat. 1976, and the acreage limitation was removed entirely in 1954. 68 Stat. 151. The Order, quoted in Executive Withdrawal Order, 55 I. D. 205, 206-207 (1935), reads as follows: “WHEREAS, the act of June 28, 1934 (ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269), provides, among other things, for the prevention of injury to the public grazing lands by overgrazing and soil deterioration; provides for the orderly use, improvement and development of such lands; and provides for the stabilization of the livestock industry dependent upon the public range; and “WHEREAS, in furtherance of its purposes, said act provides for the creation of grazing districts to include an aggregate area of not more than eighty million acres of vacant, unreserved and unappropriated lands from any part of the public domain of the United States; provides for the exchange of State owned and privately owned lands for unreserved, surveyed public lands of the United States; provides for the sale of isolated or disconnected tracts of the public domain; and provides for the leasing for grazing purposes of isolated or disconnected tracts of vacant, unreserved and unappropriated lands of the public domain; and “WHEREAS, said act provides that the President of the United States may order that unappropriated public lands be placed under national forest administration, if, in his opinion, the land be best adapted thereto; and “WHEREAS, said act provides for the use of public land for the conservation or propagation of wild life; and “WHEREAS, I find and declare that it is necessary to classify all of the vacant, unreserved and unappropriated lands of the public domain within certain States for the purpose of effective administration of the provisions of said act ; “NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the act of June 25, 1910 (ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847), as amended by the act of August 24, 1912 (ch. 369, 37 Stat. 497), and subject to the conditions therein expressed, it is ordered that all of the vacant, unreserved, and unappropriated public land in the States of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming be, and it hereby is, temporarily withdrawn from settlement, location, sale or entry, and reserved for classification, and pending determination of the most useful purpose to which such land may be put in consideration of the provisions of said act of June 28, 1934, and for conservation and development of natural resources. “The withdrawal hereby effected is subject to existing valid rights. “This order shall continue in full force and effect unless and until revoked by the President or by act of Congress.” In that Act, passed in 1910, Congress gave the President the authority to withdraw any public lands from “settlement, location, sale or entry”: “[T]he President may, at any time in his discretion, temporarily withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States . . . and reserve the same for water-power sites, irrigation, classification of lands, or other public purposes to be specified in the orders of withdrawals, and such withdrawals or reservations shall remain in force until revoked by him or by an Act of Congress.” Ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847. Although the description of the withdrawal power does not specifically mention state indemnity selections, the power as described is so broad and general that it seems clear that had such an exception been intended, Congress would have made it express. In Wyoming v. United States, 255 U. S. 489, this Court plainly indicated that an executive withdrawal of federal land under the Pickett Act would defeat a later attempt to select any part of such land as indemnity for lost school sections. The holding in the case was that an indemnity selection’s validity should be tested as of the time made, and that a subsequent Pickett Act withdrawal could not defeat an earlier selection by the State that was otherwise valid. If a Pickett Act withdrawal could not preclude a school land indemnity selection, there would have been no need for the Court to reach the timeliness issue. The Pickett Act was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, §704 (a), 90 Stat. 2792, but all previous withdrawals under the Pickett Act were expressly preserved unless and until modified. §701 (c), 90 Stat. 2786. In January 1936, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 7274, which excluded from the operation of Executive Order No. 6910 lands which were then or which were thereafter placed within federal grazing districts. Once land was placed within a grazing district, the purpose of Order No. 6910 was, of course, satisfied. Section 7 of the Act, 48 Stat. 1272, as amended by the Act of June 26, 1936, § 2, 49 Stat. 1976, as set forth in 43 U. S. C. § 315f, reads in its entirety as follows: “The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to examine and classify any lands withdrawn or reserved by Executive order of November 26, 1934 (numbered 6910), and amendments thereto, and Executive order of February 5, 1935 (numbered 6964), or within a grazing district, which are more valuable or suitable for the production of agricultural crops than for the production of native grasses and forage plants, or more valuable or suitable for any other use than for the use provided for under this subchapter or proper for acquisition in satisfaction of any outstanding lieu, exchange or script rights or land grant, and to open such lands to entry, selection, or location for disposal in accordance with such classification under applicable public-land laws, except that homestead entries shall not be allowed for tracts exceeding three hundred and twenty acres in area. Such lands shall not be subject to disposition, settlement, or occupation until after the same have been classified and opened to entry: Provided, That locations and entries under the mining laws including the Act of February 25, 1920, as amended, may be made upon such withdrawn and reserved areas without regard to classification and without restrictions or limitation by any provision of this subehapter. Where such lands are located within grazing districts reasonable notice shall be given by the Secretary of the Interior to any grazing permittee of such lands. The applicant, after his entry, selection, or location is allowed, shall be entitled to the possession and use of such lands: Provided, That upon the application of any applicant qualified to make entry, selection, or location, under the public-land laws, filed in the land office of the proper district, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause any tract to be classified, and such application, if allowed by the Secretary of the Interior, shall entitle the applicant to a preference right to enter, select, or locate such lands if opened to entry as herein provided.” Letter of Fred W. Johnson, Commissioner of the General Land Office, Department of the Interior, reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 903, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1934). See statement of John H. Page of Phoenix, Ariz.: “[T]oo much thought in all of the hearings on the act was given to the grazing features, and very little attention was given to the mechanics and as to how it would affect all of the public-land laws that we have been functioning under. The result is that we are now tied up in just one general withdrawal of all public lands, and everything in the public-land structure and in all of the public-land laws and the contractual relations between the Government — and I refer to existing exchange acts and everything — they have all ceased to function. “There is no land that can be acquired, there is no land that can be filed on for any purpose. “I think all of you Senators will agree with me that there are other uses of the remaining public lands besides grazing. I term it generally to distinguish it from grazing, the use for industrial purposes; in other words, in Arizona a great many of our town sites or smelter sites and the like; those which have everything to do with industry, the title usually has been acquired by exchange selection, scrip, State selections. . . . “When this bill was before Congress, I wrote our Senators and a great many of us did from Arizona, that we were all in sympathy with the grazing use, but that our fear was that they would get a little too enthusiastic about it and withdraw everything. In other words, I forecasted what has resulted, and I think in some measure that I was responsible for the 80,000,000-acre limitation that was put in. You remember that, Senator Hayden. “That was just so that they would have to take the land that was suitable and not include everything. But then there was immediately, when it commenced to be administered, a general withdrawal of all remaining public lands.” Hearing on S. 2539 before the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935). That it was understood that no land was available for the States' school land indemnity selections was confirmed by Senator Hayden at the same hearings. In response to Mr. Page's observation that there was no land open to entry in Arizona for exercise of railroad-grant exchange rights, the Senator observed: “The same thing would be true of a grant made to a State for university purposes or an indemnity selection.” Id., at 15. Further, it was the clear position of the Interior Department in 1935 that all of the land withdrawn under President Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 6910 was unavailable for school land indemnity selections. See State of Arizona, 55 I. D. 249, 253 (1935): “The law provides that indemnity lands may be taken for the school sections lost, but through the withdrawal of all public lands, there is no indemnity land to be obtained.” Utah argues (see also dissenting opinion, post, at 530, n. 14) that the word “grant” in § 1 of the Taylor Grazing Act in the phrase, “[n]oth-ing in this Act shall be construed in any way ... to affect any land . . . which . . . [is] part of any grant to any State,” includes not only grants in place but also the right to indemnity selections. If Utah’s construction of the language were correct, there would have been no need to amend § 7 to authorize indemnity selections. Moreover, even if indemnity selections were contemplated by that phrase in § 1, the 1936 amendment to § 7 still requires that the lands selected first be reclassified by the Secretary in his discretion. S. Rep. No. 1735, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1958): “Reports of the Secretary of the Interior on S. 2517 and H. R. 12117 [which contained the language just quoted from the House Report] are incorporated .as a part of this report.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SUMMIT VALLEY INDUSTRIES, INC. v. LOCAL 112, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS OF AMERICA No. 81-497. Argued April 28, 1982 Decided June 1, 1982 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Donald C. Robinson argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. David S. Pauli argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Paul T. Bailey. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and George Kaufmann filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 61 Stat. 158, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 187, authorizes the recovery of attorney’s fees incurred in prior proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board (Board). 454 U. S. 1079 (1981). The Courts of Appeals have divided on this issue. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that attorney’s fees may not be recovered. We affirm. r — i Petitioner Summit Valley Industries, Inc. (Summit Valley), manufactures prefabricated modular homes. These homes are completed at petitioner’s plant and sold directly to home buyers. The buyer then independently obtains the services of a local contractor to install the completed home and to attach ancillary structures. In June 1972, Summit Valley opened a plant in the Butte, Mont., area. Rather than utilizing skilled union carpenters at this plant, petitioner hired unskilled workers. These workers were represented by Butte Teamsters Union, Local No. 2 (Teamsters), under a collective-bargaining agreement between the Teamsters and Summit Valley. Upon learning that Summit Valley employed no skilled carpenters, respondent Local 112 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Union) filed unfair labor practice charges against Summit Valley. The Union claimed that Summit Valley had violated a valid work-preservation agreement between the Union and area contractor associations. Although the Union withdrew these charges when it realized that Summit Valley was not a signatory to the agreement, it ordered its members not to work on the installation of petitioner’s homes. On at least two occasions, Summit Valley sent its own employees to complete the installation work that would otherwise have been done by the Union. As a result, respondent began picketing petitioner’s plant. Summit Valley filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Union, alleging that respondent’s work stoppage and picketing violated the secondary boycott and jurisdictional picketing prohibitions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). §§ 8(b)(4)(B) and (D) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(b)(4)(B) and (D). The Regional Director of the Board initiated a § 10(l) proceeding, 29 U. S. C. § 160(l), in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. The District Court imposed a temporary restraining order pending the outcome of the proceeding before the Board. Henderson v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 112, Civ. Nos. 2235 & 2239 (1972). The Union ceased picketing in November 1972, and its members resumed the installation of Summit Valley’s homes. Summit Valley then initiated a § 10(k) proceeding, 29 U. S. C. §160(k), seeking resolution of its claim that the Union had engaged in illegal jurisdictional picketing, prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(D). After a 2-day hearing, the Board found against the Union, holding that Summit Valley had validly assigned the work in question to the Teamsters. Carpenters, Local 112 (Summit Valley Industries), 202 N. L. R. B. 974, 83 LRRM 1013 (1973). The Union agreed not to pressure Summit Valley to reassign work in violation of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Teamsters. However, the Union maintained that it had the right to truthfully advise the public that petitioner did not employ its members in the construction of modular homes. After the § 10(k) proceeding, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted 15 days of hearings on the unfair labor practice charges. The ALJ concluded that the Union had violated §§ 8(b)(4)(B) and (D), but that the Union had sought to enforce the work-preservation clause on the good-faith belief that its actions were lawful. The Board adopted the findings of the ALJ, and it ordered the Union to cease and desist from these unfair labor practices, and to fully comply with the Board’s order obtained as a result of the § 10(k) proceeding. Carpenters, Local 112 (Summit Valley Industries), 217 N. L. R. B. 902, 89 LRRM 1799 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board’s order. Chamber of Commerce of United States v. NLRB, 574 F. 2d 457 (1978). This action was filed pursuant to § 303 of the LMR A in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. Summit Valley sought damages resulting from the Union’s illegal secondary and jurisdictional activity in the amount of $17,279.33: $3,675.00 in business losses, and $13,604.33 in attorney’s fees incurred during the Board proceedings. The District Court found that the Board’s decision that the Union had committed unfair labor practices collaterally estopped the Union from relitigating this issue in the §303 action. Relying on Mead v. Retail Clerks International Assn., 523 F. 2d 1371 (CA9 1975), the District Court concluded that Summit Valley was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees as part of its damages. The court entered judgment for Summit Valley, awarding it an amount that represented its business losses. 475 F. Supp. 665 (1979). The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam. Civ. No. 79-4663 (CA9 1981); 652 F. 2d 65 (1981) (affirmance order). r-H HH Under the American Rule it is well established that attorney’s fees “are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing therefor.” Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714, 717 (1967). This Court has endorsed certain exceptions to this rule where necessary to further the interests of justice. See, e. g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U. S. 527 (1962) (bad faith); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399 (1923) (willful disobedience of a court order); Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116 (1885) (common fund). In the absence of one of these equitable exceptions, however, the rule has been consistently followed for almost 200 years. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 249-250 (1975); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306 (1796). Recognizing this consistent adherence to the American Rule, petitioner contends that § 303 provides express statutory authorization for the recovery of attorney’s fees incurred in prior Board proceedings. We find this contention unsupported by either the language or the legislative history of § 303. Section 303 authorizes a private damages action for an employer who has been injured by a union’s unfair labor practice. Section 303(a), 29 U. S. C. § 187(a), makes it unlawful for a labor organization to engage in conduct defined as an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. As a remedy for this conduct § 303(b) provides that “[wjhoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.” 29 U. S. C. § 187(b). Section 303 does not expressly provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees, so we are not presented with a situation where Congress has made “specific and explicit provisions for the allowance of” such fees. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, supra, at 260, and n. 33 (collecting statutes). Nonetheless, Summit Valley argues that § 303 does specifically authorize a district court to award attorney’s fees incurred for the purpose of terminating the Union’s illegal secondary activity by providing for the recovery of “damages” resulting from this activity. Because attorney’s fees expended to compel “‘resumption of work in effect take the place of other compensable damages which would continue to be suffered if work were not resumed,’” petitioner asserts that such fees are part of the damages caused by the Union’s illegal activity. Brief for Petitioner 13, quoting Associated General Contractors v. Construction and General Laborers Local 563, 612 F. 2d 1060, 1064 (CA8 1979). In assessing petitioner’s interpretation of the word “damages” in § 303(b), we begin with the “fundamental canon of statutory construction . . . that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1975). Ordinarily a statutory right to “damages” does not include an implicit authorization to award attorney’s fees. Indeed, the American Rule presumes that the word “damages” means damages exclusive of fees. See, e. g., Arcambel v. Wiseman, supra; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363 (1852); cf. Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252, 260, n. 15 (1964). Thus, petitioner’s claim can succeed only if an examination of the relevant legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to give a broader than normal scope to the term “damages.” Our review of the legislative history of §303 reveals no such intention. To the contrary, the little discussion pertaining to the scope of an employer’s recovery under § 303(b) indicates that Congress did not intend to expand the term “damages” to include attorney’s fees. The following colloquy between Senator Taft and Senator Morse is particularly instructive. In response to Senator Morse’s suggestion that § 303(b) would impose virtually unlimited liability on unions, Senator Taft stated: “Under the Sherman Act the same question of boycott damage is subject to a suit for damages and attorneys’ fees. In this case we simply provide for the amount of the actual damages.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4872-4873 (1947) (emphasis added). We find these remarks persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend attorney’s fees which were expended to stop a union from engaging in illegal activity to be recovered as “damages” under § 303(b). In this respect, petitioner’s claim is analogous to that presented in Teamsters v. Morton, supra. In Teamsters, this Court reviewed the history and policies underlying § 303 in order to determine whether that provision authorized an award of punitive damages. Relying on the same colloquy quoted above, we concluded that “recovery for an employer’s business losses caused by a union’s peaceful secondary activity proscribed by § 303 should be limited to actual, compensatory damages.” Id., at 260. As we have often noted, one of the primary justifications for the American Rule is that “one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit.” Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S., at 718 (emphasis added). See also, F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U. S. 116, 129 (1974); Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U. S. 227, 235 (1964). The congressional intention discerned in Teamsters to limit recovery to actual, compensatory damages, counsels against reading the word “damages” to include attorney’s fees incurred during prior Board proceedings. Nevertheless Summit Valley contends that allowing it to recover reasonable attorney’s fees incurred during Board proceedings furthers the statutory intent to protect employers from the adverse effects of a union’s illegal secondary activity. We agree that Congress was concerned about protecting employers from injury arising out of this type of activity when it enacted §303. See generally S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 54-55 (1947), 1 Legislative History of the LMRA 460-461 (1974) (Leg. Hist.); 93 Cong. Rec. 5060 (1947), 2 Leg. Hist. 1371 (remarks of Sen. Taft). However, we fail to see why this interest cannot be adequately protected by the award of compensatory damages for the business losses resulting from the Union’s prohibited conduct. Ultimately, petitioner’s argument rests on the assumption that “Congress plainly intended Section 303 to be fully remedial and to restore to the victimized employer all . . . losses caused by the illegal activity.” Brief for Petitioner 23 (emphasis added). Even assuming that attorney’s fees are necessary to achieve full compensation, this justification alone is not sufficient to create an exception to the American Rule in the absence of express congressional authority. See F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., supra, at 128-129. In F. D. Rich, this Court rejected the argument that attorney’s fees should be awarded under the Miller Act, 49 Stat. 793, as amended, 80 Stat. 1139, 40 U. S. C. § 270a et seq., because the Act provided for recovery of “sums justly due,” 40 U. S. C. § 270b(a), and, unless fees were awarded, the legislative intent in favor of full compensation would be frustrated. 417 U. S., at 128. In squarely rejecting this claim, we found it to be nothing more than a “restate[ment] of one of the oft-repeated criticisms of the American Rule.” Ibid. Although this Court acknowledged that “there is some force to the argument that a party who must bear the cost of his attorneys’ fees out of his recovery is not made whole,” we concluded that the countervailing considerations which support the American Rule argue against placing exclusive reliance on the need to provide full compensation. Id., at 129. These considerations include the possible deterrent effect that fee shifting would have on poor litigants with meritorious claims, the time, expense, and difficulty of litigating the fee question, and the possibility that the principle of independent advocacy might be threatened by having “the earnings of the attorney flow from the pen of the judge before whom he argues.” Ibid. These same considerations persuade us not to infer that Congress intended to authorize fee shifting in §303 actions in order to fully compensate an employer for the “damages sustained by him” as a result of a union’s illegal activity. Furthermore, petitioner’s analysis would authorize the recovery of attorney’s fees in every case where the plaintiff has prevailed against the defendant in prior litigation involving the same issues. See Mead v. Retail Clerks International Assn., 523 F. 2d, at 1380. Quite simply, anytime a plaintiff must resort to litigation to enjoin the defendant from engaging in illegal conduct, arguably the plaintiff has been injured in the amount of its attorney’s fees spent to obtain the injunction. Under petitioner’s analysis, each plaintiff could recover the costs of this prior litigation as part of its damages in any subsequent action involving the same conduct. Such a result, however, is clearly barred by our prior decisions. The American Rule precludes courts from awarding attorney’s fees incurred during prior proceedings in the same case. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., supra. Similarly, courts have uniformly concluded that “where an action based on the same wrongful act has been prosecuted by the plaintiff against the defendant to a successful issue, he can not in a subsequent action recover, as damages, his costs and expenses in the former action.” Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 555, 46 N. E. 2d 41, 44 (1943). See also Flanders v. Tweed, 15 Wall. 450 (1873); Mead v. Retail Clerks International Assn., supra, at 1380-1381; Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill., at 557, 46 N. E. 2d, at 45 (collecting cases). This rule is universally followed in order to avoid the endless stream of litigation that might ensue if successful litigants could recover their attorney’s fees in subsequent actions: “immediately upon the entry of judgment the plaintiff would start another action against the defendant for his attorney fees and expenses incurred in obtaining the preceding judgment.” Id., at 555, 46 N. E. 2d, at 44. Under petitioner’s construction of § 303(b) the word “damages” would always encompass attorney’s fees expended in prior litigation. In the absence of clear support for this construction in the language or the legislative history of § 303 we decline to adopt such a broad exception to the American Rule. ) — I HH I — I Attorney’s fees incurred during prior Board proceedings are not a proper element of damages under § 303(b) of the LMRA. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Affirmed. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have held that attorney’s fees may be recovered. See Texas Distributors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 100, 598 F. 2d 393 (CA5 1979); Local Union No. 984, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Humko Co., 287 F. 2d 231 (CA6), cert. denied, 366 U. S. 962 (1961); Associated General Contractors of Minnesota v. Construction and General Laborers Local No. 563, 612 F. 2d 1060 (CA8 1979). The First Circuit has expressed approval of this rule in dicta. See F. F. Instrument Corp. v. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, 558 F. 2d 607, 611 (1977). The Ninth Circuit alone has reached a contrary conclusion. See Mead v. Retail Clerks International Assn., 523 F. 2d 1371 (1975). Of course, these remarks are not conclusive. It is possible that Senator Taft’s remarks may have been confined to a rejection of the recovery of attorney’s fees expended during the § 303 proceeding itself. See Mead v. Retail Clerks International Assn., 523 F. 2d, at 1380. The rationale of petitioner’s position would seem to require that fees be awarded whenever a defendant’s wrongful conduct requires a plaintiff to incur more litigation expenses, even if those expenses are incurred in the same action. Furthermore, because the District Court gave the Board’s findings collateral-estoppel effect in the § 303 action, petitioner did not have to relitigate the question whether the Union had committed an unfair labor practice. In effect, Summit Valley is therefore asking for fees that it would have incurred in the § 303 action had it not first litigated the issues before the Board.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PEREZ et ux. v. CAMPBELL, SUPERINTENDENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, ARIZONA HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, et al. No. 5175. Argued January 19, 1971 Decided June 1, 1971 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black, Douglas, BrenNAN, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result as to petitioner Emma Perez and dissenting as to petitioner Adolfo Perez, in which Burger, C. J., and Harlan and Stewart, JJ., joined, post, p. 657. Anthony B. Ching argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Robert H. Schlosser argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Gary K. Nelson, Attorney-General of Arizona. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by David A. Binder, Raine Eisler, and Paul L. McKaskle for the Western Center on Law and Poverty et al., and by William D. Browning for the National Organization for Women. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises an important issue concerning the construction of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution— whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1163 (B) (1956), which is part of Arizona's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, is invalid under that clause as being in conflict with the mandate of § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 35, providing that receipt of a discharge in bankruptcy fully discharges all but certain specified judgments. The courts below, concluding that this case was controlled by Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U. S. 153 (1962), and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U. S. 33 (1941), two earlier opinions of this Court dealing with alleged conflicts between the Bankruptcy Act and state financial responsibility laws, ruled against the claim of conflict and upheld the Arizona statute. On July 8, 1965, petitioner Adolfo Perez, driving a car registered in his name, was involved in an automobile accident in Tucson, Arizona. The Perez automobile was not covered by liability insurance at the time of the collision. The driver of the second ca,r was the minor daughter of Leonard Pinkerton, and in September 1966 the Pinkertons sued Mr. and Mrs. Perez in state court for personal injuries and property damage sustained in the accident. On October 31, 1967, the petitioners confessed judgment in this suit, and a judgment order was entered against them on November 8, 1967, for $2,425.98 plus court costs. Mr. and Mrs. Perez each filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in Federal District Court on November 6, 1967. Each of them duly scheduled the judgment debt to the Pinkertons. The District Court entered orders on July 8, 1968, discharging both Mr. and Mrs. Perez from all debts and claims provable against their estates, including the Pinkerton judgment. 11 U. S. C. §35; Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U. S. 467 (1925). During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, the provisions of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act came into play. Although only one provision of the Arizona Act is relevant to the issue presented by this case, it is appropriate to describe the statutory scheme in some detail. The Arizona statute is based on the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act promulgated by the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety. Articles 1 and 2 of the Act deal, respectively, with definitional matters and administration. The substantive provisions begin in Art. 3, which requires the posting of financial security by those involved in accidents. Section 28-1141 of that article requires suspension of licenses for unlawful failure to report accidents, and § 28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971) provides that within 60 days of the receipt of an accident report the Superintendent of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Highway Department shall suspend the driver's license of the operator and the registration of the owner of a car involved in an accident “unless such operator or owner or both shall deposit security in a sum which is sufficient in the judgment of the superintendent to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages resulting from the accident as may be recovered against the operator or owner.” Under the same section, notice of such suspension and the amount of security required must be sent to the owner and operator not less than 10 days prior to the effective date of the suspension. This section does not apply if the owner or the operator carried liability insurance or some other covering bond at the time of the accident, or if such individual had previously qualified as a self-insurer under § 28-1222. Other exceptions to the requirement that security be posted are stated in § 28-1143. If none of these exceptions applies, the suspension continues until: (1) the person whose privileges were suspended deposits the security required under § 28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971); (2) one year elapses from the date of the accident and the person whose privileges were suspended files proof with the Superintendent that no one has initiated an action for damages arising from the accident; (3) evidence is filed with the superintendent that a release from liability, an adjudication of nonliability, a confession of judgment, or some other written settlement agreement has been entered. As far as the record in the instant case shows, the provisions of Art. 3 were not invoked against petitioners, and the constitutional validity of these provisions is, of course, not before us for decision. Article 4 of the Arizona Act, which includes the only provision at issue here, deals with suspension of licenses and registrations for nonpayment of judgments. Interestingly, it is only when the judgment debtor in an automobile accident lawsuit — usually an owner-operator like Mr. Perez — fails to respond to a judgment entered against him that he must overcome two hurdles in order to regain his driving privileges. Section 28-1161, the first section of Art. 4, requires the state court clerk or judge, when a judgment has remained unsatisfied for 60 days after entry, to forward a certified copy of the judgment to the superintendent. This was done in the present case, and on March 13, 1968, Mr. and Mrs. Perez were served with notice that their drivers’ licenses and registration were suspended pursuant to § 28-1162 (A). Under other provisions of Art. 4, such suspension is to continue until the judgment is paid, and § 28-1163 (B) specifically provides that “[a] discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this article.” In addition to requiring satisfaction of the judgment debt, § 28-1163 (A) provides that the license and registration “shall remain suspended and shall not be renewed, nor shall any license or registration be thereafter issued in the name of the person . . . until the person gives proof of financial responsibility” for a future period. Again, the validity of this limited requirement that some drivers post evidence of financial responsibility for the future in order to regain driving privileges is not questioned here. Nor is the broader issue of whether a State may require proof of financial responsibility as a precondition for granting driving privileges to anyone before us for decision. What is at issue here is the power of a State to include as part of this comprehensive enactment designed to secure compensation for automobile accident victims a section providing that a discharge in bankruptcy of the automobile accident tort judgment shall have no effect on the judgment debtor’s obligation to repay the judgment creditor, at least insofar as such repayment may be enforced by the withholding of driving privileges by the State. It was that question, among others, which petitioners raised after suspension of their licenses and registration by filing a complaint in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and requesting a three-judge court. They asserted several constitutional violations, and also alleged that § 28-1163 (B) was in direct conflict with the Bankruptcy Act and was thus violative of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. In support of their complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Perez filed affidavits stating that the suspension of their licenses and registration worked both physical and financial hardship upon them and their children. The District Judge granted the petitioners leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but thereafter granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, citing Kesler and Reitz. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the same two decisions. 421 F. 2d 619 (CA9 1970). We granted certiorari. 400 U. S. 818 (1970). I Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy-Clause is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether they are in conflict. In the present case, both statutes have been authoritatively construed. In Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P. 2d 136 (1963), the Supreme Court of Arizona held that "[t]he Financial Responsibility Act has for its principal purpose the protection of the public using the highways from financial hardship which may result from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons.” 93 Ariz., at 280, 380 P. 2d, at 140. The Arizona court has consistently adhered to this construction of its legislation, see Camacho v. Gardner, 104 Ariz. 555, 558, 456 P. 2d 925, 928 (1969); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 104 Ariz. 544, 456 P. 2d 914 (1969); Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241, 243, 428 P. 2d 98, 100 (1967); Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44, 47, 424 P. 2d 172, 175 (1967); Hastings v. Thurston, 100 Ariz. 302, 306, 413 P. 2d 767, 770 (1966); Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287, 290, 380 P. 2d 145, 147 (1963), and we are bound by its rulings. See, e. g., General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U. S. 335, 337 (1944). Although the dissent seems unwilling to accept the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the statute as expressive of the Act’s primary purpose and indeed characterizes that construction as unfortunate, post, at 667, a reading of the provisions outlined above leaves the impression that the Arizona Court’s description of the statutory purpose is not only logical but persuasive. The sole emphasis in the Act is one of providing leverage for the collection of damages from drivers who either admit that they are at fault or are adjudged negligent. The victim of another driver’s carelessness, if he so desires, can exclude the superintendent entirely from the process of “deterring” a repetition of that driver’s negligence. Further, if an accident is litigated and a special verdict that the defendant was negligent and the plaintiff contributorily negligent is entered, the result in Arizona, as in many other States, is that there is no liability for damages arising from the accident. Heimke v. Munoz, 106 Ariz. 26, 470 P. 2d 107 (1970); McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P. 2d 869 (1968). Under the Safety Responsibility Act, the apparent result of such a judgment is that no consequences are visited upon either driver although both have been found to have driven carelessly. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-1143 (A) (4), 28-1144 (3). Moreover, there are no provisions requiring drivers proved to' be careless to stay off the roads for a period of time. Nor are there provisions requiring drivers who have caused accidents to attend some kind of driver improvement course, a technique that is not unfamiliar in sentencing for traffic offenses. Turning to the federal statute, the construction of the Bankruptcy Act is similarly clear. This Court on numerous occasions has stated that “[o]ne of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act” is to give debtors “a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 244 (1934). Accord, e. g., Harris v. Zion’s Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U. S. 447, 451 (1943); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554-555 (1915). There can be no doubt, given Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U. S. 467 (1925), that Congress intended this “new opportunity” to include freedom from most kinds of pre-existing tort judgments. II With the construction of both statutes clearly established, we proceed immediately to the constitutional question whether a state statute that protects judgment creditors from “financially irresponsible persons” is in conflict with a federal statute that gives discharged debtors a new start “unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.” As early as Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall stated the governing principle — that “acts of the State Legislatures . . . [which] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution,” are invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Id., at 211 (emphasis added). Three decades ago Mr. Justice Black, after reviewing the precedents, wrote in a similar vein that, while “[t]his Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, ha[d] made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference[,] . . . [i]nthe final analysis,” our function is to determine whether a challenged state statute “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). Since Hines the Court has frequently adhered to this articulation of the meaning of the Supremacy Clause. See, e. g., Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235, 240 (1967); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 229 (1964); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U. S. 714, 722 (1963) (dictum); Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 666 (1962); Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 542-543 (1945); Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173, 176 (1942). Indeed, in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132 (1963), a recent case in which the Court was closely divided, all nine Justices accepted the Hines test. Id., at 141 (opinion of the Court), 165 (dissenting opinion). Both Kesler and Reitz, however, ignored this controlling principle. The Court in Kesler conceded that Utah’s financial responsibility law left “the bankrupt to some extent burdened by the discharged debt,” 369 U. S., at 171, made “it more probable that the debt will be paid despite the discharge,” id., at 173, and thereby made “some inroad ... on the consequences of bankruptcy . . . .” Id., at 171. Utah’s statute, in short, frustrated Congress’ policy of giving discharged debtors a new start. But the Kesler majority was not concerned by this frustration. In upholding the statute, the majority opinion did not look to the effect of the legislation but simply asserted that the statute was “not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors,” id., at 174, and was “not designed to aid collection of debts but to enforce a policy against irresponsible driving . . . .” Id., at 169. The majority, that is, looked to the purpose of the state legislation and upheld it because the purpose was not to circumvent the Bankruptcy Act but to promote highway safety; those in dissent, however, were concerned that, whatever the purpose of the Utah Act, its “plain and inevitable effect . . . [was] to create a powerful weapon for collection of a debt from which [the] bankrupt [had] been released by federal law.” Id., at 183. Such a result, they argued, left “the States free ... to impair ... an important and historic policy of this Nation . . . embodied in its bankruptcy laws.” Id., at 185. The opinion of the Court in Reitz was similarly concerned, not with the fact that New York’s financial responsibility law frustrated the operation of the Bankruptcy Act, but with the purpose of the law, which was divined as the promotion of highway safety. As the Court said: “The penalty which § 94-b imposes for injury due to careless driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching highway safety.” 314 U. S., at 37. The dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas for himself and three others noted that the New York legislation put “the bankrupt ... at the creditor’s mercy,” with the results that “[i]n practical effect the bankrupt may be in as bad, or even worse, a position than if the state had made it possible for a creditor to attach his future wages” and that “[bankruptcy . . . [was not] the sanctuary for hapless debtors which Congress intended.” Id., at 41. We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of Kesler and Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration. Apart from the fact that it is at odds with the approach taken in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases, such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee report articulating some state interest or policy — other than frustration of the federal objective — that would be tapgentially furthered by the proposed state law. In view of the consequences, we certainly would not apply the Kesler doctrine in all Supremacy Clause cases. Although it is possible to argue that Kesler and Reitz are somehow confined to cases involving either bankruptcy or highway safety, analysis discloses no reason why the States should have broader power to nullify federal law in these fields than in others. Thus, we conclude that Kesler and Reitz can have no authoritative effect to the extent they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause. Section 28-1163 (B) thus may not stand. III Even accepting the Supremacy Clause analysis of Kesler and Reitz — that is, looking to the purpose rather than the effect of state laws — those decisions are not dispositive of this case. Just as Kesler went a step beyond Reitz and broadened the holding of the earlier case, 369 U. S., at 184 (dissenting opinion), so in the present case the respondents asked the courts below and this Court to expand the holdings of the two previous cases. The distinction between Kesler and Reitz and this case lies in the State’s expressed legislative purpose. Kesler and Reitz were aberrational in their treatment of this question as well. The majority opinions in both cases assumed, without citation of state court authority or any indication that such precedent was unavailable, that the purpose of the state financial responsibility laws there under attack was not provision of relief to creditors but rather deterrence of irresponsible driving. The assumption was, in effect, that all state legislatures which had enacted prdvisions such as § 28-1163 (B) had concluded that an uninsured motorist about to embark in his car would be more careful on the road if he did not have available what the majority in Kesler cavalierly characterized as an “easy refuge in bankruptcy.” 369 U. S., at 173. Passing the question of whether the Court gave sufficient attention to binding state interpretations of state legislative purpose and conceding that it employed proper technique in divining as obvious from their face the aim of the state enactments, the present case raises doubts about whether the Court was correct even in its basic assumptions. The Arizona Supreme Court has declared that Arizona’s Safety Responsibility Act “has for its principal purpose the protection of the public . . . from financial hardship” resulting from involvement in traffic accidents with uninsured motorists unable to respond to a judgment. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz., at 280, 380 P. 2d, at 140. The Court in Kesler was able to declare, although the source of support is unclear, that the Utah statute could be upheld because it was “not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors” or a statute “designed to- aid collection of debts.” 369 U. S., at 174, 169. But here the respondents urge us to- uphold precisely the sort of statute that Kesler would have stricken down — one with a declared purpose to protect judgment creditors “from financial hardship” by giving them a powerful weapon with which to force bankrupts to pay their debts despite their discharge. Whereas the Acts in Kesler and Reitz had the effect of frustrating federal law but had, the Court said, no such purpose, the Arizona Act has both that effect and that purpose. Believing as we do that Kesler and Reitz are not in harmony with sound constitutional principle, they certainly should not be extended to cover this new and distinguishable case. IV One final argument merits discussion. The dissent points out that the District of Columbia Code contains an anti-discharge provision similar to that included in the Arizona Act. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia, D. C. Code Ann. § 40-464 (1967), 68 Stat. 132. In light of our decision today, the sum of the argument is to draw into question the constitutional validity of the District's anti-discharge section, for as noted in the dissent the Constitution confers upon Congress the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added). It is asserted that “Congress must have regarded the two statutes as consistent and compatible/’ post, at 665, but such an argument assumes a modicum of legislative attention to the question of consistency. The D. C. Code section does, of course, refer specifically to discharges, but its passage may at most be viewed as evidencing an opinion of Congress on the meaning of the general discharge provision enacted by an earlier Congress and interpreted by this Court as early as 1925. See Lewis v. Roberts, supra. In fact, in passing the initial and amended version of the District of Columbia financial responsibility law, Congress gave no attention to the interaction of the anti-discharge section with the Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, the legislative history is quite clear that when Congress dealt with the subject of financial responsibility laws for the District, it based its work upon the efforts of the uniform commissioners which had won enactment in other States. Had Congress focused on the interaction between this minor subsection of the rather lengthy financial responsibility act and the discharge provision of the Bankruptcy Act, it would have been immediately apparent to the legislators that the only constitutional method for so defining the scope and effect of a discharge in bankruptcy was by amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, which by its terms is a uniform statute applicable in the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia. 11 U. S. C. § 1 (29). To follow any other course would obviously be to legislate in such a way that a discharge in bankruptcy means one thing in the District of Columbia and something else in the States — depending on state law — a result explicitly prohibited by the uniformity requirement in the constitutional authorization to Congress to enact bankruptcy legislation. V From the foregoing, we think it clear that § 28-1163 (B) of the Arizona Safety Responsibility Act is constitutionally invalid. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. See Reviser’s Note, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1101. Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28-1143 (A), the owner or operator of a ear involved in an accident need not post security as required by §28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971): (1) if the accident caused injury or damage to no person or property other than the owner's car or the operator’s person; (2) if the car was parked when involved in the accident, unless it was parked illegally or did not carry a legally sufficient complement of lights; (3) if the car was being driven or was parked by another without the owner’s express or implied permission; (4) if prior to date for suspension the person whose license or registration would be suspended files with the superintendent a release, a final adjudication of nonliability, a confession of judgment, or some other written settlement agreement providing for payment, in installments, of an agreed amount of damages with respect to claims arising from the accident; or (5) if the driver at the time of the accident was driving a vehicle owned, operated, or leased by his employer with the employer’s permission; in that case the security and suspension provisions apply only to the owner-employer’s registration of vehicles not covered by insurance or other bond. This section further provides that the superintendent may employ suspension a second time as a means of enforcing payment should there be a default on installment obligations arising under a confession of judgment or a written settlement agreement. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann §28-1144 (3). Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann §28-1102 (Supp. 1970-1971) defines “judgment,” for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, as “any judgment which has become final . . . , upon a cause of action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, for damages ... or upon a cause of action on an agreement of settlement for such damages.” Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1161 (B), a similar notice must also be forwarded to officials in the home State of a nonresident judgment debtor. “A. The superintendent upon receipt of a certified copy of a judgment, shall forthwith suspend the license and registration and nonresident operating privilege of a person against whom the judgment was rendered, except as otherwise provided in this section and § 28-1165.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28-1163 (A). Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28-1164 (Supp. 1970-1971) defines when a judgment is “paid.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1165 sets forth a procedure for paying judgments in installments. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1162 (B) provides that if a creditor consents in writing and the debtor furnishes proof of financial responsibility, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1167, the debtor’s license and registration may be restored in the superintendent’s discretion. After six months, however, the creditor’s consent is revocable provided the judgment debt remains unpaid. Sections 28-1167 through 28-1178 set forth the requirements for various forms of proof. Under § 28-1178, the judgment debtor is apparently able to regain his license and registration to operate a motor vehicle without proof of financial responsibility after three years from the date such proof was first required of him, if during that period the superintendent has not received any notice — and notice can come from other States — of a conviction or forfeiture of bail which would require or permit the suspension or revocation of the driver’s license and if the individual is not involved in litigation arising from an accident covered by the security he posted. If the driver required to post financial security does so, and is involved as an owner or operator in another accident resulting in personal injury or property damage within one year prior to the date he requests permission to cancel his security, the superintendent may not permit cancellation. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Mr. and Mrs. Perez also alleged in their complaint that certain provisions of the Arizona Act imposed involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and denied Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection. They also claimed that portions of the Arizona Act operated as a bill of attainder in violation of Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution. The District Judge, in refusing to request the convening of a three-judge court, ruled that these constitutional claims were “obviously insubstantial.” The Court of Appeals agreed. 421 F. 2d 619, 625 (CA9 1970). Because of our resolution of this case, we express no opinion as to the substantiality of any of petitioners’ other constitutional claims. As discussed below, the majorities in Kesler and Reitz also seemed unwilling to be bound by, or even to look for, state court constructions of the financial responsibility laws before them. See infra, at 652-654. It is clear, however, from even a cursory examination of decisions in other States that the conclusion of the Arizona Supreme Court as to the purpose of the financial responsibility law is by no means unusual. See, e. g., Sullivan v. Cheatham, 264 Ala. 71, 76, 84 So. 2d 374, 378 (1955) (“The purpose of the [Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility] Act is clearly to require and establish financial responsibility for every owner or operator of a motor vehicle ‘in any manner involved in an accident.’. . . The Act is designed to protect all persons having claims arising out of highway accidents.”); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 876, 222 P. 2d 1, 5 (1950) (“[T]he state chose to allow financially irresponsible licensed operators to drive until they became involved in an accident with the consequences described in the [financial responsibility law] and their financial irresponsibility was thus brought to the attention of the department, and then to require suspension of their licenses.”); People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 215-216, 363 P. 2d 180, 183 (1961) (“The requirement of C. R. S. ’53, 13-7-7, that the director of revenue, '. . . shall suspend the license of each operator and all registrations of each owner of a motor vehicle in any manner involved in [an] accident . . .’ unless such persons deposit a sum ‘sufficient in the judgment of the director . . .’ to pay any damage which may be awarded, or otherwise show ability to indemnify the other party to the accident against financial loss, has nothing whatever to do with the protection of the public safety, health, morals or welfare. It is a device designated and intended to bring about the posting of security for the payment of a private obligation without the slightest indication that any legal obligation exists on the part of any person. The public gets no protection whatever from the deposit of such security. This is not the situation which we find in some states where the statutes require public liability insurance as a condition to be met before a driver’s license will issue. Such statute protects the public. The statute before us is entirely different. In the matters to which we have particularly directed attention, C. R. S. ’53, 13-7-7, is unconstitutional. On a matter so obviously basic and fundamental no additional citation of authority is required. We reach this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that other jurisdictions have seemingly overlooked basic constitutional guarantees which must be ignored in reaching an opposite conclusion.”); Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 208, 120 A. 2d 700, 703 (1956) (“The purpose of the legislature in enacting the financial responsibility provisions . . . was to keep off our highways the financially irresponsible owner or operator of an automobile who cannot respond in damages for the injuries he may inflict, and to require him, as a condition for securing or retaining a registration or an operator’s license, to furnish adequate means of satisfying possible claims against him.”); City of St. Paul v. Hoffmann, 223 Minn. 76, 77-78, 25 N. W. 2d 661, 662-663 (1946) (“The apparent objective of the safety responsibility act is to provide financial responsibility for injuries and damages suffered in motor vehicle trafile. It seeks to achieve its objective solely by the suspension of licenses. While its announced purpose is to promote safety of travel, its provisions take effect after an accident happens and subject drivers and owners of vehicles involved to suspension of their ‘licenses’ unless liability insurance coverage equivalent to that required by the act is carried by the owner or driver of the vehicle. . . . The purpose of the act was to effect financial responsibility to injured persons.”); Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N. H. 314, 318, 197 A. 701, 704 (1938) (“Two reasons were thought to avail for sustaining such a law. One was its character as a regulation of the use of public highways and the other was its capacity to secure public safety in dangerous agencies and operations. This latter reason has slight if any evidence for its factual support. Certainly, in the absence of known experience and statistics, it is doubtful whether the insured owner’s car, driven either by himself or another, may be considered to be operated more carefully than one whose owner is uninsured. But protection in securing redress for injured highway travelers is a proper subject of police regulation, as well as protection from being injured. It is a reasonable incident of the general welfare that financially irresponsible persons be denied the use of the highway with their cars, regardless of the competency of themselves or others as the drivers.”). For legislative statements to the effect that financial responsibility laws are designed to secure compensation for injured victims, see, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 28.20.010 (1970); Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 463, 259 S. W. 2d 177, 180 (1953) (quoting emergency clause enacted by the Texas Legislature in connection with its financial responsibility law); S. Rep. No. 515, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1953) (Report of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia on the financial responsibility law proposed for the District). See Reitz, 314 U. S., at 40-43 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Under Art. 3 of the Arizona Act, dealing with the posting of security for damages arising from a particular accident, the victim may cut the superintendent out by executing a release from liability or agreeing to some other written settlement or confession of judgment providing for payment of some damages, in installments or otherwise. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1143 (A) (4) discussed in n. 2, supra. Assuming that such an agreement or confession of judgment providing for installment payments is filed with the superintendent, it prevents him from suspending driving privileges for failure to post the amount of financial security the superintendent determines to be necessary; however, if the careless driver later defaults on one installment, the victim may give notice to the superintendent, who must then use his power of suspension to either coerce full payment or the posting of security. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1144 (3), discussed in n. 3, supra. Under Art. 4, dealing with suspension for nonpayment of a judgment, the victim who has chosen to reduce his claim to judgment maintains substantial control over the suspension of driving privileges if the judgment remains unsatisfied 60 days after entry. He may consent that the judgment debtor’s driving privileges not be suspended, but the debtor still must furnish proof of financial responsibility for the future. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28-1162 (B). For an argument that a similar provision delegating to judgment creditors the right to choose which careless drivers who do not pay judgments shall escape suspension conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act see Kesler, 369 U. S., at 179-182 (Warren, C. J., dissenting) . If the judgment debtor is able to secure a discretionary court order permitting him to pay a judgment in installments under §28-1165 (A), the creditor may cause suspension of driving privileges until the judgment is fully satisfied by notifying the superintendent of any default in payment of the installments. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28-1165 (C). Again, however, the judgment debtor must still give proof of financial responsibility for the future. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1165 (B). Kesler also decided a jurisdictional question, holding that a Supremacy Clause challenge to a state statute was required to be heard by a three-judge district court under 28 U. S. C. §2281. See 369 U. S., at 155-158. This jurisdictional part of the decision was overruled almost four years later in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 116 (1965). It also seems clear that even under the logic of Kesler and Reitz Mrs. Perez should not have lost her driving privileges. She was not present when the accident occurred, and no act or omission on her part contributed to it. Because the automobile was community property under Arizona law and because judgment was confessed as to her in the Pinkerton negligence action, the Court of Appeals reasoned that loss of Mrs. Perez’ license “is the price an Arizona wife must pay for negligent driving by her husband of the community vehicle” when the resulting judgment is not paid. 421 F. 2d, at 624. The Kesler and Reitz assumption that depriving uninsured motorists of the full relief afforded by a discharge in bankruptcy would prompt careful driving is without foundation when applied to Mrs. Perez. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated in a recent decision involving similar facts: “Even accepting the fiction that, as applied to drivers, motor vehicle responsibility statutes are intended to promote safety, it is just too much fiction to contend that, applied to a judgment debtor held vicariously liable for the omission of a sub-agent, the statute is anything but a means for the enforcement of judgments.” Miller v. Anckaitis, 436 F. 2d 115, 118 (CA3 1970) (en banc). See S. Rep. No. 10, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 208, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (both presenting a summary of the provisions of the proposed statute dealing with “Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Operators in the District of Columbia,” but failing to mention the fact that a discharge in bankruptcy of an accident judgment would have no effect on suspension of driving privileges for failure to satisfy such judgment); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 799, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (Conference Report making no mention of anti-discharge provision); 79 Cong. Rec. 272-273 (Senate); 79 Cong. Rec. 3416-3417, 4621-4629, 4631-4641, 6556-6564 (House). Some members of the House, which debated some aspects of the financial responsibility law concept rather extensively in 1935, demonstrated in debate that they were totally unaware of any of the provisions designed to enforce payment of a judgment for injuries caused by the first accident of a financially irresponsible driver. See 79 Cong. Rec. 4624 (remarks of Reps. Fitzpatrick and Sisson); id,., at 4625 (remarks of Rep. Hull). When the present District of Columbia financial responsibility law was enacted in 1954, debate was much more limited and the reports of the House and Senate District Committees were quite brief. Except for the reading of the bill, no mention was made of the anti-discharge provision. See S. Rep. No. 515, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H. R. Rep. No. 1448, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 99 Cong. Rec. 8950-8951; 100 Cong. Rec. 6281-6287, 6347-6348. S. Rep. No. 10, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 208, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 4626-4627 (remarks of Rep. Norton, chairman of the House District Committee) . In reference to the present version of the financial responsibility act, see S. Rep. No. 515, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1953); H. R. Rep. No. 1448, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1954); 100 Cong. Rec. 6287 (remarks of Rep. Talle); id., at 6347 (remarks of Sen. Beall).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CORINTH PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. WESBERRY et al. No. 227. Decided June 12, 1967. Stanley Fleishman for petitioner. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, and G. Ernest Tidwell, Executive Assistant Attorney General, for respondents. Per Curiam. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed. The Chief Justice would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument. Mr. Justice Clark would grant the petition and affirm. Mr. Justice Harlan adheres to the views expressed in his separate opinions in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496, and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455, and on the basis of the reasoning set forth therein would affirm.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK OF OREGON v. INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC., et al. No. 92-484. Argued April 19, 1993 Decided June 7, 1993 Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for petitioners in both eases and filed a brief for petitioners in No. 92-507. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Robert V. Zener, Jacob M. Lewis, William R Bowden, Jr., Ernest C. Barrett III, and Lester N. Scall. Kenneth L. Bachman, Jr., and Michael R. Lazerwitz filed briefs for petitioner in No. 92-484. Ann M. Kappler argued the cause for respondents in both eases. With her on the brief were Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., and Nory Miller. Together with No. 92-507, Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, et al. v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court. John J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, Richard M. Whiting, Leonard J. Rubin, and John S. Jackson filed a brief for the American Bankers Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The Comptroller of the Currency recently relied on a statutory provision enacted in 1916 to permit national banks located in small communities to sell insurance to customers outside those communities. These cases present the unlikely question whether Congress repealed that provision in 1918. We hold that no repeal occurred. I Almost 80 years ago, Congress authorized any national bank “doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants ... [to] act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company.” Act of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 753. In the first compilation of the United States Code, this provision appeared as section 92 of Title 12. See 12 U. S. C. § 92 (1926 ed.); see also United States Code editions of 1934, 1940, and 1946. The 1952 edition of the Code, however, omitted the insurance provision, with a note indicating that Congress had repealed it in 1918. See 12 U. S. C. § 92 (1952 ed.) (note). Though the provision has also been left out of the subsequent editions of the United States Code, including the current one (each containing in substance the same note that appeared in 1952, see United States Code editions of 1958, 1964, 1970, 1976, 1982, and 1988), the parties refer to it as “section 92,” and so will we. Despite the absence of section 92 from the Code, Congress has assumed that it remains in force, on one occasion actually-amending it. See Gam-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, § 403(b), 96 Stat. 1511; see also Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, § 201(b)(5), 101 Stat. 583 (imposing a 1-year moratorium on section 92 activities). The regulators concerned with the provision’s subject, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board, have likewise acted on the understanding that section 92 remains the law, see Brief for Federal Petitioners in No. 92-507, pp. 31-32; Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-484, pp. 26-28, and indeed it was a ruling by the Comptroller relying on section 92 that precipitated these cases. The ruling came on a request by United States National Bank of Oregon (Bank), a national bank with its principal place of business in Portland, Oregon, to sell insurance through its branch in Banks, Oregon (population: 489), to customers nationwide. The Comptroller approved the request in 1986, interpreting section 92 to permit national bank branches located in communities with populations not exceeding 5,000 to sell insurance to customers not only inside but also outside those communities. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 92-507, pp. 74a-79a. The Bank is the petitioner in the first of the cases we decide today; the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the United States are the petitioners in the other. Respondents in both cases are various trade organizations representing insurance agents. They challenged the Comptroller’s decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming the Comptroller’s ruling to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). Respondents argued, among other things, that the ruling was inconsistent with section 92, which respondents maintained permits national banks located in small communities to sell insurance only to customers in those communities. The District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment for the federal parties and the Bank, a defendant-intervenor, on the ground that the Comptroller’s interpretation was “rational and consistent with [section 92].” National Assn. of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The District Court thought it “worth noting that this section no longer appears in the United States Code” as it “apparently was inadvertently repealed” in 1918; but because Congress, the Comptroller, and other courts have presumed its continuing validity, the court was content to assume that the provision exists “in proprio vigore,” meaning, we take it, of its own force. Id., at 1163, n. 2. Respondents had not asked the District Court to rule that section 92 no longer existed, and they took the same tack before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, merely noting in their opening brief that section 92 may have been repealed in 1918 and then stating that all the relevant players had assumed its validity. The Court of Appeals, nevertheless, directed the parties to be prepared to address the status of section 92 at oral argument, and after oral argument (at which respondents’ counsel declined to argue that the provision was no longer in force) ordered supplemental briefing on the issue. In their supplemental brief, respondents urged the court to decide the question, but took no position on whether section 92 was valid law. The Court of Appeals did decide the issue, reversing the District Court’s decision and remanding with instructions to enter judgment for respondents. The court found first that, though the parties had not on their own questioned the validity of section 92, the court had a “duty” to do so, Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 293 U. S. App. D. C. 403, 406, 955 F. 2d 731, 734 (1992); and, second, that the relevant statutes, “traditionally construed,” demonstrate that Congress repealed section 92 in 1918, id., at 407, 955 F. 2d, at 735. Judge Silberman, dissenting, would have affirmed without addressing the validity of section 92, an issue he thought was not properly before the court. Id., at 413-416, 955 F. 2d, at 741-744. The Court of Appeals denied respondents’ suggestion for rehearing en banc, with several judges filing separate statements. See 296 U. S. App. D. C. 115, 965 F. 2d 1077 (1992). The Bank and the federal parties separately petitioned for certiorari, both petitions presenting the question whether section 92 remains in force and the Bank presenting the additional question whether the Court of Appeals properly addressed the issue. Because of a conflict on the important question whether section 92 is valid law, see American Land Title Assn. v. Clarke, 968 F. 2d 150, 151-154 (CA2 1992), cert. pending, Nos. 92-482, 92-645, we granted the petitions. 506 U. S. 1032 (1992). We now reverse. II Before turning to the status of section 92, we address the Bank’s threshold question, whether the Court of Appeals erred in considering the issue at all. Respondents did not challenge the validity of section 92 before the District Court; they did not do so in their opening brief in the Court of Appeals or, despite the court’s invitation, at oral argument. Not until the Court of Appeals ordered supplemental briefing on the status of section 92 did respondents even urge the court to resolve the issue, while still taking no position on the merits. The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals lacked the authority to consider whether section 92 remains the law and, alternatively, that it abused its discretion in doing so. There is no need to linger long over either argument. “The exercise of judicial power under Art. Ill of the Constitution depends on the existence of a case or controversy,” and “a federal court [lacks] the power to render advisory opinions.” Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Bank maintains that there was no case or controversy about the validity of section 92, and that in resolving the status of the provision the Court of Appeals violated the Article III prohibition against advisory opinions. There is no doubt, however, that from the start respondents’ suit was the “pursuance of an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights by one [party] against another,” Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 359 (1911) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), that “valuable legal rights . .. [would] be directly affected to a specific and substantial degree” by a decision on whether the Comptroller’s ruling was proper and lawful, Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 262 (1933), and that the Court of Appeals therefore had before it a real case and controversy extending to that issue. Though the parties did not lock horns over the status of section 92, they did clash over whether the Comptroller properly relied on section 92 as authority for his ruling, and “[w]hen an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law,” Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 99 (1991), even where the proper construction is that a law does not govern because it is not in force. “The judicial Power” extends to cases “arising under___the Laws of the United States,” Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1, and a court properly asked to construe a law has the constitutional power to determine whether the law exists, cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 405 (1821) (“[I]f, in any controversy depending in a court, the cause should depend on the validity of such a law, that would be a case arising under the constitution, to which the judicial power of the United States would extend”) (Marshall, C. J.). The contrary conclusion would permit litigants, by agreeing on the legal issue presented, to extract the opinion of a court on hypothetical Acts of Congress or dubious constitutional principles, an opinion that would be difficult to characterize as anything but advisory. Nor did prudence oblige the Court of Appeals to treat the unasserted argument that section 92 had been repealed as having been waived. Respondents argued from the start, as we noted, that section 92 was not authority for the Comptroller’s ruling, and a court may consider an issue “antecedent to . . . and ultimately dispositive of” the dispute before it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief. Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U. S. 73, 77 (1990); cf. Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., ante, at 88-89, n. 9 (addressing a legal question as to which the parties agreed on the answer). The omission of section 92 from the United States Code, moreover, along with the codifiers’ indication that the provision had been repealed, created honest doubt about whether section 92 existed as law, and a court “need not render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose nonexistence is apparent on the face of things, simply because the parties agree upon it.” United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). While the Bank says that by initially accepting the widespread assumption that section 92 remains in force, respondents forfeited their right to have the Court of Appeals consider whether the law exists, “[tjhere can be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining the existence of a law,” South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 267 (1877). In addressing the status of section 92, the Court of Appeals did not stray beyond its constitutional or prudential boundaries. The Court of Appeals, accordingly, had discretion to consider the validity of section 92, and under the circumstances did not abuse it. The court was asked to determine under the APA whether the Comptroller’s ruling was in accordance with a statutory provision that the keepers of the United States Code had suggested was no longer in force, on appeal from a District Court justifying its reliance on the law by the logic that, despite its “inadverten[t] repea[l],” section 92 remained in effect of its own force. 736 F. Supp., at 1163, n. 2. After giving the parties ample opportunity to address the issue, the Court of Appeals acted without any impropriety in refusing to accept what in effect was a stipulation on a question of law. Cf. Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U. S. 281, 289 (1917). We need not decide whether the Court of Appeals had, as it concluded, a “duty” to address the status of section 92 (which would imply error in declining to do so), for the court’s decision to consider the issue was certainly no abuse of its discretion. Ill A Though the appearance of a provision in the current edition of the United States Code is “prima facie” evidence that the provision has the force of law, 1 U. S. C. § 204(a), it is the Statutes at Large that provides the “legal evidence of laws,” § 112, and despite its omission from the Code section 92 remains on the books if the Statutes at Large so dictates. Cf. United States v. Welden, 377 U. S. 95, 98, n. 4 (1964); Stephan v. United States, 319 U. S. 423, 426 (1943) (per curiam). The analysis that underlies our conclusion that section 92 is valid law calls for familiarity with several provisions appearing in the Statutes at Large. This section provides the necessary statutory background. The background begins in 1863 and 1864, when the Civil War Congress enacted and then reenacted the National Bank Act, which-launched the modern national banking system by providing for federal chartering of private commercial banks and empowering the newly created national banks to issue and accept a uniform national currency. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58,12 Stat. 665; Act of June 3,1864, ch. 106,13 Stat. 99; see E. Symons, Jr., & J. White, Banking Law 22-25 (3d ed. 1991); see also 12 U. S. C. §38. In a section important for these eases, the National Bank Act set limits on the indebtedness of national banks, subject to certain exceptions. See §42,12 Stat. 677 (1863 Act); §36,13 Stat. 110 (1864 Act). Ten years later, Congress adopted the indebtedness provision again as part of the Revised Statutes of the United States, a massive revision, reorganization, and reenactment of all statutes in effeet at the time, accompanied by a simultaneous repeal of all prior ones. Rev. Stat. §§ 1-5601 (1874); see also Dwan & Feidler, The Federal Statutes — Their History and Use, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 1008, 1012-1015 (1938). Title 62 of the Revised Statutes, containing §§ 5133 through 5243, included the Nation’s banking laws, and, with a few stylistic alterations, the National Bank Act’s indebtedness provision became § 5202 of the Revised Statutes: Sec. 5202. No association shall at any time be indebted, or in any way liable, to an amount exceeding the amount of its capital stock at such time actually paid in and remaining undiminished by losses or otherwise, except on account of demands of the nature following: First. Notes of circulation. Second. Moneys deposited with or collected by the association. Third. Bills of exchange or drafts drawn against money actually on deposit to the credit of the association, or due thereto. Fourth. Liabilities to the stockholders of the association for dividends and reserved profits. In 1913 Congress amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 by adding a fifth exception to the indebtedness limit. The amendment was a detail of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (Federal Reserve Act or 1913 Act), which created Federal Reserve banks and the Federal Reserve Board and required the national banks formed pursuant to the National Bank Act to become members of the new Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251; see P. Studenski & H. Krooss, Financial History of the United States 255-262 (2d ed. 1963). The amendment came in § 13 of the 1913 Act, the first five paragraphs of which set forth the powers of the new Federal Reserve banks, such as the authority to accept and discount various forms of notes and commercial paper, including those issued by national banks. Federal Reserve Act, § 13,38 Stat. 263-264. This (subject to ellipsis) followed: Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended so as to read as follows: No national banking association shall at any time be indebted, or in any way liable, to an amount exceeding the amount of its capital stock at such time actually paid in and remaining undiminished by losses or otherwise, except on account of demands of the nature following: Fifth. Liabilities incurred under the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act. 38 Stat. 264. The next and final paragraph of § 13 authorized the Federal Reserve Board to issue regulations governing the rediscount by Federal Reserve banks of bills receivable and bills of exchange. Ibid. In 1916, Congress enacted what became section 92. It did so as part of a statute that amended various sections of the Federal Reserve Act and that, in the view of respondents and the Court of Appeals, also amended Rev. Stat. §5202. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 752 (1916 Act). Unlike the 1913 Act, the 1916 Act employed quotation marks, and those quotation marks proved critical to the Court of Appeals’s finding that the 1916 Act placed section 92 in Rev. Stat. § 5202. After amending § 11 of the Federal Reserve Act, the 1916 Act provided, without quotation marks, [t]hat section thirteen be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows: Ibid. Then followed within quotation marks several paragraphs that track the first five paragraphs of § 13 of the 1913 Act, the modifications generally expanding the powers of Federal Reserve banks. After the quotation marks closed, this appeared: Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended so as to read as follows: “No national banking association shall at any time be indebted, or in any way liable, to an amount exceeding the amount of its capital stock at such time actually paid in and remaining undiminished by losses or otherwise, except on account of demands of the nature following: “First. Notes of circulation. “Second. Moneys deposited with or collected by the association. “Third. Bills of exchange or drafts drawn against money actually on deposit to the credit of the association, or due thereto. “Fourth. Liabilities to the stockholders of the association for dividends and reserve profits. “Fifth. Liabilities incurred under the provisions of the Federal reserve Act. “The discount and rediscount and the purchase and sale by any Federal reserve bank of any bills receivable and of domestic and foreign bills of exchange, and of acceptances authorized by this Act, shall be subject to such restrictions, limitations, and regulations as may be imposed by the Federal Reserve Board. “That in addition to the powers now vested by law in national banking associations organized under the laws of the United States any such association located and doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding decennial census, may, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State in which said bank is located to do business in said State.... “Any member bank may accept drafts or bills of exchange drawn upon it having not more than three months’ sight to run, exclusive of days of grace, drawn under regulations to be prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board by banks or bankers in foreign countries or dependencies or insular possessions of the United States for the purpose of furnishing dollar exchange as required by the usages of trade in the respective countries, dependencies, or insular possessions. Such drafts or bills may be acquired by Federal reserve banks in such amounts and subject to such regulations, restrictions, and limitations as may be prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board ....” 39 Stat. 753-754 The second-to-last paragraph just quoted is the first appearance of the provision eventually codified as 12 U. S. C. § 92. After the quotation marks closed, the 1916 Act went on to amend § 14 of the Federal Reserve Act, introducing the amendment with a phrase not surrounded by quotation marks and then placing the revised language of § 14 within quotation marks. 39 Stat. 754. The pattern was repeated for amendments of §§ 16, 24, and 25 of the Federal Reserve Act. Id., at 754-756. The final relevant statute is the War Finance Corporation Act, ch. 45, 40 Stat. 506 (1918 Act), which in §20 amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 by, at least, adding a sixth exception to the indebtedness limit: Sec. 20. Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended so as to read as follows: “Sec. 5202. No national banking association shall at any time be indebted, or in any way liable, to an amount exceeding the amount of its capital stock at such time actually paid in and remaining undiminished by losses or otherwise, except on account of demands of the nature following: “Sixth. Liabilities incurred under the provisions of the War Finance Corporation Act.” 40 Stat. 512. B The argument that section 92 is no longer in force, adopted by the Court of Appeals and pressed here by respondents, is simply stated: the 1916 Act placed section 92 in Rev. Stat. § 5202, and the 1918 Act eliminated all of Rev. Stat. § 5202 except the indebtedness provision (to which it added a sixth exception), thus repealing section 92. Our discussion begins with the first premise of that argument, and there it ends, for we conclude with petitioners that the 1916 Act placed section 92 not in Rev. Stat. § 5202 but in § 13 of the Federal Reserve Act; since the 1918 Act did not touch § 13, it did not affect, much less repeal, section 92. A reader following the path of punctuation of the 1916 Act would no doubt arrive at the opposite conclusion, that the statute added section 92 to Rev. Stat. § 5202. The 1916 Act reads, without quotation marks, Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended so as to read as follows. 39 Stat. 753. That phrase is followed by a colon and then opening quotation marks; closing quotation marks do not appear until several paragraphs later, and the paragraph that was later codified as 12 U. S. C. § 92 is one of those within the opening and closing quotation marks. The unavoidable inference from familiar rules of punctuation is that the 1916 Act placed section 92 in Rev. Stat. § 5202. A statute’s plain meaning must be enforced, of course, and the meaning of a statute will typically heed the commands of its punctuation. But a purported plain-meaning analysis based only on punctuation is necessarily incomplete and runs the risk of distorting a statute’s true meaning. Along with punctuation, text consists of words living “a communal existence,” in Judge Learned Hand’s phrase, the meaning of each word informing the others and “all in their aggregate tak[ing] their purport from the setting in which they are used.” NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F. 2d 954, 957 (CA2 1941). Over and over we have stressed that “[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.” United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 8 How. 113,122 (1849) (quoted in more than a dozen cases, most recently Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 35 (1990)); see also King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991). No more than isolated words or sentences is punctuation alone a reliable guide for discovery of a statute’s meaning. Statutory construction “is a holistic endeavor,” United Savings Assn, of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365,371 (1988), and, at a minimum, must account for a statute’s full text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter. Here, though the deployment of quotation marks in the 1916 Act points in one direction, all of the other evidence from the statute points the other way. It points so certainly, in our view, as to allow only the conclusion that the punctuation marks were misplaced and that the 1916 Act put section 92 not in Rev. Stat. §5202 but in §13 of the Federal Reserve Act. The first thing to notice, we think, is the 1916 Act’s structure. The Act begins by stating [tjhat the Act entitled “Federal reserve Act,” approved [19IS], be, and is hereby, amended as follows. 39 Stat. 752. It then contains what appear to be seven directory phrases not surrounded by quotation marks, each of which is followed by one or more paragraphs within opening and closing quotation marks. These are the seven phrases (the numbers and citations in brackets are ours): [1] At the end of section eleven insert a new clause as follows: “...” [39 Stat. 752] [2] That section thirteen be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows: ..” [39 Stat. 752] [3] Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended so as to read as follows: ..” [39 Stat. 753] [4] That subsection (e) of section fourteen, be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows: ..” [39 Stat. 754] [5] That the second paragraph of section sixteen be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows: [39 Stat. 754] [6] That section twenty-four be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows: “..” [39 Stat. 754] [7] That section twenty-five be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows: [39 Stat. 755] The paragraph eventually codified as 12 U. S. C. § 92 is one of several inside the quotation marks that open after the third phrase, which “hereby amended” Rev. Stat. §5202, and that close before the fourth, and the argument that the 1916 Act placed section 92 in Rev. Stat. § 5202 hinges on the assumption that the third phrase is a directory phrase like each of the others. But the structure of the Act supports another possibility, that the third phrase does not introduce a new amendment at all. Of the seven phrases, only the third does not in terms refer to a section of the Federal Reserve Act. Congress, to be sure, was free to take a detour from its work on the Federal Reserve Act to revise the Revised Statutes. But if Congress had taken that turn, one would expect some textual indication of the point where once its work on Rev. Stat. § 5202 was done it returned to revision of the Federal Reserve Act. None of the directory phrases that follow the phrase mentioning Rev. Stat. § 5202, however, refers back to the Federal Reserve Act. The failure of the fourth phrase, for example, to say something like “subsection (e) of section fourteen of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 is hereby amended” suggests that the Congress never veered from its original course, that the object of the 1916 Act was singlemindedly to revise sections of the Federal Reserve Act, and that amending the Revised Statutes was beyond the 1916 law’s scope. Further evidence that the 1916 Act amended only the Federal Reserve Act comes from the 1916 Act’s title: An Act To amend certain sections of the Act entitled “Federal reserve Act,” approved December twenty-third, nineteen hundred and thirteen. During this era the titles of statutes that revised pre-existing laws appear to have typically mentioned each of the laws they revised. See, e. g., Act of Sept. 26, 1918, ch. 177, 40 Stat. 967 (“An Act to amend and reenact sections four, eleven, sixteen, nineteen, and twenty-two of the Act approved December twenty-third, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and known as the Federal reserve Act, and sections fifty-two hundred and eight and fifty-two hundred and nine, Revised Statutes”). Cf. ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (“Federal Reserve Act”). Absent a comprehensive review it is impossible to know the extent of exceptions to this general rule, if any, and we would not cast aside the 1916 Act’s punctuation based solely on the Act’s title. Nevertheless, the omission of the Revised Statutes from the 1916 Act’s title does provide supporting evidence for the inference from the Act’s structure, that the Act did not amend Rev. Stat. § 5202. Cf. INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U. S. 183, 189 (1991) (titles within a statute “can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text”). One must ask, however, why the 1916 Act stated that Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended so as to read as follows, 39 Stat. 753, if it did not amend Rev. Stat. §5202. The answer emerges from comparing the 1916 Act with the statute that all agree it did amend, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, and noticing that the identical directory phrase appeared in § 13 of the 1913 Act, which did amend Rev. Stat. §5202. As enacted in 1913, §13 contained several paragraphs granting powers to Federal Reserve banks; it then included a paragraph amending Rev. Stat. § 5202 (by adding a fifth exception to the indebtedness limit for “Pliabilities incurred under the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act”), a paragraph that began Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended so as to read as follows. 38 Stat. 264. The 1916 Act, in the portion following the phrase introducing a revision of § 13 of the 1913 Act, proceeded in the same manner. It contained several paragraphs granting powers to Federal Reserve banks, paragraphs that are somewhat revised versions of the ones that appeared in the 1913 Act, followed by the phrase introducing an amendment to Rev. Stat. § 5202 and then the language of Rev. Stat. § 5202 as it appeared in the 1913 Act. The similarity of the language of the 1916 and 1913 Acts suggests that, in order to amend § 13 in 1916, Congress restated the 1913 version of §13 in its entirety, revising the portion it intended to change and leaving the rest unaltered, including the portion that had amended Rev. Stat. § 5202. In defending the Court of Appeals’s contrary conclusion that the 1916 Act amended Rev. Stat. §5202, respondents argue that any other reading would render meaningless the language in the 1916 Act that purports to amend that section of the Revised Statutes. But the 1916 Congress would have had good reason to carry forward that portion of the 1913 Act containing Rev. Stat. § 5202, even though in 1916 it did not intend to amend it any further. The 1916 Act revised § 13 of the 1913 Act by completely restating it with a mixture of old and new language (providing that § 13 is amended “to read as follows,” 39 Stat. 752), and a failure to restate Rev. Stat. § 5202 with its 1913 amendment could have been taken to indicate its repeal. The final and decisive evidence that the 1916 Act placed section 92 in § 13 of the. Federal Reserve Act rather than Rev. Stat. §5202 is provided by the language and subject matter of section 92 and the paragraphs surrounding it, paragraphs within the same opening and closing quotation marks. In the paragraph preceding section 92, the 1916 Act granted the Federal Reserve Board authority to regulate the discount and rediscount and the purchase and sale by any Federal reserve bank of any bills receivable and of domestic and foreign bills of exchange, and of acceptances authorized by this Act.... 39 Stat. 753 (emphasis added). “[Tjhis Act” must mean the Federal Reserve Act, since it was §13 of the Federal Reserve Act that granted banks the authority to discount and rediscount. Use of “this Act” in the discount-and-rediscount paragraph is powerful proof that the 1916 Act placed that paragraph in the Act to which it necessarily refers, the Federal Reserve Act. That is crucial because section 92 travels together with the paragraphs that surround it; neither the language nor, certainly, the punctuation of the 1916 Act justifies separating them. Because the 1916 Act placed the paragraph preceding section 92 in §13 of the Federal Reserve Act, it follows that the 1916 Act placed section 92 there too. We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument that the term “this Act” in the discount-and-rediscount paragraph is an antecedent reference to “the Federal reserve Act,” which is mentioned in the prior paragraph (in the fifth exception clause of Rev. Stat. § 5202). 39 Stat. 753; see also 38 Stat. 264 (1913 Act). If respondents are right, then the 1916 Act may be read as placing the discount-and-rediscount paragraph (and section 92, which necessarily accompanies it) in Rev. Stat. § 5202. But while the antecedent interpretation is arguable as construing “this Act” in the discount-andrediscount paragraph, that reading cannot attach to the other uses of “this Act” in the 1916 Act, see 39 Stat. 752, 753, 754, since none is within the vicinity of a reference to the Federal Reserve Act. Presumptively, “ ‘identical words used in different parte of the same act are intended to have the same meaning,’” Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., ante, at 159 (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932)), and since nothing rebuts that presumption here, we are of the view that each use of “this Act” in the 1916 Act refers to the Act in which the language is contained. Rather than aiding respondents, then, the single full reference to “the Federal reserve Act” in the portion of the 1916 Act that amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 cute against them. The fact that it was not repeated in the next paragraph confirms that the statute’s quotation of Rev. Stat. § 5202 had ended. Finally, the subject matter of the diseount-and-rediscount paragraph (located, again, within the same opening and closing quotation marks as section 92) confirms that the 1916 Act placed section 92 in the Federal Reserve Act. The discount- and-rediscount paragraph subjects certain powers of Federal Reserve banks to regulation by the Federal Reserve Board. The logic of locating this provision in the Federal Reserve Act is obvious, whereas there would have been no reason for Congress to place it in Rev. Stat. §5202, which narrowly addressed the indebtedness of national banks, or even in the National Bank Act (from which Rev. Stat. §5202 derived), which concerned not public Federal Reserve banks or the Federal Reserve Board, but private national banks. Similarly, the paragraph following section 92, which authorizes Federal Reserve banks to acquire foreign drafts or bills of exchange from member banks and subjects transactions involving foreign acceptances to Federal Reserve Board regulations, fits far more comfortably with §13 of the Federal Reserve Act than with Rev. Stat. §5202. While we do not disagree with respondents insofar as they assert that Congress could have placed section 92, granting powers of insurance agency to some national banks (and without mentioning Federal Reserve banks or the Federal Reserve Board), in Rev. Stat. § 5202, Congress could also reasonably have dealt with the insurance provision as part of the Federal Reserve Act, which Congress had before it for amendment in 1916. There is no need to break that tie, however, because there is no way around the conclusion that the 1916 Act placed section 92 in the same statutory location as it must have placed its neighbors, in § 13 of the Federal Reserve Act. Against the overwhelming evidence from the structure, language, and subject matter of the 1916 Act there stands only the evidence from the Act’s punctuation, too weak to trump the rest. In these unusual cases, we are convinced that the placement of the quotation marks in the 1916 Act was a simple scrivener’s error, a mistake made by someone unfamiliar with the law’s object and design. Courts, we have said, should “disregard the punctuation, or repunctuate, if need be, to render the true meaning of the statute.” Hammock v. Loan & Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77, 84-85 (1882) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The true meaning of the 1916 Act is clear beyond question, and so we repunctuate. The 1916 Act should be read as if closing quotation marks do not appear at the end of the paragraph before the phrase Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended so as to read as follows, 39 Stat. 753, and as if the opening quotation marks that immediately follow that phrase instead precede it. Accordingly, the 1916 Act placed within §13 of the Federal Reserve Act each of the paragraphs between the phrases that introduce the amendments to §§ 13 and 14 of the Federal Reserve Act, including the paragraph that was later codified as 12 U. S. C. § 92. Because the 1918 Act did not amend the Federal Reserve Act, it did not repeal section 92, despite the Court of Appeals’s conclusion to the contrary. Section 92 remains in force, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed. These eases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered,. The note states that “[t]he provisions of this section, which were added to R. S. §5202 by act Sept. 7,1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 753, were omitted in the amendment of R. S. §5202 by act Apr. 5, 1918, ch. 45, §20, 40 Stat. 512, and therefore this section has been omitted from the Code.” 12 U. S. C. § 92 (1952 ed.) (note). We do not know what prompted the 1952 codifiers to reverse the judgment of their predecessors. The 1952 codifiers' decision, along with legislation that treated section 92 as valid law, apparently prompted a House of Representatives Committee to take a look at the status of section 92 in 1957. See Financial Institutions Act of 1957: Hearings on S. 1451 and H. R. 7206 before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 989-990,1010-1025, 1036-1040, 1060-1071 (1957). After hearing conflicting testimony, the Committee took no action. See id., at 1090, 1199. Several years later, congressional staffers explored the issue again and concluded, with the codifiers, that Congress had repealed section 92 in 1918. See Consolidation of Bank Examining and Supervisory Functions: Hearings on H. R. 107 and H. R. 6885 before the Subcommittee on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 391 (1965). Though the conclusion was published in a House Subcommittee Report, see ibid., neither the Subcommittee nor full Committee took up the matter, and at no time has Congress attempted to reenact what staff thought had been repealed. Courts too, including this one, have assumed the validity of section 92. See Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 405 U. S. 394, 401-402 (1972); Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, 266 U. S. App. D. C. 356, 360, n. 8, 835 F. 2d 1452, 1456, n. 8 (1987); First National Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F. 2d 1258, 1261, n. 6 (CA5 1980); Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F. 2d 794, 795, n. 3 (CA4 1966); Genessee Trustee Corp. v. Smith, 102 F. 2d 125, 127 (CA6 1939); Washington Agency, Inc. v. Forbes, 309 Mich. 683, 684-686, 16 N. W. 2d 121, 121-122 (1944); Marshall Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Corder, 169 Va. 606, 609, 194 S. E. 734, 736 (1938); Greene v. First National Bank of Thief River Falls, 172 Minn. 310, 311-312, 215 N. W. 213, 213 (1927). But no court squarely addressed the question until the Court of Appeals below. When Congress has enacted a title of the Code as positive law (as it has done, for instance, with Title 11, the Bankruptcy Code, see § 101, 92 Stat. 2549), the text of the Code provides “legal evidence of the laws.” 1 U. S. C. § 204(a). But Congress has not enacted as positive law Title 12, in which section 92 for a time appeared. The 1874 edition of the Revised Statutes marked the last time Congress codified United States laws by reenacting all of them. An 1878 edition of the Revised Statutes updated the original Revised Statutes, but was not enacted as positive law. See Act of Mar. 9,1878, ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27; Act of Mar. 2,1877, ch. 82,19 Stat. 268. In 1919, the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws of the United States began work on what eventually became the United States Code, the first edition of which was published in 1926. See 44 Stat., pt. 1; Dwan & Feidler, 22 Minn. L. Rev., at 1018-1021. Because of the importance in these cases of the location of quotation marks, we depart from our ordinary style regarding block quotations and reproduce quotation marks only as they appear in the original materials. Here, for example, we have not opened and closed Rev. Stat. §5202 with quotation marks because none appear in the Revised Statutes. See also n. 6, infra. Because the placement of quotation marks is crucial in these eases, the quotations in the text from the 1916 and 1913 Acts appear in italics so as not to introduce quotation marks absent from the Statutes at Large. See n. 5, supra. Contrary to respondents’ argument, the Marshall Field doctrine does not preclude us from asking whether the statute means something other than what the punctuation dictates. The Marshall Field doctrine, indeed, is irrelevant to this case. In Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 672 (1892), the Court stated that a law consists of the “enrolled bill,” signed in open session by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, see also 1 U. S. C. § 106, but there is no doubt in these cases that the 1916 Act as printed in the Statutes at Large is identical to the enrolled bill. The Marshall Field doctrine concerns “‘the nature of the evidence’ the Court [may] consider in determining whether a bill had actually passed Congress,” United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U. S. 385, 391, n. 4 (1990) (quoting Marshall Field, supra, at 670); it places no limits on the evidence a court may consider in determining the meaning of a bill that has passed Congress. That the text within quotation marks follows the third directory phrase immediately after a space, rather than after a paragraph break, is significant. See n. 9, infra. A comparison of the layout of the two Acts supplies further support for the conclusion that the 1916 Act restated the 1913 Act in full, and did not newly amend Rev. Stat. §5202. With one exception, a paragraph break separates each of the introductory phrases in the 1916 Act from the text that follows within quotation marks. The exception is the phrase mentioning Rev. Stat. § 5202, the text within quotation marks following on the same line after only a space. That, significantly, is precisely the layout of the amendment to Rev. Stat. §5202 in § 13 of the 1913 Act. Respondents point out that it would not have been absurd for Congress to have amended Rev. Stat. §5202 in the middle of the 1916 Act. We agree, and of course there is no dispute that Congress three years earlier amended Rev. Stat. §5202 in the middle of the 1913 Act. Both drafting choices strike us as odd, though neither would be without plausible reason. The 1913 Congress might well have thought it convenient to add the exception from Rev. Stat. §5202’s indebtedness limit for “[l]iabilities incurred under the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act” immediately after the language in the Federal Reserve Act that could result in the liabilities of concern, language that authorized national banks to accept certain drafts and bills of exchange. 38 Stat. 264. And the 1916 Congress could conceivably have found it similarly convenient to amend Rev. Stat. § 5202, which appeared in the Act it was amending at the time. The point of our analysis, however, is not that Congress could not possibly have amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 in the middle of the 1916 Act, but that the best reading of the Act, despite the punctuation marks, is that Congress did something else. Because we conclude that the meaning of the 1916 Act is plain, and because respondents do not argue that the law’s plain meaning is “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571 (1982), we need not consider the 1916 Act’s legislative history. Nor need we consider, again because the statute’s meaning is unambiguous, what if any weight to accord the longstanding assumption of both the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve Board that section 92 survived the 1918 amendment of Rev. Stat. §5202. See Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 171 (1989). We note finally, since respondents raise the point, that our remark in Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 502 (1936), that the 1916 Act “amends [sections of the Federal Reserve Act], and §5202 of the Revised Statutes” is obviously not controlling, coming as it did in an opinion that did not present the question we decide in these cases. Were we to consider our past remarks about the statutes we discuss here, we would also have to account for Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 405 U. S., at 401-402, and n. 12, in which the Court treated section 92 as valid law, despite noting its absence from the United States Code. Neither case tells us anything helpful for resolving this one, though together they contain a valuable reminder about the need to distinguish an opinion’s holding from its dicta.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BREEDEN No. 00-866. Decided April 23, 2001 Pee Curiam. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-3(a), it is unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” In 1997, respondent filed a §2000e-3(a) retaliation claim against petitioner Clark County School District. The claim as eventually amended alleged that petitioner had taken two separate adverse employment actions against her in response to two different protected activities in which she had engaged. The District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner, No. CV-S-97-365-DWH(RJJ) (D. Nev., Feb. 9, 1999), but a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed over the dissent of Judge Fernandez, No. 99-15522,2000 WL 991821 (July 19, 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished), judgt. order reported at 232 F. 3d 893. We grant the writ of certio-rari and reverse. On October 21, 1994, respondent’s male supervisor met with respondent and another male employee to review the psychological evaluation reports of four job applicants. The report for one of the applicants disclosed that the applicant had once commented to a co-worker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon.” Brief in Opposition 3. At the meeting respondent’s supervisor read the comment aloud, looked at respondent and stated, “I don’t know what that means.” Ibid. The other employee then said, “Well, I’ll tell you later,” and both men chuckled. Ibid. Respondent later complained about the comment to the offending employee, to Assistant Superintendent George Ann Rice, the employee’s supervisor, and to another assistant superintendent of petitioner. Her first claim of retaliation asserts that she was punished for these complaints. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied §2000e-3(a) to protect employee “opposition]” not just to practices that are actually “made... unlawful” by Title VII, but also to practices that the employee could reasonably believe were unlawful. 2000 WL 991821, at *1 (stating that respondent’s opposition was protected “if she had a reasonable, good faith belief that the incident involving the sexually explicit remark constituted unlawful sexual harassment”); Trent v. Valley Electric Assn. Inc., 41 F. 3d 524, 526 (CA9 1994). We have no occasion to rule on the propriety of this interpretation, because even assuming it is correct, no one could reasonably believe that the incident recounted above violated Title VII. Title VII forbids actions taken on the basis of sex that “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Just three Terms ago, we reiterated, what was plain from our previous decisions, that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is “so ‘severe or pervasive’ as to ‘alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (Only harassing conduct that is “severe or pervasive” can produce a “constructive alteratio[n] in the terms or conditions of employment”); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (Title VII “forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment”). Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation; instead, “whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive” must be judged “by ‘looking at all the circumstances,’ including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."' Faragher v. Boca Raton, supra, at 787-788 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1998)). Hence, “[a] recurring point in [our] opinions is that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.' ” Faragher v. Boca Raton, supra, at 788 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). No reasonable person could have believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title VII’s standard. The ordinary terms and conditions of respondent’s job required her to review the sexually explicit statement in the course of screening job applicants. Her co-workers who participated in the hiring process were subject to the same requirement, and indeed, in the District Court respondent “conceded that it did not bother or upset her” to read the statement in the file. App. to Pet. for Cert. 15 (District Court opinion). Her supervisor’s comment, made at a meeting to review the application, that he did not know what the statement meant; her co-worker’s responding comment; and the chuckling of both are at worst an “isolated inciden[t]” that cannot remotely be considered “extremely serious,” as our eases require, Faragher v. Boca Raton, supra, at 788. The holding of the Court of Appeals to the contrary must be reversed. Besides claiming that she was punished for complaining to petitioner’s personnel about the alleged sexual harassment, respondent also claimed that she was punished for filing charges against petitioner with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and for filing the present suit. Respondent filed her lawsuit on April 1,1997; on April 10,1997, respondent’s supervisor, Assistant Superintendent Rice, “mentioned to Allin Chandler, Executive Director of plaintiff’s union, that she was contemplating transferring plaintiff to the position of Director of Professional Development Education,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 11-12 (District Court opinion); and this transfer was “carried through” in May, Brief in Opposition 8. In order to show, as her defense against summary judgment required, the existence of a causal connection between her protected activities and the transfer, respondent “relie[d] wholly on the temporal proximity of the filing of her complaint on April 1,1997 and Rice’s statement to plaintiff’s union representative on April 10,1997 that she was considering transferring plaintiff to the [new] position.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 21-22 (District Court opinion). The District Court, however, found that respondent did not serve petitioner with the summons and complaint until April 11,1997, one day after Rice had made the statement, and Rice filed an affidavit stating that she did not become aware of the lawsuit until after April 11, a claim that respondent did not challenge. Hence, the court concluded, respondent “ha[d] not shown that any causal connection exists between her protected activities and the adverse employment decision.” Id., at 21. The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on two facts: The EEOC had issued a right-to-sue letter to respondent three months before Rice announced she was contemplating the transfer, and the actual transfer occurred one month after Rice learned of respondent’s suit. 2000 WL 991821, at *3. The latter fact is immaterial in light of the fact that petitioner coneededly was contemplating the transfer before it learned of the suit. Employers need not suspend previously planned transfers upon discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of causality. As for the right-to-sue letter: Respondent did not rely on that letter in the District Court and did not mention it in her opening brief on appeal. Her demonstration of causality all along had rested upon the connection between the transfer and the filing of her lawsuit — to which connection the letter was irrelevant. When, however, petitioner’s answering brief in the Court of Appeals demonstrated conclusively the lack of causation between the filing of respondent’s lawsuit and Rice’s decision, respondent mentioned the letter for the first time in her reply brief, Reply Brief in No. 99-15522 (CA9) pp. 9-10. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion did not adopt respondent’s utterly implausible suggestion that the EEOC’s issuance of a right-to-sue letter — an action in which the employee takes no part — is a protected activity of the employee, see 42 U. S. C. §2000e-3(a). Rather, the opinion suggests that the letter provided petitioner with its first notice of respondent’s charge before the EEOC, and hence allowed the inference that the transfer proposal made three months later was petitioner’s reaction to the charge. See 2000 WL 991821, at *3. This will not do. First, there is no indication that Rice even knew about the right-to-sue letter when she proposed transferring respondent. And second, if one presumes she knew about it, one must also presume that she (or her predecessor) knew almost two years earlier about the protected action (filing of the EEOC complaint) that the letter supposedly disclosed. (The complaint had been filed on August 23, 1995, and both Title VII and its implementing regulations require that an employer be given notice within 10 days of filing, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (e)(1); 29 CFR §1601.14 (2000).) The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be “very close,” O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F. 3d 1248, 1253 (CA10 2001). See, e. g., Richmond v. Oneok, Inc., 120 F. 3d 205, 209 (CA10 1997) (3-month period insufficient); Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F. 2d 1168, 1174-1175 (CA7 1992) (4-month period insufficient). Action taken (as here) 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at all. In short, neither the grounds that respondent presented to the District Court, nor the ground she added on appeal, nor even the ground the Court of Appeals developed on its own, sufficed to establish a dispute substantial enough to withstand the motion for summary judgment. The District Court’s granting of that motion was correct. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE et al. v. P. G. LAKE, INC., et al. No. 108. Argued March 11, 1958. Decided April 14, 1958. John N. Stull argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and MelvaM. Graney. Harry C. Weeks and J. Paul Jackson argued the cause for respondents. Mr. Weeks filed a brief for P. G. Lake, Inc., et al., and Mr. Jackson filed a brief, for O’Connor et al., respondents. Allen E. Pye filed a brief for Wrather et al., respondents. Peter B. Wells filed a brief for Weed, respondent. Mb. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. We have here, consolidated for argument, five cases involving an identical question of law. Four are from the Tax Court whose rulings may be found in 24 T. C. 1016 (the Lake case); 24 T. C. 818 (the Fleming case); 24 T. C. 1025 (the Weed case). (Its findings and opinion in the Wrather case are not officially reported.) Those four cases involved income tax deficiencies. The fifth, the O’Connor case, is a suit for a refund originating in the District Court. 143 F. Supp. 240. All five are from the same Court of Appeáls, 241 F. 2d 71, 65, 78, 84, 69. The cases are here on writs of certiorari which we granted because of the public importance of the question presented. 353 U. S. 982. The facts of the Lake case are closely similar to those in the Wrather and O’Connor cases. Lake is a corporation engaged in the business of producing oil and gas. It has a seven-eighths working interest in two commercial oil and gas leases. In 1950 it was indebted to its president in the sum of $600,000 and in consideration of his cancellation of the debt assigned him an oil payment right in the amount of $600,000, plus an amount equal to interest at 3 percent a year on the unpaid balance remaining from month to month, payable out of 25 percent of the oil attributable to the taxpayer’s working interest in the two leases. At the time of the assignment it could have been estimated with reasonable accuracy that the assigned oil payment right would pay out in three or more years. It did in fact pay out in a little over three years. In its 1950 tax return Lake reported the oil payment assignment as a sale of property producing a profit of $600,000 and taxable as a long-term capital gain under § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Commissioner determined a deficiency, ruling that the purchase price (less deductions not material here) was taxable as ordinary income, subject to depletion. The Wrather case has some variations in its facts. In the O’Connor case the assignors of the oil payments owned royalty interests rather than working interests. But these differences are not material to the question we have for decision. The Weed case is different only because it involves sulphur rights, rather than oil rights. The taxpayer was the owner of a pooled overriding royalty in a deposit known as Boling Dome. The royalty interest entitled the taxpayer to receive $0.00966133 per long ton of sulphur produced from Boling Dome, irrespective of the market price. Royalty payments were made each month, based on the previous month's production. In 1947, the taxpayer, in order to obtain a sure source of funds to pay his individual income taxes, agreed with one Munro, his tax advisor, on a sulphur payment assignment. The taxpayer assigned to Munro a sulphur payment totaling $50,000 and consisting of 86.254514 percent of his pooled royalty interest, which represented the royalty interest on 6,000,000 long tons of the estimated remaining 21,000,000 long tons still in place. The purchase price was paid in three installments over a three-year period. Most of the purchase price was borrowed by Munro from a bank with the sulphur payment assignment as security. The assigned sulphur payment right paid out within 28 months. The amounts received by the taxpayer in 1948 and 1949 were returned by him as capital gains. The Commissioner determined that these amounts were taxable as ordinary income, subject to depletion. The Fleming case is a bit more complicated and presents an additional question not in the other cases. Here oil payment assignments were made, not for cash but for real estate. Two transactions are involved. Fleming and others with whom he was associated made oil payment assignments, the rights and interests involved being held by them for productive use in their respective businesses of producing oil. Each oil payment was assigned for an interest in a ranch. Each was in an amount which represented the uncontested fair value of the undivided interest in the ranch received by the assignor, plus an amount equal to the interest per annum on the balance remaining unpaid from time to time. The other transaction consisted of an oil payment assignment by an owner of oil and gas leases, held for productive use in the assignor’s business, for the fee simple title to business real estate. This oil payment assignment, like the ones mentioned above, was in the amount of the uncontested fair market value of the real estate received, plus interest on the unpaid balance remaining from time to time. First, as to whether the proceeds were taxable as long-term capital gains under § 117 or as ordinary income subject to depletion. The Court of Appeals started from the premise, laid down in Texas decisions, see especially Tennant v. Dunn, 130 Tex. 285, 110 S. W. 2d 53, that oil payments are interests in land. We too proceed on that basis; and yet we conclude that the consideration received for these oil payment rights (and the sulphur payment right) was taxable as ordinary income, subject to depletion. “50 per centum if the capital asset has been held for more than 6 months.” 56 Stat. 843. The purpose of § 117 was “to relieve the taxpayer from . . . excessive tax burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of capital investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conversions.” See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 106. And this exception has always been narrowly construed so as to protect the revenue against artful devices. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U. S. 46, 52. We do not see here any conversion of a capital investment. The lump sum consideration seems essentially a substitute for what would otherwise be received at a future time as ordinary income. The pay-out of these particular assigned oil payment rights could be ascertained with considerable accuracy. Such are the stipulations, findings, or clear inferences. In the O’Connor case, the pay-out of the assigned oil payment right was so assured that the purchaser obtained a $9,990,350 purchase money loan at 3% percent interest without any security other than a deed of trust of the $10,000,000 oil payment right, he receiving 4 percent from the taxpayer. Only a fraction of the oil or sulphur rights were transferred, the balance being retained. Except in the Fleming case, which we will discuss later, cash was received which was equal to the amount of the income to accrue during the term of the assignment, the assignee being compensated by interest on his advance. The substance of what was assigned was the right to receive future income. The substance of what was received was the present value of income which the recipient would otherwise obtain in the future. In short, consideration was paid for the right to receive future income, not for an increase in the value of the income-producing property. “After careful study and considerable experience with the application of G. C. M. 24849, supra, it is now concluded that there is no legal or practical basis for distinguishing between short-lived and long-lived in-oil payment rights. It is, therefore, the present position of the Bureau that the assignment of any in-oil payment right (not pledged for development), which extends over a period less than the life of the depletable property interest from which it is carved, is essentially the assignment of expected income from such property interest. Therefore, the assignment for a consideration of any such in-oil payment right results in the receipt of ordinary income by the assignor which is taxable to him when received or accrued, depending upon the method of accounting employed by him. Where the assignment of the in-oil payment right is donative, the transaction is considered as an assignment of future income which is taxable to the donor at such time as the income from the assigned payment right arises. “Notwithstanding the foregoing, G. C. M. 24849, supra, and I. T. 3935, supra, do not apply where the assigned in-oil payment right constitutes the entire depletable interest of the assignor in the property or a fraction extending over the entire life of the property.” The pre-2946 administrative practice was not reflected in any published ruling or regulation. It therefore will not be presumed to have been known to Congress and incorporated into the law by re-enactment. See Helvering v. N. Y. Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455, 467-468. Cf. United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U. S. 383, 389-397. Moreover, prior administrative practice is always subject to change “through exercise by the administrative agency of its continuing rule-making power.” See Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U. S. 428, 432. These arrangements seem to us transparent devices. Their forms do not control. Their essence is determined not by subtleties of draftsmanship but by their total effect. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579. We have held that if one, entitled to receive at a future date interest on a bond or compensation for services, makes a grant of it by anticipatory assignment, he realizes taxable income as if he had collected the interest or received the salary and then paid it over. That is the teaching of Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, and Harrison v. Schaffner, supra; and it is applicable here. As we stated in Helvering v. Horst, supra, at 117, “The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means of procuring them.” There the taxpayer detached interest coupons from negotiable bonds and presented- them as a gift to his son. The interest when paid was held taxable to the father. Here, even more clearly than there, the taxpayer is converting future income into present income. Second, as to the Fleming case. The Court of Appeals in the Fleming case held that the transactions were tax-free under § 112 (b)(1) which provides: “No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in trade or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest) is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or business or-for investment.” 53 Stat. 37. In the alternative and as a second ground, it held that this case, too, was governed by § 117. We agree with the Tax Court, 24 T. C. 818, that this is not a tax-free exchange under § 112 (b) (1). Treasury Regulations 111, promulgated under the 1939 Act, provide in § 39.112 (b) (1)-1 as respects the words “like kind,” as used in § 112 (b) (1), that “One kind or class of property may not ... be exchanged for property of a different kind or class.” The exchange cannot satisfy that test where the effect under the tax laws is a transfer of future income from oil leases for real estate. As we have seen, these oil payment assignments were merely arrangements for delayed cash payment of the purchase price of real estate, plus interest. Moreover, § 39.112 (a)-l states that the “underlying assumption of these exceptions is that the new property is substantially a continuation of the old investment still unliquidated.” Yet the oil payment assignments were not conversions of capital investments, as we have seen. Reversed. An oil and gas lease ordinarily conveys the entire mineral interest less any royalty interest retained by the lessor. The owner of the lease is said to own the “working interest” because he has the right to develop and produce the minerals. In Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U. S. 404, we described an oil payment as “the right to a specified sum of money, payable out of a specified percentage of the oil, or the proceeds received from the sale of such oil, if, as and when produced.” Id., at 410. A royalty interest is “a right to receive a specified percentage of all oil and gas produced” but, unlike the oil payment, is not limited to a specified sum of money. The royalty interest lasts during the entire term of the lease. Id., at 409. See note 1, supra. Boling Dome is a tract composed of various parcels of land. The owners of the royalty interests in sulphur produced from the separate parcels entered into a pooling agreement by which royalties from sulphur produced anywhere in Boling Dome were distributed pro rata among all the royalty interest holders. In that sense was the interest of each “pooled.” Section 117 (a)(1) provides in relevant part: “The term ‘capital assets’ means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close' of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, or property, used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1), or real property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer.” 53 Stat. 50, as amended, 56 Stat. 846. Section 117 (a) (4) provides: “The term ‘long-term capital gain’ means gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months, if and to the extent such gain is taken into account in computing net income.” 53 Stat. 51, as amended, 56 Stat. 843. Section 117 (b) provides: “In the case of a taxpayer, other than a corporation, only the following percentages of the gain or loss recognized upon the sale or exchange of a capital asset shall be taken into account in computing net capital gain, net capital loss, and net income: “100 per centum if the capital asset has been held for not more than 6 months; Until 1946 the Commissioner agreed with the contention of the taxpayers in these cases that the assignment of an oil payment right was productive of a long-term capital gain. In 1946 he changed his mind and ruled that “consideration (not pledged for development) received for the assignment of a short-lived in-oil payment right carved out of any type of depletable interest in oil and gas in place (including a larger in-oil payment right) is ordinary income subject to the depletion allowance in the assignor’s hands.” G. C. M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 66, 69. This ruling was made applicable “only to such assignments made on or after April 1, 1946,” I. T. 3895, 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 39. In 1950 a further ruling was made that represents the present view of the Commissioner. I. T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 10, 11, reads in relevant part as follows:

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FORD MOTOR CO. v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION No. 81-300. Argued April 20, 1982 Decided June 28, 1982 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 241. John R. Wester argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert L. Stern, H. R. Nolte, Jr., and Stephen D. Bolerjack. David A. Strauss argued the cause pro hac vice for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Michael J. Connolly, Philip B. Sklover, and Vella M. Fink Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Thomas R. Bagby filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether an employer charged with discrimination in hiring can toll the continuing accrual of backpay liability under § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g), simply by unconditionally offering the claimant the job previously denied, or whether the employer also must offer seniority retroactive to the date of the alleged discrimination. The question has considerable practical significance because of the lengthy delays that too often attend Title VII litigation. The extended time it frequently takes to obtain satisfaction in the courts may force a discrimination claimant to suffer through years of underemployment or unemployment before being awarded the job the claimant deserves. Court delays, of course, affect all litigants. But for the victim of job discrimination, delay is especially unfortunate. The claimant cannot afford to stand aside while the wheels of justice grind slowly toward the ultimate resolution of the lawsuit. The claimant needs work that will feed a family and restore self-respect. A job is needed — now. In this case, therefore, we must determine how best to fashion the remedies available under Title VII to fulfill this basic need. I — I A In June and July 1971, Judy Gaddis, Rebecca Starr, and Zettie Smith applied at a Ford Motor Co. (Ford) parts warehouse located in Charlotte, N. C., for jobs as “picker-packers,” “picking” ordered parts from storage, and “packing” them for shipment. At the time, no woman had ever worked in that capacity at the Ford warehouse. All three women were qualified for the positions: Gaddis and Starr recently had been laid off from equivalent jobs at a nearby General Motors (GM) warehouse, and Smith had comparable prior experience. Smith applied before any of the openings were filled, and Gaddis and Starr applied while at least two positions remained available. Ford, however, filled the three vacant positions with men, and Gaddis filed a charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming that Ford had discriminated against her because of her sex. In January 1973, GM recalled Gaddis and Starr to their former positions at its warehouse. The following July, while they were still working at GM, a single vacancy opened up at Ford. Ford offered the job to Gaddis, without seniority retroactive to her 1971 application. Ford’s offer, however, did not require Gaddis to abandon or compromise her Title VII claim against Ford. Gaddis did not accept the job, in part because she did not want to be the only woman working at the warehouse, and in part because she did not want to lose the seniority she had earned at GM. Ford then made the same unconditional offer to Starr, who declined for the same reasons. Gaddis and Starr continued to work at the GM warehouse, but in 1974 the warehouse was closed and they were laid off. They then unsuccessfully sought new employment until September 1975, when they entered a Government training program for the unemployed. Smith applied again for work at Ford in 1973, but was never hired. She worked elsewhere, though at lower wages than she would have earned at Ford, during much of the time between 1971 and the District Court’s decision in 1977. In contrast to Gaddis’, Starr’s, and Smith’s difficulties, at least two of the three men hired by Ford in 1971 were still working at the warehouse at the time of the trial in 1977. B In July 1975, the EEOC sued Ford in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, alleging that Ford had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), by refusing to hire women at the Charlotte warehouse. The Commission sought injunctive relief and backpay for the victims. After trial, the District Court found that Ford had discriminated against the three women on the basis of their sex and awarded them backpay in an amount equal to “the difference between the amount they would have earned had they been hired in August 1971, and the amounts actually earned or reasonably earnable by them” between that date and the date of the court’s order. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-170. The District Court rejected Ford’s contention that Gaddis and Starr were not entitled to backpay accruing after the dates on which they declined Ford’s offer of employment. Id., at A-170 to A-171. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s finding of unlawful discrimination, as well as the court’s award to Gaddis and Starr of backpay that had accrued after July 1973, when the women rejected Ford’s unconditional job offer. 645 F. 2d 183 (1981). The court suggested that, had Ford promised retroactive seniority with its job offer, the offer would have cut off Ford’s backpay liability. The court concluded, however, that without the promise of retroactive seniority, Ford’s 1973 offer was “incomplete and unacceptable.” Id., at 193. Ford then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, contending, inter alia, that its unconditional job offer to Gaddis and Starr should have cut off the further accrual of backpay liability. We granted the writ. 454 U. S. 1030 (1981). II Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g), governs the award of backpay in Title VII cases. In pertinent part, § 706(g) provides: “If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmaaction as may be appropriate, which may include, is not limited to, . . . hiring of employees, with or without back pay, ... or any other equitable relief as court deems appropriate. . . . Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the per- or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable” (emphasis added). Under § 706(g), then, “backpay is not an automatic or mandatory remedy; ... it is one which the courts ‘may’ invoke” in the exercise of their sound “discretion [which] is equitable in nature.” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 415, 416 (1975). Nonetheless, while “the power to award backpay is a discretionary power,” id., at 447 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment), a “court must exercise this power ‘in light of the large objectives of the Act,’ ” and, in doing so, must be guided by “meaningful standards” enforced by “thorough appellate review.” Id., at 416 (opinion of the Court) (citations omitted). Moreover, as we emphasized in Albemarle Paper, in Title VII cases “such discretionary choices are not left to a court’s ‘inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.’ United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. J.). . . . “It is true that ‘[e]quity eschews mechanical rules . . . [and] depends on flexibility.’ Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 396 (1946). But when Congress invokes the Chancellor’s conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent with those purposes and not ‘equity [which] varies like the Chancellor’s foot.’ Important national goals would be frustrated by a regime of discretion that ‘produce[d] different results for breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy.’ Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375, 405 (1970).” Id., at 416-417 (footnote omitted). In this case, Ford and the EEOC offer competing standards to govern backpay liability. Ford argues that if an employer unconditionally offers a claimant the job for which he previously applied, the claimant’s rejection of that offer should toll the continuing accrual of backpay liability. The EEOC, on the other hand, defends the lower court’s rule, contending that backpay liability should be tolled only by the rejection of an offer that includes seniority retroactive to the date on which the alleged discrimination occurred. Our task is to determine which of these standards better coincides with the “large objectives” of Title VII. Ill The “primary objective” of Title VII is to bring employment discrimination to an end, Albemarle Paper, 422 U. S., at 417, by “ ‘achieving] equality of employment opportunities and removing] barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group . . . over other employees.’” Ibid, (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 429-430 (1971)). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973). “[T]he preferred means for achieving” this goal is through “[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974). To accomplish this objective, the legal rules fashioned to implement Title VII should be designed, consistent with other Title VII policies, to encourage Title VII defendants promptly to make curative, unconditional job offers to Title VII claimants, thereby bringing defendants into “voluntary compliance” and ending discrimination far more quickly than could litigation proceeding at its often ponderous pace. Delays in litigation unfortunately are now commonplace, forcing the victims of discrimination to suffer years of underemployment or unemployment before they can obtain a court order awarding them the jobs unlawfully denied them. In a better world, perhaps, lawsuits brought under Title VII would speed to judgment so quickly that the effects of legal rules on the behavior of the parties during the pendency of litigation would not be as important a consideration. We do not now live in such a world, however, as this case illustrates. The rule tolling the further accrual of backpay liability if the defendant offers the claimant the job originally sought well serves the objective of ending discrimination through voluntary compliance, for it gives an employer a strong incentive to hire the Title VII claimant. While the claimant may be no more attractive than the other job applicants, a job offer to the claimant will free the employer of the threat of liability for further backpay damages. Since paying backpay damages is like paying an extra worker who never came to work, Ford’s proposed rule gives the Title VII claimant a decided edge over other competitors for the job he seeks. The rule adopted by the court below, on the other hand, fails to provide the same incentive, because it makes hiring the Title VII claimant more costly than hiring one of the other applicants for the same job. To give the claimant retroactive seniority before an adjudication of liability, the employer must be willing to pay the additional costs of the fringe benefits that come with the seniority that newly hired workers usually do not receive. More important, the employer must also be prepared to cope with the deterioration in morale, labor unrest, and reduced productivity that may be engendered by inserting the claimant into the seniority ladder over the heads of the incumbents who have earned their places through their work on the job. In many cases, moreover, disruption of the existing seniority system will violate a collective-bargaining agreement, with all that such a violation entails for the employer’s labor relations. Under the rule adopted by the court below, the employer must be willing to accept all these additional costs if he hopes to toll his backpay liability by offering the job to the claimant. As a result, the employer will be less, rather than more, likely to hire the claimant. In sum, the Court of Appeals’ rule provides no incentive to employers to hire Title VII claimants. The rule advocated by Ford, by contrast, powerfully motivates employers to put Title VII claimants to work, thus ending ongoing discrimination as promptly as possible. IV Title VIPs primary goal, of course, is to end discrimination; the victims of job discrimination want jobs, not lawsuits. But when unlawful discrimination does occur, Title VIPs secondary, fallback purpose is to compensate the victims for their injuries. To this end, § 706(g) aims “ ‘to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole’ ” by restoring them, “ ‘so far as possible ... to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.’ ” Albemarle Paper, 422 U. S., at 421 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams)). We now turn to consider whether the rule urged by Ford not only better serves the goal of ending discrimination, but also properly compensates injured Title VII claimants. A If Gaddis and Starr had rejected an unconditional offer from Ford before they were recalled to their jobs at GM, tolling Ford’s backpay liability from the time of Ford’s offer plainly would be consistent with providing Gaddis and Starr full compensation for their injuries. An unemployed or underemployed claimant, like all other Title VII claimants, is subject to the statutory duty to minimize damages set out in § 706(g). This duty, rooted in an ancient principle of law, requires the claimant to use reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment. Although the unemployed or underemployed claimant need not go into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position, he forfeits his right to backpay if he refuses a job substantially equivalent to the one he was denied. Consequently, an employer charged with unlawful discrimination often can toll the accrual of backpay liability by unconditionally offering the claimant the job he sought, and thereby providing him with an opportunity to minimize damages. An employer’s unconditional offer of the job originally sought to an unemployed or underemployed claimant, moreover, need not be supplemented by an offer of retroactive seniority to be effective, lest a defendant’s offer be irrationally disfavored relative to other employers’ offers of substantially similar jobs. The claimant, after all, plainly would be required to minimize his damages by accepting another employer’s offer even though it failed to grant the benefits of seniority not yet earned. Of course, if the claimant fulfills the requirement that he minimize damages by accepting the defendant’s unconditional offer, he remains entitled to full compensation if he wins his case. A court may grant him backpay accrued prior to the effective date of the offer, retroactive seniority, and compensation for any losses suffered as a result of his lesser seniority before the court’s judgment. In short, the unemployed or underemployed claimant’s statutory obligation to minimize damages requires him to accept an unconditional offer of the job originally sought, even without retroactive seniority. Acceptance of the offer preserves, rather than jeopardizes, the claimant’s right to be made whole; in the case of an unemployed or underemployed claimant, Ford’s suggested rule merely embodies the existing requirement of § 706(g) that the claimant minimize damages, without affecting his right to compensation. B Ford’s proposed rule also is consistent with the policy of full compensation when the claimant has had the good fortune to find a more attractive job than the defendant’s, because the availability of the better job terminates the ongoing ill effects of the defendant’s refusal to hire the claimant. For example, if Gaddis and Starr considered their jobs at GM to be so far superior to the jobs originally offered by Ford that, even if Ford had hired them at the outset, they would have left Ford’s employ to take the new work, continuing to hold Ford responsible for backpay after Gaddis and Starr lost their GM jobs would be to require, in effect, that Ford insure them against the risks of unemployment in a new and independent undertaking. Such a rule would not merely restore Gaddis and Starr to the “‘position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination,’ ” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 421 (citation omitted); it would catapult them into a better position than they would have enjoyed in the absence of discrimination. Likewise, even if Gaddis and Starr considered their GM jobs only somewhat better or even substantially equivalent to the positions they would have held at Ford had Ford hired them initially, their rejection of Ford’s unconditional offer could be taken to mean that they believed that the lingering ill effects of Ford’s prior refusal to hire them had been extinguished by later developments. If, for example, they thought that the Ford and GM jobs were identical in every respect, offering identical pay, identical conditions of employment, and identical risks of layoff, Gaddis and Starr would have been utterly indifferent as to which job they had— Ford’s or GM’s. Assuming that they could work at only one job at a time, the ongoing economic ill effects caused by Ford’s prior refusal to hire them would have ceased when they found the identical jobs at GM, and they would have had no reason to accept Ford’s offers. As in the case of a claimant who lands a better job, therefore, requiring a defendant to provide what amounts to a form of unemployment insurance to claimants, after they have found identical jobs and refused the defendant’s unconditional job offer, would be, absent special circumstances, to grant them something more than compensation for their injuries. In both of these situations, the claimant has the power to accept the defendant’s offer and abandon the superior or substantially equivalent replacement job. As in the case of an unemployed or underemployed claimant, under the rule advocated by Ford acceptance of the defendant’s unconditional offer would preserve fully the ultimately victorious claimant’s right to full redress for the effects of discrimination. The claimant who chooses not to follow this path does so, then, not because it provides inadequate compensation, but because the value of the replacement job outweighs the value of the defendant’s job supplemented by the prospect of full court-ordered compensation. In other words, the victim of discrimination who finds a better or substantially equivalent job no longer suffers ongoing injury stemming from the unlawful discrimination. C Thus, the rule advocated by Ford rests comfortably both on the statutory requirement that a Title VII claimant must minimize damages and on the fact that a claimant is no longer incurring additional injury if he has been able to find other suitable work that, all things considered, is at least as attractive as the defendant’s. For this reason, in almost all circumstances the rule is fully consistent with Title VII’s object of making injured claimants whole. The sole question that can be raised regarding whether the rule adequately compensates claimants arises in that narrow category of eases in which the claimant believes his replacement job to be superior to the defendant’s job without seniority, but inferior to the defendant’s job with the benefits of seniority. In the present case, for example, it is possible that Gaddis and Starr considered their GM jobs more attractive than the jobs offered by Ford, but less satisfactory than the positions they would have held at Ford if Ford had hired them initially. If so, they were confronted with two options. They could have accepted Ford’s unconditional offer, preserving their right to full compensation if they prevailed on their Title VII claims, but forfeiting their favorable positions at GM. Alternatively, they could have kept their jobs at GM, retaining the possibility of continued employment there, but, under the operation of the rule advocated here by Ford, losing the right to claim further backpay from Ford after the date of Ford’s offer. The court below concluded that under these circumstances Ford’s rule would present Gaddis and Starr with an “intolerable choice,” 645 F. 2d, at 192, depriving them of the opportunity to receive full compensation. We agree that Gaddis and Starr had to choose between two alternatives. We do not agree, however, that their opportunity to choose deprived them of compensation. After all, they had the option of accepting Ford’s unconditional offer and retaining the right to seek full compensation at trial, which would comport fully with Title VII’s goal of making discrimination victims whole. Under the rule advocated by Ford, if Gaddis and Starr chose the option of remaining at their GM jobs rather than accept Ford’s offer, it was because they thought that the GM jobs, plus their claims to backpay accrued prior to Ford’s offer, were more valuable to them than the jobs they originally sought from Ford, plus the right to seek frill compensation from the court. It is hard to see how Gaddis and Starr could have been deprived of adequate compensation because they chose to venture upon a path that seemed to them more attractive than the Ford job plus the right to seek full compensation in court. If the choice presented to Gaddis and Starr was difficult, it was only because it required them to assess their likelihood of prevailing at trial. But surely it cannot be contended for this reason alone that they were deprived of their right to adequate compensation. It is a fact of life that litigation is risky and that a plaintiff with a claim to compensation for his losses must consider the possibility that the claim might be lost at trial, either wrongly, because of litigation error, or rightly, because the defendant was innocent. Ford’s rule merely requires the Title VII claimant to decide whether to take the job offered by the defendant, retaining his rights to an award by the court of backpay accrued prior to the effective date of the offer, and any court-ordered retroactive seniority plus compensation for any losses suffered as a result of his lesser seniority before the court’s judgment, or, instead, whether to accept a more attractive job from another employer and the limitation of the claim for backpay to the damages that have already accrued. The rule urged by the EEOC and adopted by the court below, by contrast, would have the perverse result of requiring the employer in effect to insure the claimant against the risk that the employer might win at trial. Therefore, we conclude that, when a claimant rejects the offer of the job he originally sought, as supplemented by a right to full court-ordered compensation, his choice can be taken as establishing that he considers the ongoing injury he has suffered at the hands of the defendant to have been ended by the availability of better opportunities elsewhere. For this reason, we find that, absent special circumstances, the simple rule that the ongoing accrual of backpay liability is tolled when a Title VII claimant rejects the job he originally sought comports with Title VIPs policy of making discrimination victims whole. V Although Title VII remedies depend primarily upon the objectives discussed above, the statute also permits us to consider the rights of “innocent third parties.” City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 723 (1978). See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 371-376 (1977). The lower court’s rule places a particularly onerous burden on the innocent employees of an employer charged with discrimination. Under the court’s rule, an employer may cap backpay liability only by forcing his incumbent employees to yield seniority to a person who has not proved, and may never prove, unlawful discrimination. As we have acknowledged on numerous occasions, seniority plays a central role in allocating benefits and burdens among employees. In light of the “‘overriding importance’ ” of these rights, American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 76 (1982) (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 346 (1964)), we should be wary of any rule that encourages job offers that compel innocent workers to sacrifice their seniority to a person who has only claimed, but not yet proved, unlawful discrimination. The sacrifice demanded by the lower court’s rule, moreover, leaves the displaced workers without any remedy against claimants who fail to establish their claims. If, for example, layoffs occur while the Title VII suit is pending, an employer may have to furlough an innocent worker indefinitely while retaining a claimant who was given retroactive seniority. If the claimant subsequently fails to prove unlawful discrimination, the worker unfairly relegated to the unemployment lines has no redress for the wrong done him. We do not believe that “‘the large objectives’” of Title VII, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 416 (citation omitted), require innocent employees to carry such a heavy burden. VI In conclusion, we find that the rule adopted by the court below disserves Title VII’s primary goal of getting the victims of employment discrimination into the jobs they deserve as quickly as possible. The rule, moreover, threatens the interests of other, innocent employees by disrupting the established seniority hierarchy, with the attendant risk that an innocent employee will be unfairly laid off or disadvantaged because a Title VII claimant unfairly has been granted seniority. On the other hand, the rule that a Title VII claimant’s rejection of a defendant’s job offer normally ends the defendant’s ongoing responsibility for backpay suffers neither of these disadvantages, while nevertheless adequately satisfying Title VII’s compensation goals. Most important, it also serves as a potent force on behalf of Title VII’s objective of bringing discrimination to an end more quickly than is often possible through litigation. For these reasons we hold that, absent special circumstances, the rejection of an employer’s unconditional job offer ends the accrual of potential backpay liability. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. The dissent asserts that by so “fram[ing] the question presented” we have “simply and completely misstate[d] the issue.” Post, at 242. Apparently, neither party agrees with the dissent. The petitioner summarizes the question presented as “whether back pay due an employment discrimination claimant continues to accrue after the claimant has rejected an unconditional job offer that does not include retroactive seniority or back pay.” Brief for Petitioner i. The respondent sums up the question presented as “[wjhether an employer who unlawfully refused to hire job applicants because they were women can terminate its liability for back pay by subsequently offering the applicants positions without seniority at a time when they had obtained, and accumulated seniority in, other jobs.” Brief for Respondent i. To buttress the assertion that the Court has addressed a question not presented, the dissent claims that we have “misrea[d]” the Court of Appeals’ decision, “transform[ing] a narrow Court of Appeals ruling into a broad one, just so [we could] reverse and install a broad new rule of [our] own choosing,” post, at 249, n. 8, rather than attempt, as best we are able, to decide the particular case actually before us. Because we believe we have correctly and fairly framed the question, we decline the opportunity to address further this ad hominem argument. The discriminatory refusals to hire involved in this case occurred 11 years ago. When this case came to trial, Ford claimed that Gaddis and Starr applied after men had already been hired and that Smith had not applied at all. The District Court found to the contrary, however, and the Court of Appeals upheld the findings. After Gaddis had filed her complaint, she and Starr continued to seek work at the Ford warehouse. In November 1972, Ford hired them and four other workers for six weeks to fill temporary jobs at the warehouse. Although the EEOC suit involved additional issues and claimants, we are concerned here with only the part of the suit that involved Gaddis, Starr, and Smith. Senior District Judge Walter E. Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from this portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision. 1n its petition Ford raised two other issues. First, Ford read the opinion of the Court of Appeals as suggesting that to toll backpay liability an employer must include with his job offer, not just retroactive seniority, but also an offer of already-accrued backpay. The Court of Appeals’ opinion did not expressly so hold, however, and before this Court the EEOC concedes that under Title VII such an offer of a lump-sum payment of backpay is not required to toll the continuing accrual of backpay liability. This issue thus is no longer contested by the parties. The second issue is the only one involving Smith. Ford disputed the District Court’s finding that Ford discriminated against the three women, claiming that the court reached its conclusion because it erroneously allocated the burden of proof. We are persuaded, however, that the District Court’s findings were consistent with Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment. See also Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978), and Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U. S. 24 (1978). Despite these decisions, some confusion continued to exist. In Burdine we reiterated that after a plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, “the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’” 450 U. S., at 253 (citation omitted). The “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Ibid, (citation omitted). It was then made clear that: “The defendant need not persuade the Court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. ... It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.” Id., at 254-255 (footnote omitted). As neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals cited Burdine (apparently because it had only recently been decided), we restate the foregoing principles. We conclude, however, on the basis of the specific findings of fact by the District Court, undisturbed by the Court of Appeals, that the plaintiffs in this case carried their burden of persuasion. As Burdine commands, the District Court did not place the burden of persuasion on Ford. Instead, it began its discussion of liability by straightforwardly declaring that the EEOC “ha[d] established that Ford discriminated against Smith, Gaddis and Starr on the basis of their sex.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-167. The court supported this conclusion by pointing, not only to the EEOC’s proof of a prima facie case, but also to “its showing that Ford had never hired women into the warehouse until November, 1972, and that [its] procedures for hiring were vague and were based on highly subjective criteria.” Id., at A-167 to A-168. The court, moreover, entered findings of fact discrediting each of Ford’s proffered justifications for refusing to hire the women. Id., at A-155 to A-161. This progression of factual findings and legal conclusions indicates that the District Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Ford’s justifications were “unworthy of credence,” 450 U. S., at 256, and that the company had discriminated on the basis of sex. These findings are fully consistent with Burdine. As Ford points out, the Court of Appeals opinion contains some statements that are arguably inconsistent with Burdine. That court corrected any misimpression generated by these statements, however, with a discussion directly focusing on the burden-of-proof issue. 645 F. 2d 183, 189, n. 5 (CA4 1981). In light of this discussion, and because it is clear that the trier of fact properly allocated the burden of proof, we find no merit in Ford’s burden-of-proof argument. Section 706(g) was “expressly modeled,” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 419, and n. 11 (1975), on the analogous remedial provision of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), § 10(c), 49 Stat. 454, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c). Section 10(c) provides that, if an unfair labor practice has been, or is being, committed, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is empowered to “take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies” of the Act. The principles developed under the NLRA generally guide, but do not bind, courts in tailoring remedies under Title VII. See, e. g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 366-367 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 768-770 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co., supra, at 419, and n. 11. Therefore, throughout this opinion we refer to cases decided under the NLRA as well as under Title VII. It should be clear that the contested backpay in this suit stems from the period following Ford’s offer, and during which Gaddis and Starr were unemployed, i. e., after the GM warehouse closed. Our decision today does not affect their right to claim backpay for the period before they rejected Ford’s offers. For reasons of its own, the dissenting opinion reads the decision below narrowly and takes us to task for discerning the outlines of a “general rule” post, at 248 (emphasis deleted), in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. In this regard, we note that already at least one District Court evidently not only has read the opinion below as prescribing a general rule, but in addition has interpreted that rule more broadly than we do. See Saunders v. Hercules, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1137, 1142 (WD Va. 1981) (“in view of the recent Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ford Motor Company, 645 F. 2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981). . . [i]t is clear. . . that a person who has been discriminated against does not have to accept an offer of reemployment where back pay has not been offered”). See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 76 (1982) (“Seniority provisions are of ‘overriding importance’ in collective bargaining, . . . and they ‘are universally included in these contracts’ ”) (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 346 (1964), and Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 79 (1977)). In his dissent, Justice Blackmun suggests that it is we who speak from the “comfor[t]’’ of the “sidelines,” post, at 256, somewhere outside “the real world,” ibid., of sex discrimination. For all the dissent’s rhetoric, however, nowhere does the dissent seriously challenge our conclusion that the rule we adopt will powerfully motivate employers to offer Title VII claimants the jobs they have been denied. But Rebecca Starr’s trial testimony eloquently explains what claimants need: “I was just wanting that job so bad because you can’t, a woman, when you’ve got three children, I needed the money, and I was wanting the job so bad.” 4 Tr. 356. Thus, it is the rule applied by the court below which manifests a “studied indifference to the real-life concerns,” post, at 255, of the victims of sex discrimination. See 118 Cong. Rec. 7569 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Dent during debate on 1972 amendments to Title VII) (“Most people just want to work. That is all. They want an opportunity to work. We are trying to see that all of us, no matter of what race, sex, or religious or ethnic background, will have equal opportunity in employment”). The provision expressly states that “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g). Claimants often take other lesser or dissimilar work during the pendency of their claims, even though doing so is not mandated by the statutory requirement that a claimant minimize damages or forfeit his right to compensation. See, e. g., Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F. 2d 1161 (CA5 1980) (voluntary minimization of damages in dissimilar work); Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F. 2d 416, 422 (CA6 1974) (voluntary minimization of damages by moonlighting). See generally, e. g., C. McCormick, Law of Damages 127-158 (1935). McCormick summarizes “the general rule” as follows: “Where one person has committed a tort, breach of contract, or other legal wrong against another, it is incumbent upon the latter to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages. The person wronged cannot recover for any item of damage which could thus have been avoided.” Id., at 127. In connection with the remedial provisions of the NLRA, we said: “Making the workers whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication of the public policy which the Board enforces. Since only actual losses should be made good, it seems fair that deductions should be made not only for actual earnings by the worker but also for losses which he willfully incurred.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 197-198 (1941). See, e. g., NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 153 U. S. App. D. C. 232, 245-246, 472 F. 2d 1307, 1320-1321 (1972) (employee need not “seek employment which is not consonant with his particular skills, background, and experience” or “which involves conditions that are substantially more onerous than his previous position”); Wonder Markets, Inc., 236 N. L. R. B. 787, 787 (1978) (offer of reinstatement ineffective when discharged employee offered a different job, though former position still existed), enf’d, 598 F. 2d 666, 676 (CA1 1979), supplemental decision, 249 N. L. R. B. 294 (1980); Good Foods Manufacturing & Processing Corp., 195 N. L. R. B. 418, 419 (1972) (offer of reinstatement ineffective because job offered had different conditions of employment and benefits), supplemental decision, 200 N. L. R. B. 623 (1972), enf’d, 492 F. 2d 1302 (CA7 1974); Harvey Carlton, 143 N. L. R. B. 295, 304 (1963) (offer of reinstatement ineffective because employees would return on probation). Some lower courts have indicated, however, that after an extended period of time searching for work without success, a claimant must consider taking a lower-paying position. See, e. g., NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., supra, at 245-246, 472 F. 2d, at 1320-1321; NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 242 F. 2d 697, 700 (CA6), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 821 (1957). If the claimant decides to go into a dissimilar line of work, or to accept a demotion, his earnings must be deducted from any eventual backpay award. See § 706(g); Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., supra, at 1168; Taylor v. Philips Industries, Inc., 593 F. 2d 783, 787 (CA7 1979) (per curiam). NLRB v. Arduini Mfg. Corp., 394 F. 2d 420 (CA1 1968). The claimant’s obligation to minimize damages in order to retain his right to compensation does not require him to settle his claim against the employer, in whole or in part. Thus, an applicant or discharged employee is not required to accept a job offered by the employer on the condition that his claims against the employer be compromised. See, e. g., NLRB v. St. Marys Sewer Pipe Co., 146 F. 2d 995, 996 (CA3 1945). For the same reasons, a defendant’s job offer is effective to force minimization of damages by an unemployed or underemployed claimant even without a supplemental offer of backpay, since the claimant would be required to accept another employer’s offer of a substantially similar job without a large front-end, lump-sum bonus. See, e. g., NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co., 550 F. 2d 1101, 1103 (CA8) (“It is clear that had the Company’s offer of reinstatement been conditioned solely on its refusal to give back pay, as the Company strenuously argues, then the offer of reinstatement would not have been invalidated”), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 830 (1977); Reliance Clay Products Co., 105 N. L. R. B. 135, 137 (1953) (“The Board has consistently held that a discriminatorily discharged employee may not refuse” an unconditioned offer of reinstatement even though unaccompanied by backpay; refusal of such an offer tolls the employer’s liability for backpay). In tailoring a Title VII remedy a court “ ‘has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.’ ” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 418 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 154 (1965)). See, e. g., NLRB v. Huntington Hospital, Inc., 550 F. 2d 921, 924 (CA4 1977). See, e. g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385 (1982); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). Decisions construing the remedial provision of the NLRA, § 10(c), 29 U. S. C. § 160(c), are in accord. See, e. g., In re Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 26 N. L. R. B. 1182, 1235 (1940) (persons unlawfully refused jobs must be offered jobs with “any seniority or other rights and privileges they would have acquired, had the respondent not unlawfully discriminated against them”) (quoted in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, at 770), enf. denied, 122 F. 2d 587 (CA10 1941), rev’d, 316 U. S. 105 (1942). Both Ford and the EEOC agree on this point. See Brief for Respondent 19; Reply Brief for Petitioner 9. It is possible that they did so value the GM jobs, since they applied at Ford only after being laid off at GM, and since after being recalled to the GM jobs they rejected Ford’s offer. Therefore, contrary to the dissent’s erroneous suggestion, post, at 253, the possibility that Gaddis and Starr considered their GM jobs superior to the positions they would have had at Ford had Ford hired them at the outset is not merely a “hypothetical case.” We cannot infer that they so valued their GM jobs, however, solely from their rejection of Ford’s offer. See discussion supra, at 232-234. Employees value a job for many reasons besides the rate of pay, including, for example, the presence of other workers of the employee’s own sex, the availability of recreational facilities at the worksite, staggered work hours, better health benefits, longer vacations, and so forth. What makes one job better than another varies from one employee to another. Gaddis and Starr presumably rejected Ford’s offer because they thought their jobs at GM were worth more to them than full compensation (Ford’s offer plus a court award) discounted by the risks of litigation. In essence, the position adopted by the court below and advocated here by the EEOC turns on the fact that we cannot be sure that, had Gaddis and Starr known they were going to win their lawsuit, they still would have rejected Ford’s offer. Had they known they were going to win, of course, they would have rejected the Ford job only if they valued the GM jobs more than they valued the combination of Ford’s job plus the value of court-ordered compensation «¿«discounted by the risks of litigation. To agree with the EEOC is, in effect, to contend that a claimant is not made whole for purposes of Title VII unless he decided to stay at a replacement job that was worth to him more than the sum of (1) the defendant’s job, (2) the right to seek full court-ordered compensation, and, in addition, (3) a sum analogous to insurance against the risk of loss at trial. We discern, however, no reason for concluding that Title VII requires the defendant to insure the claimant against the possibility that the defendant might prevail in the lawsuit. If, for example, the claimant has been forced to move a great distance to find a replacement job, a rejection of the employer’s offer might reflect the costs of relocation more than a judgment that the replacement job was superior, all things considered, to the defendant’s job. In exceptional circumstances, the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, could give weight to such factors when deciding whether backpay damages accrued after the rejection of an employer’s offer should be awarded to the claimant. The dissent attempts to characterize “the loss of their accumulated seniority at [a] replacement jo[b]” as such a cost of relocation. Post, at 252-253, n. 11. By so doing, the dissent simply confuses the costs of changing from one job to another — whatever the respective advantages and disadvantages of the two jobs might be — with the differences between the two jobs. Seniority may govern, “ ‘not only promotion and layoff, but also transfer, demotion, rest days, shift assignments, prerogative in scheduling vacation, order of layoff, possibilities of lateral transfer to avoid layoff, ‘bumping’ possibilities in the face of layoff, order of recall, training opportunities, working conditions, length of layoff endured without reducing seniority, length of layoff recall rights will withstand, overtime opportunities, parking privileges, and [even] a preferred place in the punch-out line.’” Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 766-767 (quoting Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 487, 490 (1975)). In addition to the rights of innocent employees, the rule urged by the EEOC and adopted by the court below burdens innocent employers. An innocent employer — or one who believes himself innocent — has the right to challenge in court claims he considers weak or baseless. The approach endorsed by the lower court undermines this right by requiring the employer, if he wishes to offer some relief to the claimant and toll the mounting backpay bill, to surrender his defense to the charge that the claimant is entitled to retroactive seniority. If the employer offers the claimant retroactive seniority as well as a job, and then prevails at trial, he will have no recourse against the claimant for the costs of the retroactive seniority that the claimant erroneously received. The rule urged by Ford permits the parties to stem the ongoing effects of the alleged discrimination without compelling either claimant or employer to compromise his claims or surrender his defenses. Cf. Moro Motors Ltd,., 216 N. L. R. B. 192, 193 (1975) (“were [an employer] required to offer to an employee, allegedly discharged for discriminatory reasons, reinstatement with accrued back pay, the [employer’s] right to litigate the issue of whether the discharge was unlawful would for all practical purposes be nullified”) (emphasis in original); National Screen Products Co., 147 N. L. R. B. 746, 747-748 (1964).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION et al. v. NELSON et al. No. 09-530. Argued October 5, 2010 Decided January 19, 2011 Acting Solicitor General Katyal argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Nicole A. Saharsky, Mark B. Stern, and Benjamin M. Shultz. Dan Stormer argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Virginia Keeny, Paul R. Q. Wolf son, and Shirley Cassin Woodward. Christopher A. Mohr and Michael R. Klipper filed a brief for the Consumer Data Industry Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Astronomical Society by Jeffrey F. Pryce and Alice E. Loughran; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Aden J. Fine, Steven R. Shapiro, Jameel Jaffer, David Blair-Loy, Peter J. Eliasberg, and Alan L. Schlosser; for the California Employment Lawyers Association by Marc A Coleman; for the Drug Policy Alliance by David T. Goldberg, Sean H. Donahue, and Daniel N. Abrahamson; for the Electronic Frontier Foundation by Jennifer Stisa Granick; and for the Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. by Marc Rotenberg. Diane J. Curran filed a brief for the Union of Concerned Scientists as amicus curiae. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. In two cases decided more than 30 years ago, this Court referred broadly to a constitutional privacy “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 457 (1977). Respondents in this case, federal contract employees at a Government laboratory, claim that two parts of a standard employment background investigation violate their rights under Whalen and Nixon. Respondents challenge a section of a form questionnaire that asks employees about treatment or counseling for recent illegal-drug use. They also object to certain open-ended questions on a form sent to employees’ designated references. We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon. We hold, however, that the challenged portions of the Government’s background check do not violate this right in the present case. The Government’s interests as employer and proprietor in managing its internal operations, combined with the protections against public dissemination provided by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S. C. § 552a (2006 ed. and Supp. IV), satisfy any “interest in avoiding disclosure” that may “arguably ha[ve] its roots in the Constitution.” Whalen, supra, at 599, 605. I A The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is an independent federal agency charged with planning and conducting the Government’s “space activities." Pub. L. 111-314, §3, 124 Stat. 3333, 51 U. S. C. § 20112(a)(1). NASA’s work force numbers in the tens of thousands of employees. While many of these workers are federal civil servants, a substantial majority are employed directly by Government contractors. Contract employees play an important role in NASA’s mission, and their duties are functionally equivalent to those performed by civil servants. One NASA facility, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California, is staffed exclusively by contract employees. NASA owns JPL, but the California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech) operates the facility under a Government contract. JPL is the lead NASA center for deep-space robotics and communications. Most of this country’s unmanned space missions — from the Explorer 1 satellite in 1958 to the Mars Rovers of today — have been developed and run by JPL. JPL scientists contribute to NASA earth-observation and technology-development projects. Many JPL employees also engage in pure scientific research on topics like “the star formation history of the universe” and “the fundamental properties of quantum fluids.” App. 64-65, 68. Twenty-eight JPL employees are respondents here. Many of them have worked at the lab for decades, and none has ever been the subject of a Government background investigation. At the time when respondents were hired, background cheeks were standard only for federal civil servants. See Exec. Order No. 10450, 3 CFR 936 (1949-1953 Comp.). In some instances, individual contracts required background checks for the employees of federal contractors, but no blanket policy was in place. The Government has recently taken steps to eliminate this two-track approach to background investigations. In 2004, a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission prompted the President to order new, uniform identification standards for “[fjederal employees,” including “contractor employees.” Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-12 — Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, Public Papers of the President, George W. Bush, Vol. 2, Aug. 27, p. 1765 (2007) (hereinafter HSPD-12), App. 127. The Department of Commerce implemented this directive by mandating that contract employees with long-term access to federal facilities complete a standard background check, typically the National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI). National Inst, of Standards and Technology, Personal Identity Verification of Federal Employees & Contractors, pp. iii-vi, 1-8, 6 (FIPS PUB 201-1, Mar. 2006) (hereinafter FIPS PUB 201-1), App. 131-150, 144-145. An October 2007 deadline was set for completion of these investigations. Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Director, OMB, to the Heads of all Departments and Agencies (Aug. 5, 2005), App. 112. In January 2007, NASA modified its contract with Cal Tech to reflect the new background-check requirement. JPL management informed employees that anyone failing to complete the NACI process by October 2007 would be denied access to JPL and would face termination by Cal Tech. B The NACI process has long been the standard background investigation for prospective civil servants. The process begins when the applicant or employee fills out a form questionnaire. Employees who work in “non-sensitive” positions (as all respondents here do) complete Standard Form 85 (SF-85). Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Standard Form 85, Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions, App. 88-95. Most of the questions on SF-85 seek basic biographical information: name, address, prior residences, education, employment history, and personal and professional references. The form also asks about citizenship, selective-service registration, and military service. The last question asks whether the employee has “used, possessed, supplied, or manufactured illegal drugs” in the last year. Id., at 94. If the answer is yes, the employee must provide details, including information about “any treatment or counseling received.” Ibid. A “truthful response,” the form notes, cannot be used as evidence against the employee in a criminal proceeding. Ibid. The employee must certify that all responses on the form are true and must sign a release authorizing the Government to obtain personal information from schools, employers, and others during its investigation. Once a completed SF-85 is on file, the “agency check” and “inquiries” begin. 75 Fed. Reg. 5359 (2010). The Government runs the information provided by the employee through FBI and other federal-agency databases. It also sends out form questionnaires to the former employers, schools, landlords, and references listed on SF-85. The particular form at issue in this case — the Investigative Request for Personal Information, Form 42 — goes to the employee’s former landlords and references. Ibid. Form 42 is a two-page document that takes about five minutes to complete. See ibid. It explains to the reference that “[y]our name has been provided by” a particular employee or applicant to help the Government determine that person’s “suitability for employment or a security clearance.” App. 96-97. After several preliminary questions about the extent of the reference’s associations with the employee, the form asks if the reference has “any reason to question” the employee’s “honesty or trustworthiness.” Id., at 97. It also asks if the reference knows of any “adverse information” concerning the employee’s “violations of the law,” “financial integrity,” “abuse of alcohol and/or drugs,” “mental or emotional stability,” “general behavior or conduct,” or “other matters.” Ibid. If “yes” is cheeked for any of these categories, the form calls for an explanation in the space below. That space is also available for providing “additional information” (“derogatory” or “positive”) that may bear on “suitability for government employment or a security clearance.” Ibid. All responses to SF-85 and Form 42 are subject to the protections of the Privacy Act. The Act authorizes the Government to keep records pertaining to an individual only when they are “relevant and necessary” to an end “required to be accomplished” by law. 5 U. S. C. § 552a(e)(1). Individuals are permitted to access their records and request amendments to them. §§ 552a(d)(1), (2). Subject to certain exceptions, the Government may not disclose records pertaining to an individual without that individual’s written consent. § 552a(b). C About two months before the October 2007 deadline for completing the NACI, respondents brought this suit, claiming, as relevant here, that the background-check process violates a constitutional right to informational privacy. App. 82 (Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief). The District Court denied respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal, 506 F. 3d 713 (2007), and later reversed the District Court’s order. The court held that portions of both SF-85 and Form 42 are likely unconstitutional and should be preliminarily enjoined. 512 F. 3d 1134, vacated and superseded, 530 F. 3d 865 (2008). Turning first to SF-85, the Court of Appeals noted respondents’ concession “that most of the questions” on the form are “unproblematic” and do not “implicate the constitutional right to informational privacy.” 530 F. 3d, at 878. But the court determined that the “group of questions concerning illegal drugs” required closer scrutiny. Ibid. Applying Circuit precedent, the court upheld SF-85’s inquiries into recent involvement with drugs as “necessary to further the government’s legitimate interest” in combating illegal-drug use. Id., at 879. The court went on to hold, however, that the portion of the form requiring disclosure of drug “treatment or counseling” furthered no legitimate interest and was thus likely to be held unconstitutional. Ibid. Form 42, in the Court of Appeals’ estimation, was even “more problematic.” Ibid. The form’s “open-ended and highly private” questions, the court concluded, were not “narrowly tailored” to meet the Government’s interests in verifying contractors’ identities and “ensuring the security of the JPL.” Id., at 881, 880. As a result, the court held, these “open-ended” questions, like the drug-treatment question on SF-85, likely violate respondents’ informational-privacy rights. Over the dissents of five judges, the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. 568 F. 3d 1028 (2009). We granted certiorari. 559 U. S. 990 (2010). II As noted, respondents contend that portions of SF-85 and Form 42 violate their “right to informational privacy.” Brief for Respondents 15. This Court considered a similar claim in Whalen, 429 U. S. 589, which concerned New York’s practice of collecting “the names and addresses of all persons” prescribed dangerous drugs with both “legitimate and illegitimate uses.” Id., at 591. In discussing that claim, the Court said that “[t]he cases sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’” actually involved “at least two different kinds of interests”: one, an “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”; the other, an interest in “making certain kinds of important decisions” free from government interference. Id., at 598-600. The patients who brought suit in Whalen argued that New York’s statute “threatened] to impair” both their “nondisclosure” interests and their interests in making healthcare decisions independently. Id., at 600. The Court, however, upheld the statute as a “reasonable exercise of New York’s broad police powers.” Id., at 598. Whalen acknowledged that the disclosure of “private information” to the State was an “unpleasant invasio[n] of privacy,” id., at 602, but the Court pointed out that the New York statute contained “security provisions” that protected against “[p]ublie disclosure” of patients’ information, id., at 600-601. This sort of “statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures” of “accumulated private data” was sufficient, in the Court’s view, to protect a privacy interest that “arguably ha[d] its roots in the Constitution.” Id., at 605-606. The Court thus concluded that the statute did not violate “any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 606. Four months later, the Court referred again to a constitutional “interest in avoiding disclosure.” Nixon, 433 U. S., at 457 (internal quotation marks omitted). Former President Nixon brought a challenge to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 88 Stat. 1695, note following 44 U. S. C. §2111, a statute that required him to turn over his Presidential papers and tape recordings for archival review and screening. 433 U. S., at 455-465. In a section of the opinion entitled “Privacy,” the Court addressed a combination of claims that the review required by this Act violated the former President’s “Fourth and Fifth Amendmenft]” rights. Id., at 455, and n. 18, 458-459. The Court rejected those challenges after concluding that the Act at issue, like the statute in Whalen, contained protections against “undue dissemination of private materials.” 433 U. S., at 458. Indeed, the Court observed that the former President’s claim was “weaker” than the one “found wanting ... [in] Whalen,” as the Government was required to return immediately all “purely private papers and recordings” identified by the archivists. Id., at 458-459. Citing Fourth Amendment precedent, the Court also stated that the public interest in preserving Presidential papers outweighed any “legitimate expectation of privacy” that the former President may have enjoyed. Id., at 458 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968)). The Court announced the decision in Nixon in the waning days of October Term 1976. Since then, the Court has said little else on the subject of an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Whalen, supra, at 599; Nixon, supra, at 457. A few opinions have mentioned the concept in passing and in other contexts. See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 762-763 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 759, n. 10 (1982). But no other decision has squarely addressed a constitutional right to informational privacy. III As was our approach in Whalen, we will assume for present purposes that the Government's challenged inquiries implicate a privacy interest of constitutional significance. 429 U. S., at 599, 605. We hold, however, that, whatever the scope of this interest, it does not prevent the Government from asking reasonable questions of the sort included on SF-85 and Form 42 in an employment background investigation that is subject to the Privacy Act’s safeguards against public disclosure. A 1 As an initial matter, judicial review of the Government’s challenged inquiries must take into account the context in which they arise. When the Government asks respondents and their references to fill out SF-85 and Form 42, it does not exercise its sovereign power “to regulate or license.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961). Rather, the Government conducts the challenged background checks in its capacity “as proprietor” and manager of its “internal operation.” Ibid. Time and again our cases have recognized that the Government has a much freer hand in dealing “with citizen employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.” Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U. S. 591, 598 (2008); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion). This distinction is grounded on the “common-sense realization” that if every “employment decision became a constitutional matter,” the Government could not function. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 143 (1983); see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 350 (1976) (“The Due Process Clause ... is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions”). An assessment of the constitutionality of the challenged portions of SF-85 and Form 42 must account for this distinction. The questions challenged by respondents are part of a standard employment background check of the sort used by millions of private employers. See Brief for Consumer Data Industry Association et al. as Amici Curiae 2 (hereinafter CDIA Brief) (“[M]ore than 88% of U. S. companies ... perform background checks on their employees”). The Government itself has been conducting employment investigations since the earliest days of the Republic. L. White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History 262-263 (1948); see OPM, Biography of An Ideal: History of the Federal Civil Service 8 (2002) (noting that President Washington “set a high standard” for federal office and finalized appointments only after “investigating [candidates’] capabilities and reputations”). Since 1871, the President has enjoyed statutory authority to “ascertain the fitness of applicants” for the civil service “as to age, health, character, knowledge and ability for the employment sought,” Act of Mar. 3,1871, Rev. Stat. § 1753, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 3301(2), and that Aet appears to have been regarded as a codification of established practice. Standard background investigations similar to those at issue here became mandatory for all candidates for the federal civil service in 1953. Exec. Order No. 10450, 3 CFR 936. And the particular investigations challenged in this case arose from a decision to extend that requirement to federal contract employees requiring long-term access to federal facilities. See HSPD-12, at 1765, App. 127; FIPS PUB 201-1, at iii-vi, 1-8, App. 131-150. As this long history suggests, the Government has an interest in conducting basic employment background checks. Reasonable investigations of applicants and employees aid the Government in ensuring the security of its facilities and in employing a competent, reliable work force. See Engquist, supra, at 598-599. Courts must keep those interests in mind when asked to go line by line through the Government’s employment forms and to scrutinize the choice and wording of the questions they contain. Respondents argue that, because they are contract employees and not civil servants, the Government’s broad authority in managing its affairs should apply with diminished force. But the Government’s interest as “proprietor” in managing its operations, Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, supra, at 896, does not turn on such formalities. See Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668, 678, 679 (1996) (formal distinctions such as whether a “service provider” has a “contract of employment or a contract for services” with the government is a “very poor proxy” for constitutional interests at stake). The fact that respondents’ direct employment relationship is with Cal Tech— which operates JPL under a Government contract — says very little about the interests at stake in this case. The record shows that, as a “practical matter,” there are no “Relevant distinctions” between the duties performed by NASA’s civil-service work force and its contractor work force. App. 221. The two classes of employees perform “functionally equivalent duties,” and the extent of employees’ “access to NASA . . . facilities” turns not on formal status but on the nature of “the jobs they perform.” Ibid. At JPL, in particular, the work that contract employees perform is critical to NASA’s mission. Respondents in this case include the “lead trouble-shooter for ... th[e] $568 [million]” Kepler space observatory, 7 Record 396; the leader of the program that “tests ... all new technology that NASA will use in space,” App. 60; and one of the lead “trajectory designers for . . . the Galileo Project and the Apollo Moon landings,” id., at 62. This is important work, and all of it is funded with a multibillion-dollar investment from the American taxpayer. See NASA, JPL Annual Report 09, p. 35 (2010), online at http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/annualreport/2009-report.pdf. The Government has a strong interest in conducting basic background checks into the contract employees minding the store at JPL. 2 With these interests in view, we conclude that the challenged portions of both SF-85 and Form 42 consist of reasonable, employment-related inquiries that further the Government’s interests in managing its internal operations. See Engquist, 553 U. S., at 598-599; Whalen, 429 U. S., at 597-598. As to SF-85, the only part of the form challenged here is its request for information about “any treatment or counseling received” for illegal-drug use within the previous year. The “treatment or counseling” question, however, must be considered in context. App. 94. It is a followup to SF-85’s inquiry into whether the employee has “used, possessed, supplied, or manufactured illegal drugs” during the past year. Ibid. The Government has good reason to ask employees about their recent illegal-drug use. Like any employer, the Government is entitled to have its projects staffed by reliable, law-abiding persons who will “ ‘efficiently and effectively’” discharge their duties. See Engquist, supra, at 598-599. Questions about illegal-drug use are a useful way of figuring out which persons have these characteristics. See, e. g., Breen & Matusitz, An Updated Examination of the Effects of Illegal Drug Use in the Workplace, 19 J. Human Behavior in the Social Environment 434 (2009) (illicit drug use negatively correlated with workplace productivity). In context, the followup question on “treatment or counseling” for recent illegal-drug use is also a reasonable, employment-related inquiry. The Government, recognizing that illegal-drug use is both a criminal and a medical issue, seeks to separate out those illegal-drug users who are taking steps to address and overcome their problems. The Government thus uses responses to the “treatment or counseling” question as a mitigating factor in determining whether to grant contract employees long-term access to federal facilities. This is a reasonable, and indeed a humane, approach, and respondents do not dispute the legitimacy of the Government’s decision to use drug treatment as a mitigating factor in its contractor credentialihg decisions. Respondents’ argument is that, if drug treatment is only used to mitigate, then the Government should change the mandatory phrasing of SF-85 — “Include [in your answer] any treatment or counseling received” — so as to make a response optional. App. 94. As it stands, the mandatory “treatment or counseling” question is unconstitutional, in respondents’ view, because it is “more intrusive than necessary to satisfy the government’s objective.” Brief for Respondents 26; 530 F. 3d, at 879 (holding that “treatment or counseling” question should be enjoined because the form “appears to compel disclosure”). We reject the argument that the Government, when it requests job-related personal information in an employment background check, has a constitutional burden to demonstrate that its questions are “necessary” or the least restrictive means of furthering its interests. So exacting a standard runs directly contrary to Whalen. The patients in Whalen, much like respondents here, argued that New York’s statute was unconstitutional because the State could not “demonstrate the necessity” of its program. 429 U. S., at 596. The Court quickly rejected that argument, concluding that New York’s collection of patients’ prescription information could “not be held unconstitutional simply because” a court viewed it as “unnecessary, in whole or in part.” Id., at 596-597. That analysis applies with even greater force where the Government acts, not as a regulator, but as the manager of its internal affairs. See Engquist, supra, at 598-599. SF-85’s “treatment or counseling” question reasonably seeks to identify a subset of acknowledged drug users who are attempting to overcome their problems. The Government’s considered position is that phrasing the question in more permissive terms would result in a lower response rate, and the question’s effectiveness in identifying illegal-drug users who are suitable for employment would be “materially reduced.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 19. That is a reasonable position, falling within the “ 'wide latitude’ ” granted the Government in its dealings with employees. See Engquist, 553 U. S., at 600. 3 The Court of Appeals also held that the broad, “open-ended questions” on Form 42 likely violate respondents’ informational-privacy rights. Form 42 asks applicants’ designated references and landlords for “information” bearing on “suitability for government employment or a security clearance.” App. 97. In a series of questions, the Government asks if the reference has any “adverse information” about the applicant’s “honesty or trustworthiness,” “violations of the law,” “financial integrity,” “abuse of alcohol and/ or drugs,” “mental or emotional stability,” “general behavior or conduct,” or “other matters.” Ibid. These open-ended inquiries, like the drug-treatment question on SF-85, are reasonably aimed at identifying capable employees who will faithfully conduct the Government’s business. See Engquist, supra, at 598-599. Asking an applicant’s designated references' broad, open-ended questions about job suitability is an appropriate tool for separating strong candidates from weak ones. It would be a truly daunting task to catalog all the reasons why a person might not be suitable for a particular job, and references do not have all day to answer a laundry list of specific questions. See CDIA Brief 6-7 (references “typically have limited time to answer questions from potential employers,” and “open-ended questions” yield more relevant information than narrow inquiries). Form 42, by contrast, takes just five minutes to complete. 75 Fed. Reg. 5359. The reasonableness of such open-ended questions is illustrated by their pervasiveness in the public and private sectors. Form 42 alone is sent out by the Government over 1.8 minion times annually. Ibid. In addition, the use of open-ended questions in employment background checks appears to be equally commonplace in the private sector. See, e. g., S. Bock et al., Mandated Benefits 2008 Compliance Guide, Exh. 20.1, A Sample Policy on Reference Checks on Job Applicants (“Following are the guidelines for conducting a telephone reference check: . . . Ask open-ended questions, then wait for the respondent to answer”); M. Zweig, Human Resources Management 87 (1991) (“Also ask, Ts there anything else I need to know about [candidate’s name]?’ This kind of open-ended question may turn up all kinds of information you wouldn’t have gotten any other way”). The use of similar open-ended questions by the Government is reasonable and furthers its interests in managing its operations. B 1 Not only are SF-85 and Form 42 reasonable in light of the Government interests at stake, they are also subject to substantial protections against disclosure to the public. Both Whalen and Nixon recognized that government “accumulation” of “personal information” for “public purposes” may pose a threat to privacy. Whalen, supra, at 605; see Nixon, 433 U. S., at 457-458, 462. But both decisions also stated that a “statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures” generally allays these privacy concerns. Whalen, supra, at 605; Nixon, supra, at 458-459. The Court in Whalen, relying on New York’s “security provisions” prohibiting public disclosure, turned aside a challenge to the collection of patients’ prescription information. 429 U. S., at 594, and n. 12, 600-601, 605. In Nixon, the Court rejected what it regarded as an even “weaker” claim by the former President because the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act “[n]ot only . . . mandate[d] regulations” against “undue dissemination,” but also required immediate return of any “purely private” materials flagged by the Government’s archivists. 433 U. S., at 458-459. Respondents in this case, like the patients in Whalen and former President Nixon, attack only the Government’s collection of information on SF-85 and Form 42. And here, no less than in Whalen and Nixon, the information collected is shielded by statute from “unwarranted disclosure]. ” See Whalen, supra, at 605. The Privacy Act, which covers all information collected during the background-check process, allows .the Government to maintain records “about an individual” only to the extent the records are “relevant and necessary to accomplish” a purpose authorized by law. 5 U. S. C. § 552a(e)(l). The Act requires written consent before the Government may disclose records pertaining to any individual. § 552a(b). And the Act imposes criminal liability for willful violations of its nondisclosure obligations. §552a(i)(1). These requirements, as we have noted, give “forceful recognition” to a Government employee’s interest in maintaining the' “confidentiality of sensitive information . . . in his personnel files.” Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U. S. 301, 318, n. 16 (1979). Like the protections against disclosure in Whalen and Nixon, they “evidence a proper concern” for individual privacy. Whalen, supra, at 605; Nixon, supra, at 458-459. 2 Notwithstanding these safeguards, respondents argue that statutory exceptions to the Privacy Act’s disclosure bar, see §§552a(b)(1)-(12), leave its protections too porous to supply a meaningful check against “unwarranted disclosures,” Whalen, supra, at 605. Respondents point in particular to what they describe as a “broad” exception for “routine use[s],” defined as uses that are “compatible with the purpose for which the record was collected.” §§ 552a(b)(3), (a)(7). Respondents’ reliance on these exceptions rests on an incorrect reading of both our precedents and the terms of the Privacy Act. As to our cases, the Court in Whalen and Nixon referred approvingly to statutory or regulatory protections against “unwarranted disclosures” and “undue dissemination” of personal information collected by the Government. Whalen, supra, at 605; Nixon, supra, at 458. Neither case suggested that an ironclad disclosure bar is needed to satisfy privacy interests that may be “rootled] in the Constitution.” Whalen, supra, at 605. In Whalen, the New York statute prohibiting “[p]ublie disclosure of the identity of patients” was itself subject to several exceptions. 429 U. S., at 594-595, and n. 12. In Nixon, the protections against “undue dissemination” mentioned in the opinion were not even before the Court, but were to be included in forthcoming regulations “mandate[d]” by the challenged Act. 433 U. S., at 458; see id., at 437-439 (explaining that the Court was limiting its review to the Act’s “facial validity” and was not considering the Administrator’s forthcoming regulations). Thus, the mere fact that the Privacy Act’s nondisclosure requirement is subject to exceptions does not show that the statute provides insufficient protection against public disclosure. Nor does the substance of the “routine use” exception relied on by respondents create any undue risk of public dissemination. None of the authorized “routine use[s]” of respondents’ background-check information allows for release to the public. 71 Fed. Reg. 45859-45860, 45862 (2006); 60 Fed. Reg. 63084 (1995), as amended, 75 Fed. Reg. 28307 (2010). Rather, the established “routine use[s]” consist of limited, reasonable steps designed to complete the background-cheek process in an efficient and orderly manner. See Whalen, supra, at 602 (approving disclosures to authorized New York Department of Health employees that were not “meaningfully distinguishable” from routine disclosures “associated with many facets of health care”). One routine use, for example, involves a limited disclosure to persons filling out Form 42 so that designated references can “identify the individual” at issue and can understand the “nature and purpose of the investigation.” App. 89. Authorized JPL employees also review each completed SF-85 to verify that all requested information has been provided. Id., at 211. These designated JPL employees may not “disclose any information contained in the form to anyone else,” ibid., and Cal Tech is not given access to adverse information uncovered during the Government’s background check, id., at 207-208. The “remote possibility” of public disclosure created by these narrow “routine use[s]” does not undermine the Privacy Act’s substantial protections. See Whalen, 429 U. S., at 601-602 (“remote possibility” that statutory security provisions will “provide inadequate protection against unwarranted disclosures” not a sufficient basis for striking down statute). Citing past violations of the Privacy Act, respondents note that it is possible that their personal information could be disclosed as a result of a similar breach. But data breaches are a possibility any time the Government stores information. As the Court recognized in Whalen, the mere possibility that security measures will fail provides no “proper ground” for a broad-based attack on government information-collection practices. Ibid. Respondents also cite a portion of SF-85 that warns of possible disclosure “[t]o the news media or the general public.” App. 89. By its terms, this exception allows public disclosure only where release is “in the public interest” and would not result in “an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Ibid. Respondents have not cited any example of such a disclosure, nor have they identified any plausible scenario in which their information might be unduly disclosed under this exception. In light of the protection provided by the Privacy Act’s nondisclosure requirement, and because the challenged portions of the forms consist of reasonable inquiries in an employment background check, we conclude that the Government’s inquiries do not violate a constitutional right to informational privacy. Whalen, supra, at 605. * * * For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. As alternatives to the NACI process, the Department of Commerce also authorized federal agencies to use another “Office of Personnel Management ... or National Security community investigation required for Federal employment.” App. 145. None of these alternative background checks are at issue here. For public-trust and national-security positions, more detailed forms are required. See OPM, Standard Form 85P, Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions, online at http://www.opm.gov/Forms/pdf_fill/sf85p.pdf (all Internet materials as visited Jan. 13, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); OPM, Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, online at http://www.opm.gov/Forms/pdf_fill/sf86.pdf. The Government sends separate forms to employers (Form 41), educational institutions (Form 43), record repositories (Form 40), and law enforcement agencies (Form 44). 75 Fed. Reg. 5359. None of these forms are at issue here. Respondents sought to represent a class of “JPL employees in nonsensitive positions.” App. 79. No class has been certified. In the Ninth Circuit, respondents also challenged the criteria that they believe the Government will use to determine their “suitability” for employment at JPL. Respondents relied on a document, which had been temporarily posted on the JPL intranet, that listed factors purportedly bearing on suitability for federal employment. App. 98-104. Among the listed factors were a failure to “mee[t] financial obligations,” “health issues,” and “mental, emotional, psychological, or psychiatric issues.” Id., at 98, 102. Other factors, which were listed under the heading “Criminal or Immoral Conduct,” included “indecent exposure,” “voyeurism,” “indecent proposal[s],” and “carnal knowledge.” Id., at 98. The document also stated that while “homosexuality,” “adultery,” and “illegitimate children” were not “suitability” issues in and of themselves, they might pose “security issue[s]” if circumstances indicated a “susceptibility to coercion or blaekmail.” Id., at 102. The Court of Appeals rejected respondents’ “challenges to . . . suitability determination[s]” as unripe. 530 F. 3d, at 873. Although respondents did not file a cross-petition from that portion of the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, they nonetheless discuss these suitability criteria at some length in their brief before this Court. Respondents’ challenge to these criteria is not before us. We note, however, the Acting Solicitor General’s statement at oral argument that “NASA will not and does not use” the document to which respondents object “to make contractor credentialing decisions.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. 429 U. S., at 598-599, and n. 25 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing “the right to be let alone” as “the right most valued by civilized men”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 559, 568 (1969); California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 79 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); and id., at 78 (Powell, J., concurring)). 429 U. S., at 599-600, and n. 26 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 587 (1897)). The Court continued its discussion of Fourth Amendment principles throughout the “Privacy” section of the opinion. See 433 U. S., at 459 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 (1973), and Katz, 389 U. S. 347); 433 U. S., at 460-462 (addressing the former President’s claim that the Act was “tantamount to a general warrant” under Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 (1965)); 433 U. S., at 463-465, and n. 26 (concluding that the challenged law was analogous to the wiretapping provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, notwithstanding the lack of a “warrant requirement”). State and lower federal courts have offered a number of different interpretations of Whalen and Nixon over the years. Many courts hold that disclosure of at least some kinds of personal information should be subject to a test that balances the government’s interests against the individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure. E. g., Barry v. New York, 712 F. 2d 1554, 1559 (CA2 1983); Fraternal Order of Police v. Philadelphia, 812 F. 2d 105, 110 (CA3 1987); Woodland v. Houston, 940 F. 2d 134, 138 (CA5 1991) (per curiam); In re Crawford, 194 F. 3d 954, 959 (CA9 1999); State v. Russo, 259 Conn. 436, 459-464, 790 A. 2d 1132, 1147-1150 (2002). The Sixth Circuit has held that the right to informational privacy protects only intrusions upon interests “that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” J. P. v. DeSanti, 653 F. 2d 1080, 1090 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). The D. C. Circuit has expressed “grave doubts” about the existence of a constitutional right to informational privacy. American Federation of Govt. Employees v. HUD, 118 F. 3d 786, 791 (1997). The opinions concurring in the judgment disagree with this approach and would instead provide a definitive answer to the question whether there is a constitutional right to informational privacy. Post, at 164-165 (opinion of Scalia, J.); post, at 169 (opinion of Thomas, J.). One of these opinions expresses concern that our failure to do so will “har[m] our image, if not our self-respect,” post, at 165 (Scalia, J.), and will cause practical problems, post, at 167-168. There are sound reasons for eschewing the concurring opinions’ recommended course. “The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F. 2d 171, 177 (CADC 1983) (opinion for the court by Scalia, J.). In this case, petitioners did not ask us to hold that there is no constitutional right to informational privacy, and respondents and their amici thus understandably refrained from addressing that issue in detail. It is undesirable for us to decide a matter of this importance in a case in which we do not have the benefit of briefing by the parties and in which potential amici had little notice that the matter might be decided. See Pet. for Cert. 15 (“no need in this case” for broad decision on “the scope of a eonstitutionally-based right to privacy for certain information”). Particularly in cases like this one, where we have only the “scarce and open-ended” guideposts of substantive due process to show us the way, see Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992), the Court has repeatedly recognized the benefits of proceeding with caution. E. g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 417 (1993) (joined by Scalia, J.) (assuming ‘Tor the sake of argument... that in a capital ease a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ ” made after conviction would render execution unconstitutional); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 279 (1990) (joined by Scalia, J.) ("[W]e assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition”); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 222-223 (1985) (“assuming], without deciding, that federal courts can review an academic decision of a pub-lie educational institution under a substantive due process standard”); Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 91-92 (1978) (same); see also New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U. S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (joining the Court’s opinion on the understanding that it “assumes for purposes of its analysis, but does not hold, the existence of a constitutional right of private association for other than expressive or religious purposes”). Justice Scalia provides no support for his claim that our approach in this case will “dramatically increase the number of lawsuits claiming violations of the right to informational privacy,” post, at 168, and will leave the lower courts at sea. We take the' same approach here that the Court took more than three decades ago in Whalen and Nixon, and there is no evidence that those decisions have caused the sky to fall. We therefore decide the case before us and leave broader issues for another day. The debate on the 1871 Act in the House of Representatives contained this exchange on Presidential authority to conduct background checks: “Mr. Peters: Has he not that power [to conduct the proposed investigations of candidates for the civil service] now? “Mr. Dawes: He has all that power. If you will go up to the War Department or the Department of the Interior you will see pretty much all of this nailed up on the doors, in the form of rules and regulations.” Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 1935 (1871). In their brief, respondents also rely on the fact that many of them have been working at JPL for years and that Cal Tech previously vetted them through standard “employment reference checks.” Brief for Respondents 52-53. The record indicates that this may be wrong as a factual matter. E. g., 7 Record 391 (“I have not been required to undergo any type of background investigation to maintain my position with JPL”); id., at 397 (“I have never been required to undergo any type of background investigation to maintain my position with JPL other than . . . [one] which required that I provide only my name, social security number and current address” to facilitate a “cheek for outstanding warrants, arrests or convictions”); id., at 356, 367, 386-387 (similar). Even if it were correct, the fact that Cal Tech once conducted a background check on respondents does not diminish the Government’s interests in conducting its own standard background check to satisfy itself that contract employees should be granted continued access to the Government’s facility. In any event, counsel abandoned this position at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Axg. 38. Asking about treatment or counseling could also help the Government identify chronic drug abusers for whom, “despite counseling and rehabilitation programs, there is little chance for effective rehabilitation.” 38 Fed. Reg. 33315 (1973). At oral argument, however, the Acting Solicitor General explained that NASA views treatment or counseling solely as a “mitigat[ing]” factor that ameliorates concerns about recent illegal-drug use. Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. E. g., GAO, Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown 5, 20 (GAO 07-737, 2007) (over 3-year period, 788 data breaches occurred at 17 federal agencies). Respondents further contend that the Privacy Act’s ability to deter unauthorized release of private information is significantly hampered by the fact that the statute provides only “an ex post money-damages action,” not injunctive relief. Brief for Respondents 44 (citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U. S. 614, 635 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Nothing in Whalen or Nixon suggests that any private right of action — for money damages or injunctive relief — is needed in order to provide sufficient protection against public disclosure.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SANGAMON VALLEY TELEVISION CORP. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 235. Decided October 20, 1958. D. M. Patrick and E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. for petitioner. Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Warren E. Baker and Richard A. Solomon for the United States and the Federal Communications Commission, respondents. Monroe Oppenheimer and James H. Heller for the Signal Hill Telecasting Corporation, respondent.' James A. McKenna, Jr. and Vernon L. Wilkinson for the American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., et al., respondents. Per Curiam. The petition for writ of certiorari is' granted. In view of the representations in the Solicitor General’s brief on pages 7 and 8, concerning testimony given before the Subcommittee of Legislative Oversight of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce subsequent to the decision by the Court of Appeals in this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for such action as it may deem appropriate.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HEALY et al. v. JAMES et al. No. 71-452. Argued March 28, 1972 Decided June 26, 1972 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, BreNNAN, Stewart, White, Marshall, and BlacicmuN, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 195. Douglas, J., filed a separate opinion, post, p. 196. RehNquist, J., filed a statement concurring in the result, post, p. 201. Melvin L. Wulf argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Eugene Z. DuBose, Jr., Alvin Pudlin, and Sanford Jay Rosen. F. Michael Ahern, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Robert K. Killian, Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, and Donald B. Day, Deputy Attorney General, for the Board of Trustees of California State Colleges; by Frank G. Carrington, Jr., and Alan S. Gam for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.; and by Morris I. Leibman and Philip B. Kurland for the American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, This case, arising out of a denial by a state college of official recognition to a group of students who desired to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), presents this Court with questions requiring the application of well-established First Amendment principles. While the factual background of this particular case raises these constitutional issues in a manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our decision today is governed by existing precedent. As the case involves delicate issues concerning the academic community, we approach our task with special caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free from disruptive interference with the educational process. We also are mindful of the equally significant interest in the widest latitude for free expression and debate consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, strikes the required balance. I We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 1969-1970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college campuses in this country. There had been widespread civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some colleges had been shut down altogether, while at others files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic force during this period. Although the causes of campus disruption were many and complex, one of the prime consequences of such activities was the denial of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights to the majority of students by the few. Indeed, many of the most cherished characteristics long associated with institutions of higher learning appeared to be endangered. Fortunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet, it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case arose. Petitioners are students attending Central Connecticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook to organize what they then referred to as a “local chapter” of SDS. Pursuant to procedures established by the College, petitioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus organization with the Student Affairs Committee, a committee composed of four students, three faculty members, and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request specified three purposes for the proposed organization’s existence. It would provide “a forum of discussion and self-education for students developing an analysis of American society”; it would serve as “an agency for integrating thought with action so as to bring about constructive changes”; and it would endeavor to provide “a coordinating body for relating the problems of leftist students” with other interested groups on campus and in the community. The Committee, while satisfied that the statement of purposes was clear and unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the relationship between the proposed local group and the National SDS organization. In response to inquiries, representatives of the proposed organization stated that they would not affiliate with any national organization and that their group would remain “completely independent.” In response to other questions asked by Committee members concerning SDS’ reputation for campus disruption, the applicants made the following statements, which proved significant during the later stages of these proceedings: “Q. How would you respond to issues of violence as other S. D. S. chapters have? “A. Our action would have to be dependent upon each issue. “Q. Would you use any means possible? “A. No I can’t say that; would not know until we know what the issues are. “Q. Could you envision the S. D. S. interrupting a class? “A. Impossible for me to say.” With this information before it, the Committee requested an additional filing by the applicants, including a formal statement regarding affiliations. The amended application filed in response stated flatly that “CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any National organization.” At a second hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the question of relationship with the National organization was raised again. One of the organizers explained that the National SDS was divided into several “factional groups,” that the national-local relationship was a loose one, and that the local organization accepted only “certain ideas” but not all of the National organization’s aims and philosophies. By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately approved the application and recommended to the President of the College, Dr. James, that the organization be accorded official recognition. In approving the application, the majority indicated that its decision was premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should be represented on campus and that since the Young Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed recognized status, a group should be available with which “left wing” students might identify. The majority also noted and relied on the organization’s claim of independence. Finally, it admonished the organization that immediate suspension would be considered if the group’s activities proved incompatible with the school’s policies against interference with the privacy of other students or destruction of property. The two dissenting members based their reservation primarily on the lack of clarity regarding the organization’s independence. Several days later, the President rejected the Committee’s recommendation, and issued a statement indicating that petitioners’ organization was not to be accorded the benefits of official campus recognition. His accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the margin, indicate several reasons for his action. He found that the organization’s philosophy was antithetical to the school’s policies, and that the group’s independence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should not be granted to any group that “openly repudiates” the College’s dedication to academic freedom. Denial of official recognition posed serious problems for the organization’s existence and growth. Its members were deprived of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies, or other activities in the student newspaper; they were precluded from using various campus bulletin boards; and — most importantly — nonrecognition barred them from using campus facilities for holding meetings. This latter disability was brought home to petitioners shortly after the President’s announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice calling a meeting to discuss what further action should be taken in light of the group’s official rejection. The members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center (“Devils’ Den”) but were disbanded on the President’s order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to use such facilities. Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ultimately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the burden of nonrecognition, petitioners resorted t-o the courts. They filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President of the College, other administrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners’ primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amendment rights of expression and association arising from denial of campus recognition. The cause was submitted initially on stipulated facts, and, after a short hearing, the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied procedural due process because the President had based his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant’s affiliation which were outside the record before him. The court concluded that if the President wished to act on the basis of material outside the application he must at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity to introduce evidence as to their affiliations. 311 F. Supp. 1275, 1279, 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over the case, the District Court ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify the several ambiguities surrounding the President’s decision. One of the matters to be explored was whether the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations, was in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at 1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two were not separable, the respondents were instructed that they might then review the “aims and philosophy” of the National organization. Ibid. Pursuant to the court’s order, the President designated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approximately two hours, added little in terms of objective substantive evidence to the record in this case. Petitioners introduced a statement offering to change the organization’s name from “CCSC local chapter of SDS” to “Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College.” They further reaffirmed that they would “have no connection whatsoever to the structure of an existing national organization.” Petitioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations elsewhere were unafSliated with any national organization. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Committee meetings, also introduced, sua sponte, portions of a transcript of hearings before the United States House of Representatives Internal Security Committee investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were offered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demonstrate that there existed a national organization that recognized and cooperated with regional and local college campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the asserted existence of a National SDS, nor did they question that it did have a system of affiliations of some sort. Their contention was simply that their organization would not associate with that network. Throughout the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes. What seemed relevant to one appeared completely immaterial to the other. This failure of the hearing to advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence of a more basic failure to join issue on the considerations that should control the President’s ultimate decision, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing section. Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits, the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny petitioners recognition as a campus organization. The reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were that the group would be a “disruptive influence” at CCSC and that recognition would be “contrary to the orderly process of change” on the campus. After the President’s second statement issued, the case then returned to the District Court, where it was ordered dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal requisites of procedural due process had been complied with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their burden of showing that they could function free from the National organization, and, third, that the College’s refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organization whose conduct it found “likely to cause violent acts of disruption” did not violate petitioners’ associational rights. 319 F. Supp. 113, 116. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court’s judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition. 445 F. 2d 1122, 1131-1132. Judge Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s refusal to address the merits and finding that petitioners had been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id., at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the judgments of the courts below must be reversed and the case remanded for reconsideration. II At the outset we note that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment. “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Justice Fortas made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights must always be applied “in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment” in the particular case. Ibid. And, where state-operated educational institutions are involved, this Court has long recognized “the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.” Id., at 507. Yet, the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960). The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the “ ‘marketplace of ideas,’ ” and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 249-250 (1957) (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren), 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Harlan, J., for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that denial of official recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges that associational right. The primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was demonstrated in this case when, several days after the President’s decision was announced, petitioners were not allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop because they were not an approved group. Petitioners’ associational interests also were circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards and the school newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in which new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, the organization’s ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students. Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial. Respondents and the courts below appear to have taken the view that denial of official recognition in this case abridged no constitutional rights. The District Court concluded that “President James’ discretionary action in denying this application cannot be legitimately magnified and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of any segment of the college students; neither does his action deter in any material way the individual advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or having a chilling effect on academic freedom.” 319 F. Supp., at 116. In that court’s view all that was denied petitioners was the “administrative seal of official college respectability.” Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals agreed that petitioners had been denied only the “college’s stamp of approval.” 445 F. 2d, at 1131. Respondents take that same position here, arguing that petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that they still may distribute written material off campus, and that they still may meet together informally on campus — as individuals, but not as CCSC-SDS. We do not agree with the characterization by the courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his opinion for a unanimous Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S., at 461, that the administration “has taken no direct action ... to restrict the rights of [petitioners] to associate freely . . . But the Constitution’s protection is not limited to direct interference with fundamental rights. The requirement in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect, infringement of the members’ associational rights. Likewise, in this case, the group’s possible ability to exist outside the campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed by the President’s action. We are not free to disregard the practical realities. Me. Justice Stewart has made the salient point: “Freedoms such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.” Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960). See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S., at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 (1957). The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the College. While petitioners have not challenged the procedural requirement that they file an application in conformity with the rules of the College, they do question the view of the courts below that final rejection could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization was unaffiliated with the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in this opinion, we do not consider the issue of affiliation to be a controlling one. But, apart from any particular issue, once petitioners had filed an application in conformity with the requirements, the burden was upon the College administration to justify its decision of rejection. See, e. g., Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 162-163 (1971); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377 (1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It is to be remembered that the effect of the College’s denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners’ organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that interest may justify such restraint, a “heavy burden” rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 713-716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965). Ill These fundamental errors — discounting the existence of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplacing the burden of proof — require that the judgments below be reversed. But we are unable to conclude that no basis exists upon which nonrecognition might be appropriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the record we conclude that the case should be remanded, and, in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts upon reconsideration, it is appropriate to discuss the several bases of President James’ decision. Pour possible justifications for nonrecognition, all closely related, might be derived from the record and his statements. Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate his decision: a fourth, however, has merit. A From the outset the controversy in this case has centered in large measure around the relationship, if any, between petitioners’ group and the National SDS. The Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue; the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners and their counsel that the local group was in fact independent of the National organization, it is evident that President James was significantly influenced by his apprehension that there was a connection. Aware of the fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justification for denying recognition. Although this precise issue has not come before the Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen’s association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g., United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S., at 605-610; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961). In these cases it has been established that “guilt by association alone, without [establishing] that an individual’s association poses the threat feared by the Government,” is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights. United States v. Robel, supra, at 265. The government has the burden of establishing a knowing affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims. Students for a Democratic Society, as conceded by the College and the lower courts, is loosely organized, having various factions and promoting a number of diverse social and political views, only some of which call for unlawful action. Not only did petitioners proclaim their complete independence from this organization, but they also indicated that they shared only some of the beliefs its leaders have expressed. On this record it is clear that the relationship was not an adequate ground for the denial of recognition. B Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with, or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, President James attributed what he believed to be the philosophy of that organization to the local group. He characterized the petitioning group as adhering to “some of the major tenets of the national organization,” including a philosophy of violence and disruption. Understandably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an article signed by President James in an alumni periodical, and made a part of the record below, he announced his unwillingness to “sanction an organization that openly advocates the destruction of the very ideals and freedoms upon which the academic life is founded.” He further emphasized that the petitioners’ “philosophies” were “counter to the official policy of the college.” The mere disagreement of the President with the group’s philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition. As repugnant as these views may have been, especially to one with President James’ responsibility, the mere expression of them would not justify the denial of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did in fact advocate a philosophy of “destruction” thus becomes immaterial. The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black put it most simply and clearly: “I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.” Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U. S. 1, 137 (dissenting opinion) (1961). C As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a third rationale for President James’ decision — beyond the questions of affiliation and philosophy — began to emerge. His second statement, issued after the court-ordered hearing, indicates that he based rejection on a conclusion that this particular group would be a “disruptive influence at CCSC.” This language was underscored in the second District Court opinion. In fact, the court concluded that the President had determined that CCSC-SDS’ “prospective campus activities were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC.” 319 F. Supp., at 116. If this reason, directed at the organization’s activities rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by the record, this Court’s prior decisions would provide a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition. The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the permissibility of regulation is the line between mere advocacy and advocacy “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion). See also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S., at 230-232; Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 298 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957). In the context of the “special characteristics of the school environment,” the power of the government to prohibit “lawless action” is not limited to acts of a criminal nature. Also prohibitable are actions which “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education. The “Student Bill of Rights” at CCSC, upon which great emphasis was placed by the President, draws precisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It purports to impose no limitations on the right of college student organizations “to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them.” (Emphasis supplied.) But it also states that students have no right (1) “to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard,” (2) “to invade the privacy of others,” (3) “to damage the property of others,” (4) “to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college,” or (5) “to interfere with the rights of others.” The line between permissible speech and impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional requirement, and if there were an evidential basis to support the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat of material disruption in violation of that command the President’s decision should be affirmed. The record, however, offers no substantial basis for that conclusion. The only support for the view expressed by the President, other than the reputed affiliation with National SDS, is to be found in the ambivalent responses offered by the group’s representatives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during which they stated that they did not know whether they might respond to “issues of violence” in the same manner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses. Nor would they state unequivocally that they could never “envision . . . interrupting a class.” Whatever force these statements might be thought to have is largely dissipated by the following exchange between petitioners’ counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs during the court-ordered hearing: Counsel: “. . . I just read the document that you’re offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee meeting] and I can’t see that there’s anything in it that intimates that these students contemplate any illegal or disruptive practice.” Dean: “No. There’s no question raised to that, counselor . . . .” App. 73-74. Dean Judd’s remark reaffirms, in accord with the full record, that there was no substantial evidence that these particular individuals acting together would constitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted little more than the sort of “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S., at 508. D These same references in the record to the group’s equivocation regarding how it might respond to “issues of violence” and whether it could ever “envision . . . interrupting a class,” suggest a fourth possible reason why recognition might have been denied to these petitioners. These remarks might well have been read as announcing petitioners’ unwillingness to be bound by reasonable school rules governing conduct. The College’s Statement of Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of Students contains, as we have seen, an explicit statement with respect to campus disruption. The regulation, carefully differentiating between advocacy and action, is a reasonable one, and petitioners have not questioned it directly. Yet their statements raise considerable question whether they intend to abide by the prohibitions contained therein. As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the critical line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn, between advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and action, which is not. Petitioners may, if they so choose, preach the propriety of amending or even doing away with any or all campus regulations. They may not, however, undertake to flout these rules. Mr. Justice Blackmun, at the time he was a circuit judge on the Eighth Circuit, stated: “We . . . hold that a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has the inherent power properly to discipline; that it has power appropriately to protect itself and its property; that it may expect that its students adhere to generally accepted standards of conduct.” Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965 (1970). Just as in the community at large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner in which student groups conduct their speech-related activities must be respected. A college administration may impose a requirement, such as may have been imposed in this case, that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does not impose an impermissible condition on the students’ associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to assemble, or to petition for changes in school rules is in no sense infringed. It merely constitutes an agreement to conform with reasonable standards respecting conduct. This is a minimal requirement, in the interest of the entire academic community, of any group seeking the privilege of official recognition. Petitioners have not challenged in this litigation the procedural or substantive aspects of the College’s requirements governing applications for official recognition. Although the record is unclear on this point, CCSC may have, among its requirements' for recognition, a rule that prospective groups affirm that they intend to comply with reasonable campus regulations. Upon remand it should first be determined whether the College recognition procedures contemplate any such requirement. If so, it should then be ascertained whether petitioners intend to comply. Since we do not have the terms of a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not called on to decide whether any particular formulation would or would not prove constitutionally acceptable. Assuming the existence of a valid rule, however, we do conclude that the benefits of participation in the internal life of the college community may be denied to any group that reserves the right to violate any valid campus rules with which it disagrees. IY We think the above discussion establishes the appropriate framework for consideration of petitioners’ request for campus recognition. Because respondents failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment principles, the judgments below approving respondents’ denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we cannot conclude from this record that petitioners were willing to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulations, we order the case remanded for reconsideration. We note, in so holding, that the wide latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms of expression and association is not without its costs in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we deplore the tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional privileges they invoke, and although the infringement of rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, we reaffirm this Court’s dedication to the principles of the Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society is founded. Reversed and remanded. See Report of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970); Report of the American Bar Association Commission on Campus Government and Student Dissent (1970). The statement of purposes is set out as an Appendix to the Second Circuit’s opinion and appears following the dissent thereto. 445 F. 2d 1122, 1135-1139 (1971). 445 F. 2d, at 1133. During the Committee’s consideration of petitioners’ application, one of the group’s representatives was asked why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a nationally known name. The witness’ response was that “the name brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across, that is, a left-wing organization which will allow students interested in such to express themselves.” The President stated: “Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Affairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society, it is my judgment that the statement of purpose to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society carries full and unmistakable adherence to at least some of the major tenets of the national organization, loose and divided though that organization may be. The published aims and philosophy of the Students for a Democratic Society, which include disruption and violence, are contrary to the approved policy (by faculty, students, and administration) of Central Connecticut State College which states: “ ‘Students do not have the right to invade the privacy of others, to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college, or to interfere with the' rights of others.’ “The further statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any National organization’ in no way clarifies why if a group intends to follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a policy. “Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus, the freedom of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of Students that ‘college students and student organizations shall have the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings and utilize the right of petition’ — these are all precious freedoms that we cherish and are freedoms on which we stand. To approve any organization or individual who joins with an organization which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those freedoms and to the approved ‘Statement on the Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of Students’ at Central.” App. 15-16. In 1969, CCSC adopted, as have many other colleges and universities, a Statement on Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students. This statement, commonly referred to as the “Student Bill of Rights,” is printed as an Appendix to the Second Circuit’s majority opinion in this case, 445 F. 2d, at 1135-1139, see n. 2, supra. Part V of that statement establishes the standards for approval of campus organizations and imposes several basic limitations on their campus activities: “A. Care shall be taken in the establishment and organization of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students will be preserved. “B. Student organizations shall submit a clear statement of purpose, criteria for membership, rules of procedures and a list of officers as a condition of institutional recognition. They shall not be required to submit a membership list as a condition of institutional recognition. “C. Membership in campus organizations shall be limited to matriculated students (day or evening) at the college. Membership shall not be restricted by race, religion or nationality. The members shall have sole power to determine organization policy consistent with the regulations of the college. “D. Each organization is free to choose its own adviser. Advisers to organizations shall advise but not control the organizations and their policies. “E. College students and student organizations shall have the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have the right to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard, to invade the privacy of others, to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of others.” During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the College’s deans, who served petitioners with a memorandum from the President stating: “Notice has been received by this office of a meeting of the ‘C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thursday — November 6 at 7:00 p. m. at the Devils’ Den.’ "Such meeting may not take place in the Devils’ Den of the Student Center nor in or on any other property of the college since the C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. is not a duly recognized college organization. “You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from meeting on college property.” 319 F. Supp. 113, 114 (1970). The hearing officer, over petitioners’ objection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible, apparently on the ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original application and would be beyond the permissible scope of the hearing. Whatever the merits of this ruling, the statement was in the record reviewed by the President and was relied on in the subsequent District Court opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid. It is unclear on this record whether recognition also carries with it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners’ counsel at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group to “make application for use of student funds.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that “ [recognition does not thereby entitle an organization to college financial support.” 311 F. Supp. 1275, 1277. Since it appears that, -at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds, and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational aspect of nonrecognition in this case. These statements are in contrast to the first opinion by the District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitutional significance of petitioners’ claim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280-1282. 445 F. 2d, at 1131; 319 F. Supp., at 116. The standards for official recognition require applicants to provide a clear statement of purposes, criteria for membership, rules of procedure, and a list of officers. Applicants must limit membership to “matriculated students” and may not discriminate on the basis of race, religion or nationality. The standards further state that groups may “examine and discuss all questions of interest,” and they may conduct demonstrations and utilize their right of petition, but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners have not challenged these standards and their validity is not here in question. See n. 4, supra, for the complete text of the President’s statement. In addition to the cases cited in the text above, see also Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 164-166 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 299-300 (1961). See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 916 (1972), in which the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, stated that while violent factions have spun off from SDS, its present leadership is “critical of bombing and violence.” Petitioners asserted their independence both orally and in a written submission before the Student Affairs Committee. They restated their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the court-ordered hearing. The only indication to the contrary is their unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see n. 3, supra. Representatives of the group stated during the Student Affairs Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the National’s statements, but wished simply to “pick . . . certain ideas” from that organization. See n. 4, supra. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). See n. 5, supra. It may not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a legitimate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights — as nonrecognition does — the State must demonstrate that the action taken is reasonably related to protection of the State’s interest and that “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U. S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). On this record, absent a showing of any likelihood of disruption or unwillingness to recognize reasonable rules governing campus conduct, it is not necessary for us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related and narrow response. See n. 5, supra. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners “failed candidly to respond to inquiries whether they would resort to violence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including interruption of classes.” 445 F. 2d, at 1131. While petitioners’ statements may be read as intimating a rejection of reasonable regulations in advance, there is in fact substantial ambiguity on this point. The questions asked by members of the Student Affairs Committee do not appear to have been propounded with any clear distinction in mind between that which the petitioners might advocate and the conduct in which they might engage. Nor did the Student Affairs Committee attempt to obtain a clarification of the petitioners’ ambiguous answers by asking specifically whether the group was willing to abide by the Student Bill of Rights governing all campus organizations. Moreover, this question was not among those referred by the District Court to the administrative hearing, and it was there addressed only tangentially. The group members who had made statements before the Student Affairs Committee did not testify, and their position was not clarified. Their counsel, whose tactics were characterized as “disruptive” by the Court of Appeals, elected to make argumentative statements rather than elicit relevant testimony. Id., at 1126. Indeed, the District Court’s failure to identify the question of willingness to abide by the College’s rules and regulations as a significant subject of inquiry, coupled with the equivocation on the part of the group’s representatives, lends support to our view that a remand is necessary. See, e. g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293, 297 (1961). In addition to the College administration’s broad rulemaking power to assure that the traditional academic atmosphere is safeguarded, it may also impose sanctions on those who violate the rules. We find, for instance, that the Student Affairs Committee’s admonition to petitioners in this case suggests one permissible practice — recognition, once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners fail to respect campus law. See, e. g., University of Southern Mississippi Chapter of Mississippi Civil Liberties Union v. University of Southern Mississippi, 452 F. 2d 564 (CA5 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (WD Va. 1970).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Andrei IANCU, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office, Petitioner v. Erik BRUNETTI No. 18-302 Supreme Court of the United States. Argued April 15, 2019 Decided June 24, 2019 Malcolm L. Stewart, Washington, DC, for the petitioner. John R. Sommer, Irvine, CA, for the respondent. Sarah Harris, General Counsel, Thomas W. Krause, Solicitor, Christina J. Hieber, Thomas L. Casagrande, Mary Beth Walker, Molly R. Silfen, Associate Solicitors, U.S. Patent and Trademark, Office, Alexandria, VA, Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Mark R. Freeman, Daniel Tenny, Joshua M. Salzman, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for petitioner. John R. Sommer, Megan E. Gray, Devon A. Beckwith, Irvine, CA, for respondent. Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. Two Terms ago, in Matal v. Tam , 582 U. S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 198 L.Ed.2d 366 (2017), this Court invalidated the Lanham Act's bar on the registration of "disparag[ing]" trademarks. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Although split between two non-majority opinions, all Members of the Court agreed that the provision violated the First Amendment because it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. Today we consider a First Amendment challenge to a neighboring provision of the Act, prohibiting the registration of "immoral[ ] or scandalous" trademarks. Ibid. We hold that this provision infringes the First Amendment for the same reason: It too disfavors certain ideas. I Respondent Erik Brunetti is an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line that uses the trademark FUCT. According to Brunetti, the mark (which functions as the clothing's brand name) is pronounced as four letters, one after the other: F-U-C-T. See Brief for Respondent 1. But you might read it differently and, if so, you would hardly be alone. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5 (describing the brand name as "the equivalent of [the] past participle form of a well-known word of profanity"). That common perception caused difficulties for Brunetti when he tried to register his mark with the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Under the Lanham Act, the PTO administers a federal registration system for trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052. Registration of a mark is not mandatory. The owner of an unregistered mark may still use it in commerce and enforce it against infringers. See Tam , 582 U. S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1752. But registration gives trademark owners valuable benefits. For example, registration constitutes "prima facie evidence" of the mark's validity. § 1115(a). And registration serves as "constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership," which forecloses some defenses in infringement actions. § 1072. Generally, a trademark is eligible for registration, and receipt of such benefits, if it is "used in commerce." § 1051(a)(1). But the Act directs the PTO to "refuse[ ] registration" of certain marks. § 1052. For instance, the PTO cannot register a mark that "so resembles" another mark as to create a likelihood of confusion. § 1052(d). It cannot register a mark that is "merely descriptive" of the goods on which it is used. § 1052(e). It cannot register a mark containing the flag or insignia of any nation or State. See § 1052(b). There are five or ten more (depending on how you count). And until we invalidated the criterion two years ago, the PTO could not register a mark that "disparage[d]" a "person[ ], living or dead." § 1052(a) ; see Tam , 582 U. S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 198 L.Ed.2d 366. This case involves another of the Lanham Act's prohibitions on registration-one applying to marks that "[c]onsist[ ] of or comprise[ ] immoral[ ] or scandalous matter." § 1052(a). The PTO applies that bar as a "unitary provision," rather than treating the two adjectives in it separately. In re Brunetti , 877 F.3d 1330, 1336 (C.A. Fed. 2017) ; Brief for Petitioner 6 (stating that the PTO "has long treated the two terms as composing a single category"). To determine whether a mark fits in the category, the PTO asks whether a "substantial composite of the general public" would find the mark "shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety"; "giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings"; "calling out for condemnation"; "disgraceful"; "offensive"; "disreputable"; or "vulgar." 877 F.3d at 1336 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Brief for Petitioner 6 (agreeing that the PTO "generally defines" the category in that way). Both a PTO examining attorney and the PTO's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decided that Brunetti's mark flunked that test. The attorney determined that FUCT was "a total vulgar" and "therefore[ ] unregistrable." App. 27-28. On review, the Board stated that the mark was "highly offensive" and "vulgar," and that it had "decidedly negative sexual connotations." App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a, 64a-65a. As part of its review, the Board also considered evidence of how Brunetti used the mark. It found that Brunetti's website and products contained imagery, near the mark, of "extreme nihilism" and "anti-social" behavior. Id., at 64a. In that context, the Board thought, the mark communicated "misogyny, depravity, [and] violence." Ibid . The Board concluded: "Whether one considers [the mark] as a sexual term, or finds that [Brunetti] has used [the mark] in the context of extreme misogyny, nihilism or violence, we have no question but that [the term is] extremely offensive." Id., at 65a. Brunetti then brought a facial challenge to the "immoral or scandalous" bar in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court found the prohibition to violate the First Amendment. As usual when a lower court has invalidated a federal statute, we granted certiorari. 586 U. S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 782, 202 L.Ed.2d 510 (2019). II This Court first considered a First Amendment challenge to a trademark registration restriction in Tam , just two Terms ago. There, the Court declared unconstitutional the Lanham Act's ban on registering marks that "disparage" any "person[ ], living or dead." § 1052(a). The eight-Justice Court divided evenly between two opinions and could not agree on the overall framework for deciding the case. (In particular, no majority emerged to resolve whether a Lanham Act bar is a condition on a government benefit or a simple restriction on speech.) But all the Justices agreed on two propositions. First, if a trademark registration bar is viewpoint-based, it is unconstitutional. See 582 U. S., at ---- - ----, ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1751, 1762-1763 (opinion of ALITO, J.); id., at ---- - ----, ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1751, 1753 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). And second, the disparagement bar was viewpoint-based. See id., at ---- - ----, ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1751, 1762-1763 (opinion of ALITO, J.); id., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1751-1753 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) The Justices thus found common ground in a core postulate of free speech law: The government may not discriminate against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 515 U.S. 819, 829-830, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (explaining that viewpoint discrimination is an "egregious form of content discrimination" and is "presumptively unconstitutional"). In Justice Kennedy's explanation, the disparagement bar allowed a trademark owner to register a mark if it was "positive" about a person, but not if it was "derogatory." Tam , 582 U. S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1750. That was the "essence of viewpoint discrimination," he continued, because "[t]he law thus reflects the Government's disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive." Id., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1766. Justice ALITO emphasized that the statute "denie[d] registration to any mark" whose disparaging message was "offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group." Id., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1763. The bar thus violated the "bedrock First Amendment principle" that the government cannot discriminate against "ideas that offend." Id., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1751. Slightly different explanations, then, but a shared conclusion: Viewpoint discrimination doomed the disparagement bar. If the "immoral or scandalous" bar similarly discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, it must also collide with our First Amendment doctrine. The Government does not argue otherwise. In briefs and oral argument, the Government offers a theory for upholding the bar if it is viewpoint-neutral (essentially, that the bar would then be a reasonable condition on a government benefit). See Brief for Petitioner 14-26. But the Government agrees that under Tam it may not "deny registration based on the views expressed" by a mark. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. "As the Court's Tam decision establishes," the Government says, "the criteria for federal trademark registration" must be "viewpoint-neutral to survive Free Speech Clause review." Pet. for Cert. 19. So the key question becomes: Is the "immoral or scandalous" criterion in the Lanham Act viewpoint-neutral or viewpoint-based? It is viewpoint-based. The meanings of "immoral" and "scandalous" are not mysterious, but resort to some dictionaries still helps to lay bare the problem. When is expressive material "immoral"? According to a standard definition, when it is "inconsistent with rectitude, purity, or good morals"; "wicked"; or "vicious." Webster's New International Dictionary 1246 (2d ed. 1949). Or again, when it is "opposed to or violating morality"; or "morally evil." Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 961 (3d ed. 1947). So the Lanham Act permits registration of marks that champion society's sense of rectitude and morality, but not marks that denigrate those concepts. And when is such material "scandalous"? Says a typical definition, when it "giv[es] offense to the conscience or moral feelings"; "excite[s] reprobation"; or "call[s] out condemnation." Webster's New International Dictionary, at 2229. Or again, when it is "shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety"; "disgraceful"; "offensive"; or "disreputable." Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary 2186 (1944). So the Lanham Act allows registration of marks when their messages accord with, but not when their messages defy, society's sense of decency or propriety. Put the pair of overlapping terms together and the statute, on its face, distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: those aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to them; those inducing societal nods of approval and those provoking offense and condemnation. The statute favors the former, and disfavors the latter. "Love rules"? "Always be good"? Registration follows. "Hate rules"? "Always be cruel"? Not according to the Lanham Act's "immoral or scandalous" bar. The facial viewpoint bias in the law results in viewpoint-discriminatory application. Recall that the PTO itself describes the "immoral or scandalous" criterion using much the same language as in the dictionary definitions recited above. See supra, at 2298. The PTO, for example, asks whether the public would view the mark as "shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety"; "calling out for condemnation"; "offensive"; or "disreputable." Brief for Petitioner 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Using those guideposts, the PTO has refused to register marks communicating "immoral" or "scandalous" views about (among other things) drug use, religion, and terrorism. But all the while, it has approved registration of marks expressing more accepted views on the same topics. See generally Gilson & LaLonde, Trademarks Laid Bare, 101 Trademark Reporter 1476, 1510-1513, 1518-1522 (2011) ; Brief for Barton Beebe et al. as Amici Curiae 28-29. Here are some samples. The PTO rejected marks conveying approval of drug use (YOU CAN'T SPELL HEALTHCARE WITHOUT THC for pain-relief medication, MARIJUANA COLA and KO KANE for beverages) because it is scandalous to "inappropriately glamoriz[e] drug abuse." PTO, Office Action of Aug. 28, 2010, Serial No. 85038867; see Office Action of Dec. 24, 2009, Serial No. 77833964; Office Action of Nov. 17, 2009, Serial No. 77671304. But at the same time, the PTO registered marks with such sayings as D.A.R.E. TO RESIST DRUGS AND VIOLENCE and SAY NO TO DRUGS-REALITY IS THE BEST TRIP IN LIFE. See PTO, Reg. No. 2975163 (July 26, 2005); Reg. No. 2966019 (July 12, 2005). Similarly, the PTO disapproved registration for the mark BONG HITS 4 JESUS because it "suggests that people should engage in an illegal activity [in connection with] worship" and because "Christians would be morally outraged by a statement that connects Jesus Christ with illegal drug use." Office Action of Mar. 15, 2008, Serial No. 77305946. And the PTO refused to register trademarks associating religious references with products (AGNUS DEI for safes and MADONNA for wine) because they would be "offensive to most individuals of the Christian faith" and "shocking to the sense of propriety." Ex parte Summit Brass & Bronze Works , 59 U.S.P.Q. 22, 23 (Dec. Com. Pat. 1943) ; In re Riverbank Canning Co. , 95 F.2d 327, 329 (CCPA 1938). But once again, the PTO approved marks-PRAISE THE LORD for a game and JESUS DIED FOR YOU on clothing-whose message suggested religious faith rather than blasphemy or irreverence. See Reg. No. 5265121 (Aug. 15, 2017); Reg. No. 3187985 (Dec. 19, 2006). Finally, the PTO rejected marks reflecting support for al-Qaeda (BABY AL QAEDA and AL-QAEDA on t-shirts) "because the bombing of civilians and other terrorist acts are shocking to the sense of decency and call out for condemnation." Office Action of Nov. 22, 2004, Serial No. 78444968; see Office Action of Feb. 23, 2005, Serial No. 78400213. Yet it approved registration of a mark with the words WAR ON TERROR MEMORIAL. Reg. No. 5495362 (Jun. 19, 2018). Of course, all these decisions are understandable. The rejected marks express opinions that are, at the least, offensive to many Americans. But as the Court made clear in Tam , a law disfavoring "ideas that offend" discriminates based on viewpoint, in violation of the First Amendment. 582 U. S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1751 (opinion of ALITO, J.); see id., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1762-1763 ; id., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1765-1766 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) How, then, can the Government claim that the "immoral or scandalous" bar is viewpoint-neutral? The Government basically asks us to treat decisions like those described above as PTO examiners' mistakes. See Brief for Petitioner 46. Still more, the Government tells us to ignore how the Lanham Act's language, on its face, disfavors some ideas. In urging that course, the Government does not dispute that the statutory language-and words used to define it-have just that effect. At oral argument, the Government conceded: "[I]f you just looked at the words like 'shocking' and 'offensive' on their face and gave them their ordinary meanings[,] they could easily encompass material that was shocking [or offensive] because it expressed an outrageous point of view or a point of view that most members" of society reject. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. But no matter, says the Government, because the statute is "susceptible of" a limiting construction that would remove this viewpoint bias. Id., at 7 (arguing that the Court should "attempt to construe [the] statute in a way that would render it constitutional"). The Government's idea, abstractly phrased, is to narrow the statutory bar to "marks that are offensive [or] shocking to a substantial segment of the public because of their mode of expression, independent of any views that they may express." Id., at 11 (emphasis added); see Brief for Petitioner 27-28. More concretely, the Government explains that this reinterpretation would mostly restrict the PTO to refusing marks that are "vulgar"-meaning "lewd," "sexually explicit or profane." Id., at 27, 30. Such a reconfigured bar, the Government says, would not turn on viewpoint, and so we could uphold it. But we cannot accept the Government's proposal, because the statute says something markedly different. This Court, of course, may interpret "ambiguous statutory language" to "avoid serious constitutional doubts." FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. , 556 U.S. 502, 516, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 173 L.Ed.2d 738 (2009). But that canon of construction applies only when ambiguity exists. "We will not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional requirements." United States v. Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 481, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). So even assuming the Government's reading would eliminate First Amendment problems, we may adopt it only if we can see it in the statutory language. And we cannot. The "immoral or scandalous" bar stretches far beyond the Government's proposed construction. The statute as written does not draw the line at lewd, sexually explicit, or profane marks. Nor does it refer only to marks whose "mode of expression," independent of viewpoint, is particularly offensive. Brief for Petitioner 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). It covers the universe of immoral or scandalous-or (to use some PTO synonyms) offensive or disreputable-material. Whether or not lewd or profane. Whether the scandal and immorality comes from mode or instead from viewpoint. To cut the statute off where the Government urges is not to interpret the statute Congress enacted, but to fashion a new one. And once the "immoral or scandalous" bar is interpreted fairly, it must be invalidated. The Government just barely argues otherwise. In the last paragraph of its brief, the Government gestures toward the idea that the provision is salvageable by virtue of its constitutionally permissible applications (in the Government's view, its applications to lewd, sexually explicit, or profane marks). See id. , at 47. In other words, the Government invokes our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, and asks us to uphold the statute against facial attack because its unconstitutional applications are not "substantial" relative to "the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Stevens , 559 U.S. at 473, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (internal quotation marks omitted). But to begin with, this Court has never applied that kind of analysis to a viewpoint-discriminatory law. In Tam , for example, we did not pause to consider whether the disparagement clause might admit some permissible applications (say, to certain libelous speech) before striking it down. The Court's finding of viewpoint bias ended the matter. And similarly, it seems unlikely we would compare permissible and impermissible applications if Congress outright banned "offensive" (or to use some other examples, "divisive" or "subversive") speech. Once we have found that a law "aim[s] at the suppression of " views, why would it matter that Congress could have captured some of the same speech through a viewpoint-neutral statute? Tam , 582 U. S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1761 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). But in any event, the "immoral or scandalous" bar is substantially overbroad. There are a great many immoral and scandalous ideas in the world (even more than there are swearwords), and the Lanham Act covers them all. It therefore violates the First Amendment. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH COAL CO. v. COUNTY COMMISSION OF WEBSTER COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA No. 87-1303. Argued December 7, 1988 Decided January 18, 1989 E. Barrett Pretty man, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs were John G. Roberts, Jr., and William James Murphy. C. William Ullrich, Chief Deputy Attorney General of West Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Charles G. Brown, Attorney General, and Jack Alsop. Together with No. 87-1310, East Kentucky Energy Corp. et al. v. County Commission of Webster County, West Virginia, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Association of Realtors by Laurene K. Janik; and for the National Taxpayers Union by Gale A. Notion. Benna Ruth Solomon and Eugene J. Comey filed a brief for the National Association of Counties et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Anthony T. Caso, and Jonathan M. Coupal; and for the International Association of Assessing Officers by James F. Gossett. Chief Justice. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The West Virginia Constitution guarantees to its citizens that, with certain exceptions, “taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value . . . .” Art. X, § 1. The Webster County tax assessor valued petitioners’ real property on the basis of its recent purchase price, but made only minor modifications in the assessments of land which had not been recently sold. This practice resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of generally comparable property, and we hold that it denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth Amendment. Between 1975 and 1986, the tax assessor for Webster County, West Virginia, fixed yearly assessments for property within the county at 50% of appraised value. She fixed the appraised value at the declared consideration at which the property last sold. Some adjustments were made in the assessments of properties that had not been recently sold, although they amounted to, at most, 10% increases in 1976, 1981, and 1983 respectively. In 1974, for example, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company (Allegheny) purchased fee, surface, and mineral interests in certain properties for a stated price somewhat in excess of $24 million, and during the tax years 1976 through 1983 its property was assessed annually at half of this figure. In 1982 Allegheny sold the property to East Kentucky Energy Corp. (Kentucky Energy) for a figure of nearly $30 million, and the property thereafter was annually assessed at a valuation just below $15 million. Oneida Coal Company and Shamrock Coal Company participated in similar transactions in Webster County, and the property they purchased or sold was assessed in a similar manner. Each year, petitioners pursued relief before the County Commission of Webster County sitting as a review board. They argued that the assessment policy of the Webster County assessor systematically resulted in appraisals for their property that were excessive compared to the appraised value of similar parcels that had not been recently conveyed. Each year the county commission affirmed the assessments, and each year petitioners appealed to the State Circuit Court. A group of these appeals from Allegheny and its successor in interest, Kentucky Energy, were consolidated by the West Virginia Circuit Court and finally decided in 1985. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1303, p. 15a. Another group of appeals from Shamrock and Oneida were consolidated and decided by the West Virginia Circuit Court early the next year. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310, p. 49a. The judge in both of these cases concluded that the system of real property assessment used by the Webster County assessor systematically and intentionally discriminated against petitioners in violation of the West Virginia Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. He ordered the county commission to reduce the assessments on petitioners’ property to the levels recommended by the state tax commissioner in his valuation guidelines published for use by local assessors. Underlying the judge’s conclusions were findings that petitioners’ tax assessments over the years were dramatically in excess of those for comparable property in the county. He found that “the assessor did not compare the various features of the real estate to which the high assessment was applied with the various features of land assessed at a much lower rate.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1303, p. 29a; App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310, p. 59a. “The questioned assessments were not based upon the presence of economically minable or removable coal, oil, gas or harvestable timber in or upon petitioners’ real estate, as compared to an absence of the same in or upon [neighboring] properties.” Ibid. Nor were they “based upon present use or immediately foreseeable economic development of petitioners’ real estate.” Ibid. Rather, “[t]he sole basis of the assessment of petitioners’ real estate was, according to the assessor, the consideration declared in petitioners’ deeds.” Ibid. This approach systematically produced dramatic differences in valuation between petitioners’ recently transferred property and otherwise comparable surrounding land. For the years 1976 through 1982, Allegheny was assessed and taxed at approximately 35 times the rate applied to owners of comparable properties. After purchasing that land, Kentucky Energy was assessed and taxed at approximately 33 times the rate of similar parcels. From 1981 through 1985, the county assessed and taxed the Shamrock-Oneida property at roughly 8 to 20 times that of comparable neighboring coal tracts. These disparities existed notwithstanding the adjustments made to the assessments of land not recently conveyed. In the case of the property held by Allegheny and Kentucky Energy, the county’s adjustment policy would have required more than 500 years to equalize the assessments. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed. It found that the record did not support the trial court’s ruling that the actions of the assessor and board of review constituted “intentional and systematic” discrimination. It held that “assessments based upon the price paid for the property in arm’s length transactions are an appropriate measure of the ‘true and actual value’ of . . . property.” In re 1975 Tax Assessments against Oneida Coal Co., - W. Va.-,-, 360 S. E. 2d 560, 564 (1987). That other properties might be undervalued relative to petitioners’ did not require that petitioners’ assessments be reduced: “‘Instead, they should seek to have the assessments of other taxpayers raised to market value.’” Id., at-, 360 S. E. 2d, at 565 (quoting Killen v. Logan County Comm’n, - W. Va. -, -, 295 S. E. 2d 689, 709 (1982)). We granted certiorari to decide whether these Webster County tax assessments denied petitioners the equal protection of the law and, if so, whether petitioners could constitutionally be limited to the remedy of seeking to raise the assessments of others. 485 U. S. 976 (1988). We agree with the import of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia that petitioners have no constitutional complaint simply because their property is assessed for real property tax purposes at a figure equal to 50% of the price paid for it at a recent arm’s-length transaction. But their complaint is a comparative one: while their property is assessed at 50% of what is roughly its current value, neighboring comparable property which has not been recently sold is assessed at only a minor fraction of that figure. We do not understand the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to have disputed this fact. We read its opinion as saying that even if there is a constitutional violation on these facts, the only remedy available to petitioners was an effort to have the assessments on the neighboring properties raised by an appropriate amount. We hold that the assessments on petitioners’ property in this case violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that petitioners may not be remitted to the remedy specified by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The county argues that its assessment scheme is rationally related to its purpose of assessing properties at true current value: when available, it makes use of exceedingly accurate information about the market value of a property — the price at which it was recently purchased. As those data grow stale, it periodically adjusts the assessment based on some perception of the general change in area property values. We do not intend to cast doubt upon the theoretical basis of such a scheme. That two methods are used to assess property in the same class is, without more, of no constitutional moment. The Equal Protection Clause “applies only to taxation which in fact bears unequally on persons or property of the same class.” Charleston Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 190 (1945) (collecting cases). The use of a general adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual reappraisal violates no constitutional command. As long as general adjustments are accurate enough over a short period of timé to equalize the differences in proportion between the assessments of a class of property holders, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied. Just as that Clause tolerates occasional errors of state law or mistakes in judgment when valuing property for tax purposes, see Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 353 (1918); Coulter v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 196 U. S. 599 (1905), it does not require immediate general adjustment on the basis of the latest market developments. In each case, the constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property owners. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 526-527 (1959),. and cases there cited; cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602 (1944) (noting, in the ratemaking context, that “[i]t is not theory, but the impact . . . that counts”). But the present action is not an example of transitional delay in adjustment of assessed value resulting in inequalities in assessments of comparable property. Petitioners’ property has been assessed at roughly 8 to 35 times more than comparable neighboring property, and these discrepancies have continued for more than 10 years with little change. The county’s adjustments to the assessments of property not recently sold are too small to seasonably dissipate the remaining disparity between these assessments and the assessments based on a recent purchase price. The States, of course, have broad powers to impose and collect taxes. A State may divide different kinds of property into classes and assign to each class a different tax burden so long as those divisions and burdens are reasonable. Allied Stores, supra, at 526-527 (“The State may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products”). It might, for example, decide to tax property held by corporations, including petitioners, at a different rate than property held by individuals. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356 (1973) (Illinois ad valorem tax on personalty of corporations). In each case, “[i]f the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law.” Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573 (1910). But West Virginia has not drawn such a distinction. Its Constitution and laws provide that all property of the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the State according to its estimated market value. There is no suggestion in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, or from any other authoritative source, that the State may have adopted a different system in practice from that specified by statute; we have held that such a system may be valid so long as the implicit policy is applied evenhandedly to all similarly situated property within the State. Nashville C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, 368-369 (1940). We are not advised of any West Virginia statute or practice which authorizes individual counties of the State to fashion their own substantive assessment policies independently of state statute. See Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954). The Webster County assessor has, apparently on her own initiative, applied the tax laws of West Virginia in the manner heretofore described, with the resulting disparity in assessed value of similar property. Indeed, her practice seems contrary to that of the guide published by the West Virginia Tax Commission as an aid to local assessors in the assessment of real property. “[I]ntentional systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his property.” Sunday Lake Iron Co., supra, at 352-353; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 445-446 (1923); Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax Assessments in Greene County, Pa., 284 U. S. 23, 28-29 (1931). “The equal protection clause . . . protects the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class.” Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 623 (1946). We have no doubt that petitioners have suffered from such “intentional systematic undervaluation by state officials” of comparable property in Webster County. Viewed in isolation, the assessments for petitioners’ property may fully comply with West Virginia law. But the fairness of one’s allocable share of the total property tax burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by comparison with the share of others similarly situated relative to their property holdings. The relative undervaluation of comparable property in Webster County over time therefore denies petitioners the equal protection of the law. A taxpayer in this situation may not be remitted by the State to the remedy of seeking to have the assessments of the undervalued property raised. “The [Equal Protection Clause] is not satisfied if a State does not itself remove the discrimination, but imposes on him against whom the discrimination has been directed the burden of seeking an upward revision of the taxes of other members of the class.” Hillsborough, supra, at 623, citing Sioux City Bridge Co., supra, 445-447; Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239, 247 (1931); Cumberland Coal Co., supra, at 28-29. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Petitioners contend that the adjustments to the assessments for property not recently transferred were uneven at best. According to petitioners, a study of the assessed value of all coal tracts in Webster County from 1983 to 1984 was introduced at trial and demonstrated that the assessment of 35% of the tracts was unchanged during that period. The courts below do not appear to have made specific factual findings accepting or rejecting this study or petitioners’ conclusions drawn from it. For the purposes of argument, we will accept the county’s figures since we find that, even accepting those figures, the adjustments do not dispel the constitutional flaw in the assessment system. After each of these primary decisions adjudicating the validity of the assessments to the lands in question, petitioners obtained a number of other orders applying the findings in the primary decisions to their specific cases and to other appeals not consolidated in the primary decisions. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310, pp. 79a, 83a, and 86a. Respondent argues in this Court that petitioners’ land was not truly comparable to that of the surrounding properties. It points to the fact that one of the parcels held by Allegheny, and then by Kentucky Energy, comprising 4,287 acres, allegedly contains 32 million tons of low-sulfur coal recoverable by strip mining. This unusually valuable parcel skews the average value of all the properties, as well as serving as a basis for higher valuation of this parcel than those surrounding it. Petitioners make a number of answers: First, they rely on respondent’s stipulations that “[t]he properties surrounding the property owned by . . . Petitioner, . . . are comparable properties in that they are substantially the same geologically as the properties of the Petitioner . . . .” Record 1319-1320, 1085. Next, they point to the factual findings of the West Virginia Circuit Court, never rejected by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, that “[although the real estate of each of these petitioners is not identical to that of all other real estate in Webster County, it appears that petitioners’ real estate is substantially similar to the real estate of the others in topography, location, access, development, mineral content and forestation, and that the petitioners’ real estate is substantially similar to adjacent and contiguous tracts and parcels of real estate owned by others.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1303, p. 16a; App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310, p. 50a. Finally, they note that the court’s findings were founded on the testimony of Kentucky Energy’s expert witness, the one who testified to the estimated 32 million tons of coal under Kentucky Energy’s land, that the surrounding properties were equally promising. On direct examination he said: “As far as comparing this area with the surrounding property, geologically, those same seams are present on all the other properties [suggested as comparable]. The same coal seams are present there. . . . [T]he coal is there and I know that the chances of them being mineable are just as good there as they are on the [Kentucky Energy] properties. “. . . There may be some variations, depending on which individual seam is mineable from one property to the other, but in the long run they are very similar properties located within the same area and there is no geological reason that they should not be comparable.” Brief in Opposition in No. 87-1303, pp. 10a-lla. We think that petitioners’ submissions justify the conclusion on the record presented to us that their properties were, in aspects relevant to valuation and assessment, comparable to surrounding property valued and assessed at markedly lower amounts. We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster County assessment method would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it appears to be. The State of California has adopted a similar policy as Article XIIIA of its Constitution, popularly known as “Proposition 13.” Proposition 13 generally provides that property will be assessed at its 1975-1976 value, and reassessed only when transferred or constructed upon, or in a limited manner for inflation. Cal. Const., Art. XIIIA, §2 (limiting inflation adjustments to 2% per year). The system is grounded on the belief that taxes should be based on the original cost of property and should not tax unrealized paper gains in the value of the property.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

THOMPSON v. NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS, LP No. 09-291. Argued December 7, 2010 Decided January 24, 2011 Eric Schnapper argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David O’Brien Suetholz, Lisa S. Blatt, and Anthony Franze. Acting Principal Deputy Solicitor General Kruger argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Katyal, Assistant Attorney General Perez, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bagenstos, Joseph R. Palmore, P. David Lopez, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Gail S. Coleman. Leigh Gross Latherow argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were William H. Jones, Jr., Gregory L. Monge, and Nathaniel K. Adams. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Michael L. Foreman, Rebecca M. Hamburg, Jeffrey R. White, Daniel B. Kohrman, Linda D. Kilb, Sarah C. Crawford, and Claudia Center; and for the National Women’s Law Center et al. by Helen Norton, Miarcia D. Greenberger, and Dina R. Lassow. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Patricia A. Millett, Robin S. Conrad, and Shane B. Kawka; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Roe T. Vann, Quentin Riegel, Karen R. Harned, and Elizabeth Milito. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Until 2003, both petitioner Eric Thompson and his fiance, Miriam Regalado, were employees of respondent North American Stainless (NAS). In February 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) notified NAS that Regalado had filed a charge alleging sex discrimination. Three weeks later, NAS fired Thompson. Thompson then filed a charge with the EEOC. After conciliation efforts proved unsuccessful, he sued NAS in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., claiming that NAS had fired him in order to retaliate against Regalado for filing her charge with the EEOC. The District Court granted summary judgment to NAS, concluding that Title VII “does not permit third party retaliation claims.” 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (ED Ky. 2006). After a panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and affirmed by a 10-to-6 vote. 567 F. 3d 804 (2009). The court reasoned that because Thompson did not “engag[e] in any statutorily protected activity, either on his own behalf or on behalf of Miriam Regalado,” he “is not in-eluded in the class of persons for whom Congress created a retaliation cause of action.” Id., at 807-808. We granted certiorari. 561 U. S. 1041 (2010). I Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has made a charge” under Title VII. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a). The statute permits “a person claiming to be aggrieved” to file a charge with the EEOC alleging that the employer committed an unlawful employment practice, and, if the EEOC declines to sue the employer, it permits a civil action to “be brought ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved ... by the alleged unlawful employment practice.” §2000e-5(b), (f)(1). It is undisputed that Regalado’s filing of a charge with the EEOC was protected conduct under Title VII. In the procedural posture of this case, we are also required to assume that NAS fired Thompson in order to retaliate against Regalado for filing a charge of discrimination. This case therefore presents two questions: First, did NAS’s firing of Thompson constitute unlawful retaliation? And second, if it did, does Title VII grant Thompson a cause of action? II With regard to the first question, we have little difficulty concluding that if the facts alleged by Thompson are true, then NAS’s firing of Thompson violated Title VII. In Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 (2006), we held that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct. We reached that conclusion by contrasting the text of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision with its substantive antidiscrimination provision. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin “ ‘with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment/” and discriminatory practices that would “ 'deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.’” Id., at 62 (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a); emphasis deleted). In contrast, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer from " 'discriminating] against any of his employees’ ” for engaging in protected conduct, without specifying the employer acts that are prohibited. 548 U. S., at 62 (quoting §2000e-3(a); emphasis deleted). Based on this textual distinction and our understanding of the antiretaliation provision’s purpose, we held that ''the antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.” Id., at 64. Rather, Title YII’s antiretaliation provision prohibits any employer action that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id., at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). We think it obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiance would be fired. Indeed, NAS does not dispute that Thompson’s firing meets the standard set forth in Burlington. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. NAS raises the concern, however, that prohibiting reprisals against third parties will lead to difficult line-drawing problems concerning the types of relationships entitled to protection. Perhaps retaliating against an employee by firing his fiance would dissuade the employee from engaging in protected activity, but what about firing an employee’s girlfriend, close friend, or trusted co-worker? Applying the Burlington standard to third-party reprisals, NAS argues, will place the employer at risk any time it fires any employee who happens to have a connection to a different employee who filed a charge with the EEOC. Although we acknowledge the force of this point, we do not think it justifies a categorical rule that third-party reprisals do not violate Title VIL As explained above, we adopted a broad standard in Burlington because Title VIPs antiretaliation provision is worded broadly. We think there is no textual basis for making an exception to it for third-party reprisals, and a preference for clear rules cannot justify departing from statutory text. We must also decline to identify a fixed class of relationships for whieh third-party reprisals are unlawful. We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize. As we explained in Burlington, 548 U. S., at 69, "the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.” Given the broad statutory text and the variety of workplace contexts in which retaliation may occur, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is simply not reducible to a comprehensive set of clear rules. We emphasize, however, that "the provision’s standard for judging harm must be objective,” so as to “avoi[d] the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.” Id., at 68-69. Ill The more difficult question in this case is whether Thompson may sue NAS for its alleged violation of Title VII. The statute provides that “a civil action may be brought ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(f)(1). The Sixth Circuit concluded that this provision was merely a reiteration of the requirement that the plaintiff have Article III standing. 567 F. 3d, at 808, n. 1. We do not understand how that can be. The provision unquestionably permits a person “claiming to be aggrieved” to bring “a civil action.” It is arguable that the aggrievement referred to is nothing more than the minimal Article III standing, which consists of injury in fact caused by the defendant and remediable by the court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). But Thompson’s claim undoubtedly meets those requirements, so if that is indeed all that aggrievement consists of, he may sue. We have suggested in dictum that the Title VII aggrievement requirement conferred a right to sue on all who satisfied Article III standing. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205 (1972), involved the “person aggrieved” provision of Title VIII (the Fair Housing Act) rather than Title VII. In deciding the case, however, we relied upon, and cited with approval, a Third Circuit opinion involving Title VII, which, we said, “concluded that the words used showed ‘a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.’ ” Id., at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F. 2d 442, 446 (1971)). We think that dictum regarding Title VII was too expansive. Indeed, the Trafficante opinion did not adhere to it in expressing its Title VIII holding that residents of an apartment complex could sue the owner for his racial discrimination against prospective tenants. The opinion said that the “person aggrieved” of Title VIII was coextensive with Article III “insofar as tenants of the same housing unit that is charged with discrimination are concerned.” 409 U. S., at 209 (emphasis added). Later opinions, we must acknowledge, reiterate that the term “aggrieved” in Title VIII reaches as far as Article III permits, see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 165-166 (1997); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 109 (1979), though the holdings of those cases are compatible with the “zone of interests” limitation that we discuss below. In any event, it is Title VII rather than Title VIII that is before us here, and as to that we are surely not bound by the Trafficante dictum. We now find that this dictum was ill-considered, and we decline to follow it. If any person injured in the Article III sense by a Title VII violation could sue, absurd consequences would follow. For example, a shareholder would be able to sue a company for firing a valuable employee for racially discriminatory reasons, so long as he could show that the value of his stock decreased as a consequence. At oral argument Thompson acknowledged that such a suit would not lie, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6. We agree, and therefore conclude that the term “aggrieved” must be construed more narrowly than the outer boundaries of Article III. At the other extreme from the position that “person aggrieved” means anyone with Article III standing, NAS argues that it is a term of art that refers only to the employee who engaged in the protected activity. We know of no other context in which the words carry this artificially narrow meaning, and if that is what Congress intended it would more naturally have said “person claiming to have been discriminated against” rather than “person claiming to be aggrieved.” We see no basis in text or prior practice for limiting the latter phrase to the person who was the subject of unlawful retaliation. Moreover, such a reading contradicts the very holding of Trafficante, which was that residents of an apartment complex were “person[s] aggrieved” by discrimination against prospective tenants. We see no reason why the same phrase in Title VII should be given a narrower meaning. In our view there is a common usage of the term “person aggrieved” that avoids the extremity of equating it with Article III and yet is fully consistent with our application of the term in Trafficante. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq., authorizes suit to challenge a federal agency by any “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute.” §702. We have held that this language establishes a regime under which a plaintiff may not sue unless he “falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 883 (1990). We have described the “zone of interests” test as denying a right of review “if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 399-400 (1987). We hold that the term “aggrieved” in Title VII incorporates this test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with an interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the statute,” National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U. S. 479, 495 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), while excluding plaintiffs who might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibitions in Title VII. Applying that test here, we conclude that Thompson falls within the zone of interests protected by Title VII. Thompson was an employee of NAS, and the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employers’ unlawful actions. Moreover, accepting the facts as alleged, Thompson is not an accidental victim of the retaliation — collateral damage, so to speak, of the employer’s unlawful act. To the contrary, injuring him was the employer’s intended means of harming Regalado. Hurting him was the unlawful act by which the employer punished her. In those circumstances, we think Thompson well within the zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII. He is a person aggrieved with standing to sue. * * * The judgment of the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COPE v. ANDERSON, RECEIVER. NO. 593. Argued April 28,1947. — Decided June 2, 1947. Harold Evans argued the cause for petitioner in No. 593. With him on the brief was John Wintersteen. Robert S. Marx argued the cause for petitioner in No. 656 and respondent in No. 593. With him on the briefs were Frank E. Wood, Harry Kasfir and Wm. C. Kelly. Murray Seasongood argued the cause for respondents in No. 656. With him on the brief were Robert P. Goldman and Joseph A. Segal. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. In Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349, we held that the shareholders of BancoKentucky Company, a bank-stock-holding company, were liable under 12 U. S. C. § § 63, 64, for an assessment on shares of an insolvent national bank held in the portfolio of the holding company. That suit was brought in a Kentucky District Court against Banco stockholders residing in that District. These suits in equity were brought in Federal District Courts in Ohio and Pennsylvania to enforce assessments against Ohio and Pennsylvania stockholders of Banco. In No. 656 the District Court in Ohio overruled a motion to dismiss made on the ground, among others, that the bill showed on its face that the action was barred by an Ohio statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 156 F. 2d 47. In No. 593 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court in Pennsylvania which had held the action there barred by the Pennsylvania statute of limitations. 156 F. 2d 972. We granted certiorari to consider both cases. 329 U. S. 707. There is no federal statute of limitations fixing the period within which suits must be brought to enforce the statutory double liability of shareholders of insolvent national banks. For this reason we look to Ohio and Pennsylvania law to determine the period in which these suits may be brought. McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S. 71; McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 158; Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96, 97. Even though these suits are in equity, the states' statutes of limitations apply. For it is only the scope of the relief sought and the multitude of parties sued which give equity concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the legal obligation here asserted. And equity will withhold its relief in such a case where the applicable statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy. Russell v. Todd, 309 U. S. 280, 289 and cases cited. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99; Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395-396. But even though the period in which suit must be brought is governed by state limitations statutes, we have previously decided that the question of when the applicable state statute of limitations begins to run depends upon when, under federal law, the Comptroller of the Currency, or his authorized agent, is empowered by federal law to bring suit. And the Comptroller’s agent, the Receiver here, could not bring these actions until the date for payment fixed by the Comptroller. Rawlings v. Ray, supra, 98, 99; Fisher v. Whiton, 317 U. S. 217, 220, 221. The date for payment fixed by the Comptroller in this instance was April 1, 1931. These actions were instituted more than five but less than six years after the payments became due under the Comptroller’s assessment order. With regard to No. 656, the Ohio proceeding, the Ohio statute of limitations provides that suit “upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty, shall be brought within six years after the cause thereof accrued.” Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938) § 11222. This statute describes the liability sued on here, and if applicable does not bar this suit. But the scope of this general provision is narrowed by another known as the “borrowing statute” which reads: “If the laws of any state or country where the cause of action arose limits the time for the commencement of the action to a less number of years than do the statutes of this state in like causes of action then said cause of action shall be barred in this state at the expiration of said lesser number of years.” Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938) § 11234. If the cause of action arose in Kentucky, the “borrowing statute” applies Kentucky’s statute of limitations, and this suit is barred. For Kentucky’s law requires that an “action upon a liability created by statute . . . shall be commenced within five years after the cause of action accrued.” Ky. Rev. Stat. (Baldwin, 1943) § 413.120. The Receiver contends that the Ohio borrowing statute’s language “the laws of any state or country where the cause.of action arose” has reference to “a system of jurisprudence other than Ohio’s,” and does not refer “necessarily to territorial limits” within which events occurred giving rise to an enforceable obligation. The place where the events giving rise to a cause of action occur is said to be “important only insofar as the laws of that place are controlling.” Under this argument, the cause of action here could not have “arisen” in any state since the statutory obligation of shareholders was not imposed or controlled by state law. Hence, the argument runs, the Ohio law did not contemplate borrowing any state statute of limitations in a case where liability is governed by federal law. And no federal statute of limitations could be borrowed in this case for none existed. Therefore, it is argued, only Ohio’s general six-year statute of limitations applies. The consequence of accepting this contention would be that the Ohio borrowing statute would have no effect at all as to suits brought in Ohio state courts to enforce actions authorized by federal law. For, of course, Ohio courts could never borrow a non-existent federal statute of limitations. And if there were a federal statute of limitations governing a federally created right, that statute would control of its own force. Herget v. Central National Bank & Trust Co., 324 U. S. 4. We have been cited to no decision by any Ohio court which would lead us to believe that its borrowing statute should be given such a sterilizing interpretation. Cf. Townsend v. Eichelberger, 51 Ohio St. 213, 216, 38 N. E. 207, 208. We find it unnecessary to our decision to discuss the contentions made here concerning differences between a “cause of action” and a “liability.” The Ohio Supreme Court has itself said that a “cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right of action, the existence of which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf.” Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Larwill, 83 Ohio St. 108, 115-116, 93 N. E. 619, 621. We have been referred to nothing in Ohio statutes or decisions which indicates that it used “cause of action” in any different sense in its borrowing statute. The purpose of the state’s borrowing statute, as those of other states, was apparently to require its courts to bar suits against an Ohio resident if the right to sue him had already expired in another state where the combination of circumstances giving rise to the right to sue had taken place. Moreover, limitations on federally created rights to sue have similarly been considered to be governed by the limitations law of the state where the crucial combination of events transpired. Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F. Supp. 1018, 104 F. 2d 659; Bluefields S. S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1, 19-20. See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610; Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 397. Our appraisal of the Ohio borrowing statute, the opinions of the courts of that state, and the circumstances leading to this suit, persuade us that the cause of action “arose” in Kentucky within the meaning of the Ohio borrowing statute. The bank was authorized to do its banking business in Louisville and did business in no other place. See 12 U. S. C. § 81. Nor was this bank’s business any the less local because its shares were held in the portfolio of a Delaware corporation. Many provisions of federal law make national banks, in important aspects, peculiarly local institutions. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 30, 33, 34 (a), 36, 51, 62, 72. For jurisdictional purposes, a national bank is a “citizen” of the state in which it is established or located, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (16), and in that district alone can it be sued. 12 U. S. C. § 94. True, when insolvency occurs, there is a shift in bank management, but the bank’s activities are still necessarily rooted in its local habitat. In this case the Receiver’s office was located in Louisville, the home of the bank; payment of assessments, like other obligations due the bank, could have been made there, and, in fact, shareholders were notified by the Receiver to pay at his office in Louisville. Liquidation of a local bank, like its daily operations, must from necessity and in the interest of good business be carried on, in the main, in the community where the bank did business with its depositors and other customers. Practically everything that preceded the final fixing of liability of shareholders derived from Kentucky transactions. We have been referred to no Ohio decisions, and have been unable to find any, which contradict our conclusion that events which culminated in this suit justify our holding that this “cause of action” “arose” in Kentucky within the meaning of the Ohio statute. See Hunter v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 73 Ohio St. 110, 76 N. E. 563; Atropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm, 138 Ohio St. 30, 33 N. E. 2d 655; Payne v. Kirchwehm, 141 Ohio St. 384, 48 N. E. 2d 224; Bowers v. Holabird, 51 Ohio App. 413, 1 N. E. 2d 326; National Bondholders Corp. v. Stoddard, 22 Ohio O. 145, 8 Ohio Supp. 19. See also Hilliard v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 73 F. 2d 473, 475-476; Note, 15 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 337 (1941); Note, 21 Ohio O. 107 (1941). Therefore the judgment in No. 656 is affirmed. In No. 593, the Pennsylvania action, the same considerations are controlling. The general statute of limitations of that state which would be applicable to this action had it arisen in Pennsylvania, like Ohio’s general statute, provides a six-year period in which this suit could be brought. 12 Pa. Stat. § 31 (Purdon, 1931). But Pennsylvania also has a “borrowing statute” which provides : “When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state or country in which it arose, such bar shall be a complete defense to an action thereon brought in any of the courts of this commonwealth.” 12 Pa. Stat. § 39 (Purdon, 1931). Our review of Pennsylvania decisions construing this statute persuades us that the borrowing statute is applicable to this case, that under that statute this cause of action “arose” in Kentucky, and that the five-year statute of Kentucky bars this action. See Mister v. Burkholder, 56 Pa. Super. 517; Fletcher’s Estate, 45 Pa. D. & C. 673, 674; Bell v. Brady, 346 Pa. 666, 31 A. 2d 547; Shaffer’s Estate, 228 Pa. 36, 40, 76 A. 716, 717. Cf. Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 A. 346. See also Notes, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 878 (1940), 4 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 215 (1938). The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals in No. 593 is therefore reversed. So ordered. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. For convenience, the motion was made by only four defendants who are respondents here. The case was continued as to the others pending final disposition of the question concerning the statute of limitations, the only ground of the motion to dismiss upon which the District Court passed. See 25 Ohio Jurisprudence 435-440 (1932). See Note, 75 A. L. R. 203 (1931); Note, 35 Col. L. Rev. 762 (1935). Whether notice by the Receiver to pay at a particular place could alter the conclusive situation as to where a cause of action might be considered to “arise” under other circumstances is a question we need not decide.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, INC., et al. No. 84-701. Argued October 16, 1985 Decided December 4, 1985 White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kathryn A. Oberly argued the cause for the United States. With her on the briefs were former Solicitor General Lee, Acting Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, and Anne S. Almy. Edgar B. Washburn argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Richard K. Gienapp. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Wildlife Federation et al. by Jerry Jackson, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, and Louis Caruso, Solicitor General; and for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, N. Gregory Taylor and Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorneys General, and Steven H. Kaufmann and David W. Hamilton, Deputy Attorneys General, Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, Michael A. Lilly, Attorney General of Hawaii, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, and Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Robert M. Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska, .Paul Bardacke, Attorney General of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Arlene Violet, Attorney General of Rhode Island, W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Charlie Brown, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Petroleum Institute by Stark Ritchie and James K. Jackson; for the Citizens of Chineoteague for a Reasonable Wetlands Policy by Richard R. Nageotte; for the Mid-Atlantic Developers Association by Kenneth D. McPherson; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Sam Kazman. R. Sarah Compton and Robin S. Conrad filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U. S. C. §1251 et seq., together with certain regulations promulgated under its authority by the Army Corps of Engineers, authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries. HH The relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act originated in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, and have remained essentially unchanged since that time. Under §§301 and 502 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311 and 1362, any discharge of dredged or fill materials into “navigable waters” — defined as the “waters of the United States” — is forbidden unless authorized by a permit issued by the Corps of Engineers pursuant to § 404, 33 U. S. C. § 1344. After initially construing the Act to cover only waters navigable in fact, in 1975 the Corps issued interim final regulations redefining “the waters of the United States” to include not only actually navigable waters but also tributaries of such waters, interstate waters and their tributaries, and nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce. 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975). More importantly for present purposes, the Corps construed the Act to cover all “freshwater wetlands” that were adjacent to other covered waters. A “freshwater wetland” was defined as an area that is “periodically inundated” and is “normally characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction.” 33 CFR § 209.120(d)(2)W (1976). In 1977, the Corps refined its definition of wetlands by eliminating the reference to periodic inundation and making other minor changes. The 1977 definition reads as follows: “The term ‘wetlands’ means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for fife in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.” 33 CFR §323.2(c) (1978). In 1982, the 1977 regulations were replaced by substantively identical regulations that remain in force today. See 33 CFR §323.2 (1985). Respondent Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (hereafter respondent), owns 80 acres of low-lying, marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb County, Michigan. In 1976, respondent began to place fill materials on its property as part of its preparations for construction of a housing development. The Corps of Engineers, believing that the property was an “adjacent wetland” under the 1975 regulation defining “waters of the United States,” filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking to enjoin respondent from filling the property without the permission of the Corps. The District Court held that the portion of respondent’s property lying below 575.5 feet above sea level was a covered wetland and enjoined respondent from filling it without a permit. Civ. No. 77-70041 (Feb. 24, 1977) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a); Civ. No. 77-70041 (June 21, 1979) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a). Respondent appealed, and the Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the effect of the intervening 1977 amendments to the regulation. 615 F. 2d 1363 (1980). On remand, the District Court again held the property to be a wetland subject to the Corps’ permit authority. Civ. No. 77-70041 (May 10, 1981) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a). Respondent again appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed. 729 F. 2d 391 (1984). The court construed the Corps’ regulation to exclude from the category of adjacent wetlands — and hence from that of “waters of the United States” — wetlands that were not subject to flooding by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation. The court adopted this construction of the regulation because, in its view, a broader definition of wetlands might result in the taking of private property without just compensation. The court also expressed its doubt that Congress, in granting the Corps jurisdiction to regulate the filling of “navigable waters,” intended to allow regulation of wetlands that were not the result of flooding by navigable waters. Under the court’s reading of the regulation, respondent’s property was not within the Corps’ jurisdiction, because its semiaquatic characteristics were not the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable waters. Respondent was therefore free to fill the property without obtaining a permit. We granted certiorari to consider the proper interpretation of the Corps’ regulation defining “waters of the United States” and the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, both of which were called into question by the Sixth Circuit’s ruling. 469 U. S. 1206 (1985). We now reverse. M h — I The question whether the Corps of Engineers may demand that respondent obtain a permit before placing fill material on its property is primarily one of regulatory and statutory interpretation: we must determine whether respondent’s property is an “adjacent wetland” within the meaning of the applicable regulation, and, if so, whether the Corps’ jurisdiction over “navigable waters” gives it statutory authority to regulate discharges of fill material into such a wetland. In this connection, we first consider the Court of Appeals’ position that the Corps’ regulatory authority under the statute and its implementing regulations must be narrowly construed to avoid a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We have frequently suggested that governmental land-use regulation may under extreme circumstances amount to a “taking” of the affected property. See, e. g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172 (1985); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). We have never precisely defined those circumstances, see id., at 123-128; but our general approach was summed up in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980), where we stated that the application of land-use regulations to a particular piece of property is a taking only “if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” Moreover, we have made it quite clear that the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 293-297 (1981). The reasons are obvious. A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her property does not itself “take” the property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent “economically viable” use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred. If neither the imposition of the permit requirement itself nor the denial of a permit necessarily constitutes a taking, it follows that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a narrow reading of the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands was “necessary” to avoid “a serious taking problem.” 729 F. 2d, at 398. We have held that, in general, “[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to a taking.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1016 (1984) (footnote omitted). This maxim rests on the principle that so long as compensation is available for those whose property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional. Williamson County, swpra, at 194-195. For precisely the same reason, the possibility that the application of a regulatory program may in some instances result in the taking of individual pieces of property is no justification for the use of narrowing constructions to curtail the program if compensation will in any event be available in those cases where a taking has occurred. Under such circumstances, adoption of a narrowing construction does not constitute avoidance of a constitutional difficulty, cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 341-356 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring); it merely frustrates permissible applications of a statute or regulation. Because the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491, which presumptively supplies a means of obtaining compensation for any taking that may occur through the operation of a federal statute, see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at 1017, is available to provide compensation for takings that may result from the Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction over wetlands, the Court of Appeals’ fears that application of the Corps’ permit program might result in a taking did not justify the court in adopting a more limited view of the Corps’ authority than the terms of the relevant regulation might otherwise support. Ill Purged of its spurious constitutional overtones, the question whether the regulation at issue requires respondent to obtain a permit before filling its property is an easy one. The regulation extends the Corps’ authority under § 404 to all wetlands adjacent to navigable or interstate waters and their tributaries. Wetlands, in turn, are defined as lands that are “inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.” 33 CFR § 323.2(c) (1985) (emphasis added). The plain language of the regulation refutes the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that inundation or “frequent flooding” by the adjacent body of water is a sine qua non of a wetland under the regulation. Indeed, the regulation could hardly state more clearly that saturation by either surface or ground water is sufficient to bring an area within the category of wetlands, provided that the saturation is sufficient to and does support wetland vegetation. The history of the regulation underscores the absence of any requirement of inundation. The interim final regulation that the current regulation replaced explicitly included a requirement of “periodi[c] inundation.” 33 CFR §209.120-(d)(2)(7t) (1976). In deleting the reference to “periodic inundation” from the regulation as finally promulgated, the Corps explained that it was repudiating the interpretation of that language “as requiring inundation over a record period of years.” 42 Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977). In fashioning its own requirement of “frequent flooding” the Court of Appeals improperly reintroduced into the regulation precisely what the Corps had excised. Without the nonexistent requirement of frequent flooding, the regulatory definition of adjacent wetlands covers the property here. The District Court found that respondent’s property was “characterized by the presence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a, and that the source of the saturated soil conditions on the property was ground water. There is no plausible suggestion that these findings are clearly erroneous, and they plainly bring the property within the category of wetlands as defined by the current regulation. In addition, the court found that the wetland located on respondent’s property was adjacent to a body of navigable water, since the area characterized by saturated soil conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of respondent’s property to Black Creek, a navigable waterway. Again, the court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. Together, these findings establish that respondent’s property is a wetland adjacent to a navigable waterway. Hence, it is part of the “waters of the United States” as defined by 33 CFR § 323.2 (1985), and if the regulation itself is valid as a construction of the term “waters of the United States” as used in the Clean Water Act, a question which we now address, the property falls within the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction over “navigable waters” under § 404 of the Act. > J — I A An agency’s construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress. Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 116, 125 (1985); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984). Accordingly, our review is limited to the question whether it is reasonable, in light of the language, policies, and legislative history of the Act for the Corps to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to but not regularly flooded by rivers, streams, and other hydrographic features more conventionally identifiable as “waters.” On a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify “lands,” wet or otherwise, as “waters.” Such a simplistic response, however, does justice neither to the problem faced by the Corps in defining the scope of its authority under § 404(a) nor to the realities of the problem of water pollution that the Clean Water Act was intended to combat. In determining the limits of its power to regulate discharges under the Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy task: the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one. Rather, between open waters and dry land may-lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs — in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land. Where on this continuum to find the limit of “waters” is far from obvious. Faced with such a problem of defining the bounds of its regulatory authority, an agency may appropriately look to the legislative history and underlying policies of its statutory grants of authority. Neither of these sources provides unambiguous guidance for the Corps in this case, but together they do support the reasonableness of the Corps’ approach of defining adjacent wetlands as “waters” within the meaning of § 404(a). Section 404 originated as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which constituted a comprehensive legislative attempt “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” CWA § 101, 33 U. S. C. § 1251. This objective incorporated a broad, systemic view of the goal of maintaining and improving water quality: as the House Report on the legislation put it, “the word ‘integrity’. . . refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems [are] maintained.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 76 (1972). Protection of aquatic ecosystems, Congress recognized, demanded broad federal authority to control pollution, for “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 77 (1972). In keeping with these views, Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly. Although the Act prohibits discharges into “navigable waters,” see CWA §§ 301(a), 404(a), 502(12), 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(12), the Act’s definition of “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States” makes it clear that the term “navigable” as used in the Act is of limited import. In adopting this definition of “navigable waters,” Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed “navigable” under the classical understanding of that term. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 144 (1972); 118 Cong. Rec. 33756-33757 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dingell). Of course, it is one thing to recognize that Congress intended to allow regulation of waters that might not satisfy traditional tests of navigability; it is another to assert that Congress intended to abandon traditional notions of “waters” and include in that term “wetlands” as well. Nonetheless, the evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term “waters” to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined. Following the lead of the Environmental Protection Agency, see 38 Fed. Reg. 10834 (1973), the Corps has determined that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters do as a general matter play a key role in protecting and enhancing water quality: “The regulation of activities that cause water pollution cannot rely on . . . artificial lines . . . but must focus on all waters that together form the entire aquatic system. Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of this part of the aquatic system, regardless of whether it is above or below an ordinary high water mark, or mean high tide line, will affect the water quality of the other waters within that aquatic system. “For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction under Section 404 must include any adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters of the United States, as these wetlands are part of this aquatic system.” 42 Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977). We cannot say that the Corps’ conclusion that adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound up with the “waters” of the United States — based as it is on the Corps’ and EPA’s technical expertise — is unreasonable. In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act. This holds true even for wetlands that are not the result of flooding or permeation by water having its source in adjacent bodies of open water. The Corps has concluded that wetlands may affect the water quality of adjacent lakes, rivers, and streams even when the waters of those bodies do not actually inundate the wetlands. For example, wetlands that are not flooded by adjacent waters may still tend to drain into those waters. In such circumstances, the Corps has concluded that wetlands may serve to filter and purify water draining into adjacent bodies of water, see 33 CFR § 320.4(b)(2)(vii) (1985), and to slow the flow of surface runoff into lakes, rivers, and streams and thus prevent flooding and erosion, see §§320.4(b)(2)(iv) and (v). In addition, adjacent wetlands may “serve significant natural biological functions, including food chain production, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic . . . species.” § 320-4(b)(2)(i). In short, the Corps has concluded that wetlands adjacent to lakes, rivers, streams, and other bodies of water may function as integral parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent bodies of water. Again, we cannot say that the Corps’ judgment on these matters is unreasonable, and we therefore conclude that a definition of “waters of the United States” encompassing all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps has jurisdiction is a permissible interpretation of the Act. Because respondent’s property is part of a wetland that actually abuts on a navigable waterway, respondent was required to have a permit in this case. B Following promulgation of the Corps’ interim final regulations in 1975, the Corps’ assertion of authority under §404 over waters not actually navigable engendered some congressional opposition. The controversy came to a head during Congress’ consideration of the Clean Water Act of 1977, a major piece of legislation aimed at achieving “interim improvements within the existing framework” of the Clean Water Act. H. R. Rep. No. 95-139, pp. 1-2 (1977). In the end, however, as we shall explain, Congress acquiesced in the administrative construction. Critics of the Corps’ permit program attempted to insert limitations on the Corps’ § 404 jurisdiction into the 1977 legislation: the House bill as reported out of committee proposed a redefinition of “navigable waters” that would have limited the Corps’ authority under § 404 to waters navigable in fact and their adjacent wetlands (defined as wetlands periodically inundated by contiguous navigable waters). H. R. 3199, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 16 (1977). The bill reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, by contrast, contained no redefinition of the scope of the “navigable waters” covered by § 404, and dealt with the perceived problem of overregulation by the Corps by exempting certain activities (primarily agricultural) from the permit requirement and by providing for assumption of some of the Corps’ regulatory duties by federally approved state programs. S. 1952, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §49(b) (1977). On the floor of the Senate, however, an amendment was proposed limiting the scope of “navigable waters” along the lines set forth in the House bill. 123 Cong. Rec. 26710-26711 (1977). In both Chambers, debate on the proposals to narrow the definition of navigable waters centered largely on the issue of wetlands preservation. See id., at 10426-10432 (House debate); id., at 26710-26729 (Senate debate). Proponents of a more limited § 404 jurisdiction contended that the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over wetlands and other nonnavigable “waters” had far exceeded what Congress had intended in enacting § 404. Opponents of the proposed changes argued that a narrower definition of “navigable waters” for purposes of § 404 would exclude vast stretches of crucial wetlands from the Corps’ jurisdiction, with detrimental effects on wetlands ecosystems, water quality, and the aquatic environment generally. The debate, particularly in the Senate, was lengthy. In the House, the debate ended with the adoption of a narrowed definition of “waters”; but in the Senate the limiting amendment was defeated and the old definition retained. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate’s approach: efforts to narrow the definition of “waters” were abandoned; the legislation as ultimately passed, in the words of Senator Baker, “retain[ed] the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s waters exercised in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.” The significance of Congress’ treatment of the Corps’ § 404 jurisdiction in its consideration of the Clean Water Act of 1977 is twofold. First, the scope of the Corps’ asserted jurisdiction over wetlands was specifically brought to Congress’ attention, and Congress rejected measures designed to curb the Corps’ jurisdiction in large part because of its concern that protection of wetlands would be unduly hampered by a narrowed definition of “navigable waters.” Although we are chary of attributing significance to Congress’ failure to act, a refusal by Congress to overrule an agency’s construction of legislation is at least some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the administrative construction has been brought to Congress’ attention through legislation specifically designed to supplant it. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 599-601 (1983); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 554, and n. 10 (1979). Second, it is notable that even those who would have restricted the reach of the Corps’ jurisdiction would have done so not by removing wetlands altogether from the definition of “waters of the United States,” but only by restricting the scope of “navigable waters” under § 404 to waters navigable in fact and their adjacent wetlands. In amending the definition of “navigable waters” for purposes of §404 only, the backers of the House bill would have left intact the existing definition of “navigable waters” for purposes of § 301 of the Act, which generally prohibits discharges of pollutants into navigable waters. As the House Report explained: “‘Navigable waters’ as used in section 301 includes all of the waters of the United States including their adjacent wetlands.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-139, p. 24 (1977). Thus, even those who thought that the Corps’ existing authority under §404 was too broad recognized (1) that the definition of “navigable waters” then in force for both § 301 and § 404 was reasonably interpreted to include adjacent wetlands, (2) that the water quality concerns of the Clean Water Act demanded regulation of at least some discharges into wetlands, and (3) that whatever jurisdiction the Corps would retain over discharges of fill material after passage of the 1977 legislation should extend to discharges into wetlands adjacent to any waters over which the Corps retained jurisdiction. These views provide additional support for a conclusion that Congress in 1977 acquiesced in the Corps’ definition of waters as including adjacent wetlands. Two features actually included in the legislation that Congress enacted in 1977 also support the view that the Act authorizes the Corps to regulate discharges into wetlands. First, in amending §404 to allow federally approved state permit programs to supplant regulation by the Corps of certain discharges of fill material, Congress provided that the States would not be permitted to supersede the Corps’ jurisdiction to regulate discharges into actually navigable waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, “including wetlands adjacent thereto.” CWA § 404(g)(1), 33 U. S. C. § 1344(g)(1). Here, then, Congress expressly stated that the term “waters” included adjacent wetlands. Second, the 1977 Act authorized an appropriation of $6 million for completion by the Department of Interior of a “National Wetlands Inventory” to assist the States “in the development and operation of programs under this Act.” CWA §208(i)(2), 33 U. S. C. §1288(i)(2). The enactment of this provision reflects congressional recognition that wetlands are a concern of the Clean Water Act and supports the conclusion that in defining the waters covered by the Act to include wetlands, the Corps is “implementing congressional policy rather than embarking on a frolic of its own.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 375 (1969). C We are thus persuaded that the language, policies, and history of the Clean Water Act compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in interpreting the Act to require permits for the discharge of fill material into wetlands adjacent to the “waters of the United States.” The regulation in which the Corps has embodied this interpretation by its terms includes the wetlands on respondent’s property within the class of waters that may not be filled without a permit; and, as we have seen, there is no reason to interpret the regulation more narrowly than its terms would indicate. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. With respect to certain waters, the Corps’ authority may be transferred to States that have devised federally approved permit programs. CWA § 404(g), as added, 91 Stat. 1600, 33 U. S. C. § 1344(g). Absent such an approved program, the Corps retains jurisdiction under § 404 over all “waters of the United States.” The regulations also cover certain wetlands not necessarily adjacent to other waters. See 33 CFR §§ 323.2(a)(2) and (3) (1985). These provisions are not now before us. In denying the Government’s petition for rehearing, the panel reiterated somewhat more strongly its belief that the Corps’ construction of its regulation was “overbroad and inconsistent with the language of the Act.” 729 F. 2d, at 401. Even were the Court of Appeals correct in concluding that a narrowing construction of the regulation is necessary to avoid takings of property through the application of the permit requirement, the construction adopted — which requires a showing of frequent flooding before property may be classified as a wetland — is hardly tailored to the supposed difficulty. Whether the denial of a permit would constitute a taking in any given case would depend upon the effect of the denial on the owner’s ability to put the property to productive use. Whether the property was frequently flooded would have no particular bearing on this question, for overbroad regulation of even completely submerged property may constitute a taking. See, e. g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979). Indeed, it may be more likely that denying a permit to fill frequently flooded property will prevent economically viable use of the property than denying a permit to fill property that is wet but not flooded. Of course, by excluding a large chunk of the Nation’s wetlands from the regulatory definition, the Court of Appeals’ construction might tend to limit the gross number of takings that the permit program would otherwise entail; but the construction adopted still bears an insufficiently precise relationship with the problem it seeks to avoid. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70 (1982), in which we adopted a narrowing construction of a statute to avoid a taking difficulty, is not to the contrary. In that case, the problem was that there was a substantial argument that retroactive application of a particular provision of the Bankruptcy Code would in every ease constitute a taking; the solution was to avoid the difficulty by construing the statute to apply only prospectively. Such an approach is sensible where it appears that there is an identifiable class of cases in which application of a statute will necessarily constitute a taking. As we have observed, this is not such a case: there is no identifiable set of instances in which mere application of the permit requirement will necessarily or even probably constitute a taking. The approach of adopting a limiting construction is thus unwarranted. Because the Corps has now denied respondent a permit to fill its property, respondent may well have a ripe claim that a taking has occurred. On the record before us, however, we have no basis for evaluating this claim, because no evidence has been introduced that bears on the question of the extent to which denial of a permit to fill this property will prevent economically viable uses of the property or frustrate reasonable investment-backed expectations. In any event, this lawsuit is not the proper forum for resolving such a dispute: if the Corps has indeed effectively taken respondent’s property, respondent’s proper course is not to resist the Corps’ suit for enforcement by denying that the regulation covers the property, but to initiate a suit for compensation in the Claims Court. In so stating, of course, we do not rule that respondent will be entitled to compensation for any temporary denial of use of its property should the Corps ultimately relent and allow it to be filled. We have not yet resolved the question whether compensation is a constitutionally mandated remedy for “temporary regulatory takings,” see Williamson County Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), and this case provides no occasion for deciding the issue. The Court of Appeals seems also to have rested its frequent-flooding requirement on the language in the regulation stating that wetlands encompass those areas that “under normal circumstances do support” aquatic or semiaquatic vegetation. In the preamble to the final regulation, the Corps explained that this language was intended in part to exclude areas characterized by the “abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation in a non-aquatic area.” 42 Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977). Apparently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the growth of wetlands vegetation in soils saturated by ground water rather than flooded by waters emanating from an adjacent navigable water or its tributaries was “abnormal” within the meaning of the preamble. This interpretation is untenable in light of the explicit statements in both the regulation and its preamble that areas saturated by ground water can fall within the category of wetlands. It would be nonsensical for the Corps to define wetlands to include such areas and then in the same sentence exclude them on the ground that the presence of wetland vegetation in such areas was abnormal. Evidently, the Corps had something else in mind when it referred to “abnormal” growth of wetlands vegetation — namely, the aberrational presence of such vegetation in dry, upland areas. We are not called upon to address the question of the authority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water, see 33 CFR §§ 323.2(a)(2) and (3) (1985), and we do not express any opinion on that question. Of course, it may well be that not every adjacent wetland is of great importance to the environment of adjoining bodies of water. But the existence of such cases does not seriously undermine the Corps’ decision to define all adjacent wetlands as “waters.” If it is reasonable for the Corps to conclude that in the majority of cases, adjacent wetlands have significant effects on water quality and the aquatic ecosystem, its definition can stand. That the definition may include some wetlands that are not significantly intertwined with the ecosystem of adjacent waterways is of little moment, for where it appears that a wetland covered by the Corps’ definition is in fact lacking in importance to the aquatic environment — or where its importance is outweighed by other values — the Corps may always allow development of the wetland for other uses simply by issuing a permit. See 33 CFR § 320.4(b)(4) (1985). 123 Cong. Rec. 39209 (1977); see also id., at 39210 (statement of Sen. Wallop); id., at 39196 (statement of Sen. Randolph); id., at 38950 (statement of Rep. Murphy); id., at 38994 (statement of Rep. Ambro). To be sure, §404(g)(1) does not conclusively determine the construction to be placed on the use of the term “waters” elsewhere in the Act (particularly in § 502(7), which contains the relevant definition of “navigable waters”); however, in light of the fact that the various provisions of the Act should be read in pari materia, it does at least suggest strongly that the term “waters” as used in the Act does not necessarily exclude “wetlands.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF NEW YORK et al. v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. No. 87-339. Argued March 29, 1988 Decided May 16, 1988 White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stephen J. McGrath argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Doron Gopstein, Leonard J. Koemer, Paul S. Ryerson, Robert Alan Garrett, Patrick J. Grant, Cynthia Pols, Lucia A. Dougherty, and Edward J. Walsh, Jr. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the federal respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried and Diane S. Killory. H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for respondent National Cable Television Association, Inc. With him on the brief were Brenda L. Fox, Michael S. Schooler, and Seth A. Davidson. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Montgomery County, Maryland, et al. by James J. Wilson, Nicholas P. Miller, W. Ran dolph Young, and Larrine S. Holbrooke; and for the U. S. Conference of Mayors et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Beate Bloch. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Communications Commission has adopted regulations that establish technical standards to govern the quality of cable television signals and that prohibit local authorities from imposing more stringent technical standards. The issue is whether in doing so the Commission has exceeded its statutory authority. I-H This case deals with yet another development in the ongoing efforts of federal, state, and local authorities to regulate different aspects of cable television over the past three decades. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 700-705 (1984); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 161-178 (1968). With the incipient development of cable television in the 1950’s and 1960’s from what had been more generally known as community antenna television systems, the Federal Communications Commission began to assert regulatory authority in this area. See CATV Second Report and Order, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725 (1966). In 1972, the Commission first asserted authority over technical aspects of cable television and devised technical standards to govern the transmission of broadcast signals by cable, though without pre-empting regulation of similar matters by state or local franchising authorities. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F. C. C. 2d 143, on reconsideration, 36 F. C. C. 2d 326 (1972), aff’d sub nom. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F. 2d 1344 (CA9 1975). Within two years, however, the Commission became convinced from its experience with conflicting federal and local technical standards that there is “a compelling need for national uniformity in cable television technical standards” which would require it to pre-empt the field of signal-quality regulation in order to meet the “necessity to rationalize, interrelate, and bring into uniformity the myriad standards now being developed by numerous jurisdictions.” Cable Television Report and Order, 49 F. C. C. 2d 470, 477, 480 (1974). The Commission explained that a multiplicity of mandatory and nonuniform technical requirements undermined “the ultimate workability of the over-all system,” could have “a deleterious effect on the development of new cable services,” and could “seriously imped[e]” the “development and marketing of signal source, transmission, and terminal equipment.” Id., at 478-479. In 1984, the Court approved the pre-emptive authority that the Commission had asserted over the regulation of cable television systems. We held that in the Communications Act of 1934, Congress authorized the Commission “to regulate all aspects of interstate communication by wire or radio,” including the subsequently developed medium of cable television, and that the Commission’s authority “extends to all regulatory actions ‘necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commission’s statutory responsibilities.’” Crisp, supra, at 700, quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 706 (1979). Although the state law that was invalidated in Crisp regulated commercial advertising on cable television, rather than the technical quality of cable television signals, the Court recognized that for 10 years the Commission had “retained exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects of cable communication, including signal carriage and technical standards.” Crisp, supra, at 702. A few months after the Court’s decision in Crisp, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act or Act), 98 Stat. 2780, 47 U. S. C. §§521-559 (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Among its objectives in passing the Cable Act, Congress purported to “establish a national policy concerning cable communications” and to “minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems.” 47 U. S. C. §§521(1), (6) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). The Act was also intended to “establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority with respect to the regulation of cable systems” through procedures and standards that “encourage the growth and development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the local community.” §§521(3), (2) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). The Cable Act left franchising to state or local authorities; those authorities were also empowered to specify the facilities and equipment that franchisees were to use, provided such requirements were “consistent with this title.” Cable Act, §§624(a),(b), 47 U. S. C. §§544(a),(b) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Section 624(e) of the Cable Act provided that “[t]he Commission may establish technical standards relating to the facilities and equipment of cable systems which a franchising authority may require in the franchise.” 47 U. S. C. § 544(e) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). In 1985, the Commission promulgated regulations that would establish technical standards governing signal quality for one of four different classes of cable television channels and that would forbid local cable franchising authorities to impose their own standards on any of the four classes of channels. 50 Fed. Reg. 7801, 7802 (1985), 47 CFR pt. 76 (1986). The Commission eventually adopted a modified version of these regulations, which reaffirmed the Commission’s established policy of pre-empting local regulation of technical signal quality standards for cable television. 50 Fed. Reg., at 52462, 52464-52465. The Commission found its statutory authority to adopt the regulations in § 624(e) of the Cable Act, 47 U. S. C. § 544(e) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), and in 47 U. S. C. §§ 154(i) and 303(r). 50 Fed. Reg., at 52466. Petitioners (the cities of New York, Miami, and Wheaton, and the National League of Cities) sought review of the regulations in federal court, where they contested the scope of the pre-emptive authority claimed by the Commission and insisted' that franchising authorities could impose stricter technical standards than those specified by the Commission. The Court of Appeals granted partial relief to petitioners. 259 U. S. App. D. C. 191, 814 F. 2d 720 (1987). It noted that the Commission had adopted technical standards applicable to one class of cable television channels, but had left the other three classes of channels completely unregulated. It agreed with petitioners that the Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it did not adopt technical standards for the latter three classes of channels, yet prohibited local authorities from adopting such standards and ignored the apparent conflict between these actions and the language of the Cable Act. It therefore vacated this part of the rule and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. The court’s holding was unanimous on this point, and that part of its decision is not at issue here. The Court of Appeals divided, however, over the propriety of the Commission’s technical standards that apply to the first class of cable channels and that pre-empt more stringent local regulations. The majority of the panel upheld preemption, ruling that Congress intended federal regulations like these to supersede local law and that the Commission acted within the broad confines of the pre-emptive authority delegated to it by Congress when it adopted the regulations with respect to this one class of channels. One judge dissented, contending that the majority had sanctioned preemption without a clear manifestation of congressional intent, contrary to this Court’s decisions. We granted certiorari, 484 U. S. 962 (1987), and we now affirm. I — I I — I When the Federal Government acts within the authority it possesses under the Constitution, it is empowered to preempt state laws to the extent it is believed that such action is necessary to achieve its purposes. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution gives force to federal action of this kind by stating that “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance” of the Constitution “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. The phrase “Laws of the United States” encompasses both federal statutes themselves and federal regulations that are properly adopted in accordance with statutory authorization. For this reason, at the same time that our decisions have established a number of ways in which Congress can be understood to have pre-empted state law, see Louisiana Public Service Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 368-369 (1986), we have also recognized that “a federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation” and hence render unenforceable state or local laws that are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law. Id., at 369. This case involves the latter kind of pre-emption, and here the inquiry becomes whether the federal agency has properly exercised its own delegated authority rather than simply whether Congress has properly exercised the legislative power. Thus we have emphasized that in a situation where state law is claimed to be pre-empted by federal regulation, a “narrow focus on Congress’ intent to supersede state law [is] misdirected,” for “[a] pre-emptive regulation’s force does not depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law.” Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 154 (1982). Instead, the correct focus is on the federal agency that seeks to displace state law and on the proper bounds of its lawful authority to undertake such action. The statutorily authorized regulations of an agency will pre-empt any state or local law that conflicts with such regulations or frustrates the purposes thereof. Beyond that, however, in proper circumstances the agency may determine that its authority is exclusive and pre-empts any state efforts to regulate in the forbidden area. Crisp, 467 U. S., at 700; De la Cuesta, supra, at 152-154. It has long been recognized that many of the responsibilities conferred on federal agencies involve a broad grant of authority to reconcile conflicting policies. Where this is trúe, the Court has cautioned that even in the area of pre-emption, if the agency’s choice to pre-empt “represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 383 (1961); see also Crisp, supra, at 700. rH HH I — I A In this case, there is no room for doubting that the Commission intended to pre-empt state technical standards governing the quality of cable television signals. In adopting the regulations at issue here, the Commission said: “Technical standards that vary from community to community create potentially serious negative consequences for cable system operators and cable consumers in terms of the cost of service and the ability of the industry to respond to technological changes. To address this problem, we proposed in the Notice to retain technical standards guidelines at the federal level which could be used, but could not be exceeded, in state and local technical quality regulations. “After a review of the record in this proceeding, we continue to believe that the policy adopted in 1974 was effective, should remain in force, and is entirely consistent with both the specific provisions and the general policy objectives underlying the 1984 Cable Act. This preemption policy has constrained state and local regulation of cable technical performance to Class I channels and has prohibited performance standards more restrictive than those contained in the Commission’s rules. The reasons that caused the adoption of this policy appear to be as valid today as they were when the policy was first adopted.” 50 Fed. Reg., at 52464. As noted above, the policy adopted by the Commission in 1974, which was continued in effect by the 1985 regulations, was a pre-emptive policy applying in the area of technical standards governing signal quality. 49 F. C. C. 2d, at 477-481. Since the Commission has explicitly stated its intent to exercise exclusive authority in this area and to preempt state and local regulation, this case does not turn on whether there is an actual conflict between federal and state law here, or whether compliance with both federal and state standards would be physically impossible. De la Cuesta, supra, at 153. B The second part of the inquiry is whether the Commission is legally authorized to pre-empt state and local regulation that would establish complementary or additional technical standards, where it clearly is possible for a cable operator to comply with these standards in addition to the federal standards. We have identified at least two reasons why this part of the inquiry is crucial to our determination of the preemption issue. “First, an agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it. Second, the best way of determining whether Congress intended the regulations of an administrative agency to displace state law is to examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency.” Louisiana Public Service Comm’n, 476 U. S., at 374. The second reason was particularly relevant in Louisiana Public Service Comm’n because there we were obliged to assess the import of a statutory section in which Congress appeared to have explicitly limited the Commission’s jurisdiction, so as to prohibit it from pre-empting state laws concerning the manner in which telephone companies could depreciate certain plant and equipment. Id., at 369-376, 379, construing 47 U. S. C. § 152(b). We conclude here that the Commission acted within the statutory authority conferred by Congress when it preempted state and local technical standards governing the quality of cable television signals. When Congress enacted the Cable Act in 1984, it acted against a background of federal pre-emption on this particular issue. For the preceding 10 years, the Commission had pre-empted such state and local technical standards under its broad delegation of authority to “[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as maybe necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter [the communications laws, Title 47 of the U. S. Code, Chapter 5],” as a means of implementing its legitimate discretionary power to determine what the “public convenience, interest, or necessity requires” in this field. 47 U. S. C. §§303 and 303(r); see also 49 F. C. C. 2d, at 481; 47 U. S. C. § 154(i). The Court’s decision in Crisp, which was handed down during the time Congress was considering the legislation that within a few months became the Cable Act, broadly upheld the Commission’s pre-emptive authority in very similar respects. 467 U. S., at 701-705. In the Cable Act, Congress sanctioned in relevant respects the regulatory scheme that the Commission had been following since 1974. In § 624 of the Cable Act, Congress specified that the local franchising authority could regulate “services, facilities, and equipment” in certain respects, and could enforce those requirements, but § 624(e) of the Act grants the Commission the power to “establish technical standards relating to the facilities and equipment of cable systems which a franchising authority may require in the franchise.” 47 U. S. C. §§544(a)-(e) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). This mirrors the state of the regulatory law before the Cable Act was passed, which permitted the local franchising authorities to regulate many aspects of cable services, facilities, and equipment but not to impose technical standards governing cable signal quality, since the Commission had explicitly reserved this power to the Federal Government. It is also quite significant that nothing in the Cable Act or its legislative history indicates that Congress explicitly disapproved of the Commission’s pre-emption of local technical standards. Given the difficulties the Commission had experienced in this area, which had caused it to reverse its ground in 1974 after two years of unhappy experience with the practical consequences of inconsistent technical standards imposed by various localities, we doubt that Congress intended to overturn the Commission’s decade-old policy without discussion or even any suggestion that it was doing so. To the contrary, the House Report which discusses this section of the Act portrays it as nothing more than a straightforward endorsement of current law: “Subsection (e) allows the Commission to set technical standards related to facilities and equipment required by a franchising authority pursuant to a franchising agreement. This provision does not affect the authority of a franchising authority to establish standards regarding facilities and equipment in the franchise pursuant to section 624(b) which are not inconsistent with standards established by the FCC under this subsection.” H. R. Rep. No. 98-934, p. 70 (1984). This passage from the House Report makes clear that the Act was not intended to work any significant change in the law in the respects relevant to this case. By noting that § 624(e) authorizes “the Commission to set technical standards related to facilities and equipment” and that it “does not affect the authority of a franchising authority to establish standards regarding facilities and equipment” that are not inconsistent with Commission standards, the House Report indicates both that Congress did not intend to remove from the Commission its longstanding power to establish pre-emptive technical standards, and that Congress did not intend to “affect the authority of a franchising authority” to set standards in these and similar matters regarding cable facilities and equipment. In particular, Congress did not manifest any intent to “affect the authority” of local franchising authorities by giving them the power to supplement the technical standards set by the Commission with respect to the quality of cable signals, a power which they generally had not been permitted to exercise for the last 10 years and which, according to the Commission’s consistent view, disserves the public interest. Petitioners insist that under §624, as evidenced by the passage from the House Report quoted above, a franchising authority may specify any technical standards that do not conflict with Commission standards and hence may set stricter standards for signal quality. But this disregards the Commission’s own power to pre-empt, an authority that we do not believe Congress intended to take away in the Cable Act. And it also disregards the Commission’s explicit findings, based on considerable experience in this area, that complementary or additional technical standards set by state and local authorities do conflict with the basic objectives of federal policy with respect to cable television — findings that the Commission first articulated in 1974 and then reiterated in 1986. See 49 F. C. C. 2d, at 478-479; 50 Fed. Reg., at 52464-52465. In sum, we find nothing in the Cable Act which leads us to believe that the Commission’s decision to pre-empt local technical standards governing the quality of cable signals “is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” Shimer, 367 U. S., at 383. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. The “technical standards” established by the Commission describe, in quantitative terms, various electrical characteristics of the audio and video components of the signals delivered by the cable system to its subscribers, including such specific items as visual carrier frequency, aural center frequency, visual signal level, terminal isolation, and radiation and signal leakage. See 47 CFR §§ 76.601, 76.605 (1987). Although the Commission recognized that “[t]he broad pre-emptive policy we are adopting today will ultimately affect all cable systems,” 49 F. C. C. 2d, at 480, it fashioned this policy to have a more gradual effect. Because “many of the pre-existing technical standards adopted by cities and states cannot be shown to adversely affect our stated goals,” the Commission decided to extend a “grandfather” approval to those technical standards that were already operational or certified to the Commission by January 1, 1975. Ibid. In addition, a mechanism was established (and remains in effect) that allows state and local authorities to impose “different or additional technical standards” if they obtain a specific waiver from the Commission. Id., at 480-481; see n. 5, infra. At argument, petitioners contended that the question of the Commission’s statutory authority to regulate these other three classes of cable channels is properly presented to the Court in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-7, 9-10. We disagree. The Court of Appeals explicitly failed to resolve this question because it agreed “with petitioner’s alternative argument that the FCC’s . . . rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious.” 259 U. S. App. D. C. 191, 197-198, 814 F. 2d 720, 726-727 (1987). The Court of Appeals’ disposition with respect to these three classes of cable channels was to vacate those portions of the rule and to remand to the Commission for further proceedings. In their brief, moreover, petitioners refer specifically to “a vote of 2-1 [in] the Court of Appeals” in stating the questions presented, which was the disposition below only with respect to the one class of cable channels. Brief for Petitioners i. Petitioners argue that by empowering local franchising authorities to take into account whether “the quality of the operator’s service, including signal quality . . . has been reasonable in light of community needs,” 47 U. S. C. § 646(c)(1)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), Congress implicitly recognized that local franchising authorities would need a comprehensive set of additional technical standards in order to carry out this task. Yet this argument simply ignores the fact that local authorities are able to assess signal quality against the technical standards set by the Commission, which it has found are adequate to ensure “an acceptable quality of service at the worst subscriber location and thus a better quality of service to the average subscriber.” 50 Fed. Reg. 52462, 52463, n. 2 (1985). ' ” Petitioners and other state and local authorities remain free, of course, to petition the Commission for an individualized waiver that would permit them to “impose additional or different requirements,” which they may seek to obtain by demonstrating that particular local conditions create special problems that make the federal technical standards inadequate. See 47 CFR §76.7 (1987). Since we conclude that the Commission is authorized under § 624(e) of the Cable Act to pre-empt technical standards imposed by state and local authorities, we need not also consider whether the Commission retains the same broad pre-emptive authority in the area of cable television under §§ 4(i) and 303 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U. S. C. §§ 154(i) and 303, that it had exercised before the Cable Act was enacted in 1984. In adopting the regulations at issue here, the Commission claimed to possess statutory authority under those two sections of the Communications Act as well as under the new Cable Act. 50 Fed. Reg., at 52466. Petitioners claim that the Cable Act withdrew such authority from the Commission, and their claim draws some support from new language in 47 U. S. C. § 152(a) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), which states that “[t]he provisions of [the Communications Act] shall apply with respect to cable service . . . as provided in [the Cable Act].” On the other hand, the House Report suggests that this language is merely a more explicit grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” to the Commission over specified aspects of cable service, see H. R. Rep. No. 98-934, pp. 95-96 (1984), which settles matters that had occasionally been in dispute. In addition, § 303 of the Communications Act continues to give the Commission broad rulemaking power “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter,” 47 U. S. C. § 303(r), which includes the body of the Cable Act as one of its subchapters. But since in any event the Commission possesses statutory authority to adopt the regulations at issue in this case under § 624(e) of the Cable Act, we do not decide whether the Commission’s actions are authorized on this alternative basis as well.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BAKER et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. et al. No. 85-117. Argued April 2, 1986 Decided July 2, 1986 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Black-mun, JJ., joined, post, p. 638. Jordan Rossen argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Fred Altshuler. Peter G. Nash argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Dixie L. Atwater, J. R. Wheatley, and Jonathan N. Wayman. Deputy Solicitor General Cohen argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In Michigan an employee is ineligible for unemployment compensation if he has provided “financing” — by means other than the payment of regular union dues — for a strike that causes his unemployment. The question presented by this appeal is whether Michigan’s statutory disqualification is implicitly prohibited by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. This case has a long history. Two appeals to the State Supreme Court and a series of administrative proceedings have determined the relevant facts and the meaning of the governing statutory provision. Before addressing the federal question, we shall therefore summarize the events that gave rise to the controversy and the propositions of state law that were resolved on each appeal. The Relevant Events The story begins in June 1967, when the international union representing the work force in the automobile industry notified the three major manufacturers — General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler — that it intended to terminate all national and local collective-bargaining agreements when they expired on September 6, 1967. In August, after the UAW and GM had opened negotiations for a new national agreement, the members of the Union employed by GM voted to authorize strikes, if necessary, on national and local issues. When the agreements expired, the UAW began a national strike against Ford, but did not immediately strike any GM plants. On October 8, 1967, while the Ford strike was continuing, the UAW held a special convention to authorize “adequate strike funds to meet the challenges of the 1967 and 1968 collective bargaining effort.” At that convention the UAW amended its constitution to authorize the collection of “emergency dues” that would be used to augment the Union’s strike insurance fund. In a letter to GM employees explaining the purpose of the dues increase, the Union stated: “ ‘These emergency extra dues are being raised to protect GM workers as well as support the Ford strikers. When our time comes at GM, we cannot go back to the bargaining table without an adequate strike fund behind us and promise of continued assistance from other UAW members.’” 420 Mich. 463, 513, 363 N. W. 2d 602, 624-625 (1984) (footnote omitted). The emergency dues were payable immediately and were to remain in effect during the “collective bargaining emergency.” See n. 6, supra. They were much larger than the regular dues. Before the emergency, each UAW member paid strike insurance dues of $1.25 per month and administrative dues of $3.75. The amendment increased the contribution to the strike insurance fund to $21.25 per month for employees in plants where the average straight-time hourly earnings amounted to $3 or more, and to $11.25 in plants where the average earnings were lower. Thus, for the former group the increase of $20 was 16 times as large as the regular contribution to the strike fund; for the latter group the $10 increase was 8 times as large. The strike against Ford was settled in October, before the first scheduled collection of the new special strike fund dues. Notwithstanding this development, emergency dues of $42 million were subsequently collected until November 30, 1967 — when the UAW determined that it would not strike any GM plants “at least during the month of December 1967. ” At this point the UAW advised its membership that even though “the collective bargaining emergency has not yet ended,” the emergency dues would be waived during December and January and dues would revert to the regular rate of $5 per month. In December, the UAW and GM reached agreement on all national issues. In January 1968, however, three UAW local unions went on strike at three GM foundries for periods of 10, 11, and 12 days. Strike fund benefits of $4 to $6 a day, totaling $247,245.31, were paid to the striking UAW employees from the fund in which the emergency dues collected in October and November had been deposited. At that time the emergency dues constituted about half of the money in the fund. As a result of the strikes, operations were temporarily curtailed at 24 other functionally integrated GM plants, idling more than 19,000 employees. Most of these employees are appellants in this case. Their claims for unemployment benefits were considered at three levels of administrative review and three levels of judicial review, and were ultimately denied by the State Supreme Court. The First Appeal In its first opinion in this case the Michigan Supreme Court decided two statutory questions and remanded a third for further consideration by the Board of Review. It first held that appellants’ unemployment was “due to a labor dispute in active progress” at other establishments operated by the same employing unit and functionally integrated with the establishments where appellants were employed within the meaning of the statute. It rejected the argument that the layoffs were due not only to the strikes, but also to a combination of management decisions and seniority provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement, holding instead that the strikes were a “substantial contributing cause” of the unemployment and need not be its sole cause. After finding the requisite causal connection between the strikes and the layoffs, the court considered the relationship between the emergency dues and the strikes. Appellants contended that their payments were expressly excepted from the coverage of the statute because they were “regular union dues.” The State Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that the term “regular” had been used “to exclude from possible treatment as financing those dues payments required uniformly of union members and collected on a continuing basis without fluctuations prompted by the exigencies of a particular labor dispute or disputes.” The exception for regular union dues thus did not encompass “unusual collections for the purpose of supporting a labor dispute.” The court did not decide whether the emergency dues constituted “financing” of the local strikes. It noted that the statute did not require that the payments made by the individuals whose disqualification was in issue must be traced into the hands of the striking employees, but it indicated that there must be a “meaningful connection” between the payments and the strikes to satisfy the “financing” requirement. It therefore remanded the case to the Appeal Board’s successor tribunal to consider that question. The Second Appeal On remand, the Board of Review concluded that there was a “meaningful connection” between the emergency dues and the GM strikes. It found that the dues were intended to support local strikes at GM plants, that strikes which might affect their own employment were foreseeable at the time appellants paid the emergency dues, and that the dues were a substantial source of funding for the strikes. The Supreme Court agreed. As a predicate to its analysis, the court explained that the term “financing” should be construed in the light of the general purpose of the statute to provide assistance to persons who are involuntarily unemployed. The disqualification applies to “persons who are ‘voluntarily’ unemployed by financing the labor dispute that causes their unemployment. It does so because ‘financing’ is one of the statutorily designated ways in which a person may evidence ‘direct involvement’ in a labor dispute.” Thus, “[t]he end result of a proper meaningful connection definition should be to delineate persons whose own activities have contributed to their unemployment so as to make them voluntarily unemployed and therefore, ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.” The Michigan Supreme Court considered and rejected appellants’ argument that their emergency dues payments were not voluntary because they were required by the UAW in order to retain their union membership and their jobs at GM. The court held that employees could not use their own collective-bargaining agent as a shield to protect them from responsibility for conduct that they had authorized. It therefore specifically held that appellants’ “emergency dues payments were not involuntary.” Those payments constituted “financing” of the strikes that had caused appellants’ unemployment because there was a “meaningful connection” between the payments and the strikes. In finding that causal connection the court relied on three factors — the purpose, the amount, and the timing of the emergency dues. In finding the requisite purpose, the court noted that the dues had actually provided financial support for the strikes, that the strikes were foreseeable when the dues were collected, that it was also foreseeable that such strikes would cause the unemployment which actually occurred, and that the evidence of purpose and foreseeability was sufficient without relying on hindsight after the events occurred. The court also concluded that the amount of the financing was significant, whether viewed in terms of the aggregate value of the emergency dues, the individual contributions by each member, or their support for the strikers. Finally, it found only a “minimal” time lag between the collections of the emergency dues and their use to support the strikes that caused appellants’ unemployment. As a consequence, the court concluded that appellants were “not eligible for unemployment benefits because they caused their unemployment by financing, in a meaningfully connected way, the labor dispute that caused” their unemployment. Only after it had meticulously satisfied itself that the emergency dues payments constituted “financing” that made appellants ineligible for unemployment compensation under the Michigan statute, did the court turn to the question whether its construction of state law was pre-empted by federal law because it inhibited the exercise of rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The state court agreed with appellants that the right to support strikes by paying extraordinary dues was protected by §7 of the NLRA, but concluded that the legislative history of the Social Security Act which was reviewed in New York Tele phone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U. S. 519 (1979), demonstrated that Congress “intended to tolerate” the conflict between the state law and the federal law. Accordingly, after some 15 years of litigation, the Michigan Supreme Court finally denied appellants’ claim for unemployment compensation. We noted probable jurisdiction of their appeal, 474 U. S. 899 (1985), and now affirm. We first discuss the problem presented by the case in general terms and then consider the specific contentions that appellants advance. I The National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act were both enacted in the summer of 1935. See New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U. S., at 527. Neither statute required any State to adopt, or to maintain, an unemployment compensation program. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 596 (1937). Title IX of the latter Act did, however, motivate the enactment of state programs throughout the Nation. That Title authorized the provision of federal funds to States having programs approved by the Secretary of Labor. Although certain minimum federal standards must be satisfied, the scheme is one in which a “wide range of judgment is given to the several states as to the particular type of statute to be spread upon their books.” Id., at 593. The policy of allowing “broad freedom to set up the type of unemployment compensation they wish” has been a basic theme of the program since the general outlines of the legislation were first identified in the Report of the Committee on Economic Security that was prepared for “the President of the United States and became the cornerstone of the Social Security Act.” Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471, 482 (1977). In guiding state efforts to draft unemployment compensation programs, however, that Report also stressed the importance of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. It characterized that distinction as “the key to eligibility. ” Id., at 483. “To serve its purposes, unemployment compensation must be paid only to workers involuntarily unemployed.” Id., at 482 (quoting Report of the Committee on Economic Security, as reprinted in Hearings on S. 1130 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1311, 1328 (1935)). The involuntary character of the unemployment is thus generally a necessary condition to eligibility for compensation. But even involuntary unemployment is not always a sufficient condition to qualify for benefits, as we found in Hodory. In that case, we held that Ohio could disqualify a millwright who was furloughed when the plant where he worked was shut down because of a shortage of fuel caused by a strike at coal mines owned by his employer. Even though he was unemployed through no fault of his own, as the result of a labor dispute in which he had no interest, federal law did not require Ohio to pay him unemployment compensation. In Hodory there was no claim that the National Labor Relations Act pre-empted Ohio’s disqualification of unemployment caused by a labor dispute. A pre-emption argument was advanced, however, in New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U. S. 519 (1979), a case in which the employer contended that federal law prohibited the State from giving unemployment compensation to the company’s striking employees. The evidence established that the payments not only provided support for the strikers but also imposed an added burden on the company and therefore plainly “altered the economic balance between labor and management.” Id., at 532. Relying on the pre-emption analysis in Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976), the employer therefore contended that the payments were inconsistent with the federal labor policy “of allowing the free play of economic forces to operate during the bargaining process.” 440 U. S., at 531. We rejected the argument, not because we disagreed with its premises, but rather because we were persuaded by our study of the legislative history of the two 1935 Acts that Congress had intended to tolerate the conflict with federal labor policy. We explained: “Undeniably, Congress was aware of the possible impact of unemployment compensation on the bargaining process. The omission of any direction concerning payment to strikers in either the National Labor Relations Act or the Social Security Act implies that Congress intended that the States be free to authorize, or to prohibit, such payments.” Id., at 544. See id., at 547 (Brennan, J., concurring in result); id., at 549 (Blackmun, J., with whom Marshall, J., joined, concurring in judgment). Our conclusion that Congress did not intend to pre-empt the States’ power to make the policy choice between paying or denying unemployment compensation to strikers does not directly respond to the argument advanced by appellants in this case. For they rely, not on the general policy of noninterference with the free play of economic forces during the bargaining process, but rather on the claim that § 7 of the NLRA provides specific protection for their payment of the emergency dues required by the UAW. Nevertheless, the claim must be analyzed in the light of our conclusion in New York Telephone Co. that Congress expressly authorized “a substantial measure of diversity,” 440 U. S., at 546, among the States concerning the payment of unemployment compensation to workers idled as the result of a labor dispute. Thus, New York Telephone Co. makes it clear that a State may, but need not, compensate actual strikers even though they are plainly responsible for their own unemployment. And, on the other hand, Hodory makes it equally clear that a State may refuse, or provide, compensation to workers laid off by reason of a labor dispute in which they have no interest or responsibility whatsoever. In between these opposite ends of the spectrum are cases in which the furloughed employees have had some participation in the labor dispute that caused their unemployment. This is such a case, because the state court has found that appellants provided significant financial support to strikes against their employer with full knowledge that their own work might thereby suffer. It is clear, however, that in financing the local strikes, they were exercising associational rights that are expressly protected by § 7 of the NLRA. The question, then, is whether that protection deprives the State of the power to make the policy choice that otherwise would be plainly authorized by Title IX of the Social Security Act. hH hH Appellants place their primary reliance on Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235 (1967), a case in which the Florida Commission had concluded that a union member was disqualified for unemployment compensation because she had filed an unfair labor practice charge against her employer. The Florida District Court of Appeal held that the Commission had properly treated the filing of the charge with the National Labor Relations Board as the initiation of a “labor dispute” within the meaning of the Florida statute disqualifying unemployment that “is due to a labor dispute.” We reversed. We explained that Congress had made it clear that it wished all persons with information about unfair labor practices “to be completely free from coercion against reporting them to the Board,” id., at 238, and that the statute prohibited an employer from interfering with an employee’s exercise of his right to file charges. Accordingly, we concluded: “[CJoercive actions which the Act forbids employers and unions to take against persons making charges are likewise prohibited from being taken by the States. . . . Florida should not be permitted to defeat or handicap a valid national objective by threatening to withdraw state benefits from persons simply because they cooperate with the Government’s constitutional plan. ” Id., at 239. The federal right implicated in Nash was the right to file an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. Arguably there are two different rights protected by § 7 that are implicated by this case — the right to contribute to a fund that will strengthen the union’s bargaining position, and the right to expend money to support a strike. It would seem clear that it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge an employee for making a contribution to a strike fund or for voting in favor of a strike at another plant, just as it would be unlawful to discharge an employee for filing a charge with the Labor Board. In each such case, the unemployment would be attributable to an unlawful act by the employer rather than the foreseeable consequence of the exercise of the employee’s § 7 rights. In the actual case before us, however, the employer did nothing to impair the exercise of appellants’ § 7 rights. To the extent that appellants may be viewed as participants in the decision to strike, or to expend funds in support of the local strikes, it is difficult to see how such a decision would be entitled to any greater protection than is afforded to actual strikers. In either event, the fact that the temporary unemployment is entirely attributable to the voluntary use of the Union’s bargaining resources — untainted by any unlawful conduct by the employer — is a sufficient reason for allowing the State to decide whether or not to pay unemployment benefits. Perhaps the answer is less obvious when we focus on the payment of the emergency dues before any actual strike decision has been made, but we believe similar reasoning leads to the same conclusion. Appellants were not laid off simply because they paid emergency dues. Rather, under the meticulous analysis of the case by the Michigan Supreme Court, they became unemployed because there was a meaningful connection between the decision to pay the emergency dues, the strikes which ensued, and ultimately their own layoffs. Under the state court’s narrow construction of its own statute, the emergency dues decision was tantamount to a plant-wide decision to call a strike in a bottleneck department that would predictably shut down an entire plant. As the court put it, “since the Michigan law only disqualifies those who are directly involved in the labor dispute through financing, the MESA essentially only disqualifies ‘strikers.’ ” 420 Mich., at 540, 363 N. W. 2d, at 637. Unquestionably federal law protects the employees’ right to authorize such a strike; it is equally clear, however, that federal law does not prohibit the States from deciding whether or not to compensate the employees who thereby cause their own unemployment. New York Telephone Co., 440 U. S., at 540-546. Thus, the essential distinction between the Nash case and this one is the distinction between involuntary and voluntary unemployment that was recognized at the inception of the Social Security Act. A decision to file an unfair labor practice charge — even though it may in fact motivate a retaliatory discharge — cannot be treated as a voluntary decision to cause one’s own unemployment without undermining an essential protection in the NLRA. But an employee’s decision to participate in a strike, either directly or by financing it, is not only an obvious example of causing one’s own unemployment — it is one that furthers the federal policy of free collective bargaining regardless of whether or not a State provides compensation for employees who are furloughed as a result of the labor dispute. In reaching this conclusion, we of course express no opinion concerning the wisdom of one policy choice or another. Nor are we concerned with the possible application of the “financing” disqualification that has been adopted in numerous States other than Michigan and which, like the Florida statute involved in Nash, may be construed in a way that has an entirely different impact on § 7 rights. Specifically, we have no occasion to consider the circumstances, if any, in which individuals might be disqualified solely because they paid regular union dues required as a condition of their employment. We merely hold that the “financing” disqualification in the Michigan statute as construed by the State Supreme Court in this case is not pre-empted by federal law. Affirmed. Section 29(8) of the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA) provides: “(8) An individual shall be disqualified for benefits for a week in which the individual’s total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute in active progress ... in the establishment in which the individual is or was last employed, or to a labor dispute, other than a lockout, in active progress ... in any other establishment within the United States which is functionally integrated with the establishment and is operated by the same employing unit. ... An individual shall not be disqualified under this subsection if the individual is not directly involved in the dispute. “(a) For the purposes of this subsection an individual shall not be considered to be directly involved in a labor dispute unless it is established that any of the following occurred: “(ii) The individual is participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which causes the individual’s total or partial unemployment. The payment of regular union dues, in amounts and for purposes established before the inception of the labor dispute, shall not be construed as financing a labor dispute within the meaning of this subparagraph.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.29(8) (Supp. 1986). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 462, 29 U. S. C. § 157, provides in part: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (referred to in the text as the UAW and the Union). The UAW employees of the Caterpillar Company were also on strike. The proceedings of the convention recited that its purposes were: “ ‘1. [To] [r]eview the status of our 1967 collective bargaining effort. “‘2. To consider revision of the dues program of the International Union, UAW, to provide adequate strike funds to meet the challenges of the 1967 and 1968 collective bargaining effort. “ ‘3. To consider revisions of the Constitution of the International Union as it relates to the payment of dues, strike fund, membership eligibility, strike insurance program and other matters related to emergencies facing the International Union, UAW.’” 420 Mich. 463, 512-513, 363 N. W. 2d 602, 624 (1984). The text of the amendments reads, in pertinent part: ‘“Article 16, Section 2(a) (new): Emergency Dues “ ‘All dues are payable during the current month to the financial secretary of the local union. “ ‘Commencing with the eighth (8th) day of October 1967 until October 31,1967, and for each month thereafter during the emergency as defined in the last paragraph of this subsection, union administrative dues shall be three dollars and seventy-five cents ($3.75) per month and Union Strike Insurance Fund dues shall be ás follows: “ ‘1. For those working in plants where the average straight time earnings * * * is three dollars ($3.00) or more, twenty-one dollars and twenty-jive cents ($21.25) per month. “ ‘2. For those working plants where the average straight time earnings * * * is less than three dollars ($3.00), eleven dollars and twenty-jive cents ($11.25). “ ‘This schedule of dues shall remain in effect during the current collective bargaining emergency as determined by the International Executive Board and thereafter, if necessary, until the International Union Strike Insurance Fund has reached the sum of twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000)...." Id., at 472, 363 N. W. 2d, at 606. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 409 Mich. 639, 653, n. 5, 297 N. W. 2d 387, 392, n. 5 (1980) (emphasis omitted). See id., at 653, 297 N. W. 2d, at 392. See 420 Mich., at 520, 363 N. W. 2d, at 628. See also App. to Juris. Statement 113a, 115a (decision of Michigan Employment Security Board of Review on remand from Michigan Supreme Court). The claims were originally allowed by the Michigan Employment Security Commission, but on an appeal by GM a hearing referee reversed the MESC. On appellants’ appeal the referee’s decision was upheld by the Michigan Employment Security Appeal Board. See 420 Mich., at 474-475, 363 N. W. 2d, at 608. Appellants appealed the denial of unemployment benefits to three County Circuit Courts, two of which reversed the decision of the Appeal Board and one of which affirmed it. On further appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals disallowed the claims, holding that the appellants had “financed” the labor dispute which caused their unemployment by paying emergency strike fund dues and that they were disqualified under Michigan Employment Security Act § 29(8)(a)(ii) as a consequence. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 74 Mich. App. 237, 254 N. W. 2d 45 (1977). The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and disposed of certain issues before remanding to the Board of Review for further proceedings. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 409 Mich. 639, 297 N. W. 2d 387 (1980). See infra this page and 628. “The seniority provisions and management decisions which plaintiffs identify as contributing causes of their unemployment would not themselves have caused plaintiffs’ unemployment or any unemployment were it not for the labor disputes in active progress at the functionally integrated foundries. But for those disputes, materials would have been available at plaintiffs’ places of employment, the work force at those establishments would not have been reduced, and the seniority provisions would not have become operative. The labor disputes in active progress at the foundries were shown by competent, material and substantial evidence to have been substantial contributing causes of the layoffs which idled plaintiffs. We affirm the board’s finding that plaintiffs’ unemployment was ‘due to a labor dispute in active progress’ within the meaning of subsection 29(8).” 409 Mich., at 661-662, 297 N. W. 2d, at 396. Id., at 666, 297 N. W. 2d, at 398. Ibid. “The appeal board did not give separate consideration to the meaning of ‘financing,’ in general or as applied to this case. We therefore remand this matter to its successor, the tribunal with the most experience and expertise in the application of the act, to reconsider, in light of its own unique familiarity with the act, practical considerations and related issues implicated by this question, whether plaintiffs’ emergency dues payments were sufficiently connected with the local labor disputes which caused their unemployment to constitute ‘financing’ of those labor disputes.” Id., at 668, 297 N. W. 2d, at 399. 420 Mich., at 493, 363 N. W. 2d, at 616. Ibid. See id., at 478, 363 N. W. 2d, at 609 (“Since the MESA is intended to provide benefits only to involuntarily unemployed persons, the purpose of §29 is obvious. MESA §29 lists the circumstances under which the Legislature holds that a person is not entitled to benefits under the MESA because he is not involuntarily unemployed”). “As noted above, the statute does not recognize such a ploy. UAW membership is required for employment by GM because the UAW bargains for such a provision in its contract with GM. In so doing, the UAW represents its members and they must ratify any contract agreed upon by the UAW and GM. Therefore, any ‘coercion’ resulting from the terms of the contract does not make the plaintiffs’ action in accord with the contract ‘involuntary.’ As the Court of Appeals said in Applegate v. Palladium Publishing Co., 95 Mich. App. 299, 305; 290 N. W. 2d 128 (1980), and we adopt here: “ ‘Action taken by employees under a contract negotiated for them by their authorized agent must be considered their voluntary acts. In effect, plaintiff agreed to [act] pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.’ “Any other holding would make all actions taken by union members pursuant to a union contract involuntary and relieve the members of responsibility for their contract-based actions. We cannot agree with such a rule. The plaintiffs’ emergency dues payments were not involuntary.” 420 Mich., at 499, 363 N. W. 2d, at 618-619. “A meaningful connection exists between the financing and the labor dispute that causes the claimant’s unemployment where, for the purpose of assisting labor disputes which reasonably and foreseeably include the labor dispute that caused the claimant’s unemployment, the claimant finances in significant amount and in temporal proximity the labor dispute that causes his unemployment. Where the Court finds these three elements present (purpose, amount, and timing), there is a meaningful connection between the financing and the labor dispute that causes the claimant’s unemployment.” Id., at 506, 363 N. W. 2d, at 621-622. Accord, id., at 500-501, 363 N. W. 2d, at 619. "The final aspect of the purpose analysis focuses on whether it was foreseeable at the time of the financing that supporting the labor disputes would cause the claimant’s unemployment. In this case, there is and can be no dispute on this issue. Since it was foreseeable that local GM strikes would occur and be financed by the emergency dues, and since automotive industry production is based upon a series of interrelated production units which produce only one component of the automobile, it is obvious that a local labor dispute which idles one plant might cause layoffs at other plants which rely upon the component produced at the idled plant. This ‘chain reaction’ can move both ‘up’ and ‘down’ the line. Therefore, layoffs at plants not presently engaged in a local labor dispute were foreseeable due to local disputes. “In conclusion, the evidence adduced in this case supports the conclusion that the purpose of the emergency dues included supporting labor disputes ineluding those that actually caused the plaintiffs’ unemployment. Therefore, the first portion of the meaningful connection definition is met.” Id., at 516-517, 363 N. W. 2d, at 626. See id., at 519, 363 N. W. 2d, at 627 (“By any standard, the amount of increase is significant and demonstrates a meaningful connection with the labor dispute that caused their unemployment”). Accord, id., at 517-520, 363 N. W. 2d, at 626-628. “As applied to this case, we find that this portion of the meaningful connection definition is satisfied since the payment of emergency dues immediately precedes the support of the labor dispute that caused the plaintiffs’ unemployment. . . . The time lag between the collection and disbursement of the strike fund benefits is minimal when it is considered that the funds were collected ‘by hand’ at the local level, were forwarded to the SIF, and were distributed to striking GM employees only after they had satisfied an initial waiting period requirement.” Id., at 521, 363 N. W. 2d, at 628. Id., at 521-522, 363 N. W. 2d, at 628. Id., at 541, 363 N. W. 2d, at 637. “Before Congress acted, unemployment compensation insurance was still, for the most part, a project and no more. Wisconsin was the pioneer. Her statute was adopted in 1931. At times bills for such insurance were introduced elsewhere, but they did not reach the stage of law. In 1935, four states (California, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New York) passed unemployment laws on the eve of the adoption of the Social Security Act, and two others did likewise after the federal act and later in the year. The statutes differed to some extent in type, but were directed to a common end. In 1936, twenty-eight other states fell in line, and eight more the present year. But if states had been holding back before the passage of the federal law, inaction was not owing, for the most part, to the lack of sympathetic interest. Many held back through alarm lest, in laying such a toll upon their industries, they would place themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors. See House Report, No. 615, 74th Congress, 1st session, p. 8; Senate Report, No. 628, 74th Congress, 1st session, p. 11.” Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S., at 587-588 (footnote omitted). In their statement of the question presented, appellants described the statutory disqualification as one arising “solely because those individuals paid union dues,” Brief for Appellants i, or, alternatively, as one arising “solely because those individuals paid union dues uniformly and lawfully required as a condition of employment,” Juris. Statement i. As the Michigan Supreme Court carefully explained, however, the Michigan statute excepts the payment of regular union dues from the financing disqualification. See supra, at 627-628. See also n. 1, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARNOLD TOURS, INC., et al. v. CAMP et al. No. 602. Decided November 23, 1970 Per Curiam. Petitioners are 42 independent travel- agents doing business in Massachusetts. They ask for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Comptroller of the Currency and the South Shore National Bank. They seek to invalidate a ruling by the Comptroller that, incidental to their banking. services, national banks may provide travel services for their customers. Petitioners allege that as a result they have lost substantial business and profits and stand to lose even greater business in the future. They contend the Comptroller exceeded his authority when he authorized national banks to provide travel services. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 408 F. 2d 1147 (CAI 1969.). Following our decisions last Term in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 160, and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159, we vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration (397 U. S. 315) and the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its previous decision. Here, as in Data Processing, we are concerned with § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U. S. C. § 1864. In Data Processing we did not rely on any legislative history showing that Congress desired to protect data processors alone from competition. Moreover, we noted a growing trend “toward enlargement of the class of people'who may protest administrative action.” 397. U. S., at 154. We held that § 4 “arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it.” Id., at 156. Nothing in the opinion limited § 4 to protecting only competitors in the data-processing field. When national banks begin to provide travel services for their customers, they compete with travel agents no less than they'compete with data processors when they, provide data-processing services to their -customers. Accordingly the writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan would set the case for argument. Paragraph 7475 of the Comptroller’s Manual for National Banks provides: “Incident to those powers vested in them under 12 U. S. C. .24, national banks may provide travel services for their customers and receive compensation therefor. Such services may include the sale of trip insurance and the rental of automobiles, as agent for a local rental service. In connection therewith, national banks may advertise, develop, and extend such travel services for the purpose of attracting customers to the bank.” “No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks.” The only legislative history of the Bank Service Corporation Act mentioned in the opinion was that § 4 was a “ ‘response t.o the fears expressed by a few senators, that without such a prohibition, the bill would have -enabled “banks to engage in a nonbanking activity,” S. Rep. No. 2105 [87th Cong;, 2d-Sess., 7-12] (Supplemental views of Senators Proxmiire, Douglas, and Neuberger), and thus constitute “a serious exception to the accepted public policy which strictly limits banks to banking.” .(Supplemental views of . Senators Muskie and Clark).’ ” 397 U. S., at 155. The final question under Data Processing, whether judicial review of the administrative decision has been precluded,' was specifically' Tesolved against the Comptroller in that case. 397 U, S., at 157.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MANDEL, GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND, et al. v. BRADLEY et al. No. 76-128. Argued February 23, 1977 Decided June 16, 1977 George A. Nilson, Deputy Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and Robert A. Zarnoch, Assistant Attorney General. Jon T. Brown argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Per Curiam. Candidates for statewide or federal office in Maryland may obtain a place on the general election ballot by filing with the State Administrative Board of Election Laws a certificate of candidacy 70 days before a political party’s primary election and then by winning the primary. Alternatively, under provisions of the Maryland Election Code, a candidate for statewide or federal office may qualify for a position on the general election ballot as an independent by filing, 70 days before the date on which party primaries are held, nominating petitions signed by at least 3% oí the State’s registered voters and a certificate of candidacy. Md. Elec. Code Ann. §7-1 (1976 and Supp. 1976). In Presidential election years this filing date occurs approximately 230 to 240 days before the general election. In other years it occurs about 120 days before the general election. §§1-1 (a)(8), 5-2, 7-1. Appellee Bruce Bradley decided in the spring of 1975 to run as an independent candidate for the United States Senate in 1976, a Presidential election year. Starting in the fall of 1975 Bradley collected signatures on nominating petitions. The requisite number was 51,155. On March 8, 1976, the deadline for filing, Bradley submitted 53,239 signatures and filed a certificate of candidacy for the Senate seat. However, on April 15, 1976, the State Administrative Board of Election Laws determined that only 42,049 of the signatures were valid and denied him a place on the ballot. Two weeks later, Bradley and the other appellees — petition signers and other voter supporters of Bradley — filed the instant suit, alleging that the procedures mandated by § 7-1 of the Md. Elec. Code (1976 and Supp. 1976) constitute an unconstitutional infringement of their associational and voting rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They complained that Maryland’s early filing date made it more difficult for Bradley to obtain the requisite number of signatures than for a party member to win a primary and sought, inter alia, an injunction against future enforcement of the offending provision of Maryland’s election procedures. A three-judge District Court agreed with the appellees that the early filing deadline of § 7-1 (i) (Supp. 1976) was an unconstitutional burden on an independent candidate’s access to the ballot and ordered the appellants to give Bradley 53 days after the party primaries to gather the requisite number of signatures. The court based its holding on our summary affirmance in Tucker v. Salera, 424 U. S. 959 (1976), aff’g 399 F. Supp. 1258 (ED Pa. 1975). In Salera, a three-judge court declared unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law setting the deadline for an independent candidate to gather signatures to obtain a place on the ballot 244 days before the general election in a Presidential election year. Under the Pennsylvania law, independents had to submit signatures of only 2% of the largest vote cast for any candidate in the preceding statewide general election, but they had to gather the required signatures within a 21-day period prior to the filing deadline. In declaring the Pennsylvania statute invalid, the three-judge court relied, not on the short period for signature gathering (which it thought was valid under Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724 (1974)), but solely on the early deadline for submission of the necessary signatures. The court. found that the deadline substantially burdened ballot access of independents by requiring them to obtain the necessary signatures at a time when the election issues were undefined and the voters were apathetic. It also rejected various countervailing state interests that had been urged. This Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the three-judge court in Salera. The three-judge court in this case viewed this Court’s summary affirmance in Salera as controlling precedent for the proposition that early filing dates, such as that employed in Maryland, are unconstitutionally burdensome on the independent candidate’s access to the ballot, and therefore decided in favor of the appellees. We noted probable jurisdiction, 429 U. S. 813 (1976). The District Court erred in believing that our affirmance in Salera adopted the reasoning as well as the judgment of the three-judge court in that case and thus required the District Court to conclude that the early filing date is impermissibly burdensome. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332 (1975), held that lower courts are bound by summary actions on the merits by this Court, but we noted that “[a]scertaining the reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of real substance.” Id., at 345 n. 14. Because a summary affirmance is an affirmance of the judgment only, the rationale of the affirmance may not be gleaned solely from the opinion below. “When we summarily affirm, without opinion, ... we affirm the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached. An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.” (Footnote omitted.) Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 391-392 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring). Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions. After Salera, for example, other courts were not free to conclude that the Pennsylvania provision invalidated was nevertheless constitutional. Summary actions, however, including Salera, should not be understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved. Here, the District Court ruled that legally “Salera decides the issue before us, and as the latest expression of the Supreme Court, we are bound to follow it.” App. to Jurisdictional Statement 12a. The precedential significance of the summary action in Salera, however, is to be assessed in the light of all of the facts in that case; and it is immediately apparent that those facts are very different from the facts of this case. There, in addition to the early filing date, signatures had to be gathered within a 21-day period. This limited time enormously increased the difficulty of obtaining the number of signatures necessary to qualify as an independent candidate. This combination of an early filing deadline and the 21-day limitation on signature gathering is sufficient to distinguish Salera from the case now before us, where there is no limitation on the period within which such signatures must be gathered. In short, Salera did not mandate the result reached by the District Court in this case. Because of its preoccupation with Salera, the District Court failed to undertake an independent examination of the merits. The’ appropriate inquiry was set out in Storer v. Brown, supra, at 742: “[I]n the context of [Maryland] politics, could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the [ballot access] requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be a helpful, if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have qualified with some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not. We note here that the State mentions only one instance of an independent candidate’s qualifying . . . but disclaims having made any comprehensive survey of the official records that would perhaps reveal the truth of the matter.” In Btorer itself, because the District Court had not applied these standards in adjudicating the constitutional issues before it, we remanded the case “to permit further findings with respect to the extent of the burden imposed on independent candidates.” 415 U. S., at 740. There is no reason here for doing any less. The District Court did not sift through the conflicting evidence and make findings of fact as to the difficulty of obtaining signatures in time to meet the early filing deadline. It did not consider the extent to which other features of the Maryland electoral system — such as the unlimited period during which signatures may be collected, or the unrestricted pool of potential petition signers — moderate whatever burden the deadline creates. See Developments in the Law— Elections, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1111,1142-1143 (1975). It did not analyze what the past experience of independent candidates for statewide office might indicate about the burden imposed on those seeking ballot access. Instead, the District Court’s assumption that the filing deadline by itself was per se illegal- — as well as the expedited basis upon which the case necessarily was decided — resulted in a failure to apply the constitutional standards announced in Storer to the statutory provisions here at issue. The application of those standards to the evidence in the record is, in the first instance, a task for the District Court. We therefore vacate the judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Bradley successfully gathered the requisite number of signatures, obtained a place on the ballot, ran, and lost. This case is nonetheless not moot. Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 737 n. 8 (1974). In Storer v. Brown, supra, as the District Court noted, the 24-day limitation was not by itself enough to invalidate the statute, but we clearly recognized that the limitation, when combined with other provisions of the election law, might invalidate the statutory scheme. 415 U. S., at 742-743. The District Court in this case erred in reading Storer v. Brown as holding irrelevant the limited period of time in which signatures must be gathered. The appellees filed this action on April 30, 1976. The three-judge court was convened and heard argument on May 12, and it announced its decision on May 17. There is evidence in the record that in both 1972 and 1976 — the only years in which the early deadline was effective — no candidate for statewide office succeeded in qualifying for the ballot. There is also evidence tending to substantiate the appellees’ contention that there existed a variety of obstacles in the way of obtaining support for an independent candidate far in advance of the general election. Without intimating any ultimate view on the merits of the appellees’ challenge, we have no doubt that it has sufficient substance to warrant a remand for further proceedings. The District Court will be free on remand to- consider the appellees’ argument that the “technical and administrative requirements of the petition signing process” are an unconstitutional burden on ballot access — a question never reached in view of the decision for the appellees and Bradley’s ultimate success in qualifying for the ballot.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. PHILADELPHIA GEAR CORP. No. 84-1972. Argued March 4, 1986 Decided May 27, 1986 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 440. Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and John C. Murphy, Jr. Gerald F. Slattery, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bankers Association et al. by John L. Warden and Stanley F. Farrar; for the Council on International Banking, Inc., by Bud G. Holman; for the National Association of Bond Lawyers by Daniel 0. Mahoney; and for the U. S. Conference of Mayors et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Joyce Holmes Benjamin. George W. Miller and Dennis J. Lehr filed a brief for William H. Allen et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to consider whether a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note is insured as a “deposit” under the federal deposit insurance program. We hold that, in light of the longstanding interpretation of petitioner Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that such a letter does not create a deposit and, in light of the fact that such a letter does not entrust any noncontingent assets to the bank, a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note does not give rise to an insured deposit. I Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) was, at the time of the relevant transactions, a customer of respondent Philadelphia Gear Corporation (Philadelphia Gear). On Orion’s application, the Penn Square Bank, N. A. (Penn Square) issued a letter of credit for the benefit of Philadelphia Gear in the amount of $145,200. The letter of credit provided that a draft drawn upon the letter of credit would be honored by Penn Square only if accompanied by Philadelphia Gear’s “signed statement that [it had] invoiced Orion Manufacturing Corporation and that said invoices have remained unpaid for at least fifteen (15) days.” App. 25. Because the letter of credit was intended to provide payment to the seller only if the buyer of the invoiced goods failed to make payment, the letter of credit was what is commonly referred to as a “standby” or “guaranty” letter of credit. See, e. g., 12 CFR § 337.2(a), and n. 1 (1985) (defining standby letters of credit and mentioning that they may “‘guaranty’ payment of a money obligation”). A conventional “commercial” letter of credit, in contrast, is one in which the seller obtains payment from the issuing bank without looking to the buyer for payment even in the first instance. See ibid, (distinguishing standby letters of credit from commercial letters of credit). See also Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 716, 717-724 (1973); Arnold & Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit — The Controversy Continues, 10 U.C.C.L.J. 272, 277-279 (Spring 1978). On the same day that Penn Square issued the standby letter of credit, Orion executed an unsecured promissory note for $145,200 in favor of Penn Square. App. 27. The purpose of the note was listed as “Back up Letter of Credit.” Ibid. Although the face of the note did not so indicate, both Orion and Penn Square understood that nothing would be considered due on the note, and no interest charged by Penn Square, unless Philadelphia Gear presented drafts on the standby letter of credit after nonpayment by Orion. 751 F. 2d 1131, 1134 (CA10 1984). See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 32. On July 5, 1982, Penn Square was declared insolvent. Petitioner FDIC was appointed its receiver. Shortly thereafter, Philadelphia Gear presented drafts on the standby letter of credit for payment of over $700,000 for goods delivered before Penn Square’s insolvency. The FDIC returned the drafts unpaid. 751 F. 2d., at 1133-1134. Philadelphia Gear sued the FDIC in the Western District of Oklahoma. Philadelphia Gear alleged that the standby letter of credit was an insured deposit under the definition of “deposit” set forth at 12 U. S. C. § 1813(0(1), and that Philadelphia Gear was therefore entitled to $100,000 in deposit insurance from the FDIC. See 12 U. S. C. § 1821(a)(1) (setting forth $100,000 as the maximum amount generally insured by the FDIC for any single depositor at a given bank). In apparent hopes of obtaining additional funds from the FDIC in the latter’s capacity as receiver rather than as insurer, respondent also alleged that terms of the standby letter of credit allowing repeated reinstatements of the credit made the letter’s total value more than $145,200. The District Court held that the total value of the standby letter of credit was $145,200, App. B to Pet. for Cert. 20a, 28a-30a; that the letter was an insured deposit on which the FDIC was hable for $100,000 in deposit insurance, id., at 37a-43a; and that Philadelphia Gear was entitled to prejudgment interest on that $100,000, id., at 43a. The FDIC appealed from the District Court’s ruling that the standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note constituted a “deposit” for purposes of 12 U. S. C. § 1813(0(1) and its ruling that Philadelphia Gear was entitled to an award of prejudgment interest. Philadelphia Gear cross-appealed from the District Court’s ruling on the total value of the letter of credit. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court’s award of prejudgment interest, 751 F. 2d, at 1138-1139, but otherwise affirmed the District Court’s decision. As to the definition of “deposit,” the Court of Appeals held that a standby letter of credit backed by a promissory note fell within the terms of 12 U. S. C. § 1813(Z)(l)’s definition of “deposit,” and was therefore insured. Id., at 1134-1138. We granted the FDIC’s petition for certiorari on this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ ruling. 474 U. S. 918 (1985). We now reverse. II Title 12 U. S. C. § 1813(0(1) provides: “The term ‘deposit’ means— “(1) the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial . . . account, or which is evidenced by ... a letter of credit or a traveler’s check on which the bank is primarily liable: Provided, That, without limiting the generality of the term ‘money or its equivalent,’ any such account or instrument must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when credited or issued in exchange for checks or drafts or for a promissory note upon which the person obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable . . . .” Philadelphia Gear successfully argued before the Court of Appeals that the standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note constituted a “deposit” under 12 U. S. C. § 1813(0(1) because that letter was one on which the bank was primarily liable, and evidenced the receipt by the bank of “money or its equivalent” in the form of a promissory note upon which the person obtaining the credit was primarily or secondarily liable. The FDIC does not here dispute that the bank was primarily liable on the letter of credit. Brief for Petitioner 7, n. 7. Nor does the FDIC contest the fact that the backup note executed by Orion is, at least in some sense, a “promissory note.” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 (remarks of Mr. Rothfeld, representing the FDIC) (“It was labeled a note. It can be termed a note”). The FDIC argues rather that it has consistently interpreted § 1813(0(1) not to include standby letters of credit backed only by a contingent promissory note because such a note represents no hard assets and thus does not constitute “money or its equivalent.” Because the alleged “deposit” consists only of a contingent liability, asserts the FDIC, a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note does not give rise to a “deposit” that Congress intended the FDIC to insure. Under this theory, while the note here may have been labeled a promissory note on its face and may have been a promissory note under state law, it was not a promissory note for purposes of the federal law set forth in 12 U. S. C. § 1813(Z)(1). See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U. S. 447, 456 (1942) (holding that liability on a promissory note acquired by the FDIC is a federal question); First National Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U. S. 122, 133-134 (1969) (holding that federal law governs the definition of branch banking under the McFadden Act). The Court of Appeals quite properly looked first to the language of the statute. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U. S. 729, 735 (1985); United States v. Yermian, 468 U. S. 63, 68 (1984). Finding the language of the proviso in § 1813(Z)(1) sufficiently plain, the Court of Appeals looked no further. But as the FDIC points out, the terms “letter of credit” and “promissory note” as used in the statute have a federal definition, and the FDIC has developed and interpreted those definitions for many years within the framework of the complex statutory scheme that the FDIC administers. The FDIC’s interpretation of whether a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note constitutes a “deposit” is consistent with Congress’ desire to protect the hard earnings of individuals by providing for federal deposit insurance. Since the creation of the FDIC, Congress has expressed no dissatisfaction with the FDIC’s interpretation of “deposit”; indeed, Congress in 1960 adopted the FDIC’s regulatory definition as the statutory language. When we weigh all these factors together, we are constrained to conclude that the term “deposit” does not include a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note. A Justice Holmes stated that, as to discerning the constitutionality of a federal estate tax, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921). Although the genesis of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act may not be quite so powerful a substitute for legal analysis, that history is worthy of at least a page of recounting for the light it sheds on Congress’ purpose in passing the Act. Cf. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 266 (1981) (“The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect”). When Congress created the FDIC, the Nation was in the throes of an extraordinary financial crisis. See generally F. Allen, Since Yesterday: The Nineteen-Thirties in America 98-121 (1940); A. Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order 474-482 (1957). More than one-third of the banks in the United States open in 1929 had shut their doors just four years later. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, pt. 2, pp. 1019, 1038 (1976). In response to this financial crisis, President Roosevelt declared a national banking holiday effective the first business day after he took office. 48 Stat. 1689. Congress in turn responded with extensive legislation on banking, including the laws that gave the FDIC its existence. Congress’ purpose in creating the FDIC was clear. Faced with virtual panic, Congress attempted to safeguard the hard earnings of individuals against the possibility that bank failures would deprive them of their savings. Congress passed the 1933 provisions “[i]n order to provide against a repetition of the present painful experience in which a vast sum of assets and purchasing power is ‘tied up.’” S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1933) (emphasis added). The focus of Congress was therefore upon ensuring that a deposit of “hard earnings” entrusted by individuals to a bank would not lead to a tangible loss in the event of a bank failure. As the chairman of the relevant Committee in the House of Representatives explained on the floor: “[T]he purpose of this legislation is to protect the people of the United States in the right to have banks in which their deposits will be safe. They have a right to expect of Congress the establishment and maintenance of a system of banks in the United States where citizens may place their hard earnings with reasonable expectation of being able to get them out again upon demand. . . . “[The purpose of the bill is to ensure that] the community is saved from the shock of a bank failure, and every citizen has been given an opportunity to withdraw his deposits. . . . “The public . . . demand of you and me that we provide a banking system worthy of this great Nation and banks in which citizens may place the fruits of their toil and know that a deposit slip in return for their hard earnings will be as safe as a Government bond.” 77 Cong. Rec. 3837, 3838, 3840 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall). See also id., at 3913 (remarks of Rep. Keller) (“[We must make] it absolutely certain that . . . any and every man, woman, or child who puts a dollar in any bank can absolutely know that he will under no circumstances lose a single penny of it”); id., at 3924 (remarks of Rep. Green) (“It is time that we pass a law so secure that when a man puts his money in a bank he will know for sure that when he comes back it will be there”). To prevent bank failure that resulted in the tangible loss of hard assets was therefore the focus of Congress’ effort in creating deposit insurance. Despite the fact Congress revisited the deposit insurance statute in 1935, 1950, and 1960, these comments remain the best indication of Congress’ underlying purpose in creating deposit insurance. The Reports on the 1935 amendments presented the definition of “deposit” without any specific comment. See H. R. Rep. No. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1935); S. Rep. No. 1007, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-4 (1935); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1822, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1935). The floor debates centered around changes in the Federal Reserve System made in the same bill, not on deposit insurance. See, e. g., 79 Cong. Rec. 6568-6577, 6651-6660 (1935). Indeed, in light of the fact that instruments denominated “promissory notes” seem at the time to have been considered exclusively uncontingent, see, e. g., 16 Fed. Res. Bull. 520 (1930) (Regulation A) (defining promissory note as an “unconditional promise ... to pay [a sum certain in dollars] at a fixed or determinable future time”) (emphasis added); Gilman v. Commissioner, 53 F. 2d 47, 50 (CA8 1931) (“The form of these [contingent] instruments referred to as ‘promissory notes’ is very unusual”), it is unlikely that Congress would have had occasion to refer expressly to contingent notes such as the one before us here even if Congress had turned its attention to the definition of “deposit” when it first enacted the provision treating “money or its equivalent.” The legislative history of the 1950 amendments is similarly unhelpful, as one would expect given that the relevant provisions were reenacted but unchanged. See S. Rep. No. 1269, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1950); H. R. Rep. No. 2564, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1950). The Committee Reports on the 1960 amendments likewise give no indication that the amendments’ phrasing was meant to effect any fundamental changes in the definition of deposit; those Reports state only that the changes are intended to bring into harmony the definitions of “deposit” used for purposes of deposit insurance with those used in reports of condition, and that the FDIC’s rules and regulations are to be incorporated into the new definition. See H. R. Rep. No. 1827, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 3, 5 (1960); S. Rep. No. 1821, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 7, 10 (1960). See also 106 Cong. Rec. 14794 (1960) (discussing pre-1960 scheme). Congress’ focus in providing for a system of deposit insurance — a system that has been continued to the present without modification to the basic definition of deposits that are “money or its equivalent” — was clearly a focus upon safeguarding the assets and “hard earnings” that businesses and individuals have entrusted to banks. Congress wanted to ensure that someone who put tangible assets into a bank could always get those assets back. The purpose behind the insurance of deposits in general, and especially in the section defining deposits as “money or its equivalent,” therefore, is the protection of assets and hard earnings entrusted to a bank. This purpose is not furthered by extending deposit insurance to cover a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note, which involves no such surrender of assets or hard earnings to the custody of the bank. Philadelphia Gear, which now seeks to collect deposit insurance, surrendered absolutely nothing to the bank. The letter of credit is for Philadelphia Gear’s benefit, but the bank relied upon Orion to meet the obligations of the letter of credit and made no demands upon Philadelphia Gear. Nor, more importantly, did Orion surrender any assets unconditionally to the bank. The bank did not credit any account of Orion’s in exchange for the promissory note, and did not treat its own assets as increased by its acceptance of the note. The bank could not have collected on the note from Orion unless Philadelphia Gear presented the unpaid invoices and a draft on the letter of credit. In the absence of a presentation by Philadelphia Gear of the unpaid invoices, the promissory note was a wholly contingent promise, and when Penn Square went into receivership, neither Orion nor Philadelphia Gear had lost anything except the ability to use Penn Square to reduce Philadelphia Gear’s risk that Philadelphia Gear would go unpaid for a delivery of goods to Orion. B Congress’ actions with respect to the particular definition of “deposit” that it has chosen in order to effect its general purpose likewise lead us to believe that a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note is not an insurable “deposit.” In 1933, Congress amended the Federal Reserve Act to authorize the creation of the FDIC and charged it “to insure . . . the deposits of all banks which are entitled to the benefits of [FDIC] insurance.” §8, Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 168. Congress did not define the term “deposit,” however, until the Banking Act of 1935, in which it stated: “The term ‘deposit’ means the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received by a bank in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit to a commercial, checking, savings, time or thrift account, or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, and trust funds held by such bank whether retained or deposited in any department of such bank or deposited in another bank, together with such other obligations of a bank as the board of directors [of the FDIC] shall find and shall prescribe by its regulations to be deposit liabilities by. general usage . . . .” §101, Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684, 685-686. Less than two months after this statute was enacted, the FDIC promulgated a definition of “deposit,” which provided in part that “letters of credit must be regarded as issued for the equivalent of money when issued in exchange for . . . promissory notes upon which the person procuring [such] instruments is primarily or secondarily liable.” See 12 CFR §301.1(d) (1939) (codifying Regulation I, rule 1, Oct. 1, 1935), revoked after incorporation into statutory law, 12 CFR 234 (Supp. 1962). In 1950, Congress revisited the provisions specifically governing the FDIC in order to remove them from the Federal Reserve Act and place them into a separate Act. See Act of Sept. 21, 1950, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 874. The new provisions did not modify the definition of “deposit.” In 1960, Congress expanded the statutory definition of “deposit” in several categories, and also incorporated the regulatory definition that the FDIC had employed since 1935 into the statute that remains in force today. See swpra, at 430 (quoting current version of statute). At no point did Congress disown its initial, clear desire to protect the hard assets of depositors. See supra, at 432-435. At no point did Congress criticize the FDIC’s longstanding interpretation, see infra, at 438, that a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note is not a “deposit.” In fact, Congress had reenacted the 1935 provisions in 1950 without changing the definition of “deposit” at all. Compare 49 Stat. 685-686 with 64 Stat. 874-875. When the statute giving rise to the longstanding interpretation has been reenacted without pertinent change, the “congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U. S. 267, 275 (1974). See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 457 (1978). Indeed, the current statutory definition of “deposit,” added by Congress in 1960, was expressly designed to incorporate the FDIC’s rules and regulations on “deposits.” As Committees of both Houses of Congress explained the amendments: “The amended definition would include the present statutory definition of deposits, and the definition of deposits in the rules and regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, [along] with . . . changes [in sections other than what is now §1813(0(1)].” H. R. Rep. No. 1827, 86th Cong, 2d Sess., 5 (1960) (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 1821, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1960) (same). Congress, therefore, has expressly incorporated into the statutory scheme the regulations that the FDIC devised to assist it in determining what constitutes a “deposit” within the statutory scheme. Under these circumstances, we must obviously give a great deal of deference to the FDIC’s interpretation of what these regulations do and do not include within their definition of “deposit.” C Although the FDIC does not argue that it has an express regulation excluding a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note from the definition of “deposit” in 12 U. S. C. § 1813(0(1), that exclusion by the FDIC is nonetheless longstanding and consistent. At a meeting of FDIC and bank officials shortly after the FDIC’s creation, a bank official asked whether a letter of credit issued by a charge against a customer’s account was a deposit. The FDIC official replied: “ Tf your letter of credit is issued by a charge against a depositor’s account or for cash and the letter of credit is reflected on your books as a liability, you do have a deposit liability. If, on the other hand, you merely extend a line of credit to your customer, you will only show a contingent liability on your books. In that event no deposit liability has been created.’” Transcript as quoted in FDIC v. Irving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145, 161 (SDNY 1955). Because Penn Square apparently never reflected the letter of credit here as a noncontingent liability, and because the interwoven financial instruments at issue here can be viewed most accurately as the extension of a line of credit by Penn Square to Orion, this transcript lends support to the FDIC’s contention that its longstanding policy has been to exclude standby letters of credit backed by contingent promissory notes from 12 U. S. C. § 1813(Z)(l)’s definition of “deposit.” The FDIC’s contemporaneous understanding that standby letters of credit backed by contingent promissory notes do not generate a “deposit” for purposes of 12 U. S. C. § 1813(i)(l) has been fortified by its behavior over the following decades. The FDIC has asserted repeatedly that it has never charged deposit insurance premiums on standby letters of credit backed by contingent promissory notes, and Philadelphia Gear does not contest that assertion. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. Congress requires the FDIC to assess contributions to its insurance fund at a fixed percentage of a bank’s “deposits” under 12 U. S. C. §1813(0(1). See 12 U. S. C. §§ 1817(a)(4), (b)(1), (b)(4)(A). By the time that this suit — the first challenge to the FDIC’s treatment of standby letters of credit backed by contingent promissory notes — was brought, almost $100 billion in standby letters of credit was outstanding. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Statistical Digest 71 (1983); FDIC, 1983 Statistics on Banking (Table 110F). The FDIC’s failure to levy premiums on standby letters of credit backed by contingent promissory notes therefore clearly demonstrates that the FDIC has never considered such letters to reflect deposits. Although the FDIC’s interpretation of the relevant statute has not been reduced to a specific regulation, we conclude nevertheless that the FDIC’s practice and belief that a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note does not create a “deposit” within the meaning of 12 U. S. C. § 1813(0(1) are entitled in the circumstances of this case to the “considerable weight [that] should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984). As we have stated above, the FDIC’s interpretation here of a statutory definition adopted wholesale from the FDIC’s own regulation is consistent with congressional purpose, and may certainly stand. Ill Philadelphia Gear essentially seeks to have the FDIC guarantee the contingent credit extended to Orion, not assets entrusted to the bank by Philadelphia Gear or by Orion on Philadelphia Gear’s behalf. With a standard “commercial” letter of credit, Orion would typically have unconditionally entrusted Penn Square with funds before Penn Square would have written the letter of credit, and thus Orion would have lost something if Penn Square became unable to honor its obligations. As the FDIC concedes, deposit insurance extends to such a letter of credit backed by an uncontingent promissory note. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8 (statement of Mr. Rothfeld, representing the FDIC) (“If this note were a fully uncontingent negotiable note that were not limited by any side agreements, it would be a note backing a letter of credit within the meaning of the statute”). See also id., at 17-18. But here, with a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note, Penn Square was not in possession of any of Orion’s or Philadelphia Gear’s assets when it went into receivership. Nothing was ventured, and therefore no insurable deposit was lost. We believe that, whatever the relevant State’s definition of “letter of credit” or “promissory note,” Congress did not by using those phrases in 12 U. S. C. § 1813(Z)(1) intend to protect with deposit insurance a standby letter of credit backed only by a contingent promissory note. We thus hold that such an arrangement does not give rise to a “deposit” under 12 U. S. C. § 1813(0(1). Accordingly, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ANSONIA BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. v. PHILBROOK et al. No. 85-495. Argued October 14, 1986 Decided November 17, 1986 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., post, p. 71, and Stevens, J., post, p. 75, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Thomas N. Sullivan argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Robert J. Murphy. Robert F. McWeeny argued the cause and filed a brief for Ansonia Federation of Teachers, respondent under this Court’s Rule 19.6, in support of petitioners. David N. Rosen argued the cause for respondent Philbrook. With him on the brief was Paul Gewirtz. Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorneys General Reynolds and Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Carolyn B. Kuhl, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Carvin, Richard J. Lazarus, Brian K. Landsberg, Louise A. Lerner, and Johnny J. Butler. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Michael H. Gottesman, David M. Silberman, and Laurence Gold; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, William S. Franklin, August W. Steinhilber, Gwendolyn H. Gregory, and Thomas A. Shannon. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Connecticut by Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General, Clarine Nardi Riddle, Deputy Attorney General, Henry S. Cohn and Robert B. Teitel-man, Assistant Attorneys General, and Philip A. Murphy, Jr.; for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Marc D. Stem and Ronald A. Krauss; for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights by Steven Frederick McDowell; for the Council on Religious Freedom by Lee Boothby, James M. Parker, and Robert W. Nixon; for the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists by Walter E. Carson; for the Presbyterian Church (USA) et al. by Douglas Laycock, Samuel E. Ericsson, Michael J. Woodruff, and Kimberlee Wood Colby; and for the Rutherford Institute et al. by W. Charles Bundren, Guy 0. Farley, Jr., Larry L. Crain, Thomas 0. Kotouc, Alfred Lindh, William B. Hollberg, and Wendell R. Bird. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Ansonia Board of Education has employed respondent Ronald Philbrook since 1962 to teach high school business and typing classes in Ansonia, Connecticut. In 1968, Philbrook was baptized into the Worldwide Church of God. The tenets of the church require members to refrain from secular employment during designated holy days, a practice that has caused respondent to miss approximately six schooldays each year. We are asked to determine whether the employer’s efforts to adjust respondent’s work schedule in light of his belief fulfill its obligation under § 701 (j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j), to “reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Since the 1967-1968 school year, the school board’s collective-bargaining agreements with the Ansonia Federation of Teachers have granted to each teacher 18 days of leave per year for illness, cumulative to 150 and later to 180 days. Accumulated leave may be used for purposes other than illness as specified in the agreement. A teacher may accordingly use five days’ leave for a death in the immediate family, one day for attendance at a wedding, three days per year for attendance as an official delegate to a national veterans organization, and the like. See, e. g., App. 98-99. With the exception of the agreement covering the 1967-1968 school year, each contract has specifically provided three days’ annual leave for observance of mandatory religious holidays, as defined in the contract. Unlike other categories for which leave is permitted, absences for religious holidays are not charged against the teacher’s annual or accumulated leave. The school board has also agreed that teachers may use up to three days of accumulated leave each school year for “necessary personal business.” Recent contracts limited permissible personal leave to those uses not otherwise specified in the contract. This limitation dictated, for example, that an employee who wanted more than three leave days to attend the convention of a national veterans organization could not use personal leave to gain extra days for that purpose. Likewise, an employee already absent three days for mandatory religious observances could not later use personal leave for “[a]ny religious activity,” id., at 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, or “[a]ny religious observance.” Id., at 96, 100. Since the 1978-1979 school year, teachers have been allowed to take one of the three personal days without prior approval; use of the remaining two days requires advance approval by the school principal. The limitations on the use of personal business leave spawned this litigation. Until the 1976-1977 year, Philbrook observed mandatory holy days by using the three days granted in the contract and then taking unauthorized leave. His pay was reduced accordingly. In 1976, however, respondent stopped taking unauthorized leave for religious reasons, and began scheduling required hospital visits on church holy days. He also worked on several holy days. Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Philbrook repeatedly asked the school board to adopt one of two alternatives. His preferred alternative would allow use of personal business leave for religious observance, effectively giving him three additional days of paid leave for that purpose. Short of this arrangement, respondent suggested that he pay the cost of a substitute and receive full pay for additional days off for religious observances. Petitioner has consistently rejected both proposals. In 1973 Philbrook filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the school board and the Ansonia Federation of Teachers. After exhausting the available administrative avenues, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that the prohibition on the use of “necessary personal business” leave for religious observance violated §§ 703(a)(1), (2) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-2(a)(l), (2), and seeking both damages and injunc-tive relief. After a 2-day trial, the District Court concluded that Philbrook had failed to prove a case of religious discrimination because he had not been placed by the school board in a position of violating his religion or losing his job. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It held that a prima facie case of discrimination is established when an employee shows that “ ‘(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.’ ” 757 F. 2d 476, 481 (1985), quoting Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 736 F. 2d 1022, 1026 (CA5 1984). Philbrook established his case, the court held, by showing that he had a sincere religious belief that conflicted with the employer’s attendance requirements, that the employer was aware of the belief, and that he suffered a detriment— namely, a loss of pay — from the conflict. The court then assumed that the employer’s leave policy constituted a reasonable accommodation to Philbrook’s belief. It held, however, that “[w]here the employer and the employee each propose a reasonable accommodation, Title VII requires the employer to accept the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer’s conduct of his business.” 757 F. 2d, at 484. The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the hardship that would result from Philbrook’s suggestions. We granted certiorari to consider the important questions of federal law presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals. 474 U. S. 1080 (1986). Specifically, we are asked to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Philbrook established a prima facie case of religious discrimination and in opining that an employer must accept the employee’s preferred accommodation absent proof of undue hardship. We find little support in the statute for the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals, but we agree that the ultimate issue of reasonable accommodation cannot be resolved without further factual inquiry. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court for additional findings. As we noted in our only previous consideration of § 701(j), its language was added to the 1972 amendments on the floor of the Senate with little discussion. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 74, n. 9 (1977). See 118 Cong. Rec. 705-706 (1972). In Hardison, supra, at 84, we determined that an accommodation causes “undue hardship” whenever that accommodation results in “more than a de minimis cost” to the employer. Hardison had been discharged because his religious beliefs would not allow him to work on Saturdays and claimed that this action violated the employer’s duty to effect a reasonable accommodation of his beliefs. Because we concluded that each of the suggested accommodations would impose on the employer an undue hardship, we had no occasion to consider the bounds of a prima facie case in the religious accommodation context or whether an employer is required to choose from available accommodations the alternative preferred by the employee. The employer in Hardison simply argued that all conceivable accommodations would result in undue hardship, and we agreed. Petitioner asks us to establish for religious accommodation claims a proof scheme analogous to that developed in other Title VII contexts, delineating the plaintiff’s prima facie case and shifting production burdens. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). But the present case raises no such issue. As in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983), the defendant here failed to persuade the District Court to dismiss the action for want of a prima facie case, and the case was fully tried on the merits. We held in Aikens that these circumstances place the ultimate Title VII question of discrimination vel non directly before the court. “Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer-relevant.” Id., at 715. We may therefore proceed to the question whether the employer’s proposed accommodation of respondent’s religious practices comports with the statutory mandate of §701(j). In addressing this question, the Court of Appeals assumed that the employer had offered a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook’s religious beliefs. This alone, however, was insufficient in that court’s view to allow resolution of the dispute. The court observed that the duty to accommodate “cannot be defined without reference to undue hardship.” 757 F. 2d, at 484. It accordingly determined that the accommodation obligation includes a duty to accept “the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer’s conduct of his business.” Ibid. Cf. American Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster General, 781 F. 2d 772, 776 (CA9 1986) (Title VII does not dictate that “an employer must accept any accommodation, short of ‘undue hardship,’ proposed by an employee . . .”). Because the District Court had not considered whether Philbrook’s proposals would impose undue hardship, the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of those proposals. We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation. The employer violates the statute unless it “demonstrates that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate ... an employee’s ... religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j). Thus, where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship. As Hardison illustrates, the extent of undue hardship on the employer’s business is at issue only where the employer claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable accommodation without such hardship. Once the Court of Appeals assumed that the school board had offered to Philbrook a reasonable alternative, it erred by requiring the Board to nonetheless demonstrate the hardship of Phil-brook’s alternatives. The legislative history of § 701(j), as we noted in Hardison, supra, at 74-75, and n. 9, is of little help in defining the employer’s accommodation obligation. To the extent it provides any indication of congressional intent, however, we think that the history supports our conclusion. Senator Randolph, the sponsor of the amendment that became §701(j), expressed his hope that accommodation would be made with “flexibility” and “a desire to achieve an adjustment.” 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972). Consistent with these goals, courts have noted that “bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s business.” Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F. 2d 141, 145-146 (CA5 1982). See also American Postal Workers, supra, at 777. Under the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals, however, the employee is given every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict. This approach, we think, conflicts with both the language of the statute and the views that led to its enactment. We accordingly hold that an employer has met its obligation under § 701(j) when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee. The remaining issue in the case is whether the school board’s leave policy constitutes a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook’s religious beliefs. Because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied what we hold to be an erroneous view of the law, neither explicitly considered this question. We- think that there are insufficient factual findings as to the manner in which the collective-bargaining agreements have been interpreted in order for us to make that judgment initially. We think that the school board policy in this case, requiring respondent to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that exceeded the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement, would generally be a reasonable one. In enacting § 701(j), Congress was understandably motivated by a desire to assure the individual additional opportunity to observe religious practices, but it did not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977). The provision of unpaid leave eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious holy days and requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact work. Generally speaking, “[t]he direct effect of [unpaid leave] is merely a loss of income for the period the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job status.” Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136, 145 (1977). But unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones. A provision for paid leave “that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free . . . not to provide the benefit at all.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 75 (1984). Such an arrangement would display a discrimination against religious practices that is the antithesis of reasonableness. Whether the policy here violates this teaching turns on factual inquiry into past and present administration of the personal business leave provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. The school board contends that the necessary personal business category in the agreement, like other leave provisions, defines a limited purpose leave. Philbrook, on the other hand, asserts that the necessary personal leave category is not so limited, operating as an open-ended leave provision that may be used for a wide range of secular purposes in addition to those specifically provided for in the contract, but not for similar religious purposes. We do not think that the record is sufficiently clear on this point for us to make the necessary factual findings, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court. The latter court on remand should make the necessary findings as to past and existing practice in the administration of the collective-bargaining agreements. It is so ordered. The reasonable accommodation duty was incorporated into the statute, somewhat awkwardly, in the definition of religion. Title VIPs central provisions make it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion ...,”§ 703(a)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . religion_” § 703(a)(2), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(2). Section 701(j), 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j), was added in 1972 to illuminate the meaning of religious discrimination under the statute. It provides that “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Absence for reasons not contemplated by the contract resulted in a proportionate deduction from pay; since 1971, 1/180 of annual salary had been deducted for each day of unexcused absence. App. 84, 90, 93, 97, 101. The suggested accommodation would reduce the financial costs to Philbrook of unauthorized absences. In 1984, for example, a substitute cost $30 per day, and respondent’s loss in pay from an unauthorized absence was over $130. Philbrook’s complaint also alleged that petitioner Board’s policies and practices violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment. Because the Court of Appeals remanded the Title VII claim for further proceedings, it did not address Philbrook’s First Amendment claims, and we have no occasion to consider them here. Judge Pollack, Senior District Judge of the Southern District of New York sitting by designation, dissented. He agreed with the District Court that “[t]he School Board’s policy neither deprives the plaintiff of employment opportunities nor adversely affects his employment status.” 757 F. 2d, at 489. Accordingly, he found that the policy did not “ ‘discriminate’ within Title VH’s use and meaning of that term . . . .” Ibid. The Court of Appeals found support for its decision in the EEOC’s guidelines on religious discrimination. 757 F. 2d, at 485, and n. 7. Specifically, the guidelines provide that “when there is more than one means of accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the employer . . . must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the individual with re-speet to his or her employment opportunities.” 29 CFR § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (1986). Though superficially consistent with the burden imposed by the Court of Appeals, this guideline, by requiring the employer to choose the option that least disadvantages an individual’s employment opportunities, contains a significant limitation not found in the court’s standard. To the extent that the guideline, like the approach of the Court of Appeals, requires the employer to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of undue hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute. We have, of course, noted that EEOC guidelines are properly accorded less weight than administrative regulations declared by Congress to have the force of law. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140 (1944). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison 432 U. S. 63, 76, n. 11. (1977).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL v. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ No. 10-1542. Argued January 18, 2012 Decided May 21, 2012 Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Leondra R. Kruger argued the cause for petitioner in both cases. On the briefs were Solicitor General Verrilli, As sistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Pratik A. Shah, Donald E. Keener, and Carol Federighi. Stephen B. Kinnaird argued the cause for respondent in No. 10-1542. With him on the briefs were Igor V. Timo-feyev, Stephanos Bibas, and Michael Franquinha. Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for respondent in No. 10-1543. With him on the brief were Andrew J. Pincus and Jeffrey A. Meyer Together with No. 10-1543, Holder, Attorney General v. Sawyers, also on certiorari to the same court. Jeffrey T. Green, Charles Roth, and Sarah O’Rourke Schrup filed a brief for the National Immigration Justice Center as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. An immigration statute, 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(a), authorizes the Attorney General to cancel the removal of an alien from the United States so long as the alien satisfies certain criteria. One of those criteria relates to the length of time an alien has lawfully resided in the United States, and another to the length of time he has held permanent resident status here. We consider whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) could reasonably conclude that an alien living in this country as a child must meet those requirements on his own, without counting a parent’s years of residence or immigration status. We hold that the BIA’s approach is based on a permissible construction of the statute. I A The immigration laws have long given the Attorney General discretion to permit certain otherwise-removable aliens to remain in the United States. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U. S. 42, 59 (2011). The Attorney General formerly exercised this authority by virtue of § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 187, 8 U. S. C. § 1182(e) (1994 ed.), a provision with some lingering relevance here, see infra, at 7-9. But in 1996, Congress replaced § 212(c) with §1229b(a) (2006 ed.). That new section, applicable to the cases before us, provides as follows: “(a) Cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents “The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien— “(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, “(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and “(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.” Ibid. Section 1229b(a) thus specifies the criteria that make an alien eligible to obtain relief from the Attorney General. The first paragraph requires that the alien have held the status of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) for at least five years. And the second adds that the alien must have lived in the United States for at least seven continuous years after a lawful admission, whether as an LPR or in some other immigration status. (The third paragraph is not at issue in these cases.) The question we consider here is whether, in applying this statutory provision, the BIA should impute a parent’s years of continuous residence or LPR status to his or her child. That question arises because a child may enter the country lawfully, or may gain LPR status, after one of his parents does. A parent may therefore satisfy the requirements of §§ 1229b(a)(l) and (a)(2), while his or her child, considered independently, does not. In these circumstances, is the child eligible for cancellation of removal? The Ninth Circuit, the first court of appeals to confront this issue, held that such an alien could obtain relief. See Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales,. 430 F. 3d 1013 (2005). Enrique Cuevas-Gaspar and his parents came to the United States illegally in 1985, when he was one year old. Cuevas-Gaspar’s mother was lawfully admitted to the country in 1990, as an LPR. But Cuevas-Gaspar was lawfully admitted only in 1997, when he too received LPR status. That meant that when Cuevas-Gaspar committed a removable offense in 2002, he could not independently satisfy § 1229b(a)(2)’s requirement of seven consecutive years of residence after a lawful entry. (The parties agreed that he just met § 1229b(a)(l)’s 5-year status requirement.) The Board deemed Cuevas-Gaspar ineligible for relief on that account, but the Ninth Circuit found that position unreasonable. According to the Court of Appeals, the Board should have “imputed” to Cuevas-Gaspar his mother’s years of continuous residence during the time he lived with her as an “unemanci-pated minor.” Id., at 1029. That approach, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, followed from both the INA’s “priorit[ization]” of familial relations and the Board’s “consistent willingness” to make imputations from a parent to a child in many areas of immigration law. Id., at 1026. The Board responded by reiterating its opposition to imputation under both relevant paragraphs of §1229b(a). In In re Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231 (2007), the Board considered whether a child could rely on a parent’s period of LPR status to satisfy § 1229b(a)(l)’s 5-year clock. The Board expressly “disagree[d] with the reasoning” of Cuevas-Gaspar, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of both the statute and the Board’s prior policies. 24 I. & N. Dec., at 233-234, and n. 4. Accordingly, the Board announced that it would “decline to extend” Cuevas-Gaspar to any case involving § 1229b(a)(l), and that it would ignore the decision even as to § 1229b(a)(2) outside the Ninth Circuit. 241. & N. Dec., at 235. A year later, in Matter of Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 599 (2008), the BIA took the final step: It rejected imputation under § 1229b(a)(2) in a case arising in the Ninth Circuit, maintaining that the court should abandon Cuevas-Gaspar and defer to the Board’s intervening reasoned decision in Escobar. See Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 600-601 (citing National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967 (2005)). The BIA’s position on imputation touched off a split in the courts of appeals. The Third and Fifth Circuits both deferred to the BIA’s approach as a reasonable construction of §1229b(a). See Augustin v. Attorney Gen., 520 F. 3d 264 (CA3 2008); Deus v. Holder, 591 F. 3d 807 (CA5 2009). But in Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F. 3d 1102 (2009), the Ninth Circuit doubled down on its contrary view, declaring the BIA’s position unreasonable and requiring imputation under both §§ 1229b(a)(1) and (a)(2). See id., at 1103 (“[T]he rationale and holding of Cuevas-Gaspar apply equally to the five-year permanent residence and the seven-year continuance residence requirements” of § 1229b(a)). B Two cases are before us. In 1989, at the age of five, respondent Carlos Martinez Gutierrez illegally entered the United States with his family. Martinez Gutierrez’s father was lawfully admitted to the country two years later as an LPR. But Martinez Gutierrez himself was neither lawfully admitted nor given LPR status until 2003. Two years after that, Martinez Gutierrez was apprehended for smuggling undocumented aliens across the border. He admitted the offense, and sought cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge concluded that Martinez Gutierrez qualified for relief because of his father’s immigration history, even though Martinez Gutierrez could not satisfy either § 1229b(a)(l) or §1229b(a)(2) on his own. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 10-1542, pp. 20a-22a (citing Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F. 3d 1013). The BIA reversed, and after entry of a removal order on remand, reaffirmed its disposition in an order relying on Escobar, see App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 10-1542, at 5a-6a. The Ninth Circuit then granted Martinez Gutierrez’s petition for review and remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of the court’s contrary decisions.. See 411 Fed. Appx. 121 (2011). Respondent Damien Sawyers was lawfully admitted as an LPR in October 1995, when he was 15 years old. At that time, his mother had already resided in the country for six consecutive years following a lawful entry. After Sawyers’s conviction of a drug offense in August 2002, the Government initiated removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge found Sawyers ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was a few months shy of the seven years of continuous residence required under § 1229b(a)(2). See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 10-1543, p. 13a. (No one doubted that Sawyers had by that time held LPR status for five years, as required under § 1229b(a)(l).) The Board affirmed, relying on its reasoning in Escobar. See In re Sawyers, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ], 2007 WL 4711443 (Dec. 26, 2007). Sawyers petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review, arguing that the Board should have counted his mother’s years of residency while he was a minor toward § 1229b(a)(2)’s 7-year requirement. As in Gutierrez, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and remanded the case to the BIA. See 399 Fed. Appx. 313 (2010). We granted the Government’s petitions for certiorari, 564 U. S. 1066 (2011), consolidated the cases, and now reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgments. II The Board has required each alien seeking cancellation of removal to satisfy §1229b(a)’s requirements on his own, without counting a parent’s years of continuous residence or LPR status. That position prevails if it is a reasonable construction of the statute, whether or not it is the only possible interpretation or even the one a court might think best. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-844, and n. 11 (1984); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 424-425 (1999) (according Chevron deference to the Board’s interpretations of the INA). We think the BIA’s view on imputation meets that standard, and so need not decide if the statute permits any other construction. The Board’s approach is consistent with the statute’s text, as even respondents tacitly concede. Section 1229b(a) does not mention imputation, much less require it. The provision calls for “the alien” — not, say, “the alien or one of his parents” — to meet the three prerequisites for cancellation of removal. Similarly, several of §1229b(a)’s other terms have statutory definitions referring to only a single individual. See, e. g., § 1101(a)(13)(A) (“The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States” (emphasis added)); § 1101(a)(33) (“The term ‘residence’ means the place of general abode; the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling” (emphasis added)). Respondents contend that none of this language “forecloses” imputation: They argue that if the Board allowed imputation, “[t]he alien” seeking cancellation would “still have to satisfy the provision’s durational requirements” — just pursuant to a different computational rule. Brief for Respondent Martinez Gutierrez in No. 10-1542, p. 16 (hereinafter Martinez Gutierrez Brief); see Brief for Respondent Sawyers in No. 10-1543, pp. 11,15 (hereinafter Sawyers Brief). And they claim that the Board’s history of permitting imputation under similarly “silent” statutes supports this construction. Martinez Gutierrez Brief 16; see Sawyers Brief 15-16; infra, at 594-596. But even if so — even if the Board could adopt an imputation rule consistent with the statute’s text — that would not avail respondents. Taken alone, the language of § 1229b(a) at least permits the Board to go the other way — to say that “the alien” must meet the statutory conditions independently, without relying on a parent’s history. For this reason, respondents focus on § 1229b(a)’s history and context — particularly, the provision’s relationship to the INA’s former § 212(c) and its associated imputation rule. Section 212(c) — §1229b(a)’s predecessor — generally allowed the Attorney General to prevent the removal of an alien with LPR status who had maintained a “lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years” in this country. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994 ed.). Like §1229b(a), §212(c) was silent on imputation. Yet the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits (the only appellate courts to consider the question) concluded that, in determining eligibility for relief under § 212(c), the Board should impute a parent’s years of domicile to his or her child. See Rosario v. INS, 962 F. 2d 220 (CA2 1992); Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F. 3d 1021, 1024-1026 (CA9 1994); Morel v. INS, 90 F. 3d 833, 840-842 (CA3 1996). Those courts reasoned that at common law, a minor’s domicile was “the same as that of its parents, since most children are presumed not legally capable of forming the requisite intent to establish their own domicile.” Rosario, 962 F. 2d, at 224; see Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30, 48 (1989) (defining “domicile” as “physical presence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one’s intent to remain there”). So by the time Congress replaced § 212(c) with § 1229b(a), the BIA often imputed a parent’s years of domicile to a child in determining eligibility for cancellation of removal. Sawyers argues that against this backdrop, Congress “would have understood the language it chose [in §1229b(a)] to provide for imputation.” Sawyers Brief 10. But we cannot conclude that Congress ratified an imputation requirement when it passed § 1229b(a). As all parties agree, Congress enacted §§ 1229b(a)(l) and (a)(2) to resolve an unrelated question about §212(c)’s meaning. See id., at 17; Martinez Gutierrez Brief 28; Brief for Petitioner 25. Courts had differed on whether an alien’s “seven consecutive years” of domicile under § 212(c) all had to post-date the alien’s obtaining LPR status. See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F. 3d, at 1027-1028 (canvassing split). Congress addressed that split by creating two distinct durational conditions: the 5-year status requirement of subsection (a)(1), which runs from the time an alien becomes an LPR, and the 7-year continuous-residency requirement of subsection (a)(2), which can include years preceding the acquisition of LPR status. In doing so, Congress eliminated the very term — “domicile” — on which the appeals courts had founded their imputation decisions. See supra, at 592. That alteration dooms respondents’ position, because the doctrine of congressional ratification applies only when Congress reenacts a statute without relevant change. See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 349 (2005). So the statutory history here provides no basis for holding that the BIA flouted a congressional command in adopting its no-imputation policy. Nor do the INA’s purposes demand imputation here, as both respondents claim. According to Martinez Gutierrez, the BIA’s approach contradicts that statute’s objectives of “providing relief to aliens with strong ties to the United States” and “promoting family unity.” Martinez Gutierrez Brief 40, 44; see Sawyers Brief 87. We agree — indeed, we have stated — that the goals respondents identify underlie or inform many provisions of immigration law. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 795, n. 6 (1977); INS v. Errico, 385 U. S. 214, 220 (1966). But they are not the INA’s only goals, and Congress did not pursue them to the nth degree. To take one example, § 1229b(a)’s third paragraph makes aliens convicted of aggravated felonies ineligible for cancellation of removal, regardless of the strength of their family ties. See § 122913(a)(3). And more generally — as these very cases show — not every alien who obtains LPR status can immediately get the same for her spouse or minor children. See Brief for Petitioner 31-32, and n. 9 (providing program-specific examples). We cannot read a silent statute as requiring (not merely allowing) imputation just because that rule would be family-friendly. Respondents’ stronger arguments take a different tack— that we should refuse to defer to the Board’s decision even assuming Congress placed the question of imputation in its hands. Respondents offer two main reasons. First, they contend that the Board’s approach to §1229b(a) cannot be squared with its acceptance of imputation under other, similar statutory provisions. This “wil[d]” and “ ‘[unexplained inconsistency,’” Sawyers asserts, is the very “paradigm of arbitrary agency action.” Sawyers Brief 13, 41 (emphasis deleted); see Martinez Gutierrez Brief 52-54. Second, they argue that the Board did not appreciate its own discretion over whether to allow imputation. The Board, they say, thought Congress had forbidden imputation, and so did not bring its “ ‘experience and- expertise to bear’ ” on the issue. Id., at 31 (quoting PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F. 3d 786, 797 (CADC 2004)); see Sawyers Brief 38-39. These arguments are not insubstantial, but in the end neither persuades us to deny the Board the usual deference we accord to agency interpretations. Start with the claim of inconsistency. The BIA has indeed imputed parental attributes to children under othér INA provisions that do not mention the matter. Section 1182(k), for example, enables the Attorney General to let certain inadmissible aliens into the country if he finds “that inadmissibility was not known to, and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence by, the immigrant before the time of departure.” Like § 1229b(a), that provision refers to a single person (“the immigrant”) and says nothing about imputation. But the BIA has consistently imputed a parent’s knowledge of inadmissibility (or lack thereof) to a child. See, e. g., Senica v. INS, 16 F. 3d 1013, 1015 (CA9 1994) (“Therefore, the BIA reasoned, the children were not entitled to relief under [§ 1182(k)] because [their mother’s] knowledge was imputed to them”); In re Mushtaq, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ], 2007 WL 4707539 (BIA, Dec. 10, 2007) (per curiam); In re Ahmed, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ], 2006 WL 448156 (BIA, Jan. 17, 2006) (per curiam). Similarly, the Board imputes a parent’s abandonment (or non-abandonment) of LPR status to her child when determining whether that child can reenter the country as a “returning resident immigran[t]” under § 1181(b). See Matter of Zamora, 17 I. & N. Dec. 395, 396 (1980) (holding that a “voluntary and intended abandonment by the mother is imputed” to an unemancipated minor child for purposes of applying § 1181(b)); Matter of Huang, 19 I. & N. Dec. 749, 755-756 (1988) (concluding that a mother and her children abandoned their LPR status based solely on the mother’s intent); In re Ali, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ], 2006 WL 3088820 (BIA, Sept. 11, 2006) (holding that a child could not have abandoned his LPR status if his mother had not abandoned hers). And once again, that is so even though neither § 1181(b) nor any other statutory provision says that the BIA should look to the parent in assessing the child’s eligibility for reentry. But Escobar provided a reasoned explanation for these divergent results: The Board imputes matters involving an alien’s state of mind, while declining to impute objective conT ditions or characteristics. See 24 I. & N. Bee., at 233-234, and n. 4. On one side of the line, knowledge of inadmissibility is all and only about a mental state. See, e. g., Senica, 16 F. 3d, at 1015; In re Ahmed, 2006 WL 448156. Likewise, abandonment of status turns on an alien’s “intention of . . . returning to the United States” to live as a permanent resident, Zamora, 17 I. & N. Dec., at 396; the Board thus explained that imputing abandonment is “consistent with the . . . longstanding policy that a child cannot form the intent necessary to establish his or her own domicile,” Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 234, n. 4. And as that analogy recalls, the 7-year domicile requirement of the former § 212(c) also involved intent and so lent itself to imputation. See Rosario, 962 F. 2d, at 224; supra, at 592. But the 5- and 7-year clocks of § 1229b(a) fall on the other side of the line, because they hinge not on any state of mind but on the objective facts of immigration status and place of residence. See Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 233 (“[W]e find that residence is different from domicile because it ‘contains no element of subjective intent’ ” (quoting Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F. 3d, at 1031 (Fernandez, J., dissenting))). The BIA’s varied rulings on imputation thus largely follow from one straightforward distinction. Similarly, Escobar belies respondents’ claim that the BIA adopted its no-imputation rule only because it thought Congress had left it no other choice. The Board, to be sure, did not highlight the statute’s gaps or ambiguity; rather, it read §1229b(a)’s text to support its conclusion that each alien must personally meet that section’s durational requirements. See 24 I. & N. Dec., at 235. But the Board also explained that “there [was] no precedent” in its decisions for imputing status or residence, and distinguished those statutory terms, on the ground just explained, from domicile or abandonment of LPR status. Id., at 284; see id., at 238-234, and n. 4. And the Board argued that allowing imputation under §1229b(a) would create anomalies in administration of the statutory scheme by permitting even those who had not obtained LPR status — or could not do so because of a criminal history — to become eligible for cancellation of removal. See id., at 234-235, and n. 5. The Board therefore saw neither a “logical” nor a “legal” basis for adopting a policy of imputation. Id., at 233. We see nothing in this decision to suggest that the Board thought its hands tied, or that it might have reached a different result if assured it could do so. To the contrary, the decision expressed the BIA’s view, based on its experience implementing the INA, that statutory text, administrative practice, and regulatory policy all pointed in one direction: toward disallowing imputation. In making that case, the decision reads like a multitude of agency interpretations — not the best example, but far from the worst— to which we and other courts have routinely deferred. We see no reason not to do so here. Because the Board’s rejection of imputation under § 1229b(a) is “based on a permissible construction of the statute,” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, we reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgments and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The INA defines “admitted” as referring to “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). The 7-year clock of § 1229b(a)(2) thus begins with an alien’s lawful entry. The 7-year clock, stopped running on the date of Cuevas-Gaspar’s offense under a statutory provision known as the “stop-time” rule. See § 1229b(d)(l) (“For purposes of this section, any period of continuous residence ... in the United States shall be deemed to end ... when the alien is served a notice to appear . . . or . . . when the alien has committed an offense . . . that renders the alien . . . removable from the United States ..., whichever is earliest”). Sawyers contends that § 1229b(a)(2)’s replacement term — “resided continuously” — is a “term of art” in the immigration context which incorporates “an intent component” and so means the same thing as “domiciled.” Sawyers Brief 25-26 (emphasis deleted). Thus, Sawyers argues, we should read § 1229b(a) as reenacting § 212(c) without meaningful change. See id., at 25. But even assuming that Congress could ratify judicial decisions based on the term “domicile” through a new statute using a synonym for that term, we do not think “resided continuously” qualifies. The INA defines “residence” as a person’s “principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent,” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(33) (emphasis added), and we find nothing to suggest that Congress added an intent element, inconsistent with that definition, by requiring that the residence have been maintained “continuously for 7 years.” Respondents aver that the BIA deviates from this principle in imputing to a child his parent’s “ ‘firm resettlement’ ” in another country, which renders an alien ineligible for asylum without regard to intent. See Sawyers Brief 39; Martinez Gutierrez Brief 52. • But the Government denies that it has a “settled imputation rule” in that context. Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. And the sources on which respondents rely are slender reeds: a 40-year-old ruling by a regional commissioner (not the Board itself) that considered the conduct of both the parents and the child, see Matter of Ng, 12 I. & N. Dec. 411 (1967), and a Ninth Circuit decision imputing a parent’s resettlement even though the Board had focused only on the child’s actions, see Vang v. INS, 146 F. 3d 1114, 1117 (1998). Based on these scant decisions, we cannot conclude that the Board has any policy on imputing resettlement, let alone one inconsistent with Escobar.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES et al. v. GUARDIANSHIP ESTATE OF KEFFELER et al. No. 01-1420. Argued December 3, 2002 Decided February 25, 2003 SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were William Berggren Collins, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Walter Dellinger, and Pamela Harris. Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCollum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William Ranter, and Jonathan H. Levy. Teresa Wynn Roseborough argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Deborah M. Danzig, Richard B. Price, and Rodney M. Reinbold. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Florida et al. by Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Thomas E. Warner, Solicitor General, and Matthew J. Conigliaro, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Fiti A Sunia of American Samoa, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Site Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, David Samson of New Jersey, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Anabelle Rodriguez of Puerto Rico, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, John Comyn of Texas, Mark L. Shwrtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia, Iver A Stridiron of the Virgin Islands, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and Hoke MacMillan of Wyoming; for the Counties of the State of California et al. by Lloyd W Pellman, Ada Gardiner, Catherine J. Pratt, Alan K. Marks, and Julie J. Surber; and for the Children’s Defense Fund et al. by Michael L. Martinez and David L. Haga. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for AARP by Rochelle Bobroff and Michael Schuster; and for Omar M. Azzam et al. by Douglas IT Grinnell, Donnie R. Cox, Dennis B. Atchley, and Paul W. Leehey. Marsha L. Levick filed a brief for the Juvenile Law Center et al. as amici curiae. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. At its own expense, the State of Washington provides foster care to certain children removed from their parents’ custody, and it also receives and manages Social Security benefits for many of the children involved, as permitted under the Social Security Act and regulations. The question here is whether the State’s use of Social Security benefits to reimburse itself for some of its initial expenditures violates a provision of the Social Security Act protecting benefits from “execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.” 42 U. S. C. § 407(a); see § 1383(d)(1). We hold that it does not. I A The federal money in question comes under one or the other of two titles of the Social Security Act. Title II, 49 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq., is the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) plan of benefits for elderly and disabled workers, and their survivors and dependents. A child may get OASDI payments if, say, the minor is unmarried and was dependent on a wage earner entitled to OASDI benefits. § 402(d). Title XVI of the Act, §1381 et seq., is the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) scheme of benefits for aged, blind, or disabled individuals, including children, whose income and assets fall below specified levels (the level for the latter currently being $2,000). §§1381-1382; 20 CFR § 416.1205(c) (2002). Although the Social Security Administration generally pays OASDI and SSI benefits directly, it may distribute them “for [a beneficiary’s] use and benefit” to another individual or entity as the beneficiary’s “ ‘representative payee.’ ” 42 U.S.C. §§4G5(j)(1)(A), 1383(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I); see 20 CFR §§404.2001, 404.2010, 416.601, 416.610. In the exercise of its rulemaking authority, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 405(a), (j)(2)(A)(ii), the Administration has given priority to a child’s parent, legal guardian, or relative when considering such an appointment. 20 CFR §§ 404.2021(b), 416.621(b). While the Act and regulations allow social service agencies and custodial institutions to serve in this capacity, such entities come last in order of preference. §§ 404.2021(b)(7), 416.621(b)(7); see also 42 U.S.C. §§405(j)(3)(F), 1383(a)(2)(D)(ii). Whoever the appointee may be, the Commissioner of Social Security must be satisfied that the particular appointment is “in the interest of” the beneficiary. §§405(j)(2)(A)(ii), 1383(a)(2)(B)(i)(II). Detailed regulations govern a representative payee’s use of benefits. Generally, a payee must expend funds “only for the use and benefit of the beneficiary,” in a way the payee determines “to be in the [beneficiary’s] best interests.” 20 CFR §§ 404.2035(a), 416.635(a). The regulations get more specific in providing that payments made for “current maintenance” are deemed to be “for the use and benefit of the beneficiary,” defining “current maintenance” to include “cost[s] incurred in obtaining food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items.” §§ 404.2040(a), 416.640(a). Although a representative payee “may not be required to use benefit payments to satisfy a debt of the beneficiary” that arose before the period the benefit payments are certified to cover, a payee may discharge such a debt “if the current and reasonably foreseeable needs of the beneficiary are met” and it is in the beneficiary’s interest to do so. §§ 404.2040(d), 416.640(d). Finally, if there are any funds left over after a representative payee has used benefits for current maintenance and other authorized purposes, the payee is required to conserve or invest the funds and to hold them in trust for the beneficiary. §§404.2046, 416.645. The Act requires a representative payee to provide the Commissioner with an accounting at least annually, 42 U. S. C. §§405(j)(3)(A), 1383(a)(2)(C)(i), and some institutional representative payees are liable to triennial onsite reviews by the Commissioner’s staff, see Social Security Admin., Increased Monitoring of Fee-for-Service and Volume Representative Payees, Policy Instruction EM-00072 (June 1,2000). In any case, the Commissioner may order a report any time she “has reason to believe” that a payee is misusing a beneficiary’s funds, §§405(j)(3)(D), 1383(a)(2)(C)(iv), a criminal offense that calls for revocation of the payee’s appointment, §§405(j)(1)(A), 408(a)(5), 1383(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1383a(a)(4); see 20 CFR §§404.2050, 416.650. B The State of Washington, through petitioner Department of Social and Health Services, makes foster care available to abandoned, abused, neglected, or orphaned children who have no guardians or other custodians able to care for them adequately. See Wash. Rev. Code §§13.34.030(5), 13.34.130(1)(b) (2002). Although the department provides foster care without strings attached to any child who needs it, the State's policy is “to attempt to recover the costs of foster care from the parents of [the] children,” 145 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 32 P. 3d 267, 269 (2001) (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 74.20A.010 (2001)), and to use “moneys and other funds” of the foster child to offset “the amount of public assistance otherwise payable,” §74.13.060. The department accordingly adopted a regulation providing that public benefits for a child, including benefits under SSI or OASDI, “shall be used on behalf of the child to help pay for the cost of the foster care received.” Wash. Admin. Code §388-70-069(1) (2001), repealed by Wash. St. Reg. 01-08-047 (Mar. 30, 2001). When the department receives Social Security benefits as representative payee for children in its care, it generally credits them to a special Foster Care Trust Fund Account kept by the state treasurer, which includes subsidiary accounts for each child beneficiary. When these accounts are debited, it is only rarely for a direct purchase by the State of a foster child’s food, clothing, and shelter. The usual purchaser is a foster care provider, who is then paid back by the department according to a fixed compensation schedule. Every month, the department compares its payments to the provider of a child’s care with the child’s subsidiary account balance, on which the department then draws to reimburse itself. Since the State’s outlay customarily exceeds a child’s monthly Social Security benefits, the reimbursement to the State usually leaves the account empty until the next federal benefit cheek arrives. The department occasionally departs from this practice, in the exercise of its discretion, to use the Social Security funds “for extra items or special needs” ranging from orthodontics, educational expenses, and computers, through athletic equipment and holiday presents. 145 Wash. 2d, at 12, 32 P. 3d, at 272. And there have also been exceptional instances in which the department has forgone reimbursement for foster care to conserve a child’s resources for expenses anticipated on impending emancipation. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A-57; App. 178. C As of September 1999, there were 10,578 foster children in the department’s care, some 1,500 of them receiving OASDI or SSI benefits. The Commissioner had appointed the department to serve as representative payee for almost all of the latter children, who are among respondents in this action brought on behalf of foster care children in the State of Washington who receive or have received OASDI or SSI benefits and for whom the department serves or has served as representative payee. In their 1995 class action filed in state court, they alleged, among other things, that the department’s use of their Social Security benefits to reimburse itself for the costs of foster care violated 42 U. S. C. §§ 407(a) and 1383(d)(1). Section 407(a), commonly called the Act’s “antiattachment” provision, provides that “[t]he right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.” Section 1383(d)(1) incorporates this provision by reference and applies it to Title XVI of the Act. Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court agreed with respondents. It enjoined the department from continuing to charge its costs of foster care against Social Security benefits, ordered restitution of previous reimbursement transfers, and awarded attorney’s fees to respondents. The department appealed to the State Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court of Washington. After remanding for further factfinding, the State Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s holding that the department’s practices violated the antiattachment provisions. Relying in part on Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U. S. 413 (1973), and Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U. S. 395 (1988) (per curiam), the state court reasoned that § 407(a) was intended to protect Social Security benefits from the claims of creditors, and consequently framed “the crucial question” as “[w]hether [the department] acts as a creditor when it reimburses itself for foster care costs out of the foster children’s [benefits].” 145 Wash. 2d, at 17, 32 P. 3d, at 275 (emphasis in original). Its answer was a slightly qualified yes, that the department’s “reimbursement scheme . . . involve[s] creditor-type acts,” performed by resort to the “ ‘other legal process’ ” barred by § 407(a). Id., at 18, 22, 25, 32 P. 3d, at 257, 277-278. The state court’s analysis not only gave no deference to the Commissioner’s regulations, but omitted any mention of the law governing rulemaking and interpretation by an administrative agency. Nor did the state court think it significant that it was the Commissioner of Social Security who had appointed the department to serve as representative payee for respondents’ Social Security benefits. See id., at 25, 32 P. 3d, at 278 (calling the department’s representative payee status “at best immaterial to the analysis”). To the contrary, the court ultimately reasoned that the department’s capacity as representative payee “further undercuts the legality of its reimbursement process” because a representative payee is charged with acting “ ‘in the best interests of the beneficiary.’” Id., at 24, 32 P. 3d, at 278 (emphasis in original) (quoting 20 CFR § 404.2035(a)). “We seriously doubt using [Social Security] benefits to reimburse the state for its public assistance expenditure is in all cases, or even some, ‘in the best interests of the beneficiary.’ ” 145 Wash. 2d, at 24, 32 P. 3d, at 278 (quoting § 404.2035(a)). Three justices concurred in part and dissented in part. They agreed with the majority that the department’s use of Social Security benefits for “past due foster care payments” violated the antiattachment provisions of the Act. Id., at 27, 32 P. 3d, at 279 (opinion of Bridge, J.) (emphasis in original). But they would have held that the department is entitled to use benefits to pay for “current maintenance costs, provided that any special needs of the children are satisfied first.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). After staying the State Supreme Court’s mandate, 535 U. S. 923 (2002), we granted certiorari, 535 U. S. 1094 (2002), and now reverse. II A Section 407(a) protects SSI and OASDI benefits from “execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.” The Supreme Court of Washington approached respondents’ claim by generalizing from this text and concluding that § 407(a) prohibits “creditor-type acts,” on which reading it held that the department’s reimbursement scheme was prohibited. The analysis was flawed. First, neither § 407(a) nor the Commissioner’s regulations interpreting that provision say anything about “creditors.” Cf. Philpott, supra, at 417 (“[Section] 407 does not refer to any ‘claim of creditors’; it imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits”). In fact, the Act and regulations to which we owe deference, see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984), not only permit certain creditors to serve as representative payees, 42 U. S. C. §§ 405(j)(2)(C)(iii), 1383(a)(2)(B)(v), but allow a representative payee to satisfy even old debts of a beneficiary so long as current and reasonably foreseeable needs will be met and reimbursement is in the beneficiary’s interest, 20 CFR §§ 404.2040(d), 416.640(d). Finally, as the Supreme Court of Washington apparently recognized (in qualifying its characterization of “creditor relationship” by referring to the department’s acts as merely “creditor-type”), the department is simply not a creditor of the foster care children for whom it serves as representative payee. No law provides that they are liable to repay the department for the costs of their care, and the State of Washington makes no such claim. The questions to be answered in resolving this case, then, do not go to the State’s character as a creditor. The questions, instead, are whether the department’s effort to become a representative payee, or its use of respondents’ Social Security benefits when it acts in that capacity, amounts to employing an “execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process” within the meaning of § 407(a). For obvious reasons, respondents do not contend that the department’s activities involve any execution, levy, attachment, or garnishment. These legal terms of art refer to formal procedures by which one person gains a degree of control over property otherwise subject to the control of another, and generally involve some form of judicial authorization. See, e. g., Black’s Law Dictionary 123 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “provisional attachment” as a “prejudgment attachment in which the debtor’s property is seized so that if the creditor ultimately prevails, the creditor will be assured of recovering on the judgment.... Ordinarily, a hearing must be held before the attachment takes place”); id., at 689 (defining “garnishment” as “[a] judicial proceeding in which a creditor (or potential creditor) asks the court to order a third party who is indebted to or is bailee for the debtor to turn over to the creditor any of the debtor’s property”). The department’s efforts to become a representative payee and to use respondents’ benefits do not even arguably employ any of these traditional procedures. Thus, the case boils down to whether the department’s manner of gaining control of the federal funds involves “other legal process,” as the statute uses that term. That restriction to the statutory usage of “other legal process” is important here, for in the abstract the department does use legal process as the avenue to reimbursement: by a federal legal process the Commissioner appoints the department a representative payee, and by a state legal process the department makes claims against the accounts kept by the state treasurer. The statute, however, uses the term “other legal process” far more restrictively, for under the established interpretative canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, “ ‘[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 114-115 (2001); see Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U. S. 250, 255 (2000) (“[W]ords ... are known by their companions”); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961) (“The maxim noscitur a sociis . . . is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress”)- Thus, “other legal process” should be understood to be process much like the processes of execution, levy, attachment, and garnishment, and at a minimum, would seem to require utilization of some judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism, though not necessarily an elaborate one, by which control over property passes from one person to another in order to discharge or secure discharge of an allegedly existing or anticipated liability. In this case, the product of these canons of construction is confirmed by legal guidance in the Commissioner’s own interpretation of “legal process.” The Social Security Administration’s Program Operations Manual System (POMS), the publicly available operating instructions for processing Social Security claims, defines “legal process” as used in § 407(a) as “the means by which a court (or agency or official authorized by law) compels compliance with its demand; generally, it is a court order.” POMS GN 02410.001 (2002), available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/aboutpoms (as visited Jan. 23, 2003) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Elsewhere in the POMS, the Commissioner defines “legal process” similarly as “any writ, order, summons or other similar process in the nature of garnishment. It may include, but is not limited to, an attachment, writ of execution, income execution order or wage assignment that is issued by ... [a] court of competent jurisdiction ... [or a]n authorized official pursuant to an order of a court of competent jurisdiction or pursuant to State or local law . . . [a]nd is directed to a governmental entity.” POMS GN 02410.200 (emphasis added). While these administrative interpretations are not products of formal rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect in closing the door on any suggestion that the usual rules of statutory construction should get short shrift for the sake of reading “other legal process” in abstract breadth. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140 (1944); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 228, 234-235 (2001). On this restrictive understanding of “other legal process,” it is apparent that the department’s efforts to become respondents’ representative payee and its use of respondents’ benefits in that capacity involve nothing of the sort. Whereas the object of the processes specifically named is to discharge, or secure discharge of, some enforceable obligation, the State has no enforceable claim against its foster children. And although execution, levy, attachment, and garnishment typically involve the exercise of some sort of judicial or-quasi-judicial authority to gain control over another’s property, the department’s reimbursement scheme operates on funds already in the department’s possession and control, held on terms that allow the reimbursement. The regulations previously quoted specify that payments made for a beneficiary’s “current maintenance” are deemed to be “for the use and benefit of the beneficiary,” and define “current maintenance” to include “cost[s] incurred in obtaining food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items.” 20 CFR §§ 404.2040(a), 416.640(a). There is no question that the state funds to be reimbursed were spent for items of “current maintenance,” and although the State typically makes the accounting reimbursement two months after spending its own funds, this practice is consistent with the regulation’s definition of “current maintenance” as “costs incurred” for food and the like. That the State is dealing with the funds consistently with Social Security regulations is confirmed by the Commissioner’s own interpretation of those regulations as allowing reimbursement by a representative payee for maintenance costs, at least for costs incurred after the first benefit payment is made to the payee. Cf. POMS GN 00602.030 (defining a “past debt,” which may be satisfied only if a beneficiary’s current and reasonably foreseeable needs are met, as “a debt the beneficiary incurred before the date of the first benefit payment is made to the current payee”). The Government has gone even further to support this as a reasonable interpretation, text aside, owing to significant advantages of the reimbursement method in providing accurate documentation and allowing for easy monitoring of representative payees in administering Social Security. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28-29. In fact, it would be hard not to see this type of slightly delayed reimbursement as the only way OASDI funds could be spent on a foster child’s current maintenance, since the Administration disburses those Social Security benefits with a time lag. See POMS GN 02401.001 (noting that OASDI benefits are dispensed within the month after they are due). In short, the Commissioner’s interpretation of her own regulations is eminently sensible and should have been given deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461 (1997). The Supreme Court of Washington rested its contrary conclusion, in part, on our decisions in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U. S. 413 (1973), and Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U. S. 395 (1988) (per curiam). But both Philpott and Bennett involved judicial actions in which a State sought to attach a beneficiary’s Social Security benefits as reimbursement for the costs of the beneficiary’s care and maintenance. See Philpott, supra, at 415 (“Respondent sued to reach the bank account”); Bennett, supra, at 396 (“The State filed separate actions in state court seeking to attach Social Security benefits”). In each case, we held that the plain language of § 407(a) barred the State’s legal action, and refused to find an implied exception to the antiattachment provision for a State simply because it provides for the care and maintenance of a beneficiary. See Philpott, supra, at 416; Bennett, supra, at 397. Unlike the present case, then, both Philpott and Bennett involved forms of legal process expressly prohibited by § 407(a). In neither case was the State acting as a representative payee in seeking to use the funds as reimbursement for the costs incurred in providing for the beneficiary’s care and maintenance. B The poor fit between § 407(a) and respondents’ argument points to the real basis of their objections to the reimbursement practice. At bottom, respondents’ position and the State Supreme Court’s holding reflect a view that allowing a state agency to reimburse itself for the costs of foster care is antithetical to the best interest of the beneficiary foster child. See 145 Wash. 2d, at 17, 32 P. 3d, at 275 (contending that a foster child “is better off with any payee other than the [department] because [the department] must provide foster care under state law regardless of whether it receives a reimbursement” (emphasis in original)); id., at 24, 32 P. 3d, at 278 (“We seriously doubt using [Social Security] benefits to reimburse the state for its public assistance expenditure is in all cases, or even some, ‘in the best interests of the beneficiary’ ” (quoting 20 CFR § 404.2035(a))). Although it is true that the State could not directly compel the beneficiary or any other representative payee to pay Social Security benefits over to the State, that fact does not render the appointment of a self-reimbursing representative payee at odds with the Commissioner’s mandate to find that a beneficiary’s “interest... would be served” by the appointment. 42 U. S. C. §§405(j)(1)(A), 1383(a)(2)(A)(ii)(X). Respondents’ premise that promoting the “best interests” of a beneficiary requires maximizing resources from left-over benefit income ignores the settled principle of administrative law that an open-ended and potentially vague term is highly susceptible to administrative interpretation subject to judicial deference. See Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842-843. Under her statutory authority, the Commissioner has read the “interest” of the beneficiary in light of the basic objectives of the Act: to provide a “minimum level of income” to children who would not “have sufficient income and resources to maintain a standard of living at the established Federal minimum income level,” 20 CFR §416.110 (SSI); see also Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U. S. 521, 524 (1990), and to provide workers and their families the “income required for ordinary and necessary living expenses,” § 404.508(a) (OASDI); see also Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 50 (1977). The Commissioner, that is, has decided that a representative payee serves the beneficiary’s interest by seeing that basic needs are met, not by maximizing a trust fund attributable to fortuitously overlapping state and federal grants. This judgment is not only obviously within the bounds of the reasonable, but one confirmed by the demonstrably antithetical character of respondents’ position to the best interest of many foster care children. SSI beneficiaries would be most obviously subject to threat, since eligibility for benefits of these child recipients is lost if their assets creep above a certain minimal level, currently $2,000. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1382(a)(1)(B), (3)(B); 20 CFR § 416.1205(c). Many foster children would lose SSI benefits altogether if respondents prevailed. See Brief for Children’s Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae 20; Brief for Counties of the State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 16-18. But foster children beneficiaries under both SSI and OASDI would suffer from a broader disadvantage. Respondents’ argument forgets the fact that public institutions like the department are last in the line of eligibility for appointment as representative payees; the Commissioner appoints them only when no one else will do. See 20 CFR §§ 404.2021(b), 416.621(b). If respondents had their way, however, public offices like the department might well not be there to serve as payees even as the last resort, for there is reason to believe that if state agencies could not use Social Security benefits to reimburse the State in funding current costs of foster care, many States would be discouraged from accepting appointment as representative payees by the administrative costs of acting in that capacity. See Brief for Children’s Defense Fund, supra, at 21; Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae 7. And without such agencies to identify children eligible for federal benefits and to help them qualify, see Brief for Children’s Defense Fund, supra, at 20-24; Brief for State of Florida, supra, at 3-5; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17, many eligible children would either obtain no Social Security benefits or need some very good luck to get them. With a smaller total pool of money for their potential use, the chances of having funds for genuine needs beyond immediate support would obviously shrink, to the children’s loss. Respondents’ position, in sum, would tend to produce worse representative payees in these cases, with less money to spend. III The department’s reimbursement from respondents’ Social Security benefits does not violate § 407(a). The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Prior to making an appointment, the Commissioner must verify the potential representative payee’s identity, connection to the beneficiary, and lack of relevant criminal record or prior misuse of Social Security funds. §§405(j)(2)(B), 1383(a)(2)(B)(ii); see 20 CFR §§404.2025, 416.625. The Commissioner must also attempt to identify any other potential representative payee whose appointment may be preferred. 42 U. S. C. §§ 405(j)(2)(A)(ii), 1383(a)(2)(B)(i)(II); see 20 CFR §§404.2020, 416.620. In addition, the Commissioner is required to notify the beneficiary or the beneficiary's legal guardian of her intention to appoint a representative payee. 42 U.S.C. §§405(j)(2)(E)(ii), 1383(a)(2)(B)(xii); see 20 CFR §§404.2030,416.630. “Any individual who is dissatisfied ... with the designation of a particular person to serve as representative payee shall be entitled to a hearing by the Commissioner,” with judicial review available thereafter. 42 U. S. C. §§ 405(j)(2)(E)(i), 1383(a)(2)(B)(xi). In April 2001, the department repealed §388-70-069 and replaced it with a functionally similar provision. The new regulation provides that the department “must use income not exempted to cover the child’s cost of care.” Wash. Admin. Code § [ XXX-XX-XXXX ]. Of the 1,480 children in foster care as of September 1999 who were receiving Social Security benefits, 923 were receiving SSI benefits, 469 were receiving OASDI benefits, and 88 were receiving both, and the department acted as representative payee for 1,411. In light of this holding, the State Supreme Court did not address respondents’ other arguments, including the contention, accepted in the alternative by the trial court, that the department violated procedural due process by failing to provide notice of the ‘“intended result’” of its appointment as representative payee. 145 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 32 P. 3d 267, 274 (2001) (quoting Memorandum Opinion, No. 96-2-00157-2 (Wash. Super. Ct., Okanogan Cty., Sept. 29, 1998), p. 8, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-130). The State Supreme Court ultimately remanded for further consideration of the scope and basis for awarding attorney’s fees. Our jurisdiction, which is premised on a “[f]inal judgmen[t] or decre[e]” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a), is unaffected by this disposition. See Pierce County v. Guillen, ante, at 142-143. Respondents have apparently never argued that the reimbursement violates the § 407(a) bar to “transfe[r]” of benefits; nor would such a claim seem to hold any promise on the facts here. Respondents do, however, contend that the department’s budgeting in anticipation of receiving Social Security benefits constitutes an “assign[ment]” prohibited by § 407(a). Congress could hardly have intended for this sort of budgeting, done by private and public representative payees alike, to run afoul of the antiat-tachment provisions of the Act, particularly since the Administration makes OASDI payments with a 1-month lag. See infra, at 387. To the extent that the text of § 407(a) is ambiguous on this score, the Commissioner’s interpretation of the provision to permit such budgeting requires deference. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140 (1944). Quite apart from any consequence of the interpretive canons discussed in the succeeding text, the mere fact of the department’s appointment as representative payee could not reasonably be taken to contravene the antiattachment provision, contrary to respondents’ suggestion. As already noted, the department’s appointment is consistent with the sections of the Act governing appointment of representative payees, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 405(j)(2)(C), (3)(B) and (F), (4)(B), 1383(a)(2)(B)(v), (vii)(II), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), and with the Commissioner’s regulations interpreting that section to authorize appointment of custodial institutions as a last resort, see 20 CFR §§404.2021(b)(7), 416.621(b)(7). To suggest that the department’s appointment as representative payee, under the same statutory scheme that forbids the use of “other legal process,” is itself forbidden legal process disregards the “cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole,” King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991), and ignores the Commissioner’s reasonable regulations implementing the Act. See King v. Schafer, 940 F. 2d 1182, 1185 (CA8 1991) (“We cannot believe Congress contemplated this result in enacting § 407(a), particularly when this result would be contrary to another provision of the Social Security Act: §405(j), providing for the appointment of representative payees”), cert. denied sub nom. Crytes v. Schafer, 502 U. S. 1095 (1992); 940 F. 2d, at 1185 (“Section 407(a) was not intended to outlaw a procedure expressly authorized by the Social Security Administration’s own regulations”). In arguing that § 407(a) applies here, respondents rely in part on § 407(b), which provides that “[n]o other provision of law .. . may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.” Given our conclusion that § 407(a), by its terms, does not apply, however, respondents’ reliance is misplaced. There is one exception to this rule, although it is not relevant for our present purposes. In October 1996, Congress amended 42 U. S. C. § 1383 to specify that when the Administration issues a retroactive lump sum payment of SSI benefits that exceeds six times the monthly benefit amount, that amount is to be deposited directly into a dedicated interest-bearing bank account to be used only for certain special needs. § 1383(a)(2)(F). Moreover, as the Government notes, the position of the Supreme Court of Washington and respondents is ultimately “one of empty formalism” because a State could, indisputably, use a foster child’s Social Security benefits directly for the costs of care and then reduce the State’s own funding by the same amount. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. The financial result would be the same as in the system currently used by the department, yet the practical advantages of the reimbursement method of accounting would be lost. It bears mentioning that nothing in the State Supreme Court’s reasoning limits its holding to state agencies. The state court’s logic would apply equally to parents serving as representative payees, since they, like the department, are under a legal obligation to support their children’s basic needs irrespective of Social Security benefits. See, e. g., Wash. Rev. Code § 74.20A.010 (2002). We find it hard to believe that Congress would have intended this result, which would likely impose onerous and absurd accounting requirements on parents. See, e.g., Mellies v. Mellies, 249 Kan. 28, 33, 815 P. 2d 114, 117 (1991) (holding that a parent “had no obligation to exhaust his personal finances in providing for [his child’s] support before spending any of [the child’s] social security benefits on the child’s maintenance”); In re Guardianship of Nelson, 547 N. W. 2d 105, 108, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that because Social Security benefits are “not a windfall” for the beneficiary, “a representative payee parent can use his or her child’s social security survivor benefits for the child’s current maintenance regardless of the parent’s financial ability to meet those needs”). Respondents also go beyond the § 407(a) issue to argue that the department violates § 405(j) itself, by, for example, failing to exercise discretion in how it uses benefits, periodically “sweeping” beneficiaries’ accounts to pay for past care, and “double dipping” by using benefits to reimburse the State for costs previously recouped from other sources. These allegations, and respondents’ §405(j) stand-alone arguments more generally, are far afield of the question on which we granted certiorari. Moreover, constitutional claims aside, respondents’ complaint and the class-action certification related only to § 407(a). Accordingly, we decline to reach respondents’ § 405(j) arguments here, except insofar as they relate to the proper interpretation of § 407(a). Respondents are free to press their standalone § 405(j) arguments before the Commissioner, who bears responsibility for overseeing representative payees, or elsewhere as appropriate. The Act does allow a state representative payee to use the lesser of 10 percent of monthly benefits or $25 per month to offset administrative expenses. See 42 U. S. C. §§405(j)(4)(A)(i), 1383(a)(2)(D)(i). Nevertheless, at least with respect to SSI, many States spend considerably more to identify eligible foster children and assist them in obtaining benefits. According to the department, for example, the process of screening potential SSI applicants among foster children and applying for benefits on their behalf involves 27 staff members and costs $1.9 million annually. See Application to Reeall and Stay the Mandate of the Supreme Court of Washington Pending Certiorari, No. 01A557, pp. 18-19. For this reason, the department has said that it would not seek to become the representative payee for SSI beneficiaries absent an ability to use benefits to recoup some costs. See ibid.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. WIESENFELD No. 73-1892. Argued January 20, 1975 Decided March 19, 1975 Keith A. Jones argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Hills, and Danny J. Boggs. Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was Melvin L. Wulf Nancy Stearns filed a brief for the Center for Constitutional Rights as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Social Security Act benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father covered by the Act are payable, with some limitations, both to the widow and to the couple's minor children in her care. § 202 (g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (g). Such benefits are payable on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife and mother covered by the Act, however, only to the minor children and not to the widower. The question in this case is whether this gender-based distinction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A three-judge District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the different treatment of men and women mandated by § 402 (g) unjustifiably discriminated against female wage earners by affording them less protection for their survivors than is provided to male employees. 367 F. Supp. 981, 991 (1973). We noted probable jurisdiction, 419 U. S. 822 (1974). We affirm. I Appellee Stephen C. Wiesenfeld and Paula Polatschek were married on November 15, 1970. Paula, who worked as a teacher for five years before her marriage, continued teaching after her marriage. Each year she worked, maximum social security contributions were deducted from her salary. Paula’s earnings were the couple’s principal source of support during the marriage, being substantially larger than those of appellee. On June 5, 1972, Paula died in childbirth. Appellee was left with the sole responsibility for the care of their infant son, Jason Paul. Shortly after his wife’s death, Stephen Wiesenfeld applied at the Social Security office in New Brunswick, N. J., for social security survivors’ benefits for himself and his son. He did obtain benefits for his son under 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d) (1970 ed. and Supp. Ill), and received for Jason $206.90 per month until September 1972, and $248.30 per month thereafter. However, appellee was told that he was not eligible for benefits for himself, because § 402 (g) benefits were available only to women. If he had been a woman, he would have received the same amount as his son as long as he was not working, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 (d)(2) and (g) (2), and, if working, that amount reduced by $1 for every $2 earned annually above $2,400. 42 U. S. C. §§ 403 (b) and (f). Appellee filed this suit in February 1973, claiming jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, on behalf of himself and of all widowers similarly situated. He sought a declaration that § 402 (g) is unconstitutional to the extent that men and women are treated differently, an injunction restraining appellant from denying benefits under § 402 (g) solely on the basis of sex, and payment of past benefits commencing with June 1972, the month of the original application. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. After the three-judge court determined that it had jurisdiction, it granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, and issued an order giving appellee the relief he sought. II The gender-based distinction made by § 402 (g) is indistinguishable from that invalidated in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973). Frontiero involved statutes which provided the wife of a male serviceman with dependents’ benefits but not the husband of a servicewoman unless she proved that she supplied more than one-half of her husband’s support. The Court held that the statutory scheme violated the right to equal protection secured by the Fifth Amendment. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975), explained: “In . . . Fron-tiero the challenged [classification] based on sex [was] premised on overbroad generalizations that could not be tolerated under the Constitution. . . . [T]he assumption . . . was that female spouses of servicemen would normally be dependent upon their husbands, while male spouses of servicewomen would not.” Id., at 507. A virtually identical “archaic and overbroad” generalization, id., at 508, “not . . . tolerated under the Constitution” underlies the distinction drawn by § 402 (g), namely, that male workers’ earnings are vital to the support of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not significantly contribute to their families’ support. Section 402 (g) was added to the Social Security Act in 1939 as one of a large number of amendments designed to “afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit.” H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1939). Monthly benefits were provided to wives, children, widows, orphans, and surviving dependent parents of covered workers. Ibid. However, children of covered female workers were eligible for survivors’ benefits only in limited circumstances, see n. 5, supra, and no benefits whatever were made available to husbands or widowers on the basis of their wives’ covered employment. Underlying the 1939 scheme was the principle that “[u]nder a social-insurance plan the primary purpose is to pay benefits in accordance with the probable needs of the beneficiaries rather than to make payments to the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether or not he leaves dependents.” H. R. Rep. No. 728, supra, at 7. (Emphasis supplied.) It was felt that “ [t]he payment of these survivorship benefits and supplements for the wife of an annuitant are ... in keeping with the principle of social insurance . . . .” Ibid. Thus, the framers of the Act legislated on the “then generally accepted presumption that a man is responsible for the support of his wife and children.” D. Hoskins & L. Bixby, Women and Social Security: Law and Policy in Five Countries, Social Security Administration Research Report No. 42, p. 77 (1973). Obviously, the notion that men are more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 354 n. 7 (1974). But such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support. Section 402 (g) clearly operates, as did the statutes invalidated by our judgment in Frontiero, to deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of their employment. Indeed, the classification here is in some ways more pernicious. First, it was open to the servicewoman under the statutes invalidated in Frontiero to prove that her husband was in fact dependent upon her. Here, Stephen Wiesenfeld was not given the opportunity to show, as may well have been the case, that he was dependent upon his wife for his support, or that, had his wife lived, she would have remained at work while he took over care of the child. Second, in this case social security taxes were deducted from Paula’s salary during the years in which she worked. Thus, she not only failed to receive for her family the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received, but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others. Since the Constitution forbids the gender-based differentiation premised upon assumptions as to dependency made in the statutes before us in Frontiero, the Constitution also forbids the gender-based differentiation that results in the efforts of female workers required to pay social security taxes producing less protection for their families than is produced by the efforts of men. I — I h-I \ — Í Appellant seeks to avoid this conclusion with two related arguments. First, he claims that because social security benefits are not compensation for work done, Congress is not obliged to provide a covered female employee with the same benefits as it provides to a male. Second, he contends that § 402 (g) was “reasonably designed to offset the adverse economic situation of women by providing a widow with financial assistance to supplement or substitute for her own efforts in the marketplace,” Brief for Appellant 14, and therefore does not contravene the equal protection guarantee. A Appellant relies for the first proposition primarily on Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603 (1960). We held in Flemming that the interest of a covered employee in future social security benefits is “noncontractual,” because “each worker's benefits, though flowing from the contributions he made to the national economy while actively employed, are not dependent on the degree to which he was called upon to support the system by taxation.” Id., at 609-610. Appellant apparently contends that since benefits derived from the social security program do not correlate necessarily with contributions made to the program, a covered employee has no right whatever to be treated equally with other employees as regards the benefits which flow from his or her employment. We do not see how the fact that social security benefits are “noncontractual” can sanction differential protection for covered employees which is solely gender based. From the outset, social security old age, survivors’, and disability (OASDI) benefits have been “afforded as a matter of right, related to past participation in the productive processes of the country.” Final Report of the Advisory Council on Social Security 17 (1938). It is true that social security benefits are not necessarily related directly to tax contributions, since the OASDI system is structured to provide benefits in part according to presumed need. For this reason, Flemming held that the position of a covered employee “cannot be soundly analogized to that of the holder of an annuity, whose right to benefits is bottomed on his contractual premium payments.” 363 U. S., at 610. But the fact remains that the statutory right to benefits is directly related to years worked and amount earned by a covered employee, and not to the need of the beneficiaries directly. Since OASDI benefits do depend significantly upon the participation in the work force of a covered employee, and since only covered employees and not others are required to pay taxes toward the system, benefits must be distributed according to classifications which do not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered employees solely on the basis of sex. B Appellant seeks to characterize the classification here as one reasonably designed to compensate women beneficiaries as a group for the economic difficulties which still confront women who seek to support themselves and their families. The Court held in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S., at 355, that a statute “reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden” can survive an equal protection attack. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975). But the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme. Here, it is apparent both from the statutory scheme itself and from the legislative history of § 402 (g) that Congress’ purpose in providing benefits to young widows with children was not to provide an income to women who were, because of economic discrimination, unable to provide for themselves. Rather, § 402 (g), linked as it is directly to responsibility for minor children, was intended to permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care of children. Since this purpose in no way is premised upon any special disadvantages of women, it cannot serve to justify a gender-based distinction which diminishes the protection afforded to women who do work. That the purpose behind § 402 (g) is to provide children deprived of one parent with the opportunity for the personal attention of the other could not be more clear in the legislative history. The Advisory Council on Social Security, which developed the 1939 amendments, said explicitly that “[s]uch payments [under §402 (g)] are intended as supplements to the orphans' benefits with the purpose of enabling the widow to remain at home and care for the children.” Final Report of the Advisory Council on Social Security 31 (1938). (Emphasis supplied.) In 1971, a new Advisory Council, considering amendments to eliminate the various gender-based distinctions in the OASDI structure, reiterated this understanding : “Present law provides benefits for the mother of young . . . children ... if she chooses to stay home and care for the children instead of working. In the Council’s judgment, it is desirable to allow a woman who is left with the care of the children the choice of whether to stay at home to care for the children or to work.” 1971 Advisory Council on Social Security, Reports on the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Medicare Programs 30 (hereinafter 1971 Reports). (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, consideration was given in 1939 to extending benefits to all widows regardless of whether or not there were minor children. The proposal was rejected, apparently because it was felt that young widows without children can be expected to work, while middle-aged widows “are likely to have more savings than younger widows and many of them have children who are grown and able to help them.” Report of the Social Security Board, H. R. Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1939). See also Final Report of the Advisory Council on Social Security 31 (1938); Hearings on the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 61,1217, 2169-2170; H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 36-37 (1939). Thus, Congress decided not to provide benefits to all widows even though it was recognized that some of them would have serious problems in the job market. Instead, it provided benefits only to those women who had responsibility for minor children, because it believed that they should not be required to work. The whole structure of survivors’ benefits conforms to this articulated purpose. Widows without minor children obtain no benefits on the basis of their husband’s earnings until they reach age 60 or, in certain instances of disability, age 50. 42 U. S. C. §§402 (e)(1) and (5). Further, benefits under § 402 (g) cease when all children of a beneficiary are no longer eligible for children’s benefits. If Congress were concerned with providing women with benefits because of economic discrimination, it would be entirely irrational to except those women who had spent many years at home rearing children, since those women are most likely to be without the skills required to succeed in the job market. See Walker, Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 Hastings L. J. 277, 278-279 (1971); Hearings, supra, at 61 (remarks of Dr. Altemeyer, Chairman, Social Security Board); Report of the Committee on Social Insurance and Taxes, The President’s Commission on the Status of Women 31-32 (1963). Similarly, the Act now provides benefits to a surviving divorced wife who is the parent of a covered employee's child, regardless of how long she was married to the deceased or of whether she or the child was dependent upon the employee for support. §§ 402 (g), 416 (d)(3). Yet, a divorced wife who is not the mother of a child entitled to children’s benefits is eligible for benefits only if she meets other eligibility requirements and was married to the covered employee for 20 years. §§ 402 (b) and (e), 416(d). Once again, this distinction among women is explicable only because Congress was not concerned in § 402 (g) with the employment problems of women generally but with the principle that children of covered employees are entitled to the personal attention of the surviving parent if that parent chooses not to work. Given the purpose of enabling the surviving parent to remain at home to care for a child, the gender-based distinction of § 402 (g) is entirely irrational. The classification discriminates among surviving children solely on the basis of the sex of the surviving parent. Even in the typical family hypothesized by the Act, in which the husband is supporting the family and the mother is caring for the children, this result makes no sense. The fact that a man is working while there is a wife at home does not mean that he would, or should be required to, continue to work if his wife dies. It is no less important for a child to be cared for by its sole surviving parent when that parent-is male rather than female. And a father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally protected right to the “companionship, care, custody, and management” of “the children he has sired and raised, [which] undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972). Further, to the extent that women who work when they have sole responsibility for children encounter special problems, it would seem that men with sole responsibility for children will encounter the same child-care related problems. Stephen Wiesenfeld, for example, found that providing adequate care for his infant son impeded his ability to work, see n. 7, supra. Finally, to the extent that Congress legislated on the presumption that women as a group would choose to forgo work to care for children while men would not, the statutory structure, independent of the gender-based classification, would deny or reduce benefits to those men who conform to the presumed norm and are not hampered by their child-care responsibilities. Benefits under § 402 (g) decrease with increased earnings, see, supra, at 641. According to appellant, “the bulk of male workers would receive no benefits in any event,” Brief for Appellant 17 n. 11, because they earn too much. Thus, the gender-based distinction is gratuitous; without it, the statutory scheme would only provide benefits to those men who are in fact similarly situated to the women the statute aids. Since the gender-based classification of § 402 (g) cannot be explained as an attempt to provide for the special problems of women, it is indistinguishable from the classification held invalid in Frontiero. Like the statutes there, “[b]y providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated, the challenged section violates the [Due Process] Clause.” Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 77 (1971). Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 402 (g) is headed “Mother’s insurance benefits.” It provides in pertinent part: “(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother (as defined in section 416 (d) of this title) of an individual who died a fully or currently insured individual, if such widow or surviving divorced mother— “(A) is not married, “(B) is not entitled to a widow’s insurance benefit, “(C) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than three-fourths of the primary insurance amount of such individual, “(D) has filed application for mother’s insurance benefits, or was entitled to wife’s insurance benefits on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of such individual for the month preceding the month in which he died, “(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a child of such individual entitled to a child’s insurance benefit . . . shall ... be entitled to a mother’s insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which she becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending with the month preceding the first month in which any of the following occurs: no child of such deceased individual is entitled to a child’s insurance benefit, such widow or surviving divorced mother becomes entitled to an old-age insurance benefit equal to or exceeding three-fourths of the primary insurance amount of such deceased individual, she becomes entitled to a widow’s insurance benefit, she remarries, or she dies. . . .” The terms “fully” and “currently” insured are defined in 42 U. S. C. § 414. See n. 3, infra. " [W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.’ ” Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 637 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973). Thus, Paula Wiesenfeld was “currently insured” when she died, see n. 1, supra, because she had “not less than six quarters of coverage during the thirteen-quarter period ending with (1) the quarter in which [she] died.” 42 U. S. C. §414 (b). In 1970, Paula earned $9,808, and Stephen earned $3,100 as a self-employed consultant; in 1971, Paula earned $10,686 and Stephen $2,188; in 1972, Paula earned $6,836.35 before she died, and Stephen $2,475 for the entire year. Stephen completed his education before the marriage. Section 402 (d) is headed “Child’s insurance benefits” and provides in pertinent part as follows: “Every child ... of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child— “(A) has filed application for child’s insurance benefits, “(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age of 22, or (ii) is under a disability (as defined in section 423 (d) of this title) which began before he attained the age of 22, and “(C) was dependent upon such individual— “(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death . . . to a child’s insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which such child becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending with the month preceding whichever of the following first occurs— “(D) the month in which such child dies or marries, “(E) the month in which such child attains the age of 18, but only if he (i) is not under a disability (as so defined) at the time he attains such age, and (ii) is not a full-time student during any part of such month.” Thus, child’s insurance benefits are now available without regard to whether the worker upon whose earnings benefits are based is the mother or father. This was not always the case. Originally, a child could receive benefits based on his mother’s earnings only if he had not been living with his father and was being supported solely by his mother. Social Security Amendments of Aug. 10, 1939, § 202 (c), 53 Stat. 1364. This provision was amended in 1950 to provide automatic entitlement to otherwise eligible children of women workers who were currently insured, see nn. 1 and 3, supra, when they died, but retaining dependency qualifications if the mother's covered employment was not recent. Social Security Amendments of Aug. 28, 1950, § 101 (a), amending § 202 (d), 64 Stat. 483. In 1967, children of women workers were made eligible for children’s benefits on exactly the same criteria applied to children of male workers. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. 90-248, § 151, 81 Stat. 860. Appellee said in an affidavit that he was told orally at the Social Security office that he could not file an application for benefits on his own behalf. The appellant Secretary does not dispute that the request for benefits was orally made and orally denied. Tr. of Oral Arg. before District Court, June 20, 1973, p. 45; 367 F. Supp. 981, 985 n. 5. Stephen Wiesenfeld was employed until October 1972. However, since he earned $2,475 for the entire year 1972, n. 4, supra, he apparently would have been eligible for benefits, were he a woman, from June 1972 until he obtained employment again on February 5, 1973, at a salary of $1,500 per month. This lawsuit was filed on February 24, 1973. On September 14, 1973, appellee was dismissed from his position, so that he was unemployed and again eligible for benefits, but for the gender-based distinction, when the lower court opinion issued on December 11, 1973. Appellee, in an affidavit filed in September 1973, ascribed his employment difficulties in large part to the difficulties of childcare. In particular, he noted that he had “encountered severe difficulty in obtaining the services of a suitable housekeeper, to whom I could conscientiously entrust Jason's care. I have employed four housekeepers in the past year . . . .” Appellee did not seek administrative review of the denial under 42 U. S. C. §405 (b). However, appellant stipulated that any administrative appeal would have been futile, since § 402 (g) on its face precludes granting benefits to men. Tr. of Oral Arg. before District Court, June 20, 1973, pp. 16-17. Nor does appellant now claim that §405 (h), which provides that “[n]o findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed . . . except as herein provided” (see § 405 (g)), is a bar to this action. See Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 539-540 (1958); Richardson v. Morris, 409 U. S. 464 (1973) (per curiam); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (Md.), aff’d, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972). The three-judge court declined to permit the action to proceed as a class action. 367 F. Supp., at 986-987. No appeal has been taken from this ruling. The court recognized that the jurisdictional amount of $10,000 under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 is established as long as it does not “appear to a legal certainty” that the matter in controversy does not total $10,000, St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 289 (1938), and therefore that where an injunction commanding future payments is sought, there is no need to await accrual of $10,000 in back benefits to bring suit. However, it was troubled by the fact that appellee was employed on the day suit was filed, see n. 7, supra, and thus would not have been entitled to benefits on that day. It held that there was nonetheless jurisdiction because of the futility of dismissing the suit when the plaintiff could refile immediately and establish jurisdiction, since he was unemployed by the time of decision. We believe that there was jurisdiction in any event on the day the suit was filed. Benefits under § 402 (g) could be available to appellee, if he prevailed, until his infant child became 18, see §§ 402 (d), (g), and (s)(1). At the then-prevailing benefit rates, appellee would reach $10,000 in benefits if he collected full benefits for a little more than three years, see supra, at 640-641. Social security benefits are to some degree in the nature of insurance, providing present security and peace of mind from fear of future lack of earnings. Also, unlike disability benefits, see 42 U. S. C. §423, these survivors’ benefits do not depend upon ability to earn, but only upon actual earnings. Thus, they give a potential recipient a choice between staying home to care for the child and working. This opportunity for choice, and the potential right to as much as $53,640 worth of benefits ($2,980 per year times 18 years), certainly has a present value of $10,000, whether or not the claimant was eligible for benefits on the day he filed suit. See the observations in Frontiero, 411 13. S., at 689 n. 23, that in view of the large percentage of married women working (41.5% in 1971), the presumption of complete dependency of wives upon husbands has little relationship to present reality. In the same vein, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), observed that current statistics belie “the presumed role in the home” of contemporary women. Id.., at 535 n. 17. Changes have been made in these provisions. For example, benefits are now available to husbands and aged widowers of covered workers if they can show that more than one-half of their support has been provided by their wives. 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 (c), (f). See also n. 5, supra. See generally Note, Sex Classifications in the Social Security Benefit Structure, 49 Ind. L. J. 181 (1973). See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1939): “[A] child is not usually financially dependent upon his mother”; 84 Cong. Rec. 6896 (1939) (remarks of Rep. Cooper): “[W]e now have under the provisions of this bill a program on a family basis, and we will take care of these people who will need this assistance because of the loss of the father or the husband and the loss of the pay and wages that he has been bringing into the family.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Report of the Committee on Social Insurance and Taxes, The President’s Commission on the Status of Women 29 (1963): “It was decided at that time that if the determination of dependency were based on generally valid presumptions, there would be no need in most situations for detailed investigations of family financial relationships. Since the husband traditionally was the wage earner in the family and the wife was the homemaker, benefits were provided for wives, widows, and children on the basis of presumed dependency on the husband . . . See supra, at 644. There has been a continuing tension in the OASDI system between two goals: individual equity, which accords benefits commensurate with the contributions made to the system, and social adequacy, which assures to all contributors and their families a tolerable standard of living. See J. Pechman, H. Aaron & M. Taussig, Social Security: Perspectives for Reform 33-34 (1968); Report of the Social Security Board, H. R. Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1939). Rather than abandoning either goal, Congress has tried to meet both, by assuring that the protection afforded each contributor is at least that which his contributions could purchase on the private market. See H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 13-14 (1939); H. R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1949). See 42 U. S. C. §§ 414, 415 for the correlation between years worked, amount earned, and the “primary insurance amount,” which is the amount received by fully insured employees upon reaching retirement age. Benefits under § 402 (g) are 75% of the primary insurance amount of the covered employee. This Court need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 406 U. S. 438 (1972); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S., at 634; U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 536-537 (1973). In certain cases, mother’s benefits under § 402 (g) cease although some children are still eligible for children’s benefits under §402 (d). In particular, children continue to be eligible for benefits while full-time students until age 22 and, in some instances, for a few months thereafter. §§ 402 (d) (1) (F) and (d)(7). Yet, benefits to the mother under § 402 (g) cease if all children have reached 18 and are not disabled. §402 (s)(l). This distinction also sustains our conclusion that § 402 (g) was intended only to provide an opportunity for children to receive the personal attention of one parent, since mother’s benefits are linked to children’s benefits only so long as it is realistic to think that the children might need their parent at home. Originally, no divorced wives were entitled to benefits on the basis of their former husbands’ earnings. The provision for surviving divorced wives who are the mothers of children entitled to survivors’ benefits was added in 1950. Social Security Amendments of 1950, § 101 (a), 64 Stat. 483. It was not until 1965 that benefits were provided for aged divorced wives and widows, premised upon a 20-year marriage. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, § 308, 79 Stat. 375. Both these groups of women were required to prove dependency upon the former husband. The proof-of-dependency requirements were eliminated in 1972. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-603, § 114, 86 Stat. 1348. This separate development of benefits for divorced women with children and those without reinforces the conclusion that the presence of children is the raison d'etre of § 402 (g). The Commission on Railroad Retirement, commenting upon a similar provision of the railroad retirement system, significantly stated: “Statistically speaking, there are, of course, significant differences by sex in the roles played in our society. For example, far more women than men are primarily involved in raising minor children. But if the society’s aim is to further a socially desirable purpose, e. g., better care for growing children, it should tailor any subsidy directly to the end desired, not indirectly and unequally by helping widows with dependent children and ignoring widowers in the same plight. In this example, it is the economic and junctional capability of the surviving breadwinner to care for children which counts; the sex of the surviving parent is incidental.” Report of the Commission on Railroad Retirement, Railroad Retirement System— Its Coming Crisis, H. R. Doc. No. 92-350, p. 378 (1972). (Emphasis supplied.) Precisely this view was expressed by the 1971 Advisory Council on Social Security, whose recommendations upon which gender-based distinctions in the OASDI system to retain and which to discard were followed in the 1972 Social Security Amendments: “The Council believes that it is unnecessary to offer the same choice [whether to work or care for surviving children] to a man. Even though many more married women work today than in the past, so that they are both workers and homemakers, very few men adopt such a dual role; the customary and predominant role of the father is not that of a homemaker but rather that of the family breadwinner. A man generally continues to work to support himself and his children after the death or disability of his wife. The Council therefore does not recommend that benefits be provided for a young father who has children in his care.” 1971 Reports 30.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EXAMINING BOARD OF ENGINEERS, ARCHITECTS AND SURVEYORS et al. v. FLORES de OTERO No. 74-1267. Argued December 8, 1975 Decided June 17, 1976 BlackmuN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. RehNquist, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 606. SteveNS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Miriam, Naveira De Rodon, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the brief was Peter Ortiz, Deputy Solicitor General. Max Ramirez de Arellano argued the cause for ap-pellees. With him on the brief was Santos P. Amadeo. Together with Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors et al. v. Perez Nogueiro, also on appeal from the same court (see this Court’s Rule 15 (3)). Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Howard E. Shapiro, and David M. Cohen filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the issue whether the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico possesses jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), to entertain a suit based upon 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and, if the answer is in the affirmative, the further issue whether Puerto Rico’s restriction, by statute, of licenses for civil engineers to United States citizens is constitutional. The first issue, phrased another way, is whether Puerto Rico is a “State,” for purposes of § 1343 (3), insofar as that statute speaks of deprivation “under color of any State law”; the resolution of that question was reserved in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 677 n. 11 (1974). I A. Puerto Rico’s Act of May 10, 1951, No. 399, as amended, now codified as P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 20, §§ 681-710 (Supp. 1973), relates to the practice of engineering, architecture, and surveying. The administration and enforcement of the statute, by § 683, are committed to the Commonwealth’s Board of Examiners of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors, an appellant here. Section 689 sets forth the qualifications “for registration as licensed engineer^ architect or surveyor.” For a “licensed engineer or architect,” these qualifications in-elude a specified education, the passing of a written examination, and a stated minimum practical experience. The statute also requires that an applicant for registration be a citizen of the United States. It, however, exempts an otherwise qualified alien from the citizenship requirement if he has “studied the total courses” in the Commonwealth, or if he is employed by an agency or instrumentality of the government of the Commonwealth or by a municipal government or public corporation there; in the case of such employment, the alien receives a conditional license valid only during the time he is employed by the public entity. B. Maria C. Flores de Otero is a native of Mexico and a legal resident of Puerto Rico. She is, by profession, a civil engineer. She is not a United States citizen. In June 1972 she applied to the Board for registration as a licensed engineer. It is undisputed that the applicant met all the specifications of formal education, examination, and practice required for licensure,- except that of United States citizenship. The Board denied her application until she furnished proof of that citizenship. In October 1973 Flores instituted an action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against the Board and its individual members. She asserted jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), and alleged that the citizenship requirement was violative of her rights under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983. A declaratory judgment and injunctive relief were requested. In their answer to Flores’ complaint, the defendants alleged that the United States District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, and that the provisions of § 689 did not contravene rights secured under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or any rights guaranteed to Flores under the Constitution. They also alleged that Flores had adequate remedies available to her in the courts of Puerto Rico and that she had not exhausted those remedies. They requested that the court “abstain from assuming jurisdiction in this case and allow the Courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico the opportunity to pass upon the issues raised by plaintiff.” App. 5. C. Sergio Perez Nogueiro is a native of Spain and a legal resident of Puerto Rico. He is, by profession, a civil engineer. He possesses degrees from universities in Spain and Colombia and from the University of Puerto Rico. He is not a United States citizen. He, like Flores, met all the specifications of formal education, examination, and practice required for licensure, except that of United States citizenship. He is presently employed as an engineer by the Public Works Department of the municipality of Carolina, Puerto Rico, and holds a conditional license granted by the Board, as authorized by § 689, after he passed the required examination. In May 1974 Perez instituted an action against the Board in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. He asserted that the citizenship requirement “is repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.” App. 10. The complaint in all relevant respects was like that filed by Flores, and Perez, too, requested declaratory and in-junctive relief, including a full and unconditional license to practice as an engineer in the Commonwealth. D. A three-judge court was convened to hear Flores’ case. It determined that it had jurisdiction under §§ 1983 and 1343. It concluded that abstention was unnecessary because § 689 was unambiguous and not susceptible of an interpretation that would obviate the need for reaching the constitutional question. On the merits, with one judge dissenting, it rejected the justifications proffered by the defendants for the citizenship requirement. It found that requirement unconstitutional and directed the defendants to license Flores as an engineer. In a separate and subsequent judgment the same three-judge court, by the same vote, granted like relief to Perez. It decreed that he, too, be licensed as an engineer. Jurisdictional Statement 7a. Appeals were taken by the defendants from both judgments, with a single jurisdictional statement pursuant to our Rule 15 (3). We noted probable jurisdiction and granted a stay of the execution and enforcement of the judgments. 421 U. S. 986 (1975). II On the jurisdictional issue, the appellants do not contend that the United States Constitution has no application in Puerto Rico or that claims' cognizable under § 1983 may not be enforced there. Instead, they argue that unless a complainant establishes the $10,000 juris•dictional amount prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a), a claim otherwise cognizable under § 1983 must be adjudicated in the courts of Puerto Rico. In approaching this question we are to examine the language of § 1343, the purposes of Congress in enacting it, “and the circumstances under which the words were employed.” Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P. R.), Ltd., 302 U. S. 253, 258 (1937); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 420 (1973). As is so frequently the case, however, the language is not free of ambiguity, the purposes appear to be diverse and sometimes contradictory, and the circumstances are not fully spread upon the record for our instruction. A. The federal civil rights legislation, with which we are here concerned, was enacted nearly 30 years before the conflict with Spain and the resulting establishment of the ties between Puerto Rico and the United States. Both § 1343 (3) and § 1983 have their origin in the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. That statute contained not only the substantive provision protecting against “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” by any person acting under color of state law, but, as well, the jurisdictional provision authorizing a proceeding for the enforcement of those rights “to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States.” Jurisdiction was not independently defined; it was given simply to enforce the substantive rights created by the statute. The two aspects, seemingly, were deemed to coincide. It has been said that the purpose of the legislation was to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth, not the Thirteenth, Amendment. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S., at 423; Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 545 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 171 (1961). As originally enacted, § 1 of the 1871 Act applied only to action under color of law of any “State.” In 1874, however, Congress, presumably pursuant to its power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” granted by the Constitution’s Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, added, without explanation, the words “or Territory” in the 1874 codification of United States statutes. Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1874). See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S., at 424 n. 11. The evident aim was to insure that all persons residing in the Territories not be denied, by persons acting under color of territorial law, rights guaranteed them by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Although one might say that the purpose of Congress was evident, the method chosen to implement this aim was curious and, indeed, somewhat confusing. In the 1874 codification, only the substantive portion (the predecessor of today’s § 1983) of § 1 of the 1871 Act was redesignated as § 1979. It became separated from the jurisdictional portion (the predecessor of today’s § 1343 (3)) which appeared as § 563 Twelfth and § 629 Sixteenth (concerning, respectively, the district courts and the circuit courts) of the Revised Statutes. But the words “or Territory” appeared only in § 1979; they did not appear in §§ 563 and 629. Our question, then, is whether, in separately codifying the provisions and in having this discrepancy between them, Congress intended to restrict federal-court jurisdiction in some way. We conclude that it intended no such restriction. First, as stated above, the common origin of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) in § 1 of the 1871 Act suggests that the two provisions were meant to be, and are, complementary. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S., at 543 n. 7. There is no indication that Congress intended to prevent federal district and circuit courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction of claims of deprivation of rights under color of territorial law if they otherwise had personal jurisdiction of the parties. Second, a contrary interpretation necessarily would lead to the conclusion that persons residing in a Territory were not effectively afforded a federal-court remedy there for a violation of the 1871 Act despite Congress’ obvious intention to afford one. The then existing territorial district courts established by Congress were granted “the same jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as is vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States.” Rev. Stat. § 1910 (1874) (emphasis added). Thus, if the federal district and circuit courts had jurisdiction to redress deprivations only under color of state (but not territorial) law, the territorial courts were likewise so limited. Further, the United States District Courts for the Districts of California and Oregon, and the territorial District Court for Washington possessed jurisdiction over violations of laws extended to the Territory of Alaska. Rev. Stat. § 1957 (1874). Unless the federal courts had jurisdiction to redress deprivations of rights by persons acting under color of territorial law, Congress’ explicit extension of the 1871 Act to provide a remedy against persons acting under color of territorial law was only theoretical because no forum existed in which these rights might be enforced. This conclusion that Congress granted territorial courts jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of § 1979 is strengthened by two additional factors. First, Congress explicitly provided: “The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized Territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized as elsewhere within the United States.” Rev. Stat. § 1891 (1874). Section 1979, with its reference to Territories was obviously an applicable statute. Second, it was not until the following year that Congress conferred on United States district courts general federal-question jurisdiction. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, now codified as 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a). See generally Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 245-247 (1967). Accordingly, unless in 1874 the federal district and circuit courts had jurisdiction to redress deprivations under color of territorial law, Congress, although providing rights and remedies, could be said to have failed to provide a means for their enforcement. For all these reasons, we conclude that the federal territorial as well as the federal district and circuit courts generally had jurisdiction to redress deprivations of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of territorial law. We turn, then, to the legislation specifically applicable to Puerto Rico. B. A similar approach was taken by Congress in its establishment of the civil government in Puerto Rico in the exercise of its territorial power under Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. By the Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat. 1754 (1899), Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States. 30 Stat. 1755. Shortly thereafter, the Foraker Act, being the Act of April 12, 1900, 31 Stat. 77, became law. This legislation established a civil government for Puerto Rico, including provisions for courts. The judicial structure so created consisted of a local court system with a Supreme Court, and, as well, of a Federal District Court. The Act, § 34,31 Stat. 84, provided: “The [federal] district court . . . shall have, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of district courts of the United States, jurisdiction of all cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United States.” On its face, this appears to have been a broad grant of jurisdiction similar to that conferred on the United States district courts and comparable to that conferred on the earlier territorial courts. The earlier territorial grants, however, were different. Whereas the Federal District Court for Puerto Rico was to have “the ordinary jurisdiction of district courts of the United States,” the earlier territorial courts had been given explicitly, by Rev. Stat. § 1910 noted above, “the same jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as is vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States.” One might expect that the grant of jurisdiction in the former necessarily encompassed or was the same as the grant of jurisdiction in the latter. Congress, however, was divided over the question whether the Constitution extended to Puerto Rico by its own force or whether Congress possessed the power to withhold from Puerto Ricans the constitutional guarantees available to all persons within the several States and the earlier Territories. See S. Rep. No. 249, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900); H. R. Rep. No. 249, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900). The division within Congress was reflected in the legislation governing Puerto Rico. Thus, despite some support for the measure, see S. Rep. No. 249, pp. 12-13, Congress declined to grant citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. 33 Cong. Rec. 3690 (1900). And, in contrast to some earlier territorial legislation, Congress did not expressly extend to Puerto Rico the Constitution of the United States or impose on the statutes of Puerto Rico then in effect the condition that they be continued only if consistent with the United States Constitution. At the same time, however, Congress undoubtedly was aware of the above-mentioned Rev. Stat. § 1891 providing : “The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect ... in every Territory hereafter organized as elsewhere within the United States.” Yet no mention of this statute was made in the Foraker Act. In contrast, two years later, Congress made § 1891 expressly inapplicable when it created a civil government for the Territory of the Philippines. Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 1, 32 Stat. 692. Moreover, Congress, by § 14 of the Foraker Act, extended to Puerto Rico “the statutory laws [other than the internal revenue laws] of the United States not locally inapplicable,” 31 Stat. 80, and Rev. Stat. § 1979, providing remedies for deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States by persons acting under color of territorial law was at least potentially “applicable.” This review of the For alter Act and its legislative history leads to several conclusions: Congress was uncertain of its own powers respecting Puerto Rico and of the extent to which the Constitution applied there. At the same time, it recognized, at least implicitly, that the ultimate resolution of these questions was the responsibility of this Court. S. Rep. No. 249, pp. 9-12; H. R. Rep. No. 249, pp. 9-15, 25-28. Thus Congress appears to have left the question of the personal rights to be accorded to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico to orderly development by this Court and to whatever further provision Congress itself might make for them. The grant of jurisdiction to the District Court in Puerto Rico, nevertheless, appeared to be sufficiently broad to permit redress of deprivations of those rights by persons acting under color of territorial law. See Insular Police Comm’n v. Lopez, 160 F. 2d 673, 676-677 (CA1), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 855 (1947). Nothing in the language of § 34 of the Foraker Act precluded the grant of jurisdiction accorded the earlier territorial courts by Rev. Stat. § 1910, and its language, containing no limitations, cautions us against reading into it an exception not supported by persuasive evidence in the legislative history. Subsequent legislation respecting Puerto Rico tends to support the conclusion that uncertainty over the application of the Constitution did not lead Congress to deprive the inhabitants of Puerto Rico of a federal forum for vindication of whatever rights did exist. In the Organic Act of 1917, sometimes known as the Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951, Congress made more explicit the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court by according it “jurisdiction of all cases cognizable in the district courts of the United States,” § 41, 39 Stat. 965; generally granted Puerto Rico citizens United States citizenship, § 5, 39 Stat. 953; and codified for Puerto Rico a bill of rights, § 2, 39 Stat. 951. This bill of rights, which remained in effect until 1952, provided Puerto Ricans with nearly all the personal guarantees found in the United States Constitution. The very first provision, for example, read: “That no law shall be enacted in Porto Rico which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.” These words are almost identical with the language of the Fourteenth Amendment; and when Congress selected them, it must have done so with the Fourteenth Amendment in mind and with a view to further development by this Court of the doctrines embodied in it. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 124 (1904). In its passage of the Jones Act, Congress clearly set the stage for the federal court in Puerto Rico to enforce the provisions of § 1983’s predecessor (Rev. Stat. § 1979) which prohibited the deprivation “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any . . . Territory ... of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” See Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 83 F. 2d 262, 26A-266 (CA1), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 689 (1936). The jurisdictional provision of the Act, referring to “all cases cognizable in the district courts of the United States,” remained in effect until 1948. At that time Congress, in the course of a major revision of the Judicial Code, placed the nonterritorial jurisdiction of the District Court of Puerto Rico, as well as the District Court of Hawaii, squarely within Title 28 of the United States Code. It provided: “Puerto Rico constitutes one judicial district.” Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 119, 62 Stat. 889. The stated reason for this change was that “Hawaii and Puerto Rico are included as judicial districts of the United States, since in matters of jurisdiction, powers, and procedure, they are in all respects equal to other United States district courts.” H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1947). This confirms our conclusion that until the establishment of the Commonwealth, the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico had the same jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as that conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) and its predecessor statutes on the United States district courts in the several States. See Miranda v. United States, 255 F. 2d 9 (CA1 1958); Insular Police Comm’n v. Lopez, supra. Only two years later, Congress responded to demands for greater autonomy for Puerto Rico with the Act of July 3, 1950; c. 446, 64 Stat. 319. This legislation, offered, in the “nature of a compact” to “the people of Puerto Rico,” § 1, 48 U. S. C. § 731b, authorized them to draft their own constitution which, however, “shall provide a republican form of government and shall include a bill of rights,” § 2, 48 U. S. C. § 731c. The proposed constitution thereafter submitted declared that it was drafted “within our union with the United States of America,” and that among the “determining factors in our life” were considered “our citizenship of the United States of America” and “our loyalty to the principles of the Federal Constitution.” Preamble of the Constitution of Puerto Rico, 1 P. R. Laws Ann. p. 207 (1965). See note following 48 U. S. C. § 731d. Congress approved the proposed constitution after adding, among other things, a condition that any amendment or revision of the document be consistent with “the applicable provisions of the Constitution of the United States.” 66 Stat. 327. The condition was accepted, the compact became effective, and Puerto Rico assumed “Commonwealth” status. This resulted in the repeal of numerous provisions of the Organic Act of 1917, including the bill of rights that Act contained. Act of July 3, 1950, c. 446, § 5, 64 Stat. 320. The remainder became known as the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act. § 4, 64 Stat. 319. The question then arises whether Congress, by entering into the compact, intended to repeal by implication the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court of Puerto Rico to enforce 42 U. S. C. § 1983. We think not. As was observed in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S., at 671, the purpose of Congress in the 1950 and 1952 legislation was to accord to Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of the Union, and accordingly, Puerto Rico “now ‘elects its Governor and legislature; appoints its judges, all cabinet officials, and lesser officials in the executive branch; sets its own educational policies; determines its own budget; and amends its own civil and criminal codq.’ ” See generally Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 Geo. L. J. 219, 221 (1967); Magruder, The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1953); Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F. 2d 431 (CA3 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 943 (1967). More importantly, the provisions relating to the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court in Puerto Rico were left undisturbed, and there is no evidence in the legislative history that would support a determination that Congress intended such a departure. In the absence of a change in the language of the jurisdictional provision or of affirmative evidence in the legislative history, we are unwilling to read into the 1952 legislation a restriction of the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court. C. Our conclusion not to attribute to Congress an inclination to leave the protection of federal rights exclusively to the local Puerto Rico courts is supported by District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418 (1973). There the Court held that the District was neither a State nor a Territory within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District, it was observed, occupies a unique status within our system of government. It is the seat of the National Government, and, at the time the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted, Congress exercised plenary power over its activities. These geographical and political considerations, as well as “the absence of any indication in the language, purposes, or history of § 1983 of a legislative intent to include the District within the scope of its coverage,” supported the Court’s conclusion. 409 U. S., at 432. Appellants, however, focus upon the characterization of the District as “sui generis in our governmental structure,” ibid., and argue that because the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is also sui generis, the conduct of persons acting under color of Commonwealth law is similarly exempted from scrutiny under § 1983. We readily concede that Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United States that has no parallel in our history, but we think that it does not follow that Congress intended to relinquish federal enforcement of § 1983 by restricting the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico. It was observed in Carter, 409 U. S., at 427, that Congress, in enacting the civil rights legislation with which we are concerned, recognized that it “had neither the means nor the authority to exert any direct control, on a day-to-day basis, over the actions of state officials,” and that the “solution chosen was to involve the federal judiciary.” Congress similarly lacked effective control over actions taken by territorial officials, although its authority to govern was plenary. The same practical limitations on Congress’ effectiveness to protect the federally guaranteed rights of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico existed from the time of its cession and, after 1952, when Congress relinquished its control over the organization of the local affairs of the island and granted Puerto Rico a measure of autonomy comparable to that possessed by the States, the need for federal protection of federal rights was not thereby lessened. Finally, § 1983, by its terms, applies to Territories; Puerto Rico, but not the District of Columbia, obviously was one of these. Whether Puerto Rico is now considered a Territory or a State, for purposes of the specific question before us, makes little difference because each is included within § 1983 and, therefore, 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). It fallows that the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) to enforce the provisions of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Ill Appellants, however, argue that the District Court should have abstained from reaching the merits of the constitutional claim. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41 (1970), is cited as an example of abstention in a Puerto Rico context. We conclude that the District Court correctly determined that abstention was unnecessary. The case presents no novel question concerning the judicially created abstention doctrine; it requires, instead, only the application of settled principles reviewed just last Term in Harris County Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U. S. 77 (1975). Appellants urge that abstention was appropriate for two reasons. First, it is said that § 689 should be construed by the commonwealth courts in the light of § 1483 of the Civil Code, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 31, § 4124 (1968). This provision imposes liability on a contractor for defective construction of a building. We fail to see, however, how § 4124 in any way could affect the interpretation of § 689 which imposes, with the exceptions that have been noted, a requirement of citizenship for the licensing of an engineer. Appellants’ second argument is that the commonwealth courts should be permitted to adjudicate the validity of the citizenship requirement in the light of §§ 1 and 7 of Art. II of the Puerto Rico Constitution. 1 P. R. Laws Ann., Const., Art. II, §§ 1, 7 (1965). Section 1 provides: “No discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.” Section 7 provides: “No person in Puerto Rico shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.” These constitutional provisions are not so interrelated with § 689 that it may be said, as in Harris County, that the law of the Commonwealth is ambiguous. Rather, the abstention issue seems clearly controlled by Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971), where, as it was said in Harris County, 420 U. S., at 8A-85, n. 8, “we declined to order abstention where the federal due process claim was not complicated by an unresolved state-law question, even though the plaintiffs might have sought relief under a similar provision of the state constitution.” Indeed, to hold that abstention is required because § 689 might conflict with the cited broad and sweeping constitutional provisions, would convert abstention from an exception into a general rule. IV This takes us, then, to the particular Puerto Rico statute before us. Does Puerto Rico’s prohibition against an alien’s engaging in the private practice of engineering deprive the appellee aliens of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,” within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983? A. The Court’s decisions respecting the rights of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico have been neither unambiguous nor exactly uniform. The nature of this country’s relationship to Puerto Rico was vigorously debated within the Court as well as within the Congress. See Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 Col. L. Rev. 823 (1926). It is clear now, however, that the protections accorded by either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to residents of Puerto Rico. The Court recognized the applicability of these guarantees as long ago as its decisions in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 283-284 (1901), and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 312-313 (1922). The principle was reaffirmed and strengthened in Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957), and then again in Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S. 663 (1974), where we held that inhabitants of Puerto Rico are protected, under either the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth, from the official taking of property without due process of law. The Court, however, thus far has declined to say whether it is the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth which provides the protection. Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 668-669, n. 5. Once again, we need not resolve that precise question because, irrespective of which Amendment applies, the statutory restriction on the ability of aliens to engage in the otherwise lawful private practice of civil engineering is plainly unconstitutional. If the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable, the Equal Protection Clause nullifies the statutory exclusion. If, on the other hand, it is the Fifth Amendment and its Due Process Clause that apply, the statute’s discrimination is so egregious that it falls within the rule of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964). B. In examining the validity of Puerto Rico’s virtually complete ban on the private practice of civil engineering by aliens, we apply the standards of our recent decisions in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Sugar man v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973); and In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973). These cases establish that state classifications based on alienage are subject to “strict judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 376. Statutes containing classifications of this kind will be upheld only if the State or Territory imposing them is able to satisfy the burden of demonstrating “that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary ... to the accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.” In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721-722 (footnotes omitted). These principles are applicable to the Puerto Rico statute now under consideration. The underpinnings of the Court’s constitutional decisions defining the circumstances under which state and local governments may favor citizens of this country by denying lawfully admitted aliens equal rights and opportunities have been two. The first, based squarely on the concepts embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, recognizes that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular’ minority ... for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. See also San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 29 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642. The second, grounded in the Supremacy Clause, Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and in the naturalization power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, recognizes the Federal Government’s primary responsibility in the field of immigration and naturalization. See, e. g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 66 (1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 378; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 419 (1948). Official discrimination against lawfully admitted aliens traditionally has taken several forms. Aliens have been prohibited from enjoying public resources or receiving public benefits on the same basis as citizens. See Graham v. Richardson, supra; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, supra. Aliens have been excluded from public employment. Sugarman v. Dougall, supra. See M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law, c. 6 (1946). And aliens have been restricted from engaging in private enterprises and occupations that are otherwise lawful. See In re Griffiths, supra; Truax v. Raich, supra; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The present Puerto Rico statute, of course, falls into the last category. It is with respect to this kind of discrimination that the States have had the greatest difficulty in persuading this Court that their interests are substantial and constitutionally permissible, and that the discrimination is necessary for the safeguarding of those interests. Thus, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins the Court struck down an ordinance that was administered so as to exclude aliens from pursuing the lawful occupation of a laundry. In Truax v. Raich the Court invalidated a state statute that required a private employer, having five or more workers, to employ at least 80% qualified electors or native-born citizens. And in In re Griffiths a state statutory requirement prescribing United States citizenship as a condition for engaging in the practice of law was held unconstitutional. But see Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927). The reason for this solicitude with respect to an alien’s engaging in an otherwise lawful occupation is apparent: “It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. If this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of words.” Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S., at 41 (citations omitted). It is true that in Truax the Court drew a distinction between discrimination against aliens in private lawful occupations and discrimination against them where, it might be said, the State has a special interest in affording protection to its own citizens. Id., at 39^40. That distinction, however, is no longer so sharp as it then was. Recently the Court has taken a more restrictive view of the powers of a State to discriminate against non-citizens with respect to public employment, compare Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915), aff’g People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, and Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915), with Sugarman v. Dougall, supra; and with respect to the distribution of public funds and the allocation of public resources, compare McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877), and Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914), with Graham v. Richardson, supra, and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, supra. We do not suggest, however, that a State, Territory, or local government, or certainly the Federal Government, may not be permitted some discretion in determining the circumstances under which it will employ aliens or whether aliens may receive public benefits or partake of public resources on the same basis as citizens. In each case, the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn. In the present case the appellants have offered three justifications for Puerto Rico's almost total ban on aliens’ engaging in the private practice of engineering: The first is to prevent the "uncontrolled” influx of Spanish-speaking aliens into the field in Puerto Rico. The second is to raise the prevailing low standard of living. The third is to provide the client of a civil engineer an assurance of financial accountability if a building for which the engineer is responsible collapses within 10 years of construction. P. R. Laws Ann., Tit, 31, § 4124 (1968). The first justification amounts to little more than an assertion that discrimination may be justified by a desire to discriminate. This interest is unpersuasive on its face. It is also at odds with the Federal Government’s primary power and responsibility for the regulation of immigration. Once an alien is lawfully admitted, a State may not justify the restriction of the alien’s liberty on the ground that it wishes to control the impact or effect of federal immigration laws. Cf. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976). Although the second broad justification proffered by the appellants has elements of substance and legitimacy, the means drawn to achieve the end are neither necessary nor precise. What the Commonwealth has done by its statute is to require private employers and contractors to hire only engineers who are American citizens. This end was held impermissible over 50 years ago in Truax v. Raich, supra. To uphold the statute on the basis of broad economic justification of this kind would permit any State to bar the employment of aliens in any or all lawful occupations. Finally, the asserted purpose to assure responsibility for negligent workmanship sweeps too broadly. United States citizenship is not a guarantee that a civil engineer will continue to reside in Puerto Rico or even in the United States, and it bears no particular or rational relationship to skill, competence, or financial responsibility. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 645; In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 724. Puerto Rico has available to it other ample tools to achieve the goal of an engineer’s financial responsibility without indiscriminately prohibiting the private practice of civil engineering by a class of otherwise qualified professionals. The judgments of the District Court are affirmed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343 provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: “(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” The statute in pertinent part reads: “§ 689. Qualifications for registration in the Board’s registry “As minimum evidence, satisfactory to the Board, to show that the applicant meets the qualifications for registration as licensed engineer, architect or surveyor, . . . the Board shall accept, as the case may be: “(2) For licensed engineer or architect: “(a) Graduation, examination and minimum experience. A certification accrediting his graduation from a course or curriculum of engineering or architecture, of a duration of not less than four (4) academic years or its equivalent, whose efficacy has been adequately verified, in any university, college or institute whose standing and proficiency are accepted by the Board; passing of written examinations (validation) on the fundamental subjects of engineering or architecture; and a detailed history of his professional experience of not less than four years, acquired after his graduation as a professional, satisfactory to the Board, and showing, in the judgment of the Board, that the applicant is qualified to practice as engineer or architect with a degree of professional responsibility which justifies his licensing. . . . “[(3)] In addition to what has already been provided in this section, it shall be required that applicants for registration in the Board’s registry be citizens of the United States of America and reside in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for not less than one year before filing their applications. Provided, that the requisite of being a citizen of the United States of America shall not apply to engineers, architects and surveyors who have studied the total courses and have received their corresponding grade or certificate in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico provided that the approved course of study and institution where he has studied fulfill the qualifications fixed by sections 681-710 of this title, as the case may be; Provided, That the applicants shall meet all the qualifications fixed by this act for registration in the Board’s registry. “The requisites of residence and United States citizenship shall not apply to engineers, architects or surveyors whom the different agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Commonwealth, the municipal governments and the public corporations employ or may wish to employ, it being understood that it shall not be necessary that the applicants be so employed at the time of their application or registration in the Board’s registry, The applicants shall meet all the other qualifications fixed by sections 681-710 of this title for registration in the Board’s registry. “Upon compliance with these requirements by a noncitizen of the United States of America, the board shall issue a conditional certificate as graduate engineer, architect or surveyor or a conditional license as engineer, architect or surveyor, as the case may be, valid for the practicing of such professions only in the performance of their employment and during the time they are employed by the above-mentioned public entities .... “Any engineer, architect or surveyor holding a conditional license or graduate engineer or architect with a conditional certificate who obtains the citizenship of the United States of America shall be entitled to apply for reregistration and be reregistered in the Board’s registry as a graduate engineer or architect, or a licensed engineer or architect, or a licensed surveyor, as the case may be, in accordance with all the other requirements of the Board.” Federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) was not asserted. The defendants, who are appellants here, acknowledge that they “are not here concerned with the general jurisdiction of the local [Federal] District Court under statutes such as 28 U. S. C. [§] 1331.” Brief for Appellants 6. The certification given appellee Perez reads in part: “That the approval of this examination grafts him the right to practice ENGINEERING solely and exclusively as an employee of Agencies and instrumentalities of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Municipal Governments and Public Corporations. “I, FURTHER CERTIFY: That the limitation imposed on MR. SERGIO PEREZ NOGUEIRO right to practice Engineering are those required . . . because of his citizenship. MR. SERGIO PEREZ NOGUEIRO is entitled to be automatically registered as an ENGINEER without limitations as soon as he presents the Naturalization Certificate as American Citizen.” App. 8-9. The complaint was later amended to include the individual members of the Board as parties defendant. At oral argument, the appellants conceded that the “Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the people of Puerto Rico.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Brief for Appellants 6, 9-10; Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. Using this approach, the Court has held (a) that the statutes of Puerto Rico are not “State” statutes for the purpose of our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2), Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 42 n. 1 (1970), but (b) that the statutes of Puerto Rico are “State” statutes for the purpose of the three-judge court provision of 28 U. S. C. § 2281, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 669-676 (1974). The first decision was based upon the Court’s practice to construe narrowly statutes authorizing appeals, and Congress’ failure to provide a statute, parallel to 28 U. S. C. § 1258, authorizing appeals from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico under the same circumstances as appeals from the highest courts of the States. The second decision recognized the greater autonomy afforded Puerto Rico with its assumption of commonwealth status in the early 1950’s. Inclusion of the statutes of Puerto Rico within 28 U. S. C. § 2281 served the purpose “of insulating a sovereign State’s laws from interference by a single judge.” 416 U. S., at 671. See also Andres v. United States, 333 U. S. 740, 745 (1948); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P. R.), Ltd., 302 U. S. 253, 257-259 (1937); and Domenech v. National City Bank, 294 U. S. 199, 204-205 (1935). The first section of the 1871 Act provided: “That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled 'An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication'; and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.” Another change effected with the codification, and without explanation, was the addition . in § 1979 of the words “and laws” following the words “the Constitution.” These changes were retained in § 1979 as it appeared in Rev. Stat. (1878). Section 1979 provided: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be hable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” The then territorial courts were those in the Territories of New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. The Territory of Washington was governed by Rev. Stat. § 1911 (1874), which provided, in part, that its territorial district courts shall have “the same jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution of the United States, and the laws of the Territory, as is vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States.” It will be noted that the quoted language does not include the.words “and laws” after “Constitution.” Section 1910, in contrast, did. The omission was soon rectified, however. Rev. Stat. § 1911 (1878). Original “arising under” jurisdiction was vested in the federal courts by the Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 92, but was repealed a year later by the Act of Mar. 8, 1802, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. There was nothing further along this line until the Act of Mar. 3, 1875. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 427 n. 20 (1973). Revised Stat. §5600 (1874) provided: “The arrangement and classification of the several sections of the revision have been made for the purpose of a more convenient and orderly arrangement of the same, and therefore no inference or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the Title, under which any particular section is placed.” This provision lends some support to our conclusion that the failure to add the words “or Territory” to the jurisdictional successor of § 1 of the 1871 Act was mere legislative oversight. Had § 1 remained intact, the words “or Territory” would have been added to the substantive part of § 1 while the jurisdictional part would have continued to read “such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States.” 17 Stat. 13, The powers vested in Congress by Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, to govern Territories are broad. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S., at 430-431; National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S. 129, 133 (1880); American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542 (1828). And in the case of Puerto Rico, the Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat. 1754 (1899), specifically provided: “The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress.” Id.., at 1759. Congress exercised its powers fully. Thus, by the Foraker Act, 31 Stat. 77, the President was authorized to appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Governor of Puerto Rico, and its chief executive officers, id., at 81; the justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and the judge of the United States District Court there. Id., at 84. In addition, Congress required that “all laws enacted by the [Puerto Rico] legislative assembly shall be reported to the Congress of the United States, which hereby reserves the power and authority, if deemed advisable, to annul the same.” Id., at 83. This establishment of two separate systems of courts stands in contrast to other territorial legislation where only one system of courts, including district courts and a supreme court, was established and given the jurisdiction vested in United States courts. See Rev. Stat. §§ 1864-1869, 1910 (1874). See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U, S. 389, 402-403 (1973). Section 34 provided in relevant part: “That Porto Rico shall constitute a judicial district to be called 'the district of Porto Rico.’ The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shah appoint a district judge ... for a term of four years, unless sooner removed by the President. The district court for said district shall be called the district court of the United States for Porto Rico . . . and shall have, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of district courts of the United States, jurisdiction of ah cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United States, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit court.” 31 Stat. 84. The report of the majority of the House Committee considering the legislation for Puerto Rico concluded: “First. That upon reason and authority the term ‘United States,’ as used in the Constitution, has reference only to the States that constitute the Federal Union and does not include Territories. “Second. That the power of Congress with respect to legislation for the Territories is plenary.” H. R. Rep. No. 249, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1900). But see the minority report, id., at 17-20. This adopts by reference the views of Representative Newlands: “The weight of authorities sustain [s] the proposition that the Constitution, ex profirió vigore, controls the action of the Government created by the Constitution wherever it operates, whether in States or Territories.” Id., at 29. The Senate Committee considering the proposed legislation for a civil government in Puerto Rico surveyed the previous territorial legislation to determine when, and under what circumstances, the Congress had extended the Constitution to the Territories. It con-eluded that, as a rule, the organization of a Territory had not been accompanied by an extension of the Constitution. Not until 1850, when Congress established a government for the Territory of New Mexico, did it explicitly provide: “That the Constitution, and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory of New Mexico as elsewhere within the United States.” Act of Sept. 9, 1850, c. 49, § 17, 9 Stat. 452. See S. Rep. No. 249, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1900). This provision became the model for subsequent territorial legislation. “'The provisions of section eighteen hundred and ninety-one of the Revised Statutes of eighteen hundred and seventy-eight shall not apply to the Philippine Islands.” 32 Stat. 692. Nevertheless, the people of the Philippines were not left unprotected because Congress also provided them with a bill of rights guaranteeing most of the basic protections afforded by the Constitution to persons within the United States. § 5, 32 Stat. 692. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100 (1904). In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901), which presented this Court with its first opportunity to review the constitutionality of the Foraker Act, Mr. Justice Brown referred to Rev. Stat. § 1891 in his opinion but attached no significance to it. 182 U. S., at 257. In contrast, the Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 143 (1904), relied on the 1902 Act’s express exclusion of § 1891, in holding that the Constitution, except insofar as required by its own terms, did not extend to the Philippines. This provision was continued as § 9 of the Organic Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 954: “That the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the United States, except the internal-revenue laws.” This is now part of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 48 U. S. C. § 734. Although appellants contend that, for a variety of reasons, the federal statutes with which we are concerned should not apply to Puerto Rico, they do not argue that these statutes are “locally inapplicable,” within the meaning of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act. Section 2 of the Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951, left only two major exceptions: the right, under the Fifth Amendment, not to "be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,” and the right, under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, to a jury trial. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 306 (1922); S. Rep. No. 1779, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1950); H. R. Rep. No. 2275, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1950). In 1947 Congress had given the qualified voters of Puerto Rico the right to select their own governor by popular suffrage. Act of Aug. 5,1947, c. 490, 61 Stat. 770. The purpose of the condition was explained: “Applicable provisions of the United States Constitution and the Federal Relations Act will have the same effect as the Constitution of the United States has with respect to State constitutions or State laws. United States laws not locally inapplicable will have equal force and effect in Puerto Rico as throughout the States except as otherwise provided in the Federal Relations Act. Any act of the Puerto Rican Legislature in conflict with . . . the Constitution of the United States or United States laws not locally inapplicable would be null and void. “Within this framework, the people of Puerto Rico will exercise self-government. As regards local matters, the sphere of action and the methods of government bear a resemblance to that of any State of the Union.” S. Rep. No. 1720, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952). Subsequent congressional legislation affecting the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico further confirms the conclusion that it possesses the same jurisdiction as that conferred on the federal district courts in the several States. By Pub. L. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764, the tenure of federal judges in Puerto Rico was made identical to that of other United States district judges. The reason given for this amendment was that the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico "is in its jurisdiction, powers, and responsibilities the same as the U. S. district courts in the [several] States.” S. Rep. No. 1504, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966); see also H. R. Rep. No. 135, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1965). The complete identity of the responsibility of these courts was effectuated in 1970, 84 Stat. 298, when Congress repealed § 41 of the Act of Mar. 2, 1917, 39 Stat. 965, in the context of providing additional United States district judges throughout the United States, including Puerto Rico. Appellants’ argument rests in large part on Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389 (1973), where, following the rationale of Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S., at 42 n. 1, the Court held that a statute of the District of Columbia was not a state statute for the purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). Palmore does not suggest, however, that the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are to be treated identically in every respect. Indeed, there is no reason to hold such a view, particularly in light of the fact that the sources of congressional authority with respect to them are entirely different. “It is true, of course, that Congress also possessed plenary power over the Territories. For practical reasons, however, effective federal control over the activities of territorial officials was virtually impossible. Indeed, 'the territories were not ruled immediately from Washington; in a day of poor roads and slow mails, it was unthinkable that they should be. Rather, Congress left municipal law to be developed largely by the territorial legislatures, within the framework of organic acts and subject to a retained power of veto. The scope of self-government exercised under these delegations was nearly as broad as that enjoyed by the States. . . .’ Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 546 (1962) .... Thus, although the Constitution vested control over the Territories in the Congress, its practical control was both ‘confused and ineffective/ maldng the problem of enforcement of civil rights in the Territories more similar to the problem as it existed in the States than in the District of Columbia.” District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S., at 430-431 (footnotes omitted). During oral argument appellants seemed to suggest, for the first time, that § 689 was ambiguous. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 36. This argument is directed to the exception in § 689 for aliens “who have studied the total courses and have received their corresponding grade or certificate in the Commonwealth.” The argument appears not to have been presented to the District Court. We conclude, also, that, for purposes of the present case, it is plainly without merit. In a series of decisions that have come to be known as the Insular Cases, the Court created the doctrine of incorporated and unincorporated Territories, e. g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U. S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901). The former category encompassed those Territories destined for statehood from the time of acquisition, and the Constitution was applied to them with full force. See, e. g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516 (1905); but see Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197 (1903). The latter category included those Territories not possessing that anticipation of statehood. As to them, only “fundamental” constitutional rights were guaranteed to the inhabitants. Although the question whether certain rights were or were not- fundamental continued to provoke debate among the Members of the Court, it was clear that the Constitution was held not to extend ex proprio vigore to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. The most significant of the Insular Cases is Downes v. Bidwell, supra, where the Court held that the imposition by Congress of special duties on Puerto Rican goods did not violate the requirement of Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” The division of opinion in the Congress over how, and to what extent, the Constitution applied to Puerto Rico was reflected in the Court’s opinions in Downes. Mr. Justice Brown believed that the question was whether Congress had extended the Constitution to Puerto Rico; Mr. Justice White, with whom Justices McKenna and Shiras joined, propounded the theory of incorporated and unincorporated Territories; and Mr. Justice Gray was of the opinion that the question was essentially a political one to be left to the political branches of government. The Chief Justice, with whom Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham joined, dissented on the ground that the Constitution applied to Puerto Rico ex proprio vigore. Mr. Justice White’s approach in Downes v. Bidwell was eventually adopted by a unanimous Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S., at 312-313. Nor does it appear that the debate over the relationship of Puerto Rico to the United States has ended even now. See Note, Inventive Statesmanship vs. The Territorial Clause: The Constitutionality of Agreements Limiting Territorial Powers, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1041 (1974). The Insular Cases served as precedent for holdings that a civilian dependent of an American serviceman stationed abroad could be tried b3»' an American court-martial for offenses committed in a foreign country. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U. S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U. S. 487 (1956). The announcement in those cases that the Constitution applied with full force only in the States composing the Union and in incorporated Territories was overruled, however, only a year later when the Court granted petitions for rehearing, arrived at the opposite result, and withdrew the earlier opinions. Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, of which Puerto Rico is a part, 28 U. S. C. § 41, similarly has declined to make that determination. E. g., Colon-Rosich v. Puerto Rico, 256 F. 2d 393, 397 (1958); Stagg, Mather & Hough v. Descartes, 244 F. 2d 578, 583 (1957); Mora v. Mejias, 206 F. 2d 377, 382 (1953). “[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The ‘equal protection of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than ‘due process of law,’ and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” 347 U. S., at 499. States also have placed restrictions on the devolution of real property to aliens, see Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 (1880); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333 (1901), and have denied them equal rights and opportunities to acquire and own land, see Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923); Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GOTTSCHALK, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS v. BENSON et al. No. 71-485. Argued October 16, 1972 Decided November 20, 1972 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Richard B. Stone argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Acting Assistant Attorney General Comegys, Howard E. Shapiro, Richard H. Stern, and S. William Cochran. Hugh B. Cox argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Henry P. Sailer, Michael Boudin, William L. Keefauver, and Robert 0. Nimtz. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by James M. Clabault and Edward G. Fiorito for Burroughs Corp.; by Henry L. Hanson and D. D. Allegretti for Honeywell, Inc.; by Lloyd N. Cutler, Ezekiel G. Stod-dard, Deanne C. Siemer, Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, and Elmer W. Galbi for International Business Machines Corp.; and by Donald J. Gavin for the Business Equipment Manufacturers Assn. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Sidney Neuman, Tom Arnold, and Jack C. Goldstein for the American Patent Law Assn.; by Ciaron N. White and Louis Robertson for the Chicago Bar Assn.; by James J. Hill and William E. Dominick for the Patent Law Association of Chicago; by Timothy L. Tilton for Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc.; by Michael I. Rackman for Institutional Networks Corp.; by David J. Toomey for Whitlow Computer Systems, Inc.; by Virgil E. Woodcock, Richard E. Kurtz, and Oswald O. Hayes for Mobil Oil Corp.; by Morton C. Jacobs for the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations et al.; by Mr. Jacobs for Applied Data Research, Inc.; and by Howard J. Marsh for Computer Software Analysts, Inc., et al. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents filed in the Patent Office an application for an invention which was described as being related “to the processing of data by program and more particularly to the programmed conversion of numerical information” in general-purpose digital computers. They claimed a method for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals. The claims were not limited to any particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use. They purported to cover any use of the claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer of any type. Claims 8 and 13 were rejected by the Patent Office but sustained by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, - C. C. P. A. (Pat.) -, 441 F. 2d 682. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari. 405 U. S. 915. The question is whether the method described and claimed is a “process” within the meaning of the Patent Act. A digital computer, as distinguished from an analog computer, operates on data expressed in digits, solving a problem by doing arithmetic as a person would do it by head and hand. Some of the digits are stored as components of the computer. Others are introduced into the computer in a form which it is designed to recognize. The computer operates then' upon both new and previously stored data. The general-purpose computer is designed to perform operations under many different programs. The representation of numbers may be in the form of a time series of electrical impulses, magnetized spots on the surface of tapes, drums, or discs, charged spots on cathode-ray tube screens, the presence or absence of punched holes on paper cards, or other devices. The method or program is a sequence of coded instructions for a digital computer. The patent sought is on a method of programming a general-purpose digital computer to convert signals from binary-coded decimal form into pure binary form. A procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem is known as an “algorithm.” The procedures set forth in the present claims are of that kind; that is to say, they are a generalized formulation for programs to solve mathematical problems of converting one form of numerical representation to another. From the generic formulation, programs may be developed as specific applications. The decimal system uses as digits the 10 symbols 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. The value represented by any digit depends, as it does in any positional system of notation, both on its individual value and on its relative position in the numeral. Decimal numerals are written by placing digits in the appropriate positions or columns of the numerical sequence, i. e., “unit” (10°), “tens” (101), “hundreds” (102), “thousands” (103), etc. Accordingly, the numeral 1492 signifies (1X103) + (4X102) + (9X101) +(2X10°). The pure binary system of positional notation uses two symbols as digits — 0 and 1, placed in a numerical sequence with values based on consecutively ascending powers of 2. In pure binary notation, what would be the tens position is the twos position; what would be hundreds position is the fours position; what would be the thousands position is the eights. Any decimal number from 0 to 10 can be represented in the binary system with four digits or positions as indicated in the following table. Shown as the sum of powers of 2 2s 22 21 Decimal (8) (4) (2) (1) Pure Binary 0 = 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0000 1 = 0 + 0 + 0 + 2° = 0001 2 = 0 + 0 + 21 + 0 = 0010 3 = 0 + 0 + 21 + 2° = 0011 4 = 0 + 22 + 0 + 0 = 0100 5 = 0 + 22 + 0 + 2° = 0101 6 = 0 + 22 + 21 + 0 = 0110 7 = 0 + 22 + 21 + 2° = 0111 8 = 23 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 1000 9 = 23 + 0 + 0 + 2° = 1001 10 = 23 + 0 + 21 + 0 = 1010 The BCD system using decimal numerals replaces the character for each component decimal digit in the decimal numeral with the corresponding four-digit binary numeral, shown in the righthand column of the table. Thus decimal 53 is represented as 0101 0011 in BCD, because decimal 5 is equal to binary 0101 and decimal 3 is equivalent to binary 0011. In pure binary notation, however, decimal 53 equals binary 110101. The conversion of BCD numerals to pure binary numerals can be done mentally through use of the foregoing table. The method sought to be patented varies the ordinary arithmetic steps a human would use by changing the order of the steps, changing the symbolism for writing the multiplier used in some steps, and by taking subtotals after each successive operation. The mathematical procedures can be carried out in existing computers long in use, no new machinery being necessary. And, as noted, they can also be performed without a computer. The Court stated in Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U. S. 86, 94, that “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.” That statement followed the longstanding rule that “[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.” Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507. “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175. Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work. As we stated in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130, “He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.” We dealt there with a “product” claim, while the present case deals with a “process” claim. But we think the- same principle applies. Here the “process” claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus. In O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, Morse was allowed a patent for a process of using electromagnetism to produce distinguishable signs for telegraphy. Id., at 111. But the Court denied the eighth claim in which Morse claimed the use of “electro magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances.” Id., at 112. The Court in disallowing that claim said, “If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know, some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His invention may be less complicated — less liable to get out of order— less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet, if it is covered by this patent, the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it, without the permission of this patentee.” Id., at 113. In The Telephone Cases, 126 U. S. 1, 534, the Court explained the Morse case as follows: “The effect of that decision was, therefore, that the use of magnetism as a motive power, without regard to the particular process with which it was connected in the patent, could not be claimed, but that its use in that connection could.” Bell’s invention was the use of electric current to transmit vocal or other sounds. The claim was not “for the use of a current of electricity in its natural state as it comes from the battery, but for putting a continuous current in a closed circuit into a certain specified condition suited to the transmission of vocal and other sounds, and using it in that condition for that purpose.” Ibid. The claim, in other words, was not “one for the use of electricity distinct from the particular process with which it is connected in his patent.” Id., at 535. The patent was for that use of electricity “both for the magneto and variable resistance methods.” Id., at 538. Bell’s claim, in other words, was not one for all telephonic use of electricity. In Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252, 267-268, the Court said, “One may discover a new and useful improvement in the process of tanning, dyeing, etc., irrespective of any particular form of machinery or mechanical device.” The examples given were the “arts of tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores.” Id., at 267. Those are instances, however, where the use of chemical substances or physical acts, such as temperature control, changes articles or materials. The chemical process or the physical acts which transform the raw material are, however, sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within rather definite bounds. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780, involved a process for manufacturing flour so as to improve its quality. The process first separated the superfine flour and then removed impurities from the middlings by blasts of air, reground the middlings, and then combined the product with the superfine. Id., at 785. The claim was not limited to any special arrangement of machinery. Ibid. The Court said, “That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. If one of the steps of a process be that a certain substance is to be reduced to a powder, it may not be at all material what instrument or machinery is used to effect that object, whether a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a mill. Either may be pointed out; but if the patent is not confined to that particular tool or machine, the use of the others would be an infringement, the general process being the same. A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an. act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.” Id., at 787-788. Transformation and reduction of an article “to a different state or thing” is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines. So it is that a patent in the process of “manufacturing fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature and pressure” was sustained in Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 721. The Court said, “The chemical principle or scientific fact upon which it is founded is, that the elements of neutral fat require to be severally united with an atomic equivalent of water in order to separate from each other and become free. This chemical fact was not discovered by Tilgh-man. He only claims to have invented a particular' mode of bringing about the desired chemical union between the fatty elements and water.” Id., at 729. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366, sustained a patent on a “process” for expanding metal. A process “involving mechanical operations, and producing a new and useful result,” id., at 385-386, was held to be a patentable process, process patents not being limited to chemical action. Smith v. Snow, 294 U. S. 1, and Waxham v. Smith, 294 U. S. 20, involved a process for setting eggs in staged in-eubation and applying mechanically circulated currents of air to the eggs. The Court, in sustaining the function performed (the hatching of eggs) and the means or process by which that is done, said: “By the use of materials in a particular manner he secured the performance of the function by a means which had never occurred in nature, and had not been anticipated by the prior art; this is a patentable method or process. ... A method, which may be patented irrespective of the particular form of the mechanism which may be availed of for carrying it into operation, is not to be rejected as ‘functional,’ merely because the specifications show a machine capable of using it.” 294 U. S., at 22. It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a “different state or thing.” We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold. It is said that we have before us a program for a digital computer but extend our holding to programs for analog computers. We have, however, made clear from the start that we deal with a program only for digital computers. It is said we freeze process patents to old technologies, leaving no room for the revelations of the new, onrushing technology. Such is not our purpose. What we come down to in a nutshell is the following. It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself. It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a policy matter to which we are not competent to speak. The President’s Commission on the Patent System rejected the proposal that these programs be patentable: “Uncertainty now exists as to whether the statute permits a valid patent to be granted on programs. Direct attempts to patent programs have been rejected on the ground of nonstatutory subject matter. Indirect attempts to obtain patents and avoid the rejection, by drafting claims as a process, or a machine or components thereof programmed in a given manner, rather than as a program itself, have confused the issue further and should not be permitted. “The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of a lack of a classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic because of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Without this search, the patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere registration and the presumption of validity would be all but nonexistent. “It is noted that the creation of programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in the absence of patent protection and that copyright protection for programs is presently available.” If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in this field entertain. The technological problems tendered in the many briefs before us indicate to us that considered action by the Congress is needed. Reversed. Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Claim 8 reads: “The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into binary which comprises the steps of “(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a re-entrant shift register, “(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a binary '1' in the second position of said register, “(3) masking out said binary T in said second position of said register, “(4) adding a binary 1’ to the first position of said register, “(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions, “(6) adding a T to said first position, and “(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for a succeeding binary 1’ in the second position of said register.” Claim 13 reads: “A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal number representations into binary number representations comprising the steps of “(1) testing each binary digit position '1/ beginning with the least significant binary digit position, of the most significant decimal digit representation for a binary ‘O’ or a binary T; “(2) if a binary ‘O’ is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation; “(3) if a binary ‘V is detected, adding a binary '1’ at the (i+l)th and (i+3)th least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant decimal digit representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation; “(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant decimal digit representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the next lesser significant decimal digit representation as modified by the previous execution of steps (1) through (3); and “(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant decimal digit representation has been so processed.” They are set forth in the Appendix to this opinion. Title 35 U. S. C. § 100 (b) provides: “The term ‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” Title 35 U. S. C. § 101 provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” See R. Benrey, Understanding Digital Computers 4 (1964). “To Promote the Progress of . . . Useful Arts,” Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System (1966). Id., at 13. See Wild, Computer Program Protection: The Need to Legislate a Solution, 54 Corn. L. Rev. 586, 604-609 (1969); Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable?, 68 Col. L. Rev. 241 (1968); Buckman, Protection of Proprietory Interest in Computer Programs, 51 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 135 (1969). Amicus briefs of 14 interested groups have been filed on the merits in this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BLANDING et al. v. DuBOSE et al. No. 81-325. Decided January 11, 1982 Per Curiam. Appellants, citizens of Sumter County, S. C., have taken an appeal from a summary judgment entered against them on February 17, 1981, by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The three-judge District Court concluded that Sumter County in June 1979 had made a preclearance submission under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, when it wrote the United States Attorney General informing him that a referendum had approved at-large County Council elections. Because the Attorney General failed to object within 60 days to the claimed preclearance submission, the District Court permitted Sumter County to proceed with at-large elections for its County Council. We hold that the county’s June 1979 letter was a reconsideration request, not a preclearance submission, and reverse. I Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that when a covered political subdivision enacts a voting procedure different from that in effect on November 1, 1964, the political subdivision must either seek a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia approving the procedure or submit it to the United States Attorney General for preclearance. If the procedure is submitted to the Attorney General and he does not interpose an objection to the preclearance submission within 60 days, the procedure may be enforced. On November 1,1964, Sumter County was governed by its South Carolina General Assembly delegation acting through a County Board of Supervisors. In 1967, the General Assembly enacted a local bill that established a new form of government for Sumter County, namely, a seven-member County Commission elected at-large. See 1967 S. C. Acts, No. 371. Although this change required preclearance under §5 of the Voting Rights Act, no steps were taken to obtain preclearance and at-large elections were held in 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974. In 1975, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor approved, the State’s Home Rule Act, 1975 S. C. Acts, No. 283, codified as S. C. Code § 4-9-10 et seq. (1976 and Supp. 1980). The Act permitted a South Carolina county to hold a referendum to select a form of local government and to choose between at-large and single-member district elections. § 4-9-10. The Act specifically provided that if Sumter County did not hold a referendum, it would be assigned, effective July 1, 1976, the council-administrator form of government with council members elected at-large. § 4-9-10(b). The Home Rule Act was submitted to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance. The Attorney General did not interpose an objection to the Act, as such, but he indicated that the outcomes of Home Rule Act refer-enda or assignments of forms of government under the Act would be subject to preclearance. Sumter County chose not to hold a referendum. Accordingly, it was assigned the council-administrator form of government with at-large elections. The County Council passed a resolution and ordinance adopting that form of government and method of election. On August 13, 1976, the County Administrator submitted the Sumter County Home Rule Ordinance and the 1967 Act to the Attorney General for preclearance. On December 3, after having obtained necessary additional information, see 28 CFR §51.18 (1980), the Attorney General made a timely objection to the at-large method of election of the Council. He interposed no objection to the council-administrator form of government. The county requested the Attorney General to reconsider his objection to at-large elections, see § 51.21(b), and the county and the Attorney General continued to correspond during 1977 and 1978. In early 1978, the county asked whether the Attorney General would withdraw his objection if a county referendum endorsed the at-large method of election. On April 28 of that year, the Attorney General declined to withdraw the objection and advised the county that a favorable referendum result, by itself, would not cause him to change his mind. A Council election was scheduled for June 13, 1978. After the Attorney General refused to withdraw his objection, private parties and the United States brought separate federal suits to prevent elections under the at-large system. The two suits were consolidated. A single judge issued a temporary restraining order, and on June 21, 1978, a three-judge District Court permanently enjoined County Council elections until the requirements of the Voting Rights Act were fulfilled. In November 1978, Sumter County went ahead with its referendum in which voters were asked whether they preferred that Council members be elected at-large or from single-member districts. The majority endorsed the at-large method. Because Council members already were being elected under the at-large system, the county did not enact any resolution or ordinance to adopt the results of the referendum. Then came the critical exchange of correspondence. On June 4, 1979, the Attorney General received a letter, dated June 1, from the county advising him of the referendum results. The letter expressed doubt as to whether it was a new preclearance submission of the at-large method, see 28 CFR § 51.2(c) (1980), or a request that the Attorney General reconsider his earlier objection to at-large elections, see § 51.21. Subsequently, on July 23, a conference was held in Washington, D. C., between county officials and representatives of the Department of Justice. See § 51.23. Fifteen days later, see § 51.24, on August 7, the Attorney General, referring to the county’s letter as a “request for reconsideration,” refused to withdraw the objection to at-large elections, but advised the county that the Department of Justice had not yet completed its review. On September 27, the Attorney General for a second time refused to withdraw his objection. See §51.25. Thereafter, the defendant-appellees moved the District Court for summary judgment. They contended that the June letter was a preclearance submission, not a request for reconsideration. Section 5, the appellees noted, requires the Attorney General to object within 60 days of a preclearance submission. They asserted that, since the Attorney General did not interpose an objection by August 3, the county was free under § 5 to proceed with at-large elections. A three-judge District Court was again convened. It agreed with appellees. 509 P. Supp. 1334 (1981). Referring to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the court observed that the 1978 referendum approved a method of electing county officials different from that in effect on November 1, 1964. The letter received June 4, 1979, according to the District Court, was the required preclearance submission. Rejecting the Attorney General’s argument that the letter was a request for reconsideration of his timely 1976 objection to at-large elections, the District Court declared: “This Court will not be a party to the [Attorney General’s] effort to excuse his failure to act by mislabeling a submission for preclearance as a ‘request for reconsideration.’” 509 F. Supp., at 1336. hH I — I We conclude that the District Court, not the Attorney General, mislabeled the June 1979 letter. The court ruled that that letter was a preclearance submission because the referendum approved a method of selecting officials different from that in effect on November 1, 1964. But the change to at-large County Council elections already had been submitted to the Attorney General for preclearance. The 1978 referendum merely approved the pre-existing at-large method — the very method to which the Attorney General earlier had made a timely objection. Because the referendum did no more than endorse a method of election that previously had been submitted to the Attorney General and that was the subject of an outstanding objection, the June letter did not amount to a new preclearance submission. Indeed, the June letter fell squarely within the definition of a reconsideration request. The applicable regulation provides that the Attorney General will reconsider his objection upon a request by a submitting authority “to present further substantiating or explanatory information which was not previously available to the submitting authority.” 28 CFR § 51.21(b) (1980). The results of the referendum constituted further explanatory information concerning at-large elections which the county asked the Attorney General to consider. The June letter thus was nothing more than a request that the Attorney General reconsider his earlier objection to at-large County Council elections in light of the referendum results. The District Court put forward several reasons why, in its view, the June letter was not a reconsideration request. None of them persuades us. First, the District Court pointed out that the county already had made one reconsideration request. But the regulations do not limit a political subdivision to a single request for reconsideration.. Second, the court relied upon 28 CFR § 51.21(b) (1980), which requires that a reconsideration request be made within 10 days of the Attorney General’s objection. The Attorney General, however, follows the laudable practice of accepting reconsideration requests even though they are untimely, thus considering possibly important information that was not available within 10 days of the original objection. See also §51.25 (permitting the Attorney General to reconsider his objection on his own motion). In any event, the mere fact that a reconsideration request is untimely does not convert it into a preclearance submission. Third, the court also cited § 51.21(b) for the proposition that a reconsideration request must be based on information not previously available. That requirement poses no obstacle to considering the June letter a reconsideration request, because the outcome of the referendum constituted information not previously available to Sumter County authorities. And, just as a reconsideration request does not become a preclearance submission merely by being untimely, so a reconsideration request does not become a preclearance submission simply by being repetitive. Not only does the District Court decision mischaracterize the June letter, but its decision also has undesirable results. Under that court’s ruling, a political subdivision could recommence the 60-day period at will by readopting the contested voting procedure. In addition, the Attorney General would be forced to interpose redundant objections to the same change in voting laws. For these reasons also, we refuse to accept the District Court’s interpretation of § 5. Finally, we have frequently stated that courts should grant deference to the interpretation given statutes and regulations by the officials charged with their administration. See, e. g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555 (1980); United States v. Sheffield Board of Comm’rs, 435 U. S. 110, 131 (1978); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). In this case, the Attorney General employed reasonable definitions of a preclearance submission and of a reconsideration request when he treated the June letter as in the latter category. Indeed, the Attorney General followed the more sensible course. The judgment of the District Court is Reversed. The Chief Justice concurs in the judgment. Section 5, as amended, reads in pertinent part as follows: “Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, . . . such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, . . . and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission. . . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.” The Attorney General acted through the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division. The letter states: “We are uncertain as to whether this submission should be termed a ‘new submission,’ or a ‘request’ for reconsideration of the Attorney General’s objection to the County’s original submission.” 1 Record, Defendants’ Exhibit 7, p. 3, attached to County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment filed with the District Court on Jan. 25, 1980. Section 51.24 reads: “An objection shall be withdrawn if the submitting authority can produce information not previously available to it which satisfies the Attorney General that the change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. The Attorney General shall notify the submitting authority within 60 days of the request for reconsideration (provided that the Attorney General shall have at least 15 days following any conference that is held in which to decide) of his decision to continue or withdraw an objection, giving the reasons for his decision. A copy of the notification shall be sent to any party that has commented on the submission or has requested notice of the Attorney General’s action thereon.” The District Court in its opinion, 509 F. Supp. 1334 (1981), omitted mention of the August 7 letter, which is Defendants’ Exhibit 8 attached to the motion for summary judgment. The court stated that the Attorney General did not take action following the July 23 conference until he refused to withdraw his objection on September 27. 509 F. Supp., at 1336. In this respect, the decision of the District Court was clearly erroneous. Once it concluded that the June letter was a preclearance submission, the District Court found that the Attorney General’s actions were untimely. But it can hardly be said that the Attorney General failed to act in response to the June letter. We note again that Department of Justice officials held a conference with Sumter County officials on July 23, that the Attorney General refused to withdraw his objection on August 7, within 15 days of that conference, and that the Attorney General once more, on September 27, refused to withdraw his objection. Before the District Court, there was a dispute whether the June letter was accompanied by a multipage document supplying, inter alia, the information required by 28 CFR §51.10 (1980), or whether that document was first presented to the Department of Justice at the July 23 conference. If the document was not presented until July 23, the Attorney General’s August 7 letter might not have been untimely even if the June letter were a preclearance submission. See §§ 51.3(b) and 51.18(a). See also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 171 (1980). Because we hold that the June letter was not a preclearance submission, we need not address this issue.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al. No. 466. Argued April 30, May 1, 1957. Decided May 13, 1957. Thomas G. Meeker argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, David Ferher and Solomon Freedman. Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for the Louisiana Public Service Commission, respondent. J. Raburn Monroe argued the cause for the Louisiana Power & Light Co., respondent. With him on the brief were /. Blanc Monroe and Monte M. Lemann. Daniel James filed a brief for Middle South Utilities, Inc., respondent. Per Curiam. On January 29, 1953, the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to § 11 (b)(1) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (b)(1), issued a notice and order for hearing directed to Middle South Utilities, Inc., and its subsidiary, Louisiana Power & Light Company, upon the matter of “[w]hether Middle South and Louisiana [Power] should be required to take action to dispose of the gas utility assets and non-utility assets of Louisiana [Power] and, if so, what terms and conditions should be imposed in connection therewith.” A copy of that notice and order for hearing was served upon those companies and also upon the Louisiana Public Service Commission by registered mail. A full hearing was conducted by the S. E. C. at which Middle South and Louisiana Power appeared, adduced evidence, and presented arguments in support of their position that they should be permitted to retain Louisiana Power’s gas properties as an additional integrated public utility system under the proviso to § 11 (b)(1) of the Act. The Louisiana Public Service Commission did not appear in that proceeding. On March 20, 1953, the S. E. C. issued its opinion, findings and order directing Middle South and Louisiana Power to divest themselves of all the non-electric assets of Louisiana Power “in any appropriate manner not in contravention of the applicable provisions of the Act,” which gave them one year for compliance under the provisions of § 11 (c) of the Act, 49 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (c). No petition to review that order was ever filed, and it ceased to be subject to judicial review with the expiration of the 60 days allowed to petition for that purpose by § 24 (a) of the Act, 49 Stat. 834, 15 U. S. C. § 79x (a), on May 19, 1953. Thereafter, pursuant to § 11 (c) of the Act, the S. E. C. extended the time for compliance with its order to March 20, 1955. On November 10, 1954, Louisiana Power and its newly organized wholly owned subsidiary, Louisiana Gas Service Corp., filed a joint “application-declaration” with the S. E. C., proposing the transfer by Louisiana Power of all its non-electric properties to Louisiana Gas as a step in compliance with the divestment order of March 20, 1953, and expressing the intention of Louisiana Power to effect divestment of the common stock of Louisiana Gas within 18 months from the date the latter might begin operations. Thereupon, the S. E. C. issued a notice advising interested persons, including the Louisiana Public Service Commission, of the filing of the “application-declaration” mentioned, and that they might request a hearing on that proposal. By telegram of December 22, 1954, the Louisiana Commission requested the S. E. C. to grant a hearing upon that “application-declaration” and to reopen the §11 (b)(1) proceeding which had resulted in the divestment order of March 20, 1953. On December 27, 1954, it filed with the S. E. C. a formal petition accordingly, which it supplemented on January 3, 1955. Also, at the suggestion of the S. E. C., the Louisiana Commission submitted an offer of proof and a brief in support of its petition to reopen the divestment proceeding. The offer of proof did not indicate any change in conditions since the divestment order of March 20, 1953, but, rather, complained that the evidence in that proceeding had been incomplete and that the S. E. C. had acted, in part, upon an erroneous conception of the law. The S. E. C. heard oral argument upon the Louisiana Commission’s petition to reopen. Thereafter, on September 13; 1955, it found that there were “no grounds for questioning . . . [its] earlier conclusion and no changed circumstances justifying a modification” of its divestment order of March 20, 1953, and it denied the petition to reopen that proceeding. The Louisiana Commission then filed a petition in the Court of Appeals to review the order of September 13, 1955, denying its petition to reopen, and also therein stated that it sought review of the divestment order of March 20,1953. The S. E. C. moved the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for review upon the ground that the order of September 13, 1955, was not judicially reviewable and that the petition for review was in essence an attempt to appeal from the divestment order of March 20, 1953, long after the time allowed by law to do so had expired. The Court of Appeals held that the order of September 13, 1955, was reviewable, and it set aside that order. It also held that legal determinations made by the S. E. C. in its divestment order of March 20, 1953, were erroneous, and it, in effect, set aside that order too. 235 F. 2d 167. We granted certiorari. 352 U. S. 924. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the order of September 13, 1955, was subject to judicial review was rested upon the last two sentences of § 11 (b) of the Act, 49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (b), reading: “The Commission may by order revoke or modify any order previously made under this subsection, if, after notice and opportunity for hearing, it finds that the conditions upon which the order was predicated do not exist. Any order made under this subsection shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 79x of this title.” It held that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s order of September 13, 1955, denying the Louisiana Commission’s petition to reopen the divestment proceeding was an “order” specifically made subject to judicial review by the quoted language. We take a different view. We hold that the orders made judicially reviewable by the quoted language are the directory orders mentioned in, and authorized by, subsection (b) of § 11 of the Act, and orders which may “revoke or modify” any such order previously made under that subsection, and that the quoted language does not include an order merely denying a petition to reopen §11 (b) proceedings. It follows that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s order of September 13, 1955, denying the Louisiana Commission’s petition to reopen the divestment proceeding was not an order which was subject to judicial review, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals must accordingly be reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BRENDALE v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND BANDS OF THE YAKIMA INDIAN NATION et al. No. 87-1622. Argued January 10, 1989 Decided June 29, 1989 White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., delivered an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711 and dissenting in No. 87-1622. Stevens, J., joined by O’Connor, J., delivered an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in No. 87-1622 and concurring in the judgment in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711, post, p. 433. Blackmun, J., joined by BREnnan and Marshall, JJ., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in No. 87-1622 and dissenting in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711, post, p. 448. Jeffrey C. Sullivan argued the cause for petitioners in all cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners in No. 87-1711 was Terry Austin. Charles C. Flower and Patrick Andre-otti filed briefs for petitioner in No. 87-1622. Dale B. Ramerman, Ronald T. Schaps, and Michael Mirande filed briefs for petitioner in No. 87-1697. Tim Weaver argued the cause for respondents in all cases. With him on the brief was R. Wayne Bjur. Together with No. 87-1697, Wilkinson v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, and No. 87-1711, County of Yakima et al. v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Arizona et al. by Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, and Timothy R. Malone, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: RobeH K. Corbin of Arizona, Mm Jones of Idaho, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Michael T. Greely of Montana, Brian McKay of Nevada, Hal Stratton of New Mexico, Nicholas J. Spaeth of North Dakota, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; for the State of South Dakota by Roger A. Telling-huisen, Attorney General, and John P. Gtihin, Deputy Attorney General; for Mendocino County et al. by Tom D. Tobin; for the city of Green Bay, Wisconsin, et al. by James L. Quarles III, William F. Lee, and Kathryn Bucher; for the town of Parker, Arizona, by John B. Weldon, Jr., Stephen E. Crofton and Gerald W. Hunt; for the Citizens Equal Rights Alliance, Inc., et al. by Kenn A. Pugh; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Berma, Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, Robert L. Deitz, and F. Henry Habicht II; and for the Quinault Property Owners Association et al. by Thomas M. Christ and Dennis D. Reynolds. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Colorado River Indian Tribes by Alletta d’A. Belin and William G. Lavell; for the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation et al. by Bruce E. Didesch, Allen H. Sanders, and Amy L. Crewdson; for the National Congress of American Indians et al. by Thomas E. Luebben and James A. Bowen; for the Navajo Nation by Steven J. Bloxham; for the Governing Council of the Pinoleville Indian Community by David J. Rapport; for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation by Charles A. Hobbs; for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe et al. by William R. Perry and Harry R. Sachse; and for the Swinomish Tribal Community et al. by Jeanette Wolfley, Thomas R. Acevedo, Jack F. Trope, Jeanne S. Whiteing, Dale T. White, Scott B. McElroy, W. Richard West, Jr., and Daniel A. Raas. Justice White, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Sc alia, and Justice Kennedy, delivered an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711 and dissenting in No. 87-1622. The issue presented by these three consolidated cases is whether the Yakima Indian Nation or the County of Yakima, a governmental unit of the State of Washington, has the authority to zone fee lands owned by nonmembers of the Tribe located within the boundaries of the Yakima Reservation. hH ut> The Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation are composed of 14 originally distinct Indian Tribes that banded together in the mid-1800’s to negotiate with the United States. The result of those negotiations was a treaty signed in 1855 and ratified by the Senate in 1859. Treaty between the United States and the Yakima Nation of Indians (Treaty with the Yakimas), 12 Stat. 951. By the terms of the treaty, the Yakima Nation ceded vast areas of land to the United States but retained an area, the Yakima Indian Reservation, for its “exclusive use and benefit.” Id., at 952. The reservation is located in the southeastern part of the State of Washington. Approximately 1.3 million acres of land are located within its boundaries. Of that land, roughly 80% is held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Yakima Nation or individual members of the Tribe. The remaining 20% of the land is owned in fee by Indian or non-Indian owners. Most of the fee land is found in Toppenish, Wapato, and Harrah, the three incorporated towns located in the northeastern part of the reservation. The remaining fee land is scattered throughout the reservation in a “checkerboard” pattern. The parties to this litigation, as well as the District Court and the Court of Appeals, have treated the Yakima Reservation as divided into two parts: a “closed area” and an “open area.” The closed area consists of the western two-thirds of the reservation and is predominantly forest land. Of the approximately 807,000 acres of land in the closed area, 740,000 acres are located in Yakima County. Twenty-five thousand acres of the seven hundred and forty thousand acres are fee land. ' The closed area is so named because it has been closed to the general public at least since 1972 when the Bureau of Indian Affairs restricted the use of federally maintained roads in the area to members of the Yakima Nation and to its permittees, who must be record landowners or associated with the Tribe. Access to the open area, as its name suggests, is not likewise restricted to the general public. The open area is primarily rangeland, agricultural land, and land used for residential and commercial development. Almost half of the land in the open area is fee land. B The Yakima Nation adopted its first zoning ordinance in 1970. The ordinance was amended to its present form in 1972. By its terms, the Yakima Nation ordinance applies to all lands within the reservation boundaries, including fee lands owned by Indians or non-Indians. Yakima County adopted its present comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1972, although the county had regulated land use as early as 1946. The county ordinance applies to all real property within county boundaries, except for Indian trust lands. The ordinance establishes a number of use districts, which generally govern agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial, and forest watershed uses. The particular zoning designations at issue are “forest watershed” and “general rural.” The fee lands located in the closed area are zoned by the county ordinance as forest watershed. That designation permits development of single-family dwellings, commercial campgrounds, small overnight lodging facilities, restaurants, bars, general stores and souvenir shops, service stations, marinas, and sawmills. The minimum lot size is one-half acre. None of these uses would be permitted by the zoning designation “reservation restricted area,” which applies to the closed area under the Yakima Nation zoning ordinance. The general rural zoning designation, applicable to land in the open area, is one of three use districts governing agricultural properties. The minimum lot size for land zoned general rural is smaller than that specified for agricultural land in the Yakima Nation ordinance, although the other county use districts for agricultural properties have larger minimum lot sizes than the Yakima Nation ordinance. C 1 Petitioner Philip Brendale, who is part Indian but not a member of the Yakima Nation, owns a 160-acre tract of land near the center of the forested portion of the closed area. The parcel was originally allotted to Brendale’s great aunt, a member of the Yakima Nation. The land passed by inheritance to Brendale’s mother and grandfather, who were issued a fee patent in 1963, and then, on his mother’s death in 1972, to Brendale: The land is zoned as reservation restricted area by the Yakima Nation. It is zoned forest watershed by Yakima County. In January 1982, Brendale filed four contiguous “short plat” applications with the Yakima County Planning Department. After determining that the short platting did not require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the department issued a Declaration of Non-Significance. The department requested comments from the Yakima Nation, and after the Tribe did not respond, the short plats were approved. Brendale then submitted in April 1983 a “long plat” application to divide one of his platted 20-acre parcels into 10 2-acre lots to be sold as summer cabin sites. Each lot is to have an individual well and a septic tank. Electric generators would provide electricity. The proposed plat is bordered on the north and east by other lands owned by Brendale, on the south by lands owned in fee by the St. Regis Paper Company, and on the west by lands held in trust by the United States. The proposed development would not have been permissible under the Yakima Nation ordinance. The county planning department again issued a Declaration of Non-Significance. The Yakima Nation appealed the Declaration of Non-Significance to the Yakima County Board of Commissioners on the grounds that the county had no zoning authority over the land and that an EIS was necessary. The commissioners concluded that the appeal was properly before the Board but reversed the planning department and ordered that an EIS be prepared. 2 Petitioner Stanley Wilkinson, a non-Indian and a nonmember of the Yakima Nation, owns a 40-acre tract of land in the open area of the reservation. The tract is located less than a mile from the northern boundary of the reservation and is on a slope overlooking the Yakima Municipal Airport and the city of Yakima. The land is bordered on the north by trust land and on the other three sides by fee land, and is currently vacant sagebrush property. It is zoned agricultural by the Yakima Nation and general rural by Yakima County. In September 1983, Wilkinson applied to the Yakima County Planning Department to subdivide 32 acres of his land into 20 lots. The lots range in size from 1.1 acres to 4.5 acres. Each is to be used for a single-family home and will be served by individual wells and septic systems. The proposed development would not have been permissible under the Yakima Nation ordinance. The planning department initially indicated that an EIS needed to be prepared for the project, but later, after Wilkinson modified his proposal, the department issued a Declaration of Non-Significance. The Yakima Nation thereafter appealed the Declaration of Non-Significance, again challenging the county’s authority to zone the land and alleging that an EIS was necessary. The county board of commissioners concluded that the appeal was properly before it and affirmed the planning department’s conclusion that an EIS was not necessary. D The Yakima Nation then filed separate actions in United States District Court challenging the proposed development of the Brendale and Wilkinson properties and the county’s exercise of zoning authority over the land. The complaints sought a declaratory judgment that the Yakima Nation had exclusive authority to zone the properties at issue and an injunction barring any action or the approval of any action on the land inconsistent with the land-use regulations of the Yakima Nation. The District Court held that the Yakima Nation had exclusive zoning authority over the Brendale property, Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735, 744, 747 (ED Wash. 1985) (Whiteside I), but concluded that the Tribe lacked authority over the Wilkinson property, Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 750, 758 (ED Wash. 1985) (Whiteside II). The District Court looked to this Court’s opinion in Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), as controlling whether an Indian tribe has authority to regulate activities of nonmembers of the tribe on fee lands. The District Court determined that there was no evidence of any “consensual relationship” between the Yakima Nation and Wilkinson and Brendale that would extend the authority of the Tribe to the fee lands. 617 F. Supp., at 743; 617 F. Supp., at 757. But after making detailed findings of fact, the court concluded that “Brendale’s proposed development does indeed pose a threat to the political integrity, the economic security and the health and welfare of the Yakima Nation,” and therefore the Tribe has authority to impose its zoning regulations on that property. 617 F. Supp., at 744. The District Court then proceeded to determine that Yakima County was pre-empted from exercising concurrent zoning authority over the land in the closed area because its interests in regulating the land were minimal while the Tribe’s interests were substantial. Id., at 747. But because Wilkinson’s proposed development did not impose a similar threat, the Tribe had no authority whatsoever over that property. 617 F. Supp., at 758. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed as to the Brendale property but reversed as to the Wilkinson property. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F. 2d 529 (1987). In upholding the Yakima Nation’s zoning authority, the Court of Appeals did not disturb or rely on the findings of the District Court. Instead, it concluded that zoning ordinances by their very nature attempt “to protect against the damage caused by uncontrolled development, which can affect all of the residents and land of the reservation.” Id., at 534. According to the Court of Appeals, zoning ordinances are within the police power of local governments precisely because they promote the health and welfare of the community. Moreover, a “major goal” of zoning is coordinated land-use planning. Because fee land is located throughout the reservation in a checkerboard pattern, denying the Yakima Nation the right to zone fee land “would destroy [its] capacity to engage' in comprehensive planning, so fundamental to a zoning scheme.” This the court was “unwilling” to do. Id., at 534-535. Brendale, Wilkinson, and Yakima County each petitioned for writ of certiorari. We granted the petitions and consolidated the cases for argument. 487 U. S. 1204 (1988). 1 — 1 1 — 1 The present actions were brought by the Yakima Nation to require development occurring on property within the boundaries of its reservation to proceed in accordance with the Yakima Nation zoning ordinance. The Tribe is necessarily contending that it has the exclusive authority to zone all of the property within the reservation, including the projects at issue here. We therefore examine whether the Yakima Nation has the authority, derived either from its treaty with the United States or from its status as an independent sovereign, to zone the fee lands owned by Brendale and Wilkinson. A The Yakima Nation argues first that its treaty with the United States establishes its authority to regulate fee land within the reservation but owned by nonmembers of the Tribe. By its terms, the Treaty with the Yakimas provides that the land retained by the Yakima Nation “shall be set apart... for the exclusive use and benefit” of the Tribe, and no “white man, excepting those in the employment of the Indian Department, [shall] be permitted to reside upon the said reservation without permission of the tribe.” 12 Stat. 951, 952. The Yakima Nation contends that this power to exclude provides the source for its authority over the land at issue here. We disagree. The Yakima Nation no longer retains the “exclusive use and benefit” of all the land within the reservation boundaries established by the Treaty with the Yakimas. Under the Indian General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388, significant portions of the Yakima Reservation, including the tracts of land at issue here, were allotted to individual members of the Tribe. The land was held in trust for a period of years, generally 25 although the period was subject to extension, after which fee patents were issued. Id., at 389, §5. Over time, through sale and inheritance, nonmembers of the Tribe, such as petitioners Brendale and Wilkinson, have come to own a substantial portion of the allotted land. We analyzed the effect of the Allotment Act on an Indian tribe’s treaty rights to regulate activities of nonmembers on fee land in Montana v. United States. The treaty language there was virtually identical to the language in the Treaty with the Yakimas, 450 U. S., at 558, and we concluded that “treaty rights with respect to reservation lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those lands.” Id., at 561. See also Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U. S. 165, 174 (1977). In Montana, as in the present cases, the lands at issue had been alienated under the Allotment Act, and the Court concluded that “[i]t defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal government.” 450 U. S., at 560, n. 9. The Yakima Nation argues that we should not consider the Allotment Act because it was repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984. But the Court in Montana was well aware of the change in Indian policy engendered by the Indian Reorganization Act and concluded that this fact was irrelevant. 450 U. S., at 560, n. 9. Although the Indian Reorganization Act may have ended the allotment of further lands, it did not restore to the Indians the exclusive use of those lands that had already passed to non-Indians or prevent already allotted lands for which fee patents were subsequently issued from thereafter passing to non-Indians. Justice Stevens acknowledges that the Allotment Act eliminated tribal authority to exclude nonmembers from fee lands they owned. Post, at 436-437. Yet he concludes that Brendale and Wilkinson are somehow subject to a tribal power to “determine the character of the tribal community,” post, at 437, unless the Tribe has voluntarily surrendered that power. This view of tribal zoning authority as a sort of equitable servitude, post, at 442, is wholly unsupported by precedent. Justice Stevens begins with a tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers from its land and from that power derives a tribal “power to define the character of” that land, post, at 434, which he asserts as the basis for the Yakima Nation’s exercise of zoning authority over the closed area of its reservation. According to Justice Stevens, the power to exclude “necessarily must include the lesser power to regulate land use in the interest of protecting the tribal community.” Post, at 438. But the Yakima Nation no longer has the power to exclude fee owners from its land within the boundaries of the reservation, as Justice Stevens concedes. Post, at 437. Therefore, that power can no longer serve as the basis for tribal exercise of the lesser included power, a result which is surely not “inconceivable,” post, at 437, but rather which is perfectly straightforward. It is irrelevant that the Tribe had declared the closed area off limits before Brendale obtained title to his property. Once Brendale obtained title to his land that land was no longer off limits to him; the tribal authority to exclude was necessarily overcome by, as Justice Stevens puts it, an “implicit] grant” of access to the land. Ibid. Aside from the alleged inconceivability of the result, Justice Stevens offers no support for his assertion that in enacting the Allotment Act Congress intended tribes to retain the “power to determine the character of the tribal community.” Ibid. Justice Stevens cites only Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U. S. 351 (1962), and Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481 (1973), in support of his position. Post, at 441-442. Those cases are irrelevant to the issue at hand, however, concluding merely that allotment is consistent with continued reservation status. Meanwhile, Montana is directly to the contrary: the Court there flatly rejected the existence of a power, derived from the power to exclude, to regulate activities on lands from which tribes can no longer exclude nonmembers. See 450 U. S., at 559. Justice Stevens’ attempts to distinguish Montana are unavailing. The distinctions on which he relies, that the regulation there was discriminatory, posed no threat to the welfare of the Tribe, and infringed on state interests, post, at 443-444, are not even mentioned in the section of the Montana opinion considering the power to exclude, see 450 U. S., at 557-563, and certainly were not considered by the Court in that case as having any relevance to this issue. We would follow Montana and conclude that, for the reasons stated there, any regulatory power the Tribe might have under the treaty “cannot apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians.” Id., at 559. B An Indian tribe’s treaty power to exclude nonmembers of the tribe from its lands is not the only source of Indian regulatory authority. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130, 141 (1982), the Court held that tribes have inherent sovereignty independent of that authority arising from their power to exclude. Prior to the European settlement of the New World, Indian tribes were “self-governing sovereign political communities,” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322-323 (1978), and they still retain some “elements of ‘quasi-sovereign’ authority after ceding their lands to the United States and announcing their dependence on the Federal Government,” Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, 208 (1978). Thus, an Indian tribe generally retains sovereignty by way of tribal self-government and control over other aspects of its internal affairs. Montana, supra, at 564. A tribe’s inherent sovereignty, however, is divested to the extent it is inconsistent with the tribe’s dependent status, that is, to the extent it involves a tribe’s “external relations.” Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 326. Those cases in which the Court has found a tribe’s sovereignty divested generally are those “involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.” Ibid. For example, Indian tribes cannot freely alienate their lands to non-Indians, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 667-668 (1974), cannot enter directly into commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations, Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832), and cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in tribal courts, Oliphant, supra, at 195. This list is by no means exclusive, as Montana makes clear. In Montana, the Crow Tribe sought to prohibit hunting and fishing within its reservation by anyone not a member of the Tribe. The Court held that the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty did not support extending the prohibition on hunting and fishing to fee lands owned by non-Indians. It recognized the general principle that the “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.” 450 U. S., at 564. Because regulation of hunting and fishing on fee lands owned by nonmembers of the Tribe did not bear any “clear relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations,” ibid., this general principle precluded extension of tribal jurisdiction to the fee lands at issue. The Yakima Nation contends that the Court’s insistence in Montana on an express congressional delegation of tribal power over nonmembers is inconsistent with language in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 153 (1980), that tribal powers are divested by implication only when “the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government.” We do not see this language as inconsistent with Montana. As the opinion in Colville made clear, that case involved “[t]he power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members.” 447 U. S., at 152. It did not involve the regulation of fee lands, as did Montana. Moreover, the Court in Montana itself reconciled the two cases, citing Colville as an example of the sort of “consensual relationship” that might even support tribal authority over nonmembers on fee lands. 450 U. S., at 565-566. Justice Blackmun takes a slightly different approach, relying particularly on Colville and Wheeler for the proposition that “tribal sovereignty is not implicitly divested except in those limited circumstances principally involving external powers of sovereignty where the exercise of tribal authority is necessarily inconsistent with their dependent status.” Post, at 451-452. But Justice Blackmun ignores what the Court made clear in Wheeler, in a passage immediately preceding the one he cites: that regulation of “the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe” is necessarily inconsistent with a tribe’s dependent status, and therefore tribal sovereignty over such matters of “external relations” is divested. 435 U. S., at 326. Indeed, it is precisely this discussion that the Court relied upon in Montana as “distinguishing] between those inherent powers retained by the tribes and those divested.” 450 U. S., at 564. There is no contention here that Congress has expressly delegated to the Yakima Nation the power to zone fee lands of nonmembers of the Tribe. Cf. 18 U. S. C. §§ 1151, 1161 (1982 ed., and Supp. V); 33 U. S. C. §§ 1377(e) and (h)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Therefore under the general principle enunciated in Montana, the Yakima Nation has no authority to impose its zoning ordinance on the fee lands owned by petitioners Brendale and Wilkinson. C Our inquiry does not end here because the opinion in Montana noted two “exceptions” to its general principle. First, “[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” 450 U. S., at 565. Second, “[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id., at 566. The parties agree that the first Montana exception does not apply in these cases. Brendale and Wilkinson do not have a “consensual relationship” with the Yakima Nation simply by virtue of their status as landowners within reservation boundaries, as Montana itself necessarily decided. The Yakima Nation instead contends that the Tribe has authority to zone under the second Montana exception. We disagree. Initially, we reject as overbroad the Ninth Circuit’s categorical acceptance of tribal zoning authority over lands within reservation boundaries. We find it significant that the so-called second Montana exception is prefaced by the word “may” — “[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation.” Ibid, (emphasis added). This indicates to us that a tribe’s authority need not extend to all conduct that “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,” but instead depends on the circumstances. The Ninth Circuit, however, transformed this indication that there may be other cases in which a tribe has an interest in activities of nonmembers on fee land into a rule describing every case in which a tribe has such an interest. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit equated an Indian tribe’s retained sovereignty with a local government’s police power, which is contrary to Montana itself. Montana rejected tribal sovereignty to regulate hunting and fishing on fee land owned by non-Indians, which clearly is a power within the police power of local governments. It is also evident that a literal application of the second exception would make little sense in the circumstances of these cases. To hold that the Tribe has authority to zone fee land when the activity on that land has the specified effect on Indian properties would mean that the authority would last only so long as the threatening use continued. If it ceased, zoning power would revert to the county. Under the District Court’s interpretation of Montana, not only would regulatory authority depend in the first instance on a factual inquiry into how a tribe’s interests are affected by a particular use of fee land, but as circumstances changed over time, so, too, would the authority to zone. Conceivably, in a case like this, zoning authority could vest variously in the county and the Tribe, switching back and forth between the two, depending on what uses the county permitted on the fee land at issue. Uncertainty of this kind would not further the interests of either the Tribe or the county government and would be chaotic for landowners. Montana should therefore not be understood to vest zoning authority in the tribe when fee land is used in certain ways. The governing principle is that the tribe has no authority itself, by way of tribal ordinance or actions in the tribal courts, to regulate the use of fee land. The inquiry thus becomes whether, and to what extent, the tribe has a protectible interest in what activities are taking place on fee land within the reservation and, if it has such an interest, how it may be protected. Of course, under ordinary law, neighbors often have a protectible interest in what is occurring on adjoining property and may seek relief in an appropriate forum, judicial or otherwise. Montana suggests that in the special circumstances of checkerboard ownership of lands within a reservation, the tribe has an interest under federal law, defined in terms of the impact of the challenged uses on the political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. But, as we have indicated above, that interest does not entitle the tribe to complain or obtain relief against every use of fee land that has some adverse effect on the tribe. The impact must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. This standard will sufficiently protect Indian tribes while at the same time avoiding undue interference with state sovereignty and providing the certainty needed by property owners. Since the tribes’ protectible interest is one arising under federal law, the Supremacy Clause requires state and local governments, including Yakima County zoning authorities, to recognize and respect that interest in the course of their activities. The Tribe in this case, as it should have, first appeared in the county zoning proceedings, but its submission should have been, not that the county was without zoning authority over fee land within the reservation, but that its tribal interests were imperiled. The federal courts had jurisdiction to entertain the Tribe’s suit for declaratory and in-junctive relief, but given that the county has jurisdiction to zone fee lands on the reservation and would be enjoinable only if it failed to respect the rights of the Tribe under federal law, the proper course for the District Court in the Brendale phase of this case would have been to stay its hand until the zoning proceedings had been completed. At that time, a judgment could be made as to whether the uses that were actually authorized on Brendale’s property imperiled the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the Tribe. If due regard is given to the Tribe’s protectible interest at all stages of the proceedings, we have every confidence that the nightmarish consequences predicted by Justice Blackmun, post, at 460-461, will be avoided. Of course if practice proves otherwise, Congress can take appropriate ' action. Ill The District Court found that Yakima County’s exercise of zoning power over the Wilkinson property would have no direct effect on the Tribe and would not threaten the Tribe’s political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare. Whiteside II, 617 F. Supp., at 755. On the basis of these findings, it is clear that the Wilkinson development and the county’s approval of that development do not imperil any interest of the Yakima Nation. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit as to the Wilkinson property. The Brendale property presents a different situation. At the time the Tribe filed its suit, the county had agreed with the Tribe that an EIS was required before Brendale’s development could go forward. The zoning proceedings had thus not been concluded, and the District Court’s judgment was that the county had no power to go forward. That judgment was infirm under the approach outlined in this opinion. The zoning proceedings should have been allowed to conclude, and it may be that those proceedings would adequately recognize tribal interests and make unnecessary further action in the District Court. If it were otherwise, the District Court could then decide whether the uses the State permits on the Brendale property would do serious injury to, and clearly imperil, the protectible tribal interests identified in this opinion. This part of the case in my view should therefore be returned to District Court. A majority of this Court, however, disagrees with this conclusion. Accordingly, since with respect to the Wilkinson property, Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711 should be reversed, that is the judgment of the Court in those cases. With respect to the Brendale property, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to vacate the judgment of the District Court and to remand the case to that Court for further proceedings. Because the Court instead affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 87-1622, I dissent as to that case. The judgment in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711 is Reversed. The treaty further provides that no “white man, excepting those in the employment of the Indian Department, [shall] be permitted to reside upon the said reservation without permission of the tribe and the superintendent and agent.” 12 Stat. 951, 952. At oral argument, counsel arguing for petitioners represented that a decision by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in April 1988, after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion here, has reopened the roads in the closed area to the public. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. See App. to Brief for Petitioner Brendale la. According to counsel, there is no longer a closed area on the reservation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. Counsel for respondents agreed with this characterization, describing what had formerly been the closed area as the “reservation reserved area,” based on the Yakima Nation’s zoning designation for the area. Id, at 28. Despite these developments, Justice Stevens persists in treating the two areas differently, post, at 439-440, a position that is rejected by seven Members of the Court, see also, post, at 468, n. 10 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.), and continues to rely on the District Court’s findings of fact regarding the Brendale property, which are undermined by the change in circumstances. This opinion will continue to refer to the respective areas as the closed area and the open area, but for convenience only. Preparation of the EIS was underway when the Yakima Nation filed the present action in District Court. In addition to Brendale, Wilkinson, and Yakima County, the Yakima Nation named as defendants Jim Whiteside and two other County Commissioners of Yakima County, the Director of the Planning Department of Yakima County, the codeveloper of the Brendale property, and prospective purchasers of portions of the Wilkinson property. The developer and the prospective purchasers were dismissed as parties by order of the District Court. See Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735, 737, n. 1 (ED Wash. 1985) (Whiteside I); Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 750, 751, n. 1 (ED Wash. 1985) (Whiteside II). The District Court found that Brendale’s proposed development would disrupt soil conditions; cause a deterioration of air quality; change drainage patterns; destroy some trees and natural vegetation; cause a deterioration of wildlife habitat; alter the location and density of human population in the area; increase traffic, light, and the use of fuel wood; and require added police and fire protection as well as new systems for waste disposal. The court also found that a number of places of religious and cultural significance were located in the closed area and that much of the Tribe’s income comes from lumber harvested from lands within the closed area. 617 F. Supp., at 741-742. Unlike the closed area, however, the District Court found that the open area had no unique religious or spiritual importance to the Yakima Nation and that the trust land in the vicinity of the proposed Wilkinson development did not provide a significant source of food for the Tribe. 617 F. Supp., at 755. The Court of Appeals then remanded to the District Court for findings of fact on the respective interests of the Yakima Nation and Yakima County in regulating the Wilkinson property, since the District Court had made such findings only concerning the Brendale property. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F. 2d 529, 536 (CA9 1987). Yakima County did not appeal the judgment of the District Court in Whiteside I, respecting the Brendale Property, App. 7, 11, and the only issue presented in its petition for certiorari concerned the Wilkinson property. Brendale and Wilkinson each petitioned for certiorari concerning their own property. Furthermore, the practical consequences of Justice Stevens’ approach will be severe. Justice Stevens’ conception of tribal zoning authority allows Indian tribes to obtain the power to zone by defining areas on their reservations that contain only a “small percentage” of fee lands. Post, at 437-438, n. 2. The uncertainty that would result from the necessarily case-by-case determination of which regulatory body (or bodies, see post, at 440-441, n. 3) has zoning jurisdiction over such land, not to mention the uncertainty as to when a tribe will attempt to assert such jurisdiction, would be far worse than that resulting from the scheme discussed infra, at 430-432, in which the contours of the zoning authority are clearly defined and resort to the courts to protect tribal interests should not often be required. Given our disposition of these cases, we need not address whether the Yakima Nation’s retained sovereignty might also have been divested by treaty or statute. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 323 (1978). See, e. g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 724 (1983). The Yakima Nation’s reliance on statements about retained tribal sovereignty in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845 (1985), and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U. S. 9 (1987), is likewise misplaced. In neither of those cases did the Court decide whether the Indian Tribe had authority over the nonmembers involved. Instead, the Court established an exhaustion rule, allowing the tribal courts initially to determine whether they have jurisdiction, and left open the possibility that the exercise of jurisdiction could be later challenged in federal court. See 471 U. S., at 856-857; 480 U. S., at 16, 19. Justice Blackmun contends that upholding zoning authority does not necessarily “entai[l] a finding of inherent authority for all police powers,” reasoning that “[a]s Montana itself demonstrates, there may be cases in which tribes assert the power to regulate activities as to which they have no valid interest.” Post, at 461-462. The errors in this reasoning are twofold. First, Justice Blackmun characterizes the decision in Montana incorrectly. The Court did not hold in Montana that the Tribe had no interest in regulating non-Indian fishing and hunting on fee land. Instead, it held that the Tribe lacked an interest sufficient “to justify tribal regulation.” 450 U. S., at 566. Second, Justice Blackmun’s reasoning confirms, rather than disproves, that recognizing zoning authority here will equate tribal retained sovereignty with the police power. Under Justice Blackmun’s view, tribes evidently lack authority to exercise a power within the police power only when they have no legitimate interest in the regulation. But this is a meaningless limitation because to be a valid exercise of the police power in the first instance a government regulation must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See, e. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 491 (1955). Justice Blackmun asserts that his position, that “the general and longer term advantages of comprehensive land management” justify tribal zoning of fee land, avoids this uncertainty. Post, at 460. But this broad position would also authorize the Yakima Nation to zone all fee land within reservation boundaries, including that within the incorporated towns of Toppenish, Wapato, and Harrah. Although Justice Blackmun purports to avoid this “difficult question,” post, at 467, n. 9, there appears to be no principled basis on which to exclude the incorporated towns from the Tribe’s zoning authority without leading to the very uncertainty Justice Blackmun attempts to dismiss as hypothetical, post, at 459. Cf. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 677 (1974).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE et al. No. 97-1252. Argued November 4,1998 Decided February 24, 1999 Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Douglas N. Letter. David D. Cole argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Steven R. Shapiro, Lucas Guttentag, Marc Van Der Rout, and Paul L. Hoffman Briefs of amici mriae urging reversal were filed for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Sekeidegger; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. the American Briefs of amici mriae urging affirmance were filed for the American Bar Association by Philip S. Anderson, Jeffrey L. Bleich, and Carol Wol-chok; for the American Immigration Law Foundation et al. by Ira J. Kurz-ban and Nadine K Wettstein; for the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law by Burt Neubome; and for the National Immigration Law Center by Linton Joaquin and Gerald L. Newman. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents sued petitioners for allegedly targeting them for deportation because of their affiliation with a politically unpopular group. While their suit was pending, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, which contains a provision restricting judicial review of the Attorney General’s "decision or action” to "commence proceedings, adjudicate eases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act.” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(g) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The issue before us is whether, as petitioners contend, this provision deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over respondents’ suit. I The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a division of the Department of Justice, instituted deportation proceedings in 1987 against Bashar Amer, Aiad Barakat, Julie Mungai, Amjad Obeid, Ayman Obeid, Naim Sharif, Khader Hamide, and Michel Shehadeh, all of whom belong to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a group that the Government characterizes as an international terrorist and communist organization. The INS charged all eight under the MeCarran-Walter Act, which, though now repealed, provided at the time for the deportation of aliens who “advocate . . . world communism.” See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251(a)(6)(D), (G)(v), and (H) (1982 ed.). In addition, the INS charged the first six, who were only temporary residents, with routine status violations such as overstaying a visa and failure to maintain student status. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251(a)(2) and (a)(9) (1988 ed.). Almost immediately, the aliens filed suit in District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the anticommunism provisions of the MeCarran-Walter Act and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Attorney General, the INS, and various immigration officials in their personal and official capacities. The INS responded by dropping the advocacy-of-communism charges, but it retained the technical violation charges against the six temporary residents and charged Hamide and Shehadeh, who were permanent residents, under a different section of the McCarran-Walter Act, which authorized the deportation of aliens who were members of an organization advocating “the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any [government] officer or officers” and “the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property.” See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251(a)(6)(F)(ii)-(iii) (1982 ed.). INS regional counsel William Odenerantz said at a press conference that the charges had been changed for tactical reasons but the INS was still seeking respondents’ deportation because of their affiliation with the PFLP. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, 70 F. 3d 1045, 1053 (CA9 1995) (AADC I). Respondents amended their complaint to include an allegation that the INS was selectively enforcing immigration laws against them in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Since this suit seeking to prevent the initiation of deportation proceedings was filed — in 1987, during the administration of Attorney General Edwin Meese — it has made four trips through the District Court for the Central District of California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The first two concerned jurisdictional issues not now before us. See Hamide v. United States District Court, No. 87-7249 (CA9, Feb. 24, 1988); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Thornburgh, 970 F. 2d 501 (CA9 1991). Then, in 1994, the District Court preliminarily enjoined deportation proceedings against the six temporary residents, holding that they were likely to prove that the INS did not enforce routine status requirements against immigrants who were not members of disfavored terrorist groups and that the possibility of deportation, combined with the chill to their First Amendment rights while the proceedings were pending, constituted irreparable injury. With regard to Hamide and Shehadeh’s claims, however, the District Court granted summary judgment to the federal parties for reasons not pertinent here. AADC I, supra, was the Ninth Circuit’s first merits determination in this case, upholding the injunction as to the six and reversing the District Court with regard to Hamide and Shehadeh. The opinion rejected the Attorney General’s argument that selective-enforcement claims are inappropriate in the immigration context, and her alternative argument that the special statutory-review provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U. S. C. § 1105a, precluded review of such a claim until a deportation order issued. See 70 F. Bd, at 1056-1057. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, whieh entered an injunction in favor of Hamide and Shehadeh and denied the Attorney General’s request that the existing injunction be dissolved in light of new evidence that all respondents participated in fundraising activities of the PFLP. While the Attorney General’s appeal of this last decision was pending, Congress passed IIRIRA which, inter alia, repealed the old judicial-review scheme set forth in § 1105a and instituted a new (and significantly more restrictive) one in 8 U. S. C. § 1252. The Attorney General filed motions in both the District Court and Court of Appeals, arguing that § 1252(g) deprived them of jurisdiction over respondents’ selective-enforcement claim. The District Court denied the motion, and the Attorney General’s appeal from that denial was consolidated with the appeal already pending in the Ninth Circuit. It is the judgment and opinion in that appeal which is before us here: 119 F. 3d 1367 (CA9 1997). It affirmed the existence of jurisdiction under § 1252, see id., at 1374, and reaching the merits of the injunctions, again affirmed the District Court, id., at 1374-1376. The Attorney General’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied over the dissent of three judges, 132 F. 3d 531 (CA9 1997). The Attorney General sought our review, and we granted certiorari, 524 U. S. 903 (1998). II Before enactment of IIRIRA, judicial review of most administrative action under the INA was governed by 8 U. S. C. § 1105a, a special statutory-review provision directing that "the sole and exclusive procedure for... the judicial review of all final orders of deportation” shall be that set forth in the Hobbs Act, 28 U. S. C. §2341 et seq., which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals, see §2342. Much of the Court of Appeals’ analysis in AADC I was devoted to the question whether this pre-IIRIRA provision applied to selective-enforcement claims. Since neither the Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to hear such claims (a point conceded by the Attorney General in AADC I, see 70 F. 3d, at 1055), a challenge to a final order of deportation based upon such a claim would arrive in the court of appeals without the factual development necessary for decision. The Attorney General argued unsuccessfully below that the Hobbs Act permits a court of appeals to remand the ease to the agency, see 28 U. S. C. § 2347(e), or transfer it to a district court, see § 2347(b)(3), for further factfinding. The Ninth Circuit, believing these options unavailable, concluded that an original district-court action was respondents’ only means of obtaining factual development and thus judicial review of their selective-enforcement claims. Relying on our decision in Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206 (1968), it held that the District Court could entertain the suit under either its general federal-question jurisdiction, see 28 U. S. C. § 1331, or the general jurisdictional provision of the INA, see 8 U. S. C. § 1329. Whether we must delve further into the details of this issue depends upon whether, after the enactment of IIRIRA, § 1105a continues to apply to this ease. On the surface of things, at least, it does not. Although the general rule set forth in § 309(c)(1) of IIRIRA is that the revised procedures for removing aliens, including the judicial-review procedures of § 1252, do not apply to aliens who were already in either exclusion or deportation proceedings on IIRIRA’s effective date, see note following 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (1994 ed., Supp. Ill), § 306(c)(1) of IIRIRA directs that a single provision, § 1252(g), shall apply "without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings.” See note following 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (1994 ed., Supp. III). Section 1252(g) reads as follows: "(g) Exclusive Jurisdiction "Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act.” This provision seemingly governs here, depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction “[ejxcept as provided in this section.” But whether it is as straightforward as that depends upon the scope of the quoted text. Here, and in the courts below, both petitioners and respondents have treated § 1252(g) as covering all or nearly all deportation claims. The Attorney General has characterized it as “a channeling provision, requiring aliens to bring all deportation-related claims in the context of a petition for review of a final order of deportation filed in the court of appeals.” Supplemental Brief for Appellants in No. 96-55929 (GA9), p. 2. Respondents have described it as applying to “most of what INS does.” Corrected Supplemental Brief for Appellees in No. 96-55929 (CA9), p. 7. This broad understanding of § 1252(g), combined with IIRIRA’s effective-date provisions, creates an interpretive anomaly. If the jurisdiction-excluding provision of § 1252(g) eliminates other sources of jurisdiction in all deportation-related cases, and if the phrase in § 1252(g) “[ejxeept as provided in this section” incorporates (as one would suppose) all the other jurisdiction-related provisions of § 1252, then § 309(c)(1) would be rendered a virtual nullity. To say that there is no jurisdiction in pending INS cases “except as” § 1252 provides jurisdiction is simply to say that § 1252’s jurisdictional limitations apply to pending cases as well as future cases — which seems hardly what § 309(c)(1) is about. If, on the other hand, the phrase “[except as provided in this section” were (somehow) interpreted not to incorporate the other jurisdictional provisions of § 1252 — if § 1252(g) stood alone, so to speak — judicial review would be foreclosed for all deportation claims in all pending deportation cases, even after entry of a final order. The Attorney General would have us avoid the horns of this dilemma by interpreting § 1252(g)’s phrase “[ejxeept as provided in this section” to mean “except as provided in § 1105a.” Because § 1105a authorizes review of only final orders, respondents must, she says, wait until their administrative proceedings come to a close and then seek review in a court of appeals. (For reasons mentioned above, the Attorney General of course rejects the Ninth Circuit’s position in AADCI that application of § 1105a would leave respondents without a judicial forum because evidence of selective prosecution cannot be introduced into the administrative record.) The obvious difficulty with the Attorney General’s interpretation is that it is impossible to understand how the qualifier in § 1252(g), “[ejxeept as provided in this section” (emphasis added), can possibly mean “except as provided in § 1105a.” And indeed the Attorney General makes no attempt to explain how this can be, except to observe that what she calls a “literal application” of the statute “would create an anomalous result.” Brief for Petitioners 30, n. 15. Respondents note this deficiency, but offer an equally implausible means of avoiding the dilemma. Section 309(c)(3) allows the Attorney General to terminate pending deportation proceedings and reinitiate them under §1252. They argue that § 1252(g) applies only to those pending cases in which the Attorney General has made that election. That way, they claim, the phrase “[ejxeept as provided in this section” can, without producing an anomalous result, be allowed to refer (as it says) to all the rest of § 1252. But this approach collides head-on with §306(c)’s prescription that § 1252(g) shall apply “without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings.” See note following 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (1994 ed., Supp. Ill) (emphasis added). (Respondents argue in the alternative, of course, that if the Attorney General is right and § 1105a does apply, A ADC I is correct that their claims will be effectively unreviewable upon entry of a final order. For this reason, and because they say that habeas review, if still available after IIRIRA, will come too late to remedy this First Amendment injury, respondents contend that we must construe § 1252(g) not to bar constitutional claims.) The Ninth Circuit, for its part, accepted the parties' broad reading of § 1252(g) and concluded, reasonably enough, that on that reading Congress could not have meant § 1252(g) to stand alone: “Divorced from all other jurisdictional provisions of IIRIRA, subsection (g) would have a more sweeping impact on cases filed before the statute’s enactment than after that date. Without incorporating any exceptions, the provision appears to cut off federal jurisdiction over all deportation decisions. We do not think that Congress intended such an absurd result.” 119 F. 3d, at 1372. It recognized, however, the existence of the other horn of the dilemma (“that retroactive application of the entire amended version of 8 U. S. C. § 1252 would threaten to render meaningless section 306(c) of IIRIRA,” ibid.), and resolved the difficulty to its satisfaction by concluding that “at least some of the other provisions of section 1252” must be included in subsection (g) “when it applies to pending cases.” Ibid, (emphasis added). One of those provisions, it thought, must be subsection (f), entitled “Limit on Injunctive Relief,” which reads as follows: “Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of chapter 4 of title II, as amended by [IIRIRA], other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such chapter have been initiated.” The Ninth Circuit found in this an affirmative grant of jurisdiction that covered the present ease. The Attorney General argued that any such grant of jurisdiction would be limited (and rendered inapplicable to this case) by § 1252(b)(9), which provides: “Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this chapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” The Ninth Circuit replied that, even if § 1252(b)(9) were one of those provisions incorporated into the transitional application of § 1252(g), it could not preclude this suit for the same reason A ADC I had held that § 1105a could not do so— namely, the Court of Appeals’ lack of access to factual findings regarding selective enforcement. Even respondents scarcely try to defend the Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 1252(f) as a jurisdictional grant. By its plain terms, and even by its title, that provision is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief. It prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive relief against the operation of §§ 1221-1231, but specifies that this ban does not extend to individual cases. To find in this an affirmative grant of jurisdiction is to go beyond what the language will bear. We think the seeming anomaly that prompted the parties’ strained readings of § 1252(g) — and that at least accompanied the Court of Appeals’ strained reading — -is a mirage. The parties’ interpretive acrobatics flow from the belief that § 306(c)(1) cannot be read to envision a straightforward application of the “[ejxcept as provided in this section” portion of § 1252(g), since that would produce in all pending INS cases jurisdictional restrictions identical to those that were contained in IIRIRA anyway. That belief, however, rests on the unexamined assumption that § 1252(g) covers the universe of deportation claims — that it is a sort of “zipper” clause that says “no judicial review in deportation cases unless this section provides judicial review.” In fact, what § 1252(g) says is much narrower. The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her “decision or action” to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” (Emphasis added.) There are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process — such as the decisions to open an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of the adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order. It is implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings. Not because Congress is too unpoetie to use synecdoche, but because that literary device is incompatible with the need for precision in legislative drafting. We are aware of no other instance in the United States Code in which language such as this has been used to impose a general jurisdictional limitation; and that those who enacted IIRIRA were familiar with the normal manner of imposing such a limitation is demonstrated by the text of § 1252(b)(9), which stands in stark contrast to § 1252(g). It could be argued, perhaps, that § 1252(g) is redundant if it channels judicial review of only some decisions and actions, since § 1252(b)(9) channels judicial review of all of them anyway. But that is not so, since only § 1252(g), and not § 1252(b)(9) (except to the extent it is incorporated within § 1252(g)), applies to what § 309(e)(1) calls “transitional eases,” that is, eases pending on the effective date of IIRIRA. That alone justifies its existence. It performs the function of categorically excluding from non-final-order judicial review — even as to transitional cases otherwise governed by § 1105a rather than the unmistakable “zipper” clause of § 1252(b)(9) — certain specified decisions and actions of the INS. In addition, even after all the transitional cases have passed through the system, § 1252(g) as we interpret it serves the continuing function of making it clear that those specified decisions and actions, which (as we shall discuss in detail below) some courts had held not to be included within the non-final-order review prohibition of § 1105a, are covered by the “zipper” clause of § 1252(b)(9). It is rather the Court of Appeals’ and the parties’ interpretation which renders § 1252(g) entirely redundant, adding to one “zipper” clause that does not apply to transitional eases, another one of equal scope that does apply to transitional eases. That makes it entirely inexplicable why the transitional provisions of § 306(c) refer to § 1252(g) instead of § 1252(b)(9) — and why § 1252(g) exists at all. There was good reason for Congress to focus special attention upon, and make special provision for, judicial review of the Attorney General’s discrete acts of “commencing] proceedings, adjudicating] cases, [and] executing] removal orders” — which represent the initiation or prosecution of various stages in the deportation process. At each stage the Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor, and at the time IIRIRA was enacted the INS had been engaging in a regular practice (which had come to be known as “deferred action”) of exercising that discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own convenience. As one treatise describes it: “To ameliorate a harsh and unjust outcome, the INS may decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation. This commendable exercise in administrative discretion, developed without express statutory authorization, originally was known as nonpriority and is now designated as deferred action. A ease may be selected for deferred action treatment at any stage of the administrative process. Approval of deferred action status means that, for the humanitarian reasons described below, no action will thereafter be taken to proceed against an apparently deportable alien, even on grounds normally regarded as aggravated.” 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and Procedure §72.03[2][h] (1998). See also Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F. 2d 884, 890-892 (CA5 1981). Since no generous act goes unpunished, however, the INS’s exercise of this discretion opened the door to litigation in instances where the INS chose not to exercise it. “[I]n each such instance, the determination to withhold or terminate deportation is confined to administrative discretion. . . . Efforts to challenge the refusal to exercise such discretion on behalf of specific aliens sometimes have been favorably considered by the courts, upon contentions that there was selective prosecution in violation of equal protection or due process, such as improper reliance on political considerations, on racial, religious, or nationality discriminations, on arbitrary or unconstitutional criteria, or on other grounds constituting abuse of discretion.” Gordon, Mailman, & Yale-Loehr, supra, § 72.03[2][a] (footnotes omitted). Such litigation was possible because courts read §1105a,s prescription that the Hobbs Act shall be “the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation” to be inapplicable to various decisions and actions leading up to or consequent upon final orders of deportation, and relied on other jurisdictional statutes to permit review. See, e. g., Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206 (1968) (review of refusal to stay deportation); Ramallo v. Reno, Civ. No. 95-01851 (D. D. C., July 23, 1996) (review of execution of removal order), described in and rev’d on other grounds, 114 F. 3d 1210 (CADC 1997); AADC I, 70 F. 3d 1045 (CA9 1995) (review of commencement of deportation proceedings); Lennon v. INS, 527 F. 2d 187, 195 (CA2 1975) (same, dicta). Section 1252(g) seems clearly designed to give some measure of protection to “no deferred action” decisions and similar discretionary determinations, providing that if they are reviewable at all, they at least will not be made the bases for separate rounds of judicial intervention outside the streamlined process that Congress has designed. Of course many provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts — indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (limiting review of any claim arising from the inspection of aliens arriving in the United States); § 1252(a)(2)(B) (barring review of denials of discretionary relief authorized by various statutory provisions); § 1252(a)(2)(C) (barring review of final removal orders against criminal aliens); § 1252(b)(4)(D) (limiting review of asylum determinations for resident aliens). It is entirely understandable, however, why Congress would want only the discretion-protecting provision of § 1252(g) applied even to pending cases: because that provision is specifically directed at the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal proceedings. Our narrow reading of § 1252(g) makes sense of the statutory scheme as a whole, for it resolves the supposed tension between § 306(c)(1) and § 809(c)(1). In cases to which § 1252(g) applies, the rest of § 1252 is incorporated through the “[e]xcept as provided in this section” clause. This incorporation does not swallow §309(c)(l)’s general rule that §§ 1252(a)-(f) do not apply to pending cases, for § 1252(g) applies to only a limited subset of deportation claims. Yet it is also faithful to § 306(e)(l)’s command that § 1252(g) be applied “without limitation” (i. e., including the “[e]xeept as provided” clause) to "claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings.” Respondents’ challenge to the Attorney General’s decision to “commence proceedings” against them falls squarely within § 1252(g) — -indeed, as we have discussed, the language seems to have been crafted with such a challenge precisely in mind — and nothing elsewhere in § 1252 provides for jurisdiction. Gf. § 1252(a)(1) (review of final orders); § 1252(e)(2) (limited habeas review for excluded aliens); § 1252(e)(3)(A) (limited review of statutes and regulations pertaining to the exclusion of aliens). As we concluded earlier, § 1252(f) plainly serves as a limit on injunctive relief rather than a jurisdictional grant. Ill Finally, we must address respondents’ contention that, since the lack of prior factual development for their claim will render the § 1252(a)(1) exception to § 1252(g) unavailing; since habeas relief will also be unavailable; and since even if one or both were available they would come too late to prevent the “chilling effect” upon their First Amendment rights; the doctrine of constitutional doubt requires us to interpret § 1252(g) in such fashion as to permit immediate review of their selective-enforcement claims. We do not believe that the doctrine of constitutional doubt has any application here. As a general matter — and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case — an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation. Even in the criminal-law field, a selective prosecution claim is a rara avis. Because such claims invade a special province of the Executive — its prosecutorial discretion — we have emphasized that the standard for proving them is particularly demanding, requiring a criminal defendant to introduce “clear evidence” displacing the presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 463-465 (1996). We have said: “This broad discretion [afforded the Executive] rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the ease’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy. All of these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607-608 (1985). These concerns are greatly magnified in the deportation context. Regarding, for example, the potential for delay: Whereas in criminal proceedings the consequence of delay is merely to postpone the criminal’s receipt of his just deserts, in deportation proceedings the consequence is to permit and prolong a continuing violation of United States law. Postponing justifiable deportation (in the hope that the alien’s status will change — by, for example, marriage to an American citizen — or simply with the object of extending the alien’s unlawful stay) is often the principal object of resistance to a deportation proceeding, and the additional obstacle of selective-enforcement suits could leave the INS hard pressed to enforce routine status requirements. And as for “chill[ing] law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry”: What will be involved in deportation cases is not merely the disclosure of normal domestic law enforcement priorities and tech-ñiques, but often the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-intelligence products and techniques. The Executive should not have to disclose its “real” reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat — or indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that country’s nationals — and even if it did disclose them a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy. Moreover, the consideration on the other side of the ledger in deportation cases — the interest of the target in avoiding “selective” treatment — is less compelling than in criminal prosecutions. While the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as a punishment, see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 537 (1952). In many cases (for six of the eight aliens here) deportation is sought simply because the time of permitted residence in this country has expired, or the activity for which residence was permitted has been completed. Even when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has committed, in principle the alien is not being punished for that act (criminal charges may be available for that separate purpose) but is merely being held to the terms under which he was admitted. And in all cases, deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an ongoing violation of United States law. The contention that a violation must be allowed to continue because it has been improperly selected is not powerfully appealing. To resolve the present controversy, we need not rule out the possibility of a rare ease in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be overcome. Whether or not there be such exceptions, the general rule certainly applies here. When an alien’s continuing presence in this country is in violation of the immigration laws, the Government does not offend the Constitution by deporting him for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization that supports terrorist activity. * * * Because 8 U. S. C. § 1252(g) deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over respondents’ claims, we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand with instructions for it to vacate the judgment of the District Court. It is so ordered. Justice Breyer joins Parts I and II of this opinion. Respondents Barakat and Sharif were subsequently granted legalization and are no longer deportable based on the original status violations. Brief for Petitioners 11, n. 5. When the MeCarran-Walter Aet was repealed, a new “terrorist activity” provision was added by the Immigration Act of 1990. See 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The INS charged Hamide and She-hadeh tmder this, but it is unclear whether that was in addition to, or in substitution for, the old McCarran-Walter charges. and for The amended complaint was styled as an action for “damages and for declaratory and injunctive relief,” but the only monetary relief specifically requested was “costs of suit and attorneys fees.” App. 20, 51. This latter provision was subsequently amended by IIRIRA to make clear that it applies only to actions brought by the United States. See 8 U. S. C. § 1329 (1994 ed., Supp. III). Section 309(c)(1) provides: “(c) Transition for Aliens in Proceedings.— “(1) General rule that new rules do not apply. — Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection [§309(a) carves out § 306(c) as an exception], in the case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of the title III-A effective date— “(A) the amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and “(B) the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without regard to such amendments.” 110 Stat. 3009-625. It is undear why the Attorney General has not exercised this option in this case. Respondents have taken the position that the District Court’s injunction prevents her from doing so. Brief for Respondents 41, n. 38. There is disagreement on this point in the Courts of Appeals. Compare Hose v. INS, 141 F. 3d 932, 935 (CA9) (habeas not available), withdrawn and reh’g en banc granted, 161 F. 3d 1225 (1998), Richardson v. Reno, 162 F. 3d 1338 (CA11 1998) (same), and Yang v. INS, 109 F. 3d 1185, 1195 (CA7 1997) (same), with Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F. 3d 110, 122 (CA1 1998) (habeas available), and Henderson v. INS, 157 F. 3d 106, 117-122 (CA2 1998) (same). See also Magana-Pizano v. INS, 152 F. 3d 1213, 1220 (CA9 1998) (elimination of habeas unconstitutional); Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F. 3d 1210, 1214 (CADC 1997) (§ 1252(g) removes statutory habeas but leaves “constitutional” habeas intact). Prior to 1997, deferred-action decisions were governed by internal INS guidelines which considered, inter alia, such factors as the likelihood of ultimately removing the alien, the presence of sympathetic factors that could adversely affect future cases or generate bad publicity for the INS, and whether the alien had violated a provision that had been given high enforcement priority. See 16 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and Procedure §242.1 (1998). These were apparently rescinded on June 27, 1997, but there is no indication that the INS has ceased making this sort of determination on a case-by-case basis. See ibid. This history explains why Justice Souter ought not find it “hard to imagine that Congress meant to bar aliens already in proceedings... from challenging the commencement of proceedings against them, but to permit the same aliens to challenge, say, the decision of the Attorney General to open an investigation of them or to issue a show-cause order.” Post, at 506 (dissenting opinion). It was the acts covered by § 1252(g) that had prompted challenges to the Attorney General’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion. We know of no case involving a challenge to “the decision... to open an investigation” — perhaps because such decisions are rarely made public. And we know of no case’challenging “the decision ... to issue a show cause order” (though that might well be considered a mere specification of the decision to “commence proceedings” which some cases do challenge and which § 1252(g) covers). Section 1252(g) was directed against a particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion. It does not tax the imagination to understand why it focuses upon the stages of administration where those attempts have occurred. But in any event, any challenge to imagination posed by reading § 1252(g) as written would be small price to pay for escaping the overwhelming difficulties of Justice Souter’s theory. He makes no effort to explain why his broad, catchall reading of § 1252(g) does not render it redundant of § 1252(b)(9). And his throw-in-the-towel approach to § 306(c)(1), which reads it out of the statute because he finds it difficult to explain, see post, at 509, not only strains the imagination but ruptures the faculty of reason. We do not think our interpretation “parses [§ 1252(g)] too finely,” post, at 505; but if it did, we would think that modest fault preferable to the exercise of such a novel power of nullification. Justice Stevens, like Justice Souter, rejects § 1252(g)’s explicit limitation to specific steps in the deportation process. He then invokes the conflict with § 306(c)(1) that this expansive interpretation creates as justification for concluding that, when § 1252(g) uses the word “section,” it “can't mean what it says,” Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 511 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) — empowering him to declare a “scrivener's error,” post, at 498 (opinion concurring in judgment), and to change the word “section” to “Act.” Justice Stevens’ approach, like Justice Souter’s, renders § 1252(g) redundant of § 1252(b)(9). That problem is solved by our more conventional solution: reading both “commence proceedings, adjudicate eases, or execute removal orders” and “section” to mean precisely what they say. Instead of resolving this constitutional question, Justice Ginsbukg chooses to resolve the constitutional question whether Congress can exclude the courts from remedying an alleged First Amendment violation with immediate effects, pending the completion of administrative proceedings. It is not clear to us that this is easier to answer than the question we address — as is evident from the fact that in resolving it Justice Gins-bukg relies almost exclusively on cases dealing with the quite different question of federal-court intervention in state proceedings. (Even in that area, most of the cases she cites where we did not intervene involved no claim of present injury from the state action — and none involved what we have here: an admission by the Government that the alleged First Amendment activity was the basis for selecting the individuals for adverse action. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 487-488, n. 4 (1965).) The one case not involving federal-state relations in fact overrode a congressional requirement for completion of administrative proceedings— even though, unlike here, no immediate harm was apparent. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U. S. 233 (1968). Justice Ginsbukg counts the ease as one for her side on the basis of nothing more substantial than the Court’s characterization of the agency action at issue as “blatantly lawless,” id., at 238. See post, at 494 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Nor is it clear that the constitutional question Justice Ginsbukg addresses has narrower application and effect than the one we resolve. Our holding generally deprives deportable aliens of the defense of selective prosecution. Hers allows all citizens and resident aliens to be deprived of constitutional rights (at least where the deprivation is not “blatantly lawless”) pending the completion of agency proceedings. Finally, Justice Ginsbukg acknowledges that her constitutional conclusion might be different if “a court of appeals reviewing final orders of removal against respondents could not consider their selective enforcement claims.” Post, at 495. But she never establishes that a court of appeals can consider their selective enforcement claims, though she expresses “eonfiden[ce]” (despite the Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary) that that would be the outcome. Post, at 496, n. 2. How well-founded that confidence is may be assessed by considering the first and most substantial option upon which it is based, namely, “the Attorney General’s position that the reviewing court of appeals may transfer a case to a district court... and counsel’s assurance at oral argument that petitioners will adhere to that position .. . .” Post, at 495-496. What petitioners primarily rely upon for this concession is the provision of the Hobbs Act that authorizes remand to the agency or transfer to a district court “[w]hen the agency has not held a hearing.” 28 U. S. C. § 2347(b). It is not at all clear that this should be interpreted to mean “when the agency’s hearing has not addressed the particular point at issue” — especially since that situation is specifically covered by § 2347(c) (providing for remand in such circumstances), which the new amendments explicitly render inapplicable to deportation cases, see 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III). Petitioners’ position is cast further in doubt by the fact that the Hobbs Act remedy for failure to hold a hearing “required by law” is not the transfer which petitioners assert, but remand, see 28 U. S. C. § 2347(b)(1). Of course petitioners’ promise not to quibble over this transfer point is of no value, since the point goes to jurisdiction and must be raised by the District Court sua sponte. It is quite possible, therefore, that what Justice Ginsbueg’s approach would ultimately accomplish in this litigation is requiring us to address both the constitutional issue she now addresses and (upon termination of the administrative proceedings) the constitutional issue we now resolve. We think it preferable to resolve only the one (and we think narrower) issue at once.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE CO. v. CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT No. 06-1717. Argued March 19, 2008 Decided June 2, 2008 Brian Wolfman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Scott L. Nelson. Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bucholtz, Deputy Solicitor General Garre, Michael Jay Singer, and Michael E. Robinson. Amy Howe, Kevin K Russell, Thomas C. Goldstein, Pamela S. Karlan, and Jeffrey L. Fisher filed a brief for the National Association of Legal Assistants et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U. S. C. § 504(a)(1) (2006 ed.) and 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000 ed.), allows a prevailing party in a case brought by or against the Government to recover fees for paralegal services at the market rate for such services or only at their cost to the party’s attorney. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit limited recovery to the attorney’s cost. 472 F. 3d 1370 (2006). We reverse. I Petitioner Richlin Security Service Co. (Richlin) is a small California proprietorship. In the early 1990’s, it was engaged by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guard services for detainees at Los Angeles International Airport. Through mutual mistake, the parties’ two contracts misclassified Richlin’s employees under the Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 U. S. C. § 351 et seq. The Department of Labor discovered the misclassification and ordered Richlin to pay its employees back wages. Richlin responded by filing a claim against the Government with the Department of Transportation’s Board of Contract Appeals (Board). The claim sought reformation of the two contracts in order to force the Government to make additional payments necessary to cover Richlin’s liability under the Service Contract Act. Richlin prevailed after extensive litigation, and the Board entered an award in its favor. Richlin then filed an application with the Board for reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs pursuant to EAJA. Under EAJA, “[a]n agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 5 U. S. C. § 504(a)(1). In addition to its other fees and expenses, Richlin sought $45,141.10 for 523.8 hours of paralegal work on its contract claim and $6,760 for 68.2 hours of paralegal work on the EAJA application itself. Thé Board granted Richlin’s application in part. Richlin Security Service Co. v. Department of Justice, Docket Nos. 3034E, 3035E, Contract Nos. WRO-06-90, WRO-03-91, 2005 WL 1635099 (June 30, 2005), App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. It found that Richlin met § 504(b)(l)(B)’s eligibility requirements, see id., at 30a, and that the Government’s position had not been “substantially justified” within the meaning of § 504(a)(1), id., at 32a. It concluded, however, that Richlin was not entitled to recover its paralegal fees at the rates (ranging from $50 per hour to $95 per hour) at which Richlin was billed by its law firm. See id., at 39a. The Board held that EAJA limited recovery of paralegal fees to “the cost to the firm rather than ... the billed rate.” Ibid. Richlin had not submitted any evidence regarding the cost of the paralegal services to its law firm, see ibid., but the Board found that “$35 per hour is a reasonable cost to the firm[,] having taken judicial notice of paralegal salaries in the Washington D. C. area as reflected on the internet,” id., at 42a-43a. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed. 472 F. 3d 1370. The court construed the term “fees,” for which ÉAJA authorizes recovery at “prevailing market rates,” § 504(b)(1)(A), as embracing only the fees of attorneys, experts, and agents. See id., at 1374. The court declined to follow the contrary decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Jean v. Nelson, 863 F. 2d 759 (1988), aff’d sub nom. Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U. S. 154 (1990). It also distinguished this Court’s decisions in Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U. S. 274 (1989), and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83 (1991), reasoning that those cases involved a different fee-shifting statute with different “‘goals and objectives.’” 472 F. 3d, at 1375-1377, 1379 (discussing the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U. S. C. § 1988). The court instead found support for its interpretation in EAJA’s legislative history, see 472 F. 3d, at 1381 (citing S. Rep. No. 98-586 (1984) (hereinafter S. Rep.)), and in considerations of public policy, see 472 F. 3d, at 1380-1381. Judge Plager dissented. He believed that the authorities distinguished by the majority (particularly this Court’s decisions in Jenkins and Casey) were indistinguishable. He also identified “sound policy reasons for... adopting the Supreme Court’s take of the case, even if we thought we had a choice.” 472 F. 3d, at 1383. Richlin petitioned for rehearing, pointing out that the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit in Jean had been followed by several other Circuits. See 482 F. 3d 1358, 1359 (CA Fed. 2007) (citing Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F. 3d 962, 974 (CADC 2004); Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315 F. 3d 239, 255 (CA4 2002); and Miller v. Alamo, 983 F. 2d 856, 862 (CA8 1993)). The panel denied rehearing over Judge Plager’s dissent, and the full court denied rehearing en banc. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a. We granted certiorari. 552 U. S. 1021 (2007). II A EAJA permits an eligible prevailing party to recover “fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with” a proceeding before an administrative agency. 5 U. S. C. § 504(a)(1). EAJA defines “fees and other expenses” as follows: “ ‘[F]ees and other expenses’ includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is found by the agency to be necessary for the preparation of the party’s case, and reasonable attorney or agent fees (The amount of fees awarded under this section shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that (i) no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the agency involved, and (ii) attorney or agent fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the agency determines by regulation that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys or agents for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.)” § 504(b)(1)(A). In this case, Richlin “incurred” “fees” for paralegal services in connection with its contract action before the Board. Since § 504(b)(1)(A) awards fees at “prevailing market rates,” a straightforward reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that Richlin was entitled to recover fees for the paralegal services it purchased at the market rate for such services. The Government resists this reading by distinguishing “fees” from “other expenses.” The Government concedes that “fees” are reimbursable at “prevailing market rates,” but it insists that “other expenses” (including expenses for “any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project”) are reimbursable only at their “reasonable cost.” And in the Government’s view, outlays for paralegal services are better characterized as “other expenses” than as “fees.” The Government observes that the second sentence of § 504(b)(1)(A), which explains how to calculate awards for “fees,” refers to attorneys, agents, and expert witnesses, without mentioning paralegals. From this omission, the Government infers that Congress intended to treat expenditures for paralegal services not as “fees” but as “other expenses,” recoverable at “reasonable cost.” We find the Government’s fractured interpretation of the statute unpersuasive. Contrary to the Government’s contention, § 504(b)(1)(A) does not clearly distinguish between the rates at which “fees” and “other expenses” are reimbursed. Although the statute does refer to the “reasonable cost” of “any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project,” Congress may reasonably have believed that market rates would not exist for work product of that kind. At one point, Congress even appears to use the terms “expenses” and “fees” interchangeably: The first clause of § 504(b)(1)(A) refers to the “reasonable expenses of expert witnesses,” while the parenthetical characterizes expert compensation as “fees.” There is no indication that Congress, in using the term “expenses” in one place and “fees” in the other, was referring to two different components of expert remuneration. Even if the dichotomy that the Government draws between “fees” and “other expenses” were supported by the statutory text, it would hardly follow that amounts billed for paralegal services should be classified as “expenses” rather than as “fees.” The Government concludes that the omission of paralegal fees from § 504(b)(l)(A)’s parenthetical (which generally authorizes reimbursement at “prevailing market rates”) implies that the recovery of paralegal fees is limited to cost. But one could just as easily conclude that the omission of paralegal fees from the litany of “any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project” (all of which are recoverable at “reasonable cost”) implies that paralegal fees are recoverable at market rates. Surely paralegals are more analogous to attorneys, experts, and agents than to studies, analyses, reports, tests, and projects. Even the Government’s brief, which incants the term “paralegal expenses,” e. g., Brief for Respondent 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, slips up once and refers to them as “fees,” see id., at 35 (“As the court of appeals explained, treating paralegal fees as attorney fees could ‘distort the normal allocation of work and result in a less efficient performance of legal services’ under the EAJA . .. ”). But even if we agreed that E A JA limited a prevailing party’s recovery for paralegal fees to “reasonable cost,” it certainly would not follow that the cost should be measured from the perspective of the party’s attorney. To the contrary, it would be anomalous to measure cost from the perspective of the attorney rather than the client. We do not understand the Government to contend, for example, that the “reasonable cost” of an “engineering report” or “analysis” should be calculated from the perspective of the firm that employs the engineer or analyst. Such an interpretation would be tough to square with the statutory language, which provides that an agency shall award to a prevailing party “fees and other expenses incurred by that party.” 5 U. S. C. § 504(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also § 504(b)(1)(A). That language leaves no doubt that Congress intended the “reasonable cost” of the specified items in § 504(b)(1)(A) to be calculated from the perspective of the litigant. That being the case, we find it hard to believe that Congress, without even mentioning paralegals, intended to make an exception of them by calculating their cost from the perspective of their employer rather than the litigant. It seems more plausible that Congress intended all “fees and other expenses” to be recoverable at the litigant’s “reasonable cost,” subject to the proviso that “reasonable cost” would be deemed to be “prevailing market rates” when such rates could be determined. B To the extent that some ambiguity subsists in the statutory text, we need not look far to resolve it, for we have already addressed a similar question with respect to another fee-shifting statute. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U. S. 274 (1989), we considered whether litigants could recover paralegal fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Section 1988 provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” We concluded that the term “attorney’s fee” in § 1988 “cannot have been meant to compensate only work performed personally by members of the bar.” 491 U. S., at 285. Although separate billing for paralegals had become “increasingly widespread,” id., at 286 (internal quotation marks omitted), attorney’s fees had traditionally subsumed both the attorney’s personal labor and the labor of paralegals and other individuals who contributed to the attorney’s work product, see id., at 285. We were so confident that Congress had given the term “attorney’s fees” this traditional gloss that we declared it “self-evident” that the term embraced the fees of paralegals as well as attorneys. Ibid. We think Jenkins substantially answers the question before us. EAJA, like §1988, entitles certain parties to recover “reasonable attorney . . . fees.” 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(A). EAJA, like § 1988, makes no mention of the paralegals, “secretaries, messengers, librarians, janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work product for which an attorney bills her client.” Jenkins, supra, at 285. And we think EAJA, like § 1988, must be interpreted as using the term “attorney .. . fees” to reach fees for paralegal services as well as compensation for the attorney’s personal labor. The Government does not contend that the meaning of the term “attorney’s fees” changed so much between § 1988’s enactment in 1976 and EAJA’s enactment in 1980 that the term’s meaning in one statute must be different from its meaning in the other. Under the reasoning of Jenkins, we take it as “self-evident” that when Congress instructed agencies to award “attorney... fees” to certain parties prevailing against the Government, that term was intended to embrace paralegal fees as well. Since §504 generally provides for recovery of attorney’s fees at “prevailing market rates,” it follows that fees for paralegal services must be recoverable at prevailing market rates as well. The Government contends that our decision in Jenkins was driven by considerations arising from the different context in which the term “attorney’s fee” was used in § 1988. At the time Jenkins was decided, §1988 provided for the recovery of attorney’s fees without reference to any other recoverable “expenses.” The Government insists that Jenkins found paralegal fees recoverable under the guise of “attorney’s fee[s]” because otherwise paralegal fees would not be recoverable at all. Since EAJA expressly permits recovery (albeit at “cost”) for items other than attorney, agent, and expert witness fees, the Government sees no reason to give EAJA the broad construction that Jenkins gave § 1988. The Government’s rationale for distinguishing Jenkins finds no support either in our opinion there or in our subsequent decisions. Our opinion in Jenkins expressed no apprehension at the possibility that a contrary decision would leave the claimant emptyhanded. This omission is unsurprising, since our decision in Jenkins did not rest on the conviction that recovery at market rates was better than nothing. Our decision rested instead on the proposition— a proposition we took as “self-evident” — that the term “attorney’s fee” had historically included fees for paralegal services. Indeed, the Government’s interpretation of Jenkins was rejected by this Court just two years after Jenkins was handed down. In West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, the petitioner sought to recover expert witness fees from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pursuant to § 1988. The petitioner looked to Jenkins for the proposition that the “broad remedial purposes” of § 1988 allowed the recovery of fees not expressly authorized by statute. The Court rejected that interpretation of Jenkins: “The issue [in Jenkins] was not, as [petitioner] contends, whether we would permit our perception of the ‘policy’ of the statute to overcome its ‘plain language.’ It was not remotely plain in Jenkins that the phrase ‘attorney’s fee’ did not include charges for law clerk and paralegal services. Such services, like the services of ‘secretaries, messengers, librarians, janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work product,’ had traditionally been included in calculation of the lawyers’ hourly rates. Only recently had there arisen ‘the increasingly widespread custom of separately billing for [such] services.’ By contrast, there has never been, to our knowledge, a practice of including the cost of expert services within attorneys’ hourly rates. There was also no record in Jenkins — as there is a lengthy record here — of statutory usage that recognizes a distinction between the charges at issue and attorney’s fees.” Casey, supra, at 99 (quoting 491 U. S., at 285-286; some internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Our analysis of Jenkins in Casey refutes the Government’s claim that Jenkins had to stretch the law to fit hard facts. As Casey shows, our decision in Jenkins turned not on extra-textual policy goals but on the traditional meaning of the term “attorney’s fees.” Ill The Government parries this textual and doctrinal analysis with legislative history and public policy. We are not persuaded by either. The legislative history cited by the Government does not address the question presented, and policy considerations actually counsel in favor of Richlin’s interpretation. A The Government contends first that a 1984 Senate Report accompanying the bill that reenacted EAJA unequivocally expressed congressional intent that paralegal fees should be recovered only “‘at cost.’” Brief for Respondent 29 (quoting S. Rep., at 15; emphasis in original). It next contends that the Report tacitly endorsed the same result by approving model rules of the Administrative Conference of the United States and a pre-EAJA Sixth Circuit decision, both of which had adopted schemes of reimbursement at attorney cost. See Brief for Respondent 29. We are not persuaded. In our view, the legislative history does not even address the question presented, much less answer it in the Government’s favor. The Senate Report accompanying the 1984 bill remarked that “[e]xamples of the type of expenses that should ordinarily be compensable [under EAJA] include paralegal time (billed at cost).” S. Rep., at 15. The Government concludes from this stray remark that Congress intended to limit recovery of paralegal fees to attorney cost. But as we observed earlier, the word “cost” could just as easily (and more sensibly) refer to the client’s cost rather than the attorney’s cost. Under the former interpretation, the Senate Report simply indicates that a prevailing party who satisfies E A JA’s other requirements should generally be able to “bil[l] ” the Government for any reasonable amount the party paid for paralegal services. Since the litigant’s out-of-pocket cost for paralegal services would normally be equal to' the “prevailing market rat[e]” for such services, 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(A), the Senate Report could easily support Richlin’s interpretation. Moreover, even if the Government’s interpretation of the word “cost” is correct, that interpretation would not be inconsistent with our decision today. “Nothing in [EAJA] requires that the work of paralegals invariably be billed separately. If it is the practice in the relevant market not to do so, or to bill the work of paralegals only at cost, that is all that [EAJA] requires.” Jenkins, 491U. S., at 288 (construing 42 U. S. C. § 1988). We thus recognize the possibility, as we did in Jenkins, that the attorney’s cost for paralegal services will supply the relevant metric for calculating the client’s recovery. Whether that metric is appropriate depends on market practice. The Senate Report, even under the Government’s contestable interpretation, is not inconsistent with that conclusion. On the contrary, the Report implies that courts should look to market practice in setting EAJA awards. See S. Rep., at 15 (“The Act should not be read ... to permit reimbursement for items ordinarily included in office overhead, nor for any other expenses not reasonable in amount, necessary for the conduct of the litigation, and customarily chargeable to clients” (emphasis added)). Beyond that vague guidance, the Report does not address the critical question in this case: whether EAJA limits recovery of paralegal fees to attorney cost regardless of market practice. As such, the Report does not persuade us of the soundness of the Government’s interpretation of the statute. The Government’s reliance on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F. 2d 624 (1979), founders for the same reason. The Government contends that Northcross approved of reimbursement at attorney cost under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 and that the 1984 Senate Report, by endorsing Northcross, tacitly approved of the same result for EAJA. See Brief for Respondent 30 (citing Northcross, supra, at 639). The problem again is that Northcross did not decide whether a litigant’s recovery for paralegal services would be limited to his attorney’s cost even in a market where litigants were customarily billed at “prevailing market rates.” Although the Sixth Circuit seems to have been aware that paralegal services could be billed to clients at market rates, some language in its opinion suggests that the court assumed that attorneys billed their clients only for the out-of-pocket cost of paralegal services. Since Northcross does not clearly address the question presented, its endorsement in the Senate Report means little. Finally, the model rules cited in the Senate Report may actually support Richlin’s position. The implementing release for the rules describes the Administrative Conference’s approach to paralegal costs as follows: “Commenters also took varying positions on whether paralegal costs should be chargeable as expenses. We do not believe the rules should discourage the use of paralegals, which can be an important cost-saving measure. On the other hand, lawyers’ practices with respect to charging for paralegal time, as with respect to other expenses such as duplicating, telephone charges and the like, vary according to locality, field of practice, and individual custom. We have decided not to designate specific items as compensable expenses. Instead, we will adopt a suggestion of the Treasury Department and revise the model rule to provide that expenses may be charged as a separate item if they are ordinarily so charged to the attorney’s clients.” Administrative Conference of the U. S., Equal Access to Justice Act: Agency Implementation, 46 Fed. Reg. 32905 (1981). To the extent that this passage addresses the question presented at all, it seems to take the same approach that the Court took in Jenkins and that we adopt today: It allows the recovery of paralegal fees according to “the practice in the relevant market.” 491 U. S., at 288. But we think the fairest interpretation of the implementing release is that it does not address how awards for paralegal fees should be calculated. Instead, it addresses the anterior question whether courts may award paralegal fees under EAJA at all. See, e. g., 46 Fed. Reg. 32905 (responding to comments urging that the model rules “identify particular expenses of attorneys and witnesses that are compensable”). Like the other legislative authorities cited by the Government, the model rules fail to persuade us of the soundness of the Government’s interpretation because they fail to clearly address the question presented. B We find the Government’s policy rationale for recovery at attorney cost likewise unpersuasive. The Government argues that market-based recovery would distort litigant incentives because EAJA would cap paralegal and attorney’s fees at the same rate. See 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (“[Attorney or agent fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the agency determines by regulation that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys or agents for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee”). The Government observes that paralegal rates are lower than rates for attorneys operating in the same market. If EAJA reimbursed both attorney time and paralegal time at market rates, then the cap would clip more off the top of the attorney’s rates than the paralegal’s rates. According to the Government, a market-based scheme would encourage litigants to shift an inefficient amount of attorney work to paralegals, since paralegal fees could be recovered at a greater percentage of their full market value. The problem with this argument, as Richlin points out, is that it proves too much. The same reasoning would imply that agent fees should not be recoverable at market rates. If market-based recovery of paralegal time resulted in excessive reliance on paralegals, then market-based recovery of agent time should result in excessive reliance on agents. The same reasoning would also imply that fees for junior attorneys (who generally bill at lower rates than senior attorneys) should not be recoverable at market rates. Cf. Jenkins, supra, at 287 (“If the fees are consistent with market rates and practices, the ‘windfall’ argument has no more force with regard to paralegals than it does for associates”). Yet despite the possibility that market-based recovery of attorney and agent fees would distort litigant incentives, § 504 unambiguously authorizes awards of “reasonable attorney or agent fees . . . [at] prevailing market rates.” 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(A). The Government offers no persuasive reason why Congress would have treated paralegal fees any differently. The Government’s policy rationale thus founders on the text of the statute, which shows that Congress was untroubled by the very distortion the Government seeks to prevent. We also question the practical feasibility of the Government’s interpretation of the statute. The Board in this case relied on the Internet for data on paralegal salaries in the District of Columbia, but the Government fails to explain why a law firm’s cost should be limited to salary. The benefits and perks with which a firm compensates its staff come out of the bottom line no less than salary. The Government has offered no solution to this accounting problem, and we do not believe that solutions are readily to be found. Market practice provides by far the more transparent basis for calculating a prevailing party’s recovery under EAJA. It strains credulity that Congress would have abandoned this predictable, workable framework for the uncertain and complex accounting requirements that a cost-based rule would inflict on litigants, their attorneys, administrative agencies, and the courts. IV Confronted with the flaws in its interpretation of the statute, the Government seeks shelter in a canon of construction. According to the Government, any right to recover paralegal fees under E A JA must be read narrowly in light of the statutory canon requiring strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity. We disagree. The sovereign immunity canon is just that — a canon of construction. It is a tool for interpreting the law, and we have never held that it displaces the other traditional tools of statutory construction. Indeed, the cases on which the Government relies all used other tools of construction in tandem with the sovereign immunity canon. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 137 (1991) (relying on the canon as “reinforce[ment]” for the independent “conclusion that any ambiguities in the legislative history are insufficient to undercut the ordinary understanding of the statutory language”); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 682, 685-686 (1983) (relying on the canon in tandem with “historic principles of fee-shifting in this and other countries” to define the scope of a fee-shifting statute); Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U. S. 607, 626-627 (1992) (resorting to the canon only after a close reading of the statutory provision had left the Court “with an unanswered question and an unresolved tension between closely related statutory provisions”); see also Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197, 201-203 (1993) (invoking the sovereign immunity canon only after observing that the claimant’s argument was “undermine[d]” by the “commonsense meaning” of the statutory language). In this case, traditional tools of statutory construction and considerations of stare decisis compel the conclusion that paralegal fees are recoverable as attorney’s fees at their “prevailing market rates.” 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(A). There is no need for us to resort to the sovereign immunity canon because there is no ambiguity left for us to construe. V For these reasons, we hold that a prevailing party that satisfies EAJA’s other requirements may recover its paralegal fees from the Government at prevailing market rates. The Board’s contrary decision was error, and the Federal Circuit erred in affirming that decision. The judgment of the Federal Circuit is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia joins this opinion except as to Part III-A, and Justice Thomas joins this opinion except as to Parts II-B and III. Richlin was actually billed for paralegal services at rates as high as $135 per hour, but it amended its application to cap the fees at $95 per hour. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a; Brief for Petitioner 9; Brief for Respondent 4, n. 2. Some agencies allow nonattorney representatives, known as “agents,” to assist parties with the presentation of their cases. See n. 10, infra. Richlin has never claimed that a paralegal may qualify as an “agent” within the meaning of § 504(b)(1)(A). Virtually identical fee-shifting provisions apply to actions by or against the Government in federal court. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2412(a)(1), (d)(2)(A). The question presented addresses both §§504 and 2412, but the Federal Circuit’s decision resolved only petitioner’s § 504 application, and the Government avers (without challenge from Richlin) that § 2412 “is not at issue in this case.” Brief for Respondent 2, n. 1. We assume without deciding that the reasoning of our opinion would extend equally to §§ 504 and 2412. We confine our discussion to § 504. The Government contends that the question presented does not fairly include the question whether the cost of paralegal services should be calculated from the perspective of the litigant rather than the litigant’s attorney. We disagree. The question presented in Riehlin’s petition for certiorari was whether “a prevailing party [may] be awarded attorney fees for paralegal services at the market rate for such services,... [or at] cost only.” Pet. for Cert. i. A decision limiting reimbursement to “cost only” would simply beg the question of how that cost should be measured. Since the question presented cannot genuinely be answered without addressing the subsidiary question, we have no difficulty concluding that the latter question is “fairly included” within the former. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a). It is worth recalling that the Board calculated Riehlin’s award based on an Internet survey of paralegal salaries in the District of Columbia. Presumably the salaries the Board identified represented the market rate for paralegal compensation. The limited award that the Government wants affirmed was thus based, ironically enough, on the “prevailing market rates” for paralegal services. The fact that paralegal salaries respond to market forces no less than the fees that clients pay suggests to us that this case has more to do with determining whose expenditures get reimbursed (the attorney’s or the client’s) than with determining how expenditures are calculated (at cost or at market). Since EAJA authorizes the recovery of fees and other expenses “incurred by [the] party,” § 504(a)(1), rather than the party’s attorney, the answer to the former question is plain. Following our decision in Casey, Congress amended §1988 to allow parties to recover “expert fees as part of the attorney’s fees.” Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 113(a), 105 Stat. 1079 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1988(c)). The version of EAJA first enacted in 1980 had a sunset provision effective October 1,1984. See §§ 203(c), 204(e), 94 Stat. 2327, 2329. Congress revived EAJA without the sunset provision (but with certain other amendments) in 1985. See Act of Aug. 5,1985, §§ 1-2, 6,99 Stat. 183-186; see also n. 8, infra; see generally Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 406-407 (2004) (summarizing EAJA’s legislative history). Richlin makes a threshold challenge to the legitimacy of the 1984 Senate Report as legislative history, observing that the bill it accompanied was vetoed by the President before being enacted by a subsequent Congress. See Brief for Petitioner 27 (“To the extent that legislative history serves as legitimate evidence of congressional intent, it does so only because it is presumed to have been ratified by Congress and the President when the relevant legislation was enacted” (citing Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1522 (2000); and Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617, 631-632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part))). But see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U. S. 89, 96 (1991) (relying on the same Report to interpret EAJA’s 1985 amendments). Because the legislative history is a wash in this case, we need not decide precisely how much weight it deserves in our analysis. Compare Northcross, 611 F. 2d, at 638 (“[A] scale of fees as is used by most law firms is appropriate to use in making fee awards pursuant to Section 1988. The use of broad categories, differentiating between paralegal services, in-office services by experienced attorneys and trial service, would result in a fair and equitable fee”), with id., at 639 (“The authority granted in section 1988 to award a reasonable attorney’s fee included the authority to award those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services. Reasonable photocopying, paralegal expenses, and travel and telephone costs are thus recoverable pursuant to the statutory authority of § 1988” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “ ‘An “agent fee” may be awarded for the services of a non-attorney where an agency permits such agents to represent parties who come before it.’” Brief for Respondent 11, n. 4 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96-1418, p. 14 (1980)); see also n. 2, swpra. Since federal courts generally do not permit nonattorneys to practice before them, the portion of EAJA governing awards for parties to federal litigation makes no provision for agent fees. Compare 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) with 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(A).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. WASHINGTON ALUMINUM CO. No. 464. Argued April 10, 1962. Decided May 28, 1962. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Stuart Rothman, Norton J. Come and Samuel M. Singer. Robert R. Bair argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, with Chief Judge Sobeloff dissenting, refused to enforce an order of the National Labor Relations Board directing the respondent Washington Aluminum Company to reinstate and make whole seven employees whom the company had discharged for leaving their work in the machine shop without permission on claims that the shop was too cold to work in. Because that decision raises important questions affecting the proper administration of the National Labor Relations Act, we granted certiorari. The Board’s order, as shown by the record and its findings, rested upon these facts and circumstances. The respondent company is engaged in the fabrication of aluminum products in Baltimore, Maryland, a business having interstate aspects that subject it to regulation under the National Labor Relations Act. The machine shop in which the seven discharged employees worked was not insulated and had a number of doors to the outside that had to be opened frequently. An oil furnace located in an adjoining building was the chief source of heat for the shop, although there were two gas-fired space heaters that contributed heat to a lesser extent. The heat produced by these units was not always satisfactory and, even prior to the day of the walkout involved here, several of the eight machinists who made up the day shift at the shop had complained from time to time to the company’s foreman “over the cold working conditions.” January 5, 1959, was an extraordinarily cold day for Baltimore, with unusually high winds and a low temperature of 11 degrees followed by a high of 22. When the employees on the day shift came to work that morning, they found the shop bitterly cold, due not only to the unusually harsh weather, but also to the fact that the large oil furnace had broken down the night before and had not as yet been put back into operation. As the workers gathered in the shop just before the starting hour of 7:30, one of them, a Mr. Caron, went into the office of Mr. Jarvis, the foreman, hoping to warm himself but, instead, found the foreman’s quarters as uncomfortable as the rest of the shop. As Caron and Jarvis sat in Jarvis’ office discussing how bitingly cold the building was, some of the other machinists walked by the office window “huddled” together in a fashion that caused Jarvis to exclaim that “[i]f those fellows had any guts at all, they would go home.” When the starting buzzer sounded a few moments later, Caron walked back to his working place in the shop and found all the other machinists “huddled there, shaking a little, cold.” Caron then said to these workers, “. . . Dave [Jarvis] told me if we had any guts, we would go home. ... I am going home, it is too damned cold to work.” Caron asked the other workers what they were going to do and, after some discussion among themselves, they decided to leave with him. One of these workers, testifying before the Board, summarized their entire discussion this way: “And we had all got together and thought it would be a good idea to go home; maybe we could get some heat brought into the plant that way.” As they started to leave, Jarvis approached and persuaded one of the workers to remain at the job. But Caron and the other six workers on the day shift left practically in a body in a matter of minutes after the 7:30 buzzer. When the company’s general foreman arrived between 7:45 and 8 that morning, Jarvis promptly informed him that all but one of the employees had left because the shop was too cold. The company’s president came in at approximately 8:20 a. m. and, upon learning of the walkout, immediately said to the foreman, “. . . if they have all gone, we are going to terminate them.” After discussion “at great length” between the general foreman and the company president as to what might be the effect of the walkout on employee discipline and plant production, the president formalized his discharge of the workers who had walked out by giving orders at 9 a. m. that the affected workers should be notified about their discharge immediately, either by telephone, telegram or personally. This was done. On these facts the Board found that the conduct of the workers was a concerted activity to protest the company’s failure to supply adequate heat in its machine shop, that such conduct is protected under the provision of § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act which guarantees that “Employees shall have the right... to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” and that the discharge of these workers by the company amounted to an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a)(1) of the Act, which forbids employers “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.” Acting under the authority of § 10 (c) of the Act, which provides that when an employer has been guilty of an unfair labor practice the Board can “take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act,” the Board then ordered the company to reinstate the discharged workers to their previous positions and to make them whole for losses resulting from what the Board found to have been the unlawful termination of their employment. In denying enforcement of this order, the majority of the Court of Appeals took the position that because the workers simply “summarily left their place of employment” without affording the company an “opportunity to avoid the work stoppage by granting a concession to a demand,” their walkout did not amount to a concerted activity protected by § 7 of the Act. On this basis, they held that there was no justification for the conduct of the workers in violating the established rules of the plant by leaving their jobs without permission and that the Board had therefore exceeded its power in issuing the order involved here because § 10 (c) declares that the Board shall not require reinstatement or back pay for an employee whom an employer has suspended or discharged “for cause.” We cannot agree that employees necessarily lose their right to engage in concerted activities under § 7 merely because they do not present a specific demand upon their employer to remedy a condition they find objectionable. The language of § 7 is broad enough to protect concerted activities whether they take place before, after, or at the same time such a demand is made. To compel the Board to interpret and apply that language in the restricted fashion suggested by the respondent here would only tend to frustrate the policy of the Act to protect the right of workers to act together to better their working conditions. Indeed, as indicated by this very case, such an interpretation of § 7 might place burdens upon employees so great that it would effectively nullify the right to engage in concerted activities which that section protects. The seven employees here were part of a small group of employees who were wholly unorganized. They had no bargaining representative and, in fact, no representative of any kind to present their grievances to their employer. Under these circumstances, they had to speak for themselves as best they could. As pointed out above, prior to the day they left the shop, several of them had repeatedly complained to company officials about the cold working conditions in the shop. These had been more or less spontaneous individual pleas, unsupported by any threat of concerted protest, to which the company apparently gave little consideration and which it now says the Board should have treated as nothing more than “the same sort of gripes as the gripes made about the heat in the summertime.” The bitter cold of January 5, however, finally brought these workers’ individual complaints into concert so that some more effective action could be considered. Having no bargaining representative and no established procedure by which they could take full advantage of their unanimity of opinion in negotiations with the company, the men took the most direct course to let the company know that they wanted a warmer place in which to work. So, after talking among themselves, they walked out together in the hope that this action might spotlight their complaint and bring about some improvement in wrhat they considered to be the “miserable” conditions of their employment. This we think was enough to justify the Board’s holding that they were not required to make any more specific demand than they did to be entitled to the protection of § 7. Although the company contends to the contrary, we think that the walkout involved here did grow out of a “labor dispute” within the plain meaning of the definition of that term in § 2 (9) of the Act, which declares that it includes “any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment . . . .” The findings of the Board, which are supported by substantial evidence and which were not disturbed below, show a running dispute between the machine shop employees and the company over the heating of the shop on cold days— a dispute which culminated in the decision of the employees to act concertedly in an effort to force the company to improve that condition of their employment. The fact that the company was already making every effort to repair the furnace and bring heat into the shop that morning does not change the nature of the controversy that caused the walkout. At the very most, that fact might tend to indicate that the conduct of the men in leaving was unnecessary and unwise, and it has long been settled that the reasonableness of workers’ decisions to engage in concerted activity is irrelevant to the determination of whether a labor dispute exists or not. Moreover, the evidence here shows that the conduct of these workers was far from unjustified under the circumstances. The company’s own foreman expressed the opinion that the shop was so cold that the men should go home. This statement by the foreman but emphasizes the obvious— that is, that the conditions of coldness about which complaint had been made before had been so aggravated on the day of the walkout that the concerted action of the men in leaving their jobs seemed like a perfectly natural and reasonable thing to do. Nor can we accept the company’s contention that because it admittedly had an established plant rule which forbade employees to leave their work without permission of the foreman, there was justifiable “cause” for discharging these employees, wholly separate and apart from any concerted activities in which they engaged in protest against the poorly heated plant. Section 10 (c) of the Act does authorize an employer to discharge employees for “cause” and our cases have long recognized this right on the part of an employer. But this, of course, cannot mean that an employer is at liberty to punish a man by discharging him for engaging in concerted activities which § 7 of the Act protects. And the plant rule in question here purports to permit the company to do just that for it would prohibit even the most plainly protected kinds of concerted work stoppages until and unless the permission of the company’s foreman was obtained. It is of course true that § 7 does not protect all concerted activities, but that aspect of the section is not involved in this case. The activities engaged in here do not fall within the normal categories of unprotected concerted activities such as those that are unlawful, violent or in breach of contract. Nor can they be brought under this Court’s more recent pronouncement which denied the protection of § 7 to activities characterized as “indefensible” because they were there found to show a disloyalty to the workers’ employer which this Court deemed unnecessary to carry on the workers’ legitimate concerted activities. The activities of these seven employees cannot be classified as “indefensible” by any recognized standard of conduct. Indeed, concerted activities by employees for the purpose of trying to protect themselves from working conditions as uncomfortable as the testimony and Board findings showed them to be in this case are unquestionably activities to correct conditions which modern labor-management legislation treats as too bad to have to be tolerated in a humane and civilized society like ours. We hold therefore that the Board correctly interpreted and applied the Act to the circumstances of this case and it was error for the Court of Appeals to refuse to enforce its order. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to enforce the order in its entirety. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 291 F. 2d 869. The Court of Appeals also refused to enforce another Board order requiring the respondent company to bargain collectively with the Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the certified bargaining representative of its employees. Since the Union’s status as majority bargaining representative turns on the ballots cast in the Board election by four of the seven discharged employees, the enforceability of that order depends upon the validitj^ of the discharges being challenged in the principal part of the case. Our decision on the discharge question will therefore also govern the refusal-to-bargain issue. 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. 368 U. S. 924. The Board made a specific finding on this issue: “We rely, inter alia, upon . . . the credited testimony of employees Heinlein, Caron, and George as to previous complaints made to the Respondent’s foremen over the cold working conditions, and to the effect that the men left on the morning of January 5 in protest of the coldness at the plant . . . .” 126 N. L. R. B. 1410, 1411. The Trial Examiner expressly credited this testimony and the Board expressly relied upon it. 126 N. L. R. B., at 1411. 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157. Section 7 in full is as follows: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3) 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (1). 49 Stat. 453-454, as amended, 61 Stat. 146-147, 29 U. S. C. §160 (c). 291 F. 2d, at 877. "No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.” 49 Stat. 453-454, as amended, 61 Stat. 146-147, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c). 49 Stat. 450, as amended, 61 Stat. 137-138, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (9). (Emphasis supplied.) “The wisdom or unwisdom of the men, their justification or lack of it, in attributing to respondent an unreasonable or arbitrar}' attitude in connection with the negotiations, cannot determine whether, when they struck, they did so as a consequence of or in connection with a current labor dispute.” Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 344. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 45. Southern Steamship Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31. Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240. Labor Board v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 306 U. S. 332. Labor Board v. Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 346 U. S. 464, 477.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KREMENS, HOSPITAL DIRECTOR, et al. v. BARTLEY et al. No. 75-1064. Argued December 1, 1976 Decided May 16, 1977 Norman J. Watkins, Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, Barry A. Roth, Assistant Attorney General, and J. Justin Blewitt, Jr., Deputy Attorney General. David Ferleger argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Bernard G. Segal argued the cause for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as amicus curiae. With him on the brief was James D. Crawford. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Curt T. Schneider, Attorney General, and Bruce A. Roby for the State of Kansas; and by Bruce A. Miller for the Michigan Association of Emotionally Disturbed Children. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Lawrence E. Walsh, John H. Lashly, and Michael S. Lottman for the American Bar Assn.; by Stanley C. Van Ness for the Department of the Public Advocate, Division of Mental Health Advocacy of New Jersey; by Gary J. Kolb for Michigan Legal Services et al.; and by Robert L. Walker and Peter B. Sandmann for the Youth Law Center. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, Brian K. Landsberg, and Judith E. Wolf for the United States; by Patricia M. Wald and Paul R. Friedman for the American Orthopsychiatric Assn, et al.; by Allen R. Snyder for the American Psychiatric Assn, et al.; by Bayard M. Graf, Harold E. Kohn, Samuel E. Klein, and Frank E. Hahn, Jr., for the Devereux Foundation et al.; by Michael A. Wolff for the National Juvenile Law Center; and by Stephen P. Berzon, Marian Wright Edelman, Stephen Wizner, and Joseph J. Levin, Jr., for the plaintiffs in Poe et al. v. Mathews et al. and other cases. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. I Appellees Bartley, Gentile, Levine, Mathews, and Weand were the named plaintiffs in a complaint challenging the constitutionality of Pennsylvania statutes governing the voluntary admission and voluntary commitment to Pennsylvania mental health institutions of persons 18 years of age or younger. The named plaintiffs alleged that they were then being held at Haver ford State Hospital, a Pennsylvania mental health facility, and that they had been admitted or committed pursuant to the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania Mental. Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 50, §4101 et seq. (1969). Various state and hospital officials were named as defendants. Plaintiffs sought to vindicate not only their own constitutional rights, but also sought to represent a class consisting of “all persons under eighteen years of age who have been, are, or, may be admitted or committed to Haverford State Hospital and all other state mental health facilities under the challenged provisions of the state statute.” App. 10a-lla (complaint ¶7). A three-judge United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania struck down the statutes as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (1975). The court also entered a broad order requiring the implementation of detailed procedural protections for those admitted under the Pennsylvania statutes. On December 15, 1975, this Court granted appellants' application for a stay of the judgment of the District Court. On March 22, 1976, we noted probable jurisdiction. 424 U. S. 964. In general, the 1966 Act, which has been superseded to a significant degree, provides for three types of admission to a mental health facility for examination, treatment, and care: voluntary admission or commitment (§§402 and 403), emergency commitment (§405), and civil court commitment (§ 406). At issue here was the constitutionality of the voluntary admission and commitment statutes, §§ 402 and 403, as those statutes regulate the admission of persons 18 years of age or younger. The statutes provide that juveniles may be admitted upon the application of a parent, guardian, or individual standing in loco parentis and that, unlike adults, the admitted person is free to withdraw only with the consent of the parent or guardian admitting him. There have been two major changes in the Pennsylvania statutory scheme that have materially affected the rights of juveniles: the promulgation of regulations under the 1966 Act, and the enactment of the Mental Health Procedures Act in 1976. At the time the complaint was filed, the 1966 Act made little or no distinction between older and younger juveniles. Each of the named plaintiffs was at that time between 15 and 18 years of age. After the commencement of this action, but before class certification or decision on the merits by the District Court, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare promulgated regulations which substantially increased the procedural safeguards afforded to minors 13 years of age or older. The regulations, promulgated pursuant to statutory authority, became effective September 1, 1973. The major impact of the regulations upon this litigation stems from the fact that the regulations accord significant procedural protections to those 13 and older, but not to those less than 13. The older juveniles are given notification of their rights, the telephone number of counsel, and the right to institute a § 406 involuntary commitment proceeding in court within two business days. Under § 406, a judicial hearing is held after notice to the parties. The younger juveniles are not given the right to a hearing and are still remitted to relying upon the admitting parent or guardian. Although the regulations sharply differentiate between juveniles of less than 13 years of age and those 13 to 18, on April 29, 1974, the District Court nonetheless certified the following class to be represented by the plaintiffs: “This action shall be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the class comprised of all persons eighteen years of age or younger who have been, are or may be admitted or committed to mental health facilities in Pennsylvania pursuant to the challenged provisions of the state mental health law (i. e., 50 P. S. §§ 4402 and 4403). This definition of the class is without prejudice to the possibility that it may be amended or altered before the decision on the merits herein.” App. 270a. On July 9, 1976, after the decision below and after this Court had noted probable jurisdiction, Pennsylvania enacted a new statute substantially altering its voluntary admission procedures. Mental Health Procedures Act, Pa. Act No. 143. The new Act completely repeals the provisions declared unconstitutional below except insofar as they relate to mentally retarded persons. § 502. Under the hew Act, any person 14 years of age or over may voluntarily admit himself, but his parents may not do so; those 14 to 18 who were subject to commitment by their parents under the 1966 Act are treated essentially as adults under the new Act. § 201. Under the new Act children 13 and younger may still be admitted for treatment by a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis. Ibid. Those 14 and over may withdraw from voluntary treatment “at any time by giving written notice.” § 206 (a). Those under 14 may be released by request of the parent; in addition, “any responsible party” may petition the Juvenile Division of the Court of Common Pleas to request withdrawal of the child or modification of his treatment. § 206 (b). Because we have concluded that the claims of the named appellees are mooted by the new Act, and that the claims of the unnamed members of the class are not properly presented for review, we do not dwell at any length upon the statutory scheme for voluntary commitment in Pennsylvania or upon the rationale of the District Court’s holding that the 1966 Act and regulations did not satisfy due process. II This case presents important constitutional issues — issues that were briefed and argued before this Court. However, for reasons hereafter discussed, we conclude that the claims of the named appellees are mooted by the new Act and decline to adjudicate the claims of the class certified by the District Court. That class has been fragmented by the enactment of the new Act and the promulgation of the regulations. Constitutional adjudication being a matter of “great gravity and delicacy,” see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), we base our refusal to pass on the merits on “the policy rules often invoked by the Court 'to avoid passing prematurely on constitutional questions. Because {such] rules operate in “cases confessedly within [the Court’s] jurisdiction” . . . they find their source in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations.’ ” Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 756 n. 8 (1976). A At the time the complaint was filed, each of the named plaintiffs was older than 14, and insofar as the record indicates, mentally ill. The essence of their position was that, as matters stood at that time, a juvenile 18 or younger could be “voluntarily” admitted upon application of his parent, over the objection of the juvenile himself. Thus, appellees urged in their complaint that the Due Process Clause required that they be accorded the right to a hearing, as well as other procedural protections, to ensure the validity of the commitment. App. 21a-22a (complaint ¶ 46). The fact that the Act was passed after the decision below does not save the named appellees’ claims from mootness. There must be a live case or controversy before this Court, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975), and we apply the law as it is now, not as it stood below. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, supra. Thus the enactment of the new statute clearly moots the claims of the named appellees, and all others 14 or older and mentally ill. These concerns were eradicated with the passage of the new Act, which applied immediately to all persons receiving voluntary treatment. § 501. The Act, in essence, treats mentally ill juveniles 14 and older as adults. They may voluntarily commit themselves, but their parents may not do so, § 201, and one receiving voluntary treatment may withdraw at any time by giving written notice. § 206. With respect to the named appellees, the Act completely repealed and replaced the statutes challenged below, and obviated their demand for a hearing, and other procedural protections, since the named appellees had total freedom to leave the hospital, and could not be forced to return absent their consent. After the passage of the Act, in no sense were the named appellees “detained and incarcerated involuntarily in mental hospitals,” as they had alleged in the complaint, App. 21a. B If the only appellees before us were the named appellees, the mootness of the case with respect to them would require that we vacate the judgment of the District Court with instructions to dismiss their complaint. United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36 (1950). But as we have previously indicated, the District Court certified, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, the class described supra, at 125-126. In particular types of class actions this Court has held that the presence of a properly certified class may provide an added dimension to our Art. Ill analysis, and that the mootness of the named plaintiffs’ claims does not “inexorably” require dismissal of the action. Sosna, supra, at 399-401. See also Franks v. Bowman Transportation, Inc., supra, at 752-757; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975). But we have never adopted a flat rule that the mere fact of certification of a class by a district court was sufficient to require us to decide the merits of the claims of unnamed class members when those of the named parties had become moot. Cf. Sosna, supra, at 402. Here, the promulgation of the regulations materially changed, prior to class certification, the controverted issues with respect to a large number of unnamed plaintiffs; prior to decision by this Court, the controverted issues pertaining to even more unnamed plaintiffs have been affected by the passage of the 1976 Act. We do not think that the fragmented residual of the class originally certified by the District Court may be treated as were the classes in Sosna and Franks. There is an obvious lack of homogeneity among those unnamed members of the class originally certified by the District Court. Analysis of the current status of the various subgroups reveals a bewildering lineup of permutations and combinations. As we parse it, the claims of those 14 and older and mentally ill are moot. They have received by statute all that they claimed under the Constitution. Those 14 and older and mentally retarded are subject to the 1966 Act, struck down by the District Court, but are afforded the protections of the regulations. Their claims are not wholly mooted, but are satisfied in many respects by the regulations. Those 13 and mentally ill are subject to the admissions procedures of the new Act, arguably supplemented by the procedural protection of the regulations. The status of their claims is unclear. Those 13 and mentally retarded are subject to the 1966 Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Their claims are satisfied in many respects. Those younger than 13 and mentally ill are unaided by the regulations and are subject to the admissions procedures of the 1976 Act, the constitutional effect of which has not been reviewed by the District Court. Those younger than 13 and mentally retarded are subject to the 1966 Act, unaffected by the regulations. This latter group is thus the only group whose status has not changed materially since the outset of the litigation. These fragmented subclasses are represented by named plaintiffs whose constitutional claims are moot, and it is the attorneys for these named plaintiffs who have conducted the litigation in the District Court and in this Court. The factors which we have just described make the class aspect of this litigation a far cry indeed from that aspect of the litigation in Sosna and in Franks, where we adjudicated the merits of the class claims notwithstanding the mootness of the claims of the named parties. In Sosna, the named plaintiff had by the time the litigation reached this Court fulfilled the residency requirement which she was challenging, but the class described in the District Court’s certification remained exactly the same. In that case, mootness was due to the inexorable passage of time, rather than to any change in the law. In Franks, a Title VII discrimination lawsuit, the named plaintiff had been subsequently discharged for a nondiscriminatory reason, and therefore before this Court that plaintiff no longer had a controversy with his employer similar to those of the unnamed members of the class. But the metes and bounds of each of those classes remained the same; the named plaintiff was simply no longer within them. Here, by contrast, the metes and bounds of the class certified by the District Court have been carved up by two changes in the law. In Sosna and Franks, the named plaintiffs had simply “left” the class, but the class remained substantially unaltered. In both of those cases, the named plaintiff's mootness was not related to any factor also affecting the unnamed members of the class. In this case, however, the class has been both truncated and compartmentalized by legislative action; this intervening legislation has rendered moot not only the claims of the named plaintiffs but also the claims of a large number of unnamed plaintiffs. The legislation, coupled with the regulations, has in a word materially changed the status of those included within the class description. For all of the foregoing reasons, we have the gravest doubts whether the class, as presently constituted, comports with the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (a) , And it is only a “properly certified” class that may succeed to the adversary position of a named representative whose claim becomes moot. Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975). In addition to the differences to which we have already adverted, the issues presented by these appellees, unlike that presented by the appellant in Sosna, supra, are not “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” In the latter case there is a significant benefit in according the class representative the opportunity to litigate on behalf of the class, since otherwise there may well never be a definitive resolution of the constitutional claim on the merits by this Court. We stated in Franks that “[gjiven a properly certified class action, . . . mootness turns on whether, in the specific circumstances of the given case at the time it is before this Court, an adversary relationship sufficient to fulfill this function exists.” 424 U. S., at 755-756. We noted that the “evading review” element was one factor to be considered in evaluating the adequacy of the adversary relationship in this Court. Id., at 756 n. 8. In this case, not only is the issue one that will not evade review, but the existence of a “properly certified class action” is dubious, and the initial shortcomings in the certification have multiplied. See Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, supra. In sum, none of the critical factors that might require us to adjudicate the claims of a class after mootness of the named plaintiff’s claims are present here. We are dealing with important constitutional issues on the merits, issues which are not apt to evade review, in the context of mooted claims on the part of all of the named parties and a certified class which, whatever the merits of its original certification by the District Court, has been fragmented by the enactment of legislation since that certification. While there are “live” disputes between unnamed members of portions of the class certified by the District Court, on the one hand, and appellants, on the other, these disputes are so unfocused as to make informed resolution of them almost impossible. Cf. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379 (1976). We accordingly decline to pass on the merits of appellees’ constitutional claims. We conclude that before the “live” claims of the fragmented subclasses remaining in this litigation can be decided on the merits, the case must be remanded to the District Court for reconsideration of the class definition, exclusion of those whose claims are moot, and substitution of class representatives with live claims. Because the District Court will confront this task on remand, we think it not amiss to remind that court that it is under the same obligation as we are to “stop, look, and listen” before certifying a class in order to adjudicate constitutional claims. That court, in its original certification, ignored the effect of the regulations promulgated by appellants which made a dramatic distinction between older and younger juveniles, and, according to the District Court, 402 F. Supp., at 1042, accorded the named appellees all of the protections which they sought, save two: the right to a precommitment hearing, and the specification of the time for the postcommitment hearing. This distinction between older and younger juveniles, recognized by state administrative authorities (and later by the Pennsylvania Legislature in its enactment of the 1976 Act), emphasizes the very possible differences in the interests of the older juveniles and the younger juveniles. Separate counsel for the younger juveniles might well have concluded that it would not have been in the best interest of their clients to press for the requirement of an automatic precommitment hearing, because of the possibility that such a hearing with its propensity to pit parent against child might actually be antithetical to the best interest of the younger juveniles. In the event that these issues are again litigated before the District Court, careful attention must be paid to the differences between mentally ill and mentally retarded, and between the young and the very young. It may be that Pennsylvania’s experience in implementing the new Act will shed light on these issues. Ill This disposition is made with full recognition of the importance of the issues, and of our assumption that all parties earnestly seek a decision on the merits. As Mr. Justice Brandéis stated in his famous concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S., at 345: “The fact that it would be convenient for the parties and the public to have promptly decided whether the legislation assailed is valid, cannot justify a departure from these settled rules . . . .” And, as we have more recently observed in the context of “ripeness”: “All of the parties now urge that the ‘conveyance taking’ issues are ripe for adjudication. However, because issues of ripeness involve, at least in part, the existence of a live ‘Case or Controversy,’ we cannot rely upon concessions of the parties and must determine whether the issues are ripe for decision in the ‘Case or Controversy’ sense. Further, to the extent that questions of ripeness involve the exercise of judicial restraint from unnecessary decision of constitutional issues, the Court must determine whether to exercise that restraint and cannot be bound by the wishes of the parties.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 138 (1974). (Footnote omitted.) Our analysis of the questions of mootness and of our ability to adjudicate the claims of the class in this case is consistent with the long-established rule that this Court will not “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co. v. Emigration Comm’rs, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885). The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Haverford State Hospital was initially named as a defendant but was dismissed by mutual agreement. 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 n. 6 (ED Pa. 1975). The principal distinction between the sections is that a voluntary commitment is not to exceed 30 days, with successive periods not to exceed 30 days each, as long as care or observation is necessary. There is no time limitation following a voluntary admission to a facility. See id., at 1054r-1055, n. 3 (dissenting opinion). See also n. 4, infra. There has been no distinction between the two sections for purposes of this lawsuit. Hence, unless otherwise indicated, we shall use the words “admitted” and “committed” interchangeably. The statutes provide: § 402. “Voluntary admission; application, examination and acceptance; duration of admission “(a) Application for voluntary admission to a facility for examination, treatment and care may be made by: “(1) Any person over eighteen years of age. “(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person to be admitted, if such person is eighteen years of age or younger. “(b) When an application is made, the director of the facility shall cause an examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named in the application is in need of care or observation, he may be admitted. “(c) Except where application for admission has been made under the provisions of section 402 (a) (2) and the person admitted is still eighteen years of age or younger, any person voluntarily admitted shall be free to withdraw at any time. Where application has been made under the provisions of section 402 (a) (2), only the applicant or his successor shall be free to withdraw the admitted person so long as the admitted person is eighteen years of age or younger. “(d) Each admission under the provisions of this section shall be reviewed at least annually by a committee, appointed by the director from the professional staff of the facility wherein the person is admitted, to determine whether continued care is necessary. Said committee shall malee written recommendations to the director which shall be filed at the facility and be open to inspection and review by the department and such other persons as the secretary by regulation may permit. “Where the admission is under the provisions of section 402 (a) (2), the person admitted shall be informed at least each sixty days of the voluntary nature of his status at the facility.” Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 50, § 4402 (1969) (footnote omitted). § 403. “Voluntary commitment; application, examination and acceptance; duration of commitment “(a) Application for voluntary commitment to a facility for examination, treatment and care may be made by: “(1) Any person over eighteen years of age. “(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person to be admitted, if such person is eighteen years of age or younger. “ (b) The application shall be in writing, signed by the applicant in the presence of at least one witness. When an application is made, the director of the facility shall cause an examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named in the application is in need of care or observation, he shall be committed for a period not to exceed thirty days. Successive applications for continued voluntary commitment may be made for successive periods not to exceed thirty days each, so long as care or observation is necessary. “(c) No person voluntarily committed shall be detained for more than ten days after he has given written notice to the director of his intention or desire to leave the facility, or after the applicant or his successor has given written notice of intention or desire to remove the detained person. “(d) Each commitment under the provisions of this section shall be reviewed at least annually by a committee, appointed by the director from the professional staff of the facility wherein the person is cared for, to determine whether continued care and commitment is necessary. Said committee shall make written recommendations to the director which shall be filed at the facility and be open to inspection and review by the department and such other persons as the secretary by regulation shall permit. “Where the commitment is under the provisions of section 403 (a) (2), the person committed shall be informed at least each sixty days of the voluntary nature of his status at the facility.” Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 50, §4403 (1969) (footnote omitted). With respect to those voluntarily admitted, the 1966 Act explicitly distinguishes between adults, who are free to withdraw at any time, and those 18 and younger, who may withdraw only with the consent of the admitting parent or guardian. § 402 (c). However, §403 (c), relating to withdrawal after voluntary commitment, does not explicitly make an age distinction, and, on its face, would allow either the person committed or the applicant {i. e., the parent or guardian) to effect the withdrawal. However, neither the court below nor the parties have read the statute as containing this distinction. E. g., Brief for Appellants 25. § 201 (2) of the 1966 Act. Relevant portions of the regulations are set forth in the District Court’s opinion. 402 F. Supp., at 1042-1043, n. 5. Section 406 is the statute that provides for the hearing procedures to be used in an involuntary civil court commitment. Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 50, §4406 (1969). Section 201 provides: “Any person 14 years of age or over who believes that he is in need of treatment and substantially understands the nature of voluntary commitment may submit himself to examination and treatment under this act, provided that the decision to do so is made voluntarily. A parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to a child less than 14 years of age may subject such child to examination and treatment under this act, and in so doing shall be deemed to be acting for the child. Except as otherwise authorized in this act, all of the provisions of this act governing examination and treatment shall apply.” Section 206 provides: “(a) A person in voluntary inpatient treatment may withdraw at any time by giving written notice unless, as stated in section 203, he has agreed in writing at the time of his admission that his release can be delayed following such notice for a period to be specified in the agreement, provided that such period shall not exceed 72 hours. “(b) If the person is under the age of 14, his parent, legal guardian, or person standing in loco parentis may effect his release. If any responsible party believes that it would be in the best interest of a person under 14 years of age in voluntary treatment to be withdrawn therefrom or afforded treatment constituting a less restrictive alternative, such party may file a petition in the Juvenile Division of the court of common pleas for the county in which the person under 14 years of age resides, requesting a withdrawal from or modification of treatment. The court shall promptly appoint an attorney for such minor person and schedule a hearing to determine what inpatient treatment, if any, is in the minor’s best interest. The hearing shall be held within ten days of receipt of the petition, unless continued upon the request of the attorney for such minor. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the rules governing other Juvenile Court proceedings. “(c) Nothing in this act shall be construed to require a facility to continue inpatient treatment where the director of the facility determines such treatment is not medically indicated. Any dispute between a facility and a county administrator as to the medical necessity for voluntary inpatient treatment of a person shall be decided by the Commissioner of Mental Health or his designate.” (Footnote omitted.) The following notations are found in various medical records and evaluations in the record: (a) appellee Bartley, “Admission Note: Organic Brain Syndrome with epilepsy” (App. 137a); (b) appellee Gentile, “Schizophrenia” (id., at 145a); appellee Levine, “functioning within the average range of intelligence” (id., at 167a); appellee Weand, “dull normal range of intelligence” (id., at 169a); appellee Mathews, “functioning on a lower average range of intelligence, giving evidence of bright, normal and even superior learning capacities” (id., at 175a). Given our view that the Act moots the claims of the named appellees, we need not address the issue of whether the promulgation of the new regulations had previously mooted their claims. Mr. Justice Brennan suggests that none of this is relevant to our adjudication of the case. Post, at 140-142. Implicit in this suggestion is the conclusion that in the present posture of this case certification of a class represented by these named plaintiffs would be acceptable. This approach disregards the prerequisites to class actions contained in Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (a), see n. 14, infra, and pushed to its logical conclusions would do away with the standing requirement of Art. III. See, e. g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 33 (1962) (parties may not “represent a class of whom they are not a part”); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 216 (1974) (class representative must “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as members of class). Mr. Justice Brennan, post, at 142, seeks to minimize the extent of the changes in the law by asserting that only 20% of the plaintiff class is affected by the new Act. Even if this assertion were undisputed, it would not affect our disposition of the case. But we have no way to test the reliability of that figure. Before the new Act was passed, the distinction between mentally ill and mentally retarded was largely irrelevant for admissions purposes; hence the District Court made no findings with respect to the proportion of the class in each category, and the dissent does not indicate any support in the record for this figure, which first appears in the Reply Brief for Appellants 1 n. 2. Since this information was supplied by a party seeking a determination on the merits, it cannot be treated as a form of “admission against interest” by a litigant on appeal. In addition, the suggestion that 80% of the class remains in statu quo ante completely overlooks the substantial changes wrought by the regulations, which classified on the basis of age, rather than on the basis of mental illness or mental retardation. Rule 23 (a) provides: “(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Mr. Justice Brennan suggests that our refusal to review the merits of these claims, and our vacation of the District Court’s judgment, are simply a confusing and unnecessary exaltation of form over substance. While our refusal to pass on the merits rests on discretionary considerations, we have long heeded such discretionary counsel in constitutional litigation. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The dissent’s startling statement that our insistence on plaintiffs with live claims is “purely a matter of form,” post, at 142, would read into the Constitution a vastly expanded version of Rule 23 while reading Art. Ill out of the Constitution. The availability of thoroughly prepared attorneys to argue both sides of a constitutional question, and of numerous amici curiae ready to assist in the decisional process, even though all of them “stand like greyhounds in the slips, straining upon the start,” does not dispense with the requirement that there be a live dispute between “live” parties before we decide such a question. The dissent, post, at 137, attaches great weight to the fact that the State argues that the case is not moot. As we have pointed out in the text, infra, at 136, the fact that the parties desire a decision on the merits does not automatically entitle them to receive such a decision. It is not at all unusual for all parties in a case to desire an adjudication on the merits when the alternative is additional litigation; but their desires can be scarcely thought to dictate the result of our inquiry into whether the merits should be reached. The dissent’s additional reliance on the “numerous amici [who have requested] an authoritative constitutional ruling . . .” post, at 140, overlooks the fact that briefs for no fewer than eight of these amici argue that the case is moot or suggest that the case be remanded for consideration of the intervening legislation. Upon promulgation of the regulations, the named appellees received, inter alia, the right to institute a “section 406” involuntary commitment proceeding in court within two business days. Under § 406, a judicial hearing is held after notice to the parties; counsel is provided for in digents. It is this right to a hearing that was the gravamen of appellees’ complaint. App. 21a-23a (complaint ¶46).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. RELIANCE FUEL OIL CORP. No. 88. Argued December 3, 1962. — Decided January 7, 1963. Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Stuart Rothman, Dominick L. Manoli, Norton J. Come and Solomon I. Hirsh. Samuel H. Borenkind argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Frank J. Mercurio. Per Curiam. The Reliance Fuel Oil Corporation, respondent herein, was found by the National Labor Relations Board to have committed certain unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. Jurisdiction before the Board was predicated upon the fact that Reliance, a New York distributor of fuel oil whose operations were local, purchased within the State a “substantial amount” of fuel oil and related products from the Gulf Oil Corporation, a supplier concededly engaged in interstate commerce. Most of the products sold to Reliance by Gulf were delivered to Gulf from without the State of New York and prior to sale and delivery to Reliance were stored, without segregation as to customer, in Gulf’s tanks located within the State. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959, Reliance had gross sales in excess of $500,000 and, during the calendar year 1959, it purchased in excess of $650,000 worth of fuel oil and related products from Gulf. The Board adopted its trial examiner’s findings that the operations of Reliance “affected” commerce within the meaning of the Act and that the unfair labor practices found tended “to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce ...” 129 N. L. R. B. 1166, 1171, 1182. The Court of Appeals reversed, 297 F. 2d 94, because, in its view, the record before the Board did not adequately demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the Board so that it might “take further evidence and make further findings on the manner in which a labor dispute at Reliance affects or tends to affect commerce.” The only issue before this Court is whether on the record before it the Board properly found that it had jurisdiction to enter an order against Reliance; the substantive findings as to the existence of the unfair labor practices are not here in dispute. Under § 10 (a) of the Act, the Board is empowered “to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce.” Section 2 (6) defines “commerce” to mean “trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the . . . States . . and § 2 (7) declares: “The term 'affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.” This Court has consistently declared that in passing the National Labor Relations Act, Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause. See, e. g., Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U. S. 1, 3; Polish Alliance v. Labor Board, 322 U. S. 643, 647-648; Labor Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 607. Compare Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 480. The Act establishes a framework within which the Board is to determine “whether proscribed practices would in particular situations adversely affect commerce when judged by the full reach of the constitutional power of Congress. Whether or no practices may be deemed by Congress to affect interstate commerce is not to be determined by confining judgment to the quantitative effect of the activities immediately before the Board. Appropriate for judgment is the fact that the immediate situation is representative of many others throughout the country, the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in its harm to commerce.” Polish Alliance v. Labor Board, 322 U. S., at 648. See also Labor Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S., at 607-608. That activities such as those of Reliance affect commerce and are within the constitutional reach of Congress is beyond doubt. See, e. g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111. Through the National Labor Relations Act, “. . . Congress has explicitly regulated not merely transactions or goods in interstate commerce but activities which in isolation might be deemed to be merely local but in the interlacings of business across state lines adversely affect such commerce.” Polish Alliance v. Labor Board, 322 U. S., at 648. This being so, the jurisdictional test is met here: the Board properly found that by virtue of Reliance’s purchases from Gulf, Reliance’s operations and the related unfair labor practices “affected” commerce, within the meaning of the Act. The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly must be and is reversed. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result. In 1969 Reliance purchased a few hundred dollars worth of truck parts in New Jersey, but the Board did not rely on such transactions to sustain its assertion of jurisdiction. Since the Board apparently treated Reliance as a “retail” concern, this amount of gross sales met its self-imposed standard for exercise of jurisdiction. 129 N. L. R. B. 1166, 1170-1171.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DEFERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS et al. v. NORRIS No. 82-52. Argued March 28, 1983 — Decided July 6, 1983 John L. Endicott, Special Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General, and John L. Jones, Assistant Attorney General. Amy Jo Gittler argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Neal J. Beets Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Jim Smith, Attorney General, and Mitchell D. Franks, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Florida; by Harry L. Dubrin, Jr., for the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System; by Erwin N. Griswold, Jack H. Blaine, and Edward J. Zimmerman for the American Council of Life Insurance; by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Monte B. Lake for the Equal Employment Advisory Council; by William R. Glendon, James B. Weidner, and James W. Paul for the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association et al.; and by Spencer L. Kimball for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Lawrence White, Woodley B. Osborne, Joy L, Koletsky, Ralph S. Spritzer, and John L. Pottenger, Jr., for the American Association of University Professors et al.; by Mary L. Heen, Burt Neubome, Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Joan E. Bertin, and Charles S. Sims for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by J. Albert Woll, Marsha Berzon, Laurence Gold, and Winn Newman for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.; by Jonathan R. Harkavy, Edward W. Kriss, and Nahomi Harkavy for the American Nurses’ Association; by Richard C. Dinkelspiel, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, Norman J. Chachkin, Beatrice Rosenberg, Richard T. Seymour, Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, and Barry L. Goldstein for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al.; and by Robert A. Jablon and Ron M. Landsman for the National Insurance Consumer Organization. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Lawrence J. Latto, Stephen J. Hadley, and William D. Hager for the American Academy of Actuaries; and by Terry Rose Saunders for Eight Individual Actuaries. Per Curiam. Petitioners in this case administer a deferred compensation plan for employees of the State of Arizona. The respondent class consists of all female employees who are enrolled in the plan or will enroll in the plan in the future. Certiorari was granted to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), prohibits an employer from offering its employees the option of receiving retirement benefits from one of several companies selected by the employer, all of which pay lower monthly retirement benefits to a woman than to a man who has made the same contributions; and whether, if so, the relief awarded by the District Court was proper. 459 U. S. 904 (1982). The Court holds that this practice does constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits derived from contributions made after the decision today must be calculated without regard to the sex of the beneficiary. This position is expressed in Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of Justice Marshall, post, at this page and 1076-1091, which are joined by Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Stevens, and Justice O’Connor. The Court further holds that benefits derived from contributions made prior to this decision may be calculated as provided by the existing terms of the Arizona plan. This position is expressed in Part III of the opinion of Justice Powell, post, at 1105, which is joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to issue the judgment August 1, 1983. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COLE, STATE HOSPITAL SUPERINTENDENT, et al. v. RICHARDSON No. 70-14. Argued November 16, 1971 Decided April 18, 1972 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, and BlachmuN, JJ., joined. Stewart and White, JJ., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 687. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 687. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN, J., joined, post, p. 691. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Walter H. Mayo III, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General. Stephen H. Oleskey argued the cause for appellee pro hac vice. With him on the brief was Harold Hestnes. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal we review the decision of the three-judge District Court holding a Massachusetts loyalty oath unconstitutional. The appellee, Richardson, was hired as a research sociologist by the Boston State Hospital. Appellant Cole is superintendent of the hospital. Soon after she entered on duty Mrs. Richardson was asked to subscribe to the oath required of all public employees in Massachusetts. The oath is as follows: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.” Mrs. Richardson informed the hospital’s personnel department that she could not take the oath as ordered because of her belief that it was in violation of the United States Constitution. Approximately 10 days later appellant Cole personally informed Mrs. Richardson that under state law she could not continue as an employee of the Boston State Hospital unless she subscribed to the oath. • Again she refused. On November 25, 1968, Mrs. Richardson’s employment was terminated and she was paid through that date. In March 1969 Mrs. Richardson filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The complaint alleged the unconstitutionality of the statute, sought damages and an injunction against its continued enforcement, and prayed for the convocation of a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§2281 and 2284. A three-judge District Court held the oath statute unconstitutional and enjoined the appellants from applying the statute to prohibit Mrs. Richardson from working for Boston State Hospital. The District Court found the attack on the “uphold and defend” clause, the first part of the oath, foreclosed by Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (SDNY 1967), aff’d, 390 U. S. 36 (1968). But it found that the “oppose the overthrow” clause was “fatally vague and unspecific,” and therefore a violation of First Amendment rights. The court granted the requested injunction but denied the claim for damages. Appeals were then brought to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We remanded for consideration of whether the case was moot in light of a suggestion that Mrs. Richardson’s job had been filled in the interim. 397 U. S. 238 (1970). On remand, the District Court concluded that Mrs. Richardson’s position had not been filled and that the hospital stood ready to hire her for the continuing research project except for the problem of the oath. In an unreported opinion dated July 1, 1970, it concluded that the case was not moot and reinstated its earlier judgment. Appellants again appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 403 U. S. 917 (1971). We conclude that the Massachusetts oath is constitutionally permissible, and in light of the prolonged litigation of this case we set forth our reasoning at greater length than previously. A review of the oath cases in this Court will put the instant oath into context. We have made clear that neither federal nor state government may condition employment on taking oaths that impinge on rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments respectively, as for example those relating to political beliefs. Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U. S. 1 (1971); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U. S. 207, 209 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in result). Nor may employment' be conditioned on an oath that one has not engaged, or will not engage, in protected speech activities such as the following: criticizing institutions of government; discussing political doctrine that approves the overthrow of certain forms of government; and supporting candidates for political office. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 (1961). Employment may not be conditioned on an oath denying past, or abjuring future, associational activities within constitutional protection; such protected activities include membership in organizations having illegal purposes unless one knows of the purpose and shares a specific intent to promote the illegal purpose. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952). Thus, last Term in Wadmond the Court sustained inquiry into a bar applicant’s associational activities only because it was narrowly confined to organizations that the individual had known to have the purpose of violent overthrow of the government and whose purpose the individual shared. And, finally, an oath may not be so vague that “ ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, [because such an oath] violates the first essential of due process of law.’ ” Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S., at 287. Concern for vagueness in the oath cases has been especially great because uncertainty as to an oath’s meaning may deter individuals from engaging in constitutionally protected activity conceivably within the scope of the oath. An underlying, seldom articulated concern running throughout these cases is that the oaths under consideration often required individuals to reach back into their past to recall minor, sometimes innocent, activities. They put the government into “the censorial business of investigating, scrutinizing, interpreting, and then penalizing or approving the political viewpoints” and past activities of individuals. Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S., at 192 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Several cases recently decided by the Court stand out among our oath cases because they have upheld the constitutionality of oaths, addressed to the future, promising constitutional support in broad terms. These cases have begun with a recognition that the Constitution itself prescribes comparable oaths in two articles. Article II, § 1, cl. 8, provides that the President shall swear that he will “faithfully execute the Office . . . and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Article VI, cl. 3, provides that all state and federal officers shall be bound by an oath “to support this Constitution.” The oath taken by attorneys as a condition of admission to the Bar of this Court identically provides in part “that I will support the Constitution of the United States”; it also requires the attorney to state that he will “conduct [himself] uprightly, and according to law.” Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116 (1966), involved Georgia’s statutory requirement that state legislators swear to “support the Constitution of this State and of the United States,” a paraphrase of the constitutionally required oath. The Court there implicitly concluded that the First Amendment did not undercut the validity of the constitutional oath provisions. Although in theory the First Amendment might have invalidated those provisions, approval of the amendment by the same individuals who had included the oaths in the Constitution suggested strongly that they were consistent. The Court’s recognition of this consistency did not involve a departure from its many decisions striking down oaths that infringed First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court read the Georgia oath as calling simply for an acknowledgment of a willingness to abide by “constitutional processes of government.” 385 U. S., at 135. Accord, Knight v. Board of Regents, 390 U. S. 36 (1968) (without opinion). Although disagreeing on other points, in Wadmond, supra, all members of the Court agreed on this point. Mr. Justice Marshall noted there, while dissenting as to other points, “The oath of constitutional support requires an individual assuming public responsibilities to affirm . . . that he will endeavor to perform his public duties lawfully.” 401 U. S., at 192. The Court has further made clear that an oath need not parrot the exact language of the constitutional oaths to be constitutionally proper. Thus in Ohlson v. Phillips, 397 U. S. 317 (1970), we sustained the constitutionality of a state requirement that teachers swear to “uphold” the Constitution. The District Court had concluded that the oath was simply a “ 'recognition that ours is a government of laws and not of men,’ ” and that the oath involved an affirmation of “organic law” and rejection of “the use of force to overthrow the government.” Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (Colo. 1969). The District Court in the instant case properly recognized that the first clause of the Massachusetts oath, in which the individual swears to “uphold and defend” the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth, is indistinguishable from the oaths this Court has recently approved. Yet the District Court applied a highly literalistic approach to the second clause to strike it down. We view the second clause of the oath as essentially the same as the first. The second clause of the oath contains a promise to “oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.” The District Court sought to give a dictionary meaning to this language and found “oppose” to raise the specter of vague, undefinable responsibilities actively to combat a potential overthrow of the government. That reading of the oath understandably troubled the court because of what it saw as vagueness in terms of what threats would constitute sufficient danger of overthrow to require the oath giver to actively oppose overthrow, and exactly what actions he would have to take in that respect. Cf. Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp., at 1154 and n. 4. But such a literal approach to the second clause is inconsistent with the Court’s approach to the “support” oaths. One could make a literal argument that “support” involves nebulous, undefined responsibilities for action in some hypothetical situations. As Mr. Justice Harlan noted in his opinion concurring in the result on our earlier consideration of this case, “[A]lmost any word or phrase may be rendered vague and ambiguous by dissection with a semantic scalpel. . . . [But such an approach] amounts to little more than verbal calisthenics. Cf. S. Chase, The Tyranny of Words (1959); W. Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity (1955).” Cole v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 238, 240 (1970). We have rejected such rigidly literal notions and recognized that the purpose leading legislatures to enact such oaths, just as the purpose leading the Framers of our Constitution to include the two explicit constitutional oaths, was not to create specific responsibilities but to assure that those in positions of public trust were willing to commit themselves to live by the constitutional processes of our system, as Mr. Justice Marshall suggested in Wadmond, 401 U. S., at 192. Here the second clause does not require specific action in some hypothetical or actual situation. Plainly “force, violence or . . . any illegal or unconstitutional method” modifies “overthrow” and does not commit the oath taker to meet force with force. Just as the connotatively active word “support” has been interpreted to mean simply a commitment to abide by our constitutional system, the second clause of this oath is merely oriented to the negative implication of this notion; it is a commitment not to use illegal and constitutionally unprotected force to change the constitutional system. The second clause does not expand the obligation of the first; it simply makes clear the application of the first clause to a particular issue. Such repetition, whether for emphasis or cadence, seems to be the wont of authors of oaths. That the second clause may be redundant is no ground to strike it down ; we are not charged with correcting grammar but with enforcing a constitution. The purpose of the oath is clear on its face. We cannot presume that the Massachusetts Legislature intended by its use of such general terms as “uphold,” “defend,” and “oppose” to impose obligations of specific, positive action on oath takers. Any such construction would raise serious questions whether the oath was so vague as to amount to a denial of due process. Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S., at 287. Nor is the oath as interpreted void for vagueness. As Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out in his opinion on our earlier consideration of this case, the oath is “no more than an amenity.” 397 U. S., at 240. It is punishable only by a prosecution for perjury and, since perjury is a knowing and willful falsehood, the constitutional vice of punishment without .fair warning cannot occur here. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 413 (1950). Nor here is there any problem of the punishment inflicted by mere prosecution. See Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S., at 284. There has been no prosecution under this statute since its 1948 enactment, and there is no indication that prosecutions have been planned or begun. The oath “triggered no serious possibility of prosecution” by the Commonwealth. Cole v. Richardson, 397 U. S., at 241. Were we confronted with a record of actual prosecutions or harassment through threatened prosecutions, we might be faced with a different question. Those who view the Massachusetts oath in terms of an endless “parade of horribles” would do well to bear in mind that many of the hazards of human existence that can be imagined are circumscribed by the classic observation of Mr. Justice Holmes, when confronted with the prophecy of dire consequences of certain judicial action, that it would not occur “while this Court sits.” Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (dissenting). Appellee mounts an additional attack on the Massachusetts oath program in that it does not provide for a hearing prior to the determination not to hire the individual based on the refusal to subscribe to the oath. All of the cases in this Court that require a hearing before discharge for failure to take an oath involved impermissible oaths. In Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956) (not an oath case), the State sought to dismiss a professor for claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege in a United States Senate committee hearing; the Court held the State’s action invalid because the exercise of the privilege was a constitutional right from which the State could not draw any rational inference of disloyalty. Appellee relies on Nostrand v. Little, 362 U. S. 474 (1960), and Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U. S. 207 (1971), but in those cases the Court held, only that the mere refusal to take the particular oath was not a constitutionally permissible basis for termination. In the circumstances of those cases, only by holding a hearing, showing evidence of disloyalty, and allowing the employee an opportunity to respond might the State develop a permissible basis for concluding that the employee was to be discharged. Since there is no constitutionally protected right to overthrow a government by force, violence, or illegal or unconstitutional means, no constitutional right is infringed by an oath to abide by the constitutional system in the future. Therefore, there is no requirement that one who refuses to take the Massachusetts oath be granted a hearing for the determination of some other fact before being discharged. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The full text of the two relevant statutes is as follows: Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 264, § 14. Oath or affirmation; form; filing; exemptions “Every person entering the employ of the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, shall'take and subscribe to, under the pains and penalty of perjury, the following oath or affirmation:— “ T do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.’ "Such oath or affirmation shall be filed by the subscriber, if he shall be employed by the state, with the secretary of the commonwealth, if an employee of a county, with the county commissioners, and if an employe of a city or town, with the city clerk or the town clerk, as the case may be. “The oath or affirmation prescribed by this section shall not be required of any person who is employed by the commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof as a physician or nurse in a hospital or other health care institution and is a citizen of a foreign country.” C. 264, § 15. Violation of section 14; penalty “Violation of section fourteen shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.” Richardson v. Cole, 300 F. Supp. 1321 (Mass. 1969). The District Court interpreted Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 264, § 15, which punishes a "[violation of section fourteen,” see n. 1, supra, as “presumably” punishing “a failure to ‘live up’ to the oath.” We see no basis for this interpretation. The clear purpose of § 15 is to punish the failure to comply with the directive aspects of § 14, which requires that every person entering the employ of the Commonwealth subscribe to the oath and file it with a certain state employee. Section 14, which includes the oath, says that it is taken upon the penalty of perjury but mentions nothing about a continuing criminal responsibility to “live up” to it. The time may come when the value of oaths in routine public employment will be thought not “worth the candle” for all the division of opinion they engender. However, while oaths are required by legislative acts it is not our function to evaluate their wisdom or utility but only to decide whether they offend the Constitution.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SWARB et al. v. LENNOX et al. No. 70-6. Argued November 9, 1971 Decided February 24, 1972 BlacKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, Stewart, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 202. Douglas, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 203. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. David A. Scholl argued the cause for appellants pro hac vice. With him on the briefs was Harvey N. Schmidt. Philip C. Patterson argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for appellees Middle Atlantic Finance Assn, et al. was Marvin Comisky. J. Shane Creamer, Attorney General, and Barry A. Roth, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for appellee the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. William L. Matz argued the cause for the Pennsylvania Savings & Loan League as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief was Herbert Bass. Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed by Don B. Kates, Jr., Martin R. Click, and Carol Ruth Silver for California Rural Legal Assistance et al.; by John J. Brennan and Cordon W. Gerber for the Pennsylvania Bankers Assn.; by David M. Jones for the Pennsylvania Credit Union League; and by Edward Donald Foster and Blair C. Shick for the National Consumer Law Center. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Matthew Hale for the American Bankers Assn., and by Gilbert Nurick and Moses K. Rosenberg for the Pennsylvania Land Title Assn. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal, heard as a companion to D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., ante, p. 174, decided today, also purports to raise for the Court the issue of the due process validity of cognovit provisions. The system under challenge in this case is that of Pennsylvania. The three-judge District Court, with one judge dissenting in part because, in his view, the court did not go far enough, refrained from declaring the Commonwealth’s rules and statutes unconstitutional on their face and granted declaratory and injunctive relief only for a limited class of cognovit signers. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (ED Pa. 1970). The plaintiffs, but not the defendants, appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction the same day certiorari was granted in Overmyer. 401 U. S. 991. I The cognovit system is firmly entrenched in Pennsylvania and has long been in effect there. A confession of judgment for money “may be entered by the prothonotary . . . without the agency of an attorney and without the fifing of a complaint, declaration or confession, for the amount which may appear to be due from the face of the instrument,” Pa. Rule Civ. Proc. 2951 (a), except that the action must be instituted by a complaint if the instrument is more than 10 years old or cannot be produced for filing, “or if it requires the occurrence of a default or condition precedent before judgment may be entered.” Rules 2951 (c) and (d). In an action instituted by a complaint, the plaintiff shall file a confession of judgment substantially in a prescribed form, and the attorney for the plaintiff “may sign the confession as attorney for the defendant” unless a statute or the instrument provides otherwise. Rule 2955. The prothonotary enters judgment “in conformity with the confession.” Rule 2956. The amount due, interest, attorneys' fees, and costs may be included by the plaintiff in the praecipe for a writ of execution. Rule 2957. Within 20 days after the entry of judgment the plaintiff shall mail the defendant written notice. Failure to do this, however, does not affect the judgment lien. Rule 2958 (a). Within the same 20 days the plaintiff may issue a writ of execution and may do so even if the notice is not yet mailed. Rule 2958 (b). If an affidavit of mailing is not filed within the 20-day period, the writ of execution may not issue until 20 days after the affidavit of mailing has been filed. Rule 2958 (c). Relief from a judgment by confession may be sought by a petition asserting “[a] 11 grounds for relief whether to strike off the judgment or to open it . . . .” Rule 2959 (a). If the petition states prima facie grounds for relief, the court issues a rule to show cause and may grant a stay. A defendant “waives all defenses and objections” not included in the petition. The court “shall dispose of the rule on petition and answer, and on any testimony, depositions, admissions and other evidence.” Rules 2959 (b), (c), and (e). If the judgment is opened in whole or in part, the issues are then tried. Rule 2960. The procedure for confession of judgment for possession of real property is essentially the same except that the action shall be commenced by filing a complaint. Rules 2970-2973. The prothonotary specifically is given power to “enter judgments at the instance of plaintiffs, upon the confessions of defendants.” Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 1482. The prothonotary is the clerk of the court of common pleas. He has no judicial function. It has been said that his power is derived from the instrument under which he acts and not from his office, Smith v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Pa. Super. 83, 87, 239 A. 2d 824, 826 (1968), and that his entry of judgment is a ministerial act, Lenson v. Sandler, 430 Pa. 193, 197, 241 A. 2d 66, 68 (1968). It has also been said that the confession of judgment procedure in Pennsylvania exists “independent of statute.” Equipment Corp. of America v. Primos Vanadium Co., 285 Pa. 432, 437, 132 A. 360, 362 (1926); Cook v. Gilbert, 8 Serg. & R. 567, 568 (1822); Hatch v. Stitt, 66 Pa. 264 (1870). It is apparent, therefore, that in Pennsylvania confession-of-judgment provisions are given full procedural effect; that the plaintiff’s attorney himself may effectuate the entire procedure; that the prothonotary, a nonjudicial officer, is the official utilized; that notice issues after the judgment is entered; and that execution upon the confessed judgment may be taken forthwith. The defendant may seek relief by way of a petition to strike the judgment or to open it, but he must assert prima facie grounds for this relief, and he achieves a trial only if he persuades the court to open. Meanwhile, the judgment and its lien remain. The pervasive and drastic character of the Pennsylvania system has been noted. Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4-5, 97 A. 2d 234, 236 (1953). See Kine v. Forman, 404 Pa. 301, 172 A. 2d 164 (1961), and Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N. Y. 2d 219, 250 N. E. 2d 474 (1969). II Seven individuals are the named plaintiffs in the original complaint filed in December 1969. Jurisdiction is based on the civil rights statutes, 28 U. S. C. § 1343 and 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The plaintiffs purport to act on behalf of a class consisting of all Pennsylvania residents who have signed documents containing cognovit provisions leading, or that could lead, to a confessed judgment in Philadelphia County. The defendants are the county’s prothonotary and sheriff, the officials responsible, respectively, for the recording of confessed judgments and for executing upon them. The complaint alleges that each plaintiff has signed one or another type of consumer financing agreement pursuant to which his creditor has entered judgment; that each faces immediate judicial sale of his home or personal belongings; that the Pennsylvania rules and statutes are unconstitutional on their face because they deprive members of the class of procedural due process in the denial of notice and hearing before judgment; that the signing of the cognovit contract was not an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to notice and hearing; that the only recourse against the recorded judgment is an action to strike or reopen; and that such recourse is costly and burdensome to low income consumers, and denies them equal protection. The relief sought is a declaration that the Pennsylvania rules and statutes are unconstitutional, and an injunction against the defendants’ “operating under the above acts and rules.” A three-judge court was requested. The single District Judge entered a temporary restraining order staying execution of judgments against the seven plaintiffs. He also provided a procedure for adding additional plaintiffs. The three-judge court continued and expanded the restraining order to stay all executions upon confessed judgments in the Commonwealth. A number of additional plaintiffs were added, and one original plaintiff was dismissed from the case. A group of finance companies was permitted to intervene. Stipulations were made. One was between counsel for the plaintiffs and the city solicitor; another was between counsel for the plaintiffs and for the intervenor finance companies. These stipulations are not identical but they do overlap. They established the following: 1. Judgments by confession against the various plaintiffs had been entered ranging in amounts from $249.23 to $25,800. 2. If called as witnesses, the original plaintiffs would testify to the facts alleged in the complaint. Each would also testify as to his unawareness of the cognovit clause, his lack of understanding of its significance if he had read it, and his inability to bargain about it anyway. 3. If called, some of the plaintiffs would testify that they were encouraged not to read their contracts; that the judgments exceeded the debts because of the addition of penalties, costs, and fees; that they could not afford proceedings to strike or reopen; and that they believed they had meritorious defenses. 4. The imposition and amount of sheriff’s costs, bar association fee schedules, and necessary deposition and transcript costs in the cognovit procedure were acknowledged. The three-judge court held a hearing. In addition to the appearance of counsel for the plaintiffs and for the intervenors, an assistant city solicitor of Philadelphia appeared for the named defendants, and a Deputy Attorney General appeared for the Commonwealth. The only plaintiff to testify was one of those added after the complaint had been filed. She was a postal clerk who earned $6,100 annually and who had agreed with a door-to-door salesman to buy a carpet for $1,300. Her contract contained a cognovit clause pursuant to which a finance company had obtained a confessed judgment. A detective and a finance company officer were presented by the plaintiffs. They testified to the pervasiveness of cognovit clauses and the “disbelief and shock” of those who had signed them. The plaintiffs also introduced in evidence by stipulation a published report by David Caplovitz, Ph. D., Consumers in Trouble. This was a 1968 study of confessed-judgment debtors in four major Pennsylvania cities. It included 245 Philadelphia debtors. The study purported to show that 96%' had annual incomes of less than $10,000, and 56% less than $6,000; that only 30%' had graduated from high school; and that only 14% knew the contracts they signed contained cognovit clauses. The only other witness at the hearing was one called by the intervenors. He was a finance company officer and testified as to the usual practice of making loans. The three-judge District Court held: 1. The Pennsylvania-system leading to confessed judgment and execution does comply with due process standards provided “there has been an understanding and voluntary consent of the debtor in signing the document.” 314 F. Supp., at 1095. 2. If, however, there is no such understanding consent, the procedure violates due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Ibid. 3. The plaintiffs did not sustain their burden of proof with respect to the lack of valid consent in the execution of bonds and warrants of attorney accompanying mortgages. Id., at 1098. 4. The record did not establish that the action could be maintained as a class action on behalf of individual natural persons with annual incomes of more than $10,000. Id., at 1098-1099. 5. It could be maintained, however, as a class action on behalf of natural persons residing in Pennsylvania who earn less than $10,000 annually and who signed consumer financing or lease contracts containing cognovit provisions. Id., at 1099. 6. There was no intentional waiver of known rights by members of that class in executing confession-of-judgment clauses. These were the right to have prejudgment notice and hearing, the right to have the burden of proof on the creditor, and the right to avoid the expenses attendant upon opening or striking a confessed judgment. Since the Pennsylvania procedure with respect to the designated class was based upon a waiver concept without adequate understanding, it was violative of due process. Id., at 1100. 7. It was not the federal court’s function to dictate to Pennsylvania “exactly what constitutes understanding waiver.” Ibid. Where the debtor is an attorney, an affidavit to that effect may be all that is necessary to prove understanding, but where the debtor is not a high school graduate more proof “may be required.” Id., at 1101. A “statewide rule or legislation providing for the filing of proof of intentional, understanding and voluntary consent,” in order to comply with the court’s opinion, was among the methods available to the State to permit continued use of the confession-of-judgment clause. Id., at 1100-1101, n. 24. 8. No judgment by confession may be entered as to a member of the recognized class after November 1, 1970, unless it is shown that at the time of executing the document the debtor “intentionally, understandingly, and voluntarily waived” his rights lost under the Pennsylvania law. Id., at 1102-1103. 9. Liens of judgments recorded prior to June 1, 1970 (the date of the filing of the court's opinion), were preserved. A confessed judgment on a contract signed before June 1 could be entered between that date and November 1, but could not be executed upon without a prior hearing to determine the validity of the waiver. The court then declared the Pennsylvania practice of confessing judgments to be unconstitutional, prospectively effective as of the dates stated, as applied to the class designated, and enjoined the entry of any confessed judgment against a member of the class in the absence of a showing of the required waiver. Id., at 1103. The judge dissenting did so as to the limitation of relief to those earning less than $10,000 annually. Id., at 1102. Ill From this judgment only the plaintiffs appeal. Their claim is that the District Court erred in confining the relief it granted to certain members of the appellants’ proffered class and that the court should have declared the Pennsylvania rules and statutes unconstitutional on their face. A holding of facial unconstitutionality, of course, wholly apart from any class consideration, would afford relief to every Pennsylvania cognovit obligor. Today's decision in Overmyer, although it concerns a corporate and not an individual debtor, is adverse to this contention of the plaintiff-appellants. In Overmyer it is recognized, as the District Court in this case recognized, that, under appropriate circumstances, a cognovit debtor may be held effectively and legally to have waived those rights he would possess if the document he signed had contained no cognovit provision. On the plaintiff-appellants’ appeal, therefore, the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed. This affirmance, however, does not mean that the District Court’s opinion and judgment are approved as to their other aspects and details that are not before us. As has been noted, the named defendants and the inter-venors have taken no cross appeal. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s office, apparently due to an interim personnel change, no longer supports the position taken at the trial by the city solicitor and the deputy attorney general and, not choosing to pursue its customarily assumed duty to defend the Commonwealth’s legislation, now joins the appellants in urging here that the rules and statutes are facially invalid. With the Attorney General taking this position, argument on the side of the defendant-appellees has been presented to us only by the intervenor finance companies and by amici. The permissible reach of this opposition, however, coincides with and goes no further than the extent of the appellants’ appeal. In the absence of a cross appeal, the opposition is in no position to attack those portions of the District Court’s judgment that are favorable to the plaintiff-appellants. IV The decision in Overmyer and the disposition of the present appeal prompt the following observations: 1. In our second concluding comment in Overmyer, supra, at 188, we state that the decision is “not controlling precedent for other facts of other cases,” and we refer to contracts of adhesion, to bargaining power disparity, and to the absence of anything received in return for a cognovit provision. When factors of this kind are present, we indicate, “other legal consequences may ensue.” That caveat has possible pertinency for participants in the Pennsylvania system. 2. Overmyer necessarily reveals some discomfiture on our part with respect to the present case. However that may be, the impact and effect of Overmyer upon the Pennsylvania system are not to be delineated in the one-sided appeal in this case and we make no attempt to do so. 3. Problems of this kind are peculiarly appropriate grist for the legislative mill. On the appellants' appeal, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. The stay heretofore granted by the Circuit Justice is dissolved. Is is so ordered. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Pa. Rules Civ. Proc. 2950-2976, effective Jan. 1, 1970 (which, by the Act of June 21, 1937, Pa. Laws 1982, have the effect of state statutes); Act of Apr. 14, 1834, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 1482 III; Act of Feb. 24, 1806, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 739; Act of Mar. 21, 1806, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 738. By Rule 2976, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 739 is suspended “only insofar as it may be inconsistent with these rules,” and Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 738 is suspended in its application to actions to confess judgment for money or for possession of real .property. Prior to the effective date of Rules 2950-2976, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 738 provided that it “shall be the duty” of the prothonotary to enter an application and “on confession in writing ... he shall enter judgment . . . .” Compare the result reached with respect to the Delaware system in Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (Del. 1971).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

POWER REACTOR DEVELOPMENT CO. v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, et al. No. 315. Argued April 26-27, 1961. Decided June 12, 1961. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for petitioners in No. 454. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Daniel M. Friedman, Morton Hollander, Neil D. Naiden, Courts Oulahan and Lionel Kestenbaum. W. Graham Claytor, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner in No. 315. With him on the briefs were John Lord O’Brian, David E. McGiffert, Edward S. Reid, Jr. and Richard B. Gushee. Benjamin C. Sigal argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Harold Cranefield and Lowell Goerlich. R. M. Stroud filed a brief for Adolph J. Ackerman, as amicus curiae. Together with No. 454, United States et al. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, et al., also on certiorari to the same Court. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is the first contested licensing proceeding to be decided by the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq. It presents the question whether the Commission erred in continuing in effect a provisional construction permit which authorizes the petitioner Power Reactor Development Company to construct, but not to operate, a fast-neutron breeder reactor for the generation of electric power. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set that order aside. 108 U. S. App. D. C. 97, 280 F. 2d 645 (1960). We granted certiorari, 364 U. S. 889 (1960), on petitions of the United States and of Power Reactor Development Company (hereafter PRDC), to decide an important question of the scope of the Commission’s power under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Stated more precisely, the question before us is whether the Commission, in issuing a permit for the construction of a facility which will utilize nuclear materials, such as the power reactor presently involved, must make the same definitive finding of safety of operation as it admittedly will have to make before it licenses actual operation of the facility. The Court of Appeals said: “It is undisputed that the Commission must make such a finding when it authorizes operation. The question is whether it must make such a finding when it authorizes construction. In our opinion it must.” 108 U. S. App. D. C., at 100, 280 F. 2d, at 648. Petitioners agree that some finding directed to safety of operation must be made at the construction-permit stage of the proceeding, but argue that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Commission must have the same degree of certitude at this preliminary point as when it licenses operation. In order to understand how the controversy arises and what is involved in its resolution, it will be necessary to state the proceedings in the case at some length, and then describe in detail the governing statute and administrative regulations. For the decision of this case ultimately turns on a comparison of what the Commission found with what the statute and regulations require. The case began on January 7, 1956, when PRDC filed with the Commission (hereafter sometimes referred to as the AEC) an application to construct and operate a developmental power reactor of a relatively new type. This device has two characteristics which distinguish it from other nuclear reactors. First, the neutrons which fly about inside the reactor (to use crude but graphic layman’s terminology) and split atoms of fissionable Uranium-235 — thus releasing new neutrons and energy in the form of heat — are “fast” neutrons. That is, they travel at a velocity of about 10,000 miles per second, much faster than neutrons in ordinary reactors. Second, this réactor is a “breeder”: it has the property of being able to produce about 1.2 times as much fissionable material as it consumes. This result comes about through a sort of modern alchemy; when the neutrons fly outside the inner core of the reactor, which is composed of fissionable U-235, they enter a blanket of nonfissionable U-238. Atoms in this blanket are changed, when struck by a neutron, into Plutonium, itself a fissionable fuel which can be removed from the reactor and be put to possible use in other installations. Thus, the reactor “breeds” Plutonium faster than it uses up U-235. It not only generates energy to produce electric power, it also creates new reactor fuel. This “breeder” effect is attainable because of the use of fast neutrons. Two boron control rods inserted into the reactor are a means designed to reduce its power level at any time. And in addition to these rods, eight more boron rods are suspended by an electromagnet over the reactor; in case the reactivity rises to a dangerously high level, these safety rods are intended to drop into the reactor automatically and shut it down immediately. The whole machine is housed in a series of thick concrete, graphite, and steel layers, all underground. Over this entire complex is placed a football-shaped building, enclosed in a two-inch steel shield capable of containing an explosion equal in force to 1,000 pounds of TNT, which is greater than any explosion which any of the experts who testified in this case believes is at all likely to result from an accident in the operation of the reactor. The application, after describing the reactor in much greater detail than this rudimentary summary, went on to provide that the reactor would be located at Lagoona Beach, Mich., on the shores of Lake Erie, about 35 miles from the center of Detroit, Mich., and about 30 miles from the center of Toledo, Ohio. The Commission took the case under advisement and, on August 4, 1956, despite a report of its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards which was at best noncommittal about the probable safety of the proposed reactor in operation, issued a provisional construction permit without having held public hearings, as the law at that time permitted it to do. This permit was subject to the following condition: “The conversion of this permit to a license is subject to submittal by PRDC to the Commission (by amendment of the application) of the complete, final Hazards Summary Report (portions of which may be submitted and evaluated from time to time). The final Hazards Summary Report must show that the final design provides Reasonable assurance . . . that the health and safety''of the public will not be endangered by operation of the reactor On August 31, 1956, in accordance with the Commission’s then existing rules of practice, the respondents in this Court, International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, and United Papermakers and Paperworkers, petitioned the Commission for permission to intervene and oppose continuation in effect of PRDC’s provisional construction permit. The AEC granted permission to intervene on October 8, 1956, and set the case down for a hearing before one of its hearing examiners. Extensive hearings were held between January 8, 1957, and August 7, 1957, and on November 22, 1957, in accordance with the AEC’s order setting the case for hearing before him, the examiner, instead of issuing an initial decision and opinion of his own, transferred and certified the record of the hearings to the full Commission for its consideration. Oral argument was had before the Commission on May 29, 1958. On December 10, 1958, the Commission rendered its “Opinion and Initial Decision” continuing PRDC’s permit in effect, subject to the same condition recited above. To its opinion were appended extensive findings of fact, including Finding 22, which is of central importance to the decision of this case. That finding reads as follows: “22. The Commission finds reasonable assurance in the record that a utilization facility of the general type proposed in the PRDC application and amendments thereto can be constructed and will be able to be operated at the location proposed without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.” Commissioners Vance and Floberg joined in the opinion. Commissioner Graham filed a short concurring opinion agreeing with the Commission’s basic safety findings, just quoted, but doing so in much shorter compass than the majority. Commissioners Libby and McCone (the chairman) took no part in the decision. The result of this initial opinion was an order continuing PRDC’s provisional construction permit in effect, but containing the same condition which the original permit, issued on August 4, 1956, had contained. The intervening unions, as was their right, filed detailed exceptions to this initial decision. The Commission fully reconsidered all the contentions and reviewed the evidence presented at the lengthy hearings, with particular attention to the testimony of the scientific experts, several of them members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, who had testified. On May 26,1959, the Commission issued its “Opinion and Final Decision,” dealing with all questions presented in even greater detail and reaffirming its initial decision. The Commission emphasized that “public safety is the first, last, and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or a license to operate a nuclear facility.” Even after operation of the reactor is licensed — if it ever is — the Commission, it said, will retain jurisdiction over PRDC’s activities to ensure that the highest safety standards are maintained. The opinion went on to examine the suitability of the proposed site, noted that it was near a great population center, and nevertheless concluded that at the present stage there was reasonable assurance that the general type of reactor proposed by PRDC would be safe enough at that location. The Commission pointed out, however, that its action in allowing PRDC to proceed with construction was by its nature tentative and preliminary, and that it was by no means committed to the issuance of an operating license. “PRDC has been on notice since before the first shovel of dirt was moved,” it said, “that its construction permit is provisional upon further demonstration of many technological and financial facts, including the complete safety of the reactor.” A more severe safety test would have to be passed when the reactor was completed, the opinion said, since “[t]he degree of ‘reasonable assurance’. . . that satisfies us . . . for purposes of the provisional construction permit would not be the same as we would require in considering the issuance of the operating license.” The Commission then made new findings of fact, including the following counterpart of its initial Finding 22: “22. The Commission finds reasonable assurance in the record, for the purposes of this provisional construction permit, that a utilization facility of the general type proposed in the PRDC Application and amendments thereto can be constructed and operated at the location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.” All three of the Commissioners who took part in the case joined in this final decision, and the Commission entered its final order continuing in effect the PRDC provisional construction permit, but again subject to the condition that a more extensive safety investigation, and a definitive safety finding, would have to be made before operation was permitted. The intervening unions, respondents in this Court, then petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review and set aside this order of the Commission. Only the final order continuing the permit in effect was drawn in question. No complaint was made of the original ex parte grant of the permit in 1956. PRDC intervened in the Court of Appeals in support of the AEC. On June 10, 1960, by a divided vote, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals set aside the AEC’s order and remanded the case to the Commission. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, two judges dissenting, and we brought the case here. We turn now to an examination of the statutes and regulations pursuant to which the Commission purported to continue in effect PRDC’s construction permit. The basic provision is § 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U. S. C. § 2134 (b), which authorizes the AEC to “issue licenses to persons applying therefor for utilization and production facilities involved in the conduct of research and development activities .... In issuing licenses under this subsection, the Commission shall impose the minimum amount of such regulations and terms of license as will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations under this chapter to promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public . . . .” Two things about this section should be emphasized. First, there is no doubt that the term “licenses” as used therein includes the provisional construction permit which PRDC has received. The last sentence of § 185, 42 U. S. C. § 2235, expressly so provides, as we shall soon see. And second, there is also no doubt that construction permits, like all other licenses, can be issued only consistently with the health and safety of the public. But the responsibility for safeguarding that health and safety belongs under the statute to the Commission. And § 104b, especially when read in connection with the general rule-making power conferred by § 161i (3), 42 U. S. C. § 2201 (i) (3), clearly contemplates that the Commission shall by regulation set forth what the public safety requires as a prerequisite to the issuance of any license or permit under the Act. The issuance of construction permits is subject to § 185, 42 U. S. C. § 2235. That section provides that “All applicants for licenses to construct or modify production or utilization facilities shall, if the application is otherwise acceptable to the Commission, be initially granted a construction permit. The construction permit shall state the earliest and latest dates for the completion of the construction or modification. Unless the construction or modification of the facility is completed by the completion date, the construction permit shall expire, and all rights thereunder be forfeited, unless upon good cause shown, the Commission extends the completion date. Upon the completion of the construction or modification of the facility, upon the filing of any additional information needed to bring the original application up to date, and upon finding that the facility authorized has been constructed and will operate in conformity with the application as amended and in conformity with the provisions of this chapter and of the rules and regulations of the Commisson, and in the absence of any good cause being shown to the Commission why the granting of a license would not be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the Commission shall thereupon issue a license to the applicant. For all other purposes of this chapter, a construction permit is deemed to be a ‘license.’ ” It is clear from the face of this statute — and all parties agree — that Congress contemplated a step-by-step procedure. First an applicant would have to get a construction permit, then he would have to construct his facility, and then he would have to ask the Commission to grant him a license to operate the facility. This procedure is described in its general outlines in Marks and Trowbridge, Framework for Atomic Industry, 76-77 (1955). See also Green, The Law of Reactor Safety, 12 Yand. L. Rev. 112, 121-127 (1958). The second step of the procedure, the application for and granting of an operating license, is governed by § 182a, 42 U. S. C. § 2232 (a). That provision reads, in pertinent part: “In connection with applications for licenses to operate production or utilization facilities, the applicant shall state such technical specifications . . . and such other information as the Commission may, by rule or regulation, deem necessary in order to enable it to find that the utilization or production of special nuclear material will be in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.” It is clear from this provision that before licensing the operation of PRDC’s reactor, the AEC will have to make a positive finding that operation of the facility will “provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.” What is not clear, and what is at the center of the controversy in this case, is whether the Commission must also have made such a finding when it issued PRDC’s construction permit. There is nothing on the face of either § 182 or f 185 which tells us what safety findings must be made before this preliminary step is taken. We know, however, from § 104b that some such finding must be made. For enlightenment on the nature of this finding, both parties urge us to examine the Commission’s regulations, and accordingly we proceed to do so. The crucial regulation for our purposes is the Commission’s regulation 50.35, 10 CFR § 50.35: “§ 50.35. Extended time for providing technical information. Where, because of the nature of a proposed project, an applicant is not in a position to supply initially all of the technical information otherwise required to complete the application, he shall indicate the reason, the items or kinds of information omitted, and the approximate times when such data will be produced. If the Commission is satisfied that it has information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that a facility of the general type proposed can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public and that the omitted information will be supplied, it may process the application and issue a construction permit on a provisional basis without the omitted information subject to its later production and an evaluation by the Commission that the final design provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.” This regulation, obviously, elaborates upon and describes in fuller detail the step-by-step licensing procedure contemplated by §§ 182 and 185. It states, pursuant to the authority conferred by §§ 104b and 161i (3), what safety findings shall be required at each stage of the proceeding. There is general agreement that the second safety finding referred to, “that the final design provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered,” comports with the requirements of § 182 concerning the issuance of a license to operate. There is also agreement that the regulation’s first required safety finding, “that [the AEC] has information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that a facility of the general type proposed can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public,” is a valid exercise of the rule-making power conferred upon the AEC by statute, and requires that some finding as to safety of operation be made even before a provisional construction permit is granted. The question is whether that first finding must be backed up with as much conviction as to the safety of the final design of the specific reactor in operation as the second, final finding must be. We think the great weight of the argument supports the position taken by PRDC and by the Commission, that Reg. 50.35 permits the Commission to defer a definitive safety finding until operation is actually licensed. The words of the regulation themselves certainly lean strongly in that direction. The first finding is to be made, by definition, on the basis of incomplete information, and concerns only the “general type” of reactor proposed. The second finding is phrased unequivocally in terms of “reasonable assurance,” while the first speaks more tentatively of “information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance.” The Commission, furthermore, had good reason to make this distinction. For nuclear reactors are fast-developing and fast-changing. What is up to date now may not, probably will not, be as acceptable tomorrow. Problems which seem insuperable now may be solved tomorrow, perhaps in the very process of construction itself. We see no reason why we should not accord to the Commission's interpretation of its own regulation and governing statute that respect which is customarily given to a practical administrative construction of a disputed provision. Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake “involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.” Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933). And finally, and perhaps demanding particular weight, this constructtion has time and again been brought to the attention of the Joint Committee of Congress on Atomic Energy, which under § 202 of the Act, 42 TJ. S. C. § 2252, has a special duty during each session of Congress to “conduct hearings in either open or executive session for the purpose of receiving information concerning the development, growth, and state of the atomic energy industry,” and to oversee the operations of the AEC. See, e. g., Hearings on Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 106 (1956); Hearings on Development, etc., 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 119-121 (1958) ; Hearings on Development, etc., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 103-109, 677-678 (1960); Hearings on Development, etc., 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 29-32 (1961); Hearings on Governmental Indemnity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 62-65 (1956); A Study of AEC Procedures and Organization in the Licensing of Reactor Facilities, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 11-14, 100-108 (Joint Comm. Print 1957). No change in this procedure has ever been suggested by the Committee, although it has on occasion been critical of other aspects of the PRDC proceedings not before us. It may often be shaky business to attribute significance to the inaction of Congress, but under these circumstances, and considering especially the peculiar responsibility and place of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the statutory scheme, we think it fair to read this history as a de jacto acquiescence in and ratification of the Commission’s licensing procedure by Congress. Cf., e. g., Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275, 292-294 (1958); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U. S. 354, 360-361 (1941). This same procedure has been used in each of the nine instances in which The Commission has granted a provisional construction permit for a developmental nuclear power reactor, e. g., Yankee Atomic Elec. Co., CPPR-5 (AEC 1957), and we hold that it was properly used in this case. It is plain that the statute and regulations, as so construed and applied, were complied with fully. The Commission did not, as respondents’ argument seems at times to suggest, find merely that the construction of the reactor would present no safety problem. The Commission’s opinion and findings clearly were deeply concerned about the prospective safety of operation of the proposed reactor. Admitting that on the basis of the facts before it it was unable to make a definitive finding of safety, the Commission nevertheless found — and respondents do not deny that the finding was supported by substantial evidence — that it had information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the general type of reactor proposed could be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. Its Finding 22, which we have quoted, was in the very words of Reg. 50.35, except for the insertion of the phrase, “for the purposes of this provisional construction permit.” This phrase was merely declaratory of the nature of the proceeding before the Commission, and in no way denigrated the finding as to safety of operation. Respondents contend nevertheless that their construction of the statute is compelled by the legislative history. Since the Court of Appeals relied heavily on this history, we have studied it carefully. Two incidents are cited in particular. First, the Joint Committee stated in its report on the bill which became the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and which when reported contained §§ 182 and 185 in substantially their present shape, that “[s]ection 185 . . . requires the issuance of a license if the construction is carried out in accordance with the terms of the construction permit.” S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28 (1954). The best we can say about this statement, with all deference, is that it must have been inadvertent. Witnesses who appeared before the Joint Committee at the hearings on the bill had made the very complaint that under the words of the bill as proposed a company might invest large sums in construction of a reactor, and then be denied the right to operate it. This situation, they claimed, was unfair, and would substan-. tially discourage the private investment in the field of atomic power which it was one of thp bill’s major purposes to stimulate. See Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Bill to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I., pp. 113, 119 (statement of Paul W. McQuillen, representing the Dow Chemical-Detroit Edison and Associates atomic power development project, predecessors of PRDC); pp. 226-227 (statement of E. H. Dixon, chairman of the Committee on Atomic Power of the Edison Electric Institute and president of Middle-South Utilities, Inc.); p. 417 (statement of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). In spite of these pleas, however, the bill was unchanged. Industry spokesmen renewed the argument the next year when they sought unsuccessfully to have § 185 amended. Hearings on Development, etc., 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 258, 261 (1955). Even a glance at § 185 suffices to show that issuance of a construction permit does not make automatic the later issuance of a license to operate. For that section sets forth three conditions, in addition to the completion of the construction, which must be met before an operating license is granted: (1) filing of any additional information necessary to bring the application up to date — information which will necessarily in this case include detailed safety data concerning the final design of petitioner’s reactor; (2) a finding that the reactor will operate in accordance with the act and regulations — i. e., that the safety and health of the public will be adequately protected — and with the construction permit itself, which is expressly conditioned upon a full investigation and finding of safety before operation is permitted; and (3) the absence of any good cause why the granting of a license to operate would not be in accordance with the Act — e. g., a showing by respondent unions, who will have full rights to appear and contest the issuance of an operating license, that the reactor may not be reasonably safe. Respondents rely more heavily on another event during the debates on this bill on the floor of the Senate. Senator Humphrey, an opponent of the bill, expressed a desire that it be made clear that “the construction permit is equivalent to a license,” and that “the revised section 182 on license application . . . appl[ies] directly to construction permits.” 100 Cong. Rec. 12014 (July 26,1954). Senator Hickenlooper, floor manager of the bill and the ranking Senate member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, indicated that he agreed with this construction of §§ 182 and 185. Senator Humphrey wanted these matters made clear because he feared that otherwise a construction permit could be easily obtained and substantial investment made in construction, and then the Commission would feel obliged, perhaps under pressure, to issue an operating license in order that this investment should not go to waste. The language used in the exchange between Senators Humphrey and Hickenlooper is susceptible, if read broadly and out of context, of the construction which respondents attribute to it, namely, that no § 185 construction permit may be issued unless the Commission has made the same safety-of-operation finding which it must make under § 182a before allowing actual operation. But the context of the exchange makes it clear that no such implication was intended by the participants. Senator'Humphrey’s statements were made during the consideration of an amendment which he had himself proposed on July 16. This amendment would have ádded the following clause to the end of § 185: “and no construction permit shall be issued by the Commission until after the completion of the procedures established by section 182 for the consideration of applications for licenses under this act.” Upon being assured by Senator Hickenlooper that an earlier amendment which Senator Hickenlooper himself had offered to § 189 took care of the problem, Senator Humphrey withdrew his proposal. This amendment to § 189, which was adopted, was concerned solely with hearings and judicial review. Plainly Senator Humphrey’s concern was not with the substantive safety findings necessary to the issuance of a construction permit, but rather with the procedural safeguards with which that issuance should, in his opinion, be surrounded. The reference to the application of § 182 to construction permits was made not with § 182a in mind — that subsection sets out the substantive safety standard for the issuance of an operating license — but rather with a view to the application of § 182b, about which Senator Humphrey particularly asked Senator Hickenlooper during the exchange on the floor referred to, and which merely provides that notice of a license application must be published and given to any appropriate regulatory agencies, a procedural requirement which was fully satisfied in this case. This interpretation of the meaning of Senator Humphrey’s remarks is borne out by a statement of Representative Holifield, who, together with Representative Price, had dissented from the favorable report of the Joint Committee, precisely because, inter alia, under the bill as reported a construction permit did not have to be preceded by the same procedures as an operating license. See S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 123 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 123 (1954). Representative Price wanted the same amendment added to § 185 which Senator Humphrey proposed, and he characterized this amendment as necessary to ensure “that the same procedural safeguards in the case of licenses be applied to construction permits.” 100 Cong. Rec. 10959 (July 19,1954). We think, therefore, that Senator Humphrey’s statement referred only to procedural prerequisites of construction permits, and had nothing to do with the substantive safety considerations which this case involves. If there were any doubt about this matter, the consistent administrative practice, made known to Congress many times and never disturbed by it, would dictate this conclusion. The Court of Appeals put forward as an alternative basis for its decision the holding that under the law the Commission may not authorize the construction of a reactor near a large population center without “compelling reasons” for doing so, 108 U. S. App. D. C., at 103-104, 280 F. 2d, at 651-652, and that no such reasons had been found by the AEC in this case. It is not clear whether respondents have abandoned that contention in this Court, and it is likewise uncertain whether they ever presented it to the Commission, a step which would ordinarily be a prerequisite to its consideration by the Court of Appeals. In any event, the position is without merit. The statute and regulations say nothing about “compelling reasons.” Of course Congress (and the Commission, too, for that matter) had the problem of safety uppermost in mind, and of course that problem is most acute when a reactor, potentially dangerous, is located near a large city. But the Commission found reasonable assurance, for present purposes, that the reactor could be safely operated at the proposed location, and that is enough to. satisfy the requirements of law. The Commission recognized that the site and all its properties are among the most important ingredients of a finding of safety vel non. It considered the site along with all the other relevant data. There is no warrant in the statute for setting aside the Commission's conclusion. We hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the order of the AEC continuing PRDC's provisional construction permit in effect. We deem it appropriate to add a few words concerning the fears of nuclear disaster which respondents so urgently place before us. The respondents’ argument is tantamount to an insistence that the Commission cannot be counted on, when the time comes to make a definitive safety finding, wholly to exclude the consideration that PRDC will have made an enormous investment. The petitioners concede that the Commission is absolutely denied any authority to consider this investment when acting upon an application for a license for operation. PRDC has been on notice long since that it proceeds with construction at its own risk, and that all its funds may go for naught. With its eyes open, PRDC has willingly accepted that risk, however great. No license to operate may be issued to PRDC until a full hazards report has been filed, until the AEC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards makes a full investigation and public report on safety to the Commission, until the Commission itself, after notice and hearings at which respondents, if they desire, may be heard, has made the safety-of-operation finding required by § 182a and Reg. 50.35, and until the other requirements of § 185 have been met. It may be that an operating license will never be issued. If one is, that will not be the end of the matter. The respondents may have judicial review. Moreover, the Commission’s responsibility for supervision of PRDC continues. For, under Reg. 50.57, 10 CFR § 50.57, operation at full power (100,000 electric kilowatts) will not be permitted until several steps of gradually increasing operation have been successfully mastered, with a full public hearing at each step, and no further advance permitted without the AEC’s being fully satisfied that a step-up will meet the high safety standards imposed by law. This is the multi-step scheme which Congress and the Commission have devised to protect the public health and safety. We hold that the actions of the Commission up to now have been within the Congressional authorization. We cannot assume that the Commission will exceed its powers, or that these many safeguards to protect the public interest will not be fully effective. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the causes are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EAGLES, POST COMMANDING OFFICER, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SAMUELS. No. 59. Argued November 21, 1946. Decided December 23, 1946. Irving S. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath and Robert S. Erdahl. Meyer Kreeger argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Samuels registered under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, and thereafter claimed exemption from military service under § 5 (d) of the Act. That exemption includes not only regular or duly ordained ministers of religion but also “students who are preparing for the ministry in theological or divinity schools recognized as such for more than one year prior” to the Act. He was classified I-A and inducted into the Army. Thereafter he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, seeking release from military custody on the ground that he was entitled to an exemption under § 5 (d) of the Act and that his classification as I-A was unlawful. There was a return and a hearing, and the District Court ordered the writ dismissed. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals, in reliance on United States v. Cain, 149 F. 2d 338, reversed and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to “discharge” Samuels “from military custody, without prejudice to further lawful proceedings under the Selective Service Act.” 151 F. 2d 801, 802. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted in order to resolve the conflict between the decision below and United States v. Hearn, 153 F. 2d 186, in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. First. A question of mootness lies at the threshold of the case presented here. We are advised that after remand of the cause the District Court ordered the release of Samuels and that he was thereupon unconditionally released from military custody. Samuels contends that the case is moot since he'is no longer in custody of the military or of any one else but is free to come and go as he pleases. Under our decisions the case would be moot if the writ of habeas corpus had been denied below and, pending disposition of the petition here, Samuels had received a discharge from the army. Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U. S. 744. And see Weber v. Squier, 315 U. S. 810; Tornello v. Hudspeth, 318 U. S. 792. That situation, like the case of a prisoner who, pending an appeal from denial of a writ of habeas corpus, is granted bail, Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 572-574, would present no existing controversy. Habeas corpus is the means of making a judicial “inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty.” R. S. § 752, 28 U. S. C. § 452. As stated in McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131, 137, “There is no warrant in either the statute or the writ for its use to invoke judicial determination of questions which could not affect the lawfulness of the custody and detention.” If the custody or restraint of liberty is terminated without use of the writ, the case is finished. Different considerations are brought into play if custody is ended through the writ itself. Our rules recognize the beneficent function of the writ, Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 26-27; People v. Jennings, 246 N. Y. 258, 158 N. E. 613, by providing that a prisoner to whom the writ has been granted may, pending appeal, be enlarged on a recognizance. Rule 45. The fact that he has been so enlarged does not render the appeal of the custodian moot. Carr v. Zaja, 283 U. S. 52, 53. In such a case the release is obtained through the assertion of judicial power. It is the propriety of the exercise of that power which is in issue in the appellate court, whether the prisoner is discharged or remanded to custody. Though the writ has been granted and the prisoner released, the appellate court by what it does is not rendering an opinion and issuing an order which cannot affect the litigants in the case before it. Cf. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41, 42, and cases cited. Affirmance makes the prisoner’s release final and unconditional. Reversal undoes what the habeas corpus court did and makes lawful a resumption of the custody. Knewel v. Egan, 268 U. S. 442, 448; Haddox v. Richardson, 168 F. 635; James v. Amrine, 157 Kan. 397, 140 P. 2d 362; State v. Langum, 135 Minn. 320, 160 N. W. 858. Second. On the merits the case involves primarily the use by the Selective Service System in New York City of advisory panels on theological classifications. Under the Act the President is authorized to establish “civilian local boards, civilian appeal boards, and such other agencies, including agencies of appeal, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.” Section 10 (a) (2), 57 Stat. 597, 598, 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. III, § 310 (a) (2). With exceptions not material here, the President is authorized to delegate to the Director of Selective Service any authority vested in him under the Act. Section 10 (b), 57 Stat. 597, 598, 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. III, §310 (b). And the Director may redelegate that authority. Id. The administration of the system in each State is delegated under the regulations to a state director. Sections 603.11, 603.12, 6 Fed. Reg. 6827. In New York City, however, a city director has been appointed who performs within that area the functions of the state director. Section 603.12-1, 8 Fed. Reg. 3514. The city director supervises the local boards and boards of appeal in New York City. He may require a local board to reopen and consider anew the classification of a registrant. Section 626.2 (b), 9 Fed. Reg. 11619, § 626.2-1, 10 Fed. Reg. 9210. He may appeal to a board of appeal any determination of a local board. Section 627.1, 8 Fed. Reg. 16720,10 Fed. Reg. 9210. He may require a board of appeal to reconsider its decision, § 627.61, 8 Fed. Reg. 6017, or appeal from it to the President. Section 628.1,7 Fed. Reg. 10521. It appears that the city director, in aid of these functions, established theological panels. It was thought desirable to give the selective service personnel the benefit of the advice of those familiar with the educational practices of various religious groups so that Selective Service might exercise a more informed judgment in evaluating claims to classifications in IV-D. Accordingly, theological panels were constituted, one of which consisted of prominent laymen and rabbis of the Jewish faith who gave advisory opinions on those who sought a IV-D classification on the grounds that they were either rabbis or students preparing for the ministry in the Jewish religion. The members of the panel were volunteers, as permitted by the regulations. Section 602.2, 6 Fed. Reg. 6826. And pursuant to the regulations each took the oath of office. Section 602.4 (a), 6 Fed. Reg. 6826. Samuels registered under the Act in February, 1942. In May and July, 1942, he filed with his local board questionnaires stating that he had had two years of high school education; that he was a student at the Mesifta Theological Seminary preparing for the rabbinate; that since 1940 his regular occupation was that of a clerk; that for the past two years he had been employed by a textile company; and that the job for which he was best fitted was that of a spiritual leader and a teacher of Hebrew or rabbinical duties. The local board was advised by the seminary that Samuels had attended there since he was six years old, that he had finished the eight-year elementary course and the four-year pre-rabbinical course, that he had been admitted to the rabbinical division in 1937, that he left the school in 1939 to seek employment, that he returned to the evening school in September, 1941, and that he was transferred to the day session in July, 1942, which, as later appeared, was a few days before the school closed for the summer. In August, 1942, the local board classified him IV-D. Section 622.44 (a), 6 Fed. Reg. 6607, 6610. In May, 1944, he was given a physical examination and found acceptable for military service. Thereafter the city director requested that he appear before the theological panel in respect to his claim to a IV-D classification. He appeared before the panel in June, 1944, stating, inter alia, that he expected to graduate from the seminary in 1945, that ill health caused him to leave the school in 1939, that between 1940 and 1942 he worked as a clerk, and that he returned to the seminary as a full-time student at about the time he filed his selective service questionnaire. The panel reported that the seminary which Samuels attended was not preparing men exclusively for the rabbinate, that orthodox tradition encouraged advanced study of the subjects in which students for the ministry were trained, and that students ultimately intending to enter business or a profession or some non-rabbinic activity in the field of religion may be enrolled in the same classes as those preparing for the rabbinate. The panel stated that it therefore seemed essential to determine in each case what the registrant had in mind in pursuing his course of study; that to make that determination the character of the seminary, the sincerity of the registrant’s declared purpose, his demeanor, and the impression as to his candor and honesty should be considered. It concluded that Samuels was not “preparing in good faith for a career of service in the practicing rabbinate.” Its recommendation and the transcript of the hearing before it were sent to the city director who forwarded them to the local board with a request that Samuels’ classification be reopened and with the statement that “while the Local Board should give careful consideration to the recommendation of the advisory panel, the responsibility of determining the registrant’s classification must rest with the Local Board itself, or the appropriate agency of appeal.” The local board reclassified Samuels I-A in August, 1944. He submitted additional evidence and requested a hearing. One was had in September, 1944 and another in October, 1944. There is no showing that the recommendation of the panel or the transcript of the hearing before it was kept from Samuels. They were not marked confidential in the file. The local board, indeed, allowed Samuels to correct alleged inaccuracies in the transcript. The local board ordered him continued in I-A and, on appeal, the board of appeal also classified him as I-A. A few days later Samuels filed additional information with the local board and requested that his classification be reopened. Another hearing was held, Samuels being present. He advised the board that he had appeared of his own volition before a committee representing the Union of Orthodox Rabbis (but not connected with the selective service system) and that the committee concluded he was a student preparing in good faith for the ministry. What facts that committee may have acted upon do not appear. In any event, the local board denied Samuels’ request to reopen the classification by a divided vote; and shortly thereafter he was inducted into the army. Congress made the decisions of the local boards and of the boards of appeal “final,” except as appeals from them may be authorized, § 10 (a) (2), withholding from the courts the customary power of review of administrative action. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114. It is elementary that habeas corpus may not be used as a writ of error. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131; Woolsey v. Best, 299 U. S. 1. The function of habeas corpus is exhausted when it is ascertained that the agency under whose order the petitioner is being held had jurisdiction to act. If the writ is to issue, mere error in the proceeding which resulted in the detention is not sufficient. Tisi v. Tod, supra. Deprivation of petitioner of basic and fundamental procedural safeguards, an assertion of power to act beyond the authority granted the agency, and action without evidence to support its order, are familiar examples of the showing which is necessary. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 149. But it is not enough to show that the decision was wrong, Tisi v. Tod, supra, or that incompetent evidence was admitted and considered. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103. If it cannot be said that there were procedural irregularities of such a nature or magnitude as to render the hearing unfair, Bridges v. Wixon, supra, p. 156, or that there was no evidence to support the order, Vajtauer v. Commissioner, supra, the inquiry is at an end. We do not think that the use of the theological panel per se infected the whole administrative proceeding and rendered it so unfair as to be nugatory. The task of the local boards in evaluating claims to exemption is almost certain to raise perplexing problems, especially in large centers where the status and activities of registrants are not so well known in the community. The local boards will frequently have to make inquiries on their own. And when it comes to exemptions claimed under § 5 (d), the variety of religious faiths and the differing educational practices of the churches or of sects within one faith may create difficult questions for the boards. We agree with the court in United States v. Hearn, supra, p. 188, that advice from well-informed members of the faith in question may “both help and speed just classification.” Congress wrote into the Act a comparable procedure for the handling of claims for exemtion by conscientious objectors. Where such claims are denied by the local board and appealed, they are referred to the Department of Justice for a hearing and an advisory report. Section 5 (g). But the fact that there is no specific statutory provision for the creation of theological panels does not make their use improper. Wise administration may call for the expert advice which they alone can offer. And we see no difference in principle if they are formally constituted and regularly used in lieu of inquiry to members of the particular faith as individual cases arise. The administrative function entrusted to the Selective Service is an enormous one. The Act contemplates an administrative organization highly decentralized so as to operate effectively at the local level. More than the director, local boards, and boards of appeal were authorized. For § 10 (a) (2), as we have noted, authorized the creation of “other agencies” as well. A theological advisory panel, serving solely in an advisory capacity, would seem to be included in that category. The information received by the board from the panel, like information from any other source, must be put in writing in the file so that the registrant may examine it, explain or correct it, or deny it. There is, moreover, no confidential information which can be kept from the registrant under the regulations. With those safeguards a truly expert panel might serve a most useful function without the administrative process being corrupted by any unfair procedure. Distinct questions would be raised if a registrant of one faith were referred to a theological panel on which his faith was not represented. See United States v. Balogh, 157 F. 2d 939. But it has not been shown that such a condition obtained here. The court in United States v. Cain, supra, p. 341, held that though the propriety of the use of a theological panel be assumed, it must be limited by two conditions: the names of the members of the panel must be disclosed to the registrant so that he may be in a position to challenge it; the advice or answers which it gives must be limited to ecclesiastical questions. In the statement which the panel filed in this case the names are not disclosed. But we, do not think that fact rendered the administrative proceedings invalid per se. This is not a case of a registrant being passed upon by a secret group. He appeared before them, saw them face to face, and indeed recognized one of them. There is no showing that Samuels tried to ascertain who the panel members were, either at the time or subsequently, and was denied the information. Though we assume that the regulations require the file to disclose the names and affiliations of the panel members, the mere absence of a formal disclosure is not, without more, so grave an omission as to undermine the whole administrative proceeding. The question is not whether the allegations of the petition are sufficient to justify the grant of the writ or the issuance of a rule to show cause, so that the facts can be ascertained in accord with the procedure outlined in Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275. In this case there was a return to the writ, a full hearing was had, and all evidence offered was received. Samuels had the burden of showing that he was unlawfully detained. Walker v. Johnston, supra. Not every procedural error, but only those so flagrant as to result in an unfair hearing render the proceedings vulnerable in a collateral attack. Tisi v. Tod, supra, p. 133; Bridges v. Wixon, supra, pp. 152-156. On the case Samuels has made out, the most that has been shown is that the use of the theological panel might result in a hearing so unfair as to deprive the administrative proceedings of vitality. Samuels has failed to show that in his case it had that effect. He has therefore failed to sustain the burden of proof which was on him. Secrecy and anonymity are not congenial to our traditions of procedure, nor in keeping with the regulations under this Act. But as we have said, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is limited. We are not sitting in review of action of federal agencies over which we have the power of supervision. Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332. The function of habeas corpus is not to correct a practice but only to ascertain whether the procedure complained of has resulted in an unlawful detention. It is the impact of the procedure on the person seeking the writ that is crucial. Whatever potentialities of abuse a particular procedure may have, the case is at an end if the challenged proceeding cannot be said to have been so corrupted as to have made it unfair. Samuels points to possibilities of abuse. But he fails to establish prejudice in his case. If, as was held in United States v. Cain, supra, the panel must be restricted to answering ecclesiastical questions, Samuels should prevail. For the panel in question not only gave the board information concerning the seminary which Samuels-attended but also rendered an advisory opinion on the bona fides of his claim. The argument for restricting the panel to ecclesiastical questions is based on the thought that it is only on such subjects that the board needs specialized information, while if the board relies on a general advisory opinion of the panel, it is devolving its administrative responsibility. See United States v. Cain, supra, pp. 341-342. It is plain that the local boards and the boards of appeal may not abdicate their duty by delegating to others the responsibility for making classifications. That is their statutory function. Section 10 (a) (2). But no such case is made out in this record. The city director submitted the panel’s report with the admonition that it was advisory only and that it was the board’s responsibility to make the classification. The recommendation of the panel was followed. But Samuels was subsequently given not only one but two hearings before the local board and a hearing before the board of appeal. There is no indication that either board relied solely on the panel’s report or considered itself bound by it. In fact both boards received additional evidence submitted by Samuels and considered it. The record does not bear out the suggestion that either board was a rubber stamp for the panel. Nor do we think that the range of inquiry and recommendation of the panel was too broad. If a panel is truly expert in the field, its expertness is not necessarily limited to knowledge of the theological schools, the course of training, and the educational practices and traditions. Its acquaintance with the ministry of that faith and with the norms of the profession may well give it special insight into the claims of those seeking exemption. To draw the line at questions technically ecclesiastical is to make a distinction which may be wholly arbitrary in terms of the panel’s expertness. A panel might act on irrelevancies; it might usurp the functions of a board. We discover nothing of the kind here. The fact that the board follows the advice of the panel does not necessarily mean that it functions in a subservient way. The fact is that the local board and the board of appeal gave Samuels further hearings and received and considered all evidence submitted. We find no procedural error of such magnitude as to warrant an uprooting of the entire administrative proceeding in this collateral attack upon it. Nor can we say there was no evidence to support the final classification made by the board of appeal. Samuels’ statement that he was best fitted to be a Hebrew school teacher and spiritual leader, the two-year interruption in his education, his return to the day session of the seminary in the month when his selective service questionnaire was returned, and the fact that the seminary in question was apparently not preparing men exclusively for the rabbinate make questionable his claim that he was preparing in good faith for the rabbinate. A registrant might seek a theological school as a refuge for the duration of the war. Congress did not create the exemption in § 5 (d) for him. There was some evidence that this was Samuels’ plan; and that evidence, coupled with his demeanor and attitude, might have seemed more persuasive to the boards than it does in the cold record. Our inquiry is ended when we are unable to say that the board flouted the command of Congress in denying Samuels the exemption. Reversed. 54 Stat. 885, 55 Stat. 211, 621, 845, 56 Stat. 386, 50 U. S. C. App., 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. I, and 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. II, § 301 et seq. Our citations of the Act and the regulations throughout the opinion refer to the provisions applicable at the times relevant here. In that case Mr. Justice Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, said, “It would be intolerable that a custodian adjudged to be at fault, placed by the judgment of the court in the position of a wrongdoer, should automatically, by a mere notice of appeal, prolong the term of imprisonment, and frustrate the operation of the historic writ of liberty.” 246 N. Y. p. 260, 158 N. E. 613. It appears from the briefs in that case that after the writ had issued in the lower court the petitioner had been discharged, pending appeal, on a recognizance. The regulations provide that in classifying a registrant, “Oral information should not be considered unless it is summarized in writing and the summary placed in the registrant’s file. Under no circumstances should the local board rely upon information received by a member personally unless such information is reduced to writing and placed in the registrant’s file.” Section 623.2, 9 Fed. Reg. 437, 10 Fed. Reg. 8541. See § 605.32 (a), 9 Fed. Reg. 9190.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES’ ASSOCIATION et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 130. Decided December 7, 1964. Clarence M. Mulhollarid, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., James L. Highsaw, Jr., William Gi Mahoney. and William H. King for appellants. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Philip B. Heymann, Robert B. Hummel and Elliott Moyer for the United States; Robert W. Ginnane and Leonard S. Goodman for Interstate Commerce Commission; and Hugh B. Cox, W. Graham Claytor, Jr., and Richard S. Arnold for Southern Railway Co. et al., appellees. Per Curiam. This appeal is from a judgment of a three-judge District Court, 226 F. Supp. 521, dismissing appellants’ complaint to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 317 I. C. C. 557, 729, relating to the Southern Railway Company’s acquisition of control through stock, ownership of the Central of Georgia Railway Company. Appellants, representing railway employees, object that under the Commission’s orders, the employees are not protected as provided by §§ 4, 5, and 0 of the Washington Job Protection- Agreement. We agree with the suggestion of the Solicitor General that this case should be remanded to the Interstate Commerce Commission for clarification of its orders insofar as they relate to the agreement. For this reason, the motion of the Interstate Commerce Commission to affirm the judgment of the District Court is denied. The motion of intervenor-appellees Southern Railway Company and Central of Georgia Railway Company to defer consideration of the jurisdictional statement is denied. Appellants’ motion to limit the appeal to questions related to §§ 4, 5, and 9 of' the Washington Job Piocection Agreement is granted. The judgment oí the District Court is vacated insofar as it relates to §§ 4, 5, and 9 of the Washington Agreement, and this case is remanded to that court with instructions to remand it to the Interstate Commerce Commission with instructions to amend its reports and orders as necessary to deal with appellants’ request that § § 4, 5, and 9 be included as protective conditions, specifically indicating why each of these provisions is either omitted or included. See United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499, 511. Vacated and remanded.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BONETTI v. ROGERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. No. 94. Argued April 7, 1958. Decided June 2, 1958. Joseph Forer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was David Rein. Roger Fisher argued the cause for respondents. With him on a brief was Solicitor General Rankin. Beatrice Rosenberg was also on a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a deportation ease. It presents a narrow and vexing problem of statutory construction. The principal question here is which, if less than all, of several entries into this country by the alien petitioner was "the time of entering the United States,” within the meaning of § 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. 64 Stat. 1008. The facts are clear and undisputed. Petitioner, an alien who was born in France of Italian parentage, was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on November 1, 1923, at the age of 15. He became a member of the Communist Party of the United States at Los Angeles in 1932 and remained a member to the end of 1936, when he voluntarily ceased paying dues and left the Party. He never rejoined it. On June 28, 1937, he departed the United States — abandoning all rights of residence here — and went to Spain to fight with the Spanish Republican Army. He fought in that army for one year, was wounded in action and suffered the loss of his left foot. On September 19, 1938, he came to the United States as a new or “quota immigrant,” and applied for admission for permanent residence. He was detained at Ellis Island. A hearing was held by a Board of Special Inquiry on the issue of his admissibility. At that hearing he freely admitted that he had been a member of the Communist Party of the United States at Los Angeles, California, from 1932 to 1936, and had voluntarily left the United States on June 28, 1937, to go to Spain and fight in the Spanish Republican Army. The Board ordered him excluded, but its order was reversed on an administrative appeal, and on October 8, 1938, he was admitted to the United States “for permanent residence as a quota immigrant.” He has since continuously resided in the United States (California), except for a one-day visit to Tijuana, Mexico, in September 1939. “[A]t the time of entering the United States” on October 8, 1938, he was not, and has not since been, a member of the Communist Party. In October 1951, proceedings were instituted to deport him under §§ 1 and 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as an “alien who had been a member of the Communist Party of the United States after entry into the United States.” After a hearing, disclosing the facts above recited, the hearing officer ordered him deported, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Petitioner then brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against respondent, praying that the order of deportation be set aside. Respondent moved for summary judgment. The district judge sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal the Court of Appeals, finding that after petitioner’s first admission for permanent residence on November 1, 1923, he admittedly had been a member of the Communist Party of the United States from 1932 through 1936, affirmed the judgment. 99 U. S. App. D. C. 386, 240 F. 2d 624. We granted certiorari. 355 U. S. 901. The parties agree that petitioner’s past Communist Party membership did not make him excludable “at the time of entering the United States” on October 8, 1938, nor when, after his one-day visit to Mexico, he re-entered in September 1939. Section 1 of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, deals with the subject of exclusion of aliens from admission and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “[Sec. 1] That any alien who is a member of any one of the following classes shall be excluded from admission into the United States: “(1) . . . ; “(2) Aliens who, at any time, shall be or shall have been, members of any of the following classes: “(C) Aliens who are members of . . . the Communist Party of the United States .... “(H) . . . (Emphasis added.) Section 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, deals with the subject of deportation and, in pertinent part, provides: “Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter ... a member of any one of the classes of aliens enumerated in section 1 (2) of this Act, shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported in the manner provided in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917. The provisions of this section shall be applicable to the classes of aliens mentioned in this Act, irrespective of the time of their entry into the United States.” (Emphasis added.) The sense of the two amended sections, as applied to this case, is this: Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter, a member of the Communist Party of the United States shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported in the manner provided in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917. Petitioner contends that it was his entry of October 8, 1938, made after the administrative adjudication of that date that he was admissible “as a quota immigrant for permanent residence” — not his entry of November 1, 1923 — that constitutes “the time of entering the United States,” within the meaning of § 4 (a); and inasmuch as he was not then, and has not since been, a member of the Communist Party he is not deportable under that section. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that § 4 (a) applies to any “entry into the United States” by petitioner, including that of November 1, 1923, and that inasmuch as he was a member of the Communist Party of the United States from 1932 to 1936 before departing from, and abandoning all rights to reside in, the United States on June 28, 1937, he is deportable under that section as an alien who has been, after entering the United States, a member of the Communist Party. To decide the question presented it is necessary to examine and construe the statutes involved. It seems plain that the reference in § 4 (a) to the “classes of aliens enumerated in § 1 (2)” incorporates only the classes enumerated in subsections (A) through (H), and that the only one of those classes which is applicable here is class “(C),” namely, “Aliens who are members of . . . the Communist Party of the United States.” (Emphasis added.) There being no question about the fact that petitioner was not a member of the Communist Party at the time of entering the United States on October 8,1938, or at any time thereafter, the question is whether that entry — as affected, if at all, by his re-entry as a returning resident alien after his one-day trip to Mexico in September 1939 — or the one of November 1, 1923, constituted “the time of [his] entering the United States,” within the meaning of § 4 (a), as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. If it was the latter he is deport-able, but if the former he is not. It is obvious that Congress in enacting these statutes did not contemplate the novel factual situation that confronts us, and that these statutes are, to say the least, ambiguous upon the question we must now decide. Our study of the problem, in the light of the facts of this case, has brought us to these conclusions: The first phrase of § 4 (a) — “Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States” — necessarily refers to “the time” of petitioner’s adjudicated lawful admission, as affected, if at all, by his re-entry as a returning resident alien after his one-day trip to Mexico in September 1939, under which he claims the right to remain-. The next phrase — “or has been at any time thereafter” — necessarily refers to all times subsequent to such lawful admission. Thus the two phrases, when read together, refer to the particular time the alien was lawfully permitted to make the entry under which he claims the status and right of lawful presence that is sought to be annulled by his deportation, and to any time subsequent thereto. Inasmuch as petitioner claims no right of lawful presence under his entry of November 1, 1923, and respondent does not by the deportation order here seek to annul any right of presence acquired under that entry, we must hold that petitioner’s entry of October 8, 1938 — as affected, if at all, by his returning from Mexico in September 1939 — constituted “the time of entering the United States,” within the meaning of § 4 (a). Since petitioner was not a member of the Communist Party “at the time of entering the United States” on October 8, 1938, and has not been a member “at any time thereafter,” including, of course, the time of his returning entry from Mexico in September 1939, he is not deportable under § 4 (a), as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. In a different context this Court has said that the word entry “includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one.” United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422, 425. While that holding is quite correct, it is not here apposite or controlling, for the question here is not whether petitioner’s coming to the United States in 1923 constituted an entry. Admittedly it did. Rather, our question is whether it was that entry, or the adjudicated lawful entry of October 8, 1938, as affected, if at all, by petitioner’s re-entry as a returning resident alien in September 1939, which constituted the time of petitioner’s entry upon which his present status depends. In the novel circumstances here we think it evident that it could not be his entry of November 1, 1923, since petitioner had abandoned all rights of residence under that entry. Volpe did not involve any question of abandonment. Of course, if petitioner had become a member of the Communist Party after the entry of October 8, 1938, or the re-entry of September 1939, he would have been deportable under § 4 (a). Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522. But it is admitted that he was not a member of that party at those times or “at any time thereafter.” Likewise, if he had applied for entry after June 27, 1952, he would be excludable under § 212 (a) (28) (C) (iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a)(28)(C)(iv). The Government argues that the construction which we adopt would enable a resident alien, who after lawfully entering the United States for permanent residence became a member of the Communist Party, to avoid deportation for that cause simply by quitting the party and thereafter stepping across the border and returning. While a resident alien who leaves the country for any period, however brief, does make a new entry on his return, he is then subject nevertheless to all current exclusionary laws, one of which, at present, excludes from admission any alien who has ever been a member of the Communist Party. Section 212 (a) (28) (C) (iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, supra. If he enters when excludable, he is deportable, even though he would not have been subject to deportation if he had not left the country. Hence, our construction of the statutes here involved does not enable an alien resident to evade the deportation laws by leaving the country and returning after a brief period, for if at the time of his return he is within an excluded class he would be excludable, or, if he nevertheless enters, he would be deport-able. It is admitted that when petitioner returned from Mexico after his one-day trip in September 1939 he was not excludable under then current exclusionary laws. That entry, being lawful, can only support our conclusion in this case. Though §§ 1 and 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of 1918, as amended by the Internal Security Act of 1950, are quite ambiguous in their application to the question here presented, we believe that our interpretation of them is the only fair and reasonable construction that their cloudy provisions will permit under the rare and novel facts of this case. “When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this not out of any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts . . . against the imposition of a harsher punishment.” Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 83. And we cannot “assume that Congress meant to trench on [an alien’s] freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10. Cf. Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U. S. 637, 642-643; Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 391. As applied to the circumstances of this case, we hold that the phrase in § 4 (a), “Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter,” refers to the time the alien was lawfully permitted to make the entry and re-entry under which he acquired the status and right of lawful presence that is sought to be annulled by his deportation. Petitioner’s entry of October 8, 1938, as affected, if at all, by his subsequent entry in September 1939 as a returning resident alien, constituted “the time of entering the United States” within the meaning of § 4 (a). Inasmuch as petitioner was not on October 8, 1938, or at any time thereafter— including September 1939 — a member of the Communist Party, he is not deportable under §§ 1 and 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the judgment must be reversed for that reason. Reversed. 40 Stat. 1012, as amended, 41 Stat. 1008, 54 Stat. 673, 8 U. S. C. § 137. He stated that he did so because he felt that Franco was a tool of Mussolini and Hitler, and if the Kome-Berlin Axis was not stopped “they would go on from country to country until the World War would start.” The statutory provision for exclusion from admission solely by reason of membership in the Communist Party was first enacted in the Internal Security Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 1006), and therefore, petitioner was not excludable from admission, on the ground of past membership in the Communist Party, at the time he entered the United States on October 8, 1938, or at the time he re-entered, after a one-day visit to Tijuana, Mexico, in September 1939. See note 1. 64 Stat. 1008. Although both §§ 1 and 4(a) were repealed by §403 (a) (16) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1962 (66 Stat. 163, 279), those sections nevertheless apply to this case under the saving clause (§405 (a)) of the 1952 Act, since the order of deportation involved here was issued prior to the effective date of the 1952 Act. Cf. Berrebi v. Crossman, 208 F. 2d 498, and Klig v. Brownell (dissenting opinion), 100 U. S. App. D. C. 294, 299-300, 244 F. 2d 742, 747-748 (certiorari granted, 355 U. S. 809; judgment of the Court of Appeals vacated and case remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the cause as moot, sub nom. Klig v. Rogers, 355 U. S. 605). Cf. Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291; United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398; United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U. S. 129. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206; United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422; United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U. S. 129; United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398; Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78; Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE v. CENTRAL ROIG REFINING CO. et al. NO. 27. Argued October 17, 1949. Decided February 6, 1950. Neil Brooks argued the cause for the Secretary of Agriculture, petitioner in No. 27 and respondent in No. 32. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., W. Carroll Hunter and Lewis A. Sigler. Orlando J. Antonsanti argued the cause for the Porto Rican American Sugar Refinery, Inc., petitioner in No. 30 and respondent in No. 27. With him on the brief were Arthur L. Quinn and Gordon Pickett Peyton. José Trias Monge, Assistant Attorney General, and Walton Hamilton argued the cause for Puerto Rico, petitioner in No. 32 and respondent in No. 27. With them on the brief were Vicente Geigel Polanco, Attorney General, and Thurman Arnold. Frederic P. Lee argued the cause for the Central Roig Refining Co. et al., respondents. With him on the brief was Noel T. Dowling. Donald R. Richberg argued the cause and filed a brief for the American Sugar Refining Co. et al., respondents. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. These three cases bring before us the validity of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture, issued by him on the basis of the Sugar Act of 1948. It is claimed that the Secretary disobeyed the requirements of that Act. If it be found that the Secretary brought himself within the Act, the power of Congress to give him the authority he exercised is challenged. By a series of enactments Congress addressed itself to what it found to be serious evils resulting from an uncontrolled sugar market. The central aim of this legislation was to rationalize the mischievous fluctuations of a free sugar market by the familiar device of a quota system. The Jones-Costigan Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 670, the Sugar Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 903, and the Sugar Act of 1948, 61 Stat. 922, 7 U. S. C. (Supp. II, 1949) §§ 1100-60. The volume of sugar moving to the continental United States market was controlled to secure a harmonious relation between supply and demand. To adapt means- to the purpose of the sugar legislation, the Act of 1948 defines five domestic sugar-producing areas; two in the continental United States and one each in Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. To each area is allotted an annual quota of sugar, specifying the maximum number of tons which may be marketed on the mainland from that area. § 202 (a). A quota is likewise assigned to the Philippines. §202 (b). The balance of the needs of consumers in the continental United States, to be determined each year by the Secretary, § 201, is met by importation from foreign countries, predominantly from Cuba, of the requisite amount of sugar. § 202 (c). The quotas thus established apply to sugar in any form, raw or refined. In addition, § 207 of the Act establishes fixed limits on the tonnage of “direct-consumption” or refined sugar which may be marketed annually on the mainland from the offshore areas as part of their total sugar quotas. But mainland refiners are not subject to quota limitations upon the marketing of refined sugar. The Puerto Rican quota for “direct-consumption” sugar is 126,033 tons. This figure had its genesis in the Jones-Costigan Act of 1934, which provided that the quota for each offshore area was to be the largest amount shipped to the mainland in any one of the three preceding years. 48 Stat. 670, 672-73. In the case of Puerto Rico this was computed by the Secretary at 126,033 tons. General Sugar Quota Regulations, Ser. 2, Rev. 1, p. 4, August 17, 1935. By the Sugar Acts of 1937 and 1948, Congress embedded this amount in legislation. All the details for the control of a commodity like sugar could not, of course, be legislatively predetermined. Administrative powers are an essential part of such a regulatory scheme. The powers conferred by § 205 (a) upon the Secretary of Agriculture raise some of the serious issues in this litigation. By that section Congress authorized the Secretary to allot the refined sugar quota as well as the inclusive allowance of a particular area among those marketing the sugar on the mainland from that area. The section provides that “Allotments shall be made in such manner and in such amounts as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of such quota or proration thereof, by taking into consideration” three factors: (1) “processings of sugar ... to which proportionate shares . . . pertained”; (2) past marketings; and (3) ability to market the amount allotted. On January 21, 1948, the Secretary issued Puerto Rico Sugar Order No. 18, 13 Fed. Reg. 310, allotting the 1948 Puerto Rican refined sugar quota among the various refineries of the island. Having satisfied himself of the need for an allotment, the Secretary, in conformity with the procedural requirements of § 205 (a), apportioned the quota among the individual refiners, setting forth in appropriate findings the manner in which he applied the three statutory standards for allotment. As to “past marketings” he found that the proper measure was the average of the highest five years of marketings during the seven-year period of 1935-1941. While recognizing that ordinarily the most recent period of marketings furnished the appropriate data, he concluded that the period 1942-1947 was unrepresentative in that the war needs made those years abnormal and not a fair basis for purposes of the economic stabilization which was the aim of the 1948 Act. Shortages as to transportation, storage and materials, caused by the war, led to special government control. These circumstances resulted in hardships or advantages in varying degrees to different refiners, quite unrelated to a fair system of quotas for the post-war period. Likewise as to “the ability ... to market,” the Secretary recognized that marketings during a recent period ordinarily furnished the best measure. But again he found that the derangements of the war years served to make that measure abnormal. He therefore concluded that a fairer guide to his judgment came from the highest marketings of any year during the 1935-1947 period, using, however, present plant capacity as a corrective. The Secretary duly considered “the processings of sugar” to which proportionate shares pertained, but concluded that this factor could not fairly be applied. This was so because it referred to processings of raw sugar from sugar cane, whereas the three largest Puerto Rican refining concerns restricted themselves to refining raw sugar after it had already been processed. He felt bound, therefore, to give no weight to this factor in the sum he finally struck, and gave equal weight to past marketings and ability to market. Availing themselves of § 205 (b), respondents, Central Roig Refining Company and Western Sugar Refining Company, two of the three largest refiners in Puerto Rico, appealed from the Secretary’s order to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They charged the Secretary with disregard of the standards which Congress imposed by § 205 (a) for his guidance in making allotment of quotas; they challenged the validity of the Act itself under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Porto Rican American Sugar Refinery, Inc., petitioner in No. 30, the largest of the Puerto Rican refiners, intervened to defend the Secretary’s order against the statutory attack. The Government of Puerto Rico, petitioner in No. 32, intervened to urge the unconstitutionality of the statute, while the American Sugar Refining Company and other mainland refiners intervened to meet this attack. Being of opinion that the Secretary’s order was not authorized by the Act, the Court of Appeals reversed it. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 161, 171 F. 2d 1016. Since the order failed on statutory grounds, a majority of that court did not deem it proper to decide the constitutional question. Because of the obvious importance of the decision below in the administration of the Sugar Act we granted certiorari. 336 U. S. 959. I. In making quota allotments the Secretary of Agriculture must of course keep scrupulously within the limits set by the Sugar Act of 1948. In devising the framework of control Congress fixed the flat quotas for the sugar-producing areas. Congress could not itself, as a practical matter, allot the area quotas among individual marketers. The details on which fair judgment must be based are too shifting and judgment upon them calls for too specialized understanding to make direct congressional determination feasible. Almost inescapably the function of allotting the area quotas among individual marketers becomes an administrative function entrusted to the member of the Cabinet charged with oversight of the agricultural economy of the nation. He could not be left at large and yet he could not be rigidly bounded. Either extreme would defeat the control system. They could be avoided only by laying down standards of such breadth as inevitably to give the Secretary leeway for his expert judgment. Its exercise presumes a judgment at once comprehensive and conscientious. Accordingly, Congress instructed the Secretary to make allotments “in such manner and in such amounts as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution” of the quota. In short, Congress gave the Secretary discretion commensurate with the legislative goal. Allocation of quotas to individual marketers was deemed an essential part of the regulatory scheme. The complexity of problems affecting raw and refined sugar in widely separated and economically disparate areas, accentuated by the instability of the differentiating factors, must have persuaded Congress of the need for continuous detailed administrative supervision. In any event, such is the plain purport of the legislation. By way of guiding the Secretary in formulating a fair distribution of individual allotments, Congress directed him to exercise his discretion “by taking into consideration” three factors: past marketings, ability to market, and processings to which proportionate shares pertained. Plainly these are not mechanical or self-defining standards. They in turn imply wide areas of judgment and therefore of discretion. ' The fact that the Secretary’s judgment is finally expressed arithmetically gives an illusory definiteness to the process of reaching it. Moreover, he is under a duty merely to take “into consideration” the particularized factors. The Secretary cannot be heedless of these factors in the sense, for instance, of refusing to hear relevant evidence bearing on them. But Congress did not think it was feasible to bind the Secretary as to the part his “consideration” of these three factors should play in his final judgment — what weight each should be given, or whether in a particular situation all three factors must play a quantitative share in his computation. It was evidently deemed fair that in a controlled market each producer should be permitted to retain more or less the share of the market which he had acquired in the past. Accordingly, past marketings were to be taken into consideration in the Secretary’s allotments. But the past is relevant only if it furnishes a representative index of the relative positions of different marketers. And there is no calculus available for determining whether a base period for measurement is fairly representative. Whether conditions have been so unusual as to make a period unrepresentative is not a matter of counting figures but of weighing imponderables. If he is to exercise the function of allotting a limited supply among avid contenders for it, the Secretary cannot escape the necessity of passing judgment on their relative competitive positions. For Congress announced that one of the main purposes justifying the making of allotments is “to afford all interested persons an equitable opportunity to market sugar.” § 205 (a). In directing the Secretary to take into consideration ability to market, Congress in effect charged the Secretary with making a forecast of the marketers’ capacity to perform in the immediate future. Such a forecast no doubt draws heavily on experience, but history never quite repeats itself even in the vicissitudes of industry. Whether ability to market is most rationally measured by plant capacity or by past performance, whether, if the latter, the base period should be a year and what year or a group of years and what group — these are not questions to be dealt with as statistical problems. They require a disinterested, informed judgment based on circumstances themselves difficult of prophetic interpretation. The proper mode of ascertaining “processings of sugar . . . to which proportionate shares . . . pertained” is not here in controversy. Perhaps this factor too implies choice. But the question common to all three standards is whether the Secretary may conclude, after due consideration, that in the particular situation before him it is not essential that each of the three factors be quantitatively reflected in the final allotment formula. Concededly, § 205 (a) empowers the Secretary to attribute different influences to the three factors. Obviously one factor may be more influential than another in the sense of furnishing a better means of achieving a “fair, efficient, and equitable distribution.” But it is not consonant with reason to authorize the Secretary to find in the context of the situation before him that a criterion has little value and is entitled to no more than nominal weight, but to find it unreasonable for him to conclude that this factor has no significance and therefore should not be at all reflected quantitatively. Congress did not predetermine the periods of time to which the standards should be related or the respective weights to be accorded them. In this respect the sugar-quota scheme differs from the quotas designed by Congress for tobacco, wheat, cotton and rice, respectively. See §§ 313 (a), 334 (a), 344 (a) and 353 (a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 47, 53, 57, 61, as amended, 7 U. S. C. §§ 1313 (a), 1334 (a), 1344 (a), 1353 (a). Nor do the bare words of § 205 (a) confine the Secretary in the responsible exercise of discretion beyond the limitation inherent upon such delegated authority. He is not free to be capricious, to act without reason, that is, in relation to the attainment of the objects declared by § 205 (a). The very standards for his conduct, the attainment of “fair, efficient, and equitable distribution” preclude abstract or doctrinaire categories. A variety of plans of allotment may well conform to the statutory standards. But the choice among permissive plans is necessarily the Secretary’s; he is the agency entrusted by Congress to make the choice. These considerations dispose of this phase of the case. We would have to replace the Secretary’s judgment with our own to hold that on the record before us he acted arbitrarily in reaching the conviction that the years 1935-1941 furnished a fairer measure of past marketings than the war years 1942-1947. Nor can we hold that it was baseless for him to decide that increased marketings during the war years may be taken to mean improved ability to market but decreased marketings do not justify the opposite conclusion. And it was within his province to exclude from his determination the processings of sugar to which proportionate shares pertained. It is not for us to reject the balance he struck on consideration of all the factors unless we can say that his judgment is not one that a fair-minded tribunal with specialized knowledge could have reached. This we cannot say. We conclude, therefore, that in issuing Order No. 18 the Secretary did not exceed the authority given him by Congress. II. We must therefore face the challenge to the constitutionality of the Act of 1948. This objection to the order in support of their judgment below is clearly open to respondents in Nos. 27 and 30. The Government of Puerto Rico likewise challenges the constitutionality of the Act. But its status in this litigation raises a distinct issue, consideration of which will be postponed for the moment. The sugar problem of the country is an old and obstinate one. For fourteen years Congress grappled with it through the mechanism of quotas. Three enactments, culminating in the Sugar Act of 1948, represented an effort to deal with what were deemed to be the harmful effects on interstate and foreign commerce of progressively depressed sugar prices of earlier years created by world surpluses, or, if one prefers it, by the conditions that reflected the imbalance between production and consumption. The legislation presupposes a finding by Congress that producers and marketers of sugar could not adequately respond to market changes merely through the mechanism of a free market and that the public interest, insofar as the Commerce Clause may be drawn upon to meet it, needed controls to supplement and replace the haggling of the market. Congress might of course have limited its intervention to the raw sugar market, trusting that thereby stability in the refined sugar market would be produced. Congress thought otherwise; it evidently felt that competition among refiners for a legally limited supply of raw sugar, in a period of overexpanded refining capacity, ought not to be left at large. In any event, Congress had the constitutional right to think otherwise and to bring the refining of sugar within its regulatory scheme. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38; United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111. It is a commonplace that reforms may bring in their train new difficulties. In any scheme of reform, their prevention or mitigation becomes a proper legislative concern. While ameliorating the effect of disorderly competition, market controls generate problems of their own, not encountered under a competitive system. Such new problems are not outside the comprehensive scope of the great Commerce Clause. Nor does the Commerce Clause impose requirements of geographic uniformity. (Compare Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 and cl. 4.) Congress may devise, as it has done in the Sugar Act of 1948, a national policy with due regard for the varying and fluctuating interests of different regions. See e. g., Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408. And since the Act of 1948 does not even remotely impinge on any of the specific limitations upon the Commerce Clause (Art. I, § 9, cl. 5 and cl. 6), we are not concerned with the vexing problem of the applicability of these clauses to Puerto Rico. Compare Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244; Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151; Alaska v. Troy, 258 U. S. 101; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 670, n. 5. However, not even resort to the Commerce Clause can defy the standards of due process. We assume that these standards extend to regulations of commerce that enmesh Puerto Rico. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 148-51; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 125-26; Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 313. The Sugar Act of 1948 is claimed to offend the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because of the alleged discriminatory character and the oppressive effects of the refined sugar quota established by the Act. If ever claims of this sort carried plausibility, they seem to us singularly belated in view of the unfolding of the Commerce Clause. The use of quotas on refined sugar, legislatively apportioned to different geographic areas and administratively allocated to individual beneficiaries, is a device based on the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 1281 et seq., and sanctioned by this Court in Mulford v. Smith, supra. The problem which confronted Congress was not the setting of quotas abstractly considered but so to fix their amount as to achieve approximate justice in the shares allotted to each area and the persons within it. To recognize the problem is to acknowledge its perplexities. Congress was thus confronted with the formulation of policy peculiarly within its wide swath of discretion. It would be a singular intrusion of the judiciary into the legislative process to extrapolate restrictions upon the formulation of such an economic policy from those deeply rooted notions of justice which the Due Process Clause expresses. ' To fix quotas on a strict historical basis is hard on latecomers into the industry or on those in it who desire to expand. On the other hand, to the extent that newcomers are allowed to enter or old-timers to expand there must either be an increase in supply or a reduction in the quotas of others. Many other factors must plague those charged with the formulation of policy — the extent to which projected expansion is a function of efficiency or becomes a depressant of wage standards; the wise direction of capital into investments and the economic waste incident to what may be on the short or the long pull overexpansion of industrial facilities; the availability of a more suitable basis for the fixing of quotas, etc., etc. The final judgment is too apt to be a hodge-podge of considerations, including considerations that may well weigh with legislators but which this Court can hardly disentangle. Suffice it to say that since Congress fixed the quotas on a historical basis it is not for this Court to reweigh the relevant factors and, perchance, substitute its notion of expediency and fairness for that of Congress. This is so even though the quotas thus fixed may demonstrably be disadvantageous to certain areas or persons. This Court is not a tribunal for relief from the crudities and inequities of complicated experimental economic legislation. See Wickard v. Filburn, supra at 129. Congress, it is insisted, has not established refined sugar quotas for the mainland refiners as it has for the offshore areas. Whatever inequalities may thereby be created, this is not the forum for their correction for the all-sufficient reason that the extent and nature of inequalities are themselves controversial matters hardly meet for judicial solution. Thus, while the mainland refiners are legally free to purchase and refine all sugar within the raw sugar quota and Puerto Rican refiners are limited to their shares of the refined sugar quota, Congress apparently thought that Puerto Rican refiners operated at costs sufficiently low to insulate them from mainland competition. In addition, it is claimed that since the total supply of raw sugar permitted to enter the mainland market is limited the mainland refiners are in effect also subject to the refined sugar quota, although in contrast to the unchanging quotas of the territories the mainland quota will vary with changes in the total consumer demand. Because this demand tends to be stable, however, the mainland refiners’ share of the refined sugar has not, it is urged, greatly expanded during the years when quotas were in effect. Congress might well have thought that relatively minor contractions and expansions in supply from year to year should thus be absorbed. Plainly it is not the business of judges to sit in judgment on the validity or the significance of such views. The Act may impose hardships here and there; the incidence of hardship may shift in location and intensity. It is not for us to have views on the merits of this legislation. It suffices that we cannot say, as we cannot, that there is “discrimination of such an injurious character as to bring into operation the due process clause.” Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 14. Expressions of dissatisfaction by the Executive and in some quarters of Congress that the refined sugar quotas were “arbitrary,” “discriminatory,” and “unfair” may reflect greater wisdom or greater fairness than the collective wisdom of Congress which put this Act on the statute books. But the issue was thrashed out in Congress; Congress is the place for its reconsideration. III. There remains Puerto Rico’s right to participate in this litigation. Puerto Rico can have no better standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Sugar Act of 1948 than if it were a full-fledged State. The right of a State to press such a claim raises familiar difficulties. Compare Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447; Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12; Jones ex rel. Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U. S. 707, with Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296; Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439. Whatever rights Puerto Rico has as a polity, see Porto Rico v. Rosaly, 227 U. S. 270; Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253; Puerto Rico v. Rubert Hermanos, Inc., 309 U. S. 543, the Island is not a State. Additional legal questions are raised whether Puerto Rico can press the interests that it is here pressing. In view of the conclusion that we have reached on the constitutional issues which had to be met apart from any jurisdictional question, it would entail an empty discussion to decide whether Puerto Rico has a standing as a party in this case. It would in effect be merely an advisory opinion on a delicate subject. Since the real issues raised by Puerto Rico have already been decided in Nos. 27 and 30, it becomes unnecessary to decide the question of Puerto Rico’s standing to sue. Wickard v. Filburn, supra at 114, n. 3. Nos. 27 and 30 reversed. No. 32 dismissed. Mr. Justice Black would affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for the reasons given in that court’s opinion. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 161, 171 F. 2d 1016. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or disposition of these cases. In the course of this opinion all expressions of an economic character are to be attributed to those who have authority to make such economic judgments — the Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture — and are not to be deemed the independent judgments of the Court. It is not our right to pronounce economic views; we are confined to passing on the right of the Congress and the Secretary to act on the basis of entertainable economic judgments. With minor exceptions not relevant here, the term “direct-consumption” sugar in the Act refers to refined sugar. The full text of §205 (a) is as follows: “Whenever the Secretary finds that the allotment of any quota, or proration thereof, established for any area pursuant to the provisions of this Act, is necessary to assure an orderly and adequate flow of sugar or liquid sugar in the channels of interstate or foreign commerce, or to prevent disorderly marketing or importation of sugar or liquid sugar, or to maintain a continuous and stable supply of sugar or liquid sugar, or to afford all interested persons an equitable opportunity to market sugar or liquid sugar within any area’s quota, after such hearing and upon such notice as he may by regulations prescribe, he shall make allotments of such quota or proration thereof by allotting to persons who market or import sugar or liquid sugar, for such periods as he may designate, the quantities of sugar or liquid sugar which each such person may market in continental United States, the Territory of Hawaii, or Puerto Rico, or may import or bring into continental United States, for consumption therein. Allotments shall be made in such manner and in such amounts as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of such quota or proration thereof, by taking into consideration the processings of sugar or liquid sugar from sugar beets or sugarcane to which proportionate shares, determined pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b) of section 302, pertained; the past marketings or importations of each such person; and the ability of such person to market or import that portion of such quota or proration thereof allotted to him. The Secretary may also, upon such hearing and notice as he may by regulations- prescribe, revise or amend any such allotment upon the same basis as the initial allotment was made.” 61 Stat. 926, 7 U. S. C. § 1115. To help effectuate the marketing controls, § 301 of the Act provides that certain payments will be made to farmers only if they limit the marketing of sugar cane or beets grown on their farms to a “proportionate share” of the quantity necessary to fill the area’s quota, plus a normal carry-over. The relevance of this provision here is that processings of sugar grown within the “proportionate share” restriction are one of the three factors to be considered by the Secretary in the making of allotments under § 205 (a). With respect to the Secretary’s comparable function of fixing proportionate shares for farms under § 302 of the Act, the House Committee on Agriculture stated: “In view of the differences in conditions of production obtaining in the various sugar-producing areas, the committee has not attempted to specify the exact manner in which the Secretary shall use production history. It is the judgment of the committee that considerable discretion should be left to the Secretary to deal with the varied and changing conditions in the various producing areas, in order to establish fair and equitable proportionate shares for farms in such areas.” H. R. Rep. No. 796, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8. The average price per pound of duty-paid raw sugar gradually declined from 6.98 cents in 1923 to 2.80 cents in early 1932. United States Tariff Comm’n, Report to the President on Sugar, Report No. 73, 2d Ser., p. 46. See also Dalton, Sugar, A Case Study of Government Control, cc. IV, V, especially p. 41; 16 Dept. State Bull. 44. It was estimated that the mainland refineries alone had a capacity in excess of demand of from one-third to one-half. See United States Tariff Comm’n, Report to the President on Sugar, Report No. 73, 2d Ser., p. 91; cf. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 574.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al. No. 386. Decided October 19, 1970 Together with:. No. 387, United States et al. v. Tennessee Public Service Commission et al., No. 396, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Tennessee Public Service Commission et al., and No. 410, Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad et al. v. City of Chicago et al., also on appeal from the same court. Per Curiam. These cases are a sequel to our decision in City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U. S. 162, last; Term. The Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad (C&EI) filed a notice under § 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 72 Stat. 571, 49 U. S. C. .§ 13a (1), proposing to discontinue a pair of trains known as the “Georgian,” operated by it between Chicago, Illinois, and Evansville, Indiana, and operated in conjunction with trains of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad (L&N) between.Evansville, Indiana, and Atlanta, Georgia, crossing Kentucky and Tennessee en route.. Part of-this litigation grows out of the ICC’s approval of the C&EI’s discontinuance of the Chicago-Evansville segment of the “Georgian,” evidenced by its termination of its investigation. The L&N also operates the “Hummingbird.” between Cincinnati, Ohio, and New Orleans, Louisiana. The “Hummingbird” connects with the “Georgian” at Nashville, Tennessee, where coaches and sleepers are transferred between the two trains. Following the ICC’s approval of C&EI’s discontinuance, the L&N served notice of discontinuance of the “Hummingbird” which the ICC also approved. In City of Chicago v. United States, supra, we held that ICC decisions to discontinue such an investigation were reviewable and remanded the cases- back to the District Court. That court then ordered consolidation . and remanded back to the ICC for further hearings, holding that the notice served by the C&EI on the Governors of Illinois and Indiana and at every station along the Chicago-Evansville run was inadequate because the people of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia, and the Governors of those States were not notified. The “Hummingbird” discontinuance was also remanded to the ICC because of its close relationship with the “Georgian.” These appeals followed. We note jurisdiction and reverse. Section 13a (1) provides: . “A carrier or carriers subject to this part, if their rights with respect to the - discontinuance or change ... of the operation or service of any train . . . are súbject to any provision of the constitution or statutes of any State . ; . shall mail to the Governor of each State in which such train . .. . operated, and post in every station, depot or other facility served thereby, notice ... of any such proposed discontinuance or change.” This section, as we read it, required C&EI to give notice in Illinois and Indiana, the only- States in which the line now in controversy has operated. No provision is made in § 13a (1) for notice to States served by connecting railroads which might be affected by a discontinuance. The dissent finds ambiguity in the phrase “such train” in § 13a (1). It is argued that two interpretations of “such train” are possible: either the train of the C&EI between Chicago and Evansville or the “Georgian” between Chicago and Atlanta. By allowing discontinuance under § 13a (1), however, the ICC must have interpreted “such train” to refer to a train operated by one railroad only; and it. was only the Chicago-Evansville discontinuance that was before it at the time. The Commission ruled that: “Copies of the notices were duly served and posted in the manner required by section 13a (1) and our rules and regulations thereunder.” 331 I. C. C. 447, 448. We defer on this issue to the definition of “train” given by the administrative agency which has oversight of the problem. See, e. g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-17; Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410, 417-418. It is true that the C&EI and the L&-N functioned in close harmony. Discontinuance of service on one line might have a substantial effect on the other. But this relationship is not unique in railroading. Congress is not unaware of the mutual interdependence of railroads. It designed a federal regulatory system that displaced a state regulatory system when the state system could defeat a carrier’s attempt to discontinue a train. Hence we think it distorts § 13a (1) to treat if. so as to require the giving of notice to States which had no regulatory-power over the carrier. Accordingly, the decisions in No's. 386 and 410 are reversed. Since Nos. 387 and 396 were remanded to the Commission solely because of their relation to Nos. 386 and 410, those decisions are also reversed. The causes aré remanded to the District Court for review of any questions on the merits which may remain unresolved. • It is so ordered. No issue as to the adequacy of the notice given in the L&N proceeding is raised here. The regulation at the time provided for “[a] certificate [stating] that a copy of the notice * * * has been mailed to the Governor and railroad regulatory body of each State in which the subject train or ferry is operated.” (49 CFR § 143.5 (j),-formerly § 43.5 (j) (see 32 Fed. Reg. 5606)). Until 1958 railroad discontinuances required approval of the appropriate regulatory agency in each of the States in which the line operated. Congress knew of the financial difficulties of the railroads and concluded that the problem of discontinuance had to be removed from its parochial setting where state agencies 'too often required the “maintenance of uneconomic and unnecessary services and facilities.” S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong.,'2d Sess., 22. Therefore, Congress vested power over discontinuances in a body aware of the national transportation problems and needs. See generally City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U. S. 162 (1969), and Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 93 (1964). The problem of discontinuance of services as put to the Congress by the Association of American Railroads was described as follows: “[S]uch matters are subject to approval of State regulatory commissions and authority for. such discontinuances or abandonments must be obtained within the scope of statutes or procedures under which those State commissions operate.” Problems of the Railroads, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 25 (Jan. 13, 1958). The legislation was responsive to that need and may not be easily construed to do more than track the jurisdiction of a' State over the carrier in question.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BRENNAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR v. ARNHEIM & NEELY, INC., et al. No. 71-1598. Argued January 16, 1973 Decided February 28, 1973 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, BreNNan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and RehNQuist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 521. Andrew L. Frey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold and Richard F. Schubert. Eugene B. Strassburger, Jr., argued the cause for respondent Arnheim & Neely, Inc. Frank L. Seamans argued the cause for respondent Institute of Real Estate Management. With them on the brief were Eugene B. Strassburger III and Robert P. Lawry. Howard Lichtenstein and Marvin Dicker filed a brief for the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. This case began when the Secretary of Labor sued the respondent real estate management company for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. The Secretary sought an injunction against future violations of the minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping provisions of the Act, as well as back wages for the affected employees. An employee is entitled to the benefits of the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the Act if he is, inter alia, “employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce ...” 29 U. S. C. §§ 206 (a), 207 (a). As stipulated in the District Court, the respondent company manages eight commercial office buildings and one apartment complex in the Pittsburgh area. With the exception of a minor ownership interest in one of the buildings, the respondent does not own these properties. Its services are provided according to management contracts entered into with the owners. Under these contracts, the respondent obtains tenants for the buildings, negotiates and signs leases, institutes whatever legal actions are necessary with respect to these leases, and generally manages and maintains the properties. The respondent collects rental payments on behalf of the owners, and deposits them in separate bank accounts for each building. These accounts, net of management expenses and the respondent’s fees, belong to the owners of the properties. Payments are periodically made from the accounts to these owners. The respondent’s services with respect to the supervisory, maintenance, and janitorial staffs of the buildings are similarly extensive. The respondent conducts the hiring, firing, payroll operations, and job supervision of those employed in the buildings.’ It also fixes hours of work, and negotiates rates of pay and fringe benefits— subject to the approval of the owners. The respondent engages in collective bargaining on behalf of the owners where the building employees are unionized. 324 F. Supp. 987, 990-991. The District Court held that the maintenance, custodial, and operational workers at the buildings managed by the respondent were “employees,” and that the respondent was an “employer,” within the meaning of §§ 3 (d) and 3 (e) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 203 (d), (e). 324 F. Supp., at 990-993. The District Court also held that gross rentals, rather than commissions obtained, were the proper measure of “annual gross volume of sales made or business done” for purposes of the dollar volume portion of the statutory definition of an “enterprise engaged in commerce.” Id., at 993-994. Though it rejected the claim that the respondent was sufficiently engaged in commerce for its employees to be covered for the time before the 1966 amendments to the Act went into effect, the District Court determined that the aggregate activities of the respondent at all nine locations were “related,” performed under “common control,” and for “a common business purpose,” thereby constituting an “enterprise” within the meaning of § 3 (r), 29 U. S. C. § 203 (r). 324 F. Supp., at 99A-995. On cross appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s determination that the respondent is an “employer” of the building “employees,” and also affirmed the use of gross rentals of the buildings as the proper measure of “gross sales.” 444 F. 2d 609, 611-612. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred, however, in aggregating the gross rentals of the nine properties to determine the “gross sales” of the respondent’s “enterprise.” Recognizing that its decision conflicted with a substantially identical case in the Fourth Circuit, Shultz v. Falk, 439 F. 2d 340, the Court of Appeals held that before separate establishments could be deemed part of a single enterprise, a showing of common business purpose was required. 444 F. 2d, at 613. “If the record in this case revealed that the retention of the Company, as agent, were accompanied by a change in the independent business purposes of the owners — for example facts such as the pooling of profits from the various buildings demonstrating a common business purpose — the result might be different. Here, however, the record reveals that the owners share no common purpose except the decision to hire the Company as their rental or management agent. . . . Without more than here presented, we think the ‘enterprise’ requirement of the Act has not been satisfied.” Id., at 614. Without reaching the issues regarding the respondent’s engagement in commerce prior to 1967, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for proof of the individual gross rentals of the buildings. Ibid. In order to resolve the intercircuit conflict, we granted the Secretary’s petition for certiorari, 409 U. S. 840, which raises the question whether the management activities of the respondent at all of the buildings served should be aggregated as part of a single “enterprise” within the meaning of § 3 (r) of the Act. Since no cross-petition for certiorari was filed by the respondent, the important issues of whether the respondent is in fact an “employer” of the building workers within the meaning of the Act, and whether gross rentals rather than gross commissions should serve as the measure of “gross sales,” are not before us. The concept of “enterprise” under the Fair Labor Standards Act came into being with the 1961 amendments, which substantially broadened the coverage of the Act. Rather than confining the protections of the Act to employees who were themselves “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” 29 U. S. C. §§ 206 (a), 207 (a), the new amendments brought those “employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce” within the ambit of the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions. The Congress defined “enterprise engaged in commerce” to include a dollar volume limitation. The standard in the original amendments included “any such enterprise which has one or more retail or service establishments if the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is not less than $1,000,000 . . . ,” 75 Stat. 66, and has since been changed to include enterprises “whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000” for the period from February 1, 1967, to January 31, 1969, and those with annual gross sales of not less than $250,000 thereafter. 29 U. S. C. § 203 (s)(l). The presence of this dollar-volume cutoff for coverage under the Act, in turn, places importance on the Act’s definition of “enterprise.” The term “enterprise” is defined by the statute as follows: “ ‘Enterprise’ means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §203 (r) (emphasis added). Specific exemptions are noted, making clear that exclusive-dealership arrangements, collective-purchasing pools, franchises, and leases of business premises from large commercial landlords do not create “enterprises” within the meaning of the Act. Ibid. The District Court correctly identified the three main elements of the statutory definition of “enterprise”: related activities, unified operation or common control, and common business purpose. We believe the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the aggregate management activities of the respondent failed to meet these statutory criteria. Once the respondent is recognized to be the employer of all of the building employees, it follows quite simply that it is a single enterprise under the Act. The respondent is, after all, but one company. Its activities in all of the buildings are virtually identical, and are plainly “related” in the sense that Congress intended. As the Senate report accompanying the 1961 amendments indicated: “Within the meaning of this term, activities are 'related’ when they are the same or similar . . . .” S. Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 41. The respondent’s activities, similarly, are performed “either through unified operation or common control.” The respondent is a fully integrated management company directing operations at all nine buildings from its central office. For purposes of determining whether it is an “enterprise” under the Act, it is irrelevant that the relationship between the respondent and the owners is one of agency; that separate bank accounts are maintained for each building; and that the risk of loss and the chance of gain on capital investment belong to the owners, not the respondent. All that is required under the statutory definition is that the respondent’s own activities be related and under common control or unified operation, as they plainly are. In its analysis of this problem, the Court of Appeals placed great weight on the fact that the building owners have no relationship with one another, and have no common business purpose. This is true, but beside the point, for the owners are not defendants in this action and it is not their activities that are under examination. As Judge Winter wrote in the conflicting case from the Fourth Circuit, “It is defendants’ activities at each building which must be held together by a common business purpose, not all the activities of all owners of apartment projects.” Shultz v. Falk, 439 F. 2d, at 346. In the present case, the respondent's activities at the several locations are tied together by the common business purpose of managing commercial properties for profit. The fact that the buildings are separate establishments is specifically made irrelevant by § 3 (r). The Court of Appeals also cited the portion of the Senate report explaining the exemptions to § 3 (r), noted above, for exclusive-dealing contracts, franchises, leasing space in shopping centers, and the like: “The bill also contains provisions which should insure that a small local independent business, not in itself large enough to come within the new coverage, will not become subject to the act by being considered a part of a large enterprise with which it has business dealings. “The definition of 'enterprise' expressly makes it clear that a local retail or service establishment which is under independent ownership shall not be considered to be so operated and controlled as to be other than a separate enterprise because of a franchise, or group purchasing, or group advertising arrangement with other establishments or because the establishment leases premises from a person who also happens to lease premises to other retail or service establishments.” S. Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 41. The Court of Appeals went on to stress that the building owners should not be brought under the Act simply because they dealt with a large real estate management company. This is true, but also beside the point, since we deal here with that large management company as a party and, for purposes of this case, as an employer of the employees in question. We do not hold, nor could we in this case, that the individual building owners in their capacity as employers are to be aggregated to create some abstract “enterprise” for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is argued that such a straightforward application of the statutory criteria to the respondent’s business ignores the significance of the dollar volume limitation included in the § 3 (s) definition of “[enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” The Court of Appeals cited evidence in the legislative history of the 1961 amendments that indicates a purpose to exempt small businesses from the obligations of the Act. 444 F. 2d, at 613; S. Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 5. If the individual building owners are engaged in enterprises too small to come within the reach of the Fair Labor Standards Act, reasoned the Court of Appeals, it would be “anomalous” to treat them as a single enterprise subject to the Act “merely because they hire a rental agent who manages other buildings.” 444 F. 2d, at 614. Once again, however, the response to this argument is that it is the respondent management, company, not the individual building owners, that has been held in this case to be an “employer” of all the affected “employees.” Furthermore, the proper measure of the respondent’s size has been held to be the gross rentals produced by properties under its management. It is true that one purpose of the dollar-volume limitation in the statutory definition of “enterprise” is the exemption of small businesses, but this respondent is not such a business under these holdings of the Court of Appeals. The argument to the contrary amounts to a collateral attack on the “employer” and “gross sales” determinations made below, and the respondent cannot make such an attack in the absence of a cross-petition for certiorari. We hold that the District Court was correct in aggregating all of the respondent’s management activities as a single “enterprise.” Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. In pertinent part, the statute provides that: “(s) ‘Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce’ means an enterprise which has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, including employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person, and which— “(1) during the period February 1, 1967, through January 31, 1969, is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately stated) or is a gasoline service establishment whose annual gross volume of sales is not less than $250,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately stated), and beginning February 1, 1969, is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $250,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately stated) . . . 29 U. S. C. §203 (s). Section 3 (s) (3) of the Act, as enacted in 1961, referred in its definition of “[enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” inter alia, to: “any establishment of any such enterprise . . . which has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce if the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is not less than $1,000,000 . . . .” Pub. L. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65, 66 (emphasis added). The District Court construed the statute to require that two or more employees in each building be engaged in commerce in order for that building to be covered under the Act. It found that in no building were there two such employees, and therefore held that there was no coverage under the Act prior to the 1966 amendments. 324 F. Supp. 987, 995-997. The 1966 amendments, see n. 1, supra, required only that the “enterprise” have “employees” engaged in commerce, and under this standard the District Court found that the respondent qualified. Id., at 997. Though the Government appealed on this issue, the Court of Appeals did not reach it, 444 F. 2d 609, 614. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U. S. 48, 52 n. 4, and cases there cited. But see n. 8, infra. Pub. L. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65, 67, 69. As both the District Court and the Court of Appeals noted, the statutory concept of “employer” is “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 203 (d). This definition was held to be broad enough that there might be “several simultaneous 'employers.' ” 444 F. 2d, at 611-612. See also 324 F. Supp. 987, 992; Wirtz v. Hebert, 368 F. 2d 139; Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, 129 F. 2d 655. Contrary to the view taken by the dissent, we specifically do not hold that “the buildings and the management company collectively are an enterprise . . . .” We deal solely with the management company and its “related activities performed ... for a common business purpose.” It is stipulated that in all relevant years, the annual gross rental income collected by the respondent exceeded $1,000,000. 324 F. Supp., at 993. We have granted certiorari in No. 72-844, Falk v. Brennan, sub nom. Falk v. Shultz, post, p. 954, to consider whether the proper measure of “gross sales” in this context is gross rentals collected or gross commissions, and whether maintenance employees are “employees” of the management company within the meaning of the Act.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HILLS, SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT v. GAUTREAUX et al. No. 74-1047. Argued January 20, 1976 Decided April 20, 1976 StewaRT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which all Members joined, except Stevens, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Marshall, J., filed a concurring statement, in which Brennan and White, JJ., joined, post, p. 306. Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, Harriet S. Shapiro, William Kanter, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer. Alexander Polikoff argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Milton I. Shadur, Bernard Weisberg, Merrill A. Freed, and Robert J. Vollen. James M. P. D’Amico filed a brief for the city of Joliet, Ill., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Martin E. Sloane and Arthur D. Wolf for the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc.; and by Howard A. Glickstein, William L. Taylor, and Richard F. Bellman for the Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by J. Harold Flannery, Paul R. Dimond, William E. Caldwell, Norman J. Chachkin, and Nathaniel R. Jones for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et ah; and by Stephen J. Poliak, Richard M. Sharp, and David Rubin for the National Education Association. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has been judicially found to have violated the Fifth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in connection with the selection of sites for public housing in the city of Chicago. The issue before us is whether the remedial order of the federal trial court may extend beyond Chicago’s territorial boundaries. I This extended litigation began in 1966 when the respondents, six Negro tenants in or applicants for public housing in Chicago, brought separate actions on behalf of themselves and all other Negro tenants and applicants similarly situated against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and HUD. The complaint filed against CHA in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleged that between 1950 and 1965 substantially all of the sites for family public housing selected by CHA and approved by the Chicago City Council were “at the time of such selection, and are now,” located “within the areas known as the Negro Ghetto.” The respondents further alleged that CHA deliberately selected the sites to “avoid the placement of Negro families in white neighborhoods” in violation of federal statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment. In a companion suit against HUD the respondents claimed that it had “assisted in the carrying on and continues to assist in the carrying on of a racially discriminatory public housing system within the City of Chicago” by providing financial assistance and other support for CHA's discriminatory housing projects. The District Court stayed the action against HUD pending resolution of the CHA suit. In February 1969, the court entered summary judgment against CHA on the ground that it had violated the respondents' constitutional rights by selecting public housing sites and assigning tenants on the basis of race. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907. Uncon-tradicted evidence submitted to the District Court established that the public housing system operated by CHA was racially segregated, with four overwhelmingly white projects located in white neighborhoods and with 99%% of the remaining family units located in Negro neighborhoods and 99% of those units occupied by Negro tenants. Id,., at 910. In order to prohibit future violations and to remedy the effects of past unconstitutional practices, the court directed CHA to build its next 700 family units in predominantly white areas of Chicago and thereafter to locate at least 75% of its new family public housing in predominantly white areas inside Chicago or in Cook County. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736, 738-739. In addition, CHA was ordered to modify its tenant-assignment and site-selection procedures and to use its best efforts to increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possible in conformity with the judgment. Id., at 739-741. The District Court then turned to the action against HUD. In September 1970, it granted HUD’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the District Court to enter summary judgment for the respondents, holding that HUD had violated both the Fifth Amendment and § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, by knowingly sanctioning and assisting CPIA’s racially discriminatory public housing program. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F. 2d 731, 739-740. On remand, the trial court addressed the difficult problem of providing an effective remedy for the racially segregated public housing system that had been created by the unconstitutional conduct of CHA and HUD. The court granted the respondents’ motion to consolidate the CHA and HUD cases and ordered the parties to formulate “a comprehensive plan to remedy the past effects of unconstitutional site selection procedures.” The order directed the parties to “provide the Court with as broad a range of alternatives as seem . . . feasible” including “alternatives which are not confined in their scope to the geographic boundary of the City of Chicago.” After consideration of the plans submitted by the parties and the evidence adduced in their support, the court denied the respondents’ motion to consider metropolitan area relief and adopted the petitioner’s proposed order requiring HUD to use its best efforts to assist CHA in increasing the supply of dwelling units and enjoining HUD from funding family public housing programs in Chicago that were inconsistent with the previous judgment entered against CHA. The court found that metropolitan area relief was unwarranted because “the wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago and solely against residents of the City” and there were no allegations that “CHA and HUD discriminated or fostered racial discrimination in the suburbs.” On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed and remanded the case for “the adoption of a comprehensive metropolitan area plan that will not only disestablish the segregated public housing system in the City of Chicago . . . but will increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possible.” 503 F. 2d 930, 939. Shortly before the Court of Appeals announced its decision, this Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, had reversed a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that had approved a plan requiring the consolidation of 54 school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area to remedy racial discrimination in the operation of the Detroit public schools. Understanding Milliken “to hold that the relief sought there would be an impractical and unreasonable overresponse to a violation limited to one school district,” the Court of Appeals concluded that the Milliken decision did not bar a remedy extending beyond the limits of Chicago in the present case because of the equitable and administrative distinctions between a metropolitan public housing plan and the consolidation of numerous local school districts. 503 F. 2d, at 935-936. In addition, the appellate court found that, in contrast to Milli-ken, there was evidence of suburban discrimination and of the likelihood that there had been an “extra-city impact” of the petitioner's “intra-city discrimination.” Id., at 936-937, 939-940. The appellate court’s determination that a remedy extending beyond the city limits was both “necessary and equitable” rested in part on the agreement of the parties and the expert witnesses that “the metropolitan area is a single relevant locality for low rent housing purposes and that a city-only remedy will not work.” Id., at 936-937. HUD subsequently sought review in this Court of the permissibility in light of Milliken of “inter-district relief for discrimination in public housing in the absence of a finding of an inter-district violation.” We granted certio-rari to consider this important question. 421 U. S. 962. II In Milliken v. Bradley, supra, this Court considered the proper scope of a federal court’s equity decree in the context of a school desegregation case. The respondents in that case had brought an action alleging that the Detroit public school system was segregated on the basis of race as the result of official conduct and sought an order establishing “ 'a unitary, nonracial school system.’ ” 418 U. S., at 723. After finding that constitutional violations committed by the Detroit School Board and state officials had contributed to racial segregation in the Detroit schools, the trial court had proceeded to the formulation of a remedy., Although there had been neither proof of unconstitutional actions on the part of neighboring school districts nor a demonstration that the Detroit violations had produced significant segregative effects in those districts, the court established a desegregation panel and ordered it to prepare a remedial plan consolidating the Detroit school system and 53 independent suburban school districts. Id., at 733-734. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the desegregation order on the ground that, in view of the racial composition of the Detroit school system, the only feasible remedy required “the crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby school districts.” 484 F. 2d 215, 249. This Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the multidistrict remedy contemplated by the desegregation order was an erroneous exercise of the equitable authority of the federal courts. Although the Milliken opinion discussed the many practical problems that would be encountered in the consolidation of numerous school districts by judicial decree, the Court’s decision rejecting the metropolitan area desegregation order was actually based on fundamental limitations on the remedial powers of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities. That power is not plenary. It “may be exercised ‘only on the basis of a constitutional violation.’ ” 418 U. S., at 738, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 377. Once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor “the scope of the remedy” to fit “the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.” 418 U. S., at 744; Swann, supra, at 16. In Milliken, there was no finding of unconstitutional action on the part of the suburban school officials and no demonstration that the violations committed in the operation of the Detroit school system had had any significant segregative effects in the suburbs. See 418 U. S., at 745, 748. The desegregation order in Milliken requiring the consolidation of local school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area thus constituted direct federal judicial interference with local governmental entities without the necessary predicate of a constitutional violation by those entities or of the identification within them of any significant segregative effects resulting from the Detroit school officials’ unconstitutional conduct. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the interdistrict decree was impermissible because it was not commensurate with the constitutional violation to be repaired. Since the Milliken decision was based on basic limitations on the exercise of the equity power of the federal courts and not on a balancing of particular considerations presented by school desegregation cases, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in finding Milliken inapplicable on that ground to this public housing case. The school desegregation context of the Milliken case is nonetheless important to an understanding of its discussion of the limitations on the exercise of federal judicial power. As the Court noted, school district lines cannot be “casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience” because they separate independent governmental entities responsible for the operation of autonomous public school systems. 418 U. S., at 741-743. The Court’s holding that there had to be an interdistrict violation or effect before a federal court could order the crossing of district boundary lines reflected the substantive impact of a consolidation remedy on separate and independent school districts. The District Court’s desegregation order in Milliken was held to be an impermissible remedy not because it envisioned relief against a wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which the violation occurred but because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any constitutional violation. Ill The question presented in this case concerns only the authority of the District Court to order HUD to take remedial action outside the city limits of Chicago. HUD does not dispute the Court of Appeals’ determination that it violated the Fifth Amendment and § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by knowingly funding CHA’s racially discriminatory family public housing program, nor does it question the appropriateness of a remedial order designed to alleviate the effects of past segregative practices by requiring that public housing be developed in areas that will afford respondents an opportunity to reside in desegregated neighborhoods. But HUD contends that the Milliken decision bars a remedy affecting its conduct beyond the boundaries of Chicago for two reasons. First, it asserts that such a remedial order would constitute the grant of relief incommensurate with the constitutional violation to be repaired. And, second, it claims that a decree regulating HUD’s conduct beyond Chicago’s boundaries would inevitably have the effect of “ consolidating] for remedial purposes” governmental units not implicated in HUD’s and CHA’s violations. We address each of these arguments in turn. A We reject the contention that, since HUD’s constitutional and statutory violations were committed in Chicago, Milliken precludes an order against HUD that will affect its conduct in the greater metropolitan area. The critical distinction between HUD and the suburban school districts in Milliken is that HUD has been found to have violated the Constitution. That violation provided the necessary predicate for the entry of a remedial order against HUD and, indeed, imposed a duty on the District Court to grant appropriate relief. See 418 U. S., at 744. Our prior decisions counsel that in the event of a constitutional violation “all reasonable methods be available to formulate an effective remedy,” North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46, and that every effort should be made by a federal court to employ those methods "to achieve the greatest possible degree of [relief], taking into account the practicalities of the situation.” Davis v. School Comm’rs of Mobile County, 402 U. S. 33, 37. As the Court observed in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education: "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” 402 U. S., at 15. Nothing in the Milliken decision suggests a per se rule that federal courts lack authority to order parties found to have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of the city where the violation occurred. As we noted in Part II, supra, the District Court’s proposed remedy in Milliken was impermissible because of the limits on the federal judicial power to interfere with the operation of state political entities that were not implicated in unconstitutional conduct. Here, unlike the desegregation remedy found erroneous in Milliken, a judicial order directing relief beyond the boundary lines of Chicago will not necessarily entail coercion of uninvolved governmental units, because both CHA and HUD have the authority to operate outside the Chicago city limits. In this case, it is entirely appropriate and consistent with Milliken to order CHA and HUD to attempt to create housing alternatives for the respondents in the Chicago suburbs. Here the wrong committed by HUD confined the respondents to segregated public housing. The relevant geographic area for purposes of the respondents’ housing options is the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city limits. That HUD recognizes this reality is evident in its administration of federal housing assistance programs through “housing market areas” encompassing “the geographic area 'within which all dwelling units . . .’ are in competition with one another as alternatives for the users of housing.” Department of Housing and Urban Development, FHA Techniques of Housing Market Analysis 8 (Jan. 1970), quoting the Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing Studies, Housing Market Analysis: A Study of Theory and Methods, c. 2 (1953). The housing market area “usually extends beyond the city limits” and in the larger markets “may extend into several adjoining counties.” FHA Techniques of Housing Market Analysis, supra, at 12. An order against HUD and CHA regulating their conduct in the greater metropolitan area will do no more than take into account HUD’s expert determination of the area relevant to the respondents’ housing opportunities and will thus be wholly commensurate with the “nature and extent of the constitutional violation.” 418 U. S., at 744. To foreclose such relief solely because HUD’s constitutional violation took place within the city limits of Chicago would transform Milliken’s principled limitation on the exercise of federal judicial authority into an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those found to have engaged in unconstitutional conduct. B The more substantial question under Milliken is whether an order against HUD affecting its conduct beyond Chicago’s boundaries would impermissibly interfere with local governments and suburban housing authorities that have not been implicated in HUD’s unconstitutional conduct. In examining this issue, it is important to note that the Court of Appeals’ decision did not endorse or even discuss “any specific metropolitan plan” but instead left the formulation of the remedial plan to the District Court on remand. 503 F. 2d, at 936. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals characterized its remand order as one calling “for additional evidence and for further consideration of the issue of metropolitan area relief in light of this opinion and that of the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley.” Id., at 940. In the current posture of the case, HUD’s contention that any remand for consideration of a metropolitan area order would be impermissible as a matter of law must necessarily be based on its claim at oral argument “that court-ordered metropolitan relief in this case, no matter how gently it’s gone about, no matter how it’s framed, is bound to require HUD to ignore the safeguards of local autonomy and local political processes” and therefore to violate the limitations on federal judicial power established in Milliken. In addressing this contention we are not called upon, in other words, to evaluate the validity of any specific order, since no such order has yet been formulated. HUD’s position, we think, underestimates the ability of a federal court to formulate a decree that will grant the respondents the constitutional relief to which they may be entitled without overstepping the limits of judicial power established in the Milliken case. HUD’s discretion regarding the selection of housing proposals to assist with funding as well as its authority under a recent statute to contract for low-income housing directly with private owners and developers can clearly be directed toward providing relief to the respondents in the greater Chicago metropolitan area without preempting the power of local governments by undercutting the role of those governments in the federal housing assistance scheme. An order directing HUD to use its discretion under the various, federal housing programs to foster projects located in white areas of the Chicago housing market would be consistent with and supportive of well-established federal housing policy. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial discrimination in federally assisted programs including, of course, public housing programs. Based upon this statutory prohibition, HUD in 1967 issued site-approval rules for low-rent housing designed to avoid racial segregation and expand the opportunities of minority group members “to locate outside areas of [minority] concentration.” Department of Housing and Urban Development, Low-Rent Housing Manual, §205.1, ¶4g (Feb. 1967 rev.). Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 expressly directed the Secretary of HUD to “administer the programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further" the Act's fair housing policy. 82 Stat. 85, 42 U. S. C. §3608 (d)(5). Among the steps taken by HUD to discharge its statutory duty to promote fair housing was the adoption of project-selection criteria for use in “eliminating clearly unacceptable proposals and assigning priorities in funding to assure that the best proposals are funded first.” HUD Evaluation of Rent Supplement Projects and Low-Rent Housing Assistance Applications, 37 Fed. Reg. 203. (1972). In structuring the minority housing opportunity component of the project-selection criteria, HUD attempted “to assure that building in minority areas goes forward only after there, truly exist housing opportunities for minorities elsewhere” in the housing market and to avoid encouraging projects located in substantially racially mixed areas. Id., at 204. See 24 CFR § 200.710 (1975). See generally Maxwell, HUD's Project Selection Criteria — A Cure for “Impermissible Color Blindness”?, 48 Notre Dame Law. 92 (1972). More recently, in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Congress emphasized the importance of locating housing so as to promote greater choice of housing opportunities and to avoid undue concentrations of lower income persons. See 88 Stat. 633, 42 U. S. C. §§ 5301 (c) (6), 5304 (a) (4) (A), (C) (ii) (1970 ed., Supp. IY); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1114, p. 8 (1974). A remedial plan designed to insure that HUD will utilize its funding and administrative powers in a manner consistent with affording relief to the respondents need not abrogate the role of local governmental units in the federal housing-assistance programs. Under the major housing programs in existence at the time the District Court entered its remedial order pertaining to HUD, local housing authorities and municipal governments had to make application for funds or approve the use of funds in the locality before HUD could make housing-assistance money available. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1415 (7)(b), 1421b (a)(2). An order directed solely to HUD would not force unwilling localities to apply for assistance under these programs but would merely reinforce the regulations guiding HUD’s determination of which of the locally authorized projects to assist with federal funds. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, amending the United States Housing Act of 1937, 88 Stat. 653, 42 U. S. C. § 1437 et seg. (1970 ed., Supp. IV), significantly enlarged HUD’s role in the creation of housing opportunities. Under the § 8 Lower-Income Housing Assistance program, which has largely replaced the older federal low-income housing programs, HUD may contract directly with private owners to make leased housing units available to eligible lower income persons. As HUD has acknowledged in this case, “local governmental approval is no longer explicitly required as a condition of the program’s applicability to a locality.” Brief for Petitioner 33-34. Regulations governing the § 8 program permit HUD to select “the geographic area or areas in which the housing is to be constructed,” 24 CFR § 880.203 (b) (1975), and direct that sites be chosen to “promote greater choice of housing opportunities and avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons.” §§ 880.112 (d), 883.209 (a)(3). See §§ 880.112 (b), (c), 883.209 (a)(2), (b)(2). In most cases the Act grants the unit of local government in which the assistance is to be provided the right to comment on the application and, in certain specified circumstances, to preclude the Secretary of HUD from approving the application. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1439 (a)-(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Use of the § 8 program to expand low-income housing opportunities outside areas of minority concentration would not have a coercive effect on suburban municipalities. For under the program, the local governmental units retain the right to comment on specific assistance proposals, to reject certain proposals that are inconsistent with their approved housing-assistance plans, and to require that zoning and other land-use restrictions be adhered to by builders. In sum, there is no basis for the petitioner’s claim that court-ordered metropolitan area relief in this case would be impermissible as a matter of law under the Milliken decision. In contrast to the desegregation order in that case, a metropolitan area relief order directed to HUD would not consolidate or in any way restructure local governmental units. The remedial decree would neither force suburban governments to submit public housing proposals to HUD nor displace the rights and powers accorded local government entities under federal or state housing statutes or existing land-use laws. The order would have the same effect on the suburban governments as a discretionary decision by HUD to use its statutory powers to provide the respondents with alternatives to the racially segregated Chicago public housing system created by CHA and HUD. Since we conclude that a metropolitan area remedy in this case is not impermissible as a matter of law, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court “for additional evidence and for further consideration of the issue of metropolitan area relief.” 503 F. 2d, at 940. Our determination that the District Court has the authority to direct HUD to engage in remedial efforts in the metropolitan area outside the city limits of Chicago should not be interpreted as requiring a metropolitan area order. The nature and scope of the remedial decree to be entered on remand is a matter for the District Court in the exercise of its equitable discretion, after affording the parties an opportunity to present their views. The judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding this case to the District Court is affirmed, but further proceedings in the District Court are to be consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The original complaint named the Housing Assistance Administration, then a corporate agency of HUD, as the defendant. Although the petitioner in this case is the current Secretary of HUD, this opinion uses the terms “petitioner” and “HUD” interchangeably. The complaint sought to enjoin HUD from providing funds for 17 projects that had been proposed by CHA in 1965 and 1966 and from making available to CHA any other financial assistance to be used in connection with the racially discriminatory aspects of the Chicago public housing system. In addition, the respondents requested that they be granted “such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.” Before the stay of the action against HUD, the District Court had certified the plaintiff class in the CHA action and had rejected CHA's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the counts of the complaint alleging that CHA had intentionally selected public housing sites to avoid desegregating housing patterns. 265 F. Supp. 582. CHA admitted that it had followed a policy of informally clearing proposed family public housing sites with the alderman in whose ward the proposed site was located and of eliminating each site opposed by the alderman. 296 F. Supp. 907, 910, 913. This procedure had resulted in the rejection of 99%% of the units proposed for sites in white areas which had been initially selected as suitable for public housing by CHA. Id., at 912. With regard to tenant assignments, the court found that CHA had established a racial quota to restrict the number of Negro families residing in the four CHA family public housing projects located in white areas in Chicago. The projects, all built prior to 1944, had Negro tenant populations of 7%, 6%, 4%, and 1% despite the fact that Negroes composed about 90% of the tenants of CHA family housing units and a similar percentage of the waiting list. A CHA official testified that until 1968 the four projects located in white areas were listed on the Authority’s tenant-selection form as suitable for white families only. Id., at 909. In July 1968, CHA had in operation or development 54 family housing projects with a total of 30,848 units. Statistics submitted to the District Court established that, aside from the four overwhelmingly white projects discussed in n. 4, supra, 92% of all of CHA’s family housing units were located in neighborhoods that were at least 75% Negro and that two-thirds of the units were situated in areas with more than 95% Negro residents. Id., at 910. The District Court's remedial decree divided Cook County into a “General Public Housing Area” and a “Limited Public Housing Area.” The “Limited Public Housing Area” consisted of the area within census tracts having a 30% or more nonwhite population or within one mile of the boundary of any such census tract. The remainder of Cook County was included in the “General Public Housing Area.” 304 F. Supp., at 737. Following the commencement of construction of at least 700 family units in the General Public Housing Area of the city of Chicago, CHA was permitted by the terms of the order to locate up to one-third of its General Public Housing Area units in the portion of Cook County outside of Chicago. See id., at 738-739. The Court of Appeals found that "HUD retained a large amount of discretion to approve or reject both site selection and tenant assignment procedures of the local housing authority” and that the Secretary had exercised those powers "in a manner which perpetuated a racially discriminatory housing system in Chicago.” 448 F. 2d, at 739. Although the appellate court stated that it was “fully sympathetic” with the “very real ‘dilemma’ ” presented by the need for public housing in Chicago, it ruled that the demand for housing did not justify “the Secretary’s past actions [which] constituted racially discriminatory conduct in their own right.” Ibid. The court’s July 1969 order directing CHA to use its best efforts to increase public housing opportunities in white areas as rapidly as possible had not resulted in the submission of a single housing site to the Chicago City Council. A subsequent order directing the submission of sites for 1,600 units by September 20, 1970, had eventually prompted CHA to submit proposed sites in the spring of 1971, but inaction by the City Council had held up the approval of the sites required for their development. See Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366, 368. The District Court subsequently took additional measures in an attempt to implement the remedial orders entered against CHA. In May 1971, the city of Chicago and HUD agreed to a letter of intent that provided that the city would process sites suitable for use by CHA to permit the Authority to commence acquisition of sites for 1,700 units in accordance with a specified timetable. HUD then released certain Model Cities funds on the condition that the City Council and CHA continue to show progress toward meeting the goals set forth in the May letter. After the city fell far behind schedule, the District Court granted the respondents’ request for an injunction directing HUD to withhold $26 million in Model Cities funds until the city remedied its existing deficit under the timetable. See id., at 368-370. The Court of Appeals reversed the injunction, holding that the District Court had abused its discretion in ordering funding cut off. 457 F. 2d 124. Between July 1971 and April 1972, the City Council failed to conduct any hearings with respect to acquisition of property for housing sites and did not approve land acquisition for any sites. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 342 F. Supp. 827, 829. Following the filing of a supplemental complaint naming the mayor and the members of the City Council as defendants, the District Court found that their inaction had prevented CHA from providing relief in conformity with the court’s prior orders. In a further effort to effectuate relief, the court ruled that the provision of Illinois law requiring City Council approval of land acquisition by CHA “shall not be applicable to CHA’s actions . . . taken for the purpose of providing Dwelling Units.” Id., at 830. The Court of Appeals upheld this decision. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F. 2d 210. Although CHA participated in the proceeding before the Court of Appeals, it did not seek review of that court's decision and has not participated in the proceedings in this Court. Although the trial court’s desegregation order in Milliken did not direct the adoption of a specific metropolitan area plan, it did contain detailed guidelines for the panel appointed to draft the desegregation plan. 345 F. Supp. 914 (ED Mich.). The framework for the plan called for the division of the designated 54-school-district desegregation area into 15 clusters, each containing a part of the Detroit school system and two or more suburban districts. Within this framework, the court charged the panel with the responsibility for devising a plan that would produce the maximum actual desegregation. Id., at 918, 928-929. See 418 U. S., at 733-734. The Court of Appeals interpreted the Milliken opinion as limited to a determination that, in view of the administrative complexities of school district consolidation and the deeply rooted tradition of local control of public schools, the balance of equitable factors weighed against metropolitan area school desegregation remedies. See 503 F. 2d, at 935-936. But the Court’s decision in Milliken was premised on a controlling principle governing the permissible scope of federal judicial power, a principle not limited to a school desegregation context. See 418 U. S., at 744. In addition, the Court of Appeals surmised that either an inter-district violation or an interdistrict segregative effect may have been present in this case. There is no support provided for either conclusion. The sole basis of the appellate court’s discussion, of alleged suburban discrimination was the respondents’ Exhibit 11 illustrating the location of 12 public housing projects within the portion of the Chicago Urbanized Area outside the city limits of Chicago. That exhibit showed that 11 of the 12 projects were located in areas that, at the time of the hearing in November 1972, were within one mile of the boundary of a census tract with less than a 70% white population. The exhibit was offered to illustrate the scarcity of integrated public housing opportunities for the plaintiff class and for lower income white families and to indicate why the respondents did not "expect cooperation from the suburban areas” in providing housing alternatives in predominately white areas. In discussing the data underlying the exhibit, counsel for the respondents in the trial court expressly attempted to avoid the “possible misconception” that he was then asserting that the suburban municipalities and housing authorities were “guilty of any discrimination or wrongdoing.” In view of the purpose for which the exhibit was offered and the District Court’s determination that “the wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago,” it is apparent that the Court of Appeals was mistaken in supposing that the exhibit constitutes evidence of suburban discrimination justifying metropolitan area relief. In its brief opinion on rehearing, the Court of Appeals asserted that “it is reasonable to conclude from the record” that the intra-city violation “may well have fostered racial paranoia and encouraged the ‘white flight’ phenomenon which has exacerbated the problems of achieving integration.” 503 F. 2d, at 939-940. The Court of Appeals’ speculation about the effects of the discriminatory site selection in Chicago is contrary both to expert testimony in the record and the conclusions of the District Court. Such unsupported speculation falls far short of the demonstration of a “significant segregative effect in another district” discussed in the Milliken opinion. See 418 U. S., at 745. The Court in Milliken required either a showing of an inter-district violation or a significant segregative effect “[b]efore the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes.” Id., at 744. In its amicus memorandum in Milliken, the United States argued that an interdistrict remedy in that case would require “the restructuring of state or local government entities” and result in “judicial interference with state prerogatives concerning the organization of local governments.” Although the State of Michigan had been found to have committed constitutional violations contributing to racial segregation in the Detroit schools, 418 U. S., at 734-735, n. 16, the Court in Milliken concluded that the interdistrict order was a wrongful exercise of judicial power because prior cases had established that such violations are to be dealt with in terms of "an established geographic and administrative school system,” id., at 746, and because the State's educational structure vested substantial independent control over school affairs in the local school districts. See id., at 742-744. In Milliken, a consolidation order directed against the State would of necessity have abrogated the rights and powers of the suburban school districts under Michigan law. See id., at 742 n. 20. Here, by contrast, a metropolitan area remedy involving HUD need not displace the rights and powers accorded suburban governmental entities under federal or state law. See Part III-B, infra. Illinois statutes permit a city housing authority to exercise its powers within an “area of operation” defined to include the territorial boundary of the city and all of the area within three miles beyond the city boundary that is not located within the boundaries of another city, village, or incorporated town. In addition, the housing authority may act outside its area of operation by contract with another housing authority or with a state public body not within the area of operation of another housing authority. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 671/2, §§ 17 (b), 27c (1973). Although the state officials in Milliken had the authority to operate across school district lines, the exercise of that authority to effectuate the court’s desegregation order would have eliminated numerous independent school districts or at least have displaced important powers granted those uninvolved governmental entities under state law. See n. 13, supra. In principal markets such as Chicago, the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area is coterminous with the housing market area. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, FHA Techniques of Housing Market Analysis 13 (Jan. 1970); Department of Housing and Urban Development, Urban Housing Market Analysis 5 (1966). In the District Court, HUD filed an appendix detailing the various federal programs designed to secure better housing opportunities for low-income families and represented that “the Department will continue to use its best efforts in review and approval of housing programs for Chicago which address the needs of low income families.” It was this statutory prohibition that HUD was held to have violated by its funding of CHA’s housing projects. See 448 F. 2d, at 740. A HUD study of the implementation of 'the project-selection criteria revealed that the actual operation of the minority housing opportunity criterion depends on the definition of “area of minority concentration" and “racially mixed” area employed by each field office. The meaning of those terms, which are not defined in the applicable regulations, 24 CFR §200.710 (1975), varied among field offices and within the jurisdiction of particular field offices. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Implementation of HUD Project Selection Criteria for Subsidized Housing: An Evaluation 116-117 (Dec. 1972). In fiscal year 1975, new contract commitments under the § 8 program were approximately $10.7 billion, as compared to total estimated new contract commitments of approximately $16.35 billion for all federally subsidized housing programs. The comparable figures for fiscal year 1976 indicate that $22,725 billion of a total of $24.8 billion in new contract commitments are to be made under the § 8 program. See Hearings on Department of Housing and Urban Development — Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1976, before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, pp. 85-86 (1975). See also id., at 119 (testimony of HUD Secretary Hills). Under the § 8 program, HUD contracts to make payments to local public housing agencies or to private owners of housing units to make up the difference between a fair market rent for the area and the amount contributed by the low-income tenant. The eligible tenant family pays between 15% and 25% of its gross income for rent. See 42 U. S. C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. IV). If the local unit of government in which the proposed assistance is to be provided does not have an approved housing-assistance plan, the Secretary of HUD is directed by statute to give the local governmental entity 30 days to comment on the proposal, after which time the Secretary may approve the project unless he determines that there is not a need for the assistance. 42 U. S. C. § 1439 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). In areas covered by an approved plan, the local governmental entity is afforded a 30-day period in which to object to the project on the ground that it is inconsistent with the municipality's approved housing-assistance plan. If such an objection is filed, the Secretary may nonetheless approve the application if he determines that the proposal is consistent with the housing-assistance plan. § 1439 (a). The local comment and objection procedures do not apply to applications for assistance involving 12 or fewer units in a single project or development. §1439 (b). The ability of local governments to block proposed § 8 projects thus depends on the size of the proposed project and the provisions of the approved housing-assistance plans. Under the 1974 Act, the housing-assistance plan must assess the needs of lower income persons residing in or expected to reside in the community and must indicate the general locations of proposed housing for lower income persons selected in accordance with the statutory objective of “promoting greater choice of housing opportunities and avoiding undue concentrations of assisted persons.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 5304 (a) (4) (A), (C) (ii) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See H. R. Rep. No. 93-1114, p. 8 (1974). See also City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (Conn. 1976). In view of these requirements of the Act, the location of subsidized housing in predominantly white areas of suburban municipalities may well be consistent with the communities’ housing-assistance plans.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFANO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. WESTCOTT et al. No. 78-437. Argued April 16, 1979 Decided June 25, 1979 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 93. William H. Alsup argued the cause for appellant in No. 78-437. On the brief were Solicitor General McCree and Sara Sun Beale. Paul W. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for appellant in No. 78-689. With him on the briefs were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and S. Stephen Rosenjeld, Assistant Attorney General. Henry A. Freedman argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief for appellees Westcott et al. were Kenneth P. Neiman and Michael B. Trister. Solicitor General McCree filed a brief for the federal appellee in No. 78-689. Together with No. 78-689, Pratt, Commissioner, Department of Public Welfare of Massachusetts v. Westcott et al., also on appeal from the same court. Buth Bader Ginsburg, Diana A. Steele, Phyllis N. Segal, and Nancy Duff Campell filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. Stephan Landsman, Anthony Touschner, Charles B. Guerrier, and Barbara Kaye Besser filed a brief for Cathy Stevens et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 78-437. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 407 of the Social Security Act, 75 Stat. - 75, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 607, part of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, provides benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of the father, but does not provide such benefits when the mother becomes unemployed. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that this distinction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and ordered that benefits be paid to families deprived of support because of the unemployment of the mother to the same extent they are paid to families deprived of support because of the unemployment of the father. 460 F. Supp. 737 (1978). In these appeals, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), in No. 78-437, challenges the holding on the constitutionality of § 407, but does not question the relief ordered by the District Court; the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (DPW), in No. 78-689, acquiesces in the decision on the merits, but contests the relief. I The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 49 Stat. 626, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., provides financial assistance to families with needy dependent children. The program is administered by participating States, in conformity with federal standards, and is financed by the Federal Government and the States on a matching-funds basis. King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316-317 (1968); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974). As originally enacted in 1935, the AFDC program provided benefits to families whose dependent children were needy because of the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 418 (1977). This provision, which forms the core of the AFDC program today, is gender neutral: benefits are available to any family so long as one parent of either sex is dead, absent from the home, or incapacitated, and the family otherwise meets the financial requirements of eligibility. 42 U. S. C. § 606. In 1961, and again in 1962, Congress temporarily extended the AFDC program to provide assistance to families whose dependent children were deprived of support because of a parent’s unemployment. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S., at 419; Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 709-710 (1975). Again, this provision was gender neutral. A “dependent child,” for purposes of determining eligibility for AFDC benefits, was defined to include “a needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment ... of a parent.” 75 Stat. 75 (emphasis added). In 1968, as part of a general revision of the Social Security Act, Congress made this extension permanent. In so doing, however, it added a gender qualification to the statute. The definition of “dependent child” in § 407 was amended to include a “needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment ... of his father.” 42 U. S. C. § 607 (a) (emphasis added). This portion of the AFDC program is known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF). Although all 50 States have chosen to participate in the basic AFDC program, only 26 States (plus Guam and the District of Columbia) take part in the AFDC-UF program. One of these is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Appellees are two couples who, it is stipulated, satisfy all the requirements for AFDC-UF benefits except for the requirement that the unemployed parent be the father. Cindy and William Westcott are married and have an infant son. They applied to the Massachusetts DPW for public assistance, but were informed that they did not qualify because William, who was unable to find work, had not previously been employed for a sufficient period to qualify as an “unemployed” father under the Act and applicable regulations. Cindy, until her recent unemployment, was the family breadwinner, and would have satisfied the “unemployment” criteria had she been male. Susan and John Westwood are also married and have an infant son. They applied for Medicaid benefits as a family eligible for, but not receiving, AFDC-UF benefits. They, too, were turned down on the ground that John’s prior work history was insufficient. Susan, like Cindy Westcott, had been the family breadwinner before losing her job, and would have qualified the family for benefits had she been male. Appellees instituted this class action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, naming as defendants the Secretary of HEW and the Commissioner of the DPW. Appellees alleged that § 407 and its implementing regulations discriminate on the basis of gender in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court certified the case as a class action, and granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment. 460 F. Supp. 737 (1978). The court found that the gender qualification of § 407 was not substantially related to the achievement of any important governmental interests. 460 F. Supp., at 748-751. It was, rather, the product of an “archaic and over-broad generalization” — that “mothers in two parent families are not breadwinners, so that loss of their earnings would not substantially affect the families’ well being.” Id., at 751. The court accordingly declared § 407 unconstitutional “insofar as it establishes a classification which discriminates . . . solely on the basis of sex.” 460 F. Supp., at 754. The District Court then turned to the question of relief. The court saw two remedial alternatives: a simple injunction against further operation of the AFDC-UF program, or extension of the program to all families with needy children where either parent is unemployed. Id., at 753. The court decided that extension, rather than nullification, was the proper remedial course; it noted the strength of Congress’ commitment to the “specific goal of assisting needy children,” and emphasized that if provision of benefits “were halted because of the constitutional defect, many persons would lose their very means of subsistence.” Id., at 753-754. The court therefore, by order dated April 20, 1978, enjoined the Commissioner from refusing to grant benefits to families made needy by the unemployment of the mother “in the same amounts and under the same standards” as he grants benefits to families made needy by the unemployment of the father. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, pp. 41A-42A. The court likewise enjoined the Secretary from refusing to provide federal matching funds for payment of such benefits. Id., at 40A-41A. Although the Commissioner originally had agreed that this was the appropriate remedy, Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 6, he later sought modification of the District Court’s order, so as to effect a more limited extension of the AFDC-UF program. The Commissioner requested that he be permitted to pay benefits “only to those families where needy children have been deprived of parental support or care by the unemployment of the family’s principal wage-earner.” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 3a (emphasis added). This modification, he argued, would accomplish a gender-neutral extension of the program at a much lower cost. Id., at 4a. On August 9, 1978, the District Court denied the Commissioner’s motion, believing that “any reformulation of the statutory scheme . . . which goes beyond the remedy already ordered in this case is properly left to Congressional action.” Id., at 13a. The Secretary, pursuant to 28 U. S. C § 1252, appealed directly to this Court from the District Court’s April 20 decision holding § 407 unconstitutional. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, p. 43A. The Commissioner took a separate appeal, also pursuant to § 1252, from the District Court’s August 9 refusal to modify its remedial order. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 15a. We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for argument. 439 U. S. 1044 (1978). II THE SECRETARY’S APPEAL The Secretary advances two arguments in support of .the constitutionality of § 407. First, he contends that although § 407 incorporates a gender distinction, it does not discriminate against women as a class. Second, he urges that the distinction is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective: the need to deter real or pretended desertion by the father in order to make his family eligible for AFDC benefits. A The Secretary readily concedes that § 407 entails a gender distinction. Brief for Appellant in No. 78-437, p. 36. He submits, however, that the Act does not award AFDC benefits to a father where it denies them to a mother. Rather, the grant or denial of aid based on the father’s unemployment necessarily affects, to an equal degree, one man, one woman, and one or more children. As the Secretary puts it, even if the statute is “gender-based,” it is not “gender-biased.” Ibid. We are not persuaded by this analysis. For mothers who are the primary providers for their families, and who are unemployed, § 407 is obviously gender biased, for it deprives them and their families of benefits solely on the basis of their sex. The Secretary’s argument, at bottom, turns on the fact that the impact of the gender qualification is felt by family units rather than individuals. But this Court has not hesitated to strike down gender classifications that result in benefits being granted or denied to family units on the basis of the sex of the qualifying parent. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) (military quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975) (survivor’s benefits); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (survivor’s benefits); Califano v. Jablon, 430 U. S. 924 (1977), summarily aff’g 399 F. Supp. 118 (Md. 1975) (spousal benefits). Here, as in those cases, the statute “discriminates against one particular category of family — that in which the female spouse is a wage earner.” Goldfarb, 430 U. S., at 209 (plurality opinion). The Secretary appears to acknowledge the force of these precedents, but suggests that each involved benefits that either were a form of compensation earned by a woman as a member of the labor force, or were directly related to such compensation. In the present case, in contrast, the benefits are part of a noncontributory welfare program. Thus, the Secretary argues, the gender qualification of § 407 is distinguishable from those contained in the earlier cases, for it does not denigrate “the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.” Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 645. The distinction between employment-related benefits and other forms of government largesse may be relevant to equal protection analysis, for example in determining whether the differential treatment of survivor’s benefits denigrates the efforts of the deceased spouse. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 645-647; Goldfarb, 430 U. S., at 206-207 (plurality opinion). This does not mean, however, that the Constitution is indifferent to a statute that conditions the availability of noncontributory welfare benefits on the basis of gender. The Secretary’s argument to the contrary in effect invites a return to the discredited view that welfare benefits are a “privilege” not subject to the guarantee of equal protection. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971). Putting labels aside, the exclusion here is if anything more pernicious than those in Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, and Goldfarb. AFDC-UF benefits are not “fringe benefits,” nor are they a type of social assistance paid without regard to need. Rather, they are subsistence payments made available as a last resort to families that would otherwise lack basic necessities. The deprivation imposed by § 407, moreover, is not a mere procedural barrier, like the proof-of-dependency requirement in Frontiero and Goldfarb, but is an absolute bar to qualification for aid. We therefore reject the contention that the classification imposed by § 407 does not discriminate on the basis of gender. B The Secretary next argues that the gender distinction imposed by § 407 survives constitutional scrutiny because it is substantially related to achievement of an important governmental objective. Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 316-317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976). The Secretary identifies two important objectives served by § 407. First and most obviously, the statute was intended to provide aid for children deprived of basic sustenance because of a parent’s unemployment. H. R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961). As then HEW Secretary Ribicoff put it in testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, “there is no justification whatsoever for denying to the child of the unemployed parent the food that you give to the child of the parent who deserts or is absent or dead.” Hearings on H. R. 3864 and 3865 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, S7th Cong., 1st Sess., 102 (1961). The appellant Secretary does not contend, however, that the gender qualification of § 407 serves to achieve this goal. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 7-8. Nor could he, since families where the mother is the principal wage earner and is unémployed are often in as much need of AFDC-UF benefits and Medicaid as families where the father is unemployed. Second, the statute was designed to remedy a structural fault in the original AFDC program. Under that program, a family was eligible for benefits if deprived of parental support because of the “continued absence from the home ... of a parent.” 42 U. S. C. §606 (a). In times of economic adversity, this provision was thought to create an incentive for the father to desert, or to pretend to desert, in order to make the family eligible for assistance. Section 407, by providing AFDC benefits to families rendered needy by parental unemployment, was intended to reduce this incentive and thereby promote the goal of family stability. The Secretary submits that reducing the incentive for the father to desert was an important objective of the AFDC-UF program, and he argues that the gender qualification is substantially related to its achievement. We perceive, however, at least two flaws in this argument. Although it is relatively clear that Congress was concerned about the problem of parental desertion, see S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 160 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961), there is no evidence that the gender distinction was designed to address this problem. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 648. Both the original AFDC program, and the temporary versions of the AFDC-UF program enacted in 1961 and 1962, were gender neutral. The gender qualification added to the permanent version of AFDC-TJF in 1968 escaped virtually unnoticed in the hearings and floor debates. The only explanation for this addition is contained in the following passage, which appears in nearly identical form in both the House and Senate Reports: “This program was originally conceived by Congress as one to provide aid for the children of unemployed fathers. However, some States make families in which the father is working but the mother is unemployed eligible for assistance. The bill would not allow such situations. Under the bill, the program could apply only to the children of unemployed fathers.” S. Rép. No. 744, at 160. See also H. R. Rep. No. 554, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 108 (1967). This suggests that the gender qualification was part of the general objective of the 1968 amendments to tighten standards for eligibility and reduce program costs. Congress was concerned that certain States were making AFDC-TJF assistance available to families where the mother was out of work, but the father remained fully employed and able to support the family. Apparently, Congress was not similarly concerned about States making benefits available where the father was out of work, but the mother remained fully employed. From all that appears, Congress, with an image of the “traditional family” in mind, simply assumed that the father would be the family breadwinner, and that the mother’s employment role, if any, would be secondary. In short, the available evidence indicates that the gender distinction was inserted to reduce costs and eliminate what was perceived to be a type of superfluous eligibility for AFDC-UF benefits. There is little to suggest that the gender qualification had anything to do with reducing the father’s incentive to desert. Even if the actual purpose of the gender qualification was to deal with the problem of paternal desertion, it does not appear that the classification is substantially related to the achievement of that goal. The Secretary argues there is “[s]olid statistical evidence” that fathers are more susceptible to pressure to desert than mothers, and thus that Congress was justified in excluding families headed by unemployed mothers from the AFDC-UF program. - Brief for Appellant in No. 78-437, p. 33. We may assume, for purposes of discussion, that Congress could legitimately view paternal desertion as a problem separate and distinct from maternal desertion. Even so, the gender qualification of § 407 is not substantially related to the stated purpose. There is no evidence, in the legislative history or elsewhere, that a father has less incentive to desert in a family where the mother is the breadwinner and becomes unemployed, than in a family where the father is the breadwinner and becomes unemployed. In either case, the family’s need will be equally great, and the father will be equally subject to pressure to leave the home to make the family eligible for benefits. The Secretary urges that Congress could take “one firm step” toward the goal of eliminating the incentive to desert, quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 57-58 (1977). But Congress may not legislate “one step at a time” when that step is drawn along the line of gender, and the consequence is to exclude one group of families altogether from badly needed subsistence benefits. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489 (1955). We conclude that the gender classification of § 407 is not substantially related to the attainment of any important and valid statutory goals. It is, rather, part of the “baggage of sexual stereotypes,” Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S., at 283, that presumes the father has the “primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,” Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 10 (1975), while the mother is the “ 'center of home and family life/ ” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 534 n. 15 (1975). Legislation that rests on such presumptions, without more, cannot survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Ill THE COMMISSIONER’S APPEAL A “Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion,” Mr. Justice Harlan noted, “there exist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by the exclusion.” Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (concurring in result). In previous cases involving equal protection challenges to underinclusive federal benefits statutes, this Court has suggested that extension, rather than nullification, is the proper course. See, e. g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 637-638 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S., at 691 and n. 25 (plurality opinion). Indeed, this Court regularly has affirmed District Court judgments ordering that welfare benefits be paid to members of an unconstitutionally excluded class. E. g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977), aff’g 396 F. Supp. 308, 309 (EDNY 1975); Califano v. Silbowitz, 430 U. S. 924 (1977), summarily aff’g 397 F. Supp. 862, 871 (SD Fla. 1975); Jablon v. Califano, 430 U. S. 924 (1977), summarily aff’g 399 F. Supp. 118, 132-133 (Md. 1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975), aff’g 367 F. Supp. 981, 991 (NJ 1973); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973), aff’g 345 F. Supp. 310, 315-316 (DC 1972); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972), summarily aff’g 346 F. Supp. 1226, 1237 (Md.). The District Court ordered extension rather than invalidation by way of remedy here, and equitable considerations surely support its choice. Approximately 300,000 needy children currently receive AFDC-UF benefits, see 42 Soc. Sec. Bull. 78 (Jan. 1979), and an injunction suspending the program’s operation would impose hardship on beneficiaries whom Congress plainly meant to protect. The presence in the Social Security Act of a strong severability clause, 42 U. S. C. § 1303, likewise counsels against nullification, for it evidences a congressional intent to minimize the burdens imposed by a declaration of unconstitutionality upon innocent recipients of government largesse. There is no need, however, to elaborate here the conditions under which invalidation rather than extension of an under-inclusive federal benefits statute should be ordered, for no party has presented that issue for review. All parties before the District Court agreed that extension was the appropriate remedy. Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 6; Motion to Affirm 5; Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, p. 6 n. 5. Appellees support that remedy here, and the Secretary, while arguing in favor of § 407’s constitutionality, urges that, if the statute is invalidated, the District Court’s remedy should be affirmed. Brief for Federal Appellee in No. 78-689, pp. 5-10. The Commissioner likewise argues that extension, rather than nullification, is proper, Tr. of Oral Arg. 18; indeed, the Commissioner did not appeal from the District Court’s April 20 extension order, but only from its August 9 refusal to limit extension along “principal wage-earner” fines. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 15a. Since no party has presented the issue of extension versus nullification for review, we would be inclined to consider it only if the power to order extension were clearly beyond the constitutional competence of a federal district court. This Court’s previous decisions, however, which routinely have affirmed District Court judgments ordering extension of federal welfare programs, suggest strongly that no such remedial incapacity exists. B The narrower question presented by the Commissioner’s appeal concerns not the merits of extension versus nullification, but rather the form that extension should take. The District- Court ordered that benefits be paid to families in which either the mother or the father is unemployed within the meaning of the Act. The Commissioner agrees that either the mother’s or the father’s unemployment should be able to qualify a needy family for benefits, but proposes to award them only if the parent in question can show that he or she is both unemployed and the family’s “principal wage-earner.” Citing the legislative history of the AFDC-UF program, the Commissioner argues that his proposed remedy comports with Congress’ intent to aid families made needy by their breadwinner’s unemployment. This argument, as the preceding portions of this opinion show, is not without force. We may assume arguendo that, if Congress knew in 1968 what it knows now, it might well have adopted the “principal wage-earner” model suggested by the Commissioner. But this does not mean that the AFDC-UF program should be restructured along these lines by a federal court. First, the Commissioner's proposed remedy would have the effect of terminating benefits to many families currently receiving them. Under the Act and implementing regulations, benefits are paid to needy families of all unemployed fathers, whether or not the father is actually the “principal wage-earner.” See 42 U. S, C. § 607 (a); 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1978). No one contends that the Act and regulations, insofar as they provide benefits to families of <all unemployed fathers, are invalid. Absent some such showing of invalidity, we would hesitate to terminate needy families’ entitlement to statutory benefits merely because the unemployed father cannot prove “breadwinner” status. Second, the Commissioner’s proposed remedy would involve a restructuring of the Act that a court should not undertake lightly. Whenever a court extends a benefits program to redress unconstitutional underinclusiveness, it risks infringing legislative prerogatives. The extension ordered by the District Court possesses at least the virtue of simplicity: by ordering that “father” be replaced by its gender-neutral equivalent, the court avoided disruption of the AFDC-UF program, for benefits simply will be paid to families with an unemployed parent on the same terms that benefits have long been paid to families with an unemployed father. The “principal wage-earner” solution, by contrast, would introduce a term novel in the AFDC scheme, and would pose definitional and policy questions best suited to legislative or administrative elaboration. The Commissioner, with his “principal wage-earner” gloss on parental unemployment, in essence asks this Court to redefine “unemployment” within the meaning of the Act. Yet “Congress in § 407 (a) expressly delegated to the Secretary the power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes 'unemployment’ for purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term.” Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S., at 425 (emphasis in original). The remedy the Commissioner proposes, of course, undeniably would be cheaper than the remedy the District Court decreed, in part because it would terminate some current recipients’ eligibility. Although cost may prove a dispositive factor in other contexts, we do not regard it as controlling here. The United States, which will bear the main burden of added coverage through federal matching grants, urges that the District Court’s remedy be affirmed. The AFDC-UF program, furthermore, is optional with the States, id., at 431, and any State is free to drop out of it if dissatisfied with the added expense. This Court, in any event, is ill-equipped both to estimate the relative costs of various types of coverage, and to gauge the effect that different levels of expenditures would have upon the alleviation of human suffering. Under these circumstances, any fine-tuning of AFDC coverage along “principal wage-earner” lines is properly left to the democratic branches of the Government. In sum, we believe the District Court, in an effort to render the AFDC-UF program gender neutral, adopted the simplest and most equitable extension possible. The judgment of the District Court accordingly is affirmed. It is so ordered. To be eligible for benefits under the AFDC-UF program, a family must meet both financial and categorical requirements. The financial requirements are determined by the participating States, and vary widely from one State to another. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 408-409 (1970). The categorical requirements, however, are largely determined by the Federal Government. The Act itself specifies that the father must have had 6 or more quarters of work in any 13-quarter period ending within one year prior to the application for aid, and must be currently employed for less than 100 hours per month. 42 U. S. C. § 607 (b) (1) (C). In addition, § 407 of the Act gives the Secretary of HEW authority to promulgate regulations further defining the “unemployment” that will render a family eligible for AFDC-UF benefits. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 (1977). The regulations, like the statute, speak in terms of the unemployment of the “father.”' 45 CFR §233.100 (a)(1) (1978). In States that participate in both the AFDC program and the Medicaid program, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq., individuals who qualify for AFDC benefits are also entitled to receive Medicaid benefits. § 1396a (a)(10). The class was defined as “those Massachusetts families with two parents in the home and with minor dependent children, born or unborn, who would otherwise be eligible for AFDC under Massachusetts AFDC program, and hence Medicaid as well, but for the sex discrimination in the federal statute [42 U. S. C. § 607] and Massachusetts regulations [6 CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 301, § 301.03; Pt. 303, Subpt. A, §§303.01 & 303.04] which provide for the granting of federally funded AFDC and Medicaid to families deprived of support because of the unemployment of their father, but not to families deprived of support because of the mother’s unemployment.” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, pp. 39A-40A. The Secretary does not contest the class certification. Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, p. 5 n. 4. The Commissioner proposed to define “principal wage-earner” as the parent whose earned income or unemployment compensation was greater during the six months preceding the month of application. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, pp. 7a-8a. During the Senate floor debate on the Conference Report, Senator Muskie briefly noted and opposed the gender limitation of § 407. 113 Cong. Rec. 36914 (1967). The overriding purpose of the 1968 AFDC amendments was “[t]o give greater emphasis to getting appropriate members of families drawing aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) payments into employment and thus no longer dependent on the welfare rolls.” H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1967). The principal changes in the AFDC-UF program designed to accomplish this end included provisions “to authorize a Federal definition of unemployment by the Secretary (but within certain limits set forth in the legislation), to tie the program more closely to the work and training program authorized by the bill, and to protect only the children of unemployed fathers who have had a recent attachment to the work force.” Id., at 108. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that both the House and Senate Reports included material dealing specifically with the problem of parental desertion, yet none of this material mentioned the gender qualification of § 407. H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 102-103 (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 160-163 (1967). “If any provision of this chapter, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.” 42 U. S. C. § 1303. The Act, for example, provides benefits to two-parent families made needy by the incapacity of either parent, regardless of which parent may have been the “principal wage-earner.” 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. IDAHO et al. No. 79-260. Argued February 25, 1980 Decided April 16, 1980 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 731. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for petitioner. On the briéf were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moorman, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, William Alsup, Jacques B. Gelin, and Edward J. Shawaker. David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were W. Hugh O’Riordan and Josephine P. Beeman, Deputy Attorneys General. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Terry L. Crapo and Bex E. Lee for the Idaho Carey Act Development Association; and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, George Deukmejian of California, J. D. MacFarlane of Colorado, Michael T. Greeley of Montana, Richard H. Bryan of Nevada, James A. Redden of Oregon, Robert B. Hansen of Utah, Slade Gorton of Washington, and John D. Troughton of Wyoming. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The Carey Act of 1894, ch. 301, § 4, 28 Stat. 422, 43 U. S. C. § 641, “to aid public-land States” in the reclamation of desert lands, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior upon proper application “to contract and agree, from time to time . . . binding the United States to donate, grant, and patent” such desert lands, not exceeding a specified acreage, as the State should cause to be irrigated, reclaimed, and occupied, provided, however, that the lands would be restored to the public domain if reclamation had not begun and plans were not carried out within stated time limits. Originally, each State covered by the Act was limited to one million acres; but in 1908, the ceiling for Idaho was raised to three million acres. Also, in 1910, upon request of a State, the Secretary was authorized to withdraw desert lands temporarily from the public domain prior to the State’s submission of a formal plan under the Carey Act. 36 Stat. 237, 43 U. S. C. § 643 (1970 ed.). Of all Carey Act patents issued, a large majority were issued early in the century, the scarcity of water for irrigation being primarily responsible for the absence of patents in the past 30 years. Improved technology for pumping from deep water sources, however, .among other things, has revived interest in reclaiming arid lands. In 1974, the State of Idaho, acting pursuant to 43 U. S. C. § 643, requested that an identified tract of some 27,400 acres be temporarily withdrawn from the public domain pending the submission of a proposed development plan as required by the Carey Act. In January 1975, the Idaho State Office, Bureau of Land Management, rejected the application in part because some of the lands requested had already been withdrawn for other purposes, including a portion being used as a stock driveway. Idaho appealed to the Interior Board of Land Appeals with respect to the lands previously withdrawn for stock-driveway purposes. Idaho also filed with the Board a petition under § 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1272, as amended, 49 Stat. 1976, 43 U. S. C. § 315f, for reclassification of the stock-driveway lands as suitable for use under the Carey Act. The Board, in its decision issued on July 31, 1975, found that the applicable regulations prevented it from withholding action on the Carey Act application pending a decision on the Taylor Act reclassification petition. The Board then rejected Idaho’s assertion that its Carey Act application took precedence over any withdrawal subsequent to the date of the Act because the Act was a grant in praesenti or because the grant, when the specified conditions were fulfilled, related back to the date of the Act. The Board adhered to its prior decision in State of Wyoming, 36 L. D. 399 (1908), which held that under the Carey Act “the acceptance of the offer of the State is a matter wholly within the discretion of the Department.” That being so, the State had no rights whatsoever to have any application approved. The Board further repeated Wyoming’s statement that if lands had been withdrawn for other purposes, the presumption that the withdrawal was proper is “conclusive,” the lands were not available for a claim under the Carey Act, and the State was not entitled to a hearing “for the purpose of determining whether or not [the Secretary’s] discretion has been properly exercised.” Id., at 400. The’ Board, therefore, affirmed the rejection of Idaho’s Carey Act application. The case was returned to the Bureau of Land Management for initial action on the petition for reclassification of the stock-driveway lands and for further action on the remaining lands covered by the application for temporary withdrawal. Meanwhile, in February 1975, the State of Idaho, through its appropriate officials, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho against the Secretary of the Interior. The State alleged that by virtue of the Carey Act, the United States “has bound itself to donate, grant and patent to the State of Idaho . . . three million acres of desert lands,” that “these lands are subject to temporary withdrawal and/or segregation upon [the State’s] request,” that the Secretary is “without any discretion to deny desert lands once requested,” and that the Secretary now asserts that “he will not allow the requests for segregation or withdrawal under the Carey Act as a matter of right.” The State prayed for a declaration of its rights under the Carey Act. The Secretary’s answer admitted that he would not allow requests for segregation or withdrawal as a matter of right but denied the remainder of the foregoing allegations. On cross-motions for summary judgment, Idaho submitted that the Carey Act had been an immediately effective grant, or at least that the United States was firmly obligated to contract with and patent the statutory acreage to Idaho when and if Idaho satisfied the statutory preconditions. In the State’s view, Carey Act applications took precedence over prior withdrawals. The Secretary, therefore, had been wrong to deny Idaho’s request for temporary withdrawal, even though the specified lands had already been withdrawn for other purposes. The United States, to the contrary, asserted that the Carey Act granted nothing to Idaho, had not obligated the Secretary to contract with Idaho with respect to any desert lands selected by the State, but had merely authorized the Secretary to contract if he, in his unbridled discretion, saw fit to do so. The Secretary, therefore, had committed no error and had not exceeded his authority under the Carey Act or any other law when he denied the petition for temporary withdrawal. The District Court, in its memorandum opinion and decision of July 15, 1976, rejected the State’s claim that the Carey Act was an in praesenti grant giving the State an absolute right to the acreage specified in the Act. The District Court went on to hold, however, (1) that Idaho was “guaranteed a maximum entitlement of three million acres of suitable desert land . . . which it cannot be deprived of by the Secretary of the Interior, if the State meets the conditions of the Carey Act”; (2) that “[t]he Secretary is under an obligation to, preserve enough desert land suitable for Carey Act development to fulfill the State’s right of entitlement, which the Federal Government must contract to donate to the State in accordance with the Act”; and (3) that “[t]o the extent the land has been withdrawn for other purposes” and the State desires the land for Carey Act development, “its remedy is to petition the Secretary to reclassify the lands suitable for Carey Act entry,” in which event “[t]he Secretary may not arbitrarily deny the State’s application for reclassification,” his ruling thereon being subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706. 417 F. Supp. 873, 881 (1976). The District Court went on to indicate its affirmance of the Interior Board of Land Appeals’ decision and to this extent granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. The Secretary moved for reconsideration and modification of the decision. The District Court again heard oral argument. After first suggesting that the District Court had erred in construing the Carey Act instead of merely sustaining the administrative action, the Secretary then agreed that the case had proceeded as a declaratory judgment action, or at least that it had a declaratory judgment dimension. The Secretary again presented his position that the Carey Act placed no obligation whatsoever on him to enter into any contract with Idaho or to approve any Carey Act application filed by the State. In this respect, the judge expressed his disagreement and on August 26, 1976, entered his judgment, which, as amended in minor respects on November 15, (1) rejected the State’s prayer for declaration of its absolute right to demand three million acres of the public domain without regard to any previous classifications and withdrawals and affirmed the decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals; (2) declared that Idaho is “entitled to have withdrawn and patented three million acres of the desert lands in the public domain,” provided that there are sufficient desert lands within the State of Idaho and provided that Idaho satisfies all the terms and conditions of the Act, and declared that by the Carey Act the United States had “bound itself to contract, donate, grant and patent to the State of Idaho, upon compliance with the stated conditions, . . . not to exceed three million acres [of desert land], as that sum may be reduced by prior patents issued pursuant to the Carey Act”; and (3) declared that with respect to desert lands presently withdrawn from the public domain for other purposes, the State’s remedy, should it desire to initiate Carey Act development on such lands, “is to petition the [Secretary] for temporary withdrawal under 43 U. S. C. Sec. 643 and/or under 43 U. S. C. Sec. 315f, and it is the duty of the [Secretary] to entertain and act upon said petition or petitions in accordance with the public land laws of the United States of America and in accordance with due and proper administrative procedures.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment “[u]pon the basis of the carefully written opinion” of the District Judge. 595 P. 2d 524 (1979). We granted the petition for writ of certiorari filed by the United States and presenting the single question whether the Carey Act “requires the Secretary of the Interior indefinitely to reserve from appropriation to other public or private uses some 2.4 million acres of desert land within Idaho for the eventuality that the State may be able and willing to select all or any part of such acreage for irrigation and reclamation under the Act.” 444 U. S. 914 (1979). I There is first the question raised at the oral argument of this cause whether there is a case or controversy between the State and the Secretary as to anything other than the State’s entitlement to the lands that had been withdrawn for stock-driveway purposes and that were involved in its Interior Department appeal; or, to put the matter another way, whether there is a real case or controversy with respect to the issue that the United States presented in its petition.for cer-tiorari, namely, whether the State was entitled to 2.4 million acres of desert land which the Secretary then must preserve for Carey Act development. Although the United States urged on appeal in the Court of Appeals that there was no case or controversy whatsoever, even as to any of the lands covered by Idaho’s Carey Act application for temporary withdrawal, the Court of Appeals apparently rejected the argument; the United States raised no jurisdictional question in its petition or its brief; and the Solicitor General at oral argument was of the opinion that the District Court and the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to enter the judgments that appear in this record. We have the same view. From the very outset, the State took the position that it is absolutely entitled to select and have withdrawn under the Carey Act up to 2.4 million acres of desert land, provided only that it satisfy the statutory preconditions. Whether or not the lands that it designated had already been withdrawn for other purposes, such as a stock driveway, it was the State’s view that the Secretary had no discretion to deny withdrawal of desert lands that the State selected. The Secretary, on the other hand, from the outset, denied that the State had any right to contract for desert lands under the Carey Act and asserted that it was within his discretion to deny any and all state requests for withdrawal or segregation of lands under the Carey Act, whether or not the selected lands were already in use for other purposes. These were the respective positions of the parties in the Interior Department proceedings, with the Interior Board of Land Appeals rejecting the State’s and adopting the Secretary’s position. These were also the positions of the parties in the District Court. The State and the Secretary were thus at odds over the proper construction of the Carey Act, over the State’s entitlement under the statute, and over the extent of the Secretary’s discretion. If the State was correct as to the meaning of the Act, the denial of its request for withdrawal of the stock-driveway lands was incorrect; but the denial was correct if the Secretary had the better view of the statute. We thus find it undeniable that there was a case or controversy between the Secretary and the State with respect to the approval of its Carey Act application and that the case or controversy in this respect turned on what rights, if any, the State had under this 1894 statute. Although at the time that the case was filed in the District Court, the State’s administrative appeal had not yet been decided, a case or controversy in the Art. Ill sense existed; and, in any event, administrative appellate procedures were soon exhausted. The District Court accepted the case as involving a review of the Secretary’s 'action.-and as requiring a declaration of the respective rights of the State and the Secretary under the Act. In proceeding to address the statutory issues tendered by the State, the District Court rejected both the position of the State and that of the Secretary. The State was entitled to up to 2.4 million acres of desert land for which the Secretary was obligated to contract with the State pursuant to the terms of the Act; but the Act was not a grant in praesenti, and the State did not have an absolute right to the particular desert lands that it happened to select. If the lands had been withdrawn for another public use pursuant to another statute, the State’s remedy was to request reclassification, which the Secretary could not arbitrarily deny. Under this approach, the Secretary was correct in denying the State’s request for immediate withdrawal of the lands already in use as a stock driveway; but the Secretary was quite wrong in claiming absolute discretion to deny any Carey Act application, including the State’s pending application insofar as it covered lands that had not yet been withdrawn for other purposes. These elements were included in the District Court’s judgment and were supported by its opinion. We find no jurisdictional barrier to the entry of such a judgment or to appellate review of that part of the judgment to which the United States objects as a misconstruction of the Carey Act and as an unwarranted extension of rights to the State that would, constitute a substantial interference with the authority of the Secretary to manage the public lands. II As was set out above, the judgment declared that Idaho is “entitled” to 2.4 million acres of Carey Act land and that the Secretary is “bound” to contract for such lands. Although the judgment did not prevent the Secretary from putting desert lands to other uses, the judgment, fairly read, would obligate the Secretary to contract with the States for lands selected by it that had not been so withdrawn, if the . State complied with the statutory conditions. The Secretary submits that the Act does not so drastically limit his discretion. He also understands these same provisions of the judgment to mean that he “must hold for eventual disposition under the Carey Act approximately 2.4 million acres of unappropriated desert lands.” Brief for Petitioner 8. At least that much desert land, he says, must be reserved and may not be put to other uses. Although the judgment does not so provide in so many words, it is fairly arguable that this is what the trial court intended, particularly because in its opinion, which the Court of Appeals made its own, the trial court held that the State is “guaranteed” the statutory acreage, “which it cannot be deprived of by the Secretary,” and that the Secretary is under an “obligation to preserve enough desert land suitable for Carey Act development” to fulfill the State’s entitlement. The precise meaning of the judgment in this respect, however, we do not further pursue; for as we understand the language and legislative history of the Carey Act, it neither requires the Secretary to hold the statutory acreage in reserve nor obliges him always to contract with the State for desert lands that the State selects from those parts of the public domain that have not been withdrawn for other purposes. The language of the Act “authorize^] and empower[s],” but does not direct, the Secretary to contract with the State upon the State’s proper application. This is permissive language, as compared with the obligatory statutory language requiring the Secretary to issue a patent once he has contracted with the State and the State has satisfied the contractual and statutory conditions. Furthermore, the Secretary may act only with the approval of the President, a provision which strongly suggests that the statutory discretion to contract is broader than merely determining whether the application on its face satisfies the statutory requirements. In ascertaining the meaning of the relevant language of the Act, it is important to note the circumstances of its adoption in 1894. The initial version of the Act was adopted in the Senate as an amendment to an appropriations bill that had already passed the House. The amendment, which was offered by Senator Carey of Wyoming, was in the form of a Senate bill that had previously been offered by the Senator and passed by the Senate but was still pending before a House committee. This bill, and the amendment to the appropriations bill, provided that each State could select up to the specified acreage of desert lands and that upon selection the lands would be immediately reserved from other entry and would be patented to the State upon proof that the selected land had been suitably reclaimed. The House conferees brought the amended appropriations bill before the House where a substitute for the Senate amendment was offered by Representative McRae and was adopted after full debate. The Conference Committee then adopted the House substitute, and it was this version that became known as the Carey Act. For present purposes, the principal difference between the Senate amendment and the McRae substitute was that the former provided for automatic reservation upon selection by the State and the latter did not. As Representative McRae explained, 26 Cong. Rec. 8391 (1894): “The Senate proposition makes a reservation outright for the States and will make it possible for the States to put a million of acres in each State in reservation for an indefinite period. . . . The pending proposition does not make any grant, but only authorizes the Secretary of the Interior with the approval of the President to make a contract with any States in which any of these lands may be situated. . . .” And again, id., at 8431: “This is no grant at all, but only gives authority to the Secretary of the Interior and President to make contracts binding the United States to donate the land to the States when reclaimed.” There are some indications during the debates, originating from both proponents and opponents of the provision, that perhaps a more substantive action was intended; but there is nothing that undercuts the explanation of Representative McRae as to the meaning of the markedly different language contained in the House substitute. Nor is there anything persuasive in the several later additions or amendments to the Carey Act to indicate that the Act reserved to the States or obligated the Secretary to contract for any particular acreage for Carey Act development. It has also been the consistent view of the Department of the Interior that the Carey Act does not grant or reserve any specified acreage of desert lands for development under the Carey Act. State of Wyoming, 36 L. D. 399 (1908), relied on by the Secretary in this case, stands for at least this much; and we have in other cases accorded a considerable deference to the responsible agency’s construction of the statute which it administers. Andrus v. Charlestons Stone Products Co., 436 U. S. 604, 613-614 (1978); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965); Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 460 (1920). It is also ascertainable from the Congressional Record, reflecting the proceedings connected with the 1908 amendments to the Carey Act, that the eight States covered by the Act had by that time selected approximately 2.72 million acres under the Carey Act but that less than half that amount, 1.12 million acres, had been approved and only 200,000 acres had gone to patent. One of the many reasons for rejections of selected lands had been that they were already in other legitimate use or that such use was being considered. 42 Cong. Rec. 6437 (1908). Against this background, we conclude that Congress did not intend to reserve any specific number of acres of desert land for any State under the Carey Act and that the Act does not prevent the Secretary from committing otherwise available parts of the public domain for any of the uses authorized under the various statutes relating to the use and management of the public lands, such as the Taylor Grazing Act under which part of the lands that Idaho sought in this case have been withdrawn. It is also clear that one of the reasons prompting the McRae substitute was to eliminate the right of the State under the Senate version to have automatically reserved, and to contract for the particular lands that it selected. As finally adopted, the Act does not oblige the Secretary automatically to contract for lands chosen by the State even if its application otherwise conforms to the statute. Hence, even though a State’s selection has not been withdrawn for other uses, as is the case with part of the land that Idaho applied for in this case, the Secretary need not always approve the application. The. District Court was therefore correct in remitting the State to a reclassification proceeding with respect to the land in use as.a stock driveway; but the District Court erred in declaring that the Act entitled the State to the statutory acreage in the sense that the Secretary was firmly bound to reserve such acreage and to contract for it as and when the State selected it.. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. So ordered. This legislation was prompted by a desire to prevent speculative filings under entry statutes on land chosen by a State for a Carey Act project. S. Rep. No. 367, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910); H. R. Rep. No. 662, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). After the decision and judgment of the District Court in this case, this provision was repealed by § 704 (a) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792. Under § 204 of FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1714, however, which gives the Secretary the general authority to make withdrawals, the Secretary construes his authority to allow him to withdraw public lands from entry pending submission of a formal plan under the Carey Act. On the State’s failure to appeal the denial with respect to the lands coveted by the application that had been withdrawn for purposes other than a stock driveway, the order as to these lands became final. The Board cited its stock-driveway regulations providing that “[l]ands withdrawn for driveways for stock ... are not subject to entry or disposition” and that applications for the acquisition of such lands shah be rejected. 43 CFR § 2313.1 (c) (1974). The Board also relied on a general regulation, 43 CFR § 2091.1 (a) (1974), providing in pertinent part that “applications which are accepted for filing must be rejected and cannot be held pending possible future availability of the land or interests in land, when approval of the application is prevented by . . . [withdrawal or reservation of lands.” The Board’s prior cases are also to this effect. The State alleged jurisdiction in the District Court “by virtue of a federal question existing and amounts of money involved ... in excess óf $10,000, exclusive of costs and interest.” The State also alleged jurisdiction “pursuant to the Federal A. P. A. (5 XJSC 701 et seq).” The complaint did not recite that the State.sought relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, but the District Court understood the complaint as seeking declaratory relief. In the Court of Appeals, the Secretary conceded that a case or controversy had existed with respect to the stock-driveway lands for which temporary withdrawal had been requested under § 643 but asserted that the controversy had become moot with the repeal of § 643. The Secretary now concedes, however, that under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, even though it repealed § 643, he has the same power of temporary withdrawal as he had under § 643. See n. 1, supra. The State has not cross petitioned from the holding that the Carey Act is not a grant in praesenti and that a Carey Act application does not automatically take precedence over prior withdrawals. The State as a respondent is not entitled, absent a cross-petition, to bring that issue before us; for a favorable ruling would enlarge the relief granted the State under the Court of Appeals judgment. The State does of course strongly urge, as it may, that it is entitled to at least what the District Court recognized to be its rights under the Carey Act. The Carey Act, 43 U. S. C. § 641, provides in pertinent part: “To aid the public-land States in the reclamation of the desert lands therein, and the settlement, cultivation and sale thereof in small tracts to actual settlers, the Secretary of the Interior with the approval of the President ... is authorized and empowered, upon proper application of the State to contract and agree, from time to time, with each of the States in which there may be situated desert lands . . . binding the United States to donate, grant, and patent to the State free of cost for survey or price such desert lands, not exceeding one million acres in each State, as the State may cause to be irrigated, reclaimed, occupied, and . . . cultivated by actual settlers . . . within ten yearn from the date of approval by the Secretary of the Interior of the State’s application for the segregation of such lands. . . .” Section 641 further provides that if the requirements as to reclamation are not satisfied within certain time periods, the Secretary may restore the lands to the public domain or may authorize limited extension of the deadlines. The District Court purported to find some support for its conclusion in Idaho Irrigation Co. v. Gooding, 265 U. S. 518, 521 (1924), where the Court recited that the Carey Act “binds” the United States to donate desert lands to the States. The passage referred to, however, does not say that the United States is bound to contract in the first instance. In any event, that case involved a dispute between an irrigation company and the owners of water rights pursuant to contracts with the company; and it was only in describing the background of the case that the Court referred to the Carey Act. There was no question in that case as to the scope of the State’s entitlement under the Act or the scope of the Secretary’s discretion. Attaching great significance to this recitation is unwarranted. Nor do we find the other state and federal cases that the District Court cited to be persuasive support for its conclusions as to the Secretary’s obligations. In 1896, Congress provided that patents could be issued when water had been supplied to the land without regard to settlement or cultivation. The same Act provided for liens against the lands prior to patent for the costs of reclamation. Act of June 11, 1896, § 1, 29 Stat. 434, 43 U. S. C. § 642. Although § 642 refers to the “grant” made under § 641, the context indicates that the word is loosely used to refer to the state laws enacted in acceptance of the terms of the Carey Act. Idaho, in fact, stresses that it, like 9 of the 11 other desert land States, specifically referred to the Carey Act’s “grants of land” when the State enacted legislative acceptances of the offer to obtain federal lands by reclamation. Brief for Respondents 12-13, and n. 6. Subsequent legislation did not touch on the issue at all. In 1908, an additional two million acres of desert lands were authorized for Carey Act selection in the State of Idaho, 43 U. S. C. § 645 and Joint Res. 28, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908), see 35 Stat. 577; and an additional one million acres in the State of Wyoming. 43 U. S. C. § 645. In 1909, the provisions of the Carey Act were extended to the States of Arizona and New Mexico, § 646, and to the former Ute Indian Reservation in Colorado. § 647. In 1910, as indicated in the text, § 643 with respect to temporary withdrawals was adopted. In 1911, the Act was extended to the Fort Bridger Military Reservation in Wyoming, Act of Feb. 16, 1911, ch. 90, 36 Stat. 913; and an additional one million acres were authorized for the States of Nevada and Colorado. 43 U. S. C. § 645. The Act was amended in 1920 with respect to rights of entry by settlers on lands covered by unsuccessful Carey Act projects. § 644. In 1921, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to extend the period of segregation or to restore the lands to the public domain when States failed to construct the anticipated reclamation works. § 641. Congress at no time indicated disagreement with the way that the Secretary was administering the Carey Act, at least as relevant to the issues in this case. During the discussion, Representative Gaines of Tennessee asked Representative French of Idaho to explain why the Secretary had not granted all Carey Act applications. Representative French replied: “The reason is this: We have a national reclamation law under which lands are being reclaimed; we have the Indian reservation law; we have lands that have passed into private ownership under the desert-land act and other laws. Sometimes it happens that an application for segregation under the Carey Act overlaps one or more of these propositions or tracts of land.” Prior to the District Court’s judgment, the Board also ruled on two other Carey Act applications by Idaho covering unwithdrawn and otherwise available land. Idaho Department of Water Resources, 25 I. B. L. A. 27 (1976); Idaho Department of Water Resources, 24 I. B. L. A. 314 (1976). The Secretary has not questioned the judgment and opinion of the District Court indicating that the Secretary’s refusal to reclassify withdrawn lands for Carey Act purposes would be subject to judicial review and would be set aside if arbitrary or capricious. Neither has the Secretary asserted that his rejection of a State’s application for withdrawal or segregation of appropriate desert lands in the public domain would not be subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706. To the extent that the claim of absolute discretion to approve or disapprove Carey Act applications is inconsistent with, the absence of a direct challenge to this aspect of the District Court’s decision or with the general standards for judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, we reject, as did the District Court, the claim of absolute discretion.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT et al. No. 02-1343. Argued January 14, 2004 Decided April 28, 2004 Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Jed R. Mandel, Timothy A. French, Jeffrey T. Green, Eric A. Shumsky, Kenneth S. Getter, Andrew J. Pincus, and John J. Sullivan. Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti, Deputy Solicitor General Hurgar, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clark, Jeffrey P. Minear, Greer S. Goldman, John A. Bryson, and R. Justin Smith. Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent South Coast Air Quality Management District were C. Boyden Gray, Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Luke A. Sobota, Daniel P. Selmi, Fran M. Layton, and Barbara Baird. Gail Ruderman Feuer and Christopher J. Wright filed a brief for respondents Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Catherine E. Stetson, Christopher T. Hardman, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers et al. by Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Stuart A. C. Drake, Eric B. Wolff, Julie C. Becker, Charles H. Lockwood II, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, G. William Frick, Ralph Colleli, Jr., Janice K. Raburn, and Douglas I. Greenhaus; and for the American Automotive Leasing Association et al. by Kipp A Coddington. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel M. Madeiros, Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Theodora Berger, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Craig C. Thompson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Susan L. Durbin, Deputy Attorney General, and Kristen M. Campfield, by Anabelle Rodriguez, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, Tom Reilly of Massachusetts, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Peter D. Smith of New Hampshire, Peter C. Harvey of New Jersey, Eliot Spitzer of New York, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Greg Abbott of Texas, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and Peggy A Lautenschlager of Wisconsin; for the American Academy of Pediatrics (California District) et al. by David M. Driesen; for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda and Timothy J. Dowling; for the Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition et al. by Gary S. Guzy; and for the Sunline Transit Agency by Lisa Garvin Copeland. A brief of amici curiae was filed for the American Road & Transportation Builders Association et al. by Lawrence J. Joseph, Robert Digges, Jr., and Mary Lynn Picket. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent South Coast Air Quality Management District (District) is a political subdivision of California responsible for air pollution control in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. and parts of surrounding counties that make up the South Coast Air Basin. It enacted six Fleet Rules that generally prohibit the purchase or lease by various public and private fleet operators of vehicles that do not comply with stringent emission requirements. The question in this case is whether these local Fleet Rules escape pre-emption under § 209(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 81 Stat. 502, as renumbered and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 7543(a), because they address the purchase of vehicles, rather than their manufacture or sale. I The District is responsible under state law for developing and implementing a “comprehensive basinwide air quality management plan” to reduce emission levels and thereby achieve and maintain “state and federal ambient air quality standards.” Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 40402(e) (West 1996). Between June and October 2000, the District adopted six Fleet Rules. The Rules govern operators of fleets of street sweepers (Rule 1186.1), of passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty vehicles (Rule 1191), of public transit vehicles and urban buses (Rule 1192), of solid waste collection vehicles (Rule 1193), of airport passenger transportation vehicles, including shuttles and taxicabs picking up airline passengers (Rule 1194), and of heavy-duty on-road vehicles (Rule 1196). All six Rules apply to public operators; three apply to private operators as well (Rules 1186.1, 1193, and 1194). The Fleet Rules contain detailed prescriptions regarding the types of vehicles that fleet operators must purchase or lease when adding or replacing fleet vehicles. Four of the Rules (1186.1, 1192, 1193, and 1196) require the purchase or lease of “alternative-fuel vehicles,” and the other two (1191 and 1194) require the purchase or lease of either “alternative-fueled vehicles” or vehicles that meet certain emission specifications established by the California Air Resources Board (CARB). CARB is a statewide regulatory body that California law designates as “the air pollution control agency for all purposes set forth in federal law.” Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 39602 (West 1996). The Rules require operators to keep records of their purchases and leases and provide access to them upon request. See, e. g., Rule 1186.1(g)(1), App. 23. Violations expose fleet operators to fines and other sanctions. See Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§42400-42410, 40447.5 (West 1996 and Supp. 2004). In August 2000, petitioner Engine Manufacturers Association sued the District and its officials, also respondents, claiming that the Fleet Rules are pre-empted by §209 of the CAA, which prohibits the adoption or attempted enforcement of any state or local “standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.” 42 U. S. C. § 7543(a). The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents, upholding the Rules in their entirety. It held that the Rules were not “standard[s]” under § 209(a) because they regulate only the purchase of vehicles that are otherwise certified for sale in California. The District Court recognized that the Courts of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits had previously held that CAA § 209(a) pre-empted state laws mandating that a specified percentage of a manufacturer’s in-state sales be of “zero-emission vehicles.” See Association of Int’l Automobile Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Mass. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 208 F. 3d 1, 6-7 (CA1 2000); American Automobile Mfrs. Assn. v. Cahill, 152 F. 3d 196, 200 (CA2 1998). It did not express disagreement with these rulings, but distinguished them as involving a restriction on vehicle sales rather than vehicle purchases: “Where a state regulation does not compel manufacturers to meet a new emissions limit, but rather affects the purchase of vehicles, as the Fleet Rules do, that regulation is not a standard.” 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1118 (CD Cal. 2001). The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the reasoning of the District Court. 309 F. 3d 550 (2002). We granted certiorari. 539 U. S. 914 (2003). II Section 209(a) of the CAA states: “No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part. No State shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the control of emissions ... as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment.” 42 U. S. C. § 7543(a). The District Court’s determination that this express preemption provision did not invalidate the Fleet Rules hinged on its interpretation of the word “standard” to include only regulations that compel manufacturers to meet specified emission limits. This interpretation of “standard” in turn caused the court to draw a distinction between purchase restrictions (not pre-empted) and sale restrictions (preempted). Neither the manufacturer-specific interpretation of “standard” nor the resulting distinction between purchase and sale restrictions finds support in the text of § 209(a) or the structure of the CAA. “Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 194 (1985). Today, as in 1967 when § 209(a) became law, “standard” is defined as that which “is established by authority, custom, or general consent, as a model or example; criterion; test.” Webster’s Second New International Dictionary 2455 (1945). The criteria referred to in § 209(a) relate to the emission characteristics of a vehicle or engine. To meet them the vehicle or engine must not emit more than a certain amount of a given pollutant, must be equipped with a certain type of pollution-control device, or must have some other design feature related to the control of emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the use of “standard” throughout Title II of the CAA (which governs emissions from moving sources) to denote requirements such as numerical emission levels with which vehicles or engines must comply, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 7521(a)(3)(B)(ii), or emission-control technology with which they must be equipped, e. g., § 7521(a)(6). Respondents, like the courts below, engraft onto this meaning of “standard” a limiting component, defining it as only “[a] production mandat[e] that require[s] manufacturers to ensure that the vehicles they produce have particular emissions characteristics, whether individually or in the aggregate.” Brief for Respondent South Coast Air Quality Management District 13 (emphases added). This confuses standards with the means of enforcing standards. Manufacturers (or purchasers) can be made responsible for ensuring that vehicles comply with emission standards, but the standards themselves are separate from those enforcement techniques. While standards target vehicles or engines, standard-enforcement efforts that are proscribed by §209 can be directed to manufacturers or purchasers. The distinction between “standards,” on the one hand, and methods of standard enforcement, on the other, is borne out in the provisions immediately following § 202. These separate provisions enforce the emission criteria — i. e., the §202 standards. Section 203 prohibits manufacturers from selling any new motor vehicle that is not covered by a “certificate of conformity.” 42 U. S. C. § 7522(a). Section 206 enables manufacturers to obtain such a certificate by demonstrating to the Environmental Protection Agency that their vehicles or engines conform to the §202 standards. §7525. Sections 204 and 205 subject manufacturers, dealers, and others who violate the CAA to fines imposed in civil or administrative enforcement actions. §§7523-7524. By defining “standard” as a “production mandate directed toward manufacturers,” respondents lump together §202 and these other distinct statutory provisions, acknowledging a standard to be such only when it is combined with a mandate that prevents manufacturers from selling noncomplying vehicles. That a standard is a standard even when not enforced through manufacturer-directed regulation can be seen in Congress’s use of the term in another portion of the CAA. As the District Court recognized, CAA § 246 (in conjunction with its accompanying provisions) requires state-adopted and federally approved “restrictions on the purchase of fleet vehicles to meet clean-air standards” 158 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118 (emphasis added); see also 42 U. S. C. §§7581-7590. (Respondents do not defend the District’s Fleet Rules as authorized by this provision; the Rules do not comply with all of the requirements that it contains.) Clearly, Congress contemplated the enforcement of emission standards through purchase requirements. Respondents contend that their qualified meaning of “standard” is necessary to prevent § 209(a) from pre-empting “far too much” by “encompass[ing] a broad range of state-level clean-air initiatives” such as voluntary incentive programs. Brief for Respondent South Coast Air Quality Management District 29; id., at 29-30. But it is hard to see why limitation to mandates on manufacturers is necessary for this purpose; limitation to mandates on manufacturers and purchasers, or to mandates on anyone, would have the same salvific effect. We need not resolve application of § 209(a) to voluntary incentive programs in this case, since all the Fleet Rules are mandates. In addition to having no basis in the text of the statute, treating sales restrictions and purchase restrictions differently for pre-emption purposes would make no sense. The manufacturer’s right to sell federally approved vehicles is meaningless in the absence of a purchaser’s right to buy them. It is true that the Fleet Rules at issue here cover only certain purchasers and certain federally certified vehicles, and thus do not eliminate all demand for covered vehicles. But if one State or political subdivision may enact such rules, then so may any other; and the end result would undo Congress’s carefully calibrated regulatory scheme. A command, accompanied by sanctions, that certain purchasers may buy only vehicles with particular emission characteristics is as much an “attempt to enforce” a “standard” as a command, accompanied by sanctions, that a certain percentage of a manufacturer’s sales volume must consist of such vehicles. We decline to read into § 209(a) a purchase/ sale distinction that is not to be found in the text of § 209(a) or the structure of the CAA. Ill The dissent expresses many areas of disagreement with our interpretation, but this should not obscure its agreement with our answer to the question “whether these local Fleet Rules escape pre-emption ... because they address the purchase of vehicles, rather than their manufacture or sale.” Supra, at 249. The dissent joins us in answering “no.” See post, at 262-263 (opinion of Souter, J.). It reaches a different outcome in the case because (1) it feels free to read into the unconditional words of the statute a requirement for the courts to determine which purchase restrictions in fact coerce manufacture and which do not; and (2) because it believes that Fleet Rules containing a “commercial availability” proviso do not coerce manufacture. As to the first point: The language of § 209(a) is categorical. It is (as we have discussed) impossible to find in it an exception for standards imposed through purchase restrictions rather than directly upon manufacturers; it is even more inventive to discover an exception for only that sw&category of standards-imposed-through-purchase-restrictions that does hot coerce manufacture. But even if one accepts that invention, one cannot conclude that these “provisos” save the day. For if a vehicle of the mandated type were commercially available, thus eliminating application of the proviso, the need to sell vehicles to persons governed by the Rule would effectively coerce manufacturers into meeting the artificially created demand. To say, as the dissent does, that this would be merely the consequence of “market demand and free competition,” post, at 263, is fanciful. The demand is a demand, not generated by the market but compelled by the Rules, which in turn effectively compels production. To think that the Rules are invalid until such time as one manufacturer makes a compliant vehicle available, whereupon they become binding, seems to us quite bizarre. The dissent objects to our interpretive method, which neither invokes the “presumption against preemption” to determine the scope of pre-emption nor delves into legislative history. Post, at 260-261. Application of those methods, on which not all Members of this Court agree, demonstrably makes no difference to resolution of the principal question, which the dissent (after applying them) answers the same as we. As for the additional question that the dissent reaches, we think the same is true: The textual obstacles to the strained interpretation that would validate the Rules by reason of the “commercial availability” provisos are insurmountable — principally, the categorical words of § 209(a). The dissent contends that giving these words their natural meaning of barring implementation of standards at the purchase and sale stage renders superfluous the second sentence of § 209(a), which provides: “No State shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment.” 42 U. S. C. § 7543(a). We think it not superfluous, since it makes clear that the term “attempt to enforce” in the first sentence is not limited to the actual imposition of penalties for violation, but includes steps preliminary to that action. Ibid. The sentence is, however, fatal to the dissent’s interpretation of the statute. It categorically prohibits “certification, inspection, or any other approval” as conditions precedent to sale. Why in the world would it do that if it had no categorical objection to standards imposed at the sale stage? Why disable the States from assuring compliance with requirements that they are authorized to impose? The dissent next charges that our interpretation attributes carelessness to Congress because §246 mandates fleet purchasing restrictions, but does so without specifying “notwithstanding” § 209(a). Post, at 264. That addition might have been nice, but hardly seems necessary. It is obvious, after all, that the principal sales restrictions against which § 209(a) is directed are those requiring compliance with state-imposed standards. What §246 mandates are fleet purchase restrictions under federal standards designed precisely for federally required clean-fuel fleet vehicle programs — which programs, in turn, must be federally approved as meeting detailed federal specifications. It is not surprising that a “notwithstanding” § 209(a) did not come to mind. Far from easting doubt upon our interpretation, § 246 is impossible to reconcile with the dissent’s interpretation. The fleet purchase standards it mandates must comply strictly with federal specifications, being neither more lenient nor more demanding. But what is the use of imposing such a limitation if the States are entirely free to impose their own fleet purchase standards with entirely different specifications? Finally, the dissent says that we should “admit” that our opinion pre-empts voluntary incentive programs. Post, at 265-266. Voluntary programs are not at issue in this case, and are significantly different from eommand-and-control regulation. Suffice it to say that nothing in the present opinion necessarily entails pre-emption of voluntary programs. It is at least arguable that the phrase “adopt or attempt to enforce any standard” refers only to standards that are enforceable — a possibility reinforced by the fact that the prohibition is imposed only on entities (States and political subdivisions) that have power to enforce. IV The courts below held all six of the Fleet Rules to be entirely outside the pre-emptive reach of § 209(a) based on reasoning that does not withstand scrutiny. In light of the principles articulated above, it appears likely that at least certain aspects of the Fleet Rules are pre-empted. For example, the District may have attempted to enforce CARB’s ULEV, SULEV, and ZEV standards when, in Rule 1194, it required 50% of new passenger-car and medium-duty-vehicle purchases by private airport-shuttle van operators to “meet ULEV, SULEV, or ZEV emission standards” after July 1, 2001, and 100% to meet those standards after July 1, 2002. See Rules 1194(d)(2)(A)-(B), App. 62. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the Fleet Rules are pre-empted in toto. -We have not addressed a number of issues that may affect the ultimate disposition of petitioners’ suit, including the scope of petitioners’ challenge, whether some of the Fleet Rules (or some applications of them) can be characterized as internal state purchase decisions (and, if so, whether a different standard for preemption applies), and whether § 209(a) pre-empts the Fleet Rules even as applied beyond the purchase of new vehicles (e. g., to lease arrangements or to the purchase of used vehicles). These questions were neither passed on below nor presented in the petition for certiorari. They are best addressed in the first instance by the lower courts in light of the principles articulated above. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. These Rules define “alternative-fuel vehicles” in varying ways, but all exclude vehicles that run on diesel. See Rule 1186.1(c)(2), App. 17 (a vehicle with an engine that “use[s] compressed or liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas (propane), methanol, electricity, or fuel cells. Hybrid-electric and dual-fuel technologies that use diesel fuel are not considered alternative-fuel technologies for the purposes of this rule”); Rule 1192(c)(1), id., at 47 (same definition as Rule 1186.1 for the most part, but also adds that the vehicle must “mee[t] the emission requirements of Title 13, Section 1956.1 of the California Code of Regulations”); Rule 1193(c)(1), id., at 52 (a vehicle that “uses compressed or liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, methanol, electricity, fuel cells, or other advanced technologies that do not rely on diesel fuel”); Rule 1196(c)(1), id., at 66-67 (same definition as Rule 1193 for the most part, but also adds that the vehicle must be “certified by the California Air Resources Board”). Rule 1191(c)(1), id., at 24-25, defines “alternative-fueled vehicle” as a vehicle that “is not powered by gasoline or diesel fuel and emits hydrocarbon, carbon monoxide, or nitrogen oxides, on an individual basis at least equivalent to or lower than a ULEV [acronym described in n. 3, infra].” Rule 1194(c)(2), App. 59, defines “alternative-fueled vehicle”, as a vehicle that “is not powered by gasoline or diesel fuel.” More specifically, Rules 1191(d), (e)(1), id., at 27-28, require that these vehicles comply with CARB’s Low-Emission Vehicle (LEV), Ultra-Low-Emission Vehicle (ULEV), Super-Ultra-Low-Emission Vehicle (SULEV), or Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) standards. Rule 1194(d), id., at 61-63, requires that the vehicles comply with the ULEV, SULEV, or ZEV standards. LEV, ULEV, SULEV, and ZEV are acronyms adopted by CARB as part of a federally approved emission reduction program. This program establishes five tiers of vehicles based on their emission characteristics: Transitional Low-Emission Vehicles (TLEVs); LEVs; ULEVs; SULEVs; and ZEVs. The tiers are subject to varying emission limitations for carbon monoxide, formaldehyde, nonmethane organic gases,' oxides of nitrogen, and particulate matter. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, §§ 1960.1(e)(3), (g), (h)(2), (p), § 1961(a) (2004). No vehicle may be sold in California unless it meets the TLEV, LEV, ULEV, SULEV, or ZEV requirements. See Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§43009, 43016-43017, 43102, 43105, 43150-43156 (West 1996). Additionally, manufacturers are obligated to meet overall “fleet average” emission requirements. The fleet average emission requirements decrease over time, requiring manufacturers to sell progressively cleaner mixes of vehicles. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, §§ 1960.1(g)(2), 1961(b) (2004). Manufacturers retain flexibility to decide how many vehicles in each emission tier to sell in order to meet the fleet average. See 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107,1113-1114 (CD Cal. 2001). Petitioner Western States Petroleum Association intervened as a plaintiff. Respondents Coalition for Clean Air, Inc., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Communities for a Better Environment, Inc., Planning and Conservation League, and Sierra Club intervened as defendants. The ZEV requirements at issue in these cases were virtually identical to those previously promulgated by CARB. See Association of Int’l Automobile Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Mass. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 208 F. 3d, at 1, 3; American Automobile Mfrs. Assn. v. Cahill, 152 F. 3d, at 199. The District Court reasoned that “[i]t is not rational to conclude that the CAA would authorize purchasing restrictions on the one hand, and prohibit them, as a prohibited adoption of a ‘standard,’ on the other.” 158 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118. This reasoning is flawed; it is not irrational to view Congress’s prescription of numerous detailed requirements for such programs as inconsistent with unconstrained state authority to enact programs that ignore those requirements. For a description of the ULEV, SULEV, and ZEV standards, see n. 3, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HUI et al. v. CASTANEDA, as personal representative of THE ESTATE OF CASTANEDA, et al. No. 08-1529. Argued March 2, 2010 Decided May 3, 2010 Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Elaine J. Goldenberg argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs for petitioner Stephen Gonsalves were Paul M. Smith, William M. Hohengarten, Matthew S. Hellman, and David P. Sheldon. Steven J. Renick and Patrick L. Hurley filed briefs for petitioner Esther Hui. Pratik A. Shah argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Kagan, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Barbara L. Herwig, Howard S. Scher, and David S. Cade. Conal Doyle argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Adele P. Kimmel, Amy Radon, Arthur H. Bryant, Leslie A. Brueckner, and Thomas M. Dempsey. Timothy B. Hyland filed a brief for the Commissioned Officers Association of the United States Public Health Service, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Jeffrey W. Sarles and Steven R. Shapiro; for National Experts on Health Services for Detained Persons by Jonathan S. Franklin and Tillman J. Breckenridge; for the National Immigrant Justice Center by Suzanne Sahakian and Charles Roth; and for Representative John Conyers, Jr., et al. by Jonathan S. Massey. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether 42 U. S. C. § 233(a), as added, 84 Stat. 1870, precludes an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), against U. S. Public Health Service (PHS) personnel for constitutional violations arising out of their official duties. When federal employees are sued for damages for harms caused in the course of their employment, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, generally authorizes substitution of the United States as the defendant. Section 233(a) makes the FTCA remedy against the United States “exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding” for any personal injury caused by a PHS officer or employee performing a medical or related function “while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” Based on the plain language of § 233(a), we conclude that PHS officers and employees are not personally subject to Bivens actions for harms arising out of such conduct. I Francisco Castaneda was detained by U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the San Diego Correctional Facility (SDCF) beginning in March 2006. According to the complaint later filed in the District Court, when Castaneda arrived at SDCF he had on his penis an irregular, raised lesion that measured roughly two centimeters square. Castaneda promptly brought his condition to the attention of medical personnel working for the Division of Immigration Health Services, reporting that the lesion was growing in size and becoming more painful and that it frequently bled and emitted a discharge. Petitioner Dr. Esther Hui, a civilian PHS employee, was the physician responsible for Castaneda’s medical care during his detention at SDCF. Petitioner Commander Stephen Gonsalves, a commissioned PHS officer, was a health services administrator at SDCF during the relevant period. Between March 2006 and January 2007, Castaneda persistently sought treatment for his condition. As his disease progressed, the lesion became increasingly painful and interfered with his urination, defecation, and sleep. In December 2006, Castaneda additionally reported a lump in his groin. A PHS physician’s assistant and three outside specialists repeatedly advised that Castaneda needed a biopsy to ascertain whether he had cancer. Petitioners denied requests for a biopsy and other recommended procedures as “elective.” App. 244, 249-251. Instead, Castaneda was treated with ibuprofen and antibiotics and was given an additional ration of boxer shorts. After a fourth specialist recommended a biopsy in January 2007, the procedure was finally authorized. Instead of providing treatment, however, ICE released Castaneda from custody on February 5. A week later, biopsy results confirmed that Castaneda was suffering from penile cancer. The next day, Castaneda had his penis amputated, and he began chemotherapy after tests confirmed that the cancer had metastasized to his groin. The treatment was unsuccessful, and Castaneda died in February 2008. Three months before his death, Castaneda filed suit against petitioners in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. As relevant, Castaneda raised medical negligence claims against the United States under the FTCA and Bivens claims against petitioners for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After Castaneda’s death, respondents — Castaneda’s sister, Yanira Castaneda, and his daughter, Vanessa Castaneda (by and through her mother, Lucia Pelayo)— amended the complaint to substitute themselves as plaintiffs. Yanira and Vanessa Castaneda are respectively the representative of and heir to Castaneda’s estate. Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims against them, contending that § 233(a) gives them absolute immunity from Bivens actions by making a suit against the United States under the FTCA the exclusive remedy for harms caused by PHS personnel in the course of their medical or related duties. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that §233(a)’s text and history evidence a congressional intent to preserve Bivens actions. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288-1295 (2008). Petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment that § 233(a) does not preclude respondents’ Bivens claims. Castaneda v. United States, 546 F. 3d 682 (2008). The court cited Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), for the proposition that a Bivens remedy is unavailable only when an alternative remedy is both expressly declared to be a substitute and can be viewed as equally effective, or when special factors militate against direct recovery. Looking to the statute’s text and history, the court noted that § 233(a) does not mention the Constitution or recovery thereunder and found it significant that §233 was enacted prior to this Court’s decision in Bivens. Drawing further support for its view from the statute’s legislative history and from subsequent congressional enactments, the Court of Appeals concluded that § 233(a) does not expressly make the remedy under the FTCA a substitute for relief under Bivens. For essentially the reasons given in Carlson, 446 U. S., at 20-23, the Court of Appeals also determined that the FTCA remedy is not equally effective as a Bivens remedy. Unlike the remedy under the FTCA, the court reasoned, a Bivens remedy is awarded against individual defendants and may include punitive damages. Additionally, Bivens cases may be tried before a jury, and liability is governed by uniform federal rules rather than the law of the State in which the violation occurred. After further concluding that no special factors militate against finding a remedy available in these circumstances, the court held that respondents’ Bivens action could proceed. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, its holding conflicts with the Second Circuit’s decision in Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F. 3d 99 (2000), which construed § 233(a) to foreclose Bivens actions against PHS personnel. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 557 U. S. 966 (2009). II A Our inquiry in this case begins and ends with the text of § 233(a). See Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U. S. 238, 254 (2000). The statute provides in pertinent part that “[t]he remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of title 28 . . . for damage for personal injury, including death, resulting from the performance of medical, surgical, dental, or related functions, including the conduct of clinical studies or investigation, by any commissioned officer or employee of the Public Health Service while acting within the scope of his office or employment, shall be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject-matter against the officer or employee (or his estate) whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” § 233(a) (emphasis added), Section 283(a) grants absolute immunity to PHS officers and employees for actions arising out of the performance of medical or related functions within the scope of their employment by barring all actions against them for such conduct. By its terms, § 233(a) limits recovery for such conduct to suits against the United States. The breadth of the words “exclusive” and “any” supports this reading, as does the provision’s inclusive reference to all civil proceedings arising out of “the same subject-matter.” We have previously cited § 233(a) to support the contention that “Congress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy.” Carlson, 446 U. S., at 20. The meaning of § 233(a) has become no less explicit since we last made that observation. Our reading of § 233(a)’s text is not undermined by the fact that the provision preceded our decision in Bivens. Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, that a Bivens remedy had not yet been recognized when § 233(a) was enacted does not support the conclusion that Congress, in making the remedy provided by the FTCA “exclusive of any other civil action,” did not mean what it said. Language that broad easily accommodates both known and unknown causes of action. The later enacted Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), 102 Stat. 4563, further supports this understanding of § 233(a). The Westfall Act amended the FTCA to make its remedy against the United States the exclusive remedy for most claims against Government employees arising out of their official conduct. In providing this official immunity, Congress used essentially the same language as it did in § 233(a), stating that the remedy against the United States is “exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding,” § 2679(b)(1). Notably, Congress also provided an exception for constitutional violations. Pursuant to § 2679(b)(2), the immunity granted by § 2679(b)(1) “does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government . . . brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States.” § 2679(b)(2)(A). The Westfall Act’s explicit exception for Bivens claims is powerful evidence that Congress did not understand the exclusivity provided by § 2679(b)(1) — or the substantially similar § 233(a) — to imply such an exception. Given Congress’ awareness of pre-existing immunity provisions like §233 when it enacted the Westfall Act, see United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160, 173 (1991), it is telling that Congress declined to enact a similar exception to the immunity provided by § 233(a). B In advocating a contrary reading of § 233(a), respondents rely heavily on our opinion in Carlson, as did the Court of Appeals. Carlson, however, is inapposite to the issue in this ease. There are two separate inquiries involved in determining whether a Bivens action may proceed against a federal agent: whether the agent is amenable to suit, and whether a damages remedy is available for a particular constitutional violation absent authorization by Congress. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U. S. 669, 684 (1987) (“[T]he availability of a damages action under the Constitution for particular injuries , . . is a question logically distinct from immunity to such an action on the part of particular defendants”). Even in circumstances in which a Bivens remedy is generally available, an action under Bivens will be defeated if the defendant is immune from suit. See, e. g., 403 U. S., at 397-398 (remanding for determination of respondents’ immunity after implying a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment). Because petitioners in Carlson invoked no official immunity, the Court did not address that question. Instead, it considered whether a remedy was available under the Eighth Amendment for alleged violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause notwithstanding that a federal remedy was also available under the FTCA. 446 U. S., at 16-17. Many of our subsequent Bivens decisions likewise addressed only the existence of an implied cause of action for an alleged constitutional violation. See, e. g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U. S. 537, 549 (2007) (declining “to devise a new Bivens damages action for retaliating against the exercise of ownership rights”); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 368 (1983) (declining to “authorize a new nonstatutory damages remedy for federal employees whose First Amendment rights are violated by their superiors”). This case presents the separate question whether petitioners are immune from suit for the alleged violations. To determine a defendant’s amenability to suit, we consider whether he or she may claim the benefits of official immunity for the alleged misconduct. Because petitioners invoke only the immunity provided by § 233(a), the question in this case is answered solely by reference to whether that provision gives petitioners the immunity they claim. As noted, the text of § 233(a) plainly indicates that it precludes a Bivens action against petitioners for the harm alleged in this case. Respondents offer three arguments in support of their claim that it does not. None persuades us that § 233(a) means something other than what it says. Respondents first contend that § 233(a) incorporates the entirety of the FTCA, as amended by the Westfall Act, through its reference to § 1346(b). Section 1346(b) in turn refers to “the provisions of chapter 171,” which constitute the FTCA, including the Westfall Act’s exception for claims “brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States,” § 2679(b)(2)(A). Through this series of cross-references, respondents would read that exception for Bivens actions into § 233(a). Section 233(a) is not susceptible of this reading. As petitioners observe, that provision refers only to “[t]he remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672.” § 233(a) (emphasis added). Thus, only those portions of chapter 171 that establish the FTCA remedy are incorporated by §233(a)’s reference to § 1346. Section 2679(b) is not such a provision. Section 233(a)’s reference to §2672 — which is codified in chapter 171 — also belies respondents’ theory. If § 233(a)’s reference to § 1346(b) served to incorporate all the provisions of chapter 171, the separate reference to §2672 would be superfluous. Respondents next argue that the Westfall Act’s Bivens exception, § 2679(b)(2)(A), directly preserves a Bivens action against PHS officers and employees. That § 2679(b)(2)(A) by its terms applies only to the specific immunity set forth in “[paragraph (1)” belies respondents’ claim. Moreover, if § 233(a) forecloses a Bivens action against PHS personnel, respondents’ reading of § 2679(b)(2)(A) would effect an implied repeal of that more specific provision. Although we noted in Smith that 12679(b) applies to all federal employees, see 499 U. S., at 173, we had no occasion to consider whether the Bivens exception in § 2679(b)(2)(A) impliedly repealed pre-existing immunity provisions to the extent of any inconsistency. “As we have emphasized, repeals by implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest.” Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U. S. 163, 175 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Respondents have pointed to nothing in § 2679(b)’s text or drafting history that suggests that Congress intended to repeal the more comprehensive immunity provided by § 233(a). Finally, respondents contend that other features of §233 show that subsection (a) does not make the remedy under the FTCA exclusive of all other actions against PHS personnel. Respondents first note § 233’s lack of a procedure for “scope certification” in federal-court actions. Under the FTCA, “certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose” transforms an action against an individual federal employee into one against the United States. § 2679(d)(1). Because § 233 does not provide a similar mechanism for scope certification in federal-court actions, respondents contend that PHS defendants seeking to invoke the immunity provided by § 233(a) must rely on the FTCA’s scope certification procedure, set forth in § 2679(d). Section 2679(d), respondents note, is in turn subject to the “limitations and exceptions” applicable to actions under the FTCA — including the exception for Bivens actions provided by § 2679(b)(2). See § 2679(d)(4). We agree with petitioners that there is no reason to think that scope certification by the Attorney General is a prerequisite to immunity under § 233(a). To be sure, that immunity is contingent upon the alleged misconduct having occurred in the course of the PHS defendant’s duties, but a defendant may make that proof pursuant to the ordinary rules of evidence and procedure. As petitioners observe, proof of scope is in most § 233(a) cases established by a declaration affirming that the defendant was a PHS official during the relevant time period. See Reply Brief for Petitioner Hui 6-7, and n. 1. Thus, while scope certification may provide a convenient mechanism for establishing that the alleged misconduct occurred within the scope of the employee’s duties, the procedure authorized by § 2679(d) is not necessary to effect substitution of the United States. Finally, that the FTCA’s scope certification procedure was enacted almost two decades after § 233(a) confirms that Congress did not intend to make that procedure the exclusive means for PHS personnel to invoke the official immunity provided by § 233(a). Respondents’ argument based on § 233(f) is similarly unavailing. That subsection authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “hold harmless or provide liability insurance” for a PHS officer or employee for personal injuries caused by conduct occurring “within the scope of his office or employment... if such employee is assigned to a foreign country ... and if the circumstances are such as are likely to preclude the remedies of third persons against the United States described in section 2679(b).” Noting that the FTCA precludes recovery against the United States for “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,” §2680(k), respondents urge that §233(f)’s authorization of insurance or indemnification in those circumstances anticipates that an injured party without a remedy under the FTCA may sue a PHS official directly. Accordingly, respondents contend, § 233(a) cannot be read to make the remedy under the FTCA truly exclusive. Even if that reading of § 233(f) were correct, it would not benefit respondents because an FTCA remedy is unquestionably available for the misconduct alleged in this case. For the foregoing reasons, respondents' arguments do not undermine our conclusion that the immunity provided by § 233(a) precludes Bivens actions against individual PHS officers or employees for harms arising out of conduct described in that section. * * * In construing § 233(a) in petitioners’ favor, we are mindful of the confines of our judicial role. Respondents’ amici caution that providing special immunity for PHS personnel is contrary to the public interest. Respondents likewise contend that allowing Bivens claims against PHS personnel is necessary to ensure an adequate standard of care in federal detention facilities, and they further urge that permitting such actions would not endanger PHS’ institutional interests as it would simply place PHS personnel in the same position as other federal employees who perform similar functions. See Brief for Respondents 52-55, 60-61. We are required, however, to read the statute according to its text. Because § 233(a) plainly precludes a Bivens action against petitioners for the harms alleged in this case, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Because this case comes to us on petitioners’ motion to dismiss, we assume the truth of respondents’ factual allegations. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Comm., 555 U. S. 246, 249 (2009). In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights. We subsequently found such a remedy available for violations of an individual’s rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 230 (1979). Although it does not bear directly on the question presented in this case, we note that while petitioners’ appeal was pending the Government filed a formal notice admitting liability with respect to respondents’ claims for medical negligence under the FTCA. App. 329. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because district court orders denying absolute immunity constitute “final decisions” for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1291. See 546 F. 3d, at 687 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 524-527 (1985)); see also Osborn v. Haley, 549 U. S. 225, 238-239 (2007). Prior to the Westfall Act amendments, the FTCA authorized substitution of the United States as a defendant in suits against federal employees for harms arising out of conduct undertaken in the scope of their employment, see 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b) (1982 ed.), but it made that remedy “exclusive” only for harms resulting from a federal employee’s operation of a motor vehicle, § 2679(b). We express no opinion as to whether a Bivens remedy is otherwise available in these circumstances, as the question is not presented in this case. Section 1346(b) provides in pertinent part that, “[sjubject to the provisions of chapter 171 of [Title 28], the district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” Section 2672 authorizes agency heads and their designees to “consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any claim for money damages against the United States for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” Section 233(c) indudes such a provision for state-court actions, authorizing removal to federal court “[u]pon a certification by the Attorney General that the defendant was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of which the suit arose,” but unlike § 2679(d) it does not prescribe a particular mechanism for substituting the United States in federal-court actions. As respondents note, the Westfall Act substantially limited the effect of § 233(f). See Brief for Respondents 32 (citing United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160, 166-167 (1991)). But because the Act does not weaken any inference about the meaning of § 233(a) that might be drawn from § 233(f), the changes effected by the Act are not relevant to the instant inquiry. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 25-28; Brief for National Experts on Health Services for Detained Persons as Amici Curiae 17-24; Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 20-21; Brief for Rep. John Conyers, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae 25-31.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. No. 330. Argued March 2, 1949. Decided June 20, 1949. Stanley M. Silverberg and David O. Mathews argued the cause for the United. States. With them on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Bergson and Philip Elman. Daniel W. Knowlton argued the cause and filed a brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellee. Windsor F. Cousins argued the cause for the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. et al., appellees. With him on the brief were Hugh B. Cox, Robert C. Barnard, Charles P. Reynolds and Charles Clark. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. It is contended here that the United States as a shipper is barred from challenging in federal courts an Interstate Commerce Commission order which denies the Government a recovery in damages for exaction of an allegedly unlawful railroad rate. Other contentions if sustained would deny federal courts all power to entertain an action by any shipper challenging a Commission order denying damages to the shipper. During the war, existing tariffs of many railroads embodied wharfagé- charges to compensate the railroads for moving goods from railroad cars to piers and from piers to railroad cars. When the United States took over certain piers at Norfolk, Virginia, it began to perform these wharfage services for itself and requested the railroads to'make the United States an allowance for the expenses incurred in performing the services. The railroads refused to make an allowance. Upon this refusal the Government requested the railroads to perform the services' themselves. The railroads refused to perform the services. The United States filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a complaint against the railroads charging that exaction of pay for unperformed services was unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, excessive, and in violation of certain sections of the Interstate Commerce Act. The complaint asked the Commission to find the cnarges unlawful. Further relief asked, under the Interstate Commerce Act, was that the Government be awarded damages (reparations) on account of the alleged unlawful exactions. The Commission found that the charges were not unjustly discriminatory, unreasonable, or otherwise in violation of the Act. Accordingly, the Commission denied reparations and ordered the complaint dismissed. United States v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 269 I. C. C. 141 (1947). The United States brought this action in a United States District Court to set aside the Commission order. The complaint charged that the Commission’s conclusions were not supported by its findings, that the findings were not supported by any substantial evidence, that the order was based-on a misapplication of law and was “otherwise arbitrary, capricious and without support in and pontrary to law and the evidence.” The Interstate Commerce Commission was made a defendant. The United States was also made a defendant because of a statutory requirement that any action to set aside an order, of the Interstate Commerce Commission “shall be brought . . . against the United States.” 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 46, now § 2322. Railroads that collected the wharfage, charges intervened as defendants under authority of 28. U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 45a, now § 2323. The'Attorney General appeared for the Government as both plaintiff and defendant. Without reaching the merits of the case, the District Court composed of three judges dismissed the cause on the theory that the Govérnment could not maintain a suit against itself. - The court also indicated its belief that a three-judge court was without jurisdiction of the suit. 78 F. Supp. 580. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 47a, now § 1253. In this Court the Commission and the railroad intervenor defendants support the District Court’s dismissal for the reasons given by that court. Alternative reasons are also urged. We hold that the dismissal was error and that the case should have been considered on its merits. First. There is much argument with citation of many cases to establish the long-recognized general principle that no person may sue himself. Properly understood the general principle is sound, for courts only adjudicate justiciable controversies. They do not engage in the academic pastime of rendering judgments in favor of persons against themselves. Thus a suit filed by John Smith against John Smith might present no case or controversy which courts could determine. But one person named John Smith might have a justiciable controversy with another John Smith: This illustrates that courts must look behind names that symbolize the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is presented. While this case is United States v. United States, et al., it involves .controversies of a type which are traditionally justiciable. The basic question is whether railroads have illegally exacted sums of money from the United States. Unless barred by statute, the Government is not less entitled than any other shipper to invoke administrative and judicial protection. To collect the alleged illegal- exactions from the railroads the United States instituted, proceedings before the-Interstate Commerce Commission, . In pursuit of the same, objective the Government challenged the legality of the Commission’s action. This suit therefore.is a Step in proceedings to settle who is legally entitled to sums of money, the Government or the railroads. The order if valid wodld defeat the Government’s claim to that money. But the Government charged that the order was issued arbitrarily and without substantial evidence. This charge alone would be enough to present a justiciable controversy. Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 262-266. Consequently, the established principle that a person cannot create a justiciable controversy against himself has no application here. Second. It is contended that the provisions of the Act making the Government a statutory defendant in court actions challenging Commission orders, show a congressional purpose to bar the Government from challenging such orders. Legislative history is cited in support of this contention. If the. contention be accepted, Congress by making the Government a statutory defendant in such cases has deprived the United States as a shipper of powers of self-protection accorded all other shippers. We cannot agree that Congress intended to make it impossible for the Government to press a just claim which could be vindicated only by a court challenge of a Commission order. See United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 279. In support of their contention that Congress did not intend for the Government to press its claims as a shipper, the Commission and railroads emphasize the anomaly of having the Attorney General appear on both sides of the same controversy. However anomalous, this situation results from the statutes defining the Attorney General’s duties. The Interstate Commerce Act requires the Attor-r ney General to appear for the Government as a statutory defendant in cases challenging Commission orders. 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 45a, now § 2323. The Attorney General is also, under a statutory duty “to determine when the United States shall sue, to decide for what, it shall sue, and to be responsible that such suits shall be brought'in appropriate cases.” United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 279. See also United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 26-29. Nothing in the Interstate. Commerce Act indicates a congressional purpose to amend prior statutes which had imposed primary responsibility on the Attorney General to seek judicial, redress for the Government. Although the formal appearance of the Attorney General for the Government as statutory defendant does create a surface anomaly, his representation of the Government as a shipper does not in any way prevent a full defense of the Commission’s order. The Interstate Commerce Act contains adequate provisions for protection of Commission orders by the Commission and by the railroads when, as here, they are the real parties in interest. Eor, whether the Attorney General defends or not, the Commission and the railroads are authorized to interpose all defenses to the Government’s charges and claims that can be interposed to charges and claims of other shippers. In this case the Commission and the railroads have availed themselves of this statutory authorization. They have vigorously defended the legality of the allowances and the validity of the Commission order at every stage of the litigation. Third. 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 41 (28) provides that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction . Of' cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” The legal consequences of this order if-upheld will finally relieve the railroad of any' obligations to the Government on account of the alleged unlawful charges; the order thus falls squarely within the type made subject to judicial review by § 41 (28). Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 131-132, 142-143; El Dorado Oil Works v. United States, 328 U. S. 12, 18-19. The Commission and the railroads contend, however,that § 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 9, bars the United States or any other shipper from judicial review of an order denying damages in reparation proceedings initiated before the Commission.. Section 9 provides-in part: “Any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier . . . may either make complaint to the commission ... or may bring suit . . . for the recovery of the damages ... in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person or persons shall not have the right .to pursue both .of said remedies, and must in each case elect which one of the two methods of procedure herein provided for he or they will adopt.” The contention of the Commission and the railroads as to § 9 is this. A shipper has an alternative. He may bring his action before the Commission or before the courts. But he must make an election. If he elects to “bring suit” in a court and is unsuccessful, he retains the customary right of appellate review. If he elects to “make complaint to” the Commission, as the Government did, and relief, is denied, he is said to be barred by the statutory language of § 9 from seeking any judicial review of the Commission order. Under the contention the order is final and not reviewable by any court even though entered arbitrarily, without substantial supporting evidence, and in defiance of law. Such a sweeping contention for administrative finality is out of harmony with the general legislative pattern of administrative and judicial relationships. See, e., g., Shields v. Utah I. C. R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 181-185; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 307-310. And this Court has consistently held Commission orders reviewable upon charges that the Commission had exceeded its lawful powers. See, e. g., Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 91-93; Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 266. The language of § 9 does not suggest an abandonment of these consistent holdings. It does suggest that a shipper whot elects either to “make complaint to” the Commission or to “bring suit” in a court is thereafter precluded from initiating a § 9 proceeding in the other. . It may therefore be assumed that after a shipper has elected to initiate a Commission proceeding for damages he could not later initiate an original district court action for the same damages. But forfeiture of the right to initiate his claim in the court under § 9 is one thing; forfeiture of his fight under 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) §41 (28), now § 1336,. to obtain judicial review of an unlawful Commission order is another. Section 9’s language controls the forum in which reparation claims may be begun-and tried to judgment or order; it does not-purport to-give complete finality to a-court judgment or to a Commission, order merely because a shipper elected to proceed in one forum rather than the other. So we can find nothing in the language of § 9 that bars á court from reviewing a reparation order upon allegations by a shipper that the order was entered in defiance of standards established by Congress to determine when reparations are due. Furthermore, the section’s careful provision for judicial protection of railroads against improper Commission awards argues against interpretation of the same section to deny to shippers any judicial review whatever. Under the suggested interpretation a shipper could recover nothing if the Commission decided against him. But a Commission award favorable to a shipper is not final or binding upon the railroad. Such an award “only establishes a rebuttable presumption. It cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle to a full contestation of all the issues, and takes no question of fact from either court or jury. ... Nor does it in any wise work a denial of due process of law.” Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412, 430. And see Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Weber, 257 U. S. 85, 90-91. It hardly seems possible to. find from the language of § 9 a congressional intent to guarantee railroads complete judicial review of adverse reparation orders while denying shippers any judicial review at all. What we have said would dispose of the § 9 contention but for the argument of the Commission and the railroads that their suggested interpretation of the section is required by this Court’s holding in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 235, and other cases that followed it. In that case the Standard Oil Co., a shipper, was denied the right to judicial review of a-Commission order denying reparations. Judicial review was denied on four grounds: (1) The order in the Standard Oil case denying reparations was “negative” in form, and was therefore beyond judicial appraisal under the “negative order” doctrine. This doctrine was wholly abandoned in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125. (2) The decision in the Standard Oil case held that the Commission order was supported by substantial evidence and was not otherwise in violation of law. The Government’s claim here is that this order cannot meet that test. (3) The third ground for denial of judicial review was that having elected to test its damage claim before the Commission, Standard was precluded from judicial review. (4) A three-judge court' was an improper tribunal to adjudicate damage claims under § 9. The Standard Oil interpretation of § 9 denying shippers any judicial review was made by a court usually careful to protect against arbitrary or unlawful administrative action. And, as shown, the court there first satisfied itself that the Commission order was not the product of an unlawful exercise of power by the Commission. Furthermore, the “negative order” philosophy, then at its peak, clearly barred review of all orders denying reparations. Consequently, the Standard Oil §9 interpretation barred judicial review of no class of Commission orders except orders already immune from such review under the “negative order” doctrine. The Standard Oil holding was thus clearly supported by and rooted in the now rejected “negative order” doctrine. Another reason for the Court’s construction of § 9 in the Standard Oil case was that Standard’s damage claim could have been adjudicated by a district court since it involved no question as to reasonableness of rates that called for exercise of the Commission’s primary jurisdiction. The importance of this factor was emphasized by this Court in applying the Standard Oil construction of § 9 in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Brady, 288 U. S. 448, 457-459. First pointing out that there was no question in that case “requiring the exercise of the Commission’s administrative powers,” the Court said: “It is to be remembered that, by electing to call on the Commission for the determination of his damages, plaintiff waived his right to maintain an action at law upon his claim. But the carriers made no such election. Undoubtedly it was to the end that they be not denied the right of trial by jury that Congress saved their right to be heard in court upon the merits of claims asserted against them. The right of election given to a claimant reasonably may have been deemed an adequate ground for making the Commission’s award final as to him.” And see Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 297 U. S. 500, 507-508. Thus, a crucial support for the Court’s holding in the Standard Oil and Brady cases was that the shippers in those cases could have commenced original § 9 actions in the district court. But it has been established doctrine since this Court’s holding in Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, that a shipper cannot file a § 9 proceeding in a district court where his claim for damages necessarily involves a question of “reasonableness” calling for exercise of the Commission’s primary jurisdiction.. The Government’s claim here does involve such a question of “reasonableness.” For the allowances exacted’ from the Government were authorized in the railroads’ published tariffs and were therefore not unlawful unless “unreasonable.” Consequently the Government here had no “right of election” between Commission and 'court that could be “deemed an adequate ground for making the Commission’s award final . ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Brady, supra, at 458. Ashland Coal Co. v. United States, 325 U. S. 840, is the only case in this Court that relied on the Standard Oil decision after we had abandoned the “negative order” doctrine. Cf. Allison & Co. v. United States, 296 U. S. 546. And it is doubtful i'f the shipper in the Ashland Coal Co. case could-have sought reparations in a district court under the “primary jurisdiction” doctrine. In affirming without argument the judgment of a three-judge court in the Ashland Coal Co. case, this Court’s per curiam opinion cited two pages of the Standard Oil. opinion that support the interpretation of § 9 urged here by the Com-, mission and railroads. It is a fair inference that the ’ pages were cited for that interpretation although other grounds for the Court’s decision also appear there. One such ground was that a three-judge court is an improper tribunal for the review of such Commission orders. Another ground was that there was “nothing to suggest that the Commission acted arbitrarily or without evidence to support its conclusions, or that it transcended its constitutional or statutory powers.” The three-judge district court in the Ashland case in sustaining "the Commission order had also held that a three-judge court was not a proper tribunal and that the Commission order was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with law. Ashland Coal & Ice Co. v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 708, 713. We cannot accept the Ashland Coal Co. per curiam holding nor the Standard Oil case on which it rested as requiring the interpretation of § 9 which the railroads and Commission here urge. Our acceptance of that interpretation would mean that a shipper who submitted to the Commission only a question of the reasonableness of rates could have an adverse order reviewed by a court, Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557, 562-563, while a shipper who asked for that administrative determination plus reparations could get no judicial review at all. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, at 507-508. On any ground except the now discarded “negative order” doctrine, this would appear to be an unsupportable and totally illogical limitation of the congressional command for judicial review. See Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 269-270; Southern R. Co. v. Tift, 206 U. S. 428, 440. Accordingly we hold that § 9 does not irripair the right of shippers to obtain judicial review of adverse Commissión orders under § 41 (28) merely because the order is sought as a basis for reparations. Fourth. For. reasons already stated we hold that a Commission order dismissing a shipper’s claim for damages under 49 U. S. C. § 9 is an “order” subject to challenge under 28 U. S. C. ,(1946 ed.) § 4,1 (28). .The remaining question is whether a district court entertaining such a challenge shall be composed of one judge or three judges and whether the judgment of a district court in such a case can be appealed directly to this Court. The Urgent Deficiencies Act from which § 41 (28) was derived contains provisions for a three-judge district court to hear and determine suits brought to set aside a Commission , “order,” and authorizes judgments rendered in such cases to be appealed directly to this Court. For reasons now stated we hold that judicial review of an order denying reparations does not require a three-judge court. . The provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act here considered derive from a 1910 congressional enactment creating the Commerce Court, defining its powers and providing for review of its judgments. That court was given jurisdiction of all actions to enjoin, set aside and modify Commission orders. Section 2 provided for direct appeals from the Commerce Court to the Supreme Court. The purpose of creating the Commerce Court with such direct appeals was expedition of final determination of the validity of certain types' of Commission orders. This éxpedition was sought for orders of national or widespread interest, such, for example, as railroad rate orders. Congress saw the necessity for an accelerated appellate procedure to prevent railroads from nullifying the effect of such orders in prolonged litigation. The Commerce Act itself indicated that the same expedition necessary in cases affecting the public generally was not necessary in other kinds of cases involving “local and isolated questions which arise in th,e ordinary courts.” The Act’s first section excluded from the . Commerce Court’s jurisdiction power to enforce “any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission ... for the payment of money.” Provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913 abolished the Commerce Court and transferred its jurisdiction to district courts composed of three judges. In considering this Act Congress was urged to bear in mind the necessity for providing a forum that could expeditiously review Commission orders of widespread importance. .But in passing the 1913 Act Congress denied power to three-judge courts to enforce Commission orders for the payment of money. And in a case not involving reparations this Court held that orders relating merely to the payment of money are not likely to be' of sufficient public importance to‘justify use of the three-judge procedure. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 233, 234-237. But cf. El Dorado Oil Works v. United States, 328 U. S. 12, 18-19; United States v. Jones, 336 U. S. 641, 647. The Urgent Deficiencies Act with 49 U. S. C. § 9, which requires enforcement of Commission reparation awards in one-judge courts, indicates the belief of Congress that such orders are not of sufficient public importance to justify the accelerated judicial review procedure. While the Government here does not seek enforcement of a Commission order for the payment of money, the root of the controversy concerns the payment of money damages under 49 U. S. C. § § 8, 9. Had the Commission made an award to the Government it could have filed a civil suit to recover money damages under the provisions of 49 U. S. C. § 16 (2). That section provides that such a suit “shall proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages . . —that is, before one district judge. And an appeal from a judgment in such a case goes to the Court of Appeals. The same one-judge trial and appeal procedure available for enforcement of an award order would appear to be an equally appropriate and adequate tribunal for adjudication of validity of a Commission order denying reparations. For actions to enforce Commission orders awarding reparation, and actions to challenge Commission orders denying reparations, basically involve the same parties, the same disputes, the same claims for money.damage?, and the same statutes. We think the orders in both instances should be reviewed in the same one-judge tribunal. We have frequently pointed out the importance of limiting the three-judge court procedure within its expressly stated confines. We are confident that in holding that one judge rather than three should entertain cases challenging Commission reparation orders we interpret the congressional expediting procedure and the Interstate Commerce Act in accordance with their basic purpose. Fifth. There remains the question of the proper disposition of this case. Three judges heárd it. This, however, is no reason for dismissal of the cause. See Stain- back v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U. S. 368, 381. If the allegations of the bill are true, the Commission’s order cannot stand. Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 264-266. Since the District Court did not pass on the merits of the allegations of the complaint, the cause is remanded to it for that'purpose. ' Reversed aryl remanded. 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 (5) (a), 1 (6), 2', 6 (8), 15 (13). 49 U. S. C. §§ 8, 9. The complaint also sought relief from future exactions, but prior to the Commission’s final order the piers were returned to private ownership and this prayer was abandoned. The substance of 28 U. S. C. § 41 (28) of the 1946 United States ■Code now appears as § 1336 of the 1948 Code. The provision for judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders first appeared in 1910 in an Act creating the Commerce Court'. 36 Stat. 539. Congress abolished the Commerce Court in 1913 and transferred lio district courts, the Commerce Court’s jurisdiction do review Commission orders. Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 208, 219-220. The Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Sta't. 237, 243, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1001 (d), 1009, provides: “Sec. 2. . . . (d) Order and Adjudication. — ‘Ordér’ means the whole or any part of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of any agency in any matter other than rule making but including licensing. ‘Adjudication’ means agency process fo.r the formulation of an order.” “Sec. 10. Except so far-, as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or_ (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion— “(a) Right op review. — Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the' meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.” Mr. Justice Cardozo so treated the Standard Oil holding in I. C. C. v. United States, 289 U. S. 385, 388, a case decided prior to this Court’s repudiation of the “negative order” doctrine. He there said that in denying'reparations “the Commission speaks with finality. Its orders purely negative — negative in form and substance— are not subject to review by this court or any other.” Authorities for this statement were “negative order” cases. These same eases were relied on by the court in a later case that referred with approval to the Standard Oil § 9 interpretation. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania, R. Co., 297 U. S. 500, 507-508. See cases collected in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 139, n. 22, and Armour & Co. v. Alton R. Co., 312 U. S. 195; Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557, 562. The Commission argues that § 9 does authorize a shipper to initiate damage claims in a district court even though the claim necessarily involves questions upon which the Commission’s primary jurisdiction must be invoked. The railroads more cautiously say that such suits can be filed upon an initial showing1 by a shipper that it might work a hardship on a shipper .for the court to refuse to entertain the case. Both contentions run counter.to this Court’s previous cases. Particular circumstances were held sufficient in one case to justify a court in staying further judicial proceedings to await Commission action. Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U. S. 247, 266-267. The same course was followed in another case, over the Commission’s .objection, where the action was in assumpsit, and the administrative problem did not emerge until the case was in course of litigation. Tank Car Corp. v. Terminal Co., 308 U. S. 422, 432. The “negative order” doctrine was first adopted by this Court in Procter & Gamble v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, decided in 1912. A shipper there brought action in the Commerce Court to set aside a Commission order dismissing the shipper’s complaint. The complaint was that the charges were unjust and unreasonable. The Commerce Court was asked to annul the Commission’s order of dismissal, to enjoin future collection of the charges, and to require the railroads to repay sums alleged to have been wrongfully collected from the shipper. ^The Commerce Court reviewed the action of the Commission and on the merits declined to grant the shipper the requested relief. This Court held that this “negative” order was not reviewable at the instance of the shipper. The Court’s ruling brought sharp criticism in Congress. Corrective legislation was proposed, exhaustive committee hearings were held, debate was taken to the floor of Congress. In spite of the strenuous efforts to get Congress to repudiate the “negative order” doctrine, Congress in 1913 declined, to act. But in all of the congressional hearings and debates on the subject, the critics of the Procter & Gamble “negative order” rule urged without contradiction that repudiation of the “negative order” rule would afford shippers the same judicial review of reparation and other orders then afforded to railroads. Not once do we find the argument suggested that 49 U. S. C. § 9 would bar shippers from judicial review of adverse reparation orders by the Commission, although this section was at the time part of the original Interstate Commerce Act, enacted in 1887, more .than a quarter of a century before this congressional consideration. This Court nevertheless abandoned the “negative order” doctrine in 1938, and in doing so effectively overruled a host of prior decisions. See cases collected in footnote to Mr. Justice Butler’s opinion in the Rochester case, 307 U. S. 146, 148. The effect of today’s decision is merely to recognize that the Standarri Oil doctrine, barring judicial review to shippers, cannot stand consistently with the Rochester case which itself overruled the Procter & Gamble and other “negative order” decisions. It was therefore the Rochester case, not today’s decision, that overruled a line of ehses and granted relief where Congress had declined to afford any. H. R. Rep. No. 1012, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1912); Hearings before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 7898, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 140-148 (1913); Hearings before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 7898, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 305-343 (1913); Hearings béfore the House Committee oh Interstate and Foreign Commerce onf H. R. 25596 and H. R. 25572, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-298 (1912); 5,0.Cong. Rec. 4532-4537, 4542-4545 (1913). 38 Stat. 208, 219, 220 ; 28 U. S. C. §2325 (1948). See also 28 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §47. 36 Stat. 539. See President’s Message to Congress, 45 Cong. Rec. 7567-7568 (1910). S. Rep. No. 355, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1910). See Procter & Gamble v. United States, 225 U. S. 282; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 7898, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 293-299, 300 (1913). It is also significant that the new judicial code does not give a three-judge court jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of commission orders “for the payment of money.” 28 Ü. S. C. § 2321. United States v. Griffin, supra, 234—237; Ayrshire Corp. v. United States, 331 U. S. 132, 136-137; Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U. S. 368, 378, n. 19; Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 250.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BRUNING v. UNITED STATES. No. 423. Argued March 3, 1964. Decided March 23, 1964. Ernest R. Mortenson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Philip B. Heymann argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer and I. Henry Kutz. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue presented in this case is whether the United States is entitled to recover, out of assets acquired by a debtor after his adjudication of bankruptcy, post-petition interest on a tax assessment which (under § 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 544, 550, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 35) was not discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings. The essential facts are not in dispute. Petitioner incurred withholding and federal insurance contributions taxes during the fourth quarter of 1951 but failed to pay those taxes when due. In March 1952, an assessment of those taxes was made against petitioner. On July 6, 1953, petitioner filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was adjudicated a bankrupt in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The District Director of Internal Revenue filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings for the assessed amount owed by petitioner, and the United States received a small distribution out of the assets of the bankruptcy estate. Petitioner was granted a discharge in bankruptcy in October 1953, and the case was closed in June 1954. In 1957, petitioner filed claims for refund of income taxes paid for the years 1953 and 1954, which resulted in his being allowed a credit for income taxes and interest in respect of those years. On March 7,1958, the Director of Internal Revenue applied the entire 1953 credit and part of the 1954 credit to the balance of the assessment of the withholding and F. I. C. A. taxes owed for 1951, plus interest to date — including interest which had accrued during the period between the filing of petitioner’s petition in bankruptcy (July 6, 1953) and the date of payment (March 7, 1958). This post-petition interest, which totals about $795, is the subject of the present controversy. Petitioner did not question the Director’s right to collect from assets acquired by petitioner after bankruptcy the unpaid principal of the tax debt and the pre-petition interest. However, contending that he was not liable for interest accruing on the assessment after his petition in bankruptcy was filed, petitioner brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of California for refund of that portion of the interest. The District Court held that petitioner’s personal liability for post-petition interest on the unpaid taxes was not discharged by the bankruptcy proceedings, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Due to an apparent conflict between circuits and the potentially recurring nature of the question involved, we granted certiorari, 375 U. S. 920. We affirm the decision below. Section 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 35, provides in relevant part: “A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as (1) are due as a tax levied by the United States . . . .” It is undisputed that, under § 17, petitioner remained personally liable after his discharge for that part of the principal amount of the tax debt and pre-petition interest not satisfied out of the bankruptcy estate. The courts below held that, under § 17, petitioner also remained personally liable for post-petition interest on the tax debt, and we find no substantial reason to reverse that holding. Initially, one would assume that Congress, in providing that a certain type of debt should survive bankruptcy proceedings as a personal liability of the debtor, intended personal liability to continue as to the interest on that debt as well as to its principal amount. Thus, it has never been seriously suggested that a creditor whose claim is not provable against the trustee in bankruptcy loses his right to interest in a post-bankruptcy action brought against the debtor personally. In most situations, interest is considered to be the cost of the use of the amounts owing a creditor and an incentive to prompt repayment and, thus, an integral part of a continuing debt. Interest on a tax debt would seem to fit that description. Thus, logic and reason indicate that post-petition interest on a tax claim excepted from discharge by § 17 of the Act should be recoverable in a later action against the debtor personally, and there is no evidence of any congressional intent to the contrary. Petitioner suggests that the Government might have ignored the bankruptcy proceeding entirely and later brought suit upon its undischarged claim against petitioner personally and collected both principal and interest. But petitioner asserts that once the Government filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, its rights became limited to the recovery of unpaid sums allowed by the trustee, not including post-petition interest. This argument is based on § 6873 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides: “Any portion of a claim for taxes allowed in . . . any proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act which is unpaid shall be paid by the taxpayer upon notice and demand from the Secretary or his delegate after the termination of such proceeding.” We find no indication in the wording or history of § 6873 (a) that the section was meant to limit the Government’s right to continuing interest on an undischarged and unpaid tax liability. Nor is petitioner aided by the now-familiar principle that one main purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to let the honest debtor begin his financial life anew. As the Court of Appeals noted, § 17 is not a compassionate section for debtors. Rather, it demonstrates congressional judgment that certain problems — e. g., those of financing government — override the value of giving the debtor a wholly fresh start. Congress clearly intended that personal liability for unpaid tax debts survive bankruptcy. The general humanitarian purpose of the Bankruptcy Act provides no reason to believe that Congress had a different intention with regard to personal liability for the interest on such debts. Finally, petitioner urges that we consider the present case in light of the decision in New York v. Saper, 336 U. S. 328. As to claims against the trustee in bankruptcy, the general rule for liquidation of the bankruptcy estate has long been that a creditor will be allowed interest only to the date of the petition in bankruptcy. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U. S. 339. In New York v. Saper, supra, this Court held that the general rule applies to claims against the trustee for taxes as well as for other debts. But the instant case concerns the debtor’s personal liability for post-petition interest on a debt for taxes which survives bankruptcy to the extent that it is not paid out of the estate. Petitioner asserts that the traditional rule which denies post-petition interest as a claim against the bankruptcy estate also applies to discharge the debtor from personal liability for such interest even if the underlying tax debt is not discharged by § 17. We hold that it does not so apply. The basic reasons for the rule denying post-petition interest as a claim against the bankruptcy estate are the avoidance of unfairness as between competing creditors and the avoidance of administrative inconvenience. These reasons are inapplicable to an action brought against the debtor personally. In the instant case, collection of post-petition interest cannot inconvenience administration of the bankruptcy estate, cannot delay payment from the estate unduly, and cannot diminish the estate in favor of high interest creditors at the expense of other creditors. In New York v. Saper, supra, the Court found the reasons for the traditional rule applicable and held that post-petition interest on a claim for taxes was not' to be allowed against the bankruptcy estate. Here, we find the reasons — and thus the rule — inapplicable, and we hold that post-petition interest on an unpaid tax debt not discharged by § 17 remains, after bankruptcy, a personal liability of the debtor. Affirmed. The remainder was distributed to petitioner. See United States v. Mighell, 273 F. 2d 682 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1959). One reason for refusing to make taxes dischargeable is the desire to prevent tax evasion. See 83 Cong. Rec. 9106 (1938). See American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 233 U. S. 261, 266: “And it is true, as held in Tredegar Co. v. Seaboard Ry., 183 Fed. Rep. 289, 290, that as a general rule, after property of an insolvent is in custodia legis interest thereafter accruing is not allowed on debts payable out of the fund realized by a sale of the property. But that is not because the claims had lost their interest-bearing quality during that period, but is a necessary and enforced rule of distribution, due to the fact that in case of receiverships the assets are generally insufficient to pay debts in full. If all claims were of equal dignity and all bore the same rate of interest, from the date of the receivership to the date of final distribution, it would be immaterial whether the dividend was calculated on the basis of the principal alone or of principal and interest combined. But some of the debts might carry a high rate and some a low rate, and hence inequality would result in the payment of interest which accrued during the delay incident to collecting and distributing the funds. As this delay was the act of the law, no one should thereby gain an advantage or suffer a loss. For that and like reasons, in case funds are not sufficient to pay claims of equal dignity, the distribution is made only on the basis of the principal of the debt. But that rule did not prevent the running of interest during the Receivership; and if as a result of good fortune or good management, the estate proved sufficient to discharge the claims in full, interest as well as principal should be paid.” See also Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 164: “Accrual of simple interest on unsecured claims in bankruptcy was prohibited in order that the administrative inconvenience of continuous reeomputation of interest causing recomputation of claims could be avoided. Moreover, different creditors whose claims bore diverse interest rates or were paid by the bankruptcy court on different dates would suffer neither gain nor loss caused solely by delay.” Because the traditional rule rests upon such practical considerations, it has been suggested that: “The principle that interest stops running from the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy should be understood as a rule of liquidation practice rather than as a rule of substantive law.” 3 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th ed., 1961) 1858.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. NEW JERSEY STATE LOTTERY COMMISSION No. 73-1471. Argued November 20, 1974 Decided February 25, 1975 Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioners. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Louis F. Claiborne, Danny J. Boggs, and Joseph A. Marino. Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William F. Hyland, Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Robert K. Killian, Attorney General, and Barney Lapp and Daniel R. Schaefer, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Connecticut; by Warren B. Rudman, Attorney General, and David H. Souter, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of New Hampshire; by Louis Schwartz and Robert A. Woods for the Maryland Public Broadcasting Commission; by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Stephen T. Parisi for the State of Ohio; by Verne Hodge, Attorney General, and Henry L. Feuerzeig, First Assistant Attorney General, for the Government of the Virgin Islands; by John B. Summers for the National Association of Broadcasters; and by Thomas B. Asher, Melvin L. Wulf, and Joel M. Gora for the American Civil Liberties Union. Per Curiam. This case involves a question regarding the applicability of 18 U. S. C. § 1304, which provides: “Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio station for which a license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” Jersey Cape, a licensed radio station in New Jersey, sued for declaratory relief before the Federal Communications Commission arguing that § 1304 should not apply to the broadcast of the winning number in a lawful state-run lottery such as the one conducted by the State of New Jersey. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 5:9-1 et seg. (1973). The Commission denied relief. 30 F. C. C. 2d 794 (1971). Upon a petition for rehearing, the New Jersey Lottery Commission was allowed to intervene and the FCC reaffirmed its denial. 36 F. C. C. 2d 93 (1972). The Lottery Commission petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 491 F. 2d 219 (1974), and the States of New Hampshire and Pennsylvania were granted permission to intervene as petitioners, id., at 221 n. 2. Sitting en banc, the Third Circuit unanimously reversed the FCC. We granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict between that decision and the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York State Broadcasters Assn. v. United States, 414 F. 2d 990 (1969). Subsequent to the briefing and oral argument of the case in this Court, Congress passed and the President signed Pub. L. 93-583, 88 Stat. 1916, codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1307 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which, in relevant part, provides: “(a) The provisions of section . . . 1304 shall not apply to an advertisement, list of prizes, or information concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under the authority of State law— “(2) broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that State or an adjacent State which conducts such a lottery.” The United States now urges us to dismiss this case as moot. It points out that the only relief requested was by a broadcaster located in New Jersey, a State that conducts an authorized lottery, and therefore the type of broadcast at issue is now allowed by statute. Intervenor, the State of New Hampshire disputes the suggestion of mootness. New Hampshire argues that the amendment to § 1304 does not grant it full relief. It is noted that Vermont, an adjacent State, does not conduct a state-authorized lottery. Thus, Vermont broadcasters will not be allowed, under § 1304, as modified by § 1307, to broadcast to New Hampshire listeners the winning numbers in the New Hampshire state lottery. New Hampshire apparently believes that this limitation constitutes a denial of First Amendment rights. This specific issue, however, was not briefed or argued in this Court. In view of the enactment of § 1307, we deem it appropriate to remand to the Court of Appeals so that it may consider whether the case is now moot. Accordingly, the judgment below is vacated and the case is remanded. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, INC., et al. v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY et al. No. 00-1167. Argued January 7, 2002 — Decided April 23, 2002 Michael M. Berger argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Gideon Kanner and Lawrence L. Hoffman. John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, and William J. Frey, Deputy Attorney General, Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Rodriquez, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel L. Siegel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, E. Clement Shute, Jr., Fran M. Layton, Ellison Folk, John L. Marshall, and Richard J. Lazarus. Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Cru-den, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Malcolm L. Stewart Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association of Small Property Owners et al. by Martin S. Kaufman; for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by John J. Rademacher and Nancy McDonough; for the Institute for Justice by William H. Mellor, Clint Bolick, Scott Bullock, and Richard A. Epstein; for the National Association of Home Builders by Christopher G. Senior and David Crump; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by R. S. Radford, June Babiracki Barlow, and Sonia M. Younglove; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo, Rickard A. Samp, and Douglas B. Levene. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Vermont et al. by William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, and Bridget Asay, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Richard Blumentkal of Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Tkomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike McGrath of Montana, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Anabelle Rodriguez of Puerto Rico, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, John-Cornyn of Texas, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington; for the American Planning Association et al. by Robert H. Freilich; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Timothy J. Dowling; for the National Audubon Society et al. by John D. Echeverría; and for Thomas Dunne et al. by Karl M. Manheim. Nancie G. Marzulla filed a brief for Defenders of Property Rights as amicus curiae. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. This case actually involves two moratoria ordered by respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to maintain the status quo while studying the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and designing a strategy for environmentally sound growth. The first, Ordinance 81-5, was effective from August 24, 1981, until August 26,1983, whereas the second more restrictive Resolution 83-21 was in effect from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984. As a result of these two directives, virtually all development on a substantial portion of the property subject to TRPA’s jurisdiction was prohibited for a period of 32 months. Although the question we decide relates only to that 32-month period, a brief description of the events leading up to the moratoria and a comment on the two permanent plans that TRPA adopted thereafter will clarify the narrow scope of our holding. The relevant facts are undisputed. The Court of Appeals, while reversing the District Court on a question of law, accepted all of its findings of fact, and no party challenges those findings. All agree that Lake Tahoe is “uniquely beautiful,” 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (Nev. 1999), that President Clinton was right to call it a “ ‘national treasure that must be protected and preserved,’” ibid., and that Mark Twain aptly described the clarity of its waters as “‘not merely transparent, but dazzlingly, brilliantly so,’” ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting M. Twain, Roughing It 174-175 (1872)). Lake Tahoe’s exceptional clarity is attributed to the absence of algae that obscures the waters of most other lakes. Historically, the lack of nitrogen and phosphorous, which nourish the growth of algae, has ensured the transparency of its waters. Unfortunately, the lake’s pristine state has deteriorated rapidly over the past 40 years; increased land development in the Lake Tahoe Basin (Basin) has threatened the “‘noble sheet of blue water’” beloved by Twain and countless others. 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1230. As the District Court found, “[d]ramatie decreases in clarity first began to be noted in the late 1950’s/early 1960’s, shortly after development at the lake began in earnest.” Id., at 1231. The lake’s unsurpassed beauty, it seems, is the wellspring of its undoing. The upsurge of development in the area has caused “increased nutrient loading of the lake largely because of the increase in impervious coverage of land in the Basin resulting from that development.” Ibid. “Impervious coverage — such as asphalt, concrete, buildings, and even packed dirt — prevents precipitation from being absorbed by the soil. -Instead, the water is gathered and concentrated by such coverage. Larger amounts of water flowing off a driveway or a roof have more erosive force than scattered raindrops falling over a dispersed area — especially one covered with indigenous vegetation, which softens the impact of the raindrops themselves.” Ibid. Given this trend, the District Court predicted that “unless the process is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and its trademark blue color, becoming green and opaque for eternity.” Those areas in the Basin that have steeper slopes produce more runoff; therefore, they are usually considered “high hazard” lands. Moreover, certain areas near streams or wetlands known as “Stream Environment Zones” (SEZs) are especially vulnerable to the impact of development because, in their natural state, they act as filters for much of the debris that runoff carries. Because “[t]he most obvious response to this problem ... is to restrict development around the lake — especially in SEZ lands, as well as in areas already naturally prone to runoff,” id., at 1232, conservation efforts have focused on controlling growth in these high hazard areas. In the 1960’s, when the problems associated with the burgeoning development began to receive significant attention, jurisdiction over the Basin, which occupies 501 square miles, was shared by the States of California and Nevada, five counties, several municipalities, and the Forest Service of the Federal Government. In 1968, the legislatures of the two States adopted the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, see 1968 Cal. Stats, no. 998, p. 1900, § 1; 1968 Nev. Stats, p. 4, which Congress approved in 1969, Pub. L. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360. The compact set goals for the protection and preservation of the lake and created TRPA as the agency assigned “to coordinate and regulate development in the Basin and to conserve its natural resources.” Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 394 (1979). Pursuant to the compact, in 1972 TRPA adopted a Land Use Ordinance that divided the land in the Basin into seven “land capability districts,” based largely on steepness but also taking into consideration other factors affecting runoff. Each district was assigned a “land coverage coefficient — a recommended limit on the percentage of such land that could be covered by impervious surface.” Those limits ranged from 1% for districts 1 and 2 to 30% for districts 6 and 7. Land in districts 1,2, and 3 is characterized as “high hazard” or “sensitive,” while land in districts 4, 5, 6, and 7 is “low hazard” or “non-sensitive.” The SEZ lands, though often treated as a separate category, were actually a subcategory of district 1. 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1232. Unfortunately, the 1972 ordinance allowed numerous exceptions and did not significantly limit the construction of new residential housing. California became so dissatisfied with TRPA that it withdrew its financial support and unilaterally imposed stricter regulations on the part of the Basin located in California. Eventually the two States, with the approval of Congress and the President, adopted an extensive amendment to the compact that became effective on December 19, 1980. Pub. L. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233; Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §66801 (West Supp. 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. §277.200 (1980). The 1980 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact (Compact) redefined the structure, functions, and voting procedures of TRPA, App. 37, 94 Stat. 3235-3238; 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1233, and directed it to develop regional “environmental threshold carrying capacities” — a term that embraced “standards for air quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation preservation and noise.” 94 Stat. 3235,3239. The Compact provided that TRPA “shall adopt” those standards within 18 months, and that “[w]ithin 1 year after” their adoption (i. e., by June 19,1983), it “shall” adopt an amended regional plan that achieves and maintains those carrying capacities. Id., at 3240. The Compact also contained a finding by the legislatures of California and Nevada “that in order to make effective the regional plan as revised by [TRPA], it is necessary to halt temporarily works of development in the region which might otherwise absorb the entire capability of the region for further development or direct it out of harmony with the ultimate plan.” Id., at 3243. Accordingly, for the period prior to the adoption of the final plan (“or until May 1, 1983, whichever is earlier”), the Compact itself prohibited the development of new subdivisions, condominiums, and apartment buildings, and also prohibited each city and county in the Basin from granting any more permits in 1981, 1982, or 1983 than had been granted in 1978. During this period TRPA was also working on the development of a regional water quality plan to comply with the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1288 (1994 ed.). Despite the fact that TRPA performed these obligations in “good faith and to the best of its ability,” 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1233, after a. few months it concluded that it could not meet the deadlines in the Compact. On June 25, 1981, it therefore enacted Ordinance 81-5 imposing the first of the two mora-toria on development that petitioners challenge in this proceeding. The ordinance provided that it would become effective on August 24,1981, and remain in effect pending, the adoption of the permanent plan required by the Compact. App. 159,191. The District Court made a detailed analysis of the ordinance, noting that it might even prohibit hiking or picnicking on SEZ lands, but construed it as essentially banning any construction or other activity that involved the removal of Vegetation or the creation of land coverage on all SEZ lands, as well as on class 1, 2, and 3 lands in California. 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1233-1235. Some permits could be obtained for such construction in Nevada if certain findings were made. Id., at 1235. It is undisputed, however, that Ordinance 81-5 prohibited the construction of any new residences on SEZ lands in either State and on class 1, 2, and 3 lands in California. Given the complexity of the task of defining “environmental threshold carrying capacities” and the division of opinion within TRPA’s governing board, the District Court found that it was “unsurprising” that TRPA failed to adopt those thresholds until August 26, 1982, roughly two months after the Compact deadline. Ibid. Under a liberal reading of the Compact, TRPA then had until August 26, 1983, to adopt a new regional plan. 94 Stat. 3240. “Unfortunately, but again not surprisingly, no regional plan was in place as of that date.” 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1235. TRPA therefore adopted Resolution 83-21, “which completely suspended all project reviews and approvals, including the acceptance of new proposals,” and which remained in effect until a new regional plan was adopted on April 26,1984. Thus, Resolution 83-21 imposed an 8-month moratorium prohibiting all construction on high hazard lands in either State. In combination, Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 effectively prohibited all construction on sensitive lands in California and on all SEZ lands in the entire Basin for 32 months, and on sensitive lands in Nevada (other than SEZ lands) for eight months. It is these two moratoria that are at issue in this case. On the same day that the 1984 plan was adopted, the State of California filed an action seeking to enjoin its implementation on the ground that it failed to establish land-use controls sufficiently stringent to protect the Basin. Id., at 1236. The District Court entered an injunction that was upheld by the Court of Appeals and remained in effect until a completely revised plan was adopted in 1987. Both the 1984 injunction and the 1987 plan contained provisions that prohibited new construction on sensitive lands in the Basin. As the case comes to us, however, we have no occasion to consider the validity of those provisions. f-H Approximately two months after the adoption of the 1984 plan, petitioners filed parallel actions against TRPA and other defendants in federal courts in Nevada and California that were ultimately consolidated for trial in the District of Nevada. The petitioners include the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., a nonprofit membership corporation representing about 2,00.0 owners of both improved and unimproved parcels of real estate in the Lake Tahoe Basin, and a class of some 400 individual owners of vacant lots located either on SEZ lands or in other parts of districts 1, 2, or 3. Those individuals purchased their properties prior to the effective date of the 1980 Compact, App. 34, primarily for the purpose of constructing “at a time of their choosing” a single-family home “to serve as a permanent, retirement or vacation residence,” id., at 86. When they made those purchases, they did so with the understanding that such construction was authorized provided that “they complied with all reasonable requirements for building.” Ibid. Petitioners’ complaints gave rise to protracted litigation that has produced four opinions by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and several published District Court opinions. For present purposes, however, we need only describe those courts’ disposition of the claim that three actions taken by TRPA — Ordinance 81-5, Resolution 83-21, and the 1984 regional plan — constituted takings of petitioners’ property without just compensation. Indeed, the challenge to the 1984 plan is not before us because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that it was the federal injunction against implementing that plan, rather than the plan itself, that caused the post-1984 injuries that petitioners allegedly suffered, and those rulings are not encompassed within our limited grant of certiorari. Thus, we limit our discussion to the lower courts’ disposition of the claims based on the 2-year moratorium (Ordinance 81-5) and the ensuing 8-month moratorium (Resolution 83-21). The District Court began its constitutional analysis by identifying the distinction between a direct government appropriation of property without just compensation and a government regulation that imposes such a severe restriction on the owner’s use of her property that it produces “nearly the same result as a direct appropriation.” 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1238. The court noted that all of the claims in this case “are of the ‘regulatory takings’ variety.” Id., at 1239. Citing our decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), it then stated that a “regulation will constitute a taking when either: (1) it does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest; or (2) it denies the owner economically viable use of her land.” 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1239. The District Court rejected the first alternative based on its finding that “further development on high hazard lands such as [petitioners’] would lead to significant additional dámage to the lake.” Id., at 1240. With respect to the second alternative, the court first considered whether the analysis adopted in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), would lead to the conclusion that TRPA had effected a “partial taking,” and then whether those actions had effected a “total taking.” Emphasizing the temporary nature of the regulations, the testimony that the “average holding time of a lot in the Tahoe area between lot purchase and home construction is twenty-five years,” and the failure of petitioners to offer specific evidence of harm, the District Court concluded that “consideration of the Penn Central factors clearly leads to the conclusion that there was no taking.” 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1240. In the absence of evidence regarding any of the individual plaintiffs, the court evaluated the “average” purchasers’ intent and found that such purchasers “did not have reasonable, investment-backed expectations that they would be able to build single-family homes on their land within the six-year period involved in this lawsuit.” Id., at 1241. The District Court had more difficulty with the “total taking” issue. Although it was satisfied that petitioners’ property did retain some value during the moratoria, it found that they had been temporarily deprived of “all economically viable use of their land.” Id., at 1245. The court concluded that those actions therefore constituted “categorical” takings under our decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 (1992). It rejected TRPA’s response that Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 were “reasonable temporary planning moratoria” that should be excluded from Lucas’ categorical approach. The court thought it “fairly clear” that such interim actions would not have been viewed as takings prior to our decisions in Lucas and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304 (1987), because “[zjoning boards, cities, counties and other agencies used them all the time to ‘maintain the status quo pending study and governmental decision making.’ ” 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1248-1249 (quoting Williams v. Central, 907 P. 2d 701, 706 (Colo. App. 1995)). After expressing uncertainty as to whether those cases required a holding that moratoria on development automatically effect takings, the court concluded that TRPA’s actions did so, partly because neither the ordinance nor the resolution, even though intended to be temporary from the beginning, contained an express termination date. 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1250-1251. Accordingly, it ordered TRPA to pay damages to most petitioners for the 32-month period from August 24,1981, to April 25, 1984, and to those owning class 1, 2, or 3 property in Nevada for the 8-month period from August 27, 1983, to April 25, 1984. Id., at 1255. Both parties appealed. TRPA successfully challenged the District Court’s takings determination, and petitioners unsuccessfully challenged the dismissal of their claims based on the 1984 and 1987 plans. Petitioners did not, however, challenge the District Court’s findings or conclusions concerning its application of Penn Central. With respect to the two moratoria, the Ninth Circuit noted that petitioners had expressly disavowed an argument “that the regulations constitute a taking under the ad hoc balancing approach described in Penn Central” and that they did not “dispute that the restrictions imposed on their properties are appropriate means of securing the purpose set forth in the Compact.” Accordingly, the only question before the court was “whether the rule set forth in Lucas applies — that is, whether a categorical taking occurred because Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 denied the plaintiffs ‘all economically beneficial or productive use of land.’ ” 216 F. 3d 764, 773 (2000). Moreover, because petitioners brought only a facial challenge, the narrow inquiry before the Court of Appeals was whether the mere enactment of the regulations constituted a taking. Contrary to the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact on petitioners’ fee interest in the properties, no categorical taking had occurred. It reasoned: “Property interests may have many different dimensions. For example, the dimensions of a property interest may include a physical dimension (which describes the size and shape of the property in question), a functional dimension (which describes the extent to which an owner may use or dispose of the property in question), and a temporal dimension (whieh describes the duration of the property interest). At base, the plaintiffs’ argument is that we should conceptually sever each plaintiff’s fee interest into discrete segments in at least one of these dimensions — the temporal one— and treat each of those segments as separate and distinct property interests for purposes of takings analysis. Under this theory, they argue that there was a categorical taking of one of those temporal segments.” Id., at 774. Putting to one side “cases of physical invasion or occupation,” ibid., the court read our cases involving regulatory taking claims to focus on the impact of a regulation on the parcel as a whole. In its view a “planning regulation that prevents the development of a parcel for a temporary period of time is conceptually no different than a land-use restriction that permanently denies all use on a discrete portion of property, or that permanently restricts a type of use across all of the parcel.” Id., at 776. In each situation, a regulation that affects only a portion of the parcel— whether limited by time, use, or space — does not deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use. The Court of Appeals distinguished Lucas as applying to the “ ‘relatively rare’ ” case in which a regulation denies all productive use of an entire parcel, whereas the moratoria involve only a “temporal ‘slice’” of the fee interest and a form of regulation that is widespread and well established. 216 F. 3d, at 773-774. It also rejected petitioners’ argument that our decision in First English was controlling. According to the Court of Appeals, First English concerned the question whether compensation is an appropriate remedy for a temporary taking and not whether or when such a taking has occurred. 216 F. 3d, at 778. Faced squarely with the question whether a taking had occurred, the court held that Penn Central was the appropriate framework for analysis. Petitioners, however, had failed to challenge the District Court’s conclusion that they could not make out a taking claim under the Penn Central factors. Over the dissent of five judges, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc. 228 F. 3d 998 (2000). In the dissenters’ opinion, the panel’s holding was not faithful to this Court’s decisions in First English and Lucas, nor to Justice Holmes admonition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 416 (1922), that “ ‘a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.’” 228 F. 3d, at 1003. Because of the importance of the case, we granted certiorari limited to the question stated at the beginning of this opinion. 533 U. S. 948 (2001). We now affirm. Ill Petitioners make only a facial attack on Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21. They contend that the mere enactment of a temporary regulation that, while in effect, denies a property owner all viable economic use of her property gives rise to an unqualified constitutional obligation to compensate her for the value of its use during that period. Hence, they “face an uphill battle,” Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 495 (1987), that is made especially steep by their desire for a categorical rule requiring compensation whenever the government imposes such a moratorium on development. Under their proposed rule, there is no need to evaluate the landowners’ investment-backed expectations, the actual impact of the regulation on any individual, the importance of the public interest served by the regulation, or the reasons for imposing the temporary restriction. For petitioners, it is enough that a regulation imposes a temporary deprivation— no matter how brief — of all economically viable use to trigger a per se rule that a taking has occurred. Petitioners assert that our opinions in First English and Lucas have already endorsed their view, and that it is a logical application of the principle that the Takings Clause was “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). We shall first explain why our cases do not support their proposed categorical rule — indeed, fairly read, they implicitly reject it. Next, we shall explain why the Armstrong principle requires rejection of that rule as well as the less extreme position advanced by petitioners at oral argument. In our view the answer to the abstract question whether a temporary moratorium effects a taking is neither “yes, always” nor “no, never”; the answer depends upon the particular circumstances of the case. Resisting “[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction,” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring), we conclude that the circumstances in this case are best analyzed within the Penn Central framework. IV The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings. Its plain language requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of a condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution contains no comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her private property. Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward application of per se rules. Our regulatory takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is characterized by “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,” Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124, designed to allow “careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” Palazzolo, 533 U. S., at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring). When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 115 (1951), regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof. Thus, compensation is mandated when a leasehold is taken and the government occupies the property for its own purposes, even though that use is temporary. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373 (1945); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372 (1946). Similarly, when the government appropriates part of a rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apartment tenants, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982); or when its planes use private airspace to approach a government airport, United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946), it is required to pay for that share no matter how small. But a government regulation that merely prohibits landlords from evicting tenants unwilling to pay a higher rent, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); that bans certain private uses of a portion of an owner’s property, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470 (1987); or that forbids the private use of certain airspace, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), does not constitute a categorical taking. “The first category of cases requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions.” Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 523 (1992). See also Loretto, 458 U. S., at 440; Keystone, 480 U. S., at 489, n. 18. This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private usés, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa. For the same reason that we do not ask whether a physical appropriation advances a substantial government interest or whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable use, we do not apply our precedent from the physical takings context to regulatory takings claims. Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential way — often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford. By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights. “This case does not present the ‘classic] taking’ in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use,” Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U. S. 498, 522 (1998); instead the interference with property rights “arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good,” Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124. Perhaps recognizing this fundamental distinction, petitioners wisely do not place all their emphasis on analogies to physical takings cases. Instead, they rely principally on our decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 (1992) — a regulatory takings case that, nevertheless, applied a categorical rule — to argue that the Penn Central framework is inapplicable here. A brief review of some of the cases that led to our decision in Lucas, however, will help to explain why the holding in that case does not answer the question presented here. As we noted in Lucas, it was Justice Holmes’ opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), that gave birth to our regulatory takings jurisprudence. In subsequent opinions we have repeatedly and consistently endorsed Holmes’ observation that “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Id., at 415. Justice Holmes did not provide a standard for determining when a regulation goes “too far,” but he did reject the view expressed in Justice Brandéis’ dissent that there could not be a taking because the property remained in the possession of the owner and had not been appropriated or used by the public.. After Mahon, neither a physical appropriation nor a public use has ever been a necessary component of a “regulatory taking.” In the decades following that decision, we have “generally eschewed” any set formula for determining how far is too far, choosing instead to engage in “ ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’ ” Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1015 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124). Indeed, we still resist the temptation to adopt per se rules in our cases involving partial regulatory takings, preferring to examine “a number of factors” rather than a simple “mathematically precise” formula. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Penn Central did, however, make it clear that even though multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of regulatory takings claims, in such cases we must focus on “the parcel as a whole”: “‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole — here, the city tax block designated as the ‘landmark site.’” Id., at 130-131. This requirement that “the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety” explains why, for example, a regulation that prohibited commercial transactions in eagle feathers, but did not bar other uses or impose any physical invasion or restraint upon them, was not a taking. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 66 (1979). It also clarifies why restrictions on the use of only limited portions of the parcel, such as setback ordinances, Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603 (1927), or a requirement that coal pillars be left in place to prevent mine subsidence, Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S., at 498, were not considered regulatory takings. In each of these cases, we affirmed that “where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking.” Andrus, 444 U. S., at 65-66. While the foregoing cases considered whether particular regulations had “gone too far” and were therefore invalid, none of them addressed the separate remedial question of how compensation is measured once a regulatory taking is established. In his dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 636 (1981), Justice Brennan identified that question and explained how he would answer it: “The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a court finds that a police power regulation has effected a ‘taking,’ the government entity must pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the ‘taking,’ and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.” Id., at 658. Justice Brennan’s proposed rule was subsequently endorsed by the Court in First English, 482 U. S., at 315, 318, 321. First English was certainly a significant decision, and nothing that we say today qualifies its holding. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that we did not address in that case the quite different and logically prior question whether the temporary regulation at issue had in fact constituted a taking. In First English, the Court unambiguously and repeatedly characterized the issue to be decided as a “compensation question” or a “remedial question.” Id., at 311 (“The disposition of the case on these grounds isolates the remedial question for our consideration”); see also id., at 313, 318. And the Court’s statement of its holding was equally unambiguous: “We merely hold that where the government’s activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.” Id., at 321 (emphasis added). In fact, First English expressly disavowed any ruling on the merits of the takings issue because the California courts had decided the remedial question on the assumption that a taking had been alleged. Id., at 312-313 (“We reject appellee’s suggestion that... we must independently evaluate the adequacy of the complaint and resolve the takings claim on the merits before we can reach the remedial question”). After our remand, the California courts concluded that there had not been a taking, First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989), and we declined review of that decision, 493 U. S. 1056 (1990). To the extent that the Court in First English referenced the antecedent takings question, we identified two reasons why a regulation temporarily denying an owner all use of her property might not constitute a taking. First, we recognized that “the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State’s authority to enact safety regulations.” 482 U. S., at 313. Second, we limited our holding “to the facts presented” and recognized “the quite different questions that would arise in the ease of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which [were] not before us.” Id., at 321. Thus, our decision in First English surely did not approve, and implicitly rejected, the categorical submission that petitioners are now advocating. Similarly, our decision in Lucas is not dispositive of the question presented. Although Lucas endorsed and applied a categorical rule, it was not the one that petitioners propose. Lucas purchased two residential lots in 1988 for $975,000. These lots were rendered “valueless” by a statute enacted two years later. The trial court found that a taking had occurred and ordered compensation of $1,232,387.50, representing the value of the fee simple estate, plus interest. As the statute read at the time of the trial, it effected a taking that “was unconditional and permanent.” 505 U. S., at 1012. While the State’s appeal was pending, the statute was amended to authorize exceptions that might have allowed Lucas to obtain a building permit. Despite the fact that the amendment gave the State Supreme Court the opportunity to dispose of the appeal on ripeness grounds, it resolved the merits of the permanent takings claim and reversed. Since “Lucas had no reason to proceed on a ‘temporary taking’ theory at trial,” we decided the case on the permanent taking theory that both the trial court and the State Supreme Court had addressed. Ibid. The categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states that compensation is required when a regulation deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial uses” of his land. Id., at 1019. Under that rule, a statute that “wholly eliminated the value” of Lucas’ fee simple title clearly qualified as a taking. But our holding was limited to “the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” Id., at 1017. The emphasis on the word “no” in the text of the opinion was, in effect, reiterated in a footnote explaining that the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 95% instead of 100%. Id., at 1019, n. 8. Anything less than a “complete elimination of value,” or a “total loss,” the Court acknowledged, would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central. Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1019-1020, n. 8. Certainly, our holding that the permanent “obliteration of the value” of a fee simple estate constitutes a categorical taking does not answer the question whether a regulation prohibiting any economic use of land for a 32-month period has the same legal effect. Petitioners seek to bring this case under the rule announced in Lucas by arguing that we can effectively sever a 32-month segment from the remainder of each landowner’s fee simple estate, and then ask whether that segment has been taken in its entirety by the moratoria. Of course, defining the property interest taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged is circular. With property so divided, every delay would become a total ban; the moratorium and the normal permit process alike would constitute categorical takings. Petitioners’ “conceptual severance” argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn Central’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on “the parcel as a whole.” 438 U. S., at 130-131. We have consistently rejected such an approach to the “denominator” question. See Keystone, 480 U. S., at 497. See also Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 644 (1993) (“To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question”). Thus, the District Court erred when it disaggregated petitioners’ property into temporal segments corresponding to the regulations at issue and then analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all economically viable use during each period. 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1242-1245. The starting point for the court’s analysis should have been to ask whether there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then Penn Central was the proper framework. An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal aspect of the owner’s interest. See Restatement of Property §§7-9 (1936). Both dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be viewed in its entirety. Hence, a permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is a taking of “the parcel as a whole,” whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in value is not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted. Cf. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S., at 263, n. 9 (“Even if the appellants’ ability to sell their property was limited during the pendency of the condemnation proceeding, the appellants were free to sell or develop their property when the proceedings ended. Mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are ‘incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a “taking” in the constitutional sense’” (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 285 (1939))). Neither Lucas, nor First English, nor any of our other regulatory takings cases compels us to accept petitioners’ categorical submission. In fact, these cases make clear that the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the “extraordinary case” in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory taking context, we require a more fact specific inquiry. Nevertheless, we will consider whether the interest in protecting individual property owners from bearing public burdens “which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S., at 49, justifies creating a new rule for these circumstances. V Considerations of “fairness and justice” arguably could support the conclusion that TRPA’s moratoria were takings of petitioners’ property based on any of seven different theories. First, even though we have not previously done so, we might now announce a categorical rule that, in the interest of fairness and justice, compensation is required whenever government temporarily deprives an owner of all economically viable use of her property. Second, we could craft a narrower rule that would cover all temporary land-use restrictions except those “normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like” which were put to one side in our opinion in First English, 482 U. S., at 321. Third, we could adopt a rule like the one suggested by an amicus supporting petitioners that would “allow a short fixed period for deliberations to take place without compensation — say maximum one year — after which the just compensation requirements” would “kick in.” Fourth, with the benefit of hindsight, we might characterize the successive actions of TRPA as a “series of rolling moratoria” that were the functional equivalent of a permanent taking. Fifth, were it not for the findings of the District Court that TRPA acted diligently and in good faith, we might have concluded that the agency was stalling in order to avoid promulgating the environmental threshold carrying capacities and regional plan mandated by the 1980 Compact. Cf. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U. S. 687, 698 (1999). Sixth, apart from the District Court’s finding that TRPA’s actions represented a proportional response to a serious risk of harm to the lake, petitioners might have argued that the moratoria did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, see Agins and Monterey. Finally, if petitioners had challenged the application of the moratoria to their individual parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some of them might have prevailed under a Penn Central analysis. ■ As the case comes to us, however, none of the last four theories is available. The “rolling moratoria” theory was presented in the petition for certiorari, but our order granting review did not encompass that issue, 533 U. S. 948 (2001); the case was tried in the District Court and reviewed in the Court of Appeals on the theory that each of the two mora-toria was a separate taking, one for a 2-year period and the other for an 8-month period. 216 F. 3d, at 769. And, as we have already noted, recovery on either a bad faith theory or a theory that the state interests were insubstantial is foreclosed by the District Court’s unchallenged findings of fact. Recovery under a Penn Central analysis is also foreclosed both because petitioners expressly disavowed that theory, and because they did not appeal from the District Court’s conclusion that the evidence would not support it. Nonetheless, each of the three per se theories is fairly encompassed within the question that we decided to answer. With respect to these theories, the ultimate constitutional question is whether the concepts of “fairness and justice” that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served by one of these categorical rules or by a Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances in particular eases. From that perspective, the extreme categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a compensable taking surely cannot be sustained. Petitioners’ broad submission would apply to numerous “normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like,” 482 U. S., at 321, as well as to orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other areas that we cannot now foresee. . Such a rule would undoubtedly require changes in numerous practices that have long been considered permissible exercises of the police power. As Justice Holmes warned in Mahon, “[government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.” 260 U. S., at 413. A rule that required compensation for every delay in the use of property would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking. Such an important change in the law should be the product of legislative rulemaking rather than adjudication. More importantly, for reasons set out at some length by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S., at 636, we are persuaded that the better approach to claims that a regulation has effected a temporary taking “requires careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” In that opinion, Justice O’Connor specifically considered the role that the “temporal relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisition” should play in the analysis of a takings claim. Id., at 632. We have no occasion to address that particular issue in this case, because it involves a different temporal relationship — the distinction between a temporary restriction and one that is permanent. Her comments on the “fairness and justice” inquiry are, nevertheless, instructive: “Today’s holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance. Our polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern partial regulatory takings. Under these cases, interference with investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine.... “The Fifth Amendment forbids the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. We have recognized that this constitutional guarantee is * “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”’ Penn Central, [438 U. S.], at 123-124 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960)). The concepts of ‘fairness and justice’ that underlie the Takings Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate. Accordingly, we have eschewed ‘any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.’ Penn Central, supra, at 124 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962)). The outcome instead ‘depends largely “upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.’” Penn Central, supra, at 124 (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155, 168 (1958)).” Id., at 633. In rejecting petitioners’ per se rule, we do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given exclusive significance one way or the other. A narrower rule that excluded the normal delays associated with processing permits, or that covered only delays of more than a year, would certainly have a less severe impact on prevailing practices, but it would still impose serious financial constraints on the planning process. Unlike the “extraordinary circumstance” in which the government deprives a property owner of all economic use, Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1017, moratoria like Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 are used widely among land-use planners to preserve the status quo while formulating a more permanent development strategy. In fact, the consensus in the planning community appears to be that moratoria, or “interim development controls” as they are often called, are an essential tool of successful development. Yet even the weak version of petitioners’ categorical rule would treat these interim measures as takings regardless of the good faith of the planners, the reasonable expectations of the landowners, or the actual impact of the moratorium on property values. The interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking by regulatory agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule that would impose such severe costs on their deliberations. Otherwise, the financial constraints of compensating property owners during a moratorium may force officials to rush through the planning process or to abandon the practice altogether. To the extent that communities are forced to. abandon using moratoria, landowners will have incentives to develop their property quickly before a comprehensive plan can be enacted, thereby fostering inefficient and ill-conceived growth. A finding in the 1980 Compact itself, which presumably was endorsed by all three legislative bodies that participated in its enactment, attests to the importance of that concern. 94 Stat. 3243 (“The legislatures of the States of California and Nevada find that in order to make effective the regional plan as revised by the agency, it is necessary to halt temporarily works of development in the region which might otherwise absorb the entire capability of the region for further development or direct it out of harmony with the ultimate plan”). As Justice Kennedy explained in his opinion for the Court in Palazzo lo, it is the interest in informed deci-sionmaking that underlies our decisions imposing a strict ripeness requirement on landowners asserting regulatory takings claims: “These cases stand for the important principle that a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation. Under our ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or regulation which is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the landowner’s first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion in considering development plans for the property, including the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law. As a general rule, until these ordinary processes have been followed the extent of the restriction on property is not known and a regulatory taking has not yet been established. See Suitum [v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U. S. 725, 736, and n. 10 (1997)] (noting difficulty of demonstrating.that ‘mere enactment’ of regulations restricting land use effects a taking).” 533 U. S., at 620-621. We, would create a perverse system of incentives were we to hold that landowners must wait for a takings claim to ripen so that planners can make well-reasoned decisions while, at the same time, holding that those planners must compensate landowners for the delay. Indeed, the interest in protecting the decisional process is even stronger when an agency is developing a regional plan than when it is considering a permit for a single parcel. In the proceedings involving the Lake Tahoe Basin, for example, the moratoria enabled TRPA to obtain the benefit of comments and criticisms from interested parties, such as the petitioners, during its deliberations. Since a categorical rule tied to the length of deliberations would likely create added pressure on decisionmakers to reach a quick resolution of land-use questions, it would only serve to disadvantage those landowners and interest groups who are not as organized or familiar with the planning process. Moreover, with a temporary ban on development there is a lesser risk that individual landowners will be “singled out” to bear a special burden that should be shared by the public as a whole. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825, 835 (1987). At least with a moratorium there is a clear “reciprocity of advantage,” Mahon, 260 U. S., at 415, because it protects the interests of all affected landowners against immediate construction that might be inconsistent with the provisions of the plan that is ultimately adopted. “While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others.” Keystone, 480 U. S., at 491. In fact, there is reason to believe property values often will continue to increase despite a moratorium. See, e. g., Growth Properties, Inc. v. Klingbeil Holding Co., 419 F. Supp. 212, 218 (Md. 1976) (noting that land values could be expected to increase 20% during a 5-year moratorium on development). Cf. Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F. 3d 1360, 1367 (CA Fed. 1999) (record showed that market value of the entire parcel increased despite denial of permit to fill and develop lake-bottom property). Such an increase makes sense in this context because property values throughout the Basin can be expected to reflect the added assurance that Lake Tahoe will remain in its pristine state. Since in some cases a 1-year moratorium may not impose a burden at all, we should not adopt a rule that assumes moratoria always force individuals to bear a special burden that should be shared by the public as a whole. It may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year should be viewed with special skepticism. But given the fact that the District Court found that the 32 months required by TRPA to formulate the 1984 Regional Plan was not unreasonable, we could not possibly conclude that every delay of over one year is constitutionally unacceptable. Formulating a general rule of this kind is a suitable task for state legislatures. In our view, the duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim, but with respect to that factor as with respect to other factors, the “temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted.” Palazzolo, 533 U. S., at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring). There may be moratoria that last longer than one year which interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations, but as the District Court’s opinion illustrates, petitioners’ proposed rule is simply “too blunt an instrument” for identifying those cases. Id., at 628. We conclude, therefore, that the interest in “fairness and justice” will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical rule. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Often referred to as the “Just Compensation Clause,” the final Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “... nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” It applies to the States as well as the Federal Government. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239, 241 (1897); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 160 (1980). According to a Senate Report: “Only two other sizable lakes in the world are of comparable quality — Crater Lake in Oregon, which is protected as part of the Crater Lake National Park, and Lake Baikal in the [former] Soviet Union. Only Lake Tahoe, however, is so readily accessible from large metropolitan centers and is so adaptable to urban development.” S. Rep. No. 91-510, pp. 3-4 (1969). The District Court added: “Or at least, for a very, very long time. Estimates are that, should the lake turn green, it could take over 700 years for it to return to its natural state, if that were ever possible at all.” 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1231. App. 104-107. This moratorium did not apply to rights that had vested before the effective date of the 1980 Compact. Id., at 107-108. Two months after the 1980 Compact became effective, TRPA adopted its Ordinance 81-1 broadly defining the term “project” to include the construction of any new residence and requiring owners of land in districts 1, 2, or 3, to get a permit from TRPA before beginning construction of homes on their property. 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1233 (Nev. 1999). As explained, supra, at 309, the petitioners who purchased land after the 1972 compact did so amidst a heavily regulated zoning scheme. Their property was already classified as part of land capability districts 1, 2, and 3, or SEZ land. And each land classification was subject to regulations as to the degree of artificial disturbance the land could safely sustain. 911 F. 2d 1331 (1990); 938 F. 2d 153 (1991); 34 F. 3d 753 (1994); 216 F. 3d 764 (2000); 611 F. Supp. 110 (1985); 808 F. Supp. 1474 (1992); 808 F. Supp. 1484 (1992). In 1991, petitioners amended their complaint to allege that the adoption of the 1987 plan also constituted an unconstitutional taking. Ultimately both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that this claim was barred by California’s 1-year statute of limitations and Nevada’s 2-year statute of limitations. See 216 F. 3d, at 785-789. Although the validity of the 1987 plan is not before us, we note that other litigants have challenged certain applications of that plan. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U. S. 725 (1997). In his dissent, The Chief Justice contends that the 1984 plan is before us because the 1980 Compact is a proximate cause of petitioners’ injuries, post, at 343-345. Petitioners, however, do not challenge the Court of Appeals’ holding on causation in their briefs on the merits, presumably because they understood when we granted certiorari on the question “[wjhether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution,” 533 U. S. 948 (2001), we were only interested in the narrow question decided today. Throughout the District Court and Court of Appeals decisions the phrase “temporary moratorium” refers to two things and two things only: Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21. The dissent’s novel theory of causation was not briefed, nor was it discussed during oral argument. As the District Court explained: “There is a direct connection between the potential development of plaintiffs’ lands and the harm the lake would suffer as a result thereof. Further, there has been no suggestion by the plaintiffs that any less severe response would have adequately addressed the problems the lake was facing. Thus it is difficult to see how a more proportional response could have been adopted. Given that TRPA’s actions had widespread application, and were not aimed at an individual landowner, the plaintiffs would appear to bear the burden of proof on this point. They have not met this burden — nor have they really attempted to do so. Although unwilling to stipulate to the fact that TRPA’s actions substantially advanced a legitimate state interest, the plaintiffs did not seriously contest the matter at trial.” 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1240 (citation omitted). The Penn Central analysis involves “a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 617 (2001). The court stated that petitioners “had plenty of time to build before the restrictions went into effect — and almost everyone in the Tahoe Basin knew in the late 1970s that a crackdown on development was in the works.” In addition, the court found “the fact that no evidence was introduced regarding the specific diminution in value of any of the plaintiffs’ individual properties clearly weighs against a finding that there was a partial taking of the plaintiffs’ property.” 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1241. The pretrial order describes purchases by the United States Forest Service of private lots in environmentally sensitive areas during the periods when the two moratoria were in effect. During the 2-year period ending on August 26, 1983, it purchased 215 parcels in California at an average price of over $19,000 and 45 parcels in Nevada at an average price of over $39,000; during the ensuing 8-month period, it purchased 167 California parcels at an average price of over $29,000 and 27 Nevada parcels at an average price of over $41,000. App. 76-77. Moreover, during those periods some owners sold sewer and building allocations to owners of higher capability lots “for between $15,000 and $30,000.” Id., at 77. Ordinance 81-5 specified that it would terminate when the regional plan became finalized. And Resolution 83-21 was limited to 90 days, but was renewed for an additional term. Nevertheless, the District Court distinguished these measures from true “temporary” moratoria because there was no fixed date for when they would terminate. 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 1250-1251. 216 F. 3d, at 773. “Below, the district court ruled that the regulations did not constitute a taking under Penn Central’s ad hoc approach, but that they did constitute a categorical taking under Lucas [v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 (1992)]. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1238-45. The defendants appealed the district court’s latter holding, but the plaintiffs did not appeal the former. And even if arguments regarding the Penn Central test were fairly encompassed by the defendants’ appeal, the plaintiffs have stated explicitly on this appeal that they do not argue that the regulations constitute a taking under the ad hoc balancing approach described in Penn Central.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals added: “Each of these three types of regulation will have an impact on the parcel’s value, because each will affect an aspect of the owner’s ‘use’ of the property — by restricting when the ‘use’ may occur, where the ‘use’ may occur, or how the ‘use’ may occur. Prior to Agins [v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980)], the Court had already rejected takings challenges to regulations eliminating all ‘use’ on a portion of the property, and to regulations restricting the type of ‘use’ across the breadth of the property. See Penn Central, 438 U. S. at 130-31 . . . ; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U. S. at 498-99...; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 384, 397 . . . (1926) (75% diminution in value caused by zoning law); see also William C. Haas & Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F. 2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979) (value reduced from $2,000,000 to $100,000). In those cases, the Court ‘uniformly rejected] the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a “taking.” ’ Penn Central, 438 U. S. at 131 .. .; see also Concrete Pipe and Products, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U. S. 602, 645 . . . (1993). There is no plausible basis on which to distinguish a similar diminution in value that results from a temporary suspension of development.” Id., at 776-777. Despite our clear refusal to hold that a moratorium never effects a taking, The Chief Justice accuses us of “allowing] the government to ‘. . . take private property without paying for it,’ ” post, at 349. It may be true that under a Penn Central analysis petitioners’ land was taken and compensation would be due. But petitioners failed to challenge the District Court’s conclusion that there was no taking under Penn Central. Supra, at 317, and n. 14. In determining whether government action affecting property is an unconstitutional deprivation of ownership rights under the Just Compensation Clause, a court must interpret the word “taken.” When the government condemns or physically appropriates the property, the fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed. When, however, the owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is more complex. To illustrate the importance of the distinction, the Court in Loretto, 458 U. S., at 430, compared two wartime takings cases, United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 116 (1951), in which there had been an “actual taking of possession and control” of a coal mine, and United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155 (1958), in which, “by contrast, the Court found no taking where the Government had issued a wartime order requiring nonessential gold mines to cease operations . . . 458 U. S., at 431. Loretto then relied on this distinction in dismissing the argument that our discussion of the physical taking at issue in the case would affect landlord-tenant laws. “So long as these regulations do not require the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity.” Id., at 440 (citing Penn Central). According to The Chief Justice’s dissent, even a temporary, use-prohibiting regulation should be governed by our physical takings cases because, under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1017 (1992), “from the landowner’s point of view,” the moratorium is the functional equivalent of a forced leasehold, post, at 348. Of course, from both the landowner’s and the government’s standpoint there are critical differences between a leasehold and a moratorium. Condemnation of a leasehold gives the government possession of the property, the right to admit and exclude others, and the right to use it for a public purpose. A regulatory taking, by contrast, does not give the government any right to use the property, nor does it dispossess the owner or affect her right to exclude others. The Chief Justice stretches Lucas’ “equivalence” language too far. For even a regulation that constitutes only a minor infringement on property may, from the landowner’s perspective, be the functional equivalent of an appropriation. Lucas carved out a narrow exception to the rules governing regulatory takings for the “extraordinary circumstance” of a permanent deprivation of all beneficial use. The exception was only partially justified based on the “equivalence” theory cited by The Chief Justice’s dissent. It was also justified on the theory that, in the “relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses,” it is less realistic to assume that the regulation will secure an “average reciprocity of advantage,” or that government could not go on if required to pay for every such restriction. 505 U. S., at 1017-1018. But as we explain, infra, at 339-341, these assumptions hold true in the context of a moratorium. The case involved “a bill in equity brought by the defendants in error to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under their property in such way as to remove the supports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of their house.” Mahon, 260 U. S., at 412. Mahon sought to prevent Pennsylvania Coal from mining under his property by relying on a state statute, which prohibited any mining that could undermine the foundation of a home. The company challenged the statute as a taking of its interest in the coal without compensation. In Lucas, we explained: “Prior to Justice Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (1871), or the functional equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession,’ Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 642 (1879) .... Justice Holmes recognized in Mahon, however, that if the protection against physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits. 260 U. S., at 414-415. If, instead, the uses of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, ‘the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappeared].’ Id., at 415. These considerations gave birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim that, ‘while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.’ Ibid.’’ 505 U. S., at 1014 (citation omitted). Justice Brandéis argued: “Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The State does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The State merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.” Mahon, 260 U. S., at 417 (dissenting opinion). In her concurring opinion in Palazzolo, 533 U. S., at 633, Justice O’Connor reaffirmed this approach: “Our polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern partial regulatory takings. Under these cases, interference with investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine.” Ibid. “Penn Central does not supply mathematically precise variables, but instead provides important guideposts that lead to the ultimate determination whether just compensation is required.” Id., at 634. “The temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted. The Takings Clause requires careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context.” Id., at 636. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment on the basis of the regulation’s impact on “reasonable, investment-backed expectations.” 505 U. S., at 1034. It is worth noting that Lucas underscores the difference between physical and regulatory takings. See supra, at 322-325. For under our physical takings cases it would be irrelevant whether a property owner maintained 5% of the value of her property so long as there was a physical appropriation of any of the parcel. The Chief Justice’s dissent makes the same mistake by carving out a 6-year interest in the property, rather than considering the parcel as a whole, and treating the regulations covering that segment as analogous to a total taking under Lucas, post, at 351. Armstrong, like Lucas, was a ease that involved the “total destruction by the Government of all value” in a specific property interest. 364 U. S., at 48-49. It is nevertheless perfectly clear that Justice Black’s oft-quoted comment about the underlying purpose of the guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation applies to partial takings as well as total takings. Brief for the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae 30. Although amicus describes the 1-year cutoff proposal as the “better approach by far,” ibid., its primary argument is that Penn Central should be overruled, id., at 20 (“All partial takings by way of land use restriction should be subject to the same prima facie rules for compensation as a physical occupation for a limited period of time”). Brief for Petitioners 44. See also Pet. for Cert. i. In addition, we recognize the anomaly that would be created if we were to apply Penn Central when a landowner is permanently deprived of 95% of the use of her property, Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1019, n. 8, and yet find a per se taking anytime the same property owner is deprived of all use for only five days. Such a scheme would present an odd inversion of Justice Holmes’ adage: “A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change.” Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 157 (1921). Petitioners fail to offer a persuasive explanation for why moratoria should be treated differently from ordinary permit delays. They contend that a permit applicant need only comply with certain specific requirements in order to receive one and can expect to develop at the end of the process, whereas there is nothing the landowner subject to a moratorium can do but wait, with no guarantee that a permit will be granted at the end of the process. Brief for Petitioners 28. Setting aside the obvious problem with basing the distinction on a course of events we can only know after the fact — in the context of a facial challenge — petitioners’ argument breaks down under closer examination because there is no guarantee that a permit will be granted, or that a decision will be made within a year. See, e. g., Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156 (1990) (holding that 16-month delay in granting a permit did not constitute a temporary taking). Moreover, under petitioners’ modified categorical rule, there would be no per se taking if TRPA simply delayed action on all permits pending a regional plan. Fairness and justice do not require that TRPA be penalized for achieving the same result, but with full disclosure. See, e. g., Santa Fe Village Venture v. Albuquerque, 914 F. Supp. 478, 483 (N. M. 1995) (30-month moratorium on development of lands within the Petroglyph National Monument was not a taking); Williams v. Central, 907 P. 2d 701, 703-706 (Colo. App. 1995) (10-month moratorium on development in gaming district while studying city’s ability to absorb growth was not a compensable taking); Woodbury Place Partners v. Woodbury, 492 N. W. 2d 258 (Minn. App. 1993) (moratorium pending review of plan for land adjacent to interstate highway was not a taking even though it deprived property owner of all economically viable use of its property for two years); Zilber v. Moranga, 692 F. Supp. 1195 (ND Cal. 1988) (18-month development moratorium during completion of a comprehensive scheme for open space did not require compensation). See also Wayman, Leaders Consider Options for Town Growth, Charlotte Observer, Feb. 3, 2002, p. 15M (describing 10-month building moratorium imposed “to give town leaders time to plan for development”); Wallman, City May Put Reins on Beach Projects, Sun-Sentinel, May 16, 2000, p. IB (2-year building moratorium on beachfront property in Fort Lauderdale pending new height, width, and dispersal regulations); Foderaro,' In Suburbs, They’re Cracking Down on the Joneses, N. Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2001, p. A1 (describing moratorium imposed in Eastchester, New York, during a review of the town’s zoning code to address the problem of oversized homes); Dawson, Commissioners recommend Aboite construction ban be lifted, Fort Wayne News Sentinel, May 4, 2001, p. 1A (3-year moratorium to allow improvements in the water and sewage treatment systems). See J. Juergensmeyer & T. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Control Law §§ 5.28(G) and 9.6 (1998); Garvin & Leitner, Drafting Interim Development Ordinances: Creating Time to Plan, 48 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest 3 (June 1996) (‘With the planning so protected, there is no need for hasty adoption of permanent controls in order to avoid the establishment of nonconforming uses, or to respond in an ad hoc fashion to specific problems. Instead, the planning and implementation process may be permitted to run its full and natural course with widespread citizen input and involvement, public debate, and full consideration of all issues and points of view”); Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 J. Urb. L. 65 (1971). The Chief Justice offers another alternative, suggesting that delays of six years or more should be treated as per se takings. However, his dissent offers no explanation for why 6 years should be the cutoff point rather than 10 days, 10 months, or 10 years. It is worth emphasizing that we do not reject a categorical rule in this case because a 32-month moratorium is just not that harsh. Instead, we reject a categorical rule because we conclude that the Penn Central framework adequately directs the inquiry to the proper considerations — only one of which is the length of the delay. Petitioner Preservation Council, “through its authorized representatives, actively participated in the entire TRPA regional planning process leading to the adoption of the 1984 Regional Plan at issue in this action, and attended and expressed its views and concerns, orally and in writing, at each public hearing held by the Defendant TRPA in connection with the consideration of the 1984 Regional Plan at issue herein, as well as in connection with the adoption of Ordinance 81-5 arid the Revised 1987 Regional Plan addressed herein.” App. 24. We note that the temporary restriction that was ultimately upheld in the First English case lasted for more than six years before it was replaced by a permanent regulation. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989). Several States already have statutes authorizing interim zoning ordinances with' specific time limits. See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §65858 (West Supp. 2002) (authorizing interim ordinance of up to two years); Colo. Rev. Stat. §30-28-121 (2001) (six months); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §100.201 (2001) (one year); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 125.215 (West 2001) (three years); Minn. Stat. §394.34 (2000) (two years); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §674:23 (West 2001) (one year); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. §197.520 (1997) (10 months); S. D. Codified Laws § 11-2-10 (2001) (two years); Utah Code Ann. §17-27-404 (1995) (18 months); Wash. Rev. Code §35.63.200 (2001); Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(d) (2001) (two years). Other States, although without specific statutory authority, have recognized that reasonable interim zoning ordinances may be enacted. See, e. g., S. E. W. Freil v. Triangle Oil Co., 76 Md. App. 96, 543 A. 2d 863 (1988); New Jersey Shore Builders Assn. v. Dover Twp. Comm., 191 N. J. Super. 627, 468 A. 2d 742 (1983); SCA Chemical Waste Servs., Inc. v. Konigsberg, 636 S. W. 2d 430 (Tenn. 1982); Sturgess v. Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246, 402 N. E. 2d 1346 (1980); Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 215 A. 2d 112 (1965).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MATTZ v. ARNETT, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME No. 71-1182. Argued March 27-28, 1973 Decided June 11, 1973 Blackmtfn, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Lee J. Sclar argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Roderick Walston, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Carl Boronkay, Assistant Attorney General. Harry R. Sachse argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Frizzell, Carl Strass, and Glen R. Goodsell. MR. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Our decision in this case turns on the resolution of the narrow question whether the Klamath River Indian Reservation in northern California was terminated by Act of Congress or whether it remains “Indian country,” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 1151. When established, the reservation was described as “a strip of territory commencing at the Pacific Ocean and extending 1 mile in width on each side of the Klamath River” for a distance of approximately 20 miles, encompassing an area not exceeding 25,000 acres. This description is taken from President Franklin Pierce’s Executive Order issued November 16, 1855, pursuant to the authority granted by the Act of March 3, 1853, 10 Stat. 226, 238, and the Act of March 3, 1855, 10 Stat. 686, 699. Petitioner Raymond Mattz is a Yurok, or Klamath River, Indian who, since the age of nine, regularly fished, as his grandfather did before him, with dip, gill, and trigger nets, at a location called Brooks Riffle on the Klamath River. On September 24, 1969, a California game warden confiscated five gill nets owned by Mattz. The nets were stored near Brooks Riffle, approximately 200 feet from the river, and within 20 miles of the river’s mouth. The respondent Director of the Department of Fish and Game instituted a forfeiture proceeding in state court. Mattz intervened and asked for the return of his nets. He alleged, among other things, that he was an enrolled member of the Yurok Tribe, that the nets were seized within Indian country, and that the state statutes prohibiting the use of gill nets, Cal. Fish & Game Code §§8664, 8686, and 8630, therefore were inapplicable to him. The state trial court, relying on Elser v. Gill Net Number One, 246 Cal. App. 2d 30, 54 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1966), found that the Klamath River Reservation in 1892 “for all practical purposes almost immediately lost its identity,” and concluded that the area where the nets were seized was not Indian country. The court thereby disposed of petitioner's primary defense to the forfeiture. It did not reach other issues bearing upon the application of the California statutes to Indian country and the existence of Indian fishing rights there. On appeal, the State Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that, inasmuch as the area in question had been opened for unrestricted homestead entry in 1892, the earlier reservation status of the land had terminated. 20 Cal. App. 3d 729, 97 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1971). The Supreme Court of California, one judge dissenting, denied a petition for hearing. See 20 Cal. App. 3d, at 735, 97 Cal. Rptr., at 898. We granted certiorari, 409 U. S. 1124 (1973), because the judgments of the state courts appeared to be in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court. We now reverse. The reversal, of course, does not dispose of the underlying forfeiture issue. On remand, the questions relating to the existence of Matiz’ fishing rights and to the applicability of California law notwithstanding reservation status will be addressed. We intimate no opinion on those issues. I While the current reservation status of the Klamath River Reservation turns primarily upon the effect of an 1892 Act of Congress which opened the reservation land for settlement, the meaning and effect of that Act cannot be determined without some reference to the Yurok Tribe and the history of the reservation between 1855 and 1892. The Yurok Indians apparently resided in the area of the lower Klamath River for a substantial period before 1855 when the Klamath River Reservation was established. Little is known of their prior history. There are sources, however, that provide us with relatively detailed information about the tribe, its culture, living conditions, and customs for the period following 1855. That the tribe had inhabited the lower Klamath River well before 1855 is suggested by the name. Yurok means “down the river.” The names of the neighboring tribes, the Karok and the Modok, mean, respectively, “up the river” and “head of the river,” and these appellations, as would be expected, coincide with the respective homelands. Powers 19; Kroeber 15. By the Act of March 3, 1853, 10 Stat. 238, the President was “authorized to make five military reservations from the public domain in the State of California or the Territories of Utah and New Mexico bordering on said State, for Indian purposes.” The Act of March 3, 1855, 10 Stat. 699, appropriated funds for “collecting, removing, and subsisting the Indians of California ... on two additional military reservations, to be selected as heretofore . . . Provided, That the President may enlarge the quantity of reservations heretofore selected, equal to those hereby provided for.” President Pierce then issued his order of November 16, 1855, specifying the Klamath River Reservation and stating, “Let the reservation be made, as proposed.” Kappler 817. The site was ideally selected for the Yuroks. They had lived in the area; the arable land, although limited, was “peculiarly adapted to the growth of vegetables,” 1856 Report 238; and the river, which ran through a canyon its entire length, abounded in salmon and other fish. Ibid.; 1858 Report 286. In 1861 nearly all the arable lands on the Klamath River Reservation were destroyed by a freshet, and, upon recommendation of the local Indian agent, some of the Indians were removed to the Smith River Reservation, established for that purpose in 1862. Only a small number of Yuroks moved to the new reservation, however, and nearly all those who did move returned within a few years to the Klamath River. Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D. 205, 208 (1904); Kappler 830; 1864 Report 122. The Smith River Reservation was then discontinued. Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 198, 221. The total Yurok population on the Klamath River Reservation in the 1860’s cannot be stated with precision. In 1852, based in part on a rough census made by a trader, it was estimated at 2,500. Kroeber 16-17. The effect of the 1861 flood cannot be firmly established; but it is clear that the tribe remained on the Klamath thereafter. For later years, Kroeber estimated that the population in 1895 was 900, and, in 1910, 668. Kroeber 19. From this it would appear that the flood at least did not cause a dissolution of the tribe; on the contrary, the Yuroks continued to reside in the area through the turn of the century and beyond. The Act of April 8, 1864, 13 Stat. 39, designated California as one Indian superintendency. It also recited that “there shall be set apart by the President, and at his discretion, not exceeding four tracts of land, within the limits of said state, to be retained by the United States for the purposes of Indian reservations.” It further provided that “the several Indian reservations in California which shall not be retained . . . under . . . this act, shall ... be surveyed into lots or parcels . . . and ... be offered for sale at public outcry, and thence afterward shall be held subject to sale at private entry.” Id., at 40. At the time of the passage of the 1864 Act there were, apparently, three reservations in California: the Klam-ath River, the Mendocino, and the Smith River. It appears, also, that the President did not take immediate action, upon the passage of the Act, to recognize reservations in California. It was not until 1868 that any formal recognition occurred, and then it was the Congress, rather than the President, that acted. In that year Congress discontinued the Smith River Reservation, 15 Stat. 221, and restored the Mendocino to the public lands. Id., at 223. No similar action was taken with respect to the Klamath River Reservation. Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D., at 209. Congress made appropriations for the Round Valley Reservation, 15 Stat. 221, and for it and the Hoopa Valley Reservation in 1869, 16 Stat. 37, although neither of these, apparently, had been established theretofore by formal Executive Order. The Klamath River Reservation, although not reestablished by Executive Order or specific congressional action, continued, certainly, in de facto existence. Yuroks remained on reservation land, and the Department of Indian Affairs regarded the Klamath River Reservation as “in a state of reservation” throughout the period from 1864 to 1891. No steps were taken to sell the reservation, or parts thereof, under the 1864 Act. Indeed, in 1879, all trespassers there were removed by the military. In 1883 the Secretary of the Interior directed that allotments of land be made to the Indians on the reservation. In February 1889, the Senate, by resolution, directed the Secretary of the Interior “to inform the Senate what proceedings, if any, have been had in his Department relative to the survey and sale of the Klamath Indian reservation ... in pursuance of the provisions of the act approved April 8, 1864.” 20 Cong. Rec. 1818. In response, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, by letter dated February 18, 1889, to the Secretary disclosed that no proceedings to this effect had been undertaken. An Assistant Attorney General for the Department of the Interior expressed a similar view in an opinion dated January 20, 1891. In 1888, in a forfeiture suit, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California concluded that the area within the Klamath River Reservation was not Indian country, within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 2133, prescribing the penalty for unlicensed trading in Indian country. The court concluded that the land composing the reservation was not retained or recognized as reservation land pursuant to the 1864 Act and that, therefore, it no longer constituted an Indian reservation. United States v. Forty-eight Pounds of Rising Star Tea, 35 F. 403 (ND Cal. 1888). This holding was expressly affirmed on appeal to a circuit judge. 38 F. 400 (CCND Cal. 1889). The Assistant Attorney General, in the opinion referred to above, conceded the probable correctness of the judgment but was not convinced that his own views were erroneous, and he could not assent to the reasoning of the court. He felt that the court’s comments as to the abandoned status of the reservation “were dicta and not essential to the decision of the case before the court.” Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D., at 215. Thus, as of 1891, it may be fair to say that the exact legal status of the Klamath River Reservation was obscure and uncertain. The petitioner in his brief here, p. 14, states that the reservation “ceased to exist in 1876, at the latest.” Any question concerning the reservation’s continuing legal existence, however, appears to have been effectively laid to rest by an Executive Order dated October 16, 1891, issued by President Benjamin Harrison. By the specific terms of that order, the Hoopa Valley Reservation, which, as we already have noted, was located in 1864 and formally set apart in 1876, and which was situated about 50 miles upstream from the Klamath River’s mouth, was extended so as to include all land, one mile in width on each side of the river, from “the present limits” of the Hoopa Valley Reservation to the Pacific Ocean. The Klamath River Reservation, or what had been the reservation, thus was made part of the Hoopa Valley Reservation, as extended. The reason for incorporating the Klamath River Reservation in the Hoopa Valley Reservation is apparent. The 1864 Act had authorized the President to “set apart” no more than four tracts for Indian reservations in California. By 1876, and certainly by 1891, four reservations already had been so set apart. These were the Round Valley, referred to above, the Mission, the Hoopa Valley, and the Tule River. Kappler 830-831. Thus, recognition of a fifth reservation along the Klamath River was not permissible under the 1864 Act. Accordingly, the President turned to his authority under the Act to expand an existing, recognized reservation. He enlarged the Hoopa Valley Reservation to include what had been the Klamath River Reservation as well as an intervening riparian strip connecting the two tracts. The President’s continuing authority so to enlarge reservations and, specifically, the legality of the 1891 Executive Order, was affirmed by this Court in Donnelly v. United States, 228 TJ. S. 243, 255-259 (1913), reh. denied, 228 U. S. 708, and is not challenged here. II This general background as to the origin and development of the Klamath River Reservation is not contested by either party. The reservation’s existence, pursuant to the Executive Order of 1891, is conceded. The present controversy relates to its termination subsequent to 1891, and turns primarily upon the effect of the Act of June 17, 1892, 27 Stat. 52, entitled “An act to provide for the disposition and sale of lands known as the Klamath River Indian Reservation.” This Act provided: “That all of the lands embraced in what was Klamath River Reservation in the State of California, as set apart and reserved under authority of law by an Executive order dated November sixteenth, eighteen hundred and fifty-five, are hereby declared to be subject to settlement, entry, and purchase under the laws of the United States granting homestead rights and authorizing the sale of mineral, stone, and timber lands: Provided, That any Indian now located upon said reservation may, at any time within one year from the passage of this act, apply to the Secretary of the Interior for an allotment .... And the Secretary of the Interior may reserve from settlement, entry, or purchase any tract or tracts of land upon which any village or settlement of Indians is now located, and may set apart the same for the permanent use and occupation of said village or settlement of Indians. . . . Provided further, That the proceeds arising from the sale of said lands shall constitute a fund to be used under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior for the maintenance and education of the Indians now residing on said lands and their children.” The respondent Director argues that this statute effected the termination of the Klamath River Reservation. The petitioner urges the contrary. It is our task, in light of the language and purpose of the Act, as well as of the historical background, outlined above, to determine the proper meaning of the Act and, consequently, the current status of the reservation. The respondent relies upon what he feels is significant language in the Act and upon references in the legislative history. He contends, “The fact that the lands were to be opened up for settlement and sale by homesteaders strongly militates against a continuation of such reservation status.” Brief for Respondent 3. We conclude, however, that this is a misreading of the effect of the allotment provisions in the 1892 Act. The meaning of those terms is to be ascertained from the overview of the earlier General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388. That Act permitted the President to make allotments of reservation lands to resident Indians and, with tribal consent, to sell surplus lands. Its policy was to continue the reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and grazing. When all the lands had been allotted and the trust expired, the reservation could be abolished. Unallotted lands were made available to non-Indians with the purpose, in part, of promoting interaction between the races and of encouraging Indians to adopt white ways. See § 6 of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390; United States Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 115-117, 127-129, 776-777 (1958). Under the 1887 Act, however, the President was not required to open reservation land for allotment; he merely had the discretion to do so. In view of the discretionary nature of this presidential power, Congress occasionally enacted special legislation in order to assure that a particular reservation was in fact opened to allotment. The 1892 Act was but one example of this. Its allotment provisions, which do not differ materially from those of the General Allotment Act of 1887, and which in fact refer to the earlier Act, do not, alone, recite or even suggest that Congress intended thereby to terminate the Klamath River Reservation. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351, 357-358 (1962). Rather, allotment under the 1892 Act is completely consistent with continued reservation status. This Court unanimously observed, in an analogous setting in Seymour, id., at 356, “The Act did no more [in this respect] than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the reservation in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development of its wards.” See United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278 (1909); United States v. Nice, 241 U. S. 591 (1916). See also Wilbur v. United States, 281 U. S. 206 (1930); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243 (1913). Ill The respondent further urges, however, that his view of the effect of the 1892 Act is supported by the Act's reference to “what was [the] Klamath River Reservation.” According to the respondent, this reference, and other references in the legislative history, compel the conclusion that Congress intended to terminate the reservation in 1892. The 1892 Act, to be sure, does refer to the Klamath River Reservation in the past tense. But this is not to be read as a clear indication of congressional purpose to terminate. Just a few weeks before the bill (H. R. 38, 52d Cong., 1st Sess.), which eventually became the Act, was reported out of committee on February 5, 1892, H. R. Rep. No. 161, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., the President had formally extended the Hoopa Valley Reservation to include the Klamath River Reservation. And only that portion of the extension which had been the Klamath River Reservation was the subject of the 1892 Act. The reference to the Klamath River Reservation in the past tense seems, then, merely to have been a natural, convenient, and shorthand way of identifying the land subject to allotment under the 1892 Act. We do not believe the reference can be read as indicating any clear purpose to terminate the reservation directly or by innuendo. The respondent also points to numerous statements in the legislative history that, in his view, indicate that the reservation was to be terminated. We need not refer in detail to the cited passages in H. R. Rep. No. 161, supra, or to the debates on the bill, 23 Cong. Rec. 1598-1599, 3918-3919 (1892), for there is no challenge here to the view that the House was generally hostile to continued reservation status of the land in question. In our estimation, however, this very fact, in proper perspective, supports the petitioner and undermines the respondent's position. As early as 1879, there were efforts in Congress to abolish the Klamath River Reservation. From that date to 1892 strong sentiment existed to this effect. But it does not appear that termination ever commanded majority support. The advocates of termination argued that the reservation, as of 1879, long had been abandoned; that the land was useless as a reservation; and that many white settlers had moved on to the land and their property should be protected. See H. R. Rep. No. 1354, 46th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1880). That whites had settled there is clear, but the view that no Indians remained after the flood of 1861 appears to have been a gross misconception on the part of those who sought termination. The first bill providing for public entry and sale of the Klamath River Reservation was introduced in the Senate on May 28, 1879. S. Res. 34, 46th Cong., 1st Sess.; 9 Cong. Rec. 1651. The resolution referred to the reservation’s having been “abandoned” in 1855 “ and the tribe removed to another reservation established for its use.” No action was taken on the bill, and another, of the same purport, was introduced on January 12, 1880, in the House. H. R. 3454, 46th Cong., 2d Sess.; 10 Cong. Rec. 286. This bill provided that the reservation “be, and the same is hereby, abolished,” and authorized and directed the Secretary of the Interior to survey the lands and have them made subject to homestead and preemption entry and sale “the same as other public lands.” It is clear from the report on this second bill, H. R. Rep. No. 1354, supra, at 1-5, that the establishment of the reservation in 1855 was viewed as a mistake and an injustice. According to the Report, the reservation had been abandoned after the 1861 freshet, and the Indians had moved to the Smith River and, later, the Hoopa Valley Reservations. White settlers had moved in and wished to exploit the lumber and soil of the area which, some said, “has no equal in California as a fruit and wine growing country.” Id., at 5. Inasmuch as the reservation blocked access to the river, the resources of the area could not be developed. Although unmentioned in that Report, the Office of Indian Affairs opposed the bill. See H. R. Rep. No. 1148, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1882). The bill as reported was recommitted and no further action was taken. 10 Cong. Rec. 3126 (1880). An identical bill was introduced in the following Congress. H. R. 60, 47th Cong., 1st Sess.; 13 Cong. Rec. 90 (1881). The Commissioner of Indian Affairs opposed the bill as introduced, but stated that he would not oppose it if provision for prior allotments to the Indians was made. H. R. Rep. No. 1148, supra, at 2. The Commissioner's proposed amendment was approved by the Committee, 13 Cong. Rec. 3414 (1882), but no action on the bill was taken by the full House. In 1883 and 1884 three more bills were introduced. It is of interest to note that each acceded to the request of the Commissioner that provision be made for prior allotments to resident Indians. H. R. 112, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.; 15 Cong. Rec. 62 (1883); S. 813, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.; 15 Cong. Rec. 166 (1883); H. R. 7505, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.; 15 Cong. Rec. 5923 (1884). Each bill would have “abolished” the reservation and would have made the land subject to homestead and pre-emption entry. None of the bills was enacted, although passage must have been generally regarded as likely, for the Indian Bureau in 1883 began the work of allotment and survey, perhaps in anticipation of passage. In 1885 two bills were introduced in the House. Each was substantially identical to those introduced in 1883 and 1884. H. R. 158 and H. R. 165, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. ; 17 Cong. Rec. 370 (1885). No action was taken on either bill. No further bills, apparently, were introduced until 1889. During the intervening period, however, the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, was passed and thereafter amended, 26 Stat. 794. The Rising Star Tea case, 35 F. 403, was also decided. In 1889 a bill providing for the allotment of the Klamath River Reservation was introduced. The allotments, however, were to be made in a manner inconsistent with the General Allotment Act. H. R. 12104, 50th Cong., 2d Sess.; 20 Cong. Rec. 756 (1889). And after affirmance of the Rising Star Tea case by the circuit court, 38 F. 400 (1889), identical bills were introduced in the House and the Senate providing, without mention of allotment, that “all of the lands embraced in what was Klamath River Reservation . . . are hereby de-dared to be subject to settlement, entry, and purchase” under the land laws. H. It. 113, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.; 21 Cong. Rec. 229 (1889); S. 2297, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.; 21 Cong. Rec. 855 (1890). The Indian Office opposed the bills, recommending that they be amended to provide for allotments to the Indians under the General Allotment Act, that surplus lands be restored to the public domain, and that the proceeds be held in trust for the Klamath River Indians. See Short v. United States, No. 102-63, pp. 44-45 (Report of Commissioner, Court of Claims, 1972). H. R. 113 was reported out of committee with certain amendments, including one to the effect that proceeds arising from the sale of lands were to be used for the “removal, maintenance, and education” of the resident Indians, the Hoopa Valley Reservation being considered the place of removal. Allotments to the Indians on the Klamath Reservation, however, were emphatically rejected. H. R. Rep. No. 1176, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1890). The bill was so amended and passed the House. 21 Cong. Rec. 10701-10702 (1890). It died in the Senate. In light of the passage of this last bill in the House and the presence of the Rising Star Tea opinions, the Indian Department moved to have the Klamath River Reservation land protected for the Indians residing there. The details of this effort, including the opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, referred to above, are outlined in the Commissioner’s report in Short v. United States, supra, at 45-50. These efforts culminated in President Harrison’s Executive Order of October 1891 expanding the Hoopa Valley Reservation to include the Klamath River Reservation. It is against this background of repeated legislative efforts to terminate the reservation, and to avoid allotting reservation lands to the Indians, that the 1892 Act was introduced. H. R. 38, 52d Cong., 1st Sess.; 23 Cong. E.ec. 125 (1892). The bill provided for the settlement, entry, and purchase of the reservation land and specified that the proceeds should be used for the “removal, maintenance, and education” of the resident Indians. No allotments were provided for, as the Indians were “semicivilized, disinclined to labor, and have no conception of land values or desire to cultivate the soil.” H. R. Rep. No. 161, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1892). The House Committee on Indian Affairs amended the bill by changing the word “and” to “or” in the proviso relating to the use of proceeds. Id., at 2. The bill passed the House without change. 23 Cong. Rec. 1598-1599 (1892). It was struck out in the Senate, however, and another version was substituted deleting reference to the removal of the Indians and providing that before public sale the land should be allotted to the Indians under the General Allotment Act of 1887, as amended. Id., at 3918-3919. This substitute measure had the support of the Interior Department. Id., at 3918. The Senate called for a conference with the House, id., at 3919, and the conference adopted the Senate version with amendments. Sen. Mise. Doc. No. 153, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892). The bill was then passed and became the 1892 Act. IV Several conclusions may be drawn from this account. First, the respondent’s reliance on the House Report and on comments made on the floor of the House is not well placed. Although the primary impetus for termination of the Klamath River Reservation had been with the House since 1871, this effort consistently had failed to accomplish the very objectives the respondent now seeks to achieve. Likewise, the House in 1892 failed to accomplish these objectives, for the Senate version, supported by the Interior Department, was substituted for that of the House. The Senate version, ultimately enacted, provided for allotments to the Indians and for the proceeds of sales to be held in trust for the “maintenance and education,” not the removal, of the Indians. The legislative history relied upon by the respondent does not support the view that the reservation was terminated; rather, by contrast with the bill as finally enacted, it compels the conclusion that efforts to terminate the reservation by denying allotments to the Indians failed completely. A second conclusion is also inescapable. The presence of allotment provisions in the 1892 Act cannot be interpreted to mean that the reservation was to be terminated. This is apparent from the very language of 18 U. S. C. § 1151, defining Indian country “notwithstanding the issuance of any patent”, therein. More significantly, throughout the period from 1871-1892 numerous bills were introduced which expressly provided for the termination of the reservation and did so in unequivocal terms. Congress was fully aware of the means by which termination could be effected. But clear termination language was not employed in the 1892 Act. This being so, we are not inclined to infer an intent to terminate the reservation. The Court stated in United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S., at 285, that “when Congress has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.” A congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 TJ. S. 351 (1962); United States v. Nice, 241 U. S. 591 (1916). Finally, our conclusion that the 1892 Act did not terminate the Klamath River Reservation is reinforced by repeated recognition of the reservation status of the land after 1892 by the Department of the Interior and by Congress. In 1904 the Department, in Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D. 205, ruled that the 1892 Act reconfirmed the continued existence of the reservation. In 1932 the Department continued to recognize the Klamath River Reservation, albeit as part of the Hoopa Valley Reservation, and it continues to do so today. And Congress has recognized the reservation's continued existence by extending the period of trust allotments for this very reservation by the 1942 Act, described above, 25 U. S. C. § 348a, and by restoring to tribal ownership certain vacant and undisposed-of ceded lands in the reservation by the 1958 Act, supra. We conclude that the Klamath River Reservation was not terminated by the Act of June 17, 1892, and that the land within the boundaries of the reservation is still Indian country, within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 1151. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. Title 18 U. S. C. § 1151 defines the term “Indian country” to include, inter alia, “all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent . . . .” Title 18 U. S. C. § 1162 (a) provides that, with respect to Indian country within California, that State “shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country ... to the same extent that such State . . . has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State . . . , and the criminal laws of such State . . . shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State . . . .” Section 1162 (b) provides, however, “Nothing in this section . . . shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.” Finally, the California Fish & Game Code § 12300 (Supp. 1973), reads: “Irrespective of any other provision of law, the provisions of this code are not applicable to California Indians whose names are inscribed upon the tribal rolls, while on the reservation of such tribe and under those circumstances in this State where the code was not applicable to them immediately prior to the effective date of Public Law 280, Chapter 505, First Session, 1953, 83d Congress of the United States [18 U. S. C. § 1162].” The Executive Order is reproduced in 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs — Laws and Treaties 817 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler). At the end of this opinion, as the Appendix, is a map of the Klam-ath River Reservation. The area described in the text is indicated as the “Old Klamath River Reservation.” See Pet. for Cert., App. B 4-5. A. Kroeber, Handbook of the Indians of California, ec. 1-4, published as Bulletin 78, Bureau of American Ethnology 1-97 (1925) (hereinafter Kroeber); S. Powers, Tribes of California, cc. 4 and 5, published as 3 Contributions to North American Ethnology 44^64 (1877) (hereinafter Powers). Various Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs provide further information; see, for example, the 1856 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 249-250 (hereinafter Report). Kroeber, in the preface to his work, suggests that the factual material contained in Powers' manuscript is subject to some criticism. Kroeber’s reference to Powers deserves reproduction in full here: “I should not close without expressing my sincere appreciation of my one predecessor in this field, the late Stephen Powers, well known for his classic 'Tribes of California,' one of the most remarkable reports ever printed by any government. Powers was a journalist by profession and it is true that his ethnology is often of the crudest. Probably the majority of his statements are inaccurate, many are misleading, and a very fair proportion are without any foundation or positively erroneous. He possessed, however, an astoundingly quick and vivid sympathy, a power of observation as keen as it was untrained, and an invariably spirited gift of portrayal that rises at times into the realm of the sheerly fascinating. Anthropologically his great service lies in the fact that with all the looseness of his data and method he was able to a greater degree than anyone before or after him to seize and fix the salient qualities of the mentality of the people he described. The ethnologist may therefore by turns writhe and smile as he fingers Powers’s pages, but for the broad outlines of the culture of the California Indian, for its values with all their high fights and shadows, he can still do no better than consult the book. With all its flimsy texture and slovenly edges, it will always remain the best introduction to the subject.” Kroeber ix. Of this area one agent stated, “No place can be found so well adapted to these Indians, and to which they themselves are so well adapted, as this very spot. No possessions of the Government can be better spared to them. No territory offers more to these Indians and very little territory offers less to the white man. The issue of their removal seems to disappear.” 1885 Report 266. It is interesting to note that Powers believed the Yurok population at one time far exceeded 2,500 and perhaps numbered over 5,000. This was, as Powers stated, “before the whites had come among them, bringing their corruptions and their maladies . . . .” Powers 59. The renowned Major John Wesley Powell, who was then in charge of the United States Geographical and Geological Survey of the Rocky Mountain Region, Department of the Interior, placed little faith in Powers’ figures and requested that he modify his estimates. Powers expressed his displeasure at this in a letter to Major Powell stating, in characteristic fashion, “I have the greatest respect for your views and beliefs, and, with your rich fund of personal experience and observation; if you desire to cut out the paragraph and insert one under your own signature, in brackets, or something of that kind, I will submit without a murmur, if you will add this remark, as quoted from myself, to wit: T desire simply to ask the reader to remember that Major Powell has been accustomed to the vast sterile wastes of the interior of the continent, and has not visited the rich forests and teeming rivers of California.’ But I should greatly prefer that you would simply disavow the estimates, and throw the whole responsibility upon me. “This permission I give you; but I have waded too many rivers and climbed too many mountains to abate one jot of my opinions or beliefs for any carpet-knight who yields a compiling-pen in the office of the - or -. If any critic, sitting in his comfortable parlor in New York, and reading about the sparse aboriginal populations of the cold forests of the Atlantic States, can overthrow any of my conclusions with a dash of his pen, what is the use of the book at all? As Luther said, at the Diet of Worms, ‘Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise.’ “I beg you, my dear major, not to consider anything above written as in the slightest degree disrespectful to yourself; such is the farthest remove from my thoughts.” Powers 2-3. Powers’ estimates were not altered, and the above-quoted letter was placed sympathetically by Major Powell in the introductory section of Powers’ published study. 1864 Report 122; Opinion dated Jan. 20, 1891, of the Assistant Attorney General for the Department of the Interior, quoted in Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D. 205, 210 (1904); Kroeber 19. Another source estimates that in 1871 the Indian population along the Klamath was 2,500. Report of D. H. Lowry, Indian Agent, Sept. 1, 1871, noted in Short v. United States, No. 102-63, p. 35 (Report of Commissioner, Court of Claims, 1972). The Hoopa Valley Reservation was located August 21, 1864, but formally set apart for Indian purposes, as authorized by the 1864 Act, by President Grant only by Executive Order dated June 23, 1876. Kappler 815. See Appendix map. The area is that described as the "Original Hoopa Valley Reservation.” Letter dated Apr. 4, 1888, from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D., at 211. The allotments, however, were postponed "on account of the discovery of gross errors in the public surveys.” Ibid.; 1885 Report XLVIII. “In response to said resolution, I have to state that I am unable to discover from the records or correspondence of this office that any proceedings were ever had or contemplated by this Department for the survey and sale of said reservation under the provisions of the act aforesaid; on the contrary, it appears to have been the declared purpose and intention of the superintendent of Indian affairs for California, who was charged with the selection of the four reservations to be retained under said act, either to extend the Hoopa Valley Reservation (one of the reservations selected under the act), so as to include the Klamath River Reservation, or else keep it as a separate independent reservation, with a station or subagency there, to be under control of the agent at the Hoopa Valley Reservation, and the lands have been held in a state of reservation from that day to this (Ex. Doc. 140, pp. 1, 2).” Quoted in Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D., at 212. “Pushing aside all technicalities of construction, can any one doubt that for all practical purposes the tract in question constitutes an Indian reservation? Surely, it has all the essential characteristics of such a reservation; was regularly established by the proper authority; has been for years and is so occupied by Indians now, and is regarded and treated as such reservation by the executive branch of the government, to which has been committed the management of Indian affairs and the administration of the public land system .... It is said, however, that the Klamath River reservation was abolished by section three of the act of 1864. Is this so? “In the present instance, the Indians have lived upon the described tract and made it their home from time immemorial; and it was regular!y set apart as such by the constituted authorities, and dedicated to that purpose with all the solemnities known to the law, thus adding official sanction to a right of occupation already in existence. It seems to me something more than a mere implication, arising from a rigid and technical construction of an act of Congress, is required to show that it was the intention of that body to deprive these Indians of their right of occupancy of said lands, without consultation with them or their assent. And an implication to that effect is all, I think that can be made out of that portion of the third section of the act of 1864 which is supposed to be applicable.” Quoted in Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D., at 212-213. “It is hereby ordered that the limits of the Hoopa Valley Reservation in the state of California, a reservation duly set apart for Indian purposes, as one of the Indian reservations authorized to be set apart, in said State, by Act of Congress approved April [8], 1864, (13 Stats., 39), be and the same are hereby extended so as to include a tract of country one mile in width on each side of the Klamath River, and extending from the present limits of the said Hoopa Valley reservation to the Pacific Ocean; Provided, however, That any tract or tracts included within the above described boundaries to which valid rights have attached under the laws of the United States are hereby excluded from the reservation as hereby extended.” Kappler 815. Kappler 819-824. It is noteworthy that the boundaries of the Mission Reservation were altered repeatedly between 1870 and 1875, and even thereafter. These actions were taken under the President’s continuing authority to set apart and add to or diminish the four reservations authorized under the 1864 Act. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243 and 708 (1913). In its final form, the Mission Reservation consisted of no less than 19 different and noncontiguous tracts. Kappler 819-824; Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D., at 209-210. See Appendix map. The strip of land between the Hoopa Valley Reservation and the Klamath River Reservation is referred to there as the “Connecting Strip.” Under the 1891 Executive Order the Hoopa Valley Reservation was extended to encompass all three areas indicated on the map. The connecting strip and the old Klamath River Reservation frequently are referred to as the Hoopa Valley Extension. The trust period on allotments to Indians on the Klamath River Reservation expired in 1919, but was later extended by Congress by the Act of Dec. 24, 1942, 56 Stat, 1081, 25 U. S. C. § 348a. See S. Rep. No. 1714, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). And in 1958 Congress restored to tribal ownership vacant and undisposed-of ceded lands on various reservations, including 159.57 acres on the Klamath River Reservation. Pub. L. 85-420, 72 Stat. 121. For an extended treatment of allotment policy, see D. Otis, History of the Allotment Policy, in Readjustment of Indian Affairs, Hearings on H. R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 428-440 (1934). The policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation land was repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984, now amended and codified as 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. See, for example, the Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 888 (Sioux Reservations), and United States v. Nice, 241 U. S. 591 (1916) ; the Act of Mar. 22, 1906, 34 Stat. 80 (Colville Reservation), and Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351 (1962); the Act of May 29, 1908, 35 Stat. 460 (Cheyenne River and Standing Rock Reservations), and United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 F. 2d 684 (CA8 1973), aff’g 344 F. Supp. 777 (SD 1972). The respondent argues, however, that Congress, perhaps unacquainted with the Executive Order of October 1891, intended this language to convey the view expressed in the House Report, H. R. Rep. No. 161, supra, 23 Cong. .Rec. 1598-1599 (1892), that the Klamath River Reservation had long been abandoned and, in fact and in law, had already been terminated. It is clear from the text, infra, that there were efforts in certain quarters of the House to terminate the reservation and open it for white settlement. See Short v. United, States, supra, n. 8, at 3F-52. While the respondent’s interpretation of the phrase is plausible, it is no less plausible to conclude, in light of the repeated and unsuccessful efforts by the House to terminate the reservation, that the Senate proponents of the legislation were not inclined to make their cause (of requiring allotments) less attractive to the House by amending the bill to refer to the “former Klamath River Reservation, now part of the Hoopa Valley Reservation” rather than “what was [the] Klamath River Reservation.” The Department of the Interior took issue with the Committee's population estimates. H. R. Rep. No. 1148, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-3 (1882). In a letter transmitted to the Committee on Indian Affairs in 1881, an infantry lieutenant, acting as Indian Agent, suggested that the Committee’s population estimates were “gleaned principally from civilians, who are, I believe, somewhat inclined to lessen the number, thinking doubtlessly that the smaller the number the greater the likelihood of its being thrown open to settlers.” Id., at 2. Congress has used clear language of express termination when that result is desired. See, for example, 15 Stat. 221 (1868) (“the Smith River reservation is hereby discontinued”); 27 Stat. 63 (1892) (adopted just two weeks after the 1892 Act with which this case is concerned, providing that the North Half of the Colville Indian Reservation, “the same being a portion of the Colville Indian Reservation ... be, and is hereby, vacated and restored to the public domain”), and Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S., at 354; 33 Stat. 218 (1904) (“the reservation lines of the said Ponca and Otoe and Missouria Indian reservations be, and the same are hereby, abolished”). In United, States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 F. 2d 684 (1973), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in a case presenting issues not unlike those before us. The court concluded, id., at 689, that “a holding favoring federal jurisdiction is required unless Congress has expressly or by clear implication diminished the boundaries of the reservation opened to settlement” (emphasis in original). Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, pt. 29, California, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 15532 (1934). Although subsequent legislation usually is not entitled to much weight in construing earlier statutes, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 170 (1968), it is not always without significance. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S., at 356-357.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. BROWN, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, et al. No. 75-909. Argued January 12, 1977 Decided May 2, 1977 Deputy Solicitor General Randolph argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 75-909 and 75-960, for petitioner in No-. 75-1055, and for respondent in No. 75-1050. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Harriet S. Shapiro, Edmund B. Clark, Bruce J. Chasan, Neil T. Proto, John E. Bonine, and Gerald K. Gleason. David G. Hawkins argued the cause and filed briefs for Washington Area Bicyclist Assn., Inc., et al., respondents under this Court's Rule 21 (4), in support of petitioners in Nos. 75-909, 75-960, and 75-1055. Joel S. Moskowitz, Deputy Attorney General of California, and Henry R.' Lord, Deputy Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for respondents in Nos. 75-909, 75-960, and 75-1055, and for petitioner in No. 75-1050. With them on the brief were Bruce E. Babbitt, Attorney General of Arizona, and Anthony B. Ching, Assistant Attorney General; Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, and Mark I. Weinberger, Deputy Attorney General; Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, and Edward M. Norton, Jr., Assistant Attorney General; Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, Walter A. McFarlane, Deputy Attorney General, and J. Thomas Steger, Assistant Attorney General; John R. Risher, Jr., Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, Louis P. Robbins, Principal Assistant Corporation Counsel, and John C. Salyer, Assistant Corporation Counsel. Together with Environmental Protection Agency v. Arizona et al., also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court’s Rule 23 (5)); No. 75-960, Environmental Protection Agency v. Maryland, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; and No. 75-1050, Virginia ex rel. State Air Pollution Control Board v. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, and No. 75-1055, Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. District of Columbia et al., both on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. W. Bernard Richland and Alexander Gigante, Jr., filed a brief for the city of New York as amicus curiae urging reversal in part in Nos. 75-1050 and 75-1055, and affirmance in Nos. 75-909 and 75-960. Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance in all cases. Per Curiam. These cases arise under the Clean Air Act, as amended by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U. S. C. § 1857 et seg., and raise questions concerning the authority of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to compel various types of implementation and enforcement actions by the States. Four separate decisions in the Courts of Appeals reviewed transportation control plans promulgated by the Administrator for several States which had previously failed to submit adequate plans of their own. Four petitions have been filed seeking review of those decisions which, with limited exceptions, invalidated the Administrator’s transportation control plans which had been adopted in the form of regulations. Those transportation control plans have a variety of aspects which need not be discussed in great detail to explain our disposition of these cases. In general, they imposed upon the States the obligations (1) to develop an inspection and maintenance program pertaining to the vehicles registered in the affected Air Quality Control Regions, and to submit to the Administrator, by fixed deadlines, both a schedule of compliance and the operative regulations by which the program was to be run; (2) to develop various retrofit programs pertaining to several classes of older vehicles, in order to minimize several different types of emissions; (3) to designate and enforce preferential bus and carpool lanes, on streets sometimes specifically identified in the regulations and sometimes left to be chosen by the State; (4) to develop a program to monitor actual emissions as affected by the foregoing programs; and (5) to adopt certain other programs which varied from State to State. The critical fact about all of the foregoing obligations was that they were imposed on the States, under 40 CFR § 52.23 (1976), as elements of an applicable implementation plan. A State's failure to carry out any of them would therefore not merely allow the Administrator to step in and carry them out himself under § 113 (a) (2) of the Clean Air Act, but would, in the view of each of the Courts of Appeals, render the State “in violation of any requirement of an applicable implementation plan” and therefore apparently subject to direct enforcement actions against it under the provisions of § 113 (a)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 1857c~8 (a)(1): “Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any requirement of an applicable implementation plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in violation of the plan and the State in which the plan applies of such finding. If such violation extends beyond the 30th day after the date of the Administrator's notification, the Administrator may issue an order requiring such person to comply with the requirements of such plan or he may bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.” Under dual challenges by the States that these regulations were not within the mandate of the Act, and that if they were they were in violation of the Constitution, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth, Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits struck them down. All of the courts rested on statutory interpretation, but noted also that serious constitutional questions might be raised if the statute were read as the United States argued it should be. Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 827 (CA9 1975); Arizona v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 825 (CA9 1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 172 U. S. App. D. C. 311, 521 F. 2d 971 (1975); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F. 2d 215 (CA4 1975). The only substantial variation in the outcome of these decisions was that the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed regulations requiring the creation of bus lanes, the purchase by the affected jurisdictions of a fixed number of new buses, and the denial of registration to a vehicle whose owner is unable to produce a federal certificate of compliance, should a federal inspection program be instituted. The Solicitor General’s petitions from all three Courts of Appeals challenged them only insofar as they invalidated the regulations requiring state inspection and maintenance programs. In addition, we granted the petition for certiorari of the Commonwealth of Virginia on its challenge to the regulations which the District of Columbia Circuit had upheld. Prior to argument, the Solicitor General informed the Court that repeal of the bus purchase regulations was imminent, Reply Brief for Federal Parties 25, and that issue was thereby effectively removed from the case. Thus the litigation has undergone a great deal of shrinkage since the decisions below due to the federal parties’ exercise of their prerogative not to seek review of the invalidation of certain regulations. But the federal parties have not merely renounced an intent to pursue certain specified regulations; they now appear to admit that those remaining in controversy are invalid unless modified in certain respects: “The Administrator . . . concedes the necessity of removing from the regulations all requirements that the States submit legally adopted regulations; the [Administrator’s] regulations contain no requirement that the State adopt laws.” Brief for Federal Parties 20 n. 14. The federal parties’ position now appears to be that, while the challenged transportation plans do not require the enactment of state legislation, they do now contain, and must be modified to eliminate, certain requirements that the State promulgate regulations. See Reply Brief for Federal Parties 14 n. 22. We decline the federal parties’ invitation to pass upon the EPA regulations, when the only ones before us are admitted to be in need of certain essential modifications. Such action on our part would amount to the rendering of an advisory opinion. For this Court to review regulations normally required to be first reviewed in the Court of Appeals, before such review is had, is extraordinary. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 584-585 (1952). For it to review regulations not yet promulgated, the final form of which has only been hinted at, would be wholly novel. See generally Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 417-419 (1942); United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U. S. 299, 309-310 (1927). The judgments of the respective Courts of Appeals are vacated, and the cases are remanded for consideration of mootness and such other proceedings as may be consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 113 (a)(2), 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-8 (a)(2), provides: “Whenever, on the basis of information available to him, the Administrator finds that violations of an applicable implementation plan are so widespread that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State in which the plan applies to enforce the plan effectively, he shall so notify the State. If the Administrator finds such failure extends beyond the 30th day after such notice, he shall give public notice of such finding. During the period beginning with such public notice and ending when such State satisfies the Administrator that it will enforce such plan (hereafter referred to in this section as ‘period of federally assumed enforcement’), the Administrator may enforce any requirement of such plan with respect to any person— “(A) by issuing an order to comply with such requirement, or “(B) by bringing a civil action under subsection (b) of this section.” Prior to the decision of the Ninth Circuit, a similar set of regulations pertaining to Pennsylvania had been upheld by the Third Circuit. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F. 2d 246 (1974). That decision is not presently before the Court. The regulations were officially rescinded on February 8, 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 7957.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. MEXIA TEXTILE MILLS, INC. No. 434. Argued April 18, 1950. Decided May 15, 1950. A. Norman Somers argued the cause for petitioner. Solicitor General Perlman, Robert N. Denham, David P. Findling and Mozart G. Ratner filed a brief for petitioner. John M. Scott argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. [Note: This dissent applies also to No. 435, National Labor Relations Board v. Pool Manufacturing Co., post, p. 577.] Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a proceeding brought by the National Labor Relations Board charging unfair labor practices of the respondent, Mexia Textile Mills, a manufacturer of cotton goods at Mexia, Texas, engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. On the Board’s petition for enforcement of its cease and desist order, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit referred the case back to the Board with directions to take evidence and report whether the order had been complied with by the respondent; if so, whether the matter should not be dismissed as moot; and, if not, what recommendations the Board had to make. We granted certiorari upon the claim that the effect of the order of the Court of Appeals was at variance with previous decisions of this Court. 338 TJ. S. 909 (1950). The pertinent facts are these. In November 1944, the Board conducted an election at the respondent’s plant, in which the Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. O., received an overwhelming majority. The Board thereupon certified that Union as the exclusive representative of those production and maintenance employees who constituted the appropriate bargaining unit designated by the Board. In January 1947 the Union filed a charge with the Board complaining that respondent had refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union and was thus guilty of unfair labor practices within the meaning of §§ 8 (1) and 8 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board issued its complaint pursuant to those charges in June 1947. Respondent, in answer, admitted that it was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act, denied the charges contained in the complaint, and alleged, inter alia, that the Union no longer represented a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, though the number of employees who had withdrawn was unknown to respondent. A hearing was held before a trial examiner in August 1947. The Trial Examiner denied respondent’s motions for a more definite statement of the complaint, and for an order permitting the inspection and copying of certain evidence. Respondent’s counsel thereupon withdrew from the hearing and took no further part therein. In December 1947 the Trial Examiner issued his report. He concluded that “From the evidence, it is apparent that, although the respondent conferred with the Union on possible contract provisions, it did not bargain in good faith and had no intention of doing so.” The failure to bargain was manifest from evidence of incidents taking place from the time of the certification of the Union until a month before its complaint was filed. Unilateral wage increases and respondent’s efforts to shunt the Union representatives from one company official to another in search of the final authority in wage and contract negotiations — these and other findings led the Examiner to conclude that “an unmistakeable effort to escape genuine collective bargaining” was demonstrated. Further, the Examiner determined, there was no merit in the respondent’s contention that the Union did not retain the membership of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. Respondent, having taken no part in the hearing, did not of course introduce any evidence to support its allegation. The Examiner recommended, in substance, that respondent be ordered to cease and desist from its refusal to bargain in good faith with the Union. No exceptions to the report were filed within the time permitted by § 10 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, and in July 1948 the Board adopted the Trial Examiner’s findings and issued the recommended order, as required by §10 (c). In April 1949 the Board petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for enforcement of its order. Respondent filed a motion for the taking of additional evidence, alleging that since the report of the Trial Examiner, “during the year 1948,” it had “entered into good faith bargaining with the Union,” but that an agreement had been prevented by the Union’s “arbitrary, capricious and intransigent attitude . . . .” A copy of a letter respondent had sent to the Board’s Regional Director, shortly after the Trial Examiner’s report, was attached to respondent’s motion. The letter stated that while respondent “did not see fit to argue” about past “disagreements and strikes” before the Trial Examiner, it was then “more than willing to accept [his] recommendations . . . .” Respondent also alleged that after “the record in the instant case was closed” it had come to the conclusion that the Union no longer represented a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. On June 3, 1949, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered that “action on petitioner’s motion should be deferred and the matter be referred back to the Board with directions to take evidence and report: (1) whether and to what extent its order has been complied with by-respondent; (2) whether and why, if the order has been complied with, the matter should not be dismissed as moot; and (3) if the matter is not moot, what recommendations or requests the Board has to make in the premises . . . We think it plain from the cases that the employer’s compliance with an order of the Board does not render the cause moot, depriving the Board of its opportunity to secure enforcement from an appropriate court. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has apparently recognized this rule both before and after the decision in the instant cases. A Board order imposes a continuing obligation; and the Board is entitled to have the resumption of the unfair practice barred by an enforcement decree. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remarked, “no more is involved than whether what the law already condemned, the court shall forbid; and the fact that its judgment adds to existing sanctions that of punishment for contempt, is not a circumstance to which a court will ordinarily lend a friendly ear.” Labor Board v. General Motors Corp., 179 F. 2d 221, 222 (1950). The Act does not require the Board to play hide-and-seek with those guilty of unfair labor practices. That the respondent doubts the Union’s ability to muster a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit does not justify the denial of an enforcement decree. Explicit congressional policy stands in the way of permitting the employers to stall enforcement of the Board’s orders on this ground. Under § 9 (c) of the Act “an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf” may “assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in section 9 (a) . . . .” § 9 (c) (1) (A) (ii). Petitions by the employer concerning selection of bargaining representatives are limited to those “alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in section 9 (a) . . . .” § 9 (c) (1) (B). To authorize the employer to assert diminution in membership in the certified union in an enforcement proceeding subverts the statutory mandate to leave these matters to the Board in separate proceedings under § 9 (c). It is of course equally clear that a motion for leave to adduce additional evidence pursuant to § 10 (e) of the labor relations acts is “addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court,” Southport Petroleum Co. v. Labor Board, 315 U. S. 100, 104 (1942)) Labor Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U. S. 9 (1943). We are told that the order of the Court of Appeals is justified in this case because the issue of compliance, so clearly irrelevant in the ordinary course of review, is imbued with relevance should the respondent’s counsel move to adduce additional evidence when the case reaches the Court of Appeals. The cases are to the contrary. Labor Board v. Condenser Corp., 128 F. 2d 67, 81 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1942); Labor Board v. Swift & Co., 129 F. 2d 222, 224 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1942); Labor Board v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 98 F. 2d 488, 493 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1938), and cases therein cited. If compliance with an order of the Board is irrelevant to the reviewing court’s function after the new evidence has been adduced, we do not see that there is point in adducing evidence of that compliance. This Court has emphasized that the “power to adduce additional evidence granted to the Circuit Court of Appeals by § 10 (e) cannot be employed to enlarge the statutory scope of judicial review.” Labor Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U. S. 219, 234-235 (1947). As the managers on the part of the House of Representatives for the Conference Committee reported concerning the Wagner Act, that statute contemplated that there be “immediately available to the Board an existing court decree to serve as a basis for contempt proceedings,” in the event a renewal of the unfair practice occurs after the enforcement order. H. R. Rep. No. 1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, on H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 55; compare H. R. Rep. No. 245, on H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 43, 93. Section 10 (e), which “in effect formulates a familiar principle regarding newly discovered evidence,” Labor Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., supra, 330 U. S. at 234, does not authorize a discretion so broad that evidence irrelevant as a matter of law may be considered “material.” Compare Griffin v. United States, 336 U. S. 704, 708 (1949), with United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106 (1946). The cases cited by respondent do not touch this controlling issue. The order of the Court of Appeals must be vacated and the enforcement of the Board order decreed pursuant to § 10 (e), unless “extraordinary circumstances” are pleaded which justify the respondent’s failure to urge its objections before the Board. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whom Mr. Justice Jackson joins, dissenting. Compliance with an order of the National Labor Relations Board is, of course, no defense to the Board’s petition for judicial enforcement of its order. Therefore, a Court of Appeals would be abusing the authority conferred by § 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, if, upon such a petition for enforcement, it even temporarily withheld enforcement merely for the purpose of asking the Board to report to it whether the order had already been complied with. Even if it had, the Board is entitled to a formal decree as a safeguard against repetition of the unfair labor practice. If in the cases before us the Court of Appeals had, by seeking light from the Board on the issue of compliance, in effect ruled that compliance with an order of the Board was relevant to enforcement, it would be incumbent upon this Court, in the fair administration of law, to issue its discretionary writ of certiorari and reverse the orders of the Court of Appeals summarily. But the action of the Court of Appeals in these two cases cannot fairly be interpreted as defiance of the settled principle of law that compliance by an employer with the Board’s order is not a defense to an application for its enforcement. In a series of decisions prior to its actions in these two cases, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in common with all other circuits, has enforced orders of the Board despite allegations of compliance. Nor are these two cases to be interpreted as departures from the principle which that court has heretofore recognized and obeyed. It has explicitly advised us that the opinions and orders in these two cases “were not intended to be, they were not, departures” from the established rule. Labor Board v. Cooper Co., 179 F. 2d 241. Whatever justification there may have been when we granted certiorari for attributing to the court below a volte-face on its own repeated application of a settled principle of law, there was none after its decision in the Cooper case ten days later. Yet it is only by attributing to the Court of Appeals a departure which that court has disavowed that it may be charged with an abuse of discretion which alone would have warranted our taking these cases for review. The fact is that in both these cases representations were made to the Court of Appeals of circumstances arising subsequent to the orders issued by the Board which amount to more than a claim that the employer had complied with what the Board had directed. The claims concern change in the union affiliation of employees and recalcitrance on the part of the union, and not of the employer, toward effectuating the Board's order. To be sure, there was a clause in the court's order which, taken abstractly, looked as though the court desired to be informed on the issue of compliance and the Court of Appeals did not spell out with particularity these other claims, but they were embraced in a catch-all clause for further “evidence and report” by the Board. This raises for me important issues of judicial administration. Due regard for the considerations that should govern the exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction and for the effective functioning of the Courts of Appeals in the whole scheme of the federal judiciary indicates dismissal of these writs. We are dealing with one of the appellate tribunals of the United States to which Congress has seen fit to commit the final determination of this type of controversy, subject only to the reviewing power of this Court. Review is to be exercised, however, not as a matter of course, but only in those rare instances where constitutional issues, or conflicts of circuits, or obvious considerations of a public importance call for our adjudication. In establishing the Courts of Appeals, Congress intended to create courts of great dignity and ability whose decisions were to be final except in the very limited instances where the Supreme Bench should pronounce for the whole nation. This design for the Courts of Appeals was powerfully reinforced by the Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936, in that it withdrew all but a few categories of cases from the obligatory jurisdiction of this Court. The volume of business that would be drawn to this Court by the overriding national importance of the issues was bound to be so heavy that adequate disposition of them was assumed to preclude the grant of certiorari in cases, however erroneously decided below, in which the incidence of error was too small compared with the drain that their consideration would make on the thought and energy demanded of this Court by the cases which inevitably belong here. And so the Court has said again and again that the writ of certiorari ought not to be employed to bring here cases which, in their essential impact, concern a restricted and perhaps a unique set of circumstances and do not involve the pronouncement by a Court of Appeals of a general doctrine on which this Court ought to have the last say. No candid student of the actual operation of certiorari can feel confident that the criteria professed for its exercise have been adequately respected. This Court is too frequently engaged in deciding cases which ought not to occupy the highest Court in the land, because they divert its energy from those matters to which it cannot give too much unburdened thought. And when comparison is made between the issues at stake in petitions that have been granted and those in which petitions have been denied, the contrast is at times glaring. This has two consequences that are to be deprecated in the administration of the federal courts, and they are avoidable without aiming at the moon. By taking cases that ought not to be taken we obviously encourage petitions to be filed that have no excuse for being here. The fact that term after term hundreds of petitions are denied indicates that our screening process is such as to encourage the hope that is eternal in the breast of losing counsel. One does not have to be an easy generalizer of national characteristics to believe that litigiousness is one of our besetting sins. A relaxed observance of the considerations that supposedly govern our certiorari jurisdiction is not calculated to discourage litigiousness. Equally undesirable is the effect, however insidious, upon Courts of Appeals. If, barring only exceptional cases, they are to be deemed final courts of appeals, consciousness of such responsibility will elicit in them, assuming they are manned by judges fit for their tasks, the qualities appropriate for such responsibility. Contrariwise, encouragement in regarding Courts of Appeals merely as way-stations to this Court is bound to have a weakening effect on the administration of tribunals whose authority and qualities we should be alert to promote. These are general considerations, but due regard for them goes, I believe, to the very marrow of high judicial performance. Let me apply them to the cases in hand. A year ago three circuit judges of long experience deferred motions of the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its orders (one of which had been outstanding for two and one-half years) by requesting the Board for “additional evidence” which these judges deemed material. The court made this request under § 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, with respect to various claims, outlined above, as they emerged in the proceedings before it. When it was confronted with the employers’ applications for leave to adduce such additional evidence, the court presumably examined the cases in this Court as to the nature of its power to grant them and noted that our cases held that such applications are “addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court.” Southport Petroleum Co. v. Labor Board, 315 U. S. 100, 104; Labor Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U. S. 219, 233-34. In granting the applications, the court, expressly reserving decision on the merits, merely referred the matters back to the Board for its assistance in furnishing further information and for its recommendations and requests “in the light of such further information.” Indeed, that court has rather plaintively explained that in the two cases which are now reversed “nothing was decided.” Labor Board v. Cooper Co., 179 F. 2d 241.. The Court notes that the Board has held that the continued majority status of a certified union may be challenged by an employer in § 9 (c) proceedings. Whitney’s, 81 N. L. R. B. 75. There is neither explicit authorization nor explicit denial in the statute of the right of an employer to make such a challenge in enforcement proceedings. Nothing in the text or context of the statute or any consideration underlying its policy precludes the relevance of continued majority status to enforcement, especially where loss of majority may be due to employee dissatisfaction with alleged union intransigence. It appears to me arbitrary to deny to a Court of Appeals, in the fair exercise of its discretion under § 10 (e), the right to ask the Board for light on this issue, if for no other reason than that the Board’s views would be helpful in the judicial determination of the issue. Fully mindful of the heavy load of cases before the Board, I venture to suggest that it could have speedily disposed of the matters that on the record appeared to trouble the Court of Appeals, could have reported back to the court, and could have secured a prompt disposition of its petitions for enforcement. Any adverse rulings by the court could then have been brought here by the Board, not with any ambiguity inherent in a discretionary ruling, but with the full clarity of an adjudication on the merits. Instead, the Board comes here to review the court’s interim orders, petitions for certiorari resting on a special set of unique circumstances are granted, and the Court of Appeals is now reversed by attributing to it a disavowed disregard of an important principle in the administration of the Labor Management Relations Act. In the light of the entire series of decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, both before and after the orders in this case, it does not seem to me reasonable to interpret the orders now before us as demands on the Board for findings merely as to compliance with the orders sought to be enforced. That court’s decisions preclude such intendment. Since the record permits, we ought to attribute to a Court of Appeals not a willful disregard of principle and, as such, an abuse of discretion, but an honest desire to get light on happenings after the Board’s orders relevant to its duties as a court of equity. Courts of Appeals are also human institutions. By attributing to the Court of Appeals an abusive exercise of discretion when the record may fairly be otherwise interpreted, we not only needlessly rebuke that court; we take action calculated to chill other judges in exercising with utter freedom a discretion which we have heretofore pronounced they possess. I would leave the action of the Court of Appeals to take the course which I believe wisely should have been taken when their orders were entered. To that end, I would dismiss these writs as improvidently granted. 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 141 et seq. 146 of the 164 valid votes were cast in favor of the union, of the approximately 186 eligible voters. Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, 271 (1938); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 230 (1938); Labor Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U. S. 217, 225 (1949); Labor Board v. Draper Corp., 159 F. 2d 294, 297 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1947); Labor Board v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862, 869-870 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1938); Labor Board v. Condenser Corp., 128 F. 2d 67, 81 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1942); Labor Board v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F. 2d 51, 55 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1944); Labor Board v. Toledo Desk & Fixture Co., 158 F. 2d 426 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1946); Labor Board v. Bachelder, 125 F. 2d 387, 388 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1942); Labor Board v. Swift & Co., 129 F. 2d 222, 224 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1942); Labor Board v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 98 F. 2d 488 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1938); Pueblo Gas & Fuel Co. v. Labor Board, 118 F. 2d 304, 307 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1941). Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 304 U. S. 257 (1938). Labor Board v. Fickett-Brown Mfg. Co., 140 F. 2d 883, 884 (1944); Labor Board v. The Cooper Co., 179 F. 2d 241 (1950). See Labor Board v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862, 869-870 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1938). See also, §§ 203.46, 203.47 of the Board’s regulations under the Wagner Act, 11 Fed. Reg. 177A-605, 177A-610 (1946), and §§ 203.52 and 203.53 of the rules printed at 12 Fed. Reg. 5651, 5662 (1947); Labor Board v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 96 F. 2d 197 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1938). Compare Franks Bros. Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 702, 705-706 (1944). The Board has held that it is the forum before which an employer may challenge a certified union’s continued representative status, Matter of Whitney’s, 81 N. L. R. B. 75 (1949), in § 9 (c) proceedings. Section 10 (e) provides in part: “If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its members, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the transcript.” 61 Stat. 148, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 160 (e).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ETSI PIPELINE PROJECT v. MISSOURI et al. No. 86-939. Argued November 3, 1987 Decided February 23, 1988 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Kennedy, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the brief for petitioners in No. 86-941 were Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Flint, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Fred R. Disheroon, and Ralph W. Tarr. James A. Hourihan, Walter A. Smith, Jr., and Mary Anne Sullivan filed briefs for petitioner in No. 86-939. Elizabeth M. Osenbaugh, Deputy Attorney General of Iowa, argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With her on the brief for respondents State of Missouri et al. were Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Eliza Ovrom, Assistant Attorney General, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Curtis F. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Le Roy W. Sievers, Assistant Attorney General. Stephen E. Roady, Ronald J. Wilson, and William E. Walters III filed a brief for respondents Kansas City Southern Railway Co. et al. Together with No. 86-941, Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Missouri et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota, Charles J. Meyers, Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming, Michael T. Greely, Attorney General of Montana, and Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, filed a brief for the State of Montana et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. We must decide whether in the circumstances of this case the Secretary of the Interior has exceeded the authority Congress delegated to him by the Flood Control Act of 1944. I The dispute centers on Lake Oahe, an enormous reservoir located on the Missouri River in South Dakota, with a capacity of more than 23 million acre-feet of water. In 1982, ETSI Pipeline Project entered into a contract with the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw up to 20,000 acre-feet of water from Lake Oahe per year for 40 years. South Dakota already had granted ETSI a state permit to use this water in a coal slurry pipeline that would transport coal from Wyoming to the southeastern United States. Soon after the contract was signed, the States of Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska brought suit in District Court to enjoin performance of the contract, alleging that the manner in which the contract was approved violated several federal statutes. In particular, the plaintiffs contended that the Interior Secretary lacks statutory authority under the Flood Control Act of 1944 (Act), 58 Stat. 887, to execute a contract to provide water from Lake Oahe for industrial uses without obtaining the approval of the Secretary of the Army. The District Court ruled for the plaintiffs. Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. 1268 (Neb. 1984). It concluded that the Oahe Dam was not a reclamation or power development that was undertaken by the Interior Secretary, pursuant to clear statutory authority. Instead, the dam was built by the Corps of Engineers, now part of the Department of the Army (formerly the Department of War, but renamed by Act of July 26,1947, 61 Stat. 495), which has always maintained and operated the reservoir. No block of water in Lake Oahe has been specifically set aside for use by the Interior Department, and the Interior Secretary has not constructed any works at Lake Oahe. On these facts, the District Court held that the Act does not empower the Interior Secretary to furnish water from Lake Oahe for industrial use. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting. Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F. 2d 270 (CA8 1986). It upheld the District Court’s conclusion that Lake Oahe is not a reclamation development undertaken by the Interior Secretary, primarily because the Army built the reservoir and controls its operation. Accordingly, the Interior Secretary cannot contract on his own to withdraw water from the reservoir for industrial use. Neither the language nor the legislative history of the Act was thought to support the claim that the Interior Secretary was ceded broad authority over water in this reservoir, even water that it claims has been designated as available for future irrigation purposes. Indeed, the language of the Act and its legislative history were found to be convincing enough on this point that the Court of Appeals refused to defer to the Interior Secretary’s contrary interpretation. The Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc by an equally divided vote of the judges. We granted certiorari, 480 U. S. 905 (1987), and we now affirm. II A The Missouri River Basin is a watershed that covers a vast area in the midwestern United States. The topography of this area, however, reveals two distinct regions that experience very different water problems. The upper part of the Basin, which includes large sections of Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and South Dakota, is mostly arid or semiarid; there, the Missouri River and its tributaries are important because they represent a major resource for developing the agricultural and industrial potential of the area. The lower part of the Basin, which includes territory in Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, and Missouri, is more humid, and there the rivers are used chiefly for navigation, though the critical problem in this region is to control flooding. See generally M. Ridge-way, The Missouri Basin’s Pick-Sloan Plan 47-55 (1955). In the early 1940’s, Congress focused its attention on the water problems of the Missouri River Basin, prompted especially by severe floods that had devastated the lower Basin in 1943 and 1944. At the behest of Congress, the Army Corps of Engineers prepared a report that described a comprehensive plan to develop the entire Basin, known as the Pick Plan for its author, a colonel in the Corps. The Pick Plan proposed the construction of 12 multiple-purpose reservoirs and related works, including 5 reservoirs on the main stem of the Missouri River, at an approximate initial cost of $480 million, though it was estimated that to carry out the entire proposal might cost close to $1 billion. The Pick Plan stressed flood control as its primary objective, but noted that its comprehensive list of projects “would also provide for the most efficient utilization of the waters of the Missouri River Basin for all purposes, including irrigation, navigation, power, domestic and sanitary purposes, wildlife, and recreation,” as well as other intangible benefits. H. R. Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1944) (H. R. Doc.). The report estimated the gross storage capacity of the Oahe Reservoir at about 6 million acre-feet of water. At almost the same time, the Interior Department’s Bureau of Reclamation independently completed its own plan to develop the Basin, which it had begun earlier, known as the Sloan Plan after the Montana engineer who prepared much of its analysis. The Sloan Plan proposed a total of 90 reservoirs, many of them on the smaller tributary streams, and included 3 reservoirs on the main stem of the Missouri River, at a projected cost of $1.2 billion, with much of that figure to be repayable. The Sloan Plan was also a comprehensive proposal, though it emphasized use of the water for irrigating land, especially in the upper part of the Basin. It estimated that the Oahe Reservoir would hold 19,600,000 acre-feet of water. The Sloan Plan also contained a section comparing its provisions to those in the Pick Plan and suggesting modifications to the Pick Plan “which appear necessary to satisfy water-use requirements throughout the Missouri River Basin.” S. Doc. No. 191, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 120 (1944) (S. Doc.). This section concluded that though “the capacity of individual reservoirs, as well as aggregate capacities, remain to be determined in greater detail,” the “Army and Reclamation plans on storage needs for all purposes can be composed.” Id., at 122-123. The Pick and Sloan Plans differed with one another not only in their primary objectives, but also in several other important respects, such as the amount of expenditures and the number of projects. The engineering features of the two plans also were dissimilar. On the main stem of the Missouri River, the two plans called for different numbers of reservoirs of divergent sizes, and thus for inconsistent amounts of total water storage. Even where the two plans agreed on the need for a particular reservoir at a particular location, which they did at Oahe and at Fort Randall, they envisioned those projects very differently; as noted above, for example, the Sloan Plan proposed that Lake Oahe would hold more than three times as much water as called for in the Pick Plan, at an additional cost of more than $20 million. Obviously Congress could not proceed with both plans at once. In order to arrive at a single set of projects for development of the Basin, a Committee composed of two representatives each from the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation was appointed to review the engineering features of the two plans. This Committee essentially combined the determinations made by the Corps about the projects that would be needed for flood control and navigation and the determinations made by the Bureau about the additional projects that would be needed for irrigation. After meeting for two days, the Committee produced an engineering report that recommended most of the specific developments that had been set out in the Sloan Plan, but provided for six main-stem reservoirs on the Missouri River. The Oahe Reservoir was to be created by construction of a high dam and to have a gross storage capacity of 19 million acre-feet of water. The stated purposes of Lake Oahe were to allow “the irrigation of 750,000 acres of land in the James River Basin as well as to provide useful storage for flood control, navigation, the development of hydroelectric power, and other purposes.” S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1944). As had been proposed in the Sloan Plan, the irrigation of the James River Basin was to be made possible by construction of a system of long canals, including one canal approximately 125 miles long. See S. Doc., at 115-116. With a single set of projects before it at last, Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1944 less than two months later. B In the Act, Congress accomplished three distinct tasks. First, it authorized certain specific projects to be undertaken by approving the “general comprehensive plans set forth in [the Pick and Sloan Plans] as revised and coordinated by Senate Document 247.” §9(a), 58 Stat. 891. It directed that “the initial stages recommended are hereby authorized and shall be prosecuted by the War Department and the Department of the Interior as speedily as may be consistent with budgetary requirements.” Ibid. Second, Congress appropriated funds to pay for the initial work done on those projects. Two separate allotments were authorized: $200 million “for the partial accomplishment of the works to be undertaken under said expanded plan by the Corps of Engineers,” § 9(d), and another $200 million “for the partial accomplishment of the works to be undertaken under said plans by the Secretary of the Interior.” § 9(e). Third, Congress adopted an administrative framework within which these projects were to go forward. This task involved several areas of potential controversy. The Act evoked federalism concerns because the States were anxious to keep control over the development of their lands and the use of valuable water resources. In response, Congress declared a policy of “recognizing] the interests and rights of the States in determining the development of the watersheds within their borders and likewise their interests and rights in water utilization and control.” §1, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. § 701-1 (1952 ed.). The Act also implicated the tensions between the Upper Basin States and the Lower Basin States, whose interests in the use and control of the water were markedly different. Congress addressed this problem by providing that when the Department of War undertook additional works not authorized by the Act it would be required to consult and share information with the affected States and the Secretary of the Interior, depending on whether the works were located west of the 97th and 98th meridians. §§ 1(a) and (b). All projects proposed by the Interior Secretary that would involve construction of “works for irrigation” were made subject to a similar requirement, without regard to geographical location. § 1(c). Finally, and most directly relevant to this case, the Act required Congress to deal with the administrative jurisdictions of several agencies of the Federal Government. Among the interested agencies were not only the Departments of War and Interior, but also the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Power Commission, both of whom joined the Interior Department in submitting comments on the Pick Plan, and both of whose interests were also touched on by the Act. H. R. Doc., at 1-3, 10-13; Act, §§2, 5, 11-15, 58 Stat. 889, 890, 903-907. The crucial provisions here, however, were the sections that set forth the specific authority allotted to War and Interior, the two key Departments affected by the Act. In relevant part, those five central sections of the Act state as follows: (1) “The Chief of Engineers, under the supervision of the Secretary of War, is authorized to construct, maintain, and operate public park and recreational facilities in reservoir areas under the control of the War Department, and to permit the construction, maintenance, and operation of such facilities. The Secretary of War is authorized to grant leases of lands, including structure or facilities thereon, in reservoir areas for such periods and upon such terms as he shall deem reasonable.” §4, 16 U. S. C. §460d (1946 ed.). (2) “Electric power and energy generated at reservoir projects under the control of the War Department and in the opinion of the Secretary of War not required in the operation of such projects shall be delivered to the Secretary of the Interior, who shall transmit and dispose of such power and energy.” §5, 16 U. S. C. §825s (1946 ed.). (3) “That the Secretary of War is authorized to make contracts with States, municipalities, private concerns, or individuals, at such prices and on such terms as he may deem reasonable, for domestic and industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any reservoir under the control of the War Department.” §6, 33 U. S. C. §708 (1946 ed.). (4) “Hereafter, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to prescribe regulations for the use of storage allocated for flood control or navigation at all reservoirs constructed wholly or in part with Federal funds provided on the basis of such purposes, and the operation of any such project shall be in accordance with such regulations.” §7. See 33 U. S. C. §709 (1946 ed.). (5) “Hereafter, whenever the Secretary of War determines, upon recommendation by the Secretary of the Interior that any dam or reservoir project operated under the direction of the Secretary of War may be utilized for irrigation purposes, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to construct, operate, and maintain, under the provisions of [the Federal reclamation laws,]. . . such additional works in connection therewith as he may deem necessary for irrigation purposes. . . . Dams and reservoirs operated under the direction of the Secretary of War may be utilized hereafter for irrigation purposes only in conformity with the provisions of this section.” §8. See 43 U. S. C. §390 (1946 ed.). Ill A In light of these specific provisions, as well as the general background to the Act, it is beyond question that the Interior Secretary does not possess the authority that is claimed in this case: to execute a contract to provide water from an Army reservoir for industrial uses without obtaining the approval of the Secretary of the Army. Nobody has disputed that Lake Oahe, one of the six main-stem reservoirs on the Missouri River, was constructed by, and has been operated and maintained by, the Army Secretary, and the District Court found this to be true as a matter of fact. 586 F. Supp., at 1273-1274. The Act says explicitly that such reservoirs are “under the control of” or “under the direction of” the Army Secretary. §§ 4-6, 8. Only two provisions of the Act provide for the Interior Secretary to exercise any authority whatsoever at Army reservoirs, and in both instances the Act clearly states that the Interior Secretary’s authority is subordinate to that of the Army Secretary, who does after all “control” those reservoirs. The Interior Secretary is authorized to “transmit and dispose of” electric power and energy generated at Army reservoirs, but only when that energy is “in the opinion of the Secretary of [the Army] not required in the operation of such projects.” §5. The Interior Secretary is also authorized to recommend to the Army Secretary that an Army reservoir “be utilized for irrigation purposes,” and to “construct, operate, and maintain . . . such additional works in connection therewith as he may deem necessary for irrigation purposes.” § 8. But this authority only comes into play if the Army Secretary “determines” that “any dam or reservoir project operated under [the Secretary’s] direction” may be used for such purposes. Ibid. The language of the Act is plain in every respect, and the conclusion is unavoidable that if the Interior Secretary wishes to remove water from an Army reservoir for any purpose, the approval of the Army Secretary must be secured. The precise authority claimed by the Interior Secretary in this case is to enter into a contract, without the approval of the Army, to remove from Lake Oahe water that is claimed to be available for irrigation, and to allow that water to be devoted to industrial use. Nowhere does the Act provide any support for this claimed authority, and in fact it is directly inconsistent with §§6 and 8 of the Act, which show that only the Army Secretary has that independent authority in this instance. Section 6 gives the Army Secretary the authority “to make contracts with States, municipalities, private concerns, or individuals ... for domestic and industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any reservoir” under the Secretary’s control, “Provided, That no contracts for such water shall adversely affect then existing lawful uses of such water.” The language of the Act is plain enough: “surplus water” is all water that can be made available from the reservoir without adversely affecting other lawful uses of the water. As long as ample water remains in Lake Oahe for the purposes embodied in the Act, and absent any allocation for irrigation pursuant to § 8, the Army Secretary has exclusive authority to contract to remove water for industrial uses. In this light, two of the District Court’s factual findings take on special significance. First, the District Court found no evidence “which would show that specific storage space in Oahe Reservoir was assigned to irrigation,” and “there is no evidence that separate allocations were made at Oahe.” 586 F. Supp., at 1277. Second, “there is no evidence that any Oahe water ever has been used for irrigation or will be in the near future.” Id., at 1274. In light of these facts, and the plain provisions of § 8, the Interior Secretary had no authority to dispose of Lake Oahe water. The Army Secretary might have but has not done so. Section 8 details the procedures for utilizing water from Lake Oahe for irrigation, and only when these procedures are followed does the Interior Secretary have any authority to deal with Lake Oahe water. The Interior Secretary may recommend to the Army Secretary that an Army reservoir be utilized at least in part for irrigation purposes. If the Army Secretary determines that the reservoir may be used for this purpose, then the Interior Secretary “is authorized to construct, operate, and maintain, under the provisions of [the Federal reclamation laws,]. . . such additional works in connection therewith as he may deem necessary for irrigation purposes.” Congress must grant “specific authorization” for the construction of any such additional works. Water from Army reservoirs “may be utilized hereafter for irrigation purposes only in conformity with the provisions of this section.” §8. It may be recalled at this point that the Sloan Plan, which had envisioned the use of a substantial amount of water from Lake Oahe for irrigation of the James River Basin, was consistent with this approach; the Sloan Plan provided for the construction of massive additional works for irrigation comprising a system of long canals. S. Doc., at 115-116. By this means, Interior would be permitted to withdraw water from Army reservoirs through these additional works for use in irrigation, which would then bring that water under its control, and under the federal reclamation laws the Interior Secretary may reallocate irrigation water from irrigation projects to other purposes when he sees fit, as long as “it will not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes.” 43 U. S. C. §485h(c) (1946 ed.). In this case, the District Court found that the Interior Department did begin initial construction on irrigation works at Lake Oahe, but Congress later authorized the Department to cancel construction, which it did. 586 P. Supp., at 1274. As already stated, the District Court found that no water from Lake Oahe has ever been used for irrigation, ibid., and we are unaware of any such plans in the near future. Under these circumstances, the Interior Secretary is not “in conformity with the provisions of” § 8, and therefore has no authority under the Act to withdraw water from Lake Oahe, whether for irrigation or otherwise. It is likely that Lake Oahe contains surplus water, but that water is subject to disposal by the Army, not by Interior. B The petitioners seek to avert this conclusion by pointing to §§ 9(a) and (c) of the Act. Section 9(a) approves the “general comprehensive plans” set out in the Pick Plan and the Sloan Plan, as revised and coordinated by the final Senate Document, and authorizes the initial stages of those projects to be “prosecuted by the War Department and the Department of the Interior as speedily as may be consistent with budgetary requirements.” The petitioners contend that this statement represents congressional approval of various aspects of the functional division of authority between the Army and Interior Departments that had been suggested in those plans; in particular, the petitioners suggest that this provision allows the Interior Secretary unilaterally to remove water from Army reservoirs for irrigation purposes and for other related uses. This contention is both wide of the mark and grounded on a misuse of the legislative history. To begin with, it would be surprising if Congress had followed up the five sections of the Act in which it explicitly established the jurisdiction of Army and Interior over specific uses of Army reservoirs, the last section of which established jurisdiction over the use of those reservoirs for irrigation, with a provision in which it indirectly made further refinements in how water could be used for irrigation, and yet did not offer the slightest indication that it was doing so. In any event, there is no reason to think that § 9(a) incorporates into the Act any additional indications about the proper division of authority between Army and Interior. On the contrary, its location in § 9 of the Act indicates that this provision was not intended as anything more than authorization for the two Departments to begin working on the projects listed in the final Senate Document. The other parts of § 9 merely harmonize the Act with existing laws and set out separate appropriations for Army and Interior to begin “the partial accomplishment of the works to be undertaken under said expanded plans,” § § 9(d) and (e), which indicates that this entire section of the Act encompasses only the necessary ministerial details to allow action to begin on the specified projects. If there were any room for believing that § 9(a) implicitly modified the jurisdictional provisions that were plainly set forth in the preceding sections of the Act, or for doubting that it instead approved a different division of authority from that suggested in the Pick Plan and the Sloan Plan, one item in the legislative history puts this supposition entirely to rest. The original House version of the Act included language almost identical to the suggestions made in the two plans, see infra, at 511-512, which obliged the Interior Secretary “to prescribe regulations” for the use of water stored in Army reservoirs for irrigation. Hearings on H. R. 4485 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1944). Secretary Ickes testified at the Senate Hearings on the proposed bill that this approach did not relate very well to the reclamation laws because it “disregards the problem of allocating costs for multiple-purpose facilities serving other uses in addition to irrigation.” Id., at 458. He proposed replacing that approach instead with the language currently contained in § 8 of the Act, which was eventually enacted by Congress. Id., at 313. As noted above, §8 now provides that Army controls the main-stem reservoir projects and Interior controls all such additional irrigation works as it may “construct, operate, and maintain” at the site of those main-stem projects. One need not draw all the inferences that may be justified by this piece of legislative history in order to make it decisive here, for at the very least it directly refutes the notion that the other sections of the Act were intended to effect no changes in the division of authority between Army and Interior that had been suggested in the Pick Plan and the Sloan Plan. Moreover, even if § 9(a) had been intended to adopt every aspect of the functional division of authority between the two Departments that had been proposed in the Pick and Sloan Plans, this section would not provide Interior with the authority to withdraw water unilaterally from Lake Oahe for irrigation and other uses in flat contradiction of § 8 of the Act. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument in this case, nothing in those two plans indicates that control over individual reservoirs was to be divided among various departments of the Federal Government. The Pick Plan, for example, emphasized that although the Department of War was willing to coordinate its activities with Interior in order to serve “the broad and important interests and responsibilities” of both agencies, “[i]t is essential, however, that the main-stem projects be built, operated, and maintained by the Corps of Engineers.” H. R. Doc., at 3-4. The War Department noted that although it would retain control of those reservoir projects, it accepted that “utilization of storage reserved for irrigation” in those reservoirs “should be in accordance with [Interior] regulations.” Id., at 4. But this accession is not at all the same as dividing control between the two agencies over the reservoir projects or the water stored in those projects, which was not contemplated in the Pick Plan. The Sloan Plan basically agreed with the approach set out in the Pick Plan, recognizing that the agency “with primary interest in the dominant function of any feature proposed in the plan should construct and operate that feature, giving full recognition, in the design, construction, and operation, to the needs of other agencies with minor interests.” S. Doc., at 11. The Sloan Plan recognized that the “dominant function” of Lake Oahe and the other main-stem reservoir projects would be flood control and navigation, and therefore these projects would come under the jurisdiction of the Army and its Corps of Engineers. Id., at 4. Even if Congress had intended to write the jurisdictional structure suggested in the Pick Plan and the Sloan Plan directly into law, therefore, it would not have extended to Interior the unilateral authority that has been claimed in this case. The petitioners also point to §9(c) of the Act as lending support to its argument. That section states that “the reclamation and power developments to be undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior under said plans shall be governed by the Federal Reclamation Laws.” As noted already, under the reclamation laws the Interior Secretary is authorized to reallocate water under his control for industrial use as he sees fit. See n. 4, supra. By its terms, however, § 9(c) applies only to “the reclamation and power developments” undertaken by the Interior Secretary under the Act: that is, to the “transmission lines and related facilities” that §5 authorizes the Interior Secretary “to construct or acquire” for transmitting and disposing of electric power, and to the “irrigation works” that § 8 authorizes the Interior Secretary “to construct, operate, and maintain” under the reclamation laws. This provision merely stipulates that the reclamation laws, which typically apply to other Interior projects, see 43 U. S. C. §371 et seq. (1946 ed.), also apply to all the projects that Interior may undertake under the Flood Control Act. But as the District Court found, and as is readily apparent, the reservoir project engineered by the Army at Oahe is neither a “power development” nor a “reclamation development” that has been undertaken by the Interior Secretary. 586 F. Supp., at 1273-1278. On the facts of this case, § 9(c) clearly does not extend any authority to Interior to withdraw water from Lake Oahe by other means than those stated in the Act. Not only do the language, structure, and legislative history of the Act fail to support the petitioners in this case, but the substance of their position is also difficult to fathom. The petitioners claim that the administrative structure established in the Act divides authority over Lake Oahe between Army and Interior in a novel fashion that is considerably different from what appears on the face of the Act. One possibility, which the petitioners disavow, is that Interior has the ultimate authority to use water from the reservoir for irrigation purposes and Army has the ultimate authority to use water from the reservoir for flood control and navigational purposes. This approach obviously would founder, and could give rise to endless squabbles, unless the water in the reservoir has been allocated between these uses, yet the District Court explicitly found “no evidence that separate allocations were made at Oahe,” and “one wonders how the Interior Department is to control what cannot be identified.” 586 F. Supp., at 1277. The position actually urged by the petitioners is even less straightforward than the foregoing: they argue that the Act requires Interior to consult with Army before withdrawing any water for industrial use from Lake Oahe, and does not allow Interior to withdraw water if Army objects, and yet the Act does not require Interior to obtain the approval of Army in order to withdraw water for industrial use. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15. The Army’s authority over Lake Oahe is thus to be understood as most closely analogous to an executive veto over legislation: Interior must offer its proposal to the Army, and cannot proceed on its own if the Army objects, but can proceed even without Army approval as long as Army does not object. This would be, to say the least, a most unusual approach to administrative jurisdiction, one that gains no support from the text of the Act, and one that we are unwilling to read into the Act as an implicit modification of its otherwise sensible and intelligible provisions. C The petitioners finally contend that this Court should defer to the Interior Secretary’s interpretation of the authority granted to him under the Act, which the Army apparently has acquiesced in at least for the purposes of this litigation. The petitioners also point to what they describe as a tradition of cooperation between these two Departments in the Missouri River Basin, including a period between 1975 and 1978 when they entered into a joint agreement that allowed the Interior Secretary, “both on his own behalf and as agent for the Secretary of the Army, [to] contract for the marketing of water for industrial uses” from the six main-stem reservoirs. The District Court disagreed with this historical account of the relations between Interior and the Army on this subject, and concluded that when “the chief attorneys for the two departments affected by a statute disagree, neither enjoys any deference.” 586 F. Supp., at 1280. The Court of Appeals discussed this issue very briefly, but the gist of its holding was simply that Interior’s interpretation did not even constitute a reasonable reading of the Act. 787 F. 2d, at 287. It is unnecessary to consider the petitioners’ contention that deference to the Interior Secretary is appropriate in this case and their related arguments about the history of relations between Army and Interior under the Act, for even if Interior’s interpretation of the Act would be entitled to any deference in these circumstances, the Executive Branch is not permitted to administer the Act in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into law. As this Court has stated in a recent opinion on the proper limits of deference to an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers: “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). The Flood Control Act speaks directly to the dispute in this case, and congressional intent as expressed in the Act indicates clearly that the Interior Secretary may not enter into a contract to withdraw water from an Army reservoir for industrial use without the approval of the Department of the Army. That is “the end of the matter.” Id., at 842. The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Although the contract states that the Interior Secretary entered into it “after consultation with the Secretary of the Army,” App. 226, no party has disputed the fact that the Secretary of the Army did not expressly approve or sign the contract, which was signed on behalf of the United States by a regional director for the Interior Department’s Bureau of Reclamation. Id., at 234. This case also has involved several procedural issues, as well as ancillary issues about the validity of the contract. Those other issues are not before this Court. Neither is there any issue presented here as to the relative interests of the United States and South Dakota in Lake Oahe water. At one time, the Army took the view that the only “surplus water” in the main-stem reservoirs was the water that neither was held in the reservoirs nor was run through the generators to produce hydroelectric power — in other words, that no “surplus water” existed in the reservoirs themselves — apparently because it assumed that all water contained in the reservoirs “is otherwise being used” for specified purposes. Army Memorandum, Marketing of Missouri River Water for Coal Gasification, AR900407 (Dec. 16, 1974), App. 183. More recently, however, the Army has abandoned this assumption and recognized that “this interpretation of what constitutes surplus water is unnecessarily narrow.” Memorandum from Susan Crawford, General Counsel of Army, to Assistant Secretary of Army, Proposed Contracts for Municipal and Industrial Water Withdrawals from Main Stem Missouri Reservoirs 2 (March 13, 1986), App. to Brief for Respondent States 14a. Its current position is that § 6 of the Act gives the Army Secretary the same authority over “water he determines is not needed to fulfill a project purpose in Army reservoirs” that the Interior Department possesses over water contained in its own reservoir projects, namely, the authority to withdraw water for industrial use if to do so would not impair the efficiency of the project for its other stated purposes. Memorandum of Crawford 4, App. to Brief for Respondent 16a. See also Army Circular EC 1105-2-181, pp. 3-4 (Oct. 30,1987). This view is consistent with the language of the Act, for if the term “surplus water” could never include any of the water stored in the reservoirs themselves, then the caveat Congress enacted in § 6 — that this grant of authority shall not “adversely affect then existing lawful uses of such water” — would have been irrelevant because this grant of authority could never adversely affect any existing or projected uses of such water. See also 43 U. S. C. § 521 (1946 ed.). Under that section the Interior Secretary “in connection with the operations under the reclamation law is hereby authorized to enter into contract to supply water from any project irrigation system for other purposes than irrigation . . . : Provided . . . , That no water shall be furnished for the uses aforesaid if the delivery of such water shall be detrimental to the water service for such irrigation project.” The Interior Secretary’s determination that the sale of water does not impair the irrigation purpose of a project under his control has been accorded broad deference. See, e. g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Morton, 420 F. Supp. 1037 (Mont. 1976), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F. 2d 848 (CA9 1979). Nothing in today’s decision, it should be emphasized, prevents the water in Lake Oahe from being put to beneficial use for industrial or other purposes. Of the 23 million acre-feet of water stored in this reservoir, by far the most part was projected for potential use in irrigation. As the District Court found, however, none of this water has been allotted for irrigation, no works have been constructed to make use of this water for irrigation, and none of this water has ever been used for irrigation or is likely to be used for that purpose in the foreseeable future. 586 F. Supp., at 1274, 1277. On these facts, there is considerable leeway for the Army Secretary to designate some of this water for industrial use without “adversely affectpng]” the “existing lawful uses of such water.” Act, §6. Certainly if the Executive Branch as a whole wishes to put the water in this reservoir to beneficial use, it may do so simply by complying with the terms of the Act. In its comments on the Pick Plan, Interior endorsed this approach, stating that the Army “Corps of Engineers should construct, operate, and maintain any feature in which flood control and navigation are dominant considerations, and the [Interior’s] Bureau of Reclamation should construct, operate, and maintain any feature in which the functions of irrigation, restoration of surface and ground water levels, and power are dominant,” though the two Departments would “advise and consult with” one another to the extent that these interests overlapped in features controlled by one or the other Department. H. R. Doc., at 7. The self-styled “joint engineering report” contained in the final Senate Document that effected a reconciliation of the Pick and Sloan Plans did not shed any further light on how the administrative jurisdictions of the two Departments were to be circumscribed, but merely observed that the engineering features of the two plans were brought into agreement by applying the principles that the Army Corps of Engineers “should have the responsibility for determining main stem reservoir capacities and capacities of tributary reservoirs for flood control and navigation,” and the Bureau of Reclamation “should have the responsibility for determining the reservoir capacities on the main stem and tributaries of the Missouri River for irrigation.” S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1944). This passage seems to be nothing more than an explanation of how the final number of projects and the amount of their storage capacities were reached by the representatives of the two Departments. The petitioners contend that the term “reclamation. . . development]” in § 9(c) can encompass either the entire reservoir project at Oahe or the activities that Interior might undertake to dispose of water stored at Oahe for irrigation. Neither suggestion is tenable. The construction of the main-stem dam and reservoir project at Oahe was undertaken and controlled by the Army, and the District Court found this to be true as a matter of fact; thus Oahe cannot be a “reclamation . . . development] to be undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior.” And the suggestion that the term “reclamation . . . development]” may refer to activities rather than projects is wrong for several reasons. First, the whole term is “reclamation and power developments to be undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior.” These developments, which were set out more specifically in the Pick and Sloan Plans, plainly refer to the only developments that the Act identifies Interior as undertaking: the “power developments” (“transmission lines and related facilities”) identified in § 5, and the “reclamation developments” (“irrigation works”) identified in §8. Second, the term “reclamation . . . development]” used in § 9(c) of the Act is linked by petitioners to § 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1193, as set forth in 43 U. S. C. §485h(c) (1946 ed.), which is said to give Interior the authority to contract to dispose of this water, yet that statutory section itself limits Interior’s authority by stating that such authority may not be used to “impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Thus this same account relates the terms “development” and “project.” Third, the integral nature of the relation between these two terms is shown by further consideration of the Reclamation Project Act §2©, 43 U. S. C. §485a© (1946 ed.), which defines the term “development unit” as “a part of a project which, for purposes of orderly engineering or reclamation development, is designated as a development unit by order of the Secretary.” Thus a “reclamation development” is a designated part of a “reclamation project” under the Reclamation Project Act, for administrative purposes, and the two terms are used almost synonomously in that Act. See § 485f(b). Petitioners suggest that their reading of the Act is supported by Congress’ enactment of §212 of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 43 U. S. C. § 390M. That provision, however, works no change in any of the substantive provisions of the Flood Control Act, and specifically does not purport to modify § 8 of the Act, which states the manner in which water may be withdrawn from Lake Oahe for use in irrigation. Section 212(a) merely was intended “to eliminate the shadow of applicability of the reclamation law to Corps of Engineers projects in any case in which the intent of Congress concerning such applicability is not clearly and explicitly set forth in statutory language,” S. Rep. No. 97-373, p. 16 (1982), which it was not in § 8 of the Act. Section 212(b) simply ensures that the Interior Secretary’s “authority to contract with water user entities for the irrigation water deliveries from Corps of Engineers projects, and to collect appropriate charges for those deliveries, continues in effect.” Ibid. It says nothing about when and how the Interior Secretary possesses and exercises the authority to enter into such contracts, which is prescribed in § 8 of the Act. Even more to the point, § 212 does not indicate in any way that the Interior Secretary has the authority to enter into a contract to withdraw water from an Army reservoir for industrial use, which is the precise authority asserted in this case. This “Memorandum of Understanding” declared that the Army Secretary “shall retain all operational and managerial control over said reservoirs.” Memorandum of Understanding Between Secretary of Interior and Secretary of Army, AR900072 (Feb. 24, 1975), App. 136. Over the four years it was in effect, no contracts were executed under it, and the agreement was allowed to expire in 1978. It also appears, by all accounts, that the contract at issue in this case is the only instance of the Interior Secretary exercising unilateral authority to withdraw water for industrial uses from a reservoir project controlled by the Army. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals mentioned various reasons why the Interior Secretary’s interpretation of the Act might not be entitled to deference even if it were a reasonable interpretation. But since in the end the District Court, like the Court of Appeals, concluded that the agency’s decision was not “reasonable,” 586 F. Supp., at 1280, its additional comments, like those of the Court of Appeals, were pure dictum, and there is no reason to address them here.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JORDAN, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, v. De GEORGE. No. 348. Argued March 5, 1951. Decided May 7, 1951. John F. Davis argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney, L. Paul Winings and Charles Gordon. Thomas F. Dolan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Sherlock J. Hartnett. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents only one question: whether conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits is a “crime involving moral turpitude” within the meaning of § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917. Respondent, a native and citizen of Italy, has lived continuously in the United States since he entered this country in 1921. In 1937, respondent was indicted under 18 U. S. C. § 88 for conspiring with seven other defendants to violate twelve sections of the Internal Revenue Code. The indictment specifically charged him with possessing whiskey and alcohol “with intent to sell it in fraud of law and evade the tax thereon.” He was further accused of removing and concealing liquor “with intent to defraud the United States of the tax thereon.” After pleading guilty, respondent was sentenced to imprisonment in a federal penitentiary for a term of one year and one day. Respondent served his sentence under this conviction, and was released from custody. Less than a year later, he returned to his former activities and in December 1939, he was indicted again with eight other defendants for violating the same federal statutes. He was charged with conspiring to “unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully defraud the United States of tax on distilled spirits.” After being tried and found guilty in 1941, he was sentenced to imprisonment for two years. While serving his sentence under this second conviction, deportation proceedings were commenced against the respondent under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act which provides: . . any alien . . . who is hereafter sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment [one year or more] because of conviction in this country of any crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry . . . shall, upon the warrant of the Attornéy General, be taken into custody and deported. ...” After continued hearings and consideration of the case by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and by the Board of Immigration Appeals, respondent was ordered to be deported in January 1946, on the ground that he had twice been convicted and sentenced to terms of one year or more of crimes involving moral turpitude. Deportation was deferred from time to time at respondent’s request until 1949, when the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization moved to execute the warrant of deportation. Respondent then sought habeas corpus in the District Court, claiming that the deportation order was invalid because the crimes of which he had been convicted did not involve moral turpitude. The District Court held a hearing, and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the District Court and ordered that the respondent be discharged. 183 F. 2d 768 (1950). The Court of Appeals stated that “crimes involving moral turpitude,” as those words were used in the Immigration Act, “were intended to include only crimes of violence, or crimes which are commonly thought of as involving baseness, vileness or depravity. Such a classification does not include the crime of evading the payment of tax on liquor, nor of conspiring to evade that tax.” 183 F. 2d at 772. We granted certiorari to review the decision, 340 U. S. 890 (1950), as conflicting with decisions of the courts of appeals in other circuits. This Court has interpreted the provision of the statute before us “to authorize deportation only where an alien having committed a crime involving moral turpitude and having been convicted and sentenced, once again commits a crime of that nature and is convicted and sentenced for it.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 9-10 (1948). Respondent has on two separate occasions been convicted of the same crime, conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits. Therefore, our inquiry in this case is narrowed to determining whether this particular offense involves moral turpitude. Whether or not certain other offenses involve moral turpitude is irrelevant and beside the point. The term “moral turpitude” has deep roots in the law. The presence of moral turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of situations, including legislation governing the disbarment of attorneys and the revocation of medical licenses. Moral turpitude also has found judicial employment as a criterion in disqualifying and impeaching witnesses, in determining the measure of contribution between joint tort-feasors, and in deciding whether certain language is slanderous. In deciding the case before the Court, we look to the manner in which the term “moral turpitude” has been applied by judicial decision. Without exception, federal and state courts have held that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude. In the construction of the specific section of the Statute before us, a court of appeals has stated that fraud has ordinarily been the test to determine whether crimes not of the gravest character involve moral turpitude. United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F. 2d 429 (1940). In every deportation case where fraud has been proved, federal courts have held that the crime in issue involved moral turpitude. This has been true in a variety of situations involving fraudulent conduct: obtaining goods under fraudulent pretenses, Bermann v. Reimer, 123 F. 2d 331 (1941); conspiracy to defraud by deceit and falsehood, Mercer v. Lence, 96 F. 2d 122 (1938); forgery with intent to defraud, United States ex rel. Popoff v. Reimer, 79 F. 2d 513 (1935); using the mails to defraud, Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. Supp. 736 (1934); execution of chattel mortgage with intent to defraud, United States ex rel. Millard v. Tuttle, 46 F. 2d 342 (1930); concealing assets in bankruptcy, United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F. 2d 57 (1928); issuing checks with intent to defraud, United States ex rel. Portada v. Day, 16 F. 2d 328 (1926). In the state courts, crimes involving fraud have universally been held to involve moral turpitude. Moreover, there have been two other decisions by courts of appeals prior to the decision now under review on the question of whether the particular offense before us in this case involves moral turpitude within the meaning of § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act. In United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F. 2d 429 (1940), and Maita v. Haff, 116 F. 2d 337 (1940), courts of appeals specifically decided that the crime of conspiracy to violate the internal revenue laws by possessing and concealing distilled spirits with intent to defraud the United States of taxes involves moral turpitude. Furthermore, in Guarneri v. Kessler, 98 F. 2d 580 (1938), a court of appeals held that the crime of smuggling alcohol into the United States with intent to defraud the United States involves moral turpitude. In view of these decisions, it can be concluded that fraud has consistently been regarded as such a contaminating component in any crime that American courts have, without exception, included such crimes within the scope of moral turpitude. It is therefore clear, under an unbroken course of judicial decisions, that the crime of conspiring to defraud the United States is a “crime involving moral turpitude.” But it has been suggested that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” lacks sufficiently definite standards to justify this deportation proceeding and that the statute before us is therefore unconstitutional for vagueness. Under this view, no crime, however grave, could be regarded as falling within the meaning of the term “moral turpitude.” The question of vagueness was not raised by the parties nor argued before this Court. It is significant that the phrase has been part of the immigration laws for more than sixty years. As discussed above, the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” has also been used for many years as a criterion in a variety of other statutes. No case has been decided holding that the phrase is vague, nor are we able to find any trace of judicial expression which hints that the phrase is so meaningless as to be a deprivation of due process. Furthermore, this Court has itself construed the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude.” In United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, Director of Immigration, 289 U. S. 422 (1933), the Court interpreted the same section of the Immigration Statute now before us. There, an alien had been convicted of counterfeiting government obligations with intent to defraud, and one question of the case was whether the crime of counterfeiting involved moral turpitude. This question was raised by the parties and discussed in the briefs. The Court treated the question without hesitation, stating that the crime of counterfeiting obligations of the United States was “plainly a crime involving moral turpitude.” 289 U. S. at 423. (Emphasis supplied.) The essential purpose of the “void for vagueness” doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct. Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97, decided April 23, 1951; Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 103-104 (1945). This Court has repeatedly stated that criminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921). It should be emphasized that this statute does not declare certain conduct to be criminal. Its function is to apprise aliens of the consequences which follow after conviction and sentence of the requisite two crimes. Despite the fact that this is not a criminal statute, we shall nevertheless examine the application of the vagueness doctrine to this case. We do this in view of the grave nature of deportation. The Court has stated that “deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile .... It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, supra, at 10. We shall, therefore, test this statute under the established criteria of the “void for vagueness” doctrine. We have several times held that difficulty in determining whether certain marginal offenses are within the meaning of the language under attack as vague does not automatically render a statute unconstitutional for indefiniteness. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, 399 (1930). Impossible standards of specificity are not required. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947). The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926). We conclude that this test has been satisfied here. Whatever else the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude. We have recently stated that doubt as to the adequacy of a standard in less obvious cases does not render that standard unconstitutional for vagueness. See Williams v. United States, supra. But there is no such doubt present in this case. Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should be judged. The phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct. We therefore decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the statutory consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is deportation. Reversed. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 155 (a). Less than three years after entering the United States, respondent was convicted for transporting liquor and sentenced to a term in the reformatory. In 1931, he was convicted and fined for transferring license plates. 35 Stat. 1096, now 18 U. S. C. § 371: “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” These charges were based upon 26 U. S. C. (1934 ed.) §§ 1155 (f), 1440 and 1441. The record establishes that respondent was a large-scale violator engaged in a sizable business. The second indictment alone charged him with possessing 4,675 gallons of alcohol and an undetermined quantity of distilled spirits. At the rate of $2.25 a gallon then in effect, the tax on the alcohol alone would have been over $10,000. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 155 (a). Section 19(a) further provides: . . The provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor shall such deportation be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing such alien for such crime shall, at the time of imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days thereafter, due notice having first been given to representatives of the State, make a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this chapter . . . .” 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 155 (a). The record does not indicate that respondent has been pardoned, nor that the sentencing judge recommended that he not be deported, nor that respondent requested that such recommendation be made. In re Kirby, 10 S. D. 322, 73 N. W. 92, 39 L. R. A. 856 (1897). Bartos v. United States District Court, 19 F. 2d 722 (1927); see Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Justify Disbarment, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 9-27. Fort v. Brinkley, 87 Ark. 400, 404, 112 S. W. 1084, 1085 (1908). “It seems clearly dedueible from the above cited authorities that the words ‘moral turpitude’ had a positive and fixed meaning at common law . . . .” 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), 540; cases are collected at 40 A. L. R. 1049, and 71 A. L. R. 219. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Christenson, 183 Minn. 182, 236 N. W. 618 (1931). Baxter v. Mohr, 37 Misc. 833, 76 N. Y. S. 982 (1902). State decisions have held that the following crimes involve moral turpitude: passing a check with intent to defraud, Bancroft v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists of Oklahoma, 202 Okla. 108, 210 P. 2d 666 (1949); using the mails to defraud, Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 S. W. 2d 502 (1944), In re Comyns, 132 Wash. 391, 232 P. 269 (1925); obtaining money and property by false and fraudulent pretenses, In re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 4 N. E. 2d 19 (1936); possessing counterfeit money with intent to defraud, Fort v. Brinkley, 87 Ark. 400, 112 S. W. 1084 (1908). One state court has specifically held that the wilful evasion of federal income taxes constitutes moral turpitude. Louisiana State Bar Assn. v. Steiner, 204 La. 1073, 16 So. 2d 843 (1944). The term “moral turpitude” first appeared in the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084, which directed the exclusion of “persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.” Similar language was reenacted in the Statutes of 1903 and 1907. § 2, Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213; § 2, Act of Feb. 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898. It has been suggested that the fact that this phrase has been used in the Immigration Laws for over sixty years has no weight in upholding its constitutionality. Of course, the mere existence of a statute for over sixty years does not provide immunity from constitutional attack. We have recently held an equally ancient statute unconstitutional for vagueness. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948). There, a statute, which employed vague terminology wholly lacking in common law background or interpretation, was aimed at limiting rights of free speech. Even in the Winters case, however, several dissenting members of this Court were of the view that the venerability of the statute was an element to be considered in deciding the question of vagueness. The phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” presents no greater uncertainty or difficulty than language found in many other statutes repeatedly sanctioned by the Court. The Sherman Act provides the most obvious example, “restraint of trade” as construed to mean “unreasonable or undue restraint of trade,” Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913). Compare other statutory language which has survived attack under the vagueness doctrine in this Court: “in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual services,” United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947); “any offensive, derisive or annoying word,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); “connected with or related to the national defense,” Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19 (1941); “psychopathic personality,” Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270 (1940); “wilfully overvalues any security,” Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938); “fair and open competition,” Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936); “reasonable variations shall be permitted,” United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (1932); “unreasonable waste of natural gas,” Bandini Petro leum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. S. 8 (1931); “political purposes," United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396 (1930); “range usually occupied by any cattle grower,” Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343 (1918).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LAND, CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION, et al. v. DOLLAR et al. No. 207. Argued February 11, 12, 1947. Decided April 7, 1947. Paul A. Sweeney argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Assistant Attorney General Sonnett, Melvin Richter, Ellis Lyons and Paul D. Page. Gregory A. Harrison argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Moses Lasky, Clinton M. Hester and M. M. Kearney. Mb. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners are present and former members of the United States Maritime Commission. Respondents are stockholders of Dollar Steamship Lines, Inc., Ltd. (Dollar of Delaware), whose corporate name was changed to American President Lines, Ltd., subsequent to the execution in 1938 of a contract out of which the present litigation arises. By 1937 Dollar of Delaware was in difficult financial straits. The problems confronting it and the various steps taken to remedy the situation need not be recapitulated here. It is sufficient for purposes of the various questions presented by this case to say that the Commission and respondents entered into a contract in 1938 by which respondents delivered their common stock in Dollar of Delaware, endorsed in blank, to the Commission; and the Commission released some of respondents from certain obligations and agreed to grant Dollar of Delaware an operating subsidy and to make a loan to it and to obtain for it another loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The subsidy was granted and the loans were made. By 1943 American President Lines, Ltd., had fully paid all indebtedness due the United States. Respondents thereupon demanded return of their shares of stock from the then members of the Commission, claiming that the shares had only been pledged as collateral for a debt which had been paid. The members of the Commission refused to surrender the shares, claiming that they had not been pledged under the 1938 contract but transferred outright. Acting on that theory the Commission had indeed offered the shares for sale and had under consideration substantial offers to purchase them. Thereupon respondents instituted the present suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia, see 11 D. C. Code, §§ 301, 305, 306, claiming that petitioners were unlawfully in possession of respondents’ stock and illegally withholding it. The prayer was that petitioners be restrained from selling the shares and be directed to return them to respondents. Respondents moved for a preliminary injunction. Petitioners submitted affidavits opposing the motion. After a hearing, the District Court on its own motion dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that .the suit was against the United States. The Court of Appeals reversed. 81 U. S. App. D. C. 28, 154 F. 2d 307. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question presented. First. The facts asserted in the affidavits support the view that the 1938 contract called for the outright transfer of the shares, not for their pledge. But we put the affidavits to one side for two reasons. In the first place, the function of the affidavits was to oppose the motion for a preliminary injunction. The case had not been submitted for decision on the merits. Issue, indeed, had not yet been joined. And the ruling of the District Court, as we read it, was based on the premise that since the Commission had the right to make the contract, the suit was against the United States. Hence we do not think the District Court in fact relied on the affidavits in dismissing the complaint. In the second place, although as a general rule the District Court would have authority to consider questions of jurisdiction on the basis of affidavits as well as the pleadings, this is the type of case where the question of jurisdiction is dependent on decision of the merits. The allegations of the complaint, if proved, would establish that petitioners are unlawfully withholding respondents’ property under the claim that it belongs to the United States. That conclusion would follow if either of respondents’ contentions were established: (1) that the Commission had no authority to purchase the shares or acquire them outright; or (2) that, even though such authority existed, the 1938 contract resulted not in an outright transfer but in a pledge of the shares. If respondents are right in these contentions, their claim rests on their right under general law to recover possession of specific property wrongfully withheld. At common law their suit as pledgors to recover the pledged property on payment of the debt would sound in tort. If viewed in that posture, the case is very close to United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196. That was an action in ejectment to recover possession of a tract of land. The defendants were military officers who, acting under orders of the President, took possession of the land and converted one part into a fort and another into a cemetery. For the lawfulness of their possession they relied on a tax sale of the property to the United States. On the trial it was held that the claim of the plaintiffs to the land was valid and that the defendants were wrongfully in possession. The Court affirmed the judgment over the objection that the suit was one against the United States. It held that the assertion by officers of the Government of their authority to act did not foreclose judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of their action; that a determination of whether their “authority is rightfully assumed is the exercise of jurisdiction, and must lead to the decision of the merits of the question.” P. 219. It further held that while such an adjudication is not res judicata against the United States because it cannot be made a party to the suit, the courts have jurisdiction to resolve the controversy between those who claim possession. And it concluded that an agent or officer of the United States who acts beyond his authority is answerable for his actions. And see Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 619-620; Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 567. Where the right to possession or enjoyment of property under general law is in issue, and the defendants claim as officers or agents' of the sovereign, the rule of United States v. Lee, supra, has been repeatedly approved. Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 452; Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 439; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 152-153; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, supra, pp. 619-620; Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U. S. 536, 545; Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82, 96; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 50-51. That rule is applicable here although we assume that record title to the shares is in the Commission. In United States v. Lee, supra, record title of the land was in the United States and its officers were in possession. The force of the decree in that case was to grant possession to the private claimant. Though the judgment was not res judicata against the United States, p. 222, it settled as between the parties the controversy over possession. Precisely the same will be true here, if we assume the allegations of the complaint are proved. For if we view the case in its posture before the District Court, petitioners, being members of the Commission, were in position to restore possession of the shares which they unlawfully held. We do not trace the principle of United States v. Lee, supra, in its various ramifications. Cases on which petitioners rely are distinguishable. This is not an indirect attempt to collect a debt from the United States by preventing action of government officials which would alter or terminate the contractual obligation of the United States to pay money. See Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335; Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371. It is not an attempt to get specific performance of a contract to deliver property of the United States. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218. It is not a case where the sovereign admittedly has title to property and is sued by those who seek to compel a conveyance or to enjoin disposition of the property, the adverse claims being based on an allegedly superior equity or on rights arising under Acts of Congress. Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., supra; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60; Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473; Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U. S. 70; Morrison v. Work, 266 U. S. 481. And see Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 271-272. We say the foregoing cases are distinguishable from the present one, though as a matter of logic it is not easy to reconcile all of them. But the rule is based on practical considerations reflected in the policy which forbids suits against the sovereign without its consent. The “essential nature and effect of the proceeding” may be such as to make plain that the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration. Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 500, 502. If so, the suit is one against the sovereign. Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal, supra, p. 374. But public officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding the limits of their authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen’s realty or chattels, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity, he is not relegated to the Court of Claims to recover a money judgment. The dominant interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the victim who may bring his possessory action to reclaim that which is wrongfully withheld. It is in the latter category that the pleadings have cast this case. That is to say, if the allegations of the petition are true, the shares of stock never were property of the United States and are being wrongfully withheld by petitioners who acted in excess of their authority as public officers. If ownership of the shares is in the United States, suit to recover them would of course be a suit against the United States. But if it is decided on the merits either that the contract was illegal or that respondents are pledgors, they are entitled to possession of the shares as against petitioners, though, as we have said, the judgment would not be res judicata as against the United States. See United States v. Lee, supra, p. 222. We intimate no opinion on the merits of the controversy. We only hold that the District Court has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction by proceeding to a decision on the merits. Second. Motions were made by the Solicitor General to substitute as defendants the new members of the Commission for those who are no longer members. We added the new members as petitioners-defendants, and dismissed as to a deceased member, but reserved decision as to the other former members. A majority of those joining in this opinion are of the view that it is more appropriate that both motions be considered by the District Court. The questions have not been briefed or argued here. Moreover, the present record may not present all the facts necessary for disposition of the motions. Accordingly, we vacate the order of substitution which we entered, so that the District Court may, on remand of the cause, pass on the motions unembarrassed by any action here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The details of the difficulties, and the steps taken to remedy them are contained in two reports to Congress by the Commission: (1) Financial Readjustments in Dollar Steamship Lines, Inc., Ltd., dated February 17, 1938; (2) Reorganization of American President Lines, Ltd., dated April 10, 1939. Although the judgment below was not a final one, we considered it appropriate for review because it involved an issue “fundamental to the further conduct of the case.” United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377. The District Court said: "... I think . . . that the Commission had the legal right; and therefore I think it is inescapable that this is a suit against the United States and therefore that the complaint must be dismissed . . . In passing on a motion to dismiss because the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the facts set forth in the complaint are assumed to be true and affidavits and other evidence produced on application for a preliminary injunction may not be considered. Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U. S. 5, 9; Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 76. But when a question of the District Court’s jurisdiction is raised, either by a party or by the court on its own motion, Judicial Code § 37, 28 U. S. C. § 80, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b), the court may inquire, by affidavits or otherwise, into the facts as they exist. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115, 120-121; McNutt v. General Motors Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 184 et seq.; KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U. S. 269, 278. As stated in Gibbs v. Buck, supra, pp. 71-72, “As there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.” Restatement of the Law of Torts, §§ 223, 237; 3 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906), p. 160. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 (d); Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 444-445.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SHAPIRO et ux. No. 74-744. Argued November 5, 1975 Decided March 8, 1976 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 634. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Baum argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Crampton, Stuart A. Smith, and Ernest J. Brown. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Herbert J. Miller, Jr., and Martin D. Minsker. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents questions relating to the scope of the Internal Revenue Code’s Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U. S. C. § 7421 (a), in the context of a summary seizure of a taxpayer’s assets pursuant to a jeopardy assessment. §§ 6861, 6331, 6213. I Normally, the Internal Revenue Service may not “assess” a tax or collect it, by levying on or otherwise seizing a taxpayer’s assets, until the taxpayer has had an opportunity to exhaust his administrative remedies, which include an opportunity to litigate his tax liability fully in the Tax Court, 26 U. S. C. §§ 6212, 6213; and if the Internal Revenue Service does attempt to collect the tax by levy or otherwise, before such exhaustion of remedies in violation of § 6213, the collection is not protected by the Anti-Injunction Act and may be restrained by a United States district court at the instance of the taxpayer. §§ 6213 (a), 7421 (a). The rule is otherwise when the Commissioner proceeds under § 6861 and finds that collection of a tax due and owing from a taxpayer will be “jeopardized by delay” in collection. In such a case, the Commissioner may immediately assess the tax and, upon “notice and demand ... for payment thereof” followed by the taxpayer’s “failure or refusal to pay such tax,” may immediately levy on the taxpayer’s assets. §§ 6861, 6331. When the Commissioner follows this procedure, the Anti-Injunction Act applies in full force and “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.” § 7421 (a). In this case, the Commissioner found, on December 6, 1973, that the imminent departure of respondent Samuel Shapiro (hereinafter Shapiro or respondent) for Israel and the probable departure with him of the assets in his New York bank accounts and safe-deposit boxes jeopardized the collection of income taxes claimed to be due and owing by him for the tax years 1970 and 1971. Accordingly, he assessed income taxes against respondent in the amount of $92,726.41 for the tax years 1970 and 1971. On the same day, he filed liens against respondent and served notices of levy upon various banks in New York State in which respondent maintained accounts or had safe-deposit boxes. These notices of levy effectively froze the money in the accounts — totaling about $35,-000 — and the contents of the safe-deposit boxes. At that time respondent Shapiro was under a final order of extradition to Israel, for trial on criminal fra”d charges, issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and was scheduled to leave for Israel on December 9, 1973 — three days later. That date had been set as a result of an agreement between Shapiro and the State of Israel pursuant to which he had withdrawn a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review by this Court of the affirmance of the extradition order by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F. 2d 894 (1973), and the State of Israel had agreed to grant him a speedy trial when he arrived in Israel and to release him on $60,000 bail pending such trial. Upon learning of the notices of levy, respondent obtained the consent of the State of Israel to postpone his extradition date until December 16, 1973; and then on December 13, 1973, he initiated the instant lawsuit. Claiming that he owed no taxes; that he could not litigate the issue with the Internal Revenue Service while in jail in Israel; that he would be in jail in Israel, unless he could use the frozen $35,000 as bail money; and that the Internal Revenue Service had deliberately and in bad faith waited until December 6, 1973, before filing its notices of levy precisely in order to place him in this predicament, respondent requested in his complaint an order enjoining his extradition until he had an opportunity to litigate the question whether he owed the Internal Revenue Service any taxes or, in the alternative, an order directing the Internal Revenue Service to lift the notices of levy. Over the Government’s claim that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case by reason of the Anti-Injunction Act and because the timing of an extradition is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Executive Branch, the District Court granted a temporary restraining order against extradition on December 13, 1973, and set argument on the motion for a preliminary injunction for December 19, 1973, later postponed until December 21, 1973. Interrogatories were then served on the Government inquiring, inter alia, into the basis for the assessments. In partial, expedited, response to the interrogatories, the Government stated on December 19, 1973, that respondent was not yet entitled to know the basis for the assessments. Then on December 21, 1973, the Commissioner served counsel for respondent with supplements to the responses to the interrogatories to which were appended notices of deficiency, see 26 U. S. C. § 6212. The notices of deficiency disclosed that the 1970 assessment was based on unexplained cash bank deposits of $18,000 and that the 1971 assessment was based on income in the amount of $137,280 derived from respondent’s alleged activities as a dealer in narcotics. On that date, the District Court dissolved the temporary restraining order and granted the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act withdrew its jurisdiction to order the levies to be lifted, and that the timing of the extradition, validly ordered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under a treaty with Israel, was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Department. On December 26, 1973, after respondent had filed a notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stayed the extradition pending resolution of that appeal. The stay was lifted by the Court of Appeals on February 12, 1974. On May 15, 1974, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's holding that it had no jurisdiction over the extradition order and respondent was extradited several days thereafter. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with the District Court that it had no jurisdiction to consider the claim for relief from the levies and remanded for further proceedings. Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 391, 499 F. 2d 527 (1974). The Court of Appeals held that an unresolved fact issue existed on the question whether this case falls within the narrow exception to the Anti-Injunction Act formulated in this Court’s decision in Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962). As the court understood the Williams Packing decision, the Anti-Injunction Act does not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction to restrain collection of a tax, if (1) the taxpayer shows “extraordinary circumstances causing irreparable harm” for which he has no “adequate remedy at law,” and (2) it is apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States “ ‘cannot establish its claim.’ ” 162 U. S. App. D. C., at 396, 499 F. 2d, at 632. The court found that Shapiro had satisfied the first test: the money frozen in his New York banks was to be used as bail money in Israel, and without it Shapiro would be incarcerated. Accordingly, his remedy at law — i. e., his ability later to contest the validity of the assessment in the Tax Court or in a suit for a refund — was inadequate. As for the second test, the court concluded that the District Court should not have dismissed the complaint without further inquiry into the factual foundation for the jeopardy assessment and that further proceedings were necessary before finally determining whether upon viewing the law and the facts most favorably to the Government there was “no factual foundation” for the Government’s claim that Shapiro was a tax-delinquent narcotics dealer during 1971 and thus no basis for the assessment. Accordingly, the court remanded in order to “allow the District Court... to develop a record” and to determine in light of it whether the asserted deficiency was “so arbitrary and excessive” as to be an exaction in the guise of a tax. Id., at 399, 499 F. 2d, at 535. II The Government argues that the order of the Court of Appeals was erroneous because it placed a burden on the Government to prove a factual basis for its assessment instead of requiring the taxpayer to prove that “under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail.” Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U. S., at 7. The Government argues further that since the taxpayer had and still has wholly failed to prove or even plead specific facts establishing that the Government can under no circumstances prevail, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the District Court’s initial dismissal and its decision to the contrary should be reversed. Respondent argues on the other hand that unless the Government has some obligation to disclose the factual basis for its assessments, either in response to a discovery request or on direct order of the court, the exception to the Anti-In junction Act provided in Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., su-pra, is meaningless. The taxpayer can never know, unless the Government tells him, what the basis for the assessment is and thus can never show that the Government will certainly be unable to prevail. We agree with Shapiro. In Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., supra, the Court held that an injunction may be obtained against the collection of any tax if (1) it is “clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail” and (2) “equity jurisdiction” otherwise exists, i. e., the taxpayer shows that he would otherwise suffer irreparable injury. 370 U. S., at 7. The Court also said that “the question of whether the Government has a chance of ultimately prevailing is to be determined on the basis of the information available to it at the time of the suit,” ibid. The Government’s claim that the Court of Appeals placed on it the burden of justifying its assessment and thereby erroneously applied the Williams Packing rule is wrong. Williams Packing did not hold that the taxpayer’s burden of persuading the District Court that the Government will under no circumstances prevail must be accomplished without any disclosure of information by the Government. It says instead that the question will be resolved on the basis of the information available to the Government at the time of the suit. Since it is absolutely impossible to determine what information is available to the Government at the time of the suit, unless the Government discloses such information in the District Court pursuant to appropriate procedures, it is obvious that the Court in Williams Packing intended some disclosure by the Government. Although the Government casts its argument in terms of “burden of proof,” the Court of Appeals did not place any technical burden of producing evidence on the Government and it would appear to matter little whether the Government discloses such information because it is said to have the burden of producing evidence on the question or whether it discloses such evidence by responding to a discovery motion made or interrogatories served by the taxpayer— in which case the burden of producing evidence may be said to have rested with the taxpayer. Thus the Court of Appeals cannot be said to have erred in declining to specify the precise manner in which the relevant facts would be revealed on remand. In either event, under Williams Packing the relevant facts are those in the Government’s possession and they must somehow be obtainable from the Government. The Government argues, however, that unless the taxpayer is required to plead specific facts which, if true, would establish that the Government cannot ultimately prevail, then the Anti-Injunction Act is eviscerated. Any taxpayer can allege in conclusory fashion that he owes no tax and, therefore, under the Court of Appeals’ decision, any taxpayer may in effect force the Government to justify its assessment in a United States District Court — thereby interfering with a “collateral objective” of the Act, Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., supra, at 7-8, i. e., to protect the collector from tax litigation outside of the statutory scheme provided by Congress. As the Government’s argument itself implicitly concedes, the primary purpose of the Act is not interfered with, since the collection of taxes will not be restrained unless the District Court is persuaded from the evidence eventually adduced that the Government will under no circumstances prevail. We do not understand the Court of Appeals to have departed from this standard enunciated in Williams Packing, or to have removed from the taxpayer the ultimate burden, which that decision appears to place on him, of persuading the District Court that it has been met. Moreover, the “collateral objective” of the Act is undercut no more than was contemplated by Williams Packing. The taxpayer himself must still plead and prove facts establishing that his remedy in the Tax Court or in a refund suit is inadequate to repair any injury that might be caused by an erroneous assessment or collection of an asserted tax liability. Even then, the Government is not required to litigate fully the taxpayer’s liability outside the statutory scheme provided by Congress. It is required simply to litigate the question whether its assessment has a basis in fact. Our conclusion that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded for further proceedings is fortified by the fact that construing the Act to permit the Government to seize and hold property on the mere good-faith allegation of an unpaid tax would raise serious constitutional problems in cases, such as this one, where it is asserted that seizure of assets pursuant to a jeopardy assessment is causing irreparable injury. This Court has recently and repeatedly held that, at least where irreparable injury may result from a deprivation of property pending final adjudication of the rights of the parties, the Due Process Clause requires that the party whose property is taken be given an opportunity for some kind of predeprivation or prompt post-deprivation hearing at which some showing of the probable validity of the deprivation must be made. Here the Government seized respondent’s property and contends that it has absolutely no obligation to prove that the seizure has any basis in fact no matter how severe or irreparable the injury to the taxpayer and no matter how inadequate his eventual remedy in the Tax Court. It is true that in Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931), this Court sustained against constitutional challenge the statutory scheme created by Congress for the litigation of tax disputes and in so doing referred both to the jeopardy assessment provisions and the Anti-Injunction Act, id., at 596 n. 6. However, the Phillips case itself did not involve a jeopardy assessment and the taxpayer’s assets could not have been taken or frozen in that case until he had either had, or waived his right to, a full and final adjudication of his tax liability before the Tax Court (then the Board of Tax Appeals). The taxpayer’s claim in that case was simply that a statutory scheme which would permit the tax to be assessed and collected prior to any judicial determination of his liability — by way of a refund suit or review of the Board of Tax Appeals’ decision — was unconstitutional. Thus, insofar as Phillips may be said to have sustained the constitutionality of the Anti-Injunction Act, as applied to a jeopardy assessment and consequent levy on a taxpayer’s assets without prompt opportunity for final resolution of the question of his liability by the Tax Court, it did so only by way of dicta. The dicta were carefully expressed. The Court said: “Where, as here, adequate opportunity is afforded for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to secure prompt performance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been consistently sustained. “Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate. . . Id., at 595, 596-597. (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, neither the holding nor the dicta in Phillips support the proposition that the tax collector may con-' stitutionally seize a taxpayer’s assets without showing some basis for the seizure under circumstances in which the seizure will injure the taxpayer in a way that cannot be adequately remedied by a Tax Court judgment in his favor. Instead it would appear to be entirely consistent with our more recent holdings. In any event we are satisfied that under the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act described in the Williams Packing case this case may be resolved by reference to that Act alone. At the time the District Court dismissed the complaint, the Government had done little more than assert that respondent owed taxes in an amount greater than the value of the property levied — it had alleged that respondent had made an unexplained bank deposit of $18,000 in 1970 and, in a wholly conclusory fashion, that he had received $137,-280 in income from selling hashish. Before the taxpayer had an opportunity to inquire into the factual basis for this conclusory allegation, it was not possible to tell whether the Government had any chance of ultimately prevailing. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not require dismissal of the taxpayer’s complaint. Moreover, we are satisfied that the standard required by the Anti-Injunction Act is at least as favorable to the taxpayer as that required by the Constitution; and that the standard to be applied by the District Court will therefore not be affected by the resolution of the constitutional issue. The Government may defeat a claim by the taxpayer that its assessment has no basis in fact — and therefore render applicable the Anti-Injunction Act — without resort to oral testimony and cross-examination. Affidavits are sufficient so long as they disclose basic facts from which it appears that the Government may prevail. The Constitution does not invariably require more, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), and we would not hold that it does where collection of the revenues is involved. Finally, it seems apparent that if the facts do not even disclose “probable cause,” North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601, 607 (1975); Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, to support the assessment, the Government would certainly be unable to prevail at trial. Thus the Williams Packing standard is consistent with the applicable constitutional standard. We point out also that a preliminary issue would appear to require resolution on remand. Irreparable injury was, of course, quite properly found by the Court of Appeals. At the time of that court’s decision, it appeared that respondent Shapiro had been deprived by the levies of the money needed to post bail in Israel and thereby avoid incarceration. However, it would appear that the basis for the Court of Appeals’ finding of irreparable injury has since disappeared. Thus, the District Court’s preliminary task on remand will be to determine whether this is so and, if so, whether respondent can establish some other sort of irreparable injury flowing from the levies. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Me. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Title 26 U. S. C. § 7421 (a) provides in full: “(a) Tax. “Except as provided in sections 6212 (a) and (c), 6213 (a), and 7426 (a) and (b) (1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” Title 26 U. S. C. § 6212 provides in relevant part: “(a) In general. “If the Secretary or his delegate determines that there is a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitles A or B or chapter 42, he is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by certified mail or registered mail.” Title 26 U. S. C. § 6213 provides in relevant part: “(a) Time for filing petition and restriction on assessment. “Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the States of the Union and the District of Columbia, after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Except as otherwise provided in section 6861 no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A or B or chapter 42 and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-day or 150-day period, as the case may be, nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421 (a), the making of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court.” Title 26 U. S. C. § 6331 provides in relevant part: “(a) Authority of Secretary or delegate. “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary or his delegate to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving a notice of levy on the employer (as defined in section 3401 (d)) of such officer, employee, or elected official. If the Secretary or his delegate makes a finding that the collection of such tax is in jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment of such tax may be made by the Secretary or his delegate and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax, collection thereof by levy shall be lawful without regard to the 10-day period provided in this section. “(b) Seizure and sale of property. “The term 'levy’ as used in this title includes the power of dis-traint and seizure by any means. A levy shall extend only to property possessed and obligations existing at the time thereof. In any case in which the Secretary or his delegate may levy upon property or rights to property, he may seize and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible or intangible).” Title 26 U. S. C. § 6861 provides in relevant part: “(a) Authority for Making. “If the Secretary or his delegate believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency, as defined in section 6211, will be jeopardized by delay, he shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 6213 (a), immediately assess such deficiency (together with all interest, additional amounts, and additions to the tax provided for by law), and notice and demand shall be made by the Secretary or his delegate for the payment thereof. “(b) Deficiency Letters. “If the jeopardy assessment is made before any notice in respect of the tax to which the jeopardy assessment relates has been mailed under section 6212 (a), then the Secretary or his delegate shall mail a notice under such subsection within 60 days after the making of the assessment.” The relevant part of the deficiency notice for the year 1970 provided: “It is determined that you realized unreported taxable income from unexplained bank deposits at the 1st National City Bank in the amount of $18,000.00.” App. 135. The relevant part of the deficiency notice for the year 1971 provided, id., at 136: “It is determined that you realized unreported taxable income in the amount of $137,280.00 for the taxable year ended December 31, 1971 from your activities as a dealer in narcotics, computed as follows: “Gross income from hashish sales. $381,680.00 “Less: costs. 244,400.00 “Net Income. $137,280.00” On January 3, 1974, respondent, armed with his deficiency notice, filed in the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. 26 U. S. C. §6213 (a). The extradition issue is therefore no longer in this case. The Court of Appeals rejected, on the record before it, and on the authority of Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931), respondent’s claim that the assessment absent a hearing violated the Due Process Clause. It noted, however, that if respondent could establish on remand that his extradition would prevent him from litigating effectively before the Tax Court, then one of the predicates for the Phillips decision would be lacking. The court also noted, but did not resolve, a factual dispute as to whether the levy was in conformity with the statute. Shapiro had alleged, for the first time on appeal, that no notice had been given to him or demand made of him to pay the taxes at the time the levies were served. Such notice and demand are required by 26 U. S. C. § 6861, compliance with which is necessary under §6213 (a), if the Anti-Injunction Act is to apply. The Commissioner claimed that he had mailed a deficiency notice to Shapiro on December 6, 1973. It is clear that a demand has now been made for payment of the tax assessed and that the levies are now in compliance with § 6213. A notice of deficiency was served on Shapiro’s attorney in the District Court on December 21, 1973. The Internal Revenue Service, conceding that it could not be sure whether the original notice of deficiency was mailed before or after the notices of levy were served, served new notices of levy on October 11 and 15, 1974. This moots both the question whether the IRS mailed a notice of deficiency to Shapiro on December 6, 1973, and whether the notice preceded the levies. There can be no question at this point, therefore, that in these respects the levies are in technical compliance with the provisions of § 6861. This standard, considered by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with Enochs v. Williams Packing was based on cases decided by other Courts of Appeals, primarily Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F. 2d 579 (CA2 1969), and Lucia v. United States, 474 F. 2d 565 (CA5 1973) (en banc). Subsequent to the time of the Court of Appeals’ order and prior to argument of this case before this Court, several things have concededly occurred of arguable relevance to this lawsuit. First, respondent Shapiro has been extradited, the State of Israel has reduced the amount of his bail and he has been able to meet it. Accordingly, he is not — as the Court of Appeals assumed he would be — incarcerated as a result of the fact that the levies have put the money in the New York banks beyond his reach. Second, the District Court interpreted the Court of Appeals’ order in this case to require the Government to come forward with proof sufficient to establish a factual foundation for the tax assessment and to negative a finding that the assessment is "entirely excessive, arbitrary, capricious, and without factual foundation.” The Government then made an effort at compliance with the District Court’s order, consisting of the filing of an affidavit by the revenue agent who investigated respondent’s income tax liabilities. The affidavit states that the basis for the assessments is as follows: “a. There was no record that Samuel Shapiro had filed an income tax return for 1970. “b. That Samuel Shapiro had filed an income tax return for 1971 reporting no tax liability based upon $1,600 in adjusted gross income, consisting of $2,600 miscellaneous income from private tutoring and net short-term losses from commodity transactions of $1,450 (limited to $1,000 in computing adjusted gross income). “c. That deposits were credited to two accounts in the name of Samuel Shapiro at the First National City Bank, New York, Nos.: 04993564 and 05008773, in the amounts of $18,000 in 1970 and $36,-735 in 1971. “d. That . . . Samuel Shapiro paid in excess of $3,000 in currency for the purchase of an automobile. “e. That information available to the Internal Revenue Service indicated that early in 1973 Samuel Shapiro paid over $40,000 for a home purchased for over $60,000. “f. That information supplied to the Internal Revenue Service indicated that Samuel Shapiro had been smuggling into the United States substantial amounts of an illegal substance, hashish, every six days from Israel, presumably for resale within the United States, and also supported a conclusion that Samuel Shapiro was dealing in hashish, during 1971. “g. That included in the 1971 bank deposits referred to in subpara-graph (c) above, were money transfers from an individual since convicted of selling hashish, who stated that the transfers were for hashish supplied to him by Samuel Shapiro as follows: “April 19,1971. $2,000 “April 23,1971. 2,300 “May 6, 1971. 2,000 “May 11, 1971. 1,500 “June 8, 1971. 1,500 “August 18, 1971. 5,600 “h. That information available to the Internal Revenue Service indicated that the known practice in hashish trafficking was to deal in full kilos (kilograms), equal to 2.2 pounds; that during 1971 the retail price of hashish was $1,360 to $1,980 per pound, or $2,992 to $4,356 per kilo; and that the wholesale cost to a dealer would approximate $2,350 per kilo; and that the common practice in hashish dealing was to receive payment in two parts — the first for cost and the second for profit. "i. That on the basis of the information set forth in subparagraphs g. and h. above, [the revenue agent] concluded that during 1971 Samuel Shapiro was dealing in at least 2 kilos of hashish per week, and that his taxable profit therefrom was $137,280, computed as follows: “Selling price. $7,340 “Cost . 4,700 “Weekly profit. 2,640 “1971 profit (52 weeks).$137,280 “j. That unexplained deposits of $18,000 during 1970 should be deemed to be taxable income.” At a hearing held by the District Court on November 12, 1974, respondent submitted two affidavits (which had been filed in the Tax Court) denying that he was or ever had been a dealer in narcotics. Respondent’s affidavits further stated that his 1971 income tax return was correct. Respondent also submitted an affidavit of Rachel Laub, a resident of Switzerland, which stated that at respondent’s request in 1970, she held for him in safekeeping $50,000 in cash and approximately 18 to 20 kilos of gold bars. That affidavit further stated that at respondent’s request, she transmitted the cash to him in 1971, and the proceeds of the sale of the gold bars ($32,000 and $35,000) in 1971 and 1972, respectively. Finally, the District Judge has tentatively ruled that the Government must, if the court is to deny injunctive relief, submit its informant for in camera examination by the court. Following the Court’s granting of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 420 U. S. 923 (1975), no further proceedings have taken place below. The proceedings before the District Court on remand and the other events just described are, of course, not before us at this time. These proceedings occurred after the decision of the Court of Appeals which we review. However, the parties appear to agree that these events have occurred as described, and we mention them because they are relevant to the question of what proceedings must eventually be conducted by the District Court following our decision in this case. We believe that it is consistent with Williams Packing to place the burden of producing evidence with the taxpayer, and to require, if the Government insists, that facts in its sole possession be obtained through discovery. However, nothing we say here should prevent the Government from voluntarily and immediately disclosing the basis for its assessment, which, if sufficient, would terminate discovery proceedings and justify judgment for the Government. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 264 (1970) (temporary deprivation of welfare payments may deprive recipient of “the very means by which to live while he waits”); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 341-342 (1969) (temporary deprivation of wages may “drive a wage-earning family to the wall”); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601, 608 (1975) (“probability of irreparable injury” sufficient to warrant preseizure probable-validity hearing); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) (incarceration must be preceded by probable-cause finding or promptly followed by probable-cause hearing); cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 156 (1974) (no probable-cause hearing required where complainant eventually will be “made whole” for any inadequacy in compensation for confiscated property). We have often noted that, in resolving a claimed violation of procedural due process, a careful weighing of the respective interests is required, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 579 (1975); and we have noted that the Government’s interest in collecting the revenues is an important one, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 92 (1972). This interest is clearly sufficient to justify seizure of a taxpayer’s assets without a preseizure hearing, Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, and to remove any need to subject the Commissioner to the burden of an inquiry into the basis for his assessment absent factual allegations of irreparable injury by the taxpayer. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 595-597 (1931). However, it is very doubtful that the need to collect the revenues is a sufficient reason to justify seizure causing irreparable injury without a prompt post-seizure inquiry of any kind into the Commissioner’s basis for his claim. The taxpayer has no right to start a proceeding before the Tax Court for 60 days following a jeopardy seizure: the IRS may under the statute wait 60 days before it issues the deficiency notice which gives the taxpayer his “ticket to the Tax Court.” 26 U. S. C. § 6861. The record does not indicate how quickly a hearing on the merits can be obtained there. Preliminary relief is not there available. Nothing we hold today, of course, would prevent the Government from providing an administrative or other forum outside the Art. Ill judicial system for whatever preliminary inquiry is to be made as to the basis for a jeopardy assessment and levy. The taxpayer also challenged unsuccessfully the provision requiring a court of appeals to give deference to a fact determination by the Board of Tax Appeals on review of the Board’s decision. We do not decide whether the allegation of an $18,000 unexplained bank deposit is insufficient to establish income in that amount — for the purposes of the Williams Packing test — for the year 1970. The levies, being greatly in excess of the tax due for 1970 in any event, may not be sustained unless the allegations with respect to respondent’s tax liability for 1971 are sufficient. We note that it has now been over two years since respondent filed his petition before the Tax Court, and so far as we are informed, there has been no final determination by that court. It may be that for some reason it has been impossible — despite the respondent’s best efforts — to obtain a decision by the Tax Court. However, it is also possible that the taxpayer has not vigorously sought such a determination, and has chosen instead to devote most of his energies litigating in the federal courts. If, on remand, the District Court concludes that the absence of a remedy at law at this time is due to respondent’s failure to pursue that remedy, then equity will not intervene and the complaint should be dismissed. The inadequacy of his legal remedy would then be due to his own choice not to pursue it.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY v. PEABODY COAL CO. et al. No. 01-705. Argued October 8, 2002 Decided January 15, 2003 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Sc alia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 172. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 184. Barbara B. McDowell argued the cause for petitioner in No. 01-705. On the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, William Ranter, and Jeffrey Clair. Peter Buscemi argued the cause for petitioners in No. 01-715. With him on the briefs were John R. Mooney and David W. Allen. John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for Peabody Coal Co. et al., respondents in No. 01-705. With him on the brief were Lorane F. Hebert and W. Gregory Mott. Jeffrey S. Sutton argued the cause for Bellaire Corp. et al., respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Brian G. Selden, Louis A. Chaiten, and Thomas A. Smock. Together with Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security v. Bellaire Corp. et al. (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), and No. 01-715, Holland et al. v. Bellaire Corp. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mary Lou Smith filed a brief for Elgin National Industries, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act or Act) includes the present 26 U. S. C. § 9706(a), providing generally that the Commissioner of Social Security “shall, before October 1, 1993,” assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits to an extant operating company or a “related” entity, which shall then be responsible for funding the assigned beneficiary’s benefits. The question is whether an initial assignment made after that date is valid despite its untimeliness. We hold that it is. I We have spoken about portions of the Coal Act in two recent cases, Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438 (2002), and Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U. S. 498 (1998), the first of which sketches the Act’s history, 534 U. S., at 442-447. Here, it is enough to recall that in its current form the Act requires the Commissioner to assign, where possible, every coal industry retiree to a “signatory operator,” defined as a signatory of a coal wage agreement specified in § 9701(b)(1). §§ 9701(c)(1), 9706(a). An assignment should turn on a retiree’s employment history with a particular operator, § 9706(a), unless an appropriate signatory is no longer in business, in which case the proper assignee is a “related person” of that operator, defined in terms of corporate associations and relationships not in issue here, § 9701(c)(2). The Act recognizes that some retirees will be “unassigned.” § 9704(d). Assignment to a signatory operator binds the operator to pay an annual premium to the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund, established under the Act to administer benefits. §9702. The premium has up to three components, starting with a “health benefit premium,” computed by multiplying the number of assigned retirees by the year’s “per beneficiary” premium, set by the Commissioner and based on the Combined Fund’s health benefit expenses for the prior year, adjusted for changes in the Consumer Price Index. § 9704(b). The second element is a “death benefit premium” for projected benefits to the retirees’ survivors, the premium being the operator’s share of “the amount, aetuarially determined, which the Combined Fund will be required to pay during the plan year for death benefits coverage.” § 9704(c). A possible third constituent of the premium is for retirees who are not assigned to a particular operator, whose health and death benefits are nonetheless paid from the Combined Fund as if they were assigned beneficiaries. Before passage of the Coal Act, many operators withdrew from coal wage agreements, shifting the costs of paying for their retirees’ benefits to the remaining signatories, Sigmon Coal Co., supra, at 444, and an important object of the Coal Act was providing stable funding for the health benefits of these “orphan retirees,” House Committee on Ways and Means, Development and Implementation of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (Comm. Print 1995) (hereinafter Coal Act Implementation). See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, § 19142, 106 Stat. 3037 (intent to “stabilize plan funding” and “provide for the continuation of a privately financed self-sufficient program”). Before signatory operators may be compelled to contribute for the benefit of unassigned beneficiaries, however, funding from two other sources must run out. The United Mine Workers of America 1950 Pension Plan (UMWA Pension Plan) was required to make three substantial payments to the Combined Fund for this purpose on February 1, 1993, October 1, 1993, and October 1, 1994. § 9705(a)(1). The Act also calls for yearly payments to the Combined Fund from the Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation Fund (AML Fund), established for reclamation and restoration of land and water resources degraded by coal mining. 30 U. S. C. § 1231(c). Annual transfers from this AML Fund are limited to the greater of $70 million and the annual interest earned by the fund, and are subject to an aggregate limit equal to the amount of interest earned on the AML Fund between September 30, 1992, and October 1, 1995. §§ 1232(h)(2), (3)(B). So far, these transfers from the UMWA Pension Plan and the AML Fund have covered the benefits of all unassigned beneficiaries. If they fall short, however, the third source comes into play (and the third element of an operator’s Combined Fund premium becomes actual): all assignee operators (that is, operators with assigned retirees) will have to pay an “unassigned beneficiaries premium,” being their applicable percentage portion of the amount needed to pay annual benefits for the unassigned. An operator’s “applicable percentage” is defined as “the percentage determined by dividing the number of eligible beneficiaries assigned under section 9706 to such operator by the total number of eligible beneficiaries assigned under section 9706 to all such operators (determined on the basis of assignments as of October 1, 1993).” 26 U. S. C. § 9704(f)(1). The signatory with the most assigned retirees thus would cover the greatest share of the benefits payable to the unassigned (as well as their spouses and certain dependants). II Although §9706 provides that the Commissioner “shall” complete all assignments before October 1, 1993, the Commissioner did not, and she now estimates that some 10,000 beneficiaries were first assigned to signatory operators after the statutory date. The parties disagree on the reason the Commissioner failed to meet the deadline, but that dispute need not be resolved here. After October 1,1993, the Commissioner assigned 330 beneficiaries to respondents Peabody Coal Company and Eastern Associated Coal Corp., and a total of 270 beneficiaries to respondents Bellaire Corporation, NACCO Industries, Inc., and The North American Coal Corporation. These companies challenged the assignments in two separate actions before different District Courts, claiming that the statutory date sets a time limit on the Commissioner’s power to assign, so that a beneficiary not assigned on October 1, 1993 (and the beneficiary’s eligible dependants) must be left unassigned for life. If the respondent companies are right, the challenged assignments are void and the corresponding benefits must be financed not by them, but by the transfers from the UMWA Pension Plan and the AML Fund and, if necessary, by unassigned beneficiary premiums paid by other signatory operators to whom timely assignments were made. The Commissioner denied that Congress intended the Commissioner’s tardiness in assignments to impose a permanent charge on the public AML Fund, otherwise earmarked for reclamation, or to raise the threat of permanently heavier financial burdens on companies that happened to get assignments before October 1, 1993. The Commissioner argued that Congress primarily intended coal operators to pay for their own retirees. The trustees of the Combined Fund intervened in one of the cases and took the Commissioner’s view that initial assignments made after September 30, 1993, are valid. The companies obtained summary judgments in each case, on the authority of Dixie Fuel Co. v. Commissioner of Social Security, 171 F. 3d 1052 (CA6 1999), which went against the Commissioner on the issue here. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in two opinions likewise following Dixie Fuel—Peabody Coal Co. v. Massanari, 14 Fed. Appx. 393 (2001), and Bellaire Corp. v. Massanari, 14 Fed. Appx. 424 (2001)—but conflicting with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Holland v. Pardee Coal Co., 269 F. 3d 424 (2001). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 534 U. S. 1112 (2002), and now reverse. III It misses the point simply to argue that the October 1, 1993, date was “mandatory,” “imperative,” or a “deadline,” as of course it was, however unrealistic the mandate may have been. The Commissioner had no discretion to choose to leave assignments until after the prescribed date, and the assignments in issue here represent a default on a statutory duty, though it may well be a wholly blameless one. But the failure to act on schedule' merely raises the real question, which is what the consequence of tardiness should be. The respondent companies call the failure “jurisdictional,” such that the affected beneficiaries (like truly orphan beneficiaries) may never be assigned, but instead must be permanent wards of the UMWA Pension Plan, the AML Fund, and, potentially, of coal operators without prior relationship to these beneficiaries. The companies, in other words, say that as to tardily assigned beneficiaries who were, perhaps, formerly their own employees, they go scot free. We think the claim is as unsupportable as it is counterintuitive. A First there is the companies’ position that couching the duty in terms of the mandatory “shall” together with a specific deadline leaves the Commissioner with no authority to make an initial assignment on or after October 1, 1993. We rejected a comparable argument in Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U. S. 253 (1986), dealing with the power of the Secretary of Labor to audit a grant recipient under a provision that he “ ‘shall’ issue a final determination . . . within 120 days” of receiving a complaint alleging misuse of federal grant funds. Id., at 255. Like the Court of Appeals here, the Ninth Circuit in Brock thought the mandate and deadline together implied that Congress “had intended to prevent the Secretary from acting” after the statutory period, id., at 257. We, on the contrary, expressed reluctance “to conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public rights are at stake,” id., at 260, and reversed. As in this litigation, the Secretary’s responsibility in Brock was “substantial,” the “ability to complete it within 120 days [was] subject to factors beyond [the Secretary’s] control,” and “the Secretary’s delay, under respondent’s theory, would prejudice the rights of the taxpaying public.” Id., at 261. We accordingly read the 120-day provision as meant “to spur the Secretary to action, not to limit the scope of his authority,” so that untimely action was still valid. Id., at 265. Nor, since Brock, have we ever construed a provision that the Government “shall” act within a specified time, without more, as a jurisdictional limit precluding action later. Thus, a provision that a detention hearing “ ‘shall be held immediately upon the [detainee’s] first appearance before the judicial officer’” did not bar detention after a tardy hearing, United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 714 (1990) (quoting 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f)), and a mandate that the Secretary of Health and Human Services “ ‘shall report’ ” within a certain time did “not mean that [the] official lacked power to act beyond it,” Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U. S. 448, 459, n. 3 (1998). We have summed up this way: “if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 63 (1993). Hence the oddity at this date of a claim that late official action should shift financial burdens from otherwise responsible private purses to the public fisc, let alone siphon money from funds set aside expressly for a different public purpose, like the AML Fund for land reclamation. The point would be the same, however, even if Brock were the only case on the subject. The Coal Act was adopted six years after Brock came down, when Congress was presumably aware that we do not readily infer congressional intent to limit an agency’s power to get a mandatory job done merely from a specification to act by a certain time. See United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997). The Brock example conse quently has to mean that a statute directing official action needs more than a mandatory “shall” before the grant of power can sensibly be read to expire when the job is supposed to be done. Nothing so limiting, however, is to be found in the Coal Act: no express language supports the companies, while structure, purpose, and legislative history go against them. Structural clues support the Commissioner in the Coal Act’s other instances of combining the word “shall” with a specific date that could not possibly be read to prohibit action outside the statutory period. Congress, for example, provided that the UMWA Pension Plan “shall transfer to the Combined Fund” installments of $70 million on February 1, 1993, on October 1, 1993, and on October 1, 1994. § 9705(a)(1). It could not be that a failure to make a transfer on one of those precise dates, for whatever reason, would have left the UMWA Pension Plan with no authority to make the payment; October 1, 1994, was not even a business day. Or consider the Act’s mandatory provisions that the trustees of the Combined Fund “shall” be designated no later than 60 days from the enactment date, § 9702(a)(1), and that the designated trustees “shall, not later than 60 days after the enactment date,” give the Commissioner certain information about benefits, § 9704(h). No one could seriously argue that the entire scheme would have been nullified if appointments had been left to the 61st day, or that trustees (whose appointments could properly have been left to the 60th day) were powerless to divulge information to the SSA after the 60-day period had expired. In each of these instances, we draw a conclusion on grounds of plausibility: if Congress had meant to set a coun-terintuitive limit on authority to act, it would have said more than it did, and would surely not have couched its intent in language Brock had already held to lack any clear jurisdictional significance. The same may be said here. B Nor do we think the result of appealing to plausibility is affected by either of two other textual features that the companies take as indicating inability to assign beneficiaries after the statutory date: the provision for unassigned beneficiary status itself, and the provision that an operator’s contribution for the benefit of the unassigned shall be calculated “on the basis of assignments as of October 1, 1993.” §§ 9704(f)(1), (2). 1 The companies characterize the provision for unassigned beneficiaries as the specification of a “consequence” for failure to assign a beneficiary to an operator or related person. Cf. Brock, 476 U. S., at 259. Specifying this consequence of failure, they say, shows that the failure must be governed by the consequence provided, not corrected by a tardy assignment corresponding to one that should have been made earlier. The specified consequence, in other words, reflects a legislative preference for finality over accurate initial assignments and creates a right on the part of the companies to rely permanently on the state of affairs as they were on October 1, 1993. We think this line of reasoning is unsound at every step. To begin with, whatever might be inferable from the fact that a specific provision addressed the failure to make a timely assignment, the part of the Act referring to “unassigned” beneficiaries is not any such provision. The Act speaks of the beneficiaries not in terms of the Commissioner’s failure to assign them in time, but simply as “beneficiaries who are not assigned.” § 9704(d). The most obvious reason for beneficiaries’ being unassigned, in fact, is the disappearance of a beneficiary’s former employer, leaving no signatory operator for assignment under § 9706(a). This is not to say that failure of timely assignment does not also leave a beneficiary “unassigned” under the Act. It simply means that unassigned status has no significance peculiar to failure of timely assignment. Second, to the extent that “unassigned” status is a consequence of mere untimeliness, there would be a far more obvious reason for specifying that consequence than a supposed desire for finality. On its face, the provision for a beneficiary left out through tardiness functions simply as a default rule to provide coverage under the new regime required to be in place by October 1, 1993; there had to be some source of funding for every beneficiary by then, and provisions for the “unassigned” employees tell the SSA what the source will be in the absence of any other. But we do not read a provision apparently made for want of something better as an absolute command to forgo something better for all time. In fact, it is unrealistic to think that Congress understood unassigned status as an enduring “consequence” of uncompleted work, for nothing indicates that Congress even foresaw that some beneficiaries matchable with operators still in business might not be assigned before October 1, 1993. As the companies themselves point out, the Commissioner led Congress to believe as late as 1995 that all possible assignments had been made on time, see n. 3, supra, and such little legislative history as there is on the point tends to show that Congress assumed that any assignments that could be made at all (say, to an operator still in business) would be made on time. On October 8, 1992, on the heels of the Conference Committee Report on the Act and just before the vote in the Senate adopting the Act, Senator Wallop gave a detailed explanation of the Coal Act’s provisions for unassigned beneficiaries, which assumed that the “unassigned” would be true orphans: “As a practical matter, not all beneficiaries can be assigned to a specific last signatory operator, related person or assigned operator for payment purposes. This is because in some instances, none of those persons remain in business, even as defined to include non-mining related businesses. Thus, provisions are made for unassigned beneficiary premiums.” 138 Cong. Rec. 34003 (1992). The Senator’s report says that the transfer to the Combined Fund from the UMWA Pension Plan and AML Fund would be made because “unassigned beneficiaries were not employed by the assigned operators at the time of their retirement.... [I]f no operator remains in business under the formulations described above, that retiree becomes an unassigned beneficiary. . . . [The Coal Act’s] purpose is to assure that any beneficiary, once assigned, remains the responsibility of a particular operator, and that the number of unassigned beneficiaries is kept to an absolute minimum.” Ibid. It seems not to have crossed Congress’s mind that the category of the “unassigned” would include beneficiaries, let alone a lot of beneficiaries, who could be connected with an operator, albeit late. Providing a consequence of default was apparently just happenstance. Congress plainly did, however, weigh finality on October 1, 1993, against accuracy of initial assignments in one circumstance, and accuracy won. Section 9704(d) speaks of “beneficiaries who are not assigned ... for [any] plan year,” suggesting that assignment status may change from year to year. One way it may change is by correcting an erroneous assignment. Under the Act, an operator getting notice of an assignment has 30 days to request information regarding the basis of the assignment and then 30 days from receipt of that information to ask for reconsideration. §§ 9706(f)(1)— (2). If the Commissioner finds error, the Combined Fund trustees will fix it by reducing premiums and refunding any overpayments. § 9706(f)(3)(A)(i); see also § 9706(f)(3)(A)(ii). Nothing is said about finality on October 1,1993, and no time limit whatever is imposed on the Commissioner’s authority to reassign. The companies concede, as they must, that the statute permits reassignment after October 1, 1993. The companies do, however, try to limit the apparent preference for accuracy by arguing that one feature of this provision for reconsideration in § 9706(f) implicitly supports them; this specific and isolated exception to an otherwise unequivocal bar to assignments after the statutory date suggests, they say, that the bar is otherwise absolute. Again, we think no such conclusion follows. First, the argument is circular; it assumes that the availability of the § 9706(f) reconsideration process with no time limit is an exception to a bar on all assignment activity imposed by the October 1, 1993, time limit of § 9706(a). But the question, after all, is whether the October 1, 1993, mandate is in fact a bar. Section 9706(f) does not say it is, and nothing in that provision suggests it was enacted as an exception to the October 1, 1993, date. It has no language about operating notwithstanding the date specified in § 9706(a); on the contrary, it states that reassignment will be made “under subsection (a),” § 9706(f)(3)(A)(ii). But if the authority to reassign is contained in § 9706(a), then § 9706(f) is reasonably read not as lifting a jurisdictional time bar but simply as specifying a procedure for an aggrieved operator to follow in requesting the Commissioner to exercise the assignment power contained in § 9706(a) all along. In the combined operation of the two subsections, there is thus no implication that the Commissioner is powerless to make an initial assignment to an operator after the specified date; any suggestion goes the other way. Second, there is no reason to read the provision in § 9706(f) for correction of erroneous assignments as implying that the Commissioner should not employ her § 9706(a) authority to make a tardy initial assignment in a situation like this. We do not read the enumeration of one case to exclude another unless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it. United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U. S. 822, 836 (2001). As we have held repeatedly, the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members of an “associated group or series,” justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence. United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 65 (2002). We explained this point as recently as last Term’s unanimous opinion in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U. S. 73, 81 (2002): “Just as statutory language suggesting exclusiveness is missing, so is that essential extrastatutory ingredient of an expression-exclusion demonstration, the series of terms from which an omission bespeaks a negative implication. The canon depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which [is] abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded. E. Crawford, Construction of Statutes 337 (1940) (expressio unius ‘“properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference” ’ (quoting State ex rel. Curtis v. De Corps, 134 Ohio St. 295, 299, 16 N. E. 2d 459, 462 (1938))); United States v. Vonn, supra.” As in Echazabal, respondents here fail to show any reason that Congress would have considered reassignments after appeal “to go hand in hand” with tardy initial assignments. Since Congress apparently never thought that initial assignments would be late, see supra, at 164-167, the better inference is that what we face here is nothing more than a case unprovided for. 2 The remaining textual argument for the companies’ side rests on the definition of an operator’s “applicable percentage” of the overall obligation of all assignee operators (or related persons) to fund benefits for the unassigned. Under § 9704(f)(1), it is defined as the percentage of the operator’s own assigned beneficiaries among all assigned beneficiaries “determined on the basis of assignments as of October 1, 1993” (parenthesis omitted). The companies argue that the .specification “as of” October 1, 1993, means that an assigned operator’s percentage of potential liability for the benefit of the unassigned is fixed according to the assignments made at that date, subject only to specific exceptions set out in § 9704(f)(2), requiring a change in the percentage when erroneously assigned retirees are reassigned or assignee operators go out of business. The companies contend that their position rests on plain meaning: “as of” the date means “as assignments actually stand” on the date. Yet the words “as of,” as used in the statute, can be read another way: since Congress required that all possible assignments be complete on October 1, 1993, see § 9706(a), it is equally fair to read assignments “as of” that date to mean “assignments as they shall be on that date, assuming the Commissioner complies with our command.” The companies’ reading is hospitable to early finality of assignments, while the alternative favors completeness and accuracy before finality prevails. Once it is seen that there is no “plain” reading, however, there is nothing left of the “as of” argument except its stress that the applicable percentage can be modified only in accordance with the two exceptions recognizing changes for initial error or the demise of an assignee operator. The answer to this point, of course, has already been given. The enunciation of two exceptions does not imply an exclusion of a third unless there is reason to think the third was at least considered, whereas there is good reason to conclude that when Congress adopted the language in question it did not foresee a failure to make timely assignments. See supra, at 168-169. The phrase “as of” cannot be read to govern a situation that Congress clearly did not contemplate, nor does it require the absolute finality of assignments urged by the companies. IV This much is certain: the Coal Act rests on Congress’s stated finding that it was necessary to “identify persons most responsible for plan liabilities,” and on its express desire to “provide for the continuation of a privately financed self-sufficient program for the delivery of health care benefits,” Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, § 19142, 106 Stat. 3037. In the words of Senator Wallop’s report delivered shortly before enactment, the statute is “designed to allocate the greatest number of beneficiaries in the Plans to a prior responsible operator. For this reason, definitions are intended by the drafters to be given broad interpretation to accomplish this goal.” 138 Cong. Rec. 34001 (1992). To accept the companies’ argument that the specified date for action is jurisdictional would be to read the Act so as to allocate not the greatest, but the least, number of beneficiaries to a responsible operator. The way to reach the congressional objective, however, is to read the statutory date as a spur to prompt action, not as a bar to tardy completion of the business of ensuring that benefits are funded, as much as possible, by those identified by Congress as principally responsible. The judgments of the Court of Appeals in both cases are accordingly Reversed. The Coal Act’s definition of “related persons” was the subject of our opinion last Term in Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438 (2002). For simplicity, we will not refer to related persons separately in the balance of this opinion. According to a 1995 congressional Report, the total premium for a single beneficiary was $2,349.38 for the 1995 fiscal year. This figure includes only the health and death benefit premiums, since no unassigned beneficiaries premium has yet been charged. Coal Act Implementation 32-33. The 2002 per-beneficiary premium was approximately $2,725. General Accounting Office Report No. 02-243, Retired Coal Miners’ Health Benefit Funds: Financial Challenges Continue 8 (Apr. 2002). The Commissioner’s proffered reason for the delay is that the Social Security Administration (SSA) was not permitted to expend appropriated funds to commence work on assignments until July 13, 1993, when Congress enacted the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-50, 107 Stat. 254. The Commissioner also states that the task of researching employment records for approximately 80,000 coal industry workers in order to determine the appropriate signatory operators was monumental and could not have been completed by October 1, 1993, without additional resources. The respondent companies counter that the Acting Commissioner assured Congress less than a month before the statutory date that SSA would meet its “statutory responsibility” to complete the assignments on time. Hearing on Provisions Relating to the Health Benefits of Retired Coal Miners before the House Ways and Means Committee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1993) (hereinafter 1993 Coal Act Hearing), Ser. No. 103-59, p. 26 (Comm. Print 1994) (statement of Acting Commissioner Thompson). The same representative informed Congress in 1995 that SSA had “completed the process of making the initial assignment decisions by October 1, 1993, as required by law.” Hearing on the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1995), Ser. No. 104-67, p. 23 (1997) (statement of Principal Deputy Commissioner Thompson). The General Accounting Office estimated in 2000 that invalidation of assignments made after September 30, 1993, could require the Combined Fund to refund $57 million in premium payments. Letter of Gloria L. Jarmon to Hon. William V. Roth, Jr., Senate Committee on Finance 2 (Aug. 15, 2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ai00267r.pdf (as visited Jan. 9, 2003) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file). After the grant of certiorari, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit came down on the side of the Fourth Circuit. See Shenango Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F. 3d 174 (2002). No one could disagree with Justice Scalia that “[w]hen a power is conferred for a limited time, the automatic consequence of the expiration of that time is the expiration of the power,” post, at 174-175 (dissenting opinion), but his assumption that the Commissioner’s power to assign retirees was “conferred for a limited time” assumes away the very question to be decided. Justice Scalia’s dissent is an elaboration on this circularity, forever returning as it must to his postulate that § 9706(a) constitutes a “time-limited mandate” that “expired” on the statutory date. Post, at 177, 178. Justice Scalia’s closest approach to a nonconclusory justification for his position is the assertion of an entirely formal interpretive rule that a date figuring in the same statutory subsection as the creation of a mandatory obligation ipso facto negates any power of tardy performance. Post, at 176-177. Justice Scalia cites no authority for his formalism, which is contradicted by United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711 (1990), where a single statutory subsection provided that a judicial officer “shall hold a hearing” and that “[t]he hearing shall be held immediately upon the person’s first appearance before the judicial officer.” Id., at 714 (quoting 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f)). Conversely, Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U. S. 253 (1986), United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43 (1993), and Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U. S. 448 (1998), ascribed no significance to the formal placement of the time limitation. One can only ask why a statute providing that “The obligor shall perform its duty before October 1, 1993,” should be thought to differ fundamentally from one providing that “(i) The obligor shall perform its duty, (ii) The obligor’s duty shall be performed before October 1, 1993.” The accepted fact is that some time limits are jurisdictional even though expressed in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants, see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1291 (providing that the courts of appeals “shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States”); § 2107 (providing that notice of appeal in civil cases must be filed “within thirty days after the entry of such judgment”); Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 264 (1978) (stating that the limitation in §2107 is “ ‘mandatory and jurisdictional’ ” (citation omitted)), while others are not, even when incorporated into the jurisdictional provision, see, e. g., Montalvo-Murillo, supra. Formalistic rules do not account for the difference, which is explained by contextual and historical indications of what Congress meant to accomplish. Here that intent is revealed in several obvious ways: in rules that define an operator’s liability in terms of employment history, see § 9706(a), in appellate rights to test the appropriateness of an initial assignment, see infra, at 167, and in the expressed understanding that the companies that got the benefit of a worker’s labor should pay for the worker’s benefits, see infra, at 164-166. What else, after all, would anyone naturally expect? As opposed to the sensible indications that the initial assignment deadline was not meant to be jurisdictional, Justice Scalia’s new formal rule would thwart the statute’s object and relieve the respondent companies of all responsibility, which other, less lucky operators might be required to shoulder. There undoubtedly was much political compromise in the development of the Coal Act, but politics does not justify turning the process of initial assignment into a game of chance. The respondent companies attempt to distinguish Brock because we noted in that case that an aggrieved party could sue under the Administrative Procedure Act to “ ‘compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,’” 476 U. S., at 260, n. 7 (quoting 5 U. S. C. §706(1)). The companies assert that no such remedy would have applied to the Commissioner’s duty under § 9706(a). Whether or not this is the case, the companies do not argue that they were aggrieved by the failure to assign retirees by the statutory date. On the contrary, they temporarily avoided payment of premium amounts for which they would indisputably have been liable had the assignments been timely made. It therefore does not appear that there was a need to provide operators “with any remedy at all — much less the drastic remedy respondents] see[k] in this case — for the [Commissioner’s] failure to meet the [October 1, 1993] deadline.” 476 U. S., at 260, n. 7. Justice Scalia concedes that his theory should not extend so far as to limit the UMWA Pension Plan’s duty to transfer funds to the Combined Fund to the particular dates in § 9705(a)(1). Justice Scalia attempts to avoid such an outcome by assuming, without basis, that the “UMWA Pension Plan has the power to transfer funds” to the Combined Fund in the absence of the authorization in § 9705(a)(1). Post, at 176 (dissenting opinion). Justice Scalia’s confidence is misplaced. Prior to the Coal Act’s enactment, the Wee Chairman of the Secretary of Labor’s Coal Commission testified before Congress that legislative authorization was needed for such a transfer to occur: “One of the things that concerned the Commission was, first of all, our understanding of the present state of law under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Under that Act it is not within the power of any of the participants or signatories to transfer a pension surplus to a benefit fund. That is one of the reasons for the recommendation that a transfer be authorized.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Medicare and Long-Term Care of the Senate Committee on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1991) (statement of Coal Commission Vice Chairman Perritt). It appears, then, that § 9705(a)(1) provides both the UMWA Pension Plan’s power to act and a time limit, which according to Justice Scalia would render action on any other date ultra vires, a result that even the dissent does not embrace. Justice Scalia thinks it “debatable” that the power to appoint initial trustees survives the deadline in § 9702(a)(1). Post, at 177. In order to avoid the embarrassment of concluding that tardiness would remove all authority to appoint the initial trustees, which would render the Act a dead letter, he suggests that an initial trustee could be appointed under § 9702(b)(2), even though that provision applies only to appointment of a “successor trustee” to be made “in the same manner as the trustee being succeeded,” whereas an initial trustee does not “succeed” anyone. The extreme implausibility of Justice Scalia’s suggested reading of § 9702(b)(2) points up the unreasonableness of placing a jurisdictional gloss on the § 9706(a) time limitation. It is impossible to believe that Congress meant its Herculean effort to resolve the coal industry benefit crisis to come to absolutely nothing if trustees were designated late. There is a basic lesson to be learned from Justice Scalia’s contortions to avoid the untoward results flowing from his formalistic theory that time limits on mandatory official action are always jurisdictional when they occur in an authorizing provision. The lesson is that something is very wrong with the theory. Many “consequences,” of course, are intended to induce an obligated person to take untimely action rather than bar that action altogether. Section 9704(i)(1)(C), for example, denies certain tax deductions to operators who fail to make contributions during specified periods, and § 9707(a) provides a penalty for operators who fail to pay premiums on time. The first consequence is eliminated when the operator takes action that is necessarily untimely, and the second penalty ceases to run when the premiums are paid, albeit out of time. Postenactment statements, though entitled to less weight, are to the same effect. At a hearing before the House Committee of Ways and Means on September 9,1993, one member asked whether SSA had established procedures “to assure that beneficiaries are not improperly designated as unassigned.” The Acting Commissioner of Social Security responded that employee training “emphasized that the intent of the Coal Act was to assign miners to mine operators if at all possible.” 1993 Coal Act Hearing 46 (statements of Rep. Johnson and Acting Commissioner Thompson). The record of the hearing also contains a statement by the committee chairman that the Act required operators to “pay for their own retirees, and to assume a proportionate share of the liability for true ‘orphans’ — retirees whose companies are no longer in existence and cannot pay for the benefits.” Id., at 85. At no point did any witness suggest that the unassigned beneficiary system was intended for miners who could be assigned but were not assigned before October 1, 1993, or that such miners would remain unassigned in perpetuity in order to protect the status quo on that date. The respondent companies cite a postenactment statement by Representative Johnson that Congress had an obligation to “make sure that companies . . . have time to figure out their liability and prepare to deal with it.” Id., at 42. The Representative’s comment did not purport to interpret the Coal Act as adopted, however, but was made in discussing whether “there should be some resolution passed” to give coal operators more time to prepare for their Coal Act obligations. Ibid. One statement in Senator Wallop’s preenactment report, which the companies do not cite, indicates an understanding that assignments would be fixed after October 1, 1993. See 138 Cong. Rec. 34003 (1992) (“[T]he percentage of the unassigned beneficiary premiums allocable to each assigned operator on October 1, 1993 will remain fixed in future years”). As discussed, however, there is no indication that Congress foresaw that the Commissioner would be unable to complete assignments by the statutory date. A general statement made on the assumption that all assignments that could ever be made would be made before October 1, 1993, does not show a legislative preference for finality over accuracy now that that assumption has proven incorrect. There is, of course, no ‘“case unprovided for’ exception” to the ex-pressio unius canon, post, at 181 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is merely that the canon does not tell us that a case was provided for by negative implication unless an item unmentioned would normally be associated with items listed. The companies emphasize that § 9704(f)(2)(B) requires that beneficiaries whose operator goes out of business must be treated as unassigned and cannot be reassigned. Even assuming that a provision that goes to the definition of “applicable percentage” and does not directly implicate assignments has the effect the companies suggest, the most that could be said is that Congress wished to identify the first, most responsible operator for a given retiree, and not to follow that with a second assignment to a less responsible operator if the initial assigned operator left the business. This interest does not indicate an object of date-specific finality over accuracy in the first assignment; on the contrary, it opts for finality only once an accurate initial assignment has been made. In the absence of a more exact explanation for this arrangement, we suppose the explanation is good political horse trading. But provisions that by their terms govern after the initial assignment is made tell us nothing about the period in which an initial assignment may be made. In fact, the permissibility under § 9706(f) of postappeal reassignment after October 1, 1993, makes plain that Congress was not “insisting upon as perfect a matchup as possible up to October 1, 1993, and then prohibiting future changes, both by way of initial assignment or otherwise,” post, at 183 (Scalia, J., dissenting), as Justice Scalia himself agrees. On the contrary, the reassignment provision indicates that a system of accuracy “in initial assignments, whether made before the deadline or afterward,” is precisely what the Act envisions. Ibid. Here, as throughout this opinion, “accuracy” refers not to an elusive system of “perfect fairness,” ibid., but to assignments by the Commissioner following the scheme set out in §§ 9706(a)(1)(3). The same may be said of the provision for an initial trustee to serve until November 1, 1993, § 9702(b)(3)(B), contrary to Justice Scalia’s view. Post, at 182 (dissenting opinion). Under the respondent companies’ view, if the transfers from the AML Fund prove insufficient to cover the benefits of all unassigned beneficiaries, an operator that received no assignments prior to October 1, 1993, would not have to contribute a penny to the unassigned beneficiary pool— solely due to the Commissioner’s fortuitous failure to make all assignments by the statutory deadline. At the same time, operators that received full assignments prior to October 1, 1993, would be forced to cover more than their fair share of unassigned beneficiaries’ premiums. Although Justice Scalia sees the Act as rife with “seemingly unfair and inequitable provisions,” ibid, (dissenting opinion), even his view is no reason to assume that Congress meant contested provisions to be construed in the most unfair and inequitable manner possible. In any event, Justice Scalia’s citation of § 9704(f)(2)(B) does not help his position. It provides a clear statutory solution to a problem Congress anticipated: the end of an assigned operator’s business. Had Congress propounded a response to the issue now before us as clear as § 9704(f)(2)(B), there would doubtless have been no split in the Courts of Appeals and no cases for us to review. Given the absence of an express provision, the statute’s goals are best served by treating operators the way Congress intended them to be treated, that is, by allowing the Commissioner to identify the operators most responsible. A Congressional Research Service report dated shortly before the enactment likewise states that the Act envisioned that “[w]herever possible, responsibility for individual beneficiaries would be assigned ... to a previous employer still in business.” Coal Industry: Use of Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund Monies for UMWA “Orphan Retiree” Health Benefits (Sept. 10, 1992), reprinted in 138 Cong. Rec., at 34005.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 642. Argued January 9-10, 1967. Decided March 27, 1967. Howard J. Trienens, Lloyd N. Cutler, Edward W. Bourne, Harry G. Silleck, Jr., Leon H. Keyserling and Gordon P. MacDougall argued the cause for appellants in all cases. With Messrs: Trienens and Cutler on the brief for appellant Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. in No. 642 were George L. Saunders, Jr., and Edward K. Wheeler. With Mr. Cutler on the brief for appellant Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey in No. 642 was Richard B. Wachenjeld. With Mr. Bourne on the brief for appellant Erie-Lackawanria Railroad. Co. in No. 691 were J. Kenneth Campbell and John T. Rafferty. Mr. Silleck also filed briefs for appellant in No. 680, and Messrs. MacDougall and Keyserling for appellants in Nos. 813 and 814. Frank F. Vesper, Patrick C. Mullen and James H. Durkin were on the briefs for appellant in No. 815. Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for the United States in all cases.’ With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Turner, Louis F. Claiborne and Richard A. Posner. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for appellee Interstate Commerce Commission in all cases. With him on the brief were Fritz R. Kahn, Arthur J. Cerra and Jerome Nelson. Hugh B. Cox, Joseph Auerbach, Walter J. Myskowski, Samuel Kanell, Special Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, David Berman, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, and John H. Chajee, Governor of Rhode Island, argued the cause for the remaining appellees. With Mr. Cox on the brief for appellee Pennsylvania Railroad Co. was Henry P. Sailer. Mr. Auerbach also filed a brief for appellees. Smith et al., trustees of New York, New Haven <fe Hartford Railroad Co. With Mr. Myskowski on the brief for appellee State of New York were Louis J. Lejko-witz, Attorney General, and Dunton F. Tynan, Assistant' Solicitor General. With Governor Chajee and Messrs. Kanelt and Berman on the brief for the State, of Connecticut et al. were Harold M. Mulvey, Attorney General, F. Michael Ahern, David B. Beizer and Robert L. Hirtle, Assistant Attorneys General, and William J. Lynch for the State of Connecticut; Edward W. Brooke, Attorney General, and Joseph L. Tauro, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and J. Joseph Nugent, Attorney General, and Robert M. Schacht, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Rhode Island. Donald L. Wallace was on the brief for appellees Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce et al. Levy Anderson was on the brief for -appellee City of Philadelphia. Edward Friedman, Attorney General, and Edward Munce and Robert M. Harris, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in Nos. 642, 680 and 691. Together with No. 680, Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corp. v. United States et al., No. 691, Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Co. v. United States et al., No. 813, City of Scranton et al. v. United States et al., No. 814, Shapp v. United States et al., and No. 815, Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. United States et al., also on appeal from the same court. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. These six appeals involve, the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission permitting the merger of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the New York Central Railroad Company (Penii-Central) pursuant to § 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 41 Stat. 481, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2). In its original order of April 6, 1966, the Commission found that the merger might divert a substantial amount of traffic from the Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Company (E-L), the Delaware and Hudson Railroad Company (D «fe H) and the Boston and Maine Corporation (B «fe M), three smaller competing carriers designated as the “protected railroads” by the Commission. These protected railroads had filéd under § 5 (2) (d) of the Act applications for inclusion in both this merger and in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. and New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.—Merger, 324 I. C. C. 1. In the latter case inclusion of E-L and D «fe H has been recommended and, together with B «fe M, is pending before the Commission. The applications of the protected roads in the Penn-Central proceeding have been held in abeyance pending decision in the Norfolk proceeding. On the merits of the Penn-Central merger, the Commission found that the service the protected railroads “render their shippers is essential and the public interest dictates that [such service] be .preserved.” The Commission concluded “that immediate consummation of the proposed merger would be consistent with the public interest, if conditions are imposed to obviate impairment or serious weakening” of the three lines. Without such conditions or the inclusion of the protected roads in a major system, the Commission further found, it would be doubtful if the “three carriers could withstand the competition of the applicants merged, and, unless they are protected during, the period necessary to determine their future, we would not authorize consummation at this time, even though approving the merger.” 327 I. C. C. 475, 532. It, therefore, applied, sua sponte, certain conditions to the immediate consummation of the merger which were “designed to prevent any loss of revenue over the three railroads [the protected railroads] as a direct result of immediate consummation of this merger.” Its “approval of the merger for undelayéd consummation” was made “subject... to the conditions specifically described in appendix G,” ibid., which was attached as an appendix to the April 6, 1966, order, and which we likewise attach as an Appendix here. The Commission, apparently because of the necessity for the conditions and the urgency of the merger, required compliance with Appendix G even though it had neither the bénefit of a report from a Hearing Examiner thereon, nor the advantage of a hearing before the Commission itself. These conditions detailed the protection which must be given the protected railroads and made them a prerequisite to the consummation of the merger. The Commission, therefore, not only found that protection of the three railroads was necessary, but fixed the terms thereof and required compliance prior to permitting the' merger. There was nothing tentative about Appendix G. The conditions were divided into two general categories and provided that: (1) On traffic for which the protected railroads are “competitive factors” the merged company shall not, pending final determination of the inclusion proceedings, provide any new or changed routing practice,, freight rates, or service which would divert or tend to divert traffic from routes in which the protected railroads, or any of them, participate or participated at the time of the merger. And (2) the protected railroads would be indemnified by the merged company against revenue losses by reason of the merger. Appendix G to the order detailed the manner in which such indemnity would be calculated and provided for the accelerated processing of complaints as to. new or changed routes, practices, rates, or services. Section 7 of Appendix G provided that if the merged company did not accede to all of the conditions, the merger would be deferred for two years or “such time as the Commission may determine to be necessary to protect, the interests of D & H, B & M and E-L.” And § 8 provided that the conditions “shall be construed, administered and enforced with the view to protecting the E-L, D & H and B & M and the shipping public which depends upon them for transportation, against the effects of the merger for the period and purposes set forth above.” Thereafter, and without a hearing, but apparently on the objection of most of the parties, the Commission on September 16, 1966, modified its April 6 order and reopened' the hearing. 328 I. C. C. 304. The objectors, among other things, pointed to the fact that the conditions of. Appendix G were made without any notice or hearing and would create irreconcilable conflicts between the protected carriers and others adversely affected by the merger. In reopening the hearing the Commission limited it to the conditions imposed in Appendix G-, the prevention of possible manipulation of such conditions and the enlargement of the indemnity provision to include capital loss. In the reopening order of September 16, Í966, the Commission left intact its order of April 6, 1966, as to the undelayed consummation of the merger, continued in effect the ban on new or changed routes, practices, and rates as to traffic in which any of the protected railroads participated, but lifted the indemnification condition until further order, at which time any such provision found necessary could be made retroactive to the date of the merger. None of the previous findings, as to the necessity for the immediate imposition of the conditions included in the original order, were amended or withdrawn. The traffic conditions alone were left in effect. This suit was filed on September 7, 1966, and arose upon the complaint of E-L and other railroads seeking an interlocutory injunction to restrain the consummation of the merger. A three-judge court was convened, 28 U. S. C. § 2284, and thereafter it declined, by a divided vote, to grant the interlocutory injunction. Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Co. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 964. The appellants sought a stay from Mr. Justice Harlan who referred the application to the Court and it was granted on October 18, 1966. At the same time we expedited the oase for consideration. 385 U. S. 914. The sole question before us is whether, in light of the findings as to the necessity for interim protection for the so-called protected railroads, the Commission erred in permitting the consummation of the merger prior to and without awaiting determination of the inclusion proceedings. We believe that the Commission erred in approving the immediate consummation of the merger without determining the ultimate fate of the protected roads. We, therefore, reverse the judgment and remand the case to the District Court with . instructions to remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. I. Questions not here decided. At the outset we make it clear that we do not pass on the validity of the merger, the special conditions of Appendix G, the modified order of the Commission, or the peripheral points posed by the various parties. We hold only that under the uncontradicted findings of the Commission it was necessary for it to conclude the inclusion proceedings, as to the protected railroads, prior to permitting consummation of the merger. II. The merger, its background, its participants and relative position. The Penn-Central merger has been under study and discussion by the Commission for some 10 years. After the initial study was completed in 1959, Central withdrew-, from the plan and began negotiations for a merger with" the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company (C «fe 0) for joint control of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company (B «fe 0). However, when at a later date.C «fe 0 had contracted for the purchase of some 61% of B «fe 0 stock, Central gave up its plan and renewed negotiations with Penn. The two roads signed an agreement of merger in 1962. The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad'Company (NH) approached Penn and Central for inclusion in the plan but was given a deaf ear. The merger agreement provided that all properties, franchises, etc. .(permitted, by respective state law), would be transferred to the merged company and appropriate stock exchange, debt arrangements, etc., effected. ' As the Commission found, the merger would “create an hour-glass shaped system flared on the east from Montreal, Canada, through Boston, Mass., to Norfolk, Va., and on the west from Mackinaw City, Mich., through Chicago, Ill., to St. Louis, Mo.” 327 I. C. C., at 489. It would operate some 19,600 miles of road in 14 States between the Great Lakes, with a splash in Canada on the north, and the Ohio and Potomac Rivers' on the south. After the two systems are connected as planned and' new and expanded yards are provided, the merger will consolidate trains now moving separately between the same points. The combined systems will have a substantial amount of parallel track-age and routes, with 160 common points or junctions. Terminals will be consolidated, present interchanges between the two systems will be eliminated and only the most efficient yards and facilities of the respective systems will be utilized. The merger plan calls for 98 projects that will intermesh their long-haul traffic at key points, creating a nonstop'service between the principal cities with “locals” coyering the multiple-stop routes and branch lines. It is estimated that enormous savings in transit time can be effected; Certain chosen yards — such as Selkirk — will be remodeled and modernized into electronically operated yards with capacities of from 5,000 to 10,000 cars per day. The through trains to the West will be formed at Selkirk and those from the West broken up for dispatch to terminals' or consignees in New England, New York, and northern New Jersey. The. plan calls for some New York City traffic to be routed over Central’s Hudson River East Shore line to lessen cost. By consolidating traffic on fast through lines, filling out trains, re-routing over the most efficient routes, eliminating some interchanges and effecting other improvements, the merged company will reduce by 6,000,000 the number of train miles operated. A single-line service will be operated between more points, with less circuity and less switching. The plan'álso calls for 31 daily trains to be withdrawn from the Pennsylvania with seven new ones added, leaving a total of 319 trains daily. The Pennsylvania is the largest and Central the third largest railroad in the Northeastern Region. Together the operating revenue of the two roads was - over $1,500,000,000 in 1965. Their net income in 1964 totaled almost $57,000,000 and in 1965 ran in excess of $75,000,000. In 1963 the total net was barely.$16,000,000. The cost of operation of the two systems runs $90,000,000 a month and their working capital was some $72,000,000 in. 1965. As of December 31, 1963, their combined investments were $1,242,000,000. The Pennsylvania and Cehtral systems are each made up of underlying corporations, As of the date of the Examiners’ Report the merged company would have ownership interest in 182 corporations and 10 railroads under lease! Thirty-six of the corporations are rail carriers! in six of which the merged company would have a voting control. All six are Class I railroads.. It would likewise control six Class II railroads, five switching and terminal railroads, a holding company, five car-leasing companies, four common carriers and 34 noncarrier corporations. The NH is the sixth largest railroad in the Northeastern Region and the largest in New England. On a national basis it ranks fourth among passenger-carrying railroads and is one of the largest non trunkline' fréight roads. It has some 1,500 miles of railroad in four States — Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and part of New York. NH has been in reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 Stat. 1474, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 205, since 1961. While its gross revenues have run in excess of $120,000,000, it has run deficits since 1958; During the trusteeship its deficits have run from $12,700,000 in 1962 to $15,100,000 in 1965. hH HH I — I The protesting parties, their setting m the Northeastern Region and their position on the merger. Altogether some 200 parties participated in the proceedings before the Commission, some in support of and others in opposition to the merger. None of the appellant railroads challenge the merits of the merger; however, appellants Milton J. Shapp and the City of Scranton both attack the merger on its merits. Aside from Penn-Central and NH, there are 10 other carriers involved in this proceeding. Three of these are the protected carriers — B & M, I) & H and E-L. B & M operates a freight and passenger service in . Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts and' New York over some 1,500 miles of road. It has suffered consecutive deficits in net income for some years and has not appealed from the decision of the District Court. D & H operates about 750 miles of road with some 600 in New York, less than 50 in Vermont and the balance in Pennsylvania. Its net income in 1965 was $5,000,000, its highest year since 1960. E-L operates some 3,000 miles of railroad located in New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. Its net income was over $3,000,000 in 1965 but it. suffered heavy deficits in the seven preceding years. As we have previously noted, these three railroads have filed applications for inclusion in both this case and in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. and New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.—Merger, 324 I. C. C. I. The Commission has withheld action, on the inclusion of E-L, B & M and D & H, in Pénn-Central until there is a final determination of their inclusion proceeding with Norfolk and Western (N & W). In the Jatter proceeding Commissioner Webb filed his report on December 22,1966, récommending the inclusion of E-L and D & H in the N & W system but was unable to prescribe terms for inclusion of B & M — this was left to private negotiation between the railroads. On argument here the Commission .has indicated that it anticipated entering a final order in the matter by Juiy or August 1967. If this is favorable these, three roads would be included in the N & W system, which has indicated its acquiescence in such a plan. Six additional railroads involved here are the C & 0, B & 0; the Central of New Jersey (CNJ), the Reading Company, the Norfolk and Western, and the' Western Maryland Company (WM). The C & O-B & O system is the result-of a control proceeding in 1962. See Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co.—Control—Baltimore & O. R. Co., 317 I. C. C. 261, sustained, sub nom, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 19, aff'd, per curiam, 375 U. S. 216 (1963). Together these two roads operate some 10,000 miles of railroad. Their lines extend from Michigan through Ohio and West Virginia to Virginia and from Chicago, Ill., and St. Louis, Mo., to Rochester, N. Y., and Washington, D. C. Their net operating income in 1965 totaled over $80,000,000. In addition, B & O owns 38 %■ voting control of'Reading which in turn controls CNJ. Reading has 1,200 miles of railroad in eastern Pennsylvania with net. operating revenue of some $8,000,000 in 1965. CNJ has 514 miles of railroad extending from Scranton, Pa., to. Jersey City, N. J. In 1965 it had a net operating deficit in excess of $3,000,000. C & O-B & O also own jointly 65% of the voting stock of WM. The latter has 741 miles of railroad extending, from Connellsville, JPa., and Webster Springs, W. Va., to Baltimore, Md. In 1965 its net operating income was nearly $8,500,000. N & W has 7,000 miles of railroad extending in a double prong from Des Moines, Iowa, and Kansas. City, Mo., on the west to Buffalo, N. Y., and Pittsburgh, Pa., on the east and from Cincinnati, Ohio, and Bristol, Va., on the west to Hagerstown, Md., and Norfolk, Va., .on the east. Its net operating income. for 1965 was approximately $118,000,000.'1 As we have noted, an inclusion proceeding is now pending under which B & M, D & H and E-L seek inclusion in the N & W system. On October 11, 1965, C & O-B & O and N <fe W filed an application with the Commission asking approval of their merger into a single system and offering to include B & M, D & H, E-L, the Reading and CNJ therein, subject to various'conditions. If this were effected and the Penn-Central-NH merger were effected, the. Northeastern Region would then have two giant systems, i. e., Penn-Central and C & O-B & O-N & W. Only one additional railroad remains a party here, the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company (C & El). It has approximately 750 miles of railroad operating between Chicago, Ill., St. Louis, Mo., and Evansville,Ind., with a net operating income of nearly $3,500,000 in. 1965. The Missouri Pacific Railroad Company has already been authorized by the Commission to make C & E I a part of its system. The fear of C & E I here was that the Penn and Central merged would be a more formidable competitor than the Central alone and it, accordingly, sought the imposition here of special routing and traffic conditions. The only other appellants are the City of Scranton, Pa., and Milton J. Shapp. Scranton is served by E-L, D & H and CNJ. It fears that the merger will have adverse effects upon the city and therefore opposes the merger. Shapp sues as a citizen and stockholder of Penn and is likewise in opposition to the merger. The United States has filed a memorandum in which it does not “quarrel with the merits of the Penn-Central merger proposal itself.” The agencies of the Executive Branch, the Solicitor General reports, “believe that the merger is in the public interest and that its consummation should be promptly effected.” This view, however, is based on the assumption “that a place in the emerging pattern of consolidation in the Northeast can be found for the lesser roads of the region.” It is the Commission’s approval of the immediate consummation of the merger prior to the completion of the proceedings to determine the place of the lesser roads to which the United States objects. It contends that since the very survival of the three protected, railroads is threatened by the Penn-Céntral merger, the Commission must first provide protection for them until their absorption by “a major system like Norfolk and Western.” - To this end the United States suggests that we hold the case to enable the Commision to conclude the related proceedings which it now has under consideration. The United States concludes that: “Only if the Commission is unable to promptly resolve the problems resulting from the merger would we deem it appropriate to urge this Court to reach the merits of the appeals and reverse the judgment below.”. The appellant railroads take varying positions all short of attacking the merits of the merger. The three protected railroads contend that the merger should not be consummated prior to the final determination of their inclusion in some major system or the enforcement of effective protective conditions in the interim. Judicial, review, they say, of the protective conditions would otherwise be illusory. The C & O-B & O group and the N <fe W system maintain that the conditions of the April 6, 1966, order give the protected railroads a vested interest in the Penn-Central merger which would result in the protected railroads diverting traffic to Penn-Central which would normally have gone to them. They say, as does the United States, that the conditions were drawn without the benefit of notice and hearing, are deficient and enforcement thereof would be to their detriment. C & EI points to what it calls inconsistent findings as to the benefits it will have “of intensified competitive efforts” by its connecting carriers on routes in competition with Perin-Central. It contends that the indemnity conditions would “compound the economic injury” which would befall the C &, E I as a result of the merger and which prompted'it to request protective measures. IV. The national transportation policy and practices of the Commission thereunder. This Court has often pointed out that the national transportation policy “is- the product of a long history of trial and error by Congress . . . .” McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67, 80 (1944). In that case it found that the Transportation Act of 1920 “markéd a sharp change in the policies and objectives embodied in those efforts.” Ibid. In that Act the Congress directed the Commission to adopt a plan for consolidation of the railroads of the United States into “a limited number of systems.” 41 Stat. 481 (1920). Consolidation would be approved by the Commission upon a finding that the transaction was in harmony with and in furtherance of the complete plan of consolidation and that the public interest would be promoted.' But the Commission was warned that “competition shall be preserved as fully as possible.” Ibid. The initiation of this unification, however, the Congress left wholly with the ■ carriers. The Commission was given ho power to compel mergers. This pattern was carried forward in the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898; however, § 5 of the former Act was amended to authorize the Commission to approve carrier-initiated proposals which it found to be consistent with the public interest and upon just and reasonable conditions. Under § 5 (2) (d) additional power was given the Commission to condition its approval of a merger upon the inclusion, upon request, of other railroads operating in the territory involved. As,we said in County of Marin v. United States, 356 U. S. 412 (1958), “the result of the [1940] Act was a change in the means, while the end remained the same. The very language of the amended ‘unification section’ expresses clearly the desire of the Congress that the industry proceed toward an integrated national transportation system through substantial corporate simplification.” Id., at 417-418. The Commission has, therefore, not proceeded by or under “a master plan” for consolidation in the various regions. Following this procedure the Commission has refused to consolidate the Northeastern Region railroad merger or control proceedings into one case. See Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co.— Control-Baltimore & O. R. Co., supra, at 265-266, and Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. and New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.—Merger, supra, at 18. Also Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 19, at 29-31; aff’d per curiam, 375 U. S. 216 (1963). It is contended that the order here is fatally defective for failure to comply with § 5 (2)(b) of the Act which requires the Commission to “enter an order approving and authorizing such transaction, upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications, so found to be just and reasonable.” The claim is that by leaving the indemnity provisions open for future, determination the Commission did not meet the requirements of the section. Once a valid order is entered by the Commission, it, of course, has the power to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of making modifications that it finds necessary in the light of subsequent circumstances or to assist in compliance with prior conditions previously required or, of course, to correct any errors. The Commission also has power under § 5 (9) of the Act to make certain supplemental orders and under § 17 (3) may correct clerical ■ errors in certificates. We do not find it necessary to pass upon the question of naked power in the Commission to' do what has been done here. Even assuming that it does have that power, we find that its order approving immediate consummation of the merger is insupportable on its findings. V. Conclusions. The Commission found in its April 6, 1966, order that the protected railroads would be adversely affected to a “serious degree” by the Penn-Central merger; that they would be “severely handicapped” in providing required transportation to the highly industrialized areas that they serve, which service is “essential” and “the public service dictates that it be preserved.” It then held that immediate consummation of the merger would be consistent with the public interest only if the conditions of Appendix G were immediately imposed. And, significantly, it concluded that even though it approved the merger, consummation of it would not be permitted unless the protected railroads “are protected during the period necessary to determine their future . . .'.” 327 I. C. C., at 529, 532. But after this suit was brought and strong opposition to Appendix G was voiced, the Commission, on September 16, 1966, withdrew all of the conditions of Appendix G save the traffic ones. ' This left the protected railroads without sufficient protection according to the Commission’s own findings. This was done apparently because of the vehement objections of the appellant railroads that Appendix G would cause havoc rather than give shelter. We cannot say, as did the District Court, that the September 16, 1966, order meant nothing more than that the traffic conditions left imposed by it were in themselves sufficient to protect the three protected railroads during the interim between the merger and the decision as to their future in one of the major railroad systems. This interpretation runs in the face of not only the prior findings enumerated above but the specific terms and conditions of Appendix G found to be necessary to prevent “impairment or serious weakening” of the three carriers. Id,., at 532. Indeed, rather than being tentative, the requirements of Appendix G were rigidly fixed and established for the entire period preceding inclusion of the protected roads in some major system. The finding of consistency with the public interest was predicated entirely upon the unqualified acceptance of Appendix G by Penn-Central. Otherwise the merger would be put off for two years. In its effort to expedite the merger the Commission failed to provide the very protection that it at the same time declared indispensable to the three roads. This leaves the ultimate conclusion — that prompt consummation of the Penn-Central merger clearly would be in the public interest— without support and it falls under the Commission’s own findings. In view of these facts and since none of the findings of the Commission were disturbed, attacked, or amended, we believe it was error to permit the merger to be effected. And we also note that even in the ultimate order of approval dated September 16, 1966, the Commission pointed out that its “finding [as to the merger being consistent with the public interest] was that, if the immediate consummation were to be authorized E-L, D & H and B & M would require special protection during the pendency of their petitions for inclusion in a major system.” Nevertheless, in spite of this confirmation of its finding, the Commission ordered the merger immediately consummated without the “special protection” afforded by Appendix G. Having found that the finding of consistency with the public interest could only be sustained by the imposition of the Appendix G “special protection,” the Commission failed to meet its statutory obligation when it arbitrarily removed the special conditions of Appendix G while leaving the prior finding-standing. In view of the patent invalidity of the order permitting immediate consummation of the merger and in light of the present status of the proceeding before the Commission, we can only conclude that it is necessary that the decision as to the future of the protected railroads and their inclusion, in a major system be decided pribr to consummation of the Penn-Central merger. This is especially true since the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Webb, as to the inclusion of the three protected railroads, are now under submission to the full Commission and a decision should be reached thereon by July or August 1967, we are advised by counsel. This short time would have little effect upon the ultimate consummation of the merger — which has been in the making for some 10 years now — and if it resulted in the future of the protected railroads being finally decided, serious losses to them would be obviated. Furthermore, there would .be no occasion for the conditions of Appendix G to be imposed and hearing and decision on this highly controversial matter would not be necessary insofar as the three protected railroads are concerned. Finally, such action would provide the solution to the problem of the necessary and indispensable protection to . the three railroads that the Commission found prerequisite to the merger. Furthermore, the serious charge that the conditions of Appendix G were imposed without notice and hearing would in a large part be dissipated by this course of action. As to the three protected roads it would be entirely obviated if and when their fate is determined. As to the other railroads affected, the Commission could more quickly conclude its present hearing and make a decision as to the effect of the merger upon them and the protection, if any, required. This disposition is also buttressed by the fact that should the immediate consummation of the merger be permitted and at a later date neither the interim conditions nor the inclusion proceedings be disposed of favorably to the continued existence of the merger, the only remedy remaining would be to set it aside and unscramble the - consolidation. It is said that this does not follow since only the indemnity terms are at issue and they involve only money. This is blinking at reality. The fact is that traffic, trackage, terminals, etc., as well as financial and corporate structures can and will, beyond doubt, be quickly combined, changed, abandoned, or consolidated. The only condition now imposed for the maintenance of the status quo is the provision against any change of routes, traffic, rates, etc., as to business in which the three protected roads participate. They are comparatively small lines located for the most part in northeastern coastal States and would, percentagewise, be a small part of the total routes, trafile, rates, etc., of the whole Penn-Central system. There would be no restriction as to other routes, traffic, rates, etc., as well as all other operations of the merged company, including terminals, warehouses, etc., financial and corporate structures. The plan that the Penn-Central proposes to follow, as we have briefly sketched it, indicates not only major changes but quick action. Our experience with other mergers, and common sense as well, indicate that the “scrambling” goes fast but the unscrambling is interminable and seldom .effectively accomplished. The Penn-Central merger has been studied for a decade.. Indeed, the parties to the merger agreed to it over five years ago and it has been under Commission consideration ever since that time. This is, of course, the more reason for expedition. We note and give weight . to the estimates of the Commission that the inclusion proceedings of the three roads in the N & W should be concluded in “a relatively short time.” Our remand should, therefore, entail only a1 very short delay before the Commission. If its order is attacked in court the hearing there can be expedited, as was this one, and an early determination made. We do not believe that this is too high a price to pay to make as certain as human ingenuity can devise, a just and reasonable disposition of this matter for all of the parties. After all, it is the largest railroad merger in our history and if not handled properly could seriously disrupt and irreparably injure the. entire railroad system in the northeastern section of the country — to the great detriment not only of the parties here but to the public conveniénce and necessity of the entire Nation. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions that it be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. ⅛ so or<¡ered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. Appendix G. Provisions for the Protection of E-L, D & H, and B <fc M. 1. Pending final determination of the petitions for inclusion filed by E-L, D & H, and B & M in this proceeding and in Finance Docket No. 21510 et al., or such other period of time as the Commission may prescribe, herein- ' after called the protective period, and on traffic for which E-L, D & H and.B & M are competitive factors, the . merged company shall not publish or provide for any new or changed routing practice and/or freight rates or services, either locally or jointly with other carriers, which would divert or tend to divert traffic from routes in which E-L, D & H or B & M, now participates, or participated at the time this merger application was filed, or take any action or engage in any practice or conduct contrary to the purpose and general objectives of this condition as explained in this report. For the purpose of illustrating — but in no way limiting — the application Of this condition, .the following specific provisions are prescribed: A. During the protective period, and as to the described trafile, the railroads which shall make up the merged system will be considered separate railroads, as they now are, for the purposes of establishing new routes or rates or privileges and changes in present routes, rates or privileges. B. When any of the described freight traffic is delivered to carriers of the merged system, it shall be allocated among the routes of the system in accordance with practices employed by the system’s railroads at the time this merger application was filed. C. Where through routes and joint rates are now in existence via any component railroad of the merged system and E-L, D & H or B & M, the participation therein of such components shall be maintained during the protective period with the same vigor as such components have heretofore exercised in competition with each other and other carriers, to the end of preventing noticeable diversion from such routes to any other route in which the merged company participates. D. The merged company for the protective period shall , agree to joint rates and. divisions thereof on its freight traffic interlined with E-L, D & H or B & M under terms no less advantageous to E-L, D & H and B & M than are the terms which those three carriers now have with the component carriers of the merged system, and, in the event of any changes in such joint rates, the divisions shall not be changed in any manner which will result in E-L, D & H or B & M receiving proportionally less than they now receive on joint rates with such component carriers. E. In conjunction with E-L, D & H and B & M, the merged company shall, during the protective period, keep open all routes now in force for the transportation of freight over the lines of the three companies and the component carriers of the merged system; shall maintain thereon service equal to or better than that being given on the date this merger application was filed; shall improve such- service, to the extent • within its power, at least as necessary to make the said through routes fully competitive with other routes in which, the merged company participates; and, where joint rates are now in effect or were in effect when this merger application was filed, it shall maintain such rates; and where change in those rates becomes appropriate, changes shall conform to the requirement of provision D above. 2. The term “competitive factor” shall be construed to mean that at the date of this order or at the time this merger application was filed, E-L, D & H or B & M was both participating in the- particular route, rate or service and was handling traffic thereon. 3. E-L, D & H and B & M shall be indemnified by the merged company under the circumstances and according to, the plan specified, in the report, supra. ' 4. This appendix constitutes a plan for protection against the effects of the applicants’ merger and does not apply to loss caused by: (a) hostile or warlike action by (1) any government or sovereign power (de jure or de facto) or (2) military, naval or air forces; (b) insurrection, rebellion, civil war, et cetera; (c) national disaster; (d) economic depression; (e) strikes; (f) act of God; or (g) other similar state of affairs. 5. The interpretation, application and enforcement of the conditions in this appendix shall be governed exclusively by the following provisions: A; All controversies arising under this appendix shall be determined with finality by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the manner indicated below. B.' (1) Except as to section 3, supra, whenever E-L, D & H or B & M considers that these protective conditions are being violated, or that a violation will result from the effectuation of a tariff publication in which the merged company participates, they may (individually or collectively) file a complaint with the Commission, Board of Suspension, and with the merged company, specifying the rate, route, practice, privilege, or such matters constituting the alleged violation and setting forth in .a statement verified by an appropriate official of the complainant all the data giving rise to the complaint. (2) In the event the Board of Suspension shall determine that, as to the matter complained of, E-L, D & H or B & M is a competitive factor (as defined in these conditions), it shall in the case of a tariff publication not yet effective, suspend the tariff forthwith for, the protective period (as defined in these conditions), and shall conduct an investigation into the matter complained of; and if the alleged violation is found not to exist, the Board shall thereupon order the suspension removed; and, in all matters not involving a tariff not yet in effect, the Board shall investigate the matters complained of; and, if in any investigation, it finds that these protective conditions are being violated, it shall order the cancellation of the violative tariff provisions or, where a tariff is not involved, the termination of the violative conduct. Orders of the Board shall have force and effect as orders of this, Commission and shall be enforced as such. C. All controversies arising under section 3 above, shall be determined by the Commission, Finance Board No. 2. Complaints, verified by an appropriate officer of the complainant, shall be addressed to such Board and the merged company, specifying both the basis of the complaint and the relief sought. D. (1) All determinations as to whether E-L, D & H or B & M is a competitive factor shall be made within 10 days after a complaint is filed; and final decisions as to issues raised by a complaint shall be rendered within 90 days after the complaint is filed. (2) Appeal shall lie to the Commission, division 2, from orders of the Board of Suspension; and to the Commission, division 3, from orders of Finance Board No. 2. (3) Special rules for proceeding before the Boards and appealing therefrom shall be promulgated by this Commission at a future time. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, an agreement pertaining to the interests of E-L, D & H and/or B & M may be hereinafter entered by the merged company and the protected-carriers, or any of them, which shall supersede the protection provided by such sections to the extent the agreement does not violate the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act or the Commission’s rules and regulations thereunder. 7. In the event applicants fail to accede to the above-named conditions, consummation of the proposed merger will be deferred for 2 years or such time as the Commission may determine to be necessary to protect the interests of D & H, B & M and E-L. 8. These conditions shall be construed, administered and-enforced with the view to protecting the E-L, D & H, and B & M and the shipping public which depends upon them for transportation, against the effects of the merger for the period and purposes set forth above. 9. These conditions are to be applied in addition to the standard conditions set out in appendix I hereof. “Competitive factor” was defined as any particular route, rate, or service on which any of the “protected railroads” were handling traffic at the time the merger application was filed or at the date of the order.. We ineludé it in this discussion since the Commission intends to include it in the PennTCentral system as soon as terms and conditions are agreed to.or fixed. In the matter of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company — Debtor, No. 30226 U. S. D. C. Conn. This- proceeding involved the merger of the Nickel Plate. E-L sought inclusion in this proceeding along with B & M-and D & H. After E-L had withdrawn its application the. Commission found that the merger “should have no harmful effects” on B & M and D & H. The Commission retained jurisdiction for five years to permit E-L, B & M and D & H to again petition for inclusion. See, .324 -I, C. C. 1, 19-31. Each of the roads so petitioned and it is this, inclusion proceeding that is how before the Commission. Among these, CNJ claims it has. been deprived of a hearing on the effect on it of the inclusion of the NH in the Penh-Central merger. As the Commission points out, however, the terms and conditions of the NH’s inclusion are subject to further proceedings and the Commission has specifically given to CNJ leave “to seek protection for. [its] traffic and gateways,” at that time. 327 I. C. C., at 527. Moreover, CNJ also says, it has not been afforded a hearing on its claim that the merger will also deprive it of important overhead coal traffic now delivered by CNJ to D & H at Wilkes-Barre, Pa. This might be lost, it alleges, because of the direct connection between D & H and N & W which will be available over the track-age rights that Penn-Central is being required to grant D & H. We know nothing of the merits of these claims and, of course, indicate no decision thereon. However, we assume that the Commission will in each instance afford the CNJ an opportunity to be heard concerning them. 327 I. C. C. 475, 561.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HARRAH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al. v. MARTIN No. 78-443. Decided February 26, 1979 Pee Curiam. Respondent Martin was employed as a teacher by petitioner School District under a contract that incorporated by reference the School Board’s rules and regulations. Because respondent was tenured, Oklahoma law required the School Board to renew her contract annually unless she was guilty of, among other things, “wilful neglect of duty.” Okla. Stat., Tit. 70, § 6-122 (Supp. 1976) (repealed 1977). The same Oklahoma statute provided for hearing and appeal procedures in the event of nonrenewal. One of the regulations incorporated into respondent’s contract required teachers holding only a bachelor’s degree to earn five semester hours of college credit every three years. Under the terms of the regulation, noncompliance with the continuing-education requirement was sanctioned by withholding salary increases. Respondent, hired in 1969, persistently refused to comply with the continuing-education requirement and consequently forfeited the increases in salary to which she would have otherwise been entitled during the 1972-1974 school years. After her contract had been renewed for the 1973-1974 school term, however, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a law mandating certain salary raises for teachers regardless of their compliance with the continuing-education policy. The School Board, thus deprived of the sanction which it had previously employed to enforce the provision, notified respondent that her contract would not be renewed for the 1974 — 1975 school year unless she completed five semester hours by April 10, 1974. Respondent nonetheless declined even to enroll in the necessary courses and, appearing before the Board in January 1974, indicated that she had no intention of complying with the requirement in her contract. Finding her persistent noncompliance with the continuing-education requirement “wilful neglect of duty,” the Board voted at its April 1974 meeting not to renew her contract for the following school year. After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative and judicial relief in the Oklahoma state courts, respondent brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. She claimed that the Board’s action had denied her liberty and property without due process of law and equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The District Court dismissed her complaint; it refused to assert “pendent jurisdiction” over respondent’s state-law claim that her refusal to comply with the continuing-education provision in her contract did not constitute “wilful neglect of duty” within the meaning of the Oklahoma tenure statute, and it concluded upon the stipulated evidence that the Board had not violated the Fourteenth Amendment in refusing to renew her contract. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 579 F. 2d 1192 (1978). Following its own precedent of Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 530 F. 2d 1335 (1976), the Court of Appeals determined that respondent had no protected “liberty” interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, but nonetheless held that under an amalgam of the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment she had a constitutional right to retain her employment as a teacher. The Board’s “arbitrary and capricious” action, concluded the Court of Appeals, “violated Fourteenth Amendment notions of fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause generally and the Equal Protection Clause particularly.” 579 F. 2d 1192, 1200 (1978). While our decisions construing the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment do not form a checkerboard of bright lines between black squares and red squares, neither do they leave courts, and parties litigating federal constitutional claims in them, quite as much at sea as the Court of Appeals apparently thought was the case. It is true, as that court observed, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not only accords procedural safeguards to protected interests, but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against impermissible governmental restrictions. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U. S. 238, 244 (1976). But our cases supply an analytical framework for determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a person in the position of respondent have been violated. Employing that framework here, we conclude that the Court of Appeals’ judgment should be reversed. The School District has conceded at all times that respondent was a “tenured” teacher under Oklahoma law, and therefore could be dismissed only for specified reasons. She was accorded the usual elements of procedural due process. Shortly after the Board’s April 1974 meeting, she was advised of the decision not to renew her contract and of her right to a hearing before the Board. At respondent’s request, a hearing was held at which both she and her attorney appeared and unsuccessfully contested the Board’s determination that her refusal to enroll in the continuing-education courses constituted “wilful neglect of duty.” Thus, as the Court of Appeals recognized, respondent has no colorable claim of a denial of procedural due process. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 599-603 (1972). If respondent is to succeed in her claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be on the basis of either “substantive” due process or equal protection. Relying on the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the “substantive aspects” of “life, liberty, and property,” the Court of Appeals held, apparently, that the School Board’s decision to substitute the sanction of contract nonrenewal for the sanction of withholding routine pay increases was so “arbitrary” that it offended “notions of fairness” generally embodied in the Due Process Clause. Here, however, there is no claim that the interest entitled to protection as a matter of substantive due process was anything resembling “the individual’s freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family life.” Kelley v. Johnson, supra, at 244; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). Rather, respondent’s claim is simply that she, as a tenured teacher, cannot be discharged under the School Board’s purely prospective rule establishing contract nonre-newal as the sanction for violations of the continuing-education requirement incorporated into her contract. The School Board’s rule is endowed with a presumption of legislative validity, and the burden is on respondent to show that there is no rational connection between the Board’s action and its conceded interest in providing its students with competent, well-trained teachers. See Kelley v. Johnson, supra, at 247; Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 168-170 (1944); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973). Respondent’s claim that the Board acted arbitrarily in imposing a new penalty for noncompliance with the continuing-education requirement simply does not square with the facts. By making pay raises mandatory, the state legislature deprived the Board of the sanction that it had earlier used to enforce its teachers’ contractual obligation to earn continuing-education credits. The Board thus turned to contract nonre-newal, but applied this sanction purely prospectively so that those who might have relied on its past practice would nonetheless have an opportunity to bring themselves into compliance with the terms of their contracts. Indeed, of the four teachers in violation of the continuing-education requirement when the state legislature mandated salary increases, only respondent persisted in refusing to enroll in the necessary courses. Such a course of conduct on the part of a school board responsible for the public education of students within its jurisdiction, and employing teachers to perform the principal portion of that task, can scarcely be described as arbitrary. Respondent’s claim of a denial of substantive due process under these circumstances is wholly untenable. The Court of Appeals’ reliance upon the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment was likewise mistaken. Since respondent neither asserted nor established the existence of any suspect classification or the deprivation of any fundamental constitutional right, see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 40 (1973), the only inquiry is whether the State’s classification is “rationally related to the State’s objective.” Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 315 (1976). The most cursory examination of the agreed facts demonstrates that the Board’s action met this test. The School District’s concern with the educational qualifications of its teachers cannot under any reasoned analysis be described as impermissible, and respondent does not contend that the Board’s continuing-education requirement bears no rational relationship to that legitimate governmental concern. Rather, respondent contests “the permissibility of the classification by which [she] and three other teachers were required to achieve [by April 1974] the number of continuing-education credits that all other teachers were given three years to achieve.” Brief in Opposition 7. The Board’s objective in sanctioning violations of the continuing-education requirement was, obviously, to encourage future compliance with the requirement. Admittedly, imposition of a penalty for noncompliance placed respondent and three other teachers in a “class” different from those teachers who had complied with their contractual obligations in the past. But any sanction designed to enforce compliance with a valid rule, whatever its source, falls only on those who break the rule. Respondent and those in her “class” were the only teachers immediately affected by the Board’s action because they were the only teachers who had previously broken their contractual obligation. There is no suggestion here that the Board enforces the continuing-education requirement selectively; the Board refuses to renew the contracts of those teachers and only those teachers who refuse to comply with the continuing-education requirement. That the Board was forced by the state legislature in 1974 to penalize noncompliance differently than it had in the past in no way alters the equal protection analysis of respondent’s claim. Like all teachers employed in the School District, respondent was given three years to earn five continuing-education credits. Unlike most of her colleagues, however, respondent refused to comply with the requirement, thus forfeiting her right to routine pay raises. Had the legislature not mandated salary increases in 1974, the Board presumably would have penalized respondent’s continued refusal to comply with the terms of her contract by denying her an increase in salary for yet another year. The Board, having been deprived by the legislature of the sanction previously employed to enforce the continuing-education requirement, merely substituted in its place another, albeit more onerous, sanction. The classification created by both sanctions, however, was between those who had acquired five continuing-education credits within the allotted time and those who had not. At bottom, respondent’s position is that she is willing to forgo routine pay raises, but she is not willing to comply with the continuing-education requirement or to give up her job. The constitutional permissibility of a sanction imposed to enforce a valid governmental rule, however, is not tested by the willingness of those governed by the rule to accept the consequences of noncompliance. The sanction of contract nonrenewal is quite rationally related to the Board’s objective of enforcing the continuing-education obligation of its teachers. Respondent was not, therefore, deprived of equal protection of the laws. The petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Mr. Justice Marshall concurs in the result.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KENT et al. v. DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE. No. 481. Argued April 10, 1958. Decided June 16, 1958. Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Victor Rabinowitz and David Rein. Daniel G. Marshall was also on the brief for Briehl, petitioner. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Doub, Samuel D. Slade and B. Jenkins Middleton. Osmond K. Fraenkel and William J. Butler filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion- of the Court. This case concerns two applications for passports, denied by the Secretary of State. One was by Rockwell Kent who desired to visit England and attend a meeting of an organization known as the “World Council of Peace” in Helsinki, Finland. The Director of the Passport Office informed Kent that issuance of a passport was precluded by § 51.135 of the Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State on two grounds: (1) that he was a Communist and (2) that he had had “a consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line.” The letter of denial specified in some detail the facts on which those conclusions were based. Kent was also advised of his right to an informal hearing under § 51.137 of the Regulations. But he was also told that whether or not a hearing was requested it would be necessary, before a. passport would be issued, to submit an affidavit as to whether he was then or ever had been a Communist. Kent did not ask for a hearing but filed a new passport application listing several European countries he desired to visit. When advised that a hearing was still available to him, his attorney replied that Kent took the position that the requirement of an affidavit concerning Communist Party membership “is unlawful and that for that reason and as a matter of conscience,” he would not supply one. He did, however, have a hearing at which the principal evidence against him was from his book It's Me 0 Lord, which Kent agreed was accurate. He again refused to submit the affidavit, maintaining that any matters unrelated to the question of his citizenship were irrelevant to the Department’s consideration of his application. The Department advised him that no further consideration of his application would be given until he satisfied the requirements of the Regulations. Thereupon Kent sued in the District Court for declaratory relief. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondent. On appeal the case of Kent was heard with that of Dr. Walter Briehl, a psychiatrist. When Briehl applied for a passport, the Director of the Passport Office asked him to supply the affidavit covering membership in the- Communist Party. Briehl, like Kent, refused. The1 Director- then tentatively disapproved the application on the following grounds: “In your case it has been alleged that you were a Communist. Specifically it is alleged that you were a member of the Los Angeles County Communist Party; that you were a member of the Bookshop Association, St. Louis, Missouri; that you held Communist Party meetings; that in 1936 and 1941 you contributed articles to the Communist Publication ‘Social Work Today’; that in 1939, 1940 and 1941 you were a sponsor to raise funds for veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in calling on the President of the United States by a petition to defend the rights of the Communist Party and its members; that you contributed to the Civil Rights Congress bail fund to be used in raising bail on behalf of convicted Communist leaders in New York City; that you were a member of the Hollywood Arts, Sciences and Professions Council and a contact of the Los Angeles Committee for Protection of Foreign Born and a contact of the Freedom Stage, Incorporated.” The Director advised Briehl of his right to a hearing but stated that whether or not a hearing was held, an affidavit concerning membership in the Communist Party would be necessary. Briehl asked for a hearing and one was held. At that hearing he raised three objections: (1) that his “political affiliations” were irrelevant to his right to a passport; (2) that “every American citizen has the right to travel regardless of politics”; and (3) that the burden was on the Department to prove illegal activities by Briehl. Briehl persisted in his refusal to supply the affidavit. Because of that refusal Briehl was advised that the Board of Passport Appeals could not under the Regulations entertain an appeal. Briehl filed his complaint in the District Court which held that his case was indistinguishable from Kent’s and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals heard the two cases en banc and affirmed the District Court by a divided vote. 101 U. S. App. D. C. 278, 239, 248 F. 2d 600, 561. The cases are here on writ of certiorari. 355 U. S. 881. The Court first noted the function that the passport performed in American law in the case of Urtetiqui v. D’Arbel, 9 Pet. 692, 699, decided in 1835: “There is no law of the United States, in any manner regulating the issuing of passports, or directing upon what evidence it may be done, or declaring their legal effect. It is understood, as matter of practice, that some evidence of citizenship is required, by the secretary of state, before issuing a passport. This, however, is entirely discretionary with him. No inquiry is instituted by him to ascertain the fact of citizenship, or any proceedings had, that will in any manner bear the character of a judicial inquiry. It is a document, which, from its nature and object, is addressed to foreign powers; purporting only to be a request, that the bearer of it may pass safely and freely; and is to be considered rather in the character of a political document, by which the bearer is recognized, in foreign countries, as an American citizen; and which, by usage and the law of nations, is received as evidence of the fact.” A passport not only is of great value — indeed necessary — abroad; it is also an aid in establishing citizenship for purposes of re-entry into the United States. See Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339; 3 Moore, Digest of International Law (1906), § 512. But throughout most of our history- — -until indeed quite recently — a passport, though a great convenience in foreign travel, was not a legal requirement for leaving or entering the United States. See Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 Foreign Affairs 17. Apart from minor exceptions to be noted, it was first made a requirement by § 215 of the Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U. S. C. § 1185, which states that, after a prescribed proclamation by the President, it is “unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport.” And the Proclamation necessary to make the restrictions of this Act applicable and in force has been made/ Prior to 1952 there were numerous laws enacted by Congress regulating passports and many decisions, rulings, and regulations by the Executive Department concerning them. Thus in 1803 Congress made it unlawful for an official knowingly to issue a passport to an alien certifying that he is a citizen. 2 Stat. 205. In 1815, just prior to the termination of the War of 1812, it made it illegal for a citizen to “cross the frontier” into enemy territory, to board vessels of the enemy on waters of the United States or to visit any of his camps within the limits of the United States, “without a passport first obtained” from the Secretary of State or other designated official. 3 Stat. 199-200. The Secretary of State took similar steps during the Civil War. See Dept, of State, The American Passport (1898), 50. In 1850 Congress ratified a treaty with Switzerland requiring passports from citizens of the two nations. 11 Stat. 587, 589-590. Finally in 1856 Congress enacted what remains today as our basic passport statute. Prior to that time various federal officials, state and local officials, and notaries public had undertaken to issue either certificates of citizenship or other documents in the nature of letters of introduction to foreign officials requesting treatment according to the usages of international law. By the Act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 52, 60-61, 22 U. S. C. .§ 211a, Congress put an end to those practices. This provision, as codified by the Act of July 3, 1926, 44 Stat., Part 2, 887, reads, “The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports.” Thus for most of our history a passport was not a condition to entry or exit. It is true that, at intervals, a passport has been required for travel. Mention has already been made of the restrictions imposed during the War of 1812 and during the Civil War. A like restriction, which was the forerunner of that contained in the 1952 Act, was imposed by Congress in 1918. The Act of May 22,1918,40 Stat. 559, made it unlawful, while a Presidential Proclamation was in force, for a citizen to leave or enter the United States “unless he bears a valid passport.” See H. R. Rep. No. 485, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. That statute was invoked by Presidential Proclamation No. 1473 on August 8,1918, 40 Stat. 1829, which continued in effect until March 3, 1921. 41 Stat. 1359. The 1918 Act was effective only in wartime. It was amended in 1941 so that it could be invoked in the then-existing emergency. 55 Stat. 252. See S. Rep. No. 444, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. It was invoked by Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, November 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1696. That emergency continued until April 28, 1952. Proc. No. 2974, 66 Stat. C31. Congress extended the statutory provisions until April 1, 1953. 66 Stat. 54, 57, 96, 137, 330, 333. It was during this extension period that the Secretary of State issued the Regulations here complained of. Under the 1926 Act and its predecessor a large body of precedents grew up which repeat over and again that the issuance of passports is “a discretionary act” on the part of the Secretary of State. The scholars, the courts, the Chief Executive, and the Attorneys General, all so said. This long-continued executive construction should be enough, it is said, to warrant the inference that Congress had adopted it. See Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535, 544-545; United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 352 U. S. 306, 310. But the key to that problem, as we shall see, is in the manner in which the Secretary’s discretion was exercised, not in the bare fact that he had discretion. The right to travel is a part of the “liberty” of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. So much is conceded by the Solicitor General. In Anglo-Saxon law that right was emerging at least as early as the Magna Carta. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787 (1956), 171-181, 187 et seq., shows how deeply engrained in our history this freedom of movement is. Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values. See Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 44; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274; Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160. “Our nation,” wrote Chafee, “has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.” Id., at 197. Freedom of movement also has large social values. As Chafee put it: “Foreign correspondents and lecturers on public affairs need first-hand information. Scientists and scholars gain greatly from consultations with colleagues in other countries. Students equip themselves for more fruitful careers in the United States by instruction in foreign universities. Then there are reasons close to the core of personal life — marriage, reuniting families, spending hours with old friends. Finally, travel abroad enables American citizens to understand that people like themselves live in Europe and helps them to be well-informed on public issues. An American who has crossed the ocean is not obliged to form his opinions about our foreign policy merely from what he is told by officials of our government or by a few correspondents of American newspapers. Moreover, his views on domestic questions are enriched by seeing how foreigners are trying to solve similar problems. In many different ways direct contact with other countries contributes to sounder decisions at home.” Id., at 195-196. And see Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 6, 13-14. Freedom to travel is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen's “liberty.” We need not decide the extent to which it can be curtailed. We are first concerned with the extent, if any, to which Congress has authorized its curtailment. The difficulty is that while the power of the Secretary of State over the issuance of passports is expressed in broad terms, it was apparently long exercised quite narrowly. So far as material here, the cases of refusal of passports generally fell into two categories. First, questions pertinent to the citizenship of the applicant and his allegiance to the United States had to be resolved by the Secretary, for the command of Congress was that “No passport shall be granted or issued to or verified for any other persons than those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United States.” 32 Stat. 386, 22 U. S. C. § 212. Second, was the question whether the applicant was participating in illegal conduct, trying to escape the toils of the law, promoting passport frauds, or otherwise engaging in conduct which would violate the laws of the United States. See 3 Moore, Digest of International Law (1906), § 512; 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1942), § 268; 2 Hyde, International Law (2d rev. ed.), § 401. The grounds for refusal asserted here do not relate to citizenship or allegiance on the one hand or to criminal or unlawful conduct on the other. Yet, so far as relevant here, those two are the only ones which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice. One can find in the records of the State Department rulings of subordinates covering a wider range of activities than the two indicated. But as respects Communists these are scattered rulings and not consistently of one pattern. We can say with assurance that whatever may have been the practice after 1926, at the time the Act of July 3, 1926, was adopted, the administrative practice, so far as relevant here, had jelled only around the two categories mentioned. We, therefore, hesitate to impute to Congress, when in 1952 it made a passport necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State, a purpose to give him unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose. More restrictive regulations were applied in 1918 and in 1941 as war measures. We are not compelled to equate this present problem of statutory construction with problems that may arise under the war power. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579. In a case of comparable magnitude, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 218, we allowed the Government in time of war to exclude citizens from their homes and restrict their freedom of movement only on a showing of “the gravest imminent danger to the public safety.” There the Congress and the Chief Executive moved in coordinated action; and, as we said, the Nation was then at war. No such condition presently exists. No such showing of extremity, no such showing of joint action by the Chief Executive and the Congress to curtail a constitutional right of the citizen has been made here. Since we start with an exercise by an American citizen of an activity included in constitutional protection, we will not readily infer that Congress gave the Secretary of State unbridled discretion to grant or withhold it. If we were dealing with political questions entrusted to the Chief Executive by the Constitution we would have a different case. But there is more involved here. In part, of course, the issuance of the passport carries some implication of intention to extend the bearer diplomatic protection, though it does no more than “request all whom it may concern to permit safely and freely to pass, and in case of need to give all lawful aid and protection” to this citizen of the United States. But that function of the passport is subordinate. Its crucial function today is control over exit. And, as we have seen, the right of exit is a personal right included within the word “liberty” as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that’ “liberty” is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra. And if that power is delegated, the standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 420-430. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 271. Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 301-302. Cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146, 156; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 46. We hesitate to find in this broad generalized power an authority to trench so heavily on the rights of the citizen. Thus we do not reach the question of constitutionality. We only conclude that § 1185 and § 211a do not delegate to the Secretary the kind of authority exercised here. We deal with beliefs, with associations, with ideological matters. We must remember that we are dealing here with citizens who have neither been accused of crimes nor found guilty. They are being denied their freedom of movement solely because of their refusal to be subjected to inquiry into their beliefs and associations. They do not seek to escape the law nor to violate it. They may or may not be Communists. But assuming they are, the only law which Congress has passed expressly curtailing the movement of Communists across our borders has not yet become effective. It would therefore be strange to infer that pending the effectiveness of that law, the Secretary has been silently granted by Congress the larger, the more pervasive power to curtail in his discretion the free movement of citizens in order to satisfy himself about their beliefs or associations. To repeat, we deal here with a constitutional right of the citizen, a right which we must assume Congress will be faithful to respect. We would be faced with important constitutional questions were we to hold that Congress by § 1185 and § 211a had given the Secretary authority to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or associations. Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms; and absent one, the Secretary may not employ that standard to restrict the citizens’ right of free movement. Reversed. 22 CFR §51.135 provides: “In order to promote the national interest by assuring that persons who support the world Communist movement of which the Communist Party is an integral unit may not, through use of United States passports, further the purposes of that movement, no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate return to the United States, shall be issued to: “(a) Persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have recently terminated such membership under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion — not otherwise rebutted by the evidence — that they continue to act in furtherance of the interests and under the discipline of the Communist Party; “ (b) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the Communist Party, who engage in activities which support the Communist movement under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion — not otherwise rebutted by the evidence — that they have engaged in such activities as a result of direction, domination, or control exercised over them by the Communist movement; “(c) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the Communist Party, as to whom there is reason to believe, on the balance of all the evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in activities which will advance the Communist movement for the purpose, knowingly and wilfully of advancing that movement.” Section 51.142 of the Regulations provides: “At any stage of the proceedings in the Passport Division or before the Board, if it is deemed necessary, the applicant may be required, as a part of his application, to subscribe, under oath or affirmation, to a statement with respect to present or past membership in the Communist Party. If applicant states that he is a Communist, refusal of a passport in his case will be without further proceedings.” Sections 2 and 6 of the Act of September 23, 1950, known as the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 993, 50 U. S. C. §§ 781, 785, provide that it shall be unlawful, when a Communist organization is registered under the Act or when “there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring an organization to register,” for any member having knowledge of such registry and order to apply for a passport or for any official to issue him one. But the conditions precedent have not yet materialized. That section provides in relevant part: “(a) When the United States is at war or during the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President, . . . and the President shall find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions in addition to those provided otherwise than by this section be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclamation thereof, it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or the Congress, be unlawful— “(1) for any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe; “(3) for any person knowingly to make any false statement in an application for permission to depart from or enter the United States with intent to induce or secure the granting of such permission either for himself or for another; “(b) After such proclamation as is provided for in subsection (a) has been made and published and while such proclamation is in force, it shall, except as otherwise provided by the President, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport.” Proc. No. 3004, 67 Stat. C31. See 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 350, 352. Dept. Reg. No. 108.162, effective August 28, 1952, 17 Fed. Reg. 8013. See 2 Hyde, International Law (2d rev. ed. 1945), §399; 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1942), §268. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 350. Exec. Order No. 654, June 13, 1907; id., No. 2119-A, Jan. 12, 1915; id., No. 2286-A, Dec. 17, 1915; id., No. 2362-A, Apr. 17, 1916; id., No. 2519-A, Jan. 24, 1917; id., No. 4382-A, Feb. 12, 1926; id., No. 4800, Jan. 31, 1928; id., No. 5860, June 22, 1932; id., No. 7856, Mar. 31, 1938, 3 Fed. Reg. 681, 22 CFR § 51.75. The present provision is that last listed and reads in part as follows: “The Secretary of State is authorized in his discretion to refuse to issue a passport, to restrict a passport for use only in certain countries, to restrict it against use in certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, and to withdraw a passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain countries.” The Department, however, did not feel that the Secretary of State could exercise his discretion willfully without cause. Acting Secretary Wilson wrote on April 27, 1907, "The issuance of passports is a discretionary act on the part of the Secretary of State, and he may, for reasons deemed by him to be sufficient, direct the refusal of a passport to an American citizen; but a passport is not to be refused to an American citizen, even if his character is doubtful, unless there is reason to believe that he will put the passports to an improper or unlawful use.” Foreign Relations of the United States, Pt. II (1910), 1083. See 3 Moore, Digest of International Law (1906), § 512. Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property (1928), 97, states . .in practice it is clear that the Department of State acts upon the theory that it must grant the passport unless there is some circumstance making it a duty to refuse it. Any other attitude would indeed be intolerable; it would mean an executive power of a political character over individuals quite out of harmony with traditional American legislative practice.” 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 89, 92; 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 509, 511. Article 42 reads as follows: “It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said above.” And see Jaffe, op. cit. supra, 19-20; Sibley, The Passport System, 7 J. Soc. Comp. Leg. (N. S.) 26, 32-33; 1 Blaclcstone Commentaries 134-135. The use of foreign travel to promote educational interests is reviewed by Francis J. Colligan in 30 Dept. State Bull. 663. See note 3, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al. v. MORENO et al. No. 72-534. Argued April 23, 1973 — Decided June 25, 1973 BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 538. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 545. A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wood, Walter H. Fleischer, and William Kanter. Ronald F. Pollack argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Roger A. Schwartz. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to consider the constitutionality of § 3 (e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U. S. C. § 2012 (e), as amended in 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, which, with certain exceptions, excludes from participation in the food stamp program any household containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of the household. In practical effect, § 3 (e) creates two classes of persons for food stamp purposes: one class is composed of those individuals who live in households all of whose members are related to one another, and the other class consists of those individuals who live in households containing one or more members who are unrelated to the rest. The latter class of persons is denied federal food assistance. A three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia held this classification invalid as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 345 F. Supp. 310 (1972). We noted probable jurisdiction. 409 U. S. 1036 (1972). We affirm. I The federal food stamp program was established in 1964 in an effort to alleviate hunger and malnutrition among the more needy segments of our society. 7 U. S. C. § 2011. Eligibility for participation in the program is determined on a household rather than an individual basis. 7 CFR §271.3 (a). An eligible household purchases sufficient food stamps to provide that household with a nutritionally adequate diet. The household pays for the stamps at a reduced rate based upon its size and cumulative income. The food stamps are then used to purchase food at retail stores, and the Government redeems the stamps at face value, thereby paying the difference between the actual cost of the food and the amount paid by the household for the stamps. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013 (a), 2016, 2025 (a). As initially enacted, § 3 (e) defined a “household” as “a group of related or non-related individuals, who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common.” In January 1971, however, Congress redefined the term “household” so as to include only groups of related individuals. Pursuant to this amendment, the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated regulations rendering ineligible for participation in the program any “household” whose members are not “all related to each other.” Appellees in this case consist of several groups of individuals who allege that, although they satisfy the income eligibility requirements for federal food assistance, they have nevertheless been excluded from the program solely because the persons in each group are not “all related to each other.” Appellee Jacinta Moreno, for example, is a 56-year-old diabetic who lives with Ermina Sanchez and the latter's three children. They share common living expenses, and Mrs. Sanchez helps to care for appellee. Appellee’s monthly income, derived from public assistance, is $75; Mrs. Sanchez receives $133 per month from public assistance. The household pays $135 per month for rent, gas, and electricity, of which appellee pays $50. Appellee spends $10 per month for transportation to a hospital for regular visits, and $5 per month for laundry. That leaves her $10 per month for food and other necessities. Despite her poverty, appellee has been denied federal food assistance solely because she is unrelated to the other members of her household. Moreover, although Mrs. Sanchez and her three children were permitted to purchase $108 worth of food stamps per month for $18, their participation in the program will be terminated if appellee Moreno continues to live with them. Appellee Sheilah Hejny is married and has three children. Although the Hejnys are indigent, they took in a 20-year-old girl, who is unrelated to them, because “we felt she had emotional problems.” The Hejnys receive $144 worth of food stamps each month for $14. If they allow the 20-year-old girl to continue to live with them, they will be denied food stamps by reason of § 3 (e). Appellee Victoria Keppler has a daughter with an acute hearing deficiency. The daughter requires special instruction in a school for the deaf. The school is located in an area in which appellee could not ordinarily afford to live. Thus, in order to make the most of her limited resources, appellee agreed to share an apartment near the school with a woman who, like appellee, is on public assistance. Since appellee is not related to the woman, appellee’s food stamps have been, and will continue to be, cut off if they continue to live together. These and two other groups of appellees instituted a class action against the Department of Agriculture, its Secretary, and two other departmental officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the 1971 amendment of § 3 (e) and its implementing regulations. In essence, appellees contend, and the District Court held, that the “unrelated person” provision of § 3 (e) creates an irrational classification in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We agree. II Under traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426 (1961). The purposes of the Food Stamp Act were expressly set forth in the congressional “declaration of policy”: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition among low-income households. The Congress hereby finds that the limited food purchasing power of low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of such households. The Congress further finds that increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and will strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of food. To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorized which will permit low-income households to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels of trade.” 7 U. S. C. § 2011. The challenged statutory classification (households of related persons versus households containing one or more unrelated persons) is clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act. As the District Court recognized, “[t]he relationships among persons constituting one economic unit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their abilities to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm surpluses, or with their personal nutritional requirements.” 345 F. Supp., at 313. Thus, if it is to be sustained, the challenged classification must rationally further some legitimate governmental interest other than those specifically stated in the congressional “declaration of policy.” Regrettably, there is little legislative history to illuminate the purposes of the 1971 amendment of § 3 (e). The legislative history that does exist, however, indicates that that amendment was intended to prevent so-called “hippies” and “hippie communes” from participating in the food stamp program. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8; 116 Cong. Rec. 44439 (1970) (Sen. Holland). The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional conception of “equal protection of the laws” means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. As a result, “[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify the 1971 amendment.” 345 F. Supp., at 314 n. 11. Although apparently conceding this point, the Government maintains that the challenged classification should nevertheless be upheld as rationally related to the clearly legitimate governmental interest in minimizing fraud in the administration of the food stamp program. In essence, the Government contends that, in adopting the 1971 amendment, Congress might rationally have thought (1) that households with one or more unrelated members are more likely than “fully related” households to contain individuals who abuse the program by fraudulently failing to report sources of income or by voluntarily remaining poor; and (2) that such households are “relatively unstable,” thereby increasing the difficulty of detecting such abuses. But even if we were to accept as rational the Government’s wholly unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the differences between “related” and “unrelated” households, we still could not agree with the Government’s conclusion that the denial of essential federal food assistance to all otherwise eligible households containing unrelated members constitutes a rational effort to deal with these concerns. At the outset, it is important to note that the Food Stamp Act itself contains provisions, wholly independent of § 3 (e), aimed specifically at the problems of fraud and of the voluntarily poor. For example, with certain exceptions, § 5 (c) of the Act, 7 U. S. C. § 2014 (c), renders ineligible for assistance any household containing “an able-bodied adult person between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five” who fails to register for, and accept, offered employment. Similarly, §§ 14 (b) and (c), 7 U. S. C. §§ 2023 (b) and (c), specifically impose strict criminal penalties upon any individual who obtains or uses food stamps fraudulently. The existence of these provisions necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that the 1971 amendment could rationally have been intended to prevent those very same abuses. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 452 (1972); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 353-354 (1972). Moreover, in practical effect, the challenged classification simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud. As previously noted, § 3 (e) defines an eligible “household” as “a group of related individuals ... [1] living as one economic unit [2] sharing common cooking facilities [and 3] for whom food is customarily purchased in common.” Thus, two unrelated persons living together and meeting all three of these conditions would constitute a single household ineligible for assistance. If financially feasible, however, these same two individuals can legally avoid the “unrelated person” exclusion simply by altering their living arrangements so as to eliminate any one of the three conditions. By so doing, they effectively create two separate “households,” both of which are eligible for assistance. See Knowles v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 228 (ND Cal. 1973). Indeed, as the California Director of Social Welfare has explained: “The ‘related household’ limitations will eliminate many households from eligibility in the Food Stamp Program. It is my understanding that the Congressional intent of the new regulations are specifically aimed at the ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes.’ Most people in this category can and will alter their living arrangements in order to remain eligible for food stamps. However, the AFDC mothers who try to raise their standard of living by sharing housing will be affected. They will not be able to utilize the altered living patterns in order to continue to be eligible without giving up their advantage of shared housing costs.” Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes from participation in the food stamp program, not those persons who are “likely to abuse the program” but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility. Traditional equal protection analysis does not require that every classification be drawn with precise “ 'mathematical nicety.’ ” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485. But the classification here in issue is not only “imprecise,” it is wholly without any rational basis. The judgment of the District Court holding the “unrelated person” provision invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is therefore Affirmed 78Stat. 703 (emphasis added). The act provided further that “[t]he term 'household' shall also mean a single individual living alone who has cooking facilities and who purchases and prepares food for home consumption.” Ibid. 84 Stat. 2048. The 1971 amendment did not affect certain groups of nonrelated individuals over 60 years of age. As amended, § 3 (e) now provides: “The term 'household' shall mean a group of related individuals (including legally adopted children and legally assigned foster children) or non-related individuals over age 60 who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common. The term ‘household’ shall also mean (1) a single individual living alone who has cooking facilities and who purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (2) an elderly person who meets the requirements of section 2019 (h) of this title.” 7 U. S. C. §2012 (e). Title 7 CFR §270.2 (Jj) provides: “(jj) ‘Household’ means a group of persons, excluding roomers, boarders, and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping, or child care reasons, who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, and who are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common: Provided, That: "(1) When all persons in the group are under 60 years of age, they are all related to each other; and “(2) When more than one of the persons in the group is under 60 years of age, and one or more other persons in the group is 60 years of age or older, each of the persons under 60 years of age is related to each other or to at least one of the persons who is 60 years of age or older. “It shall also mean (i) a single individual living alone who purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (ii) an elderly person as defined in this section, and his spouse.” Appellees also argued that the regulations themselves were invalid because beyond the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary by the statute. The District Court rejected that contention, and appellees have not pressed that argument on appeal. Moreover, appellees did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute’s reliance on “households” rather than “individuals” as the basic unit of the food stamp program. We therefore intimate no view on that question. “[W] hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.’ ” Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964); see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 680 n. 5 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 641-642 (1969); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). Indeed, the amendment first materialized, bare of committee consideration, during a conference committee’s consideration of differing House and Senate bills. The Government initially argued to the District Court that the challenged classification might be justified as a means to foster "morality.” In rejecting that contention, the District Court noted that “interpreting the amendment as an attempt to regulate morality would raise serious constitutional questions.” 345 F. Supp. 310, 314. Indeed, citing this Court’s decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), the District Court observed that it was doubtful, at best, whether Congress, “in the name of morality,” could “infringe the rights to privacy and freedom of association in the home.” 345 F. Supp., at 314. (Emphasis in original.) Moreover, the court also pointed out that the classification established in § 3 (e) was not rationally related “to prevailing notions of morality, since it in terms disqualifies all households of unrelated individuals, without reference to whether a particular group contains both sexes.” Id., at 315. The Government itself has now abandoned the “morality” argument. See Brief for Appellants 9. Title 7 U. S. C. §§2023 (b) and (c) provide: "(b) Whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization to purchase cards in any manner not authorized by this [Act] or the regulations issued pursuant to this [Act] shall, if such coupons or authorization to purchase cards are of the value of $100 or more, be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or both, or, if such coupons or authorization to purchase cards are of a value of less than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. “(c) Whoever presents, or causes to be presented, coupons for payment or redemption of the value of $100 or more, knowing the same to have been received, transferred, or used in any manner in violation of the provisions of this [Act] or the regulations issued pursuant to this [Act] shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, or, if such coupons are of a value of less than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.” App. 43.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. SHANKLIN, individually and as next friend of SHANKLIN No. 99-312. Argued March 1, 2000 Decided April 17, 2000 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalxa, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 359. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 360. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were G. Paul Moates, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Everett B. Gibson, and Wiley G. Mitchell, Jr. Gregory S. Coleman, Solicitor General of Texas, argued the cause for the State of Texas et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were John Cornyn, Attorney General of Texas, Andy Taylor, First Assistant Attorney General, and Linda E. Eads, Deputy Attorney General, Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Charlie Condon, Attorney General of South Carolina, and Norman N. Hill. Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Pamela R. O’Dwyer and Brian Wolfman. Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, Michael E. Robinson, Nancy E. McFadden, Paul M. Geier, Dale C. Andrews, Edward V. A. Kussy, and S. Mark Lindsey Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of American Railroads by Daniel Saphire; and for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Kenneth S. Getter and Charles Rothfeld. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of North Carolina et al. by Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Amy R. Gillespie, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Patricia A Madrid of New Mexico, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, and Darrell V McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the Angels on Track Foundation et al. by Robert L. Pottroff; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Dale Haralson; and for the United Transportation Union by Lawrence M. Mann and Clinton Miller III. William C. Hopkins II and David V. Scott filed a brief for Kenneth W. Heathington et al. as amici curiae. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an action for damages against a railroad due to its alleged failure to maintain adequate warning devices at a grade crossing in western Tennessee. After her husband was killed in a crossing accident, respondent brought suit against petitioner, the operator of the train involved in the collision. Respondent claimed that the warning signs posted at the crossing, which had been installed using federal funds, were insufficient to warn motorists of the danger posed by passing trains. The specific issue we must decide is whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 971, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20101 et seq., in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration’s regulation addressing the adequacy of warning devices installed with federal funds, pre-empts state tort actions such as respondent’s. We hold that it does. I A In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.” 49 U. S. C. § 20101. The FRSA grants the Secretary of Transportation the authority to “prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety,” § 20103(a), and directs the Secretary to “maintain a coordinated effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem,” § 20134(a). The FRSA also contains an express pre-emption provision, which states: “Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement.” §20106. Although the pre-emption provision contains an exception, see ibid., it is inapplicable here. Three years after passing the FRSA, Congress enacted the Highway Safety Act of 1973, §203, 87 Stat. 283, which, among other things, created the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program (Crossings Program), see 23 U. S. C. § 130. That program makes funds available to States for the “cost of construction of projects for the elimination of hazards of railway-highway crossings.” § 130(a). To participate in the Crossings Program, all States must “conduct and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify those railroad crossings which may require separation, relocation, or protective devices, and establish and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose.” § 130(d). That schedule must, “[a]t a minimum, . . . provide signs for all railway-highway crossings.” Ibid. The Secretary, through the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), has promulgated several regulations implementing the Crossings Program. One of those regulations, 23 CFR § 646.214(b) (1999), addresses the design of grade crossing improvements. More specifically, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) address the adequacy of warning devices installed under the program. According to § 646.214(b)(3), “[a]de-quate warning devices ,. on any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices are to include automatic gates with flashing light signals” if any of several conditions are present. Those conditions include (A) “[mjultiple main line railroad tracks,” (B) multiple tracks in the vicinity such that one train might “obscure the movement of another train approaching the crossing,” (C) high speed trains combined with limited sight distances, (D) a “combination of high speeds and moderately high volumes of highway and railroad traffic,” (E) the use of the crossing by “substantial numbers of sehoolbuses or trucks carrying hazardous materials,” or (F) when a “diagnostic team recommends them.” § 646.214(b)(3)(i). Subsection (b)(4) states that “[f]or crossings where the requirements of § 646.214(b)(3) are not applicable, the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA.” Thus, at crossings where any of the conditions listed in (b)(3) exist, adequate warning devices, if installed using federal funds, are automatic gates and flashing lights. And where the (b)(3) conditions are not present, the decision of what devices to install is subject to FHWA approval. B Shortly after 5 a.m. on October 3, 1993, Eddie Shanklin drove his truck eastward on Oakwood Church Road in Gibson County, Tennessee. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. As Shanklin crossed the railroad tracks that intersect the road, he was struck and killed by a train operated by petitioner. Ibid. At the time of the accident, the Oakwood Church Road crossing was equipped with advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks, id., at 34a, the familiar black-and-white, X-shaped signs that read “RAILROAD CROSSING,” see U. S. Dept, of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices §8B-2 (1988) (MUTCD). The Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) had installed the signs in 1987 with federal funds received under the Crossings Program. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. The TDOT had requested the funds as part of a project to install such signs at 196 grade crossings in 11 Tennessee counties. See App. 128-131. That request contained information about each crossing covered by the project, including the presence or absence of several of the factors listed in § 646.214(b)(3). See id., at 134. The FHWA approved the project, App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a, and federal funds accounted for 99% of the cost of installing the signs at the crossings, see App. 133. It is undisputed that the signs at the Oakwood Church Road crossing were installed and fully compliant with the federal standards for such devices at the time of the accident. Following the accident, Mr. Shanklin’s widow, respondent Dedra Shanklin, brought this diversity wrongful death action against petitioner in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. Id., at 29-34. Respondent’s claims were based on Tennessee statutory and common law. Id., at 31-33. She alleged that petitioner had been negligent in several respects, including by failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Ibid. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that the FRSA pre-empted respondent’s suit. App. to'Pet. for Cert. 28a. The District Court held that respondent’s allegation that the signs installed at the crossing were inadequate was not preempted. Id., at 29a-37a. Respondent thus presented her inadequate warning device claim and three other allegations of negligence to a jury, which found that petitioner and Mr. Shanklin had both been negligent. App. 47. The jury assigned 70% responsibility to petitioner and 30% to Mr. Shanklin, and it assessed damages of $615,379. Ibid. The District Court accordingly entered judgment of $430,765.30 for respondent. Id., at 48. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FRSA did not pre-empt respondent’s claim that the devices at the crossing were inadequate. 173 F. 3d 386 (1999). It reasoned that federal funding alone is insufficient to trigger pre-emption of state tort actions under the FRSA and §§646.214(b)(3) and (4). Id., at 394. Instead, the railroad must establish that § 646.214(b)(3) or (4) was “applied” to the crossing at issue, meaning that the FHWA affirmatively approved the particular devices installed at the crossing as adequate for safety. Id., at 397. The court concluded that, because the TDOT had installed the signs for the purpose of providing “minimum protection” at the Oakwood Church Road crossing, there had been no such individualized determination of adequacy. We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 949 (1999), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether the FRSA, by virtue of 23 CFR §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) (1999), pre-empts state tort claims concerning a railroad’s failure to maintain adequate warning devices at crossings where federal funds have participated in the installation of the devices. Compare Ingram v. CSX Transp., Inc., 146 F. 3d 858 (CA11 1998) (holding that federal funding of crossing improvement triggers pre-emption under FRSA); Armijo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 87 F. 3d 1188 (CA10 1996) (same); Elrod v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 68 F. 3d 241 (CA81995) (same); Hester v. CSX Transp., Inc., 61 F. 3d 382 (CA5 1995) (same), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1093 (1996), with 173 F. 3d 386 (CA6 1999) (ease below); Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F. 3d 304 (CA7 1994) (no pre-emption until representative of Federal Government has determined that devices installed are adequate for safety). II We previously addressed the pre-emptive effect of the FHWA’s regulations implementing the Crossings Program in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658 (1993). In that case, we explained that the language of the FRSA’s pre-emption provision dictates that, to pre-empt state law, the federal regulation must “cover” the same subject matter, and not merely “ ‘touch upon’ or ‘relate to’ that subject matter.” Id., at 664; see also 49 U. S. C. §20106. Thus, “preemption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law.” Easterwood, supra, at 664. Applying this standard, we concluded that the regulations contained in 23 CFR pt. 924 (1999), which “establish the general terms of the bargain between the Federal and State Governments” for the Crossings Program, are not pre-emptive. 507 U. S., at 667. We also held that § 646.214(b)(1), which requires that all traffic control devices installed under the program comply with the MUTCD, does not pre-empt state tort actions. Id., at 668-670. The MUTCD “provides a description of, rather than a prescription for, the allocation of responsibility for grade crossing safety between Federal and State Governments and between States and railroads,” and hence “disavows any claim to cover the subject matter of that body of law.” Id., at 669-670. With respect to §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), however, we reached a different conclusion. Because those regulations “establish requirements as to the installation of particular warning devices,” we held that “when they are applicable, state tort law is pre-empted.” Id., at 670. Unlike the other regulations, “§§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) displace state and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained.” Ibid. As a result, those regulations “effectively set the terms under which railroads are to participate in the improvement of crossings.” Ibid. In Easterwood itself, we ultimately concluded that the plaintiff’s state tort claim was not pre-empted. Ibid. As here, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action alleging that the railroad had not maintained adequate warning devices at a particular grade crossing. Id., at 661. We held that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) were not applicable because the warning devices for which federal funds had been obtained were never actually installed at the crossing where the accident occurred. Id., at 671-673. Nonetheless, we made clear that, when they do apply, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “cover the subject matter of state law which, like the tort law on which respondent relies, seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings.” Id., at 671. The sole question in this case, then, is whether §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “are applicable” to all warning devices actually installed with federal funds. We believe that Easterwood answers this question as well. As an original matter, one could plausibly read §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) as being purely definitional, establishing a standard for the adequacy of federally funded warning devices but not requiring that all such devices meet that standard. Easterwood rejected this approach, however, and held that the requirements spelled out in (b)(3) and (4) are mandatory for all warning devices installed with federal funds. “[F]or projects that involve grade crossings ... in which ‘Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the [warning] devices,’ regulations specify warning devices that must be installed.” Id., at 666 (emphasis added). Once it is accepted that the regulations are not merely definitional, their scope is plain: They apply to “any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices.” 23 CFR § 646.214(b)(3)(i) (1999). Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) therefore establish a standard of adequacy that “determiners] the devices to be installed” when federal funds participate in the crossing improvement project. Easterwood, 507 U. S., at 671. If a crossing presents those conditions listed in (b)(3), the State must install automatic gates and flashing lights; if the (b)(3) factors are absent, (b)(4) dictates that the decision as to what devices to install is subject to FHWA approval. See id., at 670-671. In either case, § 646.214(b)(3) or (4) “is applicable” and determines the type of warning device that is “adequate” under federal law. As a result, once the FHWA has funded the crossing, improvement and the warning devices are actually installed and operating, the regulation “dis-placéis] state and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained.” Id., at 670. Importantly, this is precisely the interpretation of §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) that the FHWA endorsed in Easter-wood. Appearing as amicus curiae, the Government explained that § 646.214(b) “establishes substantive standards for what constitutes adequate safety devices on grade crossing improvement projects financed with federal funds.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, O. T. 1992, Nos. 91-790 and 91-1206, p. 23. As a result, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “cover the subject matter of adequate safety devices at crossings that have been improved with the use of federal funds.” Ibid. More specifically, the Government stated that § 646.214(b) “requires gate arms in certain circumstances, and requires FHWA approval of the safety devices in all other circumstances. Thus, the warning devices in place at a crossing improved with the use of federal funds have, by definition, been specifically found to be adequate under a regulation issued by the Secretary. Any state rule that more or different crossing devices were necessary at a federally funded crossing is therefore preempted.” Id., at 24. Thus, Easterwood adopted the FHWA’s own understanding of the application of §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), a regulation that the agency had been administering for 17 years. Respondent and the Government now argue that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) are more limited in seopé and only apply where the warning devices have been selected based on diagnostic studies and particularized analyses of the conditions at the crossing. See Brief for Respondent 16, 24; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (hereinafter Brief for United States). They contend that the Crossings Program actually comprises two distinct programs — the “minimum protection” program and the “priority” or “hazard” program. See Brief for Respondent 1-7; Brief for United States 15-21. Under the “minimum protection” program, they argue, States obtain federal funds merely to equip crossings with advance warning signs and refleetorized erossbucks, the bare minimum required by the MUTCD, without any judgment as to whether the signs are adequate. See Brief for Respondent 5-7, 30-36; Brief for United States 15-21. Under the “priority” or “hazard” program, in contrast, diagnostic teams conduct individualized assessments of particular crossings, and state or FHWA officials make specific judgments about the adequacy of the warning devices using the criteria set out in § 646.214(b)(3). See Brief for Respondent 5-7, 34-35; Brief for United States 18-21. They therefore contend that (b)(3) and (4) only apply to devices installed under the “priority” or “hazard” program, when a diagnostic team has actually applied the decisional process mandated by (b)(3). See Brief for Respondent 16; Brief for United States 18-25. Only then has the regulation prescribed a federal standard for the adequacy of the warning devices that displaces state law covering the same subject. This construction, however, contradicts the regulation’s plain text. Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) make no distinction between devices installed for “minimum protection” and those installed under a so-called “priority” or “hazard” program. Nor does their applicability depend on any individualized determination of adequacy by a diagnostic team or an FHWA official. Rather, as the FHWA itself explained in its Easterwood brief, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) have a “comprehensive scope.” Brief for United States in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, O. T. 1992, Nos. 91-790 and 91-1206, at 12. Section 646.214(b)(3) states that its requirements apply to ‘‘any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices.” 23 CFR § 646.214(b)(3)(i) (1999) (emphasis added). And § 646.214(b)(4) applies to all federally funded crossings that do not meet the criteria specified in (b)(3). Either way, the federal standard for adequacy applies to the crossing improvement and “substantially subsume[s] the subject matter of the relevant state law.” Easterwood, 507 U. S., at 664. Thus, contrary to the Government’s position here, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “specify warning devices that must be installed” as a part of all federally funded crossing improvements. Id., at 666. Although generally “an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference,” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986), no such deference is appropriate here. Not only is the FHWA’s interpretation inconsistent with the text of §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), see Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 359 (1989), but it also contradicts the agency’s own previous construction that this Court adopted as authoritative in Easterwood, cf. Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 131 (1990) (“Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute’s meaning”). The dissent contends that, under our holding, state law is pre-empted even though “[n]o authority, federal or state, has found that the signs in place” are “adequate to protect safety.” Post, at 360 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). This presupposes that States have not fulfilled their obligation to comply with §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4). Those subsections establish a standard for adequacy that States are required to follow in determining what devices to install when federal funds are used. The dissent also argues that Easterwood did not hold that federal funding of the devices is “sufficient” to effect pre-emption, and that “any statement as to the automatic preemptive effect of federal funding should have remained open for reconsideration in a later case.” Post, at 361. But Easterwood did not, in fact, leave this question open. Instead, at the behest of the FHWA, the Court clearly stated that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) pre-empt state tort claims concerning the adequacy of all warning devices installed with the participation of federal funds. Respondent also argues that pre-emption does not lie in this particular case because the Oakwood Church Road crossing presented several of the factors listed in § 646.214(b)(3), and because the TDOT did not install pavement markings as required by the MUTCD. See Brief for Respondent 20-22, 36; Brief in Opposition 6-8. This misconceives how pre-emption operates under these circumstances. When the FHWA approves a crossing improvement project and the State installs the warning devices using federal funds, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) establish a federal standard for the adequacy of those devices that displaces state tort law addressing the same subject. At that point, the regulation dictates “the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection.” Easterwood, supra, at 671. It is this displacement of state law concerning the devices’ adequacy, and not the State’s or the FHWA’s adherence to the standard set out in §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) or to the requirements of the MUTCD, that pre-empts state tort actions. Whether the State should have originally installed different or additional devices, or whether conditions at the crossing have since changed such that automatic gates and flashing lights would be appropriate, is immaterial to the pre-emption question. It should be noted that nothing prevents a State from revisiting the adequacy of devices installed using federal funds. States are free to install more protective devices at such crossings with their own funds or with additional funding from the FHWA. What States cannot do — once they have installed federally funded devices at a particular crossing— is hold the railroad responsible for the adequacy of those devices. The dissent objects that this bestows on railroads a “double windfall”: The Federal Government pays for the installation of the devices, and the railroad is simultaneously absolved of state tort liability. Post, at 860-361. But the same is true of the result urged by respondent and the Government. Respondent and the Government acknowledge that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) can pre-empt state tort law, but they argue that pre-emption only occurs when the State has installed the devices pursuant to a diagnostic team’s analysis of the crossing in question. Under this reading, railroads would receive the same “double windfall” — federal funding of the devices and pre-emption of state tort law — so long as a diagnostic team has evaluated the crossing. The supposed conferral of a “windfall” on the railroads therefore casts no doubt on our construction of the regulation. Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “cover the subject matter” of the adequacy of warning devices installed with the participation of federal funds. As a result, the FRSA pre-empts respondent’s state tort claim that the advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks installed at the Oakwood Church Road crossing were inadequate. Because the TDOT used federal funds for the signs’ installation, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) governed the selection and installation of the devices. And because the TDOT determined that warning devices other than automatic gates and flashing lights were appropriate, its decision was subject to the approval of the FHWA. See § 646.214(b)(4). Once the FHWA approved the project and the signs were installed using federal funds, the federal standard for adequacy displaced Tennessee statutory and common law addressing the same subject, thereby preempting respondent’s claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) provide in full: “(3)(i) Adequate warning devices, under § 646.214(b)(2) or on any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices are to include automatic gates with flashing light signals when one or more of the following conditions exist: “(A) Multiple main line railroad tracks. "(B) Multiple tracks at or in the vicinity of the crossing which may be occupied by a train or locomotive so as to obscure the movement of another train approaching the crossing. “(C) High Speed train operation combined with limited sight distance at either single or multiple track crossings. “(D) A combination of high speeds and moderately high volumes of highway and railroad traffic. “(E) Either a high volume of vehicular traffic, high number of train movements, substantial numbers of sehoolbuses or trucks carrying hazardous materials, unusually restricted sight distance, continuing accident occurrences, or any combination of these conditions. “(F) A diagnostic team recommends them. “(ii) In individual cases where a diagnostic team justifies that gates are not appropriate, FHWA may find that the above requirements are not applicable. “(4) For crossings where the requirements of § 646.214(b)(3) are not applicable, the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

REETZ, COMMISSIONER OF FISH AND GAME OF ALASKA, et al. v. BOZANICH et al. No. 185. Argued January 13, 1970 Decided February 25, 1970 Charles K. Cranston, Assistant Attorney General of Alaska, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were G. Kent Edwards, Attorney General, and Robert L. Hartig, Assistant Attorney General. Robert Boochever argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Seth Warner Morrison III. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, declaring certain fishing laws of Alaska and regulations under them unconstitutional and enjoining their enforcement. 297 F. Supp. 300. We noted probable jurisdiction. 396 U. S. 811. The laws in question, passed in 1968, concern salmon net gear licenses for commercial fishing, not licenses for other types of salmon fishing. They are challenged because they limit licensees to a defined group of persons. The Act in material part provides: “Persons eligible for gear licenses, (a) Except in cases of extreme hardship as defined by the Board of Fish and Game, a salmon net gear license for a specific salmon registration area may be issued only to a person who “(1) has previously held a salmon net gear license for that specific salmon registration area; or “(2) has, for any three years, held a commercial fishing license and while so licensed actively engaged in commercial fishing in that specific area.” The regulations provide that except in cases of “extreme hardship ... a salmon net gear license for a specific salmon registration area may be issued only to a person who: “(A) has held in 1965 or subsequent years a salmon net gear license for that specific salmon registration area; or “(B) has, for any three years -since January 1, 1960, held a commercial fishing license and while so licensed actively engaged in commercial fishing in that specific aireaN Appellees are nonresidents who applied for commercial salmon net gear licenses. They apparently are experienced net gear salmon fishermen but they cannot qualify for a salmon net gear license to fish in any of the 12 regions or areas described in the Act and the regulations. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Act and regulations deprived them of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and also their rights under the Alaska Constitution. That constitution provides in Art. VIII, § 3: “Wherever, occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and 'waters are reserved to the -people- for common use.” And it provides in Art. VIII, § 15: “No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State.” Appellants filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively to stay the proceedings in the District Court pending the determination of the Alaska constitutional question by an Alaska court. Appellants’ motion to dismiss or to stay was denied. Appellees’ motion for summary judgment was granted, the three-judge District Court holding that the Act and regulations in question were unconstitutional both under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Constitution of Alaska. 297 F. Supp., at 304-307. This case is virtually on all fours with City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639, where a single district judge in construing a Mississippi statute held that it violated both the Federal and the State Constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed and we vacated its judgment and remanded to the District Court with directions to hold the case while the parties repaired to a state tribunal “for an authoritative declaration of applicable state law.” Id., at 640. We said: “Proper exercise of federal jurisdiction requires that controversies involving unsettled questions of state law be decided in the state tribunals preliminary to a federal court’s consideration of the underlying federal constitutional questions. . . . That is especially desirable where the questions of state law are enmeshed with federal questions. . . . Here, the state law problems are delicate ones, the resolution of which is not without substantial difficulty — certainly for a federal court. ... In such a case, when the state court’s interpretation of the statute or evaluation of its validity under the state constitution may obviate any need to consider its validity under the Federal Constitution, the federal court should hold its hand, lest it render a constitutional decision unnecessarily.” Id., at 640-641. We are advised that the provisions of the Alaska Constitution at issue have never been interpreted by an Alaska court. The District Court, feeling sure of its grounds on the merits, held, however, that this was not a proper case for abstention, saying that “if the question had been presented to an Alaska court, it would have shared our conviction that the challenged gear licensing scheme is not supportable.” 297 F. Supp., at 304. The three-judge panel was a distinguished one, two being former Alaska lawyers. And they felt that prompt decision was necessary to avoid the “grave and irreparable” injury to the “economic livelihood” of the appellees which would result, if they could not engage in their occupation “during this year’s forthcoming fishing season.” Ibid. It is, of course, true that abstention is not necessary whenever a federal court is faced with a question of local law, the classic case being Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, where federal jurisdiction was based on diversity only. Abstention certainly involves duplication of effort and expense and an attendant delay. See England v. Louisiana State Board, 375 U. S. 411. That is why we have said that this judicially created rule which stems from Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, should be applied only where “the issue of state law is uncertain.” Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528, 534. Moreover, we said in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 248, that abstention was applicable “only in narrowly limited 'special circumstances,’ ” citing Prosper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 492. In Zwickler, a state statute was attacked on the ground that on its face it was repugnant to the First Amendment; and it was conceded that state court construction could not render unnecessary a decision of the First Amendment question. 389 U. S., at 250. A state court decision here, however, could conceivably avoid any decision under the Fourteenth Amendment and would avoid any possible irritant in the federal-state relationship. The Pullman doctrine was based on “the avoidance of needless friction” between federal pronouncements and state policies. 312 U. S., at 500. The instant case is the classic case in that tradition, for here the nub of the whole controversy may be the state constitution. The constitutional provisions relate to fish resources, an asset unique in its abundance in Alaska. The statute and regulations relate to that same unique resource, the management of which is a matter of great state concern. We appreciate why the District Court felt concern over the effect of further delay on these plaintiffs, the appellees here; but we have concluded that the first judicial application of these constitutional provisions should properly be by an Alaska court. We think the federal court should have stayed its hand while the parties repaired to the state courts for a resolution of their state constitutional questions. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Alaska Stat. § 16.05.536 (1968). Subd. (b) of that section specifies the data to be supplied in applications for a gear license. Section 16.05.540 provides that the licensee shall “personally operate or assist in the operation of the licensed fishing gear”; that he shall “personally own or lease the licensed fishing gear”; and that the license is “transferable.” Alaska Commercial Fishing Regulations § 102.09 (a) (1969). As defined in the regulations, id., § 102.09 (a) (2). While the original complaint challenged the 1968 regulations, it was amended to challenge the 1968 Act and the 1969 regulations under it, which regulated the 1969 fishing season.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. COMMERCIAL OFFICE PRODUCTS CO. No. 86-1696. Argued January 13, 1988 Decided May 16, 1988 MARSHALL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and III, in which BREN-nan, White, Blacrmun, and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and II-C, in which BRENNAN, White, and Black-mun, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 125. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 126. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Richard J. Lazarus argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Charles A. Shanor, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Vella M. Fink, and Donna J. Brusoski. James L. Stone argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Brent T. Johnson. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Colorado et al. by Duane Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, Charles B. Howe, Deputy Attorney General, Richard-H. Forman, Solicitor General, Mary Ann F. Whiteside, First Assistant Attorney General, Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., Acting Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, W. Cary Edwards, Attorney General of New Jersey, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Jim Mat-tox, Attorney General of Texas, Donald J. Hanaway, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Jeffrey A. Norris filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae. Justice Marshall announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and II-C, in which Justice Brennan, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun joined. This case raises two questions regarding the time limits for filing charges of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The primary question presented is whether a state agency’s decision to waive its exclusive 60-day period for initial processing of a discrimination charge, pursuant to a worksharing agreement with the EEOC, “terminates” the agency’s proceedings within the meaning of § 706(c) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 260, as amended in 1972, 86 Stat. 104, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(c), so that the EEOC immediately may deem the charge filed. In addition, we must decide whether a complainant who files a discrimination charge that is untimely under state law is nonetheless entitled to the extended 300-day federal filing period of § 706(e) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 260, as amended in 1972, 86 Stat. 105, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(e). I The time limit provisions of Title VII as interpreted by this Court establish the following procedures for filing discrimination charges with the EEOC. As a general rule, a complainant must file a discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. § 706(e), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(e). If a complainant initially institutes proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from the practice charged, the time limit for filing with the EEOC is extended to 300 days. Ibid. In order to give States and localities an opportunity to combat discrimination free from premature federal intervention, the Act provides that no charge may be filed with the EEOC until 60 days have elapsed from initial filing of the charge with an authorized state or local agency, unless that agency’s proceedings “have been earlier terminated.” § 706(c), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(c). The EEOC’s referral of a charge initially filed with the EEOC to the appropriate state or local agency properly institutes the agency’s proceedings within the meaning of the Act, and the EEOC may hold the charge in “‘suspended animation’” during the agency’s 60-day period of exclusive jurisdiction. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 525-526 (1972). In light of the 60-day deferral period, a complainant must file a charge with the appropriate state or local agency, or have the EEOC refer the charge to that agency, within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory event in order to ensure that it may be filed with the EEOC within the BOO-day limit. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 814, n. 16 (1980). If the complainant does not file within 240 days, the charge still may be timely filed with the EEOC if the state or local agency terminates its proceedings before 300 days. See ibid. The central question in this case is whether a state agency’s waiver of the 60-day deferral period, pursuant to a work-sharing agreement with the EEOC, constitutes a “termination” of its proceedings so as to permit the EEOC to deem a charge filed and to begin to process it immediately. This question is of substantial importance because the EEOC has used its statutory authority to enter into worksharing agreements with approximately three-quarters of the 109 state and local agencies authorized to enforce state and local employment discrimination laws. See § 709(b), 86 Stat. 107-108, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8(b) (authorizing the EEOC to “enter into written agreements” with state and local agencies to promote “effective enforcement” of the Act); Brief for Petitioner 4 (EEOC has entered into worksharing agreements with approximately 81 of 109 authorized state and local agencies). These worksharing agreements typically provide that the state or local agency will process certain categories of charges and that the EEOC will process others, with the state or local agency waiving the 60-day deferral period in the latter instance. See, e. g., Worksharing Agreement between Colorado Civil Rights Division and EEOC, App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a-49a. In either instance, the nonprocessing party to the worksharing agreement generally reserves the right to review the initial processing party’s resolution of the charge and to investigate the charge further after the initial processing party has completed its proceedings. See, e. g., id., at 47a. Whether a waiver of the 60-day deferral period pursuant to a worksharing agreement constitutes a “termination” of a state or local agency’s proceedings will determine not only when the EEOC may initiate its proceedings, but also whether an entire class of charges may be timely filed with the EEOC in the first instance. The facts of the instant case concretely reflect what is at stake. On March 26, 1984, Suanne Leerssen filed a charge of discrimination with petitioner EEOC. She alleged that 290 days earlier, respondent Commercial Office Products Company had discharged her because of her sex in violation of Title VII. On March 30, the EEOC sent a copy of Leers-sen’s charge and a charge transmittal form to the Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD), which is authorized by the State to process charges of employment discrimination. The form stated that the EEOC would initially process the charge, pursuant to the worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the CCRD. The CCRD returned the transmittal form to the EEOC, indicating on the form that the CCRD waived its right under Title VII to initially process the charge. On April 4, the CCRD sent a form letter to Leerssen explaining that it had waived its right to initial processing but stating that it still retained jurisdiction to act on the charge after the conclusion of the EEOC’s proceedings. If the CCRD’s waiver “terminated” its proceedings, then Leerssen’s charge was filed with the EEOC just under the 300-day limit. If the waiver was not a “termination,” however, then the charge was not timely filed with the EEOC because the 60-day deferral period did not expire until well after the 300-day limit. The timeliness issue was raised in this case when the EEOC issued an administrative subpoena for information relevant to Leerssen’s charge. Respondent refused to comply with the subpoena, maintaining that the EEOC lacked jurisdiction to investigate the charge because it was not timely filed. The EEOC commenced an action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado seeking judicial enforcement of the subpoena. The District Court agreed with respondent and dismissed the EEOC’s enforcement action, holding that the EEOC lacked jurisdiction over Leerssen’s charge because it was not timely filed. See Civil Action No. 85-K-1385 (June 6, 1985), App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 803 F. 2d 581 (1986). As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals rejected respondent’s contention that the extended 300-day federal filing period was inapplicable because Leerssen had failed to file her charge with the CCRD within the State’s own 180-day limitations period. Id., at 585-586, and n. 3. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court, however, that Leerssen’s charge was not filed within the 300-day period and that the EEOC therefore lacked jurisdiction over the charge. The Court of Appeals reasoned that a state agency “terminates” its proceedings within the meaning of § 706(c) only when it “completely surrenders its jurisdiction over a charge.” Id., at 587. Because the CCRD retained jurisdiction over Leerssen’s charge, reserving the right to act at the conclusion of the EEOC’s proceedings, it did not “finally and unequivocally terminate its authority” over the charge as the plain language of the statute required. Id., at 590. The Court of Appeals expressly disagreed with the decision of the First Circuit in Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F. 2d 817 (1985). The First Circuit had upheld the EEOC’s view that a waiver of the right to initially process a charge constitutes a “termination,” reasoning that the language of the Act is ambiguous and that the history and purposes of the Act support the EEOC’s construction. Judge McKay dissented from the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case, arguing that the EEOC should prevail for the reasons offered by the First Circuit. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the First and the Tenth Circuits, 482 U. S. 926 (1987), and we now reverse. II A First and foremost, respondent defends the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the language of the statute unambiguously precludes the conclusion that the CCRD’s waiver of the deferral period “terminated” its proceedings. According to respondent, “terminated” means only “‘completed’” or “‘ended.’” Brief for Respondent 14. Respondent urges that this definition is met only when a state agency, in the words of the Court of Appeals, “completely relinquish[es] its authority to act on the charge at that point or in the future” 803 F. 2d, at 589, n. 13 (emphasis in original). Because the CCRD retained authority to reactivate its proceedings after the EEOC’s resolution of the charge, respondent maintains that the CCRD did not “terminate” its proceedings within the meaning of the Act. We cannot agree with respondent and the Court of Appeals that “terminate” must mean “to end for all time.” Rather, we find persuasive the determination of the First Circuit that the definition of “termination” also includes “cessation in time.” The First Circuit noted that this -definition is included in both Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2359 (1976) (definition of “terminate”) and Black’s Law Dictionary 1319 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of “termination”). See Isaac, 769 F. 2d, at 820, 821, n. 5. Moreover, the First Circuit correctly observed that common usage of the words “terminate,” “complete,” or “end” often includes a time element, as in “ending negotiations despite the likely inevitability of their resumption” or “terminating work on the job-site knowing that it will resume the next day.” Id., at 821. These observations support the EEOC’s contention that a state agency “terminates” its proceedings when it declares that it will not proceed, if it does so at all, for a specified interval of time. To be sure, “terminate” also may bear the meaning proposed by respondent. Indeed, it may bear that meaning more naturally or more frequently in common usage. But it is axiomatic that the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by grammatical or any other standards. Rather, the EEOC’s interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 761 (1979). The reasonableness of the EEOC’s interpretation of “terminate” in its statutory context is more than amply supported by the legislative history of the deferral provisions of Title VII, the purposes of those provisions, and the language of other sections of the Act, as described in detail below. Deference is therefore appropriate. B The legislative history of the deferral provisions of Title VII demonstrates that the EEOC’s interpretation of § 706(c) is far more consistent with the purposes of the Act than respondent’s contrary construction. The deferral provisions of §706 were enacted as part of a compromise forged during the course of one of the longest filibusters in the Senate’s history. The bill that had passed the House provided for “deferral” to state and local enforcement efforts only in the sense that it directed the EEOC to enter into agreements with state agencies providing for the suspension of federal enforcement in certain circumstances. See H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., §708, 110 Cong. Rec. 2511-2512 (1964). The House bill further directed the EEOC to rescind any agreement with a state agency if the EEOC determined that the agency was no longer effectively exercising its power to combat discrimination. See ibid. In the Senate, this bill met with strenuous opposition on the ground that it placed the EEOC in the position of monitoring state enforcement efforts, granting States exclusive jurisdiction over local discrimination claims only upon the EEOC’s determination that state efforts were effective. See, e. g., id., at 6449 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). The bill’s opponents voiced their concerns against the backdrop of the federal-state civil rights conflicts of the early 1960’s, which no doubt intensified their fear of “the steady and deeper intrusion of the Federal power.” See id., at 8193 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). These concerns were resolved by the “Dirksen-Mansfield substitute,” which proposed the 60-day deferral period now in § 706(c) of the Act. See 110 Cong. Rec., at 11926-11935. The proponents of the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute identified two goals of the deferral provisions, both of which fully support the EEOC’s conclusion that States may, if they choose, waive the 60-day deferral period but retain jurisdiction over discrimination charges by entering into work-sharing agreements with the EEOC. First, the proponents of the substitute deferral provisions explained that the 60-day deferral period was meant to give States a “reasonable opportunity to act under State law before the commencement of any Federal proceedings.” Id., at 12708 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Nothing in the waiver provisions of the worksharing agreements impinges on the opportunity of the States to have an exclusive 60-day period for processing a discrimination charge. The waiver of that opportunity in specified instances is a voluntary choice made through individually negotiated agreements, not an imposition by the Federal Government. Indeed, eight worksharing States and the District of Columbia filed a brief as amici in this case, explaining their satisfaction with the operation of the waiver provisions of the worksharing agreements: “By clarifying primary responsibility for different categories of charges, work-sharing agreements benefit both the EEOC and the states.” Brief for Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae 5. Moreover, most worksharing agreements are flexible, permitting States to express interest in cases ordinarily waived under the agreement and to call upon the EEOC to refrain from assuming jurisdiction in such cases. See, e. g., Worksharing Agreement Between CCRD and EEOC, App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. In contrast, respondent’s argument that States should not be permitted to waive the deferral period because its creation reflected a congressional preference for state as opposed to federal enforcement is entirely at odds with the voluntarism stressed by the proponents of deferral. Congress clearly foresaw the possibility that States might decline to take advantage of the opportunity for enforcement afforded them by the deferral provisions. It therefore gave the EEOC the authority and responsibility to act when a State is “unable or unwilling” to provide relief. 110 Cong. Rec. 12725 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). This Court, too, has recognized that Congress envisioned federal intervention when “States decline, for whatever reason, to take advantage of [their] opportunities” to settle grievances in “a voluntary and localized manner.” Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S., at 761. As counsel for the EEOC explained, deferral was meant to work as “a carrot, but not a stick,” affording States an opportunity to act, but not penalizing their failure to do so other than by authorizing federal intervention. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. The waiver provisions of worksharing agreements are fully consistent with this goal. In addition to providing States with an opportunity to forestall federal intervention, the deferral provisions were meant to promote “time economy and the expeditious handling of cases.” 110 Cong. Rec. 9790 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). Respondent’s proposed interpretation of § 706(c), adopted by the Court of Appeals, is irreconcilable with this purpose because it would result in extraordinary inefficiency without furthering any other goal of the Act. The EEOC would be required to wait 60 days before processing its share of discrimination claims under a worksharing agreement, even though both the EEOC and the relevant state or local agency agree that the State or locality will take no action during that period. Or, in an effort to avoid this pointless 60-day delay, state and local agencies could abandon their work-sharing agreements with the EEOC and attempt to initially process all charges during the 60-day deferral period, a solution suggested by respondent. See Brief for Respondent 29-30. Such a solution would create an enormous backlog of discrimination charges in States and localities, preventing them from securing for their citizens the quick attention to discrimination claims afforded under worksharing agreements. Or, in another scenario proposed by respondent, see id., at 29, n. 29, state or local agencies could rewrite their worksharing agreements with the EEOC to provide for “termination” of state or local proceedings in accordance with respondent’s definition of that term — complete relinquishment of jurisdiction. This solution would prevent a pointless 60-day delay, but it would also preclude a State’s reactivation of a discrimination charge upon the conclusion of federal proceedings. Requiring that States completely relinquish authority over claims in order to avoid needless delay turns on its head the dual purposes of the deferral provisions: deference to the States and efficient processing of claims. As the amici States observe, such a requirement “frustrates the congressional intent to ensure state and local agencies the opportunity to employ their expertise to resolve discrimination complaints.” Brief for Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae 1.. The most dramatic result of respondent’s reading of the deferral provisions is the preclusion of any federal relief for an entire class of discrimination claims. All claims filed with the EEOC in worksharing States more than 240 but less than 300 days after the alleged discriminatory event, like Leers-sen’s claim in this case, will be rendered untimely because the 60-day deferral period will not expire within the 300-day filing limit. Respondent’s interpretation thus requires the 60-day deferral period — which was passed on behalf of state and local agencies — to render untimely a claim filed within the federal 300-day limit, despite the joint efforts of the EEOC and the state or local agency to avoid that result. As petitioner epigrammatically observes, a claim like Leerssen’s that is filed with the EEOC within the last 60 days of the federal filing period is “too early until it is too late.” Brief for Petitioner 25. This severe consequence, in conjunction with the pointless delay described above, demonstrates that respondent’s interpretation of the language of § 706(c) leads to “absurd or futile results . . . ‘plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,”’ which this Court need not and should not countenance. United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543 (1940), quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 194 (1922). C The EEOC’s construction of § 706(c) also finds support in other, related sections of Title VII. These sections reinforce our reading of the legislative history that the 1964 Congress did not intend to preclude the operation of the waiver provisions of the worksharing agreements now widely in force. Section 706(d) provides that when a member of the EEOC, rather than an individual complainant, files a discrimination charge in a State or locality with concurrent jurisdiction, “the Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or local officials and, upon request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days . . . unless a shorter period is requested, to act.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(d) (emphasis added). This language clearly permits state and local agencies to waive the 60-day deferral period and thus authorize the EEOC to take immediate action in cases arising under § 706(d). There is every reason to believe that Congress intended the same result in § 706(c), notwithstanding the variance in language. The legislative history of the deferral provisions reflects the legislators’ understanding that the time limits of §§ 706(c) and (d) were the same. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 12690 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall); id., at 15896 (remarks of Rep. Celler). Moreover, this Court already has recognized in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S., at 526-527, n. 6, that “the difference in wording between [the two sections] seems to be only a reflection of the different persons who initiate the charge.” We concluded in Love that “[t]here is no reason to think” that Congress meant to permit the EEOC to hold a claim in abeyance during the deferral period under § 706(d), but not under § 706(c) — even though the former section expressly authorizes such action, and the latter section does not. Ibid. Similarly, in the instant case, there is no reason to think that Congress meant to make the deferral period waivable by States under § 706(d) when the EEOC files a claim, but mandatory under § 706(c) when an individual files a claim. The EEOC’s interpretation of § 706(c) also finds support in provisions of the Act calling for formal cooperation between the EEOC and state and local agencies. Section 705(g)(1) gives the EEOC the power “to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other agencies.” 78 Stat. 258, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-4(g)(1). Section 709(b) specifies that “[i]n furtherance of such cooperative efforts, the Commission may enter into written agreements with such State or local agencies.” 86 Stat. 108, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-8(b). These sections clearly envision the establishment of some sort of worksharing agreements between the EEOC and state and local agencies, and they in no way preclude provisions designed to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort or waste of time. Because the EEOC’s interpretation of the “termination” requirement of § 706(c) is necessary to give effect to such provisions in most of the existing worksharing agreements, we find that interpretation more consistent with the cooperative focus of the Act than respondent’s contrary construction. I — I 1-H hH In the alternative, respondent argues in support of the result below that the extended 300-day federal filing period is inapplicable to this case because the complainant failed to file her discrimination charge with the CCRD within Colorado’s 180-day limitations period. Respondent reasons that the extended 300-day filing period applies only when “the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief” from the practice charged, § 706(e), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e), and that in the absence of a timely filing under state law, a state agency lacks the requisite “authority to grant or seek relief.” The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument below, as has every other Circuit to consider the question, on the ground that the words “authority to grant or seek relief” refer merely to enabling legislation that establishes state or local agencies, not to state limitations requirements. We join the Circuits in concluding that state time limits for filing discrimination claims do not determine the applicable federal time limit. Although respondent is correct that this Court’s opinion in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750 (1979), did not decide the precise issue we address today, see Brief for Respondent 36, the reasoning of Oscar Mayer provides significant guidance. In Oscar Mayer, we found in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) context that a complainant’s failure to file a claim within a state limitations period did not automatically render his federal claim untimely. We reasoned that the federal statute contained no express requirement of timely state filing, 441 U. S., at 759, and we declined to create such a requirement in light of the remedial purpose of the ADEA and our recognition that it is a “ ‘statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.’” Id., at 761, quoting Love v. Pullman Co., supra, at 527. In the instant case, we decide the separate question whether under Title VII, untimely filing under state law automatically precludes the application of the extended 300-day federal filing period, but the reasoning of Oscar Mayer is entirely apposite. As we noted in Oscar Mayer itself, the filing provisions of the ADEA and Title VII are “virtually in haec verba,” the former having been patterned after the latter. 441 U. S., at 755. Title VII, like the ADEA, contains no express reference to timeliness under state law. In addition, the policy considerations that militate against importing such a hurdle into the federal ADEA scheme are identical in the Title VII context: Title VII also is a remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the process. The importation of state limitations periods into § 706(e) not only would confuse lay complainants, but also would embroil the EEOC in complicated issues of state law. In order for the EEOC to determine the timeliness of a charge filed with it between 180 and 300 days, it first would have to determine whether the charge had been timely filed under state law, because the answer to the latter question would establish which of the two federal limitations periods should apply. This state-law determination is not a simple matter. The EEOC first would have to determine whether a state limitations period was jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. And if the limitations period was nonjurisdictional, like Colorado’s in this case, the EEOC would have to decide whether it was waived or equitably tolled. The EEOC has neither the time nor the expertise to make such determinations under the varying laws of the many deferral States and has accordingly construed the extended 300-day period to be available regardless of the state filing. See 52 Fed. Reg. 10224 (1987). In contrast to the difficulties presented by respondent’s argument, our broadly worded statement in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980), a case presenting a related issue regarding the application of the extended 300-day federal filing period, that a complainant “need only file his charge within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice in order to ensure that his federal rights will be preserved,” id,., at 814, n. 16, establishes a rule that is both easily understood by complainants and easily administered by the EEOC. We reaffirm that rule today. Because we find that the extended 300-day federal limitations period is applicable to this case and that the CCRD’s waiver of the 60-day deferral period “terminated” its proceedings within that 300-day limit, we conclude that Leers-sen’s claim was timely filed under Title VII. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 706(e) provides: “A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.” 86 Stat. 106, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(e). Section 706(c) provides: “In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under [subsection (b)] of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.” 86 Stat. 104, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e). This point was made by other Senators and has been emphasized by this Court in our previous Title VII eases. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 12688 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall) (deferral provisions preserve “the opportunity and authority of the State and local governments to work out their own problems if they are willing to do so”); id., at 14313 (remarks of Sen. Miller) (deferral provisions “giv[e] the States the opportunity to carry out their responsibilities first”); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 821 (1980) (deferral provisions “give state agencies an opportunity to redress the evil at which the federal legislation was aimed, and to avoid federal intervention unless its need was demonstrated”); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 755 (1979) (deferral provisions “give state agencies a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination and thereby to make unnecessary, resort to federal relief by victims of the discrimination”); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 526 (1972) (deferral provisions “give state agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints”). Respondent’s contrary contention that the compromise provisions represented Congress’ choice of deferral over efficiency, see Brief for Respondent 24, finds no support in the comments of Senator Dirksen, the chief architect of the compromise. His remarks make clear that he believed the compromise would promote efficiency while respecting state prerogatives. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 8193 (1964) (deferral provisions will “assure individual complainants that they will have fair and expeditious consideration of their grievances”). Reactivation of state proceedings after the conclusion of federal proceedings serves the useful function of permitting States to enforce their discrimination laws when these laws are more protective than Title VII. For example, Title VII does not give the EEOC jurisdiction to enforce the Act against employers of fewer than 15 employees or against bona fide private membersliip clubs. § 701(b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b). Each year, the CCRD reactivates four to five charges in which the EEOC has determined after investigation that it lacks jurisdiction. Brief for Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae 7. All of the worksharing States, with the possible exception of Oklahoma and Tennessee, retain jurisdiction over a charge when they waive the 60-day deferral period. Brief for Petitioner 27, n. 24. Hence, none of these States “terminates” its proceedings by its waiver under respondent’s interpretation of that term. See Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F. 2d 1226, 1230-1231 (CA7 1987); Mennor v. Fort Hood National Bank, 829 F. 2d 553, 556 (CA5 1987); Maurya v. Peabody Coal Co., 823 F. 2d 933, 935 (CA6 1987), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1067 (1988); EEOC v. Shamrock Optical Co., 788 F. 2d 491, 493-494 (CA8 1986); Thomas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 764 F. 2d 768, 771 (CA11 1985); Howze v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 750 F. 2d 1208, 1211 (CA3 1984).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TANK TRUCK RENTALS, INC., v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 109. Argued January 29-30, 1958. Decided March 17, 1958. Leonard Sarner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Paul A. Wolkin. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Rice, Joseph F. Goetten and Meyer Rothwacks. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1951 petitioner Tank Truck Rentals paid several hundred fines imposed on it and its drivers for violations of state maximum weight laws. This case involves the deductibility of those payments as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses under §23 (a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Prior to 1950 the Commissioner had permitted such deductions, but a change of policy that year caused petitioner’s expenditures to be disallowed. The Tax Court, reasoning that allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined state policy expressed in the maximum weight laws, upheld the Commissioner. 26 T. C. 427. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same ground, 242 F. 2d 14, and we granted certiorari. 354 U. S. 920 (1957). In our view, the deductions properly were disallowed. Petitioner, a Pennsylvania corporation, owns a fleet of tank trucks which it leases, with drivers, to motor carriers for transportation of bulk liquids. The lessees operate the trucks throughout Pennsylvania and the surrounding States of New Jersey, Ohio, Delaware, West Virginia, and Maryland, with nearly all the shipments originating or terminating in Pennsylvania. In 1951, the tax year in question, each of these States imposed maximum weight limits for motor vehicles operating on its highways. Pennsylvania restricted truckers to 45,000 pounds, however, while the other States through which petitioner operated allowed maximum weights approximating 60,000 pounds. It is uncontested that trucking operations were so hindered by this situation that neither petitioner nor other bulk liquid truckers could operate profitably and also observe the Pennsylvania law. Petitioner's equipment consisted largely of 4,500- to 5,000-gallon tanks, and the industry rate structure generally was predicated on fully loaded use of equipment of that capacity. Yet only one of the commonly carried liquids weighed little enough that a fully loaded truck could satisfy the Pennsylvania statute. Operation of partially loaded trucks, however, not only would have created safety hazards, but also would have been economically impossible for any carrier so long as the rest of the industry continued capacity loading. And the industry as a whole could not operate on a partial load basis without driving shippers to competing forms of transportation. The only other alternative, use of smaller tanks, also was commercially impracticable, not only because of initial replacement costs but even more so because of reduced revenue and increased operating expense, since the rates charged were based on the number of gallons transported per mile. Confronted by this dilemma, the industry deliberately operated its trucks overweight in Pennsylvania in the hope, and at the calculated risk, of escaping the notice of the state and local police. This conduct also constituted willful violations in New Jersey, for reciprocity provisions of the New Jersey statute subjected trucks registered in Pennsylvania to Pennsylvania weight restrictions while traveling in New Jersey. In the remainder of the States in which petitioner operated, it suffered overweight fines for several unintentional violations, such as those caused by temperature changes in transit. During the tax year 1951, petitioner paid a total of $41,060.84 in fines and costs for 718 willful and 28 innocent violations. Deduction of that amount in petitioner’s 1951 tax return was disallowed by the Commissioner. It is clear that the Congress intended the income tax laws “to tax earnings and profits less expenses and losses,” Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473, 477 (1940), carrying out a broad basic policy of taxing “net, not . . . gross, income . . . .” McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 57, 66-67 (1944). Equally well established is the rule that deductibility under § 23 (a)(1) (A) is limited to expenses that are both ordinary and necessary to carrying on the taxpayer’s business. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U. S. 488, 497 (1940). A finding of “necessity” cannot be made, however, if allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467, 473 (1943); see Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U. S. 90, 97 (1952). This rule was foreshadowed in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326 (1941), where the Court, finding no congressional intent to the contrary, upheld the validity of an income tax regulation reflecting an administrative distinction “between legitimate business expenses and those arising from that family of contracts to which the law has given no sanction.” 314 U. S., at 339. Significant reference was made in Heininger to the very situation now before us; the Court stated, “Where a taxpayer has violated a federal or a state statute and incurred a fine or penalty he has not been permitted a tax deduction for its payment.” 320 U. S., at 473. Here we are concerned with the policy of several States “evidenced” by penal statutes enacted to protect their highways from damage and to insure the safety of all persons using them. Petitioner and its drivers have violated these laws and have been sentenced to pay the fines here claimed as income tax deductions. It is clear that assessment of the fines was punitive action and not a mere toll for use of the highways: the fines occurred only in the exceptional instance when the overweight run was detected by the police. Petitioner’s failure to comply with the state laws obviously was based on a balancing of the cost of compliance against the chance of detection. Such a course cannot be sanctioned, for judicial deference to state action requires, whenever possible, that a State not be thwarted in its policy. We will not presume that the Congress, in allowing deductions for income tax purposes, intended to encourage a business enterprise to violate the declared policy of a State. To allow the deduction sought here would but encourage continued violations of state law by increasing the odds in favor of noncompliance. This could only tend to destroy the effectiveness of the State’s maximum weight laws. This is not to say that the rule as to frustration of sharply defined national or state policies is to be viewed or applied in any absolute sense. “It has never been thought . . . that the mere fact that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal act makes it nondeductible.” Commissioner v. Heininger, supra, at 474. Although each case must turn on its own facts, Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F. 2d 711, 713, the test of nondeductibility always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration .resulting from allowance of the deduction. The flexibility of such a standard is necessary if we are to accommodate both the congressional intent to tax only net income, and the presumption against congressional intent to encourage violation of declared public policy. Certainly the frustration of state policy is most complete and direct when the expenditure for which deduction is sought is itself prohibited by statute. See Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., v. Commissioner, 25 T. C. 43. If the expenditure is not itself an illegal act, but rather the payment of a penalty imposed by the State because of such an act, as in the present case, the frustration attendant upon deduction would be only slightly less remote, and would clearly fall within the line of disallowance. Deduction of fines and penalties uniformly has been held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion by reducing the “sting” of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature. There is no merit to petitioner’s argument that the fines imposed here were not penalties at all, but merely a revenue toll. It is true that the Pennsylvania statute provides for purchase of a single-trip permit by an over-weighted trucker; that its provision for forcing removal of the excess weight at the discretion of the police authorities apparently was never enforced; and that the fines were devoted by statute to road repair within the municipality or township where the trucker was apprehended. Moreover, the Pennsylvania statute was amended in 1955, raising the maximum weight restriction to 60,000 pounds, making mandatory the removal of the excess, and graduating the amount of the fine by the number of pounds that the truck was overweight. These considerations, however, do not change the fact that the truckers were fined by the State as a penal measure when and if they were apprehended by the police. Finally, petitioner contends that deduction of the fines at least for the innocent violations will not frustrate state policy. But since the maximum weight statutes make no distinction between innocent and willful violators, state policy is as much thwarted in the one instance as in the other. Petitioner’s reliance on Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, supra, is misplaced. Deductions were allowed the taxpayer in that case for amounts inadvertently collected by him as OPA overcharges and then paid over to the Government, but the allowance was based on the fact that the Administrator, in applying the Act, had differentiated between willful and innocent violators. No such differentiation exists here, either in the application or the literal language of the state maximum weight laws. Affirmed. “SEC. 23. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME. “In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: “(a) EXPENSES.— “(1) Trade or business expenses.— “ (A) In General. — All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . . . .” 53 Stat. 12, as amended, 56 Stat. 819. Letter ruling by Commissioner Helvering, dated September 10, 1942 (IT:P:2-WTL), 5 CCH 1950 Fed. Tax Rep. ¶ 6134. 1951 — 1 Cum. Bull. 15. Delaware, Del. Laws 1947, c. 86, §2; Maryland, Flack’s Md. Ann. Code, 1939 (1947 Cum. Supp.), Art. 66%, § 254, and Flack’s Md. Ann. Code, 1951, Art. 66%, §278; New Jersey, N. J. Rev. Stat., 1937, 39:3-84; Ohio, Page’s Ohio Gen. Code Ann., 1938 (Cum. Pocket Supp. 1952), § 7248-1; Pennsylvania, Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1953, Tit. 75, § 453; West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann., 1949, § 1546, and 1953 Cum. Supp., § 1721(463). N. J. Rev. Stat., 1937 (Cum. Supp. 1948-1950), 39:3-84.3. Because state policy in this case was evidenced by specific legislation, it is unnecessary to decide whether the requisite “governmental declaration” might exist other than in an Act of the Legislature. See Schwartz, Business Expenses Contrary To Public Policy, 8 Tax L. Rev. 241, 248. Unlike the rest of the States, Pennsylvania imposed the fines on the driver rather than on the owner of the trucks. In each instance, however, the driver was petitioner’s employee, and petitioner paid the fines as a matter of course, being bound to do so by its collective bargaining agreement with the union representing the drivers. See, e. g., United States v. Jaffray, 97 F. 2d 488, aff'd on other grounds, sub nom. United States v. Bertelsen & Petersen Engineering Co., 306 U. S. 276 (1939); Tunnel R. Co. v. Commissioner, 61 F. 2d 166; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. 2d 990; Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. 2d 178; Great Northern R. Co. v. Commissioner, 40 F. 2d 372; Davenshire, Inc., v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 958. Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1953 (1957 Cum. Ann. Pocket Part), Tit, 75, § 453.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PYRAMID MOTOR FREIGHT CORP. v. ISPASS et al. No. 41. Argued October 22, 1946. Decided March 31, 1947. Charles E. Cotterill argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Deane Ramey argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents two issues: I. Was it reversible error for the Circuit Court of Appeals to deny petitioner’s motion to dismiss the appeal, made on the ground that the appeal had not been docketed and the transcript of record had not been filed within the time specified in Rule 73 (g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? We hold that it was not. II. Under the principles we have stated in the companion case of Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649, was the Circuit Court of Appeals justified in remanding the present case to the District Court for entry of a judgment under the Fair Labor Standards Act, in favor of all of the respondents except Shapiro? We hold that the case should be remanded, but with directions to proceed in accordance with the opinion of this Court in this case and the Levinson case. This will include a direction to the District Court to determine whether or not the activities of each respondent consisted, wholly or in substantial part, of the class of work which is defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Ex parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 133-134, as that of a “loader” of freight for an interstate common carrier by motor vehicle, and as affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce. This action was begun in 1942 in the City Court of the City of New York, pursuant to § 16 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It sought to recover unpaid overtime compensation for services rendered to the petitioner by each of six of the eight respondents as “a delivery clerk and ‘push-boy’,” during various periods between October 24, 1938, and September 20, 1941, computed in accordance with § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, together with interest, liquidated damages and an attorney’s fee. The case was removed by the petitioner to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The other two respondents there joined in the complaint on like grounds. The petitioner answered that it was an interstate common carrier of freight by motor vehicle; that the labor performed by each of the respondents “consisted primarily of that of [a] driver’s helper and of [a] loader;” that, with respect to them, the Interstate Commerce Commission had power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, and that, by virtue of § 13 (b) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, § 7 of that Act did not apply to the services of the respondents. The case was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts. On November 29, 1943, the District Court rendered an opinion in which it declined to determine the status of the respondents but held the case “open for further action” in order to give the respondents an opportunity to present that question to the Interstate Commerce Commission. 54 F. Supp. 565, 569. Pursuant to respondents’ statement that they would not so apply to the Commission and pursuant to their motion requesting a final disposition of the case, the court, on February 14, 1945, dismissed the complaint “without prejudice.” 59 F. Supp. 341. After considerable delay in the filing of the record on appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of dismissal as to the respondent Shapiro on the ground that “he is a ‘helper’ within the Commission’s ruling in 28 M. C. C. at pages 135, 136.” 152 F. 2d 619, 622. As to the other respondents, it reversed the judgment with costs and remanded the cause “for entry of judgment in their favor and for allowance of an attorney’s fee.” Id. at 622. The judgment as to Shapiro has not been questioned and is not before us. Because of its importance in the interpretation of the Motor Carrier Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, we granted certiorari, 327 U. S. 774, and the case was argued immediately following the Levinson case. A brief on behalf of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, as amicus curiae, was filed jointly in this case and in the Levinson case, supporting the position of the respondents. I. Notice of appeal, dated March 29, 1945, was filed by the respondents in the District Court April 2, 1945. In spite of the applicable provisions of Rule 73 (g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respondents sought from the District Court no extension of time within which to docket their appeal or file a transcript of the record. On July 20, 1945, more than 90 days from the date of the first notice of appeal, respondents, pursuant to motion supported by affidavit, secured from Circuit Judge Augustus N. Hand an order extending to September 1, 1945, the time within which to serve and file their record on appeal. On that date, the transcript of record was filed. The petitioner promptly moved to dismiss the appeal under Rule 73 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning especially the right of a single member of that court to make the order of July 20. This motion was denied October 10, 1945, Circuit Judges Learned Hand, Swan and Clark speaking for the court. The motion was renewed at the hearing on the merits of the appeal and, on December 28, 1945, was denied again, Circuit Judges Learned Hand, Swan and Frank speaking for the court. 152 F. 2d 619. The issue was raised properly and fully presented here. The authority of a Judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to extend the time for filing the record on appeal appears to be supported by Rule 15 of that court. That Rule, however, was not discussed by counsel and we sustain the action taken by the Circuit Court of Appeals under authority of Rule 73 (a), even without reference to its own Rule 15. The principal argument against the final action of the Circuit Court of Appeals on this motion is based upon the following statement in that court's opinion: “In the case at bar there was no abuse of discretion in extending the time, despite the somewhat feeble excuses for delay, since the appeal presents a substantial question as to the correctness of the judgment.” (Italics supplied.) 152 F. 2d 619, 621. It is urged that this shows that the court based its refusal to dismiss the appeal on the substantiality of the question to be presented on the merits of the appeal, rather than on the substantiality of the excuses for the delay in filing the record. We interpret, the statement as no more than a recognition by the court that the substantiality of the question to be at issue on the merits of the appeal was a matter appropriate for its consideration under Rule 73 (a), in connection with all the other circumstances before it. Rule 73 (a) is intended to place reliance upon the sound discretion of the Circuit Court of Appeals. We see no reason to question the discretion exercised in this case as evidenced by the agreement of all of the five Circuit Judges to whom the issue was presented. Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 104 F. 2d 83; Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn. v. Snyder, 109 F. 2d 469; Burke v. Canfield, 72 App. D. C. 127, 111 F. 2d 526; United States v. Gallagher, 151 F. 2d 556. Accordingly, we sustain the denial of the motion to dismiss the appeal under Rule 73 (a). II. On the merits, the question is whether or not the Circuit Court of Appeals was justified in remanding this case with instructions to enter a judgment under the Fair Labor Standards Act in favor of all of the respondents except Shapiro. We hold that the cause should be remanded but that the order of remand should be modified. This case was tried, without a jury, entirely upon an agreed statement of facts and a pre-trial agreement between the parties, approved by the District Court, settling the issues to be determined. For the sake of clarity, we have proceeded on the same basis and have treated the case as though, upon remand of it to the District Court, that court will proceed upon the same record. This, however, should not be interpreted as necessarily restricting that court to that record if, for good cause, that court should find it advisable to retry the case de novo. Under the agreed statement there was no question but that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to each respondent provided only that he was not found to have been excluded from the overtime pay requirements of that Act by § 13 (b) (1) because of being an “employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935; . . . .” 52 Stat. 1068, 29 U. S. C. § 213 (b) (1). There thus will remain to be determined by the District Court the question whether the activities of the respective respondents consisted, either wholly or in substantial part, of the class of work which is defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Ex parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 133-134, as that of a “loader,” and as affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce. It will remain for the District Court to apply the facts found by it as to the activities of the respective respondents to the classifications of work that have been made by the Interstate Commerce Commission, defining what comes within the jurisdiction of the Commission under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act. The Commission has defined its jurisdiction, both affirmatively and negatively, as follows: “. . . we have power, under section 204 (a) of said part II, to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for the classes of employees covered by findings of fact numbered 1, 2, and 3 above [mechanics, loaders and helpers], and ... we have no such power over any other classes of employees, except drivers.” Ex parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 139. Under these circumstances, there is no occasion for us to refer to the Commission any question presented in this case nor to suspend the long-delayed final judgment pending further findings by the Commission. The Commission has done its work. The District Court must determine simply whether or not the respective employees who seek to recover overtime compensation under § 7 are excluded from the benefits of that Section because they are within the above classification. The special knowledge and experience required to determine what classifications of work affect safety of operation of interstate motor carriers have been applied by the Commission. Whether or not an individual employee is within any such classification is to be determined by judicial process. The District Court, in applying § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act to respondents, will determine whether or not the activities of each respondent, either as a whole or in substantial part, come within the Commission’s definition of the work of a “loader.” In determining whether the activities, or any substantial part of the activities, of an individual come within those of such a “loader,” the District Court shall not be concluded by the name which may have been given to his position or to the work that he does, nor shall the District Court be required to find that any specific part of his time in any given week must have been spent in those activities. The District Court shall give particular attention to whether or not the activities of the respective respondents included that kind of “loading” which is held by the Commission to affect safety of operation. In contrast to the loading activities in the Levinson case, the mere handling of freight at a terminal, before or after loading, or even the placing of certain articles of freight on a motor carrier truck may form so trivial, casual or occasional a part of an employee’s activities, or his activities may relate only to such articles or to such limited handling of them, that his activities will not come within the kind of “loading” which is described by the Commission and which, in its opinion, affects safety of operation. See also, McKeown v. Southern California Freight Forwarders, 49 F. Supp. 543. Except insofar as the Commission has found that the activities of drivers, mechanics, loaders and helpers, as defined by it, affect safety of operation, it has disclaimed its power to establish qualifications or maximum hours of service under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act. If none of the alleged “loading” activities of the respective respondents, during the periods at issue, come within the kind of activities which, according to the Commission, affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act, then those respondents of which that is true are entitled to the benefits of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. On the other hand, if the whole or a substantial part of such alleged “loading” activities of the respective respondents, during the periods at issue, does come within the kind of activities which, according to the Commission, affect such safety of operation, then those respondents who were engaged in such activities are excluded from the benefits of such § 7. If some, but less than a substantial part, of such activities of the respective respondents, during some or all of the periods at issue, come within the kind of activities which, according to the Commission, affect such safety of operation, then the right of those respondents who were engaged in such activities to receive the benefits of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act does not come within the precise issue determined in the Levinson case and this Court reserves its decision as to the power of the Commission to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to them and, consequently, reserves its decision as to their right to receive the benefits of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. For these reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated insofar as it relates to the respondents other than Shapiro, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. See Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, ante, p. 652, note 2. See Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, ante, p. 653, note 6. See Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, ante, p. 653, note 5. See Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, ante, p. 653, note 4. This included the following description of the work of the respondents as employees of the petitioner: “Item 3. As to northbound freight the loaded vehicles would come into New York in the very early morning hours to the West 11th Street Terminal where new drivers took charge of the vehicles, and what were called downtown helpers rode on the vehicles with the drivers to the 38th Street Terminal. At such terminal the doors of the trucks were opened in the mornings, both the driver and downtown helper remaining on the vehicles. As the downtown helper pushed the freight packages over the tailboards they were received by the plaintiffs [respondents], who then placed the freight packages in the sub-terminal building. Still later in the mornings the plaintiffs [respondents] then delivered the packages to various consignees in the Garment Center, generally using for that purpose what are called hand-trucks or flat trucks, using their own manpower for propulsion. “During those same days other northbound trucks after first stopping at the West 11th Street main terminal to change a driver and receive a downtown helper, by-passed the West 38th Street sub-terminal and parked first at one place and then another alongside the curbs in the Garment Center. At those places the unloading operation was performed in the same way as at the sub-terminal hereinabove described, and the plaintiffs [respondents] then made the deliveries by hand or by hand trucks into the insides of the Garment Center buildings. “Item 4. In the late afternoons and early evenings freight originating with various consignors at various locations in the Garment Center was 'picked up’ for intended delivery the next morning in Philadelphia or elsewhere south of New York. As to these southbound operations the facts were these: Some of the freight packages would be picked up by the plaintiffs [respondents] at the consignor’s places of business in the Garment Center and hand-trucked by them to the West 88th Street sub-terminal. At that place the plaintiffs [respondents] themselves did, in due course, physically load the freight packages into a waiting truck which, when loaded, took up this journey first to the West 11th Street main terminal, and then with a new driver went on to the destinations south of New York. A downtown employee other than the plaintiffs [respondents] would also at the same time so load the vehicles. “Other trucks for southbound loadings took their stations on the public streets in the Garment Center where the plaintiffs [respondents] brought the packages by hand or by hand truck. The part which the plaintiffs [respondents] took in such loading consisted of the lifting of the packages on to the tailboards of the trucks, and very often when the weights or size of the packages so required they would stand inside the truck bodies and, together with the downtown employee, stack and pile the freight in the vehicle. “Item 5. As to all the plaintiffs [respondents] other than Shapiro they generally walked between stopping points but occasionally rode upon the trucks when the trucks moved from one place to another in the Garment Center, thereby avoiding loss of time by walking. As to the plaintiff Shapiro, he regularly and as a matter of fixed duty, between August 1939 and September 1, 1941, rode on the truck between four and five hours daily. On the truck at the same time was the driver and a helper from the downtown terminal. In addition thereto the plaintiff Shapiro devoted three and a half hours each day to inside office work at the 38th Street sub-terminal.” (Italics supplied.) The order of dismissal appearing in the record was as follows: “Ordered that the complaint be and the same hereby is dismissed and that judgment be entered abating and dismissing said action, without prejudice to the rights of plaintiffs [respondents], or any one of them, to bring other actions or proceedings for the establishment of their respective claims, either administratively or at an appropriate time, by action in this court or other proper tribunal.” See also, Walling v. Comet Carriers, 57 F. Supp. 1018, 151 F. 2d 107, 109; cert. granted, 326 U. S. 716; writ of certiorari dismissed on motion of counsel for petitioner Comet Carriers, 328 U. S. 819. That case, also in the Second Circuit, related to “four motor truck drivers, four drivers’ helpers and two hand truckers or pushers” employed by Comet Carriers in the transportation of goods between manufacturers and contractors mostly on intrastate trips within or near the New York City Garment Center. As to the hand truckers or pushers, the District Court said: “they are not employed on motor vehicles nor do their functions as employees affect or relate to the safety of operation of the motor vehicles in interstate commerce.” 57 F. Supp. 1018, 1023. The Circuit Court of Appeals discussed only the drivers and drivers’ helpers. As to them it said: “Proof that two employees worked only three hours a week in interstate transportation and that two employees made 'some’ and 'occasional’ deliveries to the warehouses of chain stores and worked the remaining time in the production of goods for commerce does not satisfy the requirement that the amount of time during which they are engaged in interstate commerce be substantial.” 151 F. 2d 107, 111. “Rule 73. Appeal to a Circuit Court of Appeals. “(g) Docketing and Record on Appeal. The record on appeal as provided for in Rules 75 and 76 shall be filed with the appellate court and the action there docketed within 40 days from the date of the notice of appeal;except that, when more than one appeal is taken from the same judgment to the same appellate court, the district court may prescribe the time for filing and docketing, which in no event shall be less than 40 days from the date of the first notice of appeal. In all cases the district court in its discretion and with or without motion or notice may extend the time for filing the record on appeal and docketing the action, if its order for extension is made before the expiration of the period for filing and docketing as originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order; but the district court shall not extend the time to a day more than 90 days from the date of the first notice of appeal.” 308 U. S. 752, 28 U. S. C. following § 723 (c). “Rule 73. Appeal to a Circuit Court of Appeals. “(a) How Taken. When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to a circuit court of appeals and within the time prescribed, a party may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district court a notice of appeal. Failure of the appellant to take any of the further steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such remedies as are specified in this rule or, when no remedy is specified, for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.” 308 U. S. 749, 28 U. S. C. following § 723 (c). Rule 15, U. S. C. C. A., Second Circuit. “Docketing Cases. “1. In an appeal in a civil action the appellant shall docket the action and file the record in this court within forty days after filing the notice of appeal with the District Court, or within any added time granted by the district judge within forty days after the filing of the notice of appeal, but in no case later than ninety days after such filing (Rule 73 [g]). . . . If the record is not presented to the clerk for filing within the periods above provided, he shall refuse to accept it unless this court so orders, or a judge thereof if the court is not sitting. “2. This Court will not hear and grant motions for filing and docketing appeals, otherwise properly taken, at times other than as stated in subdivision 1 hereof, except upon a showing by affidavits, or otherwise as the Court may order, (a) that the delay has been due to cause beyond the control of the moving party or (b) that the delay has been due to circumstances which shall be deemed to be merely excusable neglect on the part of the moving party and there is a substantial question to be presented on appeal and (e) in all cases where the district court has power to act, that an extension of time has been denied by that court, together with the grounds for such denial, if any are stated. “3. If the appellant shall have failed to comply with this rule, any appellee may either docket the action and file the record in this Court, in which event it shall stand for argument, or may have the action docketed and dismissed by the Clerk of this Court upon producing a certificate from the Clerk of the Court wherein the judgment or decree was rendered, certifying that such appeal has been duly taken or allowed, and proof that four days’ notice in writing has been served on the appellant or his attorney that application will be made to the Clerk of this Court for such dismissal. No action dismissed under this rule shall be reinstated except in the discretion of the Court and upon a showing similar to that required under subdivision 2 hereof.” (Italics supplied.) 11 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. Digest, L. Ed., Supp. No. 4, p. 55. The District Court, in its order of February 14, 1945, described the basis on which the case had been tried as follows: . . on the 3rd day of May, 1943, and. the parties hereto having duly appeared by their respective attorneys, and submitted to the Court, in lieu of the offering of proof, an agreed statement of facts setting forth the issues framed by the complaint, and the Court, upon the consent of the attorneys for the respective parties, having thereupon made and entered an order herein on the said 3rd day of May, 1943, wherein and whereby the said agreed statement of facts which were submitted by the attorneys for the respective parties, as aforesaid, was set forth as the issues framed by the complaint and answer, and the said action having been submitted to the Court for its determination upon the said agreed statement of facts and order hereinbefore mentioned and referred to, . . . .” See Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, ante, p. 652, note 2. The findings of fact referred to by the Commission, insofar as they relate to loaders, are those quoted in the text of Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, ante, p. 669, at note 17.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MINNEAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY CO. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 12. Argued November 16-17, 1959. Decided December 14, 1959 Max Swiren and Harold J. Soderberg argued the cause for appellants.. Max Swiren, John G. Dorsey and Richard Musenbrock were on the brief for the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co., appellant in No. 12; Parnell Donohue, Attorney General of South Dakota, Herman L. Bode, Assistant Attorney General, and Ernest W. Stephens for the State of South Dakota et al., appellants in No. 27; and Miles Lord, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Harold J. Soderberg, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Minnesota et al., appellants in No. 28. Robert W. Ginnane and Starr Thomas argued the cause for appellees. Solicitor General Rankin, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bicks, Richard A. Solomon, Robert W. Ginnane and B. Franklin Taylor, Jr. weré on the brief for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission; Grenville Beardsley, Attorney General of Illinois, and Harry R. Begley, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Illinois; Starr Thomas, CarlE. Bagge and Edwin A. Lucas for the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al.; and Robert H. Walker for certain municipalities and shippers et al., appellees. Together with No. 27, South Dakota et al. v. United States et al., and No. 28, Minnesota et al. v. United States et al., also on appeals from the same Court. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. These appeals present questions arising out of rival applications by several rail carriers to the' Interstate Commerce Commission under § 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act! for authority to acquire control of Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Company. “Western” is an independent, short-line “bridge carrier” of through east-west traffic by-passing the congested Chicago gateway. Its line is about 234 miles long, extending from its connection with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company (“Pennsylvania”) at Effner, on the Illinois-Indiana state line, westward, through Peoria, to its connection with the main line of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company (“Santa Fe”) at Lomax, Illinois, and tfyence southwesterly a short distance to Keokuk, Iowa. Its headquarters, shops and yards are located in East Peoria where it has 24 executives and where, and elsewhere along its line, it has about 225 other employees. It has connections for the interchange of traffic with 16 railroads, the principal ones being with the Pennsylvania at Effner,-with the Santa Fe at Lomax, and with the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company (“Nickel Plate”), the Illinois Terminal Railroad Company, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company (“Burlington”) and the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company (“Minneapolis”) at Peoria. Its interchange connections with the other 10 railroads are at 17 other towns along its line. Western has outstanding 90,000 shares of common capital stock, 82% .of which is owned by the testamentary trustees of the estate of George P. McNear — Wilmington Trust Company and Guy Gladson — and the remaining 18% is owned by members of the McNear family, a bank and the- president of Western. In 1954, the trustees determined to sell their Western stock, and rival efforts were commenced by Minneapolis, on the one hand, and by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania, on the' other hand, to purchase it. (Four of Wilmington Trust Company’s directors were also directors of Pennsylvania.) Those negotiations culminated in a contract between the trustees and. the Santa Fe, dated May 26, 1955, providing for the sale by the former and purchase by the latter of the stock at a price of $135 per share, subject to the Commission’s approval. Soon afterward, like agreements were made by the Santa Fe with the holders of the remaining 18% of the Western stock. On June 28, 1955, the' Santa Fe entered into a contract to sell to the Pennsylvania Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Pennsylvania, 50% of the outstanding capital stock of Western at $135 per share, subject to approval of the Commission. On July 8, 1955, the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania Company and its parent, Pennsylvania, applied to' the Commission under § 5 (2) of the Act for approval of those stock purchase agreements and the consequent joint control of Western. The Minneapolis intervened and objected to the application, as did also the States of Minnesota and South Dakota and their respective public service regulatory commissions. Thereafter, on October 13, 1955, the Minneapolis applied to the Commission, under the same section of the Act, for authority to acquire sole control of Western, expressing its willingness to enter into contracts with Western’s stockholders to purchase their stock at the same price and on the same terms as set forth in their existing contracts with the Santa Fe. The Santa-Fe, the Pennsylvania Company and Pennsylvania intervened in the latter proceeding and objected to the Minneapolis application. On motion of Minneapolis, the Commission consolidated the two proceedings. Thereafter, seven other railroads having interchange connections with'Western’s line intervened. Two of them sought authority, at all events, and two others of them sought authority, under stated conditions, to participate, under § 5 (2) (d) of the Act, in the acquisition of the Western stock on an equal basis with the successful applicant. The State of Illinois, 18 cities or towns and seven chambers of commerce located on or along Western’s line, two labor organizations representing Western’s employees, and á large number of shippers over Western’s line, intervened in support of the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application and in opposition to the Minneapolis application. After an/extended consolidated hearing before him, the Commission’s examiner issued a proposed report recommending approval of the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application and dismissal- of the Minneapolis application. Thereafter, upon exceptions, and briefs and-arguments in their support, Division 4 of the Commission issued its report. It was confronted, as it said, with- four alternative proposals, (1) for authorization of joint control of Western b^ the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania, (2) for authorization of sole control by the Minneapolis, (3) for authorization of two other railroads, at all events, and of two more railroads, under stated conditions, to participate in the' acquisition of the Western stock on an equal basis with the successful applicant, and (4) denial of both applications. ' The Commission observed that “[t]hese proceedings represent a new and more complicated phase in the administration of section 5,' since [they involve] 2 applications f<5r authority to control the same property, and petitions by 4 other carriers for inclusion in the transaction under varying circumstances.” It recognized that, under § 5 (2) of. thec Act and the National'Transportation Policy, it was required to “weigh whether each application is consistent with the public interest, with or without inclusion of other railroads, considering not only other intervening petitioners seeking such inclusion but also the other applicant and nonparticipating railroads as well.” It thought that the burden of proof was “most heavy for an applicant in a proceeding like this, because it must not only overbalance the claims of those seeking to share in the control but also of those seeking to exclude it from the transaction.” It conceived it to be its duty, under the Act and the National Transportation Policy, to “arrive at a standard of public interest and determine which of the various plans of control most nearly approximates it.” The Commission -found that the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania plan contemplates that Western “will continue to be operated as a separate and independent carrier with responsible management located along its lines”; that it “will continue to maintain its own solicitation forces and will be entirely free to solicit traffic in such manner as best to' serve the interests-of the Western,” and that all “existing routes and channels of trade.via the Western will be maintained and-kept open without discrimination between connecting lines of railroad.” It foiind, on the other hand, that the Minneapolis plan “unequivocally contemplates the disappearance of .the Western as an independent and neutral connection for the other 15 carriers with • which it presently works”; that “[f]or all practical purposes. the Western would be integrated,, consolidated, and merged into the Minneapolis for ownership, management, • and operation”; that features of the' Minneapolis plan “would be extremely harmful to other'carriers”; that Western’s headquarters office at Peoria would be eliminated, leaving only a trainmaster and a roadmaster at that point, and that the employment of most of Western’s* 24 executives and 225 other employees would be severed. The Commission further found that “[o]nly the Minneapolis and its supporting interveners, the States of Minnesota and South Dakota, advocate the disappearance of the Western as a separate and independent operating carrier,” and that all other parties to, and intervenors in, the proceedings “insist that the separate and independent' operation of the Western under its present local management is a public necessity.” It then found that the “[p] ublic interest demands that the present policies of the Western in all respects be continued.” It thereupon made the ultimate finding, required by § 5 (2) (b) of the Act, that the acquisition and plan of operation by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania, subject to stated conditions, was “within the scope of section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended; that the terms and conditions proposed [by them] are just and reasonable, and that the transaction will be consistent with the public interest.” The Commission then entered its order approving the Santa'Fe-Pennsylvania application, dismissing the Minneapolis application, and denying the petitions of the several intervening railroads which sought to participate in-the acquisition of the Western' stock. 295 I. C. C. 523. Thereafter, Minneapolis petitioned the whole Commission for a reconsideration, and alternatively requested that, if the approval of the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania; application be permitted to stand, it be authorized to participate equally with those railroads in the purchase of Western’s stock on' the same terms. That petition was denied. Minneapolis then timely filed a complaint in the District Court for Minnesota against the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission to vacate the Commission’s order. The States of Minnesota and South Dakota and their respective regulatory commissions, being interested in strengthening the Minneapolis, which operates in those States, intervened in support of the complaint. The defendants answered, asserting the full legality of the Commission’s order. The Santa Fe, the Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Company, the State of Illinois, the 18 cities and seven chambers of commerce and the numerous shippers who were intervenors before the Commission, intervened in opposition to the complaint. The Nickel Plate intervened, complaining that the Commission had improperly denied its request to participate in the purchase of the Western stock. A three-judge court was convened and, after hearing, rendered its opinion and judgment sustaining the Commission’s order. 165 F. Supp. 893. On separate appeals by the Minneapolis, the State of Minnesota and its regulatory commission, and the State of South Dakota and its regulatory commission, the case was brought here and we noted probable jurisdiction. 359 U. S. 933. All of those who were defendants and intervenors in opposition to the complaint in the District Court, except the Nickel Plate, are appellees in this Court. - Minneapolis, supported by the States of Minnesota and South Dakota, contends, first, that the Commission improperly adopted at the outset of its report the standard of “separate and independent management” of Western as the criterion governing the comparative merits of the rival plans, which was antithetic to its application, and thereby deprived it of “fair comparative consideration,” and that the District Court erred in • approving the Commission’s action. The record does not support that contention. Rather, it shows that the Commission’s governing standard was the “public interest,” although it ultimately did find that the public interest would be best served by Western’s continued operation as-a “separate and independent carrier.” We believe that the recited findings show that the Commission carefully “weighed” and considered “each application” in its labors to" determine which, if either, of them was “consistent with the public interest.” Its subsidiary findings (a) that the Minneapolis plan “unequivocally contemplates the disappearance of the Western as an independent and neutral connection for the other 15 carriers with which it presently works,” (b) that certain features of the Minneapolis plan “would be extremely harmful to other carriers,” (c) that the Minneapolis plan contemplates the elimination of Western’s office and the separation of its employees, and (d) that numerous witnesses insisted “that the separate and independent operation of the Western under its present local management is a public necessity,” fully support its conclusional finding that the “[pjublic interest demands that the present policies of the Western in all respects be continued.”. That finding, though antithetic to Minneapolis’ application, did not deprive it of “fair comparative consideration,” but, on the contrary, it seems to us, was made by the Commission after full and fair consideration, and the District Court did not err in so holding. Appellants’ principal contention appears to be that acquisition of control of Western by Santa Fe and Pennsylvania will create a combination in restraint of commerce in violation of § 1 of the Sherman7 Act and will lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, and that the Commission’s approval of their application was an abuse of power. - On their face these contentions would seem to run in the teeth of the language and purpose of § 5 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act. That section, in substance, provides that “The authority conferred by this section shall be exclusive and plenary, and any .carrier or corporation participating in . . . any transaction approved by the Commission thereunder, shall have full power ... to carry such transaction into effect and to own and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through said transaction . . . and any carriers . . .' participating in a transaction approved or authorized under the provisions of this section shall be and they are hereby relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws and of all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law . ; . insofar as may be necessary to enable [it] to carry into effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if.any, imposed by the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such transaction.” 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 54 Stat. 908, 49 U. S. C. §5(11). Section 5 (11) is both a more recent and a more specific expression of congressional policy than § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act, and in terms relieves the acquiring carrier, upon approval by the Commission of the acquisition, “from the operation of the antitrust laws . . . .” Although § 5 (11) does not authorize the Commission to “ignore” the antitrust laws, McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67, 80, there can be “little doubt that the Commission is not to measure proposals for. [acquisitions] by the standards of the antitrust laws.” 321 U. S., at 85-86. The problem is- one of accommodation of § 5 (2) ancl the antitrust legislation. The Conimission remains obligated to “estimate the scope and appraise the effects of the curtailment of competition which will result from the proposed [acquisition] and consider them along with, the advantages of improved service [and other matters in the public interest] to determine whether, the [acquisition] will assist in effectuating the over-all transportation policy.” 321 U. S., at 87. Even though such acquisitions might otherwise violate the antitrust laws, Congress has authorized the Commission to approve them, if it finds they are in the public interest, “because it recognized that in some circumstances they were appropriate for effectuation of the national transportation policy. It was informed that this policy would be furthered by 'encouraging the organization of stronger units’ in the . . . industry. And in authorizing those [acquisitions] it did not import the general policies of the anti-trust laws as a measure of their permissibility. It in terms relieved participants in appropriate [acquisitions] from the requirements of those laws. §5 (11).” 321 U. S., at 85. It must be presumed that, in enacting this legislation, Congress took account of the fact that railroads are subject to strict regulation and supervision. “Against this background, no other inference is possible but that, as a factor in determining the propriety of [railroad acquisitions] Jhe preservation of competition among carriers, although still a value, is significant chiefly as it aids in the attainment of the objectives of the national transportation policy.” 321 U. S., at 85-86. As respects railroad acquisitions, the Commission, is not so bound by the antitrust laws that it must permit them to overbear what it finds to be in “the public interest.” A contrary view would, in effect, permit the Commission to authorize only those acquisitions which would not offend those laws. “As has been said, this would render meaningless the exemption relieving the participants in a properly approved [acquisition] of the requirements of those laws . . . .” 321 U. S., at 86. Resolution of the conflicting considerations “is a complex task which requires extensive facilities, expert judgment and considerable knowledge of the transportation industry. Congress left that task to the Commission 'to the end that the wisdom and experience of that Commission may be used not only in connection with this form of transportation, but in its coordination of all other forms.’ 79 Cong. Rec. 12207. ‘The wisdom and experience of that commission/ not of the courts, must determine whether the proposed [acquisition] is ‘consistent with the public interest.’ Cf. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. Co., 215 U. S. 452; Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 351; United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U. S. 344; Purcell v. United States, 315 U. S. 381.” 321 U. S., at 87-88. Here, the Commission gave extensive consideration to the anticompetitive contentions advanced by appellants, devoting more than five pages of its report to that matter. It found that “[a] 11 the carriers endeavoring to participate in its control are in competition with Western”; that the “important thing is not whether there is possibility of competition, but whether there is probability of existing or potential competition being diminished or strangled by the Western under the control of the Santa Fe and the Pennsylvania.” After an extended analysis of the complex facts and conflicting evidence, the Commission found that control of Western by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania would not result in any significant lessening of competition. It pointed to the fact that although the Santa Fe’s “long haul" is to Chicago and the Pennsylvania’s “next to longest haul” is also to Chicago (its longest haul being to St. Louis) the Santa Fe has agreed, and is bound, “to place Lomax on a parity with Chicago from a solicitation standpoint, and . . . the Pennsylvania will recognize Effner as one of its principal interchanges along with Chicago and St. Louis”; that “there may be some diversion of traffic, but such diversion would not jeopardize the maintenance of adequate transportation service by the objecting intervening carriers.” The Commission also pointed to the fact that Western had been in a prolonged receivership until 1927 when George P. McNear acquired its stock at a receiver’s sale, Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. Acquisition, 124 I. C. C. 181. It further found that Western’s modern existence began at that time and, under the guidance of McNear, w.as built into' a fine railroad; that since McNear’s death, in 1947, the present management has continued, with much success, the policies he established. Those policies, the Commission found, were, and are, “to maintain strict neutrality between all connections, and to participate in any haul of traffic no matter how slight [as a bridge] carrier -through Peoria as an alternative route, bypassing the congested terminals of Chicago and St. Louis,” and that those policies are to be continued under the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania plan. ■ We think it is clear from this summary of its analysis and findings that the Commission fully estimated the scope and appraised the effects of any curtailment of competition which might result from the acquisition of Western by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania, and, after-having done so, concluded that their acquisition and plan of operation of Western would not result in any significant lessening of competition. Congress has left the task of making that determination to the wisdom and experience of the Commission. The determination it has made rests-upon adequate findings which are, in turn, supported by substantial evidence and is well within the limits of its discretion under the Act. Appellants argue that the Pennsylvania, in actuality, contracted to purchase 50c/< of the Western stock from Wilmington Trust Company, a' eo-trustee of the McNear trust, and that, since four persons were directors of both companies, that proposed stock purchase violates § 10 of the Clayton Act; that the Commission was without power to approve it; that, in any event, its action in “condoning” it was an abuse of power; and that the District Court, for those reasons also, erred in upholding the Commission’s order. The Commission found that the Santa Fe in entering into the contract of May 26, 1955, with the trustees of the McNear trust was “acting on behalf of that carrier alone.” ■ But even if we assume, for present purposes, that it was acting as well for the Pennsylvania, the result must be the same. Section-10 of the Clayton Act prohibits a common carrier engaged in commerce from having “any dealings, in securities” of more than $50,000, in the aggregate, in any one year, “with another corporation, . . . when the said common carrier shall have upon its board of directors' . . . any person who is at the same time a director [of] such other corporation . . . , except such purchases [as] shall be made ... by competitive bidding under regulations to be prescribed by [the] Commission.” 38 Stat. 734, 15 U. S. C. § 20. Section 10 of the Clayton Act is, of course, an antitrust law, and much of what we have just said relative to the problem of accommodation of § 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act and the antitrust law's is equally applicable to this contention. The evident purpose of § 10 of the Clayton. Act was- to prohibit a corporation from abusing a carrier by palming off upon it securities, supplies and other articles without competitive bidding and at excessive prices through overreaching by, or other misfeasance of, common directors, to the financial injury of the carrier and the consequent impairment of its ability to serve the public interest. But, even if this purchase of securities might, under other circumstances, violate -§ 10 of the Clayton Act, Congress, by § 5 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, has authorized the Commission to approve it if it finds that so doing is in the public interest. And Congress has expressly said that, upon such approval, the carrier shall be .relieved “from the operation of the anti-trust laws A contrary view would, in effect, permit the Commission to authorize only those stock purchases which would not, in the absence of § 5 (11), offend the antitrust laws. “As has been said; this would render meaningless the exemption relieving the participants in a properly approved [acquisition] of the requirements of those laws . . . .” McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, supra, at 86. Here, the Commission fully considered the contracts under which the Pennsylvania proposes to.acquire a 50% interest in the Western stock and all other factors bearing on that matter and, after doing so, approved them. That action by the Commission did not exceed the statutory limits within which Congress has confined its discretion. Minneapolis contends that § 5 (11) operates only in futuro and confers “no authority to purge the taint of a transaction illegal at the time it was brought to the Commission.” Whether there is merit in that contention, as a legal abstraction, we need not decide, for here the existing contractual arrangements through which Pennsylvania asks authority to acquire 50% of the Western stock look entirely to the future. Neither the stock sale and purchase contract betweeji the trustees and the Santa Fe nor the one between the Santa Fe and the Pennsylvania Company is a consummated- transaction, but each is expressly subject to, and, will become effective only upon, approval by the Commission. Apart from criminal prosecutions, with which we are not here concerned, it seems plain that approval of an acquisition by the Commission operates under § 5 (11), as that section says, to relieve the acquiring carrier “from the operation of the antitrust laws . . . Appellants next contend that the Commission violated § 8 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act .by failing to make findings which, they think, were compelled by the evidence. There can be no doubt that the Administrative Procedure Act applies to proceedings before the Commission, Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 907, and see Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. Co. v. United States, 344 U. S. 917. The last sentence of § 8 (b) provides: “All [administrative] decisions . . . shall become a part of the record and include a statement of (1) findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor, upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and (2) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial . thereof.” Upon the basis of that language, appellants argue that the Commission should have found that the price which the Santa Fe agreed to pay for the Western stock of $135 per share, was excessive. Though, the Commission made no express finding upon that , matter it did discuss it, pointing out that , the certified value of Western’s properties for ratemaking purposes was more than $13,500,000 ; that it has no outstanding preférred stock and is relatively free of debt; that it'has a fine earning record; that the transaction was at arm’s length; that Minneapolis had offered $133 per share for the stock within a few days of the time when the Santa -Fe contracted for its purchase at $135 per share; and that the Minneapolis sought authority in this proceeding to acquire the stock at the same price. The Commission concluded that if $135 per share was a fair price for the one it was also for the other. Upon the same basis, appellants also argue that the Commission should have found that the Minneapolis application was in the public interest in that its acquisition of Western would greatly strengthen both Minneapolis and Western by eliminating many duplicating facilities and by reducing operating expenses by more than $1,770,000 annually. The Commission did not make a specific finding upon that matter, but it did give consideration to it and found that most of that saving — more than $1,300,000 annually — would be at the expense of Western’s employees — a matter which, because of the express command of clause 4 of § 5 (2) (c) of the Interstate Commerce Act (see note 1), it evidently thought was not consistent with the public interest. Appellants further argue that the Commission should have found that the Minneapolis plan afforded adequate protection to Western’s employees by providing for their absorption into the Minneapolis as attrition among its own employees permitted. Again, although the Commission made no specific finding upon that contention it did consider and discuss it, and we think the law required no more. Appellants challenge the Commission’s failure to make a number of other subsidiary findings, all of which have been considered, but we find that they relate to contentions that are so collateral or immaterial that ,the law did not require specific findings upon them. By the express terms of § 8 (b), the Commission is not required to make subordinate findings on every collateral contention advanced, but only upon those issues of fact, law, or discretion which are “material.” ' From a thorough examination of the record, we are persuaded that the Commission has made adequate subsidiary findings upon all material issues and has made the ultimate findings required, by §5 (2), that they support the Commission’s order, and are, in turn, supported by substantial evidence. Finally, appellants contend that the District Court, because of inadequate subsidiary findings by the Commission, was unable to, or at least did not, afford them a proper judicial review, and merely “rubber stamped” the Commission’s order. Whether or not we approve all of the reasons and legal conclusions of the District Court, it is clear that it fairly considered and decided all of the issues raised by appellants, accorded to them a full and fair judicial review, and reached a right result. Accordingly the judgment is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. Section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act (24 Stat. 380, as amended, 54 Stat. 905, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2)) provides, in pertinent part, that: “(a) It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of' the Commission, as provided in subdivision (b) of this paragraph— “(i) for . . . two or more carriers jointly, to acquire control of another through ownership of its stock or otherwise .... “(b) Whenever a transaction is proposed under subdivision (a) of this paragraph, the carrier . . . seeking authority therefor shall present an application to the Commission, and thereupon the Commission shall notify . . . [designated parties], and shall afford reasonable opportunity for interested parties to be heard. If the Commission shall consider it necessary in order to determine whether the findings specified below may properly be made, it shall set said application for public hearing; and a public hearing shall be held in all cases where carriers by railroad are involved unless the Commission determines that a public hearing is not necessary in the public interest. If the Commission finds that, subject to such terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the proposed transaction is within the scope of subdivision (a) of this paragraph and will be consistent with the public interest, it'shall enter an order approving and authorizing such transaction, upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications, so found to be just and reasonable .... “(c) In passing upon any proposed transaction under the provisions of this paragraph, the Commission shall give weight to the following considerations, among others: (1) The effect of the proposed transaction upon adequate transportation service to the public: (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to include, other railroads in the territory involved in the proposed transaction; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the interest of the carrier employees affected. “(d) The Commission shall have authority in the case of a proposed transaction under this paragraph involving a railroad or railroads, as a prerequisite to its approval of the proposed transaction, to require, upon equitable terms, the inclusion of another railroad or other railroads in the territory involved, upon petition by such railroad or railroads requesting such inclusion, and upon a finding that such inclusion is consistent • with the public interest. “(f) As a condition of its approval, under this paragraph, of any transaction involving a carrier or carriers by railroad subject to the provisions of this chapter, the Commission shall require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected. . . .” The term “bridge carrier” appears to mean a short-line carrier which transports through traffic from one long-line carrier to another. During the negotiations, Minneapolis first offered $69.50, and later $80, per share for the stock. On April 15, 1955, the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania each obtained letter commitments from the trustees for the sale to each of them of 26% of the Western stock at a price of $100 per share. (Near the same time the Rock Island made a like offer to the trustees for 26% of the Western stock, but that offer was not accepted.) But a dispute arose — and apparently still exists between the trustees and Pennsylvania — with respect to the validity of those commitments. Thereupon, Minneapolis offered the trustees $133 per share for the Western stock, but that-offer was not accepted, and on May 26, 1955, the Santa Fe, acting-, as the Commission found, “on behalf of that carrier alone,” agreed with the trustees for the sale by the latter and purchase by the former of all the Western stock held by the trustees at a price of $135 per share, and those parties on that date entered into a contract, accordingly, subject to approval of the Commission. The contract of June 28, 1955, between the Santa Fe and the Pennsylvania Company provided that it wag without prejudice to any claims, causes of action or rights which Pennsylvania may have against the trustees of the McNear estate with respect to the letter commitment of April 15,1955, for the sale by the trustees to Pennsylvania of 26% of the Western stock; and that, in the event Pennsylvania should acquire from the trustees, under that letter commitment, all or any part of such shares, the obligation of the Santa Fe under the contract to sell Western shares to the Pennsylvania Company was to be reduced accordingly. It appears that litigation was then, and is yet, pending by Pennsylvania against the trustees for' the enforcement of the letter commitment of April 15, 1955. The contract also contained a covenant which, in essence, provided that (1) Western “will continue to be operated as a separate and independent carrier with responsible management located along its lines in order to preserve to shippers and communities the present direct access to its officials,” (2) that Western’s properties will be maintained and improved, (3) that Western “will, continue to maintain its own solicitation forces and will be entirely free to solicit traffic in such manner as best to serve the interests of” Western, (4)- that all “existing routes and channels of trade via [Western] will be maintained and kept- open without discrimination between connecting lines of railroad,” and (5) that the Board of Directors of Western shall. consist of 11 members, of whom one shall be the president of the company, two shall be officers of the Santa Fe, two shall be officers of the Pennsylvania' Company, or Pennsylvania, or both, and the remaining six shall be prominent citizens not connected-with either of the parties but selected by them through mutual agreement. See note 1. The New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company (“Nickel Plate”) and the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company (“Rock Island”) sought authority, under § 5 (2) (d) of.' the Act '(see note 1), to be included in the• acquisition of Western’s stock on an equal basis with the successful applicant or applicants. ' The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company (“Burlington”) ' and the Wabash Railroad Company • (“Wabash”) did not object to approval of the Santa Fe-:Pennsylvania application, provided the order required continuation of present routes and channels of trade via existing junctions and gateways and of all existing traffic and operating relations and arrangements, but they asked, in the event any railroad other than the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania be authorized to acquire an interest in Western’s stock, that they, too, be authorized to participate therein to the same extent as any such other railroad. The Illinois Central Railroad Company ("Illinois Central”), the Gulf, Mobile- & Ohio Railroad Company (“Gulf”) and the Chicago. & North Western Railway Company (“North Western”) asked that, if either application be approved, the order be Conditioned to require the maintenance of all routes and channels of trade via existing gateways. The Monon Railroad Company asked that if the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application be approved, the order contain a requirement that Pennsylvania shall grant to it certain trackage rights, 'and, if not done, that the Santa Fe-Pennsjdvania application be denied. See notes 6 and 7. 49 U. S. C., n.-preceding § 1, 54 Stát. 899. 15 U. S. C. § 1, 26 Stat. 209. ' 15 U. S. C. § 18,38 Stat. 731. It is clear that § 10 of the Clayton Act is included in the “antitrust laws” referred to in §5 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 12, provides that “ ‘Anti-trust laws,’ as used in 'sections 12, 13, 14-21, and 22-27 of this title, includes sections 1-27 of this title.” Moreover, §5 (11) avoids any ambiguity by including- “all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, Státe, or municipal.” The legislative history of § 10 of the Clayton Act, though meager, supports the view stated in the text. In fact, the language.of the several drafts of § 10, together with the types of abuses cited in support of its enactment, suggests strongly that the words “dealings in securities” were intended to cover only a carrier’s dealings with related persons in its own securities. See H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3; S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 47-48; S. Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 8-9; 51 Cong. Rec. 15943. 60 Stat. 242, 5 U. S. C. § 1007 (b).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PENNSYLVANIA et al. v. DELAWARE VALLEY CITIZENS’ COUNCIL FOR CLEAN AIR et al. No. 85-5. Argued March 3, 1986 Reargued October 15, 1986 Decided June 26, 1987 White, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III-A, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-B, IV, and V, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Powell and Scalia, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, -post, p. 731. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 735. Jay C. Waldman reargued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs on reargument were Henry G. Barr, John P. Krill, and John M. Hrubovcak. With him on the briefs on the original argument were Spencer A. Manthorpe and Messrs. Barr, Hrubovcak, and Krill. Donald B. Ayer reargued the cause for the United States as respondent under this Court’s Rule 19.6 in support of petitioners. Kathryn A. Oberly argued the cause for the United States on the original argument. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, F. Henry Habicht II, and Deputy Solicitor General Getter. James D. Crawford reargued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Joyce S. Meyers. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Bar Association by Eugene C. Thomas, John R. Hupper, Thomas D. Barr, and John H. Pickering; and for Joseph A. Bonjorno' et al. by Henry T. Reath and Michael M. Baylson. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Arizona et al. by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Suzanne E. Durrell, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Richard G. Opper, Attorney General of Guam, Corinne K. A. Watanabe, Attorney General of Hawaii, Jim Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, David L. Armstrong, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, James E. Tierney, Attorney General of Maine, Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, and Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Edward Lloyd Pittman, Attorney General of Mississippi, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Stephen E. Merrill, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, Michael C. Turpén, Attorney General of Oklahoma, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, William Broaddus, Attorney General of Virginia, Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, Charles G. Brown, Attorney General of West Virginia, and A. G. McClintock, Attorney General of Wyoming; and for Twelve Small Private Civil Rights Law Firms by John Leubsdorf. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, Parts I, II, and III-A of which represent the views of the Court, and Parts III-B, IV, and V of which are joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia. This case involves the award of an attorney’s fee to the prevailing party pursuant to § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604(d). h-H We set forth a detailed statement of the facts underlying this litigation in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546 (1986), and recite only an abbreviated version of those facts here. In 1977, the Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (hereinafter respondent) and the United States each filed suit to compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to comply with certain provisions of the Clean Air Act. The parties entered into a consent decree, approved by the District Court in 1978, which obligated the Commonwealth to establish a program for the inspection and maintenance of vehicle emissions systems in 10 counties in the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh areas by August 1, 1980. The Commonwealth failed to implement the program by this date, and protracted litigation ensued. Ultimately, in May 1983, the parties agreed to set June 1, 1984, as the date on which the Commonwealth would commence the inspection and maintenance program. Shortly after this agreement, respondent petitioned the District Court for attorney’s fees and costs for the work performed after the issuance of the consent decree. In determining the amount of fees to be awarded, the District Court divided the work performed by respondent’s counsel into nine phases. See 478 U. S., at 549-553. After computing the lodestar for each phase, the District Court adjusted this figure upward in phases four, five, and seven by doubling the lodestar to reflect the risk presumably faced by respondent that it would not prevail on these phases of the litigation. The District Court observed: “The contingent nature of plaintiff’s success has been apparent throughout this litigation. Plaintiffs entered the litigation against the U. S. Government and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The case involved new and novel issues, the resolution of which had little or no precedent. . . . [Plaintiffs have had to defend their rights under the consent decree due to numerous attempts by defendants and others to overturn or circumvent this Court’s Orders.” 581 F. Supp. 1412, 1431 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s enhancement of the fee award for contingency of success, 762 F. 2d 272, 282 (1985), a judgment that we now reverse. II We first focus on the nature of the issue before us. Under the typical fee-shifting statute, attorney’s fees are awarded to a prevailing party and only to the extent that party prevails. See, e. g., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129-130 (1980); Hensley v. Eckerkart, 461 U. S. 424, 435 (1983). Hence, if the case is lost, the loser is awarded no fee; and unless its attorney has an agreement with the client that the attorney will be paid, win or lose, the attorney will not be paid at all. In such cases, the attorney assumes a risk of nonpayment when he takes the case. The issue before us is whether, when a plaintiff prevails, its attorney should or may be awarded separate compensation for assuming the risk of not being paid. That risk is measured by the risk of losing rather than winning and depends on how unsettled the applicable law is with respect to the issues posed by the case and by how likely it is that the facts could be decided against the complainant. Looked at in this way, there are various factors that have little or no bearing on the question before us. First is the matter of delay. When plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorney’s fees depends on success, their lawyers are not paid until a favorable decision finally eventuates, which may be years later, as in this case. Meanwhile, their expenses of doing business continue and must be met. In setting fees for prevailing counsel, the courts have regularly recognized the delay factor, either by basing the award on current rates or by adjusting the fee based on historical rates to reflect its present value. See, e. g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 248 U. S. App. D. C. 107, 120-121, 769 F. 2d 796, 809-810 (1985); Louisville Black Police Officers Organization, Inc. v. Louisville, 700 F. 2d 268, 276, 281 (CA6 1983). Although delay and the risk of nonpayment are often mentioned in the same breath, adjusting for the former is a distinct issue that is not involved in this case. We do not suggest, however, that adjustments for delay are inconsistent with the typical fee-shifting statute. Second, that a case involves an issue of public importance, that the plaintiff’s position is unpopular in the community, or that defendant is difficult or obstreperous does not enter into assessing the risk of loss or determining whether that risk should be compensated. Neither does the chance that the court will find unnecessary and not compensate some of the time and effort spent on prosecuting the case. Third, when the plaintiff has agreed to pay its attorney, win or lose, the attorney has not assumed the risk of nonpayment and there is no occasion to adjust the lodestar fee because the case was a risky one. See, e. g., Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F. 2d 586, 593 (CA11 1984), where the court said that “[a] lawyer may not preserve a right of recourse against his client for fees and still expect to be compensated as if he had sacrificed completely his right to payment in the event of an unsuccessful outcome.” r-H h — I ► — I A Although the issue of compensating for assuming the risk of nonpayment was left open in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886 (1984), Justice Brennan wrote that “the risk of not prevailing, and therefore the risk of not recovering any attorney’s fees is a proper basis on which a district court may award an upward adjustment to an otherwise compensatory fee.” Id., at 902 (concurring). Most Courts of Appeals are of a similar view and have allowed upward adjustment of fee awards because of the risk of loss factor. The First Circuit, in Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F. 2d 605 (1985), for example, takes this approach and allows an upward adjustment to the lodestar to account for the contingency factor. In that case, the District Court entered judgment on a jury verdict finding an employer liable for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq., and two Puerto Rican statutes. The court awarded the prevailing party a lodestar fee amount of $56,500 and then increased that figure by 50% to account for the fact that because of the difficulties of the action and the novelty of the issue, “the plaintiffs’ attorneys . . . faced a contingency of losing all their time and effort.” 771 F. 2d, at 610. In sustaining the enhancement of fee awards based on contingency, the Court of Appeals relied on the legislative history of 42 U. S. C. § 1988, detailed several additional reasons as to why it is necessary to increase the lodestar figure for contingent-fee cases, and concluded that rather than compensating lawyers for unsuccessful claims, an adjustment of the lodestar figure may be necessary in particular cases to provide for the reasonable attorney’s fee envisioned by Congress. This construction of the fee-shifting statutes has not been universal. The District of Columbia Circuit is particularly skeptical of the purpose served by enhancing the lodestar amount to account for the risk of not prevailing. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 241 U. S. App. D. C. 11, 746 F. 2d 4 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U. S. 1021 (1985), the court reversed the trial court’s decision to double the lodestar based on the risk factor, citing a wide variety of problems with such an approach. The court found that, in theory, there should be no limit on the size of the fee if risk enhancement is permitted, for the less likely the chances of success in a particular case, the more “entitled” the prevailing party should be to have the fee award reflect acceptance of this risk. In a similar vein, the contingency factor penalizes the losing parties with the strongest and most reasonable defenses, thus “creating a perverse penalty for those least culpable.” 241 U. S. App. D. C., at 33, 746 F. 2d, at 26. Moreover, even if the risk of loss should be taken into account, “the chances of winning could not be set with anything approaching mathematical precision, and so vast increases in attorneys [fees] would derive from a spurious mathematical base.” Id., at 33-34, 746 F. 2d, at 26-27 (footnote omitted). On a more fundamental level, the court found that using the risk of loss to increase the lodestar figure compensates attorneys not only for their successful efforts in one case, but for their unsuccessful claims asserted in related cases. This not only “encourag[es] marginal litigation,” but raises “the reasonable question of ‘why the subsidy [for unsuccessful litigation] should come from the defendant in another case.’” Id., at 34, n. 138, 746 F. 2d, at 27, n. 138 (citations omitted). Such a scheme was deemed to be manifestly inconsistent with Congress’ intent to award attorney’s fees only to prevailing parties. Relying on this Court’s holding in Hensley that attorney’s fees could not be awarded for claims unrelated to those on which the party ultimately prevailed, the court reasoned: “The same logic which restricts compensation to those portions of a lawsuit directly related to the relief procured also forbids multiplying attorneys fees so as effectively to compensate counsel for other, losing claims which may be brought. The prevailing party may expect full compensation for prevailing claims; there is no provision for compensating losing, unrelated claims in the same case, or other losing cases which might or might not involve the same parties. Any crude multiplier derived simply from the plaintiff’s chance of success must be rejected as contrary to the congressional scheme.” Id., at 34-35, 746 F. 2d, at 27-28. Finally, the court held that even if a contingency enhancement, as opposed to a contingency multiplier, could be used to reflect the party’s initial chance of success, Blum made clear that such enhancements were proper only in the most exceptional of cases, and because “this case did not present an exceptional level of risk, no risk enhancement should be awarded.” Id., at 36, 746 F. 2d, at 29. The bar and legal commentators have been much interested in the issue. Some writers unqualifiedly have endorsed the concept of increasing the fee award to insure that lawyers will be adequately compensated for taking the risk of not prevailing. “The experience of the marketplace indicates that lawyers generally will not provide legal representation on a contingent basis unless they receive a premium for taking that risk.” Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281, 324-325 (1977). See also, Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1615 (1976); Comment, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 636, 708-711 (1974). Others have been considerably more reserved in their endorsement of a contingency bonus, focusing on four major problems with the use of this factor. First, evaluation of the risk of loss creates a potential conflict of interest between an attorney and his client, for in order to increase a fee award, a plaintiff’s lawyer must expose all of the weaknesses and inconsistencies in his client’s case, and a defendant’s attorney must either concede the strength of the plaintiff’s case in order to keep down the fee award, or “allo[w] the fee to be boosted by the contingency bonus [by] insisting that the plaintiff’s victory was freakish.” Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L. J. 473, 483 (1981) (Leubsdorf). Second, in order to determine the proper size of the contingency bonus, a court must retroactively estimate the prevailing party’s chances for success from the perspective of the attorney when he first considered filing the suit. Not only is this mathematically difficult to compute, but “once the result is known, it is hard for judges and lawyers to regain a perspective of ignorance and to treat the result as only one of several that were initially possible.” Id., at 486. The third problem with increasing the fee award to account for the risk of not prevailing is the same one identified by the courts which have questioned this practice: it penalizes the defendant with the strongest defense, and forces him to subsidize the plaintiff’s attorney for bringing other unsuccessful actions against other defendants. Id., at 488-491. See Note, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 375 (1980). Finally, because the contingency bonus cannot be determined with either certainty or accuracy, it “cannot be justified on the ground that it provides an appropriate incentive for litigation.” Leubsdorf 496. Cf. Note, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 677, 686, n. 51 (1983); Comment, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1074 (1986). There are other considerations. Fee-shifting removes the interest a paying client would have in ensuring that the lawyer is serving the client economically; the task of monitoring the attorney is shifted to the judge in separate litigation over fees if the plaintiff wins. Fee litigation occurs on a case-to-case basis and is often protracted, complicated, and exhausting. There is little doubt that it should be simplified to the maximum extent possible. If the decided cases are any measure, assessing the initial risk of loss when the case is over is a particularly uncertain matter, especially for a judge who is confident that he has correctly decided for the plaintiff, but then must inquire how weak the plaintiff’s case was and how likely it was that he, the judge, would have been mistaken. It may be absurd to ask the judge to “determine the probability that he would have decided the case incorrectly.” Id., at 1094. B The disagreement among the Circuits and commentators indicates that Congress has not clearly directed or authorized multipliers or enhancements for assuming the risk of loss. Neither the Clean Air Act nor § 1988 expressly provides for using the risk of loss as an independent basis for increasing an otherwise reasonable fee, and it is doubtful that the legislative history supports .the use of this factor. In concluding that risk-enhancement is authorized, Justice Brennan in Blum, 465 U. S., at 902, relied on the fact that one of the items to be relied on in setting a fee and enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714 (CA5 1974), is whether the fee is fixed or contingent, and that Congress endorsed consideration of this factor. See S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976) (S. Rep). But a careful reading of Johnson shows that the contingency factor was meant to focus judicial scrutiny solely on the existence of any contract for attorney’s fees which may have been executed between the party and his attorney. “The fee quoted to the client or the percentage of the recovery agreed to is helpful in demonstrating the attorney’s fee expectations when he accepted the case.” 488 F. 2d, at 718. See Leubsdorf 479, n. 38. At most, therefore, Johnson suggests that the nature of the fee contract between the client and his attorney should be taken into account when determining the reasonableness of a fee award, but there is nothing in Johnson to show that this factor was meant to reflect the contingent nature of prevailing in the lawsuit as a whole. Justice Brennan also noted that Congress cited Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F. R. D. 680 (ND Cal. 1974) (subsequently aff’d, 550 F. 2d 464 (CA9 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 436 U. S. 547 (1978)), as one of several cases which “correctly applied” the Johnson factors. Blum, supra, at 903. The court there increased the lodestar based, in part, on contingency-of-success considerations. But Congress also cited two other cases which it found also “correctly applied” the Johnson criteria. In Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 EPD ¶ 9444, p. 5047 (CD Cal. 1974), the District Court added a “Result Charge” to the basic fee award. This award was not intended to compensate the lawyers for assuming the risk of not prevailing on the merits; instead, as the label suggests, the court increased the - award because “counsel [had] achieved excellent results,” and “[t]he nature of the case made it difficult to litigate....” Id., at 5048. The court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 66 F. R. D. 483 (WDNC 1975), the third illustrative case cited .with approval by Congress, did not increase the basic fee award at all. Instead, after reviewing nine factors similar to those listed in Johnson, the court reduced the prevailing party’s fee request by nearly 15%, choosing to “err on the conservative side in dealing with any fee question” rather than “contribute unnecessarily to the overpricing of litigation in this or any other court.” 66 F. R. D., at 486. Given the divergence in both analysis and result between these three cases, the legislative history is, at best, inconclusive in determining whether Congress endorsed the concept of increasing the lodestar amount to reflect the risk of not prevailing on the merits. We must nevertheless come to a decision and have concluded that the judgment must be reversed. IV We are impressed with the view of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that enhancing fees for risk of loss forces losing defendants to compensate plaintiff’s lawyers for not prevailing against defendants in other cases.' This result is not consistent with Congress’ decision to adopt the rule that only prevailing parties are entitled to fees. If risk multipliers or enhancement are viewed as no more than compensating attorneys for their willingness to take the risk of loss and of nonpayment, we are nevertheless not at all sure that Congress intended that fees be denied when a plaintiff loses, but authorized payment for assuming the risk of an uncompensated loss. Such enhancement also penalizes the defendants who have the strongest case; and in theory, at least, would authorize the highest fees in cases least likely to be won and hence encourage the bringing of more risky cases, especially by lawyers whose time is not fully occupied with other work. Because it is difficult ever to be completely sure that a case will be won, enhancing fees for the assumption of the risk of nonpayment would justify some degree of enhancement in almost every case. Weighing all of these considerations, we are unconvinced that Congress intended the risk of losing a lawsuit to be an independent basis for increasing the amount of any otherwise reasonable fee for the time and effort expended in prevailing. As the Senate Report observed: “In computing the fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, ‘for all time reasonably expended on a matter.’ Davis, supra; Stanford Daily, supra, at 684.” S. Rep. 6. The contrary argument is that without the promise of multipliers or enhancement for risk-taking, attorneys will not take cases for clients who cannot pay, and the fee-shifting statutes will therefore not serve their purpose. We agree that a fundamental aim of such statutes is to make it possible for those who cannot pay a lawyer for his time and effort to obtain competent counsel, this by providing lawyers with reasonable fees to be paid by the the losing defendants. But it does not follow that fee enhancement for risk is necessary or allowable. Surely that is not the case where plaintiffs can afford to pay and have agreed to pay, win or lose. The same is true where any plaintiff, impecunious or otherwise, has a damages case that competent lawyers would take in the absence of fee-shifting statutes. Nor is it true in those cases where plaintiffs secure help from organizations whose very purpose is to provide legal help through salaried counsel to those who themselves cannot afford to pay a lawyer. It is also unlikely to be true in any market where there are competent lawyers whose time is not fully occupied by other matters. The issue thus involves damages cases that lawyers would not take, not because they are too risky (the fee-shifting statutes should not encourage such suits to be brought), but because the damages likely to-be recovered are not sufficient to provide adequate compensation to counsel, as well as those frequent cases in which the goal is to secure injunctive relief to the exclusion of any claim for damages. In both situations, the fee-shifting statutes guarantee reasonable payment for the time and effort expended if the case is won. Respondent’s position is that without the prospect of being awarded fees exceeding such reasonable payment, plaintiffs with such cases will be unable to secure the help that the statutes aimed to provide. We are not persuaded that this will be the case. Indeed, it may well be that using a contingency enhancement is superfluous and unnecessary under the lodestar approach to setting a fee. The reasons a particular lawsuit are considered to be “risky” for an attorney are because of the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, and because of the potential for protracted litigation. Moreover, when an attorney ultimately prevails in such a lawsuit, this success will be primarily attributable to his legal skills and experience, and to the hours of hard work he devoted to the case. These factors, however, are considered by the court in determining the reasonable number of hours expended and the reasonable hourly rate for the lodestar, and any further increase in this sum based on the risk of not prevailing would result not in a “reasonable” attorney’s fee, but in a windfall for an attorney who prevailed in a difficult case. It may be that without the promise of risk enhancement some lawyers will decline to take cases; but we doubt that the bar in general will so often be unable to respond that the goal of the fee-shifting statutes will not be achieved. In any event, risk enhancement involves difficulties in administration and possible inequities to those who must pay attorney’s fees; and in the absence of further legislative guidance, we conclude that multipliers or other enhancement of a reasonable lodestar fee to compensate for assuming the risk of loss is impermissible under the usual fee-shifting statutes. Even if § 304(d) and other typical fee-shifting statutes are construed to permit supplementing the lodestar in appropriate cases by paying counsel for assuming the risk of nonpayment, for the reasons set out below, it was error to do so in this case. V Section 304(d), like § 1988, does not indicate that adjustment for risk should be the rule rather than the exception; neither does it require such an adjustment in any case. At most, it leaves the matter of risk enhancement to the informed discretion of the courts. There are, however, severe difficulties and possible inequities involved in making upward adjustments for assuming the risk of nonpayment, and we deem it appropriate, in order to guide the exercise of the trial courts’ discretion in awarding fees, to adopt here the approach followed in Blum in dealing with other multipliers. As in that case, payment for the time and effort involved— the lodestar — is presumed to be the reasonable fee authorized by the statute, and enhancement for the risk of nonpayment should be reserved for exceptional cases where the need and justification for such enhancement are readily apparent and are supported by evidence in the record and specific findings by the courts. Blum, 465 U. S., at 898-901. For several reasons, the circumstances of this case do not justify the risk multiplier employed by the District Court. First, the District Court doubled the lodestar in three phases of the case in recognition of the risk of loss, saying that the “contingent nature of plaintiffs’ success has been apparent” from the outset, that plaintiffs entered the litigation against the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and that the case involved new and novel issues, the resolution of which had little or no precedent. Furthermore, they had to “defend their rights under the consent decree due to numerous attempts by defendants and others to overturn or circumvent this court’s orders.” 581 F. Supp., at 1431. This case, however, concerns only the reasonable fee for work done after the consent decree was entered, and fees have already been awarded for work done before that time. The risk of nonpayment should be determined at the beginning of the litigation. Lewis v. Coughlin, 801 F. 2d 570, 576 (CA2 1986); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F. 2d 546, 558 (CA10 1983). Whatever counsel thought the risk of losing was at the outset, it is doubtful that counsel anticipated a similar risk in enforcing a decree if plaintiff was successful in having one entered. In any event, the District Court did not specifically identify any new and novel issues, and we fail to discern any, that emerged in the long process of enforcing the court decree in accordance with its terms. And whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was a substantial opponent or whether it tried to circumvent the decree has little or nothing to do with whether the there was a real risk of not persuading the District Court to enforce its own decree. The matter may have been difficult, wearing, and time consuming, but that kind of effort has been recognized in the lodestar award. Second, if it be assumed that this is one of the exceptional cases in which enhancement for assuming the risk of nonpayment is justified, we conclude that doubling the lodestar for certain phases of the work was excessive. We have alluded to the uncertainties involved in determining the risk of not prevailing and the burdensome nature of fee litigation. We deem it desirable and an appropriate application of the statute to hold that if the trial court specifically finds that there was a real risk-of-not-prevailing issue in the case, an upward adjustment of the lodestar may be made, but, as a general rule, in an amount no more than one-third of the lodestar. Any additional adjustment would require the most exacting justification. This limitation will at once protect against windfalls for attorneys and act as some deterrence against bringing suits in which the the attorney believes there is less than a 50-50 chance of prevailing. Riskier suits may be brought, and if won, a reasonable lodestar may be awarded, but risk enhancement will be limited to one-third of the lodestar, if awarded at all. Here, even assuming an adjustment for risk was justified, the multiplier employed was excessive. Third, whatever the risk of winning or losing in a specific case might be, a fee award should be informed by the statutory purpose of making it possible for poor clients with good claims to secure competent help. Before adjusting for risk assumption, there should be evidence in the record, and the trial court should so find, that without risk enhancement plaintiff would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other relevant market. Here, there were no such findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Section 304(d) provides, in relevant part: “The Court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the Court determines such award is appropriate.” Last Term in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546 (1986), we agreed with the Court of Appeals that in awarding attorney’s fees under § 304(d) the courts should follow the principles and ease law governing the award of such fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which provides that in the actions specified in that section “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” At this time, respondent was awarded an attorney’s fee for work done by its counsel, the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (PILCOP), prior to the date of the consent decree. We granted certiorari last Term, 474 U. S. 815 (1984), heard argument, and issued an opinion holding that respondent was entitled to attorney’s fees under § 304(d) for its counsel’s work done in certain administrative proceedings because the work “was crucial to the vindication of Delaware Valley’s rights under the consent decree . . . .” 478 U. S., at 561. We also concluded that the District Court erred by enhancing the fee award based on the “superior quality” of counsel’s performance, reasoning that respondent did not show “why the lodestar did not provide a reasonable fee award reflecting the quality of representation . . . .” Id., at 567. We did not, however, address the merits of the question now before of us, an issue that was left open in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886 (1984). We thought that reargument on this issue would be beneficial. We therefore restored this aspect of the case to the docket for decision this Term. 478 U. S., at 568. Numerous Courts of Appeals, acting under fee-shifting statutes, have approved an upward adjustment of the lodestar to compensate for the risk of not prevailing. See, e. g., Crumbaker v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 781 F. 2d 191, 196-197 (CA Fed. 1986); Vaughns v. Board of Ed. of Prince Georges County, 770 F. 2d 1244 (CA4 1986), aff’g 698 F. Supp. 1262, 1285-1286 (Md. 1984); Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 712 F. 2d 165, 169-170 (CA5 1983); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Ed., 773 F. 2d 677, 683, 686 (CA6 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1083 (1986); Craik v. Minnesota State University Bd., 738 F. 2d 348, 350-351 (CA8 1984); White v. Richmond, 713 F. 2d 458, 462 (CA9 1983); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F. 2d 546, 557-558 (CA10 1983); Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F. 2d 586, 591 (CA11 1984). In addition to the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, other courts have refused risk enhancement for a variety of reasons. See, e. g., Lewis v. Coughlin, 801 F. 2d 570, 576 (CA2 1986) (upward adjustment vacated for failure to evaluate risk of loss); Lanasa v. New Orleans, 619 F. Supp. 39, 50-51 (ED La. 1985) (settlement for low money damages figure could have been agreed to much earlier in litigation); Littlejohn v. Null Mfg. Co., 619 F. Supp. 149, 152 (WDNC 1985) (attorney received fully compensatory fee without adjustment); Bennett v. Central Telephone Co. of Illinois, 619 F. Supp. 640, 653 (ND Ill. 1985) (lack of supporting evidence and high hourly rates); EEOC v. Burlington Northern Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1046, 1061-1062 (ND Ill. 1985) (high hourly rates and risk of nonsuccess not unusually high); Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 613 F. Supp. 824, 835 (SDNY 1985) (no great incentive needed to encourage appellee to defend its $276 million antitrust judgment on appeal); Cook v. Block, 609 F. Supp. 1036, 1043-1044 (DC 1985) (counsel guaranteed payment by client even if suit was unsuccessful); Cherry v. Rockdale County, 601 F. Supp. 78, 80-81 (ND Ga. 1984) (insufficient evidence supporting adjustment); Inmates of Maine State Prison v. Zitnay, 590 F. Supp. 979, 987 (Me. 1984) (contingency already reflected in lodestar); Rank v. Balshy, 590 F. Supp. 787, 799-800 (MD Pa. 1984) (contingency already reflected in lodestar). What the court viewed as the simple economics of the practice of law played a major part in the Court of Appeals’ analysis: “[T]he lodestar figure alone does not differentiate between the case taken on a full retainer and a case in which an attorney spends many hours over a period of months or years with no assurance of any pay if the suit is unsuccessful. Even if the client ultimately prevails, the burden of supporting salaried employees and fixed costs during the course of the contingent litigation can be substantial. “Moreover, the attorney may face a second risk once his clients has prevailed — that the court will find some of his time duplicative, unnecessary, or inefficiently expended. “We think it clear that Congress did not intend that the enforcement of civil rights be limited primarily to those able to pay an attorney a full retainer or attract one of the few pro bono legal service organizations to their cause . . . [to] deny all considerations of the added burden and additional risks an attorney under a contingent fee agreement may have to bear does not strike us as ‘reasonable.’” 771 F. 2d, at 612-613 (citations omitted). We note that some of the factors mentioned by the Court of Appeals are, in our mind, irrelevant to whether there should be separate compensation for assuming the risk of nonpayment. The Seventh Circuit has ruled that “the risk of losing ‘alone does not justify the use of a multiplier.”’ McKinnon v. Berwyn, 750 F. 2d 1383, 1392 (1984) (citations omitted). That court followed the reasoning of Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 241 U. S. App. D. C. 11, 746 F. 2d 4 (1984), finding that “[t]he fundamental problem of a risk bonus is that it compensates attorneys, indirectly but effectively, for bringing unsuccessful.. . suits, even though the attorney’s fee statute is expressly limited to cases where the party seeking the fee prevails.” 750 F. 2d, at 1392. The court also reasoned that, in cases where the attorney has entered into a contingent-fee contract with his client, the attorney is already being compensated for the risk of loss, and “is not entitled to more insurance in the form of a risk multiplier.” Id., at 1393. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy Inc., 776 P. 2d 646 (CA7 1985), and Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F. 2d 320 (CA7 1986), may evidence some withdrawal from that position, but in a still later case the Court of Appeals, citing McKinnon, said that “this circuit has not favored the use of risk multipliers.” In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 810 F. 2d 601, 608 (1986). Hearings before a congressional Subcommittee also illuminate the differing views about the desirability and necessity of enhancement for the risk of loss. Hearings on S. 2802 before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Hearings on S. 1580 et al. before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). In a similar vein, “[i]f we want to encourage private attorney general suits, risky plaintiffs’ test litigation, or claims for nonmonetary relief, forbidding the shifting of compensation for risk could deter the bringing of such cases.” Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L. J. 651, 676. The District Court employed an interesting approach in denying a risk multiplier in Cherry v. Rockdale County, 601 F. Supp., at 80-81. The court noted that risk enhancement is justified only if it is needed to provide compensation at a sufficient level to attract capable advocates. Because no evidence had been proffered showing what level of compensation was necessary to so attract lawyers, there was an insufficient evidentiary base upon which to award a fee enhancement. The court then argued “by way of illustration only,” why in the ease before it the evidence would not support a risk multiplier. According to a national survey to which the court had access, if the two attorneys requesting fees were paid at the rate that the top 25% of law firm partners admitted at the same time were paid, they would earn $77,800 and $89,800, respectively, per year. If they were associates, their annual salaries would be $56,800 and $61,300. This same survey showed that practitioners in small firms had an average overhead expense of $47,000 per lawyer. The court assumed that a reasonably diligent lawyer should bill 2,000 hours per year (40 hours per week multiplied by 50 weeks). The court relied on the parties’ affidavits that stated a reasonable hourly wage for these attorneys was $100. The court then concluded that if the attorneys lost one-third of their cases a year, their compensation would still be within the upper 25% of compensation for all lawyers— i. e., $85,000 (($200,000 minus $68,000 (uncollectible)) minus $47,000 (overhead) equals $85,000). Any enhancement, the court observed, was simply unnecessary. If the lawyers lost one-half of all then-cases in a year, some enhancement might be necessary, as compensation based on this loss rate would be only $53,000. We note the argument advanced by amici Arizona et al., but not dealt with by the parties or the courts below, that the attorneys for respondent, PILCOP, could not have properly accorded any weight whatsoever to the perceived risk of not prevailing when deciding to undertake representation in this case, due to PILCOP’s tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code. Brief for Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae 56-57. In its fee petition to the District Court, PILCOP asserted that it is “a non-profit, tax exempt law corporation,” and that it was prohibited by certain Internal Revenue Service (IRS) “regulations” from accepting fees from its clients, including respondent. App. 161a-162a. PILCOP was undoubtedly referring to Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 575, which provides that a public interest law firm desiring tax-exempt status may not accept fees for its services except in accordance with procedures approved by the IRS. Subsequently, the IRS issued Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975-1 Cum. Bull. 662, which amplified Rev. Proc. 71-39 by setting forth procedures under which a public interest law firm could accept fees for its services and maintain its charitable organization, tax-exempt status. These procedures included the requirement, among others, that the public interest law firm “not use the likelihood or probability of a fee award as a consideration in its selection of cases.” The argument advanced is that the tax-exempt law firm really risks nothing in cases like this and that because PILCOP undertook to represent respondent’s cause without regard to the likelihood of eventually recovering fees under § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, it follows that PILCOP could not validly have entertained the notion that if respondent did ultimately succeed in the litigation, its fee award would possibly have been enhanced due to the risk of not prevailing. Amici note that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit does not allow a contingency multiplier in awarding fees to nonprofit law firms. New York Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F. 2d 1136 (1983). We do not pass on the submission of the amici. “The test. . . should be an objective one based on the likely response of the bar to the case’s pre-trial merits, rather than on the judge’s subjective opinion of the merits.” Lewis v. Coughlin, 801 F. 2d, at 575. “[A]n attorney’s fee award should be only as large as necessary to attract competent counsel” and “one relevant factor bearing on high-risk is whether other counsel had declined to take the case because there was little or no prospect of earning a fee.” Lewis v. Coughlin, supra, at 576.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GUNTHER v. SAN DIEGO & ARIZONA EASTERN RAILWAY CO. No. 27. Argued November 8, 1965. Decided December 8, 1965. Charles W. Decker argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Clifton Hildebrand. Waldron A. Gregory argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William R. Denton. Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., and Richard R. Lyman filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioner, Gunther, worked as a fireman for respondent railroad for eight years, from 1916 to 1924, and as an engineer for 30 years, from 1924 until December 30, 1954. On that date, shortly after his seventy-first birthday, he was removed from active service because of an alleged physical disability. The railroad’s action was taken on the basis of reports made by its physicians, after physical examinations of petitioner, that in their opinion he was no longer physically qualified to work as a locomotive engineer because his “heart was in such condition that he would be likely to suffer an acute coronary episode.” Dissatisfied with the railroad doctors’ findings, Mr. Gunther went to a recognized specialist who, after examination, concluded that petitioner was qualified physically to continue work as an engineer. On the basis of this report petitioner requested the railroad to join him in the selection of a three-doctor board to re-examine his physical qualifications for return to service. The railroad refused. This disagreement led to prolonged litigation which has reached us 11 years after the controversy arose. When the railroad refused to consent to the appointment of a new board of doctors to re-examine petitioner or to restore him to service, he filed a claim for reinstatement and back pay with the Railroad Adjustment Board, which was created by § 3 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, to adjust, among other things, disputes of railroads and their employees “growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning . . . rules, or working conditions . ...” The Adjustment Board, over the protests of the railroad, decided it had jurisdiction of the grievance and then, referring to past practice in similar cases, proceeded, as its findings show, to appoint a committee of three qualified physicians, to re-examine petitioner, “one chosen by carrier and one by the employe and the third by the two so selected, for the purpose of determining the facts as to claimant’s disability and the propriety of his removal from service.. ..” Subsequently, this committee of doctors examined petitioner and decided by a majority vote that he was physically qualified to act as an engineer, contrary to the prior findings of the railroad’s doctors. Upon the basis of these findings the Adjustment Board decided that the railroad had been wrong in disqualifying petitioner for service and sustained his claim “for reinstatement with pay for all time lost from October 15, 1955 . . . .” The railroad refused to comply with the Board’s order and petitioner as authorized by the Act filed this action in a district court of the United States for an appropriate court order to enforce the Adjustment Board’s award. After hearings the District Court, in its third opinion in the case, held the award erroneous and refused to enforce it. The District Court’s refusal was based on its conclusion that there were no express or implied provisions in the collective bargaining contract which in the court’s judgment limited in any way what it found to be the absolute right of the railroad, in absence of such provisions, to remove petitioner from active service whenever its physicians found in good faith “that plaintiff was physically disqualified from such service.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the interpretation put upon the contract by the District Court, and thereby rejected the Board’s interpretation of the contract and its decision on the merits of the dispute. 336 F. 2d 543. We granted certiorari because the holding of the two courts below seemed, in several respects, to run counter to the requirements of the Railway Labor Act as we have construed it. 380 U. S. 905. I. Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act provides that “disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements” are to be handled by the Adjustment Board. In § 3 Congress has established an expert body to settle “minor” grievances like petitioner’s which arise from day to day in the railroad industry. The Railroad Adjustment Board, composed equally of representatives of management and labor is peculiarly familiar with the thorny problems and the whole range of grievances that constantly exist in the railroad world. Its membership is in daily contact with workers and employers, and knows the industry’s language, customs, and practices. See Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239, 243-244. The Board’s decision here fairly read shows that it construed the collective bargaining provisions which secured seniority rights, together with other provisions of the contract, as justifying an interpretation of the contract guaranteeing to petitioner “priority in service according to his seniority and pursuant to the agreement so long as he is physically qualified.” The District Court, whose opinion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, however, refused to accept the Board’s interpretation of this contract. Paying strict attention only to the bare words of the contract'and invoking old common-law rules for the interpretation of private employment contracts, the District Court found nothing in the agreement restricting the railroad’s right to remove its employees for physical disability upon the good-faith findings of disability by its own physicians. Certainly it cannot be said that the Board’s interpretation was wholly baseless and completely without reason. We hold that the District Court and the Court of Appeals as well went beyond their province in rejecting the Adjustment Board’s interpretation of this railroad collective bargaining agreement. As hereafter pointed out Congress, in the Railway Labor Act, invested the Adjustment Board with the broad power to arbitrate grievances and plainly intended that interpretation of these controversial provisions should be submitted for the decision of railroad men, both workers and management, serving on the Adjustment Board with their long experience and accepted expertise in this field. II. The courts below were also of the opinion that the Board went beyond its jurisdiction in appointing a medical board of three physicians to decide for it the question of fact relating to petitioner’s physical qualifications to act as an engineer. We do not agree. The Adjustment Board, of course, is not limited to common-law rules of evidence in obtaining information. The medical board was composed of three doctors, one of whom was appointed by the company, one by petitioner, and the third by these two doctors. This not only seems an eminently fair method of selecting doctors to perform this medical task but it appears from the record that it is commonly used in the railroad world for the very purpose it was used here. In fact the record shows that under respondent’s present collective bargaining agreement with its engineers provision is made for determining a dispute precisely like the one before us by the appointment of a board of doctors in precisely the manner the Board used here. This Court has said that the Railway Labor Act’s “provisions dealing with the Adjustment Board were to be considered as compulsory arbitration in this limited field.” On a question like the one before us here, involving the health of petitioner, and his physical ability to operate an engine, arbitrators would probably find it difficult to find a better method for arriving at the truth than by the use of doctors selected as these doctors were. We reject the idea that the Adjustment Board in some way breached its duty or went beyond its power in relying as it did upon the finding of this board of doctors. III. Section 3 First (m) provides that Adjustment Board awards “shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award.” The award of the Board in this case, based on the central finding that petitioner was wrongfully removed from service is twofold, consisting both of an order of reinstatement and the money award for lost earnings. Thus there arises the question of whether the District Court may open up the Board’s finding on the merits that the railroad wrongfully removed petitioner from his job merely because one part of the Board’s order contained a money award. We hold it cannot. This Court time and again has emphasized and re-emphasized that Congress intended minor grievances of railroad workers to be decided finally by the Railroad Adjustment Board. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, the Court gave a Board decision the same finality that a decision of arbitrators would have. In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U. S. 601, the Court discussed the legislative history of the Act at length and pointed out that it “was designed for effective and final decision of grievances which arise daily” and that its “statutory scheme cannot realistically be squared with the contention that Congress did not purpose to foreclose litigation in the courts over grievances submitted to and disposed of by the Board . . . .” 360 U. S., at 616. Also in Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 373 U. S. 33, the Court said that prior decisions of this Court had made it clear that the Adjustment Board provisions were to be considered as “compulsory arbitration in this limited field,” p. 40, “the complete and final means for settling minor disputes,” p. 39, and “a mandatory, exclusive, and comprehensive system for resolving grievance disputes.” P. 38. The Railway Labor Act as construed in the foregoing and other opinions of this Court does not allow a federal district court to review an Adjustment Board’s determination of the merits of a grievance merely because a part of the Board’s award, growing from its determination on the merits, is a money award. The basic grievance here — that is, the complaint that petitioner has been wrongfully removed from active service as an engineer because of health — has been finally, completely, and irrevocably settled by the Adjustment Board’s decision. Consequently, the merits of the wrongful removal issue as decided by the Adjustment Board must be accepted by the District Court. IV. There remains the question of further proceedings in this case with respect to the money aspect of the Board’s award. The Board did not determine the amount of back pay due petitioner on account of his wrongful removal from service. It merely sustained petitioner’s claim for “reinstatement with pay for all time lost from October 15, 1955.” Though the Board’s finding on the merits of the wrongful discharge must be accepted by the District Court, it has power under the Act to determine the size of the money award. The distinction between court review of the merits of a grievance and the size of the money award was drawn in Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra, at pp. 40-41, when it was said that the computation of a time-lost award is “an issue wholly separable from the merits of the wrongful discharge issue.” On this separable issue the District Court may determine in this action how much time has been lost by reason of the wrongful removal of petitioner from active service, and any proper issues that can be raised with reference to the amount of money necessary to compensate for the time lost. In deciding this issue as to how much money petitioner will be entitled to receive because of lost time, the District Court will bear in mind the fact that the decision on the merits of the wrongful removal issue related to the time when the Board heard and decided the case. Seven years have elapsed since that time, long enough for many changes to have occurred in connection with petitioner’s health. This would, of course, be relevant in determining the amount of money to be paid him in a lawsuit which can, as the statute provides, proceed on this separable issue “in all respects as other civil suits” where damages must be determined. The judgments of the courts below are reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court for consideration not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U. S. C.-§151 et seq. (1964 ed.). Section 3 First (i), 48 Stat. 1191, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (i) (1964 ed.). This section also provides that disputes between railroad employees and their employers “failing to reach an adjustment . . . may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.” Section 3 First (p), 48 Stat. 1192, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (p) (1964 ed.), provides: “If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment Board within the time limit in such order, the petitioner . . . may file in the District Court of the United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier ... a petition setting forth briefly . . . the order of the division of the Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in the District Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the division of the Adjustment Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated .... The district courts are empowered, under the rules of the court governing actions at law, to make such order and enter such judgment, by writ of mandamus or otherwise, as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order of the division of the Adjustment Board.” 192 F. Supp. 882, 198 F. Supp. 402. The third opinion written by the court is not reported. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, 39. 48 Stat. 1191, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (m) (1964 ed.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF CALIFORNIA v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE No. 83-372. Argued April 17, 1984 Decided June 11, 1984 Patti S. Kitching, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were John K. Van De Kamp, Attorney General, and Edmond B. Mamer, Deputy Attorney General. David A. Strauss argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, and Joan M. Bernott. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Delaware et al. by Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, and Diane G. Motz, Assistant Attorney General, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, and John Fidele, Deputy Attorney General, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Kent G. Harbison, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, and William F. Gary, Deputy Attorney General, and LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Jay A. Molluso, Chief Deputy Attorney General. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, the Franchise Tax Board of California, determined that four employees of appellee United States Postal Service were delinquent in the payment of their state income taxes. The Board served process on the Postal Service directing it to withhold the amounts of the delinquencies from the employees’ wages, pursuant to § 18817 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, which authorizes the Board to require any employer to withhold delinquent taxes from an employee’s salary and transfer those funds to the Board. The question presented is whether the Postal Service was obligated to honor these “orders to withhold.” I — I When the Postal Service refused to comply with the four orders to withhold, the Board filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California asserting that the Service was liable under the Revenue and Taxation Code for failing to honor the orders, and invoking federal jurisdiction pursuant to 39 U. S. C. § 409(a) and 28 U. S. C. § 1339. The District Court entered summary judgment for the Postal Service. It held that 5 U. S. C. §5517, which authorized the agreement that California and the United States had made regarding the withholding of state income taxes from the pay of federal employees, applies only to withholding of anticipated tax liabilities and not to delinquent liabilities. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that 5 U. S. C. § 5517 excused the Service from complying with the orders. Employment Development Department v. United States Postal Service, 698 F. 2d 1029 (CA9.1983). The Court of Appeals rejected the Board’s argument that § 5517 did not prohibit issuance of the orders, and also rejected the argument that the provision in 39 U. S. C. § 401(1) declaring that the Postal Service may “sue and be sued in its official name” had waived any sovereign immunity that the Service might possess. This appeal followed. In this Court, the Postal Service does not argue that 5 U. S. C. § 5517 and the agreement pursuant thereto between the United States and California prohibit the issuance of an order to withhold against the Postal Service with respect to delinquent tax liabilities of its employees. To the contrary, the Postal Service expressly concedes that it is amenable to judicial process and could be required to honor a garnishment order requiring it to withhold the salary of a federal employee in order to satisfy a delinquent tax liability if issued by a state court. Instead, the Postal Service contends that although it must obey a judicial order, it retains sovereign immunity with respect to state administrative tax levies. It argues that while the provision that the Postal Service can “sue and be sued in its official name” waives immunity from suit, it does not apply to administrative proceedings. The Board does not dispute the proposition that, unless waived, sovereign immunity prevents the creditor of a federal employee from collecting a debt through a judicial order requiring the United States to garnishee the employee’s salary. See Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20 (1845). Rather, it places its primary reliance on 39 U. S. C. § 401(1), which indicates that the Postal Service may “sue and be sued.” Thus the question in this case is whether this statutory waiver of sovereign immunity extends to the Board’s orders to withhold. This Court construed a statute providing that an agency created by Congress — the Federal Housing Authority — was empowered “to sue and be sued,” in FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1940). In Burr the question presented was whether the agency had to honor a garnishment order issued by a state court. The Court began by observing: “Since consent to ‘sue and be sued’ has been given by Congress, the problem here merely involves a determination of whether or not garnishment comes within the scope of that authorization.” Id., at 244. It continued: “[W]e start from the premise that such waivers by Congress of governmental immunity in case of such federal instrumentalities should be liberally construed. This policy is in line with the current disfavor of the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit, as evidenced by the increasing tendency of Congress to waive the immunity where federal governmental corporations are concerned. . . . Hence, when Congress establishes such an agency, authorizes it to engage in commercial and business transactions with the public, and permits it to ‘sue and be sued,’ it cannot be lightly assumed that restrictions on that authority are to be implied. Rather if the general, authority to ‘sue and be sued’ is to be delimited by implied exceptions, it must be clearly shown that certain types of suits are not consistent with the statutory or constitutional scheme, that an implied restriction of the general authority is necessary to avoid grave interference with the performance of a governmental function, or that for other reasons it was plainly the purpose of Congress to use the ‘sue and be sued’ clause in a narrow sense. In the absence of such showing, it must be presumed that when Congress launched a governmental agency into the commercial world and endowed it with authority to ‘sue or be sued,’ that agency is not less amenable to judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstances would be.” Id., at 245 (footnote omitted). The Court then explained why garnishment orders fell within the scope of the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity: “Clearly the words ‘sue and be sued’ in their normal connotation embrace all civil process incident to the commencement or continuance of legal proceedings. Garnishment and attachment commonly are part and parcel of the process, provided by statute, for the collection of debt. . . . [Hjowever it may be denominated, whether legal or equitable, and whenever it may be available, whether prior to or after final judgment, garnishment is a well-known remedy available to suitors. To say that Congress did not intend to include such civil process in the words 'sue and be sued’ would in general deprive suits of some of their efficacy.” Id., at 245-246 (footnotes and citation omitted). If anything, the waiver of sovereign immunity is broader here than it was in Burr. In passing the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 719, Congress not only indicated that the Postal Service could “sue and be sued,” 39 U. S. C. §401(1), but also that it had the power “to settle and compromise claims by or against it,” §401(8), and that “[t]he provisions of chapter 171 and all other provisions of title 28 relating to tort claims shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of the Postal Service.” § 409(c). Neither of these provisions would have been necessary had Congress intended to preserve sovereign immunity with respect to the Postal Service. Congress also indicated that it wished the Postal Service to be run more like a business than had its predecessor, the Post Office Department. Here, the Board has employed the same “well-known” remedy that was held to be within the scope of a sue-and-be-sued clause in Burr. Moreover, as was true of the agency involved in Burr, Congress has “launched [the Postal Service] into the commercial world”; hence under Burr not only must we liberally construe the sue-and-be-sued clause, but also we must presume that the Service’s liability is the same as that of any other business. No showing has been made to overcome that presumption. Since an order to withhold cannot issue unless the Postal Service owes the employee wages, the Service is nothing but a stakeholder; the order to withhold has precisely the same effect on its ability to operate efficiently as it does on that of any other employer subject to the California statute. It creates no greater inconvenience than did the garnishment order that this Court held could issue against a federal agency in Burr. Indeed, the Board’s order to withhold contains the same direction as did the writ of garnishment served on the FHA in Burr. The Postal Service attempts to distinguish Burr by observing that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 401(1) is limited to cases in which it has been “sued,” and then arguing that because the process that has issued here is that of an administrative agency rather than a court, the Service has not been “sued” within the meaning of §401(1). This crabbed construction of the statute overlooks our admonition that waiver of sovereign immunity is accomplished not by “a ritualistic formula”; rather intent to waive immunity and the scope of such a waiver can only be ascertained by reference to underlying congressional policy. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 389 (1939). In this case, at the level of policy and practicality it is illogical to conclude that Congress would have differentiated between process issued by the Board and that of a court, for even if a court issued the orders to withhold, neither the Postal Service nor its employees would be in a materially different position. The operation of California’s tax collection process makes it clear that there is no meaningful difference between an order to withhold issued by the Board and a garnishment order issued by a court. Under state law an assessment that has been validly made against a taxpayer operates to impose an absolute liability for the tax that may not be contested except in an action seeking refund of amounts already paid. Indeed state law is unequivocal in requiring employers to honor orders to withhold — no defense is permitted. Thus, a California tax assessment, like a federal tax assessment, operates in a way that is functionally indistinguishable from the judgment of a court of law; it creates an absolute legal obligation to make payment by a date certain: “Once the tax is assessed the taxpayer will owe the sovereign the amount when the date fixed by law for payment arrives. Default in meeting the obligations calls for some procedure whereby payment can be enforced. The statute might remit the Government to an action at law wherein the taxpayer could offer such defense as he had. A judgment against him might be collected by the levy of an execution. But taxes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need. Time out of mind, therefore, the sovereign has resorted to more drastic means of collection. The assessment is given the force of a judgment, and if the amount assessed is not paid when due, administrative officials may seize the debtor’s property to satisfy the debt.” Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 259-260 (1935). Thus, in operation and effect the Board’s orders to withhold are identical to the judgment of a court. They give rise to a binding legal obligation to pay the assessed amounts; the taxpayer may no more dispute this liability than the liability under any other judgment. Neither the Postal Service nor its employees would obtain any additional protections from a requirement that such orders be issued by a court, since the liability cannot be contested until after the tax has been paid and a refund action brought. At the same time, construing the statute to require the issuance of judicial process before the Postal Service need honor an order to withhold would create unwarranted disruption of the State’s machinery for collection of delinquent taxes, while simultaneously depriving the orders of “some of their efficacy” — a result inconsistent with Burr. There is thus no reason to believe that Congress intended to impose a meaningless procedural requirement that an order to withhold be issued by a court. To distinguish between administrative and judicial process would be to take an approach to sovereign immunity that this Court rejected more than 40 years ago — “to impute to Congess a desire for incoherence in a body of affiliated enactments and for drastic legal differentiation where policy justifies none.” Keifer & Keifer, 306 U. S., at 394. In cases of this kind, we believe Congress intended the Postal Service to be treated similarly to other self-sustaining commercial ventures. Accordingly, we hold that when administrative process of the type employed by the Board issues against the Postal Service, it has been “sued” within the meaning of § 401(1), and must respond to that process. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The statute provides in pertinent part: “The Franchise Tax Board may by notice, served personally or by first-class mail, require any employer . . . having in [its] possession, or under [its] control, any credits or other personal property or other things of value, belonging to a taxpayer ... to withhold, from such credits or other personal property or other things of value, the amount of any tax, interest, or penalties due from the taxpayer . . . and to transmit the amount withheld to the Franchise Tax Board at such times as it may designate. . . .” Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 18817 (West 1983). See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 18818 (West 1983) (“Any employer or person failing to withhold the amount due from any taxpayer and to transmit the same to the Franchise Tax Board after service of a notice pursuant to Section 18817 is liable for such amounts”). Section 1339 vests in district courts jurisdiction over any action arising under an Act of Congress relating to the Postal Service. Section 409(a) provides: “Except as provided in section 3628 of this title, the United States district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought by or against the Postal Service. Any action brought in a State court to which the Postal Service is a party may be removed to the appropriate United States district court. . . .” In the alternative, the District Court held that the state statute obligating employers to honor orders to withhold did not apply to the Postal Service. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court’s construction of the state statute, concluding that it did authorize issuance of the orders to withhold to the Postal Service. Judge Sehroeder dissented, arguing that § 401(1) constituted a waiver of the Postal Service’s immunity from process, including the type of process embodied in the orders to withhold. While the Court of Appeals did not say in so many words that §§ 18817 and 18818 could not constitutionally be applied to the Postal Service, it did expressly hold that the state statute required the Postal Service to honor the orders to withhold. Therefore, a necessary predicate to the Court of Appeals’ holding is that enforcement of the state statute would be inconsistent with federal law and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S. 393, 405-407 (1982); United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 26, n. 2 (1980). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). See City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U. S. 489 (1958). As the text of §5517 makes clear, it simply authorizes withholding agreements that otherwise the United States might be without statutory authority to enter, and limits the waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to these agreements. It does not concern the scope of the Postal Service’s amenability to process under 39 U. S. C. § 401(1): “(a) When a State statute— “(1) provides for the collection of a tax either by imposing on employers generally the duty of withholding sums from the pay of employees and making returns of the sums to the State, or by granting to employers generally the authority to withhold sums from the pay of employees if any employee voluntarily elects to have such sums withheld; and “(2) imposes the duty or grants the authority to withhold generally with respect to the pay of employees who are residents of the State; the Secretary of the Treasury, under regulations prescribed by the President, shall enter into an agreement with the State within 120 days of a request for agreement from the proper State official. The agreement shall provide that the head of each agency of the United States shall comply with the requirements of the State withholding statute in the case of employees of the agency who are subject to the tax and whose regular place of Federal employment is within the State with which the agreement is made. . . . “(b) This section does not give the consent of the United States to the application of a statute which imposes more burdensome requirements on the United States than on other employers, or which subjects the United States or its employees to a penalty or liability because of this section. An agency of the United States may not accept pay from a State for services performed in withholding State income taxes from the pay of the employees of the agency.” See Brief for Appellee 13-15. In fact, the Postal Service’s regulations provide for withholding of employees’ wages when garnished by court order, United States Postal Service, Financial Management Manual § 431.1(g) (1978); see 39 CFR § 211.2(a)(2) (1983). Accord, Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81, 84-85 (1941); United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 501 (1940). See also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U. S. 275, 280-281 (1959); Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 580 (1943). See generally National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356, 359 (1955) (“[E]ven the immunity enjoyed by the United States as territorial sovereign is a legal doctrine which has not been favored by the test of time. It has increasingly been found to be in conflict with the growing subjection of governmental action to the moral judgment”). Justice Frankfurter, writing for a unanimous Court in the Term prior to Burr, foreshadowed Burr’s approach to waivers of sovereign immunity: “Congress has provided for not less than forty of such corporations discharging governmental functions, and without exception the authority to sue-and-be-sued was included. Such a firm practice is partly an indication of the present climate of opinion which has brought governmental immunity from suit into disfavor, partly it reveals a definite attitude on the part of Congress which should be given hospitable scope.” Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 390-391 (1939) (footnotes omitted). Chapter 171 of Title 28 governs procedure under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§2671-2680. The nearly universal conclusion of the lower federal courts has been that the Postal Reorganization Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Insurance Co. of North America v. United, States Postal Service, 675 F. 2d 756, 758 (CA5 1982); Portmann v. United States, 674 F. 2d 1155, 1168 (CA7 1982); Associates Financial Services of America, Inc. v. Robinson, 582 F. 2d 1 (CA5 1978) (per curiam); Beneficial Finance Co. of New York, Inc. v. Dallas, 571 F. 2d 125 (CA2 1978); General Electric Credit Corp. v. Smith, 565 F. 2d 291 (CA4 1977) (per curiam); Goodman’s Furniture Co. v. United States Postal Service, 561 F. 2d 462 (CA3 1977); May Department Stores Co. v. Williamson, 549 F. 2d 1147 (CA8 1977); Standard Oil Division v. Starks, 528 F. 2d 201 (CA7 1975) (per curiam); Kennedy Electric Co. v. United States Postal Service, 508 F. 2d 954, 957 (CA10 1974); Butz Engineering Corp. v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 561, 566-567, 499 F. 2d 619, 621-622 (1974); Milner v. Bolger, 546 F. Supp. 375 (ED Cal. 1982); Lutz v. United States Postal Service, 538 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (EDNY 1982); Lincoln National Bank & Trust Co. v. Marotta, 442 F. Supp. 49 (NDNY 1977); Bank of Virginia v. Tompkins, 434 F. Supp. 787 (ED Va. 1977); United Virginia Bank/National v. Eaves, 416 F. Supp. 518 (ED Va. 1976); Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 1393 (SD Iowa 1976); Colonial Bank v. Broussard, 403 F. Supp. 686 (ED La. 1975). But see Nolan v. Woodruff, 68 F. R. D. 660 (DC 1975); Drs. Macht, Podare & Associates, Inc. v. Girton, 392 F. Supp. 66 (SD Ohio 1975); Lawhorn v. Lawhorn, 351 F. Supp. 1399 (SD W. Va. 1972); Detroit Window Cleaners Local 139 Insurance Fund v. Griffin, 345 F. Supp. 1343 (ED Mich. 1972). See H. R. Rep. No. 91-1104, pp. 5,11-12 (1970); 116 Cong. Rec. 19846 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Corbett); id., at 20226 (remarks of Rep. Udall). Perhaps the clearest practical expression of this intent was Congress’ decision to create a new postal rate structure designed to make the Postal Service self-supporting. See 39 U. S. C. § 3621; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1104, pp. 16-17 (1970). See also National Assn, of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Service, 462 U. S. 810, 813-814 (1983). In Burr, the Court rejected the argument that the burden of responding to garnishment actions would interfere with its ability to perform its functions. See 309 U. S., at 249. Moreover, the burden upon the Postal Service of responding to the Board’s orders to withhold is no greater than the burden it would face if it had to comply with a similar order issued by a state court, which the Postal Service concedes would not be barred by sovereign immunity. It should be noted that the Postal Service cannot be held liable for honoring the orders to withhold, see Cal. Tax. & Rev. Code Ann. § 18819 (West 1983). Accord, Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S., at 84. See also Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935) (in order to interpret waiver of sovereign in a practical manner, sue-and-be-sued clause construed to extend to permit prejudgment attachment). In Keifer & Keifer, the Court wrote: “Therefore, the government does not become the conduit of its immunity in suits against its agents or instrumentalities merely because they do its work. For more than a hundred years corporations have been used as agencies for doing work of government. Congress may create them ‘as appropriate means of executing the powers of government, as, for instance, ... a railroad corporation for the purpose of promoting commerce among the States.’ But this would not confer on such corporations legal immunity even if the conventional to-sue-and-be-sued clause were omitted. In the context of modern thought and practice regarding the use of corporate facilities, such a clause is not a ritualistic formula which alone can engender liability like unto indispensable words of early common law, such as ‘warrantizio’ or ‘to A and his heirs,’ for which there were no substitutes and without which desired legal consequences could not be wrought. “Congress may, of course, endow a governmental corporation with the government’s immunity. But always the question is: has it done so? This is our present problem. Has Congress endowed Regional with immunity in the circumstances which enveloped its creation? It is not a textual problem; for Congress has not expressed its will in words. Congress may not even have had any consciousness of intention. The Congressional will must be divined, and by a process of interpretation which, in effect, is the ascertainment of policy immanent not merely in the single statute from which flow the rights and responsibilities of Regional, but in a series of statutes utilizing corporations for governmental purposes and drawing significance from dominant contemporaneous opinion regarding the immunity of government agencies from suit.” 306 U. S., at 388-389 (citations omitted) (quoting Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 529 (1894)). California law requires that a taxpayer receive notice and opportunity for hearing prior to the assessment of a deficiency, both before the Board and then before the State Board of Equalization through an administrative appeal. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §§ 18581-18602 (West 1983). No question is raised as to the constitutional sufficiency of the notice and opportunity for hearing that the four Postal Service employees received. See generally Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U. S. 614, 629-632, and m 12 (1976). Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 18819 (West 1983) (“Any employer or person required to withhold and transmit any amount pursuant to this article shall comply with the requirement without resort to any legal or equita ble action in a court of law or equity”); see Kanarek v. Davidson, 85 Cal. App. 3d 341, 346, 148 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (1978). California courts will not entertain a suit contesting the assessment of a tax until after the taxpayer has exhausted his administrative refund remedy. See Aronoff v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 177, 180-181, 383 P. 2d 409, 411 (1963). Moreover, California law prohibits the issuance of an injunction restraining the assessment or collection of any tax, Cal. Const., Art. XIII, § 32; Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 19081 (West 1983); see California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S., at 400-401, n. 10, 415. See G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 352, n. 18 (1977); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 669 (1890); Hager v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 710 (1884). See also Randall v. Franchise Tax Board, 453 F. 2d 381 (CA9 1971); Greene v. Franchise Tax Board, 27 Cal. App. 3d 38, 44, 103 Cal. Rptr. 483, 486-487 (1972). The Postal Service argues that there is a significant disftinction between administrative and judicial garnishment because it can remove the latter proceeding, unlike the former, to federal court under 39 U. S. C. § 409(a). However, as an initial matter it is far from clear that the Postal Service may remove a garnishment action when it is merely a stakeholder and the real party in interest is the employee. See Jones Store Co. v. Hammons, 424 F. Supp. 494 (WD Mo. 1977); Armstrong Cover Co. v. Whitfield, 418 F. Supp. 972 (ND Ga. 1976). See also Murray v. Murray, 621 F. 2d 103 (CA5 1980). Even assuming that such a case is removable, the facts of this case demonstrate the fallacy in the Postal Service’s argument. If the Service feels it has a meritorious defense to the order to withhold, though it is hard to see how it could, see supra, at 522-523, it remains free to refuse to honor the order to withhold and force the Board to file suit against it, as it did here, or else it can initiate its own lawsuit against the Board under § 409(a). See generally California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S., at 410-411; Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 (1981); Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503, 522 (1981); Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 298 (1943). In Keifer & Keifer, the Court held that a Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation, a Government corporation, was not protected by sovereign immunity even though its authorizing legislation contained no sue-and-be-sued clause; since its parent corporation and a wide variety of similarly situated entities did not have immunity, the Court concluded that Congress could not have intended a different result with respect to the regional corporation. See 306 U. S., at 392-394. See also Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S., at 235-236. The Postal Service argues that Congress must have intended the Board to employ the “piggyback” provisions for collecting delinquent state tax liabilities found in 26 U. S. C. §§6361-6365, since they were passed to address this problem. However, nothing in that statute, which permits States to use the summary collection procedures of the Internal Revenue Service, limits the power of States to use any other available procedure. The Postal Service also argues that when Congress enacted 5 U. S. C. § 5520 in 1974, providing for the United States to enter withholding agreements for city and county income taxes, it must have assumed that the Service retained its sovereign immunity. Section 5520 is, however, no more relevant to this case than § 5517; both provide the Secretary of the Treasury with explicit authority to enter into withholding agreements which he might not otherwise be able to make; neither addresses the scope of the Service’s sovereign immunity. See n. 8, supra. Moreover, the Postal Service’s position that Congress intended use of only §§ 5517, 5520, and the piggyback provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to collect state taxes is inconsistent with the Service’s position that it has no immunity from a judicial garnishment order. In light of our disposition, we need not reach the Board’s contention that the Buck Act, 4 U. S. C. §§ 105-110, requires the Postal Service to honor the orders to withhold.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WELSH v. UNITED STATES No. 76. Argued January 20, 1970 Decided June 15, 1970 J. B. Tietz argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., and Beatrice Rosenberg. Mr. Justice Black announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall join. The petitioner, Elliott Ashton Welsh II, was convicted by a United States District Judge of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces in violation of 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a), and was on June 1, 1966, sentenced to imprisonment for three years. One of petitioner’s defenses to the prosecution was that § 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act exempted him from combat and noncombat service because he was “by reason of religious training and belief . . . conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.” After finding that there was no religious basis for petitioner’s conscientious objector claim, the Court of Appeals, Judge Hamley dissenting, affirmed the conviction. 404 F. 2d 1078 (1968). We granted certiorari chiefly to review the contention that Welsh’s conviction should be set aside on the basis of this Court’s decision in United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163 (1965). 396 U. S. 816 (1969). For the reasons to be stated, and without passing upon the constitutional arguments that have been raised, we vote to reverse this conviction because of its fundamental inconsistency with United States v. Seeger, supra. The controlling facts in this case are strikingly similar to those in Seeger. Both Seeger and Welsh were brought up in religious homes and attended church in their childhood, but in neither case was this church one which taught its members not to engage in war at any time for any reason. Neither Seeger nor Welsh continued his childhood religious ties into his young manhood, and neither belonged to any religious group or adhered to the teachings of any organized religion during the period of his involvement with the Selective Service System. At the time of registration for the draft, neither had yet come to accept pacifist principles. Their views on war developed only in subsequent years, but when their ideas did fully mature both made application to their local draft boards for conscientious objector exemptions from military service under § 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. That section then provided, in part: “Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” In filling out their exemption applications both Seeger and Welsh were unable to sign the statement that, as printed in the Selective Service form, stated “I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.” Seeger could sign only after striking the words “training and” and putting quotation marks around the word “religious.” Welsh could sign only after striking the words “my religious training and.” On those same applications, neither could definitely affirm or deny that he believed in a “Supreme Being,” both stating that they preferred to leave the question open. But both Seeger and Welsh affirmed on those applications that they held deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars where people were killed. Both strongly believed that killing in war was wrong, unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade them to take part in such an evil practice. Their objection to participating in war in any form could not be said to come from a “still, small voice of conscience”; rather, .for them that voice was so loud and insistent that both men preferred to go to jail rather than serve in the Armed Forces. There was never any question about the sincerity and depth of Seeger’s convictions as a conscientious objector, and the same is true of Welsh. In this regard the Court of Appeals noted, “[t]he government concedes that [Welsh’s] beliefs are held with the strength of more traditional religious convictions.” 404 F. 2d, at 1081. But in both cases the Selective Service System concluded that the beliefs of these men were in some sense insufficiently “religious” to qualify them for conscientious objector exemptions under the terms of § 6 (j). Seeger’s conscientious objector claim was denied “solely because it was not based upon a ‘belief in a relation to a Supreme Being’ as required by § 6 (j) of the Act,” United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163, 167 (1965), while Welsh was denied the exemption because his Appeal Board and the Department of Justice hearing officer “could find no religious basis for the registrant’s beliefs, opinions and convictions.” App. 52. Both Seeger and Welsh subsequently refused to submit to induction into the military and both were convicted of that offense. In Seeger the Court was confronted, first, with the problem that § 6 (j) defined “religious training and belief” in terms of a “belief in a relation to a Supreme Being definition that arguably gave a preference to those who believed in a conventional God as opposed to those who did not. Noting the “vast panoply of beliefs” prevalent in our country, the Court construed the congressional intent as being in “keeping with its long-established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs,” id., at 175, and accordingly interpreted “the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions . . . .” Id., at 165. (Emphasis added.) But, having decided that all religious conscientious objectors were entitled to the exemption, we faced the more serious problem of determining which beliefs were “religious” within the meaning of the statute. This question was particularly difficult in the case of Seeger himself. Seeger stated that his was a “belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.” 380 U. S., at 166. In a letter to his draft board, he wrote: On the basis of these and similar assertions; the Government argued that Seeger’s conscientious objection to war was not “religious” but stemmed from “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” “My decision arises from what I believe to be considerations of validity from the standpoint of the welfare of humanity and the preservation of the democratic values which we in the United States are struggling to maintain. I have concluded that war, from the practical standpoint, is futile and self-defeating, and that from the more important moral standpoint, it is unethical.” 326 F. 2d 846, 848 (1964). In resolving the question whether Seeger and the other registrants in that case qualified for the exemption, the Court stated that “[the] task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his oton scheme of things, religious.” 380 U. S., at 185. (Emphasis added.) The reference to the registrant’s “own scheme of things” was intended to indicate that the central consideration in determining whether the registrant’s beliefs are religious is whether these beliefs play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the registrant’s life. The Court’s principal statement of its test for determining whether a conscientious objector’s beliefs are religious within the meaning of § 6 (j) was as follows: “The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.” 380 U. S., at 176. The Court made it clear that these sincere and meaningful beliefs that prompt the registrant’s objection to all wars need not be confined in either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of religion. It held that § 6 (j) “does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs,” id., at 186, and also held that “intensely personal” convictions which some might find “incomprehensible” or “incorrect” come within the meaning of “religious belief” in the Act. Id., at 184-185. What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant’s conscientious objection to all war to be “religious” within the meaning of § 6 (j) is that this opposition to war stem from the registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions. Most of the great religions of today and of the past have embodied the idea of a Supreme Being or a Supreme Reality — a God — who communicates to man in some way a consciousness of what is right and should be done, of what is wrong and therefore should be shunned. If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual “a place parallel to that filled by . . . God” in traditionally religious persons. Because his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an individual is as much entitled to a “religious” conscientious objector exemption under § 6 (j) as is'someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious convictions. Applying this standard to Seeger himself, the Court noted the “compulsion to ‘goodness’ ” that shaped his total opposition to war, the undisputed sincerity with which he held his views, and the fact that Seeger had “decried the tremendous ‘spiritual’ price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life.” 380 U. S., at 186-187. The Court concluded: “We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers.” 380 U. S., at 187. Accordingly, the Court found that Seeger should be granted conscientious objector status. In the case before us the Government seeks to distinguish our holding in Seeger on basically two grounds, both of which were relied upon by the Court of Appeals in affirming Welsh’s conviction. First, it is stressed that Welsh was far more insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that his views were religious. For example, in filling out their conscientious objector applications, Seeger put quotation marks around the word “religious,” but Welsh struck the word “religious” entirely and later characterized his beliefs as having been formed “by reading in the fields of history and sociology.” App. 22. The Court of Appeals found that Welsh had “denied that his objection to war was premised on religious belief” and concluded that “[t]he Appeal Board was entitled to take him at his word.” 404 F. 2d, at 1082. We think this attempt to distinguish Seeger fails for the reason that it places undue emphasis on the registrant’s interpretation of his own beliefs. The Court’s statement in Seeger that a registrant’s characterization of his own belief as “religious” should carry great weight, 380 U. S., at 184, does not imply that his declaration that his views are nonreligious should be treated similarly. When a registrant states that his objections to wTar are “religious,” that information is highly relevant to the question of the function his beliefs have in his life. But very few registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word “religious” as used in § 6 (j), and accordingly a registrant’s statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption. Welsh himself presents a case in point. Although he originally characterized his beliefs as nonreligious, he later upon reflection wrote a long and thoughtful letter to his Appeal Board in which he declared that his beliefs were “certainly religious in the ethical sense of the word.” He explained: “I believe I mentioned taking of life as not being, for me, a religious wrong. Again, I assumed Mr. [Brady (the Department of Justice hearing officer) ] was using the word ‘religious’ in the conventional sense, and, in order to be perfectly honest did not characterize my belief as ‘religious.’ ” App. 44. The Government also seeks to distinguish Seeger on the ground that Welsh’s views, unlike Seeger’s, were “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” As previously noted, the Government made the same argument about Seeger, and not without reason, for Seeger’s views had a substantial political dimension. Supra, at 338-339. In this case, Welsh’s conscientious objection to war was undeniably based in part on his perception of world politics. In a letter to his local board, he wrote: “I can only act according to what I am and what I see. And I see that the military complex wastes both human and material resources, that it fosters disregard for (what I consider a paramount concern) human needs and ends; I see that the means we employ to ‘defend’ our ‘way of life’ profoundly change that way of life. I see that in our failure to recognize the political, social, and economic realities of the world, we, as a nation, fail our responsibility as a nation.” App. 30. We certainly do not think that § 6 (j)’s exclusion of those persons with “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code” should be read to exclude those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy.. The two groups of registrants that obviously do fall within these exclusions from the exemption are those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency. In applying § 6 (j)’s exclusion of those whose views are “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical” or of those who have a “merely personal moral code,” it should be remembered that these exclusions are definitional and do not therefore restrict the category of persons who are conscientious objectors by “religious training and belief.” Once the Selective Service System has taken the first step and determined under the standards set out here and in Seeger that the registrant is a “religious” conscientious objector, it follows that his views cannot be “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical.” Nor can they be a “merely personal moral code.” See United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S., at 186. Welsh stated that he “believe [d] the taking of life— anyone’s life — to be morally wrong.” App. 44. In his original conscientious objector application he wrote the following: “I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore I will not injure or kill another human being. This belief (and the corresponding 'duty’ to abstain from violence toward another person) is not ‘superior to those arising from any human relation.’ On the contrary: it is essential to every human relation. I cannot, therefore, conscientiously comply with the Government’s insistence that I assume duties which I feel are immoral and totally repugnant.” App. 10. Welsh elaborated his beliefs in later communications with Selective Service officials. On the basis of these beliefs and the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that he held them “with the strength of more traditional religious convictions,” 404 F. 2d, at 1081, we think Welsh was clearly entitled to a conscientious objector exemption. Section 6 (j) requires no more. That section exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war. The judgment is Reversed. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 62 Stat. 612. See also 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j). The pertinent provision as it read during the period relevant to this case is set out infra, at 336. 62 Stat. 612. An amendment to the Act in 1967, subsequent to the Court’s decision in the Seeger case, deleted the reference to a “Supreme Being” but continued to provide that “religious training and belief” does not include “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.” 81 Stat. 104, 60 U. S. C. App. §456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). In his original application in April 1964, Welsh stated that he did not believe in a Supreme Being, but in a letter to his local board in June 1965, he requested that his original answer be stricken and the question left open. App. 29.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 89. Argued February 19, 1964. Decided March 23, 1964. Jerry D. Anker argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were David E. Feller, Elliot Bredhoff and Michael H. Gottesman. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ordman and Norton J. Come. Theophil C. Kammholz argued the cause for respondent Carrier Corporation. With him on the brief was Kenneth C. McGuiness. Gregory S. Prince filed a brief for the Association of American Railroads, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this case is whether a union violates § 8 (b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, by picketing an entrance, used exclusively by railroad personnel, to a railroad spur track located on a right-of-way owned by the railroad and adjacent to the struck employer’s premises. On March 2, 1960, after the petitioning union and the respondent company, Carrier Corporation, failed to agree upon a collective bargaining contract the union, which was the certified bargaining agent, called a strike in support of its demands. During the course of the strike the union picketed the several entrances to the plant. Along the south boundary of Carrier’s property was a 35-foot railroad right-of-way used by the railroad for deliveries to Carrier and to three other companies in the area, General Electric, Western Electric, and Brace-Mueller-Huntley. The railroad spur ran across Thompson Road, a public thoroughfare which bounded Carrier’s property on the west, and through a gate in a continuous chain-link fence which enclosed both the property of Carrier Corporation and the railroad right-of-way. The gate was locked when the spur was not in use and was accessible only to railroad employees. The picketing with which we are concerned occurred at this gate. Between March 2 and March 10, railroad personnel made several trips through the gate for the purpose of switching out cars for General Electric, Western Electric and Brace-Mueller-Huntley, and also to supply coal to Carrier and General Electric. On March 11 a switch engine manned by a regular switching crew made one trip serving the three nonstruck corporations. It then returned, this time manned by supervisory personnel, with 14 empty boxcars. The pickets, being aware that these cars were destined for use by Carrier, milled around the engine from the time it reached the western side of Thompson Road, attempting to impede its progress. By inching its way across the road, however, the locomotive succeeded in reaching and entering the gate. After uncoupling the empties just inside the railroad right-of-way, for future use by Carrier, the engine picked up 16 more cars which Carrier wanted shipped out and made its way back toward the gate. This time resistance from the picketing strikers was more intense. Some of the men stood on the footboard of the engine, others prostrated themselves across the rails and one union official parked his car on the track. Invective and threats were directed toward the operators of the train, and only after the pickets were dispersed by deputies of the Onondaga County sheriff’s office was it able to pass. Acting upon charges filed by Carrier, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against the international and local union organizations and individual officials of each, alleging violations of §§ 8 (b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Trial Examiner found the union in violation of both sections and recommended appropriate cease-and-desist orders. The National Labor Relations Board sustained the Examiner’s finding that an unfair labor practice had been committed under §8 (b)(1)(A) and entered an order accordingly. The union does not contest this determination by the Board. The Board further concluded, however, that the picketing was primary activity and therefore saved from § 8 (b)(4)(B)’s proscription by the proviso that “nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” Noting the conceded fact that the deliveries and removals by the railroad in this case were made in connection with the normal operations of the struck employer, the Board regarded as dis-positive this Court’s decision in Electrical Workers Local No. 761 v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667, the General Electric case. 132 N. L. R. B. 127. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Board’s decision on the ground that the picketing at the railroad gate was directed solely at the neutral railroad employees and could not be regarded as incident to what the court considered the only legitimate union objective: publicizing the labor dispute to the employees involved therein, those working for Carrier. This Court’s holding in General Electric was deemed inapposite since the gate in the present case is located on premises belonging to the neutral employer. 311 F. 2d 135. Chief Judge Lumbard dissented. Because of the asserted conflict with General Electric and the importance of the problem to the national labor policy we granted certio-rari. 373 U. S. 908. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. The activities of the union in this case clearly fall within clauses (i) and (ii) of §8 (b)(4); likewise the objective, to induce the railroad to cease providing freight service to Carrier for the duration of the strike, is covered by the language of subsection (B), exclusive of the proviso. The question we have is whether the activities of the union, although literally within the definition of secondary activities contained in clauses (i) and (ii) of § 8 (b)(4), are nevertheless within the protected area of primary picketing carved out by Congress in the proviso to subsection (B). The dividing line between forbidden secondary activity and protected primary activity has been the subject of intense litigation both before and after the 1959 amendments to § 8 (b) (4), which broadened the coverage of the section but also added the express exceptions for the primary strike and primary picketing. We need not detail the course of this sometimes confusing litigation; for in the General Electric case, supra, the Court undertook to survey the cases dealing with picketing at both primary and secondary sites and the result reached in that case largely governs this one. In the General Electric case, because the union’s object was to enmesh “employees of the neutral employers in its dispute” with the primary employer, the Board ordered the union to cease picketing a separate gate used exclusively by employees of certain independent contractors who had been doing work on the primary premises on a regular and continuous basis for a considerable period of time. 123 N. L. R. B. 1547. In this Court, the Board conceded that when the struck premises are occupied by the primary employer alone, the right of the union to engage in primary activity at or in connection with the primary premises may be given unlimited effect — “all union attempts, by picketing and allied means, to cut off deliveries, pickups, and employment at the primary employer’s plant will be regarded as primary and outside the purview of Section 8 (b)(4)(A).” But the Board insisted that the facts presented a common situs problem since the regular work of the contractors was continuously done on the primary premises and hence the rules of the Moore Dry Dock case should be applied. The union, on the other hand, argued that no picketing at the primary premises should be considered as secondary activity. The Court accepted the approach neither of the Board nor of the Union. The location of the picketing, though important, was not deemed of decisive significance; picketing was not to be protected simply because it occurred at the site of the primary employer’s plant. Neither, however, was all picketing forbidden where occurring at gates not used by primary employees. The legality of separate gate picketing depended upon the type of work being done by the employees who used that gate; if the duties of those employees were connected with the normal operations of the employer, picketing directed at them was protected primary activity, but if their work was unrelated to the day-to-day operation of the employer’s plant, the picketing was an unfair labor practice. The order of the NLRB was vacated to permit determination of the case in accordance with the proper test. It seems clear that the rejection of the Board’s position in General Electric leaves no room for the even narrower approach of the Court of Appeals in this case, which is that the picketing at the site of a strike could be directed at secondary employees only where incidental to appeals to primary employees. Under this test, no picketing at gates used only by employees of delivery men would be permitted, a result expressly disapproved by the Court in General Electric: “On the other hand, if a separate gate were devised for regular plant deliveries, the barring of picketing at that location would make a clear invasion on traditional primary activity of appealing to neutral employees whose tasks aid the employer’s everyday operations.” 366 U. S., at 680-681. Although the picketing in the General Electric case occurred-prior to the 1959 amendments to § 8 (b) (4), the decision was rendered in 1961 and the Court bottomed its decision upon the amended law and its legislative history. We think General Electric’s construction of the proviso to § 8 (b) (4) (B) is sound and we will not disturb it. The primary strike, which is protected by the proviso, is aimed at applying economic pressure by halting the day-to-day operations of the struck employer. But Congress not only preserved the right to strike; it also saved “primary picketing” from the secondary ban. Picketing has traditionally been a major weapon to implement the goals of a strike and has characteristically been aimed at all those approaching the situs whose mission is selling, delivering or otherwise contributing to the operations which the strike is endeavoring to halt. In light of this traditional goal of primary pressures we think Congress intended to preserve the right to picket during a strike a gate reserved for employees of neutral delivery men furnishing day-to-day service essential to the plant’s regular operations. Nor may the General Electric case be put aside for the reason that the picketed gate in the present case was located on property owned by New York Central Railroad and not upon property owned by the primary employer. The location of the picketing is an important but not decisive factor, and in this case we agree with Judge Lumbard that the location of the picketed gate upon New York Central property has little, if any, significance: “In this case, it is undisputed that the railroad’s operations for Carrier were in furtherance of Carrier’s normal business. It is equally clear from the record that the picketing employees made no attempt to interfere with any of the railroad’s operations for plants other than Carrier. The railroad employees were not encouraged to, nor did they, refuse to serve the other plants. The picketing was designed to accomplish no more than picketing outside one of Carrier’s own delivery entrances might have accomplished. Because the fence surrounding the railroad’s right of way was a continuation of the fence surrounding the Carrier plant, there was no other place where the union could have brought home to the railroad workers servicing Carrier its dispute with Carrier.” 311 F. 2d 135, 154. The railroad gate adjoined company property and was in fact the railroad entrance gate to the Carrier plant. For the purposes of § 8 (b)(4) picketing at a situs so proximate and related to the employer’s day-to-day operations is no more illegal than if it had occurred at a gate owned by Carrier. Carrier, however, has another argument: holding this picketing protected thwarts the purpose of the 1959 amendment to bring railroads within the protection of §8 (b)(4). The definitions of “employer” and “employee” in §§ 2 (2) and 2 (3) of the Act specifically exclude “any person subject to the Railway Labor Act” and the employees of any such “person.” Prior to 1959, §8 (b)(4) prohibited secondary inducements to “the employees” of any “employer” and there arose a conflict of authority between the Board and several Courts of Appeals as to whether or not the secondary boycott provisions applied to any appeals to railroad employees. Congress resolved this question in 1959 by revising §8 (b)(4) to proscribe inducement of secondary work stoppages by “any individual employed by any person.” There is no indication whatever that Congress intended by the revision to do more than to eliminate the uncertainty deriving from the words “employer” and “employee” and thereby to extend to railroads the same protections which other employers enjoyed. Our holding does not derogate from this equality of treatment. On the contrary, the rule for which Carrier contends would place the railroad on a better footing than all other employers who do business with the struck plant. It would distinguish between picketing an entrance to a struck plant which is owned by the primary employer and picketing a gate which by design or otherwise had been conveyed to a neutral furnishing delivery service, an anomaly which we do not believe Congress intended. Finally, we reject Carrier’s argument that whatever the rule may be in the ordinary case of separate gate picketing, the picketing of the railroad gate in this case was violative of § 8 (b) (4) because it was accompanied by threats and violence. Under § 8 (b) (4) the distinction between primary and secondary picketing carried on at a separate gate maintained on the premises of the primary employer, does not rest upon the peaceful or violent nature of the conduct, but upon the type of work being done by the picketed secondary employees. Such picketing does not become illegal secondary activity when violence is involved but only when it interferes with business intercourse not connected with the ordinary operations of the employer. This is not to say, of course, that violent primary picketing is in all respects legal but only that it is not forbidden by § 8 (b) (4); it would escape neither the provisions of the federal law nor the local law if violative thereof. This is all, we think, that was intended by the proviso to §8 (b)(4) which provides that nothing in subsection (B) “shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is possible to read this language to mean that the proviso does not save from proscription under §8 (b)(4) union activity violative of other laws, but this interpretation would condemn as secondary conduct any and all picketing directed toward neutral employers so long as the conduct, as in the case of violence, was forbidden by some other law. In our view, the words “where not otherwise unlawful” were inserted only to make clear that the proviso, while excluding the conduct from the § 8 (b)(4) sanctions did not also legalize it under other laws, state or federal. The legality of violent picketing, if “primary,” must be determined under other sections of the statute or under state law. Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Goldberg took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 8 (b)(4) provides in pertinent part as follows: “(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is— “(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) §158 (b)(4). The union made no objection to the deliveries of coal to Carrier, since the nonstruck General Electric plant obtained its coal from Carrier. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board, Electrical Workers Local 761 v. Labor Board, No. 321, October Term, 1960, p. 31. Sailors’ Union of the Pacific, 92 N. L. R. B. 647. The Court said: “The 1959 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, which removed the word ‘concerted’ from the boycott provisions, included a proviso that ‘nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful,. any primary strike or primary picketing.’ 29 U. S. C. (Supp. I, 1959) §158 (b)(4)(B). The proviso was directed against the fear that the removal of ‘concerted’ from the statute might be interpreted so that ‘the picketing at the factory violates section 8 (b) (4) (A) because the pickets induce the truck drivers employed by the trucker not to perform their usual services where an object is to compel the trucking firm not to do business with the . . . manufacturer during the strike.’ Analysis of the bill prepared by Senator Kennedy and Representative Thompson, 105 Cong. Rec. 16589.” 366 U. S., at 681. See H. R. Rep. No. 741, on H. R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21, 80; H. R. Rep. No. 1147, on S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 38; 2 Leg. Hist, of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 1575-1576, 1707, 1857. Compare International Brotherhood of Teamsters (The International Rice Milling Co.), 84 N. L. R. B. 360; International Woodworkers of America (Smith Lumber Co.), 116 N. L. R. B. 1756; International Brotherhood of Teamsters (The Alling & Cory Company), 121 N. L. R. B. 315; and Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local Union 2409 (Great Northern Railway Co.), 122 N. L. R. B. 1403, with International Rice Milling Co. v. Labor Board, 183 F. 2d 21 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Smith Lumber Co. v. Labor Board, 246 F. 2d 129 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Great Northern Railway Co. v. Labor Board, 272 F. 2d 741 (C. A. 9th Cir.). Compare Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 672, in which the Court said: “In the instant case the violence on the picket line is not material. The complaint was not based upon that violence, as such. To reach it, the complaint more properly would have relied upon § 8 (b) (1) (A) or would have addressed itself to local authorities. The substitution of violent coercion in place of peaceful persuasion would not in itself bring the complained-of conduct into conflict with § 8 (b) (4). It is the object of union encouragement that is proscribed by that section, rather than the means adopted to make it felt.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

John WALKER, III, Chairman, Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board, et al., Petitioners v. TEXAS DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC., et al. No. 14-144. Supreme Court of the United States Argued March 23, 2015. Decided June 18, 2015. Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, for petitioners. R. James George, Jr., for respondents. Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Charles E. Roy, First Assistant Attorney General, Austin, TX, Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, J. Campbell Barker, Deputy Solicitor General, Bill Davis, Evan S. Greene, Alex Potapov, Assistant Solicitors General, Erika M. Kane, Assistant Attorney General, for Petitioner. R. James George, Jr., Counsel of Record, John R. McConnell, George Brothers Kincaid & Horton, LLP, Austin, TX, for Respondents. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Daniel T. Hodge, First Assistant Attorney General, Austin, TX, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Bill Davis, Arthur C. D'Andrea, Evan S. Greene, Alex Potapov, Assistant Solicitors General, Erika M. Kane, Assistant Attorney General, for Petitioners. Opinion Justice BREYERdelivered the opinion of the Court. Texas offers automobile owners a choice between ordinary and specialty license plates. Those who want the State to issue a particular specialty plate may propose a plate design, comprising a slogan, a graphic, or (most commonly) both. If the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board approves the design, the State will make it available for display on vehicles registered in Texas. In this case, the Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans proposed a specialty license plate design featuring a Confederate battle flag. The Board rejected the proposal. We must decide whether that rejection violated the Constitution's free speech guarantees. See Amdts. 1, 14. We conclude that it did not. I A Texas law requires all motor vehicles operating on the State's roads to display valid license plates. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 502.001(West Supp. 2014), 504.001 (2013), 504.943 (Supp. 2014). And Texas makes available several kinds of plates. Drivers may choose to display the State's general-issue license plates. See Texas Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Motor Vehicle Registration Manual 9.1 (Apr. 2015). Each of these plates contains the word "Texas," a license plate number, a silhouette of the State, a graphic of the Lone Star, and the slogan "The Lone Star State." Texas Dept. of Motor Vehicles, The Texas Classic FAQs (July 16, 2012), online at http://www.txdmv. gov/motorists/license-plates (all Internet materials as visited June 16, 2015, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). In the alternative, drivers may choose from an assortment of specialty license plates. § 504.008(b) (West 2013). Each of these plates contains the word "Texas," a license plate number, and one of a selection of designs prepared by the State. See ibid.; Specialty License Plates, http://www.txdmv.gov/motorists/license-plates/specialty-license-plates (displaying available Texas specialty plates); Create a Plate: Your Design, http://www.myplates.com/BackgroundOnly (same). Finally, Texas law provides for personalized plates (also known as vanity plates). 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 217.45(c)(7) (2015). Pursuant to the personalization program, a vehicle owner may request a particular alphanumeric pattern for use as a plate number, such as "BOB" or "TEXPL8." Here we are concerned only with the second category of plates, namely specialty license plates, not with the personalization program. Texas offers vehicle owners a variety of specialty plates, generally for an annual fee. See § 217.45(b)(2). And Texas selects the designs for specialty plates through three distinct processes. First, the state legislature may specifically call for the development of a specialty license plate. See Tex. Transp. Code §§ 504.602-504.663(West 2013 and Supp. 2014). The legislature has enacted statutes authorizing, for example, plates that say "Keep Texas Beautiful" and "Mothers Against Drunk Driving," plates that "honor" the Texas citrus industry, and plates that feature an image of the World Trade Center towers and the words "Fight Terrorism." See §§ 504.602, 504.608, 504.626, 504.647. Second, the Board may approve a specialty plate design proposal that a state-designated private vendor has created at the request of an individual or organization. See §§ 504.6011(a), 504.851(a); 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 217.52(b). Among the plates created through the private-vendor process are plates promoting the "Keller Indians" and plates with the slogan "Get it Sold with RE/MAX." Third, the Board "may create new specialty license plates on its own initiative or on receipt of an application from a" nonprofit entity seeking to sponsor a specialty plate. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 504.801(a), (b). A nonprofit must include in its application "a draft design of the specialty license plate." 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 217.45(i)(2)(C). And Texas law vests in the Board authority to approve or to disapprove an application. See § 217.45(i)(7). The relevant statute says that the Board "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate" for a number of reasons, for example "if the design might be offensive to any member of the public ... or for any other reason established by rule." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 504.801(c). Specialty plates that the Board has sanctioned through this process include plates featuring the words "The Gator Nation," together with the Florida Gators logo, and plates featuring the logo of Rotary International and the words "SERVICE ABOVE SELF." B In 2009, the Sons of Confederate Veterans, Texas Division (a nonprofit entity), applied to sponsor a specialty license plate through this last-mentioned process. SCV's application included a draft plate design. See Appendix, infra. At the bottom of the proposed plate were the words "SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS." At the side was the organization's logo, a square Confederate battle flag framed by the words "Sons of Confederate Veterans 1896." A faint Confederate battle flag appeared in the background on the lower portion of the plate. Additionally, in the middle of the plate was the license plate number, and at the top was the State's name and silhouette. The Board's predecessor denied this application. In 2010, SCV renewed its application before the Board. The Board invited public comment on its website and at an open meeting. After considering the responses, including a number of letters sent by elected officials who opposed the proposal, the Board voted unanimously against issuing the plate. The Board explained that it had found "it necessary to deny th[e] plate design application, specifically the confederate flag portion of the design, because public comments ha[d] shown that many members of the general public find the design offensive, and because such comments are reasonable." App. 64. The Board added "that a significant portion of the public associate the confederate flag with organizations advocating expressions of hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning to those people or groups." Id.,at 65. In 2012, SCV and two of its officers (collectively SCV) brought this lawsuit against the chairman and members of the Board (collectively Board). SCV argued that the Board's decision violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and it sought an injunction requiring the Board to approve the proposed plate design. The District Court entered judgment for the Board. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff,759 F.3d 388 (2014). It held that Texas's specialty license plate designs are private speech and that the Board, in refusing to approve SCV's design, engaged in constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination. The dissenting judge argued that Texas's specialty license plate designs are government speech, the content of which the State is free to control. We granted the Board's petition for certiorari, and we now reverse. II When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,555 U.S. 460, 467-468, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). That freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a check on government speech. See Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,529 U.S. 217, 235, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000). Thus, government statements (and government actions and programs that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas. See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn.,544 U.S. 550, 559, 125 S.Ct. 2055, 161 L.Ed.2d 896 (2005). Instead, the Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public, who are then able to influence the choices of a government that, through words and deeds, will reflect its electoral mandate. See Stromberg v. California,283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931)(observing that "our constitutional system" seeks to maintain "the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people"). Were the Free Speech Clause interpreted otherwise, government would not work. How could a city government create a successful recycling program if officials, when writing householders asking them to recycle cans and bottles, had to include in the letter a long plea from the local trash disposal enterprise demanding the contrary? How could a state government effectively develop programs designed to encourage and provide vaccinations, if officials also had to voice the perspective of those who oppose this type of immunization? "[I]t is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked th[e] freedom" to select the messages it wishes to convey. Summum, supra,at 468, 129 S.Ct. 1125. We have therefore refused "[t]o hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals." Rust v. Sullivan,500 U.S. 173, 194, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991). We have pointed out that a contrary holding "would render numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect." Ibid.Cf. Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,496 U.S. 1, 12-13, 110 S.Ct. 2228, 110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990)("If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed"). And we have made clear that "the government can speak for itself." Southworth, supra,at 229, 120 S.Ct. 1346. That is not to say that a government's ability to express itself is without restriction. Constitutional and statutory provisions outside of the Free Speech Clause may limit government speech. Summum, supra,at 468, 129 S.Ct. 1125. And the Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the government's speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel private persons to convey the government's speech. But, as a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and it carries out its duties on their behalf. III In our view, specialty license plates issued pursuant to Texas's statutory scheme convey government speech. Our reasoning rests primarily on our analysis in Summum,a recent case that presented a similar problem. We conclude here, as we did there, that our precedents regarding government speech (and not our precedents regarding forums for private speech) provide the appropriate framework through which to approach the case. See 555 U.S., at 464, 129 S.Ct. 1125. A In Summum,we considered a religious organization's request to erect in a 2.5-acre city park a monument setting forth the organization's religious tenets. See id.,at 464-465, 129 S.Ct. 1125. In the park were 15 other permanent displays. Id.,at 464, 129 S.Ct. 1125. At least 11 of these-including a wishing well, a September 11 monument, a historic granary, the city's first fire station, and a Ten Commandments monument-had been donated to the city by private entities. Id.,at 464-465, 129 S.Ct. 1125. The religious organization argued that the Free Speech Clause required the city to display the organization's proposed monument because, by accepting a broad range of permanent exhibitions at the park, the city had created a forum for private speech in the form of monuments. Brief for Respondent in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,O.T. 2008, No. 07-665, pp. 2-3, 30-36. This Court rejected the organization's argument. We held that the city had not "provid[ed] a forum for private speech" with respect to monuments. Summum,555 U.S., at 470, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Rather, the city, even when "accepting a privately donated monument and placing it on city property," had "engage[d] in expressive conduct." Id.,at 476, 129 S.Ct. 1125. The speech at issue, this Court decided, was "best viewed as a form of government speech" and "therefore [was] not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause." Id.,at 464, 129 S.Ct. 1125. We based our conclusion on several factors. First, history shows that "[g]overnments have long used monuments to speak to the public." Id.,at 470, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Thus, we observed that "[w]hen a government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who see the structure." Ibid. Second, we noted that it "is not common for property owners to open up their property for the installation of permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish to be associated."Id.,at 471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. As a result, "persons who observe donated monuments routinely-and reasonably-interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner's behalf." Ibid.And "observers" of such monuments, as a consequence, ordinarily "appreciate the identity of the speaker." Ibid. Third, we found relevant the fact that the city maintained control over the selection of monuments. We thought it "fair to say that throughout our Nation's history, the general government practice with respect to donated monuments has been one of selective receptivity." Ibid.And we observed that the city government in Summum" 'effectively controlled' the messages sent by the monuments in the [p]ark by exercising 'final approval authority' over their selection." Id.,at 473, 129 S.Ct. 1125. In light of these and a few other relevant considerations, the Court concluded that the expression at issue was government speech. See id.,at 470-472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. And, in reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected the premise that the involvement of private parties in designing the monuments was sufficient to prevent the government from controlling which monuments it placed in its own public park. See id.,at 470-471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Cf. Rust, supra,at 192-196, 111 S.Ct. 1759(upholding a federal regulation limiting speech in a Government-funded program where the program was established and administered by private parties). B Our analysis in Summumleads us to the conclusion that here, too, government speech is at issue. First, the history of license plates shows that, insofar as license plates have conveyed more than state names and vehicle identification numbers, they long have communicated messages from the States. Cf. 555 U.S., at 470, 129 S.Ct. 1125("Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public"). In 1917, Arizona became the first State to display a graphic on its plates. J. Fox, License Plates of the United States 15 (1997) (Fox); J. Minard & T. Stentiford, A Moving History 56 (2004) (Minard). The State presented a depiction of the head of a Hereford steer. Fox 15; Minard 56. In the years since, New Hampshire plates have featured the profile of the "Old Man of the Mountain," Massachusetts plates have included a representation of the Commonwealth's famous codfish, and Wyoming plates have displayed a rider atop a bucking bronco. Minard 60, 61, 66. In 1928, Idaho became the first State to include a slogan on its plates. The 1928 Idaho plate proclaimed "Idaho Potatoes" and featured an illustration of a brown potato, onto which the license plate number was superimposed in green. Id.,at 61. The brown potato did not catch on, but slogans on license plates did. Over the years, state plates have included the phrases "North to the Future" (Alaska), "Keep Florida Green" (Florida), "Hoosier Hospitality" (Indiana), "The Iodine Products State" (South Carolina), "Green Mountains" (Vermont), and "America's Dairyland" (Wisconsin). Fox 13, 29, 39, 91, 101, 109. States have used license plate slogans to urge action, to promote tourism, and to tout local industries. Texas, too, has selected various messages to communicate through its license plate designs. By 1919, Texas had begun to display the Lone Star emblem on its plates. Texas Department of Transportation, The History of Texas License Plates 9, 11 (1999). In 1936, the State's general-issue plates featured the first slogan on Texas license plates: the word "Centennial." Id.,at 20. In 1968, Texas plates promoted a San Antonio event by including the phrase "Hemisfair 68." Id.,at 46. In 1977, Texas replaced the Lone Star with a small silhouette of the State. Id.,at 63. And in 1995, Texas plates celebrated "150 Years of Statehood." Id.,at 101. Additionally, the Texas Legislature has specifically authorized specialty plate designs stating, among other things, "Read to Succeed," "Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo," "Texans Conquer Cancer," and "Girl Scouts." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 504.607, 504.613, 504.620, 504.622. This kind of state speech has appeared on Texas plates for decades. Second, Texas license plate designs "are often closely identified in the public mind with the [State]." Summum, supra,at 472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Each Texas license plate is a government article serving the governmental purposes of vehicle registration and identification. The governmental nature of the plates is clear from their faces: The State places the name "TEXAS" in large letters at the top of every plate. Moreover, the State requires Texas vehicle owners to display license plates, and every Texas license plate is issued by the State. See § 504.943. Texas also owns the designs on its license plates, including the designs that Texas adopts on the basis of proposals made by private individuals and organizations. See § 504.002(3). And Texas dictates the manner in which drivers may dispose of unused plates. See § 504.901(c). See also § 504.008(g) (requiring that vehicle owners return unused specialty plates to the State). Texas license plates are, essentially, government IDs. And issuers of ID "typically do not permit" the placement on their IDs of "message[s] with which they do not wish to be associated." Summum,555 U.S., at 471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Consequently, "persons who observe" designs on IDs "routinely-and reasonably-interpret them as conveying some message on the [issuer's] behalf." Ibid. Indeed, a person who displays a message on a Texas license plate likely intends to convey to the public that the State has endorsed that message. If not, the individual could simply display the message in question in larger letters on a bumper sticker right next to the plate. But the individual prefers a license plate design to the purely private speech expressed through bumper stickers. That may well be because Texas's license plate designs convey government agreement with the message displayed. Third, Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates. Texas law provides that the State "has sole control over the design, typeface, color, and alphanumeric pattern for all license plates." § 504.005. The Board must approve every specialty plate design proposal before the design can appear on a Texas plate. 43 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 217.45(i)(7)-(8), 217.52(b). And the Board and its predecessor have actively exercised this authority. Texas asserts, and SCV concedes, that the State has rejected at least a dozen proposed designs. Reply Brief 10; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49-51. Accordingly, like the city government in Summum,Texas "has 'effectively controlled' the messages [conveyed] by exercising 'final approval authority' over their selection." 555 U.S., at 473, 129 S.Ct. 1125(quoting Johanns,544 U.S., at 560-561, 125 S.Ct. 2055). This final approval authority allows Texas to choose how to present itself and its constituency. Thus, Texas offers plates celebrating the many educational institutions attended by its citizens. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 504.615. But it need not issue plates deriding schooling. Texas offers plates that pay tribute to the Texas citrus industry. See § 504.626. But it need not issue plates praising Florida's oranges as far better. And Texas offers plates that say "Fight Terrorism." See § 504.647. But it need not issue plates promoting al Qaeda. These considerations, taken together, convince us that the specialty plates here in question are similar enough to the monuments in Summumto call for the same result. That is not to say that every element of our discussion in Summumis relevant here. For instance, in Summumwe emphasized that monuments were "permanent" and we observed that "public parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent monuments." 555 U.S., at 464, 470, 478, 129 S.Ct. 1125. We believed that the speech at issue was government speech rather than private speech in part because we found it "hard to imagine how a public park could be opened up for the installation of permanent monuments by every person or group wishing to engage in that form of expression." Id.,at 479, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Here, a State could theoretically offer a much larger number of license plate designs, and those designs need not be available for time immemorial. But those characteristics of the speech at issue in Summumwere particularly important because the government speech at issue occurred in public parks, which are traditional public forums for "the delivery of speeches and the holding of marches and demonstrations" by private citizens. Id.,at 478, 129 S.Ct. 1125. By contrast, license plates are not traditional public forums for private speech. And other features of the designs on Texas's specialty license plates indicate that the message conveyed by those designs is conveyed on behalf of the government. Texas, through its Board, selects each design featured on the State's specialty license plates. Texas presents these designs on government-mandated, government-controlled, and government-issued IDs that have traditionally been used as a medium for government speech. And it places the designs directly below the large letters identifying "TEXAS" as the issuer of the IDs. "The [designs] that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute government speech." Id., at 472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. C SCV believes that Texas's specialty license plate designs are not government speech, at least with respect to the designs (comprising slogans and graphics) that were initially proposed by private parties. According to SCV, the State does not engage in expressive activity through such slogans and graphics, but rather provides a forum for private speech by making license plates available to display the private parties' designs. We cannot agree. We have previously used what we have called "forum analysis" to evaluate government restrictions on purely private speech that occurs on government property. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc.,473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). But forum analysis is misplaced here. Because the State is speaking on its own behalf, the First Amendment strictures that attend the various types of government-established forums do not apply. The parties agree that Texas's specialty license plates are not a "traditional public forum," such as a street or a park, "which ha[s] immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.,460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)(internal quotation marks omitted). "The Court has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic confines." Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,523 U.S. 666, 678, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998). And state-issued specialty license plates lie far beyond those confines. It is equally clear that Texas's specialty plates are neither a " 'designated public forum,' " which exists where "government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose," Summum, supra,at 469, 129 S.Ct. 1125, nor a "limited public forum," which exists where a government has "reserv [ed a forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). A government "does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Cornelius,473 U.S., at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439. And in order "to ascertain whether [a government] intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum," this Court "has looked to the policy and practice of the government" and to "the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity." Ibid. Texas's policies and the nature of its license plates indicate that the State did not intend its specialty license plates to serve as either a designated public forum or a limited public forum. First, the State exercises final authority over each specialty license plate design. This authority militates against a determination that Texas has created a public forum. See id.,at 803-804, 105 S.Ct. 3439(explaining that a school mail system was not a public forum because "[t]he practice was to require permission from the individual school principal before access to the system to communicate with teachers was granted"). Second, Texas takes ownership of each specialty plate design, making it particularly untenable that the State intended specialty plates to serve as a forum for public discourse. Finally, Texas license plates have traditionally been used for government speech, are primarily used as a form of government ID, and bear the State's name. These features of Texas license plates indicate that Texas explicitly associates itself with the speech on its plates. For similar reasons, we conclude that Texas's specialty license plates are not a "nonpublic for[um]," which exists "[w]here the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations." International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,505 U.S. 672, 678-679, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992). With respect to specialty license plate designs, Texas is not simply managing government property, but instead is engaging in expressive conduct. As we have described, we reach this conclusion based on the historical context, observers' reasonable interpretation of the messages conveyed by Texas specialty plates, and the effective control that the State exerts over the design selection process. Texas's specialty license plate designs "are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message." Summum,555 U.S., at 472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. They "constitute government speech." Ibid. The fact that private parties take part in the design and propagation of a message does not extinguish the governmental nature of the message or transform the government's role into that of a mere forum-provider. In Summum,private entities "financed and donated monuments that the government accept[ed] and display[ed] to the public." Id.,at 470-471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Here, similarly, private parties propose designs that Texas may accept and display on its license plates. In this case, as in Summum,the "government entity may exercise [its] freedom to express its views" even "when it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled message." Id.,at 468, 129 S.Ct. 1125. And in this case, as in Summum,forum analysis is inapposite. See id.,at 480, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Of course, Texas allows many more license plate designs than the city in Summumallowed monuments. But our holding in Summumwas not dependent on the precise number of monuments found within the park. Indeed, we indicated that the permanent displays in New York City's Central Park also constitute government speech. See id.,at 471-472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. And an amicusbrief had informed us that there were, at the time, 52 such displays. See Brief for City of New York in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,O.T. 2008, No. 07-665, p. 2. Further, there may well be many more messages that Texas wishes to convey through its license plates than there were messages that the city in Summumwished to convey through its monuments. Texas's desire to communicate numerous messages does not mean that the messages conveyed are not Texas's own. Additionally, the fact that Texas vehicle owners pay annual fees in order to display specialty license plates does not imply that the plate designs are merely a forum for private speech. While some nonpublic forums provide governments the opportunity to profit from speech, see, e.g., Lehman v. Shaker Heights,418 U.S. 298, 299, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974)(plurality opinion), the existence of government profit alone is insufficient to trigger forum analysis. Thus, if the city in Summumhad established a rule that organizations wishing to donate monuments must also pay fees to assist in park maintenance, we do not believe that the result in that case would have been any different. Here, too, we think it sufficiently clear that Texas is speaking through its specialty license plate designs, such that the existence of annual fees does not convince us that the specialty plates are a nonpublic forum. Finally, we note that this case does not resemble other cases in which we have identified a nonpublic forum. This case is not like Perry Ed. Assn.,where we found a school district's internal mail system to be a nonpublic forum for private speech. See 460 U.S., at 48-49, 103 S.Ct. 948. There, it was undisputed that a number of private organizations, including a teachers' union, had access to the mail system. See id.,at 39-40, 103 S.Ct. 948. It was therefore clear that private parties, and not only the government, used the system to communicate. Here, by contrast, each specialty license plate design is formally approved by and stamped with the imprimatur of Texas. Nor is this case like Lehman,where we found the advertising space on city buses to be a nonpublic forum. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul,505 U.S. 377, 390, n. 6, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992)(identifying Lehmanas a case about a nonpublic forum). There, the messages were located in a context (advertising space) that is traditionally available for private speech. And the advertising space, in contrast to license plates, bore no indicia that the speech was owned or conveyed by the government. Nor is this case like Cornelius,where we determined that a charitable fundraising program directed at federal employees constituted a nonpublic forum. See 473 U.S., at 804-806, 105 S.Ct. 3439. That forum lacked the kind of history present here. The fundraising drive had never been a medium for government speech. Instead, it was established "to bring order to [a] solicitation process" which had previously consisted of ad hoc solicitation by individual charitable organizations. Id.,at 792, 805, 105 S.Ct. 3439. The drive "was designed to minimize ... disruption to the [federal] workplace," id.,at 805, 105 S.Ct. 3439, not to communicate messages from the government. Further, the charitable solicitations did not appear on a government ID under the government's name. In contrast to the instant case, there was no reason for employees to "interpret [the solicitation] as conveying some message on the [government's] behalf." Summum,555 U.S., at 471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. IV Our determination that Texas's specialty license plate designs are government speech does not mean that the designs do not also implicate the free speech rights of private persons. We have acknowledged that drivers who display a State's selected license plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. See Wooley v. Maynard,430 U.S. 705, 717, n. 15, 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977)(observing that a vehicle "is readily associated with its operator" and that drivers displaying license plates "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message"). And we have recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State's authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. See id.,at 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428; Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,515 U.S. 557, 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). But here, compelled private speech is not at issue. And just as Texas cannot require SCV to convey "the State's ideological message," Wooley, supra,at 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428, SCV cannot force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates. * * * For the reasons stated, we hold that Texas's specialty license plate designs constitute government speech and that Texas was consequently entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring SCV's proposed design. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is Reversed. APPENDIX Justice ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice SCALIA, and Justice KENNEDY join, dissenting. The Court's decision passes off private speech as government speech and, in doing so, establishes a precedent that threatens private speech that government finds displeasing. Under our First Amendment cases, the distinction between government speech and private speech is critical. The First Amendment "does not regulate government speech," and therefore when government speaks, it is free "to select the views that it wants to express." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,555 U.S. 460, 467-468, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). By contrast, "[i]n the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another." Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). Unfortunately, the Court's decision categorizes private speech as government speech and thus strips it of all First Amendment protection. The Court holds that all the privately created messages on the many specialty plates issued by the State of Texas convey a government message rather than the message of the motorist displaying the plate. Can this possibly be correct? Here is a test. Suppose you sat by the side of a Texas highway and studied the license plates on the vehicles passing by. You would see, in addition to the standard Texas plates, an impressive array of specialty plates. (There are now more than 350 varieties.) You would likely observe plates that honor numerous colleges and universities. You might see plates bearing the name of a high school, a fraternity or sorority, the Masons, the Knights of Columbus, the Daughters of the American Revolution, a realty company, a favorite soft drink, a favorite burger restaurant, and a favorite NASCAR driver. As you sat there watching these plates speed by, would you really think that the sentiments reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the State of Texas and not those of the owners of the cars? If a car with a plate that says "Rather Be Golfing" passed by at 8:30 am on a Monday morning, would you think: "This is the official policy of the State-better to golf than to work?" If you did your viewing at the start of the college football season and you saw Texas plates with the names of the University of Texas's out-of-state competitors in upcoming games-Notre Dame, Oklahoma State, the University of Oklahoma, Kansas State, Iowa State-would you assume that the State of Texas was officially (and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns' opponents? And when a car zipped by with a plate that reads "NASCAR-24 Jeff Gordon," would you think that Gordon (born in California, raised in Indiana, resides in North Carolina)is the official favorite of the State government? The Court says that all of these messages are government speech. It is essential that government be able to express its own viewpoint, the Court reminds us, because otherwise, how would it promote its programs, like recycling and vaccinations? Ante,at 2245 - 2246. So when Texas issues a "Rather Be Golfing" plate, but not a "Rather Be Playing Tennis" or "Rather Be Bowling" plate, it is furthering a state policy to promote golf but not tennis or bowling. And when Texas allows motorists to obtain a Notre Dame license plate but not a University of Southern California plate, it is taking sides in that long-time rivalry. This capacious understanding of government speech takes a large and painful bite out of the First Amendment. Specialty plates may seem innocuous. They make motorists happy, and they put money in a State's coffers. But the precedent this case sets is dangerous. While all license plates unquestionably contain some government speech (e.g.,the name of the State and the numbers and/or letters identifying the vehicle), the State of Texas has converted the remaining space on its specialty plates into little mobile billboards on which motorists can display their own messages. And what Texas did here was to reject one of the messages that members of a private group wanted to post on some of these little billboards because the State thought that many of its citizens would find the message offensive. That is blatant viewpoint discrimination. If the State can do this with its little mobile billboards, could it do the same with big, stationary billboards? Suppose that a State erected electronic billboards along its highways. Suppose that the State posted some government messages on these billboards and then, to raise money, allowed private entities and individuals to purchase the right to post their own messages. And suppose that the State allowed only those messages that it liked or found not too controversial. Would that be constitutional? What if a state college or university did the same thing with a similar billboard or a campus bulletin board or dorm list serve? What if it allowed private messages that are consistent with prevailing views on campus but banned those that disturbed some students or faculty? Can there be any doubt that these examples of viewpoint discrimination would violate the First Amendment? I hope not, but the future uses of today's precedent remain to be seen. I A Specialty plates like those involved in this case are a recent development. License plates originated solely as a means of identifying vehicles. In 1901, New York became the first State to require automobiles to be licensed, but rather than issue license plates itself, New York required drivers to display their initials on their cars. J. Minard & T. Stentiford, A Moving History 50 (2004). Two years later, Massachusetts became the first State to issue license plates. The plates said "Mass. Automobile Register" and displayed the vehicle's registration number. Id., at 51. Plates of this type-featuring a registration number, the name of the State, and sometimes the date-were the standard for decades thereafter. See id., at 52-94; see also generally, J. Fox, License Plates of the United States 10-99 (1997). Texas license plates initially followed this pattern. When the first official state plate appeared in 1917, it featured a number and the abbreviation "TEX." Texas Department of Transportation, The History of Texas License Plates 9 (1999) (History). In 1925, the year of issue was added, and the State began issuing plates that identified certain vehicle types, e.g.,"C-M" for commercial trucks (1925), id., at 14-15; "FARM" for farm trucks (1935), id., at 22; "Overwidth" (1949), id., at 32; "House Trailer" (1951), id., at 36. In 1936, a special plate with the word "CENTENNIAL" was created to mark the State's 100th birthday, and the first plate identifying the owner as a "State Official" appeared two years later. Id., at 20, 25. Starting in the 1950's, Texas began issuing plates to identify some other registrants, such as "Amateur Radio Operator" (1954), id., at 38, "State Judge" (1970) id., at 64; and "Disabled Veteran," (1972), id., at 79. A sesquicentennial plate appeared in 1985, and two years later, legislation was introduced to create a bronze license plate with 14-karat gold-plated lettering, available for a fee of $1,000. Id.,at 81. The proposal aimed to make the State a profit, but it failed to pass. Ibid. It was not until 1989 that anything that might be considered a message was featured regularly on Texas plates. The words "The Lone Star State" were added "as a means of bringing favorable recognition to Texas." Id., at 82. Finally, in the late 1990's, license plates containing a small variety of messages, selected by the State, became available for the first time. Id., at 101. These messages included slogans like "Read to Succeed," "Keep Texas Beautiful," "Animal Friendly," "Big Bend National Park," "Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo," and "Lone Star Proud." Id.,at 101, 113. Also issued in the 1990's were plates bearing the names of colleges and universities, and some plates (e.g., "State of the Arts," "State Capitol Restoration") were made available to raise funds for special purposes. Id.,101. Once the idea of specialty plates took hold, the number of varieties quickly multiplied, and today, we are told, Texas motorists can choose from more than 350 messages, including many designs proposed by nonprofit groups or by individuals and for-profit businesses through the State's third-party vendor. Brief for Respondents at 2; see also Texas Department of Motor Vehicles, online at http://www.txdmv.gov/motorists/license-plates/specialty-license-plates (all Internet materials as visited June 12, 2015, and available in Clerk of Court's case file); http://www.myplates.com. Drivers can select plates advertising organizations and causes like 4-H, the Boy Scouts, the American Legion, Be a Blood Donor, the Girl Scouts, Insure Texas Kids, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Marine Mammal Recovery, Save Texas Ocelots, Share the Road, Texas Reads, Texas Realtors ("I am a Texas Realtor"), the Texas State Rifle Association ("WWW.TSRA.COM"), the Texas Trophy Hunters Association, the World Wildlife Fund, the YMCA, and Young Lawyers. There are plates for fraternities and sororities and for in-state schools, both public (like Texas A & M and Texas Tech) and private (like Trinity University and Baylor). An even larger number of schools from out-of-state are honored: Arizona State, Brigham Young, Florida State, Michigan State, Alabama, and South Carolina, to name only a few. There are political slogans, like "Come and Take It" and "Don't Tread on Me," and plates promoting the citrus industry and the "Cotton Boll." Commercial businesses can have specialty plates, too. There are plates advertising Remax ("Get It Sold with Remax"), Dr. Pepper ("Always One of a Kind"), and Mighty Fine Burgers. B The Texas Division of Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) is an organization composed of descendants of Confederate soldiers. The group applied for a Texas specialty license plate in 2009 and again in 2010. Their proposed design featured a controversial symbol, the Confederate battle flag, surrounded by the words "Sons of Confederate Veterans 1896" and a gold border. App. 29. The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board (or Board) invited public comments and considered the plate design at a meeting in April 2011. At that meeting, one board member was absent, and the remaining eight members deadlocked on whether to approve the plate. The Board thus reconsidered the plate at its meeting in November 2011. This time, many opponents of the plate turned out to voice objections. The Board then voted unanimously against approval and issued an order stating: "The Board has considered the information and finds it necessary to deny this plate design application, specifically the confederate flag portion of the design, because public comments have shown that many members of the general public find the design offensive, and because such comments are reasonable. The Board finds that a significant portion of the public associate the confederate flag with organizations advocating expressions of hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning to those people or groups." Id., at 64-65. The Board also saw "a compelling public interest in protecting a conspicuous mechanism for identification, such as a license plate, from degrading into a possible public safety issue." Id., at 65. And it thought that the public interest required rejection of the plate design because the controversy surrounding the plate was so great that "the design could distract or disturb some drivers to the point of being unreasonably dangerous." Ibid. At the same meeting, the Board approved a Buffalo Soldiers plate design by a 5-to-3 vote. Proceeds from fees paid by motorists who select that plate benefit the Buffalo Soldier National Museum in Houston, which is "dedicated primarily to preserving the legacy and honor of the African American soldier." Buffalo Soldier National Museum, online at http://www.buffalosoldiermuseum. com. "Buffalo Soldiers" is a nickname that was originally given to black soldiers in the Army's 10th Cavalry Regiment, which was formed after the Civil War, and the name was later used to describe other black soldiers. W. Leckie & S. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Black Cavalry in the West 21, 26-27 (2003). The original Buffalo Soldiers fought with distinction in the Indian Wars, but the "Buffalo Soldiers" plate was opposed by some Native Americans. One leader commented that he felt " 'the same way about the Buffalo Soldiers' " as African-Americans felt about the Confederate flag. Scharrer, Specialty License Plates can Bring in Revenue, But Some Stir Up Controversy, Houston Chronicle, Nov. 26, 2011, P.B2. " 'When we see the U.S. Cavalry uniform,' " he explained, " 'we are forced to relive an American holocaust.' " Ibid. II A Relying almost entirely on one precedent-Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,555 U.S. 460, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853-the Court holds that messages that private groups succeed in placing on Texas license plates are government messages. The Court badly misunderstands Summum. In Summum,a private group claimed the right to erect a large stone monument in a small city park. Id., at 464, 129 S.Ct. 1125. The 2.5-acre park contained 15 permanent displays, 11 of which had been donated by private parties. Ibid. The central question concerned the nature of the municipal government's conduct when it accepted privately donated monuments for placement in its park: Had the city created a forum for private speech, or had it accepted donated monuments that expressed a government message? We held that the monuments represented government speech, and we identified several important factors that led to this conclusion. First, governments have long used monuments as a means of expressing a government message. As we put it, "[s]ince ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected statues of themselves to remind their subjects of their authority and power." Id., at 470, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Here in the United States, important public monuments like the Statue of Liberty, the Washington Monument, and the Lincoln Memorial, express principles that inspire and bind the Nation together. Thus, long experience has led the public to associate public monuments with government speech. Second, there is no history of landowners allowing their property to be used by third parties as the site of large permanent monuments that do not express messages that the landowners wish to convey. See id., at 471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. While "[a] great many of the monuments that adorn the Nation's public parks were financed with private funds or donated by private parties," "cities and other jurisdictions take some care in accepting donated monuments" and select those that "conve[y] a government message." Id., at 471-472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. We were not presented in Summumwith any examples of public parks that had been thrown open for private groups or individuals to put up whatever monuments they desired. Third, spatial limitations played a prominent part in our analysis. See id., at 478-479, 129 S.Ct. 1125. "[P]ublic parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent monuments," and consequently permanent monuments "monopolize the use of the land on which they stand and interfere permanently with other uses of public space." Ibid. Because only a limited number of monuments can be built in any given space, governments do not allow their parks to be cluttered with monuments that do not serve a government purpose, a point well understood by those who visit parks and view the monuments they contain. These characteristics, which rendered public monuments government speech in Summum,are not present in Texas's specialty plate program. B 1 I begin with history. As we said in Summum,governments have used monuments since time immemorial to express important government messages, and there is no history of governments giving equal space to those wishing to express dissenting views. In 1775, when a large gilded equestrian statue of King George III dominated Bowling Green, a small park in lower Manhattan,the colonial governor surely would not have permitted the construction on that land of a monument to the fallen at Lexington and Concord. When the United States accepted the Third French Republic's gift of the Statue of Liberty in 1877, see id., at 477, 129 S.Ct. 1125, Congress, it seems safe to say, would not have welcomed a gift of a Statue of Authoritarianism if one had been offered by another country. Nor is it likely that the National Park Service today would be receptive if private groups, pointing to the Lincoln Memorial, the Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial, and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the National Mall, sought permission to put up monuments to Jefferson Davis, Orval Faubus, or the North Vietnamese Army. Governments have always used public monuments to express a government message, and members of the public understand this. The history of messages on license plates is quite different. After the beginning of motor vehicle registration in 1917, more than 70 years passed before the proliferation of specialty plates in Texas. It was not until the 1990's that motorists were allowed to choose from among 10 messages, such as "Read to Succeed" and "Keep Texas Beautiful." History at 101. Up to this point, the words on the Texas plates can be considered government speech. The messages were created by the State, and they plausibly promoted state programs.But when, at some point within the last 20 years or so, the State began to allow private entities to secure plates conveying their own messages, Texas crossed the line. The contrast between the history of public monuments, which have been used to convey government messages for centuries, and the Texas license plate program could not be starker. In an attempt to gather historical support for its position, the Court relies on plates with the mottos or symbols of other States. As the Court notes, some of these were issued well before "The Lone Star State" made its debut in Texas in 1991. Id., at 82. But this history is irrelevant for present purposes. Like the 1991 Texas plate, these out-of-state plates were created by the States that issued them, and motorists generally had no choice but to accept them. For example, the State of New Hampshire made it a crime to cover up the words "Live Free or Die" on its plates. See Wooley v. Maynard,430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). The words and symbols on plates of this sort were and are government speech, but plates that are essentially commissioned by private entities (at a cost that exceeds $8,000) and that express a message chosen by those entities are very different-and quite new. Unlike in Summum,history here does not suggest that the messages at issue are government speech. 2 The Texas specialty plate program also does not exhibit the "selective receptivity" present in Summum. To the contrary, Texas's program is not selective by design. The Board's chairman, who is charged with approving designs, explained that the program's purpose is "to encourage private plates" in order to "generate additional revenue for the state." Ibid., 58. And most of the time, the Board "base[s] [its] decisions on rules that primarily deal with reflectivity and readability." Ibid. A Department brochure explains: "Q. Who provides the plate design? A. You do, though your design is subject to reflectivity, legibility, and design standards." Id.,at 67.b. Pressed to come up with any evidence that the State has exercised "selective receptivity," Texas (and the Court) rely primarily on sketchy information not contained in the record, specifically that the Board's predecessor (might have) rejected a "pro-life" plate and perhaps others on the ground that they contained messages that were offensive. See ante,at 2249 (citing Reply Brief 10 and Tr. of Oral Arg. 49-51). But even if this happened, it shows only that the present case may not be the only one in which the State has exercised viewpoint discrimination. Texas's only other (also extrarecord) evidence of selectivity concerns a proposed plate that was thought to create a threat to the fair enforcement of the State's motor vehicle laws. Reply Brief 9-10 (citing publicly available Transcript of Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board Meeting, Aug. 9, 2012, p. 112, online at http://www.txdmv.gov/reports-and-data/doc_download/450-2012-tran-aug9). This proposed plate was a Texas DPS Troopers Foundation (Troopers) plate, proposed in 2012. The Board considered that proposed plate at an August 2012 meeting, at which it approved six other plate designs without discussion, but it rejected the Troopers plate in a deadlocked vote due to apparent concern that the plate could give the impression that those displaying it would receive favored treatment from state troopers. Id., at 109-112. The constitutionality of this Board action does not necessarily turn on whether approval of this plate would have made the message government speech. If, as I believe, the Texas specialty plate program created a limited public forum, private speech may be excluded if it is inconsistent with the purpose of the forum. Rosenberger,515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Thus, even if Texas's extrarecord information is taken into account, the picture here is different from that in Summum. Texas does not take care to approve only those proposed plates that convey messages that the State supports. Instead, it proclaims that it is open to all private messages-except those, like the SCV plate, that would offend some who viewed them. The Court believes that messages on privately created plates are government speech because motorists want a seal of state approval for their messages and therefore prefer plates over bumper stickers. Ante,at 2248 - 2249. This is dangerous reasoning. There is a big difference between government speech (that is, speech by the government in furtherance of its programs) and governmental blessing (or condemnation) of private speech. Many private speakers in a forum would welcome a sign of government approval. But in the realm of private speech, government regulation may not favor one viewpoint over another. Rosenberger,supra,at 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510 3 A final factor that was important in Summumwas space. A park can accommodate only so many permanent monuments. Often large and made of stone, monuments can last for centuries and are difficult to move. License plates, on the other hand, are small, light, mobile, and designed to last for only a relatively brief time. The only absolute limit on the number of specialty plates that a State could issue is the number of registered vehicles. The variety of available plates is limitless, too. Today Texas offers more than 350 varieties. In 10 years, might it be 3,500? In sum, the Texas specialty plate program has none of the factors that were critical in Summum,and the Texas program exhibits a very important characteristic that was missing in that case: Individuals who want to display a Texas specialty plate, instead of the standard plate, must pay an increased annual registration fee. See http://www.dmv.org/tx-texas/license-plates.php. How many groups or individuals would clamor to pay $8,000 (the cost of the deposit required to create a new plate) in order to broadcast the government's message as opposed to their own? And if Texas really wants to speak out in support of, say, Iowa State University (but not the University of Iowa) or "Young Lawyers" (but not old ones), why must it be paid to say things that it really wants to say? The fees Texas collects pay for much more than merely the administration of the program. States have not adopted specialty license plate programs like Texas's because they are now bursting with things they want to say on their license plates. Those programs were adopted because they bring in money. Texas makes public the revenue totals generated by its specialty plate program, and it is apparent that the program brings in many millions of dollars every year. See http://www.txdmv.gov/reports-and-data/doc_download/5050-specialty-plates-revenue-fy-1994-2014. Texas has space available on millions of little mobile billboards. And Texas, in effect, sells that space to those who wish to use it to express a personal message-provided only that the message does not express a viewpoint that the State finds unacceptable. That is not government speech; it is the regulation of private speech. III What Texas has done by selling space on its license plates is to create what we have called a limited public forum. It has allowed state property (i.e.,motor vehicle license plates) to be used by private speakers according to rules that the State prescribes. Cf. Good News Club v. Milford Central School,533 U.S. 98, 106-107, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001). Under the First Amendment, however, those rules cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. See Rosenberger,515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc.,473 U.S. 788, 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985)). But that is exactly what Texas did here. The Board rejected Texas SCV's design, "specifically the confederate flag portion of the design, because public comments have shown that many members of the general public find the design offensive, and because such comments are reasonable." App. 64. These statements indisputably demonstrate that the Board denied Texas SCV's design because of its viewpoint. The Confederate battle flag is a controversial symbol. To the Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans, it is said to evoke the memory of their ancestors and other soldiers who fought for the South in the Civil War. See id.,at 15-16. To others, it symbolizes slavery, segregation, and hatred. Whatever it means to motorists who display that symbol and to those who see it, the flag expresses a viewpoint. The Board rejected the plate design because it concluded that many Texans would find the flag symbol offensive. That was pure viewpoint discrimination. If the Board's candid explanation of its reason for rejecting the SCV plate were not alone sufficient to establish this point, the Board's approval of the Buffalo Soldiers plate at the same meeting dispels any doubt. The proponents of both the SCV and Buffalo Soldiers plates saw them as honoring soldiers who served with bravery and honor in the past. To the opponents of both plates, the images on the plates evoked painful memories. The Board rejected one plate and approved the other. Like these two plates, many other specialty plates have the potential to irritate and perhaps even infuriate those who see them. Texas allows a plate with the words "Choose Life," but the State of New York rejected such a plate because the message " '[is] so incredibly divisive,' " and the Second Circuit recently sustained that decision. Children First Foundation, Inc. v. Fiala,--- F.3d ----, ----, 2015 WL 2444501, *18 (C.A.2, May 22, 2015). Texas allows a specialty plate honoring the Boy Scouts, but the group's refusal to accept gay leaders angers some. Virginia, another State with a proliferation of specialty plates, issues plates for controversial organizations like the National Rifle Association, controversial commercial enterprises (raising tobacco and mining coal), controversial sports (fox hunting), and a professional sports team with a controversial name (the Washington Redskins). Allowing States to reject specialty plates based on their potential to offend is viewpoint discrimination. The Board's decision cannot be saved by its suggestion that the plate, if allowed, "could distract or disturb some drivers to the point of being unreasonably dangerous." App. 65. This rationale cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Other States allow specialty plates with the Confederate Battle Flag,and Texas has not pointed to evidence that these plates have led to incidents of road rage or accidents. Texas does not ban bumper stickers bearing the image of the Confederate battle flag. Nor does it ban any of the many other bumper stickers that convey political messages and other messages that are capable of exciting the ire of those who loathe the ideas they express. Cf. Good News Club, supra,at 111-112, 121 S.Ct. 2093 Messages that are proposed by private parties and placed on Texas specialty plates are private speech, not government speech. Texas cannot forbid private speech based on its viewpoint. That is what it did here. Because the Court approves this violation of the First Amendment, I respectfully dissent. APPENDIX Sample Texas Specialty Plates All found at http://txdmv.gov/motorists/license-plates/specialty-license-plates Elliot, Shifting Gears, Forbes Life, Oct. 2013, pp. 55, 57. The Appendix, infra,reproduces the available specialty plates mentioned throughout this opinion in order of first reference. When categories are referenced, examples from the category have been included. The Statue That Was Made Into Bullets, N.Y. Times Magazine, July 21, 1901, at p. 6. This opinion does not address whether the unique combination of letters and/or numbers assigned to each vehicle, even when selected by the motorist, is private speech. See http://www.dmv.virginia.gov/vehicles/# splates/category.asp? category=SCITTexas* * *

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DUNBAR-STANLEY STUDIOS, INC. v. ALABAMA. No. 376. Argued January 16, 1969. Decided February 25, 1969. /. Edward Thornton argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Glen B. Hardymon. William H. Burton, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General, and Willard W. Livingston, Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court. Alabama levies a tax upon photograph galleries and persons engaged in photography. If the business is conducted “at a fixed location,” the tax in the large cities is $25 a year for each such location. For each “transient or traveling photographer,” the tax is $5 per week for each county, town, or city in which he plies his trade. This case involves state assessments of the transient photographers tax against appellant and its predecessor partnership. Appellant sought a declaration from the state courts that the assessment was improper, claiming that the tax was levied upon interstate commerce, in conflict with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Alabama sustained the tax. 282 Ala. 221, 210 So. 2d 696 (1968). We affirm. Appellant is a photography firm specializing in selling photographs of children. It is organized as a North Carolina corporation and its principal office and processing plant are in Charlotte, North Carolina. It has no office or place of business in Alabama, nor does it maintain an inventory there. Its activities in that State stem from a contract between appellant and J. C. Penney Co. Penney operates department stores in eight cities in Alabama, as well as elsewhere in the Nation. By the terms of the contract, as summarized in the complaint, appellant’s photographers, nonresidents of Alabama, “were at the disposal of the local Penney stores. The local store manager requested Appellant to send representatives for picture taking on specified dates.” During the period for which the tax has been assessed, appellant’s photographers were sent to J. C. Penney stores in eight Alabama cities. According to the complaint, each visit lasted two to five days, and each city was visited from one to five times a year. The Penney stores advertised the photographic service, inviting parents to bring their children to be photographed during the visit by appellant’s photographer. Each store took the order for the photographs, arranged the time for the sitting, provided a place in the store for the temporary studio, collected the money, and delivered the pictures to the customer when completed. Appellant was paid a percentage of the receipts from the Penney stores. Appellant’s activities were limited to taking the pictures, transmitting the exposed film to its office in North Carolina where it was developed, printed, and finished, and mailing the finished prints to the Penney stores in Alabama. It is clear from the taxing statute itself and from the decisions of the Supreme Court of Alabama that the tax is laid upon the distinctive business of the photographer, not upon the soliciting of orders or the processing of film. Graves v. State, 258 Ala. 359, 62 So. 2d 446 (1952); Haden v. Olan Mills, Inc., 273 Ala. 129, 135 So. 2d 388 (1961). Appellant argues that since each of its photographers came into Alabama from North Carolina to ply his trade, bringing his equipment with him, and since he merely exposed his film in Alabama, the developing, printing, and finishing operation being conducted in North Carolina, his activities in Alabama are an inseparable part of interstate commerce and cannot constitutionally be subject to the Alabama license tax. Appellant relies upon familiar cases decided by this Court holding that the Commerce Clause precludes a state-imposed flat sum privilege tax on an interstate enterprise whose only contact with the taxing State is the solicitation of orders and the subsequent delivery of merchandise within the taxing State. West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Opelika, 354 U. S. 390 (1957); Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U. S. 389 (1952); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946). Such taxes have a substantial inhibitory effect on commerce which is essentially interstate. But these cases are not applicable to the present facts. In determining whether a state tax imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, the issue is whether the local activity which is made the nominal subject of the tax is “such an integral part of the interstate process, the flow of commerce, that it cannot realistically be separated from it.” Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157, 166 (1954). If, for example, a license tax were imposed on the acts of engaging in soliciting orders or making deliveries, conflict with the Commerce Clause would be evident because these are minimal activities within a State without which there can be no interstate commerce. But in the present case, the “taxable event,” as defined by the State’s courts, is “pursu[ing] the art of photography in Alabama.” Graves v. State, 258 Ala. 359, 362, 62 So. 2d 446, 448. When appellant’s photographers set up their equipment in the local stores, posed the children brought to them to be photographed, and operated their cameras, they were engaged in an essentially local activity: the business of providing photographers’ services. The essentially local character of the activity is emphasized by the intimate connection between appellant’s photographers and the local stores in which they set up their temporary studios. Engaging in such local business may constitutionally be made subject to local taxation. E. g., Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199 (1961). It could hardly be suggested that if J. C. Penney had set up its own resident or transient photography studios, using its own employees, such a photography business would have been exempt from state licensing merely because it chose to send the exposed film out of the State for processing. The extraction of a natural resource within a State is not immunized from state taxation merely because, once extracted, the product will immediately be shipped out of the State for processing and sale to consumers. Alaska v. Arctic Maid, supra, at 203-204; Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 177-179 (1923). Cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 394-395 (1948). A fortiori, the fact that an intermediate processing stage takes place outside the State before the pictures are returned to the State for final delivery does not make the taking of the pictures — the activity on which the tax was imposed — so inseparable a part of the flow of interstate commerce as to be immune from state license taxation. The mere substitution for J. C. Penney’s own employees of a transient photographer who comes into Alabama from North Carolina does not convert the essentially local activity of photographing the subjects into an interstate activity immune from the state privilege tax. Cf. Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117 (1941); Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U. S. 95 (1919). Nor is the tax invalid as a discrimination against interstate commerce. Alabama’s tax is levied equally upon all transient or traveling photographers whether their travel is interstate or entirely within the State. On the record before us, there is no basis for concluding that the $5 per week tax on transient out-of-state photographers is so disproportionate to the tax imposed on photographers with a fixed location as to bear unfairly on the former. Cf. West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Opelika, 354 U. S. 390 (1957); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940). In none of the cities for which appellant’s complaint gives the details of its activities would the transient tax imposed on it have exceeded that which a fixed-location photographer would have had to pay to operate in the city. For example, in 1965,. five visits are listed to Mobile, resulting in an assessed tax of $25. This is equal to the flat rate tax which a photographer permanently located in the city would have had to pay. Since, according to the complaint, the maximum tax on appellant in any year for any city would be $25, the burden could hardly be prohibitive. Affirmed. For smaller towns, the rate is stepped down. The lowest rate is $3 a year for localities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. Title 51, Code of Alabama § 569, prior to its amendment in 1967, read as follows: “Photographers and photograph galleries. Every photograph gallery, or person engaged in photography, when the business is conducted at a fixed location: In cities and towns of seventy-five thousand inhabitants and over, twenty-five dollars; in cities and towns of less than seventy-five thousand and not less than forty thousand inhabitants, fifteen dollars; in cities and towns of less than forty thousand and not less than seven thousand inhabitants, ten dollars; in cities and towns of less than seven thousand and over one thousand inhabitants, five dollars; in all other places whether incorporated or not, three dollars. The payment of the license required in this section shall authorize the doing of business only in the town, city or county where paid. For each transient or traveling photographer, five dollars per week.” No point has been made as to the identity of the taxpayer or its liability for the tax if it may be constitutionally levied. See n. 1, supra. Appellant asserts in its brief — but not in the complaint — that the taxes assessed for its operations in Birmingham were almost twice what a fixed-location photographer would have had to pay for the same period. Even assuming that to be true, we are not prepared to say that this relative burden is improper, given the differences between the two ways of carrying on the business. Allegedly, there were up to five visits per year to each city, each visit extending from two to five days. The tax rate for a transient photographer was $5 for each week of operation in a locality.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA v. BAKKE No. 76-811. Argued October 12, 1977 Decided June 28, 1978 Powell, J., announced the Court’s judgment and filed an opinion expressing his views of the case, in Parts I, III-A, and V-C of which White, J., joined; and in Parts I and V-C of which BreNNAN, Marshall, and BlacemuN, JJ., joined. BreNNAN, White, Marshall, and Blace-MUN, JJ., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 324. White, J., post, p. 379, Marshall, J., post, p. 387, and BlackmuN, J., post, p. 402, filed separate opinions. SteveNS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart and RehNQUist, JJ., joined, post, p. 408. Archibald Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Paul J. Mishkin, Jack B. Owens, and Donald L. Reidhaar. Reynold H. Colvin argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent. Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the briefs were Attorney General Bell, Assistant Attorney General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Brian K. Landsberg, Jessica Dunsay Silver, Miriam R. Eisenstein, and Vincent F. O’Rourke. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and James B. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Washington et al.; by E. Richard Larson, Joel M. Gora, Charles C. Marson, Sanford Jay Rosen, Fred Okrand, Norman Dorsen, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Frank Askin for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Edgar S. Cahn, Jean Camper Cahn, and Robert S. Catz for the Antioch School of Law; by William Jack Chow for the Asian American Bar Assn, of the Greater Bay Area; by A. Kenneth Pye, Robert B. McKay, David E. Feller, and Ernest Gellhorn for the Association of American Law Schools; by John Holt Myers for the Association of American Medical Colleges; by Jerome B. Fcdk and Peter Roos for the Bar Assn, of San Francisco et al.; by Ephraim Margolin for the Black Law Students Assn, at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law; by John T. Baker for the Black Law Students Union of Yale University Law School; by Annamay T. Sheppard and Jonathan M. Hyman for the Board of Governors of Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, et al.; by Robert J. Willey for the Cleveland State University Chapter of the Black American Law Students Assn.; by John Mason Harding, Albert J. Rosenthal, Daniel Steiner, Iris Brest, James V. Siena, Louis H. Poliak, and Michael I. Sovem for Columbia University et al.; by Herbert 0. Reid for Howard University; by Harry B. Reese and L. Orin Slagle for the Law School Admission Council; by Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Stephen J. Poliak, Burke Marshall, Norman Redlich, Robert A. Murphy, and William, E. Caldwell for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; by Alice Daniel and James E. Coleman, Jr., for the Legal Services Corp.; by Nathaniel R. Jones, Nathaniel S. Colley, and Stanley Goodman for the National Assn, for the Advancement of Colored People; by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles S. Ralston, Eric Schnapper, and David E. Kendall for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; by Stephen V. Bomse for the National Assn, of Minority Contractors et al.; by Richard B. Sobol, Marian Wright Edelman, Stephen P. Berzon, and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., for the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States et al.; by Barbara A. Morris, Joan Bertin Lowy, and Diana H. Greene for the National Employment Law Project, Inc.; by Herbert 0. Reid and J. Clay Smith, Jr., for the National Medical Assn., Inc., et ah; by Robert Hermann for the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund et al.; by Robert Allen Sedler, Howard Lesnick, and Arval A. Morris for the Society of American Law Teachers; for the American Medical Student Assn.; and for the Council on Legal Education Opportunity. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Lawrence A. Polt-rock and Wayne B. Giampietro for the American Federation of Teachers; by Abraham S. Goldstein, Nathan Z. Dershowitz, Arthur J. Gajarsa, Thaddeus L. Kowalski, Anthony J. Fornelli, Howard L. Greenberger, Samuel Rabinove, Themis N. Anastos, Julian E. Kulas, and Alan M. Dershowitz for the American Jewish Committee et al; by McNeill Stokes and Ira J. Smotherman, Jr., for the American Subcontractors Assn.; by Philip B. Kurland, Daniel D. Polsby, Larry M. Lavinsky, Arnold Forster, Dennis Rapps, Anthony J. Fornelli, Leonard Greenwald, and David I. Ashe for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et ah; by Charles G. Bakaly and Lawrence B. Kraus for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by Roger A. Clark, Jerome K. Tankel, and Glen R. Murphy for the Fraternal Order of Police et al.; by Judith R. Cohn for the Order Sons of Italy in America; by Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, and William F. Harvey for the Pacific Legal Foundation; by Benjamin Vinar and David I. Caplan for the Queens Jewish Community Council et al.; and by Jennings P. Felix for Young Americans for Freedom. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Matthew W. Finkin for the American Assn, of University Professors; by John W. Finley, Jr., Michael Blinick, John Cannon, Leonard J. Theberge, and Edward H. Dowd for the Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity et al.; by Kenneth C. McGuiness, Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Ronald M. Green for the Equal Employment Advisory Council; by Charles E. Wilson for the Fair Employment Practice Comm’n of California; by Mario G. Obledo for Jerome A. Laekner, Director of the Department of Health of California, et ah; by Vilma S. Martinez, Peter D. Roos, and Ralph Santiago Abascal for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al.; by Eva S. Goodwin for the National Assn, of Affirmative Action Officers; by Lennox S. Hinds for the National Conference of Black Lawyers; by David Ginsburg for the National Fund for Minority Engineering Students; by A. John Wabaunsee, Walter R. Echo-Hawk, and Thomas W. Fredericks for the Native American Law Students of the University of California at Davis et al; by Joseph A. Broderick, Calvin Brown, LeMarquis DeJarmon, James E. Ferguson II, Harry E. Groves, John H. Harmon, William A. Marsh, Jr., and James W. Smith for the North Carolina Assn, of Black Lawyers; by Leonard F. Walentyno-wicz for the Polish American Congress et al.; by Daniel M. Luevano and John E. McDermott for the UCLA Black Law Students Assn, et al.; by Henry A. Waxman pro se; by Leo Branton, Jr., Ann Fagan Ginger, Sam Rosenwein, and Laurence R. Sperber for Price M. Cobbs, M. D., et al.; by John S. Nolan for Ralph J. Galliano; and by Daniel T. Spitler for Timothy J. Hoy. Mr. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court. This case presents a challenge to the special admissions program of the petitioner, the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, which is designed to assure the admission of a specified number of students from certain minority groups. The Superior Court of California sustained respondent’s challenge, holding that petitioner’s program violated the California Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 200Ód et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court enjoined petitioner from considering respondent’s race or the race of any other applicant in making admissions decisions. It refused, however, to order respondent’s admission to the Medical School, holding that he had not carried his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the constitutional and statutory violations. The Supreme Court of California affirmed those portions of the trial court’s judgment declaring the special admissions program unlawful and enjoining petitioner from considering the race of any applicant. It modified that portion of the judgment denying respondent’s requested injunction and directed the trial court to order his admission. For the reasons stated in the following opinion, I believe that so much of the judgment of the California court as holds petitioner’s special admissions program unlawful and directs that respondent be admitted to the Medical School must be affirmed. For the reasons expressed in a separate opinion, my Brothers The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and Mr. Justice Stevens concur in this judgment. I also conclude for the reasons stated in the following opinion that the portion of the court’s judgment enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in its admissions process must be reversed. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun concur in this judgment. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. I The Medical School of the University of California at Davis opened in 1968 with an entering class of 50 students. In 1971, the size of the entering class was increased to 100 students, a level at which it remains. No admissions program for disadvantaged or minority students existed when the school opened, and the first class contained three Asians but no blacks, no Mexican-Americans, and no American Indians. Over the next two years, the faculty devised a special admissions program to increase the representation of “disadvantaged” students in each Medical School class. The special program consisted of a separate admissions system operating in coordination with the regular admissions process. Under the regular admissions procedure, a candidate could submit his application to the Medical School beginning in July of the year preceding the academic year for which admission was sought. Record 149. Because of the large number of applications, the admissions committee screened each one to select candidates for further consideration. Candidates whose overall undergraduate grade point averages fell below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were summarily rejected. Id., at 63. About one out of six applicants was invited for a personal interview. Ibid. Following the interviews, each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by his interviewers and four other members of the admissions committee. The rating embraced the interviewers’ summaries, the candidate’s overall grade point average, grade point average in science courses, scores on the Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT), letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other biographical data. Id., at 62. The ratings were added together to arrive at each candidate’s “benchmark” score. Since five committee members rated each candidate in 1973, a perfect score was 500; in 1974, six members rated each candidate, so that a perfect score was 600. The full committee then reviewed the file and scores of each applicant and made offers of admission on a “rolling” basis. The chairman was responsible for placing names on the waiting list. They were not placed in strict numerical order; instead, the chairman had discretion to include persons with “special skills.” Id., at 63-64. The special admissions program operated with a separate committee, a majority of whom were members of minority groups. Id., at 163. On the 1973 application form, candidates were asked to indicate whether they wished to be considered as “economically and/or educationally disadvantaged” applicants; on the 1974 form the question was whether they wished to be considered as members of a “minority group,” which the Medical School apparently viewed as “Blacks,” “Chícanos,” “Asians,” and “American Indians.” Id., at 65-66, 146, 197, 203-205, 216-218. If these questions were answered affirmatively, the application was forwarded to the special admissions committee. No formal definition of “disadvantaged” was ever produced, id., at 163-164, but the chairman of the special committee screened each application to see whether it reflected economic or educational deprivation. Having passed this initial hurdle, the applications then were rated by the special committee in a fashion similar to that used by the general admissions committee, except that special candidates did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average cutoff applied to regular applicants. About one-fifth of the total number of special applicants were invited for interviews in 1973 and 1974. Following each interview, the special committee assigned each special applicant a benchmark score. The special committee then presented its top choices to the general admissions committee. The latter did not rate or compare the special candidates against the general applicants, id., at 388, but could reject recommended special candidates for failure to meet course requirements or other specific deficiencies. Id., at 171-172. The special committee continued to recommend special applicants until a number prescribed by faculty vote were admitted. While the overall class size was still 50, the prescribed number was 8; in 1973 and 1974, when the class size had doubled to 100, the prescribed number of special admissions also doubled, to 16. Id., at 164,166. From the year of the increase in class size — 1971 — through 1974, the special program resulted in the admission of 21 black students, 30 Mexican-Americans, and 12 Asians, for a total of 63 minority students. Over the same period, the regular admissions program produced 1 black, 6 Mexican-Americans, and 37 Asians, for a total of 44 minority students. Although disadvantaged whites applied to the special program in large numbers, see n. 5, supra, none received an offer of admission through that process. Indeed, in 1974, at least, the special committee explicitly considered only “disadvantaged” special applicants who were members of one of the designated minority groups. Record 171. Allan Bakke is a white male who applied to the Davis Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. In both years Bakke’s application was considered under the general admissions program, and he received an interview. His 1973 interview was with Dr. Theodore C. West, who considered Bakke “a very desirable applicant to [the] medical school.” Id., at 225. Despite a strong benchmark score of 468 out of 500, Bakke was rejected. His application had come late in the year, and no applicants in the general admissions process with scores below 470 were accepted after Bakke’s application was completed. Id., at 69. There were four special admissions slots unfilled at that time, however, for which Bakke was not considered. Id., at 70. After his 1973 rejection, Bakke wrote to Dr. George H. Lowrey, Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions Committee, protesting that the special admissions program operated as a racial and ethnic quota. Id., at 259. Bakke’s 1974 application was completed early in the year. Id., at 70. His student interviewer gave him an overall rating of 94, finding him “friendly, well tempered, conscientious and delightful to speak with.” Id., at 229. His faculty interviewer was, by coincidence, the same Dr. Lowrey to whom he had written in protest of the special admissions program. Dr. Lowrey found Bakke “rather limited in his approach” to the problems of the medical profession and found disturbing Bakke’s “very definite opinions which were based more on his personal viewpoints than upon a study of the total problem.” Id., at 226. Dr. Lowrey gave Bakke the lowest of his six ratings, an 86; his total was 549 out of 600. Id., at 230. Again, Bakke’s application was rejected. In neither year did the chairman of the admissions committee, Dr. Lowrey, exercise his discretion to place Bakke on the waiting list. Id., at 64. In both years, applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke’s. After the second rejection, Bakke filed the instant suit in the Superior Court of California, He sought mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief compelling his admission to the Medical School. He alleged that the Medical School’s special admissions program operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Art. I, § 21, of the California Constitution, and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. The University cross-complained for a declaration that its special admissions program was lawful. The trial court found that the special program operated as a racial quota, because minority applicants in the special program were rated only against one another, Record 388, and 16 places in the class of 100 were reserved for them. Id., at 295-296. Declaring that the University could not take race into account in making admissions decisions, the trial court held the challenged program violative of the Federal Constitution, the State Constitution, and Title VI. The court refused to order Bakke’s admission, however, holding that he had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the existence of the special program. Bakke appealed from the portion of the trial court judgment denying him admission, and the University appealed from the decision that its special admissions program was unlawful and the order enjoining it from considering race in the processing of applications. The Supreme Court of California transferred the case directly from the trial court, “because of the importance of the issues involved.” 18 Cal. 3d 34, 39, 553 P. 2d 1152, 1156 (1976). The California court accepted the findings of the trial court with respect to the University's program. Because the special admissions program involved a .racial classification, the Supreme Court held itself bound to apply strict scrutiny. Id., at 49, 553 P. 2d, at 1162-1163. It then turned to the goals the University presented as justifying the special program. Although the court agreed that the goals of integrating the medical profession and increasing the number of physicians willing to serve members of minority groups were compelling state interests, id., at 53, 553 P. 2d, at 1165, it concluded that the special admissions program was not the least intrusive means of achieving those goals. Without passing on the state constitutional or the federal statutory grounds cited in the trial court’s judgment, the California court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that “no applicant may be rejected because of his race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by standards applied without regard to race.” Id., at 55, 553 P. 2d, at 1166. Turning to Bakke’s appeal, the court ruled that since Bakke had established that the University had discriminated against him on the basis of his race, the burden of proof shifted to the University to demonstrate that he would not have been admitted even in the absence of the special admissions program. Id., at 63-64, 553 P. 2d,, at 1172. The court analogized Bakke’s situation to that of a. plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-17 (1970 ed., Supp. V), see, e. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 772 (1976).. 18 Cal. 3d, at 63-64, 553 P. 2d, at 1172. On this basis, the court initially ordered a remand for the purpose of determining whether, under the newly allocated burden of proof, Bakke would have been admitted to either the 1973 or the 1974 entering class in the absence of the special admissions program. App. A to Application for Stay 48. In its petition for rehearing below, however, the University conceded its inability to carry that burden. App. B to Application for Stay A19-A20. The California court thereupon amended its opinion to direct that the trial court enter judgment ordering Bakke’s admission to the Medical School. 18 Cal. 3d, at 64, 553 P. 2d, at 1172. That order was stayed pending review in this Court. 429 U. S. 953 (1976). We granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional issue. 429 U. S. 1090 (1977). II In this Court the parties neither briefed nor argued the applicability of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Rather, as had the California court, they focused exclusively upon the validity of the special admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause. Because it was possible, however, that a decision on Title VI might obviate resort to constitutional interpretation, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-348 (1936) (concurring opinion), we requested supplementary briefing on the statutory issue. 434 U. S. 900 (1977). A At the outset we face the question whether a right of action for private parties exists under Title VI. Respondent argues that there is a private right of action, invoking the test set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975). He contends that the statute creates a federal right in his favor, that legislative history reveals an intent to permit private actions, that such actions would further the remedial purposes of the statute, and that enforcement of federal rights under the Civil Rights Act generally is not relegated to the States. In addition, he cites several lower court decisions which have recognized or assumed the existence of a private right of action. Petitioner denies the existence of a private right of action, arguing that the sole function of § 601, see n. 11, supra, was to establish a predicate for administrative action under § 602, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-l. In its view, administrative curtailment of federal funds under that section was the only sanction to be imposed upon recipients that violated § 601. Petitioner also points out that Title VI contains no explicit grant of a private right of action, in contrast to Titles II, III, IV, and VII, of the same statute, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000a-3 (a), 2000b-2, 2000c-8, and 2000e-5 (f) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). We find it unnecessary to resolve this question in the instant case. The question of respondent’s right to bring an action under Title VI was neither argued nor decided in either of the courts below, and this Court has been hesitant to review questions not addressed below. McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430, 434-435 (1940). See also Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U. S. 322 (1977); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 439 (1969). Cf. Singleton, v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 121 (1976). We therefore do not address this difficult issue. Similarly, we need not pass upon petitioner's claim that private plaintiffs under Title VI must exhaust administrative remedies. We assume, only for the purposes of this case, that respondent has a right of action under Title VI. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563, 571 n. 2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in result). B The language of § 601, 78 Stat. 252, like that of the Equal Protection Clause, is majestic in its sweep : “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” The concept of “discrimination,” like the phrase “equal protection of the laws,” is susceptible of varying interpretations, for as Mr. Justice Holmes declared, “[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 425 (1918). We must, therefore, seek whatever aid is available in determining the precise meaning of the statute before us. Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976), quoting United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940). Examination of the voluminous legislative history of Title VI reveals a congressional intent to halt federal funding of entities that violate a prohibition of racial discrimination similar to that of the Constitution. Although isolated statements of various legislators, taken out of context, can be marshaled in support of the proposition that § 601 enacted a purely colorblind scheme, without regard to the reach of the Equal Protection Clause, these comments must be read against the background of both the problem that Congress was addressing and the broader view of the statute that emerges from a full examination of the legislative debates. The problem confronting Congress was discrimination against Negro citizens at the hands of recipients of federal moneys. Indeed, the color blindness pronouncements cited in the margin at n. 19, generally occur in the midst of extended remarks dealing with the evils of segregation in federally funded programs. Over and over again, proponents of the bill detailed the plight of Negroes seeking equal treatment in such programs. There simply was no reason for Congress to consider the validity of hypothetical preferences that might be accorded minority citizens; the legislators were dealing with the real and pressing problem of how to guarantee those citizens equal treatment. In addressing that problem, supporters of Title VI repeatedly declared that the bill enacted constitutional principles. Tor example, Representative Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and floor manager of the legislation in the House, emphasized this in introducing the bill: “The bill would offer assurance that hospitals financed by Federal money would not deny adequate care to Negroes. It would prevent abuse of food distribution programs whereby Negroes have been known to be denied food surplus supplies when white persons were given such food. It would assure Negroes the benefits now accorded only-white students in programs of high[er] education financed by Federal funds. It would, in short, assure the existing right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Federal funds. It would not destroy any rights of private property or freedom of association.” 110 Cong. Rec. 1519 (1964) (emphasis added). Other sponsors shared Representative Celler’s view that Title VI embodied constitutional principles. In the Senate, Senator Humphrey declared that the purpose of Title VI was “to insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of the Nation.” Id., at 6544. Senator Ribicoff agreed that Title VI embraced the constitutional standard: “Basically, there is a constitutional restriction against discrimination in the use of federal funds; and title VI simply spells out the procedure to be used in enforcing that restriction.” Id., at 13333. Other Senators expressed similar views. Further evidence of the incorporation of a constitutional standard into Title VI appears in the repeated refusals of the legislation’s supporters precisely to define the term “discrimination.” Opponents sharply criticized this failure, but proponents of the bill merely replied that the meaning of “discrimination” would be made clear by reference to the Constitution or other existing law. For example, Senator Humphrey noted the relevance of the Constitution: “As I have said, the bill has a simple purpose. That purpose is to give fellow citizens — Negroes — the same rights and opportunities that white people take for granted. This is no more than what was preached by the prophets, and by Christ Himself. It is no more than what our Constitution guarantees.” Id., at 6553. In view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment. Ill A Petitioner does not deny that decisions based on race or ethnic origin by faculties and administrations of state universities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950). For his part, respondent does not argue that all racial or ethnic classifications are per se invalid. See, e. g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). The parties do disagree as to the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to the special admissions program. Petitioner argues that the court below erred in applying strict scrutiny, as this inexact term has been applied in our cases. That level of review, petitioner asserts, should be reserved for classifications that disadvantage “dis.-crete and insular minorities.” See United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the California court correctly rejected the notion that the degree of judicial scrutiny accorded a particular racial or ethnic classification hinges upon membership in a discrete and insular minority and duly recognized that the “rights established [by the Fourteenth Amendment] are personal rights.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22 (1948). En route to this crucial battle over the scope of judicial review, the parties fight a sharp preliminary action over the proper characterization of the special admissions program. Petitioner prefers to view it as establishing a “goal” of minority representation in the Medical School. Respondent, echoing the courts below, labels it a racial quota. This semantic distinction is beside the point: The special admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background. To the extent that there existed a pool of at least minimally, qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants. Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status. The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its language is explicit: “No State shall.. . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It is settled beyond question that the “rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights,” Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 22. Accord, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, supra, at 351; McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 161-162 (1914). The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal. Nevertheless, petitioner argues that the court below erred in applying 'strict scrutiny to the special admissions program because white males, such as respondent, are not a “discrete and insular minority” requiring extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. Carolene Products Co., supra, at 152-153, n. 4. This rationale, however, has never been invoked in our decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny. Nor has this Court held that discreteness and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that a particular classification is invidious. See, e. g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex ret. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 94-97 (1965). These characteristics may be relevant in deciding whether or not to add new types of classifications to the list of “suspect” categories or whether a particular classification survives close examination. See, e. g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 313 (1976) (age); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973) (wealth); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971) (aliens). Racial and ethnic classifications, however, are subject to stringent examination without regard to these additional characteristics. We declared as much in the first cases explicitly to recognize racial distinctions as suspect: “Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Hirabayashi, 320 U. S., at 100. “[A] 11 legal restrictions'which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.” Korematsu, 323 U. S., at 216. The Court has never questioned the validity of those pronouncements. Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination. B This perception of racial and ethnic distinctions is rooted in our Nation’s constitutional and demographic history. The Court’s initial view of the Fourteenth Amendment was that its “one pervading purpose” was “the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised dominion over him.” Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (1873). The Equal Protection Clause, however, was “[virtually strangled in infancy by post-civil-war judicial reaction-ism.” It was relegated to decades of relative desuetude while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, after a short germinal period, flourished as a cornerstone in the Court’s defense of property and liberty of contract. See, e. g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661 (1887); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). In that cause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one pervading purpose” was displaced. See, e. g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896). It was only as the era of substantive due process came to a close, see, e. g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), that the Equal Protection Clause began to attain a genuine measure of vitality, see, e. g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U. S. 144 (1938); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, supra. By that time it was no longer possible to peg the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for equality of one racial minority. During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the United States had become a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle — and to some extent struggles still — to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a “majority” composed of various minority groups of whom it was said — perhaps unfairly in many cases— that a shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups. As the Nation filled with the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official discrimination. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 308 (1880) (Celtic Irishmen) (dictum); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) (Chinese); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915) (Austrian resident aliens); Korematsu, supra (Japanese); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans) . The guarantees of equal protection, said the Court in Yick Wo, “are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” 118 U. S., at 369. Although many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived of its primary function as bridging the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the white “majority,” Slaughter-House Cases, supra, the Amendment itself was framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude. As this Court recently remarked in interpreting the 1866 Civil Rights Act to extend to claims of racial discrimination against white persons, “the 39th Congress was intent upon establishing in the federal law a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves.” McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 296 (1976). And that legislation was specifically broadened in 1870 to ensure that “all persons,” not merely “citizens,” would enjoy equal rights under the law. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 192-202 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, it is not unlikely that among the Framers were many who would have applauded a reading of the Equal Protection Clause that states a principle of universal application and is responsive to the racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity of the Nation. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1056 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Niblack); id., at 2891-2892 (remarks of Sen. Conness) ; id., 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 883 (1868) (remarks of Sen. Howe) (Fourteenth Amendment “protect [s] classes from class legislation”). See also Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 60-63 (1955). Over the past 30 years, this Court has embarked upon the crucial mission of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause with the view of assuring to all persons “the protection of equal laws,” Yick Wo, supra, at 369, in a Nation confronting a legacy of slavery and racial discrimination. See, e. g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U. S. 284 (1976). Because the landmark decisions in this area arose in response to the continued exclusion of Negroes from the mainstream of American society, they could be characterized as involving discrimination by the “majority” white race against the Negro minority. But they need not be read as depending upon that characterization for their results. It suffices to say that “ [o] ver the years, this Court has consistently repudiated ‘[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ ” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967), quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U. S., at 100. » Petitioner urges us to adopt for the first time a more restrictive view of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that discrimination against members of the white “majority” cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as “benign.” The clock of our liberties, however, cannot be turned back to 1868. Brown v. Board of Education, supra, at 492; accord, Loving v. Virginia, supra, at 9. It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others. “The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a ‘two-class theory’ — that is, based upon differences between ‘white’ and Negro.” Hernandez, 347 U. S., at 478. Once the artificial line of a “two-class theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment is put aside, the difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial review according to a perceived “preferred” status of a particular racial or ethnic minority are intractable. The concepts of “majority” and “minority” necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments. As observed above, the white “majority” itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals. Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judicial toler-anee of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only “majority” left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit “heightened judicial solicitude” and which would not. Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of toler-ability then would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other groups. Those classifications would be free from exacting judicial scrutiny. As these preferences began to have their desired effect, and the consequences of past'discrimination were undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary. The kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial competence — even if they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desirable. —Moreover, there are serious problems of justice connected with the idea of preference itself. First, it may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign. Courts may be asked to validate burdens imposed upon individual members of a particular group in order to advance the group’s general interest. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S., at 172-173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups. Second, preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Third, there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent’s position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making. By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these transitory considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional principle, that judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces. Disparate constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them. United Jewish Organizations, supra, at 173-174 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Also, the mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next, a critical feature of its coherent interpretation. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 650-651 (1895) (White, J., dissenting). In expounding the Constitution, the Court’s role is to discern “principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level of the pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and place.” A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 114 (1976). If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group, then constitutional standards may be applied consistently. Political judgments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944), but the standard of justification will remain constant. This is as it should be, since those political judgments are the product of rough compromise struck by contending groups within the democratic process. When they touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The Constitution guarantees that right to every person regardless of his background. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S., at 22; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S., at 351. c Petitioner contends that on several occasions this Court has approved preferential classifications without applying the most exacting scrutiny. Most of the cases upon which petitioner relies are drawn from three areas: school desegregation, employment discrimination, and sex discrimination. Each of the cases cited presented a situation materially different from the facts of this case. The school desegregation cases are inapposite. Each involved remedies for clearly determined constitutional violations. E. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968). Racial classifications thus were designed as remedies for the vindication of constitutional entitlement. Moreover, the scope of the remedies was not permitted to exceed the extent of the violations. E. g., Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406. (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974); see Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976). See also Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U. S. 990, 991-995 (1976) (Powell, J„ concurring). Here, there was no judicial determination of constitutional violation as a predicate for the formulation of a remedial classification. The employment discrimination cases also do not advance petitioner’s cause. For example, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976), we approved a retroactive award of seniority to a class of Negro truckdrivers who had been the victims of discrimination — not just by society at large, but by the respondent in that case. While this relief imposed some burdens on other employees, it was held necessary “ 'to make [the victims] whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.’ ” Id., at 763, quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418 (1975). The Courts of Appeals have fashioned various types of racial preferences as remedies for constitutional or •statutory violations resulting in identified, race-based injuries to individuals held entitled to the preference. E. g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 482 F. 2d 1333 (CA2 1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315 (CA8 1972), modified on rehearing en banc, id., at 327. Such preferences also have been upheld where a legislative or administrative body charged with the responsibility made determinations of past discrimination by the industries affected, and fashioned remedies deemed appropriate to rectify the discrimination. E. g., Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d 159 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 854 (1971); Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F. 2d 9 (CA1 1973), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 957 (1974); cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966). But we have never approved preferential classifications in the absence of proved constitutional or statutory violations. Nor is petitioner’s view as to the applicable standard supported by the fact that gender-based classifications are not subjected to this level of scrutiny. E. g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 316-317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 211 n. (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). Gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the analytical and practical problems present in preferential programs premised on racial or ethnic criteria. With respect to gender there are only two possible classifications. The incidence of the burdens imposed by preferential classifications is clear. There are no rival groups which can claim that they, too, are entitled to preferential treatment. Classwide questions as to the group suffering previous injury and groups which fairly can be burdened are relatively manageable for reviewing courts. See, e. g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 212-217 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 645 (1975). The resolution of these same questions in the context of racial and ethnic preferences presents far more complex and intractable problems than gender-based classifications. More importantly, the perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based classifications do not share. In sum, the Court has never viewed such classification as inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or ethnic classifications for the purpose of equal protection analysis. Petitioner also cites Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), in support of the proposition that discrimination favoring racial or ethnic minorities has received judicial approval without the exacting inquiry ordinarily accorded “suspect” classifications. In Lau, we held that the failure of the San Francisco school system to provide remedial English instruction for some 1,800 students of oriental ancestry who spoke no English amounted to a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Those regulations required remedial instruction where inability to understand English excluded children of foreign ancestry from participation in educational programs. 414 U. S., at 568. Because we found that the students in Lau were denied “a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program,” ibid., we remanded for the fashioning of a remedial order. Lau provides little support for petitioner’s argument. The decision rested solely on the statute, which had been construed by the responsible administrative agency to reach educational practices “which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination,” ibid. We stated: “Under these state-imposed standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education.” Id., at 566. Moreover, the “preference” approved did not result in the denial of the relevant benefit — “meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program”- — to anyone else. No other student was deprived by that preference of the ability to participate in San Francisco’s school system, and the applicable regulations required similar assistance for all students who suffered similar linguistic deficiencies. Id., at 570-571 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). In a similar vein, petitioner contends that our recent decision in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977), indicates a willingness to approve racial classifications designed to benefit certain minorities, without denominating the classifications as “suspect.” The State of New York had redrawn its reapportionment plan to meet objections of the Department of Justice under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V). Specifically, voting districts were redrawn to enhance the electoral power of certain “nonwhite” voters found to have been the victims of unlawful “dilution” under the original reapportionment plan. United Jewish Organizations, like Lau, properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group’s ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity — meaningful participation in the electoral process. In this case, unlike Lau and United Jewish Organizations, there has been no determination by the legislature or a responsible administrative agency that the University engaged in a discriminatory practice requiring remedial efforts. Moreover, the operation of petitioner’s special admissions program is quite different from the remedial measures approved in those cases. It prefers the designated minority groups at the expense of other individuals who are totally foreclosed from competition for the 16 special admissions seats in every Medical School class. Because of that foreclosure, some individuals are excluded from enjoyment of a state-provided benefit — admission to the Medical School — they otherwise would receive. When a classification denies an individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background, it must be regarded as suspect. E. g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S., at 641-642. IV We have held that in “order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest,is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary ... to the accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.” In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 (1973) (footnotes omitted); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S., at 11; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964). The special admissions program purports to serve the purposes of: (i) “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession,” Brief for Petitioner 32; (ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. It is necessary to decide which, if any, of these purposes is substantial enough to support the use of a suspect classification. A If petitioner’s purpose is to assure within its student body-some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids. E. g., Loving v. Virginia, supra, at 11; McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 196; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). B The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination. The line of school desegregation cases, commencing with Brown, attests to the importance of this state goal and the commitment of the judiciary to affirm all lawful means toward its attainment. In the school cases, the States were required by court order to redress the wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. That goal was far more focused than the remedying of the effects of “societal discrimination,” an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past. We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations. See, e. g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 367-376 (1977); United Jewish Organizations, 430 U. S., at 155-156; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966). After such findings have been made, the governmental interest in preferring members of the injured groups at the expense of others is substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be vindicated. In such a case, the extent of the injury and the consequent remedy will have been judicially, legislatively, or administratively defined. Also, the remedial action usually remains subject to continuing oversight to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit. Without such findings of constitutional or statutory violations, it cannot be said that the government has any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from harming another. Thus, the government has no compelling justification for inflicting such harm. Petitioner does not purport to have made, and is in no position to make, such findings. Its broad mission is education, not the formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality. For reasons similar to those stated in Part III of this opinion, isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria. Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88 (1976); n. 41, supra. Before relying upon these sorts of findings in establishing a racial classification, a governmental body must have the authority and capability to establish, in the record, that the classification is responsive to identified discrimination. See, e. g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S., at 316-321; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S., at 212-217. Lacking this capability, petitioner has not carried its burden of justification on this issue. Hence, the purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims of “societal discrimination” does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination. That is a step we have never approved. Cf. Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976). C Petitioner identifies, as another purpose of its program, improving the delivery of health-care services to communities currently underserved. It may be assumed that in some situations a State’s interest in facilitating the health care of its citizens is sufficiently compelling to support the use of a suspect classification. But there is virtually no evidence in the record indicating that petitioner’s special admissions program is either needed or geared to promote that goal. The court below addressed this failure of proof: “The University concedes it cannot assure that minority doctors who entered under the program, all of whom expressed an ‘interest’ in practicing in a disadvantaged community, will actually do so. It may be correct to assume that some of them will carry out this intention, and that it is more likely they will practice in minority communities than the average white doctor. (See Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role (1975) 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 688.) Nevertheless, there are more precise and reliable ways to identify applicants who are genuinely interested in the medical problems of minorities than by race. An applicant of whatever race who has demonstrated his concern for disadvantaged minorities in the past and who declares that practice in such a community is his primary professional goal would be more likely to contribute to alleviation of the medical shortage than one who is chosen entirely on the basis of race and disadvantage. In short, there is no empirical data to demonstrate that any one race is more selflessly socially oriented or by contrast that another is more selfishly acquisitive.” 18 Cal. 3d, at 56, 553 P. 2d, at 1167. Petitioner simply has not carried its burden of demonstrating that it must prefer members of particular ethnic groups over all other individuals in order to promote better health-care delivery to deprived citizens. Indeed, petitioner has not shown that its preferential classification is likely to have any significant effect on the problem. D The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body. Mr. Justice Frankfurter summarized the “four essential freedoms” that constitute academic freedom: “ ‘It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail “the four essential freedoms” of a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.’ ” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (concurring in result). Our national commitment to the safeguarding of these freedoms within university communities was emphasized in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967) : “Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment.... The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’ United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372.” The atmosphere of “speculation, experiment and creation” — so essential to the quality of higher education — is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. As the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that the “nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure” to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples. Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the “robust exchange of ideas,” petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light, petitioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission. It may be argued that there is greater force to these views at the undergraduate level than in a medical school where the training is centered primarily on professional competency. But even at the graduate level, our tradition and experience lend support to the view that the contribution of diversity is substantial. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S., at 634, the Court made a similar point with specific reference to legal education: “The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.” Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background— whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged — may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity. Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in-attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body. Although a university must have wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded. Respondent urges— and the courts below have held — -that petitioner’s dual admissions program is a racial classification that impermissibly infringes his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. As the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s admissions program, the question remains whether the program’s racial classification is necessary to promote this interest. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721-722. V A It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified number of seats in each class for individuals from the preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the attainment of considerable ethnic diversity in the student body. But petitioner’s argument that this is the only effective means of serving the interest of diversity is seriously flawed. In a most fundamental sense the argument misconceives the nature of the state interest that would justify consideration of race or ethnic background. It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which- a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner’s special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity. Nor would the state interest in genuine diversity be served by expanding petitioner’s two-track system into a multitrack program with a prescribed number of seats set aside for each identifiable category of applicants. Indeed, it is inconceivable that a university would thus pursue the logic of petitioner’s two-track program to the illogical end of insulating each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants. The experience of other university admissions programs, which take race into account in achieving the educational diversity valued by the First Amendment, demonstrates that the assignment of a fixed number of places to a minority group is not a necessary means toward that end. An illuminating example is found in the Harvard College program: “In recent years Harvard College has expanded the concept of diversity to include students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups. Harvard College now recruits not only Californians or Louisianans but also blacks and Chicanos and other minority students. ... “In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant that race has been a factor in some admission decisions. When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large middle group of applicants who are 'admissible’ and deemed capable of doing good work in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates’ cases. A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer. ... [See Appendix hereto.] “In Harvard College admissions the Committee has not set target-quotas for the number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or Californians to be admitted in a given year. . . . But that awareness [of the necessity of including more than a token number of black students] does not mean that the Committee sets a minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the Mississippi who are to be admitted. It means only that in choosing among thousands of applicants who are not only 'admissible’ academically but have other strong qualities, the Committee, with a number of criteria in mind, pays some attention to distribution among many types and categories of students.” App. to Brief for Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae 2-3. In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be deemed a “plus” in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for thé available seats. The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive when compared, for example, with that of an applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism. Such qualities could include exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important. In short, an admissions program operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight. Indeed, the weight attributed to a particular quality may vary from year to year depending upon the “mix” both of the student body and the applicants for the incoming class. This kind of program treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process. The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a “plus” on the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment. It has been suggested that an admissions program which considers race only as one factor is simply a subtle and more sophisticated — but no less effective — means of according racial preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner’s preference program and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic background is simply one element — to be weighed fairly against other elements — in the selection process. “A boundary line,” as Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarked in another connection, “is none the worse for being narrow.” McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, 329 (1944). And a court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith would be presumed in the absence of a showing to the contrary in the manner permitted by our cases. See, e. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965). B In summary, it is evident that the Davis special admissions program involves the use of an explicit racial classification never before countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class. The fatal flaw in petitioner’s preferential program is its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S., at 22. Such rights are not absolute. But when a State’s distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of a person’s skin, that individual is entitled to a demonstration that the challenged classification is necessary to promote a substantial state interest. Petitioner has failed to carry this burden. For this reason, that portion of the California court’s judgment holding petitioner’s special admissions program invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment must be affirmed. C In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, however, the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California court’s judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant must be reversed. VI With respect to respondent’s entitlement to an injunction directing his admission to the Medical School, petitioner has conceded that it could not carry its burden of proving that, but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions program, respondent still would not have been admitted. Hence, respondent is entitled to the injunction, and that portion of the judgment must be affirmed. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF POWELL, J. Harvard College Admissions Program For the past 30 years Harvard College has received each year applications for admission that greatly exceed the number of places in the freshman class. The number of applicants who are deemed to be not “qualified” is comparatively small. The vast majority of applicants demonstrate through test scores, high school records and teachers’ recommendations that they have the academic ability to do adequate work at Harvard, and perhaps to do it with distinction. Faced with the dilemma of choosing among a large number of “qualified” candidates, the Committee on Admissions could use the single criterion of scholarly excellence and attempt to determine who among the candidates were likely to perform best academically. But for the past 30 years the Committee on Admissions has never adopted this approach. The belief has been that if scholarly excellence were the sole or even predominant criterion, Harvard College would lose a great deal of its vitality and intellectual excellence and that the quality of the educational experience offered to all students would suffer. Final Report of W. J. Bender, Chairman of the Admission and Scholarship Committee and Dean of Admissions and Financial Aid, pp. 20 et seq. (Cambridge, 1960). Consequently, after selecting those students whose intellectual potential will seem extraordinary to the faculty — perhaps 150 or so out of an entering class of over 1,100 — the Committee seeks— variety in making its choices. This has seemed important ... in part because it adds a critical ingredient to the effectiveness of the educational experience [in Harvard College]. . . . The effectiveness of our students’ educar tional experience has seemed to the Committee to he affected as importantly by a wide variety of interests, talents, backgrounds and career goals as it is by a fine faculty and our libraries, laboratories and housing arrangements. (Dean of Admissions Fred L. Glimp, Final Report to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 65 Official Register of Harvard University No. 25, 93, 104-105 (1968) (emphasis supplied). The belief that diversity adds an essential ingredient to the educational process has long been a tenet of Harvard College admissions. Fifteen or twenty years ago, however, diversity meant students from California, New York, and Massachusetts; city dwellers and farm boys; violinists, painters and football players; biologists, historians and classicists; potential stockbrokers, academics and politicians. The result was that very few ethnic or racial minorities attended Harvard College. In recent years Harvard College has expanded the concept of diversity to include students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups. Harvard College now recruits not only Californians or Louisianans but also blacks and Chicanos and other minority students. Contemporary conditions in the United States mean that if Harvard College is to continue to offer a first-rate education to its students, minority representation in the undergraduate body cannot be ignored by the Committee on Admissions. In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant that race has been a factor in some admission decisions. When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large middle group of applicants who are “admissible” and deemed capable of doing good work in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates’ cases. A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer. The quality of the educational experience of all the students in Harvard College depends in part on these differences in the background and outlook that students bring with them. In Harvard College admissions the Committee has not set target-quotas for the number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or Californians to be admitted in a given year. At the same time the Committee is aware that if Harvard College is to provide a truly heterogen[e]ous environment that reflects the rich diversity of the United States, it cannot be provided without some attention to numbers. It would not make sense, for example, to have 10 or 20 students out of 1,100 whose homes are west of the Mississippi. Comparably, 10 or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States. Their small numbers might also create a sense of isolation among the black students themselves and thus make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential. Consequently, when making its decisions, the Committee on Admissions is aware that there is some relationship between numbers and .achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students admitted. But that awareness does not mean that the Committee sets a minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the Mississippi who are to be admitted. It means only that in choosing among thousands of applicants who are not only “admissible” academically but have other strong qualities, the Committee, with a number of criteria in mind, pays some attention to distribution among many types and categories of students. The further refinements sometimes required help to illustrate the kind of significance attached to race. The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itself forced to choose between A, the child of a successful black physician in an academic community with promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose academic achievement was lower but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently-abiding interest in black power. If a good number of black students much like A but few like B had already been admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa. If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality might give him an edge over both A and B. Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated with it. Opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. The Court today, in reversing in part the judgment of the Supreme Court of California, affirms the constitutional power of Federal and State Governments to act affirmatively to achieve equal opportunity for all. The difficulty of the issue presented- — -whether government may use race-conscious programs to redress the continuing effects of past discrimination— and the mature consideration which each of our Brethren has brought to it have resulted in many opinions, no single one speaking for the Court. But this should not and must not mask the central meaning of today’s opinions: Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area. The Chief Justice and our Brothers Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, have concluded that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq., prohibits programs such as that at the Davis Medical School. On this statutory theory alone, they would hold that respondent Allan Bakke’s rights have been violated and that he must, therefore, be admitted to the Medical School. Our Brother Powell, reaching the Constitution, concludes that, although race may be taken into account in university admissions, the particular special admissions program used by petitioner, which resulted in the exclusion of respondent Bakke, was not shown to be necessary to achieve petitioner’s stated goals. Accordingly, these Members of the Court form a majority of five affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of California insofar as it holds that respondent Bakke “is entitled to an order that he be admitted to the University.” 18 Cal. 3d 34, 64, 553 P. 2d 1152,1172 (1976). We agree with Mr. Justice Powell that, as applied to the case before us, Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. We also agree that the effect of the California Supreme Court’s affirmance of the judgment of the Superior Court of California would be to prohibit the University from establishing in the future affirmative-action programs that take race into account. See ante, at 271 n. Since we conclude that the affirmative admissions program at the Davis Medical School is constitutional, we would reverse the judgment below in all respects. Mr. Justice Powell agrees that some uses of -race in university admissions are permissible and, therefore, he joins with us to make five votes reversing the judgment below insofar as it prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious programs in the future. I Our Nation was founded on the principle that “all Men are created equal.” Yet candor requires acknowledgment that the Framers of our Constitution, to forge the 13 Colonies into one Nation, openly compromised this principle of equality with its antithesis: slavery. The consequences of this compromise are well known and have aptly been called our “American Dilemma.” Still, it is well to recount how recent the time has been, if it has yet come, when the promise of our principles has flowered into the actuality of equal opportunity for all regardless of race or color. The Fourteenth Amendment, the embodiment in the Constitution of our abiding belief in human equality, has been the law of our land for only slightly more than half its 200 years. And for half of that half, the Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment was largely moribund so that, as late as 1927, Mr. Justice Holmes could sum up the importance of that Clause by remarking that it was the “last resort of constitutional arguments.” Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 208 (1927). Worse than desuetude, the Clause was early turned against those whom it was intended to set free, condemning them to a “separate but equal” status before the law, a status always separate but seldom equal. Not until 1954 — only 24 years ago — was this odious doctrine interred by our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (Brown I), and its progeny, which proclaimed that separate schools and public facilities of all sorts were inherently unequal and forbidden under our Constitution. Even then inequality was not eliminated with “all deliberate speed.” Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 301 (1955). In 1968 and again in 1971, for example, we were forced to remind school boards of their obligation to eliminate racial discrimination root and branch. And a glance at our docket and at dockets of lower courts will show that even today officially sanctioned discrimination is not a thing of the past. Against this background, claims that law must be “colorblind” or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of reality. This is not to denigrate aspiration; for reality rebukes us that race has too often been used by those who would stigmatize and oppress minorities. Yet we cannot — and, as we shall demonstrate, need not under our Constitution or Title VI, which merely extends the constraints of the Fourteenth^ — • Amendment to private parties who receive federal funds — let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many “created equal” have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens. II The threshold question we must decide is whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars recipients of federal funds from giving preferential consideration to disadvantaged members of racial minorities as part of a program designed to enable such individuals to surmount the obstacles imposed by racial discrimination. We join Parts I and V-C of our Brother Powell’s opinion and three of us agree with his conclusion in Part II that this case does not require us to resolve the question whether there is a private right of action under Title VI. In our view, Title VI prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a State or its agencies; it does not bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. The legislative history of Title VI, administrative regulations interpreting the statute, subsequent congressional and executive action, and the prior decisions of this Court compel this conclusion. None of these sources lends support to the proposition that Congress intended to bar all race-conscious efforts to extend the benefits of federally financed programs to minorities who have been historically excluded from the full benefits of American life. A The history of Title VI — from President Kennedy’s request that Congress grant executive departments and agencies authority to cut off federal funds to programs that discriminate against Negroes through final enactment of legislation incorporating his proposals — reveals one fixed purpose: to give the Executive Branch of Government clear authority to terminate federal funding of private programs that use race as a means of disadvantaging minorities in a manner that would be prohibited by the Constitution if engaged in by government. This purpose was first expressed in President Kennedy’s June 19, 1963, message to Congress proposing the legislation that subsequently became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Representative Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and the floor manager of the legislation in the House, introduced Title VI in words unequivocally expressing the intent to provide the Federal Government with the means of assuring that its funds were not used to subsidize racial discrimination inconsistent with the standards imposed by the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments upon state and federal action. “The bill would offer assurance that hospitals financed by Federal money would not deny adequate care to Negroes. It would prevent abuse of food distribution programs whereby Negroes have been known to be denied food surplus supplies when white persons were given such food. It would assure Negroes the benefits now accorded only white students in programs of high[er] education financed by Federal funds. It would, in short, assure the existing right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Federal funds. It would not destroy any rights of private property or freedom of association.” 110 Cong. Rec. 1519 (1964). It was clear to Representative Celler that Title VI, apart from the fact that it reached all federally funded activities even in the absence of sufficient state or federal control to invoke the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments, was not placing new substantive limitations upon the use of racial criteria, but rather was designed to extend to such activities “the existing right to equal treatment” enjoyed by Negroes under those Amendments, and he later specifically defined the purpose of Title VI in this way: “In general, it seems rather anomalous that the Federal Government should aid and abet discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by granting money and other kinds of financial aid. It seems rather shocking, moreover, that while we have on the one hand the 14th amendment, which is supposed to do away with discrimination since it provides for equal protection of the laws, on the other hand, we have the Federal Government aiding and abetting those who persist in practicing racial discrimination. “It is for these reasons that we bring forth title VI. The enactment of title VI will serve to override specific provisions of law which contemplate Federal assistance to racially segregated institutions.” Id., at 2467. Representative Celler also filed a memorandum setting forth the legal basis for the enactment of Title VI which reiterated the theme of his oral remarks: “In exercising its authority to fix the terms on which Federal funds will be disbursed . . . , Congress clearly has power to legislate so as to insure that the Federal Government does not become involved in a violation of the Constitution.” Id., at 1528. Other sponsors of the legislation agreed with Representative Celler that the function of Title VI was to end the Federal Government’s complicity in conduct, particularly the segregation or exclusion of Negroes, inconsistent with the standards to be found in the antidiscrimination provisions of the Constitution. Representative Lindsay, also a member of the Judiciary Committee, candidly acknowledged, in the course of explaining why Title VI was necessary, that it did not create any new standard of equal treatment beyond that contained in the Constitution: “Both the Federal Government and the States are under constitutional mandates not to discriminate. Many have raised the question as to whether legislation is required at all. Does not the Executive already have the power in the distribution of Federal funds to apply those conditions which will enable the Federal Government itself to live up to the mandate of the Constitution and to require States and local government entities to live up to the Constitution, most especially the 5th and 14th amendments?” Id., at 2467. He then explained that legislation was needed to authorize the termination of funding by the Executive Branch because existing legislation seemed to contemplate the expenditure of funds to support racially segregated institutions. Ibid. The views of Representatives Celler and Lindsay concerning the purpose and function of Title VI were shared by other sponsors and proponents of the legislation in the House. Nowhere is there any suggestion that Title VI was intended to terminate federal funding for any reason other than consideration of race or national origin by the recipient institution in a manner inconsistent with the standards incorporated in the Constitution. The Senate’s consideration of Title VI reveals an identical understanding concerning the purpose and scope of the legislation. Senator Humphrey, the Senate floor manager, opened the Senate debate with a section-by-section analysis of the Civil Rights Act in which he succinctly stated the purpose of Title VI: “The purpose of title VI is to make sure that funds of the United States are not used to support racial discrimination. In many instances the practices of segregation or discrimination, which title VI seeks to end, are unconstitutional. This is clearly so wherever Federal funds go to a State agency which engages in racial discrimination. It may also be so where Federal funds go to support private, segregated institutions, under the decision in Simkims v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959 (C. A. 4, 1963), [cert. denied, 376 U. S. 938 (1964)]. In all cases, such discrimination is contrary to national policy, and to the moral sense of the Nation. Thus, title VI is simply designed to insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of the Nation.” Id., at 6544. Senator Humphrey, in words echoing statements in the House, explained that legislation was needed to accomplish this objective because it was necessary to eliminate uncertainty concerning the power of federal agencies to terminate financial assistance to programs engaging in racial discrimination in the face of various federal statutes which appeared to authorize grants to racially segregated institutions. Ibid. Although Senator Humphrey realized that Title VI reached conduct which, because of insufficient governmental action, might be beyond the reach of the Constitution, it was clear to him that the substantive standard imposed by the statute was that of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Senate supporters of Title VI repeatedly expressed agreement with Senator Humphrey’s description of the legislation as providing the explicit authority and obligation to apply the standards of the Constitution to all recipients of federal funds. Senator Bibicoff described the limited function of Title VI: “Basically, there is a constitutional restriction against .discrimination in the use of Federal funds; and title VI simply spells out the procedure to be used in enforcing that restriction.” Id., at 13333. Other strong proponents of the legislation in the Senate repeatedly expressed their intent to assure that federal funds would only be spent in accordance with constitutional standards. See remarks of Senator Pastore, id., at 7057, 7062; Senator Clark, id., at 5243; Senator Allott, id., at 12675, 12677. Respondent’s contention that Congress intended Title VI to bar affirmative-action programs designed to enable minorities disadvantaged by the effects of discrimination to participate in federally financed programs is also refuted by an examination of the type of conduct which Congress thought it was prohibiting by means of Title VI. The debates reveal that the legislation was motivated primarily by a desire to eradicate a very specific evil: federal financial support of programs which disadvantaged Negroes by excluding them from participation or providing them with separate facilities. Again and again supporters of Title VI emphasized that the purpose of the statute was to end segregation in federally funded activities and to end other discriminatory uses of race disadvantaging Negroes. Senator Humphrey set the theme in his speech presenting Title VI to the Senate: “Large sums of money are contributed by the United States each year for the construction, operation, and maintenance of segregated schools. “Similarly, under the Hill-Burton Act, Federal grants are made to hospitals which admit whites only or Negroes only. . . . “In higher education also, a substantial part of the Federal grants to colleges, medical schools and so forth, in the South is still going to segregated institutions. “Nor is this all. In several States, agricultural extension services, supported by Federal funds, maintain racially segregated offices for Negroes and whites. . . . “ . . . Vocational training courses, supported with Federal funds, are given in segregated schools and institutions and often limit Negroes to training in less skilled occupations. In particular localities it is reported that Negroes have been cut off from relief rolls, or denied surplus agricultural commodities, or otherwise deprived of the benefit of federally assisted programs, in retaliation for their participation in voter registration drives, sit-in demonstrations and the like.” Id., at 6543-6544. See also the remarks of Senator Pastore {id., at 7054-7055); Senator Ribicoff {id., at 7064-7065); Senator Clark {id., at 5243, 9086); Senator Javits {id., at 6050, 7102). The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is clear. Congress recognized that Negroes, in some cases with congressional acquiescence, were being discriminated against in the administration of programs and denied the full benefits of activities receiving federal financial support. It was aware that there were many federally funded programs and institutions which discriminated against minorities in a manner inconsistent with the standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments but whose activities might not involve sufficient state or federal action so as to be in violation of these Amendments. Moreover, Congress believed that it was questionable whether the Executive Branch possessed legal authority to terminate the funding of activities on the ground that they discriminated racially against Negroes in a manner violative of the standards contained in the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Congress’ solution was to end the Government’s complicity in constitutionally forbidden racial discrimination by providing the Executive Branch with the authority and the obligation to terminate its financial support of any activity which employed racial criteria in a manner condemned by the Constitution. Of course, it might be argued that the Congress which enacted Title VI understood the Constitution to require strict racial neutrality or color blindness, and then enshrined that concept as a rule of statutory law. Later interpretation and clarification of the Constitution to permit remedial use of race would then not dislodge Title YI’s prohibition of race-conscious action. But there are three compelling reasons to reject such a hypothesis. First, no decision of this Court has ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be colorblind. See infra, at 355-356. Second, Oven if it could be argued in 1964 that the Constitution might conceivably require color blindness, Congress surely would not have chosen to codify such a view unless the Constitution clearly required it. The legislative history of Title VI, as well as the statute itself, reveals a desire to induce voluntary compliance with the requirement of nondiscriminatory treatment. See § 602 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-l (no funds shall be terminated unless and until it has been “determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means”); H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 25 (1963); 110 Cong Rec. 13700 (1964) (Sen. Pasture); id., at 6546 (Sen. Humphrey). It is inconceivable that Congress intended to encourage voluntary efforts to eliminate the evil of racial discrimination while at the same time forbidding the voluntary use of race-conscious remedies to cure acknowledged or obvious statutory violations. Yet a reading of Title VI as prohibiting all action predicated upon race which adversely affects any individual would require recipients guilty of discrimination to await the imposition of such remedies by the Executive Branch. Indeed, such an interpretation of Title VI would prevent recipients of federal funds from taking race into account even when necessary to bring their programs into compliance with federal constitutional requirements. This would be a remarkable reading of a statute designed to eliminate constitutional violations, especially in light of judicial decisions holding that under certain circumstances the remedial use of racial criteria is not only permissible but is constitutionally required to eradicate constitutional violations. For example, in Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43 (1971), the Court held that a statute forbidding the assignment of students on the basis of race was unconstitutional because it would hinder the implementation of remedies necessary to accomplish the desegregation of a school system: “Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy,” Id., at 46, Surely Congress did not intend to prohibit the use of racial criteria when constitutionally required or to terminate the funding of any entity which implemented such a remedy. It clearly desired to encourage all remedies, including the use of race, necessary to eliminate racial discrimination in violation of the Constitution rather than requiring the recipient to await a judicial adjudication of unconstitutionality and the judicial imposition of a racially oriented remedy. Third, the legislative history shows that Congress specifically eschewed any static definition of discrimination in favor of broad language that could be shaped by experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine. Although it is clear from the debates that the supporters of Title VI intended to ban uses of race prohibited by the Constitution and, more specifically, the maintenance of segregated facilities, they never precisely defined the term “discrimination,” or what constituted an exclusion from participation or a denial of benefits on the ground of race. This failure was not lost upon its opponents. Senator Ervin complained: “The word 'discrimination/ as used in this reference, has no contextual explanation whatever, other than the provision that the discrimination 'is to be against’ individuals participating in or benefiting from federally assisted programs and activities on the ground specified. With this context, the discrimination condemned by this reference occurs only when an individual is treated unequally or unfairly because of his race, color, religion, or national origin. What constitutes unequal or unfair treatment? Section 601 and section 602 of title VI do not say. They leave the determination of that question to the executive department or agencies administering each program, without any guideline whatever to point out what is the congressional intent.” 110 Cong. Rec. 5612 (1964). See also remarks of Representative Abernethy {id., at 1619); Representative Dowdy {id., at 1632); Senator Talmadge {id., at 5251); Senator Sparkman {id., at 6052). Despite these criticisms, the legislation’s supporters refused to include in the statute or even provide in debate a more explicit definition of what Title VI prohibited. The explanation for this failure is clear. Specific definitions were undesirable, in the views of the legislation’s principal backers, because Title Vi’s standard was that of the Constitution and one that could and should be administratively and judicially applied. See remarks of Senator Humphrey {id., at 5253, 6553); Senator Ribicoff {id., at 7057, 13333); Senator Pastore {id., at 7057); Senator Javits {id., at 5606-5607, 6050). Indeed, there was a strong emphasis throughout Congress’ consideration of Title VI on providing the Executive Branch with considerable flexibility in interpreting and applying the prohibition against racial discrimination. Attorney General Robert Kennedy testified that regulations had not been written into the legislation itself because the rules and regulations defining discrimination might differ from one program to another so that the term would assume different meanings in different contexts. This determination to preserve flexibility in the administration of Title VI was shared by the legislation’s supporters. When Senator Johnston offered an amendment that would have expressly authorized federal grantees to take race into account in placing children in adoptive and foster homes, Senator Pastore opposed the amendment, which was ultimately defeated by a 56-29 vote, on the ground that federal administrators could be trusted to act reasonably and that there was no danger that they would prohibit the use of racial criteria under such circumstances. Id., at 13695. Congress’ resolve not to incorporate a static definition of discrimination into Title VI is not surprising. In 1963 and 1964, when Title VI was drafted and debated, the courts had only recently applied the Equal Protection Clause to strike down public racial discrimination in America, and the scope of that Clause’s nondiscrimination principle was in a state of flux and rapid evolution. Many questions, such as whether the Fourteenth Amendment barred only de jure discrimination or in at least some circumstances reached de facto discrimination, had not yet received an authoritative judicial resolution. The congressional debate reflects an awareness of the evolutionary change that constitutional law in the area of racial discrimination was undergoing in 1964. In sum, Congress’ equating of Title Vi’s prohibition with the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, its refusal precisely to define that racial discrimination which it intended to prohibit, and its expectation that the statute would be administered in a flexible manner, compel the conclusion that Congress intended the meaning of the statute’s prohibition to evolve with the interpretation of the commands of the Constitution. Thus, any claim that the use of racial criteria is barred by the plain language of the statute must fail in light of the remedial purpose of Title VI and its legislative history. The cryptic nature of the language employed in Title VI merely reflects Congress’ concern with the then-prevalent use of racial standards as a means of excluding or disadvantaging Negroes and its determination to prohibit absolutely such discrimination. We have recently held that “ ''[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no “rule of law” which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on “superficial examination.” ’ ” Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976), quoting United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940). This is especially so when, as is the case here, the literal application of what is believed to be the plain language of the statute, assuming that it is so plain, would lead to results in direct conflict with Congress’ unequivocally expressed legislative purpose. B Section 602 of Title VI, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-l, instructs federal agencies to promulgate regulations interpreting Title YI. These regulations, which, under the terms of the statute, require Presidential approval, are entitled to considerable deference in construing Title VI. See, e. g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356, 369 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969). Consequently, it is most significant that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which provides much of the federal assistance to institutions of higher education, has adopted regulations requiring affirmative measures designed to enable racial minorities which have been previously discriminated against by a federally funded institution or program to overcome the effects of such actions and authorizing the voluntary undertaking of affirmative-action programs by federally funded institutions that have not been guilty of prior discrimination in order to overcome the effects of conditions which have adversely affected the degree of participation by persons of a particular race. Title 45 CFR § 80.3 (b) (6) (i) (1977) provides: “In administering a program regarding which the recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or national origin, the recipient must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination.” Title 45 CFR § 80.5 (i) (1977) elaborates upon this requirement: “In some situations, even though past discriminatory practices attributable to a recipient or applicant have been abandoned, the consequences of such practices continue to impede the full availability of a benefit. If the efforts required of the applicant or recipient under § 80.6 (d)', to provide information as to the availability of the program or activity and the rights of beneficiaries under this regulation, have failed to overcome these consequences, it will become necessary under the requirement stated in (i) of § 80.3 (b) (6) for such applicant or recipient to take additional steps to make the benefits fully available to racial and nationality groups previously subject to discrimination. This action might take the form, for example, of special arrangements for obtaining referrals or making selections which will insure that groups previously subjected to discrimination are adequately served.” These regulations clearly establish that where there is a need to overcome the effects of past racially discriminatory or exclusionary practices engaged in- by a federally funded institution, race-conscious action is not only permitted but required to accomplish the remedial objectives of Title VI. Of course, there is no evidence that the Medical School has been guilty of past discrimination and consequently these regulations would not compel it to employ a program of preferential admissions in behalf of racial minorities. It would be- difficult to explain from the language of Title VI, however, much less from its legislative history, why the statute compels race-conscious remedies where a recipient institution has engaged in past discrimination but prohibits such remedial action where racial minorities, as a result of the effects of past discrimination imposed by entities other than the recipient, are excluded from the benefits of federally funded programs. HEW was fully aware of the incongruous nature of such an interpretation of Title VI. Title 45 CFR § 80.3 (b)(6)(h) (1977) provides: “Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which, resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin.” An explanatory regulation explicitly states that the affirmative action which § 80.3 (b) (6) (ii) contemplates includes the use of racial preferences: “Even though an applicant or recipient has never used discriminatory policies, the services and benefits of the program or activity it administers may not in fact be equally available to some racial or nationality groups. In such circumstances, an applicant or recipient may properly give special consideration to race, color, or national origin to make the benefits of its program more widely available to such groups, not then being adequately served. For example, where a university is not adequately serving members of a particular racial or nationality group, it may establish special recruitment policies to make its program better known and more readily available to such group, and take other steps to provide that group with more adequate service.” 45 CFR § 80.5 (j) (1977). This interpretation of Title VI is fully consistent with the statute’s emphasis upon voluntary remedial action and reflects the views of an agency responsible for achieving its objectives. The Court has recognized that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution is particularly deserving of respect where Congress has directed its attention to the administrative construction and left it unaltered. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 381; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965). Congress recently took just this kind of action when it considered an amendment to the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare appropriation bill for 1978, which would have restricted significantly the remedial use of race in programs funded by the appropriation. The amendment, as originally submitted by Representative Ashbrook, provided that “[n]one of the funds appropriated in this Act may be used to initiate, carry out or enforce any program of affirmative action or any other system of quotas or goals in regard to admission policies or employment practices which encourage or require any discrimination on the basis of race, creed, religion, sex or age.” 123 Cong. Rec. 19715 (1977). In support of the measure, Representative Ashbrook argued that the 1964 Civil Rights Act never authorized the imposition of affirmative action and that this was a creation of the bureaucracy. Id., at 19722. He explicitly stated, however, that he favored permitting universities to adopt affirmative-action programs giving consideration to racial identity but opposed the imposition of such programs by the Government. Id., at 19715.. His amendment was itself amended to reflect this position by only barring the imposition of race-conscious remedies by HEW: “None of the funds appropriated in this Act may be obligated or expended in connection with the issuance, implementation, or enforcement of any rule, regulation, standard, guideline, recommendation, or order issued by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare which for purposes of compliance with any ratio, quota, or other numerical requirement related to race, creed, color, national, origin, or sex requires any individual or entity to take any action with respect to (1) the hiring or promotion policies or practices of such individual or entity, or (2) the admissions policies or practices of such individual or entity.” Id., at 19722. This amendment was adopted by the House. Ibid. The Senate bill, however, contained no such restriction upon HEW's authority to impose race-conscious remedies and the Conference Committee, upon the urging of the Secretary of HEW, deleted the House provision from the bill. More significant for present purposes, however, is the fact that even the proponents of imposing limitations upon HEW’s implementation of Title VI did not challenge the right of federally funded educational institutions voluntarily to extend preferences to racial minorities. Finally, congressional action subsequent to the passage of Title VI eliminates any possible doubt about Congress’ views concerning the permissibility of racial preferences for the purpose of assisting disadvantaged racial minorities. It confirms that Congress did not intend to prohibit and does not now believe that Title VI prohibits the consideration of race as part of a remedy for societal discrimination even where there is no showing that the institution extending the preference has been guilty of past discrimination nor any judicial finding that the particular beneficiaries of the racial preference have been adversely affected by societal discrimination. Just last year Congress enacted legislation explicitly requiring that no grants shall be made “for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary [of Commerce] that at least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises.” The statute defines the term “minority business enterprise” as “a business, at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group members.” The term “minority group members” is defined in explicitly racial terms: “citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Soanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.” Although the statute contains an exemption from this requirement “to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise,” this escape clause was provided only to deal with the possibility that certain areas of the country might not contain sufficient qualified “minority business enterprises” to permit compliance with the quota provisions of the legislation. The legislative history of this race-conscious legislation reveals that it represents a deliberate attempt to deal with the excessive rate of unemployment among minority citizens and to encourage the development of viable minority controlled enterprises. It was believed that such a “set-aside” was required in order to enable minorities, still “new on the scene” and “relatively small,” to compete with larger and •more established companies which would always be successful in underbidding minority enterprises. 123 Cong. Rec. 5327 (1977) (Rep. Mitchell). What is most significant about the congressional consideration of the measure is that although the use of a racial quota or “set-aside” by a recipient of federal funds would constitute a direct violation of Title VI if that statute were read to prohibit race-conscious action, no mention was made during the debates in either the House or the Senate of even the possibility that the quota provisions for minority contractors might in any way conflict with or modify Title VI. It is inconceivable that such a purported conflict would have escaped congressional attention through an inadvertent failure to recognize the relevance of Title VI. Indeed, the Act of which this affirmative-action provision is a part also contains a provision barring discrimination on the basis of sex which states that this prohibition “will be enforced through agency provisions and rules similar to those already established, with respect to racial and other discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” 42 U. S. C. § 6709 (1976 ed.). Thus Congress was fully aware of the applicability of Title VI to the funding of public works projects. Under these circumstances, the enactment of the 10% “set-aside” for minority enterprises reflects a congressional judgment that the remedial use of race is permissible under Title VI. We have repeatedly recognized that subsequent legislation reflecting an interpretation of an earlier Act is entitled to great weight in determining the meaning of the earlier statute. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 380-381; Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U. S. 239, 243-244 (1972). See also United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 64-65 (1940). C Prior decisions of this Court also strongly suggest that Title VI does not prohibit the remedial use of race where such action is constitutionally permissible. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), the Court held that the failure of the San Francisco school system to provide English-language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak English, or to provide them with instruction in Chinese, constituted a violation of Title VI. The Court relied upon an HEW regulation which stipulates that a recipient of federal funds “may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination” or have “the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.” 45 CFR § 80.3 (b) (2) (1977). It interpreted this regulation as requiring San Francisco to extend the same educational benefits to Chinese-speaking students as to English-speaking students, even though there was no finding or allegation that the city’s failure to do so was a result of a purposeful design to discriminate on the basis of race. Lau is significant in two related respects. First, it indicates that in at least some circumstances agencies responsible for the administration of Title VI may require recipients who have not been guilty of any constitutional violations to depart from a policy of color blindness-and to be cognizant of the impact of their actions upon racial minorities. Secondly, Lau clearly requires that institutions receiving federal funds be accorded considerable latitude in voluntarily undertaking race-conscious action designed to remedy the exclusion of significant numbers of minorities from the benefits of federally funded programs. Although this Court has not yet considered the question, presumably, by analogy to our decisions construing Title VII, a medical school would not be in violation of Title VI under Lau because of the serious underrepresentation of racial minorities in its student body as long as it could demonstrate that its entrance requirements correlated sufficiently with the performance of minority students in medical school and the medical profession. It would be inconsistent with Lau and the emphasis of Title VI and the HEW regulations on voluntary action, however, to require that an institution wait to be adjudicated to be in violation of the law before being permitted to voluntarily undertake corrective action based upon a good-faith and reasonable belief that the failure of certain racial minorities to satisfy entrance requirements is not a measure of their ultimate performance as doctors but a result of the lingering effects of past societal discrimination. We recognize that Lau, especially when read in light of our subsequent decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), which rejected the general proposition that governmental action is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact, may be read as being predicated upon the view that, at least under some circumstances, Title VI proscribes conduct which might not be prohibited by the Constitution. Since we are now of the opinion, for the reasons set forth above, that Title Vi’s standard, applicable alike to public and private recipients of federal funds, is no broader than the Constitution’s, we have serious doubts concerning the correctness of what appears to be the premise of that decision. However, even accepting Lau’s implication that impact alone is in some contexts sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VI, contrary to our view that Title Vi’s definition of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution’s, this would not assist the respondent in the least. First, for the reasons discussed supra, at 336-350, regardless of whether Title VTs prohibitions extend beyond the Constitution’s, the evidence fails to establish, and, indeed, compels the rejection of, the proposition that Congress intended to prohibit recipients of federal funds from voluntarily employing race-conscious measures to eliminate the effects of past societal discrimination against racial minorities such as Negroes. Secondly, Lau itself, for the reasons set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, strongly supports the view that voluntary race-conscious remedial action is permissible under Title VI. If discriminatory racial impact alone is enough to demonstrate at least a prima facie Title VI violation, it is difficult to believe that the Title would forbid the Medical School from attempting to correct the racially exclusionary effects of its initial admissions policy during the first two years of the School’s operation. The Court has also declined to adopt a “colorblind” interpretation of other statutes containing nondiscrimination provisions similar to that contained in Title VI. We have held under Title VII that where employment requirements have a disproportionate impact upon racial minorities they constitute a statutory violation, even in the absence of discriminatory intent, unless the employer is able to demonstrate that the requirements are sufficiently related to the needs of the job. More significantly, the Court has required that preferences be given by employers to members of racial minorities as a remedy for past violations of Title VII, even where there has been no finding that the employer has acted with a discriminatory intent. Finally, we have construed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seg. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), which contains a provision barring any voting procedure or qualification that denies or abridges “the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color,” as permitting States to voluntarily take race into account in a way that fairly represents the voting strengths of different racial groups in order to comply with the commands of the statute, even where the result is a gain for one racial group at the expense of others. These prior decisions are indicative of the Courtis unwillingness to construe remedial statutes designed to eliminate discrimination against racial minorities in a manner which would impede efforts to attain this objective. There is no justification for departing from this course in the case of Title VI and frustrating the clear judgment of Congress that race-conscious remedial action is permissible. We turn, therefore, to our analysis of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ill A The assertion of human equality is closely associated with the proposition that differences in color or creed, birth or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in which persons should be treated. Nonetheless, the position that such factors must be “constitutionally an irrelevance,” Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 16.0, 185 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring), summed up by the shorthand phrase “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), has never been adopted by this Court as the proper meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, we have expressly rejected this proposition on a number of occasions. Our cases have always implied that an “overriding statutory purpose,” McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964), could be found that would justify racial classifications. See, e. g., ibid.; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100-101 (1943). More recently, in McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971), this Court unanimously reversed the Georgia Supreme Court which had held that a desegregation plan voluntarily adopted by a local school board, which assigned students on the basis of race, was per se invalid because it was not colorblind. And in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann we held, again unanimously, that a statute mandating colorblind school-assignment plans could not stand “against the background of segregation,” since such a limit on remedies would “render illusory the promise of Brown [/].” 402 U. S., at 45-46. We conclude, therefore, that racial classifications are not per se invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, we turn to the problem of articulating what our role should be in reviewing state action that expressly classifies by race. B Respondent argues that racial classifications are always suspect and, consequently, that this Court should weigh the importance of the objectives served by Davis’ special admissions program to see if they are compelling. In addition, he asserts that this Court must inquire whether, in its judgment, there are alternatives to racial classifications which would suit Davis’ purposes. Petitioner, on the other hand, states that our proper role is simply to accept petitioner’s determination that the racial classifications used by its program are reasonably related to what it tells us are its benign purposes. We reject petitioner’s view, but, because our prior cases are in many respects inapposite to that before us now, we find it necessary to define with precision the meaning of that inexact term, “strict scrutiny.” Unquestionably we have held that a government practice or statute which restricts “fundamental rights” or which contains “suspect classifications” is to be subjected to “strict scrutiny” and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available. See, e. g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972). But no fundamental right is involved here. See San Antonio, supra, at 29-36. Nor do whites as a class have any of the “traditional indicia of sus-pectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” Id., at 28; see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). Moreover, if the University’s representations are credited, this is not a case where racial classifications are “irrelevant and therefore prohibited.” Hirabayashi, supra, at 100. Nor has anyone suggested that the University’s purposes contravene the cardinal principle that racial classifications that stigmatize— because they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism — are invalid without more. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 374 (1886); accord, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 308 (1880); Korematsu v. United States, supra, at 223; Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 663 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring); Brown I, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 191-192; Loving v. Virginia, supra, at 11-12; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 375-376 (1967); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 165 (1977) (UJO) (opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 169 (opinion concurring in part). On the other hand, the fact that this case does not fit neatly into our prior analytic framework for race cases does not mean that it should be analyzed by applying the very loose rational-basis standard of review that is the very least that is always applied in equal protection cases. “ ‘[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.’ ” Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 317 (1977), quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 648 (1975). Instead, a number of considerations— developed in gender-discrimination cases but which carry even more force when applied to racial classifications — lead us to conclude that racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes “ 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.’ ” Califano v. Webster, supra, at 317, quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976). First, race, like, “gender-based classifications too often [has] been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments of society.” Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 357 (1974) (dissenting opinion). While a carefully tailored statute designed to remedy past discrimination could avoid these vices, see Califano v. Webster, supra; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, supra, we nonetheless have recognized that the line between honest and thoughtful appraisal of the effects of past discrimination and paternalistic stereotyping is not so clear and that a statute based on the latter is patently capable of stigmatizing all women with a badge of inferiority. Cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, at 508; UJO, supra, at 174, and n. 3 (opinion concurring in part); Califano v. Coldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 14-15 (1975). State programs designed ostensibly to ameliorate the effects of past racial discrimination obviously create the same hazard of stigma, since they may promote racial separatism and reinforce the views of those who believe that members of racial minorities are inherently incapable of succeeding on their own. See UJO, supra, at 172 (opinion concurring in part); ante, at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.). Second, race, like gender and illegitimacy, see Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972), is an immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside. While a classification is not per se invalid because it divides classes on the basis of an immutable characteristic, see supra, at 355-356, it is nevertheless true that such divisions are contrary to our deep belief that “legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing,” Weber, supra, at 175; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 686 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.), and that advancement sanctioned, sponsored, or approved by the State should ideally be based on individual merit or achievement, or at the least on factors within the control, of an individual. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 173 (opinion concurring in part); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U. S. 552, 566 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Because this principle is so deeply rooted it might be supposed that it would be considered in the legislative process and weighed against the benefits of programs preferring individuals because of their race. But this is not necessarily so: The “natural consequence of our governing processes ’[may well be] that the most 'discrete and insular’ of whites . . . will be called upon to bear the immediate, direct costs of benign discrimination.” UJO, supra, at 174 (opinion concurring in part). Moreover, it is clear from our cases that there are limits beyond which majorities may not go when they classify on the basis of immutable characteristics. See, e. g., Weber, supra. Thus, even if the concern for individualism is weighed by the political process, that weighing cannot waive the personal rights of individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713, 736 (1964). In sum, because of the significant risk that racial classifications established for ostensibly benign purposes can be misused, causing effects not unlike those created by invidious classifications, it is inappropriate to inquire only whether there is any conceivable basis that might sustain such a classification. Instead, to justify such a classification an important and articulated purpose for its use must be shown. In addition, any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group or that singles out those least well represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign program. Thus, our review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict — not “ 'strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,” because it is stigma that causes fatality — but strict and searching nonetheless. IV Davis’ articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past societal discrimination is, under our cases, sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious admissions programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of minorities to the Medical School. A At least since Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968), it has been clear that a public body which has itself been adjudged to have engaged in racial discrimination cannot bring itself into compliance with the Equal Protection Clause simply by ending its unlawful acts and adopting a neutral stance. Three years later, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971), and its companion cases, Davis v. School Comm’rs of Mobile County, 402 U. S. 33 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971); and North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43 (1971), reiterated that racially neutral remedies for past discrimination were inadequate where consequences of past discriminatory acts influence or control present decisions. See, e. g., Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra, at 28. And the Court further held both that courts could enter desegregation orders which assigned students and faculty by reference to race, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra; Davis, supra; United States v. Montgomery County Board of Ed., 395 U. S. 225 (1969), and that local school boards could voluntarily adopt desegregation plans which made express reference to race if this was necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination. McDaniel v. Barresi, supra. Moreover, we stated that school boards, even in the absence of a judicial finding of past discrimination, could voluntarily adopt plans which assigned students with the end of creating racial pluralism by establishing fixed ratios of black and white students in each school. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra, at 16. In each instance, the creation of unitary school systems, in which the effects of past discrimination had been “eliminated root and branch,” Creen, supra, at 438, was recognized as a compelling social goal justifying the overt use of race. Finally, the conclusion that state educational institutions may constitutionally adopt admissions programs designed to avoid exclusion of historically disadvantaged minorities, even when such programs explicitly take race into account, finds direct support in our cases construing congressional legislation designed to overcome the present effects of past discrimination. Congress can and has outlawed actions which have a disproportionately adverse and unjustified impact upon members of racial minorities and has required or authorized race-conscious action to put individuals disadvantaged by such impact in the position they otherwise might have enjoyed. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977). Such relief does not require as a predicate proof that recipients! of preferential advancement have been individually discrimi- \ nated against; it is enough that each recipient is within a \ general class of persons likely to have been the victims of dis- 1 crimination. See id., at 357-362. Nor is it an objection to J such relief that preference for minorities will upset the settled expectations of nonminorities. See Franks, supra. In addition, we have held that Congress, to remove barriers to equal opportunity, can and has required employers to use test criteria that fairly reflect the qualifications of minority applicants vis-á-vis nonminority applicants, even if this means interpreting the qualifications of an applicant in light of his race. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 435 (1975). These cases cannot be distinguished simply by the presence of judicial findings of discrimination, for race-conscious remedies have been approved where such findings have not been made. McDaniel v. Barresi, supra; UJO; see Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313 (1977); Schlednger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shewn, 416 U. S. 351 (1974). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966). Indeed, the requirement of a judicial determination of a constitutional or statutory violation as a predicate for race-conscious remedial actions would be self-defeating. Such a requirement would severely undermine efforts to achieve voluntary compliance with the requirements of law. And our society and jurisprudence have always stressed the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law. Judicial intervention is a last resort to achieve cessation of illegal conduct or the remedying of its effects rather than a prerequisite to action. Nor can our cases be distinguished on the ground that the entity using explicit racial classifications itself had violated § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment or an antidiscrimination regulation, for again race-conscious remedies have been approved where this is not the case. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 157 (opinion of White, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 167 (opinion of White, J., joined by Rbhnquist and Stevens, JJ.); cf. Califano v. Webster, supra, at 317; Kahn v. Shevin, supra. Moreover, the presence or absence of past discrimination by universities or employers is largely irrelevant to resolving respondent’s constitutional claims. The claims of those burdened by the race-conscious actions of a university or employer who has never been adjudged in violation of an antidiscrimination law are not any more or less entitled to deference than the claims of the burdened nonminority workers in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, in which the employer had violated Title VII, for in each case the employees are innocent of past discrimination. And, although it might be argued that, where an employer has violated an antidiscrimination law, the expectations of non-minority workers are themselves products of discrimination and hence “tainted,” see Franks, supra, at 776, and therefore more easily upset, the same argument can be made with respect to respondent. If it was reasonable to conclude — as we hold that it was — that the failure of minorities to qualify for admission at Davis under regular procedures was due principally to the effects of past discrimination, than there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for pervasive racial discrimination, respondent would have failed to qualify for admission even in the absence of Davis’ special admissions program. Thus, our cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act have held that, in order to achieve minority participation in previously segregated areas of public life, Congress may require or authorize preferential treatment for those likely disadvantaged by societal racial discrimination.. Such legislation has been sustained even without a requirement of findings of intentional racial discrimination by those required or authorized to accord preferential treatment, or a case-by-case determination r.sthat those to be benefited suffered from racial discrimination. \ These decisions compel the conclusion that States also may \ adopt race-conscious programs designed to overcome substantial, chronic minority underrepresentation where there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a product of past racial Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent that Congress acted under the Commerce Clause power, it was restricted in the use of race in governmental 'decisionmaking by the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment precisely to the same extent as are the States by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, to the extent that Title VII rests on the Commerce Clause power, our decisions such as Franks and Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), implicitly recognize that the affirmative use of race is consistent with the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and therefore with the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent that Congress acted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, those cases impliedly recognize that Congress was empowered under that provision to accord preferential treatment to victims of past discrimination in order to overcome the effects of segregation, and we see no reason to conclude that the States cannot voluntarily accomplish under § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment what Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment validly may authorize or compel either the States or private persons to do. A contrary position would conflict with the traditional understanding, recognizing the competence of the States to initiate measures consistent ywith federal policy in the absence of congressional pre-emption of the subject matter. Nothing whatever in the legislative history of either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Acts even remotely suggests that the States are foreclosed from furthering the fundamental purpose of equal opportunity to which the Amendment and those Acts are addressed. Indeed, voluntary initiatives by the States to achieve the national goal of equal opportunity have been recognized to be essential to its attainment. “To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such State power would stultify that Amendment.” Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 98 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). We therefore conclude that Davis' goal of admitting minority students disadvantaged by the effects of past discrimination is sufficiently important to justify use of race-conscious admissions criteria. B Properly construed, therefore, our prior cases unequivocally show that a state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at large. There is no question that Davis' program is valid under this test. Certainly, on the basis of the undisputed factual submissions before this Court, Davis had a sound basis for believing that the problem of underrepresentation of minorities was substantial and chronic and that the problem was attributable to handicaps imposed on minority applicants by past and present racial discrimination. Until at least 1973, the practice of medicine in this country was, in fact, if not in law, largely the prerogative of whites. In 1950, for example, while Negroes constituted 10% of the total population, Negro physicians constituted only 2.2% of the total number of physicians. The overwhelming majority of these, moreover, were educated in two predominantly Negro medical schools, Howard and Meharry. By 1970, the gap between the proportion of Negroes in medicine and their proportion in the population had widened: The number of Negroes employed in medicine remained frozen at 2.2% while the Negro population had increased to 11.1%. The number of Negro admittees to predominantly white medical schools, moreover, had declined in absolute numbers during the years 1955 to 1964. Odegaard 19. Moreover, Davis had very good reason to believe that the national pattern of underrepresentation of minorities in medicine would be perpetuated if it retained a single admissions standard. For example, the entering classes in 1968 and 1969, the years in which such a standard was used, included only 1 Chicano and 2 Negroes out of the 50 admittees for each year. Nor is there any relief from this pattern of underrepresentation in the statistics for the regular admissions program in later years. Davis clearly could conclude that the serious and persistent underrepresentation of minorities in medicine depicted by these statistics is the result of handicaps under which minority applicants labor as a consequence of a background of deliberate, purposeful discrimination against minorities in education and in society generally, as well as in the medical profession. From the inception of our national life, Negroes have been subjected to unique legal disabilities impairing access to equal educational opportunity. Under slavery, penal sanctions were imposed upon anyone attempting to educate Negroes. After enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment the States continued to deny Negroes equal educational opportunity, enforcing a strict policy of segregation that itself stamped Negroes as inferior, Brown I, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), that relegated minorities to inferior educational institutions, and that denied them intercourse in the mainstream of professional life necessary to advancement. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950). Segregation was not limited to public facilities, moreover, but was enforced by criminal penalties against private action as well. Thus, as late as 1908, this Court enforced a state criminal conviction against a private college for teaching Negroes together with whites. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896). Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968), gave explicit recognition to the fact that the habit of discrimination and the cultural tradition of race prejudice cultivated by centuries of legal slavery and segregation were not immediately dissipated when Brown I, supra, announced the constitutional principle that equal educational opportunity and participation in all aspects of American life could not be denied on the basis of race. Rather, massive official and private resistance prevented, and to a lesser extent still prevents, attainment of equal opportunity in education at all levels and in the professions. The generation of minority students applying to Davis Medical School since it opened in 1968 — most of whom were born before or about the time Brown I was decided— clearly have been victims of this discrimination. Judicial decrees recognizing discrimination in public education in California testify to the fact of widespread discrimination suffered by California-born minority applicants; many minority group members living in California, moreover, were born and reared in school districts in Southern States segregated by law. Since separation of schoolchildren by race “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone,” Brown I, supra, at 494, the conclusion is inescapable that applicants to medical school must be few indeed who endured the effects of de jure segregation, the resistance to Brown I, or the equally debilitating pervasive private discrimination fostered by our long history of official discrimination, cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), and yet come to the starting line with an education equal to whites. Moreover, we need not rest solely on our own conclusion that Davis had sound reason to believe that the effects of past discrimination were handicapping minority applicants to the Medical School, because the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the expert agency charged by Congress with promulgating regulations enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see supra, at 341-343, has also reached the conclusion that race may be taken into account in situations where a failure to do so would limit participation by minorities in federally funded programs, and regulations promulgated by the Department expressly contemplate that appropriate race-conscious programs may be adopted by universities to remedy unequal access to university programs caused by their own or by past societal discrimination. See supra, at 344-345, discussing 45 CFR §§ 80.3 (b) (6) (ii) and 80.5 (j) (1977). It cannot be questioned that, in the absence of the special admissions program, access of minority students to the Medical School would be severely limited and, accordingly, race-conscious admissions would be deemed an appropriate response under these federal regulations. Moreover, the Department's regulatory policy is not one that has gone unnoticed by Congress. See supra, at 346-347. Indeed, although an amendment to an appropriations bill was introduced just last year that would have prevented the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from mandating race-conscious programs in university admissions, proponents of this measure, significantly, did not question the validity of voluntary implementation of race-conscious admissions criteria. See ibid. In these circumstances, the conclusion implicit in the regulations — that the lingering effects of past discrimination continue to make race-conscious remedial programs appropriate means for ensuring equal educational opportunity in universities — deserves considerable judicial deference. See, e. g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966); UJO, 430 U. S., at 175-178 (opinion concurring in part). C The second prong of our test — whether the Davis program stigmatizes any discrete group or individual and whether race is reasonably used in light of the program’s objectives — is clearly satisfied by the Davis program. It is not even claimed that Davis’ program in any way operates to stigmatize or single out any discrete and insular, or even any identifiable, nonminority group. Nor will harm comparable to that imposed upon racial minorities by exclusion or separation on grounds of race be the likely result of the program. It does not, for example, establish an exclusive preserve for minority students apart from and exclusive of whites. Rather, its purpose is to overcome the effects of segregation by bringing the races together. True, whites are excluded from participation in the special admissions program, but this fact only operates to reduce the number of whites to be admitted in the regular admissions program in order to permit admission of a reasonable percentage — less than their proportion of the California population — of otherwise underrepresented qualified minority applicants. Nor was Bakke in any sense stamped as inferior by the Medical School’s rejection of him. Indeed, it is conceded by all that he satisfied, those criteria regarded by the school as generally relevant to academic performance better than most of the minority members who were admitted. Moreover, there is absolutely no basis for concluding that Bakke’s rejection as a result of Davis’ use of racial preference will affect him throughout his life in the same way as the segregation of the Negro schoolchildren in Brown I would have affected them. Unlike discrimination against racial minorities, use of racial preferences for remedial purposes does not inflict a pervasive injury upon individual whites in the sense that wherever they go or whatever they do there is a significant likelihood that they will be treated as second-class citizens because of their color. This distinction does not mean that the exclusion of a white resulting from the preferential use of race is not sufficiently serious to require justification; but it does mean that the injury inflicted by such a policy is not distinguishable from disadvantages caused by a wide range of government actions, none of which has ever been thought impermissible for that reason alone. In addition, there is simply no evidence that the Davis program discriminates intentionally or unintentionally against any minority group which it purports to benefit. The program does not establish a quota in the invidious sense of a ceiling on the number of minority applicants to be admitted. Nor can the program reasonably be regarded as stigmatizing the program’s beneficiaries or their race as inferior. Davis program does not simply advance less qualified applicants ; rather, it compensates applicants, who it is uncontested are fully qualified to study medicine, for educational disadvantages which it was reasonable to conclude were a product of state-fostered discrimination. Once admitted, these students must satisfy the same degree requirements as regularly admitted students; they are taught by the same faculty in the same classes; and their performance is evaluated by the same standards by which regularly admitted students are judged. Under these circumstances, their performance and degrees must be regarded equally with the regularly admitted students with whom they compete for standing. Since minority graduates cannot justifiably be regarded as less well qualified than nonminority graduates by virtue of the special admissions program, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that minority graduates at schools using such programs would be stigmatized as inferior by the existence of such programs. D We disagree with the lower courts’ conclusion that the Davis program’s use of race was unreasonable in light of its objectives. First, as petitioner argues, there are no practical means by which it could achieve its ends in the foreseeable future without the use of race-conscious measures. With respect to any factor (such as poverty or family educational background) that may be used as a substitute for race as an indicator of past discrimination, whites greatly outnumber racial minorities simply because whites make up a far larger percentage of the total population and therefore far outnumber minorities in absolute terms at every socioeconomic level. For example, of a class of recent medical school applicants from families with less than $10,000 income, at least 71% were white. Of all 1970 families headed by a person not a high school graduate which included related children under 18, 80% were white and 20% were racial minorities. Moreover, while race is positively correlated with differences in GPA and MCAT scores, economic disadvantage is not. Thus, it appears that economically disadvantaged whites do not score less well than economically advantaged whites, while economically advantaged blacks score less well than do disadvantaged whites. These statistics graphically illustrate that the University’s purpose to integrate its classes by compensating for past discrimination could not be achieved by a general preference for the economically disadvantaged or the children of parents of limited education unless such groups were to make up the entire class. Second, the Davis admissions program does not simply equate minority status with disadvantage. Rather, Davis considers on an individual basis each applicant’s personal history to determine whether he or she has likely been disadvantaged by racial discrimination. The record makes clear that only minority applicants likely to have been isolated from the mainstream of American life are considered in the special program; other minority applicants are eligible only through the regular admissions program. True, the procedure by which disadvantage is detected is informal, but we have never insisted that educators conduct their affairs through adjudicatory proceedings, and such insistence here is misplaced. A case-by-case inquiry into the extent to which each individual applicant has been affected, either directly or indirectly, by racial discrimination, would seem to be, as a practical matter, virtually impossible, despite the fact that there are excellent reasons for concluding that such effects generally exist. When individual measurement is impossible or extremely impractical, there is nothing to prevent a State from using categorical means to achieve its ends, at least where the category is closely related to the goal. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S. 285, 295-296 (1969); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966). And it is clear from our cases that specific proof that a person has been victimized by discrimination is not a necessary predicate to offering him relief where the probability of victimization is great. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977). E Finally, Davis’ special admissions program cannot be said to violate the Constitution simply because it has set aside a predetermined number of places for qualified minority applicants rather than using minority status as a positive factor to be considered in evaluating the applications of disadvantaged minority applicants. For purposes of constitutional adjudication, there is no difference between the two approaches. In any admissions program which accords special consideration to disadvantaged racial minorities, a determination of the degree of preference to be given is unavoidable, and any given preference that results in the exclusion of a white candidate is no more or less constitutionally acceptable than a program such as that at Davis. Furthermore, the extent of the preference inevitably depends on how many minority applicants the particular school is seeking to admit in any particular year so long as the number of qualified minority applicants exceeds that number. There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional, distinction between, for example, adding a set number of points to the admissions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as an expression of the preference with the expectation that this will result in the admission of an approximately determined number of qualified minority applicants and setting a fixed number of places for such applicants as was done here. The “Harvard” program, see ante, at 316-318, as those employing it readily concede, openly and successfully employs a racial criterion for the purpose of ensuring that some of the scarce places in institutions of higher education are allocated to disadvantaged minority students. That the Harvard approach does not also make public the extent of the preference and the precise workings of the system while the Davis program employs a specific, openly stated number, does not condemn the latter plan for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication. It may be that the Harvard plan is more acceptable to the public than is the Davis “quota.” If it is, any State, including California, is free to adopt it in preference to a less acceptable alternative, just as it is generally free, as far as the Constitution is concerned, to abjure granting any racial preferences in its admissions program. But there is no basis for preferring a particular preference program simply because in achieving the same goals that the Davis Medical School is pursuing, it proceeds in a manner that is not immediately apparent to the public. y Accordingly, we would reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of California holding the Medical School's spe'cial admissions program unconstitutional and directing respondent’s admission, as well as that portion of the judgment enjoining the Medical School from according any consideration to race in the admissions process. Me. Justice White. I write separately concerning the question of whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq., provides for a private cause of action. Four Justices are apparently of the view that such a private cause of action exists, and four Justices assume it for purposes of this case. I am unwilling merely to assume an affirmative answer. If in fact no private cause of action exists, this Court and the lower courts as well are without jurisdiction to consider respondent’s Title VI claim. As I see it, if we are not obliged to do so, it is at least advisable to address this threshold jurisdictional issue. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 229 (1938). Furthermore, just as it is inappropriate to address constitutional issues without determining whether statutory grounds urged before us are dispositive, it is at least questionable practice to adjudicate a novel and difficult statutory issue without first considering whether we have jurisdiction to decide it. Consequently, I address the question of whether respondent may bring suit under Title VI. A private cause of action under Title VI, in terms both of the Civil Rights Act as a whole and that Title, would not be “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme” and would be contrary to the legislative intent. Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975). Title II, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq., dealing with public accommodations, and Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), dealing with employment, proscribe private discriminatory conduct that as of 1964 neither the Constitution nor other federal statutes had been construed to forbid. Both Titles carefully provided for private actions as well as for official participation in enforcement. Title III, 42 U. S. C. § 2000b et seq., and Title IV, 42 U. S. C. § 2000c et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), dealing with public facilities and public education, respectively, authorize suits by the Attorney General to eliminate racial discrimination in these areas. Because suits to end discrimination in public facilities and public education were already available under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, it was, of course, unnecessary to provide for private actions under Titles III and IV. But each Title carefully provided that its provisions for public actions would not adversely affect pre-existing private remedies. §§ 2000b-2 and 2000c-8. The role of Title VI was to terminate federal financial support for public and private institutions or programs that discriminated on the basis of race. Section 601, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, imposed the proscription that no person, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, was to be excluded from or discriminated against under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. But there is no express provision for private actions to enforce Title VI, and it would be quite incredible if Congress, after so carefully attending to the matter of private actions in other Titles of the Act, intended silently to create a private cause of action to enforce Title VI. It is also evident from the face of § 602, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-l, that Congress intended the departments and agencies to define and to refine, by rule or regulation, the general proscription of § 601, subject only to judicial review of agency action in accordance with established procedures. Section 602 provides for enforcement: Every federal department or agency furnishing financial support is to implement the proscription by appropriate rule or regulation, each of which requires approval by the President. Termination of funding as a sanction for noncompliance is authorized, but only after a hearing and after the failure of voluntary means to secure compliance. Moreover, termination may not take place until the department or agency involved files with the appropriate committees of the House and Senate a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action and 30 days have elapsed thereafter. Judicial review was provided, at least for actions terminating financial assistance. Termination of funding was regarded by Congress as a serious enforcement step, and the legislative history is replete with assurances that it would not occur until every possibility for conciliation had been exhausted. To allow a private individual to sue to cut off funds under Title VI would compromise these assurances and short circuit the procedural preconditions provided in Title VI. If the Federal Government may not cut off funds except pursuant to an agency rule, approved by the President, and presented to the appropriate committee of Congress for a layover period, and after voluntary means to achieve compliance have failed, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to permit individuals to circumvent these administrative prerequisites themselves. Furthermore, although Congress intended Title VI to end federal financial support for racially discriminatory policies of not only public but also- private institutions and programs, it is extremely unlikely that Congress, without a word indicating that it intended to do so, contemplated creating an independent, private statutory cause of action against all private as well as public agencies that might be in violation of the section. There is no doubt that Congress regarded private litigation as an important tool to attack discriminatory practices. It does not at all follow, however, that Congress anticipated new private actions under Title VI itself. Wherever a discriminatory program was a public undertaking, such as a public school, private remedies were already available under other statutes, and a private remedy under Title VI was unnecessary. Congress was well aware of this fact. Significantly, there was frequent reference to Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959 (CA4 1963), cert. denied, 376 U. S. 938 (1964), throughout the congressional deliberations. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey). Simkins held that under appropriate circumstances, the operation of a private hospital with “massive use of public funds and extensive state-federal sharing in the common plan” constituted “state action” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 323 F. 2d, at 967. It was unnecessary, of course, to create a Title VI private action against private discriminators where they were already within the reach of existing private remedies. But when they were not — and Simkins carefully disclaimed holding that “every subvention by the federal or state government automatically involves the beneficiary in 'state action,’ ” ibid — it is difficult to believe that Congress silently created a private remedy to terminate conduct that previously had been entirely beyond the reach of federal law. For those who believe, contrary to my views, that Title VI was intended to create a stricter standard of color blindness than the Constitution itself requires, the result of no private cause of action follows even more readily. In that case Congress must be seen to have banned degrees of discrimination, as well as types of discriminators, not previously reached by law. A Congress careful enough to provide that existing private causes of action would be preserved (in Titles III and IV) would not leave for inference a vast new extension of private enforcement power. And a Congress so exceptionally concerned with the satisfaction of procedural preliminaries before confronting fund recipients with the choice of a cutoff or of stopping discriminating would not permit private parties to pose precisely that same dilemma in a greatly widened category of cases with no procedural requirements whatsoever. Significantly, in at least three instances legislators who played a major role in the passage of Title VI explicitly stated that a private right of action under Title VI does not exist. As an “indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one,” Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S., at 78, clearer statements cannot be imagined, and under Cort, “an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action [is] controlling.” Id., at 82. Senator Keating, for example, proposed a private “right to sue” for the “person suffering from discrimination”; but the Department of Justice refused to include it, and the Senator acquiesced. These are not neutral, ambiguous statements. They indicate the absence of a legislative intent to create a private remedy. Nor do any of these statements make nice distinctions between a private cause of action to enjoin discrimination and one to cut off funds, as Mr. Justice Stevens and the three Justices who join his opinion apparently would. See post, at 419-420, n. 26. Indeed, it would be odd if they did, since the practical effect of either type of private cause of action would be identical. If private suits to enjoin conduct allegedly violative of § 601 were permitted, recipients of federal funds would be presented with the choice of either ending what the court, rather than the agency, determined to be a discriminatory practice within the meaning of Title VI or refusing federal funds and thereby escaping from the statute's jurisdictional predicate. This is precisely the same choice as would confront recipients if suit were brought to cut off funds. Both types of actions would equally jeopardize the administrative processes so carefully structured into the law. This Court has always required “that the inference of such a private cause of action not otherwise authorized by the statute must be consistent with the evident legislative intent and, of course, with the effectuation of the purposes intended to be served by the Act.” National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458 (1974). See also Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 418-420 (1975). A private cause of action under Title VI is unable to satisfy either prong of this test. Because each of my colleagues either has a different view or assumes a private cause of action, however, the merits of the Title VI issue must be addressed. My views in that regard, as well as my views with respect to the equal protection issue, are included in the joint opinion that my Brothers Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmtjn and I have filed. Mr. Justice Marshall. I agree with the judgment of the Court only insofar as it permits a university to consider the race of an applicant in making admissions decisions. I do not agree that petitioner’s admissions program violates the Constitution. For it must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of that legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a barrier. I A Three hundred and fifty years ago, the Negro was dragged to this country in chains to be sold into slavery. Uprooted from his homeland and thrust into bondage for forced labor, the slave was deprived of all legal rights. It was unlawful to teach him to read; he could be sold away from his family and friends at the whim of his master; and killing or maiming him was not a crime. The system of slavery brutalized and dehumanized both master and slave. The denial of human rights was etched into the American Colonies' first attempts at establishing self-government. When the colonists determined to seek their independence from England, they drafted a unique document cataloguing their grievances against the King and proclaiming as “self-evident” that “all men are created equal” and are endowed “with certain unalienable Rights,” including those to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The self-evident truths and the unalienable rights were intended, however, to apply only to white men. An earlier draft of the Declaration of Independence, submitted-by Thomas Jefferson to the Continental Congress, had included among the charges against the King that “[h]e has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither.” Franklin 88. The Southern delegation insisted that the charge be deleted; the colonists themselves were implicated in the slave trade, and inclusion of this claim might have made it more difficult to justify the continuation of slavery once the ties to England were severed. Thus, even as the colonists embarked on a course to secure their own freedom and equality, they ensured perpetuation of the system that deprived a whole race of those rights. The implicit protection of slavery embodied in the Declaration of Independence was made explicit in the Constitution, which treated a slave as being equivalent to three-fifths of a person for purposes of apportioning representatives and taxes among the States. Art. I, § 2. The Constitution also contained a clause ensuring that the “Migration or Importation” of slaves into the existing States would be legal until at least 1808, Art. I, § 9, and a fugitive slave clause requiring that when a slave escaped to another State, he must be returned on the claim of the master, Art. IV, § 2. In their declaration of the principles that were to provide the cornerstone of the new Nation, therefore, the Framers made it plain that “we the people,” for whose protection the Constitution was designed, did not include those whose skins were the wrong color. As Professor John Hope Franklin has observed, Americans “proudly accepted the challenge and responsibility of their new political freedom by establishing the machinery and safeguards that insured the continued enslavement of blacks.” Franklin 100. The individual States likewise established the machinery to protect the system of slavery through the promulgation of the Slave Codes, which were designed primarily to defend the property interest of the owner in his slave. The position of the Negro slave as mere property was confirmed by this Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), holding that the Missouri Compromise — which prohibited slavery in the portion of the Louisiana Purchase Territory north of Missouri — was unconstitutional because it deprived slave owners of their property without due process. The Court declared that under the Constitution a slave was property, and “[t]he right to trafile in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United States . . . Id., at 451. The Court further concluded that Negroes were not intended to be included as citizens under the Constitution but were “regarded as beings of an inferior order . . . altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect . . . Id., at 407. B The status of the Negro as property was officially erased by his emancipation at the end of the Civil War. But the long-awaited emancipation, while freeing the Negro from slavery, did not bring him citizenship or equality in any meaningful way. Slavery was replaced by a system of “laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value.” Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 70 (1873). Despite the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the Negro was systematically denied the rights those Amendments were supposed to secure. The combined actions and inactions of the State and Federal Governments maintained Negroes in a position of legal inferiority for another century after the Civil War. The Southern States took the first steps to re-enslave the Negroes. Immediately following the end of the Civil War, many of the provisional legislatures passed Black Codes, similar to the Slave Codes, which, among other things, limited the rights of Negroes to own or rent property and permitted imprisonment for breach of employment contracts. Over the next several decades, the South managed to disenfranchise the Negroes in spite of the Fifteenth Amendment by various techniques, including poll taxes, deliberately complicated balloting processes, property and literacy qualifications, and finally the white primary. Congress responded to the legal disabilities being imposed in the Southern States by passing the Reconstruction Acts and the Civil Rights Acts. Congress also responded to the needs of the Negroes at the end of the Civil War by establishing the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, better known as the Freedmen’s Bureau, to supply food, hospitals, land, and education to the newly freed slaves. Thus, for a time it seemed as if the Negro might be protected from the continued denial of his civil rights and might be relieved of the disabilities that prevented him from taking his place as a free and equal citizen. That time, however, was short-lived. Reconstruction came to a close, and, with the assistance of this Court, the Negro was rapidly stripped of his new civil rights. In the words of C. Vann Woodward: “By narrow and ingenious interpretation [the Supreme Court’s] decisions over a period of years had whittled away a great part of the authority presumably given the government for protection of civil rights.” Woodward 139'. The Court began by interpreting the Civil War Amendments in a manner that sharply curtailed their substantive protections. See, e. g., Slaughter-House Cases, supra; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876). Then in the notorious Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), the Court strangled Congress’ efforts to use its power to promote racial equality. In those cases the Court invalidated sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that made it a crime to deny equal access to “inns, public conveyances, theatres and other places of public amusement.” Id., at 10. According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to proscribe only discriminatory action by the State. The Court ruled that the Negroes who were excluded from public places suffered only an invasion of their social rights at the hands of private individuals, and Congress had no power to remedy that. Id., at 24 — 25. “When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,” the Court concluded, “there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws . . . Id., at 25. As Mr. Justice Harlan noted in dissent, however, the Civil War Amendments and Civil Rights Acts did not make the Negroes the “special favorite” of the laws but instead “sought to accomplish in reference to that race . . . — what had already been done in every State of the Union for the white race — to secure and protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more.” Id., at 61. The Court’s ultimate blow to the Civil War Amendments and to the equality of Negroes came in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896)., In upholding a Louisiana law that required railway companies to provide “equal but separate” accommodations for whites and Negroes, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended “to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.” Id., at 544. Ignoring totally the realities of the positions of the two races, the Court remarked: “We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.” Id., at 551. Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion recognized the bankruptcy of the Court’s reasoning. He noted that the “real meaning” of the legislation was “that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens.” Id., at 560. He expressed his ■ fear that if like laws were enacted in other States, “the effect would be in the highest degree mischievous.” Id., at 563. Although slavery would have disappeared, the States would retain the power “to interfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race; and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens . .. .” Ibid. The fears of Mr. Justice Harlan were soon to be realized. In the wake of Plessy, many States expanded their Jim Crow laws, which had up until that time been limited primarily to passenger trains and schools. The segregation of the races was extended to residential areas, parks, hospitals, theaters, waiting rooms, and bathrooms. There were even statutes and ordinances which authorized separate phone booths for Negroes and whites, which required that textbooks used by children of one race be kept separate from those used by the other, and which required that Negro and white prostitutes be kept in separate districts. In 1898, after Plessy, the Charlestown News and Courier printed a parody of Jim Crow laws: “ 'If there must be Jim Crow cars on the railroads, there should be Jim Crow cars on the street railways. Also on all passenger boats. ... If there are to be Jim Crow cars, moreover, there should be Jim Crow waiting saloons at all stations, and Jim Crow eating houses. . . . There should be Jim Crow sections of the jury box, and a separate Jim Crow dock and witness stand in every court— and a Jim Crow Bible for colored witnesses to kiss. ” Woodward 68. The irony is that before many years had passed, with the exception of the Jim Crow witness stand, "all the improbable applications of the principle suggested by the editor in derision had been put into practice — down to and including the Jim Crow Bible.” Id., at 69. Nor were the laws restricting the rights of Negroes limited solely to the Southern States. In many of the Northern States, the Negro was denied the right to vote, prevented from serving on juries, and excluded from theaters, restaurants, hotels, and inns. Under President Wilson, the Federal Government began to require segregation in Government buildings; desks of Negro employees were curtained off; separate bathrooms and separate tables in the cafeterias were provided; and even the galleries of the Congress were segregated. When his segregationist policies were attacked, President Wilson responded that segregation was “ ‘not humiliating but a benefit’ ” and that he was “ ‘rendering [the Negroes] more safe in their possession of office and less likely to be discriminated against.’ ” Kluger 91. The enforced segregation of the races continued into the middle of the 20th century. In both World Wars, Negroes were for the most part confined to separate military units; it was not until 1948 that an end to segregation in the military was ordered by President Truman. And the history of the exclusion of Negro children from white public schools is too well known and recent to require repeating here. That Negroes were delibérately excluded from public graduate and professional schools — and thereby denied the opportunity to become doctors, lawyers, engineers, and the like — is also well established. It is of course true that some of the Jim Crow laws (which the decisions of this Court had helped to foster) were struck down by this Court in a series of decisions leading up to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). See, e. g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950). Those decisions, however, did not automatically end segregation, nor did they move Negroes from a position of legal inferiority to one of equality. The legacy of years of slavery and of years of second-class citizenship in the wake of emancipation could not be so easily eliminated. II The position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal treatment. Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful equality remains a distant dream for the Negro. A Negro child today has a life expectancy which is shorter by more than five years than that of a white child. The Negro child’s mother is over three times more likely to die of complications in childbirth, and the infant mortality rate for Negroes is nearly twice that for whites. The median income of the Negro family is only 60% that of the median of a white family, and the percentage of Negroes who live in families with incomes below the poverty line is nearly four times greater than that of whites; When the Negro child reaches working age, he finds that America offers him significantly less than it offers his white counterpart. For Negro adults, the unemployment rate is twice that of whites, and the unemployment rate for Negro teenagers is nearly three times that of white teenagers. A' Negro male who completes four years of college can expect a median annual income of merely $110 more than a white male who has only a high school diploma. Although Negroes represent 11.5% of the population, they are only 1.2% of the lawyers and judges, 2% of the physicians, 2.3% of the dentists, 1.1% of the engineers and 2.6% of the college and university professors. The relationship between those figures and the- history of unequal treatment afforded to the Negro cannot be denied. At every point from birth to death the impact of the past is reflected in the still disfavored position of the Negro. In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state interest of the highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided society. Ill I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment requires us to accept that fate. Neither its history nor our past cases lend any support to the conclusion that a university may not remedy the cumulative effects of society’s discrimination by giving consideration to race in an effort to increase the number and percentage of Negro doctors. A This Court long ago remarked that “in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these [Civil War] amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy . . . .” Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., at 72. It is plain that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to prohibit measures designed to remedy the effects of the Nation’s past treatment of Negroes. The Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment is the same Congress that passed the 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Act, an Act that provided many of its benefits only to Negroes. Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; see supra, at 391. Although the Freedmen’s Bureau legislation provided aid for refugees, thereby including white persons within some of the relief measures, 14 Stat. 174; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, the bill was regarded, to the dismay of many Congressmen, as "solely and entirely for the freedmén, and to the exclusion of all other persons . . . .” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 544 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Taylor). See also id., at 634-635 (remarks of Rep. Ritter); id., at App. 78, 80-81 (remarks of Rep. Chanler). Indeed, the bill was bitterly opposed on the ground that it "undertakes to make the negro in some respects . . . superior . . . and gives them favors that the poor white boy in the North cannot get.” Id., at 401 (remarks of Sen. McDougall). See also id., at 319 (remarks of Sen. Hendricks); id., at 362 (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury); id., at 397 (remarks of Sen. Willey); id., at 544 (remarks of Rep. Taylor). The bill’s supporters defended it — not by rebutting the claim of special treatment — but by pointing to the need for such treatment: “The very discrimination it makes between 'destitute and suffering’ negroes, and destitute and suffering white paupers, proceeds upon the distinction that, in the omitted case, civil rights and immunities are already sufficiently protected by the possession of political power, the absence of which in the case provided for necessitates governmental protection.” Id., at App. 75 (remarks of Rep. Phelps). Despite the objection to the special treatment the bill would provide for Negroes, it was passed by Congress. Id., at 421, 688. President Johnson vetoed this bill and also a subsequent bill that contained some modifications; one of his principal objections to both bills was that they gave special benefits to Negroes. 8 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 3596, 3599, 3620, 3623 (1897). Rejecting the concerns of the President and the bill’s opponents, Congress overrode the President’s second veto. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 3842, 3850 (1866). Since the Congress that considered and rejected the objections to the 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Act concerning special relief to Negroes also proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, it is inconceivable that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit all race-conscious relief measures. It “would be a distortion of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color,” Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 94 (1945), to hold that it barred state action to remedy the effects of that discrimination. Such a result would pervert the intent of the Framers by substituting abstract equality for the genuine equality the Amendment was intended to achieve. B As has been demonstrated in our joint opinion, this Court’s past cases establish the constitutionality of race-conscious remedial measures. Beginning with the school desegregation cases, we recognized that even absent a judicial or legislative finding of constitutional violation, a school board constitutionally could consider the race of students in making school-assignment decisions. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 41 (1971). We noted, moreover, that a “fiat prohibition against assignment of students for the purpose of creating a racial balance must inevitably conflict with the duty of school authorities to disestablish dual school systems. As we have held in Swarm, the Constitution does not compel any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, but when past and continuing constitutional violations are found, some ratios are likely to be useful as starting points in shaping a remedy. An absolute prohibition against use of such a device — even as a starting point — contravenes the implicit command of Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968), that all reasonable methods be available to formulate an effective remedy.” Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971). As we have observed, “[a]ny other approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes.” McDaniel v. Barresi, supra, at 41. Only last Term, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977), we upheld a New York reapportionment plan that was deliberately drawn on the basis of race to enhance the electoral power of Negroes and Puerto Ricans; the plan had the effect of diluting the electoral strength of the Hasidic Jewish community. We were willing in UJO to sanction the remedial use of a racial classification even though it disadvantaged otherwise “innocent” individuals. In another case last Term, Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313 (1977), the Court upheld a provision in the Social Security laws that discriminated against men because its purpose was “ 'the permissible one of redressing our society’s longstanding disparate treatment of women.’ ” Id., at 317, quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 209 n. 8 (1977) (plurality opinion). We thus recognized the permissibility of remedying past societal discrimination through the use of otherwise disfavored classifications. Nothing in those cases suggests that a university cannot similarly act to remedy past discrimination. It is true that in both UK) and Webster the use of the disfavored classification was predicated on legislative or administrative action, but in neither case had those bodies made findings that there had been constitutional violations or that the specific individuals to be benefited had actually been the victims of discrimination. Rather, the classification in each of those cases was based on a determination that the group was in need of the remedy because of some type of past discrimination. There is thus ample support for the conclusion that a university can employ race-conscious measures to remedy past societal discrimination, without the need for a finding that those benefited were actually victims of that discrimination. IV While I applaud th!e judgment of the Court that a university may consider race in its admissions process, it is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible. In declining to so hold, today’s judgment ignores the fact that for several hundred years Negroes have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their skins. It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact. The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never even made it into the pot. These differences in the experience of the Negro make it difficult for me to accept that Negroes cannot be afforded greater protection under the Fourteenth Amendment where it is necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination. In the Civil Rights Cases, supra, the Court wrote that the Negro emerging from slavery must cease “to be the special favorite of the laws.” 109 U. S., at 25; see supra, at 392. We cannot in light of the history of the last century yield to that view. Had the Court in that decision and others been willing to “do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship, what it did ... for the protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves,” 109 U. S., at 53 (Harlan, J., dissenting), we would not need now to permit the recognition of any “special wards.” Most importantly, had the Court been willing in 1896, in^~ Plessy v. Ferguson, to hold that the Equal Protection Clause forbids differences in treatment based on race, we would not be faced with this dilemma in 1978. We must remember, however, that the principle that the “Constitution is colorblind” appeared only in the opinion of the lone dissenter. 163 U. S., at 559. The majority of the Court rejected the principle of color blindness, and for the next 60 years, from Plessy to Brown v. Board of Education, ours was a Nation where, hy law, an individual could be given “special” treatment based on the color of his skin. It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we now must permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race in making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, affluence, and prestige in America. For far too long, the doors to those positions have been shut to Negroes. If we are ever to become a fully integrated society, one in which the color of a person’s skin will not determine the opportunities available to him or her, we must be willing to take steps to open those doors. I do not believe that anyone can truly look into America’s past and still find that a remedy for the effects of that past is impermissible. It has been said that this case involves only the individual, Bakke, and this University. I doubt, however, that there is a computer capable of determining the number of persons and institutions that may be affected by the decision in this case. For example, we are told by the Attorney General of the United States that at least 27 federal agencies have adopted regulations requiring recipients of federal funds to take “ ‘affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation ... by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin.’ ” Supplemental Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16 (emphasis added). I cannot even guess the number of state and local governments that have set up affirmative-action programs, which may be affected by today’s decision. I fear that we have come full circle. After the Civil War our Government started several “affirmative action” programs. This Court in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the movement toward complete equality. For almost a century no action was taken, and this nonaction was with the tacit approval of the courts. Then we had Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Acts of Congress, followed by numerous affirmative-action programs. Now, we have this Court again stepping in, this time to stop affirmative-action programs of the type used by the University of California. Mr. Justice Blackmun. I participate fully, of course, in the opinion, ante, p. 324, that bears the names of my Brothers Brennan, White, Marshall, and myself. I add only some general observations that hold particular significance for me, and then a few comments on equal protection. I At least until the early 1970’s, apparently only a very small number, less than 2%, of the physicians, attorneys, and medical and law students in the United States were members of what we now refer to as minority groups. In addition, approximately three-fourths of our Negro physicians were trained at only two medical schools. If ways are not found to remedy that situation, the country can never achieve its professed goal of a society that is not race conscious. I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come when an “affirmative action” program is unnecessary and is, in truth, only a relic of the past. I would hope that we could reach this stage within a decade at the most. But the story of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), decided almost a quarter of a century ago, suggests that that hope is a slim one. At some time, however, beyond any period of what some would claim is only transitional inequality, the United States must and will reach a stage of maturity where action along this line is no longer necessary. Then persons will be regarded as persons, and discrimination of the type we address today will be an ugly feature of history that is instructive but that is behind us. The number of qualified, indeed highly qualified, applicants for admission to existing medical schools in the United States far exceeds the number of places available. Wholly apart from racial and ethnic considerations, therefore, the selection process inevitably results in the denial of admission to many qualified persons, indeed, to far more than the number of those who are granted admission. Obviously, it is a denial to the deserving. This inescapable fact is brought into sharp focus here because Allan Bakke is not himself charged with discrimination and yet is the one who is disadvantaged, and because the Medical School of the University of California at Davis itself is not charged with historical discrimination. One theoretical solution to the need for more minority members in higher education would be to enlarge our graduate schools. Then all who desired and were qualified could enter, and talk of discrimination would vanish. Unfortunately, this is neither feasible nor realistic. The vast resources that apparently would be required simply are not available. And the need for more professional graduates, in the strict numerical sense, perhaps has not been demonstrated at all. There is no particular or real significance in the 84-16 division at Davis. The same theoretical, philosophical, social, legal, and constitutional considerations would necessarily apply to the case if Davis’ special admissions program had focused on any lesser number, that is, on 12 or 8 or 4 places or, indeed, on only 1. It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over a program where race is an element of consciousness, and yet to be aware of the fact, as we are, that institutions of higher learning, albeit more on the undergraduate than the graduate level, have given conceded preferences up to a point to those possessed of athletic skills, to the children of alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess on the institutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the famous, and the powerful. Programs of admission to institutions of higher learning are basically a responsibility for academicians and for administrators and the specialists they employ. The judiciary, in contrast, is ill-equipped and poorly trained for this. The administration and management of educational institutions are beyond the competence of judges and are within the special competence of educators, provided always that the educators perform within legal and constitutional bounds. Por me, therefore, interference by the judiciary must be the rare exception and not the rule. II I, of course, accept the propositions that (a) Fourteenth Amendment rights are personal; (b) racial and ethnic distinctions where they are stereotypes are inherently suspect and call for exacting judicial scrutiny; (c) academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment; and (d) the Fourteenth Amendment has expanded beyond its original 1868 concept and now is recognized to have reached a point where, as Mr. Justice Powell states, ante, at 293, quoting from the Court’s opinion in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273, 296 (1976), it embraces a “broader principle.” This enlargement does not mean for me, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment has broken away from its moorings and its original intended purposes. Those original aims persist. And that, in a distinct sense, is what “affirmative action,” in the face of proper facts, is all about. If this conflicts with idealistic equality, that tension is original Fourteenth Amendment tension, constitutionally conceived and constitutionally imposed, and it is part of the Amendment’s very nature until complete equality is achieved in the area. In this sense, constitutional equal protection is a shield. I emphasize in particular that the decided cases are not easily to be brushed aside. Many, of course, are not precisely on point, but neither are they off point. Racial factors have been given consideration in the school desegregation cases, in the employment cases, in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), and in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). To be sure, some of these may be “distinguished” on the ground that victimization was directly present. But who is to say that victimization is not present for some members of today’s minority groups, although it is of a lesser and perhaps different degree. The petitioners in United Jewish Organizations certainly complained bitterly of their reapportionment treatment, and I rather doubt that they regard the “remedy” there imposed as one that was “to improve” the group’s ability to participate, as Mr. Justice Powell describes it, ante, at 305. And surely in Lau v. Nichols we looked to ethnicity. I am not convinced, as Mr. Justice Powell seems to be, that the difference between the Davis program and the one employed by Harvard is very profound or constitutionally significant. The line between the two is a thin and indistinct one. In each, subjective application is at work. Because of my conviction that admission programs are primarily for the educators, I am willing to accept the representation that the Harvard program is one where good faith in its administration is practiced as well as professed. I agree that such a program, where race or ethnic background is only one of many factors, is a program better formulated than Davis’ two-track system. The cynical, of course, may say that under a program such as Harvard’s one may accomplish covertly what Davis concedes it does openly. I need not go that far, for despite its two-track aspect, the Davis program, for me, is within constitutional bounds, though perhaps barely so. It is surely free of stigma, and, as in United Jewish Organizations, I am not willing to infer a constitutional violation. It is worth noting, perhaps, that governmental preference has not been a stranger to our legal life. We see it in veterans’ preferences. We see it in the aid-to-the-handicapped programs. We see it in the progressive income tax. We see it in the Indian programs.- We may excuse some of these on the ground that they have specific constitutional protection or, as with Indians, that those benefited are wards of the Government. Nevertheless, these preferences exist and may not be ignored. And in the admissions field, as I have indicated, educational institutions have always used geography, athletic ability, anticipated financial largess, alumni pressure, and other factors of that kind. I add these only as additional components on the edges of the central question as to which I join my Brothers Brennan, White, and Marshall in our more general approach. • It is gratifying to know that the Court at least finds it constitutional for an academic institution to take race and ethnic background into consideration as one factor, among many, in the administration of its admissions program. I presume that that factor always has been there, though perhaps not conceded or even admitted. It is a fact of life, however, and a part of the real world of which we are all a part. The sooner we get down the road toward accepting and being a part of the real world, and not shutting it out and away from us, the sooner will these difficulties vanish from the scene. I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot — we dare not — let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy. So the ultimate question, as it was at the beginning of this litigation, is: Among the qualified, how does one choose? A long time ago, as time is measured for this Nation, a Chief Justice, both wise and farsighted, said: “In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original). In the same opinion, the Great Chief Justice further observed: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” Id., at 421. More recently, one destined to become a Justice of this Court observed: “The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance that vary from age to age.” B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 17 (1921). And an educator who became a President of the United States said: “But the Constitution of the United States is not a mere lawyers’ document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.” W. Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 69 (1911). These precepts of breadth and flexibility and ever-present modernity are basic to our constitutional law. Today, again, we are expounding a Constitution. The same principles that governed McCulloch’s case in 1819 govern Bakke’s case in 1978. There can be no other answer. Mk Justice SteveNS views the judgment of the California court as limited to prohibiting the consideration of race only in passing upon Bakke’s application. Post, at 408-411. It must be remembered, however, that petitioner here cross-complained in the trial court for a declaratory judgment that its special program was constitutional and it lost. The trial court’s judgment that the special program was unlawful was affirmed by the California Supreme Court in an opinion which left no doubt that the reason for its holding was petitioner’s use of race in consideration of any candidate’s application. Moreover, in explaining the scope of its holding, the court quite clearly stated that petitioner was prohibited from taking race into account in any way in making admissions decisions: “In addition, the University may properly as it in fact does, consider other factors in evaluating an applicant, such as the personal interview, recommendations, character, and matters relating to the needs of the profession and society, such as an applicant’s professional goals. In short, the standards for admission employed by the University are not constitutionally infirm except to the extent that they are utilized in a racially discriminatory manner. Disadvantaged applicants of all races must be eligible for sympathetic consideration, and no applicant may be rejected because of his race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by standards applied without regard to race. We reiterate, in view of the dissent’s misinterpretation, that we do not compel the University to utilize only ‘the highest objective academic credentials’ as the criterion for admission.” 18 Cal. 3d 34, 54-55, 553 P. 2d 1152, 1166 (1976) (footnote omitted). This explicit statement makes it unreasonable to assume that the reach of the California court’s judgment can be limited in the manner suggested by Mr. Justice SteveNS. Mr. Justice BreNNAN, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice BlackmuN join Parts I and V-C of this opinion. Mr. Justice White also joins Part III-A of this opinion. Material distributed to applicants for the class entering in 1973 described the special admissions program as follows: “A special subcommittee of the Admissions Committee, made up of faculty and medical students from minority groups, evaluates applications from economically and/or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds. The applicant may designate on the application form that he or she requests such an evaluation. Ethnic minorities are not categorically considered under the Task Force Program unless they are from disadvantaged backgrounds. Our goals are: 1) A short range goal in the identification and recruitment of potential candidates for admission to medical school in the near future, and 2) Our long-range goal is to stimulate career interest in health professions among junior high and high school students. “After receiving all pertinent information selected applicants will receive a letter inviting them to our School of Medicine in Davis for an interview. The interviews are conducted by at least one faculty member and one student member of the Task Force Committee. Recommendations are then made to the Admissions Committee of the medical school. Some of the Task Force Faculty are also members of the Admissions Committee. “Long-range goals will be approached by meeting with counselors and students of schools with large minority populations, as well as with local youth and adult community groups. “Applications for financial aid are available only after the applicant has been accepted and can only be awarded after registration. Financial aid is available to students in the form of scholarships and loans. In addition to the Regents’ Scholarships and President’s Scholarship programs, the medical school participates in the Health Professions Scholarship Program, whieh makes funds available to students who otherwise might not be able to pursue a medical education. Other scholarships and awards are available to students who meet special eligibility qualifications. Medical students are also eligible to participate in the Federally Insured Student Loan Program and the American Medical Association Education and Research Foundation Loan Program. “Applications for Admission are available from: “Admissions Office School of Medicine University of California Davis, California 95616” Record 195. The letter distributed the following year was virtually identical, except that the third paragraph was omitted. For the 1973 entering class of 100 seats, the Davis Medical School received 2,464 applications. Id., at 117. For the 1974 entering class, 3,737 applications were submitted. Id., at 289. That is, applications were considered and acted upon as they were received, so that the process of filling the class took place over a period of months, with later applications being considered against those still on file from earlier in the year. Id., at 64. The chairman normally cheeked to see if, among other things, the applicant had been granted a waiver of the school’s application fee, which required a means test; whether the applicant had worked during college or interrupted his education to support himself or his family; and whether the applicant was a member of a minority group. Id., at 65-66. For the class entering in 1973, the total number of special applicants was 297, of whom 73 were white. In 1974, 628 persons applied to the special committee, of whom 172 were white. Id., at 133-134. The following table provides a year-by-year comparison of minority admissions at the Davis Medical School: Special Admissions Program General Admissions Total Blacks Chícanos Asians Total Blacks Chícanos Asians Total 1970 5 3 0 8 0 0 4 4 12 1971 4 9 2 15 1 0 8 9 24 1972 6 6 5 16 0 0 11 11 27 1973 6 8 2 16 0 2 13 15 31 1974 6 7 3 16 0 4 5 9 25 Id,., at 216-218. Sixteen persons were admitted under the special program in 1974, ibid., but one Asian withdrew before the start of classes, and the vacancy was filled by a candidate from the general admissions waiting list. Brief for Petitioner 4 n. 5. The following table compares Bakke’s science grade point average, overall grade point average, and MCAT scores with the average scores of regular admittees and of special admittees in both 1973 and 1974. Record 210,223,231, 234: Class Entering in 1973 MCAT (Percentiles) Quanti- Gen. SGPA OGPA Verbal tative Science Infor. Bakke . 3.44 3.46 96 94 97 72 Average of regular admittees. 3.51 3.49 81 76 83 69 Average of special admittees. 2.62 2.88 46 24 35 33 Class Entering in 1974 MCAT (Percentiles) Quanti- Gen. SGPA OGPA Verbal tative Science Infor. Bakke. 3.44 3.46 96 94 97 72 Average of regular admittees. 3.36 3.29 69 67 82 72 Average of special admittees. 2.42 2.62 34 30 37 18 Applicants admitted under the special program also had benchmark scores significantly lower than many students, including Bakke, rejected under the general admissions program, even though the special rating system apparently gave credit for overcoming “disadvantage.” Id., at 181, 388. Prior to the actual filing of the suit, Bakke discussed his intentions with Peter C. Storandt, Assistant to the Dean of Admissions at the Davis Medical School. Id., at 259-269. Storandt expressed sympathy for Bakke’s position and offered advice on litigation strategy. Several amici imply that these discussions render Bakke’s suit “collusive.” There is no indication, however, that Storandt’s views were those of the Medical School or that anyone else at the school even was aware of Storandt’s correspondence and conversations with Bakke. Storandt is no longer with the University. “[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” “No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.” This section was recently repealed and its provisions added to Art. I, § 7, of the State Constitution. Section 601 of Title VI, 78 Stat. 252, provides as follows: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Indeed, the University did not challenge the finding that applicants who were not members of a minority group were excluded from consideration in the special admissions process. 18 Cal. 3d, at 44, 553 P. 2d, at 1159. Petitioner has not challenged this aspect of the decision. The issue of the proper placement of the burden of proof,, then, is not before us. Several amici suggest that Bakke lacks standing, arguing that he never showed that his injury — exclusion from the Medical School — will be redressed by a favorable decision, and that the petitioner “fabricated” jurisdiction by conceding its inability t.o meet its burden of proof. Petitioner does not object to Bakke’s standing,' but inasmuch as this charge concerns our jurisdiction under Art. Ill, it must be considered and rejected. First, there appears to be no reason to question the petitioner’s concession. It was not an attempt to stipulate to a conclusion of law or to disguise actual facts of record. Cf. Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U. S. 281 (1917). Second, even if Bakke had been unable to prove that hie would have been admitted in the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he lacked standing. The constitutional element of standing is plaintiff’s demonstration of any injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by favorable decision of his claim. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The trial court found such an injury, apart from failure to be admitted, in the University’s decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race. Record 323. Hence the constitutional requirements of Art. Ill were met. The question of Bakke’s admission vel non is merely one of relief. Nor is it fatal to Bakke’s standing that he was not a “disadvantaged” applicant. Despite the program’s purported emphasis on disadvantage, it was a minority enrollment program with a secondary disadvantage element. White disadvantaged students were never considered under the special program, and the University acknowledges that its goal in devising the program was to increase minority enrollment. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 5255 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case). E. g., Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F. 2d 847, 851-852 (CA5), cert. denied, 388 U. S. 911 (1967); Natonabah v. Board of Education, 355 F. Supp. 716, 724 (NM 1973); cf. Lloyd v. Regional Transportartion Authority, 548 F. 2d 1277, 1284-1287 (CA7 1977) (Title V of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. §790 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 780 n. 1 (ND Ohio 1976) (Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. (1976 ed.)). Section 602, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §2000d-l, reads as follows: “Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made andj shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.” Several comments in the debates cast doubt on the existence of any intent to create a private right of action. For example, Representative Gill stated that no private right of action was contemplated: “Nowhere in this section do you find a comparable right of legal action for a person who feels he has been denied his fights to participate in the benefits of Federal funds. Nowhere. Only those who have been cut off can go to court and present their claim.” 110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964). Accord, id., at 7065 (remarks of Sen. Keating); 6562 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel). For example, Senator Humphrey stated as follows: “Racial discrimination or segregation in the administration of disaster relief is particularly shocking; and offensive to our sense of justice and fair play. Human suffering draws no color lines, and the administration of help to the sufferers should not.” Id., at 6547. See also id., at 12675 (remarks of Sen. Aliott); 6561 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); 2494, 6047 (remarks of Sen. Pastore). But see id., at 15893 (remarks of Rep. MacGregor); 13821 (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall); 10920 (remarks of Sen. Javits); 5266, 5807 (remarks of Sen. Keating). See, e. g., id., at 7064r-7065 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff); 7054r-7055 (remarks of Sen. Pastore); 6543-6544 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 2595 (remarks of Rep. Donohue); 2467-2468 (remarks of Rep. Celler); 1643, 2481-2482 (remarks of Rep. Ryan.); H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, pp. 2A-25 (1963). See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay). See also id., at 2766 (remarks of Rep. Matsunaga); 2731-2732 (remarks of Rep. Dawson); 2595 (remarks of Rep. Donohue); 1527-1528 (remarks of Rep. Celler). See, e. g., id., at 12675, 12677 (remarks of Sen. Allott); 7064 (remarks of Sen. Pell); 7057, 7062-7064 (remarks of Sen. Pastore); 5243 (remarks of Sen. Clark). See, e. g., id., at 6052 (remarks of Sen. Johnston); 5863 (remarks of Sen. Eastland); 5612 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); 5251 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge); 1632 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); 1619 (remarks of Rep. Abemethy). See also id., at 7057, 13333 (remarks of Sen. Ribieoff); 7057 (remarks of Sen. Pastore); 5606-5607 (remarks of Sen. Javits); 5253, 5863-5864, 13442 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). That issue has generated a considerable amount of scholarly controversy. See, e. g., Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1974); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of “Benign” Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559 (1975); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev, 363 (1966); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 Va. L. Rev. 955 (1974); O’Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 Va. L. Rev. 925 (1974); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 343 (1974) ; Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653 (1975); Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution: Baldee v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Santa Clara L. Rev. 329 (1977); Seeburger, A Heuristic Argument Against Preferential Admissions, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 285 (1977). Petitioner defines “quota” as a requirement which must be met but can never be exceeded, regardless of the quality of the minority applicants. Petitioner declares that there is no “floor” under the total number of minority students admitted; completely unqualified students will not be admitted simply to meet a “quota.” Neither is there a “ceiling,” since an unlimited number could be admitted through the general admissions process. On this basis the special admissions program does not meet petitioner’s definition of a quota. The court below found — and petitioner does not deny — that white applicants could not compete for the 16 places reserved solely for the special admissions program. 18 Cal. 3d, at 44, 553 P. 2d, at 1159. Both courts below characterized this as a “quota” system. Moreover, the University’s special admissions program involves a purposeful, acknowledged use of racial criteria. This is not a situation in which the classification on its face is racially neutral, but has a disproportionate racial impact. In that situation, plaintiff must establish an intent to discriminate. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Homing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 26A-265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242 (1976); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). After Carolene Products, the first specific reference in our decisions to the elements of “discreteness and insularity” appears in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 606 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting). The next does not appear until 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 295 n. 14 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). These elements have been relied upon in recognizing a suspect class in only one group of cases, those involving aliens. E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971). Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341,381 (1949). M. Jones, American Immigration 177-246 (1960). J. Higham, Strangers in the Land (1955); G. Abbott, The Immigrant and the Community (1917); P. Roberts, The New Immigration 66-73, 86-91, 248-261 (1912). See also E. Fenton, Immigrants and Unions: A Case Study 561-562 (1975). “Members of various religious and ethnic groups, primarily but not exclusively of Eastern, Middle, and Southern European ancestry, such as Jews, Catholics, Italians, Greeks, and Slavic groups, continue to be excluded from executive, middle-management, and other job levels because of discrimination based upon their religion and/or national origin.” 41 CFR § 60-50.1 (b) (1977). E. g., P. Roberts, supra n. 31, at 75; G. Abbott, supra n. 31, at 270-271. See generally n. 31, supra. In the view of Mr. Justice BreNNAn, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blacicmun, the pliable notion of “stigma” is the crucial element in analyzing racial classifications., See, e. g., post, at 361, 362. The Equal Protection Clause is not framed in terms of “stigma.” Certainly the word has no clearly defined constitutional meaning. It reflects a subjective judgment that is standardless. All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals burdened. The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may outrage those so deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious. These individuals are likely to find little comfort in the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is merely the price of membership in the dominant majority and that its imposition is inspired by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. One should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the perception of mistreatment that accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic origin. Moreover, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice BlackmuN offer no principle for deciding whether preferential classifications reflect a benign remedial purpose or a malevolent stigmatic classification, since they are willing in this case to accept mere post hoc declarations by an isolated state entity — a medical school faculty — unadorned by particularized findings of past discrimination, to establish such a remedial purpose. Professor Bickel noted the self-contradiction of that view: “The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial equality was demanded are to be more equal than others. Having found support in the Constitution for equality, they now claim support for inequality under the same Constitution.” A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (1975). As I am in agreement with the view that race may be taken into account as a factor in an admissions program, I agree with my Brothers BreNNAN, White, Marshall, and BlackmuN that the portion of the judgment that would proscribe all consideration of race must be reversed. See Part V, infra. But I disagree with much that is said in their opinion. They would require as a justification for a program such as petitioner’s, only two findings: (i) that there has been some form of discrimination against the preferred minority groups by “society at large,” post, at 369 (it being conceded that petitioner had no history of discrimination), and (ii) that “there is reason to believe” that the disparate impact sought to be rectified by the program is the “product” of such discrimination: “If it was reasonable to conclude — as we hold that it was — that the failure of minorities to qualify for admission at Davis under regular procedures was due principally to the effects of past discrimination, then there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for pervasive racial discrimination, respondent would have failed to qualify for admission even in the absence of Davis’ special admissions program.” Post, at 365-366. The breadth of this hypothesis is unprecedented in our constitutional system. The first step is easily taken. No one denies the regrettable fact that there has been societal discrimination in this country against various racial and ethnic groups. The second step, however, involves a speculative leap: but for this discrimination by society at large, Bakke “would have failed to qualify for admission” because Negro applicants — nothing is said about Asians, cf., e. g., post, at 374 n. 57 — would have made better scores. Not one word in the record supports this conclusion, and the authors of the opinion offer no standard for courts to use in applying such a presumption of causation to other racial or ethnic classifications. This failure is a grave one, since if it may be concluded on this record that each of the minority groups preferred by the petitioner’s special program is entitled to the benefit of the presumption, it would seem difficult to determine that any of the dozens of minority groups that have suffered “societal discrimination” cannot also claim it, in any area of social intercourse. See Part IY-B, infra. Mr. Justice Douglas has noted the problems associated with such inquiries: “The reservation of a proportion of the law school class for members of selected minority groups is fraught with . . . dangers, for one must immediately determine which groups are to receive such favored treatment and which are to be excluded, the proportions of the class that are to be allocated to each, and even the criteria by which to determine whether an individual is a member of a favored group. [Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 549, 552 (1896).] There is no assurance that a common agreement can be reached, and first the schools, and then the courts, will be buffeted with the competing claims. The University of Washington included Filipinos, but excluded Chinese and Japanese; another school may limit its program to blacks, or to blacks and Chicanos. Once the Court sanctioned racial preferences suoh as these, it could not then wash its hands of the matter, leaving it entirely in the discretion of the school, for then we would have effectively overruled Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, and allowed imposition of a ‘zero’ allocation. But what standard is the Court to apply when a rejected applicant of Japanese ancestry brings suit to require the University of Washington to extend the same privileges to his group ? The Committee might conclude that the population of Washington is now 2% Japanese, and that Japanese also constitute 2% of the Bar, but that had they not been handicapped by a history of discrimination, Japanese would now constitute 5% of the Bar, or 20%. Or, alternatively, the Court could attempt to assess how grievously each group has suffered from discrimination, and allocate proportions accordingly; if that were the standard the current University of Washington policy would almost surely faff, for there is no Western State which can claim that it has always treated Japanese and Chinese in a fair and evenhanded manner. See, e. g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197; Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633. This Court has not sustained a racial classification since the wartime cases of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, involving curfews and relocations imposed upon J apanese-Americans. “Nor obviously will the problem be solved if next year the Law School included only Japanese and Chinese, for then Norwegians and Swedes, Poles and Italians, Puerto Ricans and Hungarians, and all other groups which form this diverse Nation would have just complaints.” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 337-340 (1974) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted). R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956); Posner, supra n. 25, at 27. Petitioner cites three lower court decisions allegedly deviating from this general rule in school desegregation cases: Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1967); Wanner v. County School Board, 357 F. 2d 452 (CA4 1966); Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale, 348 F. 2d 261 (CA1 1965). Of these, Wanner involved a school system held to have been de jure segregated and enjoined from maintaining segregation; racial districting was deemed necessary. 357 F. 2d, at 454. Cf. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). In Barksdale and Offer-mann, courts did approve voluntary districting designed to eliminate discriminatory attendance patterns. In neither, however, was there any showing that the school board planned extensive pupil transportation that might threaten liberty or privacy interests. See Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 240-250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nor were white students deprived of an equal opportunity for education. Respondent’s position is wholly dissimilar to that of a pupil bused from his neighborhood school to a comparable school in another neighborhood in compliance with a desegregation decree. Petitioner did not arrange for respondent to attend a different medical school in order to desegregate Davis Medical School; instead, it denied him admission and may have deprived him altogether of a medical education. Every decision upholding the requirement of preferential hiring under the authority of Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965 Comp.), has emphasized the existence of previous discrimination as a predicate for the imposition of a preferential remedy. Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania; Southern Illinois Builders Assn. v. Ogilvie, 471 F. 2d 680 (CA7 1972); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (NJ 1970); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N. E. 2d 907, cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1004 (1970). See also Rosetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F. 2d 1039, 1041 (CA7 1975); Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F. 2d 9 (CA1 1973), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 957 (1974); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 157 U. S. App. D. C. 381, 383, 390, 485 F. 2d 752, 754, 761 (1973). This case does not call into question congressionally authorized administrative actions, such as consent decrees under Title VII or approval of reapportionment plans under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V). In such cases, there has been detailed legislative consideration of the various indicia of previous constitutional or statutory violations, e. g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-310 (1966) (§5), and particular administrative bodies have been charged with monitoring various activities in order to detect such violations and formulate appropriate remedies. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 103 (1976). Furthermore, we are not here presented with an occasion to review legislation by Congress pursuant to its powers under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy the effects of prior discrimination. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968). We have previously recognized the special competence of Congress to make findings with respect to the effects of identified past discrimination and its discretionary authority to take appropriate remedial measures. Petitioner also cites our decision in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974), for the proposition that the State may prefer members of tradk' tionally disadvantaged groups. In Mancari, we approved a hiring preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior (BIA). We observed in that case, however, that the legal status of the BIA is sui generis. Id., at 554. Indeed, we found that the preference was not racial at all, but “an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to- make the BIA more responsive to . . . groups . . . whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.” Ibid. A number of distinct subgoals have been advanced as falling under the rubric of “compensation for past discrimination.” For example, it is said that preferences for Negro applicants may compensate for harm done them personally, or serve to place them at economic levels they might have attained but for discrimination against their forebears. Greenawalt, supra n. 25, at 581-586. Another view of the “compensation” goal is that it serves as a form of reparation by the “majority" to a victimized group as a whole. B. Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (1973). That justification for racial or ethnic preference has been subjected to much criticism. B. g., Greenawalt, supra n. 25, at 581; Posner, supra n. 25, at 16-17, and n. 33. Finally, it has been argued that ethnic preferences “compensate” the group by providing examples of success whom other members of the group will emulate, thereby advancing the group’s interest and society’s interest in encouraging new generations to overcome the barriers and frustrations of the past. Redish, supra n. 25, at 391. For purposes of analysis these subgoals need not be considered separately. Racial classifications in admissions conceivably could serve a fifth purpose, one which petitioner does not articulate: fair appraisal of each individual’s academic promise in the light of some cultural bias in grading or testing procedures. To the extent that race and ethnic background were considered only to the extent of curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it might be argued that there is no “preference” at all. Nothing in this record, however, suggests either that any of the quantitative factors considered by the Medical School were culturally biased or that petitioner's special admissions program was formulated to correct for any such biases. Furthermore, if race or ethnic background were used solely to arrive at an unbiased prediction of academic success, the reservation of fixed numbers of seats would be inexplicable. Mr. Justice BreNNAN, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice BlacicmuN misconceive the scope of this Court’s holdings under Title VII when they suggest that “disparate impact” alone is sufficient to establish a violation of that statute and, by analogy, other civil rights measures. See post, at 363-366, and n. 42. That this was not the meaning of Title VII was made quite clear in the seminal decision in this area, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971): “Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of artificidl, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.” Id., at 431 (emphasis added). Thus, disparate impact is a basis for relief under Title VII only if the practice in question is not founded on “business necessity,” ibid., or lacks “a manifest relationship to the employment in question,” id., at 432. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802-803, 805-806 (1973). Nothing in this record — as opposed to some of the general literature cited by Mr. Justice BreNNAN, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice BlackmuN — even remotely suggests that the disparate impact of the general admissions program at Davis Medical School, resulting primarily from the sort of disparate test scores and grades set forth in n. 7, supra, is without educational justification. Moreover, the presumption in Griggs — that disparate impact without any showing of business justification established the existence of discrimination in violation of the statute — was based on legislative determinations, wholly absent here, that past discrimination had handicapped various minority groups to such an extent that disparate impact could be traced to identifiable instances of past discrimination: “[Congress sought] to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.” Griggs, supra, at 429-430. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 26 (1963) (“Testimony supporting the fact of discrimination in employment is overwhelming”). See generally Vaas, Title VII: The Legislative History, 7 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431 (1966). The Court emphasized that “the Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.” 401 U. S., at 430-431. Indeed, § 703 (j) of the Act makes it clear that preferential treatment for an individual or minority group to correct an existing “imbalance” may not be required under Title VII. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2 (j). Thus, Title VII principles support the proposition that findings of identified discrimination must precede the fashioning of remedial measures embodying racial classifications. For example, the University is unable to explain its selection of only the four favored groups — Negroes, Mexican-Americans, American Indians, and Asians — for preferential treatment. The inclusion of the last group is especially curious in light of the substantial numbers of Asians admitted through the regular admissions process. See also n. 37, supra. The only evidence in the record with respect to such underservice is a newspaper article. Record 473. It is not clear that petitioner’s two-track system, even if adopted throughout the country, would substantially increase representation of blacks in the medical profession. That is the finding of a recent study by Sleeth & Mishell, Black Under-Representation in United States Medical Schools, 297 New England J. of Med. 1146 (1977). Those authors maintain that the cause of black underrepresentation lies in the small size of the national pool of qualified black applicants. In their view, this problem is traceable to the poor premedical experiences of black undergraduates, and can be remedied effectively only by developing remedial programs for black students before they enter college. The president of Princeton University has described some of the benefits derived from a diverse student body: “[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through interactions among students of both sexes; of different races, religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas, from various states and countries; who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a wise graduate of ours observed in commenting on this aspect of the educational process, ‘People do not learn very much when they are surrounded only by the likes of themselves.’ “In the nature of things, it is hard to know how, and when, and even if, this informal ‘learning through diversity’ actually occurs. It does not occur for everyone. For many, however, the unplanned, casual encounters with roommates, fellow sufferers in an organic chemistry class, student workers in the library, teammates on a basketball squad, or other participants in class affairs or student government can be subtle and yet powerful sources of improved understanding and personal growth.” Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, Princeton Alumni Weekly 7, 9 (Sept. 26, 1977). Graduate admissions decisions, like those at the undergraduate level, are concerned with “assessing the potential contributions to the society of each individual candidate following his or her graduation — contributions defined in the broadest way to include the doctor and the poet, the most active participant in business or government affairs and the keenest critic of all things organized, the solitary scholar and the concerned parent.” Id., at 10. See Manning, The Pursuit of Fairness in Admissions to Higher Education, in Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, Selective Admissions in Higher Education 19, 57-59 (1977). The admissions program at Princeton has been described in similar terms: “While race is not in and of itself a consideration in determining basic qualifications, and while there are obviously significant differences in background and experience among applicants of every race, in some situations race can be helpful information in enabling the admission officer to understand more fully what a particular candidate has accomplished — and against what odds. Similarly, such factors as family circumstances and previous educational opportunities may be relevant, either in conjunction with race or ethnic background (with which they may be associated) or on their own.” Bowen, supra n. 48, at 8-9. For an illuminating discussion of such flexible admissions systems, see Manning, supra n. 50, at 57-59. The denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner’s special admissions program. Nowhere in the opinion of Mr. Justice BreNnaN, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice BlackmuN is this denial .even addressed. Universities, like the prosecutor in Swain, may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational purpose. So long as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference in the academic process. If an applicant can establish that the institution does not adhere to a policy of individual comparisons, or can show that a systematic exclusion of certain groups results, the presumption of legality might be overcome, creating the necessity of proving legitimate educational purpose. There also are strong policy reasons that correspond to the constitutional distinction between petitioner’s preference program and one that assures a measure of competition among all applicants. Petitioner’s program will be viewed as inherently unfair by the public generally as well as by applicants for admission to state universities. Fairness in individual competition for opportunities, especially those provided by the State, is a widely cherished American ethic. Indeed, in a broader sense, an underlying assumption of the rule of law is the worthiness of a system of justice based on fairness to the individual. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared in another connection, “[j]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 (1954). There is no occasion for remanding the case to permit petitioner to reconstruct what might have happened if it had been operating the type of program described as legitimate in Part V, supra. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 284-287 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, there was considerable doubt whether protected First Amendment activity had been the “but for” cause of Doyle’s protested discharge. Here, in contrast, there is no question as to the sole reason for respondent’s rejection — purposeful racial discrimination in the form of the special admissions program. Having injured respondent solely on the basis of an unlawful classification, petitioner cannot now hypothesize that it might have employed lawful means of achieving the same result. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S., at 265-266. No one can say how — or even if — petitioner would have operated its admissions process if it had known that legitimate alternatives were available. Nor is there a record revealing that legitimate alternative grounds for the decision existed, as there was in Mt. Healthy. In sum, a remand would result in fictitious recasting of past conduct. This statement appears in the Appendix to the Brief for Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae. We also agree with Mr. Justice Powell that a plan, like the “Harvard” plan, see ante, at 316-318, is constitutional under our approach, at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896). New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U. S. 54 (1958); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U. S. 971 (1954); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U. S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (1955); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903 (1956). See Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968). See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Davis v. School Comm’rs of Mobile County, 402 U. S. 33 (1971); North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43 (1971). See, e. g., cases collected in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 663 n. 5 (1978). Section 601 of Title VI provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. Mr. Justice White believes we should address the private-right-of-action issue. Accordingly, he has filed a separate opinion stating his view that there is no private right of action under Title VI. See post, p. 379. “Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial discrimination. Direct discrimination by Federal, State or local governments is prohibited by the Constitution. But indirect discrimination, through the use of Federal funds, is just as invidious; and it should not be necessary to resort to the courts to prevent each individual violation. Congress and the Executive have their responsibilities to uphold the Constitution also .... “Many statutes providing Federal financial assistance, however, define with such precision both the Administrator’s role and the conditions upon which specified amounts shall be given to designated recipients that the amount of administrative discretion remaining — which might be used to withhold funds if discrimination were not ended — is at best questionable. No administrator has the unlimited authority to invoke the Constitution in opposition to the mandate of the Congress. Nor would it always be helpful to require unconditionally — as is often proposed — the withdrawal of all Federal funds from programs urgently needed by Negroes as well as whites; for this may only penalize those who least deserve it without ending discrimination. “Instead of permitting this issue to become a political device often exploited by those opposed to social or economic progress, it would be better at this time to pass a single comprehensive provision making it clear that the Federal Government is not required, under any statute, to furnish any kind of financial assistance — by way of grant, loan, contract, guaranty, insurance, or otherwise — to any program or activity in which racial discrimination occurs. This would not permit the Federal Government to cut off all Federal aid of all kinds as a means of punishing an area for the discrimination occurring therein — but it would clarify the authority of any administrator with respect to Federal funds or financial assistance and discriminatory practices.” 109 Cong. Rec. 11161 (1963). See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 2732 (1964) (Rep. Dawson); id., at 2481-2482 (Rep. Ryan); id., at 2766 (Rep. Matsunaga); id., at 2595 (Rep. Donahue). There is also- language in 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-5, enacted in 1966, which supports the conclusion that Title Vi's standard is that of the Constitution. Section 2000d~5 provides that “for the purpose of determining whether a local educational agency is in compliance with [Title VI], compliance by such agency with a final order or judgment of a Federal court for the desegregation of the school or school system operated by such agency shall be deemed to be compliance with [Title VI], insofar as the matters covered in the order or judgment are concerned.” This provision was clearly intended to avoid subjecting local educational agencies simultaneously to the jurisdiction of the federal courts and the federal administrative agencies in connection with the imposition of remedial measures designed to end school segregation. Its inclusion reflects the congressional judgment that the requirements imposed by Title VI are identical to those imposed by the Constitution as interpreted by the federal courts. As has already been seen, the proponents of Title VI in the House were motivated by the identical concern. See remarks of Representative Celler (110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964)); Representative Ryan (id., at 1643, 2481-2482); H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, Additional Views of Seven Representatives 24-25 (1963). See separate opinion of Mr. Justice White, post, at 382-383, n. 2. These remarks also reflect the expectations of Title Vi’s proponents that the application of the Constitution to the conduct at the core of their concem — the segregation of Negroes in federally funded programs and their exclusion from the full benefits of such programs — was clear. See supra, at 333-336; infra, at 340-342, n. 17. Testimony of Attorney General Kennedy in Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1731 and S. 1750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 398-399 (1963). See, e. g., 110 Cong. Ree. 6544, 13820 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6050 (Sen. Javits); id., at 12677 (Sen. Allott).. Our Brother Stevens finds support for a colorblind theory of Title VI in its legislative history, but his interpretation gives undue weight to a few isolated passages from among the thousands of pages of the legislative history of Title VI. See id., at 6547 (Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6047, 7055 (Sen. Pastore); id., at 12675 (Sen. Allott); id., at 6561 (Sen. Kuchel). These fragmentary comments fall far short of supporting a congressional intent to prohibit a racially conscious admissions program designed to assist those who are likely to have suffered injuries from the effects of past discrimination. In the first place, these statements must be read in the context in which they were made. The concern of the speakers was far removed from the incidental injuries which may be inflicted upon non-minorities by the use of racial preferences. It was rather with the evil of the segregation of Negroes in federally financed programs and, in some cases, their arbitrary exclusion on account of race from the benefits of such programs. Indeed, in this context there can be no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment does command color blindness and forbids the use of racial criteria. No consideration was given by these legislators, however, to the permissibility of racial preference designed to redress the effects of injuries suffered as a result of one’s color. Significantly one of the legislators, Senator Pastore, and perhaps also Senator Kuchel, who described Title VI as proscribing decisionmaking based upon skin color, also made it clear that Title VI does not outlaw the use of racial criteria in all circumstances. See supra, at 339-340; 110 Cong. Ree. 6562 (1964). See also id., at 2494 (Rep. Celler). Moreover, there are many statements in the legislative history explicitly indicating that Congress intended neither to require nor to prohibit the remedial use of racial preferences where not otherwise required or prohibited by the Constitution. Representative MacGregor addressed directly the problem of preferential treatment: “Your mail and mine, your contacts and mine with our constituents, indicates a great degree of misunderstanding about this bill. People complain about racial 'balancing’ in the public schools, about open occupancy in housing, about preferential treatment or quotas in employment. There is a mistaken belief that Congress is legislating in these areas in this bill. When we drafted this bill we excluded these issues largely because the problems raised by these controversial questions are more properly handled at a governmental level close to the American people and by communities and individuals themselves. The Senate has spelled out our intentions more specifically.” Id., at 15893. Other legislators explained that the achievement of racial balance in elementary and secondary schools where there had been no segregation by law was not compelled by Title VI but was rather left to the judgment of state and local communities. See, e. g., id., at 10920 (Sen. Javits); id., at 5807, 5266 (Sen. Keating); id., at 13821 (Sens. Humphrey and Saltonstall). See also, id., at 6562 (Sen. Kuchel); id., at 13695 (Sen. Pastore). Much the same can be said of the scattered remarks to be found in the legislative history of Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. Y), which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race in terms somewhat similar to those contained in Title VI, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire” any applicant “because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... .”), to the effect that any deliberate attempt by an employer to maintain a racial balance is not required by the statute and might in fact violate it. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964) (Sens. Clark and Case); id., at 6549 (Sen. Humphrey); id., at 2560 (Rep. Goodell). Once again, there is no indication that Congress intended to bar the voluntary use of racial preferences to assist minorities to surmount the obstacles imposed by the remnants of past discrimination. Even assuming that Title VII prohibits employers from deliberately maintaining a particular racial composition in their work force as an end in itself, this does not imply, in the absence of any consideration of the question, that Congress intended to bar the use of racial preferences as a tool for achieving the objective of remedying past discrimination or other compelling ends. The former may well be contrary to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment (where state action is involved), while the latter presents very different constitutional considerations. Indeed, as discussed infra, at 353, this Court has construed Title VII as requiring the use of racial preferences for the purpose of hiring and advancing those who have been adversely affected by past discriminatory employment practices, even at the expense of other employees innocent of discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 767-768 (1976). Although Title VII clearly does not require employers to take action to remedy the disadvantages imposed upon racial minorities by hands other than their own, such an objective is perfectly consistent with the remedial goals of the statute. See id., at 762-770; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418 (1975). There is no more indication in the legislative history of Title VII than in that of Title VI that Congress desired to prohibit such affirmative action to the extent that it is permitted by the Constitution, yet judicial decisions as well as subsequent executive and congressional action clearly establish that Title VII does not forbid race-conscious remedial action. See infra, at 353-355, and n. 28. HEW has stated that the purpose of these regulations is “to specify that affirmative steps to make services more equitably available are not prohibited and that such steps are required when necessary to overcome the consequences of prior discrimination.” 36 Fed. Reg. 23494 (1971). Other federal agencies which provide financial assistance pursuant to Title VI have adopted similar regulations. See Supplemental Brief for United States as Amicus■ Curiae 16 n. 14. Moreover, the President has delegated to the Attorney General responsibility for coordinating the enforcement of Title VI by federal departments and agencies and has directed him to “assist the departments and agencies in accomplishing effective implementation.” Exec. Order No. 11764, 3 CFR 849 (1971-1975 Comp.). Accordingly, the views of the Solicitor General, as well as those of HEW, that the use of racial preferences for remedial purposes is consistent with Title VI are entitled to considerable respect. HEW administers at least two explicitly race-conscious programs. Details concerning them may be found in the Office of Management and Budget, 1977 Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance 205-206, 401-402. The first program, No. 13.375, “Minority Biomedical Support,” has as its objectives: “To increase the number of ethnic'minority faculty, students, and investigators engaged in biomedical research. To broaden the opportunities for participation in biomedical research of ethnic minority faculty, students, and investigators by providing support for biomedical research programs at eligible institutions.” Eligibility for grants under this program is limited to (1) four-year colleges, universities, and health professional schools with over 50% minority enrollments; (2) four-year institutions with significant but not necessarily over 50% minority enrollment provided they have a history of encouragement and assistance to minorities; (3) two-year colleges with 50% minority enrollment; and (4) American Indian Tribal Councils. Grants made pursuant to this program are estimated to total $9,711,000 for 1977. The second program, No. 13.880, entitled “Minority Access To Research Careers,” has as its objective to “assist minority institutions to train greater numbers of scientists and teachers in health related fields.” Grants under this program are made directly to individuals and to institutions for the purpose of enabling them to make grants to individuals. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-538, p. 22 (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. 26188 (1977). See H. J. Res. 662, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Pub. L. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460. 91 Stat. 117, 42 U. S. C. §6705 (f)(2) (1976 ed.). 123 Cong. Ree. 7156 (1977); id., at 5327-5330. See id., at 7156 (Sen. Brooke). In addition to the enactment of the 10% quota provision discussed supra, Congress has also passed other Acts mandating race-conscious measures to overcome disadvantages experienced by racial minorities. Although these statutes have less direct bearing upon the meaning of Title VI, they do demonstrate that Congress believes race-conscious remedial measures to be both permissible and desirable under at least some circumstances. This in turn undercuts the likelihood that Congress intended to limit voluntary efforts to implement similar measures. For example, § 7 (a) of the National Science Foundation Authorization Act, 1977, provides: “The Director of the National Science Foundation shall initiate an intensive search for qualified women, members of minority groups, and handicapped individuals to fill executive level positions in the National Science Foundation. In carrying out the requirement of this subsection, the Director shall work closely with organizations which have been active in seeking greater recognition and utilization of the scientific and technical capabilities of minorities, women, and handicapped individuals. The Director shall improve the representation of minorities, women, and handicapped individuals on advisory committees, review panels, and all other mechanisms by which the scientific community provides assistance to the Foundation.” 90 Stat. 2056, note following 42 U. S. C. § 1873 (1976 ed.). Perhaps more importantly, the Act also authorizes the funding of Minority Centers for Graduate Education. Section 7 (c) (2) of the Act, 90 Stat. 2056, requires that these Centers: “(A) have substantial minority student enrollment; “(B) are geographically located near minority population centers; “(C) demonstrate a commitment to encouraging and assisting minority students, researchers, and faculty; “(F) will serve as a regional resource in science and engineering for the minority community which the Center is designed to serve; and “(G) will develop joint educational programs with nearby undergraduate institutions of higher' education which have a substantial minority student enrollment.” ' Once again, there is no indication in the legislative history of this Act or elsewhere that Congress saw any inconsistency between the race-conscious nature of such legislation and the meaning of Title VI. And, once again, it is unlikely in the extreme that a Congress which believed that it had commanded recipients of federal funds to be absolutely colorblind would itself expend federal funds in such a race-conscious manner. See also the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 45 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (1976 ed.), 49 U. S. C. § 1657a et seq. (1976 ed.); the Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq. (1976 ed.). Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971). Ibid.; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975). Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977). Executive, judicial, and congressional action subsequent to the passage of Title VII conclusively established that the Title did not bar the remedial use of race. Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103) a number of Courts of Appeals approved race-conscious action to remedy the effects of employment discrimination. See, e. g., Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F. 2d 1047 (CA5 1969); United States v. Electrical Workers, 428 F. 2d 144, 149-150 (CA6), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 943 (1970); United States v. Sheetmetal Workers, 416 F. 2d 123 (CA8 1969). In 1965, the President-issued Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965 Comp.), which as amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1966-1970 Comp.), required federal contractors to take affirmative action to remedy the disproportionately low employment of racial minorities in the construction industry. The Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that the race consciousness required by Exec. Order No. 11246 did not conflict with Title VII: “It is not correct to say that Title VII prohibits employers from making race or national origin a factor for consideration at any stage in the process of obtaining employees. The legal definition of discrimination is an evolving one, but it is now well recognized in judicial opinions that the obligation of nondiscrimination, whether imposed by statute or by the Constitution, does not require and, in some circumstances, may not permit obliviousness or indifference to the racial consequences of alternative courses of action which involve the application of outwardly neutral criteria.” 42 Op. Atty. Gen. 405, 411 (1969). The federal courts agreed. See, e. g., Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d 159 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 854 (1971) (which also held, 442 F. 2d, at 173, that race-conscious affirmative action was permissible under Title VI); Southern Illinois Builders Assn. v. Ogilvie, 471 F. 2d 680 (CA7 1972). Moreover, Congress, in enacting the 1972 amendments to Title VII, explicitly considered and rejected proposals to alter Exec. Order No. 11246 and the prevailing judicial interpretations of Title VII as permitting, and in some circumstances requiring, race-conscious action. See Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 747-757 (1972). The section-by-section analysis of the 1972 amendments to Title VTI undertaken by the Conference Committee Report on H. R. 1746 reveals a resolve to accept the then (as now) prevailing judicial interpretations of the scope of Title VII: “In any area where the new law does not address itself, or in any areas where a specific contrary intent is not indicated, it was assumed that the present case law as developed by the courts would continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title VII.” Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, p. 1844 (Comm. Print 1972). United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). See also id., at 167-168 (opinion of White, J.). We do not pause to debate whether our cases establish a “two-tier” analysis, a “sliding scale” analysis, or something else altogether. It is enough for present purposes that strict scrutiny is applied at least in some cases. Of course, the fact that whites constitute a political majority in our Nation does not necessarily mean that active judicial scrutiny of racial classifications that disadvantage whites is inappropriate. Cf. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 499-500 (1977); id., at 501 (Marshall, J., concurring). “[T]he conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for [the refusal to issue permits to Chinese] exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong .... The discrimination is, therefore, illegal . . . .” Indeed, even in Plessy v. Ferguson the Court recognized that a classification by race that presumed one race to be inferior to another would have to be condemned. See 163 U. S., at 544r-551. Paradoxically, petitioner’s argument is supported by the cases generally thought to establish the “strict scrutiny” standard in race cases, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944). In Hirabayashi, for example, the Court, responding to a claim that a racial classification was rational, sustained a racial classification solely on the basis of a conclusion in the double negative that it could not say that facts which might have been available “could afford no ground for differentiating citizens of Japanese ancestry from other groups in the United States.” 320 U. S., at 101. A similar mode of analysis was followed in Korematsu, see 323 U. S., at 224, even though the Court stated there that racial classifications were “immediately suspect” and should be subject to “the most rigid scrutiny.” Id., at 216. We disagree with our Brother Powell’s suggestion, ante, at 303, that the presence of “rival groups which can claim that they, too, are entitled to preferential treatment” distinguishes the gender cases or is relevant to the question of scope of judicial review of race classifications. We are not asked to determine whether groups other than those favored by the Davis program should similarly be favored. All we are asked to do is to pronounce the constitutionality of what Davis has done. But, were we asked to decide whether any given rival group — German-Americans for example — must constitutionally be accorded preferential treatment, we do have a '“principled basis,” ante, at 296, for deciding this question, one that is well established in our cases: The Davis program expressly sets out four classes which receive preferred status. Ante, at 274. The program clearly distinguishes whites, but one cannot reason from this a conclusion that German-Americans, as a national group, are singled out for invidious treatment. And even if the Davis program had a differential impact on German-Americans, they would have no constitutional claim unless they could prove that Davis intended invidiously to discriminate against German-Americans. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264-265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 238-241 (1976). If this could not be shown, then “the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights ... is inapplicable,” Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 657 (1966), and the only question is whether it was rational for Davis to conclude that the groups it preferred had a greater claim to compensation than the groups it excluded. See ibid.) San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 38-39 (1973) (applying Katzenbach test to state action intended to remove discrimination in edu-eational opportunity). Thus, claims of rival groups, although they may create thorny political problems, create relatively simple problems for the courts. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term — Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972). In Albemarle, we approved “differential validation” of employment tests. See 422 U. S., at 435. That procedure requires that an employer must ensure that a test score of, for example, 50 for a minority job applicant means the same thing as a score of 50 for a nonminority applicant. By implication, were it determined that a test score of 50 for a minority corresponded in “potential for employment” to a 60 for whites, the test could not be used consistently with Title VII unless the employer hired minorities with scores of 50 even though he might not hire nonminority applicants with scores above 50 but below 60. Thus, it is clear that employers, to ensure equal opportunity, may have to adopt race-conscious hiring practices. Indeed, Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 put great emphasis on voluntarism in remedial action. See supra, at 336-338. And, significantly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has recently proposed guidelines authorizing employers to adopt racial preferences as a remedial measure where they have a reasonable basis for believing that they might otherwise be held in violation of Title VII. See 42 Fed. Reg. 64826 (1977). “[T]he [Voting Rights] Act’s prohibition ... is not dependent upon proving past unconstitutional apportionments ....’’ “[T]he State is [not] powerless to minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by voters when it is regularly practiced at the polls.” Our cases cannot be distinguished by suggesting, as our Brother Powell does, that in none of them was anyone deprived of “the relevant benefit.” Ante, at 304. Our school cases have deprived whites of the neighborhood school of their choice; our Title VII cases have deprived nondiscriminating employees of their settled seniority expectations; and UJO deprived the Hassidim of bloc-voting strength. Each of these injuries was constitutionally cognizable as is respondent’s here. We do not understand Mr. Justice Powell to disagree that providing a remedy for past racial prejudice can constitute a compelling purpose sufficient to meet strict scrutiny. See ante, at 305. Yet, because petitioner is a corporation administering a university, he would not allow it to exercise such power in the absence of “judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.” Ante, at 307. While we agree that reversal in this case would follow a fortiori had Davis been guilty of invidious racial discrimination or if a federal statute mandated that universities refrain from applying any admissions policy that had a disparate and unjustified racial impact, see, e. g., McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976), we do not think it of constitutional significance that Davis has not been so adjudged. Generally, the manner in which a State chooses to delegate governmental functions is for it to decide. Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 256 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). California, by constitutional provision, has chosen to place authority over the operation of the University of California in the Board of Regents. See Cal. Const., Art. 9, § 9 (a). Control over the University is to be found not in the legislature, but rather in the Regents who have been vested with full legislative (including policymaking), administrative, and adjudicative powers by the citizens of California. See ibid.; Ishimatsu v. Regents, 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 863-864, 72 Cal. Rptr. 756, 762-763 (1968); Goldberg v. Regents, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 874, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (1967); 30 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 162, 166 (1957) (“The Regents, not the legislature, have the general rule-making or policy-making power in regard to the University”). This is certainly a permissible choice, see Sweezy, supra, and we, unlike our Brother Powell, find nothing in the Equal Protection Clause that requires us to depart from established principle by limiting the scope of power the Regents may exercise more narrowly than the powers that may constitutionally be wielded by the Assembly. Because the Regents can exercise plenary legislative and administrative power, it elevates form over substance to insist that Davis could not use race-conscious remedial programs until it had been adjudged in violation of the Constitution or an antidiscrimination statute. For, if the Equal Protection Clause required such a violation as a predicate, the Regents could simply have promulgated a regulation prohibiting disparate treatment not justified by the need to admit only qualified students, and could have declared Davis to have been in violation of such a regulation on the basis of the exclusionary effect of the admissions policy applied during the first two years of its operation. See infra, at 370. “Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam), citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638 n. 2 (1975). Railway Mail Assn, held that a state statute forbidding racial discrimination by certain labor organizations did not abridge the Association's due process rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment because that result “would be a distortion of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetuat^ discrimination on the basis of race or color.” 326 U. S., at 94. That case thus established the principle that a State voluntarily could go beyond what the Fourteenth Amendment required in eliminating private racial discrimination. According to 89 schools responding to a questionnaire sent to 112 medical schools (all of the then-accredited medical schools in the United States except Howard and Meharry), substantial efforts to admit minority students did not begin until 1968. That year was the earliest year of involvement for 34% of the schools; an additional 66% became involved during the years 1969 to 1973. See C. Odegaard, Minorities in Medicine: From Receptive Passivity to Positive Action, 1966-1976, p. 19 (1977) (hereinafter Odegaard). These efforts were reflected in a significant increase in the percentage of minority M. D. graduates. The number of American Negro graduates increased from 2.2% in 1970 to 3.3% in 1973 and 5.0% in 1975. Significant percentage increases in the number of Mexican-Ameriean, American Indian, and mainland Puerto Rican graduates were also recorded during those years. Id., at 40. The statistical information cited in this and the following notes was compiled by Government officials or medical educators, and has been brought to our attention in many of the briefs. Neither the parties nor the amici challenge the validity of the statistics alluded to in our discussion. D. Reitzes, Negroes and Medicine, pp. xxvii, 3 (1958). Between 1955 and 1964, for example, the percentage of Negro physicians graduated in the United States who were trained at these schools ranged from 69.0% to 75.8%. See Odegaard 19. U. S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Minorities and Women in the Health Fields 7 (Pub. No. (HRA) 75-22, May 1974). U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census, vol. 1, pt. 1, Table 60 (1973). See ante, at 276 n. 6 (opinion of Powell, J.). See, e. g., R. Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South 1820-1860, pp. 90-91 (1964). For an example of unequal facilities in California schools, see Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Board, 386 F. Supp. 539, 542 (CD Cal. 1974). See also R. Kluger, Simple Justice (1976). See, e. g., Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Board, supra; Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 311 F. Supp. 501 (CD Cal. 1970); C. Wollenberg, All Deliberate Speed: Segregation and Exclusion in California Schools, 1855-1975, pp. 136-177 (1976). For example, over 40% of American-born Negro males aged 20 to 24 residing in California in 1970 were born in the South, and the statistic for females was over 48%. These statistics were computed from data contained in Census, supra n. 49, pt. 6, California, Tables 139, 140. See, e. g., O’Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 Yale L. J, 699, 729-731 (1971). Congress and the Executive have also adopted a series of race-conscious programs, each predicated on an understanding that equal opportunity cannot be achieved by neutrality because of the effects of past and present discrimination. See supra, at 348-349. Negroes and Chícanos alone constitute approximately 22% of California’s population. This percentage was computed from data contained in Census, supra n. 49, pt. 6, California, sec. 1, 6-4, and Table 139. The constitutionality of the special admissions program is buttressed by its restriction to only 16% of the positions in the Medical School, a percentage less than that of the minority population in California, see ibid., and to those minority applicants deemed qualified for admission and deemed likely to contribute to the Medical School and the medical profession. Record 67. This is consistent with the goal of putting minority applicants in the position they would have been in if not for the evil of racial discrimination. Accordingly, this case does not raise the question whether even a remedial use of race would be unconstitutional if it admitted unqualified minority applicants in preference to qualified applicants or admitted, as a result of preferential consideration, racial minorities in numbers significantly in excess of their proportional representation in the relevant population. Such programs might well be inadequately justified by the legitimate remedial objectives. Our allusion to the proportional percentage of minorities in the population of the State administering the program is not intended to establish either that figure or that population universe as a constitutional benchmark. In this case, even respondent, as we understand him, does not argue that, if the special admissions program is otherwise constitutional, the allotment of 16 places in each entering class for special admittees is unconstitutionally high. See Census, supra n. 49, Sources and Structure of Family Income, pp. 1-12. This percentage was computed from data presented in B. Waldman, Economic and Racial Disadvantage as Reflected in Traditional Medical School Selection Factors: A Study of 1976 Applicants to U. S. Medical Schools 34 (Table A-15), 42 (Table A-23) (Association of American Medical Colleges 1977). This figure was computed from data contained in Census, supra n. 49, pt. 1, United States Summary, Table 209. See Waldman, supra n. 60, at 10-14 (Figures 1-5). The excluded white applicant, despite Mr. Justice Powell’s contention to the contrary, ante, at 318 n. 52, receives no more or less “individualized consideration” under our approach than under his. It is also clear from Griffin that “lack of jurisdiction . . . touching the subject matter of the litigation cannot be waived by the parties . . . .” 303 U. S., at 229. See also Mount Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278 (1977); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 152 (1908); Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884). In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), we did adjudicate a Title VI claim brought by a class of individuals. But the existence of a private cause of action was not at issue. In addition, the understanding of Mr. Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion, which observed that standing was not being contested, was that the standing alleged by petitioners was as third-party beneficiaries of the funding contract between the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the San Francisco United School District, a theory not alleged by the present respondent. Id., at 571 n. 2. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Lau alleged jurisdiction under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 rather than directly under the provisions of Title VI, as does the plaintiff in this case. Although the Court undoubtedly had an obligation to consider the jurisdictional question, this is surely not the first instance in which the Court has bypassed a jurisdictional problem not presented by the parties. Certainly the Court’s silence on the jurisdictional question, when considered in the context of the indifference of the litigants to it and the fact that jurisdiction was alleged under § 1983, does not foreclose a reasoned conclusion that Title VI affords no private cause of action. “Yet, before that principle [that ‘Federal funds are not to be used to support racial discrimination’] is implemented to the detriment of any person, agency, or State, regulations giving notice of what conduct is required must be drawn up by the agency administering the program. . . . Before such regulations become effective, they must be submitted to and approved by the President. “Once having become effective, there is still a long road to travel before any sanction whatsoever is imposed. Formal action to compel compliance can only take place after the following has occurred: first, there must be an unsuccessful attempt to obtain voluntary compliance; second, there must be an administrative hearing; third, a written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action must be filed with the appropriate committees of the House and Senate; and fourth, 30 days must have elapsed between such filing and the action denying benefits under a Federal program. Finally, even that action is by no means final because it is subject to judicial review and can be further postponed by judicial action granting temporary relief pending review in order to avoid irrepara-blé injury'. It would be difficult indeed to concoct any additional safeguards to incorporate in such a procedure.” 110 Cong. Rec. 6749 (1964) (Sen. Moss). “[T]he authority to cut off funds is hedged about with a number of procedural restrictions. . . . [There follow details of the preliminary steps.] “In short, title VI is a reasonable, moderate, cautious, carefully worked out solution .to a situation, that clearly calls for legislative action.” Id., at 6544 (Sen. Humphrey). “Actually, no action whatsoever can be taken against anyone until the Federal agency involved has advised the appropriate person of his failure to comply with nondiscrimination requirements and until voluntary efforts to secure compliance have failed.” Id., at 1519 (Rep. Celler) (emphasis added). See also remarks of Sen. Ribicoff (id., at 7066-7067); Sen. Proxmire (id., at 8345); Sen. Kuchel (id., at 6562). These safeguards were incorporated into 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-l. This Court has never held that the mere receipt of federal or state funds is sufficient to make the recipient a federal or state actor. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 (1973), private schools that received state aid were held subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on discrimination, but the Court’s test required “tangible financial aid” with a “significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.” Id., at 466. The mandate of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 722 (1961), to sift facte and weigh circumstances of governmental support in each case to determine whether private or state action was involved, has not been abandoned for an automatic rule based on receipt of funds. Contemporaneous with the congressional debates on the Civil Rights Act was this Court’s decision in Griffin v. School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964). Tuition grants and tax concessions were provided for parents of students in private schools, which discriminated racially. The Court found sufficient state action, but carefully limited its holding to the circumstances presented: “[C]losing the Prince Edward schools and meanwhile contributing to the support of the private segregated white schools that took their place denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws.” Id., at 232. Hence, neither at the time of the enactment of Title YI, nor at the present time to the extent this Court has spoken, has mere receipt of state funds created state action. Moreover, Simkins has not met with universal approval among the United States Courts of Appeals. See cases cited in Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corp., 423 U. S. 1000, 1004 (1975) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). “Nowhere in this section do you find a comparable right of legal action for a person who feels he has been denied his rights to participate in the benefits of Federal funds. Nowhere. Only those who have been cut off can go to court and present their claim.” 110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964) (Rep. Gill). “[A] good case could be made that a remedy is provided for the State or local official who is practicing discrimination, but none is provided for the victim of the discrimination.” Id., at 6562 (Sen. Kuchel). “Parenthetically, while we favored the inclusion of the right to sue on the part of the agency, the State, or the facility which was deprived of Federal funds, we also favored the inclusion of a provision granting the right to sue to the person suffering from discrimination. This was not included in the bill. However, both the Senator from Connecticut and I are grateful that our other suggestions were adopted by the Justice Department.” Id., at 7065 (Sen. Keating). Ibid. As Senator Ribicoff stated: “Sometimes those eligible.for Federal assistance may elect to reject such aid, unwilling to agree to a nondiscrimination requirement. If they choose that course, the responsibility is theirs.” Id., at 7067. I also join Parts I, III-A, and V-C of Mr. Justice Powell’s opinion. The history recounted here is- perhaps too well known to require documentation. But I must acknowledge the authorities on which I rely in retelling it. J. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom (4th ed. 1974) (hereinafter Franklin); R. Kluger, Simple Justice (1975) (hereinafter Kluger); C. Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (3d ed. 1974) (hereinafter Woodward). U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 65 (1977) (Table 94). Id., at 70 (Table 102). Ibid. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 107, p. 7 (1977) (Table 1). Id., at 20 (Table 14). U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1978, p. 170 (Table 44). Ibid. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 105, p. 198 (1977) (Table 47). U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, supra, at 25 (Table 24). Id., at 407-408 (Table 662) (based on 1970 census). Indeed, the action of the University finds support in the regulations promulgated under Title VI by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and approved by the President, which authorize a federally funded institution to take affirmative steps to overcome past discrimination against groups even where the institution was not guilty of prior discrimination. 45 CFR §80.3 (b) (6) (ii) (1977).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF CHARLOTTE et al. v. LOCAL 660, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, et al. No. 75-250. Argued March 3, 1976 Decided June 7, 1976 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment, post, p. 289. William A. Watts argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Henry W. Underhill, Jr. Jonathan Wallas argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were J. LeVonne Chambers and Adam Stein. William M. Acker, Jr., and Ezra B. Perry, Jr., filed a brief for Mel Bailey, Sheriff of Jefferson County, Ala., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The city of Charlotte, N. C., refuses to withhold from the paychecks of its firefighters dues owing to their union, Local 660, International Association of Firefighters. We must decide whether this refusal violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I Local 660 represents about 351 of the 543 uniformed members of the Charlotte Fire Department. Since 1969 the union and individual members have repeatedly requested the city to withhold dues owing to the union from the paychecks of those union members who agree to a checkoff. The city has refused each request. After the union learned that it could obtain a private group life insurance policy for its membership only if it had a dues checkoff agreement with the city, the union and its officers filed suit in federal court alleging, inter alia, that the city’s refusal to withhold the dues of union members violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint asserted that since the city withheld amounts from its employees’ paychecks for payment to various other organizations, it could not arbitrarily refuse to withhold amounts for payment to the union. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina ruled against the city. The court determined that, although the city had no written guidelines, its “practice has been to allow check offs from employees’ pay to organizations or programs as required by law or where the check off option is available to all City employees or where the check off option is available to all employees within a single employee unit such as the Fire Department.” 381 F. Supp. 500, 502 (1974). The court further found that the city has “not allowed check off options serving only single employees or programs which are not available either to all City employees or to all employees engaged in a particular section of City employment.” Ibid. Finding, however, that withholding union dues from the paychecks of union members would be no more difficult than processing any other deduction allowed by the city, the District Court concluded that the city had not offered a rational explanation for its refusal to withhold for the union. Accordingly, the District Court held that the city’s refusal to withhold moneys when requested to do so by the respondents for the benefit of Local 660 “constitutes a violation of the individual [respondents’] rights to equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 502-503. The court ordered that so long as the city continued “without clearly stated and fair standards, to withhold moneys from the paychecks of City employees for other purposes,” it was enjoined from refusing to withhold union dues from the paychecks of the respondents. Id., at 503. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 518 F. 2d 83 (1975), and we granted certiorari. 423 U. S. 890 (1975). We reverse. II Since it is not here asserted — and this Court would reject such a contention if it were made — that respondents’ status as union members or their interest in obtaining a dues checkoff is such as to entitle them to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, the city’s practice must meet only a relatively relaxed standard of reasonableness in order to survive constitutional scrutiny. The city presents three justifications for its refusal to allow the dues checkoff requested by respondents. First, it argues, North Carolina law makes it illegal for the city to enter into a contract with a municipal union, N. C. Gen. Stat. § 95-98 (1975), and an agreement with union members to provide a dues checkoff, with the union as a third-party beneficiary, would in effect be such a contract. See 40 N. C. Op. Atty. Gen. 591 (1968-1970). Thus, compliance with the state law, and with the public policy it represents of discouraging dealing with municipal unions, is said to provide a sufficient basis for refusing respondents’ request. Second, it claims, a dues checkoff is a proper subject of collective bargaining, which the city asserts Congress may shortly require of state and local governments. Under this theory, the desire to preserve the checkoff as a bargaining chip in any future collective-bargaining process is in itself an adequate basis for the refusal. Lastly, the city contends, allowing withholding only when it benefits all city or departmental employees is a legitimate method for avoiding the burden of withholding money for all persons or organizations that request a checkoff. Because we find that this explanation provides a sufficient justification for the challenged practice, we have no occasion to address the first two reasons proffered. The city submitted affidavits to show that it would be unduly burdensome and expensive for it to withhold money for every organization or person that requested it, App. 17, 45, 55, and respondents did not contest this showing. As respondents concede, it was therefore reasonable, and permissible under the Equal Protection Clause, for the city to develop standards or restrictions to determine who would be eligible for withholding. Mathews v. Diaz, ante, at 82-83. See Brief for Respondents 9. Within the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause, of course, the choice of those standards is for the city and not for the courts. Thus, our inquiry is not whether standards might be drawn that would include the union but whether the standards that were drawn were reasonable ones with “some basis in practical experience.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 331 (1966). Of course, the fact that the standards were drawn and applied in practice rather than pursuant to articulated guidelines is of no import for equal protection purposes. The city allows withholding for taxes, retirement-insurance programs, savings programs, and certain charitable organizations. These categories, the District Court found, are those in which the checkoff option can, or must, be availed of by all city employees, or those in an entire department. Although the District Court found that this classification did not present a rational basis for rejecting respondents’ requests, 381 F. Supp., at 502, we disagree. The city has determined that it will provide withholding only for programs of general interest in which all city or departmental employees can, without more, participate. Employees can participate in the union checkoff only if they join an outside organization— the union. Thus, Local 660 does not fit the category of groups for which the city will withhold. We cannot say that denying withholding to associational or special interest groups that claim only some departmental employees as members and that employees must first join before being eligible to participate in the checkoff marks an arbitrary line so devoid of reason as to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, this division seems a reasonable method for providing the benefit of withholding to employees in their status as employees, while limiting the number of instances of withholding and the financial and administrative burdens attendant thereon. Given the permissibility of creating standards and the reasonableness of the standards created, the District Court’s conclusion that it would be no more difficult for the city to withhold dues for the union than to process other deductions is of no import. We may accept, arguendo, that the difficulty involved in processing any individual deduction is neither great nor different in kind from that involved in processing any other deduction. However, the city has not drawn its lines in order to exclude individual deductions, but in order to avoid the cumulative burden of processing deductions every time a request is made; and inherent in such a line-drawing process are difficult choices and “some harsh and apparently arbitrary consequences . . . .” Mathews v. Diaz, ante, at 83. See ante, at 82-84; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970). Cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357, 364 (1971); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489 (1955). Respondents recognize the legitimacy of such a process and concede that the city “is free to develop fair and reasonable standards to meet any possible cost problem.” Brief for Respondents 9. Respondents have wholly failed, however, to present any reasons why the present standards are not fair and reasonable — other than the fact that the standards exclude them. This fact, of course, is insufficient to transform the city policy into a constitutional violation. Since we find a reasonable basis for the challenged classification, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit must be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the judgment upon the ground that the classification challenged in this case is not invidiously discriminatory and does not, therefore, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents brought suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, grounding jurisdiction in 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1343. As the Court of Appeals noted, insofar as the suit was brought against the city of Charlotte and the Charlotte City Council, the District Court was without jurisdiction under § 1343 since a municipal corporation is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973). We need not decide whether respondents’ allegation of $10,000 in damages was sufficient to confer § 1331 jurisdiction over the city and city council, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946); Note, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 922 (1976), since respondents also sued the individual members of the city council and the District Court unquestionably had jurisdiction under § 1343 to consider those claims. See Lynch v. Household Finance Cory., 405 U. S. 538 (1972). For convenience, we shall refer to all the petitioners collectively as the “city.” The District Court granted the city’s motion to dismiss the complaint with respect to the union, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and certiorari was not sought on this ruling. Relief was granted only to the union officers who, in their capacity as city employees, had been denied a dues checkoff. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 253-254 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 335 (1972); Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U. S. 621, 626 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30 (1968). The following payroll deductions are required by law: (a) federal income tax; (b) state income tax; (c) North Carolina Firemen’s Retirement System; (d) North Carolina Local Government Employees Retirement System; (e) city, county, and state tax levies. The following deductions are permitted for all city employees: (a) United States Savings Bonds; (b) medical and life insurance; (c) Aetna Deferred Compensation Plan (a savings program); (d) United Way. The following deductions are permitted for all firemen: (a) Firemen’s Benefit Fund (a group life insurance program); (b) Firemen’s Credit Union (a savings and loan program); (e) Firemen’s Voluntary Pledge Fund (a special withholding providing benefits to the survivors of deceased firemen).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?